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SOMALIA: PROSPECTS FOR LASTING PEACE AND A UNIFIED RESPONSE TO EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH

OF THE

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SOMALIA: PROSPECTS FOR LASTING PEACE AND A UNIFIED RESPONSE TO EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM

THURSDAY, JUNE 25, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:13 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald Payne (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. PAYNE. I will withhold my opening statement in order to save time. But I welcome all of you here, and I will make an opening statement after I return from the votes that we will have, that have already started, but we will hear from our first panel.

We first have with us Mr. Ted Dagne, a graduate of Howard University. He is a specialist in African Affairs at the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service. He has been with the CRS since 1989.

From 1993–1995, Ted Dagne served as a professional staff member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Africa, under the chairmanship of Mr. Harry Johnston from Florida. Mr. Dagne also served as a special adviser from 1999–2000 to President Clinton's Special Envoy for Sudan and to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr. Susan Rice.

Over the past 20 years, Mr. Dagne has written over 2,000 major studies on Africa, including reports on the war on terror in Africa, the status of democracy, conflict resolution, humanitarian disasters, and studies on over 30 countries. Ted has also co-authored two books on Somalia and Africa and the war on terror.

As a professional staff member and a staffer at CRS, Mr. Dagne wrote and assisted in drafting over 100 resolutions and legislative pieces in Congress. In 1994, Mr. Dagne helped write the African Conflict Resolution and Prevention Act, which was signed into law. The act provided funds to the Organization of African Unity Conflict Resolution Center and funded a number of demobilization and reintegration programs in Africa. Over the past two decades, Mr. Dagne has traveled on fact-finding missions to over 30 African countries on multiple occasions.

Also, we have Dr. J. Peter Pham. Dr. Pham is director of the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs at James Madison University in Harrisonburg, Virginia, where he holds an academic appointment as associate professor of justice studies, political

science and African studies. He is also senior fellow for Africa Policy Studies at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington, DC; senior fellow and project director at the National Committee on American Foreign Policy in New York City; and adjunct faculty for the sub-Saharan Africa course at the United States Air Force Special Operations School in Florida.

Dr. Pham is the author of over 200 essays and reviews and is the author, editor or translator of over a dozen books.

Dr. Pham is the incumbent vice president of the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa, an academic organization chaired by Professor Bernard Lewis and representing more than 700 scholars of Middle Eastern and African studies at over 300 colleges and universities in the United States of America.

Dr. Pham was the recipient of the 2008 Nelson Mandela International Prize for African Security and Development, presented jointly by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, the Brenthurst Foundation and the Nelson Mandela Foundation.

At this time, the hearing will officially come to order.

Mr. Dagne, would you begin?

STATEMENT OF MR. TED DAGNE, SPECIALIST, AFRICAN AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

Mr. DAGNE. Chairman Payne and members of the subcommittee, let me first express my appreciation for inviting me to testify before your subcommittee.

I am sure many of you have seen the images on TV or have read about it in the newspapers, and some of you have witnessed the untold suffering of many Somalis over the years. I, for one, have stopped counting how many innocent civilians have been killed, maimed or how many people have been displaced from their homes.

Unfortunately and sadly, many more people will die in the coming weeks and months. A Somali friend recently told me that he has given up dreaming about a better future for his family. Almost 3 years ago this week, in the testimony before the same subcommittee, I read a short Somali proverb in an attempt to describe the conditions that many Somalis face. The proverb goes like this:

> "Sorrow is like rice in the store; if a basketful is removed every day, it will come to an end at last."

I stated then that Somalia's tragedy would come to an end; we just do not know how soon. Three years later, I still cannot tell you with certainty what the future holds for the millions of Somalis.

One thing is clear. The determination and commitment I saw 15 years ago, at the height of the civil war, by Somali women, human rights advocates and Somali nationalists is still very much alive. The leadership of the current government is not staying at the Serena Hotel in Nairobi, Kenya. They are in Mogadishu, facing the challenges and the risks every day. Some left family members and friends so that they can help their people.

Hundreds of thousands of Somalis have died due to fighting famine or disease.

I have witnessed firsthand the untold suffering of the people of Somalia over the decades. A generation of Somalis is growing up

surrounded by violence, poverty, and they face a very bleak future. Many have been internally displaced or have been forced to flee their country.

Indeed, the most affected by the violence and chaos in Somalia are women and children. Many Somali girls have been raped and violated by the so-called "militia." Even a rape victim was stoned to death for reporting what happened to her. If the extremists waging war against the TFG succeed, we are likely to see more of these acts by the so-called al-Shabaab.

What has happened over the past 6–7 weeks?

Well, in early May, Somali extremist groups, backed by foreign fighters, launched a major offensive against the TFG and the African Union peacekeeping forces. Over the past 6 weeks, more than 300 people have been killed and many more wounded. The primary objective of this offensive is to force the collapse of the TFG and to force AMISOM to leave Somalia.

Several al-Shabaab factions, a group called Hisbul al-Islam and a number of foreign fighters, have been engaged in a series of battles against government forces. Al-Shabaab has also carried out in recent weeks, and in the past, a series of assassinations, including those of the police chief and the minister of interior, who were killed last week. This was, in large part, to create a leadership crisis.

More than 400 foreign fighters, reportedly from Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan, the United States, Canada, Britain, Kenya, and several other countries have been engaged in fighting in support of the al-Shabaab forces. More than 290 of these fighters reportedly entered Mogadishu in early May, while an estimated 50 of these fighters were in Mogadishu for much longer. Some of these fighters have been killed in battles in Mogadishu, but we do not know for sure how many.

The insurgents definitely receive support from some governments and al Qaeda. In May 2009, the spokesman of al-Shabaab admitted that they have invited and that they have accepted some foreign fighters to join them in the fighting.

In early June, al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam made important gains in Mogadishu and in other parts of Somalia, in large part due to some defections to the insurgency and due to lack of resources. The TFG forces regrouped, and by mid-June, managed to regain some lost ground in Mogadishu, but the TFG remains vulnerable, and its ability to defeat the insurgents depends on resources, including armed personnel carriers, mobility and well-organized and sustainable military operations.

The presence of the African Union force has helped prevent the takeover of Mogadishu thus far, but the African Union force does not have a Chapter VII mandate, requiring the force to be on the defensive rather than taking offensive measures against the insurgents.

The African Union force, however, has used its long-range artilleries against the insurgents. These measures have weakened and have forced the insurgents to remain outside the range of those weapons.

The most serious challenge facing the TFG forces and those of the African Union is that the insurgents are highly decentralized

and move in small units and operate independently of one another, meaning that killing an al-Shabaab commander does not mean the end of the al-Shabaab, or destroying a unit of al-Shabaab does not mean the insurgency will be over. That is the danger that we face.

So who are these leaders?

Well, the leaders of al-Shabaab are not well-known with the exception of a few. Some of the key commanders and leaders of al-Shabaab actually do not come from south or south central Somalia. Some of them come from Somaliland.

Ahmed Abdi Godane is one of the key leaders, who is also on the United States terrorism list, who was trained and fought in Afghanistan. Another one is named Mukhtar Robow, who is also on the U.S. terrorism list and is considered one of the key leaders of al-Shabaab and is the former spokesman, although in recent weeks he has been marginalized and has been at odds with the other commanders.

Another key leader who comes from Somaliland is Ibrahim Haji Jama, who is also on the U.S. terrorism list. Again, he reportedly trained and fought in Afghanistan.

Another one is Hassan al-Turki, a member of the Ogaden clan, who is not even a Somali, who comes from Ogaden, Ethiopia. He has openly called for jihad and has closely aligned himself with foreign fighters. There are a number of them who consider themselves to be leaders. What is important to remember is that these leaders have begun now to turn against each other.

The U.S. Government placed the al-Shabaab on the terrorism list, but that has had very little impact on the operations and support that the al-Shabaab receives from outside.

There is another leader that the international community has focused on, who is also on our terrorism list. His name is Sheik Hassan Aweys. In late April, Aweys, who is also on the terrorism list, returned to Mogadishu from Eritrea. Aweys had remained in Eritrea and formed his own faction after the top leadership of the ARS signed an agreement in Djibouti with other Somali parties, which led to the formation of the current government.

ARS-Asmara, under the leadership of Aweys, did not garner significant support; although Aweys intensified his support for extremist groups inside Somalia, ARS leaders were not in full agreement with Aweys and his support for the extremist groups inside Somalia. Recently, they provided a visitor written documentation to this effect, disassociating themselves from him. By the end of May, most of them had left Eritrea, which means ARS-Asmara no longer exists.

In late April, I met Sheik Aweys in Eritrea. He seemed confused at times. On a number of occasions, he contradicted himself. When asked if he was prepared to state publicly his support for peaceful participation in the current political process, Aweys responded positively. However, when he was asked whether he would renounce terrorism and call for an end to violence against civilians, Aweys stated that, since he considered the American interpretation of "terrorism" as anti-Islam, he cannot condemn terrorism. Doing so, he asserted, "is denouncing his own religion."

When asked if he wished to be removed from the terrorism list, Aweys stated that he would not seek to be removed because that

would be going against his own religion. When confronted about his role in support of terrorism and violence in Somalia, he characterized this act as a struggle against the enemies of Somalia.

Upon his return to Mogadishu in late April, Aweys discovered that the clan leaders and militia who had supported him in the past now wanted him to work with the government. The militia group he created, Hisbul Islam, also was split, and some had joined al-Shabaab. Some of the top leaders of al-Shabaab also wanted him to declare an alliance with Osama bin Laden.

In my view, Aweys is unlikely to emerge as the leader of the insurgency, and he seems to be losing support even within his own inner circle.

Briefly now about the humanitarian and human rights conditions: Conditions in 2008 actually became worse than in previous years. The recent fighting in Mogadishu has added more challenges to already poor conditions on the ground. An estimated 1.1 million people have been displaced and more than 0.5 million have fled to neighboring countries in the past several years.

Human rights groups and Somali observers estimate that more than 22,000 have been killed over the past 2 years, most of them civilians. Civilians, humanitarian workers, journalists, and human rights advocates have been the primary targets of the insurgents.

According to Amnesty International, rape, killing and looting have become widespread; entire neighborhoods have been destroyed. A number of Somali journalists covering the crisis in Somalia have been assassinated by insurgents and security forces over the past 18 years.

The United States did provide significant assistance over the years, particularly in humanitarian aid. In the past 5–6 months, the United States has also provided crucial support in terms of peacekeeping operation support as well as support to the TFG. In Fiscal Year 2009, it is estimated that the United States assistance to Somalia will reach $177 million, including peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance.

Now, I am sure most of you have heard and have read about the piracy problem. I do not want to dwell on that issue since it has been overblown beyond what is needed. What is important here is, I would like to highlight some of the issues that have not been covered and some of the issues that have been ignored as it relates to piracy.

By the way, who are these pirates?

The number of Somali pirates is not known. While there are more pirates now than in previous years, the pirates do not seem to have a unified organization with a clear command structure. Many of these pirates are reportedly fishermen and former militia members. The pirates primarily come from the Puntland region of Somalia, and are members of different clans and do not necessarily come from one region. Some reports have suggested that the pirates are being controlled and directed by the Islamic insurgents in south central Somalia. I am not aware of any evidence, however, to support this assertion.

What do Somalis say about piracy?

Well, some Somalis view the piracy crisis as a foreign problem with little impact on their daily life. Some argue that the piracy

problem will continue as long as ship owners are willing to pay the pirates ransom.

In the face of difficult economic conditions and a growing humanitarian crisis, many Somalis resent the fact that the piracy problem has received a great deal of international attention. Some Somali community leaders contend that some Somalis get involved in criminal activities in order to survive, while many others have made this kind of activity a lifetime profession. Many Somalis contend, however, that in the absence of a better alternative, they have come to accept life with all the difficulties they face daily.

Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Dagne, I think that, if you could hold your point, I will go vote now. There has been no voting time left for some time now, so I am going to rush over to the floor. We will have seven other votes at 2 minutes each, so it will be about 14 minutes—15—maybe 20 minutes at the most. I will see if I can catch this vote.

The hearing will stand in recess. I should be back in 15–20 minutes. Thank you. You can follow the votes on the screen as a matter of fact. Bye now.

[Recess.]

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you for your patience. Votes are still proceeding, but there will be about a 25-minute period of time, and then there will be about two other votes that will take about 10 or 15 minutes. We will break at that time after 25 minutes, and then resume 10 minutes after that.

I am calling the hearing back to order. We were in the process of hearing testimony from Mr. Dagne from the Congressional Research Service, and I would ask him to proceed as he sees fit.

Thank you.

Mr. DAGNE. Let me, I am almost done with my testimony. I was talking about the pirates, who they are, and how we got into this problem. You know, the pirates, these fishermen have become pirates in large part because their way of life was destroyed. In 2005, the United Nations Environmental Program released a report documenting the damages resulting from toxic waste dumping on Somalia's shores. According to a UNEP spokesmen, uranium radioactive waste, there is lead, there is heavy metal like cadmium, mercury, there is industrial waste, there is hospital waste, chemical waste, you name it, everything was dumped.

According to the report, the primary reason for toxic dumping in Somalia is cost. The report states that it costs $2.50 per ton to dump toxic waste in Africa compared to $250 per ton to dump waste in Europe.

So what are the policy options available to us in dealing with the political and security problems? The current government in Mogadishu is generally seen as the last defense against the extremists and terrorist groups currently waging war in south central Somalia. Effective policy options available to deal with these threats are limited. The international community may consider engagement with Islamic insurgents and clan elders to deal with the political and security problems facing Somalia. Regional and United States officials are convinced that it is pivotal to strengthen the moderate elements of the Islamist movement.

Most observers believe that Al-Shabaab can only be contained by another Islamist Somali movement. Some Al-Shabaab leaders are

determined to continue their military campaign, and are not inclined to participate in any negotiations. In this case, targeted measures, including sanctions and other harsh measures against the most extreme elements of the Al-Shabaab might pave the way for other moderate leaders to emerge. Harsh measures and sometimes violent measures against these individuals could backfire in the short term and increase anti-Western violence.

A more effective option for containing the extremist threat may be to look for a Somali-led solution. The TFG Somaliland, Puntland, and other moderate Somali forces could possibly form a coalition to contain the advances of the most extreme elements of the Al-Shabaab. Such a coalition is likely to get support of the Somali population. A Somali-led initiative would take away one of the most powerful justifications used by the Al-Shabaab to wage war, the presence of foreign forces and the use of Islam for political reasons. However, it is important that the unified regional approach must be maintained.

In conclusion, there appears to be no easy solution or options to bring a lasting peace in Somalia. Somalis continue to make great sacrifices to achieve this objective. There is a very telling Somali proverb that goes like this: The best bed that a man can sleep on is peace.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dagne follows:]

Somalia: Prospects for Lasting Peace and a Unified Response to Extremism and Terrorism

Testimony by Ted Dagne, Congressional Research Service

Before the Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, House Foreign Affairs Committee

June 25, 2009, Washington, D.C.

The Crisis in Somalia and Prospects for Lasting Peace

Chairman Payne, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the sub-committee, let me first express my appreciation for the opportunity to testify before your sub-committee. I am sure some of you have seen the images on TV, read about it in the newspapers, and some of you have witnessed the untold suffering of many Somalis over the years. I have stopped counting how many innocent civilians have been killed, maimed, or how many more people displaced from their homes because of fighting. Unfortunately and sadly, many more people will die in the coming weeks and months. A Somali friend recently told me that he has given up dreaming about a better future for his family.

In April, Chairman Payne and I traveled to Mogadishu to obtain a firsthand account of conditions in Mogadishu. Some questioned the delegation's decision to go to Mogadishu, while others praised it. An important thing to remember is the fact that children and the most vulnerable live in these conditions everyday. The day we arrived in Mogadishu five innocent civilians were killed and over a dozen injured.

Almost three years ago this week in a testimony before this sub-committee, I read a short Somali proverb in an attempt to describe conditions on the ground. The proverb: "Sorrow is like rice in the store; if a basketful is removed everyday, it will come to an end at last." I stated then that Somalia's tragedy would come to an end, we just don't know how soon. Three years later, I still cannot tell you with certainty what the future hold for the millions of Somalis.

One thing is clear: the determination and commitment I saw 15 years ago at the height of the civil war by Somali women, human rights advocates, and Somali nationalists, is still very much alive. The leadership of the current government is not staying at the Serena Hotel in Nairobi, Kenya. They are in Mogadishu facing the challenges and risks everyday with their people. Some left family members, friends, and safe environment here in the U.S. so that they can help their people and help secure a lasting peace in Somalia.

Hundreds of thousands of Somalis have died due to factional fighting, famine, or disease over the past decade. I have witnessed the untold suffering of the people of Somalia over the past decade in the refugee camps in Kenya and in Somalia. A generation of Somalis is growing up surrounded by violence, poverty, and face a very bleak future. Many have been internally displaced or forced to flee their country. In the

refugee camps in Kenya, you find Somali teenagers, some of them born there, who have never been able to see their country or the opportunity to live a normal life.

Indeed the most affected by the violence and chaos in Somalia are women and children. Many Somali girls have been raped and violated by the so-called militia. And even a rape victim is stoned to death for reporting what happened to her. If the extremists waging the war against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) succeed, we are likely to see more of these acts by Al-Shibaab.

Recent Developments

In early May, Somali extremist groups backed by foreign fighters launched a major offensive against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and the African Union peacekeeping forces (AMISOM). Over the past six weeks, more than 300 people have been killed and many more wounded. The primary objective of this offensive is to oust the TFG from power and force AMISOM to leave Somalia. Several Al-Shibaab factions, Hizbul al-Islam, and foreign fighters have been engaged in a series of battles against government forces. Al-Shibaab has also carried out a number of assassinations, including the police Chief and the Minister of Interior, who were killed last week, in an attempt to create a leadership crisis.

More than 400 foreign fighters reportedly from Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan, the United States, Canada, Britain, Kenya, and several other countries have been engaged in the fighting in support of the Al-Shibaab forces. More than 290 fighters reportedly entered Mogadishu in early May, while an estimated 50 fighters were in Mogadishu for much longer. Some of these fighters have been killed in battles in Mogadishu. Some of the fighters characterized as foreign fighters are actually Somalis who look like foreigners. The insurgents receive support from the outside and from some Somali businessmen, who are unhappy with the TFG leadership. In May 2009, the spokesman of Al-Shibaab admitted that foreign fighters have joined the fighting.

In early June 2009, Al-Shibaab and Hizbul Islam made important gains in Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia, in large part due to defections to the insurgency and lack of resources. The TFG forces regrouped, and by mid-June managed to regain some lost grounds in Mogadishu. But the TFG remains vulnerable and its ability to defeat the insurgents depends on resources, including Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), mobility, and a well organized and sustainable military operations.

The presence of the African Union force has helped prevent the takeover of Mogadishu by the insurgents. But the African Union force does not have a Chapter 7 mandate, requiring the force to be on the defensive rather than taking offensive measures against the insurgents. The African Union force has used its long range artilleries against the insurgents. These measures have weakened and forced the insurgents to remain outside the range of these weapons. But the most serious challenge facing the TFG forces and those of the AU is that the insurgents are highly decentralized and move in small units, and operate independently of one another.

The Leadership of Al-Shibaab and other Factions

Who are the leaders of the insurgents? The leaders of Al-Shibaab are not well known, with the exception of a few. Some of the key commanders and leaders of Al-Shibaab come from Somaliland. Ahmed Abdi Godane, who is on the U.S. terrorism list and who trained and fought in Afghanistan, is a key commander from Somaliland. Mukhtar Robow, who is also on the U.S. terrorism list, is considered one of the key

leaders of the Shibaab and a former spokesman, although in recent weeks he has been marginalized and has been at odd with the other commanders, especially Godane. Another key leader is Ibrahim Haji Jama, who is on the U.S. terrorism list, reportedly trained and fought in Afghanistan. Hassan al-Turki, a member of the Ogaden clan from Ethiopia, has openly called for Jihad, and works closely with foreign fighters. Indha Adde is another commander, who fought against the Ethiopian occupation and worked closely with Sheik Hassan Aweys, a former leader of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS-Asmara). In February 2008, then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice designated Al-Shibaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group. The TFG was able to win over some Al-Shibaab fighters to join the government side. However, several hundred fighters who recently joined government forces were sent by the extremist groups to infiltrate the government security force. In May 2009, at the height of the recent fighting in Mogadishu, most of these fighters went back to rejoin the militia groups they left earlier.

Sheik Sharif Hassan Aweys

In late April, Sheik Sharif Hassan Aweys, who is on the U.S. terrorism list, returned to Mogadishu from Eritrea. Sheik Aweys had remained in Eritrea and formed his own faction after the top leadership of the ARS signed an agreement in Djibouti with other Somali parties, which led to the formation of the current government. ARS-Asmara, under the leadership of Aweys, did not garner significant support, although Aweys intensified his support for extremist groups inside Somalia. ARS-Asmara leaders were not in full agreement with Aweys and his support for the extremist groups inside Somalia. They provided written documentation to this effect to a visitor in April 2009. These leaders stated that they formed their own organization and would disassociate themselves from Aweys. These leaders left Eritrea in May.

In late April I met with Sheik Aweys in Eritrea. He seemed confused at times and several times contradicted himself. When asked if he was prepared to state publicly his support for a peaceful participation in the current political process, Aweys responded positively. However, when he was asked whether he would renounce terrorism and call for an end to violence against civilians, Aweys stated that since he considers the American interpretation of terrorism as anti-Islam, he "cannot condemn terrorism." Doing so, he asserted, is "denouncing his own religion." When asked if he wished to be removed from the terrorism list, Aweys stated that he will not seek to be removed because that would be going against his religion.

When confronted about his role in support of terrorism and violence in Somalia, he characterized these acts as a struggle against the enemies of Somalia. Upon his return to Mogadishu in late April 2009, Sheik Aweys discovered that the clan elders and militia who had supported him in the past now wanted him to work with the government and end the violence. The militia group he helped create, Hizbul al-Islam, also was split and some have joined Al-Shibaab. Some of the top leaders of the Al-Shibaab also want him to declare an alliance with Osama Bin Laden. Aweys is unlikely to emerge as the leader of the insurgency and he seems to be losing support even within his own inner circle.

Human Rights and Humanitarian Conditions

In 2008, humanitarian and human rights conditions became worse than in previous years. The recent fighting in Mogadishu has added more challenges to already poor conditions on the ground. An estimated 1.1 million people have been displaced and more than 475,000 have fled to neighboring countries in the past two years. Human rights groups and Somali observers estimate more than 22,000 people have been killed over the past two years. Civilians, humanitarian workers, journalists, and human rights advocates

have been the primary targets of the insurgents, TFG, and Ethiopian security forces. According to Amnesty International, "rape, killings and looting have become widespread. Entire neighborhoods have been destroyed." A number of Somali journalists covering the crisis in Somalia have been assassinated by insurgents and security forces over the past eighteen months.

Dozens of humanitarian and human rights advocates have been killed, injured, or imprisoned. Because of these targeted attacks, many human rights advocates and journalists have fled Somalia to neighboring countries for safety. Somalis working for international NGOs and foreign media have also been attacked by insurgents and TFG/Ethiopian security forces. According to the May 2009 Complex Emergency report by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), an estimated 3.2 million people are in need of emergency assistance. In the first two weeks of May 2009, an estimated 27,500 people have been displaced due to the recent fighting in Mogadishu. The United States has provided an estimated $177.6 million in humanitarian and peacekeeping assistance to Somalia in FY2009. In FY2008, the United States provided $318 million in assistance to Somalia. The Obama Administration has requested $103 million for FY 2010. The United States has also provided material support in support of TFG forces.

Somali Piracy in the Horn of Africa

Overview

I will now speak briefly to the issue of piracy in the Horn of Africa. Somali pirates have intensified their attacks in the Gulf of Aden, carrying out attacks on over 111 commercial ships, and successfully hijacked an estimated 40 ships in 2008. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), piracy in the first quarter of 2009 has surpassed that of 2008. According to IMB, "in 2008, there were 111 incidents including 42 vessels hijacked. So far in 2009, there have been 29 successful hijackings from 114 attempted attacks." In January-February 2009, Somali pirates released several ships, including a Japanese-owned ship, MV Chemstar, and the MV Faina. The pirates have reportedly earned more than $120 million in ransom payments, and in return have released a number of ships and crew members.

On December 16, 2008, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution authorizing the use of "all necessary measures" by foreign military forces to stop piracy in Somalia. The resolution authorizes military operations inside Somalia and in its airspace for one year, with the consent of the TFG. The United States, Russia, India, and several other countries have deployed warships to tackle piracy in the Horn of Africa region. In February 2009, the U.S. Navy arrested 16 suspected Somali pirates. In December 2008, the Indian Navy reportedly arrested 23 Somali and Yemeni pirates. Moreover, the Russian Navy also arrested a number of suspected Somali pirates. In January 2009, the United States and Britain signed legal agreements with the Government of Kenya to extradite suspected pirates to be prosecuted in Kenya. Some insurgent leaders have warned the pirates to end the piracy and to release crew members and ships currently controlled by the pirates.

Who Are the Pirates?

The number of Somali pirates is unknown. While there are more pirates now than previous years, the pirates do not seem to have a unified organization with clear command structure. Many of these pirates are reportedly fishermen and former militia members of the Somali warlords. The pirates primarily come from Puntland region of Somalia and are members of different clans. Some press reports have suggested

that the pirates are being controlled and directed by the Islamic insurgents in south-central Somalia. I am not aware of any evidence, however, to support this assertion.

What do Somalis say about the piracy problem? Some Somalis view the piracy crisis as a foreign problem with little impact on their daily life. Some argue that the piracy problem will continue as long as the ship-owners are willing to pay the pirates ransom. In the face of difficult economic conditions and growing humanitarian crisis, many Somalis resent the fact that the piracy problem has received a great deal of international attention. Some Somali community leaders contend that some Somalis get involved in criminal activities in order to survive, while many others have made these kinds of criminal activities a lifetime profession. Many Somalis contend that in the absence of a better alternative, they have come to accept life with all the difficulties they face daily.

Some Somalis argue that the fishermen have become pirates because their way of life was destroyed by illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping that has been ignored by foreign governments. In 2005, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) released a report documenting the damages resulting from toxic waste dumping on Somalia's shores. According to a UNEP spokesman, "there's uranium radioactive waste, there's lead, there's heavy metals like cadmium and mercury, there's industrial waste, and there's hospital wastes, chemical wastes, you name it." According to the report, the primary reason for toxic dumping in Somalia is cost. The report states that it costs $2.50 per ton to dump toxic waste in Africa compared to $250 per ton to dump waste in Europe.

Policy Options in Dealing with Political and Security Problems

The current government in Mogadishu is generally seen as the last defense against the extremist and terrorist groups currently waging war in south-central Somalia. Effective policy options available to deal with these threats are limited. The international community may consider engagement with the Islamic insurgents and clan elders to deal with the political and security problems facing Somalia. Regional and U.S. officials are convinced that it is pivotal to strengthen the moderate elements of the Islamic movements. Most observers believe that the Al-Shabaab can only be contained by another Islamic movement supported by clan elders.

Some Al-Shabaab leaders are determined to continue their military campaign and are not inclined to participate in negotiations. Targeted measures, including sanctions and other measures against the most extreme elements of Al-Shibaab, might pave the way for other moderate leaders to emerge. However, others believe that harsh or violent measures are likely to backfire in the short term and increase anti-western violence.

A more effective option for containing the extremists may be to look for a Somali-led solution. The TFG, Somaliland, Puntland, and other moderate Somali forces could possibly form a coalition to contain the advances of the most extreme elements of the Al-Shabaab politically and militarily. Such a coalition is likely to get the support of the Somali population. A Somali-led initiative would take away one of the most powerful justifications used by the Al-Shabaab to wage war, the presence of foreign forces. Most observers agree, however, that a unified regional approach is pivotal, however.

In conclusion, there appear to be no easy solutions or options to bring a lasting peace in Somalia. Somalis continue to make great sacrifices to achieve this objective. There is a very telling Somali proverb: The best bed that a man can sleep on is peace. Thank You.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

Dr. Pham.

STATEMENT OF J. PETER PHAM, PH.D., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, JUSTICE STUDIES, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND AFRICANA STUDIES, DIRECTOR, NELSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY

Mr. PHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the interests of time, I would like to offer a summary of my views and ask, with your leave, that my prepared statement be entered into the record.

Mr. PAYNE. Without objection.

Mr. PHAM. Chairman Payne, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today about the critical conditions currently prevailing in Somalia and threatening the security and stability of the entire Horn of Africa. Permit me the liberty of observing it is 3 years almost to the day since I appeared before the predecessor of this subcommittee at its first hearing on the threat of extremism emanating from Somalia, and this body under your leadership, Mr. Chairman, and that of Mr. Smith has maintained consistent vigilance on this important security issue, while simultaneously upholding the highest standards of respect for human rights.

As a scholar who closely tracks developments in the subregion, allow me to add a personal note of appreciation for your leadership in keeping attention focused on issues relating to the Horn of Africa in general, and in particular for bringing about this historic hearing, which brings together in the same forum high representatives of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, the Puntland State of Somalia, as well as some of Somalia's international partners. I regret that the Foreign Minister of the Republican of Somaliland was unable to join us to share the experience of his people in avoiding the very scourges, including extremism, conflict and piracy, which this hearing endeavors to examine.

While I understand the Somalilanders' sensitivity about any appearance prejudicial to their 1991 declaration of renewed independence and the delicate nature of the internal politics there, as Somaliland, alone of all the territories which were once part of the Somali Democratic Republic before the collapse of the Mohammed Siyad Barre regime, moves to its second democratic Presidential and parliamentary elections in just 3 months, I nonetheless hope that the representatives of the Republic of Somaliland will provide the subcommittee with information on its contribution to security and peace in the subregion.

This hearing convenes at a moment when Somalia is going through yet another grave crisis, the latest in a two-decade-long cycle of state collapse, political failure, and, sadly, human suffering. The various factions of Al-Shabaab, their assorted allies, including the Hisbul al-Islamiyya, helped by outside states and other actors, have proven themselves more resilient than many international observers have been willing to admit. Having in recent months consolidated their control of the area from the southern suburbs of the capital to the border with Kenya, the militants launched an offensive at the beginning of May with the apparent objective of encir-

cling the capital to its north as well. In just the last week, the already bad security situation has deteriorated further, as militants, following on earlier incursions, brought their offensive into Mogadishu amid fierce fighting.

Now is not the time to assign blame; however, if we are to go forward, we have to acknowledge the realities on the ground. Notwithstanding the hopes that accompanied the installation of Sheikh Sharif as the TFG president at the end of January—and I say installation because I would not call the extralegal machinations in Djibouti an election unless we want to hold up a mockery of the TFG's own charter by the parliamentarians as an example of constitutional governance for the subregion—the results have been disappointing. The TFG is not a government in any commonsense definition of the term. It is entirely dependent on foreign troops from the African Union mission in Somalia to protect its small enclave in Mogadishu, but otherwise it maintains no territory, it administers no laws, and even within its restricted zone, it has shown no functional capacity to govern, much less provide minimal services to its citizens.

Even if Sheikh Sharif manages to reconcile the TFG's original secular framework with its more recent, albeit ill-defined, adoption of Sharia, the transitional government faces an almost insurmountable deficit of capacity, accountability, and credibility.

This grim recital of just some of the TFG shortcomings is not gratuitous. Rather, the point I am trying to make is that even in what many view as the best-case scenario coming out of the current crisis, that the TFG will somehow manage to rally enough support among Somali clans and communities to push back the current offensive and win itself some time, the transitional regime is not very well positioned to win a long war against the insurgency by wooing some of the insurgents and defeating or at least marginalizing the others, much less to emerge as the foundation for whatever political settlement Somalis eventually agree upon.

The worst-case scenario, of course, is that Al-Shabaab and its allies defeat the TFG entirely, assume control of the capital, as well as the bulk of south central and southern Somalia, which they already loosely control. If this were to happen, it would be a geopolitical disaster, with repercussions rippling well beyond the borders of Somalia.

While comparisons with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan in the 1990s are a bit of a stretch, that is not to say that outside actors, ranging from al Qaeda, which would undoubtedly try to capitalize at least propaganda-wise on the events, to Ethiopia, which would be tempted to return in force, to the United States, which would likely ramp up counterterrorism operations, will not treat it as such. However, it should be noted that even if the insurgents do not defeat the TFG outright, in many respects they have already achieved a status and represent a significant threat to Somalis and others.

Whatever the origins and intent of the militants currently facing the TFG, they have clearly been radicalized. Even without taking Mogadishu, al-Shabaab and its allies have already succeeded in carving out a geographical space where they and like-minded groups can operate freely. To cite one example, the suicide bomber who killed four South Korean tourists and their guide near the an-

cient fortress city of Shibam in Yemen's Hadramut on March 15th underwent training at a Shabaab-controlled southern Somali camp before returning to his native country and carrying out the deadly attack. Intelligence officials believe the same to be the case with the suicide bomber who 3 days later hit a convoy carrying the South Korean Ambassador and investigators looking on that earlier attack. Thus without even toppling the TFG, Shabaab has already achieved a major objective by securing a territorial base from which like-minded militants and terrorists can carry out attacks elsewhere, especially against targets in the Arabian Peninsula, as well as participating in the current violence against Somalis.

As if this were not disturbing enough for the United States, even more unsettling is the fact that a number of young Somali Americans have left their homes in the United States and gone to Shabaab-controlled areas of Somalia, presumably for training. One of these men, a naturalized United States citizen from Minneapolis, Minnesota, became the first-ever American suicide bomber when he blew himself up in an attack in Somaliland last October, an attack which left dozens of civilians dead.

One hopeful indicator, however, amidst this gloomy landscape, has been the ideological motivations of al-Shabaab and aligned extremist movements do not permit them to proceed at a slower speed in their march through Somali territory and society. Instead, a certain internal dynamic compels them to keep pushing, even when it might be in their long-term interests to act with greater circumspection. Militarily, this temptation to overreach is visible in the relentless advance, whose cause one might argue would be better served by consolidating their rule in areas they already control.

Turning to the issue of piracy, the attacks by Somali pirates on merchant shipping in the waters off the coast of Somalia have added an additional challenge to an already complicated regional security picture. The marauders have hardly been cowed by the international naval presence involving warships from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, India, Japan, Turkey, and several other countries, which assembled earlier this year in an unprecedented effort to prevent a repeat of last year's wave of more than 100 attacks on commercial vessels in the Gulf of Aden and nearby waters. The pirates have simply shifted their operations to areas which they know are not patrolled, with strikes taking place on the high seas of the western Indian Ocean and elsewhere, as witnessed by the seizure 2 weeks ago of a German-owned cargo ship 60 nautical miles south of Oman.

While the 2 dozen or so cruisers and other vessels from various countries make for great political theater, and may have even proven useful in escort duty along narrowly defined sea lanes, there are simply not enough of them to make a real dent in operations against the pirates. And even if there were enough warships to conduct adequate counterpiracy operations, it is doubtful that the commitment is sustainable over a long term.

Hence, what is needed is a pragmatic solution that deals with the economic, political, and security challenges caused by the expanded activities of Somali pirates, but whose costs can be contained within acceptable limits, and whose long-term operation is sustainable by those with the most immediate stake in its success,

regional and local actors as well as merchant vessels which must transit these dangerous waters. So in addition to beefing up security on and for merchant vessels, the only sustainable option currently available for dealing with the scourge is dealing with the problem on land.

I have repeatedly argued that the problem of lawlessness at sea will only be definitively resolved when the international community summons up the political will to adequately address the underlying pathology of de facto statelessness onshore. One of the ways to do this, of course, to achieve maximum local support, is building up Coast Guard capabilities that are viewed not purely as an antipiracy measure, but rather embed those efforts within the local economies of the districts, providing benefits to communities as a way of weaning them away from their dependence on criminal enterprises.

Mr. Chairman, United States policy toward Somalia has veered from neglect in the 1990s to an emphasis on kinetic counterterrorism operations in the aftermath of 9/11, and especially after the Ethiopian intervention flushed out some of the terrorists long sought by American security officials. Even if justifiable in individual cases, the use of hard power has bred resentment and allowed radical forces to wrap themselves up in the mantle of nationalism, undermining our broader strategic objective of countering radicalization, to say nothing of humanitarian norms.

More recently, even as the situation has gone from bad to worse, presenting the entire Horn of Africa with a security crisis of the first order, spreading instability across a fragile subregion, and raising the specter that transnational terrorist movements will find and exploit opportunities offered, the approach of the international community and apparently the policy of the United States has become ensnared in what is essentially a circular logic. For want of better ideas, the international community has opted to buy into a seductive but vicious cycle of its own manufacture, whereby it must stay the course and continue to devote scarce political and material resources, while exclusively shoring up the TFG because it has already invested too much time and resources into it to do otherwise.

If the failure so far of no fewer than 14 internationally sponsored attempts at establishing a national government indicate anything, it is the futility of the notion that outsiders can impose a regime on Somalia, even if it is staffed with presumably moderate Somalis of our liking. Instead, in the context of the decentralized reality among the Somali, we, the concerned international community in general, and the United States in particular, need to invest the time and resources to seek out local partners who can, first of all, work with us in creating a modicum of stability, societal, economic, and ultimately governmental. This will not be an easy task since the conflict of recent years has taken its toll on civil society. Nonetheless, local groups do exist.

If I may cite one example, SAACID, the extraordinary nongovernmental organization founded and directed by Somali women engaged in conflict transformation, women's empowerment, education, health care, emergency relief, employment schemes, development. Amid the current crisis, for example, this NGO is providing 80,000 2,000-calorie-a-day meals to residents of Mogadishu.

I would add a consensus is emerging among experts who have tracked Somalia for some time that any workable solution must embrace a bottom-up or building-block approach rather than the hitherto top-down strategy.

Given the ripple effects of continuing disorder in the Somali lands, in addition to helping the functional parts of the TFG, it makes no sense for the international community not to work with effective authorities in the Republic of Somaliland, Puntland State, the province of Gedo, and other areas, as well as to seek to engage traditional leaders and civil society actors. These figures enjoy both legitimacy with the populace and have actual, as opposed to notional, security and development agendas which complement our own goal of preventing chaos from reigning.

With respect to intervening in Somalia, while I salute the courage and determination of the Ugandan People's Defense Force peacekeepers in AMISOM, along with their Burundian colleagues, and I am fully cognizant of concerns of Somalia's immediate neighbors like Ethiopia and Kenya, I would argue that the legitimate security interests of the countries in the region can best be met not by their becoming embroiled in a conflict where their support of the TFG has become itself a rallying point for the insurgents. Rather, I would argue that the African resources might be best put to work containing the spread of instability from Somalia, and preventing additional foreign fighters and supplies from fueling the conflict in the country.

I readily acknowledge that the approach such as the one I am sketching out may strike many as minimalist; however, I am convinced, and even more so today, that it is the course most likely to buy Somalis themselves the space within which to make their own determinations about their future, while at the same time allowing the rest of the world, especially the countries of the Horn of Africa, to achieve their legitimate security objective. Not only does such a strategy offer the most realistic hope of salvaging a modicum of regional stability and security out of the situation that grows increasingly intractable, but it allows the time, space, and freedom for Somalis to rebuild their shattered common life.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, members of the subcommittee, I am grateful again for the opportunity to come before you today. I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pham follows:]

"Somalia: Prospects for Lasting Peace and a Unified Response to Extremism and Terrorism"

Testimony of Dr. J. Peter Pham
Associate Professor of Justice Studies, Political Science, and Africana Studies
and Director of the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs
James Madison University
June 25, 2009
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health

Chairman Payne, Congressman Smith, Members of the Subcommittee,

Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today about the critical conditions currently prevailing in Somalia and threatening the security and stability of the entire Horn of Africa.

Permit me the liberty of observing that it is three years almost to the day since I appeared before the predecessor of this Subcommittee at its first hearing on the threat of extremism emanating from Somalia and this body—under your leadership, Mr. Chairman, and that of Mr. Smith—has maintained consistent vigilance on this important security issue, while simultaneously upholding the highest standards of respect for human rights. In particular, as a scholar who closely tracks developments in this subregion, allow me to add a personal note of appreciation for the chairman's leadership in keeping attention focused on issues relating to the Horn of Africa in general and for bringing about this historic hearing which brings together in the same forum high representatives of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and the Puntland State of Somalia as well as His Excellency the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Uganda.

I regret that the foreign minister of the Republic of Somaliland was unable to join us to share the experience of his people in avoiding the very scourges—including extremism, conflict, and piracy—which this hearing endeavors to examine. While I understand Somalilanders' sensitivity about any appearance prejudicial to their 1991 declaration of renewed independence and the delicate nature of the internal politics of Somaliland as it—alone of all the territories which were part of the Somali Democratic Republic before the collapse of the Muhammad Siyad Barre regime—moves its second democratic presidential and parliamentary elections in just three months, I nonetheless hope that the representatives of the Republic of Somaliland will provide the Subcommittee with information on its contribution to security and peace in the subregion.

CURRENT SITUATION

This hearing convenes at a moment when Somalia is going through yet another grave crisis, the latest in its two-decade cycle state collapse, political failure, and, sadly, human suffering.

The various factions of *al-Shabaab* ("the youth"), an umbrella group that was formally designated a "foreign terrorist organization" by the U.S. Department of State last year, and their assorted allies—including the *Hisbul al-Islamiyya* ("Islamic party"), a group led by Sheikh Hassan Dahir 'Aweys, a figure who appears personally on both United States and United Nations antiterrorism sanctions lists—have proven themselves more resilient than many international observers have been willing to admit. Having in recent months consolidated their control of the area from the southern suburbs of the capital to the border with Kenya, the Islamist militants launched an offensive at the beginning of May with the apparent objective of circling the capital to its north as well. On May 12, al-Shabaab forces took control of Buulobarde, a key town in the Hiraan region of central Somalia that sits athwart a strategic crossroad on the principal route from Mogadishu to Ethiopia. On May 17, they seized control of Jowhar, located 90 kilometers north of Mogadishu, and its population of 50,000; the town is the capital of the Middle Shabelle region and had served as a joint administrative capital for the TFG. To add insult to injury, Jowhar is TFG president Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed's hometown. The following day, May 18, insurgents from Hisbul al-Islamiyya struck 20 kilometers further north, capturing another strategic town, Mahaday. Two days later, on May 20, just as it has done previously in Lower Shabelle, Jubba, and other areas it controlled, al-Shabaab proclaimed the establishment of a new Islamist administration for Middle Shabelle, appointing one Sheikh Abdirahman Hassan Hussein as the governor. The same day, the TFG-aligned mayor of Beledweyne, capital of Hiraan, Sheikh Aden Omar (Jilibay), hastily resigned, evidently frightened that his town would be the next one targeted by the insurgents.

Then, in just the last week, the already-bad security situation has deteriorated further as Islamist militants, following up on earlier incursion, brought their offensive into Mogadishu amid fierce fighting. Over the weekend, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), reeling from the loss of several of its more effective members—including Mogadishu police chief Colonel Ali Said Hassan, security minister Colonel Omar Aden Hashi, former ambassador to Ethiopia and to the African Union Abdikarim Farah Laqanyo, and parliamentarian Mohamed Hussein Addow—appealed through parliament speaker Sheikh Adan Mohamed Nuur (Madobe) for military support from neighboring countries. On Monday, the TFG president declared a "state of emergency." The United Nations estimates that at least 160,000 people have been displaced in this latest round of conflict alone.

Now is not the time to assign blame. However, if we are to go forward, we have to acknowledge the realities on the ground. Notwithstanding the hopes that accompanied the installation of Sheikh Sharif as TFG president at the end of January—I would not call the extra-legal machinations in Djibouti an "election" and, unless we want to hold up the

mockery of TFG's own charter by the parliamentarians' awarding of a two-year extension to themselves as a model for constitutional government across the region, the legitimacy of the legislature should be viewed as questionable—the results have been disappointing. With all due respect to our distinguished guest from the transitional regime, the TFG is not a government by any common-sense definition of the term: it is entirely dependent on foreign troops from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to protect its small enclave within Mogadishu, but otherwise administers no territory; even within this restricted zone, it has shown no functional capacity to govern, much less provide even minimal services to the citizens.

Even if Sheikh Sharif manages to reconcile the TFG's original secular framework with its more recent, albeit ill-defined, adoption of *shari'a*, the transitional government faces an almost insurmountable deficit of capacity, accountability, and, thus, credibility. Thanks to the frequent peregrinations abroad by Sheikh Sharif and members of his government, more Somalis than ever view the internationally-recognized interim authorities as little better than foreign puppets—and ineffectual ones at that. All of the TFG's "outreach" to date has amounted to pulling in an occasional warlord or two with bribes paid from funds it has received from Western or Arab countries. These characters have little interest in either governance or even security and have stayed "loyal" only so far as the money is forthcoming. Furthermore, while literally thousands from the TFG president's Abgaal sub-clan turned out just two months to sign up in response to an internationally recruitment drive, more than 90 percent of those who enlisted have since disappeared with their sign-up bonuses and, more ominously, their weapons, some of which have been documented as ending up in the hands of insurgents to whom they were presumably sold. Thus such forces as the TFG nominally has managed to field in the current fighting would be more accurately described as those of warlords whose interests, at least for the moment, happen to align with the interim regime's.

While this grim recital of just some of the TFG's shortcomings may seem gratuitous in light of the mortal peril that it faces at this moment, the point I am trying to make is that even in what many would view as the "best-case" scenario coming out of the current crisis—that the TFG will somehow manage to rally enough support among Somali clans and communities to push back the current offensive and win itself some time—the transitional regime is not very well-positioned to win a "long war" against the insurgency by wooing some of the insurgents and by defeating or at least marginalizing others, much less to emerge as the foundation for whatever political settlement Somalis eventually agree on. I am quite sorry to be unable to offer a more optimistic assessment of the existent capacity for governance, but reality is what it is and policy must be constructed on that basis.

THE THREAT OF EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM

The "worst-case" scenario, of course, is that al-Shabaab, Hisbul al-Islamiyya, and their allies defeat the TFG entirely and assume control of the capital as well as the bulk of south-central and southern Somalia which they already loosely control. If this were to

happen, it would be a geopolitical disaster with repercussions rippling well beyond the borders of Somalia. While comparisons with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan in the 1990s may be a bit of a stretch, that is not to say that outside actors ranging from al-Qaeda (which would undoubtedly try to capitalize at least propaganda-wise on the event) to Ethiopia (which would be tempted to return in force) to the United States (which would likely ramp up counterterrorism operations against the emergent threat) will not treat it as such.

However, it should be noted that even if the insurgents do not defeat the TFG outright, in many respects they are already a significant threat to Somalis and others. Whatever the origins and real intent of the Islamic Courts Union, the Islamist militants currently facing off against the TFG—as well as against other Somali groups, including Islamist ones like *Ahlu-Sunna wal-Jama'a* (roughly, "[Followers of] the Traditions and Consensus [of the Prophet Muhammad]"), which have risen up against the distinctly alien doctrines imported alongside foreign fighters—have clearly been radicalized. Politically, the militants' campaign of *wa'yigelin* ("consciousness-raising")—by which al-Shabaab means the imposition of its interpretation of Islam on other Somalis—has won for them few fans among the clans. Recent examples of Shabaab "awareness efforts" range from the noisome (e.g., the restriction of the chewing of *qat*, the narcotic leaf beloved by Somalis, Yemenis, and other peoples of the subregion, to the outskirts of Baidoa) to the discriminatory (e.g., the ban on men and women traveling together in the same public transport conveyances announced at the end of May by al-Shabaab's commander in Kismayo, Ahmed Hassan Ali) to the downright brutal (e.g., the imposition of *hudud* punishments like public stoning for alleged adulteresses in Kismayo and public cross-amputation of the right hand and left foot to which four unfortunate accused thieves were sentenced on Monday by a "court" in Shabaab-controlled northern Mogadishu).

Not only do these extremists aspire to control the conduct of the living, but they also impose themselves on the dead, systematically desecrating the tombs of saints and other religious figures venerated by the Sufi *turuq* ("brotherhoods"), which have traditionally been highly influential among the Somali. As the foremost contemporary authority on the Somali, Professor I.M. Lewis of the London School of Economics, has noted, Sufism has historically been more than a religious preference among the Somali: "Sufism is particularly well-adapted to Somali social organization since it enables Somalis (and they are active agents here) to sacralize their society at all levels of segmentation by indiscriminately canonizing their lineage ancestors as 'saints,' whatever the latters' actual religious comportment may have been." Thus, it is not surprising that incidents like the destruction in late May of the graves of three such saintly ancestors in Baardheere, in the Gedo region—an act of iconoclastic vandalism described by the local al-Shabaab district governor, one Sheikh Abdulqadir Yusuf Qalbi, as "a religious act"—is profoundly disturbing to most Somalis.

Even without taking Mogadishu, al-Shabaab and its allies have already succeeded in carving out a geographical space where they and likeminded jihadist groups can operate freely. For example, the suicide bomber who killed four South Korean tourists and their local guide near the ancient fortress city of Shibam in Yemen's Hadramut (coincidentally, Usama bin Laden's ancestral home region) on March 15, Abdel Rahman

Mehdi al-Aajbari, underwent training at a camp in Shabaab-controlled southern Somalia before returning to his native country to carry out the deadly attack. The same is believed to be the case with the suicide bomber who, three days later, hit a convoy carrying the South Korean ambassador and investigators sent to look into the earlier attack (fortunately, this time the terrorist, a 20-year-old student, only killed himself). Thus, even without toppling the TFG, al-Shabaab has already achieved a major objective of jihadists worldwide by securing a territorial base from which they can carry out attacks elsewhere, especially against targets on the Arabian Peninsula.

As if this is not disturbing enough for the United States, even more unsettling is the fact that a number of young Somali-Americans have left their homes in Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, and, reportedly, other communities, including Columbus, Ohio, and Portland, Maine, to train in camps in Shabaab-controlled parts of Somalia and, presumably, fight alongside the militants. One of these men, Shirwa Ahmed, a naturalized U.S. citizen originally from Somalia whose last known residence was Minneapolis, Minnesota, became the first-ever American suicide bomber when he blew himself up in an attack in Somaliland on October 29, 2008, which left dozens of civilians dead.

One hopeful indicator amidst of this otherwise gloomy landscape has been that the ideological motivations of al-Shabaab and aligned extremist movements do not permit them to proceed at a slower speed in their march through Somali territory and society. Instead, a certain internal dynamic compels them to keep pushing, even when it might be in their long-term interests to act with greater circumspection. Militarily, this temptation to overreach is visible in the relentless advance of the jihadists whose cause one might argue would be better served by consolidating their rule in areas they already control while letting the TFG collapse of its own internal contradictions.

THE CHALLENGE OF PIRACY

The attacks by Somali pirates on merchant shipping in the waters off the coast of Somalia have added an addition challenge to an already complicated regional security picture. The marauders have hardly been cowed by the international naval presence involving warships from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, India, Japan, and several other countries which assembled early this year in an unprecedented effort to prevent a repeat of last year's wave of more than one hundred hijackings and other attacks on commercial vessels in the Gulf of Aden and other waters near the Horn of Africa. The pirates have simply shifted their operations to areas which they know are not being patrolled, with strikes increasing taking place on the high seas of the western Indian Ocean and, as witnessed by the seizure two weeks ago of a German-owned, Antigua and Barbuda-flagged cargo ship, MV *Charelle*, 60 nautical miles south of Sur, Oman, elsewhere.

While the two dozen or so cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and other surface combat vessels which various countries have dispatched to the region have made for great

political theater and may have even proven useful in escort duty along narrowly defined sea lanes, there are simply not enough of them to make a real dent in the operations of the pirates. And even if there were enough warships to conduct adequate counter-piracy operations—just to control the more heavily trafficked shipping lanes in the area would require a force at least twice as large as currently deployed—it is doubtful that the commitment is sustainable over the long term. After all, with the bill for just the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) anti-piracy Operation Atalanta expected to total over $300 million this year, how long will the naval powers of the world tie their assets down in and, in these hard economic times, spend their increasingly scarce resources on the troubled waters off the Horn of Africa? As a report by the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute has put it rather succinctly:

> If Somali piracy is going to be combated using solely sea-based tactics it will require a critical mass of warships and their air assets to maintain a constant presence in the region. It is possible that the largest and most diverse unplanned gathering of warships in recent history that is ongoing in [the Gulf of Aden] will constitute such a critical mass. However, it would be wishful thinking to expect this sort of a presence to continue for any prolonged period given the cost of modern naval deployments. [The Gulf of Aden] is a large body of water, and warships are not a long-term cost effective method of providing commercial vessels with protection from Somali piracy.

Hence, what is needed is a pragmatic solution that not only deals with the economic, political, and security challenges caused by the expanded activities of Somali pirates, but whose costs can be contained within acceptable limits and whose long-term operation is sustainable by those with the greatest immediate stake in its success, regional and local actors as well as merchant vessels which must transit the currently dangerous waters off Somalia.

In addition to beefing up security on and for merchant vessels—including, possibly, encouraging them to lower their own overall costs by pooling their resources to organize escorted convoys—the only sustainable option currently available for dealing the scourge of Somali piracy is the stand-up of effective coastal patrols along the Horn of Africa's littorals. While I have repeatedly argued that the problem of Somali lawlessness at sea will only be definitively resolved when the international community summons up the political will to adequately address the underlying pathology of *de facto* Somali statelessness onshore, the truth is such a process is, as I will note later, literally a generational undertaking. That does not mean that, fatalistically, nothing should be done; rather, what needs to be acknowledged is that while the broader project needs to be attended to, it cannot be expected to pay immediate dividends in terms of improved security along the Somali coastline. What can, however, both immediately lessen the current threat to merchant shipping in the region *and* contribute to ameliorating the security situation in support of building governance capabilities across the territories of the former Somali Democratic Republic is the establishment of coast guards along the littoral. The idea is one which was commended by no less a figure than United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon when in March he advised the Security Council that:

> In the interests of a durable solution to piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, it is important that local coast guards in the region, where possible, are assisted

> in ways that will enable them to constructively play a role in anti-piracy efforts conducted off the coast of Somalia and the surrounding region. As part of a long-term strategy to promote the closure of pirates' shore bases and effectively monitor the coastline, I therefore recommend that Member States consider strengthening the capacity of the coast guards both in Somalia and the region.

Coastal patrol forces would not only be more sustainable from the fiscal point of view, but, precisely because they would concentrate on the littorals, have a more manageable area of responsibility than the naval forces which are currently sailing all over the western Indian Ocean. Moreover a coast guard is within the reach of states in the region as well as some of the effective authorities in Somalia, including the governments of the as-yet internationally-unrecognized Republic of Somaliland and the Puntland autonomous region. The key, as my colleague Dr. Martin Murphy noted in a Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments paper published earlier this year, is to not get hung up on questions of the end state of what was once the Somali Democratic Republic:

> A more attractive course of action would find the United States assembling an effective international coalition that is willing to deal with Somali sub-state entities in order to reach a more immediate solution even though this might mean deferring agreement on a unitary state to a later date. Crucial to any negotiations with such sub-state entities as Puntland and non-Islamic clan alliances in the south will be a clear commitment to curb piracy in return for U.S. and allied political and economic support.

To achieve maximum local support—vital if a sense of local responsibility is to be engendered and, ultimately, local intelligence to be obtained—the coast guard must not be viewed as purely an anti-piracy measure. Given how embedded the piracy is in economies of certain districts in Somalia, any coastal security force must provide some positive benefits to those communities if it is to have any chance at weaning them away from their dependence on criminal enterprises, much less greater success. This means designing a force capable of undertaking some classic coast guard functions like protecting natural resources (even if the "Robin Hood" argument for piracy is something of a red herring) and maritime rescue. It also requires local anchorage for the patrol vessels and, where possible, employing local citizens. Along the Somali littorals, as the coast guard units expand their areas of operation, they simultaneously expand the geographic spheres of security and, ultimately, of governance by legitimate authorities. As the latter grow stronger, one can foresee them assuming greater responsibility for the trial of pirates, thus reinforcing the message that there is no impunity for the marauders. There are indications that this type of local empowerment has great potential: to cite just one example, an ad hoc local militia composed of fed-up citizens from the fishing communities of Alula and Bargaal at the very tip of the Horn of Africa rose up and seized a dozen pirates and three boats (another boat got away), whom they handed over to Puntland authorities.

In addition to involving local communities in the establishment and operation of a coast guard, the various units of the force must achieve relatively significant degree of integration. Eight countries in the region—Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Seychelles, Tanzania, and Yemen as well as representatives of the TFG—have already signed the Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed

Robbery against Ships in the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (the "Djibouti Code of Conduct") promoted by the International Maritime Organization to facilitate regional coordination. What these states lacked were not only the material resources—now forthcoming—to recruit, train, and equip more robust coastal security forces, but the knowledge and experience to actually do so. This is precisely where properly qualified and licensed private firms, working with both donor states and local partners, can provide not only invaluable expertise, but also "good offices" to help bridge the various interests of the multiple governmental, corporate, and other stakeholders.

For the sake of the record, allow me to add just three final observations about the pirates themselves.

First, there are some who argue that the pirates are fishermen whose livelihoods were wrecked by illegal commercial fishing and toxic waste disposal off the coast of Somalia. Without denying those two phenomena were issues of concern, especially in the early-to-mid-1990s, the fact is that from what we know of the pirates, most do not actually come from fishing backgrounds. Moreover, not only are the pirate gangs are highly-organized criminal enterprises and not just spontaneous groups of unemployed fishermen, most of the attacks nowadays are taking place well beyond not just the limit of 12 nautical miles which the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) fixes for any country's territorial waters, but also the 200 nautical miles from shore which the treaty allows for a state's exclusive economic zone. Quite simply, you can hardly claim to be defending Somali waters when, for example, you are raiding 550 nautical miles east of the *Kenyan* port of Mombasa, as the eleven-member crew that was thwarted and captured by the French navy while attacking a Liberian-registered cargo ship in mid-April was doing.

Second, another canard that needs to be refuted is the belief when the Islamic Courts Union briefly held power in most of Somalia in the second half of 2006, it fought piracy. There is only one instance where the Islamist forces did anything that could even remotely be characterized as a counter-piracy operation. On November 8, 2006, Islamic Courts Union militia stormed the United Arab Emirates-registered cargo ship MV *Veesham I*, which had been hijacked off Adale, north of Mogadishu on the Somali coast, and arrested its captors. The boat had been hauling a load of charcoal from El Maan, Somalia, to Dubai when it was attacked by pirates. The operation, however, had little to do with any principled opposition to piracy and quite a bit to do with the fact that the owner of the *Veesham* was one of the key financial backers of the Islamist movement and that his contribution to its coffers would be affected if he lost his vessel and cargo to the pirates.

Third, the international community needs to search for a sustainable mechanism for bringing captured pirates to justice while both respecting their basic rights and not destabilizing the region. Hauling the prisoners before the courts of a willing third-party state like Kenya, which has signed memoranda of understanding with the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union, and the People's Republic of China to receive and prosecute suspected pirates, is simply not a wise long-term approach, even if

that country's new Merchant Shipping Act (which delineates the jurisdiction of the country's courts over extra-territorial acts of piracy and brings its norms up to date with international standards), passed by parliament in February were not still languishing on President Mwai Kibaki's desk, yet another casualty of the poisonous partisan politics which have continued to bedevil Nairobi even after a government of national unity was installed in the wake of last year's tragic post-electoral violence. In any event, while Kenya might serve as a convenient forum for adjudicating the occasional maritime brigandage, the East African country's judiciary is simply not capable of processing the large number of pirates currently being captured. And even if the Kenyan courts were able to cope with all the new cases, the country has its own restive ethnic Somali and Muslim populations whose preexisting sense of alienation from the rest of the body politic is hardly going to be assuaged by a seemingly endless parade of accused Somalis, almost all of whom will be Muslims. Moreover, trying large numbers of Somalis in the courts of a neighboring country might well permit the pirate syndicates, who have shown themselves quite clever in their use of public relations, to wrap themselves up in the mantle of Somali nationalism and thus broaden their base of support beyond the thousands of individuals already benefiting, directly or indirectly, from the extensive economic networks which make up the piracy business.

Going Forward

United States policy toward Somalia has veered from neglect in the late 1990s to an emphasis on "kinetic" counterterrorism operations in the aftermath of 9/11 and especially after the Ethiopian intervention "flushed out" some of the terrorists long sought by American security officials. Even if justifiable in individual cases, the use of "hard power" has bred resentment and allowed radical forces to wrap themselves up in the mantle of Somali nationalism, undermining our broader strategic objective of countering radicalization, to say nothing of humanitarian norms.

More recently, even as the situation has gone from bad to worse to worst, presenting the entire Horn of Africa with a security crisis of the first order, spreading instability across a fragile subregion and raising the specter that transnational terrorist networks like al-Qaeda will find and exploit the opportunities thus offered, the approach of the international community and apparently the policy of the United States has become ensnared in what is essentially a circular "logic." For want of better ideas, the international community has opted to buy into a seductive, but nonetheless vicious, circle of its own manufacture whereby it must "stay the course" and continue to devote scarce political and material resources almost exclusively to shoring up the TFG because it has already invested too much time and resources into the regime to do otherwise.

If the failure so far of no fewer than fourteen internationally-sponsored attempts at establishing a national government indicates anything, it is the futility of the notion that outsiders can impose a regime on Somalia, even if it is staffed with presumably moderate Somalis. Instead, in the context of the decentralized reality among the Somali, we—the concerned international community in general and the United States in particular—need

to invest the time and resources to seek out local partners who can, first of all, work with us in creating a modicum of stability—societal, economic, and, ultimately, governmental. This will not be an easy task since the conflict of recent years has taken its toll on civil society. Nonetheless local groups exist do exist: SAACID, the extraordinary nongovernmental organization founded and directed by Somali women, engaged in conflict transformation, women's empowerment, education, healthcare, emergency relief, employment schemes, and development, comes to mind. Amid the current crisis, SAACID is providing 80,000 2,000-calorie meals daily to residents of Mogadishu.

I would venture to say that a broad consensus is emerging among experts who have tracked Somalia for any amount of time that any workable solution must embrace a "bottom-up" or "building-block" approach rather than the hitherto "top-down" strategy. Moreover, given the ripple effects of continuing disorder in the Somali lands, in addition to relations with functional parts of the TFG, it makes no sense for the international community to not work with effective authorities in the Republic of Somaliland, Puntland State, the province of Gedo, and other areas as well seek to engage with traditional leaders and civil society actors elsewhere. These figures both enjoy legitimacy with the populace and have actual (as opposed to notional) security and economic development agendas which complement the outside world's goal of preventing chaos from reigning in Somali territory.

With respect to intervening in Somalia, while I salute the courage and determination of the Ugandan People's Defense Force peacekeepers who have deployed as part of AMISOM in addition to the Burundian troops and I fully cognizant the concerns of Somalia's immediate neighbors like Ethiopia and Kenya, I would argue that the legitimate security interests of the countries in the region can best be met not by their becoming embroiled in the Somali conflict where their support for the TFG has itself become a nationalist rallying point for the insurgents. Rather, I would argue that African resources might best be put to work containing the spread of the instability from Somalia and preventing additional foreign fighters and supplies from fueling the conflict in the country.

I readily acknowledge that an approach such as the one I have sketched out may strike many as minimalist. However, I was convinced and am even more certain today that it was the course most likely to buy Somalis themselves the space within which to make their own determinations about their future while at the same time allowing the rest of the world, especially the countries of the Horn of Africa, to achieve their legitimate security objectives. Thus, not only does the strategy offer the most realistic hope of salvaging a modicum of regional stability and international security out of a situation that otherwise grows increasingly intractable with each passing day

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, Members of the Subcommittee,

Again I am grateful for the opportunity to come before you today and I look forward to responding to your questions.

Mr. PAYNE. Let me thank both of the panelists for your testimony.

I will recess again. This time, though, I believe that I can be back within 10 or 15 minutes. We have 3 minutes left on the current vote, which should take about 7 or 8 minutes, and then an immediate vote to follow. So I really expect to be back within 10–12 minutes. So we will stand recessed.

[Recess.]

Mr. PAYNE. We will reconvene the hearing, and I will just ask our two presenters, I might ask a quick question or two, and then we will recess the hearing and move to our second panel.

I listened to both presentations. We know that the situation in Somalia is very difficult. We know that it has been a country without a central government since 1991. We have seen the difficulty. Dr. Pham had a relatively gloomy perspective, and we are aware of the difficulties. Mr. Dagne also indicated that there are very, very difficult roads ahead; however, that there is a solution, in his opinion. Dr. Pham indicated that militarily Somalia could not be won, suggesting, I guess, that the Somalis support the insurgents, which I would kind of conclude, in Mogadishu.

So I just wonder, if you, Dr. Pham, would comment on this, if I am mischaracterizing. And, of course, the criticism of the way the TFG was selected. I know that you said there was no election, which is true. It would be very difficult to have an election in Somalia after 20 years of no government. But from what I understand, there was an attempt to select a Transitional Federal Government that sort of represented the society of Somalia, the clans and the subclans and the regions. So if you could just, in a nutshell, once again reiterate your prognostication that it is virtually impossible, and then, Mr. Dagne, your prognostication on why it might be possible.

Mr. PHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to clarify.

Militarily I think there are two, possibly three things that need to be distinguished. One is I am very critical, and although I do not believe that an external military intervention is helpful, because it will play directly into the hands of the extremists, who would then wrap themselves up in the mantle of nationalism.

Mr. PAYNE. All right. But would you—you say an internal. Wouldn't you suggest that the insurgents are being supported externally?

Mr. PHAM. They are being supported externally by both foreign fighters, organizations, states, what have you. But what I am suggesting is that a foreign military force into Somalia would be totally inadvisable. We have seen where that has led already in the past, and I don't think that we want a reprise of that.

What I do suggest, however, is that we work with effective authorities within Somalia itself, the functional parts of the Transitional Federal Government, the State of Puntland's authorities, the Republic of Somaliland, and other areas where we might identify those who resist the extremists and are capable and effective; that we work with them, that we don't simply channel all of our assistance through one channel, and we work with the effective authori-

ties, and then allow the Somalis themselves the time to turn on the extremists.

The extremists, I think, as my colleague would agree, do not represent Somali society or the traditional Islam practiced in Somalia. So with time and containment, in a way the extremists carry the seeds of their own internal contradiction and self-destruction from within. We just need to keep that from spreading beyond. And the most effective way is to work with those who are most effective.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.

Mr. Dagne. Thank you.

Mr. DAGNE. I think the Somalis, in my view, already have achieved a great deal in terms of bringing stability and attempting also to contain the threats posed by the extremists and terrorists. One just has to look at Puntland and also to a certain extent also Somaliland.

Are we without clear option? The answer is no. We are—the U.S. Government is providing assistance. You have foreign forces. The Ugandans and the Burundians are there assisting. They are not there simply to function as peacekeepers, but they are protecting the legitimate government in Mogadishu.

I think in addition to a Somali-led option, the international community also must see this threat as a threat not just to Mogadishu or Puntland or Somaliland, but the threat to the entire region. This is no longer a Somali-led insurgency. This is an insurgency now being led by outsiders, whose primary purpose is to destroy, to obstruct, and to establish a base for the terrorist groups.

What specific measure can be taken? For one, I think the Somalis, both in Mogadishu and Puntland and in Somaliland, could come together, form a coalition to contain this threat. The international community can provide assistance, targeted assistance, in terms of logistic support, transportation. And at times it might be necessary also to target in order to take out some of the leaders who would never change their position.

But the military option is not the only option. We also need to invest both in terms of economic development, as well as I think the basic necessities that the Somalis need. You are not going to have a piracy problem if the pirates were to have employment. If the Somali people see that there are schools being built, hospitals, they would be able to support and they would have an interest to fight the extremists and the terrorists.

Mr. PAYNE. Well, let me thank both of you. We would probably have many more questions; but, because of the interruption with the votes, I would just like to thank both of you for your expert testimonies. And with that, I will conclude the formal meeting.

All right. Go ahead. Yes.

Ms. WOOLSEY. Go ahead.

Mr. PAYNE. I think we would like to bring on our guests who have traveled here for a long time, because we may run into another set of votes. And I think that would not work well, since we have introduced so many folks. So with that, thank you very much, and I will adjourn this portion.

[Whereupon the hearing adjourned to reconvene as a briefing.]

APPENDIX

Material Submitted for the Hearing Record

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING AND BRIEFING NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH
Donald M. Payne (D-NJ), Chairman

June 25, 2009

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend the following OPEN hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health to be held in **2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building.**

DATE: Thursday, June 25, 2009

TIME: 2:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Somalia: Prospects for Lasting Peace and a Unified Response to Extremism and Terrorism

WITNESSES: Mr. Ted Dagne
Specialist
African Affairs
Congressional Research Service

J. Peter Pham, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Justice Studies, Political Science and Africana Studies
Director
Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs
James Madison University

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202/225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee as noted above.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON *Africa and Global Health* MEETING

Day *Thursday* Date *6/25/09* Room *2172 RHOB*

Starting Time *2:13 p.m.* Ending Time *6:47 p.m.*

Recesses *1* (*2:45* to *3:15*) 2

Presiding Member(s) *Donald M. Payne*

CHECK ALL OF THE FOLLOWING THAT APPLY:

Open Session [✓]
Executive (closed) Session [ ]
Televised [✓]

Electronically Recorded (taped) [ ]
Stenographic Record [✓]

TITLE OF HEARING or BILLS FOR MARKUP: *(Include bill number(s) and title(s) of legislation.)*

Hearing and Briefing on Somalia: Prospects for Lasting Peace and a Unified Response to Extremism and Terrorism

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

Woolsey

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: *(Mark with an * if they are not Members of HIRC.)*

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes [✓] No [ ]
(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: *(List any statements submitted for the record.)*

ACTIONS TAKEN DURING THE MARKUP: *(Attach copies of legislation and amendments.)*

RECORDED VOTES TAKEN (FOR MARKUP): *(Attach final vote tally sheet listing each member.)*

Subject	Yeas	Nays	Present	Not Voting

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____
or
TIME ADJOURNED *6:47 p.m.*

Subcommittee Staff Director

Congresswoman Barbara Lee, of California
Questions for the Record

Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health

Somalia: Prospects for Lasting Peace and a Unified Response to Extremism and Terrorism
2172 Rayburn HOB

2:00 p.m.
June 25, 2009

Q1: In your opinion, has the Somalia central authority effectively balanced the pursuit of stability and the protection of internationally recognized human rights?

Q2: How can the United States work with the central authority to ensure that actions to improve security and stability Somalia do not sacrifice a fundamental respect for international standards of human rights?

Q3: Somalia has experienced increasing chaos and instability over the past two years. Humanitarian, political, and security conditions continue to deteriorate across south-central Somalia. In the last two years, more than 15,000 civilians have been killed, an estimated 1.1 million people displaced, and 476,000 Somalis have fled to neighboring countries.

Can Somalia be salvaged? What immediate steps can be taken to restore security and address humanitarian concerns? How do these short term mitigation measures compare to longer-term goals for peace and stability?

Q4: Until reforms can be implemented and stability is returned to the lives of the Somali people, what steps can the US or multilateral institutions such as the United Nations take to fill this critical gap and better facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance?

Q5: Somali pirates have been intensifying attacks in the Gulf of Aden. These pirates have extorted well over $100 million in ransom. Last year

alone, they attacked more than 90 commercial ships and hijacked at least 35 others.

What can and should the United States to end these hijackings and make the Gulf of Aden safe again for commercial shipping?

Q6: What can be done to counter the influence of violent extremists such as al-Shibaab, which the U.S. government designated as a terrorist organization one year ago?

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CONGRESSWOMAN SHEILA JACKSON LEE OF TEXAS

Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health

Somalia:

Prospects for Lasting Peace and a Unified Response to Extremism and Terrorism

JUNE 25, 2009

Thank you Madam Speaker, I rise today to address an issue so fundamental to our basic needs as human beings that it is a travesty that we must raise it here today. Violence and unrest continues as insurgents commit human rights violations in Somalia, particularly against women and children.

In early May 2009, Somali extremist groups backed by foreign fighters launched a major offensive against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Over the past six weeks, more than 300 people have been killed and many more wounded. The primary objective of this offensive is to oust the TFG from power and force AMISOM to leave Somalia.

Within Somalia, there are three regions, Puntland, Somaliland and Mogadishu and currently there are about 7,000 Ethiopian refugees fleeing from Mogadishu into Puntland. This week, I had the pleasure of meeting with President Farole of the Puntland State of Somalia. President Farole expressed serious and legitimate concern over the economic burden placed on Puntland due to the high number of refugees who are settling in the area. His Excellency is calling upon us to help provide much-needed assistance to Puntland in the midst of a growing economic crisis facing his region.

Piracy plagues the coast of Puntland and poses a serious threat to the safety and security of those who are living there. In April 2009, these same pirates attacked the Maersk Alabama and took Captain Richard Phillips hostage, spending days to trying to extort ransoms in the tens of millions of dollars. If we do not act to provide the necessary assistance to secure this region, ongoing piracy will have a significant impact on global trade. Moderate Sufi scholars and clerics are currently taking up arms and defending the region, but President Farole has asked for assistance from the U.S. in defending this otherwise secure and peaceful democratic region. Italy, Australia and France are not willing to provide a military solution to Puntland's piracy, however President Farole is here today to highlight the problems crippling Puntland and request outside enforcement, perhaps from the United Nations, to curb the violence.

Specifically, assistance is needed in establishing eight coastal stations with jetties, along the Puntland Indian Ocean village

centers. These stations will be placed in the port cities of Garacad, Eyl, Beila, Bargaal, Caluula, Kandala, Bosaso and Laas-Qorey. The Puntland government has already identified the 600 costal task force members, and the location of the command center.

In addition, equipment is needed for Coastal Task Force stations. Specifically, equipment is needed for:

- **The Port Command Center to support Intel and Inter Agency coordination and surveillance capabilities shared by Puntland Government agencies.**
- **Watercraft/Aircraft vehicles including: Swift, Avenger Patrol, Antelope Class, Medium Cutters and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in order to perform reconnaissance.**
- **Improving communications through the use of UHF/VHF, Watercraft to Aircraft and vice versa and for watercraft to watercraft and Command Center to Operating Units.**

Puntland's natural resource is fishing, and the fishing industry as well as the canning factories indigenous to Puntland, are vital to their economy. By introducing proper fishing techniques and instituting government licensing, residents will not only increase their income, but the Puntland government will be able to adequately track who is fishing off their shores. Specifically, foreign assistance is desperately needed in training on watercraft and aircraft including defense training for the 600 member Coastal Task Force. Incentives must be provided for the Coastal Task Force to ensure the first priority is to the Puntland Government.

We must act now to aid the people of Somalia and help provide a comprehensive solution for ending the extensive human rights violations, and putting an end to the unrest indigenous to the region. We have seen and felt the effects of piracy first hand. We can no longer afford to turn our heads as they suffer. As the global World Leader, we must help the Puntland government so

they can effectively maintain their position as challenges and find a lasting solution to the instability and criminality inherent in the region.

I look forward to engaging with the witnesses and hearing their opinion on how we can promote long lasting peace to promote a stable and prosperous Somalia.


Map of Puntland State of Somalia
DJIBOUTI
GULF OF ADEN
Djibouti
Boosaaso
AWDAL
WOQOOYI GALBEED
TOGDHEER
SAHAAG
BARI
KARKAAR
SOOL
AYN
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