RAISING THINKING FROM THE TACTICAL TO THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
JPME I AND JPME II AT THE SERVICES' AND JOINT COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGES

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ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
HEARING HELD
JUNE 25, 2009
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

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### THURSDAY, JUNE 25, 2009

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RAISING THINKING FROM THE TACTICAL TO THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL: JPME I AND II AT THE SERVICES' AND JOINT COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:08 a.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Dr. Snyder. The hearing will come to order.

Good morning and welcome to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations' third formal hearing on in-residence officer Professional Military Education. In our previous session, we looked at the role of the senior schools, that is the war colleges, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in educating strategists.

Today we have the commandants and directors of the intermediate schools representing the individual services' command and staff colleges and the Joint Forces Staff College. These schools are focused on taking competent tacticians and raising their thinking to the next higher level, that of the “operational art.”

In our next hearing, we will hear from the commandants and directors of the service academies and career schools, and at a subsequent hearing we will also invite those responsible for setting overarching Department of Defense joint and Service guidance on Professional Military Education.

Mr. Wittman, any opening comments you would like to make, please?

[The prepared statement of Dr. Snyder can be found in the Appendix on page 39.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ROB WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. Wittman. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you so much to Chairman Snyder, and good morning to our witnesses. And we appreciate you being here today, especially Admiral Wisecup who is here making his second appearance. And you are logging some frequent flier miles with us. We appreciate that.
Today’s hearing focuses on the first level of Joint Professional Officer Education, which comes after an officer is well-grounded in his or her service, selected for field grade rank and is ready for broader responsibilities.

More importantly, completion of the intermediate level of education, or Joint Professional Military Education I (JPME 1), is expected of all majors and lieutenant commanders. Therefore, unlike the war colleges, these schools are the only schools which educate all officers attaining the rank of O–4 and are thus an important touchstone of the Joint Professional Education System.

While concentrating on operational matters of their respective services, the schools provide an important early joint education through more than the subjects taught. The use of other service faculty and attendance by other service, international, and interagency students in these seminar-based courses provide a broadening perspective.

The witnesses will understand, then, our interest in questions of faculty quality and diversity of experience and the ability of the services to support each other with excellent faculty and students. Without a solid mix of other service and agency faculty and students, none of your institutions can provide a credible joint education. I would appreciate hearing both your success stories and your obstacles in attaining these goals as you testify today.

Our preliminary research indicates that the Army and Navy programs are in transitional periods. In fact, it seems that the Army may believe it overreached in its stated goal of sending all majors to an in-residence intermediate education in Fort Leavenworth and may scale back these plans.

It would be useful to have on record the reasons the Army determined to educate all majors in residence and the difficulties it has faced in reaching the goal.

I am less concerned with service differences and school organization and placement in the service bureaucracy. What is important is getting the right people, both faculty and students, and funding to do the job.

Mr. Chairman, since I would like to hear from our witnesses, I am mindful that our defense—or, excuse me, our National Defense Authorization bill is being debated on the floor. I will stop here and thank you for your time and leadership.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the Appendix on page 41.]

Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.

Our witnesses today are Brigadier General Katherine Kasun, United States Army, Commandant of the Joint Forces Staff College; Rear Admiral James Wisecup, United States Navy, President of the Naval War College; Brigadier General Edward Cardon, Deputy Commandant, Army Command and General Staff College; Brigadier General Jimmie Jackson, United States Air Force, Commandant of the Air Command and Staff College; and Colonel Raymond Damm, U.S. Marine Corps, Director of the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

And before we begin, General Cardon, don’t you have a guest here with you today?
General CARDON. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I have my son, Specialist Chris Cardon.

Dr. SNYDER. Stand up for us please, if we won't embarrass you terribly.

Thank you. We are pleased to have you here. Appreciate your service, too.

Specialist CHRIS CARDON. Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

We will start with General Kasun. We are going to put the five-minute clock on, but it is more just to be kind of a speed bump for you. If you decide to go rapidly over the speed bump, that is your business, too.

But if you have that thing it is good to say beyond the five minutes, just feel free to go ahead, but just to give you an idea of where the time is.

We will begin with you, General Kasun.

General KASUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I probably will go over that speed bump today——

Dr. SNYDER. Yes, that is fine.

General KASUN [continuing]. A couple of minutes——

Dr. SNYDER. Yes, that is fine.

General KASUN [continuing]. Because I have two schools.

Dr. SNYDER. Right.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. KATHERINE P. KASUN, USA, COMMANDANT, JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

General KASUN. All right, sir. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to come before you to discuss Joint Professional Military Education at the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC). The Joint Forces Staff College is a unique institution championed by General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz over 60 years ago.

In 1946, General Eisenhower emphasized that our college was the only institution in the military educational system where the basic mission will be to give instruction on the theater and major joint task force level.

Despite many changes in the world since then, this statement still holds true. Our enduring mission is to educate national security professionals to plan and execute joint, multinational, and interagency operations. We accomplish this important mission through four major schools and a host of short courses.

Today I will discuss four points concerning our two primary schools which provide resident JPME: our intermediate level, 10-week Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) and our 11-month intermediate and senior level Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS).

For the first point, allow me to reemphasize JFSC’s uniqueness. We are a joint institution which focuses on joint planning at the operational level of war. Our military faculty is almost equally divided between the Army, Air Force and Navy with a representative number of Marines.

Our student body is also divided proportionately among the services.
Since 1993, when the congressional review of the Skelton Panel’s recommendation was conducted at JFSC, the two schools have graduated approximately 3,500 Army officers, 4,400 Air Force officers and 3,400 Navy and Marine Corps officers, numbers which illustrate our true joint nature.

All JFSC students study in a joint learning environment. JCWS students are also required to share housing with officers from other services during their 10 weeks on campus. Our curriculum assumes the officers arrive with a solid understanding of their service competencies from their service staff colleges. We build upon this service expertise to create planners who are strategically minded critical thinkers and skilled joint warfighters.

The second point that I wish to make is how our curricula on academic methodologies excel in supporting the joint multinational interagency planning community. Both JCWS and JAWS immerse our students in academically rigorous programs using active and collaborative learning techniques.

Students engage in active learning in over 90 percent of their classroom time and are required to demonstrate their skills by practical application, case studies, research, writing, and examinations.

The Joint and Combined Warfighting School conducts four graduate-level JPME Phase two classes a year. They focus on joint planning at the operational level, ensuring that graduates are prepared for duty in a joint environment and can quickly become a productive leader of a joint planning group.

We have agreements with 15 colleges which grant our JCWS graduates anywhere from 3 to 19 graduate-level credits. Joint Advanced Warfighting School, JAWS, continues to fulfill the vision of an advanced joint program as first recommended by Congressman Skelton and the HASC panel in 1989.

JAWS students earned 36 graduate-level credits while completing a rigorous 11-month curriculum designed to create master joint planners. The curriculum uses military history and theory to lay the foundation for the study of national strategy and an in-depth focus on Joint Operational Campaign Planning.

The course of study culminates with the completion of a thesis, a three-hour oral comprehensive examination and the awarding of a Master of Science degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

Both curricula are designed to be relevant and current with continuous updates that include compelling planning issues and other special areas of emphasis such as theater campaign planning, irregular warfare, building partnership capacity, strategic communications and defense support to civil authorities.

Our faculty and curriculum developers maintain constant communication with subject matter experts in the joint, multinational, and interagency commands and staff in order to evolve the curricula to meet the most pressing needs of the planning community.

Our methodologies and techniques have been validated over the years. The Middle States Commission on Higher Education has awarded full accreditation to JFSC through National Defense University since 1997. Last year, under the chairman’s Process for Ac-
creditation of Joint Education, JAWS met all the standards required for 6-year accreditation.

Dr. SNYDER. Ignore those bells. I have never heard that before in my life. [Laughter.]

I don’t know what that was. [Laughter.]

General KASUN. I still get my minutes. [Laughter.]

Dr. SNYDER. You still get your minutes. [Laughter.]

General KASUN. During the same evaluation, JCWS was reaffirmed for the third time and met all accreditation standards with the exception of the required student-to-faculty ratio.

Since then, National Defense University funded 10 additional civilian Title X billets to alleviate that situation, although gaps in the military billets continue to be a problem.

I would like to close this second point by noting that we routinely hear suggestions that the JCWS course could be shorter. However, the increasing complexity of modern warfare is such that we effectively use the entire 10 weeks to execute a very rigorous academic program with very little white space left on the calendar.

Given that joint warfare has grown more complex and the operational environment is more challenging than ever before, we fully support the Skelton Panel’s conclusion that we must resist pressures to shorten the length of this school any further.

My third point involves educating the right student at the right time. Ideally, JCWS students should arrive to the college en route to or within 12 months of being assigned to a joint command. Unfortunately, only about ½ of the JCWS student meet this criteria.

Moreover, if other officers do not come en route, joint commands are frequently unwilling to lose their officers for 10 weeks. Based on surveys of former students and their supervisors, those officers who attend our course are more productive earlier in their Joint assignment if they are able to attend JCWS en route to or earlier in their tour.

For JAWS, having the right students means having one who can fill a joint planning billet immediately following graduation. However, we have noticed that the service struggled to ensure that over half of our graduates go to joint assignments immediately following their graduation.

Annual selection decisions and assignments policies limit the number of graduates reaching JAWS-coded joint billets. To date, JAWS graduates have filled less than 20 percent of available coded billets, and some billets have never received one of our graduates.

As the combatant commanders become more familiar with the skills of our graduates, we are convinced the demand for our graduates will grow exponentially.

My fourth and final point concerns the future.

Mr. Chairman, while we are successful in attracting international students, efforts to increase the number of interagency students remain a challenge. We need to increase the number of interagency students to expose more mid-level government professionals to an effective whole-of-government approach to solving complex problems.

We must also increase the number of Reserve and National Guard students attending JCWS. The need to educate the reserve component in joint matters is essential since they are deploying as
individual augmentees and populating joint staffs with increasing frequency.

Finally, we must continue to encourage services to provide the right education to the right person at the right time.

Mr. Chairman, I am very proud of our college. The quality of our faculty and staff and students are unsurpassed. Jointness permeates everything we do. We play a vital role in preparing the military to fight today’s enemies as well as those yet unknown of tomorrow.

Thank you for this opportunity to be here with you today.

[The prepared statement of General Kasun can be found in the Appendix on page 44.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, General.

Admiral Wisecup? We will see if you get the same squeaking thing. [Laughter.]

Normally, this system breaks. We have never actually had it 100 percent work before.

It was your lucky day, General. [Laughter.]

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. JAMES P. WISECUP, USN, PRESIDENT, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Admiral WISECUP. Good morning.

Chairman Snyder, Representative Wittman, distinguished ladies and gentlemen of the Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee, I am Rear Admiral Phil Wisecup, President of the Naval War College, and I thank you for the opportunity to speak with you again.

Let me begin by assuring you the Navy now has a distinct curriculum for the intermediate-level course as recommended by the Panel on Military Education of the 100th Congress headed by Representative Ike Skelton.

Today, our intermediate courses focus on building operational-level expertise, a key emphasis of Admiral Gary Roughead, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). The college’s intermediate-level graduates are skilled in applying operational art through the Navy and joint planning processes and are critically thinking leaders with operational-level perspectives.

They are familiar with a range of challenges of operating in the maritime domain and are competent in employing Naval capabilities in conjunction with other services, other agencies and partner nations to achieve strategic objectives in war and peace.

Further, the Chief of Naval Operations determined that unrestricted line Navy officers in the grade of commander must have completed an intermediate-level professional military course with embedded JPME Phase I before assuming command. Likewise, most staff and restricted line officers must have also completed that level of PME before assuming command equivalent positions.

This CNO decision requires nearly all Navy officers to complete intermediate level PME and ensures those with the greatest potential will complete it.

The intermediate-level course, resident and non-resident, consists of three academic programs. The National Security Decision-Making Course instructs in theater strategic planning, the economic, political, organization and behavior factors affecting selection, command, and the use of military forces and the operational level crit-
ical thinking skills essential to the work of complex national security organizations.

The course’s capstone exercise requires each seminar to produce an executive-level strategic estimate of the future security environment, a theater strategic vision that advances U.S. national interests and a prioritized list of new or improved concepts capabilities necessary to advance the strategy.

The strategy and war course, as opposed to the senior course, which is strategy and policy, is designed to develop a deeper understanding of the interaction of strategy and the operational use of military force. The course sharpens the students’ ability to assess how alternative operational courses of action best serve to achieve overall strategic objectives.

After reviewing the classical theories, the 11-week course explores a different war weekly, each with a discrete political purpose, normally examined through the lens of a theater of operations. For this academic year, for example, the maritime domain dominates in 5 of the 10 cases. Irregular warfare was the focus of three cases and a substantive part of three others.

The longest course of study is the 17-week Joint Maritime Operations Course. In it students study the operational level of war throughout the range of military operations with an emphasis on the maritime environment.

Once firmly grounded in operational art, students use Navy and joint planning processes to develop alternatives for applying Naval, U.S. and partner nation capabilities toward strategic objectives. A major planning exercise requires each seminar to develop alternative courses of action supporting operational orders including the Joint Force Maritime Commanders.

The course’s capstone war game involves a crisis development and deployment planning phase, a humanitarian assistance phase, and a transition phase, all using collaborative technology tools in a distributed environment.

Together, these courses develop an operational knowledge base and perspective required to contribute on a major staff. The resident curriculum is the basis for the four non-resident programs.

We are confident our educational approach, which uses an executive perspective in a seminar-centered environment, requiring an appreciation of alternative viewpoints and the synthesis of complex ideas using multidisciplinary tools remains on target.

We expect application of principles to case studies of real events and issues and require our students to provide written analysis of complex open-ended issues. Grading clearly sustains the academic rigor.

Through such endeavors, we believe we can well judge if our students are achieving the required educational outcomes.

I have found the college to be a place where morale is high, faculty and staff members are satisfied they are doing meaningful work that makes a difference, students are highly motivated professionals, many coming right off the front lines, who take their duties seriously.

They continue to challenge themselves and me every day.

On behalf of the students, faculty and staff representing each of our armed services, many of our international partners, and nu-
merous Department of Defense and other federal activities, we thank you for your continued support within Congress and your commitment to professional military education.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Wisecup can be found in the Appendix on page 79.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Admiral.

General Cardon.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. EDWARD C. CARDON, USA, DEPUTY COMMANDANT, ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

General CARDON. Chairman Snyder, Congressman Wittman and honorable members of the committee, I would like to extend to each of you a warm welcome from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Thank you for this opportunity to speak about professional military education at the Army's Command and General Staff College.

I came to the position of deputy commandant from 5 years of service in Third Infantry Division with 29 months in Iraq between 2003 and 2008. This experience directly influences how I view my job today.

First, for my personal experience and observation, our graduates are doing well in supporting the operations around the world, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. I recognize that their state of readiness is a combination of their experience, training and education, but it is clear that the college is contributing to the success of these majors.

Second, there is more we can do to prepare this next generation of leaders. We often say we train for certainty but we educate for uncertainty. This concept is more important than ever given the unknowns of the future environment.

We must broaden our focus, planning and executing operations in environments that include extended operations over time. We need a richer, joint interagency, intergovernmental, multinational experience. And we need to continue to focus on ill-structured problems.

And we need to educate our officers on comprehensive soldier fitness to preserve the force.

A considerable amount of the current success of military education is directly attributed to the implementation of recommendations on the report of the Panel of Military Education. We strive and will continue to strive to meet your intent for rigorous, quality education that prepares our officers to operate in an ever-changing environment.

Strategic leaders develop over time. We are an important stop in this journey as our students, who are already confident in tactics, will understand operational art, and will be educationally prepared to start or build on a strategic study.

Numerous thoughtful questions have been raised that we attempted to address in our written statements, but I just want to highlight a few points.

Education: We believe leaders develop though education, training and experience. Training is great if it is the right training. Experi-
ence is great if it is the right experience, and education provides the intellect to see the difference.

Educating for uncertainty allows us to operate in these complex environments, to work on these ill-structured problems, and to operate in a more decentralized environment with increasing interaction to coalition and non-military partners.

For our students, the Army adopted the concept of universal resident intermediate-level education for all active-duty and select reserve component majors, which continues to be an intriguing debate for our Army.

This concept is under stress today due to the operational demands of the force. The Army needs all of its majors to be successful, and the increasing complexity of the environment makes education even more important.

One of the greatest values to resident education—is the interaction between Army officers, district service officers, international officers and a growing number of interagency officers.

For curriculum, we have an integrated curriculum based on educational outcomes using an adult education model that includes time to reflect while providing rigor in upholding graduate standards and evaluating student work. It is possible to fail.

We incorporate history and history studies in the curricula of students in an appreciation for examining the past to prepare for the future. Our task is to provide the best education we can offer to every officer attending the college and we are very fortunate to have a select number of students attend a second year of study in operational art at the School of Advanced Military Study.

The faculty has changed dramatically, going from a predominantly military faculty to a current faculty construct that consists of approximately 65 percent civilian with more than 95 percent of the civilians having active-duty experience.

Our number of Ph.D.s is growing. Our military faculty, including the joint military faculty, is critical. They are the role models who coach and mentor, bring recent operational experience to the classroom, and provide context in our current military environment.

The challenge is balancing the needs of the college with the personnel pressures on all our formations and organizations and we need our sister service officers to receive joint credit as the current system negatively influences officers from other services in their interest to serve as an instructor at Fort Leavenworth.

For the future, I want to highlight three initiatives. Historically, interagency participation in education has been minimal, whether they were civilians from the Army or outside agencies. We have had minor faculty support from some agencies but almost no civilian students attending.

The need to add interagency faculty, students and curriculum is paramount. Over the last two years, we have talked to dozens of agencies and done our best to market this program. The story is uniformly the same.

These agencies understand and support the initiative, but lacked the education and training account of people to support the efforts. We have developed an intern program for Army officers to help mitigate the Manning issues of participating agencies, but we need additional help to better attract interagency students.
We also have interagency faculty from the Department of State, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency. It is a great start, but there is more to be done. This is an area we can also use your support.

Our current policy sets standards for joint representation within the student body. We feel a similar system to support interagency participation at the intermediate level is appropriate.

The second initiative I want to showcase is the Student Health Program, which has been added to the college. It saves lives. Three years ago, the leadership began to see signs and symptoms of stress in the student population, and upon further investigation, we discovered that the majors were in worse physical condition than our colonels.

The program was developed and resourced. We have a complete wellness program for our majors. But the next step is to implement the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program, including resiliency programs to help our students deal with the stress of today's and tomorrow's environment.

And the final initiative I want to highlight is our emphasis on preparing our majors to use information. Every student must write for publication, must be interviewed by the media, complete a public speaking engagement and touch the blogosphere.

Early results of having our students engaged with the public are inspiring. There are great stories to tell and important messages that they bear I think people should hear. This is having an immediate impact on our Army.

In closing, we are unbelievably proud of the men and women who serve at Fort Leavenworth, both in the military and our dedicated civilians. We are extremely grateful for the committee for the support to Professional Military Education. We strive and will continue to strive to meet your intent for rigorous, quality education. Both teaching and learning is strong and will remain strong.

We will continue to evolve and adjust to meet the needs of the future. We have a sacred trust to ensure our education prepares our officers, our leaders to lead our soldiers in formation.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Cardon can be found in the Appendix on page 109.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

General Jackson.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. JIMMIE C. JACKSON, USAF, COMMANDANT, AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

General JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to appear and testify about the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). I would like to submit my written statement as a part of the official record and look forward to addressing any questions you may have after my opening remarks.

Dr. SNYDER. All written statements are a part of the record.

Thank you.

General JACKSON. I understand the focus of your current efforts is on the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Panel on Military Education Report
from 1989, and what their influence has been shaping Professional Military Education.

I can personally attest to the influence they have had on Air Command and Staff College. I was a faculty member at ACSC during the 1998–1999 timeframe, and in September 2007 returned as the ACSC commandant.

What I found in 2007 is significantly different than when I left in 1999. ACSC is a programs that is academically rigorous, steeped into our operations and a college that educates airmen who are agile, critical thinkers prepared to meet any challenge.

Unique to ACSC with respect to other PME institutions is its air-centric operational focus. But this service perspective is balanced by a comprehensive curriculum that stresses joint, interagency and multinational planning and operations.

ACSC does not rest on its past laurels but continues to address key faculty, curriculum and resource challenges to sustain this level of success. I want to emphasize that we consider our faculty as our center of gravity.

Faculty make or break our institution.

I believe, and student feedback supports, that ACSC has a well-prepared, motivated faculty and staff. However, we must continue to focus on faculty and faculty development to sustain these qualifications and credentials.

ACSC faculty considerations include the mix of Air Force, sister service and civilian instructors. When I was on the faculty, we had two civilian faculty members. Today we have 31. Congressman Skelton’s support in attaining Title X authority was key to this effort.

The increased civilian faculty has been a significant factor in creating a more academically rigorous program. In addition, all Air Force Officer Professional Military Education schools are co-located within the Carl A. Spaatz Center for Officer Education at Maxwell Air Force Base.

We are able to draw upon the synergies of the seven colleges and schools, their civilian and military faculty members, to interagency advisors, to mentors assigned to every person.

It is important that the college establish the right mix with its military faculty. The right mix begins with Air Force sister service ratio. Sister services have been very supportive in providing outstanding faculty members, but an issue is joint credit for faculty duty at Air Command and Staff College.

I believe there is justification for all military faculty members at the service intermediate level colleges to receive joint credit. Your subcommittee may be able to help us with this effort.

We are working to address both the quantity and the mix of Air Force military faculty expertise. We must continue to emphasize that PME faculty duty is valued in an individual’s career in the Air Force.

As I referenced in the written comments, ACSC recognizes the need to invest in the professional development of its entire faculty as teachers, scholars and practitioners. The key is maintaining the currency and relevancy of the curriculum and remaining on the leading edge of teaching methodology.
The ACSC resident class forms a diverse, uniquely-experienced population. The class contains a mix of operational and functional expertise from the non-host military department, air reserve components, international officers, Department of Defense (DOD) civilians, and representation from other agencies.

The caliber of the students attending ACSC has remained high. The move in 1994 to integrate the international officers for the full academic year has had a significant positive impact on the ACSC program, especially as we increased our regional and cultural emphasis.

The ACSC curriculum today is very focused on operational art. One challenge I face as the commandant are frequent requests for insertions into the curriculum. ACSC has established the context of a core curriculum that serves as the basis for curriculum changes, insertions and additions.

The Air Force has also established an Air Force Learning Committee to screen these recommendations similar to the process used by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over insertions into joint PME.

The joint approach serves as a good model for the curriculum change by the Air Force.

Every element of the core is reviewed and updated to ensure that each is relevant to the needs of today’s warfighters and prepares those warfighters for the challenges they will face tomorrow.

Examples of ACSC’s adaptability include institutionalizing jointness across the curriculum, embracing a robust regional and cultural studies program, embedding concepts and ideas about operational-level warfare throughout our core courses and reemphasizing irregular warfare and the nuclear enterprise.

Another improvement I noted upon my return was a stronger emphasis on focused research. ACSC student papers are read by senior military leaders generating ideas affecting operations and military strategies.

We have already had reports that academic year 2009 student research is being used to change the way DOD handles field distribution, how Congress may view weather control, and how intelligence operations may be executed.

In summary, there has been broad sweeping change at ACSC since the initial implementation of joint education. ACSC has matured from the joint track approach in 1998 to full integration and the use of jointness as our primary language.

Process changes mandated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act and by the panel have now been institutionalized. Our students are receiving the education necessary to critically reflect upon today’s issues while preparing to address the unforeseen challenges of the future.

Mr. Chairman, I again thank you for the opportunity to testify and the chance to talk about Air Command and Staff College. I have been honored to serve as the commandant for the past two years, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Jackson can be found in the Appendix on page 131.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, General Jackson.

Colonel Damm.
STATEMENT OF COL. RAYMOND C. DAMM, JR., USMC, DIRECTOR, U.S. MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

Colonel Damm. Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Wittman, distinguished subcommittee members, good morning. On behalf of General Gardner, Marine Corps University president, thank you for allowing me to tell you about the accomplishments of your Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

Informed by the study of history and culture, the college’s present mission is to educate and train its joint, multinational and interagency professionals to overcome diverse 21st century security challenges.

We teach warfighting and the context in which that warfighting occurs. We rely heavily on a combination of seminars, practical applications, case studies and student self-direction.

As its director, my intention is to create an atmosphere of professional excellence by employing a world-class faculty and staff, working with energetic, motivated students in a supportive, challenging and forward-looking educational environment.

Our graduates are regarded by operational commanders as outstanding planners, accomplished communicators, both orally and in writing, innovative thinkers and sound decision makers who have raised their thinking above the tactical level.

They should be adept at solving the complex problems of an inherently ambiguous and dangerous world and to perform effectively at the operational level of war. In short, we seek to produce graduates who can think creatively, reason critically and act decisively.

Our students are accomplished professionals, aggressive, bright, savvy and, in this year’s class, more than 80 percent combat veterans. Knowing they will soon return to the fight, they are eager to learn.

Our task is to continue to challenge them professionally and intellectually. To do this requires a first-class faculty and a challenging and relevant curriculum. The college is blessed with both.

Let me talk about our faculty for a few moments.

The faculty is the college’s center of gravity. Our unique combination of military officers and civilian academics, paired as faculty teams, create the learning environment in the college. Congressman Skelton’s panel over 20 years ago found much about which to be concerned.

Our faculty of only 24 had just a single Ph.D. We had limited operational and academic credentials among the military faculty. That has changed.

Just this month, we said good-bye to 12 of our 19 military faculty. More than half departed because of promotion to colonel or to take command. All of our military faculty have advanced degrees. Our civilian faculty, including the one Ph.D. resident at the time of the Skelton Panel, are a mix of variety of specialties and backgrounds.

Some are former military. Others have no military background. All 19 civilian faculty are Ph.D.s.

Our core curriculum consists of four courses. Our newest addition to the curriculum is Culture and Interagency Operations. This course improves the understanding of culture in today’s security
environment and looks at interagency operations as ways to employ all the instruments of national power.

Our electives program provides additional depth to the curriculum and responds to student interests. Among our electives are courses on armed groups, insurgency from an insurgent's perspective, and religion and violence.

The Defense Language Institute supports our survival-level language instruction and our negotiations practical exercise. Next year, we will offer five languages: Arabic, French, Chinese and two Afghan dialects, Dari and Pashtu.

Students examine matters of professional significance through the college’s accredited Master of Military Studies program. Also noteworthy is the college’s exercise program, designed both to enhance the planning skills of our students as well as to increase their cultural and interagency awareness.

Our vision for the college is to remain closely attuned to the needs of the operating forces, to retain and hire higher quality faculty without sacrificing that quality and to increase the sophistication of the technologies that support our curriculum.

Our graduates face enormous challenges in the operating environment that awaits them once they leave us.

The college is committed to doing all we can to assist them in their professional and intellectual development to become more skilled at their craft and mentally agile to adapt to un-anticipated situations.

As Lieutenant General John Allen, Deputy Commanding General, Central Command (CENTCOM), told our graduating class earlier this month, “you may have 35-year-old bodies, but education is about having a 5,000-year-old brain.”

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the chance to speak with you today. I welcome the subcommittee’s questions.

Semper Fidelis.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Damm can be found in the Appendix on page 140.]

Dr. Snyder. Thank you all for your opening statements, and thank you for your service. This subcommittee greatly values what you do, and that is why we are spending as much time on this topic as we have.

And as you all know, full committee Chairman Ike Skelton feels very strongly about the work that you do. We are not trying to replicate the work that the Skelton panel did 20 years ago. It is not that extensive of a—we don't have that level of staffing, and the situation is different now.

But it is very important that we provide the kind of oversight and constructive help that, you know, the country wants and that you all want. And so we appreciate your presence here today.

I go back to the days of Easter egg hunts—I am going to use a metaphor here—you know, now you get that they do Easter egg hunts with plastic eggs, and so when June comes if you still find the plastic egg, the dollar bill inside is still good.

I am old enough when you actually hid real eggs, and if you found that missing egg in June, you really didn't want to be anywhere near it. Like if you are doing some gardening and hit it with a shovel.
Your opening statements, those were very good. It was a bit like the old-time Easter egg hunt. It is a little bit challenging to find those places where you are actually acknowledging you have got some problems and challenges. So I am going to run through these quickly, and tell me if—I want you to respond and amplify on them and then any other issue that you have.

General Kasun, you specifically mentioned the timing—I think your phrase was while no education is a waste, the timing of it—it is page 25 of your statement—the issue of sending the officers to JCWS at the right time. You also, on page 28 of your statement, discuss this issue about the billets.

Just because a graduate is—to date, JWS graduates have filled less than 20 percent of available coded billets, and some billets have never received one of our graduates. I want you to amplify on that.

On the next page, you talk about you got some aging facilities. And then on page 30 you talk about the importance of outreach, making sure your faculty stays current. Those are four of the points that I picked up where you thought you perhaps needed some work. I want you to amplify on those.

And then, Admiral Wisecup, you have mentioned faculty, I think it was on page 22 of your statement, where you say the challenges in attracting the very best Navy officers and again because this issue of jointness and where that fits into a career. I would like you to amplify on that.

General Cardon, you specifically brought the issue of the majors, how many majors are being educated and what that does to the long-term goals of your mission. And page 11 you talk about—let us see here—oh, yes, again the issue of jointness with regard to faculty in attracting faculty and this, on page 17 and 18, you talk about the—getting both students and faculty from the interagency, that that continues to be a challenge.

I think there are some creative things that can be done there, or have been done there.

General Jackson, you mentioned specifically, on page three, faculty. And I think the one thing I picked up from your statement, Colonel Damm, was, although it was not necessarily a problem, the fact the high turnover, which represents both the good and the bad.

Those are the kind of the Easter eggs I picked up from your all statements and, I am sorry, General, we need to go ahead and start the clock. But if I could get each of you to maybe amplify on those a little bit, but also, this is your time. We need to hear where you all see problems.

And I think sometimes while we want you to be upbeat about what you are doing, this is your chance to lay out where your needs are because we are trying to find out where things could be improved.

So, General, we will start with you and amplify those.

General Kasun. Sir, it keeps buzzing when it is my turn. [Laughter.]

Dr. Snyder. That means we are 15 minutes away from going into session.

General Kasun. Okay, sir. I won’t——
Dr. Snyder. So you don’t have anything to worry about, here. Okay. [Laughter.]

General Kasun. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your time and your comments and your questions. I will try to do this very succinctly.

Bringing the students in at the right time—I have mentioned a couple of times that it is a difficulty. We only have about \( \frac{1}{3} \) of the students that show up for JCWF, our 10-week program, that are on their way to joint assignment. Fifty percent of them are on the backside of their Joint assignment.

So when they come to our school, at that point, they are on their way to another service assignment or a regular command.

My opinion, sir? Is that what you are asking for?

Dr. Snyder. Yes. Yes.

General Kasun. What to fix?

Dr. Snyder. And how to fix it and whose responsibility it is to fix.

General Kasun. Okay, sir.

Well, there is legislation already there basically stating that students need to be educated prior to going to a Joint assignment. And I think just enforcing that legislation would make a difference.

Dr. Snyder. Some of us might say that that would, you know, be like going to medical school, that I think it is generally a good idea to have completed medical school before you practice medicine, but—that is just—we didn’t think we would really have to legislate that, but go ahead. [Laughter.]

General Kasun. Sir, we do find that on our surveys, like I mentioned during my point, that the graduates that have actually gone to the school prior to or that within the 12 months have gained a lot more——

Dr. Snyder. A lot more——

General Kasun. And it is truly an investment in our officers’ education.

So the 20 percent of JAWS students—we have about 41 students that come through a year. Thirty-six of them are military. They are based on the \( \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3} \), air, land and sea forces that come through. But that is an even balance of O–4s and O–5s.

However, only 20 percent of them have actually been assigned to JAWS-coded billets. About 60 percent of them have actually gone to the different joint forces—I mean, the joint billets, but not necessarily in a JAWS billet.

So they may not be planners. They are master planners, but they are not actually going into planning billets. And again, sir, I would suggest that communication, working with the services and trying to put that up front when they are assigned to JAWS, they have a following.

Dr. Snyder. Because you are creating a valuable asset.

General Kasun. Yes. Yes, sir.

Dr. Snyder. And that valuable asset, I suspect, wants to be used to their fullest capacity, and yet too often, in your opinion, they are not being used to that capacity.

Thank you.

General Kasun. That is correct, sir.

And, one other point on that specifically, we are both an intermediate and a senior-level college—I mean, a senior-level course
there. So we have the O–4s to O–6s, predominately O–4s and O–5s, but there are O–6s, and because it can be either Intermediate Level Education (ILE) or Senior Level Education (SLE), which was an agreement made when JAWS started 5 years ago, and that was in order to provide the services with flexibility, currently it is a single-phase JPME. They get JPME I and II.

But depending on the service decision, which one they get, whether they get ILE or SLE. So my point with that is that it is an advanced warfighting school equivalent to our services, and I believe that the O–4s and O–5s actually making them master campaign planners is much more useful.

I see a point where there are O–6s coming through, but they are more on the high side of the position rather than the actual workers.

Sir, you asked about the aging—I had mentioned about the aging buildings. We have buildings that have been there actually since the 1940s, but the majority of the ones that we have are about 47, almost 50 years old. And it costs over $1 million a year for maintenance and upkeep. We are refurbishing the exterior of the existing buildings to support more classes, and we had some issues with post-9/11 security.

We are putting a gate in and, of course, funding. We are still working on getting funding for that. We have the human capital. We are sending students through, about 255 students, every 10 weeks through our school, and we have them 4 times a year for our JCWS.

We have just enough faculty—actually, we are just a few short—basically, we have just enough faculty, sir, to be able to teach those students over and over and over and there is about a week and a half in between, there is no white space for the faculty.

So that our human faculty, we have some outstanding faculty. We have ⅔ military and ⅓ civilian, but there is no time to do any research. And we are working on getting another manpower increase but, again, it is going to have to be built in to make sure that that is authorized.

Because currently, right now, for the ratio, the 3.5-to-1—I am not sure which student gets ½ a leg—but the ratio of 3.5-to-1 students-to-faculty, we are about 4-to-1. So the faculty is working all the time.

We actually have several of our faculty who have gone down range. Since 2003, we have had 18 faculty and staff that have deployed in support of a variety of outreach operational missions in the following areas: the Horn of Africa, Iraq, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and we also have other faculty members working specifically on teams to help develop political and military policy in Bulgaria, the Ukraine and Georgia.

We have frequent opportunities for billets out working for the COMOs, and that is one of my missions or one of my visions that I plan to continue that. But again, that is taking faculty out of the class when they need to do the research.

When they do come back, when the faculty comes back, whether they are the Title X’s or the military, they bring that new freshness to the students. Of course, our student population being joint with
all services, almost everyone has gone downrange either one, two and even three times.

So to keep that freshness within the students—I mean, the faculty with the students is very, very important.

The interagency attendance, I don’t know, sir, if you mentioned that, but I know I did. It is difficult at best. I know that the 10-week course, it makes it very difficult to sell to the interagency. My two brother schools at Indy U, National War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), have a great following. They can actually attract more. But they are in the D.C. area.

And we find ourselves down in Norfolk in a hub with a great deal of experience. We have tradeoff. We have all the different services at the operational level, but for the 10-week course, we have some difficulty attracting interagency because the interagency looks at it as a gap when it is 10-weeks.

But they look at it when they come to the JAWS course or 11-month course, they get a Masters degree, and it is an investment. I find that both courses are an investment in their people.

Thank you, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Wittman, I have run out of time. My suggestion is we let them respond to this, and then I think that we have got a five-person panel. We will let you take as much time, if that is all right with you, sir.

Mr. WITTMAN. That is fine. Yes.

Dr. SNYDER. So Admiral Wisecup, if you would continue that discussion?

Admiral WISECUP. Yes, sir.

You asked about the issue about attracting the very best Navy officers to join the faculty since you are not credited with joint duty.

This is an issue that I have seen now as I have only been here seven months, and this is one of those things that I am becoming aware of. You know, we did have one of our officers screened to be carrier air group commander, which I thought was a very good development, okay?

But JDAL, the Joint Duty Assignment List issues is a policy issue I probably need to work on as I have not yet really made the case on the quality versus the joint assignment. So what happens is naval officers look at the broad range of duties they can go to, come into the Naval War College, a Navy guy, you don’t see the jointness. You don’t see the joint experience.

I could probably make the case, and I need to do that, okay, that they’re actually getting a joint experience there. And we have, for example, 35 faculty members from other agencies and other services, of course, an Army officer coming to the Naval War College will very easily get joint credit on the JDAL, the Joint Duty Assignment List.

But it is probably harder to make the case for a naval officer to get Joint Duty Assignment credit coming to the Naval War College. But that is something that I will work to try to make that case.

Dr. SNYDER. I mean, because it is a real problem if you have some of your, you know, kind of the folks that you want to be faculty members if they don’t think coming to your place helps their career.
Admiral WiseCup. Sure.
Dr. Snyder. I mean, it sure is a problem.
General.
General Cardon. Sir, I will just carry on there first with the joint faculty.
It used to be that sister service officers who came to the Command and General Staff College received joint credit. Now they don’t. They have to apply for it. And as the admiral said, the problem with that is it is a quality cut because you have to be joint-qualified to advance. Officers know that.
And because that is not seen as an automatic joint qualification, it is not seen as desirable of an assignment which brings a degree of negativeness.
Sir, on the ILE issue, universal ILE for the majors, a number of reasons why this was formed. I will just highlight two.
One is we used to have a 50-percent cut on the majors. So 50 percent went to the resident course, 50 percent did the box of books. The challenge is that the 50 percent that did not go viewed themselves as disadvantaged. At the same time, we are trying to retain them to do important jobs for the Army.
So the Army said if they are majors in the United States Army, they should all receive quality educations.
What has complicated this has been the wars and the——
Dr. Snyder. I am sorry, has been the——
General Cardon [continuing]. The wars and the rotational Army. Because of the demands on the force now, not all of the majors are coming to ILE and we have a significant backlog already.
So now the question is are we sending the right majors, because what is happening is as majors stay out and the captains then get promoted to major and stay out, and even if we actually have a couple of hundred majors that are in the primary zone for lieutenant-colonel who have not been to any form of intermediate-level education.
Now, half of those are probably our best officers serving as operation officers, executive officers, in both our battalions and brigades today. And so the Army is trying to address how to do this.
But the complexity of the environment, I think, almost demands that we have to have—the officers need more education, not less. Because if you look to the future, it doesn’t look like anything is becoming more clear. It is more complex. You need to educate to do that.
Sir, interagency, 10 years ago when I was a young field grade officer, I had no involvement with the interagency to speak of. Nowadays, our captains are dealing with the interagency with the guards and things like the Provincial Reconstruction Teams out on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq and, even more importantly, heavy integration with the intelligence agencies to the levels that I have never seen before.
But we do nothing to help them operate in this environment and, you know, General Caldwell has started a number of initiatives to try and bring interagency to the college. And we are moving in the right direction, but we need help in and, as I said in my statement, the agencies do not have a pool of officers from which they can choose.
So we have tried to give the interagency officers, but every major we give them in exchange for a major to come back, that is a reasonable level, but to grow to the 96 seminars we want, to have 96 interagency officers at the Command and General Staff College, I think, we are going to need some additional help.

Sir, for military officers, the challenge is with the—and I think you are referring here to the—to confirm that you are talking about military faculty—there is no floor on military faculty. And what I mean by that is as the numbers—as the demands of the war increased, the number of military officers in the college have continued to drop.

And General Caldwell and I are trying to hold the line at about 30 percent. But there is nothing written and I am not sure anything has to be written. But the challenge is how do you ensure you get the best military officer and have the right number of military officers?

We think the military officers are critical for role modeling current experience and—well, it is role modeling and current experience being most important.

So we don't need help. But I would say it is a challenge if the demands for majors continue. Why is the demand for majors continuing to increase? An example is the Security Force Assistance Missions that the Army is taking on, which is very officer-heavy, has put another levy of demands on our captains and majors, which directly impacts, now, availability to go to school and availability for majors assignments worldwide.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

General Jackson.

General JACKSON. Sir, thanks for the opportunity to talk about our faculty.

Sir, I view the faculty as my weapons system. And, as a result, I spend a lot of time resourcing, rewarding them and making sure that they are recognized for the great things they do.

Chairman Skelton then was very, very instrumental in Title X authority that allowed us to hire great civilians. In fact, I had two different phenomena. On my civilian side, I have great quality, not necessarily quantity, but it is a product of our success.

As I mentioned in my opening remarks, we have reorganized that area of our university to put all our officer PME under one center. That means from lieutenants all the way through colonels. But as a result some of my Ph.D.s are moving as a natural progression to the other seven colleges and schools.

So it is a never ending piece, but the quality of the civilian faculty is actually exponentially better than when I was there 20 years ago.

For my military faculty, we have the quantity, but quality is what I am trying to instill in. We have some initiatives that we are undertaking from the Air Force and their university to instill the idea that being a faculty member at their university is valued in your Air Force career.

Jointness would help us as an incentive. We are also trying to get the word out. We have been able to promote our folks from major to lieutenant colonel exceeding the Air Force rate for the last
4 years. And on Tuesday of this week, four of my active members were selected for O–6.

So we have a good process, but in terms of getting volunteers and people with the right degrees, we still have a little bit of challenge that we are working at without——

Dr. SNYDER. Colonel.

Colonel DAMM. Mr. Chairman, you asked a specific question on the turnover rate. Sir, I see that as a challenge and not a detractor. We are very excited about hiring faculty that have one, commanded, two, have Masters degrees, and then the third iteration is Top Level School (TLS).

So, occasionally we don’t get the TLS, but we want upwardly-mobile, good faculty members and the backside of that is that we lose them. As I say, we had six up for O–6 this year and we had five selected. So immediately when they are selected, they leave.

The analogy I will use is that as I start off as an F–4 pilot and I moved from that analog airplane to F–16s for an exchange tour with the Air Force, and as a guy who had somebody in the back seat helping me out, an F–4’s to a guy who was doing it all by myself in F–16’s for the first iteration of students, I was about a step and a half ahead of them.

So it causes our instructors to work a little harder for the first month of school. We will get them here in about two weeks. But we like having good people. We like having people who are upwardly mobile and we think they fit perfectly with that.

One of our challenges I think is our building was built in 1919. It was renovated in 1997. It is not digital-friendly and we are working through that right now, sir, and that is probably one of the bigger challenges we have that—to make that better as we go along with the students.

Dr. SNYDER. When you say work through that, does that mean trying to find money?

Colonel DAMM. Some, sir. We can try to do wireless, which is not that expensive. When we do one of our exercises, we run wireless throughout the system. But right now with Navy, Marine Corps Internet (NMCI) that can’t work all the time.

Now, our students can go over to our Gray Research Center facility and they are much better at their digital connecting than we are and the college itself.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Wittman, as much time as you need.

Mr. WITTMAN. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am going to ask some specific questions and then go into a suite of general questions for each of you. I will begin with General Kasun.

The Joint Forces Staff College obviously is your purview, but I wanted to ask are you adequately being resourced for the Joint Advanced Warfare School and, if not, is there a plan for that to happen or how do you think that should happen?

Secondly, when you talked about aging facilities, is there currently a military construction (MILCON) in place or is this on the unmet needs list? I am just wondering where that is in the process if we are identifying that as something that needs to be addressed. Where are we in that process?
And then what I will do is just put some general questions out there for the rest of the panel members. I wanted to get a sense from you about how you survey students and graduates to assess quality and how you use that to manage and adjust your programs.

Secondly, as we talked about keeping faculty, and I think that goes to not only—actually, in two areas, recruiting and retaining. And I wanted to get your ideas about how you think we should recruit and retain top-tier civilian faculty. I want to focus a little bit on that. You talked about uniformed faculty there, but civilian faculty and what do you have in mind as the definition of top-tier and what are the things that go into that effort to attract those folks?

And then, lastly, we have heard a lot about this in some of our previous hearings about how do we, at this level, identify promising officers with the potential for high-level strategic thinking at this particular point in their career? And how do we do that?

And then, how do we take that information and use that to develop these officers to their full potential, and is there something after the intermediate schools where these officers can be tracked and monitored to make sure that we have the best and brightest making their way into these key, critical leadership positions.

And I know that is a lot, but I wanted to try to go ahead and get at that and——

General Kasun. Sir, I was just trying to make sure I got all those notes.

Mr. Wittman. Sure. Absolutely. [Laughter.]

Thank you.

General Kasun. You want me to start out and then pass it and then come back?

Mr. Wittman. Yes. That will be great.

General Kasun. I will answer one that way. It won’t bog down the deal here.

Are we adequately being resourced? That is a good question, sir. I believe that, at this point, we have for our 41, 42 students that arrive, we have just enough. We have 10 faculty, and so we have three seminars.

Currently, we are going to get another faculty member and we have intent to increase to four seminars, but that is not another 12 people because right now we have 14 in each. We are dropping it down. So it’s really about seven or eight additional students.

Again, my intent would be to increase the JAWS school to approximately 60, if that was going to be possible. We are looking for master campaign planners out in the field. The COCOM and the Joint Staff have asked for approximately 120 billets, JAWS-coded billets. We can’t do that, sir.

At this rate, the way they are being assigned, certainly, like I mentioned in my speech, we are not even meeting some of those. They are not even being touched because they are being put into different jobs. We have one JAWS graduate who is a speech writer. A great writer. He does very well.

So, we have them all over, but they are not in the right billet. So if we determine to do that, then I would suggest that we expand it. Like I said, again, it is on the equation of the other advanced warfighting schools.
So I believe that it would be a good point to see if we can do that. That would take more funding. Yes, sir. More resources, both faculty as well as support in the classrooms as well.

Our aging facilities. Sir, we are working on a MILCON request. But right now because we have our air conditioning system in the buildings, they are very antiquated, we are looking at getting them refurbished. We had funding. It has now been bumped. We have to make a determination if we need to build new buildings by putting in a new air conditioning system because there is still the asbestos issue.

So, that is something, yes, sir, that I believe that we could look at and probably could utilize your help on.

Mr. Wittman. Okay.

Admiral WISECUP. I am sorry, sir, if one of the questions was directed at me, I missed it entirely. I apologize.

Mr. Wittman. No, no. That is all right. I just kind of gave that suite of questions and wanted to try to get everybody's thoughts on that about how to attract top-tier civilian faculty, how do you survey your students about quality, and then also how do we use the process to identify those high-level strategic thinkers and make sure that that follows them through their career so that each branch is getting the best and putting them into positions where they can succeed and do the most for each branch.

Admiral WISECUP. Sir. No, I am sorry.

Mr. Wittman. That is all right.

Admiral WISECUP. We recently had an opening in our strategy and policy department, and I will tell you we had 60 applicants for the position. In the end, this is civilian faculty, of which you know we have a good number. We have about I want to say 63 percent of our faculty is civilian.

I think, in those terms, the only difficulty is the fact that we are a war college which is a little off-putting, but we are working on that. We are reaching out, we are coming more on line, we are shining a light on ourselves so that others understand.

We also use our network. I mean, we have a very, very good network with Fletcher School, Yale, others, people who are faculty know and we use that network hard on the civilian side.

With respect to the survey system, frankly, our students actually complain that they are over-surveyed. Each course at graduation, graduates, alumni at the two-year mark and five years post-graduation, and then what we call our academic policy council reviews those results.

I feel confident that, you know, we are getting the kind of feedback that we need to keep the curriculum current and fresh.

And then, I am sorry, I can't remember the last point.

Mr. Wittman. The last one is just how do we identify high-level strategic thinkers and then what do we do to nurture them to make sure that they get further advancement and get tracked and monitored to make sure we are getting the best out of them and putting them into positions where they can succeed?

Admiral WISECUP. Yes, sir.

Our, I mean, our graduates are all earmarked in the personnel system. For me, having thought about this for a while now since
I have been there and also having talked with Representative Skelton, that is one of the places I want to zero in because trying to identify these people early is really the challenge.

And sometimes, you know, even before they come to the War College that is part of getting the right people also to the War College. But in the end, what I find is that our faculty who actually touches these students are in a very, very good position to be tapped and so what I am shooting for is George Marshall's little black book so that we know who these people are, of course, there are ways to get that into the system formally.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Admiral.

General Cardon.

General CARDON. Sir, we also do extensive surveys on our students and the faculty also does an assessment and we assess post—once they leave. And we just finished another survey. The stack of data is about this thick and that goes back into our curriculum.

We feel pretty good that we got an assessment means to fix it. Some of the data that comes back is rather interesting. For example, we have a rotational model that we are using now. The force generation was not seen as value-added then, but I think it is seen much more as value-added now.

So, there is some assessment that has to be done there as well. Recruiting and retaining top faculty. We have tried to—we have three previous points. One is we have tried to implement a chair program. That needs money. And we are trying to do that with our foundation.

The second way that we attract top faculty is to try and get the niche areas such as history, strategic studies or ethics, et cetera, that has a draw where it can influence, this year it will be up to 1,500 majors. So there is a draw on that.

We do have a challenge with top-tier faculty because of our location at Kansas City or Fort Leavenworth, which is a lot different than many of them living around the top universities. However, we are doing a lot more with the University of Kansas.

All of our faculty have to teach, and that is the other thing that goes against top-tier faculty, because a lot of them want to write as well, and we are not set up that way right now. It is something that Dr. Ping and I will have to look at here in the future.

And, sir, the last thing for identifying promising officers, I think there are three ways we are doing that. One is they self-select. We have the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) that celebrated its 25th anniversary, well-known, but that is a self-select program. But it is very demanding to get in.

The second is there is an elective program that gives you what we call a six Zulu identifier which identifies you as a strategist. We are looking for two parts. We actually have a functional area in the army for strategists, but they don't command. And then we have commanders that we want to be strategists. I think we need both.

And so both programs work in those directions.

Now, are we getting absolutely the best officers to be our strategists? The Army now has what they call a Leader Development Panel which, as captains, tries to identify those officers that have specific skill sets in certain areas that we want to further develop.
I don’t think that it is working as well as it could be because of the demands on the force, that we have a lot of opportunities out there, but we have a lot of requirements that have to be filled by the combatant commanders.

That is all I have.

Mr. Wittman. Okay.

General Jackson.

General JACKSON, Sir, to maintain a great curriculum, we need to stay relevant and current. As such, we must listen to our external and internal customers. We do that with a myriad of survey initiatives like a few of my other colleagues have mentioned—as we look at it lesson by lesson, daily comments from the students and the faculty, we have focus groups, interviews and special surveys as needed. And of course, at the end of the course all of the students will compile a survey and highlight the good things that happened.

At the end of the year, all of the students that are doing the graduation week complete a survey that will allow us to prepare for the next upcoming point. Our alumni and alumni supervisors will be contacted 12 months after graduation to ensure that we are instilling the right skills with our customers as they receive our services.

And we have a variety of external sources, the Process for Accreditation of Joint Education, operational readiness, the president of the Southern Association of Schools and Colleges, our own POV and our command board of advisors who are the vice commanders of our major commands.

We ask their inputs to see if we are actually producing the kinds of folks that they would like.

With respect to recruiting and retaining students and faculty, I look at faculty development as a great investment. For every dollar I put into the program, I will get a return of about 10. And as such, we send our civilian faculty to various professional symposia. We recruit from those means.

We try to attract and develop relationships with great schools like the University of Denver or Gonzaga so that we can identify some folks that may want to come to our school. Once they get identified to the school, we review their C.V.’s to see if they are the kind of folks that can bring the tools that we would like to have to instill and develop in front of our students.

We have a very good program. We also have a sabbatical. Since we are all located at Maxwell Air Force Base, we have the Maxwell Research Institute, which will allow our Ph.D. folks to do the things that are important to maintain their academic credentials, and that is publish, research.

We have an opportunity for them to take a 1-year sabbatical to work issues that are of interest to them or to the United States Air Force and the joint community at large.

Sir, to identify high-level thinkers, last week we graduated the 18th class of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. This is similar to the SAMS program. This is where we identify our best intermediate-level majors, lieutenant colonels, or international officers. We steep them in another year of academic rigor to filter that.
We will look at where the special experience identifier for them and continue on with a possibility of establishing a Ph.D. program at our school that will allow us to continue the opportunity but also be very sensitive to the command opportunities so that we can develop a true warrior-scholars.

Colonel DAMM. Congressman, thank you for your questions.

Mr. WITTMAN. Sure.

Colonel DAMM. With our students, all of our students are board-selected. I have sat on a couple of those boards myself throughout my career. And so we consider about ⅓ of the Marines can go to resident course. So, we select those and to attend the other schools as well.

On the survey issue, we survey our students throughout the year. We survey them at the end of the year for the entire class, and then we survey them about six, eight months after they have been out. And that is kind of important for us because I talked about our cultural interagency operations course. They hated it last year—it was one of the newer courses—and then six months after they were out in the fleet said that was the best thing we could have gotten.

So, we read all those surveys. We try to apply them to our curriculum review board and make changes where changes apply, but we don’t change everything because of that.

We also survey the commanders. It is very important for us to know whether the commanders are getting the graduates that they want. And that is where we come up with the fact that they want them to be able to read, write, speak and make decisions.

Our civilian faculty, when we went to the Title X hiring process, it made it a much better process for us because we can hire and pay world-class faculty. And we believe we have gotten that opportunity.

We were looking for four for the next year. We had 31 applicants. Those applicants came from referrals. Those applications came from personal networking of our own faculty that we had and then also via an electronic system that the request goes out.

How do we retain them? I think some of our faculty will come and tell us that I will be here for four or five years, and I would like to move on. Some of our faculty come because they get tired of academia. Some of our faculty come—they are former military—they come for the reputation of the school and where we are, 30 miles south of D.C. And then some faculty come just because they love Marines and they love teaching.

We have Dr. Bittner who is starting his 35th year with us this year. And how we keep them? We have another one, Dr. DiNardo, he is publishing his sixth book I think this fall. He has been here for a while.

As you know, we bridge the tactical to the operational and then we bridge to the strategic and the school.

How do we I.D. our tactical—or our strategic thinkers, excuse me. We have the same process and our School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW) program was modeled after SAMS at Fort Leavenworth. We actually board-select—it is voluntary—but we board-select them to go to the school and it is one of the nice things
is we have recently opened it up about three years ago to non-resident courses because not every Marine can get to a resident course. So, but they still have to interview and get themselves in. We also tag them with a Military Occupational Specialty, 0505, so you can find them amongst the 200—almost 200,000 Marines, now. You can figure out who they are.

We also look at the published papers through the year for our thinkers and we look at those who are outstanding teachers we think become the strategic leaders of the future.

As for the college itself, we have had a wonderful thing. As you know, General Gardner, today I will head back south and attend his retirement ceremony. But he has been there for 5 years, 54 years of service in the Marine Corps. And the nice thing about having him there was he has given us a strategic vision for the school and that is where our fiscal vision, our strategic vision has come from.

Thank you, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Colonel.
General Kasun.
General Kasun. Thank you, sir.

As for the surveying the students, we actually do queries as well. We do the surveys during the school time, but afterwards we send out surveys to both the students as well as the graduates as well as their supervisors to find out if they are—just like some others—are getting what they want.

And we have been getting very, very good feedback as long as the students came to them already educated or if they have gone and let them go to come back. If they have actually invested—and I use that word because I believe it is investing in education and the people—if they have invested their time to let it go, let that person go for a bit, then they are very, very happy with the quality and what they are getting.

However, many of our surveys that go out, they go out to the supervisors, and they are the service supervisors, and it is “thank you very much, but he is a commander, doing a great job.” Or as a planner, if they are on staff, they are not necessarily a planner, but, yes, he understands joint. She understands joint.

But that is how that works.

On the flipside with our JAWS graduates, everybody is extremely happy when they have a JAWS graduate on their staff no matter where they are at. Again, we prefer to put them in the planning position where they are supposed to be or a JAWS-coded billet, but they are very satisfied with the education that they are getting through the JAWS.

And the students, the graduates, are very happy for the most part.

The senior officers that are coming through, all of the O–6s that are coming through certainly because now there are not more waivers, most of them have been joint, in joint billets and joint staffs many times, so when they are coming by to get their education way back after the backside of their careers, it is okay. They say yes. Good training. Good education.

Civilian faculty. How do we recruit and retain? We actually advertise in every possible venue to make sure that everybody across
the board has the opportunity, and then we go through a very rigorous matrix and a hiring process.

So I feel that we do get the highest quality and we can attract them there in the Norfolk area. It is only three-and-a-half hours away from the big city.

Their main concern, any faculty that we do hire on the civilian side is that there is very little white space for them to do any thinking outside the box, any stopping and working on research and publishing. However, we have had many published papers from some of our faculty, but they are doing it on their own time because truly there is no white space there.

We are looking to fund and establish a writing program. We have found through the JCWS and the JAWS that the students need a writing refresher. And that is through the thesis as well as the papers that they are writing. People aren’t doing that well.

So, that is what we need to look forward as well. We are looking to a Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for a couple of additional people. Of course, that is going to build out the need for some space and time, or space and equipment. But we are looking to hopefully pull on two more people to get that set up.

Identifying the high level of strategic thinkers. We have to defer to our service, our brothers and sisters in the services to actually choose the planners. They are the ones who actually send the students to our college. As a joint college, we don’t choose who comes. They choose who comes, how they are vetted, how they get there to the JAWS and there is not always the same boarding as they are sent to the war colleges. And I find that just a little bit disconcerting because I feel that we do need just as strong a vetting process.

For the placement, again, the services choose where they are placed. So, it would be great if we can get that kind of fixed up and online, but it is not much different than the service schools. When they choose the—to go to these schools and specifically the SAMS and SAWS and the Advanced Warfighting Schools, they have a plan.

But the services each, as I understand it, tag their service personnel differently. So, they will follow them, and if you are a planner, some of them will follow. But they don’t necessarily tag them, or tag them as joint planners.

So, thank you.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.

How often do the five of you get together, and when was the last time you were all together?

Sorry?

Colonel DAMM. Mr. Chairman, we were at the Military Education Coordination Council (MECC), and then we had a pre-MECC meeting in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas about 3 months before that. Twice this year, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. Do you all formally try to get together on a regular basis? Is that helpful or not? It sounds like you have some similar issues. At least give you a chance to poach each other’s faculty, I would think. [Laughter.]
Is it something you find helpful, or do you meet on a formal basis to sit down with each other, or is it more kind of random?

General Kasun. Sir, I would say that it would be very helpful to get together more often, but we have, with our schedules, sir, we haven’t been doing that.

Dr. Snyder. You have some similar concerns.

Colonel, I am going to start with you and go the other way. How are you chosen for this job and where does it fit into your career? Will you retire out of this job, or how does your service view your service or how were you selected?

Colonel Damm. Sir, I am probably a little bit of a different case because, at this point, I just passed my 29th year. So, I will retire out of this job, next year.

What happens in the schools is the school is actually a requisition that goes up to the commandant, he will pick some folks, and then the commandant will choose that person.

But I think the lead-up to me coming to be the director of the school was I was at our Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) staff training program just before I came there, which goes around, and it is another model after the Army’s Battle Command Training Program, which I also had the pleasure of spending two years on.

They go out and they train staffs, we train staffs before they went out to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). So, I was there for two years as a deputy, and then my name went up and the commandant approved it for me to go down to the college.

So, besides that, sir, I have taught Air Force guys how to fly F–16s. I spent two years teaching youngsters how to fly F/A–18s, which was a wonderful experience, down at Oceana. And, so, I had a lot of opportunity to teach people.

I have to teach them how to think now, not how to fly, though.

Dr. Snyder. General Jackson.

General Jackson. Mr. Chairman, I will retire from the Air Force in 19 days, but that is a good thing—I think our process works. Of course, our chief gets involved. We view, as you know, sir, military education is very, very high importantly. I think I was a little unusual. I am the 40th commandant of former commandant at Air Command and Staff College but the first that has been on the faculty.

I bring a different perspective to the school and, as I mentioned in my remarks, it has changed exponentially better from the late 1980s when I was there as a student and as a faculty. It is a very, very focused program.

I think about it a little bit because I had seen things out there that we are doing. I have also considered that the faculty needs to be looked at very, very strongly. We have that look from our interuniversity commander and our former interuniversity commander was promoted to four-star, and he is now a commander of the Air Education and Training Command, so we did a lot of focus on ensuring that we have the right resources and the faculty to do our job for the United States Air Force and the joint community, sir.

Dr. Snyder. General Cardon.

General Cardon. Sir, I know the secretary and the chief had something to do with this. I am not exactly sure how I was se-
lected. I was told 3 months before I arrived back from my 15-month tour there in Iraq.

I am not retiring. I am trying to stay in the Army a while longer, and I think the Army did look pretty hard because the three previous deputy commandants have retired. And that is not the trend that has been in this position, which, if you look at the wall of previous deputy commandants, they have all gone on into much more senior positions in the Army.

Admiral WISECUP. Sir, I can honestly say that, you know, I got the call from Admiral Roughead asking me to come and be president of the Naval War College. I came off Operational Fleet Command. I was out at the Carrier Strike Group 7 in charge of the Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group.

So, operationally, very current, and that is necessary for background, credibility with the students and the war gaming piece of the Naval War College.

But as you look down our corridor which, you know, now has portraits of presidents over 125 years, it is mixed. So, in the end, I come into this job, and I tell everyone I am on a day-to-day contract, and I am just going to work as hard as I can, and I don't know what the future holds.

But if you look over time, many of these presidents have gone on to other positions after. Stansfield Turner, for example, in the 1970s went on to be Director of the CIA. Those kinds of things.

But in terms of Navy, I can't answer that question, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. General.

General KASUN. Sir, I have a somewhat unique background. I was the Deputy Commanding General of the Intelligence Security Command at Fort Belvoir as an Individual Mobilization Augmentee. As a reserve officer, I was called up and said that my name is being put into the hat as the nominee for the Army Reserve to be the Commandant for the Joint Forces Staff College. That was sometime in June.

In August, I was somewhere over Australia on Capstone, and I got an e-mail saying that you are now the Commandant of the Joint Forces Staff College. And so about one month later I took the staff and thrilled to be there. I believe that I am at the right place at the right time.

For my future, sir, I am in a two-star billet. I am very honored to be there. It is up to the chairman as well as my Chief of the Army Reserve what happens to me now. [Laughter.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

You all may have touched on this when Mr. Wittman was asking about looking for strategists, but I hope I am not asking you something repetitive, but do you all look for potential Ph.D. candidates and, if so, what mechanisms do you have for considering, you know, calling to somebody's attention or shepherding them into a program.

Again, Colonel Damm, I will start with you.

Colonel DAMM. Mr. Chairman, no, I would say that we probably do not do that. But they can be identified generally through our faculty. As my dean sits behind me, he was an Army officer, a graduate at West Point, that type of thing. And we can point them in the right direction to do that.
But I will say that the Marine Corps does not look at our program as a pre-Ph.D. program.

Dr. SNYDER. General Jackson.

General JACKSON. Sir, we have a couple of opportunities for our faculty and also our students. I currently have 10 folks that are in Ph.D. pipeline. We normally get between three and four of our faculty members to go to a school to get a Ph.D.—I currently have 11 military faculty members that are products of that kind of organization.

We have looked to build strategists and Ph.D.s in particular. Once they finish Air Command and Staff College they are vetted to a board, get selected for a slew of advanced air and space higher studies.

We have looked at the possibility of increasing the rigor in that program to get them all but dissertationed, and then allow them to go back to the field to get operational command or things to fill up their portfolio professionally and then bring them back as a research fellow at senior development education, probably at Air War College, and allow them to write their dissertation so that we can allow them to think strategically, get an operational pause, command, and an operational opportunity and then come back and become the strategist of the future, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. General Cardon.

General CARDON. Sir, we don't do it that way.

When we met in Fort Leavenworth, when we heard about what the Air Force was doing with their advanced program, we are looking at that for our SAMS program. But we have no—we do not use the school to identify strategists for Ph.D. programs at this time.

Dr. SNYDER. And when I mentioned Ph.D., I don't specifically mean in strategy in terms of Ph.D.-quality people.

General CARDON. Sir, Ph.D.s for the Army are really in two—I would say two places. One is you do it as a junior officer, in other words as a captain where you have a lot of time, so by the time they come to the school, that time has already passed. Or they are going to go to a job that requires a Ph.D.

For example, they are going to go teach at West Point and the decision is that they want you to go to a Ph.D. program. So, I think once you get past major, there is little opportunity for a field-grade officer to attend school for that amount of time without going in to a very specific billet.

Dr. SNYDER. Right.

Admiral WISECUP. Sir, what I have seen in my short time is that there is a very nice, informal network managed centrally in the Officer Personnel Information System (OPINS) staff, that is Admiral Doug Crowder’s folks who manage things like Federal Executive Fellowships, graduate programs and things like that, Arthur Morrow scholarships up to Fletcher, those types of things.

But I think that we have the possibility to keep our eye open for good talent and, like one of the gentlemen said the faculty is very helpful in identifying those people. And I talk to a lot of students, too.

You can tell when you talk to some of these folks that not only are they bringing operational experience and they are going to be the big thinkers, okay, but you read some of their papers and you
know immediately that these are the kind of guys we want to keep our eye on.

For me, personally, it is, right now, it is an informal feedback network to talk to the people who are actually trying to keep their eyes out on their staff.

Dr. Snyder. General Kasun.

General Kasun. Sir, for the Joint Forces Staff College, we just went through a large surge, and not all of them were Ph.D.s, so we are not going out exclusively for them. But, however, within the actual hiring contract, they have to roll within a Ph.D. program within the 3 years.

There are eight universities, local universities, that have doctorate courses that they can actually enroll in, or, of course, there are others.

So, yes, sir, we need it for the JAWS as well as for our accreditation.

Dr. Snyder. For the faculty. I got you.

Colonel Damm, I had just one specific question for you. You all have been perhaps more aggressive about language, formal language training, and what kind of feedback do you get from your graduates as far as whether that language training has been helpful or not, in terms of trying to get specific language skills, and where they are going to end up and how it has worked out for them?

Colonel Damm. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question.

We kind of have come to the realization on the language that we have looked at a couple of different things, sir. We have looked at a full year program. We have found that that is not really cost effective. What we should probably do for a language, if we truly want Marines to have that language skill, is to start it at TBS, at The Basic School, and then have them followed.

They are already doing some tagging with foreign area officer stuff where they actually get tested on that language and use it and have some cultural program that they are part of.

What we have figured out is that if we give them a year at school it doesn’t work very well. So, what we have gone to is the negotiation exercise where last year was the first year we did it this way. We used to do it all in one block. Last year, we just finished. Excuse me sir.

We had the Defense Language Institute (DLI) come out in the fall, give them instruction for a couple weeks on specific languages. We only had four this year. Korean was part of it last year. And next year, as I told you, we are going to switch to the Afghan dialects.

Then we give them Rosetta Stone and have them practice that throughout the year, and then in the spring we come to the negotiation exercise where we just want them to have survival-level language training where they do the niceties of the cultural, hello, you know, how are you, who is that, who is the big guy around here, that type of thing, and then turn it over to a negotiator.

So, the feedback from this year, and as I talked about the cultural piece, I am going to—I would like to see what it is eight months from now. But the feedback was good, but that was about the right amount for them.
We also involve our international students a little bit in that as part of the negotiator or the negotee that they are talking to. So, it works now. I would like to see, and I think the commandant would like to see, much more of the language piece that follows a Marine through his entire career.

But I don't think we can do it in the 10 months that we have them.

Dr. Snyder. Right.

Doesn't have any of the—I don't remember if you and I have ever talked about it, Colonel Damm, but I have always thought is that when we are not talking enlisted now that it ought to start the first day of Marine Corps boot camp. That you have a—you don't get to relax very much at Marine Corps boot camp from enlisted, but like at either—like lunchtime that you would have a foreign language, perhaps, native speaker that would let the lunchtime be a relaxed thing if people spoke in that language and learned to talk. That it would just be a way of making it part of—wouldn't take any much more time away from the rifle range or the obstacle course or anything.

But we would just bring home, you know, this may actually help you sometime. Because it has got to start early. And then you would identify the people that you think are important or that value the language.

I think we have probably kept you all here long enough. I am sure we will have some formal questions for the record and probably some informal phone calls and so on as time goes by. I hope you will feel free to share with us any thoughts you have, if you think of something after you leave here, and just send us something or call us up.

We are going to continue to look at this over the next several months and we continue to value your input.

General Jackson, seeing as how you have got, like, 18 1/2 days to go, this is your last chance to say anything you want to say to the Congress. [Laughter.]

General Jackson. I just appreciate the opportunity to serve and what the committee and Congress has done for our United States, sir.

Dr. Snyder. Well, we appreciate your service.

Thank you all. We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 10:47 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Opening Statement of
Chairman Dr. Vic Snyder
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

Hearing on “Raising Thinking from the Tactical to the Operational Level: JPME I and II at the Services’ and Joint Command & Staff Colleges”

June 23, 2009

The hearing will come to order.

Good morning, and welcome to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations’ third hearing on in-residence officer professional military education.

In our previous session, we looked at the role of the senior schools, that is, the war colleges and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, in educating strategists. Today, we have the commandants and directors of the intermediate schools in the PME enterprise—representing the individual Services’ command and staff colleges and the Joint Forces Staff College. These schools are focused on taking competent tacticians and raising their thinking to the next higher level, that of the “operational art.” And, although we see officers being exposed to joint operations earlier and earlier in their careers, teaching joint operations in a comprehensive manner is still a mainstay of the intermediate schools’ curricula.

In our next hearing, we will hear from the commandants and directors of the service academies and career schools. And, at a subsequent hearing, we will also invite those responsible for setting overarching Department of Defense, Joint and Service guidance on professional military education.

Our witnesses today are Brigadier General Katherine Kasun, United States Army, Commandant of the Joint Forces Staff College; Rear
Admiral James Wisecup, United States Navy, President of the Naval War College; Brigadier General Edward Cardon, Deputy Commandant, Army Command and General Staff College; Brigadier General Jimmie Jackson, United States Air Force, Commandant of the Air Command and Staff College; and Colonel Raymond Damm, U.S. Marine Corps, Director of the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

Welcome to all of you and thank you for being here. Your entire prepared statements will be made part of the record. If you would like to submit anything as a follow-up, our staff will be in contact, and we’ll appreciate your response to any questions for the record we may send to you after this session.
Statement of Ranking Member Rob Wittman  
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations  
House Armed Services Committee  

Hearing on Professional Military Education—Commandants’ View  

June 25, 2009  

Thank you, Chairman Snyder, and good morning to our witnesses—we appreciate your being here today, especially Admiral Wisecup who is making his second appearance this month.

Today’s hearing focuses on the first level of joint professional officer education, which comes after an officer is well grounded in his or her service, selected for field grade rank, and is ready for broader responsibilities. More importantly, completion of the intermediate level of education or JPME I, is expected of all majors and lieutenant commanders. Therefore, unlike the war colleges, these schools are the only schools which educate all officers attaining the rank of O-4, and are thus an important touchstone of the joint professional education system.

While concentrating on operational matters of their respective services, the schools provide an important, early joint education through
more than the subjects taught. The use of other service faculty and attendance by other service, international, and interagency students in these seminar based courses provide a broadening perspective. The witnesses will understand then, our interest in questions of faculty quality and diversity of experience, and the ability of the services to support each other with excellent faculty and students. Without a solid mix of other service and agency faculty and students, none of your institutions can provide a credible joint education. I would appreciate hearing both your success stories and your obstacles in attaining these goals as you testify today.

Our preliminary research indicates that the Army and Navy programs are in transitional periods. In fact, it seems the Army may believe it over reached in its stated goal of sending all majors to in residence intermediate education at Fort Leavenworth, and may scale back these plans. It would be useful to have on the record the reasons the Army determined to educate all majors in residence and the difficulties it has faced in reaching this goal.

I am less concerned with service differences in school organization and placement in the service bureaucracy. What’s important is getting the right people, both faculty and students, and funding to do the job.
Mr. Chairman, since I'd like to hear from our witnesses and I'm mindful that our National Defense Authorization bill is being debated on the floor of the House today, I will stop here.

Thank you.
STATEMENT BY
BG KATHERINE P. KASUN
COMMANDANT
JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

BEFORE THE
OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FIRST SESSION, 111TH CONGRESS

JUNE 25, 2009

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY
THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to report on the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC). JFSC is proud of its unique nature and role in the preparation of joint officers. Ever since the need for a school such as ours was seen by ADM Nimitz and GEN Eisenhower in 1946 and the graduation of the first class a year later, we have contributed to the process of joint education. Through the Goldwater-Nichols legislation and the Skelton Panel Report, Congress has provided superb direction and clear vision for joint education. I believe that current legislation continues to reflect that guidance but still allows adequate flexibility for each institution to most effectively carry out its role.

I’m very happy to be in a position to help ensure that our officers are prepared to work with other Services, agencies, and nations. In the years following the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, students only had three choices to obtain Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II: graduate from National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, or the Armed Forces Staff College, now JFSC. Our course, the Joint and Combined Warfighting School, or JCWS, became a temporary-duty JPME College where Phase II of the Chairman’s Program for Joint Education was taught. In 2005, we went to a ten-week course offered four times a year. Despite Service war colleges now providing Phase II credit, we still have no trouble filling our military slots with both those junior officers pending joint assignments as well as those more senior officers who graduated from the war colleges before they granted Phase II.

Since 2000, JFSC has expanded to four schools and a number of courses, preparing over 3,600 students each year to serve in the current and future joint force, as articulated in the Chairman's Vision for Joint Officer Development. Today I will focus on two of our schools, the Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS), and the Joint Advanced Warfighting School, or JAWS. They each provide resident Joint Professional Military Education, JPME as opposed to Service Staff Colleges which focus on Service skills and JPME Phase I only. JAWS also provides Intermediate Level Education/Senior Level
Education based on the status of the student. I will also briefly mention the Joint Continuing Distance Education School (JCDES), which provides joint education to Reserve officers through a blend of distance learning and face-to-face sessions. Our fourth school, the Joint Command, Control, and Information Operations School (JC2IOS), instructs individuals assigned to or en route to Information Operations or Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence positions on joint staffs. We also offer several short courses, such as the one-week Homeland Security Planners Course, and the Joint, Interagency, Multinational Planners Course. During recent years we have also been tasked to provide ten-day courses that bring together senior US and Pakistani or US and Russian officers. All of these courses contribute to the joint education provided by the schools within the College, and just as importantly are force multipliers to the joint force.

Vision and Mission

Our vision as a College is to be the premier institution for educating national security professionals in planning and executing joint operations. We are a cutting edge educational institution that is adapting its organizational structure, curricula and course offerings in response to evolving global security challenges. The College works closely with Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) to include emerging joint operating concepts such as Irregular Warfare (IW) in its programs. The JFSC faculty Combatant Command (COCOM) liaison officers stay in tune with critical issues of their respective commands. This involvement helps ensure that our curricula remain relevant and supportive to those COCOMs.

To achieve this vision, our mission is to educate national security professionals to plan and execute joint, multinational, and interagency operations and to instill a primary commitment to joint, multinational, and interagency teamwork, attitudes, and perspectives. We prepare selected officers for joint and combined staff duty. We are aligned with the CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development to produce "strategically minded, critical thinking and skilled joint warfighters" and NDU's Mission, Vision, and Values to achieve core joint warfighting competencies for national security professionals today and lead the effort to prepare them for the future by implementing a common strategic vision.
Educational Philosophy

The 1989 “Report of the Panel on Military Education” of the 101st Congress of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives noted, “In the Panel’s view, the selection, assignment, and education systems need to be better coordinated in order to maximize the inherent synergy of those three factors.” This statement is just as true today as it was then. In fact, perhaps more so. I can only speak for joint education in general, and JFSC in particular, but I strongly believe that the education we currently provide is focused on the right subjects and delivered in an academically rigorous manner. However, the ultimate utility of that education is still dependent on the Services sending the student to us at the right time and assigning them to the right duties afterwards. Much of Chapter IV of the Report provides a superb framework for JFSC’s academic responsibilities and as such, I plan to use it to frame my presentation. To summarize, the framework outlined for JFSC to effectively teach joint education consists of the following four considerations:

- The right curriculum must be taught.
- The curriculum must be rigorous and taught by the most appropriate means to be effective.
- The right faculty must be teaching the material.
- The course must be taught to the right students at the appropriate time.

All of this must come together and support the acculturation of our students to the joint environment. We ensure that our curriculum, learning environment and teaching methodologies, and overall school structure is designed to stress the importance of acculturation and provide students every opportunity to experience it and grow.

While JFSC can manage its curriculum and much of the faculty support, as already noted, some areas remain which fall under the purview of the Services. Therefore, with this outline from Congress as our standard, allow me to take a few minutes to provide my assessment of how we are currently achieving our mission. As part of this, I will answer your specific questions, and highlight our successes.
and innovations. I will also identify those challenges that affect our ability to carry out our mandate. Finally, I will present my vision of JFSC's future and recommendations for growth and improvement.

The Right Curriculum Must be Taught

Curriculum in our schools is guided by "Joint Matters" as defined by law and implementing guidance such as the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff's Officers Military Education Policy (OPMEP) and Special Areas of Emphasis (SAE) among others. JFSC complements its counterpart institutions at Fort McNair. Where they teach at the strategic level, it is our responsibility to teach at the strategic-operational nexus and at the overall operational level. Our joint education schools focus on joint planning at the operational level, with each school's focus based on the nature of the students and the positions for which they are being groomed. The JPME II provided by JCWS it its ten-week program and the joint education provided by the Joint Continuing Distance Education School (JCDES) in its forty-week blended program focuses on preparing Joint Qualified Officers, ensuring that those Active and Reserve officers are prepared for duty in a joint environment, and can quickly step into a role as a member of an operational planning team. For JAWS, our goal is to educate officers who can immediately lead a planning team on the Joint Staff or at a COCOM. The curriculum is both developed and delivered by the faculty. This helps ensure that it is current and relevant, while also promoting its effective delivery in the classroom.

The College continuously assesses all of its schools. Within our curricula, we focus on enduring concepts by concentrating on the critical aspects of joint planning. The level of detail we are able to address in each course increases with the length of the program. Our curricula is focused on joint matters and the OPMEP. We receive new potential topics through various venues, for instance, doctrinal and policy changes, new guidance, broader changes of society or the world at large, recommendations for COCOMs, lessons learned, or just the identification that there are important new concepts or ideas that must be considered. Within each school there are avenues for considering and implementing such changes in an organized manner which ensure overall learning objectives continue to focus on what's important. On the College level there are also avenues of review in order to ensure that the academic
foundation for each school remains solid. The regular collection of feedback from students, faculty, and all those involved in the education processes ensures the curricula remains vital and provides a continuous focus on excellence in learning.

While each of the JPME Phase II granting courses has a specific curriculum to meet its mission, strategy is a key element in all of the curricula. Strategy is a critical examination of the relationship between ends, ways, and means on a national level. The decisions made in support of strategy are those which lead to the planning processes and requirements which are the foundation of JFSC education programs. Military history is an important aspect of our curriculum. Not only does it provide the background for current actions and decisions, but it also helps us prepare officers for the future by examining the lessons of the past. Additionally, new topics such as IW are routinely incorporated into the curricula in the manner most appropriate for each school. I will provide specific details of how these subjects are incorporated into each school as I provide the highlights of their curricula.

Another area of particular interest to this Committee concerns language and culture in the curriculum. This testimony will note areas of cultural awareness liberally woven throughout the curricula. However, in accordance with the OPMEP and the short time we have to provide our students with the fundamentals of joint mission, we do not teach any languages at JFSC. Nevertheless, through our library we subscribe to on-line language programs. This program allows interested students, staff, and faculty access to various levels of 31 languages. The library also holds an extensive collection of audio language materials to both teach and help faculty and students maintain their skills.

Each of the schools also participates in an elective program. It provides for specialized knowledge that enriches the curriculum and allows students to tailor their studies to suit the needs of their particular joint duty assignment. The four- and eight-week electives cover COCOMs; the contemporary environment, to include courses in low intensity conflict and counter-terrorism; and operational art where students explore areas such as information operations or joint logistics in more depth.

JCWS

The JCWS program uses an integrated learning concept employing a background scenario, based on a fictitious COCOM, U.S. Eastern Command (USEASTCOM). This provides a framework for the ordering of lessons as well as a contextual framework for the assignments students complete as part
of each lesson. The courses build on previous instruction, exercises and simulations. Each seminar functions independently, with the students in each seminar serving as members of the USEASTCOM staff and working curriculum-based requirements accordingly, either as individuals or as a team. Depending on the particular exercise or simulation, students may have an opportunity to role-play a number of different staff positions found at a COCOM. In some situations students serve as members of the COCOM's planning staff, or as members of the EASTCOM Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) Staff.

The curriculum structures the lessons and practical exercises so that they serve to replicate normal staff requirements. In addition, the decisions students make during each exercise are cumulative. In other words, when students take actions in their seminar concerning an issue, their decisions affect the starting point of future exercises and influence later actions throughout the remainder of the curriculum. This cumulative approach ensures that the group also gains a greater appreciation for the impact and outcomes of decisions and policies.

The heart of JCWS falls into three courses: Multinational Campaign Planning, Contingency Planning, and Crisis Action Planning.

**Multidimensional Campaign Planning (MCP).** The course covers two major areas, the study of operational design across the range of military operations (ROMO) and warfare primarily at the national and theater level. The first portion of the course addresses the operational design of campaigns and the enablers, such as command and control of a joint force, information operations (IO), Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) operations, and multinational operations. Next, the course focuses the students' attention at a high level of strategic decision-making, thus establishing the primary scenario used as a teaching vehicle in the rest of the curriculum. It examines both broad and specific issues of joint staff and COCOM-level problems and decisions required to formulate a military strategy and supporting force structure for conventional war in a distant theater -- USEASTCOM. The theater contains a significant threat to our national interests. The course emphasizes how national strategies, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, and the COCOMs effect the strategic synchronization (mobilizations, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment) of joint forces. The course uses the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and other related systems as tools in teaching high-level decision-making. Additionally, students review issues within the EASTCOM AOR, develop a theater
strategy mission, vision and theater objectives, as well as aspects of a security cooperation strategy, plans and activities brief. The course prepares students with the foundation of Service and multinational capabilities and functions as they move into the detailed contingency planning course.

**Contingency Planning (CNP).** This course focuses on the contingency planning process and its procedures as described in relevant Joint Publications. It builds on all the instruction and student assignments completed in the preceding MCP course, as well as material presented during JPME Phase I courses. This course affords students the opportunity to apply their understanding of JOPES, the capabilities and limitations of the forces, and the theater campaign plan, theater strategy and security cooperation plan developed during MCP to develop a seminar specific contingency plan for USEASTCOM, with a transportation-feasible Time-Phased Force and Deployment Database (TPFDD).

**Crisis Action Planning (CAP).** The CAP course has three exercises. The exercises present students with unique challenges across the ROMO. During each exercise, students develop plans to address challenges in specific operational environments. The first exercise, PURPLE LIGHTNING (PL), focuses on humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and peace enforcement as well as a host of other issues for the use of the military element of national power. The exercise makes students understand the initial steps of the CAP process and the requirement to analyze a situation for tasks, develop a mission statement, commander's intent (end state), and a concept of operations for a crisis in the USEASTCOM AOR.

The exercise that brings in all the aspects of the previous planning courses into perspective is PURPLE ECLIPSE (PE). This exercise presents the students a daunting, realistic, political-military crisis in northern Africa that includes significant multinational and interagency issues. Students apply the processes learned, the guidance developed, and the capabilities and doctrine analyzed during the MCP course to a complex contingency. They develop an operation plan which integrates coalition and interagency partners. The exercise allows the faculty to assess how well students understand operational design, campaign planning, existing joint doctrine and the JOPP. Working as a Joint Planning Group at the USEASTCOM, students analyze the politico-military factors driving the crisis and recommend whole-of-government solutions to resolve or mitigate the crisis. While diplomatic efforts are underway, students develop an operation order using the time-sensitive CAP process. When diplomatic efforts fail to resolve
the crisis, students execute their plan for the defense of an allied nation. Students use real and simulated planning technology to develop a transportation-feasible TPFDD for the operation plan, as well as for situational awareness. In the later stages of the exercise, students transition to the JTF level for the execution of the operation plan and the subsequent stability operations and reconstruction effort. Upon completion of major combat operations, students develop and brief a detailed plan dealing with a complex reconstruction effort and the transition to UN control.

The last exercise, PURPLE GUARDIAN (PG), is a stand-alone exercise in the last week of the course. Students role-play as members of the Northern Command (NORTHCOM) Standing Joint Forces Headquarters (SJJFHQ). The seminars conduct this exercise using an in-house developed simulation. The simulation's scenarios provide students an opportunity to explore the complexities and special demands of the emerging homeland security/homeland defense missions (HLS/HLD) in NORTHCOM's unique interagency environment. The scenarios require the seminar to provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) of the United States in response to terrorist actions. A certain level of uncertainty, fog and friction, and limited time to construct solutions is the hallmark of the fast-paced scenarios of the exercise.

During JCWS, strategy is taught during 26.5 of our contact hours in the seminars with a practical exercise application to theater strategy and in theater campaign plan development. Historical cases or vignettes are used during approximately 27 contact hours to illustrate current concepts or principles. Over one-third of the lessons directly incorporate or discuss interagency or multinational aspects in some form. Some classes are dedicated specifically to the interagency, international organizations, and multinational operations, while others discuss them as supporting or secondary themes or considerations. Interagency and multinational operations figure prominently in the major courses. The percentage of curriculum time which touches on these topics approaches 85%. By the time they graduate, students have completed 287 contact hours and 159 study hours.

**Irregular Warfare**

JCWS addresses IW at the operational-level of war and includes IW throughout the curriculum. As the students develop their planning skills, they concurrently focus their attention on the joint, multinational and interagency nature of IW. The curriculum highlights both the military and political
complexities within an IW environment. During the first half of the JCWS course, the students weave IW into their development of a regional Theater Campaign Plan. Throughout the second half of the course, faculty continue to interject IW into the planning lessons as the students develop a Contingency Plan to defeat an aggressor in the North African region. The PURPLE LIGHTNING and PURPLE ECLIPSE reinforce these IW threads as the students develop COAs that must include measures to ameliorate enemy IW actions. In addition, half of the 32 electives offered to students allow them to develop a fuller understanding and depth of knowledge in areas related to IW.

**Cultural and Regional Lessons**

Approximately 25% of the JCWS curriculum has cultural and regional issues imbedded in its lessons, including those on Theater Security Cooperation Planning, Theater Strategy, Mission Analysis, and Course of Action Development. The PURPLE LIGHTNING and PURPLE WARRIOR exercises also incorporate cultural and regional issues, and eight of 32 electives specifically focus on regional or cultural areas.

**JAWS**

JAWS continues to exceed the Chairman’s intent and expectations to provide the COCOMs and the Joint Staff with graduates who can create campaign-quality concepts, plan for the employment of all elements of national power, accelerate transformation, succeed as joint force operational/strategic planners and be creative, conceptual, adaptive, and innovative. While JCWS makes officers familiar with the planning process, JAWS creates master planners. This 11 month program leads to a fully accredited Master of Science degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy, offering either Intermediate or Senior Level Education appropriate to the grade of the student, and grants both Joint Professional Military Education Phase I and II credit. Earlier this month we graduated our fifth class of students; we now have 171 JAWS graduates working hard and achieving positive results in the field on joint, combined, and Service staffs, as well as helping to meet the increasing demand for planning expertise in the interagency arena.

Using the OPMIP Learning Areas as a starting point, the current JAWS curriculum focuses on "high end" operational art and contemporary transformational thought. By direction of the CJCS, JAWS focuses on the nexus between the strategic and operational levels of war. JAWS inculcates the joint
competencies identified in the CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development in determining desired outcomes and therefore focuses on developing critical thinking leaders and planners who are both strategically minded and skilled joint warfighters. This course focus allows for more in-depth immersion and applied rigor than is possible in some other more standard military education institutions.

The JAWS curriculum endeavors to balance between operational and strategic studies and between warfighting and war preparation with a continued emphasis on campaign-planning competencies. The separate yet interrelated core courses, Foundations in Theory of War, Strategic Foundations, and Operational Art and Campaigning, provide the developmental framework for the students of joint operational planning. Each fall semester, students participate in the College elective program, with opportunities to explore regional and functional COCOM, interagency topics, and other areas of personal or professional interest. One of the first JAWS lessons introduces ethics as a planning consideration for the rest of the course. By emphasizing problem solving and decision-making within the specific context of the joint operational concepts and adaptive contingency and crisis action planning, JAWS strives to produce world-class joint warfighters prepared to operate in tomorrow’s fast-paced, often chaotic and multi-tasking environment.

Foundations in the Theory of War focuses on developing critical thinking skills with a distinct focus on analyzing the art, science and nature of war and its evolving character and conduct—past, present, and future. A series of historical case studies provide the opportunity to analyze and evaluate techniques for leading strategic change and building consensus among key constituencies, including Service, multinational, and interagency partners within the changing nature of conflict and national security. This course also requires students to synthesize techniques and skills necessary for leading and sustaining effective organizations in a complex joint, interagency, and multinational environment. The curriculum contains about 137 contact hours with a broad, conceptual survey of classical through contemporary theories of the nature of conflict and the application of armed force in the land, sea, and air domains. Subsequent segments of this curriculum include study of timeless patterns of force application, investigation of engines of transformation, analysis of the relationship between national security strategies and warfighting concepts, and the importance of personality and leadership at strategic-operational levels. A module exploring three tectonic cultural clashes is included in the curriculum and specifically
addresses Islam, Russia, and China as well as contemporary lessons from the War on Terror. A highlight of the first portion of this curriculum is a week-long staff ride/field research visit to the Gettysburg battlefield to explore the confluence of the human dimension of warfare with other intangibles at the strategic and operational levels of war. The course concludes with a second module that bridges the Strategic Foundations course with the Operational Art and Campaign Planning course. The focus of this second module is on historical case studies that define the current environment and represent contemporary issues in operational art and campaigning.

Strategic Foundations focuses on an examination of national strategy and how the nation develops, resources, and implements strategic goals. It ensures students become strategically minded in their approach to learning, leading, and planning. Much of the course focuses on analyzing the strategic art to include developing, applying, and coordinating the political, diplomatic, informational, military, social and economic elements of national power and to analyzing how the constituent elements of government and American society exert influence on the national strategy process in the joint operational environment. Throughout the course, students have ample opportunity to analyze the ends-ways-means interrelationships for achieving national security objectives. Students are provided an opportunity to comprehend Service, joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities and to explain how these capabilities can be best integrated to attain national security objectives while applying an analytical framework that incorporates the role of factors such as geopolitics, geo-strategy, culture, and religion in shaping compelling strategies, supporting military plans, and joint force operations.

The course begins with analysis of grand strategy and its role in the development of U.S. National Security Strategy. A review of key classified and unclassified national security and joint strategic planning documents helps ensure student mastery of the strategy development process and full understanding of the linkage between the strategic and operational levels of national security activities and warfighting. A significant emphasis is placed on student comprehension of Service planning roles in numerous key defense strategy and policy mechanisms such as the Quadrennial Defense Review, annual defense authorizations and appropriations and the management of national risk. The course emphasizes an understanding of the interagency process, the key agency organizations, and their structures and processes. The entire JAWS class participates in a week-long field research visit to the National Capital.
Region to meet with leaders and planners from organizations such as Congress, the National Security Council, Department of Defense, Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, U.S. Coast Guard and the Joint Staff. Students have also participated in strategic vulnerabilities assessment exercises, a real-world project in support of the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Beginning in this course, students become familiar with the missions, planning processes and relevant issues of the regional COCOMs through classified video-teleconferences with U.S. European, U.S. Africa, and U.S. Pacific commands, and visits to the remaining seven U.S. COCOMs.

Operational Art and Campaigning provides the students with the requisite skills to become world class joint campaign planners. The instruction given in the preceding six months is built upon and synthesized during the Operational Art and Campaigning coursework. The curriculum consists of lessons (which include application and analysis of campaign planning concepts presented), case studies, historical vignettes, guest speakers, tours, simulation exercises, and student-conducted briefings to senior fellows. The course is primarily focused on building skilled joint warfighters through developing the ability to apply contemporary and emerging planning concepts, techniques and procedures for integrating battlespace support systems into campaign theater-level planning operations. Student participation in a rigorous plan development sequence and in several exercises ensures they comprehend the collaborative processes employed in operationalizing strategic guidance with the systematic, on-demand creation and revision of executable plans with up-to-date options in real time. The course stresses joint and combined operations, interagency operations, adaptive planning, and future campaign planning considerations, among other subjects.

This course consists of approximately 470 actual student-faculty contact hours including exercises and field research visits. Its introduction requires students to master various components of military planning, organizations for planning, principles of joint operations and campaign design. A series of case studies, historic campaign plans, joint doctrinal publications, and guest speakers are employed to assist students in focusing their study at the theater strategic level of war and on the unique considerations required of a COCOM campaign planner. The crux of the course is a detailed series of lessons addressing operational design and synchronization, adaptive contingency planning, the Joint
Operation Planning Process (JOPP), and the full range of appropriate, detailed considerations, and process elements. Key learning areas are emphasized in a series of realistic exercises, the major combat contingency operation exercise, and two African Crisis Action Planning exercise. The venue for the CAP exercises are adjusted annually to ensure that they can use "real world" data and information in actual emerging global "hot spots." All the exercises address the full range of military operations and, as reflected in DOD and Chairman's guidance, have recently increased emphasis on Stability, Support, Transition, and Reconstruction aspects of campaign planning. The course also includes a historical research visit/staff ride to the Yorktown battlefield to examine the application of the facets of operational art and to study campaign considerations, multi-national operations, conflict termination and strategic-operational-tactical implications of campaigning. Embedded in the course are several separate sub-courses including elements of the Information Operations Planners Course, the Homeland Security Planners Course, and the Joint Interagency Multinational Planners Course.

Irregular Warfare

JAWS has implemented appropriate learning objectives in existing curriculum and expanded practical application exercises within the program to address IW both to align with the CJCS SAE and to keep pace with emerging doctrine and concepts particularly those from USJFCOM. Current curriculum days devoted in whole or in part to IW concepts is a minimum 23 days of this 48 week program. In addition, numerous guest speakers address the issue.

Joint Forces Command has approached the Chairman about establishing an IW track within JAWS. We are examining what is needed for such a program. Before we commit, we need to ensure we have adequate resources and qualified instructors. We also need to ensure that such a program can be effectively integrated into the existing program in a manner that complements its overall goals.

Cultural and Regional Lessons

Regional and cultural issues are addressed throughout the JAWS course curriculum. Ten lessons out of approximately 150 are devoted specifically to culture and regional studies. This amounts to approximately 30 hours. Additionally, the class speaks with all five Regional COCOMs or staffs; together this totals approximately 18 hours with some emphasis on regional/cultural concerns. Regional and cultural issues are also raised during visits to the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency,
the National Security Council, and other interagency players during the JAWS research visit to Washington, D.C. In addition, eight historically-based lessons include regional and cultural considerations in the context of past operations. Throughout the six month Campaign Planning block, specific times are committed to addressing regional and cultural considerations as well as other operational issues of the COCOMs; this results in approximately 20 hours of discussion. JAWS students may also participate in any of several electives that include regional and cultural selections. In sum, approximately 82 hours (not including electives) are committed to addressing regional and cultural issues. This represents just under 10% of the entire JAWS curriculum.

Teaching Methodology and Rigor

JAWS and JAWS students are placed into seminars so as to ensure a mix of backgrounds, skill, and experience. Increasingly, students arrive with hard-earned experience from being on the ground in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, or other hot spots around the world. Just as impressive, many arrive having already earned multiple masters degrees. They don't just sit back and absorb – they actively contribute. JOWS students spent 15 hours in passive learning; 272 hours, or over 95% of the time, the students are engaged in active learning. Another enrichment to each seminar is the increasing participation by international and interagency representatives in both schools which gives the students exposure to alternate points of view and ways of thinking.

JOWS and JAWS faculty are organized into seminar teaching teams of three full-time faculty members. Faculty assignments to seminar teams maximize the faculty Service-mix in each seminar in order to provide the best available joint learning environment. Faculty member teaching experience is also taken into account to provide support and mentoring for new faculty members. In addition to their seminar teaching responsibilities, faculty members are also assigned curriculum development responsibilities as course directors, lesson developers, and exercise directors. This teaching team is augmented with an extensive array of guest speakers, including current and former military, civilian, and international leaders. Most faculty members also have a leading or supporting teaching role in the
elective program. A superb faculty development program ensures that our instructors are fully prepared
to use the most appropriate teaching techniques for each situation.

To maintain currency, faculty have been deployed to Afghanistan, Djibouti, the Horn of Africa,
Iraq, Qatar, and Rwanda. Civilian and military faculty have also been sent to locations such as Georgia,
Ukraine, Bulgaria, Liberia, and Saudi Arabia in support of a variety of outreach opportunities. We also
send teams to provide instruction in joint planning to a variety of joint, Service, and interagency
organizations. To ensure operational lessons learned are integrated into our curricula, the College has a
liaison with JFCOM’s Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA), responsible for maintaining a
comprehensive database of these lessons and producing recommendations for change derived from
direct observations and sound analysis of current joint operations. We have a new College initiative to
support JCOA by participating on their data collection teams in theater. The dividends the College
receives for this aggressive support to current operations and international requests for assistance is
seen daily in the classroom, resulting from the experiences brought back and shared by faculty.

Distinguished Graduate Program

The College has currently made a conscious decision not to have a distinguished graduate
program. Individual student performance is evaluated against specific learning objectives as appropriate
throughout the curriculum. By the nature of JPME II and where it fits in an individual officer’s career,
there is a wide range of differing ranks and experience in each course and seminar which makes direct
comparisons difficult. We believe the learning objectives and student acculturation is therefore best
served by fostering a cooperative attitude among students.

We do, however, have several ways of recognizing individual excellence in critical areas. The
Joint Campaign Planner Award is given to JCWS and JAWS students who best demonstrate exceptional
knowledge of joint warfighting. In addition, with each class, five papers are selected for recognition from
each school, and the JAWS Director presents an additional award to the student whose thesis on joint,
multinational and interagency teamwork best exemplifies a commitment to further the study of our joint
profession.
JCWS

JCWS students must complete a series of formal assessments and evaluations, pass mid-course and final essay examinations and write a collaborative research paper. Three students from different Services collaboratively develop, under the supervision of a faculty advisor, a Joint Critical Analysis or Campaign Critical Analysis (JCA-CCA) paper, 12-14 pages in length. The paper demonstrates critical research, thought and analysis by the students. The collaborative research paper allows to select a contemporary joint issue or a historical campaign and develop a thesis requiring graduate-level research and writing. The research paper enables assessment and evaluation of student teams for research skills, writing abilities, and verbal delivery or briefing skills. The JCA-CCA paper stimulates in-depth analysis and provides joint team-recommended solutions to a current joint, multinational, or interagency issue that does not have an obvious solution.

JAWS

JAWS is an extremely rigorous academic program. The leader of a recent Joint Staff evaluation team cited JAWS as "the best program seen by the team in 10 years." Students hone their campaigning skills through critical discussion, a systems approach to international issues, strategic analysis, and refinement of joint warfighting expertise. JAWS students must prepare a collaborative history paper, write two strategic level staff papers, pass two three-hour written exams, write a complete campaign plan, and complete a thesis of between 60 to 90 pages. They also develop a variety of planning documents and are evaluated on numerous presentations and briefings. Finally, just prior to graduation, each student must successfully pass a three-hour oral comprehensive exam, which includes a defense of their thesis in front of a panel composed of a minimum of three faculty. Each class recognizes six students for superior research and writing and one student is identified as the most skilled joint planner at the end of the course. Throughout the year, approximately 644 scheduled hours are specifically devoted to "white space" - reading, research, and study time for JAWS students. This does not include any time after 1700 hours daily or any weekend/federal holiday time.
The Right Faculty Must be Teaching the Material

Our faculty for both schools consists of active duty officers and civilians hired under the authority of Title X. They are an experienced, diverse group of professionals with a unique blend of academic expertise and operational experience. Their skills and experience result in a learning environment that is focused on the issues and considerations necessary to plan and conduct operations in the joint, multinational, and interagency arena.

Military Faculty. The vast majority of our military faculty have joint experience. These military faculty provide strategic and operational currency in joint, interagency, and multinational operations. They are a key resource in maintaining the currency and relevance of the curriculum. The overall military faculty mix at both schools promotes a thoroughly joint outlook and ensures a representation of all the U.S. military services. Ideally, our active duty faculty would be fully joint qualified and with extensive Service and joint experience, but Services are not always able to fully meet those requirements. Additionally, gaps in assignments to both schools routinely occurs, resulting in regular shortfalls in the classroom.

Civilian Faculty. The civilians include those with extensive operational experience, relevant terminal degrees, and specific academic expertise. The vast majority of our civilian faculty have some military experience. Their degrees in a wide array of disciplines and extensive background and experience in joint matters provide the academic foundation of the curriculum. They bring great depth of subject matter expertise and a wealth of teaching experience to the program. They provide the long-term perspective needed to balance continuity and change and complement the military component of the faculty.

Academic Chairs. In addition to the military and Title X faculty, JFSC currently has two full-time representatives from the Department of State and National Security Agency who serve as full-time faculty Chairs, normally for a two year duration with a possibility of an extension to a third year. A third Chair, that of the Department of Transportation, is currently vacant. These Chairs teach, prepare or design curriculum, and conduct research related to JFSC curricula. They support all four JFSC schools. We have taken steps to establish DIA, U.S. Coast Guard, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard Chairs.
Adjunct Faculty. Adjunct faculty members with specialized knowledge, usually from within the local academic community, may be hired to teach a focus study.

Senior Fellows. JFSC's extensive use of Senior Fellows enhances the curriculum by providing students with the unique perspectives of retired flag and general officers and ambassadors. The Senior Fellows make presentations to seminars, participate in panel discussions and question-and-answer sessions, lead discussions during seminars, and participate in field research, wargames and exercises. The majority of the Senior Fellows are retired three- and four-star flag and general officers who served as a Commander of a Unified Command, Chief of their Service, or major Service component commanders of one of the Unified Commands. Additionally, several ambassadors and former congressmen participate in this program.

Internal Support. In addition to the faculty assigned to the schools, selected members of the Command Group, the Directorate of Academic Affairs, the Information Technology Division, and the other schools provide support to the classroom. They contribute their educational and technical expertise or supervise subordinate programs that involve JPME learning areas or standards.

Exchange Officers. We are exploring ways to develop faculty exchange programs with select foreign universities as a means of enriching the educational programs at JFSC.

JCWS

JCWS is authorized a faculty composed of 13 Army officers, 13 Air Force officers, 14 Navy officers, 4 Marine Corps officers, and 19 civilians, for a total of 63 positions. Of the 60 military faculty who have reported in the last four years, 36, or 60%, previously completed JPME Phase II. All military faculty members are in the grade of O-5 or O-6. Due to rotation schedules and staffing gaps, we currently have 14 Army officers, 11 Air Force officers, 11 Navy officers, and 4 Marines currently on board, with orders four prospective gains. The civilian faculty comprises academicians with doctoral degrees and former senior military officers with doctoral degrees and/or significant experience in joint matters.

JCWS Faculty Organization. The JCWS faculty is organized into three-person teaching teams. In addition, a five-person curriculum development team ensures curriculum currency and consistency of teaching across the fifteen seminars.
Most members of the JAWS faculty have more than twenty years of experience as educators, scholars, practitioners, military planners or policy-makers. JAWS is authorized a faculty composed of 1 Army officer, 2 Air Force officers, 1 Navy officer, 1 Marine Corps officer, and 5 civilians, for a total of 10 positions. JAWS has been authorized an increase of one Navy billet in FY 2010. Of the ten authorized billets, two are currently vacant, though we do have orders for an inbound Air Force officer. All military faculty members are in the grade of Colonel or Navy Captain. The JAWS civilian faculty is comprised of academicians who are retired senior military officers, all with doctoral degrees and significant experience in joint matters.

**JAWS Faculty Organization.** The JAWS faculty is organized as a matrix organization. Each of the teaching faculty members belong to both a department and to a seminar teaching team. Each seminar team is comprised of at least one member from each of the three departments (Foundations in Theory of War, Strategic Foundations, and Operational Art/Campaigning). Each department is comprised of at least one member from each seminar teaching team. In effect, there are two leadership and administrative chains within JAWS, each overseen by the Director.

**Faculty Selection Criteria and Procedures for both JCWS and JAWS**

**Military Faculty.** Military faculty members are nominated for assignment to JFSC by their respective Services on the basis of criteria established by JFSC in accordance with guidelines set forth by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff in the OPMEP. JFSC seeks officers who have a superior record of military performance and Service qualifications appropriate for their grade and specialty, previous joint experience and/or assignment, graduate level academic credentials from civilian institutions and military colleges and schools, and previous teaching experience; the qualification matrix that we use is provided as Appendix 1. Nominations are reviewed and vetted through interviews and vitae reviews by the senior leadership and senior Service representatives of JFSC. A faculty qualification matrix that reflects evaluation criteria and standards is used to support the review of nominations packages. Sometimes the Services cannot meet our requirements, and we either have to accept a nominee or allow a gap. For JAWS, the Director submits the name of personnel recommended for selection to the Commandant for final approval.
Civilian Faculty. JFSC advertises positions and hires civilian faculty through a competitive process that includes screening and review of resumes, and individual and group interviews by a selection committee. JFSC's hiring process is extremely selective which assures the hiring of highly qualified individuals with a rich blend of operational, regional, and interagency expertise. Civilian faculty members are selected based on knowledge and expertise in specific regional areas, joint matters, and joint operational experience.

Academic Chairs. Academic Chairs are assigned to the faculty in a manner similar to that used for military officers. JFSC seeks senior personnel with doctoral or master's degrees, teaching experience, and an extensive background in the agency or organization to be represented.

Adjunct Faculty. JFSC hires experts on various topics as adjunct faculty members to teach selected electives as required. Positions are advertised and applicants for the positions may either respond to an identified subject need or propose a topic that they think may be useful. Candidates submit a syllabus for a course and must possess at least a master's degree, have prior teaching experience, and have expertise in a subject that will enhance the curriculum.

Faculty and Staff Qualification, Evaluation, Credentials, and Experience

Our faculty is well qualified, though some challenges remain when Services send officers lacking joint education and experience. Of particular note is the high degree of joint, multinational, and interagency experience. Each faculty member is evaluated at least annually by his or her Director.

Staff personnel are selected and evaluated the same way as faculty. Military personnel are nominated by their Service; civilian personnel positions are filled following a competitive process. Military personnel are evaluated using their Service process and staff civilians are in the National Security Personnel System.

Retention and Turnover

Military. The normal tour of duty for military faculty members is three years, although a few remain for only two years as a result of selection for command, promotion, or further professional military education. A few officers are extended at the request of the Commandant for a year and sometimes longer. The military faculty is subject to the normal turnover rate each year and on occasion this rate has been higher due to unprogrammed losses caused by high priority reassignments or retirements.
Civilian. Title X faculty members do not have permanent civil service status. Based on NDU policy, Title X employees can be retained on a one- to three-year contract which is renewed if they have demonstrated satisfactory performance. While Title X employees are not tenured, there does appear to be a long-term commitment between JFSC and these faculty members. Title X faculty members provide continuity to academic operations that offsets the turnover of military faculty members. The agency Academic Chairs are typically assigned for a two-year tour of duty, with a possibility of an extension to a third year.

Faculty Development

The objective for new faculty members during the first year of assignment is to prepare and qualify them to support the primary mission of JFSC: to teach the core curriculum or department-specific curriculum and support the basic outreach programs of their school. The faculty development program offers training and education at every phase of the faculty member's tenure and includes a variety of pre-service, in-service, and professional development opportunities to achieve the objectives and priorities established by the OPMEP and the Commandant. An in-house Orientation and Pre-Service Training Course (OPTC) introduces new faculty members to College policies, procedures, organization, and their respective school curriculum. The overall OPTC program includes general educational training in the JFSC curriculum development system and a variety of instructional methods, teaching techniques, and classroom management skills.

Experienced faculty members focus on supporting the primary and future missions of JFSC. This means striving to master the core curriculum or department-specific lessons; contributing to development of evolving curriculum; assuming outreach responsibilities and leadership roles at JFSC; and participating in research and publication activities that contribute directly to the JFSC mission. Priorities are teaching the assigned curriculum; mentoring students and fellow faculty members; designing courses and developing curriculum; conducting outreach to all elements of the Joint Planning and Execution Community; and participating in research and publishing in a way that directly supports the mission of the college.

Faculty development does not stop with initial training. An in-service training and education component consolidates and extends the instructional training throughout each faculty member's tenure.
at JFSC. The objective of in-service training and education is to assist and enable faculty members to

The objective of in-service training and education is to assist and enable faculty members to

gain increasing knowledge and expertise in subject matter relevant to the JFSC core curricula and
education topics. We may do this training in-house using subject matter experts, or alternatively we may
schedule guest speakers to provide insight and expert viewpoints on issues relevant to the JFSC
curricula. We ask the guest speakers to focus their presentation on current issues, future concepts, and
Special Areas of Emphasis.

Faculty members also participate in a variety of special activities to broaden their perspective and
foundation knowledge in joint operational matters. These special activities include mobile training team
support to the COCOMs and major components, participation in exercises, and military-to-military contact
programs. Of note are the JAWS faculty members' participation in the Washington, D.C. field trip (joint
and interagency) and the COCOM field trips. These field trips provide valuable insight into the current
strategic and operational issues facing joint, multinational, and interagency community in the current
global security environment.

Faculty members attend local, national, and international conferences and symposia which are
essential to maintaining currency in curriculum-related issues. These activities contribute to the JFSC
educational mission and broaden the knowledge and expertise for faculty members. Faculty members
participate based on their assigned duties and responsibilities regarding core curriculum development,
electives, additional duties as liaison officers, and the need to maintain currency in their respective
specialties and interests. Themes of the conferences and symposia attended by JAWS and JCWS
faculty are focused on strategy, planning, regional security, and education. Moreover, each faculty
member is expected to engage in professional development activities to the maximum extent possible.
Faculty members are responsible for continuously seeking to improve their knowledge and abilities in
curriculum subject matter and teaching skills as well as other academic abilities and to continue to grow
as a military or civilian professional. Individual professional development activities include continuing
education through course work at civilian higher education institutions or through military college courses,

professional reading and research, and membership in professional organizations.
JFSC is a member of the Virginia Tidewater Consortium for Higher Education. Membership in the consortium provides an opportunity for faculty members to participate in workshops on education topics. These workshops refine and broaden knowledge in teaching skills and techniques.

JCWS conducts pre-course workshops prior to each course of core curriculum instruction. The purpose of these workshops is to update faculty members on changes made to course lessons and to present any new lesson material incorporated into the course. JCWS also conducts post-course workshops at the conclusion of each course of core curriculum. Post-course workshops provide an initial opportunity for faculty members to discuss and assess the delivery of the curriculum. JCWS uses Program Assessment information and data to generate discussion for improvements in course design. When appropriate, special workshops provide hands-on training in wargaming and simulation programs used at JFSC. These workshops and faculty meetings also provide an opportunity for faculty members to share knowledge and insights gained from conference/symposia attendance and participation in outreach activities.

JAWS curriculum workshops use the same concept as the JCWS program but on a smaller scale and more informally due to the small number of faculty in JAWS and the departmental organization of the JAWS program. JAWS faculty members hold departmental meetings on a routine basis. These meetings provide an opportunity to ensure that critical issues regarding instruction are covered or scheduled. After-action Reviews (AARs) and discussions concerning the content of current courses, issues relating to teaching methodologies, or aspects of student evaluation or assessment are all routine topics.

The Right Student at the Right Time

Student selection for JCWS and JAWS is under the purview of the Services. Overall, we have been very pleased with the quality of the students. Only a handful of JCWS students in the past five years and no JAWS students have been pulled out of school before graduating due to operational necessity; when the JCWS students are pulled out we make arrangements for them to complete the course at a later date. We also have interagency and international students in both schools, which I will also address.
JCWS

Student seats are allocated by the percentage of billets the Services have on the Joint Duty Assignment list, and as a result 33% of the seats go to the Army, 29% to the Air Force; 19% to the Navy, and 6% to the Marines. Based on law, ideally mid-grade officers should be assigned to JCWS en route to or within the first twelve months of being assigned to a joint command. By doing so, the Commanders would have more valuable assets on their staff. Unfortunately, about two-thirds of our JCWS students do not meet this criterion. While education is never a waste, the issue is sending the officers to JCWS at the right time.

Officers are no longer able to obtain waivers to the requirement for Phase II education prior to promotion to Flag or General Officer. As a result of the lack of a waiver, JCWS has increased its senior officer seminars from two to five during the past three classes. In Academic year 08-09, we had 166 Colonels/Navy Captains out of 933 US officers.

I would like to see more Reserve and National Guard students in JCWS. We must educate our Active and Reserve officers together before they we send them to fight together. The number of Reserve Officers coming through the course has declined by a third since 2007. Currently their components do not have specific quotas assigned. Therefore, they cannot plan in advance to send their best candidates.

JAWS

JAWS military student seats are divided equally between the three military departments. While JAWS has rapidly established itself academically as an advanced school on par with the Service advanced schools, two processes that are solely the responsibility of the Services related to the mission of the school are not well synchronized: student selection and graduate outplacement. All of the Service's advanced schools have a formal screening process such as a school-specific board, interviews, or an application essay beyond their initial PME selection process. JAWS, however, relies completely on the Services to properly vet their nominees. As a result, a wider range of talent arrives for the program than is typically the case at the Service advanced schools.

We are working with the Joint Staff to update the OPMEP to address these concerns. We support maintaining mid-level O-4s and O-5s as our primary target population while accepting O-6s as the exception. As far as limiting the number of O-6s who attend JAWS, we have seen the Services selecting
an increasing number of O-6s each year with a few being post O-6 command. We believe the benefit to the Joint Community of a school like JAWS would be best served by educating lower ranking officers who can be expected to serve longer in the force especially after completion of their JAWS "payback tour." Most of the O-6s who have attended JAWS have not been assigned to either joint tours or to a specific JAWS coded billet. Moreover, mid-grade officers are more likely to be the ones actually preparing contingency and crisis action plans, rather than overseeing the department that does so.

As the reputation of our graduates for achieving world-class results grows, we will continue to strive to meet the Chairman's vision to continue to produce leaders for the ever increasingly complex world of joint campaign planning and strategy.

Interagency Students

JFSC has proven its value to the joint community, but we need to increase the number of interagency students to expose the rest of the students to an effective "whole of government" approach to solving complex contingencies. The emphasis on interagency education and operations is manifested in the JFSC curriculum by the inclusion of Stability, Support, Transition and Reconstruction and Phase IV operations, as well as continued emphasis on interagency processes. Greater interagency participation benefits both us and their home agency. Interagency students share valuable lessons from the ongoing effort to integrate the military and other government agencies at the federal, state, and local levels.

Meeting on the field in a place like Iraq for the first time is not the right way to conduct business. I know that most of our interagency partners are not manned to a level that readily supports the loss of people for ten weeks to a school. As a result, even though we would like to have much greater interagency participation, we have had only limited success. Over the past five years, while we have had 48 DoD civilians, we have only three Interagency students, one in 2005 and two in 2006.

JFSC strives to build relationships with the interagency organizations and provide education opportunities that will benefit all stakeholders. The College responded to the requirement for increased educational opportunities on interagency and intergovernmental issues with the innovative short courses I mentioned above, the Homeland Security Planners Course and the Joint Interagency Multinational Planners Course. These courses are successful and popular. However, JFSC uses its current operational funding to support these courses. The use of our own resources causes a continual strain on
the College faculty and budget. JFSC would greatly benefit by increased resources from external sources to support these interagency initiatives.

JAWS graduates increasingly find themselves involved in activities that extend beyond traditionally military operations. Each JAWS class is composed of students from the Services, Agencies, and selected international partners. JAWS has been much more successful in attracting interagency students. Since the program began accepting civilians in its second year, we have seen a steady increase in the number of interagency students in each class. In the past five years, twelve interagency students have graduated from JAWS, and six more will be in the class that convenes next month. Civilian students have come from Department of State, Customs and Border Protection, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Coast Guard, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and U.S. Joint Forces Command.

International Students

JAWS is very successful in attracting international officers. In the current class, we have 27 students from 21 countries on four continents. International officers enrich the JFSC learning experience. They add a valuable perspective to planning and contingency operations. The quality of international officers selected by the Services for attendance at JFSC is exceptionally high and is a critical factor in sustaining the high quality of the JFSC educational experience.

JAWS is open to students from Britain, Australia, and Canada, but until now we have only had students from Britain. However, next month we will welcome our first Australian officer along with two British officers.

Ensuring Students are Assigned to the Right Positions

As with student selection, student placement falls under the purview of the Services.

JAWS

JAWS students are at the College while en route to a pre-determined assignment or come to us from their duty assignment on temporary additional duty. The Services control who comes; if we have a cancellation, we go to the Service representative to get a replacement. In some cases, the person who is
assigned is realistically coming just to "check the box" in order to put on a star. It would be more beneficial to have students assigned who will benefit from our courses rather than those who are merely looking to get a graduation certificate for their record.

JAWS

The outplacement process for JAWS graduates is also solely the purview of the Services. To date, this has resulted in a far lower number of JAWS graduates reaching appropriate JAWS coded billets at the Joint Staff and the COCOMs than is required. We have noticed that the Services struggle to ensure that over half of our graduates go to joint assignments immediately following graduation. Chairman Mullen has expressed his desire to reach as high as 100% of the JAWS graduates "going joint" after graduation. While legislation does require 50% plus one graduate of the combined National Defense University be assigned to a joint command, annual selection decisions and assignment policies limit the number of graduates reaching JAWS coded joint billets.

Additionally, just because a graduate is placed into a joint assignment doesn’t mean that they are in a planning billet. To date, JAWS graduates have filled less than 20% of available coded billets and some billets have never received one of our graduates.

As the COCOMs become more familiar with the skills of our graduates, we see this changing. The cooperation of the Services’ leadership and their personnel management teams, the COCOMs and the Joint Staff is required to establish and maintain an organized and routine flow from selection through the school to a predetermined billet for these officers. Such a process would help achieve both the mission and the intent of the Chairman for JAWS. Balancing the intended objective of populating COCOMs and the Joint Staff with joint campaign planners with the needs of the Services is indeed a challenge. The college has studied this question for over 35 years and we understand the ability to provide the Joint Community with highly educated officers will continue to be a cooperative effort of the Joint Staff, the COCOMs and, most importantly, the Services to achieve and maintain success.
Organization and Resources

JFSC is a component of the National Defense University and reports through the President of NDU to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Funding support for the University comes from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Joint Staff support comes from the DJ-7 as the staff proponent for PME. Within the College, we are organized into the four schools plus two divisions, Academic Affairs and Operations, which provide oversight and direction. Operations includes Resource Support, Facilities, and Information Technology.

This flat organizational structure adequately supports the College, faculty and students. With the staff focusing on support, the faculty can focus on teaching with minimal distractions. The Directors of each school shape their own curriculum. However, any new or revised curriculum is evaluated by Academic Affairs to ensure it is being taught effectively and meets learning standards.

Another area that I would like to address concerns resources. We would like to thank you for providing resources to support JFSC’s seminar renovations and overseas travel. The funding strengthens JFSC’s ability to provide military officers and enlisted personnel with the education needed to support our national and international security challenges.

We request your continued support in acquiring additional resources to support the restoration and modernization of our aging buildings. Our buildings are over 46 years old and the maintenance and repair costs exceed one million dollars annually. As an integral part of our vision, we plan to restore underutilized buildings to provide an innovative and enhanced learning environment for both students and faculty. Every year we transition over 3,500 students through our educational buildings and war gaming suites and support 313 full time support staff and academic faculty. In addition, we accommodate over 3,700 guests in our 340 temporary lodging quarters each fiscal year. As we look to the future, as one of the premier joint educational institutions, we believe that we need to take advantage of our outdated buildings to effectively utilize our scarce infrastructure dollars wisely. Our plan is to transform these outdated buildings so they will meet our upcoming academic space requirements. This revitalization plan will eliminate expansion of our footprint. More is not always best, conserving our natural resources while reducing energy consumption is one of our worthwhile goals. Finally, we have superb faculty, but just
enough to cover classroom requirements without any in reserve, which stresses both teaching and curriculum development. Increased funding would allow us to attract additional highly qualified civilian faculty, which in turn would allow those on board to conduct research and publish.

The Road Ahead

I know the focus of this Committee is on resident JPME. However, an important part of my vision for the future is to examine how JFSC can contribute to improvements in the nature and availability of joint education—continuing to work to provide the right education to the right person at the right time. We are uniquely suited to examine future options. With JCWS and its Reserve counterpart, JCDES, both under the same roof, we can begin to examine the potentials of new teaching techniques. It is incumbent on us to use our resources as effectively as possible and explore opportunities offered by current technology. At the same time, there are opportunities to support the joint force commanders with a wider variety of education options, from residence education, to blended learning, to on-line learning. We have the opportunity now to examine our schools and see how effectively we achieve the same learning objectives, and just as importantly, how well we also affect the acculturation of our students. I intend to begin to analytically research those questions, with a view to providing feedback to NDU and the Joint Staff on the viability of JFSC broadening educational opportunities offered in the future.

I also want to expand our outreach. As I have discussed, the challenges our faculty face are significant when it comes to having adequate time to teach, develop curriculum, conduct research, and publish. However, outreach helps ensure our faculty remains current. Therefore, I believe we need to support outreach activities when they do not adversely affect the classroom. For example, among our faculty are subject matter experts capable of supporting the COCOMs, OSD, and Joint Staff studies. Our focus is and will always remain educating joint officers, but when appropriate and consistent with our education mission, support to studies could benefit the College and DoD. It will keep faculty engaged in relevant research and contribute to the effective use of DoD internal resources as opposed to using contractors.
A third area I plan to focus on is increasing the number of JAWS students. Based on the currently identified requirements of the COCOMs and J5 for joint campaign planners, I believe the JAWS program should be increased to 60 students a year, which would be the equivalent of two additional seminars. As stated earlier, a plan could be devised to upgrade current buildings to accommodate such growth. Of course, such a plan would require adequate resourcing.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I am very proud of our college. The quality of our faculty, staff and students is unsurpassed. "Jointness" permeates everything we do. We play a vital role in preparing the military to fight today's enemies, as well as those, yet unknown, of tomorrow. I thank you for this opportunity to discuss my college with you.
### Qualification Matrix for New Faculty Nomination

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<td>Civilian Education</td>
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<td>JPME</td>
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<td>JPME II</td>
<td>Additional courses relating to JMI subject matter</td>
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<td>Prior Teaching Experience</td>
<td>No teaching experience in formal educational institution setting.</td>
<td>Has taught in a formal educational institution setting.</td>
<td>Has taught in a formal educational institution at the graduate level.</td>
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<td>Command and Staff Experience</td>
<td>Has commanded or served as the head of a staff element on a Service or Joint Staff below the 0-5 level</td>
<td>Has commanded or served as the head of a staff element on a Service or Joint Staff at the 0-5 level</td>
<td>Has commanded or served as the head of a staff element on a Service or Joint Staff at the 0-6 level</td>
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<td>Joint, Multinational, Interagency Experience</td>
<td>Accrual of &lt; 36 total joint qualification points</td>
<td>Accrual of a minimum of 36 total joint qualification points</td>
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**REMARKS:**

**OVERALL TOTAL**

(## out of 13)

**RECOMMENDATION:**

ACCEPT REJECT
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to come before you to discuss Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) at the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC).

The Joint Forces Staff College is a unique institution championed by General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz over sixty years ago. In 1946, General Eisenhower emphasized that our college was the only institution in the military educational system where, "the basic mission will be to give instruction on the theater and major joint task force level." Despite many changes in the world since then, this statement still holds true. Our enduring mission is to educate national security professionals to plan and execute joint, multinational, and interagency operations. We accomplish this important mission through four major schools and a host of short courses. Today I will discuss four points concerning our two primary schools which provide resident JPME – our intermediate level, ten-week Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) and our 11 month intermediate and senior level Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS).

For the first point, allow me to reemphasize JFSC's uniqueness. We are a joint institution which focuses on joint planning at the operational level of war. Our military faculty is almost equally divided between the Army, Air Force, and Navy, with a representative number of Marines. Our student body is also divided proportionately among the Services. Since 1993 when the Congressional Review of the Skelton Panel's recommendation was conducted at JFSC, the two schools have graduated approximately 3,500 Army officers, 4,400 Air Force officers, and 3,400 Navy and Marine Corps officers – numbers which illustrate our true joint nature.

All JFSC students study in a joint learning environment. JCWS students are also required to share housing with officers from other Services during their ten weeks on campus. Our curriculum assumes the officers arrive with a solid understanding of their Service competencies from their Service Staff Colleges. We build upon this Service expertise to create planners who are strategically minded critical thinkers, and skilled joint warfighters.
The second point I wish to make is how our curricula and academic methodologies excel in supporting the Joint, Multinational, and Interagency planning communities. Both JOWS and JAWS immerse our students in academically rigorous programs using active and collaborative learning techniques. Students engage in active learning over 90 percent of their classroom time and are required to demonstrate their skills by practical application, case studies, research, writing, and examinations.

The Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JOWS) conducts four graduate level JPM/Phase II classes a year. They focus on joint planning at the operational level, ensuring that graduates are prepared for duty in a joint environment and can quickly become a productive member of a joint planning group. We have agreements with fifteen colleges which grant our JOWS graduates anywhere between 3 and 19 graduate level credits.

The Joint Advance Warfighting School (JAWS) continues to fulfill the vision for an advance joint program as first recommended by Congressman Skelton and the HASC's Panel in 1989. JAWS students earn 36 graduate-level credits while completing a rigorous, eleven month curriculum designed to create master joint planners. The curriculum uses military history and theory to lay the foundation for the study of national strategy and an in-depth focus on joint operational campaign planning. This course of study culminates with the completion of a thesis, a three-hour oral comprehensive examination, and the awarding of a Master of Science degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

Both curricula are designed to be relevant and current with continuous updates that include compelling planning issues and other special areas of emphasis such as theater campaign planning, irregular warfare, building partnership capacity, strategic communications, and defense support to civil authorities. Our faculty and curriculum developers maintain constant communication with subject matter experts in the Joint, Multinational, and Interagency commands and staffs in order to evolve the curricula to meet the most pressing needs of the planning community.

Our methodologies and techniques have been validated over the years. The Middle States Commission on Higher Education has awarded National Defense University full accreditation since 1997. Last year, under the Chairman's Process for Accreditation of Joint Education, JAWS met all the standards required for six-year accreditation. During the same evaluation, JOWS was reaffirmed for the third time and met all accreditation standards with the exception of the required student to faculty ratio. Since then, National Defense University funded ten additional civilian Title X billets to alleviate the situation although gaps in military billets continue to be a problem.

I would like to close this second point by noting that we routinely hear suggestions that the JOWS course could be shorter. However, the increasing complexity of modern warfare is such that we
effectively use the entire ten weeks to execute a very rigorous academic program with very little "white space" left on the calendar. Given that joint warfare has grown more complex and the operational environment is more challenging than ever before, we fully support the Skelton Panel's conclusion that we must resist pressures to shorten the length of this school any further.

My third point involves educating the right student at the right time. Ideally, JCWS students should arrive at the College en-route to or within the first twelve months of being assigned to a joint command. Unfortunately, only about one-third of our JCWS students meet this criterion. Moreover, if officers do not come en-route, joint commands are frequently unwilling to lose their officers for ten weeks. Based on surveys of former students and their supervisors, those officers who attend our course are more productive earlier in their joint assignment if they are able to attend JCWS en-route to or early in their tour.

For JAWS, having the right student means having one who can fill a joint planning billet immediately following graduation. However, we have noticed that the Services struggle to ensure that over half of our graduates go to joint assignments immediately following graduation. Annual selection decisions and assignment policies limit the number of graduates reaching JAWS coded joint billets. To date, JAWS graduates have filled less than 20% of available coded billets and some billets have never received one of our graduates. As the Combatant Commanders become more familiar with the skills of our graduates, we are convinced the demands for our graduates will grow exponentially.

My fourth and final point concerns the future. Mr. Chairman, while we are successful in attracting international students, efforts to increase the number of interagency students remains a challenge. We need to increase the number of interagency students to expose more mid-level government professionals to an effective "whole of government" approach to solving complex problems. We must also increase the number of Reserve and National Guard students attending JCWS. The need to educate the Reserve Component in joint matters is essential since they are deploying as individual augmentees and populating joint staffs with increasing frequency. Finally, we must continue to encourage Services to provide the right education to the right person at the right time.

Mr. Chairman, I am very proud of our College. The quality of our faculty, staff and students is unsurpassed. "Jointness" permeates everything we do. We play a vital role in preparing the military to fight today's enemies, as well as those, yet unknown, of tomorrow. Thank you for this opportunity to be here with you today.
STATEMENT OF
REAR ADMIRAL  J. P. WISECUP, U.S. NAVY
PRESIDENT OF U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND EVALUATIONS
OF THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
25 JUNE 2009
PART I

Good morning, Chairman Snyder, Representative Wittman and distinguished ladies and gentlemen of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee; I thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about our Intermediate Level Professional Military Education at the Naval War College in providing career-long educational opportunities related to the mission of the Navy in serving this people of this nation as well as providing professional and personal growth to our mid-grade officers throughout the course of the selfless sacrifice and service to our nation's security. My testimony is divided into three parts parallels the structure of Rear Admiral Ronald J. Kurth, USN when he hosted distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee twenty-one years ago. First, I will address the five, main questions posed by the panel regarding the distinctness and focus of our intermediate-level programs, interagency and multinational aspects of joint matters, irregular warfare, language, regional and cultural knowledge and the faculty's careful balancing of the curricula between enduring and current challenges across the Navy's PME Continuum. Second, I will discuss the recurring themes of professional military education in the Navy, outlining our progress over the last decade. Third, I will describe the current missions and military education programs at the U. S. Naval War College.

The first question was whether the Navy implemented the recommendation of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress headed by Representative Ike Skelton to develop a distinct curriculum for the intermediate-level course. Today, the intermediate courses taught by the Naval War College focuses at the operational level of war and operational-level leadership. Building operational level expertise in the Navy is one of the key focuses of Admiral Gary Roughead, the Chief of Naval Operations. The College contributes by producing intermediate-level graduates who are planners skilled in applying operational art through the Navy and Joint planning processes, leaders with operational-level perspectives who have honed their critical thinking skills through a rigorous, academic program, and effective maritime spokespersons familiar with the range of challenges of operating in the maritime domain and are competent in employing naval capabilities in conjunction with other Service, other agencies, and partner nations to achieve strategic objectives in war and peace.

Further, the Chief of Naval Operations determined that unrestricted line Navy officers in the grade of Commander must have completed an intermediate-level professional military education course with embedded Joint Professional Military Education Phase I before assuming command and most staff and restricted line officers must have completed that level of PME before assuming equivalent positions within their community. This decision made in 2004 and fully in effect today reflected a shift in policy for the Navy in that it requires nearly all Navy officers to complete intermediate-level PME. To provide ample opportunity for this policy's implementation, the Navy had to increase the accessibility of intermediate-level PME. It has
done so through growth in the in-residence throughput and a complete restructuring of the Naval War College’s non-resident programs, which I will detail in Part II of this statement.

The intermediate-level course, resident and non-resident, consists of three core academic programs: National Security Decision Making, Strategy and Warfare, and Joint Maritime Operations. The National Security Decision Making Course aims to further develop the staff and leadership skills of its students to make them a more effective participant in a senior staff environment through the study of three complementary sub-courses titled, Strategy and Theater Security, Leading Organizations Effectively, and the Contemporary Staff Environment. The course’s capstone exercise requires each seminar to produce and present an executive-level strategic estimate of the future security environment over the next eight years, a theater strategic vision that advances and defends U.S. national interests and a prioritized list of new or improved concepts/capabilities necessary to advance the strategy.

The Strategy and War Course is designed to sharpen the student’s ability to assess how alternative operational courses of action best serve to achieve overall strategic and national objectives; it is tilted toward the interface of strategy and operations. After reviewing the classical theorists, the eleven-week course reviews a different war weekly, each with a discrete political purpose normally examined through the lens of a theater of operations. For this academic year, the maritime domain dominates in five of the ten cases; irregular warfare is the focus of three cases and a substantive part of three others.

The longest course of study is the seventeen week Joint Maritime Operations course. In it, students become skilled in applying the concepts of operational art especially in a maritime environment. Once firmly grounded in operational art concepts and the challenges of the maritime domain, students use Navy and Joint planning processes to develop alternatives for applying naval, U.S. and partner nation capabilities toward strategic objectives throughout the range of military operations in peace, crisis, and war. A major planning exercise requires each seminar to develop alternative courses of action and supporting operational orders, including the Joint Force Maritime Commander’s, in a Joint Task Force level decision brief in a maritime dominated environment. The course’s capstone wargame involves a crisis development and deployment planning phase, a humanitarian assistance phase, and a transition phase, all using collaborative technology tools in a distributed environment.

Together these courses focus on developing the operational knowledge base, operational-level perspective, critical thinking skills, and leadership required to contribute on a major staff. The resident curriculum is the basis for the four, non-resident programs. While all are derived from and parallel as closely as possible the resident program, each of the non-resident courses are tailored to suit the respective educational environment. Three of the programs retain close faculty-student interaction, in fact, two of them are conducted in seminar format with Naval War
College professors or adjunct professors at additional instructional locations throughout the United States. The Web course also retains faculty-student interaction accomplished asynchronously through a distance learning management system. The fourth course is self-paced, individual study with intermittent faculty-student interface. Unfortunately, none of them have the benefit of a Joint Maritime Operations capstone exercise conducted in a collaborative and distributed wargaming center.

The second query concerned how the College curricula embedded interagency and multinational perspectives and issues. Interagency and multinational themes are an important part of the curricula. The rich diversity of the student body with international officers, civilians from several government agencies, and US military officers expands the opportunities for seminar discussion of these issues and enhances our approach of them.

The institutional dimensions of strategy, a theme in the strategy and policy course, provides an analytical framework to examine how decision makers, the armed forces, government departments and agencies, and non-government organizations all pull together their individual efforts to achieve overall policy objectives. Additionally, case studies are infused with the importance of understanding the international environment and the working of coalitions in determining the outcome of wars and preserving peace. Case studies reflect that America’s wars were, have been, are, and will be coalition wars in the future.

The National Security Decision Making course examines how the interagency system helps the President in developing, coordinating, articulating and implementing National Security Policy. Moreover, the final exercise conducts a global security assessment and utilizes the regional knowledge possessed by both US and international students to guide seminar deliberations about what the national security strategy and the national military strategy should contain in order to increase its likelihood of success in tomorrow’s global security environment.

Essentially, almost every session in the Joint Maritime Operations curriculum deal with interagency and multinational themes. All of the planning exercises and the capstone synthesis events are based on fictional scenarios in which the students develop plans in a multinational and interagency environment. Joint Interagency Control Groups are an important part of the coordination for planning operations. Additionally, students work with nongovernment organizations and private volunteer organizations to achieve success.

The third question involved how we teach irregular warfare. It is covered in both the core curriculum and many of our elective courses. In fact, one of the dedicated elective areas of study focuses on insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and counterterrorism. The College has long studied these aspects of irregular warfare, often as a supporting element to conventional military operations. In the last decade, however, the focused study of irregular warfare has had an increased emphasis.
The Strategy and Warfare course includes a diverse assortment of case studies focusing on irregular warfare and the challenges of countering belligerents that utilize irregular strategies. Students read Mao's famous study *On Protracted War* along with a number of other case studies involving irregular warfare including the American Revolution, the Chinese Civil War, the Huk Rebellion, the Malayan Insurgency, Vietnam, and current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Joint Maritime Operations course discusses irregular warfare in their sessions on insurgency and counterinsurgency, operational planning, campaigning, and countering global insurgency. Students read several case studies highlighting insurgencies and counterinsurgencies noting the regional and local forces that make each unique. The National Security Decision Making course covers irregular warfare tangentially in many of its sessions especially its impact on strategy and force planning in future wars.

In addition, in 2008 the Naval War College created the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) in order to promote and support research and teaching on irregular warfare and armed groups. The Center hosts a series of conferences that bring scholars, both American and international, together with military scholars and practitioners to analyze the national and international security challenges posed by armed groups and irregular warfare. CIWAG contributes to curriculum development in the strategy, joint military operations and elective courses.

The fourth question asked how the College incorporated foreign language, regional knowledge and cultural knowledge in our curricula. First, the Naval War College does not provide language training whatsoever. As part of the Navy’s Language and Regional Expertise and Culture Strategy, formal language training is delivered in other forums and is not included in the Navy’s Professional Military Education Continuum. However, regional knowledge and cultural sensitivity by deliberate design are evident throughout the broad range of the Navy’s PME continuum. At each educational level, cultural proficiency is a continuing theme that is studied and explored.

Officers in grades O-3 to O-4 complete intermediate-level PME and the requirements for JPME I either as resident students or nonresident students via the fleet seminar program, a web-enabled program, a CD-ROM program, or the Naval War College Program at the Naval Postgraduate School. Graduates have a basic regional understanding, know the military challenges, and are able to apply both cultural awareness and cultural sensitivity to planning and execution of naval and joint operations worldwide. Selected resident intermediate-level students also complete the Naval Operational Planner’s Course. This course enables students to explore both naval and joint operational planning in greater detail and to gain in-depth appreciation of the cultural factors that impact military operations in the region.
The electives program provides five regional Areas of Study: Asia-Pacific, Greater Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Eurasia. About 100 students per academic year chose one of the regional areas of study. They gain an in-depth understanding of the region and the factors that influence that region.

The final question asked how the Naval War College balances between teaching enduring and current things. Throughout its history the College has held fast to the belief, first articulated by its founding president, Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, USN that “The War College is a place of original research on all questions relating to war and to statesmanship connected to war, or the prevention of war.” Admiral Luce intended students and faculty to develop a deeper understanding of the central element of the military profession. To do so, he initiated a holistic educational process which included the questions and methods of many disciplines used to examine seminal strategic issues. To hone the skills of abstraction and analysis required of higher level staff and command, reflection and study of history and case studies along with analysis and gaming of the embedded longer-term issues within their environmental context was paramount. The College follows that educational methodology today.

For decades, the College and its academic departments have practiced a disciplined and comprehensive approach to curricula development. Members of the teaching departments usually become quite committed to the collective enterprise of curricular development and teaching. The curriculum is constantly in some degree of revision because every faculty member is personally dedicated to the product.

The teaching departments emphasize faculty awareness of emerging issues that will affect the curricula. Faculty members not only design and constantly refine the curricula using formal and informal data, collected from internal and external sources, but they also establish a pattern of reaching ever-higher levels of academic excellence. Faculty members are actively engaged with the national security community and military leaders around the world as well as their peers in their respective academic or military fields. The Naval War College draws over twenty-five guest lecturers each year, ranging from Combatant Commanders to prominent national security executives and politicians. This provides faculty and students a unique opportunity to remain at the forefront of national security issues.

Curricula currency and relevance are especially vital to a college whose students are high achieving, mid-career professionals. By encouraging their critical analysis and questioning, we often become the initial target of those improved skills. Yet, their feedback of the quality of the instruction and the relevance of the educational experience remains most positive leading us to the conclusion that we have achieved a solid balance between the enduring issues involved with the study of war and the challenges of the contemporary operating environment. Students discover for themselves the value of the critical frameworks provided through their studies to the
emerging contemporary issues that they face as professionals. We aim to make them more comfortable in dealing with surprise, ambiguity, cultures and regions foreign to their own experience.

In carrying out its educational function, the Naval War College successfully prepares officers for the transition from duties in technical and tactical operations to responsibilities that require a broad understanding of national policy and strategy, resource allocation and management, and joint, interagency, and multinational combined operations. This kind of education does three critical things. It imparts a healthy skepticism about pat answers or easy solutions. In particular, it makes our students wary about received wisdom. Second, it exposes students to a tremendous variety of experience. As someone has said, "history has more imagination than any scenario writer in the Pentagon." In the summer of 2001 who would have predicted that by the end of the year Americans would be viciously attacked on their own shores by an enemy that has no capitol or conventional military force? And, within weeks of that attack, America would go to war in landlocked Afghanistan? And by the time the last fires of the World Trade Center were extinguished, that U. S. forces would be in Kabul? Third, a classical education makes professionals think differently. It prepares officers to continue self-education. And it makes them more intellectually adaptable as circumstances change and they confront surprise.

**Recurring Themes in Professional Military Education**

**PART II**

My predecessor, Rear Admiral Ron Kurth, USN, testified to the Panel On Military Education in 1988 that Rear Admiral Steven B. Luce, USN, founder and first president of the Naval War College "established it explicitly for the study of the higher aspects of warfare, grasped almost intuitively that naval strategy could only be understood by reference to the entire art of war and within the context of national and international affairs." Admiral Kurth then presented four recurring themes concerning (1) learning, (2) professional education, (3) national security studies, and (4) jointness. As his thoughts remain valid today, I will present his conclusions and then indicate how we have improved the Navy's implementation of them over the last two decades.

About learning, "Admiral Luce made clear choices -- a focused, holistic, long-term, active education and a balancing of scholars and practitioners and of professorial and collegial

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contributions to learning.” To the tension between training and professional education in a military career, Admiral Kurth indicated planning and management differentiate between “an examination of technique to a conceptual understanding of warfighting;” it is education which demands “abstraction and analysis as well as the cultivation of wisdom and judgment” that hones the mental skills required of higher levels of staff and command. The conceptual and long-term aspects of an integrated examination of strategy and warfare were paramount in national security studies, best pursued by a faculty composed of scholars and practitioners along with officer-students. Admiral Kurth stated “Our task is the study of strategy . . . . We believe we have largely achieved this objective by a study that is both theoretical and contextual—that is the derivation and elucidation of strategic concepts from a disciplined examination of history, case studies, and games and simulations.” Admiral Kurth concluded with his belief that “Joint education cannot be separated from a general understanding of learning, professional education in general, and the organic qualities of an existent curriculum, . . . what education ultimately contributes to a successful military commander and strategist is a habit of mind and judgment and not a checklist of requirements satisfied.”

These themes are at the root of the College’s strategic tradition. Their purposes still resonates clearly today. They are the driving forces of the College’s approach to education and research, analysis and gaming. This strategic tradition is more than rhetoric; it has a very practical and abiding influence in everything the College does. Over the succeeding years, the faculty has continued to mature and refine the curricula in the senior and intermediate level courses with embedded JPME. They continue to improve and have clearly adjusted to a quite different environment. These educational programs still, however, are designed to foster the required mental flexibility and discipline to cope effectively with the intellectual demands of addressing uncertainty inherent in issues addressed by those in positions of significant responsibility within the broader national security community in the United States and that of our friends and allies.

But not every officer has the opportunity to study war in the resident program at Newport. The Navy and the Naval War College recognized this fact early on and saw the importance of bringing professional military education to military leaders where they live and work. That effort first began in 1914 when the Secretary of the Navy ordered the College to prepare to conduct extension courses by correspondence. The challenge has always been to ensure the quality of that nonresident education remained high despite the inherent difficulties. In the years subsequent to Admiral Kurth’s testimony, the faculty also continued to mature and refine the nonresident intermediate program, ensuring the curricula derived from and closely paralleled that of the resident program. That diligence led to an improved program, which

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3 Ibid., p. 855.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., pp. 856-857
6 Ibid., 858.
attracted students just as did the resident programs. Ultimately, the resident faculty directly involved themselves in the development and delivery of the nonresident educational programs. It was upon that solid foundation the Navy deliberately expanded the availability of professional military education until it evolved as an integrated system designed to create career-long opportunities for learning for every Sailor, officer or enlisted.

At the direction of the Navy’s senior leadership, the Naval War College began expanding its nonresident opportunities in 1996. Over the next eight years, substantial investments were made to more than double the opportunities and provide better access to NWC faculty through an intermediate-level education with embedded Joint Professional Military Education Phase I. The original two modes of nonresident education dating back to 1914 have today evolved into four modern methods, three of which involve consistent interface with a NWC professor. The first major change in delivery mode came when the College established an additional instructional location on the campus of the Naval Postgraduate School in 1999. On campus NWC faculty delivered an intermediate-level course restructured as elective courses designed to be embedded in the School’s graduate programs under its quarterly construct. In 2000, fifteen students completed the program, and in 2001 nearly one hundred finished it. Today, we average 330 enrollments per quarter in this program.

In 2001, with an eye toward embracing new technology in order to increase student throughput while retaining academic quality and rigor, the College introduced the Web-enabled Program. This internet-based instruction is taught by a professor to a cohort, or “virtual seminar” of about twenty students. This non-real time instruction uses an internet bulletin board methodology supported by the “Blackboard” learning management system. Students use books, readings and CD’s to complement the Web instruction, and the entire program of three courses is designed for completion in 18 months. This top-notch, state-of-the-art program was fully embraced by naval officers as it had 250 students enrolled by 2003. The high educational quality of this program and its astute design earned it the coveted Crystal Award presented by the Association for Educational Communications and Technology (AECT) in a hard-fought international competition among the leaders in distance learning.

In 2001, the College also extended eligibility for the masters degree to successful students enrolled in our nonresident seminars under the Fleet Seminar Program. This high quality program closely replicates the curricula and methodologies of the resident program, yielding an equivalent, graduate-level professional military education. Regional accreditation by the New England Association of Schools and Colleges confirmed its superior educational excellence. Today it is taught at twenty sites in the U.S., including all fleet concentration areas and some single naval bases. The program typically offers about fifty five separate seminars annually in the three core courses. Seminars are comprised of about twenty students each and
meet with their adjunct professor one evening each week for thirty-five weeks. There are 1,200 seats available nationwide each year.

In 2002, the Naval War College and the Naval Postgraduate School conducted a study of graduate-level education opportunities in the Navy. The Graduate Education Review Board Report of May 2002 served as the catalyst for the Navy’s senior leadership to increase the in-residence opportunity for the intermediate-level program at Newport by one hundred Navy students over a five-year period. Subsequently, the Navy increased its student presence at the Army’s Command and General Staff College as part of the larger expansion of the Army students. These increases in resident and nonresident intermediate programs raised the educational opportunity to eighty-five percent. Approximately eighty-five percent of each year group would have an opportunity to attend the resident or nonresident intermediate program.

In April 2004, the final element of the reinvented nonresident program was fielded. The CDROM-based program made its debut with the expressed purpose of replacing the obsolete individual correspondence program, known unaffectionately as the “box of books.” Deployment patterns, isolated duty stations, and unreliable connectivity to the worldwide web made it mandatory especially amidst the Overseas Contingency Operations to continue to offer an individually-focused, self-paced educational program to Sailors unable to participate in the other resident or group-based nonresident programs. Students use books, readings and CD’s to prepare assignments and assessments that they then send to Newport by email. This program has seats for 600 new students each year and is designed for a 12-14 month completion time. This course, now presented in DVD format, seized the cutting-edge technology to incorporate in-resident lectures and panels into the distance learning arena.

By 2005 the paper Correspondence Program was ended, and 636 Web and CD program students joined 1,110 FSP and 313 in the NWC at NPS program, and 329 pursuing their NWC graduate degree for a record total of 2,388 students studying Intermediate PME with JPME Phase I through NWC’s College of Distance Education. These numbers have increased every year since, with the Navy’s increased emphasis on JPME I qualification and the Navy’s PME Continuum, to a total of 4,650 students in the four intermediate level PME programs for this academic year of 2008-2009, and just over 1,000 graduates per year.

With a robust nonresident educational infrastructure in place, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Clark, approved the Navy’s Professional Military Education Strategy in July, 2004. The strategy created career-long educational opportunities related to the Navy’s mission and supported the professional and personal growth of all Sailors, officer and enlisted. His decision created the Navy’s PME Continuum and linked completion of professional military education to career progression and assignment. As a major step toward that linkage, he required completion of intermediate-level professional military education with JPME Phase I for
assumption of command as an unrestricted line Commander or its equivalent billet for the restricted line and staff communities.

As a result of this decision, the Naval War College was tasked to create two new officer courses, one for flag officers and a primary course for junior officers as well as create distinct curricula for the existing senior and intermediate courses. For enlisted Sailors, the Senior Enlisted Academy was the only professional military education opportunity. Three new courses had to be designed and fielded to meet the requirements of the PME Strategy. The President, Naval War College was assigned the responsibility for the Navy’s PME Continuum depicted below in its current form.

To ensure a logical, education progression, the College developed draft educational outcomes for the six major PME courses combining naval and joint requirements at every level. The President conducted a six month dialogue with key Navy flag-level leaders in the operating forces and the supporting establishment. The outcomes were refined, presented, and approved by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations with the full consent of his OPNAV “Board of Directors.” Using those validated outcomes depicting what were the expectations of the graduates at each level, the faculty turned to the task of designing courses and creating curricula. A summary of the courses as they now exist follows.
The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Course (JFMCC) prepares future three star officers for duties as Maritime Component Commanders by developing perspectives necessary to articulate effectively the role of the Maritime Component in the design and execution of campaign plans and theater-security efforts. Seminar forums led by our nation’s senior joint leadership and facilitated by senior mentors and assigned NWC faculty facilitate discussion for attendees from all services. Sessions address the practical challenges of operational-level leadership and ensure the flag and general officers gain a high degree of confidence with the concepts, systems, languages, and processes required to employ naval forces effectively in a multi-service, multi-agency, and multinational environment.

The Combined Force Maritime Component Commander Course (CFMCC) additionally improves the effectiveness of senior leaders who routinely function together at the operational level by incorporating flag-level peers from partner nations into the student body. Normally, CFMCC courses are conducted with a regional focus in order to develop and deepen relationships based on trust and confidence, to serve as a forum to evolve combined maritime command and control concepts and mechanisms, and to advance the understanding of those security issues facing participating nations.

CFMCC courses last about seven days and are held at least semi-annually either at Newport or in the respective theater AOR.

The College of Naval Warfare (CNW) is a ten-month senior-level PME program with JPME Phase II designed to produce broadly educated strategic leaders who possess a strategic perspective, underpinned by strategic analytical frameworks. Graduates will apply disciplined, strategic minded, critical thinking to challenges in the multi-service, multi-agency, and multinational environments. Graduates will also be able strategic planners and joint warfighters who are effective maritime advocates. This course and the CICs Standards are the focus of this study.

In the Naval Command College (NCC) senior international officers pursue eleven months of graduate-level study in residence. Annually, CNO personally invites his counterparts in selected countries to nominate students for the NCC. Begun in 1956, NCC’s vision is to foster knowledge, friendship, and cooperation among navies from around the world. In so doing, NCC not only educates these officers in planning, decision making, strategic analysis, and naval and joint military operations but greatly strengthens understanding and builds trust and confidence between American and foreign officers.

International students are fully integrated with in their U.S. counterparts in the College of Naval Warfare. Although international students do not receive formal grades or a master’s degree, they participate fully in all three core courses in the CNW program. They must
complete all class and seminar exercises and writing assignments, and they receive written feedback from the faculty. NCC students are encouraged to enroll in electives.

The **College of Naval Command and Staff (CNC&S)** is a ten-month intermediate-level PME program with JPME Phase I designed to produce leaders who are skilled in warfighting, the joint planning processes, concepts, systems, and languages, and are capable of applying operational art in maritime, multi-service, multi-agency, and multinational environments. Graduates can apply disciplined, critical thinking from an operational perspective to the challenges associated with elements of the international security environment including the ongoing Overseas Contingency Operations, irregular warfare, Homeland Security and Defense, stability operations, humanitarian operations, and major wars, home and abroad. Graduates will be capable of excelling in command and operational-level staff billets on a numbered fleet, fleet, joint, interagency, or multinational staff.

International students are also fully integrated with their U.S. counterparts in the College of Naval Command and Staff. These students are in the **Naval Staff College’s ten-month program, NSC-10**. Their academic program consists of an orientation period followed by three trimesters of study of the CNC&S curriculum, supplemented by a Field Studies Program designed to promote understanding of U.S. institutions, society, and culture. In addition, they will audit an elective in each trimester, one of which will be specialized study in operational law. Like their senior international officer counterparts, these students must complete the papers and examinations, which the faculty will evaluate, provide written feedback, but earn a diploma rather than a Master of Arts degree.

The **Naval Operational Planner Course (NOPC)** is a CNO-directed, thirteen-month course designed to develop operational-level leaders with depth in operational-level planning. The course prepares intermediate-level U.S. Navy and other-Service officers for assignment to operational planner billets on the staffs of the numbered fleet, naval component fleet, and unified (geographic and functional) commanders. It is a peer to the advanced war fighting schools of the other Services: Army's School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS Fort Leavenworth), Marine Corps' School of Advanced War fighting (SAW Quantico), and Air Force's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS Maxwell AFB).

The CNO approved this program in 1999. Each class of about thirty students (22 Navy and 8 other-Services (Army, Marine Corps, Air Force and Coast Guard)) begins in August, taking the core intermediate-level CNC&S course and three tailored electives. After completing the intermediate-level academic program, the NOPC students remain in Newport conducting a contemporary, real-world crisis scenario exercise and conduct crisis action planning & execution as part of a two-week game. Based on their game experience, they devote the remaining ten weeks to deliberate planning by writing a formal, maritime component commander concept plan.
(CONPLAN), which will result in the development/refinement of a real-world, operational plan. Navy graduates proceed to either planner billets on operational staffs, or warfare community assignments followed by operational planner tours.

The Maritime Staff Officer’s Course (MSOC) provides organizational and individual-level education and training in planning, execution, and assessment functions and tasks for Navy leaders assigned to a Maritime Operation Center (MOC) or other operational level maritime staffs. This five-week long course is for Navy Chiefs and officers en route to a maritime operations center or operational level maritime staff. Student throughput is currently programmed for approximately 700 students annually.

The Senior Enlisted Academy (SEA) provides PME to Senior Chiefs and selected Chiefs in resident and blended education formats. While NWC has long provided faculty for key topics at SEA and a capstone wargame event, the educational relationship is now deepening to ensure alignment within the PME Continuum. Further, the SEA Board of Advisors has broadened its charter to review and to advise on enlisted PME Continuum matters.

The Navy’s Primary PME Program, which was fielded in May 2006, is uniquely designed to develop a shared understanding of Navy capabilities for the joint warfight by the Navy’s deckplate-level leaders—chief petty officers (E-7 to E-8) and young officers (O-1 to O-3). It includes about seventy hours of computer time on NKO and is divided into individual lessons that each has a short assessment that must be completed before moving to the next lesson. A tailored version of the course with visual aids depicting enlisted surroundings, but delivering duplicate substantive material was released in January 2007. The Primary PME (Enlisted) course prepares the Chief Petty Officer for attendance at the Senior Enlisted Academy and further assignment as a senior enlisted leader in Navy and Joint billets.

Two enlisted PME programs, Introductory and Basic PME, were designed for sailors in the grades of E-1 to E-4 and E-5 to E-6, respectively. These courses were fielded in January 2008. The Basic PME is about 40 hours work on NKO, and the Introductory PME is takes about 20 hours to complete. Both of these courses enhance the understanding of naval and joint matters for the junior enlisted Sailor as he or she advances in their career assignments.

In summary, the faculty at the Naval War College at the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations restructured both in-resident courses and created two versions of flag level courses. For the Navy’s nonresident and distance learning programs, they modified the Fleet Seminar Program and designed, developed, and fielded six new courses and programs to which Sailors responded by enrolling in ever-increasing numbers to further their professional military education and make themselves eligible for career advancement and joint job assignment. This incredible and unprecedented response to educational initiatives has resulted in an increase from
1,500 students in 1989 to a total of over 27,000 students studying for their naval and joint education in 2009.

PART III

I now turn to the third broad subject of this testimony, the mission of the College and our current professional military education programs. I will describe our mission, the curricula, our method of instruction, our faculty and students and close by describing other relevant activity at the College in order to give you a complete picture of the role the College and its educational programs along with its analysis, research, and wargaming activities support the mission of the Navy.

MISSION

The five major elements of the mission of the U.S. Naval War College are to:

Develop strategic and operational leaders: The College shall provide professional military education programs that are current, rigorous, relevant, and accessible to the maximum number of qualified U.S. officers and Navy enlisted personnel, civilian employees of the U.S. Government and non-governmental organizations, and international officers. The desired effect is a group of leaders of character who have trust and confidence in each other and are operationally and strategically minded, critical thinkers, proficient in joint matters, and skilled naval and joint warfighters.

Help CNO define the future Navy and its roles and missions: The College shall conduct research, analysis, and gaming to support the requirements of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the Combatant Commanders, the Navy Component Commanders, the Navy’s numbered fleet commanders, other Navy and Marine Corps commanders, the U.S. Intelligence Community, and other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government. The desired effect is a program of focused, forward-thinking and timely research, analysis, and gaming that anticipates future operational and strategic challenges; develops and assesses strategic and operational concepts to overcome those challenges; assesses the risk associated with these concepts; and provides analytical products that inform the Navy’s leadership and help shape key decisions.

Support combat readiness: The College shall conduct training, education, leadership and assessment activities to support the ability of the Navy’s Joint Force Maritime and Navy Component Commanders to function effectively as operational commanders. This effort shall include supporting the needs of the Combatant Commanders, Navy Component Commanders, and the Navy’s numbered fleet commanders for operational planning, analysis, and war gaming
to respond to emerging operational requirements. The desired effect is to improve the capability of Navy commanders to lead maritime, joint and combined forces and their staff members to plan, execute and assess and function cohesively as a maritime headquarters organization.

**Strengthen maritime security cooperation:** The College shall bring together senior and intermediate level naval officers from other countries to develop leaders for high command in their navies; understand and evolve operational planning methods; create opportunities for expanded, high-level professional exchange through venues such as the International Sea Symposium, Regional Symposia, formal college-to-college relationships with international counterparts, international publications, and alumni relations; and establish a regional studies structure to focus resources for greater impact in building and extending maritime partnerships. The desired effect is to build more robust and productive international maritime relationships, to improve the ability to operate effectively with partner nations, and to improve maritime security cooperation.

**Deliver excellent support:** To discharge successfully these primary mission responsibilities, the College shall strive for excellence in organization, processes, and infrastructure to enable mission accomplishment. The desired effect is to remain an exemplary steward of the resources entrusted to us and fully accomplish our mission both efficiently and effectively.

The first mission function, developing strategic and operational leaders, is the main focus of our academic programs. This education effort is the principal responsibility of our academic faculty, but they are augmented in this endeavor by our research, analysis and gaming faculty. Nearly fifty per cent of the mission funding for NWC is dedicated to this education function.

**VISION**

The 2007-8 strategic planning process produced a new vision for the College, which reads:

The Naval War College will be the Navy and nation’s first choice for educating and inspiring innovative leaders who think strategically, are masters of the operational art, and lead with confidence maritime, joint, interagency, and multinational operations to achieve national security objectives.

We will be foremost in providing the nation’s military leaders and statesmen with rigorous analysis, independent research and robust war gaming to clarify and resolve critical national security issues. As the intellectual center of the Navy, we will play an indispensable role in developing leaders, crafting strategy, and building trust and confidence—the foundation of enduring relationships of inestimable value to our nation and the world.
Our purpose remains as clear today as when the college was founded: to lead the world in the conduct of “original research in all questions relating to war and to statesmanship connected with war, or the prevention of war.”

The short term challenge remains improving the physical plant, which was designed for three hundred students and now through a series of conscious decisions by Navy leadership serves over six hundred. The longer term challenge is to ensure the Naval War College is constantly working toward excellence in the classroom, in our research and in our gaming efforts.

**RESIDENT CURRICULA**

The core course work for the senior and intermediate programs consists of three trimesters of study, plus three electives, one per each trimester. The intermediate course has one trimester of seventeen weeks for the study of joint maritime operations and two eleven week trimesters. NWC develops the three core courses as independent courses of study to accommodate the College of Naval Command and Staff’s unique system of matriculating and graduating students thrice annually in November, February, and June. While the courses are clearly interrelated, they are developed and delivered as independent courses. A speaker program and two professional conferences complete the College’s academic requirements. International officers are embedded with the U.S. students for the entire academic year. The structuring of the course work permits one faculty, in one facility, to teach both senior and intermediate students, an effective and efficient use of resources.

The CNC&$S/NSC National Security Decision Making Course educates military officers and U.S. government civilians in effective decision-making and leadership on security issues, particularly those involving force selection and planning challenges within national and theater resource constraints. The course instructs in: strategic planning by regional combatant commanders; the nature of economic, political, organization, and behavior factors affecting selection, command, and use of military forces; using expanded critical thinking skills to formulate and execute strategy to achieve desired outcomes within complex national security organizations; and the characteristics and skills needed to be an effective participant in a senior staff environment. Major emphasis is placed on the executive development of students in preparation for intermediate-level command and staff assignments. The course employs a multi-discipline approach, synthesizing selected concepts from economics, political science, strategy, leadership, psychology, management, anthropology, and other related disciplines. All instruction seeks to utilize the broad experience of the student body and focuses on making and implementing critical decisions within the command and staff environment.
The CNC&Ś/NSC Strategy and War Course is designed to teach students to think strategically and develop a deeper understanding of the interaction of strategy and the operational use of military force. Leadership and operational level command figure prominently in the course. The aim of the course is to sharpen the students’ ability to assess how alternative operational courses of action best serve to achieve overall strategic and national objectives. Students are asked to think in a disciplined, critical, and original manner about the international strategic environment about a range of potential strategies, and about the strategic effects of joint, interagency, and multinational operations.

The CNC&Ś/NSC Joint Maritime Operations Course is an in-depth study of the operational level of war throughout the range of military operations. The Joint Maritime Operations Course is a practitioners course which prepares students for the operational arena and to excel through effective operational planning and application of Joint forces to achieve appropriate military objectives in coalition/multinational and interagency environments. Although maritime operations and sea service contributions are emphasized, the capabilities of all services are studies with ultimate focus on planning and execution of joint operations at the Joint/combined task force and functional/service component levels.

An extensive Electives Program expands both the breadth and depth of the College’s educational offerings by providing opportunities to explore subjects not included in the core curriculum or to investigate in greater detail specific elements of that curriculum. The elective courses are now offered in twenty-one distinct Areas of Study (AOS). The elective program this academic year offers fourteen areas of individual study ranging from five regional area studies, to leadership and ethics, Joint Warfare Analysis for the Commander and enterprise strategic planning, to operational law, insurgency and terrorism or information operations, command & control and battlespace awareness, and strategy, operations, and military history. There are also three Areas of Study designed for group study. Normally, interested students apply and then are selected to participate in the one of these programs. This year’s programs include the Halsey Groups, the Mahan Scholars, and NOFC.

TEACHING METHODOLOGY

The seminar is the central focus for learning for resident students at the Naval War College. Seminar contact time and practical exercises, where the students are continuously together, are keys to the academic program’s success. For those active interchanges, a well-constructed, relevant curriculum, that includes carefully selected readings designed to build the knowledge essential for informed discussion comprises the first essential element. The second element is a quality faculty member able to teach and lead a graduate-level discussion. The College has multilayered curricula and faculty development programs designed to sustain the relevance and currency of the academic programs and the individual faculty members. Curricula
development, teaching notes, and faculty preparation all are premised on the disciplined work habits of the professionals who comprise the student body. The third and final element is the individual student’s experience, preparation and participation. Their assiduous preparation and the high quality of their engagement add significantly to the quality of the educational experience.

While the seminar clearly predominates the in-resident educational experience, the faculty’s curricula design uses a wide variety of learning methodologies including lectures, guest speakers, panel discussions, films, group projects, and wargames.

The 15-person seminars reflect a robust mix of Services and the incorporation of international students into most seminars. Interagency representation is less prominent; but the College’s academic leadership takes care to distribute such students to ensure maximum exposure. By reforming the seminars for each trimester, students are exposed to a broader array of their peers, providing further opportunities for building trust and confidence. Additionally, the elective program provides another forum for broadening student exposure and interaction, again remixed after each trimester.

Evaluating student performance is essential in judging the extent to which the College achieves its educational function of enhancing the professional capabilities of its students to meet the nation’s national security challenges as leaders and decision makers. Assessing student achievement within the core courses also assesses students’ success in the joint professional military education learning requirements. Grading clearly sustains the academic rigor in the College’s programs.

Each department establishes specific learning objectives linked to the Navy’s educational outcomes for that particular educational level and then uses a combination of traditional graded events, such as papers and examinations, as well as ungraded events, to measure student and course achievement of those objectives. Two of the three departments end their courses with capstone events requiring students, individually and collectively, to apply their knowledge in practical exercises, where student learning outcomes including joint learning requirements are visible to the faculty. The third department curriculum uses an incremental process to evaluate the progress of students in applying the course’s analytical constructs through a series of essays and a comprehensive exam. Again, student learning outcomes are clearly visible to its faculty.

The number and form of graded events varies by department and changes as the curriculum evolves; but these events consistently include both research papers and examinations. Two of the departments also assign grades for contribution in seminar, providing another means of tracking individual achievement with regards to required learning throughout the course. Equally important in assessing both student performance and the value of the curriculum are
numerous ungraded exercises scheduled throughout the academic year, such as simulations, individual and group presentations, and role playing. These events are designed to determine how effectively students have assimilated and can employ the material presented in the curriculum. The combination of graded and ungraded events provides the faculty with substantial evidence of student achievement including joint requirements, and the students with substantive and continuous feedback regarding their progress.

A student is considered to have successfully completed the JMO, NSDM, and S&W course upon attaining a minimum final grade of B- (80%) for a Master's Degree, or a C- (70%) for an NWC diploma. Grade descriptions of what constitutes grade letters (A+ through F) are provided to each student in the respective syllabus. Elective courses, although graded on a High Pass/Pass/Fail basis, also require either examinations or papers.

The study of war and its prevention in the modern era is highly complex and demands rigorous intellectual preparation. The professional, active and ongoing dialogue on warfare conducted at Newport between and among the students and faculty, in and out of the classroom, is part of the College's strong and enduring strategic tradition. If for no other reason, graduate-level PME and JPME Phase I have a bright future at the Naval War College.

FACULTY

One of the enduring strengths of the Naval War College is its faculty. The College seeks to recruit, develop and retain faculty members that are best suited to the College's mission, functions and tasks as assigned to it by the Chief of Naval Operations. The faculty is thorough -- one might even say aggressive -- in assessing the performance of their students against the College's well-defined institutional standards.

This is noteworthy because faculty workloads remain substantial with the completion of the PME Continuum. This tension between workload and development continues to challenge the College's ability to sustain the kind of development program that it desires for its faculty; however, over the last two years there has been a better balance and considerable financial resources were devoted to faculty development. That said, this workload is appropriate to the College's mission and is manageable given that most faculty members have little direct role in the governance and administration of the College. To their credit as dedicated, well-qualified professionals, the faculty's effectiveness in executing these new tasks is high and their acceptance of the responsibility for ensuring that the content and methods of instruction to execute these new tasks meets or exceeds generally accepted academic and professional standards and expectations is noteworthy.
The professional qualifications, pedagogical competence, scholarly qualities, dedication, and enthusiasm of the teaching faculty have long been the primary source of the Naval War College's very high reputation in the world of professional military education and in civilian academic circles as well. That reputation helps the College to continue to attract and retain outstanding professors. Quantitative measures of teaching performance for all departments are regularly quite high confirming the faculty's teaching effectiveness. Graduates are exceptionally satisfied with their overall educational experience, the high quality of instruction, and, in the main, the honest feedback provided to them.

One key pillar of the College's strategic tradition established by Admiral Stansfield Turner, the College's thirty-seventh president, holds that "Scholarship for scholarship's sake is of no importance to us. You must keep your sights set on decision making or problem solving as your objective." That said, scholarship remains vital to the rigor, relevancy, currency and quality of the College's academic programs as an important, supporting academic responsibility. The College has developed a systematic method of reviewing and approving individual faculty members proposed developmental plans to supplement its habitual, disciplined curricula development process. More than $600,000 has been committed to faculty development during the last two fiscal years.

Indeed, the record of publication among the faculty as a whole is remarkable for a group whose main institutional priority is teaching. The College faculty includes established scholars of national and even international renown in such fields as maritime strategy, naval power, amphibious operations, joint military doctrine, space, civil-military relations, war planning, strategic theory and practice, classical theorists of war, political philosophy, American foreign policy and military history, European diplomatic history and military history, politics in the Balkans and in Russia, Russian and Soviet military history, international relations in Northeast Asia, and Chinese foreign policy. Among younger members of the faculty are promising scholars in the fields of air power, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, armed groups, insurgents, terrorist groups, ethnic conflict in the Middle East, Chinese history, and many others.

Faculty Profile

Civilian professors, U.S. and international military officers, and representatives from selected U.S. Government departments and agencies constitute the faculty. The College characterizes them as academic faculty or research faculty on the basis of their primary responsibility.

The academic faculty is largely located in the three core departments -- Strategy and Policy (S&P), National Security Decision Making (NSDM), and Joint Military Operations (JMO) or the College of Distance Education (CDE). Over the last two decades, the College has
increased the faculty within these core departments from eighty to one hundred and forty-two members. As of the end of April 2009, the faculty of these three departments consisted of sixty-four military officers and seventy-eight civilians.

The faculty of the three core teaching departments comprises the bulk of the PME/IPME faculty. Military faculty members in the teaching departments at Newport are officers with the ranks of captain or colonel and commander or lieutenant colonel. All are graduates of war or staff colleges; almost all hold at least one master’s degree, and some have earned doctorates. All are also proven performers in their respective operational arenas. Emphasis for selection to a faculty position is placed on O-5 or higher command experience, a joint or service component operational tour, a joint, service headquarters or Washington, D.C. tour, and completion of a senior service college. Waivers to this are granted when considered against other relative operational background experience. Forty-seven percent of S&P’s military faculty members have held O-5 command. All have the requisite PME and hold a master’s degree with eighteen percent having a PhD or enrolled as doctoral candidates. Within the JMO Department’s military faculty, sixty-nine percent have held O-5 command, and over ninety-four percent are graduates of an intermediate or senior level service college and hold a master’s degree; forty-one percent hold multiple master degrees. Sixty percent of the NSDM military faculty has had O-5 command and sixty-seven percent hold multiple master’s degrees.

The College continues to encounter challenges in attracting the very best Navy officers to join the faculty since they are not credited with a joint duty tour as are their other Service peers. This makes the teaching assignment less advantageous and contributes to the perception within the Navy that assignment as a military faculty member to the Navy’s senior service college is, generally, not career enhancing.

For Academic Year 2008-2009, the military faculty staffing for the teaching departments is:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Sea Services</th>
<th>USN</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USC</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>USAF</th>
<th>Royal Navy</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>S&amp;P</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>35</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>65</td>
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</tbody>
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Civilian faculty members are recruited from several sources: faculties at civilian academic institutions, the ranks of retired military officers, the business sector, and government
agencies, such as the State Department. The last source provides only a small number, who are assigned to the College for a year or two. Typically, they have master’s degrees but only rarely doctorates; they are valued for their professional experience in diplomacy or intelligence and often for their regional expertise as well.

Civilian faculty members who come from civilian academic institutions hold doctorates, almost always from the top doctoral programs in the United States or Europe. Nearly all have prior teaching experience and records of scholarly publication. Retired military officers who become civilian faculty members almost always have had experience as military faculty members, often at the Naval War College. Indeed, it is their record of excellence as teachers, not just their prior practical experience, training and education, which make them attractive recruits as civilian faculty members. While some may work toward their doctoral degrees, they are required to sustain the skills and expertise for which they were hired.

For civilian faculty, these departments seek an appropriate mix of expertise as well. For JMO, civilian faculty members all have a specialty which relates to the JMO curricula and complements the expertise of the military faculty. Twenty-two of the twenty-five civilian professors are retired military officers. All have significant and diverse military or military related backgrounds (e.g., Army, Air Force, Marine, Merchant Marine, etc.) which incorporate a broad range of tactical, operational, and joint duty experience into the overall skills base of JMO. All civilian faculty members have a minimum of a M.A. /M.S. and fifty-two percent hold a J.D. /PhD or are PhD candidates. Sixty-four percent hold multiple advanced degrees. Seventy-six percent were JPME Phase I or II qualified while on active duty and twenty-five percent were designated as Joint Qualified Officers or its equivalent while on active duty. There is significant previous joint duty experience among the civilian faculty.

The twenty-two civilian faculty members in the S&O Department all hold doctorates and are acknowledged experts in history, political science, or international relations. All come from prestigious universities or institutes. The civilian NSDM faculty members all have a specialty which relates to NSDM curricula and are proven experts in their respective field of endeavor. Currently, all NSDM civilian faculty members hold, at a minimum, a masters degree, while over seventy-one percent hold doctorates. Ten of the thirty-one civilians (thirty-two percent) are retired from the US military. Of the fourteen NSDM Department military faculty members, one hundred percent are JPME Phase I qualified and thirty-six percent are also JPME II and designated a Joint Qualified Officer or its equivalent. Of the thirty-one civilian faculty members, thirty-two percent completed JPME I educational requirements.

The College of Distance Education has forty-five permanent civilian faculty members. Of these eighteen have doctorates and thirty-three are retired military. Thirty-two of the retired military faculty members have completed JPME I. Periodically, these on-campus CDE
professors augment the faculty in the core teaching departments. Many of them also teach electives for the resident students.

The College of Distance Education also has a significant number of adjunct faculty members with long service to the College. There are fifty-seven adjuncts that work with the fleet seminar program with an average of fifteen years of service. There are also thirty-eight adjuncts working with the web-enabled course with an average of four years of service to the College.

The Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS) includes twenty-seven military officers\(^6\) and thirty-six civilian faculty members\(^7\). Many research faculty members teach elective courses in the degree program; some of these courses are co-taught with faculty from the core teaching departments.

The College of Operational and Strategic Leadership has nineteen civilian professors, one of whom is in Annapolis, MD. Several of them teach electives and mentor the Stockdale Group in their group advanced research project. Three civilian professors are involved with the flag and general officer level courses taught at the College -- the Joint Force Maritime Component Course (JFMCC) and the Combined Force Maritime Component Course (CFMCC). Additionally, there is one military and nine civilian professors with the Maritime Staff Operator’s Course (MSOC), and nine military and two civilian faculty members with the Assess and Assist Teams (AAT). In Newport, the Electives Program makes limited use of adjunct professors. There are no graduate teaching assistants in any of the academic programs.

**STUDENTS**

**College of Naval Command and Staff.** Naval War College intermediate-level resident students are approximately thirty-six years of age. Approximately sixty percent of the student body begins their studies in August and graduates in June. The remaining forty percent of the student body arrives either in November or February. Over ninety-one percent of the off-cycle students are Navy, but Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, and civilian agencies also take advantage of the opportunity to send off-cycle students.

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\(^6\) This level of manning constitutes a substantial decrease from the sixty-eight military officers assigned to CNWS in 1994.

\(^7\) This level of manning constitutes more than four-fold increase in civilian positions since 1994.
The two hundred and eighty-five US students in the College of Naval Command and Staff include representatives from all military services and several civilian agencies. There are one hundred and seventy-seven Navy students in the grades of lieutenant and lieutenant commander that make up fifty-six percent of the class and sixty-three percent of the US students. There are twenty-four Marines in the grades of major or lieutenant colonel that make up eight percent of the class and nine percent of the US students. The five Coast Guard students represent two percent of the student body.

The forty-three Army officers in the grade of major represent fifteen percent of the US students and fourteen percent of the overall student body. The Department of the Air Force provides thirty officers in the grade of major and they represent ten percent of the US students and nine percent of the overall student body. Six civilians represent two percent of the overall student body.

**Naval Staff College.** There are thirty-two international officers each representing a different nation in the intermediate-level Naval Staff College course. They represent approximately ten percent of the overall student body.

**College of Distance Education.** There are 4,650 students enrolled on one of the four JPME I programs offered by the College of Distance Education. This breaks down as follows: 970 in Fleet Seminar Program; 1,110 in the web-enabled correspondence program; 1,200 in the CD ROM-based program; and 1,370 in Naval War College courses at the Naval Postgraduate School.
OTHER FACETS OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

The Naval War College is more than a school house that delivers a curriculum; it is the Navy's "center of thought" that regards the generation of new knowledge as an integral component of high quality professional and graduate education. It has additional three major departments, the Senior Enlisted Academy, and hosts the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group.

Center for Naval Warfare Studies

The Naval War College, founded as a "place of original research," has closely integrated research and teaching throughout its 125 year history. We regard research as an essential component of quality PME. To this end, virtually all faculty conduct research but we also have a full-time research organization called the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. This arm of the College supports student education through the development of core course segments such as the joint military operations planning exercise, international law sessions, electives in area studies and analysis techniques, and directed research programs. The synergy of teaching by means of research is powerful and distinguishes our institution from others. Moreover, because of the joint composition of our directed research programs, the documented actions by our graduates to maintain contact in their subsequent assignments constitute a channel of communication among operational staffs of different services that would not otherwise exist. The Navy has directly benefited, for example from the presence of Army officers in our Halsey directed research groups who suggested the application of existing Army systems to emergent Navy force protection problems. These suggestions led to actual fleet experimentation.

By virtue of integrating research and classroom instruction, the Naval War College has been throughout its history been influential in helping the Navy adapt to emergent strategic environments. Most recently, the College conducted the gaming and analysis that underpinned the new maritime strategy. This project was conducted as a joint, interagency and international project, with non-governmental and commercial organizations brought in as well. Students participated. Actually helping to shape the future of the Navy in such a way increases the credibility and value of the teaching at the College. Moreover, because our research is also oriented on enhancing the operational readiness and effectiveness of the fleet, it deals with cutting edge issues such as hybrid warfare, piracy, the Arctic and many others. This makes the institution more vital and relevant.

The Naval War College is also a significant actor in forging a global maritime partnership for increased maritime security. Faculty from the Center for Naval Warfare Studies are constantly collaborating with counterparts in sister institutions around the world on common issues and functions such as wargaming, counter-piracy, international law and research techniques. It is in no small part due to the actions of our research faculty that the relationship
between the U.S. and Mexican navies has, in the last several years, attained unprecedented levels of interaction and interoperability. As an acknowledged world leader in wargaming, the College has not only played a significant role in the rebuilding of the New York City fire and police departments after 9/11, it has become the "institution of record" for providing wargaming and seminar support to the Proliferation Security Initiative. The language skills and regional expertise of the research faculty facilitate the development of collegial relationships with both military and civilian institutions around the world. Especially significant is our China expertise, and we not only study Chinese Maritime developments, we have established useful relationships with scholars and naval officers there; contributing in a material way to the reduction of misunderstanding and suspicion between our navies.

The Center for Naval Warfare Studies consists of six core departments supported by two detachments from external commands and two operational support officer units.

The Strategic Research Department consists of twelve civilian and two Navy faculty members and focuses principally on regional security studies. Its mission is to produce innovative strategic analysis for the Navy, DoD and the broader national security community. SRD faculty teach several electives and either lead or participate in all of the College's regional study groups. Especially noteworthy is the department's language capability, which includes Chinese, Japanese, Russian, French, German, Korean, Spanish, Arabic, Turkish, and Farsi.

The International Law Department is a focal point in the Navy for the study of international law and oceans policy as they affect US military policy, strategy and operations. Led by a civilian professor, it is normally staffed by a uniformed lawyer from each Service. It advances the understanding of international law and oceans policy through research, publication, teaching, and international engagement, and helps shape the development of international law and oceans policy throughout the world to promote the rule of law.

The Warfare Analysis and Research Department consists of nine faculty and two technical staff that support advanced student research and maintain the Decision Support Center, a world-class conference facility. The College's Advanced Research Groups focus on the operational level of warfare informed by classified tactical knowledge coupled with a clear understanding of the strategic environment where U.S. naval forces will be operating. Two of the groups draw heavily upon country-specific and regional expertise of the faculty including the college's regional studies groups. The joint composition of each group enables them to apply an expansive joint and interagency approach to the challenges they are addressing. They continuously look at a broad spectrum of warfighting -- from high-end, technologically focused issues to asymmetrical and irregular warfare challenges and adapt contemporary lessons to the enduring elements of warfare. This has resulted in their research findings being highly sought after by senior leaders
The Wargaming Department is the most well-known and respected organization of its kind in the world. In addition to supporting various teaching departments with wargames, this department provides extensive support to the Navy Staff, the operational fleets and a host of other organizations inside and outside the Navy. The department has twelve civilian, three contractors and seventeen military faculty members, thirty enlisted staff, three government civilian technicians and thirteen contractor technicians. Housed in McCarty-Little Hall, designed and built as an advanced wargaming center, the department operates a three-hundred workstation self-contained gaming network and an extensive array of audio-visual technology to simulate the modern operational staff environment. The department conducts over thirty games in a typical year as well as numerous other events such as conferences and tours. It is also notable that the department frequently supports the gaming efforts of allied nations including India, Japan, Uruguay, Norway and Mexico.

The Maritime History department consists of a world renowned naval historian and one other faculty member that directs and manages the Naval War College’s maritime history and sea service heritage program. The Department serves as the central resource and contact point for the entire Naval War College in matters relating to maritime history and has particular responsibility for implementing and coordinating the College’s research and writing program in this area, for its collections of historical materials, art work, artifacts, and documents, and for their use and display.

The Naval War College Press publishes the Naval War College Review, a quarterly professional journal as well as a series of monographs on naval subjects entitled The Newport Papers. The NWC Press also publishes a series of short monographs on Chinese maritime developments as well as an occasional book. The Press’ experienced staff is expert on naval and maritime subjects and makes the NWC Press a focused and highly respected forum for rigorous naval thought. It is broadening its reach through a web page and other internet media.

The Office of Naval Intelligence Detachment Newport provides the College with a wide range of intelligence support. The detachment is comprised of Navy intelligence, information warfare and surface warfare officers, enlisted intelligence specialists and civilian analysts.

The Navy Meteorological and Oceanographic Command supports a small detachment at the College that provides environmental information for wargames and research as well as general support to the College.

College of Operational and Strategic Leadership

Key tenets of the College’s intermediate and senior courses have been the development of operational and strategic level planning, decision-making, and leadership. NWC has
considerably expanded its reach in developing such expertise at the operational level of war with the establishment in 2006 of the College of Operational and Strategic Leadership (COSL). COSL aims to improve the capability of Navy commanders to lead maritime, joint, and multinational forces as well as improve the capability of Navy staff members to plan, execute, and assess and to function cohesively as a marmite operations center. The faculty is focused on supporting combat readiness at the operational level of war through the following:

The Navy's CJFMCC and the Maritime Staff Orientation Course (MSOC) were previously discussed. The Assess & Assist Team (AAT) works with MOCs and operational level maritime staff in order to develop and maintain capability to enable the Navy to comply with Secretary of Defense and Fleet Force Commander's requirements for certification of JFMCCs, Navy Component Commands, and other maritime operational level commanders. In order to bolster Navy competence at the operational level of war, AAT supports the Navy's ongoing certification and accreditation cycle and conducts staff assist visits for Navy operational commanders.

This College also established and manages the CNO Senior Mentor Program. These senior mentors support CJFMCC, MSOC, & AAT by providing experienced senior leadership well imbued with historic operational level challenges, currency with ongoing challenges, and a key source of Joint/Interagency interface.

The COSL faculty and staff also conduct strategic planning and policy development for leadership and ethics education and character development as they pertain to the College's responsibility for developing operational and strategic level leaders. COSL faculty teach and mentor students selected for the Stockdale Group, develop the annual leadership and ethics theme, and then execute the ethics conference and ongoing panels and speakers throughout the academic year.

Regional and International Programs and Outreach Supporting Maritime Security Cooperation

The College builds on fifty-three years of global cooperation via international programs. More than 125 nations have sent over 3500 of their finest officers to study in one of our three international academic programs. Fully fifty percent of these have become flag/general officers and ten percent have risen to the top leadership position including twenty alumni currently serving as chiefs of their own service. After retirement, many go on to further prominence as ambassadors, cabinet ministers, businessmen and heads of state.

In addition to the formal PME academic programs for international students, the College is involved in a number of activities and engagements designed to build trust and collaboration
with maritime partners worldwide. NWC faculty are constantly collaborating with counterparts in sister institutions around the world on common issues and functions such as curriculum design, teaching, wargaming, counter-piracy, international law and research techniques. It is in no small part due to the actions of our research faculty that the relationship between the U.S. and Mexican navies has, in the last several years, attained unprecedented levels of interaction and interoperability. As an acknowledged world leader in wargaming, the College has not only played a significant role in the rebuilding of the New York City fire and police departments after 9/11, it has become the "institution of record" for providing wargaming and seminar support to the Proliferation Security Initiative. The language skills and regional expertise of the faculty facilitate the development of collegial relationships with both military and civilian institutions around the world. Especially significant is our China expertise, and we not only study Chinese Maritime developments, we have established useful relationships with scholars and naval officers there; contributing in a material way to the reduction of misunderstanding and suspicion between our navies.

Our six regional studies groups provide the faculty a forum to collaborate with each other and peers deeply involved in international security studies in their respective regions. This consistent dialogue deepens understanding, creates insights and builds trust around the globe.

The College sponsors regional symposia around the world bringing our faculty, our alumni, and naval leaders assigned or deployed to the respective region together to discuss current international security challenges and developments.

On behalf of the students, faculty and staff representing each of our armed services, many of our international partners, and numerous Department of Defense and other federal activities, we thank you for your continued support within Congress and your commitment to professional military education.
STATEMENT BY

BG EDWARD C. CARDON

DEPUTY COMMANDANT

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

BEFORE

OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FIRST SESSION, 111TH CONGRESS

JUNE 25, 2009

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNTIL RELEASED BY

THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
Chairman Snyder, Congressman Wittman and the honorable members of the House Armed Services Oversight and Investigations Sub-Committee, I am BG Edward C. Cardon, the Deputy Commandant of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the Deputy Commanding General of the US Army Combined Arms Center. On behalf of LTG William B. Caldwell IV, Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth and Commandant of the Command and General Staff College, I would like to extend to each of you a warm welcome from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and the Soldiers and Civilians of the Combined Arms Center. Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about Professional Military Education at the United States Army Command and General Staff College.

Everything I will say today must start with a preface – our graduates are doing well in operations all around the world, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. Their service is selfless and often at great personal and family sacrifice. The faculty and staff of the College recognize that we owe them the best education possible and are dedicated to growing the next generation of leaders for our Army and Nation. In military terms of reference, the students are our center of gravity. Our challenge is and remains the same: to prepare them for both today and the future. We are grateful for the Committee’s tremendous support to professional military education.

For 127 years the United States Army Command and General Staff College has developed military officers to lead our citizen soldiers, in peace and in war. Distinguished graduates include Eisenhower, Bradley, Marshall, Arnold, MacArthur, and tens of thousands of officers no less important to the security of our Nation. In addition, over the last 100 years, more than 7,100 international officers from 155 countries have joined America’s military leaders in the classrooms at Fort Leavenworth to study military art and science at the operational level of war. This rich history of distinguished international officers includes 28 officers who subsequently rose to lead their Nations, including four who are currently serving Heads of State. The Fort Leavenworth United States Students Hall of Fame and International Students Hall of
Fame is a "who's who" of Military Leadership. Just two examples from the international list reflect the critical importance of our international program to the strategic interests of the United States. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia graduated from the Command and General Staff College in 1991 and was inducted into our International Hall of Fame in 2005. The Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani graduated from CGSC in 1988 and was recently inducted into our International Hall of Fame in 2009. Both are poignant examples of the criticality of our international exchange program. Further illustrating this point are the words of our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, who commented to the Military Education Coordinating Council (MECC) this year that he did not know where relations with Pakistan would be today if General Kayani had not attended Fort Leavenworth.

I realize the Committee is constantly reviewing the overall health of the professional military education process – now in its 20th year following the original issuance of the Report of the Panel on Military Education of the 100th Congress, which came to be known to us in military education as the Skelton Report. First, we have implemented the HASC’s report recommendations and they continue to serve us well at CGSC, but more importantly, we strive to meet your intent of a rigorous quality education that prepares officers to operate in an ever changing environment.

For today’s testimony, you have asked us to specifically address the following five topics:

- What should the military schools be and do?

- What constitutes rigor?

- What are the organizational structure and resources needed to accomplish your schools’ mission?
- How do you define the quality of the senior leaders, best faculty, and qualifications for students at your school?

- How do you manage the curriculum broadly and specifically in the focus areas of strategy operational art, Joint, Inter-Agency, Inter-Governmental, and Multinational (JIMA), language, regional studies and culture, irregular warfare and hybrid threats, and ethics.

The theme of our testimony is two-fold. First, we have implemented the HASC’s report recommendations and they continue to serve us well at the College. Military education has been profoundly changed over the course of 20 years to achieve the development of a joint force as envisioned in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. While we have made tremendous progress, we also recognize we do not have a perfect system, and we continue to evolve to meet your overarching goals.

The second major focus of my testimony is to present the vision of our way ahead. A way to put this into the context of our discussions is to ask a question. What recommendations should shape the next 20 years of professional military education? What changes can and should we make in order to achieve the far-reaching impact we have witnesses from the original report?

First, allow me to present a more complete picture of the College. The answers to some of your questions are better explained in the context of describing the history and educational processes that causes us to conclude that we are successfully meeting the goals outlined in the 1989 Report.

The Army, by policy, provides an intermediate level education to all active duty majors and the opportunity for the same level of education to National Guard and Reserve majors through distance learning programs. For many years selection to attend resident CGSC was made by a Department of the Army Selection Board. This board selected approximately 50
percent of the eligible officers by year group to attend the resident CGSC course, while the remainder were required to complete the course by correspondence. All officers were required to complete CGSC, resident or non-resident, to remain competitive for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel. The CGSC selection board became a determinant for branch qualifying follow-on positions, and was a major discriminator for future success.

In 2004, the Army made the decision to take a different direction in selecting students to attend CGSC. There were a number of reasons for changing this policy. First, if CGSC was needed for success for assignments as a major and beyond, why should the Army provide less than half of the officers the requisite education? Secondly, the operational environment was growing more complex, increasing the demand on education for leader development. For these and other very supportable reasons the Army moved forward to implement universal resident Intermediate Level Education (ILE) for all active duty majors.

Universal ILE has two parts: a common core and a credentialing course. The current 10-month CGSC experience consists of two courses: a 14-week core course which emphasizes joint educational outcomes, and a 28-week Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course. The resident course is primarily oriented toward branch officers – those officers who serve in duty positions directly related to their basic branch (infantry, armor, artillery, etc...), while most officers serving in specialty branches and career fields attend one of our resident satellite campuses where they take the 14-week Core Course and then complete a follow-on credentialing course based on their unique specialty.

Under current policy, approximately 75 percent of active duty officers should come to Ft. Leavenworth for CGSC, but the resources, instructors, and facilities were never provided to make this a reality. Given this lack of resources and today's operational demands that impacts the availability of officers, the Army simply cannot man the operational force and have 75
percent of a year group attend CGSC. This has resulted in a large backlog of officers waiting to attend the 10 month resident course. The Army is currently reexamining this issue. An unintended consequence of this policy has been the demand growth for our sister services to support the increased number of staff groups.

Educationally, the concept of universal Intermediate Level Education for all majors is an intriguing debate for the Army. There is one line of analysis which maintains that universal ILE really makes sense, especially today. This supportive logic proposes that the 50 percent of majors who would not have attended CGSC under the old policy may have been the same officers who could have benefitted most from additional resident education, if the rigor and standards of the course are maintained. The counter argument assumes that when you enroll everyone the standards would have to be lowered to account for the weaker educational background of some students. The fact that I believe cannot be disputed is the Army is going to need all of our majors to be successful and all will face tough challenges. It is our task to provide the best education we can offer to every officer attending CGSC.

While this dialog will continue, I can assure you that all majors today receive a better education than provided previously. Those officers not attending resident CGSC at Ft Leavenworth receive the same 14 week ILE core curriculum taught by instructors who have been prepared and certified by our Faculty Development staff and the teaching departments at Ft. Leavenworth. We have traded our old correspondence courses for computer-based distance learning which strives to use the newest technology to improve the education experience. I do caution that these distance learning courses are not interchangeable with resident experiences. All our data identifies the interactions of our students in the classroom as the most important aspect of their learning experience and this level of interaction cannot be provided through distance learning. Regardless of what the Army decision is on universal ILE, all options which exist for majors today are far superior to that available 20 years ago.
As the Committee identified more than 20 years ago, professional military education is a critical component to leader development. We often say we train for certainty, but we educate for uncertainty. Given the unknowns of the future environment, we believe education today is more important than ever. It will allow our leaders to operate with complexity over extended time; to work ill-structured problems; and to operate in a more decentralized environment with increasing interactions with coalition and non-military partners. Education prepares our leaders for an uncertain future. CGSC has seen tremendous change over the past 20 years. Today, we focus on how to think about complex problems, not studying complicated yet tractable situations, which can yield linear solutions. Our Cold War planning for major combat operations has been replaced by studies in the full spectrum of conflict across the broad expanse of today’s contemporary operating environment. Full spectrum operations have themes such as irregular warfare, counterinsurgency (COIN), and hybrid threats, and the contemporary operating environment includes both the human and physical domains with the culture, language and regional analysis being important areas of study at CGSC today.

Within the Department of Defense and specifically the professional military education community, we now habitually work together to plan and execute a uniform set of educational goals at all intermediate level schools. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, Officer Professional Military Education Policy, referred to as the OPMEP, is our common standard. Under the direction of the Director of the Joint Staff, the Military Education Coordination Council (MECC) is the corporate management body for the process and also the integrating activity for many cooperative programs that have emerged from this regular gathering of the senior leaders of all of the schools. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regularly visits with this group to provide his vision for the military education mission. Overall, and as you expected, we have found a lot more common ground than divergence in working
through even the most contentious issues and this organizational structure is greatly enhancing joint education in all of the schools.

This presents the opportunity to address your specific question concerning the value in the uniqueness of the service schools. We believe strongly that there is value at the intermediate level of education because these schools are not solely joint focused, but retain important requirements for service specific education. In the case of CGSC, we are the Army’s land power institution, both in teaching and in research. This mission is critical for the overall success of the Army. The joint mission integrates well because the sister services routinely assign students who benefit in better understanding the Army because they routinely work with us in meeting their missions during operational deployments.

The Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) process is built on a set of common learning areas and educational standards, with a supporting accreditation process that assures uniformity of effort and also regularly evaluates the programs to assure that schools achieve the rigor of graduate education which was a key component of the Skelton Report recommendations. The OPMEP standards reflect good adult learning methodology, applying an educational outcomes-based model with the appropriate levels of review and reporting. The seven common educational standards of the OPMEP are our guidance addressing many of the questions you have posed and more. OPMEP addresses the specific standards in your question, to include covering qualifications for and recruiting of faculty, in assessment of students and program effectiveness, and the curriculum management and educational processes. We also have met all the standards of our regional accrediting body, the Higher Learning Commission, the accrediting activity which allows us to confer graduate degrees. These standards also examine rigor, faculty credentials, educational process, and assessment.
Your committee had a specific question concerning the value of our Advisory Committee, which is another part of our program assessment process. Our Advisory Committee consists of both educators and scholars in the military sciences. The value provided by the Advisory Committee is an independent review of educational processes and advising the leadership on issues from their perspective. The best evidence of their value is to recognize that significant organizational changes have been made based on advice from the Advisory Committee. I think this process is healthy because it provides the military leaders that come and go through the College independent review and unencumbered advice.

In considering the committee’s question concerning processes to identify potential strategists early on, the College provides a number of venues to aid in this identification. As part of our research thesis program, students can pursue the Strategist track of study to research and write on a topic that falls within this category. They can also pursue the Joint Planner track of study and research and write in this area as well. How well these individuals handle the analysis of these complex questions and synthesize their results is a strong indicator of their potential in these critical areas.

We also have a very competitive selection process for students (Army, Sister Service, and International Military Students) who wish to continue their studies at Ft. Leavenworth for a second year, as part of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). These students who study in the Advanced Military Studies program are assigned to coded planning positions upon graduation from SAMS and many serve as senior planners and strategist repeatedly throughout their career. Many of our students also apply for similar programs throughout the joint professional military education community, such as at Quantico Marine Corps Base or at Maxwell Air Force Base.
Next to the students, the faculty of the College is the second critical line of operation for the College. The faculty at CGSC has changed dramatically over the past eight years, going from a predominately military faculty to a current faculty construct that is 65 percent civilian; although more than 95 percent of the civilians have active duty experience. The senior leadership of CGSC is the 3-star Commandant with a 1-star Deputy Commandant. The general requirement for both of these positions includes recent operational command experience, graduate education, and completion of a senior military college. The Dean of Academics is the chief academic officer for the College. This position requires a doctorate, significant leadership in education, and experience in the operational arts. Previous military experience is an obvious plus, but not a prerequisite for the position. The schools within the College are directed by colonels with operational experience, graduate degrees, and senior service college. There are also additional credentials depending on the position. As an example relevant to this discussion, the Director of the Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations Department must also have joint experience sufficient for appointment to the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair of Military Studies.

A current snapshot shows we currently have 275 civilian faculty members, 249 of which have active duty experience. The military faculty projected for this summer consists of 90 Army, 13 sister service, and 3 interagency officers. Within our civilian faculty, 32 served in our sister services, which yields a comparable joint representation in the civilian faculty. Later, I will talk about how this faculty model may be modified as we study comprehensive approaches.

Civilian faculty provides a core of professional educators who are critical to achieving graduate level education within an adult learning environment. Also, with the addition of civilian faculty, CGSC has grown from a very small number of Ph.D.s to more than 50 who possess terminal degrees and many more who are actively engaged in doctoral programs, adding depth to the teaching and learning at CGSC. The civilian faculty empowers us to seek specific expertise that
cannot be found in uniform, such as historians, political scientists, and economists. For example, the College is currently seeking to hire faculty with expertise in counterinsurgency, culture studies, and media relations. The value added by civilian faculty at CGSC is well established in external assessment data and in the feedback we collect from our students.

We recognize the value of the civilians teaching at CGSC, but we also understand the importance and value of Army officers teaching at CGSC. Our military faculty at the College is indispensable and provides balance in our faculty composition. The military faculty includes Army and joint leaders who coach and mentor our young officers, bring recent operational experience to the classroom, and provide context in our current military environment, among other benefits. The challenge is balancing the needs at CGSC and all the Army schools with the personnel pressures on all our formations and organizations at the midgrade and senior ranks. Army officers with the right education and experience are the lifeblood of the College.

The OPMEP process has provided CGSC with the joint service officers critical to infusing the joint service perspective into the Army’s premier center of intellectual excellence. However, with the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2007 a change was made to the rules for granting joint credit to non-host faculty teaching at CGSC. These billets were previously on a list of assignments receiving joint duty credit on the Joint Duty Authorization List (JDAL) and from the College’s standpoint this was both necessary and appropriate. This JDAL listing made teaching at CGSC attractive for sister service faculty because it assured them joint credit. There is now a different system in place which removes the Joint Duty Authorization List status for our sister service slots. The new process allows officers assigned to CGSC to apply for this credit after the fact, but joint officers consider the previous system much better, which (negatively) influences their interest in coming to Ft. Leavenworth. The second related issue is more critical. Because our sister service faculty positions were dropped from JDAL status they are a much lower fill priority for the Air Force, Marines, and Navy. They are not ‘must fill’ jobs.
Recommendation 2 from the Skelton Report emphasized the criticality of recruiting and retaining a high quality faculty; having these positions on the JDAL better achieves this goal than the changes made with the National Defense Authorization Act of 2007. This also speaks to your fourth question, concerning the selection of uniform faculty by the Services and the Chairman.

Military faculty remains a significant challenge for the Army into the foreseeable future. The College will continue providing a superb educational experience, and military faculty is one of our watch areas. Adding retired military instructors with recent combat experience alleviates immediate concerns for currency and relevance within the civilian faculty; however, we are carefully reviewing and assessing the long-term impacts.

The final recommendation of the Skelton report that applies to CGSC, and is also one of your focus areas, is the question concerning the rigor of our program often measured by exams and writing requirements. CGSC assesses student work and provides feedback on performance to our students as an integral part of our educational model. A typical student receives 25 or more grades on their transcript with each grade being the composite of their performance on written work, oral presentations, participation, and exams in each numbered course they complete. We have a published grading policy and our graduation standards include achieving graduate level performance in our coursework.

A number of awards for overall performance and writing are offered in every class as an incentive. Some examples include awards for the best overall performances by US, international, and interagency students, a history writing award, a thesis writing award, and a leadership writing award. Further, the top logistician, tactician and strategist are selected based on grades in their regular coursework and performance on additional written and oral exams.
Over the last several years the College has seen a need to provide majors more work in writing and communications, which has generated additional emphasis in our overarching education outcome of “communicate effectively.” Our course has, what we believe is, an appropriate level of rigor for graduate education. We side with those who insist that time for processing and reflections are critical components of graduate education. Full spectrum operations, with its renewed focus on stability operations, requires officers to think outside of the better previously understood parameters of major combat operations. This requirement will not be met by shortening intermediate level education experiences, but by maintaining their quality and integrity.

With that as a backdrop and I would like to sum up the first theme of this testimony with a quote by one of their military history heroes. General Pershing, in his memoirs while examining America’s performance in WW I, acknowledged the following:

“Our most highly trained officers as a rule came from the Staff College at Fort Leavenworth and from the Army War College....I was fortunate in having at my disposal ...a small group of men which included some of the most efficient and highly educated officers in our Army.”

This remains our standard and we should not settle for less. The evidence we collect internally and externally on the performance of our graduates supports that we remain a source of highly educated and trained men and women who are performing extremely well in these most difficult times. In our view, 20 years of developing and refining the Officer Professional Military Education Policy has been value added to the education of the officer corps and is reflected in the conduct of our operations around the world today.

This segues into the second topic I believe germane to today’s deliberations - what are the future needs of the Army in military education? Today, this is a subset of a larger issue.

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being addressed by the Army, which is defining a comprehensive process to manage leader
development. The Army recognizes that leader development is a balance and mix of education,
training, and experience throughout a career. Each of the three components must be
sequenced to effectively and efficiently develop our leaders as they progress. Just focusing on
the education and training of officers, it is intuitive that to obtain the optimum result, each
educational experience from Officer’s Basic Course to the War College needs to cumulatively
build on all preceding education, training, and experience. Each educational experience builds
on the previous and subsequent assignments are a practicum for what has been learned.

To accomplish a comprehensive execution of leader development, the Army has
assigned the management of leader development to the TRADOC Commander, currently GEN
Martin Dempsey. GEN Dempsey has further delegated design and management of the leader
development program to the Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center LTG William
B. Caldwell, IV. Our strategy is nearly complete and when approved, it will become the
guidepost for the Army education process. The synergies for Army education that result from
the Army Leader Development Strategy are certain to be positive. Allow me to examine this in
more detail and specifically as it applies to education at CGSC.

CGSC manages the curriculum under a process we call the Accountable Instruction
System. We are accountable for achieving our educational outcomes at the appropriate
graduate learning levels. Our Accountable Instruction System process provides us two
important data points, 1) an assessment of how well we achieved our learning outcomes, and 2)
What should we be teaching that we are not teaching now. Answering the first question is
relatively straightforward and provides us confidence in the analysis I have just presented. The
second is the much harder question. This committee tackled the same issue 20 years ago with
its creation of the joint education process that led to the OPMEP. The Army charges the leader
development strategy with coordinating a vision for the Army. The synergy between the leader
development program and CGSC co-existing at Ft Leavenworth, is the College faculty can contribute to examining the future needs for the Army and help design the education needed to meet these challenges. This process will help focus the CGSC curriculum and allow our program to interrelate with previous and follow-on experience and education. In reality, co-existing understates the relationship because, CGSC will have a significant part in the planning and execution of the Army’s leader development strategy.

Secondly, in education and development of military leaders, there will always be more to do than time to accomplish the mission. The education process must allow the College to measure the benefits and costs of proposed changes in comparison to the current curriculum. This is the natural friction in a healthy process. Our Accountable Instruction System provides us the data needed for that calculation. However, our internal processes cannot examine the impacts on the overall leader development strategy. Do changes at Ft Leavenworth cause unintended consequences elsewhere? The leader development strategy provides the appropriate process for the Army to answer the secondary questions.

The constant in this discussion is that CGSC remains a professional school for developing military officers and national security professionals into experts in the operational art of war. War applies in the broadest sense as defined by Clausewitz. In today’s definitions, war equates to full spectrum operations, not just major combat operations, therefore, war is offense, defense, stability, and civil support with all the intervening transitions. These all transpire concurrently, yet with different levels of intensity. War has gone from being a very complicated set of conditions that could be modeled to a complex and adaptive living system, much more difficult to analyze. Writing plans has been a process of military decision making that assumed that the problems could be modeled. Today, adaptive problem solving and design are the tools required to prepare officers for planning and commanding. Further, topics such as irregular war or hybrid threats, stability operations, reconstruction, and comprehensive approaches to winning
the final peace, must be and are part of the CGSC curriculum. All of this must be done without adding to the course lengths or simply demanding more from the students. To maintain the hallmarks of a graduate educational institution, with time for reading, reflection, writing and discussion, we must incorporate the critical topics into the natural rhythm at CGSC. We realize that friction will always exist where the current curriculum competes with the many emerging topics. As one of your questions alludes to, we are regularly pressed to insert new material into the curriculum. We apply the College’s Accountable Instruction System process to select only those that are most critical and thus retain an appropriate amount of time for study and reflection in the academic day. The solution to what should be in the curriculum is hard, but not intractable. The second great synergy for Army leader development program coexisting at CAC with CGSC is that the solutions to these issues can be managed across the Army education and training continuum, rather than CGSC in isolation making changes without accounting for what occurs before and after officers attend CGSC.

Inside the College, the development of an integrated curriculum is one approach that we employ to lessen the friction in curriculum management. We briefed your staff delegation on how the integrated curriculum approach designed at CGSC allows us to address multiple learning outcomes in common lesson blocks. The topics are not organized into discrete blocks such as individual classes in counterinsurgency, stability operations, threats, culture, major combat operations, etc. In the course by course approach we would either run out time before we covered all of the most important topics, or be forced to teach a myriad of topics broadly, but without depth in any one area. For us, the latter approach is not acceptable. Philosophically, we have to make the hard choices on what must be taught. We teach applying a realistic scenario for students to analyze which recognizes the full spectrum of operations and is set in a real world contemporary environment. Officers understand that as military leaders they are either engaged in, or planning for, all of these elements simultaneously. For example, students
may plan and execute a major operation with hybrid threats while simultaneously conducting stability operations while designing the transition to stability/reconstruction operations. Three major exercises provide practice in planning and execution across the full spectrum of operations, culminating with a brigade stability operation. In parallel to our integrated course of study, we teach military history and leadership throughout the year. Leadership includes our ethics programs. Again, these courses are leveraged to achieve multiple learning outcomes that cover full spectrum operations. It is quite insightful how much we teach about the contemporary operating environment in the study of history.

We at CGSC have begun our analysis of the needs for officers over the next ten years. As a product of our self-assessment, there are a number of initiatives in military education ongoing at CGSC and I want to take a few moments to highlight the most important of these. I will introduce our interagency education campaign, placing warrant officers in the intermediate level education course, the student health and wellness program, additions to our language studies being piloted for the first time with our current class, and a new focus on strategic communications.

Over the history of the College, civilian student participation in education at CGSC has been minimal, whether these were civilians from the Army or outside agencies. We have had minor faculty support from some agencies, but almost no civilian students attending. With the war in Iraq and a better understanding within DOD of the criticality of whole of government solutions to win the peace in Iraq and Afghanistan, the need to add interagency studies to the curriculum became paramount. As a professional school, this would logically lead to the addition of interagency professionals to the faculty to develop curriculum and teach. Further, the great value of having mid-career military officers studying with their interagency was also easily recognized. In discussions with Department of State (DOS) and a number of other government agencies it became clear that bringing interagency students and faculty to the
Heartland was going to require a major campaign on the part of the CGSC. The College assigned a senior faculty member to direct the Interagency Program and hit the road to contact the agencies we saw as contributors and partners. Over the last two years we have talked to dozens of agencies and done our best to market this program. The story was uniformly the same. These agencies understood and supported this initiative, but lacked the education and training account of people to support our efforts.

The Army developed a program which allows a small number of Army officers to intern with these agencies to help mitigate the manning issues they experience by sending students to Ft. Leavenworth. While helping our interagency partners is a critical component in getting interagency students to Ft. Leavenworth, the experience that these officers gain working within a partner organization is a powerful educational experience and cannot be underestimated. Our results to date are encouraging with 23 total interagency students scheduled to attend CGSC this summer. Eighteen of these will be in the intermediate level education course and in exchange, 22 Army majors will serve internships in 14 agencies. We also have interagency faculty from the Department of State, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. It is a great start, but there is more to be done. This is an area where we believe we can use your support. Our current policies set standards for joint representation within the student body. We feel a similar system to support interagency participation at the intermediate level is appropriate, similar to the process applied at the senior service schools. We will be working through the Military Education Coordination Council to develop a proposal, which may eventually require legislative action. Here, I just wanted to introduce this as a concern to full integration of interagency students and faculty into CGSC.

Our second initiative has been to expand our Army student body to include senior warrant officers. We just completed a very successful pilot program, where we graduated five senior warrant officers from the ILE course. These experienced technical experts in our Army
provided yet another broad perspective of how our Army operates, enriching the educational experience for all the students. We plan to continue the inclusion of small number of select warrant officers in each subsequent class.

The third initiative I went to showcase is the student health program that has been added at CGSC. The Army War College has, for a long time, operated a wellness program for its students, with dramatic impact. It has literally saved people’s lives by detecting critical health issues that were going undiagnosed. The program not only provides health screening, but educates on health maintenance issues such as diet, exercise, stress and other life style issues. Three years ago, the leadership at CGSC began to see the signs and symptoms of stress in the population of majors at CGSC. As an experiment, we solicited the support of the Army Physical Fitness Research Institute (APFRI) from the Army War College (AWC) to screen the majors at CGSC. The results were startling. The majors were, overall, in worse physical condition than the students at AWC, officers 10 years their senior. A plan was developed to add a satellite program at CGSC to educate our officers on the criticality of a healthy force for Army readiness and ensure these leaders were aware of their health and fitness level. This program is resourced and we now have a full wellness program for our majors. This program is also being established at the Army’s Sergeants’ Major Academy. Our next step is to develop and implement the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program in our curriculum to allow these leaders to institute strong programs in the units they will both serve in and command in the future.

The next initiative I wish to share concerns the teaching of language and culture. The Army now has a strategy for addressing the development of culture and language skills within the service. CGSC had already added more cultural education and created language opportunities. My report today represents an update on a work in progress. Culture is part of the foundation curriculum required for all Army majors. Further, of eight required electives, every student must take at least one from a list of approved cultural electives, usually a regional
studies course. After this initial volley, culture becomes a component of the integrated curriculum I described earlier. Students learn to conduct cultural analysis to address the impacts of culture on military operations, particularly as they practice or exercise their planning skills using scenarios crafted to require cultural understanding.

Teaching language as an additional subject in a 10-month warfighting course is an educational challenge. Consider that Defense Language Institute courses to bring students to a rudimentary working level of proficiency are all immersion experiences lasting from nine months to over a year, depending on the relative difficulty of the language. Language instruction is needed at CGSC, but must be prudently implemented. Students who know they are going to Iraq or Afghanistan take appropriate culture and language elective courses. New with this class, we have started a pilot program to offer more language to interested students. Students will have intensive afternoon classes for a week with Defense Language Institute instructors in our classrooms. They will then have a five-month online program of study that will include VTCs with their instructor in California, and then at the end of the term the Defense Language Institute instructors will return to Ft Leavenworth to teach for a month. We have 42 students enrolled in Arabic, Chinese, and French. At the end of the year, we will assess how much the students have been able to learn and whether the program has value in the future.

The final initiative I want to highlight is our new emphasis on preparing our majors to employ the weapons of strategic communication. One of the most profound lessons learned from today’s conflicts is the power of the media to influence the outcome. I grew up in an Army in which no comment, maybe subtly rephrased, was the smart approach to dealing with any media. Today, as the media relations experts that we bring to the College point out, a whole broadcast studio fits in a large suitcase. The media is going to be there so we must be ready to engage with them, because our adversaries are. The second important issue in media relations is the requirement to engage with the American people. They want to support their military, but
also want to know more about what we are doing. Therefore, at CGSC every student must write for publication, be interviewed by the media, complete a public speaking engagement, and touch the blogosphere. The early results of having our students engage with the public are inspiring. There are great stories to tell and important messages that the American people should hear. This program is having an immediate impact on our Army and has long-term benefits for our officers.

In closing we are unbelievably proud of the men and women who serve at Fort Leavenworth, both the military and our dedicated civilians. Teaching and learning is strong in the College. We will continue to evolve and adjust to meet the needs of the future. Our analysis is that the impact of the Skelton Report has been outstanding represented by the actions of our leaders on the ground. The challenge is to adapt for the future, and while what we have now is much better and certainly appropriate for our officers for the next ten years, we cannot rest on the past. We must continue to prepare these leaders to be adaptive and open minded in framing the problems they will face, agile in considering new ideas, and grounded in the values to which our Nation aspires.

In the years following his graduation from CGSC, George S. Patton Jr. continued to study each year's staff college curriculum, and to work the tactical exercises therein. He stated, "I am convinced that as good as Leavenworth is it is still only a means not an end and that we must keep on. I have worked all the problems of the two years since I graduated and shall continue to do so. However I don't try for approved solutions any more but rather to do what I will do in war."

We look at each class and recognize that somewhere in the mix may be, or must be, the next Marshall, Eisenhower, or Patton, both in the quality of the person and the criticality of the
missions the country will heap upon him or her. We understand the importance of what must be
done. We greatly appreciate your support in this mission.

This is concludes my prepared statement and again, thank you for this opportunity to
testify before the committee today.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

PRESENTATION TO THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SUBJECT: INTERMEDIATE-LEVEL PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION SCHOOLS

STATEMENT OF: BRIGADIER GENERAL JIMMIE C. JACKSON, JR
COMMANDANT, AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
AND VICE COMMANDER, SPAATZ CENTER FOR OFFICER PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION
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BY THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Air Command and Staff College traces its organizational and intellectual roots back to the Army Air Corps Tactical School founded in 1931. The Air Command Staff School was founded in September 1946 and in 1954 it was renamed the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). On 8 June 2009, ACSC graduated its 69th resident class, increasing the college’s alumni to 37,705 leaders. Since the beginning, the mission of the college has been evolving. The first Air University Commander, Major General Fairchild, laid down a challenge for ACSC to be a pre-war school that looks ahead to the next conflict instead of being a post-war school looking backwards to past conflicts. ACSC embraced that challenge by being innovative and adaptive with the curriculum balancing the need to produce reflective thinkers with operationally-proficient Airmen capable of leveraging new ideas in the complex and fast-paced environment of military operations. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (GNA) and this subcommittee’s Panel on Military Education Report of 1989 were key influences shaping the evolution of ACSC through the 1990s and into the 21st century. The result is an ACSC program that is academically rigorous, steeped in joint operations, and a college that graduates students who are agile, critical thinkers prepared to meet any challenge.

ACSC’s mission today focuses on preparing field-grade officers to develop, employ, and command air, space, and cyberspace power in Joint, Combined, and Multinational operations. ACSC is unique in that it provides an air-centric operational focus that is not available in other PME institutions or in civilian graduate programs. ACSC maintains a balance between its service perspective and Joint, Interagency and Multinational planning and operations in its curriculum. ACSC focuses on warfighting within the context of operational art and teaches joint operations from the standpoint of service forces in a joint force supported by service component commands. ACSC recognizes both the distinctiveness and interdependence of joint and service
schools in officer education. ACSC graduates are ready for operational-level staff positions working with or for combatant commanders, International Security Assistance Force commanders, senior level interagency officials, service components, and coalition partners.

Air University’s successful accreditation through the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, ACSC’s accreditation and reaffirmations by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and other external and internal assessment processes confirm ACSC’s effectiveness in meeting its mission. ACSC does not rest on its past laurels but continues to address key faculty, curriculum, and resource challenges to sustain this level of success.

Ironically, one of the greatest strengths of the college—its enthusiastic and energetic faculty and staff—is also an area which demands close attention from the College. ACSC views faculty as its weapon system and the most critical aspect of resourcing for mission accomplishment. The College’s unique mission requires a distinctive mix of faculty qualifications and credentials. Faculty qualifications and credentials available to ACSC are enhanced through the synergy of all Air Force PME schools being located at Maxwell AFB. Traditional civilian academics provide the depth and breadth of subject-matter expertise to guarantee the academic rigor of the College’s offerings while simultaneously ensuring adherence to validated pedagogical theory and practice. Military faculty (Air Force, sister service, and International Officers) contribute unparalleled currency and expertise in the operational courses so critical to the College’s success. Title 10 authority (thanks to Congressman Skelton’s assistance) has enabled ACSC to effectively address civilian faculty needs. ACSC has increased its civilian faculty presence from two in 1989 to 31 in 2009. This has been a significant factor in creating a more academically rigorous program. Although the civilian-military mix of faculty members is important to ACSC’s success, it is equally important that the College establish the
right mix within its military faculty. The right mix begins with the Air Force-sister service mix. This helps meet the CJCS's aim for the College to provide a truly joint educational experience. Sister services have been very supportive in providing outstanding faculty members but an emerging issue is joint credit for faculty duty at ACSC. ACSC believes all military faculty members at the Service intermediate-level colleges should receive Joint credit because of teaching joint curriculum to a joint and total force student body.

Military faculty manning is an ongoing concern at ACSC. ACSC is currently minimally manned and has difficulty meeting the 4:1 student-to-faculty ratio mandated by the Chairman in the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP). A 4:1 student-to-faculty ratio is the CJCS accreditation standard for intermediate-level college resident programs. Small student-to-faculty ratios are essential to quality instruction. In addition to the overall number of faculty necessary to meet required ratios, ACSC must also have sufficient numbers of military faculty with command, joint, and aviation experience. We acknowledge the demand current operations place on manpower, but ACSC needs experienced commanders, aviators, and joint operators to meet its mission.

ACSC recognizes the need to invest in the professional development of its faculty as teachers, scholars, and practitioners. The College provides opportunities and resources for faculty development and enrichment. ACSC faculty professional development is a continuous process, preparing individuals to assume duties within an ACSC department and, following initial orientation and qualification, enhancing professional qualifications and intellectual abilities. Faculty professional development activities enhance teaching skills, facilitate creative thinking, improve instructional methods, and maintain currency in and expand individual areas of experience. Faculty development is particularly useful to prepare our military faculty who
have not taught before or attended PME in residence. Each new faculty member is assigned a
mentor and receives intensive assistance before teaching in the classroom. Another key aspect of
ACSC’s professional development program is the Advanced Academic Degree (AAD) program.
This has been instrumental in enhancing the academic credentials of ACSC’s military faculty
members. The AAD program is an Air Force-sponsored program that selects highly-qualified
faculty members for funded study at civilian institutions to acquire doctoral degrees in fields
directly applicable to the ACSC curriculum. Continuing support and possible expansion of this
program is very important to the ACSC mission.

The approximately 500 students in the typical ACSC resident class form a diverse,
uniquely experienced population. The class mix contains a balanced mix of operational and
functional expertise from the non-host military departments, the Air Reserve components,
International Officers, DoD civilians and representation from other agencies. ACSC would
benefit from more interagency representation in the student body. The caliber of the students
attending ACSC has remained high and operational experience of students is at an all-time high.
International Officers have attended ACSC annually since 1946. During its 54-year history, the
college has graduated more than 2,500 International Officers from 92 nations with many of them
becoming Chiefs of Staff, government officials in key national positions, heads of state,
ministers, ambassadors, or members of Parliament.

One challenge the Commandant faces is curriculum insertions that come from various
functional areas to ensure “their” subjects and topics are taught in PME. Contributing to the
challenge is a lack of understanding on the differences between training and education. To help
mediate the insertion of “pet rocks” the Air Force has established the Air Force Learning
Committee to screen these recommendations similar to the process used by CJSC for insertions
into joint education. The methodical evolutionary approach that the Joint Staff has employed to change joint educational requirements is very much appreciated and serves as a good model for curriculum change by the Air Force. ACSC has also developed the concept of a “core curriculum.” ACSC’s core curriculum consists of those courses necessary to produce warfighters capable of critical analysis. The core is how ACSC achieves its mission in terms of preparing its students. First, the Joint, Combined, Multinational, and Interagency Operations area addresses the forces, organizational structures, planning processes, supporting doctrine, and operational concepts that enable the US military to engage as a joint team, across the full range of military operations. Second, the air, space, and cyberspace area addresses the heritage, theory, and employment of air, space, and cyberspace power, applying these critical concepts to current and future operations. Third, the War Studies area of the core addresses military history and strategy, focusing specifically on the nature and theories of war, methods of warfare, and the evolving operational art. Fourth, in the Security Environment area of the core modern leaders learn about the broader context of modern military operations, comprehending both the challenges and opportunities that confront the US in the 21st century. They also learn about security policies, national planning systems, and resulting strategies through which the US will employ its instruments of power to engage regionally and globally. Fifth, in the Leadership and Command area students learn about the challenges military officers face in today’s complex security environment. Military history is woven throughout all core courses and electives. The War Studies area of the core addresses military history and strategy, focusing specifically on the nature and theories of war, methods of warfare, and the evolving operational art. It provides a solid foundation in the canon of military theory, yet draws these classic ideas into the present, as students compare and contrast what they have learned to current operations. The Leadership and
Warfare course analyzes the factors that guide military leaders’ actions in establishing and maintaining an effective leadership environment. The course also seeks both to educate and inspire students to their full leadership potential through the study of great commanders and their conduct of warfare, as well as current problems of command in contemporary joint operations. Students leave with a broadened understanding of the nature of conflict.

Changes to the core require careful analysis to ensure the addition of any new area does not result in the removal of critical topics essential for ACSC students to master the operational level of war. Yet this in no way means that the core curriculum is static and unchangeable; on the contrary, every element of the core is reviewed and updated to ensure each is relevant to the needs of today’s warfighters and also prepare those warfighters for the challenges they will face tomorrow. Examples of ACSC’s adaptability include institutionalizing “jointness” across the curriculum, embracing a robust regional and cultural studies program, embedding concepts and ideas about operational-level warfare throughout our core courses, and reflecting increased emphasis on irregular warfare, and the nuclear enterprise.

ACSC’s curriculum is academically rigorous with embedded active learning methodology and a rigorous student evaluation program that includes long analytical papers and essay exams that receive letter grades. ACSC executes a distinguished graduate program that identifies the top 10% of the graduates and a recognition program for the top one third of the graduates. Two years ago a major initiative to make sure all ACSC exercises and war-games are realistic was launched and the result is that all ACSC planning exercises—the Joint Planning Exercise (JPEx) and the Joint Air Exercise (JAX), the Capstone War-Game (CWG), and the interservice ACSC-CGSC (USA) Intermediate Learning Exercise (ILE)—all take place in real world settings involving real world allies using real world systems and collaborative planning
tools. Approximately 75 percent of all contact time is devoted to active learning methods such as seminar discussion guided by faculty, case studies and practical exercises. Scheduled contact time balances the need to preserve time for student reflection and interaction. Additionally, students are engaged in a research and electives program in which they investigate topics of particular interest to the Air Force in a rigorous fashion under the direction and guidance of a subject-matter expert. Through this program, students develop their ability to define an issue succinctly; conduct thoughtful, logical, and critical research and analysis; and create well-supported conclusions and recommendations of potential benefit to today's warfighters. ACSC's student papers are read by senior military leaders, generating ideas affecting operations and military strategy. We have already had reports that 2009 student research is being used to change the way DoD handles fuel distribution, how Congress views weather control, and how an intelligence operation will be executed.

As indicated earlier, ACSC cannot rest on its past laurels but must cast a vision for the future and address key faculty, curriculum, and resource challenges. We must continue to emphasize and focus on the core mission—professional military education. Although the focus of my statement is on the resident program, ACSC's mission encompasses both resident and distance learning programs. Distance learning is an increasingly important part of the mission. ACSC created nonresident programs in 1948 to provide intermediate-level PME to those midcareer officers unable to attend ACSC in residence. Enhanced technologies have enabled ACSC to enrich these programs and make them increasingly interactive.

Assignment of the right military faculty, with relevant master's degrees, combined with additional funding for civilian faculty members is required to meet future challenges. Emphasizing the importance of faculty duty for Air Force personnel by senior Air Force leaders
is critical for our continuing success. A more robust AAD program and close monitoring of post-graduate school faculty assignments would also enhance the faculty and the credentials they possess, both of which are critical to sustainment of the College’s mission.

The expanding DoD-wide network security problems and resulting restrictions and lack of access to various research venues is affecting many faculty members' research and ability to collaborate with civilian colleagues and institutions. Solutions to these problems present significant challenges.

The GNA and the Skelton Panel have achieved their purposes at ACSC. ACSC successfully incorporates a Joint curriculum that meets CICSI 1800.01C guidance (OPMEP), while at the same time maintains a distinctive air, space, and cyberspace flavor that meets Air Force requirements at the operational level. The OPMEP has been flexible enough to adjust to a changing environment yet has provided the strategic level guidance to achieve these initiatives. The Process of Accreditation of Joint Education has also provided the desired accountability needed to ensure schools continue to meet the intent of the legislation. “Jointness” has become our primary language. Process changes mandated in the GNA and by the Skelton Panel have now been institutionalized. In sum, our students are receiving the education necessary to critically reflect upon today’s issues, while preparing to address the unforeseen challenges of the future.
STATEMENT OF

COLONEL RAYMOND C. DAMM, JR.
DIRECTOR, MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

BEFORE

THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

ON

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

25 JUNE 2009
STATEMENT OF
COLONEL RAYMOND C. Damm, JR.
DIRECTOR, MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Wittman, distinguished sub-committee members.

Good morning. On behalf of General Gardner, Marine Corps University President, thank you for allowing me to tell you about the accomplishments of your Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

MISSION AND INTENT

Since its establishment in 1920 as the Field Officers’ Course, the Command and Staff College has been dedicated to the preparation of field grade officers for the challenges of an increasingly complex operating environment. Informed by the study of history and culture, the College’s present mission is to “educate and train its joint, multinational, and interagency professionals in order to produce skilled warfighting leaders able to overcome diverse 21st Century security challenges.” We teach warfighting, and the context in which that warfighting occurs. We employ adult education methodologies, relying heavily on a combination of seminars, practical applications, case studies, and student self-direction. As its Director, my intention is to create an atmosphere of professional excellence by employing a first-class faculty and staff, working with energetic, motivated students in a supportive, challenging and forward-looking educational environment. The end result is an officer who thinks critically and exercises sound military judgment. We strive to enable our graduates to be outstanding planners, accomplished communicators, both orally and in writing, innovative thinkers, and sound decision-makers, adept in solving the complex problems of the inherently ambiguous and
dangerous world they face upon graduation, and to perform effectively at the operational level of war. In short, we seek to produce graduates who can think creatively, reason critically, and act decisively.

STUDENTS
Our students are accomplished professionals, aggressive, bright, savvy, and, in this year’s class, more than 80% combat veterans. Knowing they will soon return to the fight, they are eager to learn. Our task is to continue to offer them intellectual experiences that will be professionally useful to them. Back in 1988 there were 124 Marines, 22 International Military Students, and 12 students each from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. No civilians. No Coast Guard. A total of 188 in the class. This year there were 100 Marines, 17 Army, 21 Navy, 14 Air Force, 27 International, 1 Coast Guard, 12 civilian interagency. A total of 192. So the student body has become more joint, multinational, and interagency in its composition and only about 50% Marine. To ensure the greatest possible interaction and exchange, the College breaks down the student body into twelve Conference Groups (CGs). Each CG has 14 or 15 students. The College’s Operations Officer/Registrar arranges the CGs so that each of the services is represented by at least one student. She also distributes the Marine Corps students so that all specialties in the Corps are present in each CG. There are two (occasionally three) international military students in each CG. Civilian students are distributed one per CG. The composition of each CG meets the standard as set forth in the CJCS Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP).
The program for our International Military Students is comprehensive. With their presence in each of the College’s CG’s they are completely integrated within the student body and curriculum. From the day we welcome them until the day we say “so long,” we are better off because of their professional, cultural, and personal insights. This year students came from the following countries:

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For AY 09-10, international military students will attend from the following countries:

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The operating forces tell us they want graduates who can write concisely and persuasively, can speak lucidly, and can confront complex problems successfully. To accomplish these goals requires a faculty who can draw the best out of our students and a challenging and relevant curriculum. The College is blessed with both. Let me talk about our faculty at greater length.

FACULTY

The faculty is the College’s center of gravity. Our unique combination of military officers and civilian academics, paired as faculty teams, create the learning environment in the College. The assessment of the College by Rep. Skelton’s panel over twenty years ago found much about which to be concerned. At that time we had a total of only 24 faculty, including just one civilian Ph.D. and one officer each from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The military faculty possessed limited operational and academic credentials. Since then our faculty has increased in number and improved in quality. Our current military faculty are among the best and the brightest. They are carefully screened for their operational experience. Our requirement is for former commanders, war college graduates, with Master’s degrees. The drawback of this approach is that such high quality officers are in great demand, so they often do not stay on the faculty for more than one year. Just this month we said good-bye to 12 of our 19 military faculty. More than half departed because of promotion to Colonel or to take a command. The College is willing to accept such a rate of turnover in order to retain the high quality of our military faculty. The Command and Staff College is not a place to disappear off the radar screen and to languish.
For AY 09-10, our 22 military faculty will include many post-command and war college graduates with extensive operational (including combat) experience. All have advanced degrees. That number also includes two officers each from the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as a Norwegian officer, a former battalion commander, graduate of his country’s war college, and a graduate of the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting.

Our civilian faculty, including Dr. Don Bittner, the one Ph.D. resident at the time of the Skelton Panel, who starts his 35th year on the faculty this summer, are a mix of a variety of specialties and backgrounds. Some are former military; others have no military background. All our teaching civilian faculty – nineteen for AY 09-10 – are Ph.D.’s. Their specialties include History, Anthropology, Political Science, Geography, National Security Studies, International Relations, Irregular Warfare, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency, Negotiations and Mediation, Reconstruction and Stabilization.

The College is first and foremost a teaching institution. However, our faculty remain active in the wider intellectual academy by participation in professional activities such as conferences and symposia. Although not required they also conduct research and write scholarly publications. Within the past year our civilian faculty have produced books on issues related to Asian security, coalition warfare, operational culture, and colonial warfare. Works accepted for publication include further studies on Asian security, expeditionary warfare, weapons of mass destruction, military education, demobilizing militias, operational art, and South Asian history.

In sum, in AY 88-89 the faculty numbered 24, of which one was a civilian Ph.D. This coming academic year, the faculty will number 42, of which 19 are civilian Ph.D.’s. The
operational experience of the military faculty is much deeper and broader, and the
certainty and continuity provided by the civilian faculty is invaluable to maintaining
excellence over time.

Supplementing the resident faculty are a group of outstanding Marine Corps University
Chairs. They provide expertise in areas such as leadership, ethics, innovation and
transformation, Arabic culture, Iran, China and the Orient, insurgency and terrorism. In
addition, proximity to the National Capital Region enables the College to include
outstanding speakers from government, the military, and academe.

**CURRICULUM**

In the hands of a competent faculty, even a mediocre curriculum can be effective. Put a
well-designed, forward-looking, faculty owned, current and relevant curriculum in the
hands of an outstanding faculty, the combination can achieve extraordinary results. At
Quantico we believe we put just such a combination at the service of our students.

There are over 1500 hours devoted to the ten month curriculum, just under half of which
is dedicated to professional study and preparation. There are four courses in the core
curriculum:

**Warfighting From the Sea (WFTS).** The WFTS Course is designed for the purpose of
enhancing the warfighting abilities of the students within the framework of joint and
MAGTF doctrine and in a joint, multinational, and interagency environment. The
curriculum is designed with an understanding that graduates of the college must be
equally adept in their ability to think creatively, reason critically and act decisively. The
course is focused on a specific set of learning outcomes and on the more general
“recurring themes” that apply to all aspects of the CSC curriculum. Broadly speaking, the course is designed to enhance a student’s ability to:

1. Conceptualize and develop solutions to complex operational problems.
2. Understand planning and execution methodologies within the framework of joint and MAGTF doctrine.
3. Coordinate and apply a broad array of capabilities and resources that yield desired effects across the spectrum and levels of conflict.
4. Analyze contemporary issues and emergent challenges facing today’s military professionals.

The course seeks to achieve these objectives through a combination of seminar based blocks of instruction and practical application exercises.

The focus on planning is a recurring theme throughout the academic year. The first planning experience introduces the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) and is designed to educate students, using a combination of lecture and practical application, on the Marine Corps’ doctrinal planning process. This initial exposure to planning incorporates a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) amphibious scenario and establishes the intellectual framework for further exercises. The subsequent series of exercises employs a building block approach and examines a variety of problems such as traditional combined arms applications at the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) level, Domestic Support to Civil Authority and counterinsurgency campaign planning. The
final exercise, NINE INNINGS, is designed to introduce students to the complexity of Phase 0 planning within the context of the interagency environment. Collectively, these exercises address a variety of conventional, irregular and catastrophic and disruptive threats while enhancing students' ability to plan integrated MAGTF operations in a joint, interagency and multinational environment. The WFTS Course has the following learning outcomes, that support the broader goals outlined above. Students will be able to:

1. Assess the relationships among the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war and conceptualize solutions that create the military conditions for strategic success.
2. Analyze doctrinal concepts that inform the employment of joint and MAGTF resources throughout the spectrum, of crisis and conflict.
3. Explain MCPP as a practical methodology for analytical military problem solving.
4. Employ the MAGTF throughout the spectrum of crisis and conflict, maximizing both lethal and non lethal effects in a joint and/or multinational context.
5. Discuss emerging and non traditional concepts that are shaping the character of joint and multinational warfare.
6. Assess the impact of cultural issues throughout the planning and execution of military operations.
7. Integrate interagency organizations into the planning and execution of military operations.

8. Apply lessons learned from history to the planning and executions of military operations.

Students are evaluated through a combination of written requirements and contributions made during seminars and exercises. Written requirements range from one page professional papers to operations orders and campaign plans of twenty pages or more.

**Leadership.** The Leadership Course provides education to improve the leadership abilities of Field Grade Officers to articulate, apply and integrate MAGTF capabilities in joint, multinational, and interagency environments. This course is embedded throughout the Academic Year with particular emphasis placed on leading change, thinking creatively, developing subordinates, building consensus, making operational decisions, establishing command relations and establishing command climates.

In the continuum of leadership development, this course better defines specific roles and responsibilities that challenge field grade officers in today’s operating environment. It is intended to provide the students with improved tools to enhance their warfighting capabilities.

Foreign language training is included within the Leadership Course and is tied to the negotiation exercise. Students participate in two periods of language training, an initial
series of classes totaling approximate 10.5 hours in the Fall, and a week long survival
level language course in Arabic, French, Korean or Chinese in the Spring. Language
instructors are provided by the Defense Language Institute (DLI), and in AY 08-09 each
student received a total of 40.5 hours of instruction in one of the four languages
mentioned above. Between the two periods of in-class work, students are provided
software to enable web-based individual study. In AY 09-10 the College will offer 5
languages, namely, Arabic, French, Chinese, Dari, and Pashtu.

Leadership Course issues are also embedded throughout the other core courses.
The Leadership Course has the following learning outcomes. Students will be able to:

1. Discuss the various methodologies for responding to junior officer and enlisted
   challenges and concerns.

2. Discuss the various methodologies for establishing professional relationships
   with junior officers.

3. Discuss ethical and legal dimensions of warfighting leadership in a cross-
   cultural environment.

4. Negotiate, bargain and coordinate in a cross-cultural environment.

5. Examine the differences and balance among Information Operations, Strategic
   Communications and public affairs.

6. Explain how to develop a command climate that develops subordinate leaders.
Culture and Interagency Operations (CIAO). One of the most significant recent refinements to the curriculum was the creation of The Culture and Interagency Operations Course (CIAO) in AY 05-06. The CIAO Course is designed to improve our students’ ability to understand and analyze regional cultures and interagency components of national and international governments at the operational level of war. The course is also structured to develop students’ critical thinking and their understanding of irregular warfare, peace operations, multinational operations and strategy and policy.

The CIAO course’s learning outcomes are derived from the course’s focus on the elements of national power, the structure and functioning of national power, peace and humanitarian operations, interagency operations, conflict termination, the ethnic and religious component to conflict, irregular warfare and the complex relationships between the social, political, ideological and economic elements of war. The CIAO course has the following learning outcomes. The students will be able to:

1. Analyze foreign cultures and assess the role of culture in confronting contemporary security challenges.
2. Analyze the use of all instruments of national power and evaluate interagency operations in employing those instruments.
3. Evaluate the nature of insurgency and terrorism and assess methods for combating them.
4. Explain the process by which policy and strategic decisions are made and how the process is integrated with decisions made at the operational level of war.
Students will be evaluated by several written requirements and the contributions made during seminar. Written assignments range from one page professional papers to a five to six page analytical essay.

**Operational Art (Op Art).** The Op Art course examines the art and science of war at the operational level. Operational art sets and achieves intermediate goals that lead to the attainment of a “campaign” goal.

The campaign goal is the “what” to be achieved and the operational art is the “how.” The campaign goal is set by strategy. Operational art focuses on the employment, arrangement and synchronization of joint forces in terms of time, space and purpose. Thus the course explores the principal issues surrounding and informing thinking and decision making as they contribute to achieving campaign goals in support of strategic objectives. The emphasis of this course is on the thoughtful integration of theory and execution and the development of critical analytical skills. The methodology employed is a case-study approach, informed by theory and doctrine.

Within the Op Art course, students will gain a solid foundation in the art of war at the operational level. They will gain an understanding of the relationship between strategic objectives, campaigns and the operational art. They will develop an appreciation of the operational art in the context of joint and multinational operations in both conventional and irregular warfare settings. Students will also develop an appreciation of the
operational art in relation to theory and doctrine, planning and campaign design, intelligence, logistics and professional military education. Finally, students will explore historical campaigns and evaluate those campaigns in terms of their success or failure in light of current joint warfighting concepts.

The Op Art course has the following learning outcomes. Students will be able to:

1. Analyze campaigns and operational art, and express the analysis in both oral and written form.
2. Identify the linkages between strategy, operations and tactics that inform and shape campaign planning and design.
3. Explain the link between ends and means in strategy, operations and tactics.

Students will be evaluated by several written requirements and the contributions they make during seminar. Written assignments range from one page point papers to a ten page joint campaign analysis paper.

The Electives Program. The Electives Program is designed to allow a student to formulate a personal program of study. During the second semester, elective courses, each consisting of ten, 2 hour seminars conducted over the course of a month, are offered. As of AY 07-08 students are permitted to take two electives instead of one. Students can then pick any two electives they wish to take. The only exception is the acquisitions
course, which counts for both of the student electives. The breakdown of courses for AY 08-09 is as follows:

Insurgency from the Insurgent's Perspective*
Rising China: Strategic and Military Thought in the Middle Kingdom
Systems Acquisition Management*
Airpower and Asymmetrical Warfare
Operational Law for Commanders*
Conflict Resolution and Restoration: Case Studies From the Pacific
Introduction to System Theory*
Challenges to US Security Interests on the Korean Peninsula
The American Indian Wars: Irregular Warfare Relevant to the 21st Century
The Evolving Intelligence Community (SECRET/US ONLY)
Operational Fires (SECRET/US ONLY)*
The Middle East: Religion, Identity and Power
Islam and Politics
US Special Operations Command and Special Operations Forces*
Systems Acquisition Management*
The American Revolution: Insurgency vs. Expeditionary Warfare
Cape Comorin: The Strategic Geography of the Iranian Plateau and South Asia
Professional Military Ethics and Moral Decision Making
Evolution of the Operational Art*
Counterinsurgency Theory and Practice*
Information Operations*
The Vietnam War*
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction*
The United States and the Pacific: 1784-1945
Nature and History of Command*

The asterisks indicate courses taught by instructors who are not part of the College's resident faculty. Those courses are taught by various chairs, funded by either MCU or the Marine Corps University Foundation (MCUF). The breakdown of courses is designed to give students the opportunity to create an individual elective course of study that provides greater depth and breadth to the curriculum. The elective program also offers a different intellectual challenge to CSC students and takes advantage of the various talents of the faculty. International students are required to take only one elective course. International
students who are enrolled in the Master of Military Studies Program are required to take two elective courses.

**Master of Military Studies (MMS).** Since 1994 the College has offered the Master of Military Studies (MMS) program. The MMS Program has two purposes. The first is to encourage the student to inquire deeply into an area of professional significance, academic importance and/or personal interest. The second purpose is to improve the student’s ability to conceive and execute an extended formal inquiry. The MMS program is voluntary, and open to all students. Those participating must maintain higher grades than their peers in all courses, core and elective. Students also complete a paper of not less than 20 pages of text. Completion of the paper is accompanied by an oral defense. The goal is to conduct a professional conversation and gauge the student’s grasp of the material, and the ability to communicate ideas orally. MMS paper length has had the advantage of greater potential for immediate publication. A number of MMS papers from previous academic years have appeared in a variety of professional military publications, including *Air and Space Power Journal* and the *Marine Corps Gazette*. One MMS paper from AY 2007-2008 was among the winners in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Essay Contest. Participation in the MMS Program has grown steadily. In AY 08-09, 161 students, 83.8% of the class, completed the requirements and earned an MMS Degree. The curriculum is reviewed and updated based upon both internal and external evaluations. Internally, the College routinely asks students to critique their instruction. Those responses provide an indication of the student measure of satisfaction. Faculty come together periodically to assess the effectiveness of curriculum. The College’s
Course Content Review Boards (CCRB’s) provide a holistic evaluation of the curriculum and offer a comprehensive approach to chart the way forward. Outside assessments from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools offer commentary and recommendations regarding our success at matching purpose to performance, and in meeting learning areas and objectives as outlined in the OPMEP.

VISION

Our vision for the College is to remain closely attuned to the needs of the operating forces, to retain the high quality faculty we currently have and add to their number without sacrificing that quality, and to increase the sophistication of the technologies that support our curriculum. Our graduates face enormous challenges in the operating environment that awaits them once they leave us. The College is committed to doing all we can to assist them in their professional and intellectual development to become more skilled at their craft and mentally agile to adapt to unanticipated situations. As LtGen John Allen, Deputy Commanding General of CENTRAL COMMAND, told our graduating class earlier this month, “You may have 35 year-old bodies, but education is about having a five thousand year-old brain.”

Thank you, Mister Chairman, for the chance to speak with you today. I welcome the Sub-Committee’s questions. Semper Fidelis.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

JUNE 25, 2009
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER

Dr. Snyder. Please provide your school's mission statement.

General Kasun. The mission of the Joint Forces Staff College is to educate national security professionals to plan and execute joint, multinational, and interagency operations to instill a primary commitment to joint, multinational, and interagency teamwork, attitudes, and perspectives. Its vision is to be the premier institution for educating national security professionals in planning and executing joint operations.

The mission of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) is to produce graduates capable of creatively and effectively planning operational level warfighting for joint and combined military forces while integrating the effects of the United States Government, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations to ensure the success of Combatant and Joint Task Force Commanders operating within an uncertain operating environment.

The mission of the Joint Advance Warfighting School (JAWS) is to produce graduates who can create campaign-quality concepts, plan for the employment of all elements of national power, accelerate transformation, succeed as joint force operational/strategic planners and be creative, conceptual, adaptive and innovative.

Dr. Snyder. How have ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan affected the quality of military faculty members? What is your average tour length for military faculty members? Have the credentials of military faculty in terms of graduate degrees and JQO qualifications diminished during this period? What is the percentage of military faculty who are fully JQO qualified?

General Kasun. Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have increased the quality and credentials of military faculty members assigned to JFSC. Seventy-seven percent (77%) of the JAWS and seventy-eight percent (78%) of the JCWS military faculty have combat/operational experience. The vast majority of these military faculty members have been deployed in support of current operations. Many have been deployed on multiple occasions. This battlefield experience increases their understanding of planning and executing operations in complex contingencies and enhances their ability to facilitate the dialogue with students in the learning environment during planning exercises. The percentage of U.S. military students with combat/operational experience over the past two years in the JAWS/JCWS classes is seventy-nine percent (79%).

The typical military faculty is ordered to the College for a three year tour. Some faculty retire prior to completion of their tour; in accordance with DoD regulation, they must spend at least one year on board before retiring. Others extend beyond the three years to bring them up to their retirement date.

The credentials of military faculty in terms of graduate degrees and JQO qualifications have improved. The JAWS and JCWS military faculty members have a wealth of operational experience. Three of the four JAWS military faculty are currently enrolled in PhD programs and all four are fully-JQO qualified. A greater percentage of JCWS military faculty have graduate level degrees and there has been an increase in the number who are fully JQO qualified from 59% to 68% during this period.

As shown by the data below, faculty is more qualified now than they were several years ago in terms of education and joint qualifications. Military faculty assigned to JFSC without JPME II completion are normally enrolled as students in a JCWS JPME II class immediately upon arrival. On occasion, at the discretion of their Service, JAWS and JCWS instructors may receive credit for completing Phase II after teaching the course twice and demonstrating mastery of the entire curricula. Therefore, by the time they depart most faculty are eligible to be designated a JQO.
Dr. SNYDER. Are the services and agencies filling their assigned billets for faculty? What are your gaps?

General KASUN. While Services fill the billets, there are often gaps between the time a person detaches and the next one reports. Service representatives are actively working to get faculty members ordered into the College.

When officers report, they may be placed in either the Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) or the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) depending on their qualifications. We currently have eleven gapped billets, all at the O-5 (LTC/LtCol/CDR) level affecting these two schools. JCWS is authorized 64 billets which achieves the 4:1 student to faculty ratio for 256 students. JFSC does not have any assigned agency billets. However, through Memorandum of Agreements Academic Chair billets are currently available with the Department of State and the National Security Agency. The State Department Academic Chair detached on 7 AUG 09; his relief is not yet identified but the Department of State is actively contacting potential personnel. The National Security Agency Academic Chair is filled.

Dr. SNYDER. To what extent has the curriculum enhanced its coverage of Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations given that DOD has put them on a par with combat operations?

General KASUN. The Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) curriculum includes Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations throughout contingency and crisis action planning lessons and exercises. SSTR is addressed as part of military support for whole-of-government approaches to national security issues. There is an increased emphasis on planning operations that set the conditions for SSTR implementation during the early phases of war. Students also study the considerations and concepts necessary for successful post conflict/disaster operations and practice planning SSTR phases in a number of scenarios that are described in the answer to question five.

SSTR Operations are discussed throughout the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) curriculum. In the TH6100 Theory and History of War block of instruction SSTR Operations are looked at in the historical context of the Post WWII era in comparison with the occupation of Iraq beginning in 2003. During the ST6300 Strategic Foundations block of instruction SSTR Operations are discussed in the broader context of national strategy, defense strategy and State Department strategy. During the student visit to the State Department they are given a brief by the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization on the role of S/CRS.

Throughout the OP6500 Operational Art/Campaign Planning block of instruction in JAWS, SSTR Operations are emphasized. Practical exercises which entail approximately 60 total classroom days commence with phase 0 and work through phases 1–5. Specially, SSTR Operations are discussed in the context of Campaign Design in OP6504. In OP6509, the students take an in-depth look at operational plans for OIF with emphasis on the SSTR Operations. During the deliberate planning portion of the curriculum (OP6517–6538), SSTR Operations are incorporated into phase 3, 4 and 5 planning as appropriate to the planning scenario. Finally, the students engage in two Crisis Action Planning exercises, OP6543 and OP6547, where SSTR Operations are again considered across the spectrum of the plan with particular emphasis on the transition and return to civilian control phases. OP 6543 and OP6547 scenarios are based on potential real-world complex SSTR issues with only minor traditional warfare components.

Dr. SNYDER. Describe the scenarios that you use for your simulation exercises and war games. To what extent do they incorporate SSTR and irregular warfare concepts?

General KASUN. Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) and Irregular Warfare (IW) concepts are woven throughout the Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) and Joint Advanced Warfare School (JAWS) curricula. SSTR is addressed as part of military support for whole-of-government approaches to national security issues. IW is addressed during lessons about the nature of anticipated operations.
JAWS executes Joint Operational Planning for three distinct scenarios under the current curriculum. The first two scenarios incorporate detailed aspects of traditional, irregular, catastrophic and disruptive threats represented by complex sets of state and non-state actors in weak or failing state scenarios. Careful emphasis is placed on the thorough assessment of and response to these complex “Hybrid” threats in a coherent balance. SSTR activities are fully addressed by balanced analyses and courses of action, with direct application of contemporary lesson learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. They also reflect consideration of the published Joint Operating Environment (JOE) and Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO), both of which consider future environmental and threat trends.

The final scenario is not established far in advance of the exercise, but typically derives from real-world emerging crises which involve less traditional and conventional military employment. The emphasis remains the same although this scenario is usually much more strongly balanced toward SSTR than the previous two scenarios.

The Wargaming section of the Information Technology Division provides role-playing Computer-Assisted Exercises (CAX) for both JAWS and JCWS. The following scenarios are used:

**PURPLE ECLIPSE (JCWS)**
A five day role-playing exercise that presents the students with a daunting political-military crisis in northern Africa that includes significant multinational and interagency issues. Although the scenario involves regular force engagements, IW aspects are threaded throughout. The students not only construct a detailed Operation Plan for Phases IV (Stabilize) and V (Enable Civil Authority) but set the conditions for SSTR during Phases I, II and III (Deter, Seize Initiative, Dominate) to ensure success of SSTR during Phases IV and V. In this exercise, students are required to apply Crisis Action Planning (CAP) procedures during a time-sensitive scenario. This exercise highlights the collaborative planning as the Combatant Commander and Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters staffs are conducting parallel planning in support of the objective. This is the capstone exercise in the JCWS (JPME II) course.

**PURPLE LIGHTNING (JCWS)**
A faculty guided practical exercise involving a humanitarian crisis brought on by religious strife, terrorism, and an insurgency in a central African country. This scenario gives the students the opportunity to develop solutions using U.S. and coalition forces and coordinating with U.S. agencies, private humanitarian organizations and other nations to employ the SSTR and IW concepts. Specifically students are asked to apply an understanding of the relationships and activities of governmental agencies, and non-governmental agencies (NGOs); prepare a concept of operations for integrating the governmental, non-governmental, and private volunteer organizations into provision of humanitarian assistance to the people of Nigeria; and plan to transfer control of the humanitarian assistance from coalition military to the NGOs.

**PURPLE GUARDIAN (JCWS and JAWS)**
A one day simulation-model assisted, student role-playing exercise. The exercise is designed to provide students with an opportunity to explore the unique intricacies and special demands of the homeland security/homeland defense mission. It involves a number of domestic homeland security threats in which the military provides support to federal, state, and local government agencies. Although not normally described as SSTR, these support activities and capabilities can be related to SSTR. Role playing as a member of the USNORTHCOM Standing Joint Force Headquarters, students experience the challenges of establishing relevant situational awareness while simultaneously being faced with tough decision-making scenarios in an unfamiliar environment. A certain level of ambiguity, fog, friction, and uncertainty is desired in this fast paced exercise.

The scenarios consist of two terrorist attacks within CONUS requiring the Standing Joint Force Headquarters to assess potential tasking. Command and Control relationships and the actions required to pre-empt future attacks are stressed. The third vignette of the exercise consists of a LNG tanker approaching the U.S. that may have been taken over by a group of terrorist crew members. The seminar uses this inject to compare and contrast Homeland Security and Homeland Defense, the roles of the Navy and USCG, and the interagency relationships between DoD, DHS, and the other federal agencies.

Dr. Snyder. Please provide the most recent survey results from your graduates and their supervisors.
General Kasun. The answer to this question is being provided for both the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) and the Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS).

**JAWS Graduate and Supervisor Surveys (Class 07–08, graduated June 2008)**

Process: Approximately nine months after graduation in June 2008, each of 41 07–08 JAWS graduates and their supervisors were contacted individually via a Commandant-signed letter with a link to an electronic survey.

Questions asked: In addition to demographic and general program questions, graduates and supervisors were asked questions that related to the 10 Graduate Competencies. This report will focus on the responses to the Competencies.

**Graduates** were asked to assess their level of preparation for their current assignments as measured by the following 10 JAWS Graduate Competencies. Available responses were Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Agree, and Strongly Agree:

1. I am able to communicate cross-culturally in a joint environment, while fostering trust internally and externally. Others will find me versatile at tailoring communication to audiences.
2. I am confident and at ease making decisions in the absence of complete information, responding quickly, effectively and proactively to emerging and ambiguous conditions and opportunities.
3. I am able to effectively communicate and build teams through persuasive influence, collaboration, negotiation, and consensus building. Through active listening, I modify my communications in response to feedback.
4. I am able to recognize patterns and changes, and am comfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity.
5. Others find me versatile and creative and able to develop innovative solutions, thinking in time and context within the complex environment.
6. I habitually think in terms of systems/linkages (effects) and function as an expert learner.
7. I am able to conduct campaigning and statecraft and understand the role of war and politics. Maintaining an integrated understanding of globalization and its effects on defense, domestic and foreign policy, I use this understanding to inform strategic visioning.
8. I am capable of integrating joint, interagency and multi-national capabilities within physical, virtual and human domains in time, space and purpose in terms of operational art. I demonstrate a broad understanding of battle-space systems and their interdependencies.
9. I understand and employ Service core competencies, demonstrating this expertise through integrating and leveraging Service and joint doctrine.
10. I maintain an understanding and awareness of Service-centric biases and tendencies (in myself and others) that may compromise mission success. Exercising this awareness, I work to eliminate biases and tendencies such as self-interest-careerism and Service provincialism or parochialism.

**Supervisors** were asked to respond to 10 questions related to the graduate’s preparedness in terms of the 10 JAWS Graduate Competencies. Available responses were Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Agree, and Strongly Agree:

1. This graduate is a cross-cultural communicator in a joint environment, able to foster trust internally and externally. The graduate is versatile at tailoring communication to audiences.
2. This graduate is self-confident and at ease making decisions in the absence of complete information, responding quickly, effectively and proactively to emerging and ambiguous conditions and opportunities.
3. This graduate effectively communicates and builds teams through persuasive influence, collaboration, negotiation and consensus building. As an active listener, the graduate modifies communications in response to feedback.
4. This graduate is able to recognize patterns and changes, and is comfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity.
5. This graduate is versatile and creative, and is able to develop innovative solutions, thinking in time and context within the complex environment.
6. This graduate thinks in terms of systems/linkages (effects) and functions as an expert learner.
7. This graduate is able to conduct campaigning and statecraft and understands the role of war and politics. Maintaining an integrated understanding of globalization and its effects on defense, domestic and foreign policy, the graduate uses this understanding to inform strategic visioning.

8. This graduate is capable of integrating joint, interagency, and multi-national capabilities within physical, virtual and human domains in time, space, and purpose in terms of operational art. The graduate demonstrates broad understanding of battle-space systems and their interdependencies.

9. This graduate understands and employs Service core competencies, demonstrating this expertise through integrating and leveraging Service and joint doctrine.

10. This graduate maintains an understanding and awareness of Service-centric biases and tendencies (in self and others) that may compromise mission success. Exercising this awareness, the graduate works to eliminate biases and tendencies such as self-interest-careerism and Service provincialism or parochialism.

End process: Our review of the 07–08 graduate and supervisor survey data found many similarities with the two previous graduated classes. The surveys suggest strong post-graduate benefits, particularly in the data from graduates who are currently assigned to planning billets. The results were provided to the JAWS Director for use in ensuring the curriculum remained current and relevant.

Survey results: For 41 JAWS students of Class 07–08, the response rate was 63% for the Graduate Survey and 68% for the Supervisors.

The percentage of graduates indicating they agreed or strongly agreed that they had been prepared in the following competency areas is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competencies (paraphrased)</th>
<th>JAWS 07</th>
<th>JAWS 08</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cross-cultural Communication</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision Making Confidence</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Building</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognize Patterns</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Versatile and Creative</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective Learning and Systems Thinking</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct Campaigning</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capable of Integrating</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding Service Competencies</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness of Service-centric Biases</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The percentage of supervisors indicating they agreed or strongly agreed that graduates demonstrated the competencies is show below:
JCWS Graduate and Supervisor Surveys (all four 2008 JCWS classes)

Process: Approximately six months after graduation, graduates were contacted via email with a link to an electronic survey. The email also contained a link to the supervisor survey and asked the graduate to forward the email to their immediate supervisor. The most recently completed report was based on survey data was for all four classes from Academic Year 2008 (1 October 2007–30 September 2008).

Questions asked: In addition to demographic and general program questions, graduates and supervisors were asked 14 questions related to Learning Objectives (LOs).

**Graduates** were asked 14 questions related to the LOs in terms of applicability and usefulness.

**Supervisors** were asked 14 questions related to the usefulness of the JCWS program in terms of the LOs.

Questions asked to both Graduates and Supervisors:

- Apply appropriate strategic security policies and guidance used in developing joint operational plans across the range of military operations to support national objectives.
- Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in achieving strategic objectives. Focus on the proper employment of the military instrument of national power at the joint force level both as a supported instrument and as a supporting instrument of national power.
- Synthesize the capabilities and limitations of all Services (own Service, other Services—to include SOF) in achieving the appropriate strategic objectives in joint operations.
- Analyze the capabilities and limitations of multinational forces in achieving the appropriate strategic objectives in coalition operations.
- Analyze the capabilities and limitations of the interagency processes in achieving the appropriate strategic objectives in joint operational plans.
- Comprehend the attributes of the future joint force and how this force will organize, plan, prepare and conduct operations.
- Value a thoroughly joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, combined, interagency efforts and teamwork.
- Analyze the principles, capabilities, and limitations of information operations across the range of military operations—to include pre- and post-conflict operations.
- Analyze the use of information operations to achieve desired effects across the spectrum of national security threats.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competencies (paraphrased)</th>
<th>JAWS 07</th>
<th>JAWS 08</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cross-cultural Communication</td>
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<tr>
<td>Decision Making Confidence</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Building</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognize Patterns</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Versatile and Creative</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective Learning and Systems Thinking</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct Campaigning</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capable of Integrating</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding Service Competencies</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness of Service-centric Biases</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Synthesize examples of campaign/theater planning and operations. Focus on the use of planning concepts, techniques and procedures as well as the integration of battlespace support systems.

Analyze complex contingency operations for use of appropriate planning principles.

Apply current technology, modeling, simulation and wargaming to accomplish the synchronization, employment, support and transportation planning of the joint force.

Analyze the appropriate mix of battlespace support systems and functions to develop joint operational plans.

Apply an analytical framework that incorporates the role that factors such as geopolitics, geostrategy, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desire outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns in the joint, interagency, and multinational arena.

End Process: Survey data for all four classes was aggregated, analyzed and reported to the Director of the JCWS for use in ensuring the curriculum remained current and relevant.

Survey results: There were 1,008 graduates from the four JCWS classes in 2008; 339 completed the survey for a 34% response rate. Forty-seven supervisors completed their survey, an increase from last year's thirty-three respondents.

The percentage of graduates indicating that they agreed or strongly agreed that the learning objective was relevant to their current job is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Learning Objective Applicability</th>
<th>JCWS 2007</th>
<th>JCWS 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LO # 1 Strategic Security Policies &amp; Guidance</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 2 National Power Integration</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 3 Services Capabilities/Limitations</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 4 Multinational Forces Capabilities/Limitations</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 5 Interagency Processes Capabilities/Limitations</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 6 Joint Force Attributes</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 7 Joint Perspective</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 8 Information Operations Capabilities/Limitations</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 9 Use of Information Operations</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 10 Campaign/Theater Planning &amp; Operations</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 11 Contingency Planning &amp; Operations</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 12 Current Technology &amp; Joint Planning</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 13 Battlespace Support &amp; Joint Planning</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 14 Analytical Framework</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The percentage of graduates indicating that they agreed or strongly agreed that the learning objective was useful in their current job is shown below:
The percentage of supervisors indicating that they agreed or strongly agreed that the learning objective information was useful for the graduate in his or her current job is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Graduates—Learning Objectives Usefulness</th>
<th>JCWS 2007</th>
<th>JCWS 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LO # 1 Strategic Security Policies &amp; Guidance</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 2 National Power Integration</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 3 Services Capabilities/Limitations</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 4 Multinational Forces Capabilities/Limitations</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 5 Interagency Processes Capabilities/Limitations</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 6 Joint Force Attributes</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 7 Joint Perspective</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 8 Information Operations Capabilities/Limitations</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>90%</td>
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<td>LO # 9 Use of Information Operations</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>88%</td>
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<td>84%</td>
<td>89%</td>
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<td>LO # 11 Contingency Planning &amp; Operations</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 12 Current Technology &amp; Joint Planning</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 13 Battlespace Support &amp; Joint Planning</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 14 Analytical Framework</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The percentage of supervisors indicating that they agreed or strongly agreed that the learning objective information was useful for the graduate in his or her current job is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supervisors—Learning Objectives</th>
<th>JCWS 2007</th>
<th>JCWS 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LO # 1 Strategic Security Policies &amp; Guidance</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 2 National Power Integration</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 3 Services Capabilities/Limitations</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 4 Multinational Forces Capabilities/Limitations</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 5 Interagency Processes Capabilities/Limitations</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<td>LO # 6 Joint Force Attributes</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>LO # 7 Joint Perspective</td>
<td>97%</td>
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<tr>
<td>LO # 8 Information Operations Capabilities/Limitations</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 9 Use of Information Operations</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 10 Campaign/Theater Planning &amp; Operations</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 11 Contingency Planning &amp; Operations</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 12 Current Technology &amp; Joint Planning</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 13 Battlespace Support &amp; Joint Planning</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO # 14 Analytical Framework</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Graduates were also asked to list any areas they believed were important for their joint job, but not taught at JFSC. The two areas most repeatedly listed were (1) the POM/Budgeting Process and (2) Interagency Focus/Communication.

When graduates were asked if attending JFSC was a valuable and worthwhile experience, 94 percent responded positively (agreed or strongly agreed). This compares favorably with last year’s 90 percent positive rating to the same question.

Dr. Snyder. The intermediate level schools lost Joint Duty credit for their non-host service military faculty in the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act. We know that the tours of those who were grandfathered are ending. What will the effect of this be? How will it affect the quality of your faculty? How important is it that these JDAL positions be restored? Do the instructors truly get a joint experience?

General Kasun. Neither JAWS nor JCWS are impacted by this restriction. However, faculty billets in the Joint Command, Control, and Information Operations School (JC2IOS) were removed from the JDAL even though, as with JCWS and JAWS, the subject matter, faculty, and student body are innately joint. Though not a Joint Professional Military Education qualifying school, the JC2IOS faculty provide specialized instruction to JCWS and JAWS.

JC2IOS courses are chartered by the Joint Staff, built from joint doctrine and policy, and prepare students for assignments to Joint Task Force and Unified Combatant Command staffs. As a result of the billets being removed from the JDAL, it is more difficult to get quality faculty assigned to the school and retain them for a controlled (three-year) tour. These instructors, as those assigned to JCWS and JAWS, truly get a joint experience. These billets should be restored to the JDAL.

Dr. Snyder. Describe your school’s use of historical case studies to teach strategy.

General Kasun. The Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) uses several historical case studies to examine strategy and the enduring principles of military operations. Historical case studies are used to reinforce strategic concepts and principles, bringing students from the knowledge level to the analysis level of education.

JCWS cases studies include:

- Yorktown, 1781
- Gettysburg, 1863 (Optional)
- Operation Torch, North Africa 1942
- Operation Overlord, 1944
- Operation Iceberg, Invasion of Okinawa, 1945
- Beirut, 1983
- Liberia, 2003
- Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003–Present
- Post WWII to include Korean War
- Mao’s Insurgency Campaign, 1935–1949
- Beirut, 1983
- Panama, 1989

The Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) has a 137 contact hour block focused on history. It is a broad, conceptual survey of classical through contemporary theories of the nature of conflict and the application of armed force in the land, sea and air domains. This block focuses on developing critical thinking skills with a distinct focus on analyzing the art, science and nature of war and its evolving character and conduct—past, present, and future. A series of historical case studies provides the opportunity to analyze and evaluate techniques for leading strategic change and building consensus among key constituencies, including Service, multinational, and interagency partners within the changing nature of conflict and national security. This course requires students to synthesize techniques and skills necessary for leading and sustaining effective organizations in a complex joint, interagency, and multinational environment. The curriculum includes a study of timeless patterns of force application, investigation of engines of transformation, analysis of the relationship between national security strategies and warfighting concepts, and the importance of personality and leadership at strategic-operational levels. A module exploring three tectonic cultural clashes is included in the curriculum and specifically addresses Islam, Russia, and China as well as contemporary lessons from the War on Terror. A highlight of the first portion of this curriculum is a week-long staff ride/field research visit to the Gettysburg battlefield to explore the confluence of the human dimension of warfare with other intangibles at the strategic and operational levels of war.

Specific cases studies in the JAWS curriculum include:

- Yorktown, 1781
- Gettysburg, 1863
- Post WWII to include Korean War
- Mao’s Insurgency Campaign, 1935–1949
- Beirut, 1983
- Panama, 1989
Somalia, 1993–1994
Bosnia, 1994–1996
Kosovo, 1999
Afghanistan, 2001–Present
Iraq, 2003–Present

Additional current case studies which focus on the history of the conflict as a part of mission analysis include Nigeria, Darfur, Congo, and Zimbabwe.

Dr. Snyder. What is the process for renewal and non-renewal of the faculty? How transparent is the system? In a tenure system people think the faculty members have all the power, in a non-tenure system it appears that the school has unlimited power. How do you avoid these extremes?

General Kasun. The NDU–P has the sole authority to approve renewal or non-renewal of Title 10 employees (faculty). In accordance with NDU Policy 690–4 paragraph 8b:

Subsequent consecutive terms of employment, that is renewals, will normally be for periods not to exceed three years, although the NDU–P may authorize longer renewals in exceptional circumstances. No faculty member is entitled to renewal. Non-renewal at the expiration of an employment term is not an involuntary termination of employment. … The Commandant/Component Director may make a recommendation to renew an employee based upon demonstrated exceptional professional experience and competence. When hired or renewed, the employee understands that his/her experience, expertise, and skills are the basis for his/her employment and that the extent to which he/she sustains his/her currency in the field (i.e. continues to maintain and improve their expertise) and their performance of their duties will be considered in any decision to renew. … If the determination [for non-renewal] is made, based on the reasons provided below, the Commandant submits a recommendation to the NDU–P to either terminate the Title 10 appointment or request the appointment not be renewed. The employee would be notified, in writing, as early as possible.

NDU 690–4, paragraph 12b(2) addresses other reasons for non-renewal:

The Commandant/Director has the authority to recommend termination of the employment of Title 10 employees prior to the expiration of their employment terms for the following reasons:

(a) Change in mission, resources, workload or organizational changes, or other similar and compelling reasons may require a change in the number of Title 10 civilian positions. Commandants/Directors, with the concurrence of COO/VPA, will decide which positions shall be abolished. If practicable and possible, at least six months notice of termination will be given to the individual(s) affected, but in no event will the notice be less than 60 days.

(b) Loss of Security Clearance. Any faculty member who for any reason fails to obtain and maintain a security clearance (if required) for his/her position will be terminated from that position.

(c) Termination for Cause: A Title X employee may be terminated for misconduct or unsatisfactory performance. Proposed termination actions will be initiated by the Commandant/Director/Vice President by providing a “Notice of Proposed Termination” to the employee in writing setting forth the grounds for the proposed termination. The employee will be given a reasonable opportunity to respond to the proposed termination. After consideration of the employee’s response, the Commandant/Director/Vice President will make a recommendation through proper channels to the NDU–P. Commandants and Directors should seek both UGC and Director, HRD guidance and assistance. NDU–P is the final decision maker in all termination cases. This includes those that may require terminating a Director or a Vice President.

The Joint and Combined Warfighting School and Joint Advanced Warfighting School faculty are generally retained on three-year contracts, which are renewed if they have demonstrated satisfactory performance. During this time, the faculty member must prepare a portfolio of their accomplishments in the areas of teaching, research, and outreach with specific outcomes. While Title X employees are not tenured, there does appear to be a long-term commitment between JFSC and these faculty members. Only two faculty members since 1997 have not had their contract renewed, which prevents the appearance of the school having unlimited power.

Dr. Snyder. What is your school’s role in identifying promising officers with the potential for high-level strategic thinking at the appropriate point in their careers?
General Kasun. Joint Forces Staff College provides an equal educational opportunity to all students sent to the school by the Services. We do not specifically identify promising officers; however certain officer's academic achievements are recognized via our awards program. This information is provided back to the services for their further consideration and evaluation of the officer's potential.

Dr. Snyder. How do you specifically measure the quality of the faculty and staff in the PME environment?

General Kasun. Each military and civilian faculty member is evaluated at least annually by his/her Director. The Director takes into account the person's contributions to the college, student evaluations, outreach, and research activities. The contributions of military personnel are documented using their Service process with the Commandant being the Senior Rater. The contributions of civilian faculty are documented using the Title X evaluation system.

Staff members are evaluated at least annually by their supervisor, who takes into account the effectiveness of their contributions to the College as defined in their position description. As with faculty members, the contributions of military personnel are documented using their Service process. The contributions of civilian staff are documented either using the Title X evaluation system or the National Security Personnel System as appropriate.

Dr. Snyder. How were you chosen to be the school's commandant? How was your dean chosen? Will you be retiring from this job? What background should the Chief of Naval Operations be looking for in selecting individuals for these positions? Should the focus be on operational leadership skills or academic and teaching experience (not instructing in a training institution) background or both?

General Kasun. The current Commandant was notified by the U.S. Army reserve General Officer Management Office (GOMO) in June 2008 that she was being nominated for the vacancy as the most qualified candidate for the Army Reserves by the Chief, Army Reserve (CAR) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). She was notified in August 2008 that she had been selected as the first Reserve general/flag officer to fill this position. Further questions on how she was selected should be directed to GOMO and/or CAR.

BG Kasun is filling a two star position. Her future will be decided upon by a board of senior Active Duty and Reserve general officers and the Chief, Army Reserve.

The Commandant should have both extensive operational experience and joint senior level education commensurate with the authorized billet. The Commandant needs a minimum of a master's degree, should be fully joint qualified, and have had some exposure to adult education. The Commandant should have experience in managing a large dynamic organization.

The Academic Dean was selected through the Title X competitive process. The Academic Dean plans to retire in 2012 after 33 years of federal service. The Academic Dean should have a doctorate in a relevant field such as education or national security studies, have attained the academic rank of full professor, have had exposure to the military environment, have experience in higher education and administration, and have an extensive background in managing and supervision of large dynamic organizations.

Dr. Snyder. How should intermediate schools attract top-tier civilian faculty? How do you specifically define top-tier? What are the elements that would attract the highest quality of faculty—tenure, copyright, resources, pay, ability to keep their government retirements, research and administrative assistance, etc.?

General Kasun. Top tier faculty are those who are nationally recognized by their peers as experts in their field of study. Teaching faculty are attracted by the promise of high-quality, motivated students, the freedom to teach the subject assigned by any appropriate means, and a sufficient compensation package including pay, vacation time, and retirement. The flexibility of the Title X pay scale, through which exceptional performers may be appropriately recognized, is also an incentive. To help ensure we attract the best faculty, we advertise for openings at multiple educational and employment institutions as well as the on the government web site.

Currently, we have superb faculty, but just enough to cover classroom requirements without any in reserve, which stresses both the teaching and curriculum development faculty. The problem is exacerbated by gaps when filling military billets as well as by the time needed to qualify some military faculty to teach the curriculum. Increased funding would allow us to attract additional highly qualified civilian faculty, which in turn would allow those on board to conduct research and publish, another important incentive for top-tier civilian faculty.

Dr. Snyder. What are the policies at your school regarding academic freedom? What is its proper role in a PME setting without tenure? Describe how your faculty...
may be called upon to respond to press inquiries in the field of expertise and whether and how they are allowed to respond in a timely manner.

General Kasun. The Joint Forces Staff College fully supports academic freedom as outlined in the National Defense University’s policy below:

NDU policy states that we subscribe to the 1940 American Association of University Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure

- “freedom to pursue research and publication in concert with other academic duties, freedom in the classroom to discuss his or her subject, and the right to speak on nonacademic issues just as an ordinary citizen”
- “faculty members also have the responsibility to uphold the reputation of their profession and institution”
- “freedom to discuss relevant subject matter in classrooms, even if controversial with attendant responsibility to remain on the subject and consciously and consistently avoid intruding material that has no relation to the subject they are teaching”

For reference to the statement itself: http://www.higher-ed.org/resources/AAUP_1940stat.htm

Recent controversies regarding academic freedom have led to a recent AAUP Report: Freedom in the Classroom (2007): Response to help faculty with what they can and can’t say in the classroom . . . especially on controversial or political issues. “We out to learn from history that the vitality of institutions of higher learning has been damaged far more by efforts to correct abuses of freedom than by those alleged abuses. . . . We ought to learn from history that education cannot possibly thrive in an atmosphere of state-encouraged suspicion and surveillance. . . . The essence of higher education does not lie in the passive transmission of knowledge but in the inculcation of a mature independence of mind.”

Middle States Accreditation Standard 6: Integrity, “In the conduct of its programs and activities, involving the public and the constituencies it serves, the institution demonstrates adherence to ethical standards and its own states policies, providing support for academic and intellectual freedom.”

Academic freedom, intellectual freedom, and freedom of expression are central to the academic enterprise. These special privileges, characteristic of the academic environment, should be extended to all members of the institution’s community. . . .

- Academic and intellectual freedom gives one the right and obligation as a scholar to examine data and to question assumptions. It also obliges instructors to present all information objectively because it asserts the student’s right to know all pertinent facts and information. A particular point of view may be advanced, based upon complete access to the facts or opinions that underlie the argument, as long as the right to further inquiry and consideration remains unabridged.
- To restrict the availability or to limit unreasonably the presentation of data or opinions is to deny academic freedom.
- Intellectual freedom does not rule out commitment; rather it makes it possible. Institutions may hold particular political, social, or religious philosophies, as may individual faculty members or students; but both individuals and institutions should remain intellectually free and allow others the same freedom to pursue truth.
- “At NDU we seek to understand issues, policies, and strategies so we can, as scholars, future leaders, and current advisors, best articulate, assess, defend, critique, and improve those policies and strategies over time.” (former NDU president Paul Gaffney)

Legal standing:

Based on constitutional protection of 1st amendment to the U.S. Constitution—academic freedom as a special concern of the 1st amendment

Adler v. Board of Education (K–12) “there could be no academic freedom in an environment where teachers are under surveillance and feared for their jobs”

Sweezy v. New Hampshire (higher education) “to impose any straight jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of the nation” (Chief Justice Warren). Four essential freedoms of the university (Justice Frankfurter): who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, who may be admitted to study.

Regents of the University of Michigan v Ewing “Academic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students
but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decision-making by the academy itself.

Faculty members' academic freedom in the classroom is limited by the academic freedom of the institution to determine what shall be taught (establishing curriculum, relevance to mission) and how it shall be taught (setting teaching standards) multiple cases.

Faculty in private institutions do not have constitutional protection and must rely on contracts with the institution to protect academic freedom (i.e., the AAUP statement).

Ethical Considerations

Central to the values of education is the "search for truth." Academic freedom is necessary for discovery.

"Truth seeking and discovery are facilitated when professors and their institutions remain free to pursue scholarship, wherever it may lead.

"Scientific and scholarly progress cannot be made if so-called heretical views are not brought to light to be subjected to the scrutiny of others through observation, research, and whatever objective, scientific method is appropriate to the subject matter at hand."

NDU Non-Attribution/Academic Freedom Policy

1. Academic Freedom is defined in the university's values as: Providing the climate to pursue and express ideas, opinions, and issues relative to the university purpose, free of undue limitations, restraints, or coercion by the organization or external environment. It is the hallmark of an academic institution.

2. The National Defense University subscribes to the American Association of University Professors' statement on academic freedom, issues in 1940. That statement defines academic freedom in terms of:

a. Freedom of research and publication of results.


c. Freedom from censorship when faculty speak or write as citizens.

3. The statement also includes faculty responsibilities in academic freedom:

a. Faculty, when action as private citizens, should make every effort to indicate that they are not institutional spokespersons.

b. Controversial issues not pertaining to the subject should not be introduced.

c. Peer review is vital and encouraged.

d. Institutional missions could limit academic freedom.

4. Free inquiry is essential to the National Defense University because the senior officers and government officials who are educated here will assume a variety of roles in their future assignments, as future policy makers, advisors, and leaders. NDU graduates must be ready to discuss, challenge, question, and determine national policy.

5. So that guests and university community members may speak candidly, the university offers its assurance that presentations will be held in strict confidence. Our policy on non-attribution provides that, without the expressed permission of the speaker, nothing will be attributed directly or indirectly in the presence of anyone who was not authorized to attend the lecture.

APPLICABLE REGULATION: Title 10, United States Code; DoD Directive 5230.0, Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release; NDU Reg. 360–1, Academic Freedom and Public Information

Press inquiries are directed to the Public Affairs Office, who determines whether or not current faculty or students have expertise in the field/areas of the inquiry. PAO will inform the school director of the faculty/student member. If the faculty/student member is available/willing to respond, the response will be reviewed by the PAO who will then forward the response to the entity making the inquiry.

Dr. Snyder. Acquisition reforms all call for more of the general purpose forces to be educated and trained in understanding contracting and contractors. Civilians, contracting, and contractors on the battlefield—how much do officers, outside the acquisition workforce, need to know?

General Kasun. The battlefield is comprised of military, civilians, and contractors. It is imperative that officers are familiar with the contracting process. When working with contractors, they must understand the appropriate interactions and legal constraints that affect working relationships.

In 2009, at the recommendation of the MECC, the Chairman designated “Operational Contract Support Education for Non-Acquisition DoD Personnel” as a JPME Special Area of Emphasis. Additionally, the October 2008 issuance of a relevant Joint Doctrine publication (JP 4–10 “Operational Contract Support”) is available to underpin efforts.
Dr. Snyder. What level of support do you receive from your University? The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs? JCS/J7? The Secretary of Defense? OSD? Who advocates for your budget requirements in what forums?

General Kasun. NDU provides us with our allocation of the budget and POM's our issues. They provide us with policy guidance. They also provide us with our manpower allocation and maintain hiring authority. They provide our legal support and select subject matter experts. We also share library databases and the IT system. We have our regional accreditation under NDU. We are satisfied with the level of support provided by NDU.

The Chairman provides us with curriculum guidance via the Officers Professional Military Education Program (OPMEP). The Faculty Education Conference provides yearly training to the faculty on key joint issues and new joint doctrine. Any guidance provided by the SECDEF/OSD to NDU applies to JFSC. Both NDU and OSD advocated for our budget requirements in the POM cycle.

Dr. Snyder. Are you being adequately resourced for the Joint Advanced Warfare School? If not, what is your plan for becoming so?

General Kasun. The Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) is adequately resourced. There are no significant budget issues at this time. JAWS has dedicated classrooms which have the most advanced technology of any at JFSC. The school has adequate faculty to meet the mission; however there is no redundancy to allow for seamless turn-over of faculty or additional tasking of faculty to include research and writing time. Additionally, the Director must teach in order to meet the student to faculty ratio of 3.5:1.

Dr. Snyder. Describe any IT challenges you may have. What are your other resource challenges, if any?

General Kasun. Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) requires the replacement of critical network servers that provide all of the required services to the command. Critical services such as electronic mail, network security, database management, Continuity of Operations Program (COOP), and file storage are supported by the servers. A total of 40 servers currently support the College. The cost to replace these servers is $210,000.

JFSC also requires the replacement of critical network switches that provide the infrastructure to support the College’s local area network. The switches provide the connectivity needed to extend the network to the entire College and allow users access to network services such as electronic mail, file storage/retrieval, and database management systems. The JFSC network infrastructure currently has approximately 75 access switches and 7 distribution switches. Through lifecycle replacement, the cost to replace these switches is $150,000/year.

The classified JFSC SIPR network should be utilizing a tape backup system. The current system was purchased in FY00 and requires replacement. Security requirements specify that a backup system must be in place that will allow the College to be able to backup vital data on external media and store it in an offsite location in case of emergency or catastrophic loss to a system which is onsite. The cost for such a system is $25,000.

In addition to the SIPR network, JFSC uses a Storage Area Network that provides approximately three terabytes of unclassified information storage. The Storage Area Network provides the ability to address continuing user storage requirements. Network size has continued to grow and it is more economical to purchase a Storage Area Network than to purchase the servers that would be needed to meet our growing requirements. This type of solution enables a backup solution that is faster than tape backup solutions. The Storage Area Network could not be used for classified information because doing so would make the entire system classified. The cost for a Storage Area Network is approximately $93,000.

The JFSC backbone relies on a central Core switch which acts as a traffic cop for all network data. The Core switch controls connectivity to all devices within the College, including all user workstations, war gaming suites, and seminars. All computers that try to gain any information from the internal or external network are routed through the Core switch. All outlying switches/pc’s/hubs/LAN drops/etc. attach to this central Core switch. The current Core switch was replaced in FY 07, and should be replaced every 3 years. The cost for a replacement is approximately $63,700.

The audio visual infrastructure and equipment are aging and in need of modernization. As an example, the infrastructure in the war game suites in Okinawa Hall and the Distance Learning Center in Normandy Hall is over 10 years old. The systems are heavily used to conduct exercises, provide video teleconferencing links, and enable distance learning with combatant commands to enhance the education of our students. All are well beyond their life-cycle. Internal equipment in these facilities is no longer supported by the manufacturer and consequently it requires an
increased amount of time and money to keep them at minimal operational levels. The cost for this update is approximately $5,169,000.

The College is designing its classroom of the future that will be incrementally implemented over the FYDP. The current classroom structure has five computers being shared by up to twenty students and three faculty members. The classroom of the future will need to provide computer access for all students and faculty. The front-end assessment has identified critical requirements for computing capability for the individual student, classroom flexibility, and interactive display devices. The solution will incorporate laptop computers to serve as both an electronic reader and IT asset. A wireless network for both Normandy and Okinawa Halls will enable the flexibility required for these classrooms and have a significant impact on network infrastructure. Interactive whiteboards will enable students and faculty to electronically capture application-level educational experiences in the classroom. In addition, the Joint and Combined Warfare School (JCWS) has 355 electronic readers (eBooks) that the students and faculty use to access the curriculum and reference materials. These readers will need to be replaced with a newer version of an electronic reader or laptop computers. The cost for JCWS classroom modernization is $5,400,000 over four years. The cost for the wireless network $1,200,000. Each electronic reader or laptop will cost $330–$450.

An additional challenge is outside access to computer files. Many students and faculty take work home. Due to concerns for system security, people are currently unable to use thumb drives or access files from outside the college. Issuing government owned laptops to each student and faculty member may be the only way to restore homework access capabilities. The cost to do this is approximately $1,270 per person.

Dr. Snyder. Is the Joint Advanced Warfighting School going to be ILE or SLE? We have heard conflicting stories.

General Kasun. The Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) was established in 2004 for O4 and O5 officers. In 2005 the program was expanded to allow O6 officers to attend. The CJCSI 1800.01C Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) listed JAWS as both ILE and SLE. As such students received either ILE or SLE credit depending on their rank. The Director, Joint Staff signed an update to this policy on 15 July 2009. In CJCSI 1800.01D Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) JAWS is now listed as only SLE. The current class which graduates 18 June 2010 will be the last class to have students who receive ILE credit for JAWS.

Dr. Snyder. Please provide your school’s mission statement.

Admiral Wisecup. The mission of the Naval War College is to:

1. Develop strategic and operational leaders: The College shall provide professional military education programs that are current, rigorous, relevant, and accessible to the maximum number of qualified U.S. officers and Navy enlisted personnel, civilian employees of the U.S. Government and non-governmental organizations, and international officers. The desired effect is a group of leaders of character who have trust and confidence in each other and are operationally and strategically minded, critical thinkers, proficient in joint matters, and skilled naval and joint warfighters.

2. Help CNO define the future Navy and its roles and missions: The College shall conduct research, analysis, and gaming to support the requirements of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Combatant Commanders, the Navy Component Commanders, the Navy’s numbered fleet commanders, other Navy and Marine Corps commanders, the U.S. Intelligence Community, and other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government. The desired effect is a program of focused, forward-thinking and timely research, analysis, and gaming that anticipates future operational and strategic challenges; develops and assesses strategic and operational concepts to overcome those challenges; assesses the risk associated with these concepts; and provides analytical products that inform the Navy’s leadership and help shape key decisions.

3. Support combat readiness: The College shall conduct training, education, leadership and assessment activities to support the ability of the Navy’s Joint Force Maritime and Navy Component Commanders to function effectively as operational commanders. This effort shall include supporting the needs of the Combatant Commanders, Navy Component Commanders, and the Navy’s numbered fleet commanders for operational planning, analysis, and war gaming to respond to emerging operational requirements. The desired effect is to improve the capability of Navy commanders to lead maritime, joint and combined forces and their staff members to plan, execute and assess and function cohesively as a maritime headquarters organization.
(4) Strengthen maritime security cooperation: The College shall bring together senior and intermediate level naval officers from other countries to develop leaders for high command in their navies; promote an open exchange of professional views; encourage friendship and cooperation; and study operational planning methods. The desired effect is to build and strengthen national and international maritime relationships and to improve the ability of U.S. and partner nations to operate together in the maritime domain.

Status and Command Relationships. The Naval War College is a shore activity in an active, fully operational status under the command of a President who reports to the Chief of Naval Operations for mission accomplishment, broad policy guidance and governance. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Total Force serves as the College’s Resource Sponsor and Budget Submission Office.

Dr. Snyder. How have ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan affected the quality of military faculty members? What is your average tour length for military faculty members? Have the credentials of military faculty in terms of graduate degrees and JQO qualifications diminished during this period? What is the percentage of military faculty who are fully JQO qualified?

Admiral WiseCup. Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have clearly enhanced the quality of those military faculty members at the U.S. Naval War College who have had this experience. Recent combat experience provides instant credibility and enables our military faculty members to connect with students who have recently returned from combat operations. Recent faculty combat experience is also instrumental in making sure that our curriculum is current and relevant. We have used the Individual Augmentation program periodically as a professional development opportunity for selected military faculty members. The challenge is that combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan only cover one aspect of the range of military operations and we must teach the full spectrum.

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have also affected the perception among students especially those with combat experience that such experience is a discriminator. Those military faculty members without combat experience must work to build that credibility and prove their value in the classroom.

However, there were problems with gapped billets for military faculty members especially during periods with the highest tempo of operations.

The average tour length for military faculty is between two and three years, with most seasoned officers staying for a full tour and the more junior commanders/lieutenant colonels or junior captains/colonels often departing closer to the twenty-four month mark. Clearly, the full tour allows these officers to contribute significantly in both teaching and curricula development. Most of the faculty members who depart after only two years are on the fast track to promotion and command and these are exactly the officers that we want to have in the seminar with both our intermediate and senior level students.

The credentials of military faculty in terms of graduate degrees and JQO qualifications have not diminished at all during this period. Forty-seven percent of S&P’s military faculty members have held O-5 command. All have the requisite PME and hold a master’s degree with eighteen percent having a PhD or enrolled as doctoral candidates.

Among the JMO Department’s military faculty, sixty-nine percent have held O-5 command, and over ninety-four percent are graduates of an intermediate or senior level service college and hold a master’s degree; forty-one percent hold multiple master’s degrees. Sixty percent of the NSDM military faculty has had O-5 command and sixty-seven percent hold multiple master’s degrees.

Approximately 20% (13/66) military faculty members are fully JQO qualified. In fact, the percentage of JQO faculty has remained steady over the past ten years.

Dr. Snyder. Are the services and agencies filling their assigned billets for faculty? What are your gaps?

Admiral WiseCup. Yes, the military services and agencies are filling their assigned billets at the Naval War College. Moreover, each of the other military departments have provided military faculty members who provide the skills, professional experiences, and generally the education outlined in the Memorandum of Agreement on Assignment of Military Faculty at the Service Senior Level Colleges dated 30 December 2005.

That Memorandum of Agreement covers the portion of the other Service faculty at the Naval War College which meets the CJCS definition for PME faculty, those who “teach, prepare, or design PME curriculum or conduct research related to PME.” Faculty members assigned to NWC’s College of Operational and Strategic Leadership, the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, the Naval Command College, and the Naval Staff College do not fully meet this definition and are not counted as PME faculty unless they actively teach in the Elective Program. The information
below is in reference to the PME faculty which is related to this Subcommittee's inquiry.

For the upcoming academic year, the following billets for teaching faculty are currently gapped with no replacement yet identified:

- CIA—none (1 of 1 billets filled)
- Maritime Administration—none (1 of 1 billets filled)
- NCIS—none (1 of 1 billets filled)
- Royal Navy—none (1 of 1 billets filled)
- U.S. Air Force—1 of 11 billets (9%)
- U.S. Army—1 of 13 billets (8%)
- U.S. Coast Guard—none (1 of 1 filled)
- U.S. Marine Corps—none (5 of 5 billets filled)
- U.S. Navy—3 of 42 billets (7%)
- U.S. State Department—none (2 of 2 billets filled)

The Army had problems with timely fills in Academic Years 2006-2007 and 2007-2008, but rectified them last academic year. As with all shore stations, Navy manning is less than 100%, but the College, as a matter of practice, places high priority on filling the PME faculty positions and absorbs the manning decrement with the research and gaming faculty and staff positions.

Dr. SNYDER. To what extent has the curriculum enhanced its coverage of Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations given that DOD has put them on a par with combat operations?

Admiral WISECUP. Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations are an important part of the curricula at the U.S. Naval War College. The College has held fast to the belief, first articulated by its Founding Father, Rear Admiral Steven B. Luce, USN that “The War College is a place of original research on all questions relating to war and to statesmanship connected with war, or the prevention of War.” For the past 125 years, our focus has never been solely on conventional wars or high-intensity conflicts. We have examined the full spectrum of combat operations. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent end of the Cold War as we know it, the College has increasingly emphasized both SSTR and irregular warfare.

Failing and low-performing states are a perfect environment for these difficult operations. Our students have read and studied about operations in Beirut and Panama since the early 1990s. We continue to study operations in the Balkans that occurred during the Clinton years. Clearly there is a linkage between unstable environments like these and irregular war and insurgencies. We see this complexity as a part of the comprehensive whole.

The NSDM Capstone Exercise asks students to look into the future security environment (6 years) to develop a seminar presentation that addresses creation of a future national security strategy, national military strategy, a regional strategic estimate, a theater strategic vision, and a list of new or improved concepts/capabilities necessary to advance the regional strategic vision. This exercise requires students to carefully consider all kinds of potential future operations, including SSTR operations.

In addition, NSDM uses several case studies that touch on past events related to SSTR operations including:

- The use of Marines in Beirut in the early 80s
- Darfur
- Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles

The Strategy and Warfare course includes a diverse assortment of case studies. SSTR concepts are clearly discussed in many of these case studies. Consequently, it is often an area that students discuss on their final examination.

During the Joint Maritime Operations (JMO) course, students are required to complete a major research paper. There are many topic suggestions that include SSTR subjects; 36 students this past academic year chose SSTR topics.

In the session on Introduction to Operational Art, students explore the application of operational art not only in conventional force-on-force constructs, but ask the question, “Can operational art be applied across the range of military operations?” extending the consideration through the traditional Phase 4 and Phase 5 construct. In the lesson on Military Objectives and the Levels of War, exploration of the desired end state leads students into consideration of SSTR issues.

Specific to naval operations, one question students entertain in the lesson on the Employment of Naval Forces Across the Spectrum of Conflict, is “Discuss the type and range of missions conducted by maritime forces in time of peace?” Discussion
leads to many roles for naval forces within SSTR. Another question in the session asks students to consider the application of naval forces to peace keeping and peace enforcement, two elements that have roles within SSTR.

Interagency coordination and cooperation get consideration in several seminar sessions. In the lesson on the Department of State and the Country Team, the interaction between a Joint Task Force and the DoS/Country Team are considered specifically in SSTR operations. The JMO session on military decision making and planning continue the theme by asking students to consider planning not only for conflict but also for post-conflict operations.

Many sessions in contemporary operations look at SSTR considerations. These include Failed States; a session devoted to a lecture on SSTR, Security Cooperation Planning, Interagency Coordination, and a panel discussion featuring representatives from nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations and civilian contractors. The Post-Conflict Operations seminar looks at three SSTR case studies, Post-WWII Germany, Post-Operation Just Cause in Panama, and stability operations in Kosovo. The class on Civil-Military Operations features the investigation of establishing relationships early in an operation with a mind to ensuring coherent action in SSTR. The session on Peace Operations also includes SSTR considerations. Likewise, sessions on insurgency, counter-insurgency, and complex irregular warfare explore the gap between where a region or country is where it needs to be, and how it gets there through the lens of SSTR considerations. A seminar on Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations concludes the seminar series and through analysis of Operation Unified Assistance looks to identify lessons relevant to SSTR concerns. Overall, the JMO course weaves SSTR operations and considerations throughout the sixteen week course with concentrations interspersed.

There are also several electives and workshops that cover SSTR and an Area of Studies with electives devoted to Irregular Warfare. These include:

- Employment of Special Operations Forces: A Case Study Approach
- Advanced Studies in Special Operations Forces
- Directed Research in Special Operations Forces
- Small Wars: An Introduction to Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, Guerilla and Partisan Warfare Colonial Wars, 1846–1902
- Irregular Warfare
- Homeland Security and Counter Terrorism
- Technological and Policy Foundations
- Confronting Armed Groups: 21st Century Challenges to U.S. National Security
- Iraq: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency
- Contemporary Experiences in Counterinsurgency and Counter-Terrorism

Also, our resident faculty members have recent experience and expertise with SSTR especially the military faculty that have recently returned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Faculty members in the Wargaming Department work closely with the teaching faculty to remain current and share their experiences.

In addition, in 2008, the Naval War College created a Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) in order promote and support research and teaching on irregular warfare and armed groups. CIWAG hosted a conference that brought U.S. and international scholars together with military scholars and practitioners to analyze the national and international security challenges posed by armed groups and irregular warfare. CIWAG is taking a complex and rapidly evolving problem and exploring ways to help scholars and military leaders develop a sufficient understanding of the unique challenges posed by armed groups and irregular warfare.

Dr. SNYDER. Describe the scenarios that you use for your simulation exercises and war games. To what extent do they incorporate SSTR and irregular warfare concepts?

Admiral WISECUP. At the Naval War College, our seminar-based educational methodology requires students to demonstrate mastery of theory and concepts through analysis, application, synthesis, and evaluation throughout the academic year through a variety of means including comprehensive case studies, exercises and simulations, and war games.

In the National Security Decision Making course, the final exercise requires students to look into the future security environment (6 years); they create their own scenario based on their assessment of the global and regional trends affecting their assigned geographic area of responsibility. The exercise requires the seminar to develop a presentation that addresses creation of a future national security strategy, national military strategy, a regional strategic estimate, a theater strategic vision,
and a list of new or improved concepts/capabilities necessary to advance the regional strategic vision. This exercise requires students to carefully consider all kinds of potential future operations, including SSTR operations and irregular warfare and determine the likelihood and risk of them to the security of the region and the United States.

NSDM also uses two case studies involving SSTR operations and irregular warfare concepts:

- The use of Marines in Beirut in the early 80s
- Darfur

The Strategy and War course includes a diverse assortment of case studies focusing on irregular warfare (IW) and the challenges of countering belligerents that utilize irregular strategies. IW is defined as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations and encompasses insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and counterterrorism. IW theory and cases are analyzed by students using historical and contemporary case studies. Students read the famous study *On Protracted War* by Mao, perhaps the most successful fractioned and celebrated theorist of IW. A number of case studies involving IW and hybrid wars—the role of armed groups and militias in determining the outcome of the American War for Independence, the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines, the Emergency, Vietnam, the insurgencies in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, and current operations in Afghanistan—receive in-depth examination. Moreover, the Strategy and War course emphasizes the importance of understanding how and why superiority in conventional military capabilities do not automatically translate into strategic success, when weaker adversaries adopt asymmetric, irregular methods of warfare to protract the fighting and diminish the will of their opponent. It is important to note that IW is taught in context so that the geopolitical, economic, historical, social, and cultural environments surrounding the conflict are also assessed in order to develop realistic strategies and counter-strategies.

In the examination of IW, culture and religion figure prominently in the strategy courses. A conflict studied is the Algerian war to gain independence from France. This struggle raises troubling questions about the strategic effectiveness of a major western power—in this case, France—fighting in another cultural and religious setting against an adversary employing terrorism and insurgency.

In addition, IW in the joint and interagency environment is exhaustively studied. On Vietnam, for example, students read *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam*, the classic study authored by Robert Komer, who headed the most successful phase of the United States pacification effort during the Vietnam War. Meanwhile, Andrew Krepinevich’s provocative study *The Army and Vietnam* provides insights into the problems facing armed forces in adapting to strategic realities. Students examine institutional constraints that hamstrung the performance of the United States on the civil and local security aspects of the war. These include the faulty coordination of our diplomatic and military instruments, the lack of unified plans, the misuse of AID tools, poorly equipped staffs on several agencies that also could not understand each other’s perspective or mission, and above all the lack of unified management both across civil and military functions and within each sphere.

Students also examine the arguments made by the eminent Harvard academic, the late Samuel Huntington that the terror war is a culturally or religiously driven “clash of civilizations.” (That, indeed, is how Al Qaeda has been predisposed to portray the war.) The Strategy and Policy Department provides a valuable reading, entitled *In the Eyes of Your Enemy: An Al-Qaeda Compendium*, consisting of primary-source documents, which allows students to engage in “cultural intelligence” by assessing first hand AQAM’s ideological view of the world, peculiar version of history, and image of the United States, as well as their political objectives, strategies, information operations, and internal divisions and debates. In addition, Usama Bin Laden’s speech, “Come to Jihad: A Speech to the People of Pakistan,” covering a substantial change in AQ’s strategic rhetoric, is examined. In it, Bin Laden formally calls for war against the Pakistani state in a fashion which may mark another turning point in the Long War’s evolution. Readings by well-known experts on the Middle East Fawaz Gerges and Gilles Kepel provide astute analyses of the cultural roots of the Arab-Israeli conflicts. Other readings and lectures provide an ethnographic break-down of tribal society along the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier, and some of the key “cultural terrain” features it that effect military operations.

AQAM has exploited the revolution in information technology to craft and control their messages to an unprecedented degree of sophistication and to mix personal, tactical training, operational planning, and strategic debate in a decentralized organizational framework. Another reading by Bruce Hoffman, a longtime RAND Cor-
poration expert on terrorism, analyzes the “virtual battleground of cyberspace” and the different ways in which AQAM leaders and operatives have used the internet to advance their cause. AQAM has used new means of communication to try to impel a wide range of Muslim audiences to transcend their multiple national, ethnic, and tribal sources of identity and embrace a single, extreme, religious identity as a global umma (community) in mortal confrontation with infidels. AQAM also addresses Western audiences with words as well as propaganda of the deed. Its package of terrorism and strategic communication seeks to achieve psychological, economic, and political effects that, it presumes, will bring an end to the Western presence in the Muslim world. The deep attention paid to Al Qaeda’s worldview, messages, and efforts in the strategy courses also provides a solid backdrop against which to compare and evaluate the United States’ own efforts.

Two major scenarios consider SSTR within the Joint Maritime Operations course. The first is a notional case study of a conflict on the island of Borneo. Within it, students are exposed to a conventional, maritime-based conflict with irregular warfare concerns. Within it, students are expected to plan for U.S. and coalition operations, including SSTR operations. The second and capstone exercise looks at the implosion of the DPRK in the year 2012. The entire exercise centers on conflict avoidance and SSTR efforts. As a result of years of food shortages and the collapse of the people, the DPRK leadership is unable to provide either security of basic human services. DPRK infrastructure is incapable of supporting the population and the U.N. estimates that, as winter approaches, up to 2 million DPRK citizens may starve or freeze to death. The U.S.-led Combined Task Force (CTF) Morning Calm conducts humanitarian assistance operations to assist DPRK government in maintaining order and restoring basic human services in order to ease human suffering and prevent regional instability. This exercise was designed as an SSTR/Irregular Warfare exercise to synthesize the course learning objectives.

In addition, in 2008, the Naval War College created a Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) in order promote and support research and teaching on irregular warfare and armed groups. Part of its mission is to hold a series of conferences that bring scholars, both American and international, together with military scholars and practitioners to analyze the national and international security challenges posed by armed groups and irregular warfare. CIWAG contributes to curriculum development in the strategy, joint military operations, and electives courses taught at the Naval War College. This focus on increasing the faculty’s expertise on SSTR and IW extends to our War Gaming Department, which executed a number of other SSTR and IW wargames over the past year involving faculty throughout the College. These include:

1. NAVCENT BILAT Game Series. Classified, scenario-based war game explored the irregular warfare threat to maritime infrastructure in the NAVCENT AOR. This war game served as a theater security cooperation instrument for NAVCENT to build partnership capacity among oil-producing coalition partners.
2. Navy-Marine Corps Command Relationship Game. Scenario-based war game explored the issues and problems associated with various command relationship constructs for employing embarked Marine Forces. A range of scenarios from low-intensity conflict to MCO were analyzed.
3. Global 08. Four different alternative future scenarios used: “Made in East Asia,” “Global Chaos,” “United We Stand,” and “Tri-Polar.”
4. Global 09. Classified scenario addressing Sea Control in an anti-access environment against a capable adversary.
5. Force Design Workshop. Scenario focused on high-end anti-access and irregular maritime warfare across the most stressing Defense Planning Scenarios.
6. Final Destination 2 Game. SECRET–NOFORN level, included multiple, asymmetric attacks on the U.S. homeland and U.S. forces abroad.
7. U.S.-Australia Electronic Warfare Interoperability Game. Designed to identify gaps, deficiencies, and issues with respect to U.S. and Australian Electronic Warfare actions in combat conditions. Two scenarios were presented, the first of which focused on Major Combat Operations against a near-peer competitor. The second scenario explored the challenges of conducting EW operations in later-phasing (e.g., post-major combat, stability and rebuilding operations) in a Counter-Insurgency (COIN) environment.
8. Maritime Infrastructure Protection Symposium Scenario-Based Planning Activity. The scenario presented simulated attacks on a variety of physical infrastructure assets (i.e., oil platforms, agricultural experiment station, LNG holding facilities, and commercial assets). Participants were divided into four
multi-national groups, and explored the events from the specific lenses of indications and warnings, analysis and assessment, mitigation, and incident response.

9. Maritime Homeland Security/Homeland Defense War Game Series. Focus of all scenarios is on asymmetrical threats coming from the maritime environment (VOI, COI, POI threats). The series incorporates robust play from U.S. maritime forces as well as both the Canadian military and civilian senior leadership and an advancing Mexican involvement. Scenarios included: maritime assault teams inbound to Vancouver Olympics, small boat threat to oil platforms in GOMEX, VBIED inbound to Hampton Roads, and transiting vessel exhibiting personnel with radiation poisoning declaring force majeure for a U.S. Port.

10. Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) War Game Series. The game includes significant U.S. interagency participation with the overarching goal of creating and implementing a single, unified U.S. government approach to an emerging irregular warfare threat. Scenarios included: suspected WMD being shipped to U.S. waters, chemical weapons shipments inbound through St Lawrence Seaway, and POI onboard vessels transiting through U.S. waters.

11. Office of Defense Cooperation/EUCOM Theater Engagement. The scenario based war game reinforced the concepts of joint operational planning. All scenarios focused on IW threats to critical energy infrastructure and WMD in a joint maritime environment.

12. Deterrence and Escalation Game and Review 09. The objectives for this game were to explore escalation dynamics after an adversary’s first use of WMD. The game was conducted primarily at the operational and strategic levels of war.

Dr. Snyder. Please provide the most recent survey results from your graduates and their supervisors.

Admiral Wisecup. The U.S. Naval War College routinely surveys graduating students, alumni, and naval and joint leaders. With the significant change of intended educational outcomes and the corresponding curriculum revision implemented in academic year 2006–2007, surveys to our alumni and senior leaders regarding the outdated intermediate-level course would have served no useful purpose. We have begun to solicit feedback on the revised course, but have not yet collected all of the data. Likewise, the College has not yet analyzed the data from our graduating students for the last academic year. However, the analysis from Academic Year 2007–08 follows.

[The information referred to is retained in the committee files and can be viewed upon request.]

Dr. Snyder. The intermediate level schools lost Joint Duty credit for their non-host service military faculty in the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act. We know that the tours of those who were grandfathered are ending. What will the effect of this be? How will it affect the quality of your faculty? How important is it that these JDAL positions be restored? Do the instructors truly get a joint experience?

Admiral Wisecup. Billets at the U.S. Naval War College remained on the JDAL because our military faculty members teach both intermediate level PME with JPME I and Senior level PME with JPME II. To date, officers in these billets have received joint credit. However, previously the Joint Staff queried whether our faculty should receive full joint credit since they also teach the intermediate level JPME course.

The long-term concern is that a bureaucratic decision may affect our teaching billets. Therefore we fully support returning these billets to the JDAL.

Discussions with the Bureau of Naval Personnel indicates that a lack of joint credit makes it more difficult to assign commanders still competitive for promotion and recently promoted captains to faculty positions at the other intermediate level colleges. However, these billets are filled by more experienced officers, who do not absolutely require joint duty credit. Returning those faculty billets to the JDAL would be most beneficial.

Dr. Snyder. Describe your school’s use of historical case studies to teach strategy.

Admiral Wisecup. The study of history has formed a part of the curriculum since the founding of the Naval War College. The College’s first President, Stephen B. Luce, argued: "Naval history abounds in materials whereon to erect a science, and it is our purpose to build up with these a science of naval warfare." (Stephen B. Luce, “On the Study of Naval Warfare as a Science” Proceedings, 1886) Historical
case studies provided the foundation for frameworks of strategic thought that could guide the making of strategy and operations. Alfred Thayer Mahan used historical case studies to develop his concepts of sea power and grand strategy in the lectures delivered to students attending the College. These lectures, transformed into his famous book *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, Mahan stated: "It is ... particularly in the field of naval strategy that the teachings of the past have a value." (p. 9) Mahan's famous history remains a part of the College's courses on strategy. Historical case studies, then, have long formed a vital part of the curriculum on strategy at the Naval War College.

Mahan's works on naval history, and those of his near contemporary Sir Julian Corbett, have lost none of their power for spurring critical thought on strategy. The noted policy commentator Robert Kaplan believes that an understanding of the current-day and future strategic environment "requires an acquaintance with two books published a century ago: Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783* ... and Julian S. Corbett's *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.*" (Robert D. Kaplan, "America’s Elegant Decline," *Atlantic Monthly*, November 2007) The historical case studies drawn upon by Mahan and Corbett, as well as their acute strategic analyses, remain an integral part of the education on strategy provided by the Naval War College.

The study of strategy is an integral element of the Naval War College's intermediate-level education programs, resident and non-resident. Through the core curriculum, students examine the formulation and implementation of strategy, assess its execution and effectiveness, and evaluate the subsequent adaptation and revision of strategy. For intermediate-level students, our focus remains at the operational level emphasizing the application of operational art and operational level leadership. The nexus of strategy and operations is then a major emphasis of the core curriculum. While our students analyze the national level strategies, their studies require them to synthesize and evaluate theater strategies and the corresponding campaigns, operations, and activities.

Historical case studies are a significant element of the College's educational methodology, especially so in our study of strategy covered mostly by the National Security Decision Making (NSDM) and the Strategy and Warfare (S&W) courses. NSDM uses historical case studies extensively to teach both the development and implementation of strategy and policy, though the faculty has found case studies to be more effective in examining how strategy was implemented than in how it was developed. NSDM also uses historical case studies extensively to teach leadership.

Most of the historical case studies used were developed by NSDM faculty members to illustrate various course concepts. Historical case studies related to strategy and policy development and implementation that have recently been used include:

- Use of Marines in Lebanon between 1982 and 1984
- The United States and Russia—Rekindling the Cold War
- The Cuban Missile Crisis
- North Korea
- A Time of Our Choosing: Confronting Saddam
- Darfur
- The 1973 Arab-Israeli War
- All midterm and final exams involve student analysis of case studies.

These cases are used in conjunction with other required readings as necessary preparation for graduate-level seminar discussions. Those discussions are important to developing course concepts and applying the three general analytical frameworks offered by the NSDM course. The first conceptual framework considers how national interests, national strategies, and the security environment affect the ways and means combatant commanders develop and execute theater strategy cooperation activities. The second conceptual framework is designed to prepare students to lead and effectively participate in a dynamic staff environment, applying management and leadership skills to organizational assessment, strategy formulation, strategy implementation, and measurements. The third conceptual framework describes the environment with and external to the staff ensuring leadership styles, staff structure, organizational behavior and culture as well as the influence on the staff of U.S. government higher authority, and elements of the international community are considered during the strategic process. Through seminar discussions, a 14–17 page analytical essay exploring an existing strategy, a military strategic concept, or an emerging security challenge, and examinations involving student analysis of case studies, the NSDM course teaches strategy.
The Strategy and Warfare course examines the complete strategic process through the use of historic case studies. This course uses required historic readings and faculty lectures to provide the baseline for exploration through seminar discussions and two analytical essays of 8–10 pages each. Students are provided nine interrelated course themes as a starting point for undertaking critical strategic thinking. Those themes are applied repeatedly via the historic case studies, the essay papers, and often the course’s written final examination.

A hallmark of the courses developed by the Strategy and Policy Department, including Strategy and Warfare, is the many different types of wars and the wide range of operations covered in historical case studies. By using historical case studies, the students have an opportunity to evaluate and discuss the ways in which political leaders, military and interagency planners in the real world have successfully (or unsuccessfully) grappled with the strategic challenges associated with the use of force to attain national objectives. The historical case studies in strategy examine diverse types of wars, featuring a variety of operations and different keys to success. The strategy courses show how success in one type of war may be followed by failure in another. An important aspect of strategic leadership is the ability to adapt to different types of wars. The curriculum analyzes the strategic success and failure of leading great powers and non-state actors over long periods of time. The goal in using historical case study is to expand the horizons of the officers studying at the College. Admiral Stansfield Turner argued for the value of this method for the study of strategy: “Studying historical examples should enable us to view current issues and trends through a broader perspective of the basic elements of strategy. Approaching today’s problems through a study of the past is one way to ensure that we do not become trapped within the limits of our own experience.”

These historical cases lead up to the strategic problems confronting today’s decision makers and emerging security challenges. In each case study, the students can study the actions of famous strategic leaders—such as, Washington, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, Marshall, Eisenhower, Mao, and others. The case studies on strategy, then, are concerned with strategic leadership that can effectively deal not only with current problems in policy and strategy but also those that might emerge in the future.

The study of history is also essential so that our students know about the books influencing the Nation’s top decision makers. A recent example is provided by former President George Bush, who studied the historical case study of the Algerian war for independence against France. Henry Kissinger recommended that President Bush read Alistair Horne’s book Savage War of Peace. This book shaped President Bush’s views about the problems facing outside great powers fighting in the Middle East. This book, too, is part of the core curriculum on strategy at the College. In the courses offered by the Strategy and Policy Department, historical case studies give students an awareness of what is read by the country’s leadership. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates highlighted in the journal the importance of Robert Komer’s book Bureaucracy Does Its Thing for grasping the institutional impediments standing in the way of strategic effectiveness in fighting an insurgency. (Foreign Affairs, January-February 2009). The historical case study in the strategies of the Vietnam War employs this book with great effect. Many students returning from service in Afghanistan and Iraq have commented on the value of reading this book that captured some of the salient lessons of the hard-won experience of the long war in Vietnam.

Our adversaries, of course, also turn to the past to make strategic sense current-day conflicts. We at the Naval War College must equip our students with an understanding of our enemies’ construction of the past. For example, Osama bin Laden, in a famous speech delivered in 2004, drew upon the experience of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan to explain why he remained confident of ultimate victory over the United States in the terror war. “[W]e have experience in using guerrilla warfare and the war of attrition to fight tyrannical superpowers, as we, alongside the mujahidin, bled Russia for 10 years, until it went bankrupt and was forced to withdraw in defeat… So we are continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy.” (October 29, 2004) Understanding the strategy of our Nation’s enemies requires an examination of history and the enemy’s interpretation of it. The Naval War College’s curriculum thus uses historical case studies to understand the ends, ways, and means employed by adversaries, as well as the role of cultural and religious considerations in the making of strategy.

The strategy courses also examine the part culture played in the major conflicts fought in East Asia in the twentieth century. The study of these wars shows the violent interaction between the peoples within the region and with outside powers. In particular, students examine the Pacific theater in World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. In the strategy courses, students examine the rise of
Japan as a major power, the growth of Japanese nationalism during the first half of the twentieth century, and Japan's collision with China, Russia, and the United States. The students also examine the rise of China. In recent years, the strategy courses have sought to give more prominence to the history of conflicts in South Asia. This historical background is an essential element of cultural literacy and for understanding today's dangerous flashpoints in Asia.

An education in strategy entails an understanding of our own Nation's past. Cultural studies must begin with knowing about one's own history. The Strategy and Policy Department's courses provide an in-depth examination of the evolution of the American way of war and strategic thought. The late Russell Weigley's landmark study *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* provides essential background on how the United States has waged war. The history of the United States' interaction with the world and its wars offers invaluable background on the evolution of the international strategic environment as well as our own country's history. The Strategy and War Course examines the founding of the Republic in the midst of a highly competitive international environment and great-power wars. The victory at Yorktown is examined as a case study in successful joint and combined operations. The Strategy and War Course also follows the rise of the United States as a world power. The strategy courses examine as well the strategic challenges that have confronted the United States and the way our country's institutions have changed and adapted over time to provide for the Nation's security. Historical case studies provide the opportunity to delve into the topic of service cultures and civil-military relations. History, then, provides a rich vein of experience to understand the making of strategy in a joint and interagency environment and the barriers that can thwart strategic effectiveness.

The courses on strategy offered by the Strategy and Policy Department thus employ in-depth examination of historical case studies. Strategic theory is put to the test offered by the hard reality of history. The study of history can hone the skills of critical analysis that are essential for understanding principles of war, the inter-relationship of ends, ways, and means, and the dynamics of strategic interaction.

**Dr. Snyder.** What is the process for renewal and non-renewal of the faculty? How transparent is the system? In a tenure system people think the faculty members have all the power, in a non-tenure system it appears that the school has unlimited power. How do you avoid these extremes?

Admiral Wisecup. The process of retaining faculty at the U.S. Naval War College is an open, orderly and fair one. Though the College does not employ a system of tenure and has no intention of doing so, it accords its faculty reasonable contractual security consistent with the College's mission and its quality standard for faculty. As a practice, the College renews contracts as early as 364 days in advance prior to their expiration. All faculty members are notified at least six months prior to the expiration of their contract. As highlighted in the *Faculty Handbook*, in all but extraordinary circumstances, notification of non-reappointment will be given by 1 December prior to the expiration of the contractual term.

Faculty members with more than six years of continuous employment at the Naval War College have the right to request a peer review of their non-reappointment. (Six years is the typical length of time it takes to make tenure at a civilian university.) A Non-Reappointment Review Committee will be appointed to consider their appeal. This process is delineated in the *Faculty Handbook*. There has only been one request for peer review of a non-reappointment since the original Skelton Report was published in 1989. Non-reappointment of faculty members who have served more than six years is rare.

The College is well aware of the unique governance system under which it operates. The Chief of Naval Operations essentially serves as the governance board for the College. Faculty members have neither tenure system nor a faculty senate. The formal voice of the faculty is represented by the departmental chairs who are members of the Academic Policy Council, the President's advisory body on academic policy, practices, procedures, and resources. While there are a number of institutional practices and procedures to provide the faculty's voice formally and informally, they are simply not the same as their counterparts at civilian universities and colleges. But neither is our multi-disciplinary approach to education, our faculty-built and taught single curriculum, or our bias toward faculty teaching teams. Faculty members must work together much more closely at NWC to accomplish departmental curriculum development. Faculty members must become collegial, team players to a much greater extent than their colleagues at civilian educational institutions. Individual faculty members who have difficulty adjusting to our unique approach to curriculum development and teaching a shared curriculum or simply chose not to adjust are generally identified in their first contractual term, well before they would
normally qualify for tenure at a civilian college or university, and depart on their
own terms.

Our current educational paradigm dates from 1972, when Admiral Stansfield Tur-
ner instituted the graduate-level case-study based, seminar model and expanded
considerably the number of civilian scholars on the NWC faculty. Admiral Turner
believed the faculty was the critical cog in a quality educational experience. To this
day, we still contend our faculty is our center of gravity. As the College’s “Guiding
Principles” from our Strategic Plan 2008–12 state “The Naval War College’s true
strength lies in the creativity, energy, and intellectual capital of our people.” And
our values in that same plan include “Academic Responsibility” which “means that
one of our key duties as an academic institution is to ‘seek and state truth without
bias.’ Our faculty enjoys full freedom of dispassionate inquiry with no limitations
other than security classification. Within this context, faculty members
are expected to extend and transmit knowledge to their respective fields of expert-
ise.” In the ensuing thirty-seven years since Admiral Turner transformed NWC,
this critical value of the faculty is ingrained in the culture of the College.

This value placed on the faculty also imparts great responsibility to them. They
take pride in their ownership of the curricula and the academic programs. They
drive themselves relentlessly to ensure what we teach remains challenging, current,
and relevant. Our culture of self-assessment begins with the faculty and permeates
the institution. Continual improvement is the unspoken motto. First and foremost,
we believe the faculty knows the trust because the faculty knows the faculty
accept fully the responsibility and are self-
driven to excel. Continued mission success, not tenure, provides them job satisfac-
tion and security. They, in turn, place their confidence and trust in the College’s
leadership to be fair and judicious in its actions toward them and the College’s mis-

Dr. Snyder. What is your school’s role in identifying promising officers with the
potential for high-level strategic thinking at the appropriate point in their careers?

Admiral Wise. The College of Naval Command and Staff in the College of Naval Command and Staff of the Naval War College has a number of selective programs to enable students and faculty to work closely on strategic issues. These include the Advanced Research Program, which offers highly qualified students the opportunity to participate in one of several collaborative research groups as well as substitute an in-depth research project for some other segment of the academic program. Selected students may join an already established research group and at the direction of the group’s faculty mentors, participate in the development of research and analysis products of that group. Alternatively, select students can either develop a topic or choose from a list of pre-approved topics from which a major research paper is completed in place of one of two core courses.

The Warfare Analysis and Research (WAR) Department conducts relevant research into current and future war-fighting issues using select Naval War College students working under the mentorship of experienced research professionals. Collaborative research efforts are coordinated through student participation in one of the Halsey or the Mahan Scholars research groups while individual research work is guided by faculty from not only within the WAR department but also faculty throughout the college as appropriate. This analysis is used to inform key policymakers, commanders and other defense and security professionals.

Students in these programs work closely with faculty members for the duration of their year at the College. As a result, they receive higher contact time and signifi-
cantly more mentorship than normal studying a variety of issues with strategic im-

1. They yield an Additional Qualification Designator (AQD) for Navy students
which identify them for their expertise. The AQD is a personnel code which

identifies a skill set that can be matched to billet requirements throughout the Navy and Joint force.

2. These professors each have continuity with these research topics and have developed a network within the Navy and the Department of Defense that enables them to identify outstanding students to other subject matter experts.

Dr. Snyder. How do you specifically measure the quality of the faculty and staff in the PME environment?

Admiral WISECUP. CJCS PME standards for faculty members establish certain qualifications. The Naval War College aims for incoming faculty members to meet or exceed those qualifications. We then have high expectations for our qualified faculty members to continue to learn and grow as an integral element of their professional development.

Regarding qualifications we expect our uniformed faculty to have expertise in their area of specialty (i.e., submarines, infantry, surface ships, aviation, logistics, etc.). We seek officers who have commanded as commanders or lieutenant colonels or held equivalent positions in the restricted line or staff communities and prefer officers who have also commanded as a captain or a colonel. We seek combat experience or operational experience in the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. We seek experience at the strategic or operational levels. We expect them to be intermediate-level school graduates with JPME Phase I and expect most of them to also be senior-level graduates. We seek officers with joint experience, preferably Joint Qualified Officers. For civilian education, we expect them to possess a master's degree at a minimum. Although a majority of our faculty have advanced degrees in international relations, history, political science, or military or political history, the discipline is not as important as their teaching ability. Our faculty has advanced degrees in a variety of disciplines and this diversity adds to the richness of our education.

As stated in our Faculty Handbook, “The Naval War College expects all civilian faculty members whose primary duties are not primarily administrative to engage in professional research and exhibit a sustained commitment to scholarship. It expects most of them to publish at least some of the results of their research. Military members are not expected to publish, but are encouraged to do so in their areas of expertise.” For civilian professors teaching in the three core academic departments, there are common elements in every faculty member’s performance appraisal: teaching performance, curriculum development, research and publication, and service to the College’s larger mission. Individual faculty members meet with their departmental Chairs and establish personal plans annually to develop more specific criteria for those common areas and any distinct areas relevant to the professor’s performance. Additionally, the Faculty Handbook established criteria for consideration for promotion to the ranks of Associate Professor and Professor which includes research and publication expectations. Thus, their annual appraisals, their potential for promotion, and ultimately their reappointment rest, in part on their productive scholarship. Military faculty members are expected to research and contribute to curricula development and are judged in their appraisals accordingly.

For PME faculty members, teaching and curriculum development are the priorities. During their first year, the primary focus is on teaching responsibilities within the core curriculum. Once their teaching is mastered, they expand into other areas. Perhaps the best published indication of our expectations for faculty quality is expressed in our Faculty Handbook’s section on qualifications for promotion, which are cited below:

(a) From Instructor to Assistant Professor. The most basic criterion for promotion from Instructor to Assistant Professor is completion of the terminal degree when required or the attainment of sufficient professional expertise to warrant the higher rank. Those eligible for this promotion will also be evaluated on the basis of teaching and service done while an Instructor and promise shown of the ability to be a productive contributor to the work of his or her Department and the mission of the Naval War College.

(b) From Assistant Professor/Assistant Research Professor to Associate Professor/Associate Research Professor. The key criteria for promotion to Associate Professor/Associate Research Professor are continued improvement and maturation in the faculty member's performance of his or her duties; initial evidence of professional productivity, including first curricular products, research, publications, or other outputs relevant to the faculty member’s duties and area of expertise; clear evidence of further promise of scholarly or professional achievement, as defined by the leadership of the relevant department or unit of the College; and a demonstrated commitment to understanding and considering issues of jointness (to include interagency and
multinational as well as interservice collaboration) in the faculty member’s teaching and/or research, analysis and gaming activities at the College.

(c) From Associate Professor/Associate Research Professor to Professor/Research Professor. This is an especially significant step for both the faculty member and the College. The criteria here include excellence in teaching or research, not simply a satisfactory level of performance; significant contributions to either the NWC’s educational mission or the NWC’s research, analysis, and gaming function; active engagement and visibility in the faculty member’s academic or professional community; significant productivity in scholarly publication or professional research; a consistent commitment in the faculty member’s teaching and/or research, analysis, and gaming to fostering critical thinking from a joint perspective and cultivating the ability of students/officers to function effectively in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment; a demonstrated commitment to teamwork with other faculty members across the departments and codes of the Naval War College; and the ability to develop or advance new ideas that enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of both the faculty member’s department and the College as a whole.

Faculty members undergo two regular types of evaluation in the course of an academic year at the Naval War College. After each term of instruction, the teaching performance of faculty members who have taught in a core course and/or an elective will be evaluated by their students. At the end of each year of instruction, the overall performance of faculty members will be evaluated by their Department Chairs or program directors. In addition, on occasion, and as coordinated between the faculty member to be evaluated and his/her Chair or Director, the teaching of a faculty member will receive a formal or informal evaluation by another faculty member after observation of classroom performance.

(1) Civilian Faculty Members

(a) Teaching Evaluations. The Academic Departments, the Electives Program, the Naval Staff College, and the College of Distance Education each use somewhat different mixes of methods for evaluating teaching proficiency. All make use of questionnaires, critiques, or surveys filled out by students, but the items included and questions asked may vary from course to course. In addition to written forms of evaluation, direct observation of teaching performance takes place as well. The College of Distance Education, with its extensive program of periodic Site Visits to Fleet Seminars, makes the most formal use of direct observation of one faculty member’s teaching proficiency by another faculty member, although in residential departments that use a team-teaching approach there is much informal observation by faculty colleagues. On occasion, a lecture or a seminar may be visited by Department Chairs or Executive Assistants, Division or Deputy Division Heads, directors of programs, other senior administrators or the President. Such monitoring is not meant to encroach upon academic freedom and is not used simply for purposes of evaluation; it serves to aid curriculum development, enhance pedagogical skills, and otherwise help maintain the high quality of the instructional environment at the Naval War College. Department Chairs and the Director, CDE, may elect to incorporate the results of teaching evaluations into the annual overall appraisal of a faculty member’s performance.

(b) Performance Appraisal and Review System. Civilian faculty members are evaluated annually in accordance with standard procedures established in the Performance Appraisal and Review System (PARS). The PARS annual appraisal period is 1 July to 30 June or, in the case of initial appointments, from the beginning date of appointment until 30 June. At the beginning of the appraisal period, faculty members are apprised of the “job elements” and “performance standards” by which they will be assessed—for example, curriculum development, research and publication, teaching performance, and extra-departmental service to the Naval War College. Toward the middle of the year there is a “progress review.” At the end of the year, Department Chairs, Directors, or other supervisors make full written assessments of the performance of each of their faculty members. Faculty members have the right to grieve performance appraisals and other matters relating to the appraisal program in accordance with NWCINST 12430.1 (series).

(2) Military

(a) Teaching Evaluations. All military officers on the teaching faculty participate in the same teaching evaluation process that civilian faculty members do.

(b) Fitness Reports. Fitness Reports on military faculty members are submitted periodically and upon detachment of officers or reporting senior. Normal due dates are specified by individual Service directives. The appropriate Dean is responsible for coordinating and processing Navy reports. The Service Advisors coordinate prep-
aration of faculty and staff evaluations for the members of their respective services, in conjunction with the Department Chair.

The College collects data on faculty performance from graduate and alumni surveys. The feedback continues to be very positive about the quality of the education, the performance of the faculty, and the relevance and currency of the curriculum.

Dr. Snyder. How were you chosen to be school's commandant? How was your dean chosen? Will you be retiring from this job? What background should the Chief of Naval Operations be looking for in selecting individuals for these positions? Should the focus be on operational leadership skills or academic and teaching experience (not instructing in a training institution) background or both?

Admiral Wisecup. Selection of the President of the NWC is accomplished through a highly competitive administrative slating and nominative process, and ultimate appointment by the Secretary of the Navy.

There are four parts to the institution's mission:

(1) Develop strategic and operational leaders.
(2) Help CNO define the future Navy and its roles and missions.
(3) Support combat readiness.
(4) Strengthen maritime security cooperation.

If Rear Admiral Wisecup were selecting the College's President, he would select based upon an assessment of the Navy's flag officers who could fulfill all four parts of this mission statement. Rear Admiral Wisecup believes in addition to strong leadership the President needs expertise at the operational level of war, a comprehensive understanding naval and joint warfighting, strategic level experience, experience in the international area, and credibility with the Navy's senior leadership.

Rear Admiral Wisecup does not plan to retire at the completion of this tour although he serves at the pleasure of the CNO and the Secretary of the Navy. In fact two of the last three Presidents have not retired from this job.

The Naval War College employs both a Provost, who is the chief operating officer and dean of faculty, and a Dean of Academics. Those positions provide the necessary educational and teaching expertise for the College's successful mission accomplishment. Thus, it is not essential that the president have academic or teaching experience.

We recently conducted a selection process to select both the Provost and the Dean of Academics. Both executive positions were advertised in a number of scholarly journals including The Chronicle of Higher Education. Well qualified candidates were invited to undergo the interview process here at the College. The selection boards included retired senior flag and general officers, faculty members, and distinguished scholars from local colleges and universities.

Dr. Snyder. How should intermediate schools attract top-tier civilian faculty? How do you specifically define top-tier? What are the elements that would attract the highest quality of faculty—tenure, copyright, resources, pay, ability to keep their government retirements, research and administrative assistance, etc.?

Admiral Wise cup. Since the U.S. Naval War College PME faculty teach both the intermediate and senior courses, it is very difficult to answer this in simply an intermediate-level context. We believe we possess a top-tier civilian faculty consisting of a balance of academic scholars and retired professionals with superb experience supported by solid academic credentials. We believe both are necessary, especially at the intermediate-level, to perform the educational focus especially that required by USC Title X and CJCS Officer PME Policy.

Many of our faculty's stalwarts today have invested most of their professional life in this College and its mission. We hired most of them as younger scholars of great promise, retained them, and nurtured them wherever possible. They grew into seasoned, top tier faculty members. What attracted most of them was the opportunity to intermix with a faculty replete with esteemed scholars and the concentrated expertise of their colleagues. We believe the lure of teaching graduate-level courses to unique professional students (rather than introductory courses to college students) was a major consideration for faculty interested in job satisfaction. Our competitive pay and generous benefits certainly contributed to their hiring. Accreditation also proved significant because it meant their professional time at NWC generally met established academic standards, offering opportunity to retain their professional path of development as a professor. Our emphasis on teaching and curricula development as our principal mission vice publishing is a bit of an impediment, but for younger scholars there is clear evidence that publishing while at NWC is not only possible but encouraged. In order to continue to attract and retain top-notch scholars, it is vital that we continue to allow faculty to copyright their work under the conditions that currently prevail at NWC and other top PME institutions.
Attracting top tier, full professor faculty members from other civilian institutions has its challenges. Pay can be an issue. Likewise, the teaching and curriculum development responsibility can be an issue as it may compete with time for writing and research. For top tier civilian faculty members who have been practitioners, like retired State Department personnel, they must forfeit their annuity to join our faculty. Rectifying that would be most helpful in our continued search for such talent.

Our current educational paradigm dates from 1972, when Admiral Stansfield Turner instituted the graduate-level case-study based, seminar model of expanded considerably the number of civilian scholars on the NWC faculty. Admiral Turner believed the faculty was the critical cog in a quality educational experience. To this day, we still contend our faculty is our center of gravity. As the College’s “Guiding Principles” from our Strategic Plan 2008–12 state “The Naval War College’s true strength lies in the creativity, energy, and intellectual capital of our people.” And our values in that same plan include “Academic Responsibility” which “means that one of our key duties as an academic institution is to ‘seek and state truth without bias.’ Our faculty enjoys full freedom of dispassionate inquiry with no limitations other than adherence to security classification. Within this context, faculty members are expected to extend and transmit knowledge to their respective fields of expertise.”

In the ensuing thirty-seven years since Admiral Turner transformed NWC, this critical value of the faculty is ingrained in the culture of the College.

This value placed on the faculty also imparts great responsibility to them. They take pride in their ownership of the curricula and the academic programs. They drive themselves relentlessly to ensure what we teach remains challenging, current, and relevant. Our culture of self-assessment begins with the faculty and permeates the institution. Continual improvement is the unspoken motto. First and foremost, we continue to thrive because the faculty knows the trust and confidence placed in them by the College’s leadership. They accept fully the responsibility and are self-driven to excel. Continued mission success, not tenure, provides them job satisfaction and security. They, in turn, place their confidence and trust in the College’s leadership to be fair and judicious in its actions toward them and the College’s mission.

As stated in our Faculty Handbook, “The Naval War College expects all civilian faculty members whose primary duties are not primarily administrative to energize in professional research and exhibit a sustained commitment to scholarship. It expects most of them to publish at least some of the results of their research. Military members are not expected to publish, but are encouraged to do so in their areas of expertise.” For civilian professors teaching in the three core academic departments, there are common elements in every faculty member’s performance appraisal; teaching performance, curriculum development, research and publication, and service to the College’s larger mission. Individual faculty members meet with their departmental Chairs and establish personal plans annually to develop more specific criteria for those common areas and any distinct areas relevant to the professor’s performance. Additionally, the Faculty Handbook established criteria for consideration for promotion to the ranks of Associate Professor and Professor which includes research and publication expectations. Thus, their annual appraisals, their potential for promotion, and ultimately their reappointment rest, in part, on their productive scholarship. Military faculty members are expected to research and contribute to curricula development and are judged in their appraisals accordingly.

When the College revised its criteria for assignment of civilian professorial ranks and the criteria for promotion and published it in the Faculty Handbook, we publicly identified our key indicators of quality at each professorial rank. The specific criteria for promotion to the rank of professor best describe our standard for top-tier faculty. The criteria are “excellence in teaching or research, not simply a satisfactory level of performance; significant contributions to either the NWC’s educational mission or NWC’s research, analysis, and gaming function; active engagement and visibility in the faculty members’ academic or professional community; significant productivity in scholarly publication or professional research; a consistent commitment in the faculty member’s teaching and/or research, analysis, and gaming to fostering critical thinking from a joint perspective and cultivating the ability of students/officials to function effectively in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment; a demonstrated commitment to teamwork with other faculty members across the departments and codes of the Naval War College, and the ability to develop or advance new ideas that enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of both the faculty members department and the college as a whole.”

Dr. Snyder. What are the policies at your school regarding academic freedom? What is its proper role in a PME setting without tenure? Describe how your faculty may be called upon to respond to press inquiries in the field of expertise and whether and how they are allowed to respond in a timely manner.
Admiral WISECUP. The practice of academic freedom by faculty members at the U.S. Naval War College is robust. While the Congress, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, and CNO are rightfully involved in professional military education policy and engaged in determining professional educational standards, the College’s executive leadership has been successful in preserving the autonomy of the College and its faculty in deciding what to teach and how to teach it. Faculty members are allowed great scope for experimenting with different teaching methods and for expressing different points of view in the classroom. Aside from projects assigned to researchers in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, faculty members have been free to choose the subjects of their research and writing.

The Naval War College endorses the key elements of the 1940 statement of principles on academic freedom issued by the American Association of University Professors, as quoted in the following three items:

“(a) Teachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of results, subject to the adequate performance of their other academic duties. . . .

(b) Teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject, but they should be careful not to introduce into their teaching controversial matter which has no relation to their subject. . . .

(c) College and university teachers are citizens, members of a learned profession, and officers of an educational institution. When they speak or write as citizens, they should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but their special position in the community imposes special obligations. As scholars and educational officers, they should remember that the public may judge their profession and their institution by their utterances. Hence they should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and should make every effort to indicate that they are not speaking for the institution.”

(d) As employees of an educational institution in DoD, faculty members have obligations that go beyond those incumbent upon professors in civilian educational institutions. While the leadership of the Naval War College encourages faculty members to write, make speeches, and give interviews in any forum, they shall not reveal classified information. In expressing opinions they must issue explicit disclaimers that they do not speak for the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, the Department of the Navy, or the Naval War College. Faculty members who are active-duty military officers are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and must refrain from speech that is disparaging or contemptuous of public officials, insulting toward superior officers, harmful to good order and discipline in the military, or harmful to the interests of the United States.

Hardly a week passes without Naval War College professors publicly expressing opinions and offering expertise on current political and military issues in a wide variety of mass media—television, radio, newspapers, magazines, and journalistic websites. Individual faculty members ensure this material contains a disclaimer identifying it as the opinion of the author and not the College. The College prides itself on respect for academic freedom; at the same time, the idea that the exercise of academic freedom should be informed in practice by a sense of responsibility is widely accepted among faculty members dealing with issues of great national and international importance. There have never been any allegations that a faculty member’s contract was not renewed because of his views or opinions.

Faculty members inform their departments when they have provided or are about to respond to press inquiries, interviews or expert advice. Individual faculty members know they can respond timely, but must, as with their written work, provide a verbal disclaimer to the interviewer that the opinions and positions represent the individual and not the College, the Navy or DoD. Previously, faculty members had to travel to Providence to appear on local or national television stations for interviews. Within the last few years, the College built a television studio on campus in which we now facilitate such interviews. The College has recently funded the appropriate equipment to send high-quality broadcast audio from campus to support faculty radio interviews with the likes of National Public Radio or BBC.

Dr. SNYDER. Acquisition reforms all call for more of the general purpose forces to be educated and trained in understanding contracting and contractors. Civilians, contracting, and contractors on the battlefield—how much do officers, outside the acquisition workforce, need to know?

Admiral WISECUP. Civilians, contracting, and contractors on the battlefield are an important part of the curricula at the U.S. Naval War College. Operational Contract Support was recently approved as one of the 2009 Joint Professional Military Education Special Areas of Emphasis. For planning and conducting military operations
through the full spectrum of conflict, contractors on the battlefield are an integral part of the planning process and are included in our curricula. Contractors have been on battlefields during every major conflict of our nation’s history.

In the Joint Maritime Operations course, there is a specific session on contractors, Nongovernmental and Intergovernmental Organizations/Contractors in the Operating Environment. The focus of the session is getting students to know that an operational commander cannot ignore the presence of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), and contractors in the contemporary operating environment. Objectives for the session include comprehending the differences in culture between military, NGO/IGO, and contractor communities. Students analyze the impact these differences may have on building unity of effort throughout the phases of an operation. In seminar they explore the capabilities and requirements for NGO/IGOs and contractors operate under in the joint environment.

This session also addresses the practical challenges and risks associated with civilian contractors in the contemporary operating environment. Students come to understand that contractors are employed by most U.S. government agencies, as well as by IGOs and NGOs. NGOs may also be contractors. All of them may also employ contracted security providers. This is nothing new or unusual—contractors in one form or another have almost always been present on the battlefield and at sea. In the seminar we note there is limited service doctrine (Army doctrine, largely addressing logistics contractors) and less joint doctrine governing contractors (only those accompanying U.S. armed forces). Nevertheless, no joint force commander can hope to plan and execute operations effectively without carefully considering contractors; especially with respect to their consequences for key operational functions, including command and control, operational security, force protection, and logistics.

The presence of contractors in an area of operations also raises complex and mostly not yet resolved legal issues concerning Status of Forces Agreements, Rules of Engagement, and the Law of Armed Conflict, not to mention problems of fiduciary responsibility. Adding contractors to the mix makes the problem of maintaining unity of effort with other U.S. government agencies, NGOs, and IGOs even more challenging for the JFC. We ask students to consider, among others, these questions:

What can a joint force commander do to mitigate the risks posed by contractors, NGOs and IGOs?

What considerations must be made for loss of capabilities provided by contractors?

What are the responsibilities of the joint force commander for contractors in his area of operations (e.g., force protection)?

How do contractors affect the management of operational security?

In what ways do contractors alter the level of risk for the joint force commander?

Is the risk military, political, or both?

Dr. Snyder. Explain the Naval War College’s civilian tenure program.

Admiral Wise. Though the U.S. Naval College does not employ a system of tenure and has no intention of doing so, it accords its faculty reasonable contractual security consistent with the College’s mission. The process of retaining faculty is an open, orderly and fair one. The College continues to sustain its quality standard for faculty. As a practice, the College renews contracts as early as 364 days in advance prior to their expiration. All faculty members are notified at least six months prior to the expiration of their contract. As highlighted in the Faculty Handbook, in all but extraordinary circumstances, notification of non-reappointment will be given by 1 December prior to the expiration of the contractual term.

The retention rate at the College is quite high for faculty beyond the six year mark, when many colleges and universities begin to grant tenure. In fact, the College identified just the opposite problem, a graying faculty, several years ago. Job satisfaction is high among our faculty members who know they possess the significant responsibility of curricula ownership for a Navy’s profession of arms and the obligation to prepare the future military leaders of this nation for the challenges ahead.

Dr. Snyder. Have the Navy intermediate (College of Naval Command and Staff) and senior (College of Naval Warfare) courses been differentiated enough? Should they have been? They share a faculty. What are the challenges and benefits of that?

Students also start at various times throughout the school year and are integrated with other students who have been there longer. What are the benefits and challenges of that?

Admiral Wise. Yes, the Navy intermediate (College of Naval Command and Staff) and senior (College of Naval Warfare) at the U.S. Naval War College have been differentiated enough. Today, the intermediate courses taught by the Naval War College focus at the operational level of war and operational-level leadership.
Building operational level expertise in the Navy is one of the key focuses of Admiral Gary Roughead, the Chief of Naval Operations. The College contributes by producing intermediate-level graduates who are planners skilled in applying operational art through the Navy and Joint planning processes, leaders with operational-level perspectives who have honed their critical thinking skills through a rigorous, academic program, and effective maritime spokespersons familiar with the range of challenges of operating in the maritime domain and are competent in employing naval capabilities in conjunction with other Service, other agencies, and partner nations to achieve strategic objectives in war and peace.

The intermediate-level course, resident and non-resident, consists of three core academic programs: National Security Decision Making, Strategy and Warfare, and Joint Maritime Operations. Together these courses focus on developing the operational knowledge base, operational-level perspective, critical thinking skills, and leadership required to contribute on a major staff. The senior course focuses at the strategic level examining national strategic and theater strategic perspectives, issues, and challenges.

One of the most significant challenges with a single faculty teaching both intermediate and senior level courses is that it takes much more time than previously to do curriculum development because the two courses are so different. In the past, because of their parallel nature, there was more time available for faculty professional development or other teaching responsibilities. Additionally, the learning curve for new faculty members is higher since they have to learn to teach two different courses.

The chief benefit with a single faculty is that both courses are aligned well and changes to the curriculum can be made easily. Both the senior and intermediate courses complement each other and there are efficiencies created with a single faculty. It allows the faculty to provide a progressive education experience. Our faculty must also meet the higher CJCS and U.S.C. Title X standards required to teach the JPME II curriculum. As a result, our service mix for military faculty is more robust than required for schools and colleges teaching intermediate-level PME with JPME I. Moreover, the faculty has a more comprehensive appreciation of the joint educational requirements for both JPME I and JPME II and how they work together.

Before September 11, 2001, it was only the Navy and Marine Corps students who started three times per year, a schedule devised to meet their Services routine rotational deployments. These options offered flexibility for school assignment within tight and demanding career paths built on a culture of command and operational expertise. Subsequent to September 11, 2001, all Services found that their operational tempo has driven the assignment process. Now all Services avail themselves of the opportunity to align student academic years with their operational tempo and start the academic year at different times. Students rotating back from Iraq and Afghanistan are not forced to wait until the next summer rotation to start the academic year. It provides efficiency of personnel assignment without markedly affecting educational effectiveness.

There are challenges with students starting at various times during the school year. In most schools, reading and writing ability and study skills are honed during the first 8–10 weeks of the academic year. We do this on an ongoing basis since there are always students that have recently started the curriculum. Additionally, there is an administrative overhead incurred with three different starts. The Dean of Students conducts three orientations and three graduation ceremonies as opposed to a single orientation and graduation ceremony at most other institutions. The departments must also distribute the students equitably to ensure that a single seminar does not have all new students.

In terms of curriculum, the faculty must develop stand-alone courses for each trimester. In terms of curriculum development, faculty must be very aware of the incoming student foundational knowledge base and must on occasion provide succinct foundational material to facilitate transition into the course. Faculty must guard against redundancy especially since the curriculum is only progressive within each finite trimester. Having worked this educational model for nearly three decades, the faculty has most of the kinks out and the systematic means to assess and keep the core curriculum distinct, aligned and complementary.

There are also benefits with students starting at various times during the school year. One of the main benefits is that students have an opportunity to master and synthesize the curriculum reinforcing concepts during each trimester. The exchange between students is high as often incoming students learn from the other students in a variety of informal venues and forums. In fact, it closely parallels the paradigm of our civilian higher education system so students readily adjust. Acculturation is an integral aspect on an in-resident education. The daily interaction builds trust and confidence and establishes career-long and life-long associations and networks.
Since our students change seminars each trimester, they closely associate with more of their fellow students as seminar mates extending their network of personal associates significantly more than their peers at other institutions. This process also enables them to meet three times as many their international and interagency classmates. Further, student gouge on courses and faculty passes readily between classes creating a sustained student memory not present in other PME schools and colleges. This lingering reputation positively affects the faculty and the staff who work hard to maintain positive reputations.

Dr. Snyder. Please provide your school’s mission statement.

General Cardon. The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) educates and develops leaders for full-spectrum joint, interagency, and multinational operations and advances the art and science of the profession of arms in support of Army operational requirements.

Dr. Snyder. How have ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan affected the quality of military faculty members? What is your average tour length for military faculty members? Have the credentials of military faculty in terms of graduate degrees and JQO qualifications diminished during this period? What is the percentage of military faculty who are fully JQO qualified?

General Cardon. Faculty either returning from combat or enroute to combat operations are not always sent to the Command and General Staff College (CGSC). The same can be said of students. The typical tour length is three years; it has shortened since 9/11 with the average tour being around two years. Military faculty continue to arrive with the appropriate credentials and experience, but some aspects of their preparation have changed. The officers we receive now have significantly greater experience based upon more time in service (more lieutenant colonels versus majors) and repetitive combat tours. They almost universally have graduate degrees, but because of past reductions in the Army’s Advanced Civil Schooling programs fewer of them have experience in a residential graduate program. The one area of greatest change is with senior faculty members. A decade ago most of our department directors were former brigade commanders, but that is becoming the exception now rather than the norm.

Approximately 7% of the ILE/JPME-I military faculty are JQOs. While this number may not be as high as we would like it, many of the officers returning from the combat zones have worked in a joint, interagency, multinational environment due to the demands of these wars. This means that while only 7% of our uniformed faculty are formally qualified, a much greater percentage has hands-on experience with joint, interagency, and multinational operations that can transferred into the classrooms.

We are working very diligently to achieve a 30:70 ratio of military to civilian faculty at the Command and General Staff College. The true benefits of a mixed faculty entail differing perspectives to broaden the learning aperture of our students. While many of our civilian faculty are indeed retired military, we also hire purely academic faculty as well to ensure our academic credentials demonstrate our commitment to excellence. Two challenges affect the quality within this target ratio. First, the current demands of the war preclude the sustained assignment of our best and brightest officers. Second is the challenge of recruiting and retaining the top tier faculty because of our commitment to teaching. Publishing and research are more difficult with the teaching loads required at military schools, and restrictive copyright laws make us less attractive to many scholars.

Dr. Snyder. Are the services and agencies filling their assigned billets for faculty? What are your gaps?

General Cardon. The Services are providing as many faculty and staff as they can spare because most are in the Contemporary Operating Environment. The personnel provided are qualified, dedicated professionals who take the mission of educating officers seriously.

A current snapshot shows we currently have 275 civilian faculty members, 249 of which have active duty experience that sums to more than 4,700 years of service. The military faculty projected for this summer consists of 90 Army and 17 sister service (10 Air Force, 4 Navy, and 3 Marine). Within our civilian faculty, 32 served in our sister services, which yields a comparable joint representation in the civilian faculty.

Our sister services, to their credit, continue to send highly qualified officers to the Command and General Staff College as faculty, for they also see a clear benefit to the joint force in doing so. The recent selection of the Air Force Element and Navy Element Commanders for command is indicative of this level of quality. However, there are indications the services cannot sustain this effort and still meet service and joint requirements. Further, this creates a second order effect by decreasing the number of viable career officers with potential for further promotion, thus degrading
the quality of faculty. When the issue of the JDAL position changes in the NDAA is added to the other stresses that our sister services face, this could lead to the assignment of officers at the Command and General Staff College who are not promotion eligible and don't represent the best their service has to offer. This will be discussed in more depth in question #7.

We currently have three Interagency faculty members who serve full time on our faculty. Representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, and the National Geospatial Agency occupy exchange billets with the College and act as subject matter experts for our students and faculty, along with providing a conduit for information to and from the agencies they represent. This capability has shown great potential and our faculty would be greatly strengthened if more agencies would build in the capacity for a regular exchange at the intermediate level staff colleges.

Dr. Snyder. To what extent has the curriculum enhanced its coverage of Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations given that DOD has put them on a par with combat operations?

General Cardon. The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) has enhanced its curriculum in regards to SSTR (Stability Operations). CGSC's U.S. Army Full-Spectrum Operations (FSO) Curriculum balances combat operations and SSTR doctrine and application exercises. The course curriculum is presented in two major portions: Intermediate Level Education (ILE) Common Core and the Advanced Operations Course (AOC).

ILE COMMON CORE
The Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations (DJIMO) introduces the concept of SSTR in its Joint Functions and Capabilities lessons (C302/4/5/7/8). These lessons review the functions and capabilities of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Special Ops, and Multinational Ops.

The Center for Army Tactics (CTAC) conducts a 3 hour class—C422 Full Spectrum Operations (3 hours)—dedicated to studying the Army's role in SSTR. The Department of Command and Leadership (DCL) curriculum includes 6 hours using case studies from contemporary full spectrum operations to prepare leaders to operate effectively in complex, uncertain operational environments.

AOC
This course provides greater emphasis on FSO and the balance between combat operations, SSTR, and the important transitions between them. Specific areas of instruction include:

Campaign planning (67 hours). This area focuses at the operational level of war and includes SSTR planning and execution. The block concludes with a four day planning exercise totally focused on Phase IV Stability Operations and includes multinational, interagency, and joint force interactions.

Full-Spectrum Operations (150 hours). This area focuses on land operations at the tactical level of war. This block includes 64 hours devoted to SSTR in a complex operational environment. The remaining 86 hours are focused on conventional operations, but includes transitions and stability operations planning as a part of full spectrum operations.

Force Generation (36 hours). This area focuses on how Army forces are generated, trained, readied, and prepared to conduct full-spectrum operations including both combat operations and SSTR.

Historical analysis (16 hours). The Department of Military History (DMH) modified its H300 Block, Roots of Today's Operational Environment, to study several historical SSTR related events/periods.

Leadership Case Studies (6 hours). The DCL curriculum uses case studies from contemporary operations (FSO) to prepare leaders to operate in the contemporary environment.

Dr. Snyder. Describe the scenarios that you use for your simulation exercises and war games. To what extent do they incorporate SSTR and irregular warfare concepts?

General Cardon. The ILE Common Core Course culminates with two application exercises that provide basic insights into Full Spectrum Operations, including Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) and irregular warfare. The main focus of these exercises is on planning skill development using both Joint and Service doctrinal planning tools. They are foundational in nature. The instructional operating environment is hybrid, but the focus is on the skills needed in any environment.
The Advanced Operations Course (AOC) O199 exercise is a “whole of government” approach. It is a 24-hour Joint Operational Level Planning exercise entirely focused on planning for actions, after major conflict operations have ended, through the transition to local national civil control. This exercise simulates the actions of a Joint Force Land Component staff planning SSTR operations in an environment where hybrid warfare (irregular warfare in which some of the insurgent fighters have technologically advanced systems) is occurring. The challenge for the students is to visualize what the operational environment will be based on a post conflict scenario, where there are remnants of conventional forces operating as well as insurgent activities and large displaced populations. The compound and complex situation includes a weak to non-functioning infrastructure, environmental concerns, a large number of non-governmental agencies as well as cultural and social challenges between all the various players. The students are to develop a “whole of government” approach to the situation where there are multiple levels of transition from military to civilian control of operations as well as local to national level host nation transition of authority and control. The students face a resource constrained situation where they must plan to work with local authorities to restore the rule of law, provide essential services and train and prepare the host nation forces to work without significant outside support. The exercise is not computer supported, but rather a planning exercise developing a workable resource-constrained concept in a limited timeframe.

The AOC O399 exercise is a 36-hour practical exercise entirely focused on planning and executing actions envisioned during the O199 exercise. This exercise simulates the actions of a Brigade Combat Team planning and executing SSTR operations in a hybrid warfare environment that is facing and reacting to the challenges identified in the O199 exercise, including those of the integration of “Other U.S. Governmental Agencies” (Whole of Government) as well as local official and unofficial leadership and non-governmental agencies. The College is piloting with several possible computer support tools and simulations but no decision has been reached. The simulation exercises for both of these courses are supported by Interagency faculty resident at the College, augmented by personnel from their agencies. Our Distinguished Professor of National Intelligence Studies, a CIA position, provides support to these exercises in the operational and strategic use of intelligence and the exchange faculty member from NGA, along with augmentation from his agency, supports student requests for imagery and geospatial data. Other Interagency partners are being solicited to provide support to these exercises in the future.

Dr. Snyder, please provide the most recent survey results from your graduates and their supervisors.

General Cardon. In January 2009, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) surveyed 9,910 Intermediate Level Education (ILE) graduates from academic years 2006–2008. The number of respondents was 3,476 graduates. Graduates indicated that CGSC met ILE purposes and missions; the 31 ILE-Common Core learning objectives; the six common Advanced Operational Warfighting Course (AOWC) learning objectives; the four Joint Advanced Warfighting Seminar (JAWS) track learning objectives; and the three W300 (Brigade Combat Team Operations) objectives.

The summary report of our most recent graduate survey is attached for the committee’s use.

CGSC has not done a supervisor survey in the last year.

[The information referred to is retained in the committee files and can be viewed upon request.]

Dr. Snyder. The intermediate level schools lost Joint Duty credit for their non-host service military faculty in the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act. We know that the tours of those who were grandfathered are ending. What will the effect of this be? How will it affect the quality of your faculty? How important is it that these JDAL positions be restored? Do the instructors truly get a joint experience? [Question #7, for cross-reference.]

General Cardon. We recognize the value of the civilians teaching at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), but also must convey the essentiality of military faculty. Army officers with the right education and experience are the lifeblood of the College. The Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) process has provided CGSC the joint service officers critical to infusing the joint service perspective into the Army’s school house. However, with the NDAA of 2007 a change was made to the rules for granting joint duty credit (JDAL) and from the College’s standpoint this was both necessary and appropriate. This JDAL listing made teaching at CGSC attractive for sister service faculty because it assured them joint credit. There is now a different system in place...
which removes the JDAL status for our sister service slots. The new process does allow officers assigned to CGSC to apply for this credit after the fact, but joint officers consider the previous system much better, which influences their interest in coming to Ft. Leavenworth. The second related issue is more critical. Because our sister service faculty positions were dropped from JDAL status they are a much lower fill priority for the Air Force, Marines, and Navy. They are not ‘must fill’ jobs. Recommendation 2 from the Skelton Report emphasized the criticality of recruiting and retaining a high quality faculty; having these positions on the JDAL better achieves this goal than the changes made with the NDAA of 2007. The Military Education Coordination Council (MECC) unanimously supports returning all sister service joint teaching billets to the JDAL.

We truly appreciate the opportunity to address the impacts of change in rules for joint duty authorization list credit for non-host military in joint professional military education schools. This change directly impacts the quality of instruction for our officers attending Intermediate Level Education. This is all the more relevant given that the General Staff College equivalent PME rates Joint Professional Military Education I accreditation. As discussed at the Military Education Coordination Council chaired by the Director of the Joint Staff, all members agreed that we need to revisit this critical issue. The impact from revising National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2007 on joint duty authorization list credit is two-fold. First, this change eliminates a powerful incentive for officers from these services to view this assignment as both developmental and career enhancing, thus narrowing the aperture of highly qualified officers. Second, because our sister service faculty positions were dropped from joint duty authorization list status they are a much lower fill priority for the Air Force, Marines, and Navy. They are not ‘must fill’ jobs. Therefore, given the current strategic environment and its inherent joint, interagency, and multinational nature, we request Congress authorize joint credit for non-host faculty positions in joint professional military education schools.

Dr. Snyder. Describe your school’s use of historical case studies to teach strategy.

General Cardon. The Department of Military History teaches a required 60-hour military history curriculum designed to contribute to historical consciousness, critical thinking, and problem-solving skills at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war for Field Grade Officers. This curriculum consists of three discrete blocks that address, respectively, the evolution of the Western Way of War, Military Innovation and Transformation, and the Roots of the Contemporary Operating Environment. Each block focuses on history, theory, doctrine, and application within the three main themes addressed, using history to illuminate and inform the contemporary challenges that the Officers will face when they graduate and go back into the field. In addition to the Military History curriculum required of all students, the Department of Military History also offers a slate of 36 electives.

The Department of Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations (DJIMO) teaches a 34-hour block of instruction on the Strategic Environment. The block includes a case study on the 1956 Suez Crisis. The case study addresses the political background and military planning leading up to and including the July-November 1956 crisis. The actions by Egypt, France, Britain and Israel resulted in an uncoordinated series of attacks, with frequent disconnects between national political authorities and their military subordinates as well as between the vital interests of different nation states. This lesson has three purposes: (1) enhances student understanding of the complexities and ambiguities at the strategic level of war and the inter-relationships between decisions made at the strategic and operational levels; (2) reinforces an appreciation of the value of military history as a professional tool, developed throughout the H100, History block of instruction; and (3) serves as an opportunity to apply the concepts of ends-ways and means. The lesson further challenges the students to assimilate much of what they learned throughout the Strategic Environment block of instruction.

Dr. Snyder. What is the process for renewal and non-renewal of the faculty? How transparent is the system? In a tenure system people think the faculty members have all the power, in a non-tenure system it appears that the school has unlimited power. How do you avoid these extremes?

General Cardon. Title 10 faculty members are initially appointed to two year term contracts, with the first year being a probationary period. Upon successfully meeting the requirements of the probationary period, faculty members are eligible for reappointment at the end of their initial contract to term contracts of greater lengths, depending on their level of performance. Term contracts can be from 1–5 years, with 3 years being the standard contract for those that meet College requirements.

Title 10 faculty members who do not meet the performance standards set by their immediate leadership team may not be eligible for standard term contracts and may
be offered contracts of lesser duration or no contract at all. This can be true at the completion of the initial two year contract or at the conclusion of any successive term contract. Contracts of lesser duration than the standard indicate performance that is below the expected level and carries with them the assumption that performance must be brought up to standards by the next renewal period. Failure to meet performance standards by the end of the non-standard contract may result in non-renewal of Title 10 employment and termination. Contracts of greater duration than the standard indicate performance that is above the expected level and carries with them the distinction of superior performance.

Title 10 faculty members apply for reappointment not earlier than nine months and not later than six months before the end of their current contract. The application for reappointment is staffed beginning with the faculty member’s immediate leadership and through the appropriate channels to the Deputy Commandant, who approves all reappointment actions.

If an initial appointment is not renewed, the school director will make a reasonable effort to provide three months advance written notice of the decision to the affected faculty member. If a subsequent appointment is not renewed, the director will make a reasonable effort to provide six months advance written notice of the decision to the affected faculty member.

These procedures are outlined in our Faculty Manual (dated 2008), so that every member of the faculty knows the policies and procedures for contract renewal early on in their employment. The process allows for remediation with short duration contracts if the leadership believes a faculty member has shortcomings that must be addressed to meet College standards. Final decisions on all renewals or non-renewals are made by the College’s Deputy Commandant, after detailed review and recommendation of the academic leadership up through the Dean of Academics.

Our mix of faculty includes military, Title 10, and Title 5 civilians. The military provide us currency and are not truly involved in the renewal discussion. The Title 5 civilians are the closest thing we have to tenured faculty members. Serving at the GS–12 through 14 grades, they do not require contract renewal and have provided academic continuity for the College for many years. There are less than 10 of these individuals left on the faculty, but they continue to serve as senior faculty members in both Intermediate Level Education (ILE) and the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). The bulk of our faculty are Title 10 civilians, the population that this question mainly addresses. They are contract faculty, similar to many faculty members at civilian institutions, who serve 1–5 year contracts. By law, they can be released at the end of their contract, but by custom at the College they serve as long term members of the faculty. There is occasionally consternation from some Title 10 faculty members as to their status whenever the Army looks at possible changes to the ILE program, but the majority of these faculty members get on with their duties confident that if they perform well in the classroom they will be given the continuing opportunity to serve. One step that has been taken to try and relieve any faculty consternation and avoid the extremes mentioned in the question is to also hire the senior academic civilians in the College using the Title 10 authority. The Dean of Academics and Associate Dean of Academics are both Title 10 faculty members, as are the Directors of the Department of Command and Leadership and Department of Military History. By creating a single system through which the faculty and their civilian academic leadership are all in the same renewal process, the College avoids the perception of a have and have-not system of extremes within the institution.

Dr. Snyder. What is your school’s role in identifying promising officers with the potential for high-level strategic thinking at the appropriate point in their careers?

General Cardon. The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) mission is to educate future leaders of our Armed Forces, our Allies, and the Inter-Agency at the graduate level to be agile and adaptive leaders who think critically at the strategic and operational levels to solve complex ambiguous problems. The School runs two programs. One is a Senior Service College (SSC) Fellowship titled the Advanced Operational Art Studies Fellowship (AOASF) with the role to educate future leaders of our Armed Forces, our Allies, and the Inter-Agency at the graduate level to be agile and adaptive leaders who think critically at the strategic level to solve complex ambiguous problems. The second program is the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) which educates future leaders of our Armed Forces, our Allies, and the Inter-Agency at the graduate level to be agile and adaptive leaders who think critically at the operational level to solve complex ambiguous problems.

The military officers who attend the AOASF must have been selected through their service’s process and board for senior service college (SSC) attendance. SAMS recruits for AOASF students from the published SSC list. Military officers who volunteer to attend the AMSP compete in a rigorous selection process which concludes...
with a local Command and General Staff College (CGSC) board. After volunteering, the individual competes in a selection process which begins with the Intermediate Level Education (ILE) Staff Group Advisors (SGA) preparing an evaluation of the student’s potential. Applicants also take an entrance exam composed of objective questions and essay questions. The SGA evaluation and applicant’s exam results are then reviewed by SAMS senior leaders, who subsequently conduct personal interviews with each applicant. This initial effort produces a board file with: Officer Record Brief, individual’s application & goals statement, entrance exam score and essay, SGA evaluation, applicant interview sheet, and letters of recommendation. The CGSC board, composed of colonels and civilian PhD faculty, conduct an objective review of each file over a week, to produce an Order of Merit List (OML). This overall effort is similar to formal Department of the Army selection boards and enables the command to identify and select the most qualified officers for SAMS. The OML is subsequently forward from the Commandant, CGSC to HQDA G1, G3, and the Human Resources Command CG for final approval.

Dr. Snyder. How do you specifically measure the quality of the faculty and staff in the PME environment?

General Cardon. In response to this question, let us first deal with the quality of faculty. The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) monitors the quality of its faculty both systemically and individually. From a systemic point of view, CGSC adheres to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) guidance to ensure the requisite number of instructors from the other services and complements that mix as possible with selected specialists from other agencies. In addition, CGSC also employs a small number of exchange instructors from other armies such as Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom. The range of mixture of requisite faculty specialties and credentials figures directly in the hiring process in order to yield a composite faculty that meets institutional needs.

CGSC manages the quality of individual faculty in two distinct stages based on initial hiring and subsequently on performance. Initial hiring is based upon the requirements for each specific faculty position. Some teaching positions, such as in the Department of Tactics, place a premium on relevant experience in the field but also require at least a master’s degree. Other positions, such as those in the Department of Military History, place more emphasis on formal academic credentials. Accordingly most of our historians hold a doctoral degree and have a track record of research and publication.

Measurement of faculty quality performance after hiring is shaped by our Faculty Manual. The Faculty Manual identifies four domains of performance for faculty members and lays out the expectations of faculty members based upon their academic rank. The four domains that we use would look very familiar to faculty members at most academic institution and consist of Teaching, Scholarship, Service, and Faculty Development. First of all, because CGSC is foremost a teaching institution, excellence in classroom instruction is paramount. CGSC employs peer observation of teaching as well as student surveys to gauge the performance of faculty in the classroom. Input from each of these sources offers instructors constructive advice on how to improve. While teaching makes up the largest part of any faculty member’s performance evaluation, the other three domains require attention. Faculty members are expected to contribute to the scholarly and professional body of knowledge in their discipline, be it tactics or history. As faculty progress through the ranks towards Associate Professor or Professor of Discipline, publication will become a more important part of their evaluation. In the same vein, all faculty members are evaluated in the areas of service and faculty development, as defined in the Faculty Manual, but these requirements grow as faculty members become more senior.

In turn, the measurement of staff performance corresponds to the specific requirements of each position as well as to the rules under which each hiring action occurred, whether under General Schedule, the National Security Personnel System (NSPS), or Title 10. Senior staff positions requiring some knowledge of the functioning of academic institutions may demand a combination of academic as well as administrative or managerial experience. Each staff job description specifies performance career criteria in the form of job objectives against which results can be evaluated on an annual basis.

Dr. Snyder. How were you chosen to be school’s commandant? How was your dean chosen? Will you be retiring from this job? What background should the Chief of Naval Operations be looking for in selecting individuals for these positions? Should the focus be on operational leadership skills or academic and teaching experience (not instructing in a training institution) background or both?

General Cardon. The Deputy Commandant is chosen as part of the general officer assignment process lead by the Army Chief of Staff. I will not be retiring from this job. The Dean of Academics was chosen after a nationwide academic search. A hir-
ing panel, made up of senior members of the College leadership and members from the Army War College, interviewed final candidates and recommended a candidate to the Deputy Commandant and Commandant. The final decision was made by the Commandant, at that time GEN Petraeus. The Dean’s position is focused on the academic and teaching experience; in this case the Dean spent over 15 years on the faculty at the United States Military Academy and had an outstanding national reputation as a scholar and administrator. The Deputy Commandant’s position requires less of a focus on academic expertise and more on the operational leadership skills and experience. The Deputy Commandant is responsible for the content of the programs at the College and, as such, must have the recent experience necessary to guide the modification and maturation of the curriculum in relation to the Army’s mission. While the Dean provides advice and counsel on the systems and methods of curriculum change and faculty management, the Deputy Commandant must be the guiding force at the College who represents the Chief of Staff and the Commandant in forming the right programs to meet the Army’s current and future needs.

Dr. Snyder. How should intermediate schools attract top-tier civilian faculty? How do you specifically define top-tier? What are the elements that would attract the highest quality of faculty—tenure, copyright, resources, pay, ability to keep their government retirements, research and administrative assistance, etc.?

General Cardon. The ongoing challenge for the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) is to attract top-tier faculty who meet highly specific institutional needs. Overall, CGSC is successful in identifying and hiring highly qualified faculty members due both to actively advertising position openings and its reputation across the military community as a good place to work.

CGSC defines top-tier according to position requirements. Top-tier for a tactics instructor may well mean that the individual has experience in battalion command or as a brigade-level staff officer. In addition, the individual should have earned at least a master’s degree sometime during his or her career. Most CGSC faculty positions fit this general paradigm and require significant experience as an officer in one of the armed services. Thus, the competition for their services will come less from civilian academia than from other Intermediate Level Education (ILE) institutions or civilian contractors. The pool of individuals with the requisite mix of career experience and academic credentials is limited. Tenure, pay, and retirement benefits all figure heavily in successful recruitment.

Of course, there are some positions, especially those related to military history, international security, or strategy, in which CGSC must often compete with civilian academia. In such instances, the relative importance of tenure, research opportunities, or the ability to copyright and publish one’s work increases. CGSC has generally found that its salaries, especially at entry level, are quite competitive with those in civilian academia. However, in contrast to a typical system of civilian university tenure, the Title 10 system for faculty hiring provides only for renewable, term appointments. Nevertheless, CGSC has a commendable record to date of keeping the overwhelming majority of high-performing teaching faculty.

Another challenge in hiring and retention stems from the higher classroom teaching loads generally expected of CGSC faculty. Accordingly, the time available to focus on research is less than it would be at typical civilian research universities. Therefore, expectations concerning publication align more closely with those of small liberal arts or teaching-focused colleges. As a result, CGSC considers top-tier faculty in these fields to be outstanding teachers who have proven their ability to research and publish and are recognized in their respective fields. The opportunity to publish has remained a bit problematic because federal law denies federal employees the right to copyright work that has been accomplished during government duty time. In other words, in order to retain the freedom to dispose of a given work as the author wishes, it is necessary for him or her to complete this work outside of duty hours and not use any government facilities or equipment. Not surprisingly, this rule clashes with the expectations of many faculty in civilian academia who are accustomed to the unencumbered right to publish freely.

Dr. Snyder. What are the policies at your school regarding academic freedom? What is its proper role in a PME setting without tenure? Describe how your faculty may be called upon to respond to press inquiries in the field of expertise and whether and how they are allowed to respond in a timely manner.

General Cardon. Like most civilian academic institutions, the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) subscribes to the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) official statement on academic freedom. In practice, CGSC determines the general configuration and learning objectives of the curriculum, but leaves it up to individual instructors to shape all classroom dialogue. CGSC remains wholly committed to an environment of open, critical discussion.
As for dealing with the press, CGSC invites all faculty members to respond to press inquiries, as well as to submit letters to the editor or participate in online discussions. The College asks only that faculty members observe federal law with respect to the release of sensitive or classified information and that they apprise the Public Affairs Office of formal interviews with members of the press.

Dr. Snyder. Acquisition reforms all call for more of the general purpose forces to be educated and trained in understanding contracting and contractors. Civilians, contracting, and contractors on the battlefield—how much do officers, outside the acquisition workforce, need to know?

General Cardon. The officers’ education should cover all aspects of operational contracting support as it relates to the requirements of being a Field Grade Officer. This education should include the understanding of how to manage Logistics Civilian Assistance Program (LOGCAP) operations. They first need to understand why the Gansler Commission Findings were initiated and what was found to be an issue throughout the force. Each student should be educated on the different “colors” of money and how they are allocated by law, such as Operations, Maintenance, and Acquisition (OMA), Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), and specific funding lines. Additional education in the contracting arena is required to understand contracting from the perspective of how to manage contracting officers and contracting representatives in their respective units. This would include: Joint and Army Contracting command and control architecture; Theater contracting command and control architecture; understanding how the joint acquisition review process and the Coalition Acquisition Review Board (CARB) validates requirements; how to interpret a contracting support annex in a theater; understanding the intrinsic aspects of Money as a Weapons System; CERP, understanding the contracting process in a theater of operations; being able to develop a performance work statement (statement of work); how to develop an Organizational Needs Statement (ONS) and finally how to manage contracting support of our Brigade Combat Team (BCT) which would include hiring, accounting for funds and managing the Brigade Contracting Officers Representatives (CORs).

Dr. Snyder. The Universal Intermediate Level Education program has put a strain on the other services to provide sufficient instructors and students. Has this initiative watered down the joint experience for those officers attending?

General Cardon. The resident faculty mix of Army and other Military Department Faculty meets the requirements of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01B, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP). The Command and General Staff School (CGSS) teaches in staff groups (seminars) of 16 students. Under the CGSS model which is based on the OPMEP rules, each staff group should include one sea and one air service officer. Resident Class 09–02 currently in session and Class 10–01 scheduled to begin 10 August, include a total of 92 staff groups. Class 09–02 is short two sea service officers and 10–01 will be short one Air Force officer and eight sea service officers. CGSS mitigates shortages to the extent possible. No staff group is without both sister service students and all staff groups short a sister service officer have an interagency student. This helps ensure diversity and different perspectives during seminar discussions. Also, to the extent possible, sister service faculty members are assigned to the staff groups without sister service students. Although we know service mix is vitally important, we believe mitigation efforts have reduced the impact of shortages. For a number of reasons the policy Universal Intermediate Level Education is currently being reexamined by the Army. Our ability to meet the OPMEP standards at CGSS is certainly important concern for the Army, but there are other issues within the current operation tempo that also must be addressed to assure that the Army is providing its future strategic leaders the best possible education.

Dr. Snyder. What opportunities do your students have to study language and culture?

General Cardon. We at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) have begun our analysis of what are the needs for officers over the next ten years. As a product of our self-assessment, there are a number of initiatives in military education ongoing at CGSC, one of which is the teaching of language and culture. The Army now has a strategy for addressing the development of language and cultural skills within the service. CGSC has already added more cultural education and created language opportunities. Culture is part of the foundation curriculum required for all Army majors. Further, of eight required electives, every student must take at least one from a list of approved cultural electives, usually a regional studies course. After this initial volley, culture becomes a component of the integrated curriculum discussed in my previous testimony. Students learn to conduct cultural analysis to address the impacts of culture on military operations, particu-
larly as they practice or exercise their planning skills using scenarios crafted to require cultural understanding.

Teaching language as an additional subject in a 10-month warfighting course is an educational challenge. Consider that Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFL) courses to bring students to a rudimentary working level of proficiency are all immersion experiences lasting from nine months to over a year, depending on the relative difficulty of the language. Language instruction is need-
ed at CGSC, but must be prudently implemented. In January 2006, CGSC imple-
mented Iraqi and Pashto language familiarization programs for students who upon graduation would join units deploying in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). CGSC developed these programs with the support of DLIFLC. They helped develop the concept and provided native-speaking instructors. Currently, CGSC offers operational language familiarization classes in Iraqi dialect Arabic and Dari. These are the prominent languages used in current operations and are consistent with Military Training Team (MiTT) language training taught at Fort Riley, KS. The 48 hour mandatory courses prepare students for OIF/OEF deployment assignments. The courses not only introduce students to Iraqi and Dari languages, but also Arab and Afghan interpersonal cultural. The course increases awareness of cultural norms, values, customs and events. Since the 2006 elective term, all students can enroll in self-study language electives to study a lan-
guage of their choice (self development) using Rosetta Stone, available through
Army Knowledge Online (AKO). Students may choose from any of the languages of-
tered in Rosetta Stone online through Army E–Learning (Arabic, Chinese, Danish,
Dutch, Farsi (Persian), French, German, Greek, Hebrew, Hindi, Indonesian, Italian,
Japanese, Korean, Dari, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, Swahili, Swedish,
Tagalog, Thai, Turkish, Vietnamese, Welsh). In April 2008, CGSC developed a stra-
tegic language program that allows students to study Chinese, French, Spanish or
Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) in a modified year-long program employing directed
self-study, distance learning, and resident instruction conducted by DLIFLC instruc-
tors. Students acquire basic knowledge of the language in listening, speaking, read-
ning and writing, to include the basic grammar, syntax and cultural information.

DR. SNYDER. What is the impact of not being able to hold copyright, especially on civilian faculty?

General CARDON. The inability to hold copyright has in some instances acted on
a constraint on faculty publication. For example, a faculty member who intends to publish with an academic press must do the writing on his or her own time. Alter-
atively, work done on duty time must be offered to a government press for first
right of publication. Whether or not a government press chooses to publish the work in question, the inability to copyright is an impediment to outside publication since
all academic and commercial publishers expect to copyright the works they publish.
Thus, in order to meet legal requirements, a work initially authored on duty time
must undergo substantial revision outside of duty time to be considered copyright-
able. Needless to say, many civilian faculty chafe under this restriction and consider
it a deterrent both to research and publication. While we have no specific evidence
of this affecting the employment decisions of prospective civilian faculty has been
noted, it could be perceived as a deterrent if we are in competition with a non-gov-
ernment academic institution.

DR. SNYDER. What expanded Title 10 authorities are needed?

General CARDON. Current Title 10 authority has, thus far, been used extensively
in Intermediate Level Education (ILE) to meet our mission requirements. For Pro-
fessional Military Education (PME) overall, the largest problem with Title 10 au-
thority is the requirement in the law that a course be 10 months in length to qualify
for Title 10 faculty. A relaxation of this requirement would permit a broader use
of Title 10 authority to meet faculty needs.

DR. SNYDER. Please provide these two documents: 1) CGSC Student Text 2010,
Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Research and Thesis, August 2007 and

General CARDON. The latest version of the two referenced documents, updated for
the class beginning in February 2009, is attached for your use.

[The information referred to is retained in the committee files and can be viewed
upon request.]

DR. SNYDER. Please provide your school’s mission statement.

General JACKSON. Air Command and Staff College’s (ACSC) current mission state-
ment is to prepare field-grade officers to develop, employ and command air, space
and cyberspace power in joint, combined and multinational operations. ACSC re-
views the mission statement as a part of its strategic planning processes to ensure
it is focused on producing agile, critical thinkers to meet future challenges. Based
on the latest review the statement is being changed to prepare field-grade officers
to develop, employ and command air, space and cyberspace power in joint, multinational and interagency operations. The minor change more accurately reflects the environment in which ACSC graduates will be operating.

Dr. Snyder. How have ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan affected the quality of military faculty members? What is your average tour length for military faculty members? Have the credentials of military faculty in terms of graduate degrees and JQO qualifications diminished during this period? What is the percentage of military faculty who are fully JQO qualified?

General Jackson. Current operations have actually increased the quality of military faculty members. First hand operational experience provides instant credibility with students. The experience is an excellent source of real-world examples/cases and contacts that can be exploited for curriculum material and faculty development opportunities. Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) now has a high percentage of faculty members who have had experience, either in command or in staff positions, who have dealt with the challenges of combat, stabilization, and reconstruction. The challenge is getting faculty members from the highly stressed career fields. ACSC works closely with the Air Force Personnel Center to minimize the impact of deployments on faculty manning. Coordination and timing of 179-day and 365-day deployments are keys to minimizing impact.

Tour lengths for our military faculty members are typically 3 years. We often allow shorter tours to support members selected for key command and leadership positions. This flexibility and support is an incentive for making faculty assignments more attractive.

CREDENTIALS OF MILITARY FACULTY MEMBERS IN TERMS OF GRADUATE DEGREES HAVE NOT DIMINISHED. The ACSC Advanced Academic Degree (AAD) program has been instrumental in increasing the academic credentials among the military faculty members. These are Air Force-sponsored programs that select highly qualified military faculty members for funded study at civilian institutions to acquire advanced (doctoral or master’s level) degrees in fields directly applicable to the ACSC curriculum. Most ACSC faculty members have joint operational experience; however, only three percent are fully JQO qualified.

Dr. Snyder. Are the services and agencies filling their assigned billets for faculty? What are your gaps?

General Jackson. Sister services have been very supportive in providing outstanding faculty members but an emerging issue is joint credit for faculty duty at Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). Faculty requirements for ACSC are outlined in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP). The mix of military faculty members whose primary duty is student instruction of Joint Professional Military Education should be a minimum of 5 percent from each non-host Military Department. ACSC’s current requirement based on this policy is 7 Army, 5 Navy, and 2 Marine faculty members. ACSC does not have faculty billets for other agencies. Faculty and advisory positions from the other agencies are assigned at the Spaatz Center for Officer Education or Air University and ACSC draws upon these resources for interagency expertise. ACSC is currently short two Naval faculty members with one projected fill in November 2009. A significant contributing factor is the Navy Fiscal Year 09 Permanent Change of Station funding shortfall.

Dr. Snyder. To what extent has the curriculum enhanced its coverage of Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations given that DOD has put them on a par with combat operations?

General Jackson. Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) recognizes that the planning and conduct of post-conflict operations are as important as combat operations. Accordingly, the college has added both lectures and seminars that pertain specifically to SSTR. Draft revision to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) includes a Learning Area Objective that specifically requires Intermediate Level Colleges to address the topic. The wording of the objective in the draft states that students should “comprehend the role and perspective of the combatant commander and staff in developing various theater policies, strategies, and plans to include Weapons of Mass Destruction/Effect (WMD/E), irregular warfare, information operations, Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) and strategic communication.” The International Security Studies course covers weak and failing states and the problems surrounding stability operations. The course examines not only military options, but diplomatic (i.e. international/multinational to include nongovernment organizations and intergovernmental organizations) and economic resources and strategies related to this topic. The Warfare Studies course has curriculum time devoted to war termination and conflict resolution, with focus on operations in Kosovo. The course also includes curriculum time directly focused on stability oper-
The Joint Campaign Planning course devotes a lecture and seminar to planning considerations for conducting SSTR operations in irregular warfare.

Dr. Snyder. Describe the scenarios that you use for your simulation exercises and war games. To what extent do they incorporate SSTR and irregular warfare concepts?

General Jackson. Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) principally uses two scenarios to support educational objectives concerning SSTR and irregular warfare operations. These scenarios also support SSTR and irregular warfare educational objectives in the Joint Advanced Warfare Elective Series (JAWES). The first scenario is the Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey (GAAT) scenario and the second is the Joint Forces Command/North Atlantic Treaty Organization (JFCOM/NATO) Zoran Sea scenario. The GAAT scenario is used during the annual Intermediate Level Education Exercise with the Army Command and General Staff College and a variant of the GAAT scenario is incorporated into the Joint Planning Exercise of the Joint Planning course and the Joint Air Exercise during the Joint Air and Space Operations course.

Dr. Snyder. Please provide the most recent survey results from your graduates and their supervisors.

General Jackson. The Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) executes an aggressive closed-loop feedback process to assess quality and constantly improve our program. While any student can critique any event, each week during the academic year we task one fourth of the ACSC class in rotating groups to provide feedback for the lectures, seminars, readings, and guest speakers delivered that week. These surveys provide a method to detect and influence immediate trends. At the end of each of our 11 courses, all students and the faculty who taught the course are asked to provide feedback on the effectiveness, structure, relevance, and workload of the course as well as whether the course achieved its stated educational objectives. Just prior to graduation, we survey the students on the overall program, soliciting their feedback on whether the program achieved our published educational outcomes, the proportion of curriculum devoted to various topics, the variety and quality of instructional methodologies employed, the support, the value, and so on. Satisfaction rates are over 85 percent positive in virtually all categories surveyed, and return rates give us a 95 percent confidence that the survey results accurately reflect the opinion of the student population within 5 percent. Finally, surveys are sent to graduates and the graduates’ supervisors approximately one year after graduation. The survey to our graduates consists of questions dealing with broad areas such as mission effectiveness, program value, career institutional impact, and areas that reflect how well the curriculum helped them in their current duties. Results from the last two classes on these surveys showed satisfaction levels of over 85 percent in every area measured. In fact, most areas showed 95 percent satisfaction. Supervisor results on questions that parallel those we ask the graduates were unanimously (100 percent) positive. A remarkable trend that we’ve observed is that the already-high satisfaction levels on the exit surveys are even higher on the post-graduate surveys. This further substantiates the lasting value of the resident professional military education experience. All survey data are used to inform decisions of the curriculum builders and is briefed to the commandant as part of the course approval process.

In addition to the routine graduate and supervisor surveys ACSC seeks feedback from the Command Board of Advisors (CBOA). The CBOA is chaired by the Air Education and Training Command vice commander and consists of the vice-commanders of the major commands. This body includes the key stakeholders in the ACSC educational program. The CBOA provides information about the educational needs of the commands and their level of satisfaction with ACSC (and other Air University schools) graduates and programs. At the last meeting of the CBOA members indicated Air University programs (including ACSC) perform well in meeting the needs of Airmen, developing warrior-leaders for the Air Force and providing education in the right eight areas prescribed by the Air Force Competency List.

Dr. Snyder. The intermediate level schools lost Joint Duty credit for their non-host service military faculty in the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act. We know that the tours of those who were grandfathered are ending. What will the effect of this be? How will it affect the quality of your faculty? How important is it that these JDAL positions be restored? Do the instructors truly get a joint experience?

General Jackson. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired. Answer is provided by Air Command and Staff College.

The long-term effect of restricting JPME I institutions from adding billets to the Joint Duty Assignment List has yet to be determined. While having the joint duty
designator for faculty member positions is a selling point when soliciting volunteers, there are a number of assignment policies that can positively impact the quality and number of candidates. The Department is exploring these options in concert with the Military Services. In addition, the Department has indicated no objection to the withdrawal of the statutory prohibition provided that these positions are vetted along with all other potential joint qualifying assignments. It is possible that given the right mixture of duties and responsibilities, faculty members can meet the statutory definition of joint matters. If the statutory prohibition is lifted, these positions can be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

Dr. Snyder. Describe your school’s use of historical case studies to teach strategy.

General Jackson. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired. Answer is provided by Air Command and Staff College.

Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) is focused at the operational level of war and the strategy taught is operational strategy from the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) perspective. The entire Warfare Studies course deals with the concepts of operational warfare and strategy, the factors that influence and have led to changes in operational art and strategy, and examines in great detail the differences between regular warfare and irregular warfare strategies. Case studies include the attrition warfare on the Western Front in World War I, mechanized warfare in World War II, airpower operations in Kosovo, irregular warfare and stability operations in Afghanistan, T.E. Lawrence in the Middle East, and counterinsurgency operations in Iraq. The Air, Space and Cyberspace course specifically examines strategies for the development and employment of air, space and cyberspace power. This involves study of classical and contemporary air power theory, and the evaluation of historical air power strategies as well as air, space and cyberspace strategies in ongoing operations. Through historical case studies of air power in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan, students analyze the evolution of U.S. air power strategies since WW II. Coalition air power strategy is examined through lessons on Operations Deliberate Force and Provide Promise, along with operations in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans. Lessons on Chinese and Soviet air power in the Korean War and Israel’s recent conflict with Hezbollah provide insight into air power strategies employed by other countries. These historical studies encourage assessment of the effectiveness of diverse air power strategies in different geopolitical and military contexts. Students are prompted to take lessons from these historical cases and apply them to the development of effective air power strategies for future operations.

Dr. Snyder. What is the process for renewal and non-renewal of the faculty? How transparent is the system? In a tenure system people think the faculty members have all the power, in a non-tenure system it appears that the school has unlimited power. How do you avoid these extremes?

General Jackson. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired. Answer is provided by Air Command and Staff College.

The initial appointment of faculty is based on the applicant's meeting the minimum criteria for each academic grade established as described in Air University Instruction 36–2314, Academic Rank. All civilian faculty members new to federal service serve a one-year probationary period. The reappointment process normally begins 12 months prior to the expiration of a faculty member’s current appointment. Air University (AU) policy requires that any non-renewal decision must be communicated to the faculty member in writing at least 12 months before the effective date for those on an appointment of 2 years or longer. The faculty member's supervisor prepares a staff summary sheet which details the faculty member's current appointment data and the requested reappointment terms. The faculty member’s vita or resume is attached as supporting documentation and forwarded to the Dean of Academic Affairs and the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) Commandant for review. The ACSC Commandant signs the staff summary sheet and sends the renewal package to the AU Commander for approval. Once approved, the faculty member’s supervisor explains the terms of reappointment approved by the AU Commander to the faculty member. Faculty members are reappointed for a period of 1 to 5 years. Reappointment occurs when significant contributions to AU and ACSC are expected for the term of the reappointment. Any member of the faculty may be removed for cause (such as misconduct or poor performance) regardless of academic tenure, faculty status, or length of appointment according to applicable statutory and regulatory provisions governing federal employment.

The renewal and non-renewal process is very transparent. Information and processes related to reappointment and termination/non-reappointment are included in Air Force and Air University instructions (AFI 36–804, Civilian Faculty Pay Plan for Air University and the USAF Academy and AU Supplement 1) and the Air Uni-
versity Faculty Handbook. Each publication is posted on the Air University website. Individuals are briefed on the processes as a part of their initial faculty orientation.

AU and ACSC avoid the extremes and arbitrariness through transparent personnel policies and the involvement of faculty in administrative and curriculum development processes. For example, the ACSC curriculum is created, reviewed, and approved by the full-time faculty members through a rigorous, academic, corporate process. Curriculum guidance is strategic in nature with primary responsibility for the content, quality, and effectiveness of the curriculum placed with the faculty. This strategic guidance ensures ACSC remains focused on the mission of the college while providing flexibility for the faculty to design courses to achieve the strategic objectives.

Dr. Snyder. What is your school's role in identifying promising officers with the potential for high-level strategic thinking at the appropriate point in their careers?

General Jackson. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired. Answer is provided by Air Command and Staff College.

Air Command and Staff College’s (ACSC) primary role in identifying promising strategic thinking officers rests in providing opportunities for academic preparation. The school’s Joint Advanced Warfare Elective Series (JAWES) focuses on preparing U.S. and international students for second year programs such as the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS), School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), and the School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW). During Academic Year 2010, ACSC will expand the number of students participating in JAWES from 85 to 102. The mission statement of SAASS is to produce strategists through advanced education in the art and science of air, space, and cyberspace power to defend the United States and protect its interest. One of the means of identifying officers with the potential for high-level strategic thinking is through the highly competitive selection process for the school. ACSC also has a Distinguished Graduate program that identifies the top 10 percent of the graduating class. This indicates the individual has excelled in a program that is focused on producing critical and strategic thinkers. This designation is entered into the individual's training report that becomes a part of the permanent personnel record.

Dr. Snyder. How do you specifically measure the quality of the faculty and staff in the PME environment?

General Jackson. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired. Answer is provided by Air Command and Staff College.

Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) measures quality based on credentials at the time of appointment/assignment and performance on elements or factors in the faculty member's work plan. We measure the quality of faculty members in three distinct areas: teaching, research and publication, and service. A strong faculty development program is key in developing and sustaining a high quality faculty. The college's unique mission requires a distinctive mix of faculty qualifications and credentials. Traditional civilian academics provide the depth and breadth of subject-matter expertise to guarantee the academic rigor of the college's offerings while simultaneously ensuring adherence to validated teaching theory and practice. Military officers contribute unparalleled currency and expertise in the operational topics so critical to the college's success.

ACSC sets high standards for its military faculty members to ensure its high standards for educational excellence are never compromised. Military faculty requirements are communicated to the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) for use in assignment of individuals to faculty duty at ACSC. With the unique hiring process (non-volunteers) for active duty AF faculty members, we use their level of educational credentials and prior professional experience to determine if they are academically qualified (terminal degree) and/or professionally qualified (graduate degree plus applicable professional experience). Military members must have completed the appropriate levels of professional military education (PME), functional-area education and training, and offer expertise relevant to the College's core curriculum. In addition, ACSC strives to ensure that 75 percent of its military faculty members have completed intermediate or senior level PME in residence or earned qualification as a Joint Specialty Officer (JSO).

Our civilian faculty members are hired as academically qualified; we recruit civilians based on their terminal degree and research experience/interests in areas of expertise applicable to the ACSC educational program. We expect all faculty members to continue their professional development through professional activities such as conference attendance, research and publications/presentations.

To ensure a continuous level of improvement in the execution of the educational program (instruction) we use several feedback methods including student assessment of instruction and peer/supervisor observation and evaluation. Additionally, through our faculty development colloquia, faculty members inform each other re-
Military faculty members are evaluated through the Air Force personnel evaluation system and through annual instructional reviews within the college or when a change in reporting official occurs. These performance reports are completed in accordance with established Air Force (or other Service) personnel policies using the appropriate official form. Each civilian faculty member is evaluated based on three primary criteria: teaching effectiveness; research, scholarship, and publication; and service. Assessment of these criteria is based on the work plan established for the individual at the beginning of the appraisal cycle. Civilian faculty members' merit pay and cash/time off awards are based on this assessment.

**Dr. Snyder.** How do you specifically define top-tier? What are the elements that would attract top-tier civilian faculty? How do you define top-tier?
fessional competence, as evidenced by educational achievement and experience (degrees earned or other professional recognition); academic activity and service; publishing record; evidence of effective teaching; reputation in a field of academic or professional specialization; and promise of significant contribution to the mission and operation of Air University (AU) and its schools.

Defining “top-tier” faculty occurs within the relevant disciplines and within the academic rank level being focused. Each discipline and rank has its own specific criteria, but they always involve a combination of scholarship, teaching and service. Top-tier definition for young first-time faculty members are based more on presumptive potential for effective teaching, research, and consultation while those more mature in the discipline it is based on demonstrated evidence. ACSC defines a top quality civilian faculty as those who have: experience in the subject matter sought in the vacancy, evidence of academic activity and service, a record of publication in peer-reviewed outlets in the subject matter sought or related fields, and evidence of outstanding teaching. Top tier faculty members within professional military education are multi-role professionals who possess military and/or civilian education credentials, are capable of research and publishing, and effective teaching.

Degree-granting authority and regional accreditation play an intrinsic role in attracting top-tier civilian faculty members. Accreditation signifies high standards and serves as a common denominator among academic institutions. High-ranking professors are more likely to seek out teaching and research opportunities at accredited institutions. Air University’s accreditation has been a key factor in enabling ACSC to continue to attract and retain top-tier civilian faculty. Attracting top-tier faculty also requires a wide range of incentives. No single incentive can be solely relied upon to attract the quality of faculty required to educate intermediate-level students. The best quality faculty members necessarily want to achieve prominence and respect within their disciplines; therefore the elements that attract the highest quality faculty are those elements that enable them to achieve excellence in their discipline. Tenure is an issue for some faculty candidates. There have been in the past some candidates vying for vacant faculty positions who have either voiced their concerns or withdrawn themselves from consideration after discovering we do not have a tenure track. The most often cited benefits of a tenure system would be to protect faculty members from the vagaries of faculty management policy changes and to provide additional reassurances on the promise of academic freedom. Academics respond to attractions of pay and benefits no differently than other job seekers. Support for research travel, technology support and flexibility in establishing an individual’s research agenda are important in attracting some civilian faculty members.

Dr. Snyder. What are the policies at your school regarding academic freedom? What is its proper role in a PME setting without tenure? Describe how your faculty may be called upon to respond to press inquiries in the field of expertise and whether and how they are allowed to respond in a timely manner.

General Jackson. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired. Answer is provided by Air Command and Staff College.

Air University (AU) has a clearly articulated policy on academic freedom which is an amended form of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) definition of academic freedom. AU Instruction 36–2308, Academic Freedom states:

“Air University faculty, students, and staff are members of a learned profession, and members of their respective educational organizations. The free exchange of opinions and ideas is essential to the educational process and, to the greatest extent possible, faculty, students, and staff are encouraged to speak and write freely. Even in this academic setting, however, the importance of the University’s military mission requires limits on some types of expression. For example, in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), commissioned officers, officer trainees, and cadets may not use contemptuous words toward the President, Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force, and others. In addition, military members may not make disrespectful remarks about a superior commissioned officer, nor may an enlisted member make a disrespectful statement toward a superior noncommissioned officer. In addition to these specific restrictions on military members, faculty, students, and staff should remember that the public might judge the armed forces or Air University by their spoken or written statements. In any public forum, Air University faculty, students and staff members should make every effort to indicate clearly that the opinions they express are personal to the member, and do not represent the official views of their organization, Air University, the United States Air Force, the U.S. government, or any other government or academic community.”
Academic freedom is further enhanced and safeguarded though AU’s policy of “non-attribution.” ACSC encourages guest lecturers, faculty and students to state their opinions and support or offer critical opinion of any objective, policy, strategy, or tactic while pursuing knowledge, understanding, and improvement of the military profession. In the articulation and defense of ideas and positions on issues, individuals should endeavor to be accurate, should show respect for the opinions of others and should make every effort to indicate they do not speak for the university. It is acceptable to say “a previous speaker” made a particular statement, but the speaker’s identity may not be divulged without permission.

The role of academic freedom is equally important in tenure and non-tenure environments. Although ACSC civilian faculty members do not receive tenure ACSC ensures procedures are in place to safeguard and protect academic freedom. This is foundational to the full freedom of research and the publication of the results. Academic freedom is fundamental in producing students who are agile, critical thinkers capable of leveraging new ideas in the complex and fast-paced environment of military operations. Freedom for faculty to discuss their subject in the educational setting is key to the critical thought process.

AU faculty members are called upon to respond to the press regarding matters in their respective field(s) of expertise and they are encouraged to respond in a timely manner. The only limitation to any response concerns discussions of sensitive subjects and, depending on the scope of the request, coordination with senior-level Public Affairs staff may be appropriate. In addition, notifying supervisors and leadership of the press inquiry is standard practice. How faculty respond depends on the manner in which a request is made; for instance, whether through direct contact with the faculty member or through a request to Public Affairs. Faculty members may respond independently or may request Public Affairs facilitation. All requests are handled with utmost awareness of press deadlines and every effort is made to respond in a timely manner.

Dr. Snyder. Acquisition reforms all call for more of the general purpose forces to be educated and trained in understanding contracting and contractors. Civilians, contracting, and contractors on the battlefield—how much do officers, outside the acquisition workforce, need to know?

General Jackson. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired. Answer is provided by Air Command and Staff College.

A general understanding of the acquisition and budgeting processes is appropriate because of the staffing and leadership roles that Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) graduates fill. ACSC addresses the acquisition reforms/issues through readings, lectures, and seminar discussion. The key focus is the impact of having the right equipment, at the right time to fly, fight, and win in air, space, and cyberspace. Discussions of the impact of civilians and contractors on the battlefield are included in our warfare studies courses and the leadership and command lessons. These discussions are incorporated into the learning area objective related to the role and perspective of the combatant commander and staff in developing various theater policies, strategies and plans, and building partnerships.

Dr. Snyder. Regarding languages, regional studies, and cultural competency—how much can be taught at the intermediate level and for what purpose? What feedback have you been receiving from your students on your foreign language training? What changes have you effected on the basis of that feedback?

General Jackson. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired and the answer is provided by Air Command and Staff College.

Modern leaders need to grasp the broader context of modern military operations, comprehending both the challenges and opportunities that confront the United States in the 21st Century. They must also understand the security policies, national planning systems and resulting strategies through which the U.S. will employ instruments of power to engage regionally and globally. This involves regional studies, development of cultural competency and a familiarization or understanding of the nuances of languages in a region.

Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) responded to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force initiative to introduce language training into the college’s curriculum in Academic Year 2007. During the first 2 years of implementation the program consisted of completing an assigned number of language software modules in Rosetta Stone in one of the four strategic languages (Spanish, French, Mandarin Chinese or Arabic). Students were required to take the Defense Language Aptitude Battery Test as a data point in determining which languages students were vectored to. Students were offered optional use of Defense Language Institute’s (DLI) mobile training teams. The program for Academic Year 2010 will shift to a mandatory program of 30 hours of face-to-face mediated instruction with DLI instructors. Software tools will be available to students to supplement classroom instruction.
Surveys of students conducted at the end of the language familiarization program and at graduation revealed some of the lowest levels of satisfaction of all the areas measured. ACSC’s assessment of the program indicated that it is very difficult to gain language proficiency within the time allotted for the program without significantly impacting the critical time needed to focus on the core curriculum. The college now uses the term “language familiarization” and “language enhancement” to describe the language program. The Air Force vision is to focus language capability development and proficiency earlier in an individual’s career and provide enhancing opportunities throughout the career. The Air Force Culture and Language Center located at Air University provides the strategic leadership and guidance for the language program.

ACSC’s Regional and Cultural Studies course focuses specifically on regional and cultural competencies. Tools for understanding and interacting with and within other cultures and the broad regional differences are a major component of the course. ACSC has introduced culture-general and culture-specific concepts and skills and integrated them into the existing curriculum. This course has also improved the integration of the over 70 International Officer students into the educational process of understanding regions and cultures.

Dr. Snyder. Please provide your school’s mission statement.

Colonel Damm. Informed by the study of history and culture, Command and Staff College (CSC) educates and trains its joint, multinational, and interagency professionals in order to produce skilled warfighting leaders able to overcome diverse 21st Century security challenges.

Dr. Snyder. How have ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan affected the quality of military faculty members? What is your average tour length for military faculty members? Have the credentials of military faculty in terms of graduate degrees and JQO qualifications diminished during this period? What is the percentage of military faculty who are fully JQO qualified?

Colonel Damm. How have ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan affected the quality of military faculty members? I would say that the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have positively affected the quality of military faculty members. We now have a generation of field grade officers with multiple deployments in combat environments—nothing beats experience and the subsequent ability to pass along that knowledge to the next level of warfighter.

What is your average tour length for military faculty members? The average tour length for military faculty members is two years. Over the last several years the tour length for the majority of Marine faculty has been only one year, but it is a good news story. This is because the rate of selection for promotion to O-6 and selection for Command has been very high among our Marine faculty and, once they are selected, they are reassigned. The College and Marine Corps University have made the conscious decision to accept capability over continuity; we “hire” highly competitive Officers as our Instructors. As long as the level of quality among the Marine faculty remains high, we will live with the fact that some may be leaving earlier than they otherwise are slated.

Have the credentials of military faculty in terms of graduate degrees and JQO qualifications diminished during this period? No, the credentials of military faculty in terms of graduate degrees and JQO qualifications have not diminished as the services, and the Marine Corps in particular, has continued to promote officer professional military education during this period of high operational tempo.

What is the percentage of military faculty who are fully JQO qualified?

Fifty percent of our Military teaching faculty are JQO.

Dr. Snyder. Are the services and agencies filling their assigned billets for faculty? What are your gaps?

Colonel Damm. Yes, the sister services and agencies are fulfilling their assigned billets for our faculty. At present we have two United States Air Force (USAF) officers, two United States Army (USA) officers, two United States Navy (USN) officers, and one International Military Officer (IMO) from Norway on staff here at CSC. This is in addition to the twelve United States Marine Corps (USMC) officers, eighteen Terminally Degreed civilian faculty members, and a number of adjunct Marine Corps University (MCU) chair faculty available to our student population.

At present, I would not say that we have any identifiable gaps within our faculty as we are as strong as we have ever been in the history of our school.

Dr. Snyder. To what extent has the curriculum enhanced its coverage of Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations given that DOD has put them on a par with combat operations?

Colonel Damm. Prior to 2005 approximately 17% of the curriculum was dedicated coverage of Irregular Warfare subject matter. Beginning with Academic Year 2005–2006, Marine Corps Command and Staff College began implementing a comprehen-
sive redesign of its curriculum in response to emerging lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq with the objective of maintaining the highest degree of currency and relevance with regard to the challenges and opportunities of the contemporary security environment. Now in its fifth year, this effort has yielded impressive results as they relate to the coverage of irregular warfare, to include both counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations. In the Operational Art (OpArt) and Culture and Interagency Operations (CIAO) lines of operation, fully 47% of total curriculum hours (164 of 348) are dedicated to these subjects for AY09–10. This coursework provides students with extensive exposure to the historical, social, and cultural factors that influence the application of all instruments of national power during operations. Likewise, our leadership line of operation provides coverage in 144 out of 318 total hours (45%) including courses in negotiations, ethics in a COIN environment, and strategic communications. Finally, the Warfighting … from the Sea (WFTS) line of operation dedicates 237 of 562 hours (42%) to these topics, to include an entire, seminar-based block of instruction on Irregular Warfare, complemented by two major practical application exercises focused on campaign planning for long-term stability and security. The first of these, COINEX, is based on an historical scenario set in the Long An Province of South Vietnam during the period 1969–1972. The second, more comprehensive, “living” exercise (NINE INNINGS) is based on current events in a country in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility and involves the development of a “whole of government” interagency campaign plan that fosters stability and security and advances U.S. strategic interests in the region. Overall, Marine Corps Command & Staff College dedicates 545 of 1229 curriculum hours (44%) to irregular warfare-related subject matter. This total does not include the electives block, which also includes a number of electives that deal directly with these subjects.

Dr. Snyder. Describe the scenarios that you use for your simulation exercises and war games. To what extent do they incorporate SSTR and irregular warfare concepts? [Question #5, for cross-reference.]

Colonel Damm.

BARBARY DAGGER OVERVIEW

COURSE DESCRIPTION. As the second block of instruction (of eight) Warfighting … from the Sea (WFTS) practical application Exercise BARBARY DAGGER provides students with an opportunity to employ the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) in a relatively simple scenario against an opponent employing “traditional” methods. The focus of this exercise is on the planning process itself, with the goal of ensuring that all students have a grasp of the Marine Corps’ approach to planning, and of the basic planning “toolkit” as outlined in the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Planning lesson within the MAGTF Operations block. Employing a “crawl, walk, run” approach, this exercise begins to lay the intellectual foundation for the more sophisticated planning exercises that follow. Though this exercise scenario exists in a “traditional” setting the student will be exposed to and discuss how to deal with challenges associated with a locally displaced or disrupted population that may be hostile or belligerent to the U.S. military presence. 69 hours are dedicated to this block of instruction with basic incorporation of SSTR and irregular warfare concepts.

PACIFIC CHALLENGE OVERVIEW

COURSE DESCRIPTION. As the fourth block of instruction (of eight) WFTS practical application Exercise PACIFIC CHALLENGE provides students with an opportunity to build upon the knowledge obtained during Exercise BARBARY DAGGER to employ the MCPP in a more complex, MEF-level operational planning scenario against an opponent employing “traditional” methods. The focus of this exercise is not only on the continued refinement of student understanding of the planning process itself, but also on the viability and sophistication of the proposed solution(s). As the last “traditional” planning problem for AY09–10, it provides students with a thorough test of their understanding of the Marine Corps’ approach to planning and of the basic planning “toolkit” as outlined in previous coursework. Future planning exercises will require the adaptation of these basic tools to meet irregular challenges. 93 hours are dedicated to this block of instruction with basic incorporation of SSTR and irregular warfare concepts.

COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN) EXERCISE OVERVIEW

COURSE DESCRIPTION. Building on previous coursework and practical application exercises on the Marine Corps approach to planning and the MCPP, and augmented by the lessons provided during WFTS Block 5 (Irregular Warfare) and related Culture and Interagency Operations (CIAO) and Operational Art (OpArt) seminars on Vietnam, this sixth block of instruction (of eight) WFTS practical applica-
tion (COIN Exercise) provides students with an opportunity to adapt the basic planning “tool kit” to address the unique characteristics and challenges of irregular operations. The COIN Exercise introduces students to the seminal problem of our day: the conduct of “whole of government” campaign design and planning to address an unstructured problem posed by an enemy employing irregular methods. The objective is the “hearts and minds” of a contested population rather than terrain captured or enemy units destroyed; more precisely, the challenge centers on the establishment and maintenance of the mechanisms of political control over a population—all in competition with similar mechanisms that define the political and social alternative offered by a thinking enemy. 54 hours are dedicated to this block of instruction with thorough incorporation of SSTR and irregular warfare concepts.

NATIONAL RESPONSE TO CATASTROPHIC AND DISRUPTIVE THREAT EXERCISE OVERVIEW

COURSE DESCRIPTION. WFTS Block 7, National Response to Catastrophic and Disruptive Threats (NRCDT) block of instruction, is designed to educate mid-career professionals in the myriad of threats to the homeland, the organizations and plans in place that drive DoD support in these scenarios, and the challenges associated with joint crisis action planning to support a national response to a catastrophic incident. Developed in partnership with the Joint Staff J–8 (Joint Requirements Office-CBRN), United States Joint Forces Command’s Joint Warfighting Center, and Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF–CS), this experience familiarizes students with the military’s role in domestic consequence management planning and execution. The methods used to achieve these educational objectives include lectures, seminars, and selected readings, all of which lay the intellectual foundation necessary to conduct the culminating event of the block—a student practical exercise involving interagency representatives from the state, local and federal levels. The end state is to prepare students to serve as future commanders and staff officers in units that may be called upon to support USNORTHCOM in responding to a natural or man-made disaster. Though this scenario takes place within CONUS the students are required to think through how to support USNORTHCOM in dealing with security and stability type situation that might occur due to a disaster within the borders of the United States. 39 hours are dedicated to this block of instruction with aspects similar to SSTR.

NINE INNINGS OVERVIEW

COURSE DESCRIPTION. Building on all previous seminar-based coursework and practical application exercises within the WFTS line of operations (LOO), and augmented by the material covered in the CIAO, Op-Art and Leadership LOOs, the final WFTS practical application exercise (Exercise NINE INNINGS) is designed to test student understanding of all of the material covered during the Command & Staff College academic year … and then some. Students will be challenged to think critically about, and to develop viable solutions for, a myriad of problems that fall well outside of the typical officer’s intellectual comfort zone; to demonstrate their ability, to use General Petreaus’ words, to serve as “‘pentathlete leaders’—individuals who, metaphorically speaking, are not just sprinters or shot putters but can do it all.” The exercise affords an opportunity, in an unclassified venue and working with our counterparts from within the interagency, to develop a “whole of government” plan for confronting a range of issues centered on a country within SOUTHCOM AOR, to include the loss of U.S. influence in the region, transnational terrorism, multiple insurgencies, the potential for civil war, and the threat of a broader regional conflict with emerging powers. It is a “living exercise” in that it relies on existing conditions/events—as gleaned from various open source venues—rather than a pre-scripted, canned scenario. Students will serve as planners in a Joint Interagency Planning Group (JIPG), co-chaired by Senior Mentors playing the roles of the U.S. Ambassador and the Commander of the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF). The mission of the JIPG is to design a four-year, “Phase 0” interagency campaign plan that fosters stability and security in the country and advances U.S. strategic interests in the region. A number of resources will be made available to the students to support the accomplishment of these daunting tasks, to include the large-scale participation of Subject Matter Experts from a wide variety of joint, combined, interagency, NGO, media, think tank, and academic organizations. However, all of these resources merely supplement the issue at hand—one final opportunity to apply critical and creative thinking to a challenging, contemporary operational problem. 115 hours are dedicated to this block of instruction with thorough incorporation of SSTR and irregular warfare concepts.
Dr. Snyder. Please provide the most recent survey results from your graduates and their supervisors. [Question #6, for cross-reference.]

Colonel Damm. The raw data collected by our Marine Corps University survey section from graduates and supervisors is included as an enclosure following these questions.

[The information referred to is retained in the committee files and can be viewed upon request.]

Dr. Snyder. The intermediate level schools lost Joint Duty credit for their non-host service military faculty in the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act. We know that the tours of those who were grandfathered are ending. What will the effect of this be? How will it affect the quality of your faculty? How important is it that these JDAL positions be restored? Do the instructors truly get a joint experience?

Colonel Damm. The requirement for Joint Duty in the National Defense Authorization Act is an important one for the growth and training of our forces. As we have defined necessary requirements, we need to realize the benefits of a well-rounded Officer as we find ways to fulfill the requirement. To understand your own warfighting culture, you must experience it first; only then can you represent your service position as you branch out into the other services. To do that, you need time. My own example would be I had to learn how to fly my own aircraft before I could shift my focus to training others how to fly. If we let Officers get joint credit at other service institutions, we satisfy a requirement for them to attain Flag Officer rank without requiring another tour outside their respective service. In the Marine Corps, we look at an Officer file and check for credibility in his own Military Occupational Specialty before we promote that Officer or send them to school. The effect of not receiving joint credit as an “exchange” instructor is that the quality of the Officers may suffer as there is no incentive other than wanting to learn more about another service. It is very important to restore joint credit so we can continue to attract high quality Officers to our respective programs.

Officers do get joint experience. First they must immerse themselves in other service culture to learn and then teach in each curriculum. As an example, one of the first things in our program of instruction is the Marine Corps Planning Process; it is our baseline. We have Army, Navy and Air Force Officers teaching that process. The absolutely best way to learn is to teach. They are also inculcated with our culture beginning with faculty development in the weeks before the students arrive. Development included visits to an amphibious ship and a wing to not just talk about a Marine Air Ground Task Force, but to show a Marine Air Ground Task Force. The year is truly a joint experience.

Dr. Snyder. Describe your school’s use of historical case studies to teach strategy.

Colonel Damm. The Command and Staff College is an intermediate-level school within the hierarchy of professional military education. As such, it is expected to educate its students in matters relating primarily to the Operational Level of War, that is, the level that forms the bridge between strategy and tactics. The level at which campaigns are planned. The level of the Combatant Commander. The College’s mission is not focused primarily on teaching strategy. In the course of establishing and examining the context in which campaigns are planned and executed it is necessary to examine both strategy and strategic issues and tactics and tactical issues. In all of these areas case studies play an important educational role. Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 1–1, Strategy (Italics), broadly defines strategy as the process of interrelating ends and means. Through a series of lectures and seminars, reinforced by case studies and practical applications, the College requires the students to examine the relationships between ends and means. Students read and discuss the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy, among other strategic issues, as part of their understanding of the context of the current operating environment. The planning processes they learn and employ in practical exercises during the year are all about defining the “ways” in which ends and means will be reconciled. The precise character of the various exercises conducted at the College are explained in response to Question #5. In the Operational Art and Culture and Interagency Operations courses they examine historical and contemporary situations ranging from, for example, the British experiences confronting the Malayan Emergency from 1948–1960, or the French experience in Algeria, 1954–1962, or the American experiences in Operations DESERT STORM, ENDURING FREEDOM or IRAQI FREEDOM, or the Allied dilemmas in defining the modern Middle-East in the aftermath of World War I, the challenges of bringing stability to post-War Japan and Germany in 1945, the responses to insurgency in the Huk rebellion in the Philippines, or the interagency challenges of the current array of overseas contingency operations. In these and other cases the questions associated with reconciling ends, ways, and means are central to seminar
discussion. So the College contributes to the development of strategic thinkers and the College does teach strategy, although not in quite the structured way that the sub-committee's question suggests.

Dr. Snyder. What is the process for renewal and non-renewal of the faculty? How transparent is the system? In a tenure system people think the faculty members have all the power, in a non-tenure system it appears that the school has unlimited power. How do you avoid these extremes? [Question #9, for cross-reference.]

Colonel Damm. Civilian faculty members are hired under Title 10 authority granted to the President of Marine Corps University by the Secretary of the Navy. Civilian faculty members are offered a one, two or three-year appointment based on the needs of the college and the individual's qualifications. New civilian faculty members undergo a one-year probationary period during which their performance is evaluated. During the period, they are supervised and counseled on a periodic basis regarding their performance by the Director and the Dean of Academics.

The faculty evaluation and renewal system is extremely transparent to the individual. He/she will receive periodic counseling as well as an annual performance appraisal. Renewals can be for periods of one, two, or three years. The College's informal policy has been to offer three year renewals. At least seven months prior to the end of the faculty member's appointment, the Director of the College recommends to the President of the University whether the faculty member's appointment should be renewed and for what period of time. If the University does not intend to retain an individual, the individual will be formally and informally counseled regarding his/her substandard performance and be given the means to improve. If he/she fails to improve, his/her performance appraisal will document the fact and state the reason for termination.

To avoid arbitrariness, the College leadership manages the civilian faculty in an upfront and forthright manner, providing maximum transparency while maintaining open, two-way lines of communication. First, the College ensures that all rules governing policies and procedures are clearly delineated and equitably applied. Each faculty member is provided a College Faculty Handbook and Marine Corps University Title 10 Faculty Handbook which outlines the policies for the handling of reappointments, terminations, appeals, and grievances.

Second, demonstrating its long-term commitment to its faculty, despite the absence of a formal program of tenure, the College invests time and funds into an aggressive faculty development program. The program seeks to advance faculty members' abilities through participation in functional area and academic meetings, panels, conferences, symposium, field studies, courses, and classes. By investing in each faculty member's development, the College develops a stronger cadre of instructors while recognizing the symbiotic and mutually supportive relationship between the individual and the institution.

All but one of the College's civilian faculty members possess a Doctorate degree. The sole exception is the Deputy Head of the College's Warfighting Section. The individual is a former career officer in the Air Force whose professional background and experiences made him the ideal choice to fill this newly created position. He has multiple Master's Degrees but it is his professional military expertise that made him the proper individual for this non-teaching position.

The benefits or pitfalls of a tenure system have never been issues at the College. During the interviews for prospective faculty, the process of hiring and renewals is explained to applicants so they understand how the system works. Since 1992, when the Title 10 faculty began to be hired, only one faculty member has been released prior to the completion of an appointment. Currently there are several civilian faculty who left tenured positions in civilian academic institutions to join the College faculty because of the opportunity to work in the kind of forward-looking and supportive educational environment that we have been able to establish and maintain over the past 17 years.

Dr. Snyder. What is your school's role in identifying promising officers with the potential for high-level strategic thinking at the appropriate point in their careers? Colonel Damm. During our Academic year we identify students with the potential for strategic thinking as candidates for the School of Advanced Warfighting. They must go through an interview process and be selected to attend this resident follow-on school. A notable graduate of this school is LtGen John Allen, currently the Deputy Commanding General of CENTRAL COMMAND, hand selected by General Petraeus to be his Deputy. We also acknowledge superior performance in our students through our Distinguished Graduate and Writing Programs. Many of these students are identified as potential future instructors by our Faculty (both Military and Civilian). The corporate memory resides in our civilian instructors as many have been here for many years, as names come up for military faculty, we use them as the ultimate litmus test.
Dr. Snyder. How do you specifically measure the quality of the faculty and staff in the PME environment?

Colonel Damm. I think this question may be asked incorrectly... the Faculty, both military and civilian, are "hired" because of their quality. That quality is measured by looking into their professional and academic experiences. Then we "measure" their quality by how they impart our constantly evolving curriculum to our student body. The "measurement" is how the student body does; papers, exercises, and outside accolades of their work (one of our students has been the recipient of the Secretary of Defense writing award two years running). We monitor each other through our Director, Deputy and Academic Dean as we attend seminar. Another method of measurement is through student surveys, something included in this document at question #6. We read every word of those surveys and after deliberation, implement changes when necessary.

Dr. Snyder. How were you chosen to be school's commandant? How was your dean chosen? Will you be retiring from this job? What background should the Chief of Naval Operations be looking for in selecting individuals for these positions? Should the focus be on operational leadership skills or academic and teaching experience (not instructing in a training institution) background or both?

Colonel Damm. The Academic Dean came from the Civilian Faculty as delineated in the next paragraph. I was chosen by the Commandant of the Marine Corps from a number of names submitted by Manpower to the President of Marine Corps University. From that list, Active Duty Marines are recommended by the President and forwarded to the Commandant for his approval. My view is that individuals should be chosen for the important responsibility of training future leaders of all of our services and agencies based on both their operational and educational background. It is not just an academic responsibility. The Director should have a professional pedigree students can relate to and admire. In my case, although an aviator, I have commanded a squadron in combat and have attended both resident intermediate level education and top level school. I am also JPME II qualified and have joint credit. The only service I have not served personally with is the Coast Guard, although I have attended resident school with Coast Guard Officers. The Commandant should look at well rounded Officers who have shown a penchant for life-long learning and are credentialed in their Military Occupational Specialty as Commanders and operators; they will command the respect of their students.

My intention is to retire out of this position merely due to service limitations and non-selection to O–7. Promotion to Flag Officer has happened from this position and from some of our other schools, but not in my case; but, the selection rate to General Officer in the Marine Corps is a very small percentage of the O–6's eligible so that is not an indictment of the system at all, it is just the way it is. The benefit is my career brings 29 years of leadership and learning to this billet, and I am still excited about being a part of the Marine Corps.

The current dean of academics was hired as an associate dean in 1992, after a career of 24 years of active service in the United States Army. That service included considerable time in operational assignments, but also included service on the faculties of both West Point and the Army's Command and General Staff College in teaching, curriculum design and development, and leadership positions. He also possessed a terminal degree from an outstanding university. The dean of academics at that time was an active duty Marine O–6. In 1998, when the College was about to name its 5th military dean in 6 years, the Director named the civilian associate dean previously described to assume the position of dean of academics. In other words he promoted from within. Subsequently the position has been validated as a civilian, Title 10, GM–15 (Colonel equivalent) position and the Marine Corps University has put the active duty O–6 billet to use elsewhere.

Dr. Snyder. How should intermediate schools attract top-tier civilian faculty? How do you specifically define top-tier? What are the elements that would attract the highest quality of faculty—tenure, copyright, resources, pay, ability to keep their government retirements, research and administrative assistance, etc.?

Colonel Damm. Our definition of a "top quality" civilian faculty member is a scholar and educator who possesses 1) expertise in his/her respective field of study, 2) operational experience in curriculum-related areas, 3) a general knowledge of adult educational methodology and most importantly, 4) a passion for developing curriculum and teaching our unique type of student. Such an individual should possess a terminal degree, yet remain a life-long student of his/her craft, continuously pursuing greater understanding of the subject through reading, research, reflection, and participation in scholarly form. He/she should be proficient in written and oral communications, able to translate complex issues into understandable terms applicable to any audience—students or scholars.
The principal attractions for top notch people to join the College faculty are intangible. There is much to be said for being paid a fair and equitable salary and participating in a good retirement program. The University is committed to doing that so that we do not undervalue those who we hire. There is also much to be said for being located in the area of the Nation’s capitol with the attendant access to organizations and people that further research and enrichment in academic disciplines. Tenure is a topic already addressed in response to Question #9. But the most compelling attractions for top tier faculty have to do with three things. The first and foremost reason is our experienced, aggressive, and motivated professional students. Having the privilege of being involved with their professional and intellectual development is enormously attractive to top notch faculty. Second, the quality of faculty, both military and civilian, is compelling to those who perhaps have not worked in such a collegial environment. Third, the combination of the two previous factors has created over time a well deserved reputation for excellence that makes people want to be part of who the College is and what the college does.

Dr. Snyder. What are the policies at your school regarding academic freedom? What is its proper role in a PME setting without tenure? Describe how your faculty may be called upon to respond to press inquiries in the field of expertise and whether and how they are allowed to respond in a timely manner.

Colonel Dam. All candidates for positions at the College are asked their definitions of academic freedom during their interviews. They are also asked whether or not they believe they will have any difficulty reconciling their sense of what academic freedom means in a military environment. The definition of academic freedom commonly expressed is couched in terms of being able to state judgments, do research, publish the results of that research, based on evidence, without fear of retribution or sanction. Faculty recognize that there are, and should be, boundaries defined by professional courtesy, common decency, and security classifications. Otherwise they are free to stimulate free and open discussion. Our faculty have never expressed concerns about being limited in their academic freedom. In fact, those who have more recent experience in the civilian academic world have testified that the environment at the College is more conducive to true academic freedom than the institutions where they previously taught, which might have cloaked particular agendas in the garb of academic freedom.

Lack of tenure does not affect the “academic freedom” enjoyed by the faculty of the College. We believe that “academic freedom” is fostered by a positive organizational culture, not guaranteed employment. It springs from an academic environment in which faculty and students alike are encouraged to voice their judgments on any relevant subjects in open, scholarly debate without risk of rebuke or reprisal. Such judgments should be expressed in a well-researched, well-reasoned, and rational manner, based on valid, empirical data and devoid of emotion. The College’s strict non-attribution policy also safeguards academic freedom. It allows faculty, students and guest speakers voice their thoughts without fear of further dissemination.

As an institution manned by a number of leader scholars, we have continuous requests for our faculty to join seminars or respond to the press. We endeavor to allow them to do as much as possible as long as it does not interfere with their primary responsibility of teaching our students. We are now blessed with a large enough quality faculty to cover down if there is a requirement for one of our Conference Group leaders to be out. As for requests from the press, we just ask that a disclaimer be added that their comments reflect their own opinions and not those necessarily endorsed by the school. We consider requests for our faculty as part of our outreach program, necessary for the academic growth of our faculty as well as a good news story about our University.

Dr. Snyder. Acquisition reforms all call for more of the general purpose forces to be educated and trained in understanding contracting and contractors. Civilians, contracting, and contractors on the battlefield—how much do officers, outside the acquisition workforce, need to know?

Colonel Dam. We approach this problem from the view that contractors on the battlefield come in all shapes and forms. They can sometimes be lumped in to the interagency or non-governmental groups we have turned to for many of the day to day requirements our forces need to operate. It is most prevalent on our final exercise NINE INNINGS where we have our students build a campaign plan for engagement using a real country and real time unclassified information. During that exercise, we bring in numerous subject matter experts (including contractors) to expand the students understanding of the operational environment before them. As a side note, this academic year we will be partnering with SOUTHCOM to set two hundred minds loose in their area or responsibility, in the Central American countries of Guatemala and Honduras (we actually chose this area before the current coup).
Dr. Snyder. Regarding languages, regional studies, and cultural competency—how much can be taught at the intermediate level and for what purpose? What feedback have you been receiving from your students on your foreign language training? What changes have you effected on the basis of that feedback?

Colonel Damm. Our language program has undergone a number of changes due to our looking at the program and realizing we were not reaping the benefits we desired. The options are either a full year language course as part of the curriculum, or some other language program tied in to a cultural immersion program. The first program would be the best as long as it was tied to an Officer’s career, as studies show one year of language without continuous practice after the fact is a poor investment. It would also, if the program wasn’t tied to past language capability, require us to drop something from our curriculum. The Marine Corps is looking at tying a young Lieutenant to a specific area as a life long area of expertise, to include language training. That is under review at this time. The benefit of a language and cultural immersion is where we believe we can do the most good for the Marine Corps and the individual Marines as language is a tremendous component of culture. We bring in the Defense Language Institute (DLI) (the teaching specialist in language indoctrination) in the beginning of the year and immerse our students in a particular language. Throughout the year, students are expected to practice their skills through different available language training software. In the Spring, we bring back DLI and refresh our students, and then have them engage in a Negotiation exercise. In the exercise, students must communicate in a rudimentary fashion to a non-English speaker in the chosen language and eventually turn over the negotiation to an interpreter. Last academic year was our first using this methodology. The initial feedback was very positive, but we would like to check that feedback against a later survey after things have sunk in for a little while.