REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES

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CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2009

Hearing:
Wednesday, May 6, 2009, Report of The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States ............................................................... 1

Appendix:
Wednesday, May 6, 2009 ................................................................. 31

WEDNESDAY, MAY 6, 2009

REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

McHugh, Hon. John M., a Representative from New York, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services ................................................................. 3

Spratt, Hon. John, a Representative from South Carolina, Committee on Armed Services .......................................................................................... 1

WITNESSES

Perry, Dr. William J., Chairman, The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States ......................................................... 5

Schlesinger, Dr. James R., Vice Chairman, The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States ........................................... 8

Appendix

Prepared Statements:

Perry, Dr. William J. .................................................................................. 35

Schlesinger, Dr. James R. .......................................................................... 43

Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SPRATT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SPRATT. I call the committee meeting to order. I welcome everyone here. Chairman Skelton, unfortunately, is not able to be here, but I am pleased to have the opportunity to chair this important hearing in his place instead.

Led by the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, which is ably chaired by Ellen Tauscher, this committee has a long tradition of attention to the United States’ strategic posture and to nuclear weapons policy in particular. The National Defense Authorization Act of fiscal year 2008 calls for the establishment of a commission, a congressionally appointed, bipartisan commission, to analyze and make recommendations on our strategic posture.

I am pleased to welcome the Commission chairman and vice chair and other members of the Commission, but in particular Bill Perry and Jim Schlesinger, to the hearing today.

All of you deserve enormous credit for bringing this hearing, this investigative process, to the conclusion you have in the reports you filed today.

In the interim reports you released last December, I agree with your broad definition of strategic posture and the priority you placed on dealing with the most urgent post-Cold War threat, which you termed in that report “catastrophic terrorism.” You went on to write or say, “A terror group cannot make a nuclear bomb from scratch, so the best defense against this threat is to prevent terror groups from acquiring a nuclear bomb or the fissile material from which they could perhaps make a bomb.” I have been making this argument since the demise of the Soviet Union, and I commend you for emphasizing it in your interim report.

I have not yet had a chance to read your report in its entirety, but I can see that it places our most pressing strategic challenges in the right context.

My friend and colleague, Ellen Tauscher, was the driving force behind the legislation that set up this commission, and I want to yield to her now for any opening remarks you may care to make.

Ms. Tauscher.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon to everyone.

This hearing will cover very important ground. Led by the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, which I have the privilege of chairing, the House Armed Services Committee has long called for a vigorous and open debate on the future direction of the United States' strategic posture and a fresh examination of our nuclear weapons policy.

In the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2008, which the House approved almost exactly two years ago, we created a congressionally appointed bipartisan commission to analyze and make recommendations on the United States' strategic posture. The Commission was designed to foster and frame a debate on these critical issues. It was also designed to help forge a consensus on the United States' nuclear weapons policy that has been lacking for too long.

It is with great pride and anticipation that just 14 months ago, this committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee announced the names of the 12 individuals who agreed to serve on the Commission. I see several of the commissioners here, and I want to thank each and every one of you for your service.

I am most delighted to welcome the Commission Chairman and Vice Chairman, Dr. William Perry and Dr. James Schlesinger, to this hearing. I also want to praise the United States Institute of Peace, its President, Richard Solomon, and Paul Hughes, the Commission's Executive Director, for their vision, hard work, and shepherding of the Commission's final product and the publishing of the final report.

I would also like to thank Secretary Gates and the Strategic Systems Programs of the Navy, where we were able to get the funding for this very, very important commission. As you know, forming commissions is a part-time job of the Congress. Finding the money is the very, very difficult job of the Congress. And without Secretary Gates and the Navy coming forward, we would not have the final product that we have today.

Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, both of you have brought a great wealth of experience and expertise in your service to the country of many decades; and it could not be more timely or more important for this work to be done now.

As the Commission noted in both its interim and final reports, what the United States does with its nuclear weapons, and how it does it, is linked to our ability to dissuade other nations from pursuing nuclear weapons and to our efforts to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and nuclear weapons. Of course, other nations will continue to make their own decisions about whether to pursue nuclear weapons for many reasons. As the Commission has noted, as long as there are nuclear weapons, the United States must maintain a strong, safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent.

But, as you have also said, how we maintain and manage our nuclear arsenal directly impacts how credible we can be when press-
ing for nonproliferation. We have committed under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to work in good faith toward nuclear disarmament. Both President Obama and Russian President Medvedev have recently reaffirmed this pledge.

So the question we basically put before the Strategic Posture Commission was: How do we craft a nuclear weapons strategy that balances these fundamental challenges? How do we maintain an effective and credible deterrent, while trying to reduce our nuclear arsenal, and persuade other nations not to pursue nuclear weapons? Each of you has spoken eloquently about this need for balance in your testimony, and the Commission’s final report reflects that challenge as well.

Dr. Schlesinger, I appreciate your emphasis on the stabilizing effect and nonproliferation benefits that accrue from the extended deterrence we provide our allies.

And Dr. Perry, I am grateful for your forceful observations about the urgency of our efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Let me recite a part of your testimony, Dr. Perry. And I quote: “All commissioners accept the view that the United States must support programs that both lead and hedge; that is, programs that move in two parallel paths—one path that protects our security by maintaining deterrence, and the other which protects our security by reducing the danger of nuclear weapons.”

That is at the heart of the matter. I want to commend you all for your leadership in steering the Commission to consensus. Thank you, again, for your work and for being here today.

I agree with you, Dr. Perry, that we are at a moment of both opportunity and urgency, and I look forward to a good discussion.

Congratulations to you all. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time. And I yield back.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, Ms. Tauscher.

Let me turn now to the distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. McHugh, for his opening remarks.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. McHugh. I thank the chairman.

I certainly want to begin by adding my words of welcome to two most venerable witnesses; and we are deeply blessed to have both Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, sage national security and foreign policy experts, with us here today with such long and distinguished histories of public service. Joining these two gentlemen, as has been noted, on the Commission are ten other extremely accomplished individuals, and we are fortunate, as both a committee and as a Nation, to have the service of these great people on what has certainly been a long-standing and repeatedly difficult and complex task.

It goes without saying that the report before us is thoughtful and it is thorough. And I want to add my words, Mr. Chairman, to yours of appreciation to our Strategic Force chair, Ms. Tauscher, and Ranking Member, the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Turner, for their great work. They asked for recommendations as to the most appropriate strategic posture and the most effective nuclear weap-
on strategy for the United States, and I think this great commission has really set the stage for delving into those answers.

I expected, when this all began, widely divergent views on such matters as nuclear weapons and the policies associated therewith; however, it is, to say the least, unusual—and I would note, highly refreshing—to learn that this commission, embodied as it is with 12 thoughtful individuals, could achieve bipartisan consensus on these issues. I said to Dr. Perry before the hearing, perhaps they could give us here in this Congress some lessons on how to come and to work together.

I am, most of all, hopeful that the Administration, working with Congress on both sides of the aisle, can now build upon this bipartisan momentum as it works to define its nuclear policies and posture in the future.

The report highlights some basic truths and realities. First and foremost, it reaffirms the need for the United States to maintain a nuclear deterrent capability to deter potential adversaries and, equally important, to reassure our allies who depend upon our nuclear umbrella and, as a result, forsake developing their own nuclear arsenals.

One month ago, the President delivered a speech in Prague calling for a “world without nuclear weapons.” But, as the Commission rightfully noted in its interim report, no less than a fundamental transformation of world political order will be required to obtain a goal of zero.

While no President has wanted nuclear weapons, all came to the stark realization that possessing them was necessary as long as others had sought or had them in their possession. In a speech last fall, Secretary Gates observed, “Try as we might and hope as we will, the power of nuclear weapons and their strategic impact is a genie that cannot be put back in the bottle—at least for a very long time.”

While the President’s long-term vision is laudable, I fear its allure may be a distraction from the near-term nuclear security and proliferation challenges faced by our Nation and the international community. These challenges are multifaceted and start with how we bring an end to the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs—two efforts that, at least in my view, pose a real and immediate threat.

A month ago—and perhaps coincidentally on the same day as President Obama’s speech—North Korea launched a satellite atop a long-range Taepodong-2 ballistic missile, ignoring all international warnings. According to recent reports, some in the Administration expect that nation to conduct yet another nuclear test. In the meantime, Iran continues to perfect its assortment of long-range missiles and pursue key elements of a potential nuclear weapons capability, despite United Nations (U.N.) Security Council efforts.

As the report before us observes, unless these programs are halted, “There is likely to be a proliferation cascade that would greatly increase the risks of nuclear use and terrorism.”

We are also faced with the challenge of securing nuclear materials and facilities worldwide, implementing safeguards into civilian nuclear programs to prevent breakout weapons capabilities,
and preventing terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear bombs, weapons design, or fissile material. Both Russia and China are modernizing their strategic forces program and—as this report points out—ironically, our edge in conventional capabilities has induced the Russians to increase their reliance on both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.

A credible and reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent will be required for the foreseeable future. However, senior government officials and many outside experts have expressed concern about our stockpile's long-term condition and the confidence that many have in that stockpile and its supporting infrastructure.

The commander of U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) testified this spring, “The most urgent concerns for today's nuclear enterprise lie with our aging stockpile, infrastructure, and human capital.” To that end, I believe we need a program to modernize our stockpile and infrastructure.

I want to be clear; I am not calling for new weapons capabilities. However, I believe there are prudent steps we can and must take to introduce greater reliability, safety, and security features into our arsenal and, thus, create conditions for maintaining a highly reliable deterrent with fewer warheads. Furthermore, we should insist on conscious efforts to strengthen the U.S. nuclear infrastructure, support investments and stockpile stewardship, and sustain our exceptional scientific, engineering, and production workforce.

What I find worrisome in this evolving nuclear policy is that they rest almost entirely on treaties and arms control measures. The previous Administration—wrongly in my view—appeared to have an aversion to arms control. I believe it is a valuable tool, but it must be practical, verifiable, and enforceable. Furthermore, actions taken to decrease our nuclear forces should be counterbalanced by other means to strengthen our security and that of our allies—missile defenses, advanced conventional capabilities, unconventional capabilities, intelligence, nonproliferation, and other aspects of a comprehensive strategic posture strategy.

Lastly, Secretary Gates warned we cannot predict the future. That uncertainty cannot be underestimated as we weigh the nuclear policy and posture decisions ahead of us.

The Commission has given us much to consider. I want to thank them again, and I look forward to their testimony.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SPRATT. Dr. Schlesinger and Dr. Perry, the floor is now yours. Once again, thank you for the effort all of you put into this report. Your written testimony has been received; we will make it part of the record so you can summarize as you see fit. We welcome you to make a full statement of the positions that are taken in the report.

By arrangement, Dr. Perry, I believe we will begin with you. The floor is yours. Thank you again for coming.

STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM J. PERRY, CHAIRMAN, THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES

Dr. PERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
When the Congress formed this Commission, they formed it deliberatively and consciously as a bipartisan panel, and we have functioned as such. At our very first meeting, Congresswoman Ellen Tauscher came out to join us and urged us to come forward—in spite of the fact that we are a bipartisan group—to come forward with a consensus report. Easy for her to say, but very difficult to execute. Nevertheless, we have come surprisingly close to that, as you will see in reading the report.

I am going to use my time, Mr. Chairman, by trying to relate some of the major findings in our report to what I perceive to be the Administration’s emerging strategic policy. I base this judgment primarily on statements and speeches made by President Obama.

First of all, he has said the country—indeed, the world—faces a new threat: nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. But, at the same time, we need to hedge against the possible resurgence of the old threat. The Commission firmly agrees with that judgment.

Secondly, he said that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT, is critical in dealing with this new threat. The United States should work to strengthen the NPT and it should agree to put more resources into the arms of the NPT, dealing with inspection and enforcements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Commission agrees with that judgment as well.

Third, he has said that we—in order to get success in preventing proliferation, we need the effort of all nations; and to get their full cooperation entails that the United States and other nuclear powers make progress in disarmament. I agree fully with that judgment. The Commission members have different views on the extent to which our progress in disarmament and getting that full cooperation is really coupled together. Some of us think it is coupled quite closely—I am of that view—and others think the coupling is quite loose.

Fourth, the President made a very clear statement in his speech in Prague that the United States seeks a world without nuclear weapons and, therefore, we should be reducing the number and the salience of our nuclear weapons. But, he went on to say, as long as nuclear weapons exist, it will be important for the United States to maintain safe, secure, reliable, and credible deterrent forces. I strongly agree with that full statement.

Some of our members do not agree that we should be seeking a world without nuclear weapons or that it is even feasible to do that. But, even those members fully support the part of the statement of maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable deterrent, and they also support reduction in the numbers, provided that reduction is done bilaterally.

Fifth, the President is seeking new treaties: the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, and seeking to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Our commissioners agree with the goal of moving for a new follow-on START Treaty, and we offer some comments in the report about how that might be done. We also agree that seeking a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty is desirable.

On the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ratification, I strongly agree with that move. Indeed, I believe that the U.S. will not be
able to assume leadership in the world if we do not actually make that ratification, but I must say that the Commission is split on that issue. About half of our members disagree with the goal of ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and, indeed, if the Senate proceeds to hold hearings on that, I suspect some of our members may be testifying on one side of the issue and others testifying on the other side.

All of us, however, agree that there are certain steps that the Administration should take before they submit the treaty for ratification, most importantly, to get a clarification among the Permanent Five (P-5) as to exactly what is banned by the test ban treaty. There seems to be some ambiguity on that today.

The sixth issue is missile defense. The President says he wants to move forward on the European missile defense system as long as the Iranian threat persists and he wants to seek a way to find cooperation on that with the Russians. The commissioners agree on both of those goals. I must say that our commissioners have a wide variety of views on the value and importance of missile defense. But on those two issues—at least on missile defense—we were able to reach an agreement.

Seven, on civilian nuclear programs, the President has argued we should get and propose programs to get the loose fissile material under control, and stated we need a new international framework to discourage the spread of enrichment and processing in the civilian nuclear field. We strongly agree with both of those conclusions.

And finally, the President has said we should roll back the North Korean nuclear program and prevent Iran from getting nuclear. The Six-Party Talks have failed to stop the North Koreans from building and testing the nuclear bomb, and the compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is in tatters. The President has argued there must be consequences under the NPT. We firmly agree with that. We do not offer him or you advice on how to achieve those goals but, quite clearly, those are very important goals.

Now, beyond commenting to you on these policy issues, I wanted to highlight some specific recommendations we made on how to sustain the nuclear force; particularly, how to sustain this force in the face of American policies of no testing, no design of weapons of new capabilities, and with the budget limitations that have been existing.

Under those three limitations, it is a challenge to sustain this nuclear deterrence. The key to that, I believe—indeed, all of our members believe—is the strength of the nuclear weapons laboratories. We are blessed in that they have outstanding technical staffs at these laboratories, and they have had remarkable success in what is called the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) and the Life Extension Program (LEP). But as our weapons age, it is going to be harder and harder to sustain that success.

Inexplicably, I believe our government has responded to that growing problem by cutting the staff at the weapons laboratories. We believe that that trend should be reversed and indeed, beyond that, we should add responsibilities for laboratories for other national security programs—for example, programs in energy technologies; programs in supporting our nuclear intelligence assess-
ments; and, even more broadly, programs in research that have the effect of making a research lab—national research laboratory—out of the three weapons laboratories.

If this is done, we believe it would be important to change the name of the laboratories. They are not just weapons laboratories, but they are national security laboratories. And they should be renamed, and they should be funded accordingly. We have a unique national asset in these weapons laboratories, and we should be treating it accordingly.

Now, if that is done, they need to be given more freedom of action appropriate with that new mission. And we need, also, to look at their direction, which is at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), to whom the laboratories report. NNSA was created by Congress some years ago on the view that they would be able to provide that direction. But they have not had full success in doing that. We believe that the NNSA should have more autonomy of action than it has today, and it should be restructured so that it reports to the President through the Secretary of Energy instead of the present reporting arrangements.

I would like to conclude my comments by looking briefly ahead.

The future world out there is heading in the direction today in a very dangerous direction. There is a danger that we are going to have a collapse of the nonproliferation regime, the danger that there will be a cascade of proliferation in the world, particularly if Iran succeeds in going nuclear; and both of those will increase substantially the risk of nuclear terrorism. And there is a danger that the nuclear powers in the world will renew their nuclear competition.

All three of those dangers are facing us right now quite seriously. But there is also a more hopeful future out there: that we will be able to contain the proliferation, that we will be able to stymie nuclear terrorism, and the nuclear powers, instead of competing in the nuclear field, will learn how to cooperate in that field.

Our report tries to describe for you a strategy which leads to that more hopeful future rather than the more dangerous world that I have described.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Perry can be found in the Appendix on page 35.]

Mr. SPRATT. Dr. Schlesinger, the floor is yours. We welcome your statement.

STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, VICE CHAIRMAN, THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. McHugh, and Ms. Tauscher, our godmother.

The Congress established the Commission on Strategic Posture in order to provide recommendations regarding the appropriate posture for the United States under the changed conditions of the early 21st century. The appointed commissioners represented a wide range of the political spectrum and have had quite diverse judgments on these matters.

Nonetheless, urged by Members of Congress—not the least of whom was Ms. Tauscher—the Commission has sought to develop
a consensus view. To a large and, to some, an astonishing degree, we have succeeded.

Secretary Perry and I are here to present our consensus to this committee. We are, of course, indebted to the committee for this opportunity to present these recommendations.

For over half a century, the U.S. strategic policy has been driven by two critical elements: to maintain a deterrent that prevents attacks on the United States, its interests and, notably, its allies; and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The end of the Cold War and, particularly, the collapse of the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact, along with the substantial edge that the United States has now developed in conventional military capabilities, have permitted this country sharply to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons, radically to reduce our nuclear forces, and to move away from a doctrine of nuclear initiation to a new stance of nuclear response only under extreme circumstances of major attack on the United States or its allies.

On the other hand, the growing availability of nuclear technology, along with a relaxation of the constraints of the Cold War, have obliged us to turn increasing attention to the problem of non-proliferation and, in particular, to the possibility of a terrorist attack on the United States.

Secretary Perry has just spoken on the diplomatic issues and the problems of arms control, of preventing proliferation, and the risks of nuclear terrorism. I, for my part, will focus on the need—despite its substantially shrunken role in the post-Cold War world—to maintain a deterrent reduced in size, yet nonetheless reliable and secure, and sufficiently impressive and visible to provide assurance to the 30-odd nations that are protected under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

Since the early days of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States has provided extended deterrence for its allies. That has proved a far more demanding task than the protection of the United States itself. In the past, that has required a deterrent sufficiently large and sophisticated to deter a conventional attack by the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact. It also meant that the United States discouraged the development of national nuclear capabilities, particularly during the Kennedy Administration, both to prevent proliferation and to avoid the diversion of resources away from the development of conventional allied capabilities.

With the end of the Cold War and the achievement of the U.S. preponderance in conventional capabilities, the need for so substantial a deterrent largely disappeared. Nonetheless, the requirements for extended deterrence will remain at the heart of the design of the U.S. nuclear posture. Extended deterrence will remain a major barrier to proliferation; both the size and the specific elements of our forces are driven more by the need to reassure those that we protect under the nuclear umbrella than by U.S. requirements alone.

Even though the overall requirements of our nuclear forces have shrunk some 80 percent since the height of the Cold War, nonetheless, the expansion of NATO and the rise of Chinese nuclear forces—significant, if modest—have altered somewhat the requirements for our own nuclear forces.
Two: Even though the most probable source of a weapon landing on American soil increasingly is that of a nuclear terrorist attack, nonetheless, the sizing of our own nuclear forces, in addition to other elements of our deterrent posture, remains driven in large degree by Russia. Our NATO allies and, most notably, the new members of NATO, remain wary of Russia and would eye nervously any sharp reduction of our nuclear forces relative to those of Russia, especially in light of the now greater emphasis by Russia on tactical nuclear weapons.

Consequently, the Commission did conclude that we should not engage in unilateral reductions in our nuclear forces, and that such reduction should occur only as a result of bilateral negotiations with Russia under a follow-on START Agreement. Any such reductions must, of course, be thoroughly discussed with our allies.

Three: Our East Asian allies also view with great interest our capabilities relative to the slowly burgeoning Chinese force. Clearly, that adds complexity; for example, to the protection of Japan—though that remains a lesser driver with respect to overall numbers. Still, the time has come to engage Japan in more comprehensive discussions akin to those with our NATO partners in the Nuclear Planning Group. It would also augment the credibility of the Pacific Extended Deterrent.

Four: The Commission has been urged to specify the number of the nuclear weapons the United States should have. That is an understandable question, particularly in light of the demands of the appropriations process in the Congress. Nonetheless, it is a mistake to focus unduly on numbers alone without reference to the overall strategic context. Clearly, it would be illogical to provide a number outside the process of negotiation with Russia, given the need to avoid giving away bargaining leverage.

In preparation for the Treaty of Moscow, as with all of its predecessors, the composition for our prospective forces was subject to the most rigorous analysis. Thus, it would seem to be unacceptable to go below the numbers specified in that treaty without a similarly rigorous analysis of the strategic context, which has not yet taken place. Moreover, as our Russian friends have repeatedly told us, strategic balance is more important than the numbers.

Five: Given the existence of other nations’ nuclear capabilities and the international role that the United States necessarily plays, the Commission quickly reached the judgment that the United States must maintain a nuclear deterrent for “the indefinite future.” It must convey not only the capacity, but the will to respond in necessity.

Some members of the Commission have expressed a hope that at some future date we might see the worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons. The judgment of the Commission, however, has been that the attainment of such a goal would require a transformation of world politics.

President Obama also has expressed that goal, but has added that as long as nuclear weapons exist in the world, the United States must maintain “a strong deterrent.” We should all bear in mind that abolition of nuclear weapons will not occur outside that “transformation of world politics.”
Six: We sometimes hear or read the query: Why are we investing in these capabilities which will never be used? This is a fallacy. A deterrent, if it is effective, is in use every day. The purpose in sustaining these capabilities is to be sufficiently impressive to avoid their “use” in the sense of the actual need to deliver weapons to targets. That is the nature of any deterrent but, particularly so, a nuclear deterrent. It exists to deter major attacks against the United States, its allies, and its interests.

Years ago, the role and the details of our nuclear deterrent command sustained and high-level national attention. Regrettably, today, they do so far less than is necessary. Nonetheless, the role of the deterrent remains crucial. Therefore, I thank this committee for its continued attention to these critical matters.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, Dr. Schlesinger.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Schlesinger can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

Mr. SPRATT. I will start the questions.

Unless there is another member of this panel that would like to have the opportunity to make a statement? Dr. Foster?

Let me turn everyone’s attention to something that receives too little attention, I think, and that is tactical nuclear weapons. We tend to think and talk about Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and heavy-lifting systems, but these systems, if our principal concern is nonproliferation, may be a bigger danger to us than the larger systems which are subject to deterrence.

In your report, you say “The imbalance of non-strategic nuclear weapons will become more prominent and worrisome as strategic reductions continue and will require new arms control approaches” that are assuring to our allies.

Would you explain to us what your worries are about tactical nuclear weapons? Do we have a good count as to these weapons? Are we assured that they are securely held somewhere? Are we satisfied we know what we should know about the universe of nuclear tactical weapons abroad and in the world?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I believe that the Russians have removed, as they said they would, their tactical nuclear weapons to the Ural Mountains. Nonetheless, as the Soviet conventional forces have deteriorated—as the Russian conventional forces have deteriorated, the Russians have expressed increasing interest, doctrinally, on reliance of tactical nuclear weapons to protect the vast territories of Russia, which they fear are under potential attack from NATO and, notably in Siberia, underpopulated Siberia, China. As a consequence, they have maintained not only a doctrine but a sizable number of tactical weapons.

We, in the United States, have tended to stress strategic weapons because we are reaching overseas, but we have a significant number of nuclear weapons that are tactical here in the United States. Nonetheless, as a result, our weapons are here in North America and the Russians are close to some of our allies in Europe, which causes them to be rather nervous.

So I hope that our negotiators, as they deal with the strategic level, will also look at the total number of nuclear weapons, includ-
ing tactical, so that there is some kind of balance that is main-
tained and, in consequence, reassure some of our allies.

Mr. SPRATT. Do you think then, this requires a special approach
different from that of larger systems? For arms control purposes,
do we require——

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that we need to have an inspection sys-
tem that we can rely on, and that we need to have a clear declara-
tion by the Russians where their tactical nuclear weapons are, and
an inspection of those tactical nuclear weapons.

The strategic weapons are easier to deal with because we can
count them by overhead reconnaissance.

Mr. SPRATT. Dr. Perry.

Dr. PERRY. I would emphasize one of the points that Dr. Schles-
ing made, but I mostly want to emphasize the asymmetry be-
tween the U.S. position and the Russian position.

The Russians perceive that they need their tactical nuclear
weapons to buttress their conventional—decline in the conventional
forces—and that leads them to put a major emphasis on tactical
nuclear weapons.

We, on the other hand, could meet our military requirements
without any tactical weapons. The reason we keep tactical nuclear
weapons is more a political reason, which is because our allies in
Europe feel more comfortable when we have weapons deployed in
Europe. So we do it to assure the credibility of our extended deter-
rence to our allies, not because we have a military necessity. We
could meet the real needs of our allies—the military needs—with
our strategic forces, but they feel much more comfortable if we
have forces deployed in Europe.

So it is a very different situation. There is great asymmetry be-
tween the two. Therefore, as we go into arms control and start to
consider tactical weapons, we have to recognize it is going to be a
difficult problem because of the asymmetry and the perceived need
for tactical weapons between the United States and Russia.

Mr. SPRATT. One further question from me, and that is, the Com-
mission also found that “Missile defenses are effective against re-
gional nuclear aggressors, including against limited long-range
threats are a valuable component” of our strategic posture. Would
you explain what you meant there?

And you went on to say that you would be concerned about ac-
tions taken on our part that increase—that lead to counteractions
by Russia and China. Would you elaborate on what you mean
there?

Dr. PERRY. We were focusing on the role of missile defenses to
deter or, if necessary, defend against nuclear weapons in the hands
of regional powers; for example, North Korea and Iran. But to the
extent we build and deploy such systems, those systems also have
some capability against Russia and China.

So our concern here was that we do not want to have a missile
defense so extensive and so capable that it threatens the Russians
and the Chinese deterrent to the extent that they believe they are
going to have to increase the number of missiles deployed. We do
not want our missile defense systems to stimulate an increase in
offensive missiles to be used against us. That was the point we
were trying to make.
Jim, would you like to comment on that?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I would like to add one point: there is a distinction between Europe, in which some of the nations are relatively indifferent to missile defense, and Japan, which has gotten deeply into missile defense.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much.

Mr. McHugh.

Mr. McHugh. Thank you again for being here.

I would like to pursue a little bit further, for my own edification, this issue of deterrence, particularly with respect to our allies. I appreciate Dr. Schlesinger's comments.

Too often, perhaps understandably, when we think about our allies and the deterrence that our nuclear umbrella has provided, we think Europe. But there is another theater where Japan certainly has its limits as to how many questions they feel they can ask about the nuclear effectiveness or commitment of this Nation to continue to provide that umbrella before they strike out on their own. And the whole objective, it seems to me, of arms limitation, nuclear proliferation, is to try to keep those who don't yet have them from wanting to get them.

I understand the comments about a number. Clearly, we can reduce warheads. But how do we go about partnering with our allies to make sure that they still feel we have the structure and the forces necessary to continue to provide that umbrella and deterrence?

Is it through consultation? Is it at some point a mathematical formula? Actual deployments? How do you pursue that? Because if you are not successful, then other nations will make themselves a part of the nuclear family, will they not?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, no nation that I know of is reassured by mathematical formulas. It will require direct consultation. In the past, as I indicated in my earlier comments, we have not had those kinds of direct consultations with Japan, which is the country that has, perhaps, the greatest leaning amongst the 30-odd nations that we have under the umbrella, to create its own nuclear force; and, therefore, intimate discussions with the Japanese, I think, are mandatory at this stage.

In the past, the Japanese have not really worried about the Soviet nuclear threat. But as the Chinese have increased their capability, they have become increasingly concerned about China and, thus, they want to have direct consultation with us and reassurance from us.

In the case of Europe, some nations are relatively relaxed and others are nervous. For the most part, given the attitude of the European public, they would prefer that this whole question of nuclear weapons be left out of the headlines.

Mr. McHugh. Dr. Perry, any thoughts?

Dr. PERRY. My comment is that this issue goes back many, many decades. There is nothing new about it.

Back in the late 1970s, when I was Under Secretary of Defense, the Soviet Union was deploying their intermediate-range missiles in Europe, threatening Western Europe; and we were planning an offset to that, a deterrent force to that, which we were doing in consultation of our NATO allies. And our judgment at the time was...
that we could provide that offset with what we call “strategic weapons”—in this case, would be submarine-launched missiles.

But it was very, very clear in consultation with allies that, although they saw the logic of the argument, they felt that it was necessary to have our forces deployed in Europe in order to give them the confidence that our deterrence would be upheld. And to a certain extent, that issue is still with us today even though conditions have changed quite a bit.

So we still see great concern in both Europe and in Asia about the credibility of our extended deterrence. It is important for us to pay attention to their concern and not to judge whether deterrence is effective by our standards, but we have to take their standards into account as well. And the failure to do this, as suggested by Dr. Schlesinger, the failure to do this will be that those nations will feel that they have to provide their own deterrence—in other words, they will have to provide their own nuclear weapons. So that will lead to a failure of proliferation.

Mr. McHugh. We discussed very briefly the CTBT. I would just be curious, Dr. Schlesinger and Dr. Perry, if you would care to comment, your view of the future for that treaty, should the United States sign on. Obviously—it seems to me, at least—there will be a number of nations that will never sign, or certainly at this point in time have very few incentives to sign. And although the treaty calls for a certain number of nations having to sign before it is binding, there is probably a policy imperative the United States would almost unilaterally, once signing it, adhere to it.

What is your opinion on the CTBT?

Dr. Schlesinger. Well, a number of nations in Western Europe, in particular, and the President have both said that they would like to see the United States ratify and the treaty come into force. The likelihood of the latter is very low, because all of the nations on Annex 2 must ratify before the treaty comes into force. That includes China, India, Pakistan, Egypt, Israel, Iran and, most notably perhaps, North Korea in this connection.

If we were—some suggest that American diplomacy can bring them around. I would point out that we have had extended diplomacy with respect to North Korea over nuclear weapons for approaching 20 years, which has not been a signal success; and that if we put pressure on them, we are likely to be asked for a bribe, to put it bluntly.

I think that Dr. Perry will point out that there is value, even if the treaty doesn’t come into force, for diplomatic reasons. But my own judgment is that the substantive benefits of the treaty are modest and, therefore, I think that roughly half of the members of the Commission did not endorse ratification.

Dr. Perry. I will repeat again that I believe that the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty enhances America’s national security whether or not the treaty enters into force.

I have had considerable discussion with leaders all over the world on this question, and I am persuaded that our signing will put substantial pressure on India, Pakistan, and China to ratify. I would be willing to bet that their ratification will follow ours if we do it in reasonable time. And that, itself, will be a substantial benefit to national security.
I cannot conceive of the circumstances under which North Korea would willingly ratify the treaty, and I do not believe it makes any sense for the United States or other nations to be in a position of trying to bribe them to do so. But with or without their signature, I still think this is an enhancement of U.S. security.

Mr. McHugh. Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. McHugh, I am going to yield back. Thank you for the sidebar consultation. I would just note that when our side’s turn comes again, I will be yielding to Mr. Turner, who is the ranking member on Strategic Forces, to lead off the questioning after ours.

And again I thank the two gentlemen. I think we have a lot of ground to cover on this issue of tactical nuclear weapons and how we approach discussion with our friends, the Russians, et cetera. But I am sure the other members want to talk about that as well. So I will yield back at this time.

Dr. Perry. Can I make one other comment relative to the points Mr. McHugh was making?

Mr. McHugh. He will say “yes.” He is a nice man.

Mr. Spratt. Certainly, Dr. Perry. I beg your pardon. We are trying to resolve the problem of who speaks next up here, but you have the floor.

Dr. Perry. Assuming this treaty comes to the Senate for ratification, there will be safeguards on the treaty. We certainly advocate safeguards. Some of those safeguards will require legislation and funding, and the House will be as much involved in that as the Senate will be. So I think this is a very important issue for the House.

Certainly, one of the most important safeguards is maintaining the vitality and the strength of our weapons laboratories; and that requires funding, which the House will have to play a major role in.

Ms. Tauscher. Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, I would like you to elaborate—each of you, if you don’t mind—on your recommendations for the National Nuclear Security Administration.

About 10 years ago, Mr. Thornberry was the chairman of the panel—and I was the ranking member—that helped create the National Nuclear Security Administration. It was a little bit of a compromise, to say the least. But we believed that it was very important to get the NNSA out from under what we considered to be a “kudzulating” bureaucracy.

As you know, the Department of Energy (DOE) regulates refrigerator coolant and also has the nuclear weapons. It takes quite a wide brain pan to manage all of that, and we believe that for national security reasons, intelligence reasons, and many other reasons that the weapons labs and the complex in general and its budget policies needed to be elevated in a way that could give it much more standing and much more of a national importance, not just also something that the Department of Energy did.

So I would really be interested in your talking about—in your report, you basically talk about that the NNSA should now report to
the Department of Energy but, effectively, to the President. If you could expand a little bit on that, I would appreciate it.

Dr. Schlesinger. As you will recall, in 1985, the Blue Ribbon Task Force recommended greater autonomy for the nuclear enterprise within the Department of Energy. Congress passed legislation in 1999 after a lag, establishing the NNSA.

The problem is that the NNSA has not escaped the large bureaucracy of the Department of Energy. Instead of really dealing with the NNSA, it is affected by general counsel’s office of the Department of Energy, environmental safety and health, and other elements within the DOE bureaucracy. And this bureaucratic tendency has trickled down to the NNSA itself, so that everything that is done out there in the labs or in the plants kind of gets examined not only by the site office, the successors to the operations office of the past, the NNSA, and by the Department of Energy, so that the costs keep rising.

And one of our concerns in establishing national security laboratories is that who, elsewhere in the government, wants to pay those operating additional overhead costs, which can be quite excessive. We need to reduce the costs, the non-operational costs, of the laboratories and the plants in such a way as to provide some leeway with regard to the total budget. And the Congress, of course, can help in that regard.

With respect to reporting to the President through the Secretary of Energy, our intent was to get the DOE bureaucracy out of the way. And we need to have clear-cut lines of authority. Whoever is the head of NNSA must take it on as a task to reduce the kind of bureaucratic interference that has marked these recent years.

Ms. Tauscher. Dr. Perry, can you also talk about the role that you imagine for the Cabinet officials that you recommend take on formal roles regarding the NNSA programming budget matters, like the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)?

Dr. Perry. When we talk about this expanded national security role for the laboratories, it is today performing some of those functions already, but it is doing it on a hit-or-miss basis from the point of view of funding, and there is no overall guidance or overall organization of how this is done. And as Dr. Schlesinger has already indicated, the different agencies who fund this are paying for the direct work, but they are not paying for the overhead costs of that work.

So there needs to be a better way of doing that. And our view was that that would entail creating a broader responsibility for the laboratories. That was part of this stated mission. It also requires some oversight, then, on the part of the Defense Department, for example, and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), which have the responsibilities for those programs. So we imagine there needs to be some form of a steering group of those various—formed of the secretaries of those various agencies which provide the oversight and the funding necessary to the providers of the programs.

But the hit-or-miss program-specific funding that is done today is not an appropriate way to effectively and appropriately use the great skills where you have those laboratories. This is just one way
of doing it. We are open to other ways of doing it, but it needs to be approached—we need a fresh approach to it—tailored to that particular set of problems.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Dr. Schlesinger, I just want to state the obvious, and I am speaking as Congresswoman Tauscher, not somebody who is potentially nominated for another job in the State Department. I would like to chat with you a little bit about the CTBT. Since 1993, we have had an executive order, presidential executive order that has put the United States in a place of suspending testing. In 1999, when the CTBT was failed to be ratified, I think there was tremendous concern about science-based stockpile stewardship. The difference between 1993, 1999 and 2009 is not only a lot of time, but an overwhelming grade of “A” on the success of science-based stockpile stewardship.

And effectively ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, there is an out that says if you have a national imperative you can test. So since we have been living since 1993 without testing, since the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ratification allows for the out, could you talk to me and explain to us what the hesitancy is, considering that I think we have universal agreement that the stockpile stewardship program, the science-based program, is enormously successful and that in time since 1993, 1999 and now 2009, I think we have a lot more evidence that the safety, security and reliability of stockpile has been more than secured without testing.

Dr. S CHLESINGER. Well, we don’t know the last. We have the Stockpile Stewardship Program which has given us some basis for encouragement. But as you know, the directors of the laboratories have pointed out that the stockpile continues to age and that there are greater uncertainties. The question before us is whether or not the United States should surrender the option to test, given the uncertainties. I might point out that there are other members of this commission who feel more passionately on this subject than do I. But it was—this issue has been around as a dialectical tilting ground at least since the signing of the underground test moratorium, test treaty. A question is whether we are completing something that is in the minds of the proponents of the last 60 years when it is not of any substantive benefit to the United States.

It is, as Bill Perry points out, potential diplomatic advantage, as you will no doubt hear when you arrive in the Department of State. But symbolism has a role to play in diplomacy. It is not necessarily the ideal element in judging force posture. Years ago, somebody observed that the CTBT was a bad idea whose time has come. And the question that was posed to me the other day by somebody from the laboratory said, each element of that should be examined carefully, why is it a bad idea and why has its time come?

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Dr. Schlesinger. Dr. Perry.

Dr. PERRY. I was the Secretary of Defense at the time we signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. All of these issues were considered at that time. No one in the Department of Defense, and certainly not the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was willing to say me signing this treaty means we never again can conduct tests. It means we agree not to conduct tests. But the treaty has, as you all know, a provision by which we are going to withdraw if we see our supreme national interest at stake. We felt that wasn’t quite strong
enough at the time, so we added to it, as one of the safeguards, that the director of the weapons laboratory had to certify on a yearly basis the adequacy of the stockpile to perform the deterrence missions.

And that the President, on receiving this then, if he got a statement that said they were unable to certify it, that was a clear signal where we would withdraw from the treaty and begin testing. So I don’t think it is an issue that we have forever given up our right to test. We are simply formalizing in a treaty the agreement we have already made—the policy we have already established—not to test. And we still have the—we will still have, even after signing the treaty, the provision that we can withdraw from it if we see the—national interest.

Now, if I thought we were going to have to exercise that withdrawal provision any time in the foreseeable future, I would not be in favor of the treaty. As I look at what we are doing in the laboratories and on the Stockpile Stewardship Program and the Life Extension Program, the considerable technical capabilities we have there, I am confident that that is not going to happen. That is contingent though on the Congress and including the House, not just the Senate, funding adequately the work that goes on at the laboratories.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. SPRATT. By unanimous consent, we turn now to Mr. Turner. And after his questions we will recess momentarily to go to the floor. We have three votes. We beg your indulgence. We will be back as quickly as possible. Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank Ranking Member McHugh for recognizing me. Dr. Perry, Dr. Schlesinger, thank you so much for taking your long legacy of great accomplishment in this field to give us some present guidance to Congress. I am the ranking member of the Strategic Forces Committee and I want to recognize our Chair’s work, our Chairman, Ellen Tauscher on this, and her leadership so that we could have this document for Congress to take a look at. In looking at both your testimony and the report, there is one area that I wanted to highlight.

Dr. Schlesinger, you said in your written testimony, “why are we investing in these capabilities which will never be used?” And you said, “This is a fallacy. A deterrent, if it is effective, is in ‘use’ every day.” And then I look at the report and its writings in the executive summary. And the report says, “so long as it continues to rely on nuclear deterrents, the United States requires a stockpile of nuclear weapons that are safe, secure, reliable, and whose threatened use in military conflict would be credible.”

You go on to cite, the controversy that occurred over the Reliable Replacement Warhead discussion, and indicate there appears to be some confusion as to what we need to do and how we go forward. And then you conclude with something to the effect of, “so long as modernization proceeds within the framework of existing U.S. policy, it should encounter minimum political difficulty.” Well, I thank you for those words because you contribute a great deal of insight with your report as how to get over the issue of political difficulty,
because this is an area that requires congressional attention and congressional investment.

Even if we all have the goal of the future elimination of nuclear weapons, that investment of that strategic and important deterrent is echoed throughout your report.

Another theme in your report on this posture review is the issue of strategic balance. And I have here some of the quotes that you have given in the report about Russia's strategic forces modernization. For example, you say, “current strategic modernization programming includes various elements. Russia is at work on a new intercontinental ballistic missile ... a new ballistic missile submarine and the associated new missile and warhead, a new short-range ballistic missile, and low-yield tactical nuclear weapons.” It was on page 12.

And you say, “Russia's military leaders are putting more emphasis on non-strategic nuclear forces” on tactical use in the battlefield, also on page 12. And you indicate, “senior Russian experts have reported that Russia has 3,800 operational tactical nuclear warheads,” and you expound by saying, “the United States does not know definitively the numbers of nuclear weapons in the Russian arsenal.” I would like if you would, both of you, to speak for just a moment on the need for strategic balance as we look to Russia's efforts of modernization.

I know we are all currently focused on Iran and North Korea, but what should we look to with what the Russians are doing and how that might be some impetus for us to look for investment in our own nuclear complex. Dr. Perry.

Dr. Perry. I would say, first of all, Mr. Turner, that Russia's needs—security needs—are very different from the United States' security needs. The most important element of the difference is the asymmetry in our conventional forces. We have, probably, the most powerful conventional forces in the world. Russia perceives, and I think correctly, that their conventional forces are quite weak, particularly relative to the neighborhood in which they live. So they have a totally different need for tactical weapons than have we. Having said that, when we consider any arms agreements with them, all of our commission believes at some level of reduction we should not go lower until or unless their tactical weapons are considered in the equation. Because there is, in terms of maintaining our extended deterrence, the perception in the minds of our allies is going to be very important on whether they believe we can continue to maintain that extended deterrence. And if they see an overwhelming superiority of tactical nuclear weapons in Russia relative to the United States, then we will lose some of the credibility of our deterrence.

So indeed, the need is very different between Russia and the United States. But at some level, we have to consider their tactical weapons very seriously in any balance.

Mr. Turner. Dr. Schlesinger, on the issue of modernization and our deterrent?

Dr. Schlesinger. I think that Dr. Perry has covered it to a substantial degree. We don’t need the same number of tactical nuclear weapons that the Russians have. We do not need to match them. In the strategic area, we do need to match them because the Rus-
sians fear that they cannot defend their vast territories against a hypothetical NATO attack which they talk about publicly and an engagement with China which they talk about privately, given the underpopulation of Siberia. So they feel a need, and we do not have to match them. But we have to be responsive to the requirements of our allies. That involves the dual capable aircraft, which are in Europe at the present time, which some of our military folks have thought are cost-ineffective and should be removed.

We must not remove those capabilities in Europe without careful consultation with our allies. The Japanese have different requirements that they have expressed to us with regard to the specific components of local nuclear forces, and they have to be taken into account in a different context. But overall, we do not need to match the Russians in terms of the aggregate number of tactical nuclear weapons.

Mr. TURNER. Gentlemen, thank you.

Mr. SPRATT. We have got about three minutes to make it to the floor. We will be back as soon as we possibly can. We appreciate your indulgence. And when we come back, Ellen Tauscher will take the gavel because I have a meeting with the Speaker. Thank you again for your participation and for your report.

[Recess.]

Ms. TAUSCHER [presiding]. The committee will be in order. At this time I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from Arkansas, Dr. Snyder.

Dr. S NYDER. Thank you. If the timing was just right, Madam Chair, you could call the committee to order, then run down there and testify if they just timed this confirmation stuff just right. But I guess it is not to be. Thank you all, Dr. Schlesinger and Dr. Perry, for being here. I appreciate your patience with us as we went to vote. I think it is apparent to those that have studied your report and to those of us that have been more peripheral in our study of your report that it is a very serious compilation of these very important issues.

I want to ask more, I guess, of a diplomatic question. It seems to me that the timing of your report is a good one in terms of the relationships between the United States and Russia that, I don't know, in my amateurism, I have sensed, in the last six or eight months or so, that there seems to be renewed interest in the relationship, which, I think, over the last couple of decades, we Americans probably haven't done enough to cultivate. But it seems like these issues that you have brought up, in all their complexity and detail, are an excellent starting point for a relationship between a new administration and leadership in Russia. And I would like to hear you both comment on that question in terms of a broader relationship between the United States and Russia.

Dr. P ERRY. I think that is a very important point, Dr. Snyder. I see that we have a major opportunity now in forming a new relationship with Russia. And what I think Vice President Biden referred to as "pressing the reset button," which I would call it to be in computer terminology "rebooting." I have talked with nearly every major leader in Russia about this in the last two months. The President, the foreign minister, the National Security Advisor, they are all very anxious to do that.
So this is a great opportunity. I must say, though, it is not an opportunity we foresaw when we were working on the report. This has only developed in the last few months. And by the time it developed, our report was already pretty much put together. In the report, we urged working to establish such a relationship. And by the time we put the final words down in the report, we were talking as if that was a great opportunity to do that. But we did not know that that opportunity was going to exist six months ago, eight months ago. So it is a big opportunity, though.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. We are going to have our ups and downs with Russia, but the important thing is to focus on the priorities. With Russia, our priorities are dealing with terrorism, dealing with proliferation, and dealing with arms control. And that other issues that come up, for example, the controversy over Georgia should not mislead us about what is central—or should be central—in our relationship. If one can object to a tenor of American foreign policy, it is a tendency to start chasing rabbits off the main trail rather than focus on what is central to our relationship. That applies to Russia, it applies to China and to others.

Dr. NYDIER. And I am sorry, I left for a while so you may have discussed this but, in the report, you talk about the Nunn-Lugar funds and that additional funding for Nunn-Lugar would be money well spent. And I probably should ask the Chair because she would probably be able to answer my question, but I will ask you. I have sometimes heard the argument over the last several years as somebody who has been very supportive of this program that it has not just been a funding issue; that, in fact, it has been, you know, are projects ready to use the funding? But you all concluded that the primary obstacle was funding the further progress, is that accurate? Or would you amplify on your statements about Nunn-Lugar, please?

Dr. PERRY. I think two things are necessary to make further progress in Nunn-Lugar. The first is the funding. That is a necessary condition. It also requires a Russia that is motivated to fully cooperate. And so it gets back to your first point, that we seem to be developing a new relationship with Russia, and that new relationship should enable us to cooperate, and cooperate effectively, on things that can be done to reduce the risk of proliferation. I don't believe that proliferation is at the top list of their priority of things that need to be done now—dealing with proliferation—but it is on their list, and therefore we ought to be able to find some way of cooperating in that field if we can get other things off the table.

I believe, myself, that the main factor in souring a relationship between the United States and Russia in the last couple of years has had nothing, really, to do with this nuclear field as such; it has had to do with the NATO expansion, it has had to do with the dispute over Georgia. But if we can get those issues resolved, or at least set aside, then we ought to be able to deal effectively and cooperatively with them in the nuclear field.

Dr. NYDIER. I think missile defense has probably been one of the issues that made the relationship difficult too. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Dr. Snyder, new relationship or old relationship, Nunn-Lugar overall has been a substantial success. Nothing
works perfectly. Of course, funding is not the only issue. It is difficult dealing with the Russians because of security problems. But if you look over the years, their nuclear weapons are now reasonably well protected. They haven't done as well on fissile material. We would hope that they will do better. But the fact that their nuclear weapons are under good security is an accomplishment that would not have occurred without Nunn-Lugar.  

Ms. TAUSCHER. I am happy to yield five minutes to gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. Dr. Schlesinger, when you said in your testimony that a deterrent, if it is effective, is in use every day, I remembered the emotional response I had when I was privileged to spend an overnight on one of the big boomer subs. And standing there beside that missile tube, the captain said, you know, if we ever have to use one of these, we will have failed. Thank you for reminding us how important they are. I think in practice, everybody knows the rules of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. If you don't have nuclear weapons, you absolutely certainly cannot have nuclear weapons until you have them, and then it is okay and you are a member of the club. Witness India and Pakistan, North Korea, Iran tomorrow; certainly the threat is proliferating.

I think that there is a very high probability that our antiballistic missile shield in Alaska will never be used. The only country, I think, that would use it to come over the pole today is Russia, and they would very quickly overwhelm our system there. There is no other country—I believe China may be tomorrow—but no other country that is going to come over the pole, no other country that is going to launch from their soil. We would certainly detect that, and we would vaporize them and they know that.

I think that if a nuclear weapon is delivered by missile on us, it will certainly come from the sea. They will then sink the ship and they will believe there are no fingerprints. You may argue that there is a signature in the weapon or a signature in the missile that you could detect. I am not sure they believe that. And I am not sure we would be certain that it wasn't a nonstate actor who was doing that, so our response would be very difficult to predict. Since this is true, and we have large coasts, how are we going to deter that kind of an attack, and how could we protect ourselves from it?

Dr. PERRY. Mr. Bartlett, let me take one component of your question which has to do with North Korea. It is not the whole story you are talking about, but it is an important part of that story. I do not believe the United States should accept North Korea as a nuclear power. And I believe that the U.S. Government should make every effort to roll back nuclear weapons they have, and I think there is some possibility we can be successful in that. The possibility of success depends on being able to apply what, I think, could reasonably be called coercive diplomacy. Of course, for diplomacy to have a chance of success, it is going to require the cooperation of several other key nations, most importantly China. So the key that I see to having any success in rolling back the North Korea nuclear program is finding a way of getting a common strategy with China on how to do that. Because while we supply some of the—have some of the positive incentives for North Korea, or
more importantly South Korea and Japan have some of the positive incentives for North Korea, all of the negative incentives short of military action are in the hands of China. And so we have to have some cooperation from China to make that happen. Thank you.

Mr. BARTLETT. Jim.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Bill has outlined a world of hope about nonproliferation, and I hope that he is correct. But our—I am sorry. Bill has outlined some hope with regard to nonproliferation, and I hope he is correct. But as you have indicated——

Ms. TAUSCHER. Dr. Schlesinger, your mike is not on.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Oh, I see. Bill has, the third time, outlined hope with regard to nonproliferation. I hope he is correct. Needless to say, I worry about the North Koreas and Irans of this world. But our record that you mentioned at the outset of your comments—about India and Pakistan are now part of the club—our overall record over the last 60 years has not been awe-inspiring. We attempted to deflect Israel. We were not particularly hardworking at that, but we were not successful. We attempted to deflect France and of course, as you mentioned, India and Pakistan. So we must work hard on seeing whether, in this new environment, nonproliferation becomes a higher priority for many of the countries of the world. But we must also recognize that it is not a certainty that we will be successful. And the—I think that is sufficient.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. I remain concerned about the challenge of deterring nations that would attack us from the sea without any notions to where it came from. We have huge coasts on both sides. I am not sure how we protect ourselves there. I think this is a vulnerability that warrants considerable attention. Thank you all very much for your service and your testimony.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett. I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Madam Chair, and this is really a great day for us to arrive at this point after several years of working on this issue, and it is due largely in part, I believe, to your leadership. So it is pretty exciting to be here together doing this. Gentlemen, thank you, both of you doctors for being before us and for all of your service to our Nation. I think that one of the biggest threats the world faces today is the terrorist groups like al Qaeda, seeking and working to obtain nuclear weapons. And the IAEA has proposed strengthening the NPT safeguards to enhance protection of fissile material, but it is not getting the support that it needs for their proposals.

So my question to you would be, considering—what should we do to try to prevent terrorists from obtaining these nuclear weapons? In particular, what are the reasons that the IAEA is not getting support for the proposals they put forward on this?

Dr. PERRY. I believe that the proposals of the IAEA for strengthening the—for the so-called additional protocols and strengthening their ability to inspect, for example, are well founded and would have been very—would have enhanced the whole world’s security had they been accepted. Secondly, I have not yet given up on those proposals, or something like those proposals being accepted. To try to get to your question, what is the reason the nations have turned that down: it is not a very happy reason, but nations—Iran and
other nations—have been able to make the case that they have a right to enrich uranium, they have a right to reprocess plutonium, and that nuclear powers like the United States, Russia, and so on should not be trying to abridge that right. They have put it as an issue of unfairness.

Ms. SANCHEZ. So sort of a sovereign right and, who are we to have it and not they?

Dr. PERRY. And that in my mind is a fallacious issue, but it is an issue which has gained quite a lot of resonance among 60 or 70 countries—nonnuclear countries—who have been swayed by that argument. I think we need to be much more effective in addressing that argument. It is not—when they join the NPT, their rights come along with obligations, and those obligations, of course, have to do with not taking any actions that would use the facilities and equipment and technologies that have been given them to move towards nuclear weapons.

So this battle—this debate is not yet over. And I think we should be much more effective in pursuing the move to get support for the additional protocols of the IAEA. Otherwise, the move to contain the uranium enrichment and protocol will be lost and the probability of a nuclear weapon falling in the hands of terrorists is greatly increased.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Doctor, do you have anything to add?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, we have had somewhat—we, the United States have had a somewhat checkered career with the IAEA. Unfortunately, we have allowed, in recent years, for our relations to deteriorate, which is a mistake. The IAEA is an independent body; it has been influenced by the United States effectively in the past, less so today. I hope with a change of certain personalities—both in the Administration and at the IAEA—that those relationships can be restored and that the United States can have an improved relationship.

Unfortunately, in the eyes of many people, the IAEA is just another part of the United Nations, which many don't like. The fact of the matter is that the IAEA is, has been and, potentially, will be a very effective part of nonproliferation and American foreign policy, and that we ought not to allow personal estrangements to affect our overall support. On a broader issue, going back to the Atoms for Peace Program 1956, it is my personal judgment that that was based upon the premise—and I think Bill may have covered this—that was based upon the premise that those who received technical information under Atoms for Peace had also accepted and embraced nonproliferation. If they failed to do that, they are not entitled to technical information, as in the case of Iran.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. My last question. Secretary Gates has stated that, currently, the U.S. is the only declared nuclear power that is neither modernizing its nuclear arsenal nor has the capability to produce a new nuclear warhead, and has called on the modernization of nuclear security complex and the stockpile itself. I agree with President Obama and Secretary Gates that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States needs to maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal. However, I am concerned by what ex-
actly maintaining an effective and modernized arsenal entails and how it would be perceived by the international community.

So my question to the two of you is: What is the Commission's recommendation for the most efficient way to maintain a credible, safe, secure and reliable deterrent and, with the comments of Secretary Gates, what has been your knowledge of what the rest of the international community has said to the fact that we might want to start back up?

Dr. Perry. A major section of the report goes into that in quite a lot of detail. I will try to summarize the main points from it. That an important key is maintaining robust, healthy, vigorous weapons laboratories. And related to that is a strong Stockpile Stewardship Program and effective Life Extension Program. As we proceed—but as our weapons continue to age, we may find that the things that they have done in the past to keep the credibility of our deterrence may not be adequate.

And so I believe we should be open to, as we take each new weapon into its Life Extension Program, we should be open to a variety of approaches on how that should be done. If it can be done through the Life Extension Program techniques in the past, it should be done that way. If it requires mining other weapons for the components to get that reliability we could do it that way. But if it involves a new design, I think we should be open to doing that also. And the decision should be based on the technical necessity, not on a political judgment.

Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Doctor. Doctor, do you have a comment to add?

Dr. Schlesinger. I think that we ought to drop phrases like "modernization" and "new weapons" from our vocabulary, and that we just talk about refurbishment, maintenance of the stockpile. Some of these weapons are aging. As Bill mentioned, we need to have life extension systems. We ought not to be arguing about modernization, which has created more clouds than light. And, if we can get over what have been some unnecessary quarrels from the past, we would be far better off.

Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Doctor. Thank you, Madam Chair, for your indulgence.

Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Ms. Sanchez. I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Coffman.

Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Madam Chairman. One question from both of you, and that is: to what extent are we still relying on the mutually assured destruction doctrine, and do you think that missile defense systems have to—or to what extent missile defense systems have a stabilizing or destabilizing impact on security?

Dr. Schlesinger. You are going to buck that one to me, Bill. With regard to mutual assured destruction: that has declined, and declined substantially, in importance. I do not expect that the Russians are prepared to attack us, and I do not expect that we would need to respond with a full strike. I think that both sides have learned from the past that a lot of our rhetoric got out of hand. So we are going to maintain an assured destruction capability as a hedge, as Bill might say, against the possibility—however remote it may be—that the Russians would engage in a strike against the United States, so as to deter them.
But I think that that possibility is vastly remote. With respect to the problems of missile defense, I think that we have to recognize that neither Russia or China are going to be put off by an American missile defense. They have already demonstrated the capacity of maneuverable warheads, penetration aids, against such a defense and they can penetrate it.

Years ago, going back to the 1960s, when the Soviet Union deployed the missile defense around Moscow, Secretary McNamara said, no, we are not going to try and create a damage-limiting capability, we are not going to have a missile defense of our own; we are going to use offensive weapons to penetrate that defense. That was our strategy then, and that would be the strategy of Russia or China if they thought that we had a thick missile defense. And as a consequence, there is always this interaction with sophisticated nuclear powers that a missile defense that worries them will simply lead to an expansion of their offensive forces, which is something that we do not want to see.

Dr. Perry. I associate myself with the answer that Dr. Schlesinger just gave; the same answer.

Mr. Coffman. Thank you, gentlemen. Does the success of mutually assured destruction assume that we are dealing with rational nation-states?

Dr. Perry. Yes.

Mr. Coffman. Would you classify Iran as a rational nation-state?

Dr. Perry. Yes, I would. I can see many other instances where it does not apply; in particular, with a terrorist attack. But everybody can come to their own judgment about how rational Iran is. My own belief is that they understand that if they attack the United States, their country would be destroyed and that they are not seeking suicide.

Mr. Coffman. Is North Korea a rational nation-state?

Dr. Perry. I think yes to that, also. And for the same reason, I do not think the regime in North Korea is seeking suicide.

Dr. Schlesinger. In my view, you hear irrational statements from the President of Iran. Whether or not he completely believes them or whether he is engaged in stirring up support—domestic support—for his position in the run-up to the election or whatever, the supreme leader in Iran maintains control. And it is not the President of Iran, who has, from time to time, been pulled back from some of his bolder statements by other Iranians. I worry about the degree of control that the Iranian government has over the Iranian guards who express flamboyant statements that exceed those of the President of Iran.

And I think that one of the things that we ought to be doing in our own deterrent policy is to make sure that we know where the guards' core bases are and, in the event of trouble, that they get wiped out.

Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you gentlemen.

Ms. Tauscher. I am going to yield to Mr. Langevin for five minutes, the gentleman from Rhode Island.

Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Madam Chair. Dr. Schlesinger, Dr. Perry, thank you for your testimony here today and the fine work you have done on this report. If I could go back to the discussion
just a minute ago about the role of missile defense and, in particular, the relations with China and Russia. Again, the Commission found that missile defense is effective against regional nuclear aggressors, including against limited long-range threats, are a valuable component of U.S. strategic posture. And you recommend the United States should ensure that its actions do not lead Russia or China to take actions that increase the threat to the United States and its allies and friends. Can you expand on that discussion a little more about the balance of missile defense before it provokes Russia and China to take action because we went too far with a strong missile defense program?

Could you talk about the role that missile defenses play in achieving that objective, the strategic stability that the Commission emphasized throughout the report? And is there a way, by the way, to enlist Russia and China’s support for a missile defense system so that it would protect us against either accidental missile launches or an irrational actor who would launch a missile.

Dr. Perry. Well, a system to provide defense against a very limited Iranian capability should look very different from a system designed to defend against a Russian larger-scale missile attack. And, therefore, we ought to be able to have one without threatening the other. Moreover, to the extent we are focused on defense against Iran, a nuclear missile in Iran is actually a greater threat to Russia than a nuclear missile is against the United States. And, therefore, there ought to be some way of not only communicating with Russia on this problem, but maybe even cooperating in providing that defense. And to the extent you have that communication and even the possibility of cooperation, then there should be no basis for the Russians increasing or expanding their missile program to try to offset this missile defense which, in any event, is not directed against them. But it does require good communication with the Russians.

Mr. Langevin. If I could just interject there, what I find troubling, of course, is that when the previous Administration took steps to begin the process of putting the missile defense system somewhere in Europe, the Russians found that very provocative, and it clearly increased tensions between the United States and Russia. Is there no way to bring them to the table to support a limited defense, missile defense system?

Dr. Perry. Well, we have—I think the first step in getting that issue resolved is very close communications with the Russians which would start off with a joint threat assessment. We and the Russians, both looking at what Iran is doing, together assessing what the threat is and what should be done about that. Because I say, again, they are at least as much a threat to Russia as they are to the United States. And if we are working together on this issue, then it should not become—it should not morph into an issue in which the system is seen as posing a threat to Russia. I believe this is a solvable problem. And based on my own discussion with Russians over the last two or three months, I think we are probably already on the way to getting that problem solved.

Dr. Schlesinger. There has been discussion over the course of the last 30 or 40 years about unauthorized launches; alternatively, accidental launches. I think that a missile defense for either China
or Russia clearly directed against that remote possibility would be acceptable to them. What would not be acceptable is a degree of deployment of missile defenses that clearly undermines their own deterrence. Now, there has been a good deal of unnecessary talk about our deployment in Poland and in Czech Republic. It seems to me that we decided to deploy before the Iranian threat really had developed. But the most important thing is: in the eyes of the Russians, they profess that this is a threat to their own deterrent and they go on and make speeches on that subject.

The fact of the matter is they know full well that it is not a threat to their deterrent and they say privately, why in God's name did you deploy in Poland and the Czech Republic? If you had deployed in France or Britain or Germany, we would not have this problem, but you are provoking us by deploying in former satellites of the Soviet Union, and we regard that as provocative. I think that that might have been avoided by the conversations with the Russians early on.

Mr. Langevin. Thank you both for your answers and your testimony today, and your invaluable service to our country. Thank you.

Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from New Mexico, Mr. Heinrich.

Mr. Heinrich. Dr. Perry, Dr. Schlesinger, I want to thank you for being here today and for all the work the Commission did. Gentlemen, the Commission concluded on page 62 that “the intellectual infrastructure is also in serious trouble. A major cause is the recent (and projected) decline in resources.” The report went on to say that, if funding for the NNSA does not increase, that the Agency will be unable to transform the weapons complex, perform the necessary life extension work, and sustain the scientific base of the weapons program. Indeed, the report points out that the NNSA is already planning to reduce lab budgets by 20 to 30 percent regardless of the impact on scientific capabilities, and without having even studied that impact.

Recognizing that you believe that a funding study should be performed, I would like to ask: Did the Commission reach any consensus on the level of resources that should be allocated in the short-run to NNSA to ensure that these three key objectives can be achieved?

Dr. Perry. The short answer to your question is no, we have not done a detailed cost analysis. We have reached a clear judgment that it is a mistake to proceed with this decrease in the intellectual capital with the laboratories. Without any question, I have to add my own personal judgment that we should restore it to the previous levels. That can be done either by increasing the overall budget for NNSA, or by time-phasing out some of the physical infrastructure changes that are being made, and we gave a set of priorities on how that might be done. But, without question we ought to put first priority to maintaining the intellectual capital at the three laboratories.

Dr. Schlesinger. The first point, of course, is: do no harm. And given the prospective budget levels, the labs are in for a 20 or 30 percent cut, which would do damage. So we need to sustain at least the present level. The problem that we have had is that the plant infrastructure for many years has been starved in order to preserve
the laboratories. And now that infrastructure needs to be replaced. And against a level budget, all that we can do in the eyes of NNSA is to reduce the funding of the laboratories, and we think that that is a mistake. I think that you have to break out the restoration of the metallurgical lab at Los Alamos separate from the funding for the labs.

Now, I would hope that there would be a careful analysis of how much money is required to sustain that intellectual capability, not this year, not next year, but over the decades ahead. And we have not done that. I don't know whether we have the resources to do that in the Commission, but it needs to be done in a serious way. Otherwise, one faces these kinds of arbitrary cuts that, in this case, will damage the intellectual capital at a time that it is deteriorating simply because of the aging of those who have worked on this work in the laboratories for many years and who are now retiring.

One other comment I would make is that the intellectual and the human capital, if we continue on the process of reducing the funding for the laboratories and the personnel at the laboratories, and we lose more laboratories, that is an irreversible move. It took us decades to build up that human capital, and it will take us many more decades to try to restore it. So it is a very serious concern.

Mr. HEINRICH. Would you have any comments on the consequences of not funding the national security labs on the potential for future arms reduction attempts and negotiations?

Dr. PERRY. Just one point I would make.

I testified to this committee that I strongly support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. That support is contingent, in my mind, on maintaining a strong intellectual capacity at the laboratories.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. We have repeatedly made the point that one of the purposes of our posture is to provide reassurance to the allies who depend upon us. And to the extent that they watch the deterioration of our intellectual capital at the laboratories, their confidence in us diminishes and the willingness of some to develop their own nuclear capabilities may increase.

So the overall impressiveness of the U.S. nuclear establishment is part of what maintains stability in the international environment.

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you both. I yield back.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Heinrich. Dr. Perry, Dr. Schlesinger, members of the Commission, the United Institute of Peace, and staff that have worked so hard on this: let me tell you that this document that you have worked on is one of the finest I think I have ever seen, and far beyond meets my expectations when we created this commission two years ago.

Let me thank you for your significant and extraordinary pedigrees that you have brought forward. You have done extraordinary service for this committee, for the Congress, and for the American people. Let me thank you for your patriotism. Some of you have been in service of this country all of your adult lives, and I will tell you that for all of the work that you have done, this, I think, is a fantastic culmination.
I will tell the American people and my constituents the most impressive thing about this is that, not only is it so important and timely, but it is readable. And I really commend this to average Americans who are interested in understanding where we are on this issue.

When I met with you the first time, one of the things I asked you for was a narrative for the American people, for us to be able to lift this above partisan politics and ideology to a place where average Americans could understand exactly where we are, exactly what the threats are, exactly what our opportunities are, and to really lever the time of a new Administration—a time when we have a nuclear treaty review, when we have a new nuclear posture review coming out, nonproliferation treaty review, a potential for a CTBT, all of these coming together in this extraordinary time.

And I think that you have given a road map by an all-star team, and I hope we can keep this team together. Perhaps we will find more work for you to do in the not-too-distant future.

Thank you very much for your service, and the hearing is adjourned.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Madam Chairman, you are far too modest. Think of this as your baby.

Ms. TAUSCHER. My baby, by the way, is graduating from high school and is going to Bucknell University to play Division I volleyball. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McHugh, and Members of the Armed Services Committee, it is a pleasure to be here today with my colleague Dr. Schlesinger to present to you the findings and results of the work of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States.

Last year, Congress appointed our 12-person bipartisan group to conduct this review of U.S. strategic posture, and asked me to serve as Chairman with Jim Schlesinger as Vice-Chairman. This Commission has deliberated for the last eleven months and is now prepared to report to the Administration, to the Congress, and to the American people, and we are here today to do so. We all applaud the wisdom of Congress in setting up this Commission. For too long, there have been unanswered, even unasked, questions about the strategic posture of the United States, especially the nuclear dimensions of that posture. This “strategic silence” has not served America well. Continuing questions about our broader strategic posture have gone unaddressed, while the military, geopolitical, and technical needs that underlie these questions have grown ever more insistent. We understood from the outset that the lack of consensus about the future of the U.S. nuclear deterrent was a key motivator in Congress’s charge to the Commission. So your tasking last year to the Commission was timely. We hope that our report will be a useful input to the new administration as it prepares to undertake a new nuclear posture review.

The Commission has greatly benefited from the input of a number of members of Congress, outside groups and individuals of every stripe that care deeply about these issues and their country. Likewise we have been enriched in our understanding of these issues by the thoughtful perspectives and advice of nations that are U.S. allies, friends, or fellow nuclear powers. We received unstinting assistance from the Executive Branch, which has been individually and collectively supportive of the Commission. The United States Institute of Peace, its employees and contractors have provided outstanding support to the Commission, and I thank them. I also want to make special mention of and praise the members of our five Expert Working Groups and their leaders, who have volunteered countless hours of their time in supporting the Commission and its work and provided us with strong intellectual assistance of the highest caliber.
While each Commissioner would have written a report that would be worded somewhat differently than our final report, it is most significant that with the exception of parts of the chapter on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), this is a consensus document. And even with CTBT, while we could not agree on common language overall, we did agree on recommendations that would prepare the way for Senate reconsideration of the Treaty. We strove to ensure that the essence of our disagreement was presented as clearly and succinctly as possible so that interested individuals and groups can review the arguments, weigh them carefully, and reach their own conclusions.

At the beginning of the Commission’s work, I did not imagine that such an ideologically disparate group of senior experts would find so much common ground. And the trail we followed to arrive at this document was not always easy for us, logistically, intellectually, or emotionally. But the seriousness of the issues, and the stakes involved for America and the world, called forth the “better angels” in all of us Commissioners, producing the largely consensus document you have before you today. We hope that the Executive Branch and Congress will also face these critical security policy issues in a similar nonpartisan spirit.

In conducting its work, the Commission has adopted a broad definition of strategic posture. We defined the scope of our work to include all dimensions of nuclear weapons, including the key infrastructures that support them, and all the major tools to counter the nuclear threat to the United States and its allies, including arms control, missile defense, and countering nuclear proliferation. But we also defined some limits to our inquiry. For example, we chose not to expand our scope of work to address issues associated with all weapons of mass destruction, though we did address the question of whether and how nuclear weapons have a role in deterring attacks with biological weapons. Neither did we examine threats such as cyber attacks and space conflict, though this does not mean we consider them unimportant, and believe they merit serious examination in the near future. Also, our pre-eminent conventional military capabilities are themselves a major strategic force, but we understood Congress was not seeking our advice on these matters.

When one considers the destructive power of the nuclear weapons within our strategic posture, which generated important disagreements throughout the Cold War and after, it is not surprising the American nuclear posture has been, and will continue to be, highly controversial on key issues. What was surprising is the extent to which our commission did reach agreement on numerous issues related to our deterrent capabilities, nonproliferation initiatives and arms control strategies – what I believe are the three key components of U.S. strategic posture in the years ahead. The Commission agreed that the nation must continue to safeguard itself by maintaining a nuclear deterrent appropriate to existing threats until such time as verifiable international agreements are in place that could set the conditions for the final abolition of nuclear weapons. That is, we seek to safeguard our security by supporting military and intelligence programs that maintain our deterrence force. At the same time, we also seek to safeguard our security by supporting largely non-military programs that prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other states, that reduce the number of nuclear weapons worldwide, and that provide better protection for the residual nuclear forces and fissile material. Both approaches are
necessary for America’s future; each can and should reinforce the other; and neither by itself is sufficient as long as nuclear weapons still exist in the world.

Nuclear weapons safeguarded our security for decades during the Cold War by deterring an attack on the U.S. and its allies. We will need them to continue to perform this deterrence role as long as others possess them as well. On the other hand, if nuclear weapons were to fall into the hands of a terror organization, they could pose an extremely serious threat to our security, and one for which traditional forms of deterrence would not be applicable, given the terrorist mindset. We must be mindful that Al Qaeda, for example, has declared that obtaining a nuclear weapon is a “holy duty” for its members. Preventing nuclear terrorism is closely tied to stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and recent developments in North Korea and Iran suggest that we may be at or near a tipping point in nuclear proliferation. (The urgency of stopping proliferation is articulated compellingly in the recent WMD Commission report: “World at Risk.”)

While the programs that maintain our deterrence force are national, the programs that prevent proliferation and safeguard nuclear weapons and fissile material are both national and international. Indeed, it is clear that we cannot meet our goal of reducing the proliferation threat without substantial international cooperation. We cannot “go it alone” on this crucial security issue, nor need we, given that other nations are at risk from nuclear proliferation as much as we. But the international programs that are most effective in containing and rolling back proliferation can sometimes be in conflict with the national programs designed to maintain deterrence. Thus a strategic posture for the U.S. that meets both of these security requirements will necessarily have to make some tradeoffs between these two important security goals when they are in conflict. Some commissioners give a priority to dealing with one threat while others give a priority to dealing with the other threat. But throughout the deliberations of the commission, there was unswerving member loyalty to the importance of assuring U.S. security in the years ahead, and all of our members sought to strike a balance that supports, to reasonable levels, both of these security needs. To a large extent, I am pleased to say, we were able to meet that objective.

The need to strike such a balance has been with us at least since the ending of the Cold War. President Clinton’s policy on nuclear posture spoke of the need to “lead but hedge”. That policy called for the U.S. to lead the world in mutual nuclear arms reductions and to lead in programs to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, while at the same time maintaining a nuclear deterrent force that hedged against adverse geopolitical developments. The leadership aspect of this policy was demonstrated most vividly by a cooperative program with Russia, established under the Nunn-Lugar Program that dismantled more than 4,000 Russian nuclear weapons and assisted Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan in removing all of their nuclear weapons, a signal contribution to a safer world. U.S. leadership was also demonstrated by signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which seeks a permanent end to all nuclear testing, and negotiating with Russia a new arms control treaty for further reductions in nuclear weapons. However neither treaty was ratified by the Senate. The Bush Administration initially took a different view on U.S. strategic posture, but last year Defense Secretary Gates
explicitly reaffirmed that the American nuclear posture would be based on the time-tested “lead but hedge” strategy.

President Obama has moved this strategy forward, stating that the U.S. should work towards the goal of eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons. But he has also said that until that goal is reached, he is committed to maintain a U.S. nuclear deterrent that is safe, secure and reliable. This is, in a sense, the most recent formulation of the “lead but hedge” policy. The Commission believes that reaching the ultimate goal of global nuclear elimination would require a fundamental change in the world geopolitical situation, something that none of us believe is imminent. Senator Sam Nunn, former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who has espoused the vision of nuclear elimination, has described this vision as the “top of the mountain,” which cannot be seen at this time, and the exact path to which is not yet visible. But he argues that we should be heading up the mountain to a “base camp” that would be safer than where we are today, and from which the path to the mountaintop becomes clearer. In Nunn’s view, getting the international political support to move to this “base camp” requires the United States to affirm the vision of global elimination of nuclear weapons. When we reach the base camp, it would:

- provide for U.S. nuclear forces that are safe, secure and can reliably deter attacks against the U.S. and our allies;
- be headed in the direction of the global elimination of nuclear weapons; and
- be stable -- that is, it should be sustainable even under typical fluctuations in geopolitical conditions.

This base camp concept serves as an organizing principle for my own thinking about our strategic posture, since it allows the United States to both lead in the struggle to reduce and ultimately eliminate the nuclear danger; and hedge against a reversal in this struggle, providing an important safety net for U.S. security. While some of the commissioners do not accept this view of the base camp as an organizing principle, all commissioners accept the view that the U.S. must support programs that both lead and hedge; that is, programs that move in two parallel paths --- one path which protects our security by maintaining deterrence, and the other which protects our security by reducing the danger of nuclear weapons.

The first path, “Deterrence,” would include the following components:

- Clarify our policy on use of nuclear weapons to include a statement that our nuclear forces are intended to deter an attack against the U.S. or its allies (extending this security guarantee to our allies is often referred to as “extended deterrence”) and would be used only as a defensive last resort; at the same time, our policy would reaffirm the security assurances we have made to non-nuclear states that signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
- Back up our deterrent and extended deterrent policy by ensuring that our nuclear forces – including the weapons themselves, their delivery platforms, and the surveillance, detection, and command/control/communications/intelligence
infrastructures that support them and the National Command Authority -- are safe, secure, and reliable, and in sufficient quantities to perform their deterrent tasks;

• Maintain the safety, security, reliability and effectiveness of our nuclear weapons stockpile by an enhanced nuclear weapons life extension program as long as it is feasible; but ensure the nuclear weapons laboratories maintain their capability to design a new weapon should that ever become necessary;

• Provide robust support for the Stockpile Stewardship Program. DOE’s highly successful program to ensure the safety, security and reliability of the nation’s nuclear stockpile without testing. This program seeks a comprehensive, science-based understanding of nuclear weapon systems, and entails pushing the frontiers of computing and simulation along with ensuring robust laboratory experimental capabilities. The weapons labs have achieved remarkable success with stockpile stewardship, but continued success is endangered by recent personnel and funding cuts.

• Maintain all three weapon laboratories with programs that fully support the nuclear weapons programs and maintain their scientific and design vitality. Besides weapons programs, their program mix should include fundamental research and energy technologies as well as an expanded national security role, which will benefit other dimensions of the security challenges we face.

• Transform our weapons production capability by reducing and modernizing it, giving first priority to the Los Alamos plutonium facility, followed by the Y-12 site Uranium Processing Facility site after the plutonium facilities are under construction. The goal would be to have a capability to produce small numbers of nuclear weapons as needed to maintain nuclear stockpile reliability.

• Provide proven strategic missile defenses sufficient to limit damage from and defend against a limited nuclear threat such as posed by North Korea or Iran, as long as the defenses are effective enough to at least sow doubts in the minds of such countries that an attack would succeed. These defenses should not be so sizable or capable as to sow such doubts in the minds of Russia or China, which could well lead them to take countering actions, increasing the nuclear threat to the U.S. and its allies and friends and undermining efforts to reduce nuclear numbers, and nuclear dangers.

• Reprogram funding to initiate F-35 fighter aircraft contractor participation with NNSA to assure that the U.S. would maintain current capabilities available to support U.S. allies.

The Commission recognizes the tension between modernization and nonproliferation. But so long as modernization proceeds within the framework of existing U.S. policy, it should minimize political difficulties. As a matter of policy, the United States does not produce fissile materials and does not conduct nuclear explosive tests, and does not currently seek new weapons with new military characteristics. Within this framework,
the United States should seek all of the possible benefits of improved safety, security, and reliability.

The second path, “Reducing the Danger,” includes the following components:

- Re-energize efforts to reverse the nuclear proliferation of North Korea and prevent the nuclear proliferation of Iran. Seek global cooperation to deal with other potential proliferation concerns arising from the anticipated global expansion of civilian nuclear power.

- Negotiate arms reduction treaties with Russia that make significant reductions in the nuclear stockpiles of Russia and the United States. The treaties should include verification procedures and should entail real reductions, not just a transfer of weapons from deployed to reserve forces. The first treaty could decrease deployed strategic warheads to numbers lower than the lower SORT limit (Moscow Treaty of 2002), but the actual numbers are probably less important than the “counting and attribution rules” of preceding agreements. I am quite encouraged by President Obama’s announcement that he will seek a replacement strategic arms agreement before START I expires this December, and the positive Russian response. Follow-on treaties should seek deeper reductions, which would require finding ways to deal with difficult problems such as addressing “tactical” nuclear forces, reserve weapons and engaging other nuclear powers.

- Seek a deeper strategic dialogue with Russia that is broader than nuclear treaties, to include civilian nuclear energy, ballistic missile defenses, space systems, nuclear nonproliferation steps, and ways of improving warning systems and increasing decision time.

- Renew and strengthen strategic dialogue with a broad set of states interested in strategic stability, including not just Russia and our NATO allies but also China and U.S. allies and friends in Asia.

- Augment funding for threat reduction activities that strengthen controls at vulnerable nuclear sites. The surest way to prevent nuclear terrorism is to deny terrorist acquisitions of nuclear weapons or fissile materials. An accelerated campaign to close or secure the world’s most vulnerable nuclear sites as quickly as possible should be a top national priority. This would build on and expand the important foundation of work begun under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Commitment to the investment is necessary to remove or secure all fissile material at vulnerable sites worldwide in four years. This relatively small investment could dramatically decrease the prospects of terrorist nuclear acquisition.

- Seek Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and encourage other hold-outs to do likewise. I strongly support Senate ratification of the CTBT, but I want to be clear that my view is not shared by all commissioners. I believe that the Stockpile Stewardship Program, established as a safeguard when the U.S. signed the CTBT, has been an outstanding success, and, with sufficient funding support, can continue to be. The United States has refrained from testing nuclear weapons for 17
years already and has no plans to resume such testing in the future. Prior to seeking ratification, the Administration should obtain an explicit understanding with the P-5 states as to what tests are permitted by the treaty, and conduct a careful analysis of the issues that prevented ratification a decade ago. (All commissioners agree that these preceding steps should be taken, but not all commissioners support ratifying the CTBT.)

• While the Senate has the responsibility for considering the CTBT for ratification, both the Senate and the House should support funding for any Treaty safeguards the Obama Administration may propose, which will be essential to the ratification process.

• Prepare carefully for the NPT review conference in 2010. If we are able to make progress in a new arms reduction treaty and CTBT ratification, this will reassert U.S. leadership and create favorable conditions for a successful conference.

• Seek an international Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, as President Obama has called for, that includes verification procedures, and redouble domestic and international efforts to secure all stocks of fissile material, steps that would discourage both nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.

• Seek to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its task to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other nations and control access to fissile material. In particular, work with the IAEA to promote universal adoption of the Additional Protocol to the NPT, which would allow extra inspections of suspected nuclear facilities as well as declared facilities.

• Develop and pursue options for advancing U.S. interests in stability in outer space and in increasing warning and decision-time. The options could include the possibility of negotiated measures.

• Renew the practice and spirit of executive-legislative dialogue on nuclear strategy that helped pave the way for bipartisanship and continuity in policy in past years. To this end, we urge the Senate to consider reviving the Arms Control Observer Group, which served the country well in the past.

In surveying six-plus decades of nuclear history, the Commission notes that nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. It is clear that a tradition against the use of nuclear weapons has taken hold, which we must strive to maintain, and urge all nuclear-armed nations to adhere to it.

In sum, this is a moment of opportunity but also of urgency. The opportunity arises from the arrival of the new administration in Washington and the top-down reassessment that must now begin of national security strategy and of the purposes of U.S. nuclear weapons. The opportunity also arises because the Russian government has indicated a readiness to undertake a serious dialogue with the U.S. on strategic issues. The urgency arises because of the imminent danger of nuclear terrorism if we pass a tipping point in nuclear proliferation. The urgency also arises because of an accumulation of difficult decisions affecting our nuclear posture.
The commissioners know and agree on what direction they want to see the world take. We reject the vision of a future world defined by a collapse of the nonproliferation regime, a cascade of nuclear proliferation to new states, a resulting dramatic rise in the risks of nuclear terrorism, and renewed fruitless competition for nuclear advantage among major powers.

As pragmatic experts, we embrace a different vision. We see a world where the occasional nonproliferation failure is counter-balanced by the occasional rollback of some and continued restraint by the many. We see a world in which nuclear terrorism risks are steadily reduced through stronger cooperative measures to control terrorist access to materials, technology, and expertise. And we see a world of cooperation among the major powers that ensures strategic stability and order, and steadily diminishes reliance on nuclear weapons to preserve world peace, not as a favor to others, but because it is in the best interests of the United States, and the world. We commissioners believe that implementing the strategy our report recommends will help the United States lead the global effort to give fruitful birth to this new world.

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Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

The Congress established the Commission on Strategic Posture in order to provide recommendations regarding the appropriate posture for the United States under the changed conditions of the early twenty-first century. The appointed Commissioners represent a wide range of the political spectrum and have had quite diverse judgments on these matters. Nonetheless, urged by members of Congress, the Commission has sought to develop a consensus view. To a large—and, to some, a surprising—extent, the Commission has succeeded in this effort. Secretary Perry and I are here to present that consensus to this Committee. We are, of course, indebted to the Committee for this opportunity to present these recommendations.

For over half a century, the U. S. strategic policy has been driven by two critical elements: to maintain a deterrent that prevents attacks on the United States, its interests, and, notably, its allies—and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The end of the Cold War, and particularly the collapse of the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact, along with the substantial edge that the United States has developed in conventional military capabilities have permitted this country sharply to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons, radically to reduce our nuclear forces, and to move away from a doctrine of nuclear initiation to a stance of nuclear response only under extreme circumstances of major attack on the United States or its allies.
On the other hand, the growing availability of nuclear technology, along with the relaxation of the constraints of the Cold War, have obliged us to turn increasing attention to the problem of nonproliferation and, in particular, to the possibility of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States.

Secretary Perry has just spoken on the diplomatic issues and the problems of preventing proliferation, and the risks of nuclear terrorism. I, for my part, will focus on the need, despite its substantially shrunken role in the post-Cold War world, to maintain a deterrent reduced in size, yet nonetheless reliable and secure—and sufficiently impressive and visible to provide assurance to the thirty-odd nations that are protected under the U. S. nuclear umbrella.

1. Since the early days of NATO, the United States has provided Extended
Deterrence for its allies. That has proved a far more demanding task than
protection of the United States itself. In the past that has required a deterrent
sufficiently large and sophisticated, to deter a conventional attack by the Soviet
Union/Warsaw Pact. It also meant that the United States discouraged the
development of national nuclear capabilities, particularly during the Kennedy
Administration, both to prevent proliferation and to avoid the diversion of
resources away from the development of conventional allied capabilities. With
the end of the Cold War and the achievement of U. S. preponderance in
conventional capabilities, the need for so substantial a deterrent largely
disappeared. Nonetheless, the requirements for Extended Deterrence still remain
at the heart of the design of the U. S. nuclear posture. Extended Deterrence still
remains a major barrier to proliferation. Both the size and the specific elements
of our forces are driven more by the need to reassure those that we protect under the nuclear umbrella than by U.S. requirements alone. Even though the overall requirements of our nuclear forces have shrunk some eighty percent since the height of the Cold War, nonetheless the expansion of NATO and the rise of Chinese nuclear forces, significant if modest, have altered somewhat the requirements for our own nuclear forces.

2. Even though the most probable source of a weapon landing on American soil increasingly is that of a nuclear terrorist attack, nonetheless the sizing of our own nuclear forces (in addition to other elements of our deterrent posture) remains driven in large degree by Russia. Our NATO allies—and most notably the new members of NATO—remain wary of Russia and would eye nervously any sharp reduction of our nuclear forces relative to those of Russia—especially in light of the now-greater emphasis by Russia on tactical nuclear weapons. Consequently, the Commission did conclude that we should not engage in unilateral reductions in our nuclear forces and that such reductions should occur only as a result of bilateral negotiations with Russia under a follow-on START Agreement. Any such reductions must, of course, be thoroughly discussed with our allies.

3. Our East Asian allies also view with great interest our capabilities relative to the slowly burgeoning Chinese force. Clearly that adds complexities, for example, to the protection of Japan, though that remains a lesser driver with respect to overall numbers. Still, the time has come to engage Japan in more comprehensive discussions—akin to those with NATO in the Nuclear Planning Group. It will also augment the credibility of the Extended Deterrent.
4. The Commission has been urged to specify the number of nuclear weapons the United States should have. That is an understandable question—particularly in light of the demands of the appropriations process in the Congress. Nonetheless, it is a mistake to focus unduly on numbers, without reference to the overall strategic context. Clearly, it would be illogical to provide a number outside of the process of negotiation with Russia—given the need to avoid giving away bargaining leverage. In preparation for the Treaty of Moscow, as with all of its predecessors, the composition for our prospective forces was subjected to the most rigorous analyses. Thus, it would seem to be unacceptable to go below the numbers specified in that Treaty without a similarly rigorous analysis of the strategic context—which has not yet taken place. Moreover, as our Russian friends have repeatedly told us: strategic balance is more important than the numbers.

5. Given the existence of other nations' nuclear capabilities and the international role that the United States necessarily plays, the Commission quickly reached the judgment that the United States must maintain a nuclear deterrent for "the indefinite future." It must convey, not only the capacity, but the will to respond—in necessity. Some members of the Commission have expressed a hope that at some future date we might see the worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons. The judgment of the Commission, however, has been that attainment of such a goal would require a "transformation of world politics." President Obama also has expressed that goal, but has added that as long as nuclear weapons exist in the world, the United States must maintain "a strong deterrent." We should all bear
in mind that abolition of nuclear weapons will not occur outside that
“transformation of world politics.”

6. We sometimes hear or read the query: why are we investing in these capabilities
which will never be used?”. This is a fallacy. A deterrent, if it is effective, is in
“use” every day. The purpose in sustaining these capabilities is to be sufficiently
impressive to avoid their “use”—in the sense of the actual need to deliver the
weapons to targets. That is the nature of any deterrent, but particularly a nuclear
deterrent. It exists to deter major attacks against the United States, its allies, and
its interests.

Years ago the role and the details of our nuclear deterrent commanded sustained and
high-level national attention. Regrettably, today they do so far less than is necessary.

Nonetheless, the role of the deterrent remains crucial. Therefore, I thank this Committee
for its continued attention to these critical questions.