[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
KEY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES FACING NASA: VIEWS OF THE AGENCY'S WATCHDOGS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
February 3, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-73
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov
______
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chair
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California Wisconsin
DAVID WU, Oregon LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
BEN R. LUJAN, New Mexico RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
PAUL D. TONKO, New York BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
JIM MATHESON, Utah BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri PETE OLSON, Texas
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
KATHLEEN DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania
ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
SUZANNE M. KOSMAS, Florida
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
VACANCY
------
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
HON. GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona, Chair
DAVID WU, Oregon PETE OLSON, Texas
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio Wisconsin
PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama DANA ROHRABACHER, California
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
BARON P. HILL, Indiana MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
SUZANNE M. KOSMAS, Florida
BART GORDON, Tennessee RALPH M. HALL, Texas
RICHARD OBERMANN Subcommittee Staff Director
PAM WHITNEY Democratic Professional Staff Member
ALLEN LI Democratic Professional Staff Member
KEN MONROE Republican Professional Staff Member
ED FEDDEMAN Republican Professional Staff Member
DEVIN BRYANT Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
February 3, 2010
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Gabrielle Giffords, Chairwoman,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 15
Written Statement............................................ 17
Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Minority Ranking
Member, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 20
Written Statement............................................ 20
Statement by Representative Pete Olson, Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 18
Written Statement............................................ 19
Witnesses:
Hon. Paul K. Martin, Inspector General, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Oral Statement............................................... 21
Written Statement............................................ 23
Ms. Cristina T. Chaplain, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
Management, Government Accountability Office
Oral Statement............................................... 27
Written Statement............................................ 29
Vice Admiral Joseph W. Dyer (U.S. Navy, Retired), Chair,
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
Oral Statement............................................... 33
Written Statement............................................ 35
Discussion
Cost Growth.................................................... 38
Risk Reduction Report Methods.................................. 39
Risk in Ares Program........................................... 40
Regulation of Human Space Flight............................... 40
Technology Development on Ares/Orion........................... 42
Cost Growth.................................................... 42
Systemic Weakness of Government Acquisitions................... 42
Progress on Improving Program Management....................... 43
Public vs. Private Management of Spaceflight................... 44
Managing the Shuttle and Constellation Transitions............. 46
Oversight of Commercial Human Spaceflight...................... 47
Human Rating Requirements...................................... 47
Ensuring Access to LEO......................................... 48
NASA Role in Commercial Spaceflight............................ 48
Shuttle Extension.............................................. 49
Maintaining Vital Skills in Transition......................... 49
Shuttle Extension.............................................. 50
Opinions on Constellation...................................... 50
Gap in Human Spaceflight....................................... 51
Fully Utilizing the ISS........................................ 52
Transitioning Workforce and Infrastructure..................... 53
Safety Implications of Transition.............................. 54
SBIR Program Progress/Minority Contracting..................... 55
Human Rating Requirements...................................... 56
Progress on Constellation...................................... 58
Role of NASA in Commercial Space Program....................... 59
...............................................................
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Hon. Paul K. Martin, Inspector General, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration........................................... 62
Ms. Cristina T. Chaplain, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
Management, Government Accountability Office................... 65
Vice Admiral Joseph W. Dyer (U.S. Navy, Retired), Chair,
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration................................................. 69
KEY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES FACING NASA: VIEWS OF THE AGENCY'S WATCHDOGS
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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2010
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
Committee on Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:06 a.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gabrielle
Giffords [Chairwoman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
hearing charter
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
Key Issues and Challenges Facing NASA:
Views of the Agency's Watchdogs
wednesday, february 3, 2010
10 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
I. Purpose
On February 3, 2010 the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics will
hold a hearing on the key issues and challenges facing the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as seen by the agency's
``watchdogs''--the NASA Inspector General, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), and the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
(ASAP). Leveraging the unique perspectives these organizations
developed in the course of their work at NASA in the areas of
management, mission execution, and security and safety oversight, the
hearing will examine (1) the critical issues and challenges facing NASA
that warrant congressional attention and (2) the corresponding
commitment, initiatives, and policies needed by NASA to successfully
address these issues and challenges. Separate hearings are planned to
address NASA's Fiscal Year 2011 budget request as well as the
administration's human space flight strategy after they are announced.
II. Scheduled Witnesses:
Hon. Paul K. Martin
Inspector General
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Ms. Cristina T. Chaplain
Director
Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Government Accountability Office
Vice Admiral Joseph W. Dyer [U.S. Navy, retired]
Chair
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
III. Overview
During the second session of the 111th Congress, the Committee on
Science and Technology expects to move legislation reauthorizing NASA
activities. To inform Congress' deliberations, it will be important to
hear from the agency's ``watchdog'' organizations on what they consider
to be the key issues and challenges facing NASA. At this hearing, they
will be basing their testimony on recent work that they have carried
out. In particular:
In November 2009, the NASA Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) issued its annual memorandum identifying what it
views as NASA's most serious management and performance
challenges, namely transitioning from the Space Shuttle to the
next generation of space vehicles; managing risk to people,
equipment, and mission; financial management; acquisition and
contracting processes; and information technology security.
On the eve of this hearing, GAO released its annual
assessment of 19 large-scale projects focusing on the extent of
cost and schedule growth in each project. In this
congressionally-directed review, GAO found that 9 of the 10
projects that have been in the implementation phase for several
years experienced cost growth ranging from 8 to 68 percent, and
launch delays of 1 to 33 months, in the past three years.
Contract management has been on GAO's high-risk list since
1990. As part of its high-risk update issued last year, GAO
continued to include NASA's ``acquisition management'' activity
on its high-risk list. The office cited the persistence of cost
growth and schedule delays as reason for the inclusion. GAO has
also recently reported on vulnerabilities of NASA's key
information technology (IT) networks (at the direction of the
2008 NASA Authorization Act) and, at the request of the
Committee on Science and Technology, on future research
utilization of the International Space Station (ISS).
The ASAP found, in its 2009 Annual report released on
January 15, 2010, that NASA faces unprecedented challenges; and
that important decisions on the future of human space flight
face NASA, as well as the White House, Congress, and the
Nation. Significant concerns identified by the ASAP include the
need to: establish human rating requirements for potential
commercial and international vehicle systems that might be used
to carry U.S. astronauts; analyze the ramifications of any
decision to extend the Space Shuttle beyond the current
manifest; transition the workforce from the Shuttle to the
follow-on program; candidly communicate the risks of human
space flight with the public and the Congress; and more
aggressively use robots to reduce the risk of human
exploration.
IV. Potential Issues
What are the top priorities and issues that the
witnesses think Congress should consider in upcoming NASA
authorizing legislation?
What critical challenges is NASA facing and what
corresponding decisions are required? What are the major
concerns regarding NASA's ability to address these challenges?
How does NASA compare, in terms of financial
accountability today to where the agency was three years ago?
How successful has NASA been in instilling the rigor and
discipline necessary for good financial management? What more
needs to be done?
How do acquisition management weaknesses impact
NASA's ability to carry out its missions? What progress has
NASA made in addressing its acquisition management weaknesses?
What issues could interfere with NASA's progress in addressing
these weaknesses?
How significant are the identified vulnerabilities in
NASA's key networks to the agency's ability to successfully
execute future missions? What progress has NASA made in
addressing these network vulnerabilities?
What progress has NASA made in instilling and
maintaining safety in the agency's culture, standards, and
processes? What could impact continued progress?
V. Background Information
Funding NASA for Fiscal Year 2010
To put NASA's FY 2010 budget request into context, NASA has been
tasked with flying the Space Shuttle safely until the end of the decade
and then retiring the Shuttle fleet; completing assembly of, operating,
and utilizing the ISS; developing a new Crew Exploration Vehicle (known
as Orion) and a Crew Launch Vehicle (known as Ares I) by 2015;
returning U.S. astronauts to the Moon by 2020; and conducting a variety
of challenging science and aeronautics programs. The NASA Authorization
Act of 2008 [P.L. 110-422] authorized a FY 2009 funding level for NASA
of $20.21 billion; the appropriation enacted for FY 2009 was $17.78
billion. P.L. 110-422 is a one-year authorization for NASA; the
Committee on Science and Technology is planning to move legislation
reauthorizing NASA this legislative session. In addition, The American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act [P.L. 111-5] included $1 billion for
NASA's Earth science, aeronautics, exploration programs, cross-agency
support, and Inspector General. Recovery Act funds are to be expended
by September 30, 2010.
In response to the president's FY 2010 budget request for NASA, the
House passed the Commerce, Justice, Science (CJS) appropriations bill,
which includes NASA, in June 2009. Agreement on the final bill was
reached with the Senate as part of the FY 2010 Consolidated
Appropriations Act which passed the House on December 10, 2009 and the
Senate on December 13, 2009. The president signed the bill into law on
December 16, 2009. The total amount appropriated for FY 2010 for NASA
approximates the total requested by the president for the agency. While
the FY 2010 enacted appropriations total is about $1 billion greater
than that enacted for FY 2009, the total of FY 2009 appropriations is
basically the same when the $1 billion of funding provided to NASA by
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (a.k.a. ``stimulus funds'')
is added.
Specific language was included in the Statement of Managers
accompanying the consolidated appropriations with regards to human
space flight expenditures. Because Congress is awaiting a decision from
the president on his plans for future implementation of human space
flight following the findings of the U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans
Committee, the statement placed constraints on how the FY 2010
appropriations for human space exploration could be used, with specific
direction on the current program. Specifically, the Statement said:
``Accordingly, it is premature for the conferees to advocate or
initiate significant changes to the current program absent a
bona fide proposal from the Administration and subsequent
assessment, consideration and enactment by Congress.
To protect the jurisdiction and prerogatives of the House and
Senate Committees on Appropriations and of the Congress
generally while providing appropriate flexibility to the
Administration in managing a complex research and development
program, the conference agreement provides $3,466,400,000 for
human exploration architecture development, the same level as
the budget request. Changes in budgetary and programmatic
requirements for fiscal year 2010 from the original request
shall be submitted only in the form of a supplemental budget
request for fiscal year 2010 and not through an initial
operating plan or subsequent updates.''
``Funds are also not provided herein to cancel, terminate or
significantly modify contracts related to the spacecraft
architecture of the current program, unless such changes or
modifications have been considered in subsequent appropriations
Acts.''
In addition, the conferees created a new account called
``Construction and Environmental Compliance.'' It is funded by moving
money from several of the Mission Directorates into this new account
and funds necessary expenses for the ``construction of facilities
including repair, rehabilitation, revitalization, and modification of
facilities, construction of new facilities and additions to existing
facilities, facility planning and design, and restoration, and
acquisition or condemnation or real property, as authorized by law, and
environmental compliance and restoration.''
The following table compares the NASA appropriation enacted for FY
2009, the amount requested by the president for FY 2010, and the
appropriation recently enacted for FY 2010.
NASA's Office of the Inspector General
Authority and Scope of Work
Public Law 95-452, known as the Inspector General Act of 1978,
created independent audit and investigative units, called Offices of
Inspector General (OIGs) at 63 Federal agencies. The mandate of the
OIGs, as spelled out in the Act, is to:
Conduct and supervise independent and objective
audits and investigations relating to agency programs and
operations;
Promote economy, effectiveness and efficiency within
the agency;
Prevent and detect crime, fraud, waste and abuse in
agency programs and operations;
Review and make recommendations regarding existing
and proposed legislation and regulations relating to agency
programs and operations; and
Keep the agency head and the Congress fully and
currently informed of problems in agency programs and
operations.
In accordance with the Inspector General Act, NASA's Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) conducts oversight of NASA programs and
operations and independently reports to the Administrator, Congress,
and the public to further the agency's accomplishment of its mission.
The OIG is led by the NASA Inspector General, a presidentially-
appointed position requiring Senate confirmation. The OIG's Office of
Audits conducts independent and objective audits, reviews, and other
examinations to improve the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness and
to identify any waste and mismanagement in NASA programs, projects,
operations, and contractor activities. In addition, the Office of
Audits oversees the work of the independent public accountant in its
audit of NASA's financial statements. The OIG's Office of
Investigations investigates allegations of crime, cyber-crime, fraud,
abuse or misconduct having an impact on NASA programs, operations, and
resources. The Office of Investigations refers its findings to either
the Department of Justice for prosecution or to NASA management for
action. Through its investigations, the Office of Investigations
identifies crime indicators and recommends effective measures for NASA
management that are designed to reduce NASA's vulnerability to criminal
activity.
Memorandum on NASA's Most Serious Management and
Performance Challenges
In November 2009, the Acting Inspector General released a
memorandum entitled ``NASA's Most Serious Management and Performance
Challenges''. As required by the Reports Consolidation Act of 2000,
this memorandum provides the OIG's views of the most serious management
and performance challenges facing NASA. In determining whether to
report an issue as a challenge, the OIG said that it considered the
significance of the issue in relation to the agency's mission; its
susceptibility to fraud, waste, and abuse; whether the underlying
problems are systemic; and the agency's progress in addressing the
issue. The NASA OIG found that NASA is working to improve agency
programs and operations through various initiatives and by implementing
recommendations made by GAO and itself. However, the NASA OIG said that
challenges remain in several areas.
Transitioning from the Space Shuttle to the Next Generation
of Space Vehicles
The NASA OIG said that ``NASA's greatest challenge continues to be
maintaining the critical skills and capabilities required to safely and
effectively fly the Space Shuttle until its retirement while
transitioning to the next generation of space vehicles. In 2004, the
``President's Vision for U.S. Space Exploration'' caused a substantive
reorganization of NASA's strategic priorities, established a timeline
for the retirement of the Space Shuttle, established the completion
date for the International Space Station (ISS), and set the goals of
returning to the Moon and reaching Mars. However, fiscal realities and
technical challenges have hampered NASA's efforts to effectively
implement the Vision.''
Managing Risk to People, Equipment, and Mission
The NASA OIG said in the November 2009 memorandum that ``Ensuring
the success of NASA's mission is the goal of effective risk management.
Safety and mission assurance controls are key to supporting robust and
reliable operations in the context of very challenging launch and
mission schedules. NASA program managers are constantly confronted with
risks introduced by fiscal realities, schedule demands, and ever-
changing priorities. In addition, the NASA OIG has investigated
instances involving damaged, counterfeit, or inferior parts purchased
by NASA as a result of questionable or even criminal actions of
suppliers. Technical challenges, competition for scarce resources, and
U.S. economic constraints add risk to international and commercial
partnerships. Close scrutiny by NASA management of adherence to the
fundamentals of project and program management, risk identification and
mitigation, and proven acquisition strategies is beneficial toward the
accomplishment of Agency goals.''
Financial Management
The NASA OIG acknowledged that over the past year, NASA continued
to make progress in improving its internal control over financial
reporting by executing its Continuous Monitoring Program (CMP). The OIG
said that ``The CMP assesses and evaluates internal controls,
compliance with generally accepted accounting principles, and evidence
used to support that balances and activity reported in NASA's financial
statements are accurate and complete by requiring Centers to perform a
set of control activities. Throughout FY 2009, the CMP has operated as
designed. NASA has identified exceptions through the execution of the
control activities and has generally tracked and resolved those
exceptions in a timely manner.''
While recognizing that much progress has been made in developing
policies, procedures and controls to improve NASA's financial processes
and systems, the NASA OIG also reported that challenges remain.
Specifically, the NASA OIG said that ``during FY 2009, NASA management
and Ernst & Young LLP (E&Y) continued to identify deficiencies in the
Agency's system of internal control, which impair NASA's ability to
timely report accurate financial information. The most severe
deficiency involves NASA's internal control over legacy property,
plant, and equipment (PP&E).'' The NASA OIG found that the effort to
address PP&E deficiencies is currently focused primarily on
establishing controls over legacy assets that flow from contracts
executed prior to October 1, 2007. The most significant of these legacy
assets are the ISS and the Shuttle. For several years, audits of these
legacy assets have identified serious weaknesses in internal controls
over the completeness and accuracy of the value of the assets. As a
result, the NASA OIG said, ``Agency management and E&Y have been unable
to obtain sufficient evidentiary support for the amounts presented in
the financial statements.''
Each year, federal agencies are required to obtain an audit of
their consolidated financial statements from independent auditing
firms. The E&Y November 2009 report said that E&Y determined that ``. .
. the scope of our work was not sufficient to enable us to express, and
we do not express, an opinion on the consolidated balance sheets . .
..'' This constitutes a ``disclaimed opinion''--one in which the
auditing firm finds a material weakness in the accounting processes of
the agency so severe that they cannot reliably verify the agency's
financial accounts. The Subcommittees on Investigations and Oversight
and Space and Aeronautics held a joint hearing in December 2009 to
determine what NASA needs to do to continue improving its financial
control and accounting system.
Acquisition and Contracting Processes
One of NASA's long-standing management challenges, the OIG
memorandum said, relates to systemic weaknesses identified in its
acquisition and contracting processes. The OIG referenced GAO's
identification of NASA's contract management as a high-risk area in
1990 and that office's acknowledgment of improvements to NASA's
processes in its most recent update. The OIG also noted NASA's
continued emphasis, in 2009, on monitoring this challenge and
implementing disciplined acquisition management processes. However, the
OIG said that both GAO's and its audits and investigations ``continue
to reveal systemic weaknesses in the areas of acquisition and
procurement, to include awards as part of the Small Business Innovation
Research (SBIR) Program.'' OIG work has identified instances of fraud,
waste, and abuse by SBIR Program participants that bring into question
the effectiveness of the Program's internal controls. For example, the
NASA OIG found that some SBIR contractors received awards from multiple
agencies for essentially the same work, submitted different proposals
to multiple agencies but then provided all of them the same
deliverable, or misrepresented information including the role of the
principal investigator who was supposed to perform the research.
Information Technology Security
The NASA OIG said in its November 2009 memorandum that it
recognizes that strengthening the agency's Information Technology (IT)
security program will occur through improvements in the Agency's
overarching IT management practices. In the past, the OIG noted that
NASA reported IT security as a material weakness in the Administrator's
annual Statement of Assurance. The NASA OIG reported that subsequent to
IT security being reported as a material weakness, NASA has implemented
various solutions in an attempt to improve its IT security. The OIG
said in the November 2009 memorandum that ``These solutions have
resulted in continued incremental improvements across NASA's IT
infrastructure; however, challenges remain. Specifically, not all
solutions have been fully implemented and ongoing breaches of NASA
computer systems have resulted in the theft of sensitive data related
to Agency programs, which adversely affected NASA's mission and
resulted in millions of dollars in losses.''
Mr. Paul Martin, NASA's Inspector General, will be a witness at the
hearing and can provide additional details on the November 2009
memorandum as well as other work performed by his office.
Government Accountability Office
Authority and Scope of Work
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent,
nonpartisan agency that works for Congress. Often called the
``congressional watchdog,'' GAO investigates how the federal government
spends taxpayer dollars. GAO's work is done at the request of
congressional committees or subcommittees or is mandated by public laws
or committee reports. It also undertakes research under the authority
of the Comptroller General who heads GAO. GAO audits agency operations
to determine whether federal funds are being spent efficiently and
effectively and reports on how well government programs and policies
are meeting their objectives. Ms. Cristina Chaplain, who directs much
of GAO's work at NASA, is a witness at today's hearing and will use
recent GAO findings as the basis for the office's views on key
challenges facing NASA.
High-Risk Report Update
Since 1990, GAO has periodically reported on government operations
that it identifies as ``high risk.'' This effort has brought focus to
problems impeding effective government and costing the government
billions of dollars each year. GAO's high-risk status reports are
provided at the start of each new Congress. Historically, high-risk
areas have been so designated because of traditional vulnerabilities
related to their greater susceptibility to fraud, waste, abuse, and
mismanagement. As GAO's high-risk program has evolved, it has
increasingly used the high-risk designation to draw attention to areas
associated with broad-based transformations needed to achieve greater
economy, efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, and sustainability
of selected key government programs and operations. In 1990, GAO
designated NASA's contract management as high risk in view of
persistent cost growth and schedule slippage in the majority of its
major projects. Since that time, GAO's high-risk work has focused on
identifying a number of causal factors, including antiquated financial
management systems, poor cost estimating, and undefinitized contracts.
In its January 2009 update of the office's high-risk list [GAO-09-
271], GAO reported that since the 2007 high-risk update, NASA had taken
significant steps to improve its acquisition management with the
implementation of new policies and procedures and the development of a
corrective action plan to address weaknesses in areas identified as
high risk by GAO. For example, NASA revised its acquisition and
engineering polices to incorporate elements of a knowledge-based
approach that should allow the agency to make informed decisions.
According to GAO, NASA is also instituting a new approach whereby
senior leadership is reviewing acquisition strategies earlier in the
process and developed broad procurement tenets to guide the agency's
procurement practices. Among procurement policy reforms, GAO noted that
an earned value management procurement policy has been established and
a requirement that all award fee contracts undergo a cost-benefit
analysis has been codified to improve the likelihood that NASA is using
its resources most effectively. GAO noted NASA's broad plan for
reducing acquisition risk and observed that successful implementation
of both the plan and revised policies should stem cost growth and
schedule slippage.
However, GAO said that because cost growth and schedule delays
persist, this activity--now titled ``acquisition management'' because
of the scope of issues that need to be resolved--remains high-risk. GAO
added that, to maximize NASA's investment dollars, implementation needs
to be complemented by vigorous executive leadership to foster the
expansion of a business-oriented culture and a sustained commitment to
identify and take action on projects that are not achieving cost,
schedule or performance goals upon which they were based when they were
initiated.
Assessment of Selected Large-Scale Projects [GAO-10-227-SP]
GAO released its report [GAO-10-227-SP] on the eve of this hearing
assessing the status of 19 NASA large-scale projects with a combined
life cycle cost of more than $66 billion. GAO's independent assessment
was initially undertaken in response to the explanatory statement of
the House Committee on Appropriations accompanying the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2008; the Committee on Science and Technology was
a co-requester of that assessment and is a co-requester on the 2009
assessment [The explanatory statement of the House Committee on
Appropriations accompanying the Fiscal Year 2009 Omnibus Appropriations
Act directed GAO to prepare this latest assessment].
In its most recent assessment, GAO compared projects against best
practice criteria for system development including attainment of
knowledge on technologies and design. The office found that of the 19
projects, 4 are still in the formulation phase where cost and schedule
baselines have yet to be established, and 5 just entered the
implementation phase in fiscal year 2009 and therefore do not have any
cost and schedule growth. However, GAO said that ``9 of the 10 projects
that have been in the implementation phase for several years
experienced cost growth ranging from 8 to 68 percent, and launch delays
of 1 to 33 months, in the past three years. These 10 projects had
average development cost growth of almost $121.1 million--or 18.7
percent--and schedule growth of 15 months, and a total increase in
development cost of over $1.2 billion, with over half of this total--or
$706.6 million--occurring in the last year. In some cases, cost growth
was higher than is reported because it occurred before project
baselines were established in response to the statutory requirement.''
Commenting on factors contributing to cost and schedule increases,
GAO said ``Many of the projects we reviewed experienced challenges in
developing new or retrofitting older technologies, stabilizing
engineering designs, managing the performance of their contractors and
development partners, as well as funding and launch planning issues.
Reducing the kinds of problems this assessment identifies in
acquisition programs hinges on developing a sound business case for a
project. Based, in part, on GAO's previous recommendations, NASA has
acted to adopt practices that would ensure programs proceed based on a
sound business case and undertaken initiatives aimed at improving
program management, cost estimating, and contractor oversight.
Continued attention to these efforts should help maximize NASA's
acquisition investments.''
[GAO defines a ``sound business case'' as having, in its simplest
form, the following two elements: (1) the customer's needs are valid
and can best be met with the chosen concept, and (2) the chosen concept
can be developed and produced within existing resources--that is,
proven technologies, design knowledge, adequate funding, and adequate
time to deliver the product when needed.]
GAO recognized NASA's efforts to improve acquisition management
through the issuance of a new policy instituting key decision points in
the development life-cycle; a corrective plan to improve the
effectiveness of the agency's program/project management; and an
initiative to help programs and projects with management, cost and
schedule estimating, and maintenance of adequate levels of reserves.
However, GAO said that while these efforts are positive steps, it is
too early to assess their impact. The office cautioned that ``For
projects to have better outcomes not only must they demonstrate a high
level of knowledge at key junctures, but decision makers must also use
this information to determine whether and how best a project should
proceed through the development life cycle. If done successfully, these
measures should enable NASA to foster the expansion of a business-
oriented culture, reduce persistent cost growth and schedule delays,
and maximize investment dollars.''
Cost and schedule growth at NASA was the subject of a hearing held
by the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee in March 2009. At that
hearing entitled ``Cost Management Issues in NASA's Acquisitions and
Programs'', Subcommittee Chairwoman Giffords noted:
``It is clear that good cost and schedule management will be
critical to the success of NASA's planned robotic and human
space flight activities. However, it is also clear that NASA,
Department of Defense (DOD), and the other agencies of the
federal government involved in space activities have many
dedicated and competent scientists and engineers working long
hours to try to deliver successful projects. That tells me that
dealing with these cost and schedule issues is hard, and that
there's no simple fix or the situation would have been resolved
long ago. We need to find out why preventing cost and schedule
growth in our space projects is so hard, and more importantly,
what we can do to put us on a better path for the future.''
Report on International Space Station Utilization [GAO-10-
9]
In 2005, Congress designated the ISS as a national laboratory; in
addition, the NASA Authorization Act of 2008 required NASA to provide a
research management plan for the ISS National Laboratory. GAO was asked
by the Committee on Science and Technology to review the research use
of the ISS. In a report dated November 2009, GAO found that research
utilization has not been the priority because the primary objective for
the ISS through 2010 is construction. GAO said that ``Some research has
been and is being conducted as time and resources permit while the crew
on board performs assembly tasks, but research is expected to begin in
earnest in 2010. NASA projects that it will utilize approximately 50
percent of the U.S. ISS research facilities for its own research,
including the Human Research Program, opening the remaining facilities
to U.S. ISS National Laboratory researchers.'' GAO reported that ``NASA
faces several significant challenges that may impede efforts to
maximize utilization of all ISS research facilities, including:
the impending retirement of the Space Shuttle in 2010
and reduced launch capabilities for transporting ISS research
cargo once the shuttle retires,
high costs for launches and no dedicated funding to
support research,
limited time available for research due to the fixed
size of crew and competing demands for the crew's time, and
an uncertain future for the ISS beyond 2015.''
GAO also reported that ``NASA is researching the possibility of
developing a management body including internal and external elements
to manage ISS research, which would make the ISS National Laboratory
similar to other national laboratories.'' NASA concurred with GAO's
recommendations that the NASA Administrator implement certain actions
such as increasing user outreach and centralizing decision-making to
enhance use of the ISS.
Report on Vulnerabilities in Key IT Networks [GAO-10-4]
The NASA Authorization Act of 2008 directed GAO to (1) determine
whether NASA has implemented appropriate controls to protect the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information and
systems used to support NASA's mission directorates and (2) assess
NASA's vulnerabilities in the context of prior incidents and corrective
actions.
In a report dated October 2009, GAO found that ``although NASA has
made important progress in implementing security controls and aspects
of its information security program, it has not always implemented
appropriate controls to sufficiently protect the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of the information and systems supporting
its mission directorates.'' GAO said that NASA did not consistently
implement effective controls to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized
access to its networks and systems. As examples, GAO said that NASA did
not always sufficiently restrict user access to systems, encrypt
network services and data, and audit and monitor computer-related
events. GAO reported that a key reason for these weaknesses is that
NASA has not yet fully implemented key activities of its information
security program to ensure that controls are appropriately designed and
operating effectively. For example, GAO found that NASA has not always
conducted comprehensive tests and evaluation of its information system
controls; tracked the status of plans to remedy known weaknesses; and
maintained capabilities to detect, report, and respond to security
incidents.
Despite actions to address prior security incidents, GAO concluded
that ``NASA remains vulnerable to similar incidents. NASA networks and
systems have been successfully targeted by cyber attacks. During fiscal
years 2007 and 2008, NASA reported 1,120 security incidents that have
resulted in the installation of malicious software on its systems and
unauthorized access to sensitive information.''
GAO also concluded that the control vulnerabilities and program
shortfalls it identified ``collectively increase the risk of
unauthorized access to NASA's sensitive information, as well as
inadvertent or deliberate disruption of its system operations and
services. They make it possible for intruders, as well as government
and contractor employees, to bypass or disable computer access controls
and undertake a wide variety of inappropriate or malicious acts. As a
result, increased and unnecessary risk exists that sensitive
information is subject to unauthorized disclosure, modification, and
destruction and that mission operations could be disrupted.''
GAO recommended that the NASA Administrator take steps to mitigate
control vulnerabilities and fully implement a comprehensive information
security program. For example, GAO recommended that NASA ``conduct
sufficient or comprehensive security testing and evaluation of all
relevant security controls including management, operational, and
technical controls.'' NASA concurred with GAO's recommendations,
stating that it would continue to mitigate the information security
weaknesses identified, and noted that many of the recommendations are
currently being implemented as part of an ongoing strategic effort to
improve information technology management and correct information
technology security program deficiencies.
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
Authority and Scope of Work
Since it was established in 1968 by Congress, the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel (ASAP) has been evaluating NASA's safety performance and
advising the agency on ways to improve that performance. The panel,
which is a Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)-chartered advisory
body, is comprised of recognized safety, management, and engineering
experts from industry, academia, and other government agencies. This
senior advisory committee reports to the NASA Administrator and
Congress. The panel was established by Congress in the aftermath of the
January 1967 Apollo 204 spacecraft fire that took the lives of three
astronauts. The ASAP's statutory duties, as prescribed in Section 6 of
the NASA Authorization Act of 1968, Public Law 90-67, 42 U.S.C. 2477
are as follows:
``The Panel shall review safety studies and operations plans
that are referred to it and shall make reports thereon, shall
advise the Administrator with respect to the hazards of
proposed operations and with respect to the adequacy of
proposed or existing safety standards, and shall perform such
other duties as the Administrator may request.''
The panel was reauthorized in Section 106, Safety Management,
Section 6, of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Authorization Act of 2005, [P.L. 109-155]. The ASAP bases its advice on
direct observation of NASA operations and decision-making. The panel
provides a report on an annual basis. Its ``2009 Annual Report'' was
released on January 15, 2010. In addition to an annual report, the
panel also conducts quarterly meetings, submits minutes, and provides
NASA with recommendations.
2009 Annual Report
In its recently issued 2009 annual report, the ASAP recognized
several NASA accomplishments in 2009, such as safe completion of five
successful Shuttle missions, continued construction of the ISS, flight
testing of the Ares I-X, and progress in Constellation Program ground
project efforts. Safety is the primary focus of the report. Two
critical safety-related issues identified relate to human space flight,
specifically those concerning the establishment of human rating
requirements for follow-on vehicles and the potential extension of the
Shuttle beyond its current flight manifest. Other issues identified as
critical were external communication of the risks associated with
exploration; transition of workforces from Shuttle to Constellation;
integration of robotics agency-wide; and timeliness in completing
mishap investigations. Other safety-related issues identified in the
annual report were NASA facilities/aging infrastructure; timeliness of
NASA responses to ASAP recommendations; and progress in addressing the
recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB).
Establishment of Human Rating Requirements
In referencing the work by the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight
Plans Committee, better known as the ``Augustine Committee'', the
report raised concern about the committee's observation that
``appropriate consideration be given to using the commercial space
industry to fulfill NASA crew-delivery services to LEO.'' The panel
said, regarding the committee's assumption that safety was assumed to
be ``a given'', that ``this assumption is premature and oversimplifies
a complex and challenging problem because there is not a ``cookie-
cutter approach'' to safety in space.'' The ASAP strongly reaffirmed,
as a basic principle, that ``whatever new policies or vehicles are
selected for America's space activities, ensuring human safety must
continue to receive the appropriate funding, visibility, and support to
prevent another Columbia-like tragedy. With this basic principle in
mind, the Panel has set its focus on the following critical safety
issues associated with the present program and its potential
alternatives.''
In its prior ``2008 Annual Report'', the panel had stated that
proposed commercial orbital transportation services (COTS) vehicles
being developed by SpaceX and Orbital Sciences Corporation had not been
required to meet Human Rating Requirements (HRR) standards nor were
they proven to be appropriate to transport NASA personnel. The ASAP
acknowledged that this was understandable, since these contractors were
only tasked with developing cargo delivery systems.
However, the ASAP noted that the possible expansion of the
commercial vehicle mission to include human transport caused the panel
to highlight the standards for human rating requirements as an issue at
every quarterly meeting in 2009. The report said that a principal
concern identified at the first ASAP meeting in 2009 was that the
current HRR procedures, when applied to the development of future
human-related vehicles, were not specifically intended to establish
requirements for vehicles produced by entities external to NASA, such
as commercial space transportation firms or international programs.
Consequently, the panel recommended that ``NASA stipulate directly the
applicable HRR standards and share acceptable risk levels with those
other entities.'' The 2009 annual report noted that in the fourth
quarter of 2009, ``NASA finally made a start at achieving progress to
more clearly develop and communicate the standards necessary for any
COTS manufacturer if astronauts are to be transported on non-NASA
vehicles. However, this will only partially answer the challenge. After
the criteria and their applicability are clearly established, a process
must be developed for validating and certifying compliance with those
criteria. Validation and certification itself has two components: that
which takes place at the front end (at various stages) and one that
follows the program in the form of insight, oversight etc. Although the
Panel strongly supports the start that NASA has made, the Panel
continues to believe that NASA is behind where it needs to be at this
point in time. Considerable work must be done, and priority efforts
should be established to accelerate the level of effort underway.''
The report also stated that ``It is the Panel's position that no
COTS manufacturer is currently HRR qualified, despite some claims and
beliefs to the contrary. Questions that must be answered are: What is
the process for certifying that potential COTS vehicles are airworthy
and capable of carrying astronauts into space safely? How is compliance
assured over the life of the activity? The same questions would apply
to any potential international orbital transportation systems.''
With regard to NASA's ``program of record'', the report noted that
``The Ares I vehicle has been designed from the beginning with a clear
emphasis on safety. Its architecture was selected by NASA's Exploration
System Architecture Study (ESAS) team because of its potential to
deliver at least 10 times the level of crew safety as the current
Shuttle. The launch vehicle configuration has been developed to provide
the best possible allowances for crew escape in the event of a launch
failure. The independent launch escape system pulls the capsule clear
of the launch pad and any attendant explosion or fire. The demonstrated
high reliability of the solid rocket booster (SRB) suggests a low
likelihood of first stage failure on ascent, but the launch escape
system would cover, even with this low probability of failure.
To abandon Ares I as a baseline vehicle for an alternative without
demonstrated capability nor proven superiority (or even equivalence) is
unwise and probably not cost-effective. The ability of any current COTS
design to ``close the gap'' or even provide an equivalent degree of
safety is speculative. Switching from a demonstrated (design approach
proven by Apollo, use of heritage hardware, and Ares 1-X flight
success), well designed, safety optimized (ESAS) system to one based on
nothing more than unsubstantiated claims would seem a poor choice.
Before any change is made to another architecture, the inherent safety
of that approach must be assessed to ensure that it offers a level of
safety equal to or greater than the program of record.''
Shuttle Extension
The ASAP said in its 2009 report that it was very concerned about
possible extension of Shuttle operations beyond those currently
manifested to complete the construction of the ISS. The U.S. Human
Space Flight Plans Committee had concluded that the only way to reduce
the ``gap'' in human space flight launch capability between ISS
completion and the planned flights of Ares I is by extending the
Shuttle program well beyond 2010. The ASAP indicated that it ``does not
support extending the Shuttle significantly beyond its current
manifest. We are especially concerned over any kind of ``serial
extension'' where a few flights at a time might be added. The risk of
continuing to fly the Shuttle without a recertification and expending
the resources to bring the vehicle up to modern standards is more than
what we should ask astronauts to shoulder.'' The ASAP concluded that
``Extension significantly beyond what is planned through the current
manifest would be unwise.''
External Communication on Risks Associated with Exploration
The ASAP noted that, in light of critical human space flight
efforts, communications with the public and Congress are more important
than ever before. The report encouraged NASA to be ``fully candid with
the public and Congress, and those audiences must fully understand what
risks are involved. There can never be zero risk, and the rate of
progress can be limited by the amount of risk one is willing to take.
Space exploration is a dangerous enterprise, and the Nation is
fortunate to have courageous people willing to accept the risk. In
going forward with exploration, the shouldering of risk needs to be
undertaken not only by NASA, but by Congress and the Administration.
The risks must be communicated clearly to Congress and the public. To
do otherwise is disingenuous and does the Nation a disservice.''
Shuttle to Constellation Workforce Transition
The panel commended NASA Centers' leadership and contractors in
working to ease the transition from the Shuttle program to the
Constellation Program. However, the report noted that the ``workforce
is worried about the uncertainty of NASA's mission and the five- to
eight-year gap between Shuttle and its successor. Human space flight is
a business in which safety rides on the shoulders of skilled, hard-
working people. Successful workforce transition depends heavily on a
decision being made about NASA's direction. The Panel's concern
continues to grow as NASA's future in human space flight remains
undecided. The current ``transition'' plans were drawn up assuming that
the program of record would be executed. The Panel is impressed by the
level of detail in the plans and the diligence with which they are
being carried out. A programmatic decision regarding exploration and a
possible change to the program of record is under review as a result of
the Augustine Committee report. At the time this Annual Report went to
press, the future path forward for the space program had not been
announced. When it is announced, the transition plans will need to be
reevaluated and redefined.''
Integration of Robotics Agency-Wide
In the annual report, the panel continued to urge NASA to take an
aggressive view towards using robots to reduce human risk whenever
possible, consistent with mission accomplishment. The report said that
``This means using robots to replace humans on some missions and to
support astronauts on others. The Panel notes that the vision for
exploration includes dangerous and challenging work like construction,
mining, and manufacturing. In accomplishing this work, there is
significant risk to astronauts in their fragile but critical
spacesuits.'' The panel said that it is still finding a wide
discrepancy between how NASA views robots and the current state of
practice in the commercial and military arenas. As a result, during
2010, the ASAP said that it would undertake a more in-depth assessment
of NASA's investment in and planning for using robots in place of and
in support of human astronauts.
Timeliness in Completing Mishap Investigations
In 2007, the panel had recommended that NASA reevaluate the mishap
investigation process to provide for more timely release of information
across the agency. The panel followed up with two more recommendations
in 2008 to spur this effort forward. Despite some progress, the ASAP
said in its 2009 annual report that it ``continues to be concerned
about the need to correct each phase in the process to shorten the
overall timeline: (1) accomplishing the investigation itself; (2)
developing the investigation report; (3) obtaining the NASA
Headquarters endorsements; (4) obtaining the Center approval; (5)
developing the corrective action plan and implementing it; and (6)
verifying implementation so that the case can be closed.'' While
acknowledging progress at the Field Centers to reduce the timeline for
the phases that are under their control, the ASAP said that ``it will
take more effort, especially at NASA Headquarters, before an overall
improvement in the final report's timeline is seen. What is still
lacking are the metrics that show the tracking and trending for all
phases of the mishap investigation process so that one can see whether
positive changes in the timelines are occurring.''
Other Issues
NASA Facilities/Aging Infrastructure: The ASAP said
that ``over 80 percent of NASA facilities are beyond their
design life, and annual maintenance is underfunded. Facilities
continue to degrade and facilities failures are starting to
impact missions and have safety implications Agency-wide.
Evidence for this can be seen in the increasing number of small
fires, key equipment losses through failures in material
handling and transportation facilities, and in the ``weak
signals'' that we observe in current safety reports. The
infrastructure used to launch complex vehicles into space must
be reviewed and maintained down to the smallest component to
remain safe. In the past, one of NASA's goals was ``ten healthy
Centers.'' A considerable investment in facility maintenance,
repair, and replacement is needed for this goal to be achieved.
This may be unrealistic in the current economic climate. If
funding is not available, NASA should consider consolidating
its programs and efforts at fewer Centers so that its
activities may be safely continued at the remaining facilities.
This planning needs to be part of a conscious and deliberate
facilities strategy.''
Timeliness of NASA Responses to ASAP Recommendations:
The panel indicated concern about NASA's unresponsiveness to
its recommendations. Following 25 written recommendations to
NASA in 2009, by the end of the year, the report said that NASA
had issued a single response addressing just three
recommendations. The report found that about half of the
remaining responses were in a ``concurrence loop'' at NASA for
signature. The panel recommended ``that more management
attention be placed on streamlining the review and concurrence
process for NASA responses to Panel recommendations.''
Monitoring NASA's Responses to CAIB Recommendations:
As Congress mandated in the NASA Authorization Act of 2005, the
ASAP evaluates and reports annually on NASA compliance with
CAIB return-to-flight (RTF) and continue-to-fly (CTF)
recommendations. In 2009, there were three outstanding CAIB
recommendations: (1) eliminate all external tank thermal
protection system debris shedding at the source; (2) increase
the orbiter's ability to sustain debris damage; and (3) develop
an on-orbit repair capability. In 2008, the panel had concluded
that ``NASA must decide whether to formally accept the risks
associated with these three outstanding recommendations. The
Panel believes that informed, formal risk acceptance is
essential for a successful safety program. This process
provides a formal record of the risks that were accepted and
the assumptions used in making those decisions. While NASA has
concluded that no further action is warranted on the remaining
three CAIB recommendations and has closed these out, it is not
clear that the risk acceptance for that decision has been
formally documented by NASA management. The Panel continues to
recommend that NASA do so. NASA should revisit these decisions
if the Agency decides to recertify the Shuttle. Because NASA
has moved beyond the RTF phase, the Panel will no longer
specifically address RTF in future annual reports.''
In the 2009 annual report, the ASAP stated that
``While NASA has concluded that no further action is warranted
on the remaining three CAIB recommendations and has closed
these out, it is not clear that the risk acceptance for that
decision has been formally documented by NASA management. The
Panel continues to recommend that NASA do so. NASA should
revisit these decisions if the Agency decides to recertify the
Shuttle. Because NASA has moved beyond the RTF phase, the Panel
will no longer specifically address RTF in future annual
reports. The Panel will continue to monitor, review, and
provide recommendations on CTF issues.''
Admiral Dyer, the Chairman of the ASAP, will be a witness at the
hearing and can provide additional details on the ASAP's 2009 Annual
report.
Chairwoman Giffords. I want to welcome everyone this
morning and let everyone know that this is the first
subcommittee hearing of the second session, and we have had a
very active subcommittee over the last session, and I fully
expect that this upcoming year will be as busy in carrying out
our oversight responsibilities.
In that regard, I have called this hearing today so that we
have a chance to hear from NASA's watchdogs; the NASA Inspector
General, the Government Accountability Office, and the
Independent Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel.
As Congress prepares to reauthorize NASA, it is important
that we focus on the issues and the challenges that will
determine whether or not NASA will be successful over the next
decade. The three individuals testifying before us today can
provide us with the kind of expert, objective assessments that
we will need to inform our deliberations over NASA's future,
and we look forward to your testimony.
As everyone knows, the President's fiscal year 2011 budget
request was delivered to the Hill on Monday. It proposes large
changes to NASA's programs, including the outright cancellation
of Constellation. Today's hearing, of course, is not intended
to be an examination of that request, in part because many of
those details are still unavailable to us.
However, I can assure you that the full Science and
Technology Committee and this subcommittee will be holding
hearings over the next few weeks to examine the President's
proposals, and of course, we intend to give them serious
scrutiny.
I would just like to state that one of the reasons that I
was particularly honored to accept the chairmanship of this
subcommittee last year was my excitement to be involved in an
agency that has inspired Americans, and frankly the world at
large for decades.
But as I reviewed the President's budget request, I found a
quite glaring omission. I once again point all of you to this
chamber, in this chamber to the proverb that is on the wall
behind us, and in fact, it is good for members of this
subcommittee and the full committee to think about why we are
here, and of course, that quote is, ``Where there is no vision,
the people perish.'' And these words are as true today as when
our forefathers undertook a voyage of discovery, when they
landed on this continent and founded America as a city upon a
hill, a beacon of light for the future world, for the entire
world to admire.
We are still that city on the hill, and the eyes of all
people are upon us. We have set forth on a mission to explore
the heavens, and should we deal falsely with this work we have
undertaken, we shall be made a byword across the world. We
shall shame the faces of many of America's worthy civil
servants who have dedicated their lives to this mission.
Today we are still a city on that hill, but I fear that we
may soon abandon our vision. Our job as servants of the people,
as members of this subcommittee, is to allow our scientists,
our engineers, our researchers, our visionaries, to be as bold
in this undertaking as our faculties will allow. To be
unconstrained by artificial impositions of expedience or purse
but rather limited only by the strength of their imagination
and the immutability of the laws of physics.
My concern today is not numbers on a ledger but rather the
state of the American dream to reach for the stars. Should we
falter, should we slip, should we let our dream fade? What will
we tell our children? How will we inspire the next generation
of great minds to pursue the science and engineering fields
critical to our competitiveness in the 21st century when we
abandoned a generation of thousands of aerospace engineers in
the middle of this endeavor? What will we tell the world that
we led into space and that we took the moon? My fear is that we
will tell them--tell us what the stars are like when you get
there.
So in the coming weeks we will be holding a number of
hearings, both in the subcommittee and in the full committee to
address the range of NASA programs and responsibility in
science, aeronautics, and space flight. We will discuss the
potential impact of program changes on tens of thousands of
jobs, precisely the type of high-tech jobs that are critical to
our economic competitiveness. We will discuss the impact that
NASA programs, especially those in human space exploration,
play in inspiring young people to pursue careers in STEM
fields, another issue vital to developing a workforce for the
21st century.
Both of these issues will be especially timely as the full
committee considered reauthorization of the America COMPETES
legislation. And I in my work on the House Arm Services
Committee and others that serve on both of these committees,
will be diving into the impact the proposed cuts to human
spaceflight will have on our aerospace industry and our
national defense as well.
No doubt we will hear a great deal in order to assess what
will be decided in the next few weeks and the testimony that we
hear I think will--today, will likely raise additional concerns
and considerations.
And just in closing before I hand it over to Mr. Olson, I
would just like to tell a story that illustrates my concern.
Nearly 100 years before Columbus sailed to the Americas, China
had a great fleet of ships traveling throughout the Indian
Ocean. This fleet was ahead of its time, exploring the seas,
and spurring an unprecedented era of knowledge, trade, and
discovery. However, as times changed China felt they could no
longer afford its fleet and so it was defunded. The fleet soon
fell to ruin, with some historians reporting that the ships
were burned and destroyed, and so ended a great opportunity for
the Chinese people.
Had the Chinese continued to fund this endeavor of
exploration, of discovery, the world today might very well be a
totally different place, and how ironic, then, it is that today
we consider abandoning our space-worthy vessels, ending a half
century of American leadership in space exploration just as the
Chinese ramp up their own space program and aim for the moon.
NASA is an agency with a wide range of programs and
responsibilities in science, aeronautics, and human
spaceflight, and we need to make sure that the agency is
proceeding as effectively as possible to carry out its diverse
missions. Today's hearing will help us assess how NASA is doing
in that regard.
I look forward to working with members on both sides of the
aisle as we strive to ensure that Congress crafts the most
responsible and productive future for the Nation's space and
aeronautics programs. The stakes for America are too high for
us to attempt anything less.
[The prepared statement of Chairwoman Giffords follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairwoman Gabrielle Giffords
Good morning, and welcome to the Subcommittee's first hearing of
the 2nd session. We had a very active Subcommittee last session, and I
expect to be at least as busy this year as we carry out our oversight
responsibilities. In that regard, I have called this morning's hearing
so that we may have a chance to hear early on from NASA's
``watchdogs''--the NASA Inspector General, the Government
Accountability Office, and the independent Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel.
As Congress prepares to reauthorize NASA, it is important that we
focus on the issues and challenges that will determine whether or not
NASA succeeds or fails in the coming decade. The three individuals
testifying before us today can provide us with the kind of expert,
objective assessments that we will need to inform our deliberations
over NASA's future, and I look forward to their testimony.
As you know, the president's Fiscal Year 2011 budget request was
delivered to the Hill on Monday. It proposes large changes to NASA
programs, including the outright cancellation of Constellation. Today's
hearing is not intended to be an examination of that request, in part
because many of the details are still unavailable. However, I can
assure you that the full Science and Technology Committee and this
Subcommittee will be holding a series of hearings over the coming weeks
to examine the president's proposals, and we intend to give them
serious scrutiny. One of the reasons I was particularly honored to
accept the chairmanship of this subcommittee was my excitement to be
involved in an agency that has inspired Americans, and the world at
large, for decades.
But as I reviewed the President's budget request, I found a quite
glaring omission. I would once again point all of you in this chamber
to the proverb written on the wall behind me. ``Where there is no
vision, the people perish.'' These words are as true today as when our
forefathers undertook a voyage of discovery, when they landed on this
continent and founded America as a city upon a hill, a beacon of light
for the whole world to admire. We are still that city upon a hill and
the eyes of all people are upon us.
We have set forth on a mission to explore the heavens and should we
deal falsely with this work we have undertaken, we shall be made a
byword across the world. We shall shame the faces of many of America's
worthy civil servants who have dedicated their lives to this mission.
Today we are still that city upon a hill, but I fear that we may soon
abandon our vision. Our job as servants of the people, as members of
this committee is to allow our scientists, our engineers and
researchers, our visionaries to be as bold in this undertaking as their
faculties allow. To be unconstrained by artificial impositions of
expedience or purse, but rather limited only by the strength of their
imagination and the immutability of the laws of physics. My concern
today is not numbers on a ledger, but rather the fate of the American
dream to reach for the stars. Should we falter, should we slip, should
we let our dream fade, what will we tell our children? How will we
inspire the next generation of great minds to pursue the science and
engineering fields critical to our competitiveness in the 21st century
when we abandon a generation of thousands of aerospace engineers in the
middle of this endeavor? What will we tell the world that we led into
space, that we took to the moon? My fear is that we will tell them,
``Tell us what the stars are like, when you get there.''
In the coming weeks we will be holding a number of hearings both in
this subcommittee and the full committee to address the range of NASA
programs and responsibilities in science, aeronautics, and human
spaceflight. We will discuss the potential impact of program changes on
tens of thousands of jobs, precisely the type of high tech jobs that
are critical to our economic competitiveness. We will discuss the
impact that NASA programs, especially those in human space exploration,
play in inspiring young people to pursue careers in STEM fields,
another issue vital to developing a workforce for the 21st century.
Both of these issues will be especially timely as the full committee
considers reauthorization of America COMPETES legislation.
And I, in my work on the House Armed Services Committee, will be
diving into the impact that proposed cuts to human spaceflight will
have on our aerospace industry and our national defense.
No doubt we will have a great deal to assess in the coming weeks.
The testimony we hear today will likely raise additional issues that we
will need to consider.
In closing, I would like to tell a story that illustrates my
concern. Nearly 100 years before Columbus sailed to the Americas, China
had a great fleet of ships traveling throughout the Indian Ocean. This
fleet was ahead of its time, exploring the seas and spurring an
unprecedented era of knowledge, trade, and discovery. However, as times
changed, China felt that it could no longer afford its fleet, and so it
was defunded. The fleet soon fell to ruin, with some historians
reporting that the ships were burned and destroyed, and so ended a
great opportunity for the Chinese people. Had the Chinese continued to
fund this endeavor of exploration, of discovery, the world might now be
a very different place. How ironic then that today we consider
abandoning our space worthy vessels, ending a half century of American
leadership in space exploration just as the Chinese ramp up their own
space program and aim for the moon.
NASA is an agency with a range of programs and responsibilities in
science, aeronautics, and human spaceflight--and we need to make sure
that the agency is proceeding as effectively as possible to carry out
its diverse missions. Today's hearing will help us to assess how NASA
is doing in that regard. I look forward to working with Members on both
sides of the aisle as we strive to ensure that Congress crafts the most
responsible and productive future for the nation's space and
aeronautics programs. The stakes for America are too high for us to
attempt anything less.
Chairwoman Giffords. And with that the Chair now recognizes
Mr. Olson for an opening statement.
Mr. Olson. Well, thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and thank you
for calling this morning's hearing, and I will do my best to
stay on the advertised topic, but I make no guarantees.
I would like to thank our witnesses for their appearance
today. I realize that each one of you has spent considerable
time and effort preparing for this hearing, and I look forward
to hearing from you so that our subcommittee can benefit from
your expertise.
The role of watchdogs is critical in our government, and I
applaud your efforts and encourage your continued diligence
going forward. We have a similar role right here in Congress,
and when we can, we would like to partner with you to make each
of our jobs more effective to accomplish our shared goals.
Mr. Martin, good to see you again. I trust you have gotten
more acquainted in your new role as you are settling in there.
I do have an admonition that we will surely discuss in the
future, but it is in light of the President's recent budget
proposal. His proposal is a radical departure for how NASA does
business. The impacts to the workforce and to the relationship
between the government and its contractors is about to change
and change dramatically. I implore you, implore you to monitor
how this process evolves going forward.
Ms. Chaplain, thank you for your work, especially in light
of your recent report on the International Space Station.
Should this program continue, and it appears it is going to
continue at least until 2020, your recommendations about a
centralized structure will need to be addressed, and we are
anxious to hear more.
And finally, Admiral Dyer, we thank you for your service.
Earlier this week we marked the seventh anniversary of the
Columbia tragedy. We must not forget the inherent dangers that
travel by space brings on. You and the members of the ASAP are
critical in our efforts of exploration. Your recent annual
report provided critical insight on the path our Nation should
be pursuing in regard to human spaceflight, and I would like to
read for the record a very significant passage. The statement
was included in a press release the agency issued but since
that release went out at 6:00 p.m. on the Friday of the long
Martin Luther King Day holiday, I think it is worth reading for
the record.
In regard to the Constellation Program you found, and I
quote, ``To abandon the program of record as a baseline for an
alternative without demonstrated capability or proven
superiority is unwise and probably not cost effective.'' Let me
read that again. ``To abandon the program of record as a
baseline for an alternative without demonstrated capability or
proven superiority is unwise and probably not cost effective.''
And yet this is exactly what the President's 2011 budget aims
to do.
My concern about the direction of the Administration's
budget proposal will take NASA is something I have spoken out
about and will continue to do so. We are on the verge of
abandoning human spaceflight in the near term, and I fear
beyond that. The witnesses before us will play a critical role
in the direction the agency goes, and the men and women on this
dais will have an equally-critical role in the direction our
Nation goes.
And I look forward to working with you to chart that path.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Olson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Pete Olson
Madam Chairwoman, thank you for calling this morning's hearing. I
will do my best to ensure we stay on the advertised topic, but I make
no guarantees. I'd like to thank our witnesses for their appearance
today. I realize that each of you has spent considerable time and
effort preparing for this hearing, and I look forward to hearing from
you so that our subcommittee can benefit from your expertise.
The role of watchdogs is critical in our government, and I applaud
your efforts and encourage your continued diligence going forward. We
have a similar role here in Congress, and when we can, would like to
partner with you to make each of our jobs more effective to accomplish
our shared goals.
Mr. Martin, it is good to see you again and I trust you are getting
more acquainted with your still-new role. I do have an admonition that
we will surely discuss more in the future, but it is in light of the
President's recent budget proposal. His proposal is a radical departure
for how NASA does business. The impacts to the workforce and to the
relationship between the government and its contractors is about to
change. I implore you to monitor how this process evolves going
forward.
Ms. Chaplain, thank you for your work, especially in light of your
recent report on the International Space Station. Should this program
continue, your recommendations about a centralized structure will need
to be addressed and we are anxious to hear more.
Finally, Admiral Dyer, thank you for your service. Earlier this
week we marked the 7th anniversary of the Columbia tragedy. We must not
forget the inherent dangers that travel by rocket brings. You and the
members of the ASAP are critical in our efforts of exploration.
Your recent annual report provided critical insight on the path our
nation should be pursuing in regard to human space flight. I would like
to read, for the record, a very significant passage. This statement was
included in the press release the agency issued, but since that release
was sent out at 6:00 pm on the Friday of the long Martin Luther King
Day Holiday weekend I think it is worth reading for the record:
In regard to the Constellation program you found that: To
abandon the program of record as a baseline for an alternative
without demonstrated capability or proven superiority is unwise
and probably not cost-effective.''
My concerns about the direction the Administration's budget
proposal will take NASA is something I have spoken about, and will
continue to do so. We are on the verge of abandoning human space flight
in the near term, and I fear beyond that. The witnesses before us will
play a critical role in the direction the agency goes, and the men and
women on this dais will have an equally critical one in the direction
we as a nation goes. I look forward to working with you all to chart
that path.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I yield back by time.
Mr. Olson. And I yield the balance of my time, Madam
Chairwoman, to the Ranking Member of the full committee.
Chairwoman Giffords. No objection.
Mr. Olson. Gentleman from Texas.
Mr. Hall. Thank you, and thank you, Madam Chairman.
Everyone in this room knows NASA's management is constantly
challenged to manage a diverse, complex, and yet risky set of
programs and missions with resources that too often are deemed
to be inadequate and yet NASA succeeds, producing startling
discoveries that help us better understand our solar system and
universe, the planet earth, and living and working in space. I
can't think of any other civil, federal agency that matches its
record of scientific achievement, not one with a record of
fostering new technologies that have helped transform the
American economy.
And Madam Chairwoman, speaking of sound management
practices, I want to digress slightly by offering a couple of
thoughts regarding NASA's fiscal year 2011 budget request. I
can hardly read this damn thing I am so mad.
Congress expects and demands that the Executive Branch
offer solid justification for their plans and programs, but for
the life of me I cannot understand how this Administration can
rationalize its decision to scrap Constellation and simply
start anew, especially given the strong support it has received
from Congress, Republicans and Democrats. It is naive to assume
that a do-over will somehow offer a safer, cheaper system
faster than the current path we are on.
The Ares Launcher and Orion Crew Vehicle have been designed
to be very safe and robust systems. They have undergone
rigorous engineering reviews. American taxpayers have invested
$9 billion, and the agency and its contractors have spent five
years working to ensure that Constellation will be flexible,
affordable, and safe. To simply toss this aside and gamble
America's human spaceflight program on an undefined, untested
system is more than alarming.
I look forward to taking part in your incoming hearings,
examining NASA's budget requests and exploration program.
Madam Chairman, I thank you. I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Ralph M. Hall
Madam Chairwoman, thank you for calling this hearing, and my thanks
to our witnesses for testifying before us this morning. I realize you
and your staffs have worked long and hard to prepare for this
appearance, and I want to assure you that your efforts will help this
Committee as we begin the necessary work of reauthorizing NASA later
this spring.
As everyone in this room knows, NASA's management is constantly
challenged to manage a diverse, complex and risky set of programs and
missions with resources that too often are deemed to be inadequate. And
yet NASA succeeds, producing startling discoveries that help us better
understand our solar system and universe, the planet Earth, and living
and working in space. I cannot think of any other civil federal agency
that matches its record of scientific achievement, nor one with a
record of fostering new technologies that have helped transform the
American economy.
Day-in and day-out, NASA has to rely on the talents of its
scientists and engineers, and its trained and motivated managers, to
ensure taxpayers' dollars are wisely spent to meet its goals while also
ensuring the best use of very limited resources. With 90 percent of the
agency's budget spent on procuring goods and services, fiscal
accountability and sound business practices are crucial.
Thanks to the good work performed by the organizations represented
at the witness table this morning, I am confident their skills and
expertise help push NASA to be a better and more capable manager as it
seeks to launch future missions and engage scientists and engineers in
research that will be exciting and inspiring.
Madam Chairwoman, speaking of sound management practices, before
closing I want to digress slightly by offering a couple of thoughts
regarding NASA's FY11 budget request. Congress expects and demands that
the executive branch offer solid justification for their plans and
programs, but for the life of me I cannot understand how this
Administration can rationalize its decision to scrap Constellation and
simply start anew, especially given the strong support it has received
in Congress. It is naive to assume that a do-over will somehow deliver
a safer, cheaper system faster than the current path we're on.
The Ares launcher and Orion crew vehicle have been designed to be a
very safe and robust system. They have undergone rigorous engineering
reviews. American taxpayers have invested nine billion dollars--and the
agency and its contractors have spent five years--working to ensure
that Constellation will be flexible, affordable, and safe. To simply
toss this aside and gamble America's human spaceflight program on an
undefined, untested system is alarming.
I look forward to taking part in your upcoming hearings examining
NASA's budget request and the Exploration program.
Thank you.
Chairwoman Giffords. And thank you, Mr. Hall, for your
leadership over so many years and Mr. Olson.
If there are other members that wish to submit opening
statements, your statements will be added to the record at this
point.
At this time I would like to introduce our witnesses. First
up we have Honorable Paul Martin, who was recently confirmed by
the Senate as Inspector General for NASA. Welcome back, Mr.
Martin.
We have Ms. Cristina Chaplain, who is the Director of
Acquisition and Source Management Team at the Government
Accountability Office. Thank you, our Nation's watchdog group.
We are glad you are back as well.
And finally we have Vice Admiral Joseph Dyer, who is the
Chair of NASA's Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, and Admiral,
thank you for your service to our Nation.
As our witnesses should know, you will each have five
minutes for your spoken testimony. Your written testimony will
be included in the record for the hearing, and when you have
completed your spoken testimony, we will begin rounds of
questions, and each member will have five minutes to question
the panel.
We would like to start this morning with the Honorable Mr.
Martin.
STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL K. MARTIN, INSPECTOR GENERAL, NATIONAL
AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Martin. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Chairwoman
Giffords, Ranking Member Olson, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for inviting the Office of Inspector
General to testify about the key challenges facing NASA. Based
on our oversight work we identified five critical issues.
Number one, transitioning from the Space Shuttle to the
Next Generation of Space Vehicles. Number two, managing risks
to people, equipment, and mission. Number three, improving the
agency's financial management. Number four, addressing systemic
weaknesses in acquisition and contracting processes, and number
five, ensuring the security of NASA's information and
information technology systems.
Some of these challenges, in particular financial
management, acquisition and contracting, and IT security, have
confronted NASA leadership for most of the past decade. Other
challenges such as transitioning from the Space Shuttle are
more recent. But none of these challenges are easily solved.
They are complex, multi-faceted issues that will take
dedication, determination, and NASA's best efforts to do
successfully.
My written statement provides detailed information about
each of these challenges. In my remarks this morning I will
focus on two challenges; transitioning from the Space Shuttle
and NASA's efforts to produce a clean financial statement.
Perhaps the highest-profile challenge facing NASA at the
moment is maintaining the critical skills and capabilities
required to safely fly the five remaining Space Shuttle
missions until the program's planned retirement in September of
this year. We have doubts, however, that NASA will be able to
keep to this ambitious timetable and most likely the last of
the planned Shuttle flights will take place in the second
quarter of fiscal year 2011.
Importantly, any delay in NASA's current timetable has
ramifications far beyond scheduling, given that the agency
spends approximately $200 million a month to sustain the
Shuttle program. Moreover, if the Shuttle's flight schedule is
extended beyond the five missions currently planned, NASA will
need to evaluate not only funding issues but also the
sustainability of the Shuttle's workforce and infrastructure,
much of which has been in wind-down mode since 2009.
I will leave it to ASAP Chairman Dyer to address the
potential safety implications of extending the Shuttle Program
beyond its currently-scheduled manifest.
Just this past Monday the President's fiscal year 2011,
budget set out the Administration's blueprint for NASA and the
Shuttle Program. Of course, this subcommittee and other
committees of Congress will weigh in and help shape NASA's
future direction. However, one thing is clear. NASA will need a
sustained level of funding to enable it to successfully execute
whatever plan is ultimately adopted.
Financial management. For most of the past decade the OIG
has identified the need to improve financial management as one
of the agency's top management challenges. In early December,
2009, when I last testified before this subcommittee, I noted
that several challenges remain, even though NASA has
successfully implemented a variety of corrective actions to
address these longstanding weaknesses. In NASA's fiscal year
2009 audit the independent accounting firm, Ernst and Young,
disclaimed an opinion on the agency's financial statements.
This disclaimer resulted primarily because of continued
weaknesses in NASA's internal controls over accounting for
legacy assets, specifically the Space Shuttle and the
International Space Station.
As we discussed in detail at the December hearing, E & Y
identified three significant deficiencies in internal controls,
one of which was considered a material weakness. Since that
December hearing staff from the Inspector General's Office and
E & Y have met with NASA's financial staff to discuss the
agency's efforts to address these weaknesses, in particular,
the evaluation of legacy assets.
While we cannot predict the success of NASA's efforts, I am
hopeful that by implementing the outstanding recommendations
and continuing to focus on its monitoring and remediation
efforts NASA can correct these weaknesses in its financial
management to the point that E & Y can render an opinion for
fiscal year 2010. We will continue to work closely with NASA
managers in an attempt to achieve that goal.
Finally, the OIG has several reviews ongoing that examine
other high-profile NASA projects such as the agency's
development of the James Webb Space Telescope and upgrades to
the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System.
In the months ahead we look forward to working with NASA
leadership, this subcommittee, and other Congressional
committees as we seek to help the agency address these and
other critical challenges. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Martin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paul K. Martin
Chairwoman Giffords, Ranking Member Olson, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the key issues and
challenges facing NASA. As requested, this statement describes the
Office of Inspector General's (OIG's) observations based on findings
and recommendations from our recent oversight work, particularly our
report on ``NASA's Most Serious Management and Performance
Challenges,'' which we provided to the Administrator and Congress in
November 2009. Our report, which was included in the Agency's
Performance and Accountability Report for fiscal year (FY) 2009, is
available to the public on the OIG's Web site.
Based on our audit and investigative work, we identified five areas
that we believe constitute the most serious management and performance
challenges facing NASA. They are:
Transitioning from the Space Shuttle to the Next
Generation of Space Vehicles
Managing Risk to People, Equipment, and Mission
Financial Management
Acquisition and Contracting Processes
Information Technology Security
In determining whether to identify an issue as a ``top management
and performance challenge,'' we consider its significance in relation
to NASA's mission; its susceptibility to fraud, waste, and abuse;
whether the underlying problems are systemic; and the Agency's progress
in addressing the issue. Some of the challenges, such as financial
management, acquisition and contracting processes, and information
technology security, have confronted Agency leadership for most of the
past decade.
Through various initiatives, including implementing recommendations
made by the OIG and other oversight bodies such as the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) and the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
(ASAP), NASA is working to address these and other challenges and to
improve Agency operations. For example, NASA has implemented a variety
of corrective actions over the last several years to address long-
standing weaknesses in its financial management processes and systems,
reduce vulnerabilities in information technology security, and improve
acquisition and contracting practices. However, NASA needs to do more
to address these and other critical challenges.
The remainder of this statement provides more detail on NASA's five
major management and performance challenges identified by the OIG.
Transitioning From the Space Shuttle to the Next Generation of Space
Vehicles
A key challenge for NASA is maintaining the critical skills and
capabilities required to fly the Space Shuttle safely until its
retirement while transitioning to the next generation of space
vehicles. In 2004, the President's Vision for U.S. Space Exploration
caused a substantive reorganization of NASA's strategic priorities,
established a timeline for the retirement of the Space Shuttle,
established the completion date for the International Space Station
(ISS), and set the human spaceflight goals of returning to the Moon and
reaching Mars. However, since that time fiscal constraints and
technical challenges have hampered NASA's efforts to implement the
Vision effectively.
NASA continues to fund and plan for completion of the five
remaining Space Shuttle flights by September 30, 2010. However, we have
doubts that NASA will be able to keep to this aggressive and ambitious
flight schedule. Based on calculations by the OIG, historical flight
rates, the presidentially directed Review of U.S. Human Space Flight
Plans Committee (the Augustine Committee), and internal NASA
evaluations, NASA is not likely to meet its September 2010 timetable,
and it will most likely take until the second quarter of FY 2011 to
complete the last of the planned Space Shuttle flights. Importantly,
any delay in this timetable has ramifications far beyond scheduling,
given that NASA spends approximately $200 million a month to sustain
the Shuttle Program.
At the request of Congress and the Administration, NASA has
developed options for extending Shuttle operations and closing the gap
between its planned retirement in 2010 and the planned first piloted
space flight of the Constellation Program's Orion crew exploration
vehicle in 2015. While technically feasible, each option involves
additional Shuttle flights and results in a higher cumulative safety
risk associated with increased exposure to debris and potential vehicle
failures. Moreover, NASA would need additional funding to avoid
``borrowing'' from the development of the next generation of space
vehicles and other NASA programs to pay for more Shuttle missions.
If the Shuttle's flight schedule is extended beyond the five
missions currently planned, NASA will need to reevaluate not only
funding issues, but also the sustainability of the Shuttle's workforce
and infrastructure, much of which has been in wind-down mode since
2009. In 2003, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommended
that NASA complete a recertification at the material, component,
system, and subsystem levels before operating the Shuttle beyond 2010.
In its recently released annual report, the ASAP stated that it does
not support extending the Shuttle Program significantly beyond its
current manifest. I will leave to ASAP Chairman Joseph Dyer any
additional comments he cares to offer on the potential safety
implications of extending the Shuttle Program beyond its currently
scheduled manifest.
The President's FY 2011 budget, released on Monday, set out the
Administration's blueprint for NASA's future. Of course, this
Subcommittee and other Committees of Congress will weigh in and help
shape NASA's future direction. Amid much uncertainty, one thing is
clear: NASA will need a sustained level of funding to enable successful
execution of whatever future plan is ultimately adopted.
Managing Risk to People, Equipment, and Mission
NASA program and project managers face a variety of challenges
associated with risks introduced by fiscal constraints, schedule
demands, and changing priorities. To meet these challenges, NASA
program and project managers must adhere to the fundamentals of program
and project management, fully implement acquisition strategies that
share risks and rewards with contractors, and effectively use earned
value management systems to help Agency managers identify and mitigate
risks.
In the past year, the OIG dedicated considerable resources to
reviewing the Agency's risk management efforts at program and project
levels. For example, we identified opportunities to improve the risk
management processes in the Landsat Program and Orion Project.
Specifically, we found that the Landsat Data Continuity Mission was
facing a cost increase and possible launch schedule delays because
baseline requirements were not finalized prior to contract award. In
reviewing the Orion Project, we found that the Project Office conducted
a premature life-cycle review. Instead of delaying the life-cycle
review until the revised vehicle configuration was developed, the Orion
Project Office proceeded with the review of a vehicle configuration
that was under revision.
Technical issues continue to add risk to NASA projects and
challenge mission success. For example:
The Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy
(SOFIA) Program recently resolved technological challenges with
the aircraft's movable door that covers the opening to the
telescope, challenges that had caused delays in flight testing.
The Mars Science Lab suffered a major setback due to
technical challenges that resulted in a missed launch
opportunity in 2009, a $400 million cost increase, and a 2-year
schedule delay.
The Orbiting Carbon Observatory, a satellite
important to monitoring and understanding the Earth's changing
climate, suffered an undetermined technical failure on launch,
resulting in the loss of the $209 million satellite and leaving
a gap in NASA's ability to measure carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere and its role in global warming.
Financial Management
For most of the past decade, the OIG has identified the need to
improve financial management at NASA as one of the Agency's most
serious management and performance challenges. In early December 2009,
when I testified on this issue before this Subcommittee, I noted that
while NASA has successfully implemented a variety of corrective actions
over the years to address long-standing weaknesses, several challenges
remain.
For example, in its most recent report the independent public
accounting firm Ernst & Young (E&Y) disclaimed an opinion on NASA's
financial statements for FY 2009, noting that it was unable to obtain
sufficient evidentiary support for the amounts presented in the
Agency's financial statements. This disclaimer resulted primarily
because of continued weaknesses in NASA's internal controls over
accounting for legacy assets--specifically, the Space Shuttle and
International Space Station.
As we discussed in detail at the December hearing, E&Y identified
three significant deficiencies in internal controls with one considered
a material weakness. Specifically, E&Y reported a material weakness in
NASA's controls for assuring that the financial statements fairly state
the value of legacy property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) and
materials. E&Y's identification of internal controls over legacy assets
as a material weakness means there was a reasonable possibility that
the controls were not sufficient to prevent a material misstatement in
the financial statements. The other two internal control deficiencies
cited by E&Y involved NASA's processes for estimating environmental
liabilities and its compliance with the Federal Financial Management
Improvement Act of 1996.
E&Y's report contained specific recommendations intended to assist
NASA in remediating these weaknesses during FY 2010, to include
implementing guidance allowing the use of estimates in establishing the
value of legacy assets. Since the December hearing, OIG and E&Y staff
have met with staff in NASA's Office of the Chief Financial Officer to
discuss the Agency's efforts to address identified weaknesses in
internal controls.
While we cannot predict the success of NASA's efforts, I am hopeful
that through effective implementation of E&Y's most recent
recommendations and a continued focus on its ongoing monitoring and
remediation efforts, the Agency can correct existing weaknesses in
financial management during FY 2010 to the point that E&Y can render an
opinion. We will continue to work closely with NASA managers throughout
the fiscal year in an attempt to achieve that goal.
Acquisition and Contracting Processes
Systemic weaknesses in NASA's acquisition and contracting processes
represent another long-standing management challenge for the Agency. In
our November report addressing NASA's key challenges, we specifically
note acquisition and contracting challenges in relation to cost
estimating, acquisition processes, contract management, and ethical
standards.
In recent reviews of several NASA programs, the OIG found that NASA
still lacks the disciplined cost-estimating processes and financial and
performance management systems needed to effectively establish
priorities, quantify risks, and manage program costs. For example, in
our review of the SOFIA Program, which is now 10 years behind schedule
with costs more than 200 percent over initial estimates, we found that
the program had not developed an independent cost estimate or
implemented an earned value management plan to monitor and control
program costs. Given that NASA programs and projects have historically
experienced cost overruns, improvements in cost estimating using
detailed, empirical data to explain program decisions could help
minimize the risk of cost overruns.
GAO--which has done a lot of oversight work in this area--first
identified NASA's contract management as a high-risk area in 1990,
citing NASA's undisciplined cost-estimating processes, a lack of
information needed to assess contract progress, and persistent cost
growth and schedule slippage in many of its major projects. In its most
recent high-risk update, GAO reported improvements in NASA's processes,
including its plan for addressing systemic weaknesses. I will leave it
to Cristina Chaplain from GAO to provide further details on their work.
During 2009, the OIG also noted NASA's plan for addressing systemic
weaknesses and improving its acquisition and contract management
processes. However, our audits and investigations continue to identify
weaknesses such as those we found in contracts under NASA's Small
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program that bring into question
the effectiveness of the program's internal controls.
Given that NASA spends approximately 90 percent of its $19 billion
budget on contracts and grants, it is imperative that NASA employees
comply with applicable ethics laws and regulations. The scope of this
ongoing challenge is underscored by the large amount of interaction
between NASA employees and individuals in the private sector, both in
industry and academia.
As an illustration of the challenge, NASA directives require that
Standing Review Board (SRB) members be independent to ensure that the
boards can provide an impartial opinion of a project's potential
success. Our 2009 review of membership for all Constellation Program
SRBs found that 21 of the 66 non-Federal board members were employees
or consultants of a NASA contractor with an interest in or contract
with either the Constellation Program or one of its constituent
projects.
Our review concluded that NASA's procedures for determining the
independence of SRB members were inadequate. Specifically, NASA did not
organize the SRBs in accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA) requirements even though they met the definition of a FACA
committee. As a result, NASA did not use the more stringent ethics
review process associated with the establishment of FACA committees.
Instead, NASA used a process that was lacking in both rigor and
accuracy for determining the independence of SRB members. During our
review, NASA suspended the activities of its Constellation Program SRBs
while it addressed the FACA and conflict of interest compliance issues
we disclosed.
Given the large amount of money at stake in NASA projects, the
OIG's Office of Investigations has made procurement fraud and ethics a
high priority. Within the past year, several OIG investigations led to
criminal indictments and convictions. For example:
A former NASA Chief of Staff was convicted on
conflict of interest and false statement charges stemming from
his steering of earmarked funds to a client of his private
consulting company.
A NASA SBIR contractor submitted false financial
reports and improperly claimed family members on the company
payroll.
An individual working on Intergovernmental Personnel
Act agreements pled guilty to conspiracy to defraud and tax
evasion for payments he received from NASA and other Federal
agencies.
A senior NASA scientist steered contracts to a
company operated by his spouse.
These cases illustrate the types of criminal offenses the OIG
pursues to help guard against waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct.
Moving forward, the OIG will continue to work with NASA ethics
officials and the Agency's Acquisition Integrity Program to address
these issues proactively through comprehensive training while at the
same time conducting vigorous investigations and enforcement.
Information Technology Security
NASA continues to face significant challenges in developing,
documenting, and implementing an Agency-wide program to secure its
information and information technology (IT) systems. Recent breaches of
NASA computer systems have resulted in the theft of sensitive data
related to Agency programs, which adversely affected NASA's mission and
resulted in millions of dollars in losses. Over the last several years,
NASA implemented a series of technical solutions that have
incrementally improved the Agency's overarching IT infrastructure and
management practices. However, IT security remains a key management
challenge.
During FYs 2008 and 2009, the Agency reported making progress on
two key management initiatives related to IT security. First, NASA
implemented the Cyber Threat Analysis Program to proactively detect and
handle intrusions into NASA's cyber assets. The program includes threat
analysis, identification, and reporting as well as advanced data
forensics. Second, NASA initiated the Security Operations Center (SOC)
project to consolidate Agency security operations and incident response
capabilities. The SOC, scheduled to be fully operational in late FY
2010, will provide the Agency with the capability to perform real-time
monitoring of its computer networks and systems.
Similarly, NASA has shown progress in improving IT security as
judged by our annual Federal Information Security Management Act
(FISMA) audits. For example, in our FY 2009 FISMA audit we found that
89 percent of the 29 NASA IT systems we reviewed were certified and
accredited as required. However, only 50 percent of the systems met
FISMA requirements for annual contingency plan testing and only 25
percent had their security controls tested within the last year as
required.
NASA is a prime target for sophisticated cyber attacks as new
phishing techniques and malware programs become more advanced and
destructive. In a recent incident, for example, intruders were able to
steal large amounts of NASA research data, including information
protected under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. The
foreign-based intruders initially compromised a single user's account
but gained access to a great deal of data across a number of NASA
programs because of poorly implemented access controls. This incident
remains under investigation by our Computer Crimes Division, a group of
highly skilled special agents and forensic technicians with advanced
training in cybercrime investigations.
Our cybercrime investigations have resulted in criminal convictions
or disruptions in the operations of internationally based cyber-
intruders who are highly adaptive in avoiding detection. For example, a
group of Romanian hackers, the so-called ``White Hat Gang,'' penetrated
and damaged a number of NASA systems integral to the Global Earth
Observation System. Our agents and technicians eventually tracked one
perpetrator to Arad, Romania, where local officials held him
accountable in the Romanian Judicial System. Similarly, we have had
investigative success against cyber-criminals from Nigeria, Portugal,
Slovenia, Italy, Venezuela, and Sweden.
Finally, recommendations from our cybercrime investigations have
also identified opportunities to enhance NASA's incident response
training, internal coordination, and centralized command and control,
leading to systemic improvements in NASA IT security. Significantly,
NASA's decision to establish a Security Operations Center for
centralized management of intrusion detection, response, reporting, and
damage assessment was partially based on OIG recommendations supported
by over 4 years of investigative and audit analyses.
Conclusion
We have a number of ongoing or planned reviews that address the key
challenges facing NASA. For example, we are assessing critical
components of NASA's efforts to transition from the Space Shuttle to
the next generation of space vehicles. Specific areas of focus include
NASA's plans for completing the remaining Shuttle flights, disposing of
Shuttle Program equipment, and estimating costs for transition and
retirement activities.
In addition, we are nearing the completion of fieldwork for our
reviews of the James Webb Space Telescope and the Tracking and Data
Relay Satellite System. We are also conducting a review of NASA's
acquisition strategy for obtaining launch services when the current
contract expires in June 2010.
We continue to work with NASA to improve its financial management
through both the annual audit of the Agency's financial statements and
our monitoring NASA's use of the $1 billion received under the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.
In the area of acquisition and contracting, our investigative work
continues to identify fraud, waste, and abuse by participants in NASA's
SBIR Program. Consequently, we opened a comprehensive audit of NASA's
management of the SBIR Program that will examine the sufficiency and
implementation of the Program's internal controls.
Finally, we are continuing to assess NASA's IT security and the
Agency's efforts to ensure the availability, confidentiality, and
integrity of mission and mission support networks and systems.
We look forward to continuing our work with NASA leadership, this
Subcommittee, and other congressional Committees as we seek to help the
Agency address its top management and performance challenges.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Martin.
Ms. Chaplain, please.
STATEMENT OF MS. CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION
AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Chaplain. Madam Chairwoman, members of the
subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to discuss NASA's major
management challenges. Our work in recent years has identified
several specific challenges. They are very similar to the IG's.
They include retiring the Space Shuttle, completing and
sustaining the International Space Station, acquiring highly-
complex, unique systems for exploration, science, and
aeronautics research, improving financial management, and
protecting critical data in IT systems.
Each one of these activities is integral to the success of
the agency, yet difficult to achieve given a variety of
factors. For instance, inherent technical and engineering
complexities and challenges to developing systems create
challenges to developing systems, as well as recruiting the
right workforce. Complications associated with launching
spacecraft can also make missing schedule deadlines much more
costly than non-space systems.
The broad changes to NASA's direction proposed in the
President's budget this week do not change the basic challenges
facing NASA. The agency will still be acquiring complex, unique
systems that demand highly-specialized skills, high-performing
contractors and partners, and highly-effective management and
oversight.
But for nearly 2 decades GAO has identified significant
weaknesses in acquisition management practices at NASA.
Specifically, projects are allowed to move forward into full-
scale acquisition programs when they still have considerable
unknowns about technology and design. In turn, technology and
design problems invariably arise and are much more costly to
fix than they would have been in a more forgiving environment
earlier in the acquisition process.
Another issue, contractors and international partners are
not always able to execute as intended. Optimistic estimating
allows too many programs to compete for too few dollars.
Funding instability disrupts high-performing programs and
causes delays that may end up being much more costly in the
long run. Requirements might not always be stable. And lastly,
sound contract management practices such as limiting the use of
undefinitized contracts are not always followed.
A review of NASA's projects issued this week confirm that
these problems still persist. Nine of 19 projects we reviewed
experience significant costs and schedule growth, some within
just a year or two. Only one ongoing project in the
implementation phase did not have significant cost and schedule
growth. The remaining projects were either in the formulation
phase where no baselines are set or just very recently had
baselines set.
There was a 1.2 billion total cost increase in just two
years with the projects that had baselines. This number does
not include the Constellation Program, as it does not have a
baseline yet, or the James Webb telescope, which just
established a measurable baseline fiscal year 2009. It also
does not include cost growth that may have occurred before the
baselines were set.
The President's budget also proposes heavier reliance on
commercial suppliers for human spaceflight missions. Again, the
need for effective management and oversight practices will be
just as necessary here as they were for the Constellation
Program. In the past space programs claiming to be following
commercial approaches did not succeed because they lacked sound
insight and oversight on the government's part. In fact, key
government technical expertise was let go once such programs
were in vogue, and that was a trend that both DOD and NASA have
deeply regretted.
Moreover, while we found in prior reports that the cost
providers were making progress in meeting their milestones and
that the program was well managed, we also noted that the most
very difficult phases of development lay ahead.
Lastly, in moving forward with the new budget it is
critical that NASA maintain transparency and accountability for
its spending. Requirements for baselining and authorizing major
programs have helped considerably to shed light on problems and
the help of the acquisition portfolio, but little is known
about programs before they reach implementation, which can
sometimes take years, and there has not always been clarity on
costs involved with the challenges we identify in our
testimony.
We recognize that NASA is taking an array of actions to
reduce acquisition risks and respond to recommendations. For
example, it is revamping cost estimating and providing more
oversight at the headquarters' level. We are hopeful that these
and other efforts will meet the challenges we discussed, but
for this to happen senior leaders need to sustain their
attention to instituting discipline processes and remove
incentives that drive poor decision making. This will be
difficult to do but yet integral for the future success of
NASA.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain follows:]
Prepared Statement of Cristina T. Chaplain
Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting me to discuss the challenges facing the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). NASA is in the
midst of many changes and one of the most challenging periods in its
history: the space shuttle is slated to retire this year after flying
for 29 years; the International Space Station draws closer both to its
completion but remains underutilized; and the future vehicles for human
space flight are experiencing problems in development and have been
hotly debated and recently reviewed by an independent commission.
The Administration in its 2011 budget is proposing to cancel the
Constellation Systems program and replace it with a new approach that
uses the commercial space industry and international partnerships to
develop new technologies for space exploration. Amid all this potential
change, one thing that will most likely remain constant is NASA's need
to manage programs and projects within a fiscally constrained
environment. This will require hard choices among competing priorities
within the organization, which must balance its core missions in
science, aeronautics, and human space flight and exploration. In
addition, NASA will be competing for an ever-shrinking share of
discretionary spending against other national priorities such as the
economy, fighting terrorism, and health care reform.
Over the years NASA has had significant achievements exploring
space, helping us understand Earth's environment, and conducting
fundamental research in the aeronautical disciplines. Unfortunately, it
has not achieved the same level of results on its business side. For 20
years, NASA acquisition management has been on GAO's list of federal
programs and operations at high risk and vulnerable to fraud, waste,
abuse, and mismanagement. To its credit, NASA has made a concerted
effort to improve its acquisition management and continues to work
constructively with GAO to address systemic weaknesses in program/
project management, contractor performance, business processes,
financial management, and information technology.
The broad changes proposed for NASA do not change the basic
challenges facing the agency. Against this backdrop, my testimony today
focuses on four management and program challenges: (1) retiring of the
space shuttle, (2) utilizing and sustaining the International Space
Station, (3) continuing difficulty developing large-scale systems, and
(4) continuing weaknesses in financial management and information
technology systems.In preparing this statement, we relied on completed
and ongoing work. All of the work used in preparing this statement was
performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We have
made a number of recommendations to address some of the challenges we
identified.
NASA Challenges
Retiring of the Space Shuttle
This year the space shuttle is scheduled to fly its final six
missions to deliver hardware, supplies, and an international scientific
laboratory to the International Space Station. NASA officials remain
confident that the current flight manifest can be accomplished within
the given time, and add that should delays occur, the International
Space Station can still function. According to NASA, there are trade-
offs the agency can make in what it can take up to support and sustain
the station. However, failure to complete assembly as currently planned
would further reduce the station's ability to fulfill its research
objectives and deprive the station of critical spare parts that only
the shuttle can deliver. The recent review completed by the U.S. Human
Space Flight Plans Committee included the option of flying the space
shuttle through 2011 in order to complete the International Space
Station. However, the Committee noted that there are currently no funds
in NASA's budget for additional shuttle flights. Most recently, the
Administration is proposing over $600 million in the fiscal year 2011
budget to, ensure that the space shuttle can fly its final missions, in
case the space shuttle's schedule slips into fiscal year 2011.
Retirement of the shuttle will involve many activities that warrant
special attention. These include: disposing of the facilities that no
longer are needed while complying with federal, state, and local
environmental laws and regulations; ensuring the retention of critical
shills within NASA's workforce and its suppliers; and disposing of over
1 million equipment items. In addition, the total cost of shuttle
retirement and transition to include the disposition of the orbiters
themselves-is not readily transparent in NASA's budget. We have
recommended that NASA clearly identify all direct and indirect shuttle
transition and retirement costs, including any potential sale proceeds
of excess inventory and environmental remediation costs in its future
budget requests. NASA provided this information to the House and Senate
Appropriations committees hi July 2009 but did not identify all
indirect shuttle transition and retirement costs in its fiscal year
2010 budget request. We look forward to examining the fiscal year 2011
budget request to determine whether this information is identified.
Lastly, NASA has recognized that sustaining the shuttle workforce
through the retirement of the shuttle while ensuring that a viable
workforce is available to support future activities is a major
challenge. We commend NASA for its efforts to understand and mitigate
the effect of the space shuttle's retirement on the civil service and
contractor workforce. Nevertheless, how well NASA executes its
workforce management plans as they retire the space shuttle will affect
the agency's ability to maintain the skilled workforce to support space
exploration.
Utilizing and Sustaining the International Space
Although it is nearing completion, the International Space Station
faces several significant challenges that may impede efforts to
maximize utilization of research facilities available onboard. These
include: the retirement of the Space Shuttle in 2010 and the loss of
its unmatched capacity to move cargo and astronauts to and from the
station; the uncertain future for the station beyond 2015; and the
limited time available for research due to competing demands for the
crew's time.
We have previously reported that the International Space Station
will face a significant cargo supply shortfall without the Space
Shuttle's great capacity to deliver cargo to the station and return it
to earth.\1\ NASA plans on using a mixed fleet of vehicles, including
those developed by international partners, to service the space station
on an interim basis. However, international partners' vehicles alone
cannot fully satisfy the space station's cargo resupply needs. Without
a domestic cargo resupply capability to augment this mixed fleet
approach, NASA faces a 40 metric ton (approximately 88,000 pounds)
cargo resupply shortfall between 2010 and 2015. While NASA is
sponsoring commercial efforts to develop vehicles capable of carrying
cargo to the station and the administration has endorsed this approach,
none of those currently in development has been launched into orbit,
and the vehicles' aggressive development schedules leave little room
for the unexpected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, NASA: Commercial Partners Are Making Progress, but Face
Aggressive Schedules to Demonstrate Critical Space Station. Cargo
Transport Capabilities, GAO-09-618 (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, upon completion of construction, unless the decision
is made to extend station operations, NASA has only 5 years to execute
a robust research program before the International Space Station is
deorbited. The leaves little time to establish a strong utilization
program. At present, NASA projects that its share of the International
Space Station research facilities will be less than fully utilized by
planned NASA research. Specifically, NASA plans to utilize only 48
percent of the racks that accommodate scientific research facilities
onboard, with the remainder available for use by others.\2\ Congress
has directed NASA to take all necessary steps to ensure that the
International Space Station remains a viable and productive facility
capable of potential utilization through at least 2020.\3\ The
Administration is proposing in its fiscal year 2011 budget to extend
operations of the International Space Station to 2020 or beyond in
concert with its international partners.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Scientific research facilities currently available inside the
space station are generally mounted in modular, refrigerator-sized
mounts called racks or ExPRESS racks, which provide the utilities
necessary for conducting research.
\3\ National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-422 Sec. 601.
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Lastly, NASA faces a significant constraint for science on board
the space station because of limited crew time. There can only be six
crew members aboard the station at one time due to the number of spaces
available in the ``lifeboats,'' or docked spacecraft that can transport
the crew in case of an emergency. As such, crew time cannot presently
be increased to meet increased demand. Though available crew time may
increase as the six-person crew becomes more experienced with operating
the space station efficiently or if the crew volunteers its free time
for research, crew time for U.S. research remains a limiting factor.
According to NASA officials, potential National Laboratory researchers
should design their experiments to be as automated as possible or
minimize crew involvement required for their experiments to ensure that
they are accepted for flight.
We have recommended that NASA implement actions, such as developing
a plan to broaden and enhance ongoing outreach to potential users and
creating a centralized body to oversee U.S. space station research
decision making, including the selection of all U.S. research to be
conducted on board and ensuring that all U.S. International Space
Station National Laboratory research is meritorious and valid. NASA
concurred with our recommendation and is researching the possibility of
developing a management body to manage space station research, which
would make the International Space Station National Laboratory similar
to other national laboratories.
Continuing Difficulty Developing Large-Scale Systems
NASA projects have produced ground-breaking research and advanced
our understanding of the universe. However, one common theme binds most
of the projects--they cost more and take longer to develop than
planned. As we reported in our recently completed assessment of NASA's
19 most costly projects--which have a combined life-cycle cost that
exceeds $66 billion--the agency's projects continue to experience cost
growth and schedule delays.\4\ Ten of the 19 projects, which had their
baselines set within the last 3 years, experienced cost growth
averaging $121.1 million or 18.7 percent and the average schedule
growth was 15 months.\5\ For example, the Glory project has recently
breached its revised schedule baseline by 16 months and exceeded its
development cost baseline by over 14 percent--for a total development
cost growth of over 75 percent in just 2 years.\6\ Project officials
also indicated that recent technical problems could cause additional
cost growth. Similarly, the Mars Science Laboratory project is
currently seeking reauthorization from Congress after experiencing
development cost growth in excess of 30 percent. Many of the other
projects we reviewed experienced challenges, including developing new
or retrofitting older technologies, stabilizing engineering designs,
and managing the performance of contractors and development partners.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ GAO, NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects, GAO-
10-22-7SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2010.)
\5\ Of the 19 projects included in our review, 4 are still in the
formulation phase, including Ares I and Orion, where cost and schedule
baselines have yet to be established. Five of the projects just entered
the implementation phase in fiscal year 2009 and therefore have not
experienced cost and schedule growth.
\6\ If development cost of a program will exceed the baseline
estimate by more than 30 percent, then NASA is required to seek
reauthorization from Congress in order to continue the program. If the
program is reauthorized, NASA is required to establish new cost and
schedule baselines. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 16613(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our work has consistently shown that reducing these kinds of
problems in acquisition programs hinges on developing a sound business
case for each project. Such a business case provides for early
recognition of challenges, allows managers to take corrective action,
and places needed and justifiable projects in a better position to
succeed. Product development efforts that have not followed a
knowledge-based business case approach have frequently suffered poor
cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. A sound business case
includes development of firm requirements, mature technologies, a
preliminary design, a realistic cost estimate, and sound estimates of
available funding and time needed before the projects proceed beyond
preliminary design review. If necessary, the project should be delayed
until a sound business case, demonstrating the project's readiness to
move forward into product development, is in hand.
In particular, two of NASA's largest projects--Ares I and Orion,
which are part of NASA's Constellation program to return to the moon--
face considerable technical, design, and production challenges. NASA is
actively addressing these challenges. Both projects, however, still
face considerable hurdles to meeting overarching safety and performance
requirements, including limiting vibration during launch, mitigating
the risk of hitting the launch tower during liftoff, and reducing the
mass of the Orion vehicle. In addition, we found that the Constellation
program, from the onset, has faced a mismatch between funding and
program needs. This finding was reinforced by the Review of U.S. Human
Spaceflight Plans Committee, which reported that NASA's plans for the
Constellation program to return to the moon by 2020 are unexecutable
without increases to NASA's current budget.
To its credit, NASA has acknowledged that the Constellation
program, for example, faces knowledge gaps concerning requirements,
technologies, funding, schedule, and other resources. NASA stated that
it is working to close these gaps and at the preliminary design review
the program will be required to demonstrate that the program and its
projects meet all system requirements with acceptable risk and within
cost and schedule constraints, and that the program has established a
sound business case for proceeding into the implementation phase. Even
though NASA has made progress in developing the actual vehicles, the
mismatch between resources and requirements remains and the
administration's proposed fiscal year 2011 budget leaves the future of
the program in question.
Continuing Weakness in Financial Management and Information Technology
Systems
NASA has continually struggled to put its financial house in order.
GAO and others have reported for years on these efforts.\7\ In fact,
GAO has made a number of recommendations to address NASA's financial
management challenges. Moreover, the NASA Inspector General has
identified financial management as one of NASA's most serious
challenges. In a November 2008 report, the Inspector General found
continuing weaknesses in NASA's financial management process and
systems, including internal controls over property accounting. It noted
that these deficiencies have resulted in disclaimed audits of NASA's
financial statements since fiscal year 2003. The disclaimers were
largely attributed to data integrity issues and poor internal controls.
NASA has made progress in addressing some of these issues, but the
recent disclaimer on the fiscal year 2009 audit shows that more work
needs to be done.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ GAO, Property Management: NASA's Goal of Increasing Equipment
Reutilization May Fall Short without Further Efforts, GAO-09-187
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2009); GAO; Business Modernization: NASA
Must Consider Agencywide Needs to Reap the Full Benefits of Its
Enterprise Management System Modernization Effort, GAO-07-691
(Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2007); and GAO, Financial Management
Systems: Additional Efforts Needed to Address Key Causes of
Modernization Failures, GAO-06-184 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We have also reported that NASA remains vulnerable to disruptions
in its information technology network.\8\ Information security is a
critical consideration for any organization reliant on information
technology and especially important for NASA, which depends on a number
of key computer systems and communication networks to conduct its work.
These networks traverse the Earth and beyond, providing critical two-
way communication links between Earth and spacecraft; connections
between NASA centers and partners, scientists, and the public; and
administrative applications and functions. NASA has made important
progress in implementing security controls and aspects of its
information security program. However, NASA has not always implemented
sufficient controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of the information and systems supporting its mission
directorates. Specifically, NASA did not consistently implement
effective controls to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to
its networks and systems. A key reason for these weaknesses is that
NASA has not yet fully implemented key activities of its information
security program to ensure that controls are appropriately designed and
operating effectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ GAO, Information Security: NASA Needs to Remedy Vulnerabilities
in Key Networks, GAO-10-4 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2009.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During fiscal years 2007 and 2008, NASA reported 1,120 security
incidents that resulted in the installation of malicious software on
its systems and unauthorized access to sensitive information. NASA
established a Security Operations Center in 2008 to enhance prevention
and provide early detection of security incidents and coordinate
agency-level information related to its security posture. Nevertheless,
the control vulnerabilities and program shortfalls--which GAO
identified--collectively increase the risk of unauthorized access to
NASA's sensitive information, as well as inadvertent or deliberate
disruption of its system operations and services. They make it possible
for intruders, as well as government and contractor employees, to
bypass or disable computer access controls and undertake a wide variety
of inappropriate or malicious acts. As a result, increased and
unnecessary risk exists that sensitive information is subject to
unauthorized disclosure, modification, and destruction and that mission
operations could be disrupted.
GAO has recommended actions the NASA Administrator should take to
mitigate control vulnerabilities and fully implement a comprehensive
information security program including: developing and implementing
comprehensive and physical risk assessments; conducting sufficient or
comprehensive security testing and evaluation of all relevant security
controls; and implementing an adequate incident detection program. In
response to our report, the Deputy Administrator noted that NASA is
implementing many of our recommendations as part of an ongoing NASA
strategic effort to improve information technology management and
information technology security program deficiencies. The Deputy
Administrator also stated that NASA will continue to mitigate the
information security weaknesses identified in our report. The actions
identified by the Deputy Administrator, if effectively implemented,
will improve the agency's information security program.
Concluding Observations
In executing NASA's space exploration, scientific discovery, and
aeronautics research missions, NASA must use its resources as
effectively and efficiently as possible because of the severity of the
fiscal challenges our nation faces and the wide range of competing
national priorities. Establishing a sound business case before a
project starts should also better position NASA management to deliver
promised capability for the funding it receives. While space
development programs are complex and difficult by nature, and most are
one-time efforts, the nature of its work should not preclude NASA from
being accountable for achieving what it promises when requesting and
receiving funds. Congress will also need to do its part to ensure that
NASA has the support to hold poorly performing programs accountable in
order to provide an environment where the systems portfolio as a whole
can succeed with the resources NASA is given. NASA shows a willingness
to face these challenges. We look forward to continuing work with NASA
to develop tools to enhance the management of acquisitions and agency
operations to optimize its investment in space and aeronautics
missions.
Madam Chairwoman, and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes
my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
have at this time.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Ms. Chaplain.
Admiral Dyer. Admiral Dyer, before you start, yeah, the
microphone, please.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JOSEPH W. DYER (U.S. NAVY, RETIRED),
CHAIR, AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Admiral Dyer. Thank you. Thank you for the opportunity to
discuss the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's 2009 activities
and annual report.
Let me begin by quoting from the report's conclusion. ``The
panel continues to believe, as it did in 2008, that NASA faces
unprecedented challenges, perhaps greater than any time in the
agency's history. Important decisions on the future of human
spaceflight face NASA as well as the White House, the Congress,
and the Nation. Commercial entities and international partners
will likely have a larger role in transporting both cargo and
crew to orbit. It is critical that NASA focus on establishing
the criteria requirements and the certification process for
orbital transportation vehicles, as well as a process for
validating compliance. The performance and safety requirements
must be stated promptly and clearly to enable NASA and non-NASA
entities to proceed in the most productive and effective
manner.
The Ares I vehicle has been designed from the beginning
with a clear emphasis on safety. Before any changes made to
architecture, the inherent safety of a selected approach should
be assessed to ensure it offers a level of safety equal to or
greater than the program of record. We recognize that the
Shuttle is risky by inherent design and is becoming more so
because of aging and wear. Extension of the Shuttle's use
significantly beyond what is planned through the current
manifest is not recommended.
Space exploration is a dangerous enterprise. The risks must
be shouldered by NASA, the Congress, and the Administration,
and those risks must be communicated clearly to the public. The
panel hopes that our summary of critical safety-related issues
will help focus attention on the important decisions and the
direction of the agency.''
The 2009, report has been widely read, strongly commended,
and energetically criticized. With those well-rounded metrics
we believe we have fulfilled our statutory purpose which is to
infuse safety considerations into an informed debate.
The panel spent a good amount of ink on two specific
issues; human rating requirements or HRR for follow-on vehicles
and the Shuttle extension.
Regarding human rating requirements, in our report the
panel recommends NASA stipulate directly the applicable HRR
standards and the level of acceptable risk for potential
commercial contractors. Not only should the standards be
provided but the certification mechanism and required
validation data should be made clear as well.
Regarding the Shuttle extension, the panel does not support
extending the Shuttle significantly beyond its current
manifest. We are especially concerned over any kind of serial
extension where a few flights at a time might be added.
The report goes on to add other issues and opportunities.
Those include the use of robots to both supplement astronauts
and to replace them in some undertakings, as well as facilities
and aging infrastructure, a growing and under-funded issue. If
one steps back and observes with a wide lens the 2009 ASAP
report is about three things. First, about the Space Shuttle,
second about safely meeting our Nation's goals and objectives
for space transportation, and third, the knowledge needed to
safely transport human beings into space.
Let me address those one at a time. With the Shuttle, we
believe that every responsible American has some concerns about
the safety of the Shuttle. The Shuttle has flown 129 flights.
There have been two catastrophic accidents and 14 lives lost.
The Shuttle's history, age, and eroding supply and support
chain all speak to increasing risks.
Secondly, we must be clear about our goals for space
transportation and what is required to achieve safety in the
implementation of those goals. Are the goals to, A, minimize
the gap between Shuttle and America's next transportation
vehicle? Is it to privatize transport of NASA astronauts into
low-earth orbit? Is it to secure a launch vehicle with greater
lift and potentially greater flexibility? The panel believes
NASA can accomplish any of these goals given sufficient time
and money, but NASA cannot be expected to accomplish all three
safely and concurrently within available budgets.
Third, let us talk about the knowledge. Perhaps competency
would be the better word. The panel is not against commercial
transport of humans but has registered concern in our report
about commercial transportation without updated safety
standards. Those standards have not yet been written by NASA,
so no one can truly claim compliance with them.
Chairman, in closing I want to highlight what causes
programs to get into situations where safety is at risk. We
believe there are most often three common themes; compressing
schedule, stretching resources, and a workforce that loses
direction. We believe both resources and scheduling must
include management reserve to accomplish and accommodate issues
that will arise as the new design evolves and working
relationship matures.
Additionally, managing the Shuttle's workforce, both
government and contractor, will require new and focused
attention. The Workforce Transition Plan that has maintained
the stable Shuttle workforce and requisite knowledge is now in
jeopardy. It will be a challenge to keep the necessary skill
sets as workers find themselves without a clear future and are
looking for a safe place to land.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on
behalf of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dyer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph W. Dyer
Chairwoman Giffords, Ranking Member Olson, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel's 2009 Activities and Annual Report. Let me begin by
quoting from the Report's conclusion.
CONCLUSION
``The Panel continues to believe, as it did in 2008, that NASA
faces unprecedented challenges, perhaps greater than any time in the
Agency's history. Important decisions on the future of human
spaceflight face NASA, as well as the White House, the Congress, and
the Nation.
Commercial entities and international partners will likely have a
larger role in transporting both cargo and crew to orbit. It is crucial
that NASA focus on establishing the certification requirements, a
certification process for orbital transportation vehicles, and a
process for validating compliance. The performance and safety
requirements must be stated promptly and clearly to enable NASA and
non-NASA entities to proceed in the most productive and effective
manner possible.
The Ares I vehicle has been designed from the beginning with a
clear emphasis on safety. Before any change is made to architecture,
the inherent safety of that approach should be assessed to ensure that
it offers a level of safety equal to or greater than the program of
record.
We recognize that the Shuttle is risky by inherent design, and it
is becoming more so because of aging and wear. Extension of its use
significantly beyond what is planned through the current manifest is
not recommended.
Space exploration is a dangerous enterprise. The risks must be
shouldered by NASA, Congress, and the Administration, and those risks
must be communicated clearly to the public.
The Panel hopes that our summary of critical safety-related issues
will help focus attention on the important decisions and the direction
of the Agency.''
The 2009 Report has been widely read, strongly commended, and
energetically criticized. With those well rounded metrics, we believe
we have fulfilled our statutory purpose, which is to infuse safety
considerations into an informed debate.
During this period of deliberation and redirection, it is important
not to overlook NASA's 2009 accomplishments. In the Report, we
highlight several accomplishments that are noteworthy due to the
commitment to safety. Highlights include:
Five successful Shuttle launches,
Progress on International Space Station (ISS) build
out,
Ares I-X Rocket flight test,
NASA Safety Center (NSC) Safety & Mission Assurance
Technical Excellence Program (STEP),
ISS cargo resupply,
Safe and successful Hubble Servicing Mission (SM)-4,
NASA and the OSHA Voluntary Protection Program (VPP),
and
Continuing successes in deep space missions.
The Panel also highlighted a few critical issues in the Report. The
most important one is, ``Whatever new policies or vehicles are selected
for America's space activities, ensuring human safety must continue to
receive the appropriate funding, visibility, and support . . ..''
The Panel spent a good amount of ink on two specific issues: Human
Rating Requirements (HRR) for Follow-on Vehicles and Shuttle Extension.
Human Rating Requirements
In our Report, we note that the Commercial Orbital Transportation
Services (COTS) vehicles being developed thus far had not been required
to meet HRR standards nor were they proven to be appropriate to
transport NASA personnel. This is understandable since COTS vehicle
contractors are currently tasked only with developing cargo delivery
systems. However, since expanding the commercial vehicle mission to
include human transport has become an active topic, the Panel
highlighted the HRR standards issue at every quarterly meeting in 2009.
A principal concern identified at the first meeting in 2009 was that
the current HRR procedures, when applied to the development of future
human-related vehicles, were not specifically intended to establish
requirements for vehicles produced by entities external to NASA. The
Panel recommended that NASA stipulate directly the applicable HRR
standards and share acceptable risk levels with those other entities.
It is essential that any entity that might be creating human-rated
transport systems that may transport NASA astronauts must understand
the safety requirements that will be mandatory for such services. Not
only should the standards be provided, but the certification mechanism
and required validation data should be made clear.
We go on to note that, in the fourth quarter of 2009, NASA made a
start at achieving progress to more clearly develop and communicate the
standards necessary for any COTS manufacturer if astronauts are to be
transported on non-NASA vehicles. However, this will only partially
answer the challenge. After the criteria and their applicability are
clearly established, a process must be developed for validating and
certifying compliance with those criteria. Although the Panel strongly
supports the start that NASA has made, the Panel continues to believe
that NASA is behind where it needs to be at this point in time.
Considerable work must be done, and priority efforts should be
established to accelerate the level of effort underway.
For these reasons, the Panel stated, ``To abandon Ares I as a
baseline vehicle for an alternative without demonstrated capability nor
proven superiority is unwise and probably not cost effective. The
ability of any current COTS design to ``close the gap'' or even provide
an equivalent degree of safety is speculative.''
Shuttle Extension
The Augustine Committee concluded that the only way to reduce the
``gap'' in human spaceflight launch capability between ISS completion
and the planned flights of Ares I is by extending the Shuttle program
well beyond 2010.
The Panel does not support extending the Shuttle significantly
beyond its current manifest. We are especially concerned over any kind
of ``serial extension'' where a few flights at a time might be added.
The risk of continuing to fly the Shuttle without a recertification and
expending the resources to bring the vehicle up to modem standards is
more than what we should ask astronauts to shoulder. The Panel does not
believe that there is full transparency to the risk. We recognize that
such transparency is challenging due to the difficulty in communicating
highly technical issues to a largely non-technical public. Still, NASA
must find a way to successfully communicate the level of risk inherent
in experimental space flight. The Agency must be supported in doing so
by Congress and the Administration. In our opinion, the time to extend
the Shuttle was several years ago when there was an opportunity to go
forward with an extension certification program of reasonable scope and
cost. With sufficient money, manpower, and recertification efforts, it
is possible that the Shuttle could be extended. While we are aware of
no major systems that are ``on the knee of the curve'' of wear out, the
funds needed to allow full recertification are substantial, and the
probability of finding things that demand even more resources during
recertification is very real.
The Report goes on to address other issues and opportunities. Those
include:
Integration of Robotics Agency-wide
The Panel continues to urge NASA to take a more
open-minded and aggressive view towards using robots to
reduce human risk whenever possible, consistent with
mission accomplishment. This means using robots to
replace humans on some missions and to support
astronauts on others.
The Panel notes that the vision for Exploration
includes dangerous and challenging work like
construction, mining, and manufacturing. In
accomplishing this work, there is significant risk to
astronauts in their fragile but critical space suits.
Facilities and Aging Infrastructure
Over eighty percent of NASA facilities are beyond their design
life, and annual maintenance is underfunded.\1\ Facilities continue to
degrade and facilities failures are starting to impact missions and
have safety implications Agency-wide. Evidence for this can be seen in
the increasing number of small fires, key equipment losses through
failures in material handling and transportation facilities, and in the
``weak signals'' that we observe in current safety reports. The
infrastructure used to launch complex vehicles into space must be
reviewed and maintained down to the smallest component to remain safe.
In the past, one of NASA's goals was ``ten healthy Centers.'' A
considerable investment in facility maintenance, repair, and
replacement is needed for this goal to be achieved. This may be
unrealistic in the current economic climate. If funding is not
available, NASA should consider consolidating its programs and efforts
at fewer Centers so that its activities may be safely continued at the
remaining facilities. This planning needs to be part of a conscious and
deliberate facilities strategy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Presentation ``NASA's Construction Program'' by Frank
Bellinger, Director Facilities Engineering & Real Property Division,
NASA Headquarters, to American Council of Engineering Companies, April
27, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If one steps back and observes with a wide lens, the FY 2009 ASAP
Annual Report is about three things: the Space Shuttle, safely meeting
our nation's goals and objectives for space transportation, and the
knowledge needed to safely transport human beings into space.
The Space Shuttle--We believe every responsible
American has concerns about the safety of the Shuttle. The
Shuttle has flown 129 flights; there have been two catastrophic
accidents and 14 lives lost. The Shuttle's history, age, and
its eroding supply and support chain all speak to increasing
risk.
Space Transportation Goals--We must be clear on our
goals for space transportation to meet those goals safely. Are
they to:
Minimize the gap between the Shuttle and America's
next human transport vehicle?
Privatize the transport of NASA astronauts to low
earth orbit?
Secure a new launch vehicle with greater lift and
potentially greater flexibility?
The panel believes NASA can accomplish any of these goals, given
sufficient time and money, but NASA cannot be expected to accomplish
all three safely and concurrently within available budgets.
To speak clearly about the first goal, the ASAP believes attempting
to close the gap or to buy time for new program direction by extending
the Shuttle is ill advised.
Competency--The Panel is not against commercial
transport of humans but has registered concern in our Report
about commercial transport without updated safety standards.
These standards have not yet been written by NASA, so no one
can truly claim compliance with them. So far in the U.S., only
NASA has demonstrated the knowledge and competence needed to
transport humans into space and return them safely to the
earth. If the U.S. decides to contract for commercial services
to transport our astronauts into low earth orbit, there is much
work to be done. That work is about transferring knowledge and
about developing a process whereby competency and design can be
certified.
Whatever the direction forward, the Congress and the White House
need to provide NASA with clear guidance. The focus needs to turn to
getting the job done as soon as possible.
What causes programs to get into situations where safety is at risk
or, sometimes, even a causality? We believe there are most often three
common themes:
1. Compressing schedule,
2. Stretching resources,
3. A workforce that looses direction.
With the new budget come significant changes to our Nation's plan
for space. The ASAP's advice is to carefully and adequately provide
resources and to realistically schedule work. We believe both resources
and scheduling must include a ``management reserve'' to accommodate
issues that will arise as new designs evolve and working relationships
mature.
Additionally, managing the Shuttle's workforce--both government and
contactor--will require new and focused attention. NASA's workforce
transition planning that has maintained a stable Shuttle workforce and
requisite knowledge is now in jeopardy. It will be a challenge to keep
the necessary skill-sets as workers find themselves without a clear
future and looking for a safe place to land.
Once again, I thank you for the opportunity to offer the Panel's
view on these issues and would be pleased to respond to any questions
you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Admiral Dyer, and to all of
our witnesses today, at this point we are going to begin our
first round of questions, and the Chair will recognize herself
for five minutes.
Cost Growth
I would like to start with Ms. Chaplain. GAO has reported
that cost and schedule growth in several of NASA's projects has
resulted from problems such as failing to adequately identify
requirements and underestimating technology complexity and
maturity. And I know that this is just a draft that you have
submitted here to our subcommittee, but can you talk a little
bit about cost growth and schedule delay? Is this a matter of
agency discipline, or is it something else that has--that is
involved in this very slow progress at NASA?
Ms. Chaplain. I believe it is more than just discipline,
though discipline has a lot to do with it. There are issues
with regard to planning ahead for acquisitions, notably like
really looking at your supplier base, the health of it, what
gaps and expertise they have, what potential problems you may
have when you come to acquisitions. More of that could be done
at the headquarters level and at the project level.
There are also issues that are related to launch manifest
that are going to be very severe in the next few years as NASA
goes away from the Delta II vehicles to other medium launch
vehicles. They raised the cost of missing any kind of launch
deadline.
So I think it is just an array of issues, but discipline is
a big part of it.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you. Mr. Martin, would you care
to comment.
Mr. Martin. Yes. Our observation would be we think that
NASA has done a better job developing guidance to steer program
management and now is really more of a matter of effectively
implementing the guidance developed. And they have had varying
degrees of success with some programs.
Risk Reduction Report Methods
Chairwoman Giffords. As a follow up, Ms. Chaplain, looking
at the report you released yesterday, and you talk about 19
large-scale projects and includes a thumbnail sketch of Ares I,
you indicate in the report that the totality of your work
lasted until February 10, yet when you go to describe the
status of Ares I, you failed to acknowledge significant
progress such as the successful Ares I ground tests, the I-X
flight, an agreement on how to deal with the thrust oscillation
issue. All of these events that I mentioned happened late last
year, so I am curious as to why they weren't acknowledged in
the report and whether or not you consider them to be among the
risk-reduction activities.
Ms. Chaplain. A couple of things with regard to that. We do
have to cut off our audit work at a certain point in time to
allow for production of the report, and they also allow at
least a month for agency comment period, so you are always
going to have a lag of a month or two between the audit work
and the report.
Where we could, we tried to update the projects,
specifically with some issues that were brought to our
attention, either by NASA or the committee. Some key events
like the Ares I-X we couldn't validate the results yet, so they
are not reflected. They will be reflected in the next one.
On the other hand, too, while you might have some positive
events taking place, there might be negative events taking
place. The NPP Project, for example, may have more cost
increase than what we reflect in the report. So we really need
to be sure that we are as accurate as possible. We have to cut
off and know what we can validate.
I will also note that when NASA does have an opportunity to
provide comments, it can also point out those events that have
taken place. They didn't specifically point anything like that
out in their comment letter, and in our agency exit meeting we
didn't have any specific updates that were validated, and when
I say validated, it has to be provided by documentation, things
we can substantiate and analyze. We didn't get those kinds of
materials from NASA at the exit conference, either.
In addition to that, each program has an opportunity to
update their status when they comment on the 2-page sheet that
we produce for that report.
Chairwoman Giffords. And Ms. Chaplain, is that pretty
typical of agencies not providing that information? I mean,
obviously, NASA is unlike all agencies just because of the
complexity and the cost of these programs, but I am just
curious whether or not that is typical and----
Ms. Chaplain. I would say yes. We produce a very similar
product for our DOD weapons portfolio, and there, again, most
of the information on that is based on these selected
acquisition reports that go to Congress every year, and that
information can be dated by the time the report comes out. The
projects try to update where we can, and we try to validate
where we can, but you tend to have that lag.
The one thing about this mandate for this work is there is
a biannual reporting requirement. That gives us an opportunity
to brief staff midyear and kind of report on the updates that
have taken place and where we stand with some of the programs.
Risk in Ares Program
Chairwoman Giffords. Okay. Just--I just have a few seconds.
Admiral Dyer, would you just talk briefly about your
thoughts on where Ares I stands relative to risk, in relation
to risk rather?
Admiral Dyer. The panel's position is that if the goal is
to minimize the gap between Shuttle and a follow-on vehicle,
then Ares I offers the safest, quickest opportunity and
probably the most cost effective one. If the Nation is willing
to accept a wider gap, more risk, and a higher cost, then other
opportunities avail themselves.
Chairwoman Giffords. And Admiral Dyer, in terms of your--
the panel, the experts that are apart of your organization, I
mean, to what extent are you confident that the analysis is
truly accurate?
Admiral Dyer. We are confident that the analysis is
accurate, that the program is on track. I bristle a bit when
any program is referenced as troubled, because you have to
discriminate between the ongoing activities of any
developmental program, part of getting the work done, and
programs that are really in general in great difficulty. We
think what you see with Ares is part of the developmental
process. We think the program is on track.
Chairwoman Giffords. Okay. Thank you, Admiral.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Olson for five minutes.
Regulation of Human Space Flight
Mr. Olson. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman, and
I have got a question for all the panelists.
With respect to ensuring that future human space-related
vehicles meet NASA requirements and to validate compliance, it
has been suggested that NASA follow the FAA model by delegating
safety mission assurance authority to the space launch
provider.
It has been asserted that this system is much more
efficient, adaptable, and cost effective than having to deal
with NASA's cumbersome safety regime. Under the FAA Enforcement
System select employees of aircraft manufacturers, airlines,
and aircraft maintenance companies are licensed by the FAA and
charged with enforcing FAA safety regulations. Failure to
adhere to FAA standards can lead to fines, license suspensions,
or worse.
What are your views on adapting such a system for companies
hired to fly astronauts to low-earth orbit? Mr. Martin.
Mr. Martin. Okay. We will take that one first. We have not
done work in this particular issue, but speaking for myself I
would think that NASA would be foolish to cede any issues
dealing with the safety of its most precious cargo, that is the
astronauts. I would be shocked if the administrator, who is an
astronaut, would agree to that, and I just think the human
rating issue and the safety issue needs to remain in house.
Mr. Olson. Thank you for that answer.
Ms. Chaplain.
Ms. Chaplain. I am not as familiar with the FAA process,
but I do have some thoughts. We would almost like to see a
process analogous to what they have for the launch services
program for NASA, probably more stringent than that, so when
NASA is looking to get a new supplier, for example, to take up
science missions, it has a very rigorous process for certifying
those suppliers and ensuring that they meet all of NASA's
standards for taking up science missions, which are pretty
stringent in and of themselves.
Along with this process comes insight into design
production and test activities, and in the case of human
spaceflight you would almost expect that they have approval
authority over top-level requirements and test strategies and
success criteria, et cetera.
Overall, I would just see a much more rigorous process and
a lot more insight and oversight than what we have with the
COTS Program. The COTS wasn't set up to be that kind of
rigorous oversight effort.
Mr. Olson. Thank you, Ms. Chaplain.
Admiral Dyer.
Admiral Dyer. May I point out or perhaps predict two
evolving catch-22 opportunities. The first is that FAA has
great knowledge about the certification of commercial vehicles
but little knowledge about space. Just the opposite is true on
NASA; deep knowledge with regard to spaceflight, little
knowledge with regard to certifying commercial vehicles.
Madam Chairman, I guess you could call this an interagency
opportunity in the making.
A second catch-22 related is how do you, as you have heard
us mention a couple of times, how do you both communicate what
is required and then certify it? The second catch-22, Mr.
Olson, I believe, will be commercial industry's belief that
they can only deliver on-cost and on-schedule if NASA is kept
at arm's length. But keeping NASA at arm's length will neither
transition the knowledge that is needed, nor build the
confidence to certify.
These are two serious problems that need to be addressed as
we go into the future.
Mr. Olson. Yes, sir. I can see how both of those would
affect safety.
Technology Development on Ares/Orion
One more question and this is for you, again, Admiral Dyer.
One of the biggest technical challenges for the Ares and Orion
has been the design and development of a launch-abort system,
and as you know, later this spring NASA has scheduled its first
major test of an integrated launch-abort system at White Sands.
Assuming this system won't be used now on the Orion
Vehicle, is it reasonable to believe that this technology and
design can be transferred to other vehicles? Would the hardware
and software be fairly generic, and what are the kinds of
validation tests that would be required to ensure the system is
safe and reliable?
Admiral Dyer. Sir, I would note that the technology and the
development is sound. There is much knowledge with this regard.
Probably some of it can be transferred, but I am afraid we
don't have on the board the panel, the deep knowledge necessary
to answer your question.
Cost Growth
Mr. Olson. Thank you for that answer, sir, and I will close
with just one comment I would like to make.
I mean, one of the things we hear, and it is sort of a
follow up on a comment Admiral Dyer made, but one of the things
we hear is how the justification for this new budget and its
implication for human spaceflight is the cost overruns and how
the Constellation Project is just way beyond budget. And the
numbers are true. We have, you know, we have put $9 billion in
there, and I want to point out that some of the cost overruns,
the majority of that problem hasn't been with the agency. It
has been with the people in this room, the people in the
Congress, and the people over at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.
We haven't given NASA the resources they need to complete
the missions we have asked them to do, and I hope to eliminate
that process in the future, and again, keep the Constellation
Program going.
Madam Chairwoman, I yield back.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Olson.
The Chair will now recognize Ms. Edwards.
Systemic Weakness of Government Acquisitions
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and thank you for
holding this hearing and discussion today. I think it is really
important and especially in light of the Administration, the
President's release of the budget for 2011.
I want to--and I just wanted to say I do share the concerns
expressed by my colleagues about the proposed budget and the
impact on human spaceflight and essentially decimating
America's human spaceflight capacity. I think there is a bit of
an inconsistency between thinking about it and as the President
has outlined, the future and 21st century technology and job
creation for this century and maintaining a robust human
spaceflight program. And we need to resolve those
inconsistencies, and I look forward to working with the
committee and with this subcommittee in doing that.
I am concerned about a couple of things. One, Ms. Chaplain,
you said that--you noted in your testimony that NASA has
produced over the years some amazing research and technology,
but the projects cost more and take longer. How much different
really is this say from Department of Defense large-scale
weapon systems or military spaceflight? How much greater are
the cost overruns and the financial management problems in--
within NASA different from these--from say the Department of
Defense and other agencies? Because I think we suffer from some
of those same problems across the board in the Federal
Government, and the fact that we are spotlighting NASA for I
think a cut, a decimation of the human spaceflight program,
looking at those kind of things, really misplaces where we need
to go in terms of how we think about risk taking and
technology.
And I also wonder whether you have had an opportunity
really to look within the culture of NASA where I think that
there are times when the agency recognizes the limitations here
in the Congress, and as Mr. Olson has pointed out, at 1600
Pennsylvania Avenue, and then constrains its requests to the
Congress and then we run up costs in programs and systems. And
that is in, you know, and I don't know that that necessarily
can be placed at the foot of the agency.
Ms. Chaplain. I would say NASA's issues with constant
schedule overruns are very similar to the ones that DOD,
particularly the space systems, and the underlying causes are
very similar, and some of that does have to do with culture and
the competition for funding and having a lot of instability in
that funding process.
I will note at DOD there has been cuts in big programs
there as well.
Progress on Improving Program Management
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, and then I am also curious as to--
and perhaps, Admiral Dyer, you can comment on this, when you
look at things like contractor management and trying to
stabilize, stabilizing engineering designs and those challenges
that NASA faces, do you think that the agency is actually on a
path and perhaps Mr. Martin, you could talk to this, speak to
this as well, is actually on a path to doing a better job there
so that there is a little bit more predictability for future
programs?
Admiral Dyer. I think the situation is improving. It is
certainly a focus for General Boldon, but you do give me an
opportunity to make a point I was thinking about during Ms.
Chaplain's answer to your question.
Cost and schedule and safety warp and weave. They are very
tightly related to one another, so both from a safety
perspective as well from a program management cost performance
perspective. If I could give this subcommittee a gift in
deliberation going forward, it would be an independent, truly
independent cost estimate, one that is independent of the
missionary movement, the folks that are trying to sell a
program, and one that is also independent of the folks that are
trying to fit a program within the available budget. In my
experience and many folks on the panel, an independent cost
estimate is the key to predicting the future.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, and lastly, is there any indication
whatsoever that abandoning the human spaceflight program in
terms of its residence within NASA will result in any lower
costs and would change any of the challenges that you have
already identified that NASA faces?
I will take that--as I mentioned in my opening, it won't
change the challenges. There still needs to be a lot more
discipline in the acquisition process. We need cost estimates
to improve, we need them to be independent. There is a lot of
things that need to change whether that Constellation Program
is there or not. The condition is very systemic across the
agency.
Thank you very much.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Ms. Edwards.
The Chair will recognize Mr. Hall.
I am sorry. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, and thank you,
Chairman Hall.
Public vs. Private Management of Spaceflight
We are all pretty shocked about the President's budget one
way or the other. There are some good things in it, there are
some things in it that we really need to discuss, and I am very
pleased that we have got some people who are focusing on these
issues.
Today our witnesses are not necessarily here to discuss the
new budget, however, and not even perhaps to discuss policy but
to talk about key challenges that we face in America's Space
Program, and safety is, of course, one of the preeminent
challenges.
Let us note that those of us who do believe that mankind is
destined to head into space and that we look at that as a
dramatic challenge to our generation, to continue that movement
of humankind into space, that we understand that there are
great risks involved with this perhaps most noble of human
endeavors. And that is to locate human beings elsewhere in this
universe.
But let us also note there that great risks should not be
the impediment to fulfilling that task. They are saying, and
Admiral, I am sure you have heard this many times, that if a
captain thinks his only responsibility towards the ship is the
safety of his ship, he will never leave port, and there are
safety elements that we have to have identified with my
colleagues. Remarks recently--we just heard about comparing the
cost overruns and some of the efficiency problems of NASA to
the Department of Defense.
Let me just note that that is not a proper comparison. The
proper comparison is are these extra costs and are these
overruns comparable to the private sector, and that is the
question that needs to be asked and perhaps I would ask that of
our witness.
Ms. Chaplain. We have compared----
Mr. Rohrabacher. To Space X, et cetera.
Ms. Chaplain. Yeah. We have done some comparisons to the
other space companies and found out most of the commercial
companies don't have the same costs and growth, but you have to
remember they are not chasing after the same requirements. They
have much less demanding, they are not pushing the technical
edge that DOD and both NASA are trying to do.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Pushing the edge and let us take a
look at this and look at some of the things that that
indicates.
Admiral, in your statement you indicate that Ares, the
government approach to trying to--new approach to getting into
space, has been designed from the very beginning with a clear
emphasis on safety. Is it your contention that Space X or
Orbital or Lockheed Martin or Boeing have not had an emphasis
on safety in launching, in developing and designing their
launch vehicles?
Admiral Dyer. For sure. These are right-hearted folks, and
they have given safety a great consideration, but I would make
two points, sir. The first is they are on contract only for
cargo deliveries, not for human transport.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Uh-huh.
Admiral Dyer. Number one, and number two, the information,
the knowledge that needs to be transmitted in terms of human
rating requirements out of NASA and provided to the commercial
sector has not been published, has not been made available.
And by the way, that is a hard challenge because while NASA
has human rating requirements, they are for NASA, and they rest
on a foundation of 50 years of understanding and institutional
knowledge.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Admiral Dyer. To transmit that out to new activities with
new undertakings is quite----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, is it your contention that these
private companies are then developing something that is unsafe?
Admiral Dyer. Absolutely not, sir. I didn't say that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right.
Admiral Dyer. What I said was they don't have the measuring
stick yet available to answer that question.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Uh-huh. So these requirements that we are
talking about just have not been presented by NASA then. Is
that it?
Admiral Dyer. That is correct.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So we have a bureaucratic impasse, not
based on a willingness of these private companies to meet
standards, but instead by, again, a government agency not being
able or willing to do its job in a timely manner.
Admiral Dyer. Upon General Boldon's arrival at NASA, this
activity started, and it started in earnest in the last quarter
of last year, but in terms of being behind the ball, yes, sir.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So how long do you expect this to take
before we can actually let these--I have been involved with
commercial space concepts for 20 years now, and I think it
should be a cost-effective alternative to just simply relying
on the government for these endeavors. How long do you think it
should take to develop this certification and these standards
that we can measure these companies by?
Admiral Dyer. Less time than it will take but you need,
sir, to, I think, put that question to NASA rather than the
panel. We can never speak, neither speak for them, nor do we
have the insight of the staffing requirements in terms of the
timeline or delivery.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me be very----
Chairwoman Giffords. Mr. Rohrabacher, your time----
Mr. Rohrabacher.--just a clarification on a point that he
has already made. You then are not saying that the Ares Program
by what you are testifying today is that--you are not saying
that it is safer and more reliable than the counterparts in the
private sector? You are not saying that?
Admiral Dyer. We are saying that it is well ahead on that
timeline because it had human rating requirements and
institutional knowledge and from the get-go had a set of
measuring sticks----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Does that mean safer? That you consider
them to be safer and that the other ones are less safe?
Chairwoman Giffords. Mr. Rohrabacher, we are going to do a
second round of questions.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right.
Chairwoman Giffords. So I think it is just important that
everyone gets a first round of questions----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Got it.
Chairwoman Giffords.--and then hold that, and we will come
back to you in a few minutes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. Got it.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Wilson.
Managing the Shuttle and Constellation Transitions
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
The ASAP mentioned that the current workforce transition
plans were drawn up assuming that the Constellation Program
would be executed. These plans have been put on hold because of
the uncertain future of NASA's human spaceflight program. How
are NASA personnel being impacted by the delays in settling on
a new strategy, number one? Number two, how quickly can NASA
modify and implement these transition plans once a final
decision is made with regard to the Constellation Program?
Please, anyone on the panel give me that. Start with you,
Mr. Martin.
Mr. Martin. That would be fine. Obviously, the--it is
exactly right that the transition plan was based on retirement
of the Shuttle and movement of the technology and many of the
people onto the Constellation Program. There needs to be a new
development of this workforce transition strategy, and it is
going to affect NASA's people, it is going to affect NASA's
parts and NASA's facilities.
As far as a timetable for execution of that, that is up the
agency. I think they need to develop the strategy. I doubt that
it is developed at this point and then how long it would take
to implement that remains to be seen.
Mr. Wilson. Ms. Chaplain.
Ms. Chaplain. I would agree, but I would also add that to
NASA's advantage it does have a very robust, strategic human
planning process and a lot of good mechanisms for dealing with
uncertainties and changes. They were dealing with that somewhat
under the Constellation Program, a lot of flexibility needed to
be in place because we didn't quite know what the requirements
were yet for Constellation.
So I have confidence that the agency has a lot of good
tools and processes to manage this uncertainty, but it will
take time because it is a big change.
Mr. Wilson. Admiral Dyer.
Admiral Dyer. I really don't have anything to add. I think
Mr. Martin and Ms. Chaplain covered the water, sir.
Mr. Wilson. Okay. You know, we are very concerned.
Oversight of Commercial Human Spaceflight
The jobs and what all effects it has, NASA Glenn in Ohio is
significant and concerned about the decisions that are being
made and why we are going through the time that we are. Then in
my second question, if the decision is made to end NASA's
direct involvement in sending U.S. astronauts into space, what
would be an appropriate level of NASA involvement in oversight
during vehicle design and development?
Ms. Chaplain. I covered a little bit of this before, but I
think they should have a much stronger role than they have now
under the COTS Program. They do have a pretty good process and
guidance and certifications for bringing new commercial
vehicles on to do science missions, and it is a very rigorous
process, and it involves a lot of oversight into the design of
the vehicles and what is behind them.
So I would see that as sort of the starting point for the
thinking of what should happen when it comes to human
spaceflight.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you. Admiral Dyer.
Admiral Dyer. Well, sir, I think you do touch this
requirement for a delicate balance, and the balance is deep
enough insight to be able to certify and to manage the process
of certification but at the same time to have enough distance
to allow commercial industry to exercise efficiencies and
hopefully speed that are promised.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you. Mr. Martin.
Mr. Martin. I have nothing to add, Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
The Chair will now recognize Mr. Olson.
Oh. Mr. Hall.
Human Rating Requirements
Mr. Hall. Okay. Thank you. Thank you very much.
I won't go any further than Mr. Rohrabacher and Congressman
Wilson have gone on their questions, but just one thing I would
like to ask is will each competing commercial crew vehicle and
launcher have its own set--own unique set of requirements?
Admiral Dyer. I would not anticipate, sir, that the
requirements would be different. The performance requirements.
Design approaches may be different, but there will be different
trades across the system at large, and you can meet a common
set of requirements with different approaches.
Mr. Hall. And I note that you support or supported the
theory of the Constellation because of its safety. I somehow
gleaned that from your testimony, and I believe, and I would
like to ask you how you feel about the President just clearing
off a place and canceling it, but I don't imagine that is one
that you all, any of you want to answer. We sure would like to
hear it, but I will get away from that.
Ensuring Access to LEO
A premise underlying NASA's reliance on commercial human
space launches, that the launch company is going to be a
successful business, but if they have a bad day at the launch
pad or if sufficient customers don't materialize, there is
always the risk of going out of business. Right?
Admiral Dyer. Sure.
Mr. Hall. So leaving NASA then and the Nation in the lurch,
what steps should NASA take to ensure that it has alternative
means of getting U.S. astronauts to and from orbit if we are in
the hands of a contractor that falls by the wayside or doesn't
come up to do what they have indicated that they can do?
It gives you some concern, doesn't it?
Admiral Dyer. Well, sir, it isn't cheap, but if you have
sufficient resources, and the undertaking is of sufficient
importance, an acquisition technique is to dual source, to
mitigate that risk that you discussed.
Mr. Hall. Well, money ain't much, but it sure keeps you in
touch with your kids. That is what you are saying.
Admiral Dyer. Yes, sir.
NASA Role in Commercial Spaceflight
Mr. Hall. And I ask, Admiral, proponents of the commercial
human spaceflight have argued that presently NASA relies on
private contractors to build, maintain, and launch the Shuttle.
NASA is merely the Shuttle owner. Right?
Admiral Dyer. NASA's involvement today in programs is
significantly more engaging.
Mr. Hall. But they are the owner.
Admiral Dyer. They are the owner.
Mr. Hall. And by giving up their ownership role and
becoming the customer, there is an implication that little else
has changed in the relationship or in the execution of the
program, and from a safety perspective what are your thoughts
about the significance of being a mere customer now? Going from
an owner to being just a customer?
Admiral Dyer. Well, when we talk about certification and
the process of certification, we are talking about clearing up
or sharpening up this gray zone that extends from just
contracting the services over to being the systems integrator
and general contractor if you want to use a term from the
housing industry perhaps.
It can be--you can rest at many places on that continuum,
Congressman Hall, but deciding what is the right place is work
yet to be done.
Mr. Hall. I can't disagree with that, but if the private
contractors fall by the wayside and we have lost the faith of
our international partners and we have lost our huge
professional group of people that have carried out the work of
NASA, we would be in a pretty tough situation, wouldn't we?
Admiral Dyer. It would be regrettable, sir.
Mr. Hall. I thank you, Admiral. I admire you, and I thank
you for your testimony.
I yield back. Thank you, Madam.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Hall.
The Chair recognizes Ms. Kosmas for five minutes.
Ms. Kosmas. Thank you very much. Thank you all for being
here today. I happen to be the representative from the 24th
Congressional District in Florida, which is the home of Kennedy
Space Center, so obviously, your participation in the
discussions as we move forward are very important to me, and
like many others have expressed today, I am extremely concerned
about some of the lack of direction that we might have in the
policy as put forth in the President's budget. I don't see a
vision, I don't see an inspiration, and I see a major loss of
workforce and workforce skills.
Shuttle Extension
So I have a couple questions that I would like to ask first
to Admiral Dyer and Ms. Chaplain. Can you discuss whether or
not you have studied the recertification process for the
Shuttle? In other words, what it would take to fly the Shuttle
past 2010, and how that could be impacted if we should make a
determination that we want to add a couple of Shuttle flights?
Ms. Chaplain. We have not been requested to do that study,
and we have not done work there.
Ms. Kosmas. Do you know if the certification process is in
process, recertification process?
Ms. Chaplain. I don't believe so.
Maintaining Vital Skills in Transition
Ms. Kosmas. Okay. Okay. The other question I guess it would
be for anybody who wants to answer it. What do you see in terms
of human spaceflight expertise, capabilities, and critical
skills? Are we at risk of losing in the Nation due to the gap
in the human access to space after--U.S. access to space after
the Shuttle is retired, and how do we go about retaining those
skills, particularly if the government's human exploration
program is put on a hiatus, which is apparently what is
happening in the Administration's budget directive.
Ms. Chaplain. I think NASA has a very good basis to build
on when it comes to determining what skills might be at risk
with this transition. For the past several years they have been
going through a skill-mapping exercise at all their centers,
determining like what are the very critical skills each center
needs to retain, what kind of skills they are, and so they kind
of have an inventory now of what they need and what they have,
and they can look at this change coming up and see what the
gaps are, because they could be considerable, and you don't
want to lose certain expertise in case there is something
disastrous that happens, and you need to call people back.
Ms. Kosmas. I appreciate that. Again, if they have been
doing this assessment for several years, it would be somewhat
not relative to where we look to be moving based on what we
have learned this week. So I guess the question then becomes--
that you all observed that the current workforce transition
plans were drawn based on what we anticipated to happen, that
is to say, obviously, that the next phase would be
Constellation and so forth.
Now, these plans would be on hold because the uncertain
future of what has not been identified frankly as the U.S.
Human Spaceflight Program.
So if you can put that into the answer, I would appreciate
it.
Ms. Chaplain. Yeah. Just to clarify what I said earlier, at
least they have an as-is inventory, so they know what kinds of
skills they have onboard. As they look to the new programs
coming on and the new requirements that they will have, they
will at least have the first part of the basis that they need
to do a gap analysis for. You are exactly right that going
forward it is going to be a whole new kind of ballgame in terms
of what you want to stay on board, what you may not want. That
part is going to be all new to them.
Shuttle Extension
Ms. Kosmas. Okay. With that response let me go back to
Admiral Dyer, if you don't mind. Can you answer the earlier
question that I asked about the certification and whether you
have any details on what it would take for an extension should
there be a Congressional move towards extending the Shuttle
Program for a couple of flights?
Admiral Dyer. Well, let me repeat a caution from the panel.
We think the most dangerous thing that could happen to us with
regard to extending the Shuttle would be serial extension. A
couple more followed by a couple more followed by a couple
more.
Ms. Kosmas. Okay. I am going to run out of time, but let us
just assume four or less.
Admiral Dyer. With that said, could the Shuttle be
extended? Absolutely. It would be, we believe, a fairly serious
and expensive undertaking.
Ms. Kosmas. Okay. Again, I am going to run out time, but I
want to just express to you, again, my appreciation for your
being here and my extreme concern for my particular loss of
jobs and the lost opportunities for this Nation to remain
number one in space exploration in the world and continue to be
a leader with this undefined plan. I think you are going to see
based on what you have heard here that Congress is going to
fill in some of the blanks with what we see as our vision.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Ms. Kosmas.
Mr. McCaul.
Opinions on Constellation
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Madam Chair.
In his State of Union, President Kennedy outlined the
mission of NASA, and that was to land a man on the moon and
return him safely to the earth, and according to the NASA
website their vision was to explore the universe and search for
life and to inspire the next generation of explorers as only
NASA can.
I believe that with the President's cutting in his budget
of the Constellation Program it undermines that very mission,
the vision of NASA, and the actual, the principles upon which
NASA was set up in the first place was human spaceflight. I am
concerned about the impact on our children in science and math,
in those fields, and I am concerned about our leadership in the
world as it relates to the Russians and the Chinese by
scrapping this human spaceflight program.
We have invested a tremendous amount of money, billions of
dollars already in the Constellation Program. Now, I know this
may be a policy decision that may be a little bit over your pay
grade, but I would like to get some comment from you as to why
we are doing this.
Ms. Chaplain. I really can't offer a comment. We don't look
at policy and the goodness of it or not at GAO.
Mr. McCaul. Well, instead we are moving to an earth science
mission as opposed to a human spaceflight mission. That is what
I am getting from this Administration, and I am sorry. Did you
have a comment?
Mr. Martin. Just that at the Inspector General's office we
don't do policy. We come behind the policy made by the agency
and then criticize them.
Mr. McCaul. Well, maybe you could criticize them here.
Gap in Human Spaceflight
Admiral, I don't know if you have a comment. You may not
want to touch that, but as it relates to the commercial, I
mean, we are going to have a gap in human spaceflight in my
judgment, and it sounds like the plan here is to have a
commercial spaceflight somehow fill the void and the gap there.
I have got some serious questions and reservations whether that
is going to--or that it is possible.
Can you comment on that and also the fact that, you know,
we have been working on the safety requirements as it relates
to Orion and Ares. Why wouldn't that also apply to commercial?
Admiral Dyer. Would you restate that last part?
Mr. McCaul. Well, first of all, do you think, do you really
think that, I mean, I think we are going to have a real gap and
a break in human spaceflight under this proposal. Do you really
think the commercial sector after we have invested billions of
dollars in infrastructure in NASA can possibly fill that gap in
this short period of time?
Admiral Dyer. Well, you constrained that in a number of
ways. Again, the panel believes that Ares I is the quickest gap
fill because it has been underway for a considerable period of
time with human transport, a fundamental part, and with NASA's
knowledge imparted into it. Again, can commercial industry do
that? Absolutely. Is it important to have a commercial industry
going forward? I think the panel would agree, but it is a
question of what are those goals that we talked about earlier
in the testimony.
Mr. McCaul. But do you foresee a disruption in human
spaceflight, though, under this plan?
Admiral Dyer. We think that some of the positions that say
that the commercial industry can deliver a launch vehicle in
three years probably is unrealistic given the work to be done.
Mr. McCaul. You know, sir, and I am all for competition in
the private sector. I just think we have--NASA has had a, you
know, a very different mission here. We have invested a lot of
money into NASA, and particularly in the Constellation Program,
and I hate to see that being completely scrubbed and taken out
of this budget.
And with that I yield back.
Fully Utilizing the ISS
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Mr. McCaul.
With that, members have expressed an interest in a second
round of questions, so I will begin.
I would like to talk about the International Space Station.
The President did outline a proposal to extend the ISS until
2020, and this is, of course, something that has been expressed
favorably by members of the subcommittee for quite some period
of time, even in consideration of the fact that the
International Space Station is not even yet completed, we
certainly don't want to de-orbit it and not take advantage of
the science and technology that we have worked so hard and paid
so much to construct.
Ms. Chaplain, can you talk about the primary obstacles in
the way of utilization in terms of effective research for the
International Space Station and the provisions and the upcoming
NASA authorization legislation that you think would enhance
greater prospects for better research on the ISS?
Ms. Chaplain. Yes. We identified several challenges in our
recent report on the Station. One of them just being the mere
absence of the Shuttle itself severely limited as to what you
can take up and down from the Station, even more so in terms of
what you can take down, and that matters a lot for scientific
research. The results of the high cost to develop experiments
and launch them, those costs were somewhat unknown and unknown
as to who would really pay for them when you are involving
other agencies like the NIH.
There is also the issue of little crew time available on
the Station to manage experiments, so they have to be as
automated as possible, which could be a disincentive to some
researchers.
There has also up until recently been very much uncertainty
about the retirement date for the Station, which is another
disincentive for the scientific community to really engage. You
need a lot of lead time to plan for experiments.
In terms of the authorization, we looked at other national
labs to see how they manage their facilities and could anything
be helpful for the Station, and we did identify three things,
one being a central management body to kind of help put the
research together, decide what is the most important, ensure
that it is peer reviewed, and NASA recognized that this could
be a good practice. It just--that idea hasn't gone anywhere for
a couple of years, and I know you guys have emphasized it a
couple of times.
The need for robust, in-house technical expertise, that was
lost in recent years on the Station Program, and that really
needs to come back if you want to fully utilize the Station.
And then the idea of significant user outreach, NASA does
have activities to outreach to user communities, but they
really could be more robust, and I think the budget helps
provide some of those resources, but it really needs to be
emphasized that they need to have very strong outreach efforts.
Chairwoman Giffords. To follow up with that, you touched on
it, but can you elaborate on NASA's progress so far in
establishing some agreements for using the ISS in conjunction
with federal agencies, perhaps private firms, academic
institutions, and the provisions in, again, the upcoming
authorization that would enhance the prospects of the ISS
becoming a national lab?
Ms. Chaplain. What was the second part of that?
Chairwoman Giffords. Yes. The chances, what we can do to
improve the prospects of the ISS becoming a national
laboratory.
Ms. Chaplain. Okay. In terms of agreements, we--I think
there were five in place at the time of our review, and it
doesn't sound like a large number, but they seem to be very
significant agreements. There weren't any with academic
institutions at the time of our review. They were with agencies
like the NIH.
In terms of what could be done to improve the utilization,
the biggest issue we saw was resources just in the hands of the
managers of the station. They have been depleted over the
years, and they are not able to do all the things they could be
doing to man the station, and then also to kind of encourage
NASA to manage it more like the labs in terms of having a
central management body kind of help collect all the research
ideas, decide who is going to go on board and to really assist
the users in their ability to use the Station. You need a lot
of guidance and outreach out there to kind of tell people what
is available and then, you know, bring them into that process.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you. Admiral Dyer, any safety
concerns with the extension of the ISS beyond 2015?
Admiral Dyer. No specific ones. We--our scope has been
limited to looking at the operation of ISS and look at logistic
support.
I might add just one point, and that is while the panel has
expressed some concerns about COTS contractors or others in
terms of human rating, their ability to deliver cargo to space
has been underway, has been an intimate part of the design from
the beginning, and we think can help significantly.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you.
Mr. Olson.
Transitioning Workforce and Infrastructure
Mr. Olson. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Question for Mr. Martin and Ms. Chaplain regarding human
spaceflight infrastructure costs. NASA has estimated that the
carrying cost of the Shuttle Program was approximately $2.7
billion a year to pay for much of the personnel, management,
and related infrastructure costs at the several NASA centers
devoted to human spaceflight.
If NASA implements its proposed human spaceflight program,
as the Obama Administration wants, by becoming a customer of
commercial space launch companies, how should it book keep the
infrastructure and personnel now charged to the shuttle
program, assuming that some portion of those same facilities in
people continue to play a role in human spaceflight?
Mr. Martin.
Mr. Martin. That is a good question. I will defer that if I
could to Ms. Chaplain. We have not done work in that area. We
are looking at the--our work to date has focused on the
transition of the Shuttle Program, the costs associated with
that, and the concerns we have about NASA being able to
maintain its ambitious and aggressive schedule.
Mr. Olson. Thank you. Ms. Chaplain.
Ms. Chaplain. Well, one thing our work showed is there are
a lot of aging facilities out there, and the plans for the
transition effort weren't really showing what costs would be
involved in terms of revitalizing facilities that you could
keep for Constellation and what you couldn't. Obviously, now,
everything changes, so the question is what do you do with all
these facilities. NASA will have to go through a process where
it examines everything, because some things could be available
to the commercial suppliers, for example, on a leasing basis.
So they will just have to think more out of the box in
terms of what to do with the facilities. If they take them down
and dispense with them, as they may have done with the
Constellation transition, there is a lot of costs associated
with environmental clean-up and indirect costs that could be
better reflected in budgets and things like that.
Mr. Olson. Thank you.
Mr. Martin. Sir, if I could raise one related matter----
Mr. Olson. Sure.
Mr. Martin.--and that is the issue of deferred maintenance
and facilities. I know that wasn't exactly what you were
asking, but as far as being a significant challenge facing NASA
and an expensive challenge, I think the latest estimate is
there has been about $2.5 billion in deferred maintenance at
NASA's aging facilities, and that is a key issue that NASA
needs to keep its eye on the ball.
Mr. Olson. Thanks for that answer, and I want to get--many
of my colleagues mentioned the issue of workforce transition,
and sort of what is happening now with the President's budget
out there, and I spent yesterday, I talked with the director of
the Johnson Center, Mike Coats, and he is spending his days in
the office going around to every employee, ever federal
employee that he has oversight over to talk to them, letting
them know what he knows and trying to assuage their fears about
their future.
And he is very confident that they are going to proceed as
the professionals they are and complete the five, you know, we
have got three operations working out of the Johnson Center. We
have got the Constellation, the Shuttle, and the ISS, and you
know, with the Administration's budget we are going to be down
to one. But he is confident the five Shuttle missions, they are
going to do their darnedest and be the professionals they are.
They are going to come off without a hitch.
Safety Implications of Transition
But I just want to--how would you rate NASA's overall
efforts to keep its Shuttle workforce fully focused on flying
safely out the manifest? Do you see any deficiencies? And as a
follow-on question, now that the Administration has proposed
canceling the Constellation, by injecting new uncertainties in
terms of a follow on system, scheduling jobs, would this
further complicate NASA's ability to keep the Shuttle workforce
for at least to close out the five manifested flights we have?
Admiral Dyer.
Admiral Dyer. I think that is perhaps the most significant,
near-term safety worry. You are a Navy veteran, and in keeping
with Chairwoman Giffords opening with the historical story of
the Chinese Navy, let me use a naval term that you will
appreciate. Underway without way on. The layman's definition of
that is there is always risks in drifting while you are trying
to figure it out.
So whatever the route forward, to transition from deciding
to implementing will lower this risk and allow for better human
resource management and keeping the skills necessary to fly
safely.
Mr. Olson. Thank you very much.
Ms. Chaplain.
Ms. Chaplain. We have commended NASA for its ability to try
to manage the workforce through the transition and assure that
the right people are maintained for the Shuttle. They have used
things like DCMA employees and other kinds of measures to get
stop-gap people in there.
But definitely this change will further complicate matters.
Mr. Olson. Mr. Martin.
Mr. Martin. As you indicated, it is incredibly important
that NASA keeps its eye on its mission, especially this Sunday
with the launch of Endeavour, and so I think if they, you know,
what we have seen as NASA, very professional work for us, but
the potential changes out there do create an air of uncertainty
that NASA is going to need to manage through.
Mr. Olson. Thanks for the answers. I see I have used my
time up.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Olson.
The Chair will recognize Ms. Edwards.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I have a couple
of areas of questions.
SBIR Program Progress/Minority Contracting
First for Mr. Martin and Ms. Chaplain. In 2009, both the
GAO and the OIG noted that in your audits and investigations,
``They continue to reveal systemic weakness in the area of
acquisition and procurement to include awards as part of the
Small Business Innovation Research, the SBIR Program.''
And I would note that in the announcement of the awards of
$50 million in Recovery Act funding, to companies for
development and demonstration contracts--concepts, five of the
companies that received awards, none were minority owned. There
may have been one woman-owned business, and I wonder if you
could comment on how NASA is meeting its goals for investing in
small, minority-owned businesses?
Mr. Martin. Just quickly, we have done a fair amount of
work in the SBIR Program and actually have raised a series of
concerns that the lack of internal controls. These tend to be--
not to be large contracts or grants. I think NASA's focus given
this multitude of other issues has been to push the money out.
I don't think there have been adequate, again, safeguards to
make sure that, frankly, there is not double dipping where
someone is putting in for an SBIR grant through NASA and at the
same time through the National Science Foundation.
Ms. Edwards. Uh-huh.
Mr. Martin. So I think we can learn, we can adopt past
practices from the National Science Foundation and others, and
we can monitor and oversee these grants much more effectively.
Ms. Edwards. Well, I think I would like to see, you know, a
little bit more analysis both from GAO and from the Inspector
General to look at NASA's minority contracting processes. I
know over at Goddard Space Flight Center, you know, a number of
businesses in and around the center who want to do business
there, it is very complicated for them, they don't understand
the contracting process, and although I think the Administrator
has made a commitment on this, I don't--I can't see the pathway
toward meeting those commitments.
Also, in the general contracting area and looking at
subcontracts and then analyzing where those subcontracts are
going as well, and I would like to see some additional
reporting and analysis in that area.
Mr. Martin. The Inspector General's Office has an ongoing
review looking at the entire NASA SBIR Program. I have been
here----
Ms. Edwards. Not just SBIR, though. I am talking about
looking at--because, you know, that is one way for small
minority-owned businesses to get in. Women own businesses to
get in the door, but the general contracting processes and
making sure that those are spread out across our small and our
large business community and that the subcontracting processes
also are open in that sense.
And I just--I really want to pay attention to this because
if we are investing on one hand in developing scientists,
engineers, and researchers who represent the broad base of our
population, and we expect them, some of them to be
entrepreneurs, where do they get a foot into the agency?
Anyway, I just leave that for open consideration for the
future.
Human Rating Requirements
Just as a close here, Admiral Dyer, in your statement you
said that the 2009, report has been widely read, strongly
commended, and energetically criticized. With those well-
rounded metrics we believe we have fulfilled our statutory
purpose, which is to infuse safety considerations into an
informed debate.
And I want you to know that this subcommittee is really
appreciative of ASAP's contributions, and we will continue to
seek your counsel on safety matters, but I also am sure that
you are aware that Mr. Elon Musk, the CEO of SpaceX, and one of
two COTS manufacturers disagrees with your panel's findings and
conclusions regarding the human rating of SpaceX vehicles
currently under development. He says that the Falcon 9 Rocket
and Dragon Spacecraft, ``meet all of NASA's published human
rating requirements apart from the escape systems,'' and it was
reported also that he said that the members of your panel
didn't review SpaceX's data and have, ``no idea what our
margins are and what is and what isn't human rated.''
Why is there so much divergence in the views held by ASAP
and Mr. Musk regarding SpaceX's human rating status?
Admiral Dyer. Well, I think Mr. Musk used the phrase that
he has lost respect for the panel. I would tell you that the
panel has not lost respect for Mr. Musk. He is an icon, an
American entrepreneur. There is great strength in that, and
these folks make great things happen. I would predict an
exciting future for SpaceX, but in terms of fundamentals the
human rating requirements have not been published by NASA, and
therefore, a claim that one meets them we think is incorrect.
It is that simple.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you very much, and I yield, Madam
Chairwoman.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Ms. Edwards.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. Let me just note that
earlier my colleague suggested that there would be a gap in
human space, our capabilities if the President's budget
suggestions are followed. It is not going to be just a gap. I
hope we all understand. We are not talking about a gap here.
The President's budget is leaving us with no governmental
alternative to human space transportation in the works, anyway.
So this is something that should be taken very seriously by
those of us who do believe that human beings should be,
eventually be playing a role in space. Let us just look at--and
let me take a look at one other element here.
We have had one test of--on all of this research that has
been done on Constellation. One test that had no new technology
and hardware, no new hardware in that test, and that brought us
to $9 billion that we spent on the program that now is being
suggested that we scrap. This does not speak well of using our
government as the vehicle of getting human beings into space,
whether it is Elon Musk or whether--I know in the, for example,
Boeing has the Delta System that could someway be reconfigured,
but instead we spent $9 billion, and we didn't even have any
new hardware.
So we--if we are going to have human beings in space, which
I believe in, we have got to get serious about this, and we
can't simply just go back and say, NASA, we are going to rely
on NASA to do it, because obviously it is not working out.
Let me get back then to some analysis of this human space
endeavor. Admiral, how long did it take us--it seems to me that
the stumbling block now is still NASA in the sense that we have
to have these standards, and you--that will determine human
flight, whether human flight is possible in a certain vehicle.
How long did it take us to determine that the Soyuz vehicles
were approved for Americans?
Admiral Dyer. Sir, I don't know the definitive answer to
that. We have had discussions with regard to the NASA senior
technical leadership, with regard to the safety of Soyuz----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay.
Admiral Dyer.--but I am afraid we don't know the details.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Apparently it took about three years for
us to, even to analyze what the Soviets had been doing for a
long time, much less a new system, which is being developed.
Don't you see this as one unacceptable burden and weight
that are being carried perhaps by some of our--the
entrepreneurs in the private sector? To wait for that long just
before they will even know what the standard is, much less
being able to incorporate it into their designs?
Admiral Dyer. I am a bit more empathetic in the following
sense. This institutional knowledge that is part of NASA, to
communicate that to the private sector is a job to be done and
one that needs to be done carefully, and some discussions on
this topic a week or so ago I used an analogy, sir, and it
was--it is one thing to give a building code to an electrician
of significant experience. A guy who has built a lot of houses.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Uh-huh.
Admiral Dyer. But to give a building code to a novice
electrician that doesn't have that history of experience in
working in the human, in this case, by stretching the analogy,
in this human arena, it is a dicier undertaking.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, let me go back on that. You know, I
worked for a guy, sorry, I worked for Ronald Reagan, and Reagan
always told me that, well, you know, the experts know every
reason why something can't be done, and so quite often it is a
better thing to bring in fresh blood and new thoughts that may
not have the experience but may have an open vision to new
ideas, and perhaps certainly new approach to trying to do
things in a cost-effective manner than what the NASA
bureaucracy has been showing us that they do in this last
decade or two.
Well, thank you very much to all of you for sharing your
talents with us today, and sharing your thoughts because we
need this type of input the thank you, Madam Chairman, again,
for your leadership, which you are constantly demonstrating in
your leadership here on this subcommittee.
Chairwoman Giffords. Well, thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
We have one final question from Ms. Kosmas, but just to--
you know, you threw out a question, Mr. Rohrabacher, that I
would like Ms. Chaplain to answer concerning the investment
that has been made so far in Constellation, the $9 billion that
has been spent.
Progress on Constellation
Obviously, you know, it wasn't--just for one test flight so
if you could just detail briefly the money that has been
invested so far in the program.
Ms. Chaplain. Well, it was more than just that test flight.
I think concurrently there was a lot of money being invested in
developing the new stuff that will be eventually included in
Ares and Orion, and you have to think about all the money that
went to Orion, too, but a lot of the money--concurrently as
Ares I was being developed, it is going into the new parts in
the final spacecraft.
Chairwoman Giffords. And either Ms. Chaplain or perhaps
Admiral Dyer, can you comment on how far along Orion is at this
point?
Ms. Chaplain. I believe they recently had their preliminary
design review, and the Constellation Program as a whole is
expected to have a preliminary design review this spring. That
put them very close to the time and point when NASA would
consider moving them into the formal phase of acquisition, what
we call implementation. That is when baselines get set, that is
when they are held more accountable.
One thing that has been talked about here today is cost
overruns. Technically they haven't had cost overruns because
there is no baseline. We are just looking at more money that
was put to the contract than was originally anticipated.
Chairwoman Giffords. Okay. Thank you.
The Chair will recognize Ms. Kosmas.
Ms. Kosmas. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Role of NASA in Commercial Space Program
I apologize. This is a busy day in my office today, but
this is an extremely important matter to me. I want to--and I
am sorry I missed some of the answers and questions and answers
earlier, particularly with regard to safety and the assessment
of commercial safety.
But I want to move onto a slightly different question, ask
you, Ms. Chaplain, does NASA have the tools to--in place to
manage a commercial procurement program, and what steps would
you recommend to enable NASA to adequately manage such a
program, particularly, and how would that affect Kennedy Space
Center?
Ms. Chaplain. They do have the beginnings of that in place,
and but I think what they need to do is to see how much more
robust it needs to be. Up until now the idea of having a
commercial crew was plan B, not the only plan. So you have--
when it becomes the only plan, you kind of need to reconsider
all your contracting tools, your oversight mechanisms, and you
probably want to ramp up things, you know, in a more position
of strength in terms of oversight and management than you had
when it was just going to be one of several options.
Ms. Kosmas. Okay. Thank you for that answer. I guess it
sort of begs the question then, do you, does anyone want to
make a statement as to whether or not they believe that the
policy articulated by the Administration anticipated this or
adequately provides an opportunity for this to be addressed?
Ms. Chaplain. I don't know the budget and enough detail to
see that happening myself.
Ms. Kosmas. Okay. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Ms. Kosmas.
Before we bring the hearing to a close, I just want to
thank our witnesses for testifying before the subcommittee
today, particularly for the GAO and for the IG's office. There
are a lot of people that work with you that we don't see. They
are behind the scenes, but you know, every member of Congress
and all the American people really depend on the work that you
do. I would say underappreciated probably not quite understood,
and I just want to thank the two of you and if you will please
pass that onto your colleagues.
Admiral Dyer as well, thank you, not just to you but to
members of your panel for your many, many years of dedication
to, you know, a very, very important issue that is facing our
Nation really at the moment.
The record will remain open for the next two weeks for
additional statements from members and for answers to any
follow-up questions that perhaps the subcommittee members may
have of the witnesses, and as I said in my opening remarks, you
can be assured that the full Science and Technology Committee
and our subcommittee as well will be holding a series of
hearings over the next few weeks to examine the President's
proposed budget.
The witnesses are now excused, and the hearing is
adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix:
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Paul K. Martin, Inspector General, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration
Questions submitted by Chairwoman Gabrielle Giffords
Q1. The ASAP's latest report says that over 80 percent of NASA
facilities are beyond their design life, annual maintenance is
underfunded, facilities continue to degrade and facilities failures are
starting to impact missions and have safety implications Agency-wide.
Q1a. Is this another neglected area in need of resources at the
Agency?
A1,1a. Yes. As the ninth largest federal government property holder,
NASA owns more than 100,000 acres with over 6,000 buildings and other
structures that provided more than 44 million square feet of space.
Most of the buildings and other structures are more than 40 years old
and some predate the establishment of NASA. NASA's deferred maintenance
has increased over the last several years as the Agency has focused its
funds on mission and project-oriented priorities.
Q1b. Does the NASA IG know the extent to which NASA's facilities are
in need of repair, how much this will cost, and what the priority
projects are?
A1,1b. The NASA OIG is currently conducting an audit of NASA's
processes for identifying and prioritizing maintenance projects. NASA's
estimate of deferred maintenance increased from $1.9 billion in fiscal
year (FY) 2005 to $2.55 billion in FY 2009. Each NASA Center maintains
a list of priority maintenance and upgrade projects.
Q1c. Is this area likely to receive greater attention with the recent
establishment of a Construction and Environmental Compliance account as
required by NASA's FY2010 appropriations?
A1,1c. Possibly. Creation of the separate account has the potential for
focusing greater attention on the deferred maintenance backlog, but it
remains to be seen whether this will translate into increased spending
in this area.
Q2. If a decision is made to carry U.S. astronauts on a commercial
transportation system in the future, NASA will, likely need early
warning safety systems. Can you suggest any ``time out'' indicators
that would be capable of providing NASA and the Congress a warning when
projected margins of safety are in danger of being reduced?
A2. The OIG has not conducted any recent oversight work on this issue.
Moreover, since the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) evaluates
NASA's safety performance, we believe this question would be best
addressed by ASAP.
Q3. Are you satisfied with NASA's efforts to enhance its application
of sound project management principles and identification of technical
and safety risks? What key areas warrant the OIG's continued oversight?
A3. In the past year, the OIG has found deficiencies when we examined
the Agency's risk management efforts at the program and project levels.
For example, we found that the Landsat Data Continuity Mission was
facing a cost increase and possible launch schedule delays because
mangers awarded the contract before finalizing baseline requirements.
In reviewing the Orion Project, we found that the Project Office
conducted a life-cycle review with a version of the vehicle that was
under revision instead of delaying the review until the revised vehicle
configuration was developed.
Given the importance and cost of its projects. NASA must establish
and validate project requirements, manages risks, and controls costs
and schedules using established life-cycle reviews.
Q4. Your memorandum on serious management challenges references the
risk posed by counterfeit or inferior parts. I understand that testing
is being done to determine the extent of ``improperly treated non-
conforming'' titanium'' on the $2.5 billion Mars Science Laboratory
scheduled for launch later this year. NASA is concerned that some parts
built using this non-conforming titanium might not withstand the
stresses, pressures. temperatures present during the life of the
mission. Is the risk of counterfeit parts being purchased a growing
issue and if so, how can NASA protect itself from this problem?
A4. A recent proliferation of counterfeit electronic parts (primarily
microchips) is a new risk to NASA's programs and operations. We have
found that trade in international counterfeit electronic parts begins
with traders who export scrap circuit boards from the United States to
foreign-based counterfeiters who remove, copy, and after the parts so
they appear to be new parts from reputable manufacturers. Domestic
distributors then buy the parts and sell them as genuine to industry or
government buyers, including NASA and the Department of Defense.
Protecting NASA programs from counterfeit electronics is a complex
task that involves sensitive law enforcement investigations and
aggressive oversight policies within NASA. This includes NASA's
continued commitment to world class quality assurance programs for its
critical systems, continued participation in interagency information
sharing groups on counterfeit parts, and a zero tolerance management
philosophy that holds offending contractors accountable. In that
regard, NASA OIG is fully integrated with the interagency law
enforcement to address the distribution of counterfeit electronics
alongside the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security.
Q5. In your November memorandum, you note the need for NASA to examine
the effectiveness of its ethics training and processes. Investigations
completed by your office have identified cases such as conflict of
interest and false statement charges stemming from the steering of
earmarked funds to a client and a NASA scientist steering contracts to
a company operated by his spouse. In addition to improving ethics
training and enforcement, what other ways can NASA use to reduce
instances of ethics violations with its acquisitions?
A5. Given that NASA spends approximately 90 percent of its $19 billion
budget on contracts and grants, it is imperative that NASA employees
comply with applicable ethics laws and regulations. The significant
interaction between NASA employees and individuals in the private
sector, both in industry and academia, underscores the scope of this
ongoing challenge.
Any efforts to reduce ethics violations do not lend themselves to a
singular solution. Ethics training, awareness, and active enforcement
of ethics laws and regulations are critical components in ensuring NASA
employees and contractors have a clear understanding of their
respective roles, responsibilities, and the consequences for
noncompliance. Agency initiatives such as NASA's Acquisition Integrity
Program have proven to be valuable ethics training tools for
acquisition practitioners. But we also believe the Agency can further
reduce violations in the acquisition process by strengthening its
procurement oversight mechanisms, particularly in the pre-award phase
of the contracting and grant process. For example, in the area of
grants OIG investigations in the area of Small Business Innovative
Research indicate that a strong ``certification'' process is helpful in
ensuring that the award is not an opportunity for fraud--such as
billing two federal agencies for the same research.
Q6. Last July, your office reported on NASA's research in support of
FAA's modernization of the nation's air traffic control system known as
Next Gen. The report identified some instances where NASA research
activities could be better coordinated with FAA. What do you recommend
be done?
A6. Since issuance our report, NASA has taken action to coordinate more
effectively with FAA on Next Gen support. In response to one of our
recommendations, the NASA Associate Administrator for the Aerospace
Research Mission Directorate established a policy for coordinating
investment decisions with FAA's Joint Planning and Development Office
that includes quarterly meetings to discuss strategic issues.
Questions submitted by Representative Pete Olson
Q1. What are your views about NASA's reliance on Space Act Agreements
to fund commercial space capabilities in lieu of the more standard
acquisition based on Federal Acquisition Regulations? And going
forward, where is the threshold that should compel NASA to discontinue
using Space Act Agreements in favor of a FAR-based acquisition?
A1. Space Act Agreements provide NASA a means to meet wide-ranging NASA
mission and program requirements and objectives by partnering with
diverse groups of people and organizations, both in the private and
public sector. The agreement partner can be a U.S. or foreign person or
entity, an educational institution, a Federal, state, or local
governmental unit, a foreign government, or an international
organization.
Historically, NASA has used the broad authority granted in the
Space Act to further a variety of the Agency's missions. However,
funded agreements, under which the Agency transfers appropriated funds
to a domestic agreement partner, may be used only when NASA's
objectives cannot be accomplished with a procurement contract, grant,
or cooperative agreement.
The OIG intends to examine NASA's use of Space Act Agreements to
fund commercial space capabilities in order to ensure that the Agency
is adhering to requirements of the Space Act and Federal Acquisition
Regulations, and, ultimately, obtaining the best value for the
taxpayer.
Q2. With regard to commercial crew and cargo procurements, NASA's
FY2011 budget request states that, ``Government requirements are kept
to a minimum and are only concerned with assuring safe interaction with
the ISS. The partners [meaning commercial launch companies] are not
required to follow the standard NASA Program and Project Management
Processes and Requirements, NPR 7120.5.'' In other places, the budget
says crew safety won't be compromised and acknowledges the imperative
of safety, but otherwise provides no detail. What are your thoughts
about NASA's proposal to relieve commercial launch providers from
adherence to NPR 7120.5? How difficult would it be for NASA to maintain
good insight and oversight?
A2. NPR 7120.5 and other NASA acquisition and life-cycle management
requirements are based on sound management principles and should be the
standard for all NASA program and project procurements. It is unclear
to us how NASA intends to maintain the contractor oversight currently
required by Federal and NASA regulations in the absence of a
requirement to follow NPR 7120.5 and other NASA acquisition and life-
cycle management requirements.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Cristina T. Chaplain, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
Management, Government Accountability Office
Questions submitted by Chairwoman Gabrielle Giffords
Q1. Cyber-security is a growing concern across government, as well as
in the private sector.
Q1a. Do control weaknesses similar to those GAO found at NASA that
jeopardize the agency's systems and networks exist across other federal
agencies?
A1,1a. Unfortunately, NASA is not unique. Most federal agencies have
deficient information security. We have identified information security
as a government-wide high risk area since 1997. Having said that, the
187 recommendations that we made during our audit are the most we made
in an engagement.
Q1b. Is GAO satisfied that NASA is moving in the direction of
correcting these weaknesses in a systematic and pro-active way?
A1,1b. It appears that NASA is moving in the right direction. In his
``60 day letter'' dated January 6, 2010, the NASA Administrator
provided a detailed accounting for each of the 179 technical
recommendations we made in an October 2009 report designated for
limited official use only. In essence, the Administrator concurred with
159 recommendations, partially concurred with 10, and non-concurred
with 10. He also provided details on the status of planned and
completed actions to mitigate the vulnerabilities. The actions
identified by the Administrator will, if effectively and consistently
implemented, improve the agency's information security program. We plan
to follow-up with NASA to assess the effectiveness of its corrective
actions going forward.
Q2. The ASAP's latest report says that over 80 percent of NASA
facilities are beyond their design life, annual maintenance is
underfunded, facilities continue to degrade and facilities failures are
starting to impact missions and have safety implications Agency-wide.
Q2a. Is this another neglected area in need of resources?
A2,2a. As the ninth largest federal government property holder, NASA
owns more than 100,000 acres of real estate, as well as over 3,000
buildings and 3,000 other structures totaling over 44 million square
feet. Like many federal agencies, NASA faces considerable challenges
addressing facilities needs with limited funds. In January 2003, GAO
designated federal real property a high risk area because of long-
standing problems with excess and underutilized property, deteriorating
facilities, unreliable real property data, over-reliance on costly
leasing, and building security challenges.
Q2b. Do we know the extent to which NASA's facilities are in need for
repair, how much this will cost, and what the priority projects are?
A2,2b. In 2008, GAO reported that NASA has a $2.3 billion repair
backlog. NASA has used a contractor since 2002 to conduct annual
deferred maintenance assessments of all its facilities and their
component systems. NASA contractors visually assess nine different
systems within each facility (such as the roof and the electrical
system), and rate each facility using an overall condition index with a
scale from 0 to 5. Based on that rating, the contractor uses an
industry cost database and other information to estimate the costs of
correcting the identified deficiencies. According to NASA officials,
using a contractor and a standard estimating methodology to assess all
its facilities provides consistent information across sites.
Furthermore, NASA requires its Centers to conduct their own
detailed condition assessments at least every 5 years. These
assessments, which are separate from the annual deferred maintenance
assessments, are used by the Centers to identify and prioritize repair
and maintenance projects. According to officials at the Ames Research
Center, for example, their assessment focuses more on active, mission-
critical assets and repairs and maintenance that they will try to get
funded within the next 5 years. According to NASA officials, the
backlog reported by these individual NASA centers is lower than the
deferred repair and maintenance needs NASA reported because the centers
include only the most important projects that they believe should
receive funding, instead of all projects to address their backlog as
estimated in NASA's annual deferred maintenance assessment report.
Q2c. Is this area likely to receive greater attention with the recent
establishment of a Construction and Environmental Compliance account as
required by NASA's FY 2010 appropriations?
A2,2c. Establishment of a Construction and Environmental Compliance
account should provide the Congress better visibility to NASA's plans
to revitalize or construct facilities and its environmental and
restoration activities.
Q3. If a decision is made to carry U.S. astronauts on a commercial
transportation system in the future, NASA will likely need early
warning safety systems. Can you suggest any ``time out'' indicators
that would be capable of providing NASA and the Congress a warning when
projected margins of safety are in danger of being reduced?
A3. Although GAO has not performed any work in this area, in my opinion
NASA should have processes in place to obtain the insight into all
design, production, and test activities and should have approval
authority over top level requirements, test strategies, success
criteria, and anomaly resolution. Furthermore, before flying astronauts
on commercial launch vehicles, NASA should subject these vehicles to a
formal certification process including an agency inspection of vehicle
designs, contractor engineering process and analysis of data from all
flights and test events. This certification should also consider
demonstrated flight history, e.g., vehicles with less successful flight
history should be subject to more stringent certification requirements.
Furthermore, the Congress could direct NASA to provide periodic reports
on key performance metrics of programs or projects in order to
facilitate the Congress' oversight of those programs.
Q4. Philosophically, it is hard to disagree with GAO's call to ensure
that adequate knowledge is secured at key development points,
especially for large and costly projects. However, some may question
the cost-effectiveness of applying this approach uniformly, such as for
low-cost missions when the agency is openly willing to take greater
risks in return for the promise of lower development costs. What are
your views on this matter?
A4. Regardless of the size of the mission, we believe that risk should
be managed by demonstrating the requisite knowledge prior to moving
from one phase of development to the next, as even low-cost missions
have life-cycle estimates of hundreds of millions of dollars. However,
as long as the all risks are known, openly recognized, accepted, and
planned for, it is hard to argue that knowingly accepting risks for
low-cost efforts is inherently bad. Unfortunately, history shows that
there can be issues associated with this type of approach. For example,
in the 1990's the NASA administrator challenged agency personnel to do
projects faster, better, and cheaper by streamlining practices and
becoming more efficient. The goal was to shorten program development
times, reduce cost, and increase scientific return by flying more and
smaller missions in less time. However, smaller lower cost missions do
not always result in successful projects. For example, NASA experienced
a few notable failures such as the Mars Polar Lander and Climate
Orbiter. After-action reports commissioned by NASA found that the Mars
Program failures resulted from cost and schedule constraints and a lack
of rigorous attention to sound process and practices. In addition, NASA
experienced extensive negative feedback about the failure of missions
developed under the faster, better, cheaper effort.
Q5. GAO, in its reviews of large scale acquisitions in DOD and NASA,
has consistently advocated for applying knowledge management principles
during system development. Is this the only way to look at the health
of an acquisition project, or are their other indicators that also need
to be examined?
A5. There are various models that can be used to look at the
acquisition approach for a project and all tend to focus on having the
processes in place that allow you to gain the knowledge and employ the
discipline necessary to manage a project, just as GAO's framework does.
Further, many of the metrics we use are incorporated in NASA's
acquisition policy for spaceflight systems. Regardless of the type of
metrics used, the ability to measure knowledge, processes, and outcomes
is critical to achieving improved project outcomes. Metrics provide
important indicators for decision makers, as achieving the right
knowledge at the right time enables leadership to make informed
decisions about when and how best to move into various expensive
acquisition phases. Our extensive body of work examining world-class
enterprises and the way they operate has validated their value for
programs that must deliver a new product to market at a certain time
and within a certain investment cost or suffer significant
consequences. While knowledge and outcome metrics provide valuable
information about the potential problems and health of programs, they
are of limited value if acquisitions do not begin with realistic plans
and baselines that are informed by doable requirements and accurate
cost and schedule estimates prior to development start.
Q6. In your latest assessment of selected large-scale projects, you
identified cases where contractor performance was a challenge. One case
involved the buyout of a company. Evidently, NASA had difficulty
exerting pressure on the company to get better performance. NASA told
GAO that terminating the contract due to poor performance and bringing
the work in-house would result in a one-year delay. I find it troubling
that NASA is in this box. I recognize that NASA cannot anticipate all
mergers and buyouts. What would you recommend be done to avoid NASA
being at the mercy of contractors who know NASA's options are limited?
A6. Most of NASA's missions are one of a kind and space development
programs that require specialized expertise and are complex and
difficult by nature. For this reason, it can be difficult to change
contractors in midcourse. Nevertheless, NASA still needs to have a
business-oriented culture that provides the appropriate level of
oversight and insight into their contractor's activity. This could
allow the agency to be proactive in monitoring the work being done by
contractors and, in some cases, subcontractors. By doing so, any
problems with the contractor's performance or potential delays could be
identified sooner and corrective actions could then be put in place.
Questions submitted by Representative Pete Olson
Q1. What are your views about NASA's reliance on Space Act Agreements
to fund commercial space capabilities in lieu of the more standard
acquisition based on Federal Acquisition Regulations? And going
forward, where is the threshold that should compel NASA to discontinue
using Space Act Agreements in favor of a FAR-based acquisition?
A1. Other transaction authority enhances the federal government's
ability to acquire cutting-edge science and technology, in part by
attracting contractors that have not typically pursued government
contracts. Other transaction authority was created under the National
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, commonly referred to as the Space
Act, and agreements utilizing NASA's other transaction authority are
known as Space Act agreements. NASA uses other transaction authority to
enter into a wide range of agreements with numerous entities to advance
NASA mission and program objectives including international cooperative
space activities under international agreements. Space Act Agreements
are agreements other than government contracts, grants, or cooperative
agreements and may take a number of forms. Under a reimbursable
agreement, the partner pays for work NASA conducts for the partner's
benefit. Under a nonreimbursable agreement, each party assumes
responsibility for its own costs for a project that furthers NASA's
mission. Under a funded agreement, NASA provides funding to the partner
to accomplish a NASA mission. These Space Act Agreements are one of the
many tools that NASA has to acquire goods and services or establish
relationships to advance NASA's mission and program objectives.
A funded Space Act agreement should only be used when NASA cannot
use a federal procurement contract or other type of agreement for a
transaction. Unfortunately, the Space Act does not establish a
threshold as to when to use a Space Act Agreement versus a federal
government contract; it is simply based on business judgment. These
types of agreements are not federal government contracts and,
therefore, generally are not subject to those federal laws and
regulations that apply to federal government contracts. Consequently,
agreements formed using other transaction authority permit considerable
latitude in negotiating agreement terms. For example, Space Act
Agreements allow NASA flexibility in negotiating intellectual property
and data rights, which generally stipulate each party's rights to
technology developed under the agreement. Since these agreements are
generally not subject to the certain federal laws and the Federal
Acquisition Regulation, they carry the risk of reduced accountability
and transparency if not properly managed. Space Act Agreements
establish a set of legally enforceable promises between NASA and the
other party to the agreement, requiring a commitment of NASA resources
such as personnel, funding, services, equipment, expertise,
information, or facilities, to accomplish the objectives stipulated in
the agreement. Because Space Act Agreements do not have a standard
structure based on regulatory guidelines, they can be challenging to
create and administer. While NASA has established guidance on how to
implement these agreements, in our opinion NASA must have staff with
experience in planning and conducting research and development
acquisitions, strong business acumen, and sound judgment to enable them
to operate in a relatively unstructured business environment.
Q2. With regard to commercial crew and cargo procurements, NASA's
FY2011 budget request states that, ``Government requirements are kept
to a minimum and are only concerned with assuring safe interaction with
the ISS. The partners [meaning commercial launch companies] are not
required to follow the standard NASA Program and Project Management
Processes and Requirements, NPR 7120.5.'' In other places, the budget
says crew safety won't be compromised and acknowledges the imperative
of safety, but otherwise provides no detail. What are your thoughts
about NASA's proposal to relieve commercial launch providers from
adherence to NPR 7120.5? How difficult would it be for NASA to maintain
good insight and oversight?
A2. While NASA Procedural Requirements 7120.5D is not necessary to
execute a successful project by a commercial company, it is imperative
that NASA establish in its contract or agreement a uniform process and
set of metrics that it can use to identify potential problems that
could lead to cost, schedule, or performance shortfalls. For example,
NASA used a Space Act agreement for the Commercial Orbital
Transportation Services (COTS) project and it was not required to
follow NASA Procedural Requirements 7120.5D. We reported that NASA used
these management requirements as a guide to ensure that it had the
proper program authorization and planning documentation in place for
the COTS project. Such plans help define realistic time frames,
identify responsibility for key tasks and deliverables, and provide a
yardstick by which to measure the progress of the effort. NASA
developed a program authorization document that outlined NASA's
management structure, project objectives, acquisition strategy, project
scope, funding profile, and planned program reviews. In addition, the
first performance milestone in NASA's agreements with its commercial
partners required the partners to develop a program or project
management plan that included the overall project schedule with
milestones and described how the partner would manage the development
process and identify and mitigate risks. Each commercial partner
successfully passed this milestone. Furthermore, during the course of
our review of the COTS project, we found NASA's management has
generally adhered to critical project management tools and activities
and the vast majority of project expenditures were for milestone
payments to COTS partners. NASA has also taken several steps since the
beginning of the COTS project to ensure that risks were identified,
assessed, and documented, and that mitigation plans were in place to
reduce these risks. NASA has communicated regularly with its partners
through quarterly and milestone reviews and provided them with
technical expertise to assist in their development efforts and to
facilitate integration with the space station.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Joseph W. Dyer (U.S. Navy, Retired), Chair, Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
Questions submitted by Chairwoman Gabrielle Giffords
Q1. The ASAP's latest report says that over 80 percent of NASA
facilities are beyond their design life, annual maintenance is
underfunded, facilities continue to degrade and facilities failures are
starting to impact missions and have safety implications Agency-wide.
A1. The ASAP based its finding that over 80 percent of NASA facilities
are beyond their useful life on a recent NASA presentation to the
American Council of Engineering Companies. That assessment is
consistent with the conditions that we have observed during our regular
visits to centers and reviews of NASA activities. Examples of facility
shortfalls include: expensive deep space probe assembly bays that lack
basic fire protection; a clean room used for spacecraft assembly that
shares a room with the dust pad being used to develop Mars Rover
extraction techniques (separated by a sheet of plastic); and a Saturn
era rocket motor test stand being refurbished for modern propulsion
testing, but with insufficient funds to scrape the rust off of the 50
year old steel structure.
Q1a. Is this another neglected area in need of resources?
1a. Yes, this is clearly an area that requires addressing. While the
positive attitude of the workers that we meet attempts to transcend the
facility conditions, there is no question that lack of proper
facilities impacts their productivity and morale, and potentially, the
quality of their products.
Q1b. Does the NASA IG know the extent to which NASA's facilities are
in need for repair, how much this will cost, and what the priority
projects are?
1b. It is our understanding that the NASA IG will respond to you
directly on his knowledge of specific facility needs.
Q1c. Is this area likely to receive greater attention with the recent
establishment of a Construction and Environmental Compliance account as
required by NASA's FY 2010 appropriations?
1c. While funding mechanisms are outside the purview of the ASAP's
primary focus, it would appear that having a fenced funding stream
dedicated to facility improvements and maintenance would reduce the
need to ``steal from Peter to pay Paul,'' or in this case ``steal from
facilities to pay for mission.'' The impact on mission will depend
directly on how its funding was affected by the Construction and
Environmental Compliance account creation, a subject that we have not
studied.
Q2. If a decision is made to carry U.S. astronauts on a commercial
transportation system in the future, NASA will likely need early
warning safety systems. Can you suggest any ``time out'' indicators
that would be capable of providing NASA and the Congress a warning when
projected margins of safety are in danger of being reduced?
A2. There are signs that a program is under stress and thus vulnerable
to short term or incomplete thinking that increases risk. The most
obvious of these follow:
A. When the three principal program metrics--cost, schedule,
and performance--no longer align, the program may be in
trouble. Cost, schedule, and performance are inevitably linked
together. Should one principal metric be altered, either
deliberately or inadvertently, and the other two are not
adjusted, then there is a probability that something is amiss,
e.g., that additional risk or trade-offs are taking place that
could impact safety.
B. In a program where oversight by the customer is essential
to ensure safety and subsequent certification, a ``closed
hand'' attitude on the part of the executing team (either
public or private) such that reasonable outside review is not
possible is most certainly a warning signal. The present
Shuttle Program is a great example of things done correctly.
While such extensive visibility may not be possible for a
developmental program, the Shuttle Program sets a good example
to be emulated. When programs are open to review (i.e., outside
information, ideas, and criticism), they are able to make well
informed decisions.
C. Failure of or resistance to witnessed testing is a danger
sign of a program in trouble. Testing, especially of critical
systems, should be carried out such that they can be witnessed
by an appropriate oversight authority. In the best programs,
the objective of the test and the expected results are also
reviewed by the same oversight authority. Unpredictable data is
dangerous data. Data like this demonstrates an incomplete
understanding about how a parameter is produced, and the next
time the result could be far worse than expected.
D. Key personnel/workforce fluctuations normally precede
problems. When key management personnel (i.e., lead engineers,
analysts, etc.) begin to leave a program, for reasons that are
neither clear nor explainable, this indicates instability in
leadership which inevitably leads to uncertainty in the
workforce. Sudden lay-offs within the contractor base, even if
not in the same program, can indicate a problem. Also,
financial instability in a key contractor or subcontractor can
indicate potential problems downstream if the needed parts and
pieces must be farmed out to another source.
E. Sudden and unanticipated changes in the program's
objectives can lead to rapid design changes that can cause
things to be missed. ``Constancy of purpose'' means that the
entire team executing the program understands the final
objective and makes the myriad daily choices in that direction.
If there are changes in the final objective, a full, detailed
program review that includes the responsible agency should be
mandatory.
F. When the agency representatives who are the ``boots on the
ground'' in the plant begin to be concerned, you can be
reasonably certain that there is concern for the program and
the decisions that are being made. These representatives play
an invaluable role in maintaining cognizance that a
contractor's systems (quality, cost, work planning, scheduling,
supervision, workforce training and skill set, etc.) are being
maintained. These functions are highly valuable for maintaining
visibility and oversight in a program. The FAA uses similar
representatives and quality assurance personnel in civil
aviation programs--they do it differently, but the effect is
very similar.
G. A weak relationship between the oversight agency and the
contractor is a sure warning sign. A strong ``partnership''
relationship cannot be overemphasized. This relationship, built
on a mutual drive towards a common goal, will be the best
protection against unseen risk entering the program. Likewise,
the workforce's identification with that same goal helps ensure
that the people involved understand the importance of doing
their work right and identifying problems so that they can be
corrected.
Q3. The ASAP states, in its annual report, that no Commercial Orbital
Transportation Services (COTS) provider is currently human-rated
qualified and therefore abandoning Ares I for an alternative without
the alternative's capability being demonstrated is unwise.
Q3a. How would one go about conducting a safety assessment as the ASAP
envisions?
A3,3a. First, NASA must publish safety requirements; the assessment
will follow an evaluation of a provider's ability to fulfill those
requirements.
Q3b. Who would conduct the assessment and what criteria or guidelines
would be used?
A3,3b. Only NASA subject matter experts have the deep knowledge needed
to conduct these assessments. Independent entities such as the ASAP,
and the representative from, for example, academia and the national
academies, should be afforded the insight necessary to attest that NASA
undertook a complete, fair and balanced approach.
Q4. In the past, the ASAP has commented on the implications of
proposals aimed at reducing the gap in U.S. human space flight launch
capability. Now, with reports that the administration is proposing to
rely on yet-to-be built commercial crew transportation systems, are
there any gap-related issues the ASAP believes Congress should be
cognizant of?
A4. Like others involved in the space sector, the ASAP is aware that
after the Shuttle's retirement, NASA will not have a NASA-developed
human spaceflight capability for several years and will need to rely on
others during this period. While there are both short and long term
options that NASA can use to fill its requirement for access to the
Space Station, those options have advantages and disadvantages and
previously have been reviewed by NASA, your Subcommittee, and others.
Considering this, the ASAP continues to caution that if actions are
taken to rapidly close the current gap, including delaying the
Shuttle's retirement or accelerating the development of alternative
vehicles including commercial systems, those actions must not and
cannot compromise safety. Required engineering analysis, testing,
certification, and verification must be completed, and adequate funding
to support these actions must be provided. To do otherwise will only
further extend the gap and could further delay exploration beyond low-
Earth orbit.
Q5. Your report says that NASA must be fully candid with the public
and Congress, and those audiences must fully understand what risks are
involved. You urge that risks be communicated clearly to Congress and
the public because not doing so is disingenuous and does the Nation a
disservice.
Q5a. What was the impetus for this observation?
A5,5a. In the ASAP's 2009 Annual Report, the Panel observed, ``NASA has
made significant cultural progress evolving and strengthening internal
communications as well as communications within the technical
community. Internally, the Agency now speaks more plainly, openly
discusses risk and risk management, and better ensures dissenting
voices are heard. Largely gone is the ``spin'' noted by the CAIB.
External communications has been slower to evolve, and ``spin'' still
remains a part of these communications. The Panel does not believe this
practice best serves the Agency.'' We continue to see NASA's external
communicators practicing public affairs techniques that are contrary to
the transparency that we believe would better serve the Agency. One
small example: While NASA's public affairs staff issued a press release
announcing the publication of the ASAP's Annual Report, they did so
late on a Friday before a three day weekend. A source that asked not to
be identified noted, ``This is a technique the public affairs shop uses
to minimize press coverage which they believe may cast NASA in a less
than favorable light.'' We are fully confident NASA Administrator
Bolden is putting in place policies and processes that will lead to
greater transparency. Such transparency is challenging due to the
difficulty in communicating highly technical issues to a nontechnical
public. Still, NASA must find a way to successfully communicate the
level of risk inherent in experimental space flight. The Agency must be
supported in doing so by Congress and the Administration.
Q5b. Does the panel project greater risks in space exploration in the
future?
A5,5b. Yes. Reaching farther--to the Moon and Mars--brings greater risk
because it involves more time and distance in space. More modern design
techniques, better materials, and better modeling and simulation tools
will serve to reduce risk. The safety impact from commercializing space
transportation has yet to be determined and will depend on how well
NASA's knowledge can be transferred to the private sector, the
sophistication of the acquisition strategy, and the sufficiency of
resources provided. The net result remains uncertain.
Q6. Last year, it was reported that the Air Force's 45th Space Wing
had performed a study which raised concern about the ability of the
crew of Orion to survive an explosion of the Ares I rocket within the
first minute of launch. I understand that the Air Force does analyses
as part of its responsibilities in providing tracking and safety
services for all launches from Kennedy Space Center and Cape Canaveral
Air Force Station.
Q6a. During the course of your safety oversight duties, did the ASAP
follow up on the Air Force's concern and was it appropriately addressed
by NASA?
A6,6a. The ASAP did follow-up on the Air Force's concern during our 1st
Quarterly Meeting on February 23, 2010, at MSFC. Data presented by Mr.
Anthony Lyons, Deputy of the Flight Performance Systems Integration
Group for Constellation, provided an overview of the Constellation
Integrated Aborts Assessment. The presentation included a discussion of
the 45th Space Wing debris assessment and noted the reasons for the
potential differences between that assessment and the Ares integrated
risk assessment. The crew safety concern expressed by the 45th Space
Wing involved the debris hazard associated with an Ares first stage
explosion during ascent. The 45th Space Wing assumed that any intrusion
into the debris cloud is 100% fatal. The Ares/Simulation Assisted Risk
Assessment (SARA) team used the 45th Space Wing debris catalog to model
the explosion scenarios, but also included high-fidelity modeling of
the debris flux, detailed thermal analysis, and an accurate Orion
trajectory. The Ares modeling indicated that the strike probability
would be 0.013 for an abort at 60 seconds mission elapsed time, 12 g
Launch Abort System acceleration, and a 2 second abort delay. The Ares
results, which have been shared with the 45th Space Wing, show that the
45th Space Wing and Ares modeling are in close agreement given the same
assumptions. The ASAP is satisfied that the Air Force's concern was
appropriately addressed by NASA.
Q6b. Is it still an issue?
A6,6b. In the opinion of the ASAP, the differences in the 45th Space
Wing and the Ares assessments are not an issue. NASA is ultimately
responsible for public safety and astronaut safety and uses the 45th
Space Wing to assist them. Staff of the NASA Constellation Program and
the 45th Space Wing meet regularly through the Constellation Range
Safety Panel and other forums to discuss range safety issues. Results
to date show that the Constellation ascent abort design provides for
crew survival during all phases of ascent, and that the abort design is
sufficiently robust for Preliminary Design Review and allows for
further improvements. There is still a considerable amount of ascent
abort work to do, including more detailed analyses and the need to
determine operationally preferred method of ascent aborts from a risk/
complexity perspective.
Q7. In your prepared statement, you say: ``The ASAP's advice is to
carefully and adequately provide resources and to realistically
schedule work We believe both resources and scheduling must include a
``management reserve'' to accommodate issues that will arise as new
designs evolve and working relationships mature.'' While I believe this
to be wise advice, management reserves, as you know, seem to be prime
targets for budget cuts. How can NASA best make the case for those
management reserves?
A7. In any large program, it is impossible to thoroughly anticipate all
future developments and events. In the execution of difficult technical
programs, sometimes developments and testing must occur to address
areas that are not well understood at the time of project inception.
Since the technology answers cannot always be appropriately
anticipated, it is important to add in resources, normally funding and
time, to account for these unknowns. Sometimes the additional resources
are called a ``management reserve,'' or ``contingency.'' This extra
funding is prudent, normal, and is targeted appropriately for the
issues particular to each given program.
NASA should be in a position to benchmark its reserve, linking the
estimated need for funding and time with the level of unknown. Usually,
this is summarized as a percentage of the total requested funding. To
remove this funding before the unknowns are effectively addressed, is
to violate the basics of better management practices that are suggested
by today's universities and business leaders. NASA should be in a
position to benchmark its reserve with similar large programs, as
technology development is usually a part of any large endeavor.
Questions submitted by Representative Pete Olson
Q1. You noted in your statement that the ASAP believes NASA must do a
better job communicating ``the level of risk inherent in experimental
space flight.'' Would you elaborate on that statement? What do you
consider to be the essential elements to convey to the public, and how
do you best modulate the message so as not to be counter-productive to
the agency's mission, which, by its very nature, carries significant
risk?
A1. In order for audiences external to NASA (and by those audiences,
the Panel means the public, the Administration, and the Congress) to
better understand the level of risk associated with space flight, NASA
has to provide more than just a safe or unsafe declaration. While go/
no-go decisions must be made by NASA in its everyday operation, the
factors that are considered when making these decisions are very
complex and not readily apparent to those external to these decision
processes. A simple ``safe'' or ``unsafe'' description implies a
certainty of performance that does not and never can exist. Therefore,
when an activity that was declared to be ``safe'' results in a mishap,
external observers may conclude that something must have been done
incorrectly and that someone should be blamed because a ``safe''
process failed. This can negatively impact confidence in NASA's ability
to manage its programs and to appropriately allocate resources to
programs and projects.
In reality, no operation can ever be 100 percent safe as there is
always some element of risk. This message of ever-present risk must be
clearly communicated to all stakeholders and audiences as well as
defining an acceptable level of safety and its possible consequences.
If this is not done, NASA will repeatedly suffer degradation to its
reputation and loss of confidence. Clear communication about the
undesirable things that can occur, and the likelihood that they will
occur, does not now exist.
Communicating the level of risk is certainly not easy because the
audiences are diverse in their background as well as their ability to
understand and interpret data. This means that the methods used to
communicate must be diverse and include not only technical assessments,
but also give comparisons to activities that are within the public
experience base, such as commercial airline mishaps or automobile
accidents. The key here is transparency and candor from the outset.
Clear descriptions of the potential hazards involved, their likelihood
of occurring in both quantitative and descriptive terms, as well as
what risks have been accepted by NASA and why such acceptance was
worthwhile--if communicated prior to undertaking an activity--are more
likely to prevent accusations of cover-up or dodging responsibility
when a mishap does occur. This level of transparency and candor in
communicating, ``how safe is safe enough?'', is much more likely to
increase the public's trust and support of NASA and its mission than
one that only addresses problems after a mishap has already occurred.
Q2. With regard to commercial crew and cargo procurements, NASA's FY
2011 budget request states that, ``Government requirements are kept to
a minimum and are only concerned with assuring safe interaction with
the ISS. The partners [meaning commercial launch companies] are not
required to follow the standard NASA Program and Project Management
Processes and Requirements, NPR 7120.5.'' In other places, the budget
says crew safety won't be compromised and acknowledges the imperative
of safety, but otherwise provides no detail. What are your thoughts
about NASA's proposal to relieve commercial launch providers from
adherence to NPR 7120.5? How difficult would it be for NASA to maintain
good insight and oversight?
A2. The NASA Commercial Crew and Cargo Program is aimed at encouraging
the development of commercial space transportation services and an
associated market, with multiple suppliers and customers. NASA would be
one of these customers, purchasing transportation services on the open
market. In an effort to encourage innovation, NASA is proposing to
allow providers to use alternatives to the standard NASA program
management approaches. This appears to be a reasonable strategy, as
long as the providers are held accountable for meeting NASA's existing
and future Human Rating standards where appropriate, applicable safety
standards, and International Space Station visiting vehicle
requirements. In this regard, the ASAP continues to believe that NASA
verification that providers have met these requirements is fundamental
and should not be changed. Further, the ASAP continues to also believe
that critical vehicle subsystems, such as a crew escape system, be
NASA-certified prior to acceptance. The fact that the new approach will
first be implemented on cargo delivery missions will allow NASA time to
evaluate whether its plan for insight and oversight would be adequate
for the much more challenging missions involving crew delivery.
In order for industry to maximize safety in the design of systems
that are intended to carry crew, it will be very important for NASA to
finalize its proposed human rating requirements as soon as possible.
NASA has indicated that it plans to complete an agency and industry-
coordinated human rating draft by the end of 2010. The Panel has noted
that this timetable has the potential to put NASA behind in building
systems currently under development, rather than ahead.