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[H.A.S.C. No. 111–101]

U.S. MILITARY REDEPLOYMENT FROM IRAQ: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

COMMUNITY ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD
OCTOBER 21, 2009

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
56–005 WASHINGTON : 2010

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U.S. MILITARY REDEPLOYMENT FROM IRAQ: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

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The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in room HVC–210, Capitol Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning.

Today, the committee meets to receive testimony on the status of the U.S. military redeployment from Iraq, issues and challenges. Our witnesses today are the honorable Michele Flournoy, under secretary of defense for policy, Vice Admiral James Winnefeld, director for strategic plans and policy, which is the J–5, Mr. Alan Estevez, the acting deputy under secretary of defense for logistics and materiel readiness, and Lieutenant General Kathleen Gainey, the director for logistics, which is known as the J–4.

And, General Gainey, I believe this is your very first time in appearing before this committee. We certainly welcome you.

This is the second full committee event on this subject. The first was a classified briefing on July the 22nd of this year, and I doubt it will be our last.

Right now, the United States has over 120,000 combat forces in Iraq. Under the current plan, we will end the year with 11 combat brigades, totaling somewhere around 100,000 personnel. In August 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end and our military presence in Iraq will consist of six Advise and Assist brigades, with about 50,000 American military personnel.

Reducing our military presence by over 50,000 people and thousands of vehicles in just a few months, while simultaneously closing bases, consolidating headquarters, continuing to conduct both combat and training operations, will not be a simple undertaking.

Such an enormous operation, conducted in a complex environment, demands extensive planning and inspired execution. Assuming this phase of the redeployment goes smoothly, we will slowly withdraw the remaining brigades until we meet the terms of the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and there are no U.S. military personnel on January 1, 2012.

This period and the period immediately afterward could well provide a jarring transition. For starters, the Iraqis will have to as-
sume full responsibility for internal security, and there are questions if they will be fully capable in that area by the time we leave.

We have provided the Department with the requested authority to transfer some current U.S. military equipment to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and I hope our witnesses will address how that process will work, in particular, how we will ensure that this process will not hurt the National Guard’s capability to respond to disasters and other emergencies here in the United States.

I hope that they will take a minute to discuss potential future requests for assisting of the Iraqis. I hope our witnesses will also take a moment to discuss how Iraq will be provided protection from external threats and how long such a commitment might last.

Our military command in Iraq will also be transitioning a number of responsibilities to the United States embassy and the government of Iraq during this point. Some of these, such as providing protection for provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), may be relatively easy to move to the State Department. Others, however, such as providing for the training of Iraqi police or resourcing future military assistance through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) or Foreign Military Financing (FMF) process may prove more challenging for the State Department to—and its ability to manage. I hope our witnesses can take a moment to lay out what major functions will have to transition, how this will happen, how it will come to pass.

This is ongoing process. I don’t think anyone on this committee thinks it will be the last hearing on this subject. We have been involved in Iraq for a long time, as you know, and I believe we will be involved there for a long time to come. We owe it to those outstanding and brave men and women who have given their lives to get to this point to make sure that we get it right.

Now, while this may not be our last hearing on Iraq, it is the last hearing for Alicia Haley, one of our able staff, and we wish her well in her future endeavors as she goes to another position within the Administration.

Now I turn to my good friend, Buck McKeon, the ranking member and gentleman from California, for comments.

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. “BUCK” MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for holding this very important hearing. And I join you in welcoming our witnesses and thanking you all for being here today.

We have made remarkable progress in Iraq. Violence continues to stay at a level comparable to 2003. The provincial elections earlier in the year were a success, and the SOFA agreement has held together.

Most recently, in June, the Iraqi Security Forces assumed primary security responsibility within Iraqi cities, and U.S. combat forces departed the last remaining cities. As I had previously stated, the question we face in Iraq is not whether we have won the war, but whether we will win the peace.

We heard encouraging testimony from General Odierno last month. While he acknowledged that security is improving, he cau-
tioned, “It is not yet enduring,” and noted that, again, “There still remains underlying unresolved sources of potential conflict.” This is what he calls drivers of instability. And that is what we need to keep an eye on.

With national elections set for January, a referendum on the SOFA on the horizon, as well as other significant, unresolved political hurdles like the status of Kirkuk, there are many unknowns that will determine the prospect of enduring domestic peace in Iraq.

The President’s February 2009 plan calls for a dramatic reduction to the U.S. footprints in Iraq by August 2010. By next summer, the President plans to decrease our troop strength by 60 percent, in addition to closing bases and moving materiel out of theater.

There seems to be widespread agreement that a peaceful national election in January is critical for Iraq’s emerging democracy and the successful implementation of the President’s redeployment plan. Last month, General Odierno was hopeful that the election will occur on time, if we get the election law passed.

The London Times reported yesterday that the Iraqi parliament is now talking about delaying the elections in January. Yesterday, President Obama reaffirmed his commitment to his redeployment timetable.

I am concerned that if the national election is, indeed, delayed, the President’s timetable for redeployment offers General Odierno little room to maneuver. Do we have contingency plans in the event the security situation demands revisiting the August 2010 timeline? This plan arguably made sense in February. Does this still make the same sense today?

Many of us here have consistently held the position that scheduling troop withdrawals in Iraq should be based on the conditions on the ground. The standard should continue to be that we do not draw down forces if it means sacrificing security. I hope our witnesses will affirm their commitment to that standard.

As we begin executing the President’s redeployment plan, we also need to keep an eye on the future. This leads me to concerns about the normalization of our relations with Iraq. After all we have invested in Iraq, we should be taking steps to ensure that we pursue a robust security relationship with Baghdad.

Our increase in combat forces was not the only reason the surge was successful. Rather, Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus knew how to leverage our presence to ensure Iraqi leadership made the right choices. I am concerned that we may be retreating from this posture too quickly in an effort to normalize our relationship with Iraq.

In particular, we need to keep an eye on how our military in Iraq hands over responsibility to our embassy in Baghdad. Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC–I) has a critical role in developing and sustaining the Iraqi Security Forces. We need to make sure that the embassy is ready for the handoff.

As General Odierno emphasized last month, this is an embryonic democracy. While the situation in Iraq has improved, I think it is fair to say the situation is far from normal. So long as we have a force presence in Iraq, our leadership should continue to involve
itself in Iraqi political affairs to ensure the right decisions are made. Robust engagement seems to be the key to a redeployment plan.

I look forward to a candid discussion on these important issues. Again, thank you for being here this morning.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman from California.

One statement has been furnished from the witnesses. As I understand it, it is a consolidated statement. However, I understand that each of you will be testifying this morning. But we will begin with the under secretary.

Madam Under Secretary, we welcome you again.

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHELE FLOURNOY, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Secretary FLOURNOY. Chairman Skelton, Representative McKeon, and distinguished committee members, we very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today.

We have briefed the committee in July on the President’s Iraq drawdown strategy, and we are pleased to be able to follow up today to discuss the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) continuing efforts to draw down equipment in Iraq.

As you know, on February 27th of this year, the President announced that, in accordance with the U.S.-Iraq security agreement, he would begin a responsible drawdown of our forces in Iraq. He directed a fundamental change of U.S. military mission. By August 31, 2010, U.S. forces in Iraq will complete the transition from combat and counterinsurgency activities to a more limited mission.

We will shift to focus on training and advising the Iraqi Security Forces, conducting targeted counterterrorism operations, providing force protection for U.S. personnel and facilities, and supporting civilian agencies and international organizations in their capacity-building efforts.

We have continued along the timeline laid out by the President. On June 30th of this year, as you know, U.S. combat forces repositioned out of Iraqi cities. And for the first time, Iraqi forces assumed responsibility for security within cities, villages and localities across the country.

The ISF have performed quite well since June 30th of 2009, and to underscore what General Odierno told you in his recent testimony, the security situation in Iraq continues to improve, despite a few high-profile attacks. Our initial force repositioning also helped to demonstrate to the Iraqi people that we remain committed to the timeline agreed upon in the U.S.-Iraqi security agreement.

While the Iraqi security forces have improved greatly in recent years, they still require our sustained support. The global economic downturn has driven down the price of oil, causing budget shortfalls for the Iraq government. These shortfalls have resulted in hiring freezes and hindered some of the ISF’s ability to field critical equipment. Much remains to be done to enable the ISF to assume full responsibility for internal security by December 31st of 2011,
when the security agreement comes to an end and the drawdown of U.S. forces is slated to be complete.

Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I) assesses that, in order to maintain stability when the U.S. drawdown is complete, the ISF must at a minimum have the capacity to secure its population, conduct internal defense, and conduct basic external defense. Over the past several years, the government of Iraq has steadily increased its capacity to fund its own defense needs.

In 2005, the Iraqi government was only able to contribute $2.4 billion of the cost of funding the ISF. In 2009, the Iraqi government contribution increased to $9.6 billion.

Nonetheless, without our assistance, the ISF will not be able to develop the needed capabilities and address their remaining budgetary and equipment shortfalls within the necessary timeframe. We believe that increasing ISF capabilities is the best way to ensure that our hard-fought security gains in Iraq will not be lost as we draw down.

And to that end, MNF–I has developed an ISF equipment requirements list, and the joint staff has revalidated that list to develop solutions that address Iraqi shortfalls.

To assist the ISF, the Administration has requested the authority to provide the government of Iraq with unlimited excess material. This includes everything from commercial trucks to individual clothing and equipment, such as helmets and body armor. We have also requested the authority to transfer non-excess equipment, such as pistols, cargo trucks, up-armored Humvees, and we would like to thank the committee for including this authority in the authorization bill. It will certainly help to ensure that the ISF can fulfill their mission by the time the U.S. forces depart, an absolutely vital step towards the goal of a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq.

Given the government of Iraq’s budget shortfalls and the ISF’s requirements, the Iraqi government may ultimately require additional assistance beyond the transfer of excess and non-excess equipment. We are still evaluating how much and what type of additional assistance may be needed, and we look forward to coming back to you at a future date with a plan in those areas.

In order to balance our own needs with those of the ISF, as well as the needs of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which we are also seeking to address, the Department has established a very robust process to determine which equipment it can appropriately transfer.

A core principle in our decision-making is that equipment will only be considered for transfer if it is not needed by U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. As plans for the transfer of non-excess equipment to the Iraqi and Afghan security forces are refined, DOD will also work with the military services to manage the cost of replacing that transferred equipment.

The financial requirements associated with the replacement of transferred equipment will be part of the Department’s normal budget development process. In that process, we will be taking into consideration the timing of the transfer of equipment and the urgency expressed by DOD components for reimbursement or replacement.
This committee has previously and again today expressed concern about the impact on Reserve component of transferring non-excess items. And we are pleased to report that Reserve component equipment will not be used as a source for ISF requirements. In fact, Reserve units serving in Iraq are being offered the opportunity to take theater-provided equipment back to their home station to fill any authorized shortages.

Ultimately, the ISF will only be effective if they are viewed as legitimate across Iraqi society. And to help ensure that the ISF remains a non-sectarian, nationalist element, loyal to the government of Iraq, we are tying continued ISF assistance to their non-sectarian performance.

Let me close with a word on the equipment drawdown. As President Obama has directed, by August 31st of 2010, we will seek to reduce our footprint in Iraq to a transition force of no more than 50,000, and we have already begun that drawdown. Over 143,000 troops were serving on the ground in January of this year. We are now just under 120,000.

Needless to say, the challenge of drawing down our troops is paralleled by the challenge of drawing down all the equipment that is not appropriate for transfer to the ISF or the Afghan National Security Forces. At the moment, roughly 3.3 million pieces of equipment remain in Iraq. Although some of this equipment will be provided to the ISF to help improve their capabilities, the vast majority of the equipment will remain with U.S. forces and will either be returned home or transferred to Afghanistan.

DOD and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) have been planning this equipment drawdown for over a year. We have now begun to execute it. The services have all identified which pieces of equipment are not mission-essential and can therefore be retrograded early. And this way, we will be able to draw down the equipment gradually as the troops draw down.

Throughout the equipment process—drawdown process, the relevant DOD components will be meeting on a regular basis to resolve various issues that will inevitably arise during this very complex logistical operation.

Let me close by emphasizing that we continue to plan for and implement a responsible U.S. drawdown, one that advances our goal of a stable, sovereign, and self-reliant Iraq. We are continuing our efforts to train and equip the ISF so they can effectively defend the Iraqi people and protect Iraqi institutions by the end of 2011.

We are also committed to conducting the drawdown of troops, equipment, and materiel in a manner that addresses the needs of our own military and our obligations to the American taxpayer. While doing all of this presents significant challenges, we are confident that we are making progress towards our goals on the timeline laid out by the President.

Again, I am happy to take any questions on potential developments in Iraq that may—we may need to respond to and as we refine and adjust our plans going forward during the question-and-answer (Q&A) period. And I want to thank you for allowing us to testify today. We look forward to working with this committee on these issues as we move forward.

Thank you.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. JAMES A. WINNEFELD, USN, JOINT STAFF, DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY (J–5), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Admiral Winnefeld. Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member McKeon, members of the committee, good morning, and thank you for the opportunity to meet again with you to discuss progress in executing the President’s strategy for a responsible drawdown in Iraq.

I would first like to tell the members how thankful we are for the support we have received from the committee, especially with regards to the Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). I would like to publicly congratulate your staff members for their hard work and significant contributions to our progress. They have done a really, really good job.

Since our last hearing in July, U.S. Central Command and Multi-National Forces of Iraq have remained on track to meet the President’s guidance for the responsible drawdown. In March of this year, when we spoke to you, the coalition footprint in Iraq was 141,000 troops. When I spoke to you in July, when we spoke to you together, it was 132,000. And by the end of this month, we expect our footprint to be approximately 120,000. We also have our first two Advise and Assist brigades on the ground doing the work they were designed to do.

A commensurate reduction in the number of bases we occupy has put us ahead of the schedule outlined earlier for you this year. We have 35,000 fewer contractors on the ground in Iraq than we did in January of this year. And based on the security gains made to date, as you have heard recently, General Odierno decided to offramp a brigade combat team (BCT), the 1st of the 10th Mountain, scheduled for deployment to Iraq on January 1, 2010. This will move us towards the 10 brigade combat teams at the time of the Iraqi elections, well on our way to the 6 Advise and Assistance brigades that we plan to have on the ground by September 1, 2010.

Next spring, MNF–I will begin to redeploy forces in a manner that General Odierno describes as thinning the lines. This will enable MNF–I to redeploy their remaining brigade combat teams battalion by battalion through the summer of 2010. This approach will allow MNF–I to maintain key partnerships with regional leaders, particularly in Iraq, for the maximum time possible, while reducing the force to 50,000.

MNF–I is currently planning for the final phase of the drawdown after September 1st of 2010. This plan, which will be completed in this spring timeframe—late winter, early spring—will ensure the successful execution of training and assistance operations after September 1, 2010, and ultimately the transition to a strategic partnership with Iraq.

Meanwhile, the Iraqi Security Forces, which we will refer to as ISF, have come a long way since the security agreement was signed
in November of 2008, and we have witnessed a number of operational successes, of which you are aware. These include our successful withdrawal from the cities to which the chairman referred this past June, which provided a significant psychological boost to the Iraqi security forces and, contrary to some reports at the time, actually helped cement our relationship with those forces.

And as horrific as the attacks on August 19th were, we saw in their aftermath an Iraqi Security Force that was capable enough to conduct a thorough investigation and flexible enough to adjust their procedures to reduce the possibility of a reoccurrence.

Thus, we are seeing an Iraqi Security Force that is increasingly independent of U.S. support and assistance. However, the ISF still have a long way to go to achieve the capabilities and capacities they need, including rounded-out internal security forces and a foundational external defense that will allow our complete drawdown by December 31st of 2011.

The government of Iraq will not achieve these capabilities without the continued dedicated support of MNF–I and the rest of the U.S. Government. The legislative authorities recently granted to the Secretary of Defense to transfer excess and non-excess equipment to the Iraqi security forces are absolutely essential and very much appreciated in meeting the identified capability requirements that we have.

In conclusion, through the efforts of U.S. Central Command and MNF–I, in concert with Embassy Baghdad, we will continue to plan and execute a responsible drawdown from Iraq that ensures we meet the objectives outlined by the President. As General Odierno pointed out during his recent testimony, concerns remain, including Arab-Kurd tensions, the election process, which we have been watching unfold over the last day or so, government capacity, and the potential for interference from violent extremists.

Nonetheless, we do remain on track, and we intend to continue the drawdown in a manner that protects our military forces and civilians, exercises good stewardship over the resources provided to us, does not jeopardize the readiness of our military as we reset, and leaves a stable, secure, and self-reliant Iraq as a long-term strategic partner to the United States.

Once again, thank you for the support you have provided and that you have consistently provided to our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much.

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Winnefeld, Secretary Flournoy, Mr. Estevez, and General Gainey can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, thank you.

Mr. Estevez.

STATEMENT OF ALAN F. ESTEVEZ, ACTING DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL READINESS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. Estevez. Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member McKeon, distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and discuss the Department of Defense’s ongoing efforts to withdraw U.S. assets from Iraq.
In my capacity as the acting deputy under secretary of defense for logistics and materiel readiness, I am responsible for developing overarching logistics policies for the DOD to include the logistics policies which are supporting General Odierno’s drawdown strategy for combat forces in Iraq.

Given the President’s decision on troop strength reductions, a concerted effort is ongoing in the Department to assess and synchronize logistics drawdown actions and policies to fully support the drawdown strategy. Having said that, the Department’s mission is not only focused on systematically and responsibly drawing down our forces, supplies, and materiel in Iraq, but also on fulfilling U.S. combat equipment requirements in Afghanistan and on providing equipment capabilities to the Iraqi Security Forces and the Afghan Security Forces.

The magnitude of our logistics challenges associated with successfully supporting these mission requirements is enormous. Today in Iraq, we have over 289 of the 495 forward operating bases remaining to turn over, roughly 3.3 million pieces of equipment, 49,000 sea-land containers, 34,000 short tons of ammunition, 22 supply support activities, and 21,000 short tons of supplies.

The good news is, we know how to do this. We know how to redeploy. We have been doing it as part of our force rotations for six years, and we have the capacity. DOD and the Multi-National Forces–Iraq, in coordination with the military services, have proactively developed and integrated and coordinated logistics, plans, policies, and direction to ensure the systemic and responsible drawdown of supplies and major end items in Iraq.

In 2008, the military services reduced the amount of equipment and supplies flowing in to theater and instructed units to start shipping non-critical items out of Iraq. The Department directed the departing units to follow a four-step disposition process for drawing down excess supplies and equipment.

The four-step disposition process that is in effect and being executed today is to consume, redistribute, transfer, and dispose. The responsible drawdown actions that we have taken to date have been accomplished while retaining logistics flexibility to adjust to operational changes in mission requirements.

Excess property in Iraq is being reviewed against combat equipment requirements in Afghanistan and DOD’s overall requirements. The Department, in coordination with the General Services Administration (GSA), which is responsible for the transfer of excess property to state and local entities, has established a process that would allow state and local entities the opportunity to screen excess property in Iraq prior to it being transferred to the Iraqi government.

However, it is unlikely that much of the property is suitable for state and local agencies based on the property’s operational condition or items that are—meet foreign specification standards, in other words, are running on 220 volts rather than 120.

The military departments continue to emphasize the importance of maintaining property accountability and visibility throughout the equipment drawdown and retrograde process. Weekly senior-level video teleconferences between the Iraqi theater and Department have proven invaluable in synchronized coordinating and fa-
cilitating solutions affecting the successful execution of the over-arching drawdown mission.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the committee. The Department is achieving logistics unity of effort in executing the President’s directive to systemically and responsibly draw down the size of U.S. forces in Iraq.

We have a plan for the equipment coming out of Iraq and have been working this for many months. We are tracking drawdown progress against specific goals and will provide whatever policy assistance is required to meet the President’s timelines. With continued support from this Congress, the Department can execute all of the required drawdown tasks.

I would be happy to answer any questions that you or members of the committee may have. Thank you.

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Estevez, Secretary Flournoy, Admiral Winnefeld, and General Gainey can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Lieutenant General Gainey, welcome.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. KATHLEEN M. GAINLEY, USA, JOINT STAFF, DIRECTOR FOR LOGISTICS (J–4), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

General GAINLEY. Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member McKeon, and distinguished members of the committee, good morning, and thank you for this opportunity to appear before you and to discuss the Department of Defense strategy and ongoing initiatives to responsibly draw down from the United States assets from Iraq.

I am Lieutenant General Kathleen Gainey, director of logistics on the Joint Staff. As director of logistics, I am the principal adviser to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for the entire spectrum of joint logistics, to include reviewing the logistics policies and processes that are guiding the drawdown strategy in Iraq, as well as the Joint Staff lead in the effort to equip the Iraqi security forces.

Mr. Chairman, we have been redeploying significant amounts of forces out of Iraq and Kuwait for each of the past six years. The Department of Defense has been planning for and executing the mandated drawdown of forces from Iraq for over a year. The planning and execution have been a coordinated effort among Multi-National Force–Iraq, the services, the Department of State, Central Command, and its components.

Central Command, through its service components, is orchestrating the process that determined the responsible drawdown strategy and additionally has positioned teams in Iraq whose primary focus is providing on-site assistance for the drawdown. Those teams, in concert with their parent service, have identified materiel and equipment no longer required to support operations in Iraq and can either be re-postured to support operations in Afghanistan or sent back to the United States.

My assessment concludes that the process guiding the drawdown and the strategic transportation infrastructure in Iraq and in Kuwait are sufficient to fully support the drawdown strategy. If needed, we have the option to direct the flow of some equipment
through our regional partners' ports, such as those in Jordan and Turkey.

A key component of the drawdown strategy is the development and the use of metrics to measure our progress toward the required posture for the 31 August, 2010, and beyond. The various components within Iraq and Central Command area of responsibility (AOR) have established milestones, such as total containers or numbers of vehicles on hand.

To chart their progress relative to that end state, these leading indicators enable commanders to grade themselves and gauge their progress against this established goal. As you heard in testimony from Secretary Flournoy earlier, it is an essential element of our drawdown strategy, is equipping Iraq's security forces. As the Joint Staff lead, I am responsible for overseeing the process of equipping the Iraq Security Forces, a process involving Multi-National Force–Iraq, Central Command, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the Joint Staff, the services, and the National Guard Bureau.

This calculated process, which includes validating requirements, adjudicating risk to the services, developing sourcing solutions, and we have reached a successful conclusion and the recommendations were brief to the Joint Chiefs two days ago on 19 October.

Of the approximately 1,000 equipment categories, 42 percent were sources from service-declared excess equipment, and 51 percent were recommended for sourcing through sale from stock. The remaining 7 percent represents roughly $233 million in equipment and requires the Secretary of Defense to direct the transfer under the authorities provided to us by section 1234 of the National Defense Authorization Act.

During our last testimony before this committee, a chief concern was the potential impact to the National Guard and the ability to respond to domestic incidents. I am pleased to report that we were able to arrive at a previously stated recommendation and that for sourcing Iraqi Security Force without having to expend National Guard Reserve component equipment.

Additionally, National Guard Reserve component units currently serving in Iraq have the opportunity to take theater-provided equipment back to their home station to fill any authorized shortages.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to testify before the committee. We firmly believe that the description of the drawdown as a responsible drawdown is fundamental to this process, and we understand the criticality of good stewardship and property accountability of United States assets in Iraq. And therefore, we are diligently tracking drawdown progress against specific goals.

At the same time, we are also focused on doing everything within our power and the authority to enable the Iraqi Security Force to operate effectively once the drawdown is complete.

I would be happy to answer any questions that you or members of the committee may have. Thank you.

[The joint prepared statement of General Gainey, Secretary Flournoy, Admiral Winnefeld, and Mr. Estevez can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]
The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you for your testimony.

Admiral, it was kind of you to compliment the committee for our work and for what we have done for the young men and young women in uniform. And I think you specifically spelled out the Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization Act that we just passed a few days ago.

Back on July the 22nd, Madam Under Secretary, we asked that the Department of Defense provide our committee with a copy of up forward 0901, which is, so the members will remember, the order that lays out the organizations and responsibilities for various functions in how the redeployment will work. Despite repeated requests by our staff of the Department of Defense, then up forward 0901 has not been provided, nor has there been a legal reason given for not providing it for us.

Now, we pass legislation based upon testimony, based upon briefings, based upon documents, and all of this goes together to put us in a position to receive compliments like Admiral Winnefeld just gave us, on putting out good legislation. But this one piece of legislation which is highly important on redeployment from Iraq thus far, unless you are willing to give it to us this morning, has not been furnished.

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, I am—we are quite happy to bring that Operations Plan (OPLAN) over to you to have staff brief you on the details——

The CHAIRMAN. And you will leave it with us in our classified——

Secretary FLOURNOY. And I regret that we were not more responsive to your request earlier. But what we would like to do is come over and share it with you, brief you on it, and we can work out the details of how it should be handled in declassification.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the details are not just come over and show it to us and walk back with it.

Secretary FLOURNOY. I understand.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Responsible in classified material, as you know. It is some 400 pages long. And come over——

Secretary FLOURNOY. I understand.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. And give us a rough look at 400 pages is pretty difficult. And we would expect full cooperation. And, really, is there some reason—I mean, we really want to know. I am not trying to be difficult.

Secretary FLOURNOY. There is——

The CHAIRMAN. I just really want to know.

Secretary FLOURNOY. There is no intention to keep the information from you at all. And, again, we want to be responsive to your request.

The CHAIRMAN. But that was July the 22nd.

Secretary FLOURNOY. I understand. I think it was recently brought to my attention, and we want to make sure that we are responsive to your request as soon as possible. So I don’t have it physically with me today, but I can promise you that we will get it over——
The CHAIRMAN. You will bring it over and leave it with us in a classified manner so we will have the time to go through the 400 pages. Is that correct?

Secretary FLOURNOY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. McKeon.

Mr. McKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have this article that was written in the London Times yesterday. The title is “Violence Threatens Barack Obama’s Pledge to Pull Troops Out of Iraq.” And what they are basically saying is that they are threatening to move back the election from January.

The election can’t be held until their parliament passes an election law. And Al Qaeda doesn’t want to have an election, and they want to do what they can to disrupt it. General Odierno feels that he needs to keep his troops there 30 to 60 days after the election to ensure a peaceful transition of government.

Do you have any intelligence showing that—or any feeling that the election is going to be postponed?

Secretary FLOURNOY. Let me start by saying, you know, the drawdown plan that we have is conditions-based. And it creates multiple decision points for re-evaluating and, if necessary, changing our plans based on developments on the ground.

Although the government of Iraq’s self-imposed deadline of October 15 for passing the elections law has passed, we judge that the Council of Representatives (COR) still has another week or two to come to some kind of agreement on an elections law before it will put the early January date in jeopardy, in terms of the election commission’s ability to actually physically execute the election.

If a new law with open lists is not passed, the fallback option for them is to return to the 2005 election law, which is based on a closed list system, and that—but that could be still used for upcoming elections, and the COR would simply have to vote on an election date.

If that law is not passed in the next two weeks, they will be looking at slipping the date to later in January, which would still be compliant with the constitution, but would be later than originally planned. In that instance, MNF–I would need to engage with the government of Iraq to do some contingency planning on how to secure the elections at a later date, and that might well have implications.

But I just want to reinforce right now, on the ground in Baghdad, here in Washington, just yesterday, our focus is on trying to stick to the current election timeline. The President personally impressed upon Prime Minister Maliki the importance of sticking to the constitutionally specified timeline for the Iraqi elections, and we are putting all of our diplomatic effort towards that end.

That said, of course, we will have contingency plans to adjust, if necessary. But right now, we are using all of our diplomatic and other leverage to try to make sure the elections happen on time.

Mr. McKEON. We won’t be forcing General Odierno to withdraw our troops if they don’t hold the election in a timely manner? We will still be flexible and allow him to keep the troops there to provide the national security, so they don’t put themselves at risk in trying to rush out in a couple-month period?
Secretary FLOURNOY. The drawdown plan is not rigid. It is conditions-based. It leaves room for re-evaluation and adjustment, in terms of the pace of the drawdown between now and the end of 2011. So if need be, we will re-examine things based on conditions on the ground.

Mr. McKEON. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Estevez and General Gainey, one of my concerns has been who will make the decisions about what equipment would be reset into the Army or the Marine Corps versus what will be provided to the Iraqis. And what are the criteria for those decisions? Because we do have—and I have no idea, of the 3 million pieces of equipment, how many of those have been damaged and how much of that equipment belongs to the Reserves or how much of that equipment belongs to the National Guard?

And specifically, what are the Army’s plans for theater-provided equipment in Iraq, especially the rolling stock in the inventory? And what is going to be brought back to the United States for reset? And what would be used to replenish preposition stock? And that has been a problem for several years.

And in regard to reset, what has been done to increase the depot capacity in preparation for the potentially huge influx of equipment from Iraq? Is our depot industrial base ready? Is it getting ready to accept some of this equipment? And maybe both of you can at least enlighten me a little bit.

General GAINEY. Congressman Ortiz, thank you very much. The items to determine what is retrograded back, and what remains with the Iraqis as a possible item for transfer, that decision is made by the services. They look first at their equipment shortfalls back here in the United States and what the requirements are for our services back here. They meet those needs first. Then they can identify that equipment which is excess, which they have done. Those items are predominantly what we are looking at to transfer.

There is also items that we have—what we call long in supply. And so those items are then categorized for sale from stock, because we have sufficient back in the United States to sell from our stocks here.

Then that last category is that non-excess. That is that seven percent that I talked about. And those are critical items to allow the Iraqi Security Forces to be stood up at a stage which they can then do internal defense and basic self-defense.

Those items are the ones that we have identified that the services feel that they can assume risk in to their readiness and have designated those items as acceptable to transfer to meet the requirements of the Iraqi Security Forces.

For the depot capacity, we feel that the depot capacity we have today is sufficient. We have the plan in concert with the retrograde coming out. The retrograde will not negatively affect any of the depot workloads. We will adjust workloads given the requirements of what we have to reset to meet the force generation model to send
forces back over and to make them ready for any future contingency.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. Esteevez. If I could just add on to what General Gainey said, Congressman, the vast majority—the vast, vast majority of the equipment coming back will go back to U.S. forces. The stuff that we are transferring, there was a small amount of what we would call military green equipment that is going to be transferred to the Iraqis.

The stuff that is coming back will go through, as General Gainey alluded to, the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process for Army equipment, so that will go into depot, depending on the status of its repair requirement, and then flow back into the Army forces based on their need, and eventually everything will flow through. It will probably be about a two-year process after we draw down before we have run everything through the depots, in order to get back into a full capability. With that said, the capacity is there to meet our force requirements while we are still repairing equipment through the depot process.

Mr. Ortiz. One of my concerns has been that Government Accountability Office (GAO) in the past raised concerns that there was no complete inventory of the United States equipment, and the property books of many units were incomplete. And although when we had General Odierno come and testify, he suggested that they—that an inventory had been completed at the time of his testimony. And this bothers me whether it is completed or it is not.

Mr. Esteevez. In fact, it is completed. With that said, we are still going through processes, and things are found on forward operating bases (FOBs) that, you know, we should have had on the books. But we have gone through a definitive process with MNF–I and U.S. Army Central Command. We have weekly video teleconferences (VTCs) while we go through these numbers, and they are going out and ensuring that everything is captured on the property books.

So that, you know, from July through late August timeframe, in fact, there was an uptick in the number of items that we said we had in Iraq versus a decrease while we were retrograding out. And that was because of the process of capturing those items onto property book. The 3.3 million number, which is down from 3.4 million, because we have pulled equipment out of Iraq, is a good number for us to work with.

Mr. Ortiz. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you so much.

The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.

Gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Akin.

Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I guess it was a year or two ago, getting a status of the Iraqi troops, and we were talking about, well, they are pretty good at fighting, they are pretty good at this, pretty good at that. There are a number of things that were the last things they had to learn to do or that they didn’t have capabilities. And, one, they didn’t have much in the way of air support. Two, logistically, they weren’t strong in that area. And then, three, medically, they didn’t have the kind of medical resources that we had.
Have we made some progress in those areas? Are the Iraqi troops able to at least make some efforts at air support, their own logistics and medical?

And then the second question would be, the equipping of Iraqi troops, which apparently we are doing, are we getting paid for that, or is this just a freebie? Thank you.

Admiral Winnefeld. I would say that the Iraqi Security Forces have come a long way in the last year, since you asked that question. I don't have any specifics at my fingertips in terms of exact numbers of aircraft and medical units and the like.

I can tell you that, since we talked to the committee in July, that the Iraqi Security Forces operational readiness—the number of their units that have come up to operational readiness rating one has gone up by about 15 percent, just in that short period of time, which is indicative of pretty good progress. And that is the army.

The Ministry of the Interior (MOI), the internal security forces, have almost doubled the number of units that have come up to that operational readiness, that the precise numbers are classified, but I can give you those percentages.

Mr. Akin. Does that include, then, the logistical piece?

Admiral Winnefeld. They are getting better at the logistics. And among the exact numbers of increasing up to operational readiness rating one (O.R. 1) includes command and control (C2) units and logistics units and the medical units. So they are improving. They are not anywhere near where they need to be for us to draw down completely, but they are definitely making progress. I would say the aviation piece is the hardest, but they are even making progress there.

Mr. Akin. Good.

Mr. Estevez. Congressman Akin, if I could jump in there, Army Materiel Command has helped the Iraqis stand up repair capability at Taji. They are using that capability. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is now in there working with them so they have a distribution depot warehousing-type capability to go with that. They were over here, looked at our capability, so we are helping them grow their logistics capability, has been in progress.

Mr. Akin. Good. Do they have software and all to start to be able to track some of that all? Yes. And what is the story on equipping their—are they paying for the troop equipment that we are giving them? What are those? Are those uniforms and flak jackets and weapons and all our—

Secretary Flournoy. Sir, it is—

Mr. Akin [continuing]. Weapons and all our—

Secretary Flournoy. It is a mix. Some of the items that we are transferring they are getting gratis. Some of the items we are transferring they are paying to refurbish. Some of the items that they are buying—particularly the major weapons systems—they are using—we are doing foreign military sales (FMS) to the Iraqi government. So it is really a mix, depending on the item.

Mr. Akin. Okay. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you.

The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.

Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing.
And I want to thank our panel for being here.

Ms. Flournoy, I was lucky enough to start off in local government. And I think what we are seeing now around the country is sort of what I saw way back when, which is that almost every state and almost every city’s revenues are down. And the things that they would have liked to have bought new, they are in many instances buying used or looking through the government surplus for these things.

I very much remember after Katrina getting then-Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Mike Mullen on the phone and informing him that almost every hospital in coastal Mississippi had gone underwater, that every generator in coastal Mississippi had gone underwater, and that we had a desperate need for things like tents to take the place of the hospitals, desperate need for generators. And I remember him saying something to the effect that, “We don’t have any. They are all in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

Something like Katrina is going to happen again, whether it is man-made or the hand of God. And to that point and knowing what a big problem the lack of electricity was, the lack of just shelter was, to what extent are you taking those things that the military says they don’t need anymore, putting them online for, number one, other government agencies like Homeland Security, but beyond Homeland Security, in a tiered manner much like we do with the DRMO, the defense reuse management office? To what extent are you making those things available to cities, states, and counties, and coming up with some sort of plan to get them back?

Because I can assure you that—and I will give you just one for instance. The 8th 90th engineers had already done their hitch in Iraq in 2003. By the time they returned to Mississippi, they had left every piece of equipment behind. Now, they did a magnificent job after Katrina with only 60 percent of the equipment they should have had, but the fact of the matter is, they only had 60 percent of the equipment they should have had.

I heard what the general had to say, but my gut tells me that two or three years from now, I am going to be looking at an episode of "60 Minutes" that shows me billions of dollars of equipment that got left behind in Iraq that is probably going to end up on the world market, may end up in China or some other place.

What steps are you taking to alleviate some of these problems up front? Because it did happen when we left Panama. It did happen when we left the Philippines. Heck, it happened when we left Vieques. We left a lot of good stuff behind.

So what extent are you taking, thinking with that line of thought, that a five-kilowatt (kW) generator in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, at the firehouse after Katrina, that is a big deal? It may not be a big deal to you right now, but I can assure you, under those circumstances, that is a big deal. What are we doing to make this equipment that we think of as little stuff, but to a city or a county is a big deal? What are we doing to make it available to them?

Mr. ESTEVEZ. Congressman, if you don’t mind, I will take that question.

Mr. TAYLOR. Sure.
Mr. STEVEZ. Let me start with the accountability. As I said to Congressman Ortiz, we have gone out, got things on our property books so we know what we have. If it is standard military gear and it is not excess, we are bringing it back, running it through the depot process, ensuring that the force—and I mean the total force—Guard, Reserve—has what they need on their books.

For non-standard gear, which includes commercial generators and the like, if it is excess to DOD requirements in Iraq, we are going through the same process we would go through in the states. And we have worked through this with GSA and the National Association of State agencies that draws equipment from our DRMOs in the states——

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. So for clarification——

Mr. ESTEVEZ. Yes.

Mr. TAYLOR [continuing]. Any state surplus office could go online and will be made aware of what is potentially going to be left behind in Iraq?

Mr. ESTEVEZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. What do they do then?

Mr. ESTEVEZ. If they see something they want, they can put a claim against that. They would have the same 14 days that they would have here to say, “I want that.” They can get more information about it. For example, you know, the generator could be 220, and they could decide they don’t want it.

After that 14 days, if they want it, they would have another 14 days to arrange through the forwarder that the state association has to come and claim it in Iraq.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. Do you have—if my office wanted to take a look at that master list of what you have available, what is—or if a state surplus office wanted to look at it, what is that site?

Mr. ESTEVEZ. That is a—and I will have to get you the exact site, sir, but it is a rolling number, of course, because as we close FOBs, forward operating bases, things become available. And that is when we post that out there, through an e-mail of, “Here is the list of equipment that is available at this particular site that is going to become available.”

Mr. TAYLOR. Would you have someone from your office get in touch with mine?

Mr. ESTEVEZ. Absolutely, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Before I call on Mr. Hunter, Madam Under Secretary, let me ask, on page six of the written statement furnished to us, it says that we have made continued support of the Iraqi Security Forces contingent on their non-sectarian performance. Now, I suppose that means contingent upon the Shottes not shooting the Sunnis. How will we make judgments on this? Have we placed any other conditions on future assistance? Tell us about it.

Secretary FLOURNOY. Well, I think this is something that we are in dialogue with the Iraqi government about and Iraqi commanders about on an ongoing basis, that we are supporting the development of the ISF towards a certain set of objectives. And one of those is making sure that the military is truly representative of Iraq. It is
a national institution. It is not a tool that any one individual or party or person in power can use for sectarian aims.

We continue to monitor that. In many instances, we have had many opportunities to work through specific issues. And, frankly, the Iraqis have been very responsive over time on this point. They understand that the only way we can get the support here to support them is to demonstrate that they truly are a non-sectarian institution, so we continue to bring that home at every level, from the tactical all the way up to the headquarters here in Washington when we have interactions.

The Chairman. If we do see some sectarian performance, what do we do?

Secretary Flournoy. Generally what has happened is the ambassador and General Odierno have called the government and the military on the issue, immediately gone in to discuss it with them, and worked out remedial steps to either, you know, isolate a unit, to step in and deal with a situation, and so forth. They have also taken very proactive initiatives, such as initiatives to try to get the ISF, for example, and the Peshmerga working much more closely in border areas where the two forces come up against each other.

And so I think they have done both reactive steps and proactive steps. But, again, we have seen—we have—you know, we have seen a decrease, a decline in that kind of behavior over time. And so that is the good news. It is something we need to keep—continue to be watchful for, but it is something that has been very well-managed to this point.

The Chairman. If there is a severe sectarian act, at what point do we say, “Sorry, we are out of here”?

Secretary Flournoy. Well, you know, again, I think, you know, I don’t want to speculate on exactly what could provoke that kind of thing. What I can say is we take it very seriously, we have taken it very seriously, and we——

The Chairman. Well, the important thing is——

Secretary Flournoy [continuing]. And the trend has been increasing.

The Chairman [continuing]. Is, do they take it very seriously?

Secretary Flournoy. They certainly understand, when this has—you know, in the instances this has happened, the reaction from us has been very swift and very clear. And it has had impact. So I don’t think there is any question in the minds of the Iraqi government where our red lines are on this issue.

The Chairman. Thank you so much.

Mr. Hunter.

Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, panel, for being here today. The first question is, is there any correlation between a troop drawdown in Iraq and the ability to surge troops in Afghanistan?

Admiral Winnefeld. There is not a direct correlation in the sense that we are making judgments about the debate that is going on right now, the discussion, if you will, about the strategy for Afghanistan and tying that directly to the drawdown from Iraq. We have adequate capacity right now to do what we believe—whatever decision the President makes on Afghanistan, well within the current drawdown plan for Iraq.
So there is no direct tie between the two, where, you know, you can't do this unless you do this. That is not happening right now.

Mr. HUNTER. But it obviously will alleviate strain on the overall strength——

Admiral WINNEFELD. Health of the force, I think, sir, is the real impact that—you know, that—if you were to keep more forces in Iraq and you plussed up in Afghanistan, of course, you would be imposing more health of the force risks on the force, but I don't—we are not in that situation right now. And the chairman is in very close consultation with the service chiefs to make sure that we keep that in mind at every step.

Mr. HUNTER. Got you. What force would you say in Iraq right now are actual combat forces, compared to combat service support?

Admiral WINNEFELD. What percentage of approximately 120,000 people?

Mr. HUNTER. Yes. Yes.

Admiral WINNEFELD. I don't have an exact number. I mean, it all varies, of course, between——

Mr. HUNTER. What would you guess?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Well, we have 11 brigade combat teams (BCTs). So in terms of combat troops on the ground, you multiply that out, and you, you know—about 4,500 troops per brigade combat team. And then, of course, there are a lot of other forces over there that I would qualify as combat forces, to include the Special Operations Forces (SOF) we have over there. So we can get you a more detailed number on that.

Mr. HUNTER. As you withdraw then, do you draw down the same amount of each type of force, meaning, do you pull out service support last? Do you pull out combat guys first?

Admiral WINNEFELD. In general, I think, you know, General Odierno has pointed out that he wants to thin the lines, come out battalion by battalion within the brigade combat teams that are there in order to get down to the six Advise and Assist brigades. We have very difficult decisions that we do make between—regarding enablers, in terms of making sure that we have got the correct balance of enablers between Iraq and Afghanistan. And those are drawn down, paced as required with the combat forces. And then the combat service support, there is a lot of base closure that has to happen and the like, and we need to provide for their force protection.

So it is sort of a complicated animal. And I would say it is not, you know, a straight-line glide slope coming down for those forces together.

Mr. HUNTER. Got you. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Snyder, please.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all for being here.
Mr. Hunter began a discussion of a topic I wanted to ask about. I want to come at it in a little bit different way. Last week, we had a very good hearing on Afghanistan policy. And one of the witnesses was General Jack Keane, that you all know retired at the end of 2003. And in his testimony, I was actually shocked by what he said, and I am going to read what he said. He said, “It is a fact that Afghanistan, beginning in 2002 and increasingly so in 2003, became a secondary priority in the war in Iraq. Indeed, it remained as such until this year, 2009, when only now we are beginning to shift our priority effort from Iraq to Afghanistan. As such, as a secondary effort, despite the addition of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces and resources, Afghanistan has always been operating at the margin and in most of those years below what was required in forces and resources.”

That is what General Keane had in his written statement, and then he testified to. There were a lot of us who had been confused, I think, for some years about, at what point did Iraq become the priority, when we all said—and as a legislative body and American people were united in our resolve to take down the Taliban and go into Afghanistan. But one of the things we said was we were not going to abandon Afghanistan again.

General Keane, who was involved in the highest levels of leadership, said we started abandoning Afghanistan at the end of 2002. That certainly wasn’t part of our discussion in the months leading up to the debate over the Iraq war resolution. It certainly wasn’t the discussion, as the years went by, that we had abandoned Afghanistan.

Admiral, you, in response to Mr. Hunter, said we have adequate capacity to do both. What if things really go badly in Iraq and President Obama, who has already made the decision—he has already sent in 17,000 additional troops, has changed the leadership in Afghanistan, and clearly is making Afghanistan a higher priority—what if he were to decide we need to, in the secretary’s words, be flexible, we are going to have to put troops back in?

You say we have adequate capacity. We didn’t. We didn’t for six or seven years. If we had it, I don’t know where they were, but we certainly didn’t as a country respond to the need in Afghanistan. What assurance do we have that we have adequate capacity should we decide that we needed to return troops to Iraq?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Well, I would say right now our principal focus right now is to make sure that Iraq goes on the same trajectory that it is on and that we don’t have to confront that decision. And so far, by every indication—and General Odierno, I think, was quite eloquent a week or so ago in describing how, even though there are concerns and there are potential drivers of instability, that Iraq is on track and that he and his partnership with the embassy over there are determined to keep it on track.

If there are probably scenarios out there—and I don’t want to speculate in public on what those might be—that could cause you to need to, you know, delay the drawdown a little bit or make the hump a little bit further out in the planning cycle there, but I believe that we, with the 10 brigade combat teams we will have on the ground early next year, that General Odierno has a very capa-
ble force on his hands to handle any number of contingencies that could arise.

Dr. Snyder. Well, and—you know, and I accept your reassurance. It is just I would hate to see us having this discussion several years from now that says, well, when we shifted the priority to have General Jack Keane to come back and testify, whoever else was—maybe you—at a think-tank or some years from now and say, “Well, we began shifting our priority, and things didn’t go well, and we didn’t have the resources,” because that is clearly what has occurred. And it has only been—we finally got the attention—as President Obama came in and said we were going to put more troops in Afghanistan.

Madam Secretary.

Secretary Flournoy. I just wanted to—you know, we are very cognizant of the fact that we do not want to take our eye off the ball in Iraq. And I can assure you that we are having—the secretary continues to have equally—you know, equally frequent video teleconferences with General Odierno and the team on the ground. The deputies committee meets every other week on this. We are monitoring this as closely as we possibly can to make sure that we are getting after any kind of inkling, any kind of instance of—indicator of instability as soon as it occurs.

The one thing I will say that I am hearing more and more from Iraqis is that a growing confidence that, despite the efforts of Al Qaeda in Iraq, remnants of the insurgency, they are trying very hard to try to spark sectarian reaction in—with their attacks. It is not working.

The groups that they were able to provoke and incite before have opted to participate in the political process. And that is the greatest insurance we have against the kind of scenario that you are worried about.

Dr. Snyder. Thank you. Thank you for your service.

The Chairman. Before I call on Mr. Wilson, let me ask—the GAO tells us that the Iraqis have approximately $48 billion in the bank. And with that as a background, what additional funding is planned to request for the purpose of training and equipping Iraqi Security Forces, especially in light of the fact that they have these oil revenues, Madam Under Secretary?

Secretary Flournoy. Sir, I can’t give you a firm answer yet. We are in the middle of an interagency discussion developing our proposal to you for a long-term approach to transitioning our relationship with Iraq to kind of a normal security assistance relationship over a multi-year period. There will be DOD elements of that plan, State Department elements of that plan, and certain assumptions about what the Iraqis themselves will pay for.

We will come back to you when we have a clear sense of our bottom lines on that. And I expect that will be sooner rather than later. But I don’t have specific, you know, answers for you today.

The Chairman. I am sure that is what our colleagues will ask, members of this committee, particularly with a pretty large bank account like that.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all for being here today.
And, Secretary Flournoy, thank you so much for your comments in that we certainly can count on General Odierno. We have excellent military leadership in Iraq. And I am just so proud of his service, and I appreciate your recognizing that.

As a representative of Fort Jackson, Parris Island, the Beaufort Marine Corps Air Station, I am grateful for the success in Iraq. I also agree with President Obama. He met yesterday at the White House with Prime Minister Maliki. The Washington Examiner reports today, “We have seen in the last several months a consolidation of a commitment to democratic politics inside Iraq.” I think the President is absolutely correct.

And it is startling. I have a first-hand knowledge to it. My son served in Iraq. I have a nephew currently serving in Iraq. We have a very humble member of Congress here who didn’t identify himself, but Congressman Duncan Hunter served in Iraq and Afghanistan.

And, Admiral Winnefeld, General Odierno has confirmed before this committee that the relationship between the Multi-National Forces–Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces are actually far more positive than the media portrays. What is your assessment of the relationship? What measures can be taken to further improve communication and cooperation?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I would certainly agree with General Odierno that the relationship is good. I think those of you who have been to Iraq have observed that personally. It has gotten better over the years.

When I was operationally assigned in the North Arabian Gulf, I observed it personally within the Iraqi navy to include different sectarian people inside the same unit, cooperating together with each other, and also cooperating well with us, as we taught them how to protect their oil platforms.

General Odierno has reflected recently on how the—both the withdrawal from the cities and the August bombing have tightened that bond between us. He will speak eloquently of the close cooperation we have with the Iraqi special operations forces and continually successes, daily and weekly successes in rolling up extremist elements that threaten the Iraqi government and Iraqi stability.

So, you know, every now and then, there might be a little friction that you would expect to happen when such large forces are intermingled with each other, but the partnership is close, and it is instructive that that close partnership where we have been embedded with them for several years now has really paid off.

So I think that we have never had a better partnership with them. They have confidence in us, in our—that we are going to stick to what we say we are doing and turning responsibility over to them.

Mr. WILSON. And two months ago, I had the opportunity to see a joint operating center at Al-Nasiriyah and to see the Iraqis and Americans working together. And, Secretary, indeed, they are stopping the sectarian violence. It was so inspiring. And I was happy to see the special forces were using M249s made by FN Manufacturing of Columbia, South Carolina. So this is good.

And, General Gainey, as a 31-year veteran of the Army National Guard and Reserve, I am really grateful that the Guard and Re-
serve have served with extraordinary distinction in Iraq and Afghanistan. What do you see the potential for their use, Advise and Assist? Also, will advanced equipment—does redeployment be sent back to armories within the United States?

Additionally, I know unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been shifted from Iraq to Afghanistan. And I would hope, as we need reinforcements in Afghanistan, that more equipment would be sent to Afghanistan.

General Gainey. Sir, the National Guard and Army Reserve and all forces Reserve have performed incredibly well. They are truly part of the total force. As far as their equipment, they will redeploy with their equipment that is there. Forty-six percent of the equipment that is over there, you know, is unit equipment and will redeploy with their forces.

Of specific, National Guard has—of the total equipment there, only four percent of that is National Guard equipment. And for the Army Reserve, it is 16 percent. Most of the Marine Corps equipment is already redeployed.

To your question on equipment that is being transferred, we have already redirected several units and equipment over to Afghanistan to include clearing equipment for roads, you know, the Huskies and cargo vehicles, automation equipment, communications equipment, et cetera. So as equipment is freed up and identified for use over in Afghanistan, that process happens all the time and is ongoing today.

Mr. Wilson. And I want to thank you. And on behalf of military families, thank you very much.

The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Loebssack.

Mr. Loebssack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thanks to the four of you for being here today. I just want to follow up a little bit on the National Guard and Reserve issue, if we could just get a little bit more from you folks.

But before I ask you to elaborate a little bit more, I just want to thank my colleagues here who have a particular concern—we all do, but certainly Mr. Wilson does, and he has a personal connection to the National Guard, but also, Mr. Taylor, with what has happened on the Gulf Coast with the hurricanes and what have you, and, of course, in Iowa, when we had the great flood last year, we were able to utilize our National Guard for those emergency services, obviously, prior to, during, and after that flood.

And so we can see the National Guard engaged in those domestic kinds of operations, as well as going overseas. I am really proud of the Iowa National Guard. Next fall, we are going to be deploying somewhere between 3,500 and 3,900 National Guard to Afghanistan. That was just made public today, I believe.

But I do have a real concern, obviously, on the equipment front. I appreciate the answers that you gave so far today, but I want to give you an opportunity, Madam Secretary and General Gainey, to elaborate a little bit more, if you would, about bringing the materiel from the theater and back here to the United States, because, again, we have to make certain, I think, that we continue to equip our National Guard, not just for combat missions when called upon
to do so, but also for those domestic missions that they perform here.

So spend a little time elaborating, if you would, on your testimony, Madam Secretary, and General Gainey, please.

Secretary FLORNOY. Actually, I would like to defer to the general, as she is really working the details of this.

Admiral WINNEFELD. But before the general speaks, may I put in a plug?

Mr. LOEBSACK. Please.

Admiral WINNEFELD. And I would simply say that, during our testimony in July, we heard your message loud and clear, both from you and Mr. Taylor and others, that you were very interested in the National Guard and also the civilian capacity piece.

And believe me: It was a real challenge for us to get through the Internet technology systems and the like. And my hat is off to General Gainey and her folks for really working hard. And we still got a ways to go on this, but we have heard you loud and clear, and we are determined to take your concerns into account.

And I will turn it over to——

Mr. LOEBSACK. I appreciate that very much.

General.

General GAINEY. Yes, sir. Sir, all of the services are working very hard to continually review the requirements for our National Guard and Reserve units to look at what are their shortfalls and to identify if there is any equipment that is currently in Iraq that could be used to fill their shortages.

As well, the services all look at that which is coming back through the refurbishment system of the depots to then fill the shortages where they had been directed to leave equipment in theater. They may not get back the exact same truck or Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle or tank that they left in theater, but they will get one of those out of depot.

Those pieces of equipment are identified for transfer back to the Reserve components to meet the requirements of their missions and our daily requirements.

Mr. LOEBSACK. I appreciate that, because on page five of your testimony, Madam Secretary, you said, in fact, Reserve units serving in Iraq are being offered the opportunity to take theater-provided equipment back to their home station to fill any authorized shortages.

And what you are saying, General Gainey, is that those who previously were deployed to Iraq are also able, then, to replenish their sources, their equipment?

General GAINEY. For that equipment that they had previously had to leave in theater, that is being filled more from stocks that are coming out of United States depot refurbishment facilities so that they can, you know, make best use of it immediately.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Okay.

Okay. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will yield back the balance of my time. Thank you all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
General, let me ask. It is maybe a bit repetitious. Would you tell us again, in your opinion, how the American National Guard has performed in Iraq?

General GAINEY. Certainly, sir. Sir, I had served over there as the director of resources and sustainment for Multi-National Force–Iraq, so I have personally seen the great work that the National Guard and all of our Reserve units have performed.

As well, I have seen them perform in previous conflicts, as well, serving alongside them, particularly in Desert Storm.

When you look at the total force, and you are forward-deployed, and you are expecting support on your left and right, you are not looking to see what unit they came from. You are looking to see that you have got a competent leader on your side and a subordinate that knows their job and is trained to standard. And that is what we have in our Reserve forces.

The CHAIRMAN. You would say that about the National Guard?

General GAINEY. I would, indeed, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, when we talk to our National Guard units back home, what message can I tell them about redeploying the equipment back to them, resetting the equipment back to them?

General GAINEY. Sir, you can tell them that the equipment is coming back, will be put through the refurbishment program. That equipment then will be balanced with the requirements for the forces that have to go back out to the fight. The services look at that and generate that equipment back out of the depots to the units that are the next to deploying.

That may be a National Guard unit. That may be a Reserve unit. That may be an active unit. Those are the units that will be filled first with the equipment coming out of depots so that those units can train on that equipment prior to going back into the fight.

As more and more equipment comes out of the depot, shortages will be filled in units that are still back in the United States that don’t currently have a deployment mission immediately on the horizon.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was in Iraq during the Memorial Day recess, and so prior to the June 30th pullout, and met with General Odierno and Ambassador Hill in Baghdad. And one of the questions that I raised at that time was that Mosul, the second-largest city in Iraq, at I think a population of about 2.0 million, that was still had tremendous security concerns, that still was under Al Qaeda influence in a significant way, and I posed to Ambassador—I mean, Ambassador Hill or General Odierno, would they, in fact, ask for an extension of the June 30th deadline?

And at that point, they told me, no, because they felt that the political considerations would outweigh the tactical considerations. And I, in fact, agree with them. Can you give me an assessment of Mosul at this point in time?

Secretary FLOURNOY. Mosul remains an area where we are still—where, you know, some of the insurgent elements are trying to kind of make a last stand, if you will, in terms of urban areas. So it remains an area of focus in the campaign.
That said, I think there has been substantial improvement since the period when you were there. I think you have increasingly effective Iraqi forces in the city. You have U.S. forces, when invited in, backing them up, providing support, doing joint operations with them, and so forth. So we have made progress.

I think, again, most importantly, I would underscore the political evolution in the area. You have a population that is really in the process of turning against the more extremist elements and opting into the political process at the local level, the provincial level, and now in January with the—at the national level.

I don’t know if you have anything to add to that, but it is still an area that we are keeping a close eye on. We are working it hard, but it is, you know, moving in the right direction.

Mr. COFFMAN. In terms of redeployment, as far as equipment goes, can you give me a categorical definition as to what we are giving the Iraqis versus selling the Iraqis?

Secretary FLOURNOY. I would defer that to my colleagues.

General GAINEY. Sir, I can’t give you a specific item, but I can tell you that the type of equipment that would be identified transfer might range from non-standard equipment, like generators or tents, to equipment that is that they are purchasing that is an end-item weapon system.

They may also be purchasing some of the items where we may be using Iraqi Security Forces Funds (ISFF) to support them for repair or for training, also for possible repair parts.

The types of equipment that we have identified for transfer that we are looking at today ranges everything from, again, tentage to perhaps the wheeled vehicles, ASVs, you know, armored security vehicles, Humvees. That is the sort of thing that, if it is excess, that is going to go ahead and be transferred. But most of the newer weapon systems would have to be purchased, that which could be an exportable version.

Mr. COFFMAN. We are required by the SOFA agreement to have our forces out of Iraq by, I think, December 31, 2011. Will we have all of our equipment out of Iraq by December 31, 2011?

Secretary FLOURNOY. I will let you answer that, General.

General GAINEY. We have a process by which we are going to be bringing that equipment out and storing it in various locations. So we believe that we will be able to meet that requirement. There may be some items that might be in DRMO that we are still processing through that would not have totally departed the location. Does that answer the question, sir?

Mr. COFFMAN. It does.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The gentlelady, Ms. Shea-Porter.

Ms. SHEA-PORTE. Thank you. And thank you all for being here today.

I have had concerns about the rest time for servicemembers, some who have experienced three and four tours, and we know the impact on readiness and also the impact on our troops and their families. We know about the PTSD, the divorce rates, the increasing suicide rates, et cetera.
After the election, I know that we plan to redeploy 6,000 to 8,000 troops. Will there now be an opportunity to provide these troops more dwell time at home?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I don't have the exact numbers for you, but the answer is yes. And the Army is very, very focused on trying to get the boots on the ground versus the dwell time up to an acceptable number.

And General Casey, of course, I believe would like to see a three-to-one ratio. It is going to be a long time before we can get there. The current goal is to get it to two-to-one.

But, clearly, if the aggregate number of forces that are deployed outside the continental United States comes down, as it will significantly, then we should start to be able to build that dwell time back up, and we already are.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. So you could tell a soldier and his or her family today that, if all goes according to plan, they can expect to have their loved one home more often between deployments? Is that something that——

Admiral WINNEFELD. A gradually increasing amount of time between home—between deployments will occur if all goes well, yes, ma'am.

Secretary FLOURNOY. In addition to the force management piece, something that has helped in this regard has been the authorization to grow the force over the last couple of years and then the temporary authorization for additional 22,000 for the Army. All of that is designed to help reduce some of the pressure.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Right. But I am also wondering, do you have any idea of how many numbers of men and women will then be sent to Afghanistan? Or is there a guarantee that there will be some time back in the states? Are you able to do that?

Secretary FLOURNOY. The decision on the force disposition in Afghanistan has yet to be made. The President is working through that. But I can tell you that, in the discussions, there is a very explicit addressal of the impacts of any options that we are considering on dwell time for men and women in uniform.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay, thank you.

I also would like to ask about increasing numbers, the redeployment efforts. Will it cause contractors to stay longer? And will there be more of them? I know that we have had a decrease this year, but the GAO mentioned that they are expecting that we will actually have to increase or leave more contractors there to do the work as the troops leave. Is that what you are expecting, also?

Mr. ESTEVEZ. The contractor number will continue to decrease. It will not decrease as rapidly as the force decrease. So, for a while, we were about a one-to-one ratio, maybe a little higher. By next July, we expect—-or August, we expect to be about 1-to-1.5, so about 75,000 contractors to help us close those FOBs and help us redeploy equipment. And then that will also start to come down.

So there is flexibility in that, but there will be a little higher number of a ratio of contractors, thought it will be an overall decrease in the number of contractors in Iraq.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. All right. And a question about the contractors. Who is going to be left behind providing accountability and oversight?
Mr. ESTEY. Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan will still be in place. We are deploying additional contracting officers as we speak, in fact, to help us manage that. And they will have flexibility between Afghanistan and Iraq, with the number of contracting officers.

In addition, we have required any units that are there now to have trained contracting officers, representatives to oversee our contracts. You know, there is a regimen, is that we put in place based on lessons learned.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay, thank you.

And one last question. I understand that Iraq is interested in purchasing some pretty sophisticated equipment, tanks, F-16s. Are you concerned about the long-term stability of Iraq after the election? Are you comfortable with leaving in some advanced military equipment?

Secretary FLOURNOY. Again, I think that that will certainly be factored into any decision on major weapons sales going forward. But I think that we are on—given the path that we are on, we are on the path to having Iraq as a stable ally of the United States in the region.

Should indicators change that we are on a different path, that would obviously have to be factored into our decision-making on weapons sales.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. If I had time, I would ask you to define stability for Iraq, given that they have other issues within, but thank you. And I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank each of the witnesses for your testimony and certainly your service to our Nation. I apologize if my question is repetitive and was addressed before my arrival, but I do want to follow on with Mr. Coffman’s focus on the status of forces agreement. And specifically, my understanding is the plan now is that we will have roughly 100,000 troops through the election early next year and then to begin drawing down to roughly 50,000 by August of next year.

The other vote that I guess still is pending or proposed is a vote on the status of forces agreement, that there be a referendum, and that if that was rejected, that we could perhaps have to withdraw all personnel and equipment within one year. So my, I guess, two-part question is, what is the status of that proposed referendum vote, as best we know it? And given the logistical challenge of just going from 100,000 to 50,000, if we were required to withdraw completely in a year of it being voted and denied, are we planning for that very challenging scenario?

Secretary FLOURNOY. Our understanding is—and this has been confirmed by a number of Iraqis—is that Iraqi politicians have pretty much put aside for the time being any plans to push for the referendum on the security agreement. So that is very good news.

Should the referendum be held, though, and if U.S. forces were requested to leave before the end of 2011, they would have—still have a year to complete the drawdown from the date of notification by the government of Iraq.
But, again, you know, obviously, we would have to deal with that contingency, should it arise. Given the politics of the situation, we think that is an increasingly remote possibility, especially because we have worked so hard to be totally compliant with the terms of the agreement to date. And I think the Iraqi government is very satisfied that we are completely committed to implementing the agreement in full.

Mr. Platts. I would agree that it is good news if they are not going forward with that.

And maybe a quick follow-on then is, is there more definitive insights on the date of the election itself? Or is that still a work in progress with the council?

Secretary Flournoy. The constitution requires that the election be held by the end of January. The Council of Representatives has not yet passed a law, either a new elections law or a vote to use the old elections law and set a date. Again, we are pushing very hard for that so that the commission has—the elections commission has time to actually do the logistics necessary.

So we continue to push for a January date. That is still very much in the cards. I think if several weeks from now we are—have not made progress, then we will have to do some re-examining of our plans.

Mr. Platts. Our planning for the withdrawal, once that election occurs, to get down to the 50,000 by August, is that assuming 2, 3, 4 months of 100,000 level after the election because of——

Secretary Flournoy. General—yes——

Mr. Platts [continuing]. The past elections?

Secretary Flournoy. General Odierno has asked for sort of a buffer before and after the election to keep our forces levels relatively stable during that time so that we can adequately secure the process and then actually ensure a stable environment for the seating of—you know, for the implementation of the election results, if you will.

Mr. Platts. And our—the logistical planning is based on that assumption?

Secretary Flournoy. Yes. Yes.

Mr. Platts. Good.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, again, thanks to each of the witnesses.

The Chairman. Thank you very much.

Mr. Courtney, wrap it up.

Mr. Courtney. Actually, I was just going to follow up with what Mr. Platts was just inquiring. I mean, the last time there was a national election, it was a pretty excruciating, long, drawn-out process of forming the Maliki government. And since so much of this time—or the drawdown sort of hinges on the election process, I mean, if we go through that again, where it is, you know, four months, six months before they finally get their act together in terms of forming a government, I mean, you know, is that going to bump back the drawdown?

Admiral Winnefeld. It is a really good question. General Odierno, as Ms. Flournoy mentioned, is looking for 60 days or so after the election. And the choice of that number is not based on the complete formation of the government. And, in fact, we are sort
of expecting that that government will take until potentially June to form.

His desire for the 60 days is principally based on his assessment that, if there is going to be post-election violence, if the election is contested, that that violence would occur in the first 60 days. It would be very clear to us within the first 60 days if that were going to happen. He calls that the most dangerous time after the election.

And once it appears that that is not going to happen—and, of course, that is what we hope for—then it will take the natural time to form the government, but he does not expect that there would be violence that would prevent him from recommencing, if you will, the drawdown to support it.

Mr. COURTNEY. And when he was here last time, I mean, I sort of asked the question about the interaction between, you know, DOD and State as far as working together the way Crocker and Petraeus did. And I guess, you know, I mean, obviously, the political part of this is so critical to our military operations. I mean, I assume that that is still sort of a strong relationship and people are trying to, again, maximize that transition.

Secretary FLUHRNOY. Yes. I think Ambassador Hill and General Odierno have been working very closely together. In fact, the drawdown planning—there is a whole civilian side to this. I mean, there—it is actually—they have developed a joint campaign plan for the coming period. And we are actively working a number of transition issues between DOD and State, in terms of handing off responsibilities, making sure that our military repositioning plans are absolutely in sync with the eventual footprint for the State Department, in terms of embassy consulates, teams, deployable teams, and so forth, so that is done absolutely hand in glove.

And so I think that is something they are working daily. And, again, as we get a little more clarity on the details of that, we will be coming back to you to walk you through those plans.

Mr. COURTNEY. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

You may not have this information with you, but I am sure there is a list of functions that will be transferred from the United States military to the State Department and to other agencies. And I would ask if, Madam Under Secretary, if that information could be transmitted to us within a reasonable time.

I know it might take some time to gather it all together, but I know that is coming. And it would be very helpful to our committee to see that information within a reasonable time.

Secretary FLUHRNOY. Sir, we are developing that as part of—as sort of the conceptual basis for our fiscal year 2011 budget requests across the government on Iraq with regard to Iraq. And so in that sort of timeframe of developing that, we will get it to you as soon as we have a whole-of-government approach.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be very helpful.

I think we on our committee wish to express our great appreciation to the young men and young women who serve with you and under you in Iraq, as well as in Afghanistan and elsewhere. They are truly our national treasures, and it appears that the work and the efforts and the challenges that have been met in Iraq deserve a sincere compliment from us to them. So we wish them continued
success putting America in the position of redeploying, a very difficult challenge that we have faced through the years.

So with that, we thank you for your testimony. We thank you for being with us.

And, General, thank you for your maiden voyage to our committee. We will welcome you back again.

Mr. Estevez, Madam Under Secretary, it is always a pleasure to have you.

Secretary FLOURNOY. Thank you very much, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And, Admiral, thank you so much.

The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX

October 21, 2009
PREPARED JOINT STATEMENT OF
MICHÈLE FLOURNOY
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
VICE ADMIRAL JAMES WINNEFELD
DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY, THE JOINT STAFF
LIEUTENANT GENERAL KATHLEEN GAINES
DIRECTOR FOR LOGISTICS, THE JOINT STAFF
ALAN ESTEVEZ
ACTING DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LOGISTICS &
MATERIEL READINESS

Before the House Armed Services Committee
Wednesday, October 21, 2009, 10:00 A.M.

Chairman Skelton, Representative McKeon, and distinguished committee members, we appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. We briefed this committee on July 22, 2009 on the President’s Iraq drawdown strategy, and we’re pleased to be able to follow up on that briefing and discuss the continuing efforts of the Department of Defense (DoD) to draw down equipment in Iraq.

On February 27, 2009, the President announced that in accordance with the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, we would begin a responsible drawdown of our forces in Iraq. He directed a fundamental change of the U.S. military mission: by August 31, 2010, U.S. forces in Iraq will complete the transition from combat and counterinsurgency activities to a more limited mission set. Our earlier focus on combat and counterinsurgency activities will shift to a focus on training and advising
the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), conducting targeted counter-terrorism operations, providing force protection for U.S. military and civilian personnel and facilities, and supporting civilian agencies and international organizations in their capacity-building efforts.

We continue to proceed according to the timeline laid out by the President. On June 30, 2009, U.S. combat forces repositioned out of Iraqi cities. This repositioning marked a significant milestone, as Iraqi forces assumed responsibility for security within cities, villages, and localities across the country. It also served as a demonstration to the Iraqi people, Iraqi leaders, and the international community that the U.S. remains committed to the timeline agreed upon in the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement.

So far, the transition has gone relatively smoothly. Nonetheless, challenges remain; occasional high-profile attacks — such as those that occurred on August 10 and 19, 2009 — demonstrate that those intent upon destabilizing Iraq can still inflict significant damage.

**ISF Capabilities and Equipment Transfer**

The ISF have improved greatly in recent years, and they have performed well since the June 30, 2009 repositioning of our forces. However, the ISF still require our support to counter ongoing threats from insurgents and terrorist entities. With the global economic downturn driving down the price of oil, Government of Iraq (GoI)
budget shortfalls have exacerbated the situation, forcing hiring freezes and hindering the ISF’s ability to field critical equipment. Much remains to be done to enable the ISF to assume full responsibility for internal security by December 31, 2011, when the Security Agreement comes to an end and the drawdown of U.S. forces is complete.

As General Odierno noted during his recent testimony before this committee, the U.S. is working with the ISF to build their capabilities to provide a “defense in depth” across Iraq by 2011. Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) conducted an assessment of the ISF to determine what capabilities would be required to maintain stability and allow U.S. forces to complete withdrawal by December 2011. MNF-I concluded that the ISF needs at a minimum to develop the capacity to secure the population, conduct internal defense, and conduct basic external defense.

Based on this assessment, MNF-I identified ISF shortfalls and developed an ISF equipment requirements list, which the Joint Staff then validated. As a result, the Joint Staff has worked with the Services to develop sourcing solutions that address ISF shortfalls. We believe that increasing ISF capabilities is the best way to ensure that as we draw down our own troops, hard fought security gains will not be lost.

To assist the ISF in achieving the minimum essential capabilities required to provide for internal security with foundational external defense by December 2011, the Administration has requested the authority to provide the Government of Iraq with unlimited excess materiel. Examples of the kinds of excess equipment that we intend
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to transfer to the ISF are tool kits and sets, individual clothing and equipment items such as helmets and body armor, and commercial trucks.

We requested the authority to streamline the materiel process and transfer some non-excess equipment, such as 9mm pistols, cargo trucks, airfield control and operations systems, M1114 up-armored HWMMVs, and armored gun trucks. We would like thank the Committee for including this authority as it will help ensure that the ISF can fulfill their mission by the time U.S. forces depart, an absolutely vital step toward the goal of a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq. This requested additional authority would provide a replacement value cap of up to $750 million on non-excess items that can be transferred and defense services that can be provided to both the Iraqi and Afghan Security Forces.

Given the Government of Iraq’s budget shortfalls and the ISF’s requirements, however, the Iraqi government may ultimately require additional assistance beyond the transfer of excess and non-excess equipment. We are still evaluating how much and what type of additional assistance may be needed.

In order to balance the needs of the Services and the ISF’s requirements within the drawdown timeline, the Department has put in place a process to determine which equipment can appropriately be transferred to the ISF. A core principle in our decision-making is that equipment will only be considered for transfer if it is not needed by U.S. Forces in Iraq or Afghanistan. The Director for Logistics on the Joint Staff oversees the equipment process, and the Director’s decisions are validated by an
ISF Equipping Working Group that is co-chaired by Flag Officers from all the Services, the Joint Staff, U.S. Central Command, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), MNF-I, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq and the National Guard Bureau. Ultimately, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will make a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense to direct the transfer of selected defense articles.

As plans for the transfer of non-excess equipment to the Iraqi and Afghan security forces are refined, DoD will work with the Military Services to manage the cost associated with replacing the transferred equipment. Financial requirements associated with replacement of transferred equipment will be part of the Department's normal budget development process. In the budget process, we will be taking into consideration the timing of the transfer of equipment and the urgency expressed by DoD Components for its reimbursement/replacement.

During its last hearing on this issue, this committee expressed concern about the impact on the Reserve Component of transferring non-excess items. We are pleased to report that Reserve Component equipment will not be used to source ISF requirements. In fact, Reserve units serving in Iraq are being offered the opportunity to take Theater Provided Equipment back to their home station to fill any authorized shortages.

Ultimately, the Iraqi Security Forces will only be effective if they are viewed as legitimate by all elements of Iraqi society. That is why in addition to building Iraqi military and police capabilities, we are also working to ensure that the ISF remains a
non-sectarian, nationalist element loyal to the Government of Iraq. We have thus made continued U.S. assistance to the ISF contingent on their non-sectarian performance.

Equipment Drawdown

We'd like to turn now to the challenge of removing from Iraq the equipment that will not be transferred to the ISF. As President Obama has directed, our combat mission in Iraq will end by August 31, 2010, by which time we will have reduced our footprint in Iraq to a transition force of no more than 50,000. That transition force will consist of three Division Headquarters and six Advisory and Assistance Brigades (AABs).

We have already begun to draw down our forces. From over 143,500 troops and 14 Brigade Combat Teams on the ground in January, we are now under 120,000 troops and 11 Brigade Combat Teams operating in Iraq.

Needless to say, the challenge of drawing down our troops is paralleled by the challenge of drawing down all equipment that is not appropriate for transfer to the ISF or the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). At this time, we still have roughly 3.3 million pieces of equipment in Iraq. As we have noted, we are committed to determining the disposition of that equipment in a manner that advances our goal of a stable, sovereign and self-reliant Iraq, while also addressing the needs of the ANSF, our own military and our obligations to American taxpayers.
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Accomplishing this poses significant logistical challenges, since the majority of the equipment currently in Iraq will not be transferred to the Iraqis, but will remain with U.S. forces. Fortunately, deployment and redeployment operations are a core competency for USCENTCOM and the Service components, and we will be able to make good use of the unit deployment and redeployment processes and infrastructures that we have developed and practiced over the last eight years.

DoD has been planning the drawdown of equipment for over a year now, and we are in the process of executing that drawdown now. USCENTCOM has a plan, orders, and contingencies to support posture requirements for August 2010 and beyond, and the relevant DoD components meet regularly to resolve the issues and overcome the obstacles that inevitably develop in a logistical operation of this magnitude.

The equipment drawdown is a priority for all relevant DoD components, many of which have teams positioned in Iraq to provide on-site expertise and assistance. To facilitate disposition instructions for those items destined for national-level reset programs, the Army Materiel Command has positioned the Reposture Retrograde Task Force both in Kuwait and in Baghdad with MNF-I. Similarly, Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT) and Marine Force Central Command (MARCENT) have liaison officers co-located with MNF-I to facilitate retrograde of service-specific equipment.

Equipment and materiel have been divided into the following four categories:
(1) Equipment and material from the Iraq Joint Operations Area that will be refurbished and ultimately redistributed to U.S. forces in Afghanistan; (2) Equipment
and material that will be retrograded to home stations; (3) Equipment and material that will be retrograded to depot/reset programs; or (4) Equipment and material that will be transferred to the Government of Iraq or the Government of Afghanistan.

In order to reduce the volume of materiel being moved at the height of the drawdown, the Services have validated equipment accountability in Iraq to determine which pieces of equipment are not mission essential and can therefore be retrograded early. In this way, we will be able to draw down equipment gradually, as troops are drawn down.

Conclusion

The Defense Department continues to plan for and implement a responsible U.S. drawdown that advances our goal of a stable, sovereign, and self-reliant Iraq. We are continuing our efforts to train and equip the ISF so that they can effectively defend the Iraqi people and protect Iraqi institutions by the end of 2011. To that end, we have sought additional authorities from Congress and would like to thank this committee for including them in the conference version of the National Defense Authorization Bill for FY 2010.

We are also committed to conducting the drawdown of troops, equipment and materiel in a manner that addresses the needs of our own military and our obligations to American taxpayers. While doing all this presents significant challenges, we are
confident that we are making progress towards our goals on the timeline laid out by the President.

Once again, thank you for allowing us the opportunity to testify today. We look forward to working with the Committee on these issues as we move forward.
Michèle Flournoy was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on February 9, 2009. She serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives.

Prior to her confirmation, Ms. Flournoy was appointed President of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) in January 2007. Before co-founding CNAS, she was a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where she worked on a broad range of defense policy and international security issues.

Ms. Flournoy previously served as a distinguished research professor at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU), where she founded and led the university’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) working group, which was chartered by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop intellectual capital in preparation for the Department of Defense’s 2001 QDR.

Prior to joining NDU, Ms. Flournoy was dual-hatted as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Threat Reduction and Counterproliferation; and Russia, Ukraine and Eurasian Affairs.

Ms. Flournoy was awarded the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service in 1996, the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service in 1998 and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Distinguished Civilian Service Award in 2000. She is a former member of the Defense Policy Board and the Defense Science Board Task Force on Transformation.

Ms. Flournoy earned a bachelor’s degree in social studies from Harvard University and a master’s degree in international relations from Balliol College, Oxford University, where she was a Newton-Tatum scholar.
Vice Admiral Winnefeld graduated with high honor in Aerospace Engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology and received his commission from the Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps program. After designation as a Naval aviator, he served with two fighter squadrons and as an instructor at the Navy Fighter Weapons School (Topgun).

His command tours include Fighter Squadron 211, USS Cleveland (LPD 7) and USS Enterprise (CVN 65), the “Big E.” He led “Big E” through her 18th deployment, which included combat operations in Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom immediately after the terrorist acts of Sept. 11, 2001. As commander, Carrier Strike Group 2/Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group, he led Task Forces 50, 152 and 58 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and maritime interception operations in the Persian Gulf. He most recently served as commander, United States 6th Fleet, commander NATO Allied Joint Command Lisbon and commander, Striking and Support Forces NATO.

His shore tours include service as an action officer in the Joint Staff Operations Directorate, as senior aide to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as executive assistant to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. As a flag officer he served ashore as director, Warfare Programs and Transformational Concepts, United States Fleet Forces Command and as director of Joint Innovation and Experimentation at United States Joint Forces Command.

Winnefeld’s awards include the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal, the Air Medal, and five Battle Efficiency awards.
Lieutenant General Kathleen M. Gainey
Director for Logistics

Lieutenant General Kathleen M. Gainey received her commission as a Second Lieutenant through ROTC in 1978, after graduating from Norfolk, Virginia's Old Dominion University, and receiving a Bachelor of Science Degree in Special Education.

Currently, LTG Gainey is the Director for Logistics, J4, The Joint Staff.

Her previous commands include 5th Heavy Boat Company, Ford Island, HI; 6th Transportation Battalion, Fort Eustis, VA; 7th Corps Support Group, Bamberg, Germany; Defense Distribution Center, New Cumberland, PA; and Commanding General, Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, headquartered at Scott Air Force Base, IL.

In 1987, she attended Babson College, Wellesley, MA, to complete her MBA in Contract Management and Procurement. In July 1989, she attended the Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, and she is a 1997 graduate of the Army War College.

LTG Gainey's other assignments include Chief, Container Freight Branch, Military Ocean Terminal Bay Area, MTMC Western Area, Oakland, CA; Program Analyst, United States Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command, Rock Island, IL; Executive Officer, 2d Area Support Group, 22d Support Command; S-2/S3, 702d Transportation Battalion, Saudi Arabia; Division Transportation Officer, 24th Infantry Division (Mech), Fort Stewart, GA; Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff, Army, Washington, DC; Chief Joint Operations Division, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, IL; Director, Force Projection and Distribution, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, Washington, DC; Deputy Chief of Staff, Resources and Sustainment, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Her awards and decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal; Defense Superior Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster; Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster; Bronze Star Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster; Meritorious Service Medal with 5 Oak Leaf Clusters; Joint Service Commendation Medal; Army Commendation Medal with 3 Oak Leaf Clusters. Her badges include the Army Staff Identification Badge.
Mr. Alan F. Estevez
Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Logistics and Materiel Readiness

Alan Estevez is the Principal Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics & Materiel Readiness). In this capacity, he is responsible for guiding the transformation of the Department of Defense (DoD) logistics processes to ensure cost effective, joint logistics support to support the warfighter in the 21st Century. He provides program oversight and develops policies for the operation of the over $100 billion DoD logistics operations, and he is a key leader of the DoD’s implementation of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology to improve logistics support to U.S. forces. He assumed his current position in November 2006.

From October 2002 to November 2006, Mr. Estevez was the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Supply Chain Integrations) responsible for development of global supply chain management and distribution policies. Prior to assuming his executive position, Mr. Estevez held key positions within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where he played a critical role in reengineering Defense transportation processes, and with the U.S. Army Strategic Logistics Agency, where he managed the Army’s program to correct logistics deficiencies identified during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. From 1981 through 1990, Mr. Estevez held numerous positions with Military Traffic Management Command in Bayonne, New Jersey, Oakland, California, and Falls Church, Virginia.

Mr. Estevez received a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey in 1979 and a Masters degree in National Security Resource Strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in 1995. He is the recipient of the Presidential Rank Meritorious Executive Award, the Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service, and the 2005 Service to America Medal awarded by the Partnership for Public Service. He was inducted into the Senior Executive Service in October 2002.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON

The Chairman. We understand that the bulk of the equipment being considered for transfer to the Iraqi Security Forces is Army equipment. What plans, if any, have been made to reimburse or recoup the Army for these losses? What effect will this have on Army readiness?

Secretary Flournoy. OSD and the Joint Staff are working with Multi-National Force-Iraq and the Military Departments to finalize the initial list of equipment to be transferred to the Iraqi Security Forces. Although the list at this time is not final, it includes equipment from the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps. Each of the Military Departments is first, identifying any excess equipment, and second working closely with the DoD Comptroller to identify equipment proposed for transfer that is not excess to the Military Departments and for which reimbursement will be requested. The DoD Comptroller, working with the Office of Management and Budget, will determine the timing and submission of the reimbursement request to Congress. The Joint Staff has worked with each of the Military Departments and U.S. Central Command to ensure that as much equipment as possible will be transferred without impacting military readiness.

The Chairman. How does the Foreign Military Sales program figure into the equation of providing equipment to the Iraqi Security Forces? Why are additional authorities being sought to do this?

Secretary Flournoy. The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, and programs available under other authorities, will be used to provide defense equipment and services to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The FMS program provides an important mechanism for the transfer to Iraq of major end-items, such as M1A1 Abrams tanks and C–130J aircraft. We will also be relying on other authorities, including those permitting the transfer of excess and non-excess defense articles under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act and Section 1234 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 to help the ISF develop the capacity to provide internal security and a foundation for external defense by the end of December 2011.

The authority the Department recently requested to transfer non-excess equipment to the ISF was provided in Section 1234 of the NDAA for FY10. We are not seeking any additional authorities at this time.