[House Hearing, 111 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] ELIMINATING WASTE AND MANAGING SPACE IN FEDERAL COURTHOUSES: GAO RECOMMENDATIONS ON COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION, COURTROOM SHARING, AND ENFORCING CONGRESSIONALLY AUTHORIZED LIMITS ON SIZE AND COST ======================================================================= (111-115) HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ May 25, 2010 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 56-725 PDF WASHINGTON : 2010 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, JOHN L. MICA, Florida Vice Chair DON YOUNG, Alaska PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee Columbia VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan JERROLD NADLER, New York FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey CORRINE BROWN, Florida JERRY MORAN, Kansas BOB FILNER, California GARY G. MILLER, California EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi Carolina ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania SAM GRAVES, Missouri BRIAN BAIRD, Washington BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania RICK LARSEN, Washington JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York Virginia MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois CONNIE MACK, Florida MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan HEATH SHULER, North Carolina MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York VERN BUCHANAN, Florida HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania ANH ``JOSEPH'' CAO, Louisiana JOHN J. HALL, New York AARON SCHOCK, Illinois STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin PETE OLSON, Texas STEVE COHEN, Tennessee VACANCY LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas PHIL HARE, Illinois JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan BETSY MARKEY, Colorado MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia DINA TITUS, Nevada HARRY TEAGUE, New Mexico JOHN GARAMENDI, California HANK JOHNSON, Georgia (ii) Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of Columbia, Chair BETSY MARKEY, Colorado MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois HEATH SHULER, North Carolina SAM GRAVES, Missouri RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota Virginia MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky Pennsylvania, Vice Chair ANH ``JOSEPH'' CAO, Louisiana DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland PETE OLSON, Texas THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia HANK JOHNSON, Georgia JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota (Ex Officio) (iii) CONTENTS Page Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vi TESTIMONY Goldstein, Mark, Director, Physical Infrastructure, Government Accountability Office.......................................... 7 Peck, Hon. Robert, Public Building Service, Commissioner, U.S. General Services Administration................................ 7 Ponsor, Judge Michael A., Chairman, Committee On Space and Facilities, Judicial Conference of the United States........... 7 Robinson, Judge Julie A., Chair, Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, Judicial Conference of the United States.................................................. 7 PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Norton, Hon. Eleanor Holems, a Representative in Congress from the District of Columbia....................................... 58 Oberstar, Hon. James L., a Representative in Congress from the State of Minnesota............................................. 63 PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES Goldstein, Mark Director......................................... 66 Peck, Hon. Robert................................................ 116 Ponsor, Judge Michael A.......................................... 123 Robinson, Judge Julie A.......................................... 133 SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD Goldstein, Mark Director, Physical Infrastructure, Government Accountability Office, response to request for information from the Subcommittee............................................... 108 Ponsor, Judge Michael A., Chairman, Committee On Space and Facilities and Robinson, Judge Julie A., Chair, Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, Judicial Conference of the United States, supplemental information................. 14 ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, James C. Duff, Director, letter to Mark Goldstein, Director, Physical Infrastructure, Government Accountability Office............... 150 [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ELIMINATING WASTE AND MANAGING SPACE IN FEDERAL COURTHOUSES: GAO RECOMMENDATIONS ON COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION, COURTROOM SHARING, AND ENFORCING CONGRESSIONALLY AUTHORIZED LIMITS ON SIZE AND COST ---------- Tuesday, May 24, 2010 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Washington, DC. The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. Ms. Norton. Good morning. And welcome to today's hearing on the Government Accounting Office's draft report entitled Eliminating Waste and Managing Space in Federal Courthouses, GAO Recommendations on Courthouse Construction, Courtroom Sharing, and Enforcing Congressionally Authorized Limits on Size and Cost. We are pleased to have two Federal judges with us this morning, the Honorable Michael Ponsor, chair of the Judicial Conference Committee on Space and Facilities, and the Honorable Julie Robinson, chair of the Judicial Conferences Court Administration and Case Management Committee, as well as the Honorable Robert Peck, commissioner of the GSA Public Building Service, and Mark Goldstein, GAO director of physical infrastructure. Today's hearing is one of several hearings that meet the oversight requirements under clause 2(n), (o), and(p) of rule 11 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, which requires each Subcommittee to have at least one hearing annually dedicated to providing oversight on waste, fraud, and abuse. We convene this morning primarily to hear from GAO regarding a January 24, 2008, bipartisan request from the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure that the GAO examine courthouse planning and construction, including courthouse construction, management, and cost. The draft GAO report contains astonishing and serious findings about how the courthouse program has been managed and the amount of money that has been wasted. GAO determined that the 33 courthouses completed by GSA since 2000 include 3.56 million square feet of extra space, consisting of space that was constructed above the congressionally-approved size, with no notice to this Committee or Subcommittee; consistent overestimation of the number of judges that courthouses would be required to accommodate; and, failure to implement courtroom sharing, despite the mandate of the Committee. The total value of the unneeded extra space is $835 million in construction costs and $51 million in annual costs in rent and operating expenses, according to GAO. The amount of money that GAO reports was wasted in overbuilding alone demands address by Congress, because GAO has calculated that it is equivalent to the cost of nine additional mid-sized courthouses. As the Nation is emerging from the greatest economic crisis of our generation with unemployment at 9.9 percent and a growing $12 trillion deficit, it is imperative that waste in Federal spending be eliminated. The American taxpayer has no stomach for such waste when services are being cut in Federal programs and others are being scaled down or eliminated across the entire country. Yet, criticism of a Federal construction program is neither new nor misunderstood. As far back as 15 years ago, this Committee asked the Judicial Conference of the United States to address the issue of cost containment. The hesitance in decision and absence of resolve led to the draft GAO report we are considering today. The report cites three principal forms of waste in the Federal courthouse construction program. The construction of 1.7 million square feet--that is 1.7 million square feet--in excess of congressional authorization. Of that number, construction of 887,000 extra square feet was caused by overestimating the number of judges the courthouse would have in 10 years, and the construction of 946,000 square feet because of lack of sharing in courthouses across the country. Remarkably, a report prepared in 1996 by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, at the direction of the Judicial Conference, entitled, ``Space Management Initiative in the Federal Courts'', asked the judiciary to begin a process of sharing. A segment of the report of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts bears hearing. And I am quoting. ``Courtroom Sharing. The Congress has asked the Judiciary to consider sharing courtrooms, and to determine the impact on a judge's ability to try cases if courtroom sharing were implemented. The Court Administration and Case Management Committee, working in conjunction with other appropriate committees, should be tasked by the conference to determine what policy on courtroom sharing for active and senior judges should be adopted, and whether the impact of any delays that would result from sharing courthouses will adversely affect case processing.'' This was the same conversation we were having with GSA and the AOUSC 4 years ago. However, only in the last 2 years has the Judicial Conference agreed to a very modest courtroom sharing policy for senior and magistrate judges. Consequently, today there are empty courtrooms across the country because of resistance to the congressional directive to share courtrooms whenever possible. GAO's report states that the Judicial Conference also has consistently overprojected the number of judgeships and the number of senior judges that would be appointed 10 years from the point of courthouse design. For 28 of the 33 courthouses the GAO studied, at least 10 years have lapsed since design. Of these 28 courthouses, 23 had extra courtrooms and auxiliary space associated with empty courtrooms, space such as jury deliberation rooms, attorney conference rooms, holding cells, et cetera. For at least two of these courthouses, the number of judges required to be housed was overestimated by 10. Because approval of new Article 3 judgeships and judge appointments relies on a political process, we certainly can appreciate the difficulty in making accurate predictions. However, with overestimations of 887,000 square feet of wasted courthouse area, the Committee intends to require the necessary expertise to account for probable growth with sufficient accuracy to assure sound fiscal stewardship of the government's resources. The Judicial Conference appears to have taken leadership of a major GSA construction program, rendering the public building service of the GSA all but a nominal partner in the management of the program. With 3.56 million square feet of wasted space, GSA is responsible for 1.7 million square feet of the overbuilt space, nearly half of the total because the Public Building Service provided poor oversight of the design and construction process. This Committee, in deliberate and careful review, examined each prospectus submitted by GSA and made an affirmative decision to authorize each of these courthouses by resolution at a certain square footage. Yet GSA exceeded the limits of the Committee resolutions in 27 of the 33 courthouses completed since 2000. In the case of the O'Connor Courthouse in Phoenix, Arizona, and the Arnold Courthouse Annex in Little Rock, Arkansas, GSA overbuilt the courthouses by over 50 percent, creating several hundred thousand square feet of wasted space. For some time now, GSA has considered not only the courts, but Federal agencies to be GSA's coustomers rather than the American taxpayer. Time and again, over the past decade, the Agency has allowed the courts and Federal agencies to redesign, reassign, and rethink space decisions with apparently no thought of the financial considerations. The number of amended resolutions has grown steadily, as has the cost of the court program. Twice in the last 6 years, this Subcommittee has heard testimony regarding the judiciary's inability to pay for its future and current space needs and the problems of the courthouse construction program. Today, the draft report from GAO finds that the Federal courthouse construction program has been undisciplined and out of the control of the GSA, the Agency charged by statute with administration of the program. Not the courts, it is the GSA that is charged by statute of the Congress of the United States with administration of this program. In the 2005 hearing, the judiciary as well as the GSA, committed to a series of actions each entity would undertake to control the court's runaway rental costs. The Committee did its part by asking the GAO to review how the courts budget for rent, how GSA accounts for rents, and what impact the court's rent relief request of nearly $500 million would have on the Federal building fund. GAO's review came in a June 2006 report on courthouse rent increases and mismanagement, and contained findings of multiple instances of unused or underutilized courtrooms, chambers and support spaces, that there is no criteria in the design guide to assign space to appeals courts, even after 15 years of the Committee requesting such criteria, and that judges have exclusive access to facilities in multiple buildings. In March 2004, the courts essentially imposed a 2-year moratorium on courthouse construction because of the escalating rental costs. Also in 2005, the Judiciary Space and Facilities Committee committed to reviewing the space standards of the U.S. Court's Design Guide with ``emphasis on controlling costs.'' First, the Space and Facilities Committee began a revamping of its long-range facilities planning process to include ``examining staff and judgeship growth as well as the space standard use for estimating square footage needs.'' Although GSA knew that the judiciary had difficulty paying its rent bills, GAO reports that GSA overbuilt 9 of the 33 courthouses after the 2006 hearing. At least three courthouses were more than 25 percent over the congressionally authorized limit without any notification to this Subcommittee even after we made certain that both the AOUSC and GSA knew that we were deeply concerned about the issue of space saving and adherence to the Committee's direction on cost containment. In effect, GSA to some measure, turned a deaf ear not only to this Committee's concerns, but also to the judiciary's concerns about the inordinate rent costs associated with new courthouses. GSA ran up the tab with overbuilding, apparently oblivious of any hardship this might create for the judiciary in funding its burgeoning rent obligation to GSA. Moreover, several of the courthouse prospectus requests submitted since that hearing still do not include courtroom sharing on the scale that this Subcommittee has consistently required. In surprising disregard of the Committee's mandates, nearly every courthouse has continued to have a one to one ratio of judges to courtrooms. The prospectus requests do not reflect the level of sharing that GAO now finds has been more than possible using the judiciary's own data produced by the Federal Judicial Center. It is fair to ask where GSA has been throughout this process, why did the GSA not notify the authorizers that these problems were continuing even after our hearings when the judiciary continued to submit projects that were inconsistent with our direction. The conclusion is unavoidable: That little if any progress has been made in controlling costs or managing the Federal courthouse construction program after a decade of scrutiny. This Subcommittee will withhold authorizing any new additions to the court's inventory until we are convinced that the Federal courthouse construction program is satisfactorily reformed. There will be courthouse sharing where it is appropriate and every courthouse on the court's 5-year courthouse project plan will be reconsidered under new sharing guidelines. We do not plan to authorize any new courthouses without details on real savings and programs to control spending. We will need a list from GSA of all court projects that are currently appropriated and designed so they can be evaluated to ensure that they do not include the type of waste identified by the GAO in its draft report. This Subcommittee has a long history of bipartisan and actually nonpartisan action, particularly when it comes to the courts. Today, we will hear from all of the parties, and in collaboration with them, we will begin a process of problem- solving reform of a major Federal program. We intend to work with the GSA and the courts to ensure good management decisions on behalf of the American taxpayer. Legislation will be necessary, and we look forward to working with the minority towards a bipartisan solution to ensure significant savings for taxpayers. We appreciate the testimony of each of our witnesses today, and we welcome your thoughts and suggestions. It is now my pleasure to ask our Ranking Member if he has an opening statement. Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. I could almost repeat what you have just said. You mentioned, among the things that you talked about, the fact that this Committee works in an nonpartisan way. And it is true, very few Committees work the way this one does. And it is because, frankly, the leadership of the Committee. It has been that way regardless of who is in control, and it remains that way with you as Chairwoman and with Mr. Oberstar as Chair of the Full Committee. This is one area where we absolutely speak with one voice. I want to thank you for holding this hearing. This is a key hearing, and I know one that you have been talking about for a long time, and we have just never had all of the right information until now. Now we have it. For almost two decades, this Committee has been one of the few voices talking about this issue. We have argued for smaller courthouses and for courtroom sharing and for stronger GSA management of the program. And again, we suspected that courthouses were overbuilt, but we didn't have the actual data. Today the Government Accountability Office is going to present its review of every courthouse constructed in the last decade. Findings of government waste and mismanagement and disregard for the congressional authority and authorization process are, frankly, unacceptable and appalling. First and foremost, there appears to be a complete and absolute breakdown in the management and oversight of the courthouse planning and construction. And as a result, GSA built, as the Chairwoman said, 3.5 million square feet of courthouses costing over $800 million, almost a billion dollars which we just don't need and should never have been built. Let's put that in perspective. That is as if we built three House office buildings, including the one that we are in, three of them, and left them empty. Think of that concept when you are walking through this building and you see the size and scope of this building. Think of three of these buildings empty. That is what we have built using taxpayer money, precious taxpayer money. It is totally unacceptable. According to the GAO, the three main factors the Chairwoman already talked about: construction of courthouses that exceeded authorized size; the overinflated projections for future judges; and the lack of courtroom sharing. I was just reminded a little while ago that this Committee has six Subcommittees. I don't believe we have six meeting rooms. We share the meeting rooms. I know a lot of people will argue that Congress is necessarily the most efficient institution on the planet. However, that illustration alone will tell you how problematic this overbuilding of courthouses has been because they do not share. Even Congress shares, but courthouses do not. Again, the GAO reviewed 33 courthouses since 2000 and found 28 exceeded their authorized size limit. To add insult to injury, GSA officials responsible for the construction of several of the courthouses didn't know they were overbuilt until the GAO mentioned it to them. I think I need to repeat. Again: GSA officials responsible for the construction of several courthouses did not know they were overbuilt--these are the people responsible for them-- until GAO told them. That is what my understanding is, and I hope to hear about that. Again, on top of this mismanagement, the courts continued to base their space decisions on projections that have been shown to be flawed, to be unreliable. Another 887,000 square feet of unneeded space was built because U.S. court models for projections projecting the numbers of future judges were overestimated by 35 percent. We are not talking about a small margin of error here, we are talking about huge percentages: 35 percent. For example, in 1995, the Long Island, New York, courthouse had 14 judges and the courts estimated 25 judges by 2005. After building a brand new courthouse, there are now only 15 judges at the courthouse, one more than was previously there. Today the courts continue to base their space decisions on those bad projections despite nearly two decades of experience that have shown us those are wrong assumptions and failed experiences. More space and money could have been saved had the courts instituted a courtroom-sharing policy. I mentioned that a little while ago. The Chairwoman has mentioned that, and I want to reiterate what she said. A sharing model developed by the GAO clearly indicates that sharing could have reduced the number of courtrooms by about 40 percent. 40 percent. Or 950,000 square feet of space. Those are serious increases of space that taxpayers should not have to pay for. These estimates are based on the court's own data of courtroom usage, including cancelled events and nonjudicial ceremonial uses. We hold the trust for the American people, and it seems that trust has been broken. Courthouses have been built way too big for way too long and for more money than ever needed, and that is the taxpayer's money. They have the right to expect that their money is being used efficiently and effectively. Here is a case where we can demonstrate that has not been the case. This Committee has been mentioning that for a long, long time. We have been stonewalled, but now we have the information that proves it. It is clearly appropriate that the judiciary have the appropriate space to carry out its constitutional functions, and we all support that, we must ensure that we are good stewards of taxpayer dollars and we are not just throwing money away for no good reason. I hope today we can hearing from the witnesses to examine those issues more closely. I also hope that the Committee will use this information that we have gathered today to better inform our decisions on current and future courthouse authorizations. Again, this Committee has been mentioning this for a long time. We have the data, and I want to thank, once again, the Chairwoman not only for the hearing we are having today, but also for Chairwoman's steadfast leadership on this issue. This is not new for you, you have been talking about this for a long time. You have been right, the Committee has been right, and the data is there to prove it and now we need to take it to its next logical conclusion. I thank you for the hearing, and I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Diaz-Balart. TESTIMONIES OF MARK GOLDSTEIN, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; HON. BOB PECK, PUBLIC BUILDING SERVICE, COMMISSIONER, U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION; JUDGE MICHAEL A. PONSOR, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON SPACE AND FACILITIES, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES; AND JUDGE JULIE A. ROBINSON, CHAIR, COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES Ms. Norton. Let us begin with Mark Goldstein, director, physical infrastructure, Government Accountability Office. Mr. Goldstein. Thank you, Chairwoman Norton, and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank for the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee this morning to discuss Federal courthouse construction. The Federal judiciary and the GSA are in the midst of a multi-billion-dollar courthouse construction initiative which began in the early 1990's, and has since faced rising construction costs. As requested by this Subcommittee, for 33 Federal courthouses completed since 2000, GAO examined: (1) whether they contained extra space and any costs related to it; (2) how their actual size compares with the congressionally authorized size; (3) how their space based on the judiciary's 10-year estimates of judges compares with the actual number of judges; (4) whether the level of courthouse sharing supported by the judiciary's data could have changed the amount of space needed in these courthouses. GAO analyzed courthouse planning and use data, visited courthouses and modeled courtroom sharing scenarios and interview judges, GSA officials, and other experts. The findings in this testimony are preliminary because the Federal judiciary and GSA are still in the process of commenting on GAO's draft report and did not provide comments on this testimony. Our preliminary findings in this report are as follows: First, the 33 Federal courthouses completed since 2000 include 3.56 million square feet of extra space; 28 percent of the total, 12.76 million square feet constructed. The excess square footage consists of space that was constructed above the congressionally authorized size due to overestimating the number of judges the courthouses would have, and without planning for courtroom sharing among judges. Overall, this space represents about nine average size courthouses. The estimated cost to construct this extra space when adjusted to 2010 dollars is $835 million approximately, and the annual cost to rent, operate and maintain it is approximately $51 million a year. Second, GAO found that 27 of the 33 courthouses exceeded their congressionally authorized size by approximately 1.7 million square feet; 15 exceeded their congressionally authorized size by more than 10 percent; and 12 of these 15 also had total project costs that exceeded the estimates provided to congressional committees, eight by less than 10 percent and four by 10 to 21 percent. There is no requirement to notify congressional committees about size overages, as is required for cost overages more than 10 percent. A lack of oversight by GSA, including a lack of focus on not exceeding the congressionally authorized size contributed to these overages. Our third finding is that the judiciary overestimated the number of judges that would be located in 23 of the 28 courthouses whose space planning occurred at least 10 years ago, causing them to be larger and costlier than necessary. Overall, the judiciary has 119 or approximately 26 percent fewer judges than the 461 it estimated it would have. This leaves the 23 courthouses with extra courtrooms and chamber suites that together total approximate 887,000 square feet. A variety of factors contributed to the judiciary's overestimates, including inaccurate caseload projections and long-standing difficulties in obtaining new authorizations and filling vacancies. However, the degree to which inaccurate caseloads projections contributed to inaccurate judge estimates cannot be measured because the judiciary did not retain the historic caseload projections used in planning the courthouses. Finally, using the judiciary's data, GAO designed a model for courthouse sharing which shows that there is enough unscheduled time for substantial courtroom sharing. Sharing could have reduced the number of courtrooms needed in courthouses built since 2000 by 126 courtrooms, about 40 percent of the total, covering about 946,000 square feet. Some judges GAO consulted raised potential challenges to courtroom sharing, such as uncertainty about courtroom availability. But other judges indicated they overcame these challenges, when necessary, and no trials were postponed. The judiciary has adopted policies for future sharing for senior magistrate judges; but GAO's analysis shows additional sharing opportunities are available. For example, GAO's courtroom sharing model shows that there is sufficient unscheduled time for three district judges to share two courtrooms and for three senior judges to share one courtroom. GAO has developed draft recommendations related to GSA's oversight of construction projects ask the judiciary's planning and sharing of courtrooms that we will finalize in our forthcoming report after fully considering agency comments. That concludes my statement. I would be happy to take any questions that the Committee may have. Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Goldstein. Our next witness if Robert Peck, Public Building Service commissioner of the GSA. Mr. Peck. Madame Chair Norton, Ranking Member Diaz-Balart and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me today to discuss GSA's Federal courthouse construction program. The Federal courts play a critical role in the constitutional framework of American democracy. Local, State and Federal courthouses are a traditional landmark dating back to the founding of the Nation. As a steward of federally own buildings, GSA is proud to build courthouses worthy of that role. Federal courthouses must maintain the judiciary's mission of ensuring fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans, while providing security for judges, jurors and others engaged in the judicial process. I want to thank you and the Members of this Committee and the Congress for the authorization and funding we have been given to construct this inventory. GSA has serious concerns with this draft GAO report, and takes exception to much of its methodology and conclusions. We welcome the opportunity to clarify and correct the misinformation presented in the report. One, GAO has used a space measure that assumes upper space in building atriums and courtrooms is included in the gross square footage of an asset when it is typically not. Two, GAO compounded this erroneous assumption by mistakenly ascribing normal operating and construction costs to these empty volumes. Three, GAO retroactively applies a methodology of courtroom sharing to buildings designed in some cases more than a decade ago, and then claims that the buildings thus previously designed and built somehow violate this retroactive standard. Most egregiously, one reading of the GAO report might assume that GSA has willfully neglected congressional direction in the courthouse program. On the contrary, GSA has conscientiously sought and followed regular congressional authorizations and appropriations, and has been subject to strict congressional oversight of the program. We built only courtrooms requested by the judiciary and authorized by the Congress. GSA has been forthright and transparent in our documents, testimony, and briefings to Congress. GAO also discusses overestimating judgeship projections in this report. GSA agrees this issue warrants further review since these projections have been off the mark in the past. This is a complicated issue, and we believe that GSA, the judiciary, and the Congress should discuss a realistic approach for the future. GSA has concerns over the data in this report, as I noted, and we dispute many of the findings. To be a little more precise, when calculating the amount of extra space constructed in courthouses, GAO counted the square feet in the building, including tenant floor cuts and vertical floor penetrations in multi-story atriums and double-height courtrooms that are in reality phantom floors. We have included a diagram on page 6 of the written statement that show graphically how this works. GAO uses phantom square footage to calculate additional costs supposedly incurred to complete the building. GAO divided the total cost of the facility by the building's gross square footage, multiplied it by the alleged amount of additional space GSA constructed to determine the cost of the alleged overbuilt space. These assertions and calculations are inaccurate and grossly misleading. Costs for vertical space are not the same as typical building or office space. The cost of constructing, maintaining and operating this type of space is significantly less compared to the rest of the facility, not the glaring cost exaggeration in the GAO report. For example, the O'Connor courthouse in Phoenix referenced in the GAO report has an atrium that is not air conditioned. So to assume these operating costs are the same as the space inside other occupied parts of the building is inaccurate. GAO also suggests that cost overruns were the direct result of constructing additional space. These increases were actually primarily due to unprecedented increases in construction costs which escalated by 58 percent during GAO's review period. Additionally, during the period covered by the audit, the U.S. was attacked by terrorists which resulted in increased costs for enhanced security. In fact, only four of the 33 courthouses focused on by GAO were over 10 percent of their cost authorizations and appropriations. For the 33 as a whole, final costs were 8.8 percent over the original appropriated amounts which confirms that in fact the gross overbuilding that GAO alleges did not occur. GAO asserts that 27 out of the 33 Federal courthouses built since 2000 are larger than authorized by Congress. GSA disagrees with GAO's claims since 50 percent of this square footage is due to this atrium and tenant cut space that I have noted. GSA bases our measuring standards on private industry standards. If GAO applied that current private industry standard, the atriums in all 33 products audited would be excluded from the calculation, as I said, resulting in over a 50 percent decrease in square footage. Reasons for the remaining 50 percent of the alleged 1.7 million square feet can be attributed to site limitations, which requires us to alter a design from the initial very conceptual design presented in prospectus authorizations and constructing connections for annexes and some of the space and connections resulting therefrom, and new requirements including new design energy and security standards. GAO suggests that GSA should notify congressional authorizing and appropriation committees if the size of a courthouse exceeds the congressionally authorized gross square footage. We will notify the appropriate congressional committees when the square footage increase exceeds 10 percent. We always ensure our projects stay within the statutory 10 percent of the appropriated and authorized amounts of dollars; or we notify Congress accordingly and apply for either escalation or reprogramming authority. We have multiple levels of management and system controls to ensure costs do not exceed this threshold. GSA often has pressing and logical reasons to exceed the original gross square footage. For example, during design, architects can develop more energy-efficient methods, including creating atriums and light wells to bring natural light into interior, windowless space within the building that could increase the building's square footage, but in the long run, reduce energy costs. GSA will ensure that Congress is notified of these increases in the future, as I said, along with the reasons for the increases. In estimating the cost for this additional space, GAO applies current GSA space measurement policy retroactively in its analysis. Although GSA adopted the American National Standards Institute and Building Owners and Managers Association measurements standards in 1997, GSA did not establish formal national guidance to include atrium space in the gross area calculation until fiscal year 2005. The 33 courthouse projects under review by GAO were authorized prior to this policy. So in other words, some of the confusion about measurement is as a result of our having brought in one measurement standard when we did the prospectuses, and another one later when we actually measured the space and then did include the atrium, the empty atrium and courtroom volumetric space in our calculations. GAO also asserts that GSA needs additional oversight and controls over the management of our program. We already have policies that require central office of GSA and the regions during the design process to approve facility measurements and ensure they are in line with the appropriation and authorization. Additionally, we have measurement experts who provide an independent evaluation of the design. Compliance with the prospectus building size is necessary to proceed with a project, and GSA will continue to educate our project teams on these policies and ensure our measurement experts are involved throughout the project phases. We work closely with the judiciary to develop their courthouse requirements. The judiciary has developed and implemented policies that require courtrooms to be shared among certain classes of judges. We commend the courts for developing these new courtroom sharing models which were developed in recent years. GAO audited courthouses that were designed, and in some cases, built before the judiciary and GSA implemented these newer sharing models. It is important to note that this sharing requires one courtroom for every two senior judges, and one courtroom for every two magistrate judges. The judiciary and GSA also implemented additional sharing policies for American Recovery and Reinvestment Act projects of no more than one courtroom for every two senior district judges who are up to 10 years in advance of their senior eligibility date. It is important to note that GAO's findings were based on projects designed before these sharing models were implemented. We in the judiciary are committed to these courtroom sharing policy for new courthouse projects with future plan designs. This concludes my testimony. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the draft report and clarify the assumptions and statements made in it. Thank you for inviting me to appear. I am happy to answer your questions. Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Peck. Ms. Norton. We will hear next from Judge Michael Ponsor, chairman of the committee on space and facilities of the Judicial Conference of the United States. Judge Ponsor. Thank you, and good morning, Madam Chair and Members of the Subcommittee. I am Michael A. Ponsor. I am a United States District Court Judge for the district of Massachusetts western division. Since last October, I have served as chair of the Judicial Conference Committee on Space and Facilities, and I am very honored to be appearing before you for the first time today in that capacity. Before my brief remarks, I do want to take the opportunity to thank the Subcommittee for its support of the judiciary's courthouse construction program. I have special reason to express my gratitude since my community has benefited from this Subcommittee's assistance and oversight in the form of Springfield's new much-needed courthouse which opened in October 2008 and which I work in every day. I will be commenting on the GAO report, and I have two points to make in my brief time: the first to praise; and the second to demur. First of all, the six recommendations offered at pages 47 and 48 of the GAO report are, in my opinion, sensible and helpful. I welcome them. I believe they will mesh comfortably with the efforts that the judiciary is making in this area, and I look forward to working with this Subcommittee toward their implementation. Some aspects of the recommendation regarding courtroom sharing need more discussion and refinement, and my committee looks forward to playing a role in these discussions. My colleague, Judge Julie Robinson of Kansas, will be addressing this topic in a few minutes. Second, and less happily, I must say that the suggestion in the draft report that the judiciary overspent to the tune of $835 million in its courthouse construction program during the period 2000 to 2010 is both unfounded and quite unfair and distorts what actually happened. None of the three reasons offered to support the draft report's claim of this kind of overspending can withstand fair scrutiny. The first explanation by GAO for the alleged excessive cost--that we spent beyond Congressional authorization--is particularly disturbing. As Commissioner Peck has pointed out, supposed discrepancies between square footage contained in courthouse prospectuses and the ultimate size of the courthouse can largely be explained by differences between the GSA and the GAO in how gross square footage has been calculated and certainly not by any intent to evade or thwart the will of Congress. The report's chart on page 15 identifies the Springfield courthouse as having exceeded its authorization by 10 to 20 percent. I have not had access to the GAO's work papers, but based on the documents I have seen, this is simply untrue. Between the design and construction phases in Springfield, we actually deleted one of the five courtrooms originally approved for the project. The construction prospectus predicted a total 157,750 gross square footage for our courthouse. As the building went up, I visited the site regularly and participated in monthly construction meetings for more than 3 years with representatives of the GSA, the architect, the contractor and a senior staff member from Congressman Richard Neal's office. The building's total square footage when it opened in October 2008 was 162,000 square feet, about 2 percent, not 10 or 20, percent over prediction. If numbers for the other courthouses are as far off as they appear to be for Springfield, the GAO overall estimate of 1.7 million in excess square footage is not worthy of credit. [Additional information follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] The GAO's second explanation--that we planned for too many judges--while true to some extent, is unfairly exaggerated. We all have 20/20 hindsight. Between 1970 and 2000, the Federal court's civil and criminal caseload skyrocketed. Congress authorized more than 400 new district court and circuit court judges over those 30 years, plus scores of new bankruptcy and magistrate judge positions. It would have been irresponsible not to plan for comparable growth in 2000 to 2010. The 119 judges that they say were excessively planned for, fall easily within the average over the previous 30 years for congressional authorizations. That the caseloads flattened out in some areas of the country between 2000 and 2010, and almost no new judgeships were approved by Congress during that time, does not undercut the reasonableness of the planning decision in the year 2000. Predicting the number of judges necessary in a planning horizon of 10 years or more is hard. We have welcomed the input of the GAO in tackling this difficult problem, and we welcome it today. Indeed, of the six recommendations about planning offered by the GAO back in 1993, the courts by 2000 had fully adopted five and partially adopted the sixth, which was largely superseded. As with the current recommendations, these GAO recommendations served to complement the efforts we are already taking in the judiciary. A 2-year moratorium on courthouse construction starting in 2004, which has been noted by the chair, gave the courts a chance to take a hard look at our planning methodology and soon afterwards a new planning method, asset-management planning (AMP), emerged. AMP gives us the most accurate yardstick to date to identify courts and districts that truly need new courthouses and major renovations. The draft GAO report overlooks the fact that while it is unfortunate to overestimate necessary court capacity, it can be catastrophic to underestimate it. We simply can't shoot low. New judges or senior judges will have no place to work or will have to be farmed out into expensive leased space. Moreover, while our planning horizon is 10 years, we all know courthouses will be with us far longer. Where a courthouse is not full within the 10-year planning horizon, it will inevitably be full within a relatively short period afterwards. The third explanation by GAO for the court's alleged overbuilding is the failure to apply courtroom-sharing policies, and it is similarly unfair. As I have noted, my colleague, Judge Julie Robinson from Kansas, will address this topic in detail. I will only say that it does not make sense to criticize the courts for failing in the year 2000 to follow courtroom sharing policies that were only recently adopted by the judiciary after careful study and consideration. The conclusion of the GAO report begins with a sentence that I heartily agree with, and I believe all of us in this room concur in: ``It is important for the Federal judiciary to have adequate, appropriate, modern facilities to carry out judicial functions''. As the committee chair tasked with ensuring that the court's physical facilities are adequate to perform our critical role, I find this sentiment somewhat understated. The Judicial Conference has a very serious obligation to ensure that the citizens of our country have access to adequate, safe, and well-functioning Federal court facilities. I look forward to working with this Subcommittee on this important but difficult task. I also look forward to a continued discussion this morning, and am happy to entertain questions. Ms. Norton. Thank you, Judge Ponsor. Ms. Norton. Finally, we will hear from Judge Julie A. Robinson, chair of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States. We also welcome her mother, who has accompanied her here as well. Judge Robinson. Thank you, Madam Chair, and Members of the Committee. My name is Julie Robinson, and I am honored to be here this morning and thank you for inviting me. I am accompanied by the lady who put me through law school, Charlene Robinson. I am glad she is here with me. I am a United States district judge in the district of Kansas, and since 2005, I have been a Member of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management (CACM) for the Judicial Conference of the United States. Since October, like my colleague, Judge Ponsor, who is the new chair of his committee, I became chair of the CACM committee in October. I have been asked to testify today regarding our committee's work in developing the Judicial Conference's new courtroom sharing policies and share the views of the judiciary on the recent report from the Government Accountability Office on the planning and construction of court facilities. The primary responsibility of my committee is to ensure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of cases; inexpensive for the litigants, taxpayers, citizens, and others who come before our court to take advantage of our core mission. The availability of a courtroom is one of the judiciary's most important tools in meeting this goal. As a result, the Judicial Conference asked the Court Administration and Case Management Committee rather than its Space and Facilities Committee to take the lead in developing an appropriate courtroom sharing policy for the Federal courts. Thus, my testimony pertains exclusively to the sharing policy and not to other issues involving the planning and construction of court facilities. My written testimony contains an overview of how we developed the new courtroom allocation policies and the judiciary's response to the GAO's report. But in my statement to you today, I wish to emphasize some key points about our new courtroom sharing policies and the problems with the GAO's proposed report. As you know, our committee asked the Federal Judicial Center, FJC, to conduct the courtroom use study requested by your House Subcommittee. The FJC conducted this study independently by surveying 26 randomly selected districts representing various-sized courts. The committee based significant changes to the judiciary's courtroom allocation policies on the findings of the FJC study, but it also noted the limitations in applying the findings too broadly or too literally. The FJC's findings provide national averages, distorting the picture of the courtroom use in any given court. If taken as an average, the existence of underutilized courtrooms in some locations would negate the need for courtrooms in other busier locations; or provide an incorrect picture of the real number of courtroom hours in very busy courts or for courts experiencing peak workloads. Thus, the study's findings must be applied carefully. The committee also noted that many courthouses were built in a different era when demographics supported the facilities. Even if no longer fully utilized, those facilities are an important link to the judiciary and the national government in those areas. The committee cautioned that the courtroom usage data was collected over two 3-month periods. Thus, it may not be a complete picture of all courtroom use. For all these reasons, care must be used in applying these national findings to local projects. We were careful in crafting the new policies to ensure that courtroom sharing would not unduly impede current cost savings or efficient case management. For instance, we accounted for the impact that delayed justice has on litigants, attorneys, crime victims, and others. We noted the cost savings of having an available courtroom and its effect in encouraging the parties to either be ready for trial or to settle their case. And we tried to ensure some certainty in the prosecution of criminal cases, costs such as travel and housing for defendants in criminal cases, and we have worked with Congress to reduce delay and cost in litigation. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, for instance, required all district courts to implement plans to reduce civil litigation delays. Those changes increased efficiency for the courts, but imposed costs that have been borne by the judiciary, including the need for immediate and certain access to a courtroom. With these considerations in mind, our committee devoted a great deal of time and effort in developing an appropriate balance between meaningful courtroom sharing and effective case management. This effort included the FJC's comprehensive study, our negotiations with other Judicial Conference committees, and consultations with the House Subcommittee by my predecessor and the predecessor of Judge Ponsor on his committee. As a result, the Judicial Conference adopted a policy to provide one courtroom for every two seniors judges and one courtroom for every two magistrate judges. We currently have underway a courtroom usage study of bankruptcy courts, and my committee will consider a sharing policy for courthouses with more than 10 active district judges after the bankruptcy study is complete. We expect the bankruptcy study to be complete this summer, and we will be working on its findings this fall. The draft GAO report proposes a number of sharing policies that are very different from those endorsed by the Judicial Conference, and include sharing policies that are still being studied or considered by my committee. These proposals are based on two sources of information. The first is a computer model of the FJC study data that was developed by a contractor for the GAO with no apparent claim to any particular expertise in the judicial system. Any model must be based on certain assumptions formulated by those with great expertise and understanding. The GAO does not describe the assumptions used to develop the model. Moreover, the GAO's recommendations, which may well have been part of the assumptions, are highly questionable. For example, GAO asserts that the Nation's border courts and those with higher pending caseloads do make greater than average use of courtrooms, but other courthouses in those same districts offset that higher use, they assume. Yet it is entirely unrealistic to say that all courtrooms in a district are fungible, no matter where they are located. Proceedings cannot be easily transferred from one division to another, and it is not good stewardship of taxpayer money to transfer cases long distances and pay travel costs for U.S. attorneys, assistant public defenders, marshals, prisoners, court staff, and witnesses simply to find an available courtroom. The GAO also assumes that every courtroom can be used for 10 hours each day. This is totally unrealistic and virtually impossible. Aside from the fact that it inflates the workday of a Federal employee by 25 percent, it assumes that jurors and litigants and witnesses and family members can be present for 10 hours at a time. Those people would have trouble arranging their schedules to spend the extra hours in the courtroom. This assumption alone grossly distorts the GAO's resulting courtroom sharing ratios. I would also note that the GAO incorrectly assumes that criminal hearings can be accomplished by videoconferencing. Aside from the other participants that participate in criminal hearings, this assumption dismisses the rights of a defendant to have a criminal case hearing held in open court. I question the wisdom of basing courtroom planning assumptions that are premised on a waiver of a constitutional right and contrary to the requirements for the presence of the defendant set forth in Federal rules and case law. The second source of information used by the GAO to support its proposals is a set of comments elicited from a 1-day confidential panel of individuals, a panel whose selection and agenda were greatly influenced by the GAO itself, but who found that courtroom sharing presented a number of problems that would adversely affect the administration of justice. Nonetheless, the GAO report discounts these judges' skepticism over long term courtroom sharing, the disservice of rescheduling an event due to lack of space, and the importance of having a courtroom available to encourage resolution of cases. Let me share with you briefly from personal experience why the quick and rudimentary modeling program employed by the GAO would have disastrous results for the judiciary. If I am in trial, my courtroom is not being used 2.7 hours a day. It is being used at least 8 hours a day. In fact, I am in a heavy season of trials right now. For the last 7 months, I have been in trials almost back to back until last month--not unique, not unusual, all judges go through heavy seasons, as well as light seasons. There is no such thing as an average workday or an average workload or an average work week for any of us. The judges in my court use courtrooms heavily because when we are in trial, we schedule other criminal hearings. We try to sandwich those in at the beginning of the day or the end of the day. Or we are in trial for perhaps only 4 days a week so that we can set aside a full day to handle other matters. Even with this scheduling, we have to overlap the scheduling of criminal trials and civil trials. If I didn't overlap or stack set, as we call civil trials, right now I would be giving litigants trial dates for their civil cases in 2017 or 2018, instead of 2011 or 2012, if I were to specially set every civil trial that needs to go to trial in my caseload. We also have latent use of courtrooms, meaning courtrooms that aren't in use because many scheduled trials settle once they are given a firm date for trial. But this is unavoidable. For example, I am starting a civil trial early next month. I originally had 10 civil trials scheduled to start during that same time frame. Nine of them have settled; I am scheduled to go on the tenth. If that case were to settle today, I can't fill that estimated week long period of time with another trial. It is not enough notice to the parties and their witnesses and their attorneys who likely are scheduled to be in another courtroom during that time period. In a courtroom sharing scenario, particularly for small and medium-sized courthouses, we simply cannot insert another trial at the last minute. And it is not only the tax dollars at stake, we see litigants who are almost bankrupted by the costs of litigation and discovery. Many of our cases that go to trial involve small businesses who cannot bear the heavy costs of litigation and the attendant costs of delay and rescheduling. And also individuals pursuing their civil rights and their rights under title 7 or other important rights. An uninformed or hasty courtroom sharing policy will cause delay, it will increase costs, and it will impair our ability to dispense justice. The key point I do want to make on behalf of the committee and the Judicial Conference is that we have taken our responsibility to examine courtroom utilization very seriously. We have made significant changes in the courtroom sharing ratios that we have adopted, and in our ongoing work with bankruptcy courts and beyond to the larger courthouses involving district judges. The judiciary has made great strides in reducing construction and rent costs by sharing. The policies reflect what the model simply cannot--the real world experiences of litigants, parties, and judges who sit in these courtrooms regularly. They also take into account the legitimate concerns of your Subcommittee, that the taxpayer money be wisely spent. Fundamentally, we believe that the policy changes we are adopting strike the correct balance between controlling costs and delivering justice. I thank you, and I am open for any questions. Ms. Norton. Thank you, Judge Robinson. Well, Mr. Goldstein, since it has been three against one, perhaps we ought to give you the opportunity to respond to some of the testimony before we go forward with our own questions. But before I do that, I was informed only after testimony began that Mr. Johnson has some opening comments. Do you want to do those now. Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you, Madam Chair. Just briefly, I would like to say as a practicing lawyer for 27 years, running between courthouses, both State and Federal, trying mostly criminal cases but some civil, some civil litigation as well, I do first of all appreciate the Constitution for having set up the three legs of the stool, if you will, of government. It is a three-legged stool, coequal branches, coequal legs. If one of those legs should be chopped off in any fashion whatsoever, then the stool starts to lean. And if you cut it off altogether then, what you have is a leg that is not able to function and you don't have a functioning stool at that point. So I think it is important that we remember that the coequal branch, the judiciary, has to have resources to function efficiently and effectively. And if judges are underpaid, and I know that we are not talking about that today, but if they are underpaid, overworked and are homeless, with not having a courtroom or an office to work from where, you know, where you are supposed to be at all times, it makes for a judiciary that is not functional. And thus, it lays the groundwork for the destroying of our great country which is dependent on this coequal branch of government system. Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Now, I realize Congress has responsibility for funding the operations, and Congress needs to be concerned about how the taxpayers' money is being spent and making sure that it is wisely spent, but we should spare no resource to support that third leg of the stool and to make sure that it does what it is supposed to do. And so I view--I have a strong suspicion that any courtroom-sharing advice coming from outside of the court itself is--and produced, I would assume, by nonpracticing lawyers without an appreciation for juries, for pretrial issues, for motions, for the expediency that criminal laws require in the criminal law process, and some understanding of the civil justice system and how judges play an intricate role in terms of how those cases are decided either through pretrial motion or through things like trial settings, setting dates which encourage people to engage in either alternative dispute resolution or just plain settlement-- there is so many niceties that go into this, and I am not sure lay people can appreciate. So thank you, Madam Chair, for allowing me to make this statement. I will ask some questions, of course, to gain more knowledge about these issues. Thank you. Ms. Norton. I thank the gentleman. And I remind the gentleman that this hearing is not about cases and controversies, and that the Committee has always been respectful of the independence of the judiciary. And we want to make it clear again, the judiciary is not independent when it comes to building space. That is the province of this Committee and the Congress, which authorizes the money and is going to see to it that the money is spent. This hearing is about $835 million in taxpayers' money that was spent beyond the authorization of this Committee. This is a Committee that abides by the law, and the courts are going to abide by the law when it comes to space and the authorization of this Committee. Now, I had asked you, Mr. Goldstein, since it was three on one on the GAO report, whether we should allow you to respond to some of the challenges to the GAO draft report. And it is a draft report. And Mr. Peck and all others are going to have the opportunity to respond in writing, but perhaps you would like to respond to their criticism of the report. Mr. Goldstein. Thank you, Madam Chair. Just a few comments at this point. I very much appreciate the panelists' comments because, as we have said, it is a draft report. And we use a draft report to be able to engage and obtain comments and try to come to greater agreement, which we will do once this report is finalized. Just a few real quick comments. I think I would hope that Judge Robinson particularly might read the report again, because I feel that a number of the issues that she raised today, she made assumptions that she took out of the report that aren't quite accurate, as well as I think there are some things that she mischaracterized and did not fully explain. So I hope that she will reread the report before the judiciary's comments are provided to us in full. With respect to Commissioner Peck, GAO and GSA have long had a very strong relationship and have worked together very well over the years. We can have honest differences, and it appears in this case we do. But I would make a few comments regarding Mr. Peck's charges where he feels that we did not-- where our calculators were wrong. So let me make a few comments. First of all, GAO relied on GSA to provide us all the information in the report. All the numbers we used are GSA numbers. GAO did not independently measure anything; we did not make any independent policy decisions. We used the policy guidance and standards that GSA has had in place. For the 33 courthouses in the scope of our engagement, GSA provided us the total gross square footage via its E-Smart measurement database. This total gross square footage, in line with GSA's policy, includes the upper level of atriums and tenant floor cuts as part of gross square footage. So I don't know why Mr. Peck is saying that is not the case. For our seven case study courthouses, GSA provided us with the blueprints with the space already measured and classified according to GSA policy. We verified that these measurements were equivalent to the measurements in E-Smart, but made no independent measurements or space classifications on our own. Therefore, the extent to which the upper level of the atrium floors and tenant floor cuts are counted as useable space are determined by how GSA classified them. Upper levels of the atrium floors are counted as part of the gross square footage, but not as usable space. Tenant floor cuts for courtrooms are counted as usable space for the most part and included in rental calculations to the judiciary, unless the tenant floor goes up to the penthouse, in which it is not included. GSA's current policies on how to classify and count this space have been in existence since at least 2000. Mr. Peck's description of 2005 is not correct. During the course of our engagement, we received the GSA policy provided to regional offices in 2000 that describes the equivalent policies regarding the measurement of atrium and tenant floor cut space as GSA's current policy. Atrium and tenant floor cuts are not the only reason that these courthouses are larger than authorized. For example, the Ferguson Courthouse in Miami has more than 50,000 square feet of tenant space, and planned each of its 14 district courtrooms are about 17 percent larger than design guide standards. Of the seven courthouses we examined in case studies, three of the seven had atriums large enough to be major contributors to the size overages. And we certainly don't dispute that large atriums push gross square footage. That is obvious. But the other four had no atriums or had atriums too small to be major contributors to size overages. On these four, the size overages were largely caused by other issues such as extra tenant spaces or extra mechanical or common spaces. These four courthouses were all larger than authorized by percentages ranging by 5 percent in Tucson to 26 percent in St. Louis. Furthermore, of these four, only St. Louis had tenant floor cuts. So that issue is only a small part as well. So those are just some of the things that obviously we will talk about more in our final formal comments once we receive GSA's comments. Thank you, ma'am. Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Goldstein. Mr. Peck, you can see the Committee is concerned that the authorizing committee was not informed. You talk about informing the appropriate committees. Do you understand that to mean the authorizers as well as the appropriators? Mr. Peck. Yes, ma'am. Absolutely. And let me just make a point about the difference of measurements. This is a complicated issue in the private sector as well as in the public sector, because it is always hard to explain to someone how a given floor plate, a floor of an office building, much simpler than a courthouse, can have different measurements. But whether or not you count the cuts in the floor for elevator shafts or even for electrical conduits and water pipes, whether those count as gross or net square footage to be charged to a tenant are issues of significant debate, in the private sector as well as in the public sector. So what we have here is a situation that works like this: When we come to you for a prospectus authorization, and, as you know, we have detailed discussions with your staff and with the Committee about almost every one of those, we come to you at the beginning of a design process for an authorization. At the beginning of that design process, we take the generic requirements of a court, which is done by multiplying the amount of square footage that you need for the number of courtrooms, the associated circulation space; ancillary spaces like attorney conference rooms, jury rooms, jury assembly rooms; plus space of other agencies that typically go with courthouses, like the marshals, sometimes parole and probation, and we give you a generic square footage and an estimate of the dollar amount that will be required to build the courthouse. During the course of detailed design and construction, however, we make decisions about how we will align the courtrooms within the building, whether there will be an atrium, for what purposes they are. And so at the end of the process, we have built a building, and we have focused very much on our overall dollar authorizations and appropriations. Square footages can vary. And as I can tell you, in the Miami courthouse, a huge amount--I am sorry, the Phoenix courthouse, a huge amount of the extra footage is accounted for by a very large covered atrium, which we and the designer might have made the decision to keep as an open courtyard, but we enclosed it, and that adds to the gross square footage of the building. The problem I have with the GAO calculations is that GAO then takes that empty square footage, multiplies it by the dollars per square foot that you normally apply to building enclosed courtroom, corridor, jury room space, and says all of that money is wasted. So this $835 million estimate is just flat out wrong. And it is---- Ms. Norton. Mr. Peck, I think that is a fair point. But we are still left with 50 percent overbuilding. Let us give you your atriums. And I don't want to see any more atriums. Taxpayers are paying for space. Programs are being cut across the United States, and nobody knows when this economy will come back. The President has put a freeze across the board. Do you think we are not going to freeze here as well? Even if I give you those points, let us say 50 percent of this space is attributed to atriums and tenant floor space, that leaves 800,000 square feet overbuilt for other reasons. Now, I mean, all we want--we are not playing a game of gotcha here. We are trying to find a way to make sure this doesn't happen again. And with that much overbuilt space, wasn't there a legitimate reason to come back to the Committee for additional congressional authorization? You act as though once you give it to us, these things happen. Do you really expect us to sit here and take that? Mr. Peck. Because we have mostly in hearings here and in the authorizing committees on both sides of the Hill and in the Appropriations Committee focused very much on the cost of our buildings, as I know you all want us to. We haven't focused as much on whether the square footage during the course of detailed design, both because of measurement anomalies and because of changes in the scope or design standards, add square footage so long as it doesn't add to the overall cost of the project. Ms. Norton. Square footage equals costs. Square footage and costs cannot be disaggregated that way. Mr. Peck. No, they can, because there are gross square footages. For example, the empty square footage of the top 30 feet of space in this room doesn't cost anything to build. Ms. Norton. I granted you that. And we still find 50 percent overbuilding. And you say that the standard for reporting square footage overages are to be 10 percent. Let us just look at that for a moment. While the costs may not completely be within your control, Mr. Peck, certainly the design should be substantially, if not completely, in your control. Wouldn't GSA task its architects to design to the authorized square footage of this Committee, period? Mr. Peck. We certainly could, but that would be a mistake. Ms. Norton. And if so, why would we need more than 5 percent leeway? Mr. Peck. I know, but here is what happens. May I give you a current example of how this can come about, how the square footage doesn't necessarily increase the dollar amount? We are--on one courthouse project we are undertaking now under the Recovery Act, I believe it is Recovery Act funding, we are going to add a security pavilion to an historic courthouse. Ms. Norton. What is that? What is a security---- Mr. Peck. A security pavilion means that we are going to build out from the front entrance an enclosed space for the marshals and the court security officers to process visitors so that they don't actually get into the more seriously intense part of the building. Ms. Norton. Sort of like the visitor center here? Mr. Peck. Yes, ma'am, Although it is much smaller. Ms. Norton. Yeah. Mr. Peck. No comment. It is, however--in that case, we are going to be able to build that space within the budget that we already provided for the renovation, because we found ways to save money on the rest of it. We are adding square footage. I will grant you, and I will tell you the judges have said, I have said, we should come back to you, We have not done it before. I would like to say it hasn't occurred to us because we've been so focused on costs. We will get back to you when we are getting square footage increases as design occurs. But one thing I will note to you that atriums in many cases, atriums sometimes called light wells, are a feature of many historic buildings and many current buildings in the interest of saving energy. So rather than have a strict standard when we are just coming to you for the first authorization and saying, let us never build a square foot more than we first anticipate, I much prefer the approach of coming back to you and saying, here is why we believe the square footage is going to increase, and particularly is that square footage going to increase the scope of the project beyond what the Committee intended, and is it going to increase cost. That is something we certainly want to come back and discuss with the Committee. Ms. Norton. Well, of course. As you know, Mr. Peck, this Committee has the greatest respect for the flexibility that is necessary in any and all building. What we don't respect is our authorizations being ignored. Yes, we are indeed--as long as we can have a discussion about increases in square footage given what the GSA has found, we will be fine. And there may be perfect reasons to increase. We just need to know it, because ultimately we are accountable, too. We know that--we don't believe that you are building atriums in large open spaces any longer. Are you? Mr. Peck. Not as large as some we have seen in the past. But, again, I don't want to rule them out in---- Ms. Norton. The first time that I ever heard that an atrium saves energy. I would be most interested in that. Mr. Peck. Remember, the difference between an atrium and a light well, which we don't count as gross square footage, is whether you put a roof over it. And the point of an atrium, the point of buildings like our headquarters building that is in the shape of an E, was that in the old days when you couldn't get so much lighting and air conditioning and mechanical ventilation into a building, you need to have areas that were open. Getting daylight into a building reduces the energy that you require to put in artificial lighting. So that is one reason. Ms. Norton. And as GSA has made some good progress on green roofs of various kind, if this is a variation on a green roof and you can show us that it saves energy, that is precisely what we are after. We are aware that the largest expense in building construction is the external skin, the curtain wall. So if buildings are, by volume, larger, they will be more expensive. And we believe we have a mandate not to--Mr. Peck, I have been on this Committee for 20 years. You haven't been here all the time I have been on this Committee. When I came to this Committee, there was scandalous things being done to build courthouses. There were all kinds of--at taxpayers' expense, there was overbuilding welcomed, given the kind of luxurious spaces, extra kitchens, extra lavatories, extra gyms. I mean, this was a scandal in the courthouse. Now, that has been drawn in. Now we are in overbuilding. I think I should be grateful, having been on this Committee for so long, that we are not building luxurious courthouses. There were actually judges who sat here who said that it was necessary for the administration of justice to have high ceilings, as if they had calculated in some way that justice would fall down if the ceilings were beneath a certain height. It was absurd. And it came from GSA--and here is where you need statutory help--GSA buying what some judges were saying. And, you know, we are Article 3 judges. We have to deal with cases in controversy; ergo, we have to do with everything about the courthouse. Absolutely not. When judges begin to collect the money to build the courthouses, they will have that responsibility. As long as the Constitution gives us that responsibility, they are not going to peel off from the Congress the responsibility to stay within the mandated authorization of this Committee and of the Congress of the United States. So I am pleased we are where we are, given that I know where we have been before. I am going to ask the Ranking Member, before I proceed with further questions, if he has any questions. Mr. Diaz-Balart. I do, Madam Chairman. Thank you very much. Mr. Peck, you just mentioned that you would rather come back to the Committee as opposed to just not allow you to do it for any cost increases, projection increases. Are you telling us now that before 2007, that was the case, and anything over 10 percent you would come back to this Committee? Are you committing now to do that again, to start doing that again; that if GSA sees that the cost is going to be 10 percent or above, that you would come back to this Committee as opposed to just move forward on it? Mr. Peck. Yes. Mr. Diaz-Balart, what I was referring to was the requirement we have in appropriations. If we go over 10 percent, we have to ask for a reprogramming. What I am saying is that if we think the square footage is going to go over 10 percent or whatever percent you choose, could be zero percent, on the square footage that we initially report, we are happy to come back and describe it to you and tell you the costs, obviously. Mr. Diaz-Balart. I think what you need to do is come back and request an amendment of that authorization. And is that what I am hearing is that you would come back and request an amendment of the authorization? Mr. Peck. What I would prefer in the interest of management that is more efficient is some percentage of flexibility, because before we have to come back and get an amended prospectus, and here is why. Here is why, when we first come back to you with a design prospectus, it is based on a very generic program for a building. We then have to apply it to a site that we acquire. All kinds of things come in. And things can move up and down in the square footage we need. And rather than have to come back to you, because then we have to wait for you to have a hearing and a markup, I would rather have some leeway in there, but with the understanding that we would always report a square footage and perhaps have your staff at least have some leeway in there before we have to amend the prospectus. Mr. Diaz-Balart. We are now--just to make sure we are understanding each other, what used to be the case was over 10 percent is when you would come back. Ten percent leeway is leeway. Now, even for Federal standards, 10 percent leeway is a heck of a lot of leeway. What I am asking you is do you not think--which is what you used to do before 2007--that you would come back to the Committee to ask for an amendment if it is above 10 percent? What is the right number? How much leeway; is it 30 percent, 20 percent, 50 percent? You don't think 10 percent is enough leeway? Mr. Peck. I think 10 percent--like I said, 10 percent would be enough leeway to not have to come back to the Committee. And anything, if we hit 10 percent, we should have to come back to the Committee. Mr. Diaz-Balart. For an amended authorization. All right. I just want to make sure, because--again, I want to make sure of that. Our frustration, and that is why we speak with one voice here, is because we keep hearing--I hate to say this, with all due respect--a lot of excuses du jour. Again, you are saying that you want leeway. I ask you 10 percent; I got your answer. I am not going to hound on that. So we do expect, because, as you just said right now, that you would have to come back to this Committee for authorization, for an amendment authorization of anything over 10 percent, correct? Mr. Peck. Yes, sir. Mr. Diaz-Balart. OK. Great. Now, Mr. Ponsor, we all understand the importance of making sure that judges have the space they need. But regardless, it is very difficult to argue, and this report confirms it, that there are not empty spaces and courtrooms that are overbuilt. And yet when I heard your testimony, it was--and, again, very respectfully, I want to make sure I didn't misunderstand. I am almost hearing the fact that, yes, you said there are six suggestions that you like, but almost kind of justifying this overbuilding as if it really wasn't happening. And let us focus on some outcomes, specific outcomes. Let us focus, for example, on in Long Island or Washington, D.C., or even in Miami where I am from. Are you going to tell me that those are not seriously overbuilt? Judge Ponsor. I am not going to tell you that there isn't overbuilding in those three courthouses that you just identified. I have been to the Islip courthouse. It was built larger than it should have been. I agree with you. There are specific reasons with regard to the Miami situation that I think help to explain what happened. I am not going to sit here and try and justify it to you. When I read in the report, I will tell you frankly, that they have 2,800- square-foot district courtrooms in the Miami courthouse, I was like the cartoon character whose hat flies up in the air with a big exclamation mark next to it. We have 2,400-square-foot courtrooms. That would not happen today. We are tightening things down. Those courtrooms should not be 2,800 square feet, and I am committed to controlling that. We were talked into that, I am told, historically--it was not on my watch--by judges saying that they need 2,800 square feet because they have multidefendant trials. I have a 27-defendant drug gang coming before me. Don't tell me that Miami needs extra big courtrooms because they have multidefendant trials. We have an obligation to control that. Now, we do have the building there that is contaminated with mold. That is no longer on our rent rolls. We have had to take it off the rent rolls. The Ferguson Building does have problems. There is a complex there that has difficulties. But I am not going to sit here and tell you that the building in Miami was one of our good planning days. As far as the Prettyman Building here in Washington, D.C., I am frightened to even get into a conversation with you about it because you know it much better than I do. The only thing that I can say about the building is that it is one of those situations where our resources really can't be overwhelmed. We are maxed out on that site. That is going to be the courthouse for the next generation. We have got to have the resources to deal with what is going to be thrown at that court. We have nine judges in that court right now who are very close to coming into senior status; they are going to keep working, we are going to need space for them. They have a high security courtroom there with the plexiglass security screen. They have an Internet hookup with Gitmo for some of the proceedings related to Guantanamo. That is a court that is very heavily used. It is also being used by the Washington Superior Court. It is being used by the Court of International Claims. It is one of those courts that, like my good friend Judith Resnik talks about wanting to use, we want to use the courtrooms more. We don't want them to be empty. But let me say one thing about capacity and the fact that some of the courtrooms are not always being used. I know this may be an awkward analogy, but it occurs to me. My son, who I am very, very proud of, is on his third deployment in Iraq right now. He is up in a helicopter. They send the resources over there not to deal with averages. They don't send the resources over there to deal with minimal demands. They have to deal with anything that is thrown at them, and they have to have the capacity for the peak demands. We know these peak demands are going to be coming along. We need our courthouses. We are the institution that cannot be overwhelmed. We have to have the resources. If I can shift my analogy, it is like a power grid. The power grid is not designed to deal with averages; it is designed to deal with peak demands. We know the Augusts are going to come along, the hot weather is going to come, and we have to have the resources. Mr. Diaz-Balart. But, sir, with all due respect, we can all start talking about in general terms about where, what we need. But when you look at the actual facts on the ground, we are way beyond that. We are way beyond that. You know, the D.C. One, it was designed for 41; 10 years later we are, what, 39 judges. So I don't care what analogy you use, sir, power outages, power companies, you are way beyond that, you know. And I am glad, by the way--and let me first thank your family for its service to the country. Yours, but also your son's, which is important to know, and it is important to recognize it. Judge Ponsor. Thank you. Mr. Diaz-Balart. But using that in context, $800 million in overspending, that is a heck of a lot of armor for helicopters that we are not funding, et cetera. So let us put it in perspective. Here is the bottom line, because we can talk about specifics all day long. I think the report has a lot of specifics. I would respectfully ask also what Mr. Goldstein said, that you all reread that report and look at the bottom line. And as opposed to coming up with all sorts of reasons why the overbuilding took place and all sorts of excuses as to why the overbuilding took place, that we figure out and we find ways to stop it. Not to just look at, oh, yeah. No. How do we stop it? Because you are looking at real numbers here, real money. And as the Chairwoman said, particularly in tough times, we have to be even more conscious of that. Judge Ponsor. If I could respond for a minute and a half. It is a painful accusation. Mr. Diaz-Balart. It is not an accusation. Judge Ponsor. In my mind, most respectfully, it is an accusation that is not fully supported. And I agree that there should be no overbuilding, and I agree that individual courts can be criticized. But the criticism contained in this report is very substantially exaggerated, in my opinion. And I understand, anyone would be concerned at an $835 million waste of taxpayer money. In my opinion, the amount was nothing like that. And that number, to allow it to hang in the air without response is something that I really can't do. That number is an unfair and exaggerated number, in my opinion. Let me give you a specific example. Mr. Diaz-Balart. You will have the opportunity to respond. Judge Ponsor. And we will. In my courthouse they say we are 10 to 20 percent over the authorization. I asked my people to pull the construction prospectus. The construction prospectus is 158,755 gross feet. The final courthouse is 162,000 gross square feet. I am surprised we went over even by that much, because we cut one courtroom out of the process when we were going through it. We were really killing ourselves to try to keep this courthouse down to what it should be, and I think we succeeded. We are 2 percent over, not 10 to 20 percent over. That is the fact. And I don't know about these other numbers. I don't have the GAO working papers. And we have been given nothing from them to work with. Mr. Diaz-Balart. And I think it would be unfair now to go into the specifics of every single issue, and obviously you are going to have the opportunity to look at that, to review that, and to get back. I do want to, though, mention another issue. I understand, for example, the L.A. courthouse, which is something this Committee has been dealing with for a long time, supposedly--my understanding is there are fewer judges today in L.A. than there were over 10 years ago, which is when the courthouse was proposed. Is that L.A. courthouse still a huge priority for the judiciary? Number one priority, is my understanding. Is it still designated as a space emergency? Judge Ponsor. Yes. Mr. Diaz-Balart. Can you explain why? Judge Ponsor. First of all, I want to compliment you, because you are doing a very good job of putting your finger right on our sore spots. The L.A. courthouse, as you know as well as I do, has been a huge difficulty for all of us. It remains our number one priority. It is a very important courthouse. It is, what, the second largest city in the United States, I guess. It is an important facility. I think the Chair has visited it. I have visited it. I have walked around the courthouse. It is a dangerous courthouse. It is a courthouse that is falling apart. It is a courthouse that is hard to try cases in. And we need a solution in Los Angeles. We do not have that solution right now. And we are going to work closely with you on anything that happens in Los Angeles. Mr. Diaz-Balart. I appreciate that. Judge Ponsor. If you don't want to call it a space emergency, it is an emergency. It is a very nonfunctional situation that is hard on the courts. I cannot comment on whether the number of judges has gone down. I just don't know that. Mr. Diaz-Balart. Well, again, here is where we are having a hard time understanding. This Committee authorized $400 million. Now, $400 million in anybody's book is real money. Judge Ponsor. Yes, it is. Mr. Diaz-Balart. I understand that. I guess the request is $1 billion. You know, when we are dealing with--there are still unutilized--there is unutilized space there. Already you have fewer judges today than there were 10 years ago, my understanding. You have $400 million that has been sitting there. And the attitude is we have less judges, we have unutilized space, we have $400 million sitting there, and that is not enough. Now, you see that that is our frustration. Judge Ponsor. I can understand it. Mr. Diaz-Balart. So I am not trying to pick on a specific issue, but here is what I think we need to see. We have a report that shows that there are serious problems. You have mentioned some specifics; you are saying that those numbers may not be quite right. Nothing is perfect in life, I understand that; however, I am telling you right now one case that we are familiar with, that this Committee is familiar with, L.A., I am not quite sure what the report says about L.A., but I don't know if it is underreporting, overreporting. What I am telling you is that it is hard to argue the case of L.A., and yet it is still a huge priority. And you have $400 million sitting there, and that is not enough. Don't you understand where our frustration comes from? Judge Ponsor. I certainly do. Mr. Diaz-Balart. And do you not understand, sir, why the American people have to be saying this is totally broken? Four hundred million dollars is not enough in a situation where you have, again, less judges today than when this thing was planned for. You have $400 million in the bank, you have unutilized court space, and it is still not enough. And people are losing their jobs. Judge Ponsor. Mr. Peck may want to comment on that. He may know better than I. Mr. Peck. Two things. One is on Los Angeles, I understand before I came back to GSA that there was an estimate at some point of a $1 billion project. We are trying to rescope the project; we will be nowhere near $1 billion, I can tell you that. I am aware of how much money we have in bank, and we are going to try to bring in that project as close to that number as we can. But it has not been built. So we have not overbuilt it yet. Ms. Norton. Would the gentleman yield for a moment? When it was authorized, it was not $1 billion. But because you have let the money sit in the bank with costs, of course, construction costs, going up, somehow the people think this Committee--I regard this as nothing--it is not a stalemate, it is a strike. Congress said $400 million it has got to be 10 years ago. They decided that wasn't enough then. You come back. Yes, I understand you, Mr. Peck. It is $1 billion; it is probably more than that now. Does anybody really think we are going to get up off of more money for the L.A. courthouse? It can just sit there as far as we are concerned. Mr. Peck. Well, what I was going to respond to, we need to take a look at--I have heard this, too, that there are fewer judges than there were before. Normally when we hear that, it is because some judges who were on senior status have retired or have passed away or something has happened. But we will get back to you on that. But one thing I do want to clarify again. There is a bottom-line number here that I have alluded to that I want to say again so that we can get over the $835 million number. We added up the appropriations that we got for the 33 courthouses studied by GAO. The total appropriated dollar amounts--and these are completed buildings--was $3,046,000,000. And the funding required for completion was 3,314,000,000. So that was an increase overall of about 8.8 percent. So just so we don't--just so we get out of this sense that there has been some huge overbuilding of the program, I am just telling you that we held to within 8.8 percent of our budget. And I have to tell you, having just come out of the private sector projects, that is a pretty good record as well. Mr. Diaz-Balart. Again, a couple things. There seems to be, however, a consensus--and nobody is denying that we are overbuilt, number one. Number two is almost 9 percent--being within 9 percent of the budget is not exactly something that I think any of us should be proud of. Mr. Peck. No, sir. But in a period in which construction costs escalated for various reasons in this country, because we were building in a period generally of an industry boom, construction costs escalated by about 58 percent during that period, and we held our costs to an 8 percent overage. So I am just telling you there are reasons. I am only--when I say I am really proud of our project is when it is on time, on budget, and now as we now say on green. Mr. Diaz-Balart. And I agree, that is when we should be proud. Again, there will be ample opportunity to discuss the real specifics of the report. Let me just go to another issue, if I may, Madam Chair. The issue of how--the estimates of how many judges are going to be there in the future, and that is obviously something that has not worked. I am not pointing fingers or blaming anybody. It was not done on purpose, but we know it doesn't work. We know those estimates have not been accurate. Are you looking at changing that? Are we throwing that out finally because we know it is not working, and coming up with a more accurate way of determining, of making those estimates? Mr. Peck. I think we have already thrown it out. We at the beginning of this program back in 1993, 1994, whenever you count the beginning, I believe we were looking at 30-year requirements on the court. We were assuming that there would be judgeship bills coming rather regularly. That has not been the case, but we have not made those kinds of projections on recent courthouse designs. But as I said in my testimony, we are in conversations with the courts, and we would--I believe all of us, including you and the Members of the Committee, need to come together and reach an agreement on how we do project needs for courthouses as we go forward, because all of us, it is not an easy business, but we sure ought to have an agreement on how we are going to go about doing it. Mr. Diaz-Balart. We have a long list of knowing that it is not working. Mr. Peck. That is correct. Mr. Diaz-Balart. And that is not recent. That is 20 years or whatever that may be. Now, the issue of courtroom sharing. You know, I do want to just very briefly--I mentioned a little bit at the beginning, it makes no sense to me why we are not doing a lot more of that. A lot more of that. Is it a little bit more difficult to share? Maybe. But, you know, there seems to be a trend now around the country where we have to more thoroughly utilize the people's assets, and this is one where we clearly can do a much better job. The report shows it. The Committeehas been saying it. The Chairwoman has been saying it for a long time. And I hope that is not something that is also swept under the table, and that we don't just look at ways why it cannot be done as opposed to look at ways how we are going to get it done and how we are going to figure out how to get it done. If the report's actual way of getting it done does not fulfill your needs, then I would like to see how you are going to get it done, not how you are not going to get it done and why it is impossible to do it, as opposed to, all right, that may not be the right way. Let us figure out a way to make sure we utilize those courtrooms, that they are shared, because that is happening throughout the country in schools and in public buildings, and it makes no sense that we cannot do it with the courtrooms. I mean, I don't know if--I think the American people are just fed up from Congress, from the administration, and from every other segment of government with bureaucratic answers as to why we can't share space, why we can't do these things, as opposed to figuring out ways to get it done. Are we expressing that? Is that getting across today? Judge Robinson. Congressman, we agree. We agree that we should be good stewards of taxpayers' money, and that contemplates that we seriously consider courtroom sharing. And we have been responsive, the Judicial Conference has been responsive, and are now being proactive in that effort. When we first started talking about this issue in 2005--and I understand there were many years of talking about it before that. But in 2005, when Congressman Shuster really charged us to go back and start studying this, we did that. And we have enacted a 2-1 sharing ratio for senior judges, a 2-1 for magistrate judges, a careful and considered study of bankruptcy judges. And we are going to go beyond that and try to determine what kind of economies of scale we can accomplish, particularly in the larger courthouses with more than ten district judges. So we take this very seriously. But there are so many things in the balance that's what I want to suggest to you and to tell you today, and one is that we also have a duty to taxpayers and citizens or noncitizens, whoever they are, who come into our courtrooms, to give them a place where they can resolve their situations without too much undue expense. And for every time we reschedule something or continue something, not to mention any talk about moving a trial or a hearing some distance away, we are talking about real costs shouldered by the very people that you are talking about as well. They are paying their own expenses, but they are paying their attorneys' fees and attorneys' expenses. And oftentimes all of it is at the taxpayer's expense. I think Representative Johnson spoke of being a litigator both in criminal and civil cases. And I don't know if any of his cases involved appointed cases, but oftentimes it is the taxpayers that are shouldering the entirety of the criminal case. So when you talk about rescheduling or moving, you are talking about real dollars and lots of dollars. That is part of the balance that we are attempting to strike. We could look at averages, and we can look at models, but it doesn't replicate what goes on in the real world. And that is why we have to consider the experience that we continue to have in litigating these cases. And I have read the GAO study. I take issue with Mr. Goldstein. I have read it, and I have read it again, and I can read it right now. And what it will not tell you is what their assumptions are. There are underlying assumptions for that modeling. In my remarks I tried to glean what some of those assumptions would be based on some of the things in the report, such as 1- to 2- day average trials. I have never had an experience of having a 1- to 2-day criminal trial. I think most district judges will tell you that it takes the good part of 1 day to select the jury in even a small, short-term criminal case. The defendant has a right to a jury trial, both sides have a right to select a jury, a jury that is going to be of their peers, but also a jury that is going to be objective and impartial. There is no such thing, in my experience, as a 1-day criminal trial for that reason, or even a 2-day criminal trial. Similarly, with civil jury trials, even though they may be short, to say that any modeling is based on that assumption-- and I don't know that it is. Again, I don't have their assumptions. To say that it is a 10-hour trial day doesn't replicate what goes on in the real world. We are talking about human beings. Jurors can't sit there and listen to evidence for 10 days and process it. The court reporters can't report for 10 days straight and process it, even with an hour off for lunch. I mean, there are limitations. And that is why I appreciated what Congressman Johnson had to say for those of us in the field, if you will, who are on the ground. Our experience matters, and that is why my committee, along with the--well, the FJC is the one that conducted the study. But those findings have to be evaluated in the context of human nature and the experiences that we have had in our many years of collective judging experience. Mr. Diaz-Balart. And nobody is arguing that. Nobody is arguing against that. On that point, though, by the way, let me just ask GAO, in some of the courthouses, a few of the courthouses where there is sharing, do we know if there has been a horrible issue of delays or moved cases, et cetera? Mr. Goldstein. I would raise a couple points, sir. First of all, Judge Robinson is again not correct about the assumptions she is making in her report. And so I can only reiterate that she is misreading it, and I would encourage the judiciary in their comments to read it carefully, because what she is saying is simply not accurate. She is mischaracterizing our report in many regards. With respect to the question you are raising, sir, we had numerous interviews with judges, with clerks and others across the country in this report in our work. We went out into the field and we went to many different courthouses, particularly courthouses that have shared. Combination of real-life experience as well as the models that we developed show that there have been no delays. The model shows that there will be no delays. If you look and recall page 24 of our report, the Federal Judicial Center's own data shows that, on average, a district courtroom is used by a judge for court-related purposes 2 hours a day. The rest of it is either not used or used for other purposes. Mr. Diaz-Balart. Where do those numbers come from? Mr. Goldstein. The FJC, based on the study they did. On its face sharing can be accomplished. The degree to which sharing is accomplished should be up to the judiciary. We are not suggesting that they follow our model exactly. They can develop their own model, their own parameters, their own assumptions. But I would add, the parameters by which our model was developed was not done by GAO. The parameters of our model was based on the National Academy of Sciences panel that we put together that we asked the National Academy to do. It consisted of a 1-day session as well as numerous other interviews that we did with roughly 24, 25 panel members. It was a discussion of conditions of and challenges to sharing, and it is from there that the parameters were developed. They weren't developed by GAO. Mr. Diaz-Balart. Here is the issue. I mean, again, and I keep saying, I don't think this is the moment to start talking about the specifics of every single issue of every single detail. However, I am not a lawyer, but I know that for lawyers in particular, words matter. And I would just like to say, as opposed to consider sharing, no; that you look at ways to make it happen, to figure out ways to make it work, as opposed to you are going to consider whether there should be sharing. There is a consensus on this Committee, and, you know, I understand that there may be and there is going to be ample opportunity to review the numbers, and there may be some discrepancies, and there may be some differences of opinion as to if the model is perfect, if it works. But as you just heard, nobody is saying that you follow that particular model. But I think what you are hearing, and I just want to make sure that it is clear, is not that you should consider whether courtrooms should be shared, but you should find ways to share courtrooms. And I just want to make sure that I am not--that that word was not used--how you are using that word. Judge Robinson. You are exactly right, Congressman Diaz- Balart. And you are right, we are wordsmiths. And the point I want to get across is that we are not considering sharing--we have been considering sharing ratios. We have been sharing. I think if GAO or anyone else went across the country and talked to judges--and the study encompassed a much broader questionnaire and requests for experiential information--you would find that many of us, I would say most of us, at one time or another have shared courtrooms either because a courtroom is out of commission, or there was a shortage of courtrooms, or we were in an historical courthouse where there simply weren't enough courtrooms, or one of us was engaged in a particularly long trial. I have actually had to take another trial to another division in my district because of high-profile concerns and because of the length of the trial and because my courtroom wasn't large enough to accommodate it. We do share. What we have been trying to do and study very deliberately and with great consideration is what the appropriate ratio ought to be, particularly as we are looking forward. But to say that we are only considering sharing is not correct. And I do take issue with the comments made about the judiciary not appropriately reading the GAO report. We are hampered by the fact that we don't have the assumptions underlying this modeling. I wish we did. And if we did, I would be here to address them more specifically. I have tried to glean what I think some of those assumptions might be from certain statements made in the GAO report. And some of those statements, I think, in fact, come from comments that were made by the select group of judges that the GAO talked to. And it is interesting, because I have talked to some of those judges, and they are very upset because their statements and views were misrepresented. All of them said, yes, short-term or as-needed courtroom sharing can be accomplished. We know this because that is our experience. We have done it. But to say that that does not result in longer delays is not at all consistent with any of our experience. If we have to all share 2-1 going forward from here on out, you can bet that at some point you are going to be wanting to conduct a hearing because there are going to be a lot of litigants that are going to be costed out of our system when they have to wait twice as long to get to trial. That has been our experience, and that will continue to be our experience, because that is the way this works. Now, and to talk about collegiality and the sharing of courtrooms and scheduling of courtrooms, that is a small piece of the algorithm of all the variables that we have to consider when we are trying to get our 300 or 400 or how many cases it is into trial within a 3-year period. Congress has tasked us with getting a civil case to trial within 3 years. Under the Constitution, and as augmented by the Speedy Trial Act, we are tasked with getting a criminal case to trial--jury trial-- within 70 days with some exceptions. And these are things that are part of our critical mission, but also among the so-called variables that we deal with on a daily basis when we are trying to get these courtrooms scheduled and ready for trial. Does that mean our courtrooms always have the lights on and are used every minute? That does not mean that, because, as you know and I know, with civil cases and criminal cases, ultimately the large percentage of them do settle. But we need the readiness of the courtroom. And it is because of the readiness and availability of the courtroom that we are able to even get those cases in that posture. A lot of this has to do with human behavior. A case is not going to settle if the lawyers know that you don't have a courtroom ready and available for them to go to trial, because they are going to be working on their other 50 cases that they have got in their quiver or their inventory. I see Congressman Johnson laughing; it is because he has been in the trenches and he knows that is how it works. You work on the thing that is the most pressing and the highest priority in your inventory. So it is an important tool. Whether it is latent use or actual use, the availability of a courtroom is what makes our system work. Mr. Diaz-Balart. When you all come forward to us and asking for additional space, do you put in there latent use of space? Is that part of it? Or is it--I have never heard that. Judge Robinson. That was part of the FJC study. By that we mean the example I gave you earlier, that when I have 10 civil cases set for trial, I stack them. That is the only way I know how to efficiently do this. All but nine have settled. If that last case settles, and it is about 2 or 3 weeks out from going, then I am going to have a 5-day period of latent use, meaning that that case was scheduled for trial, but for whatever reason they have now settled it. And I can't move another week-long trial in there. Now, I can fill part of that time. I can find some criminal hearings where the parties are ready, and I am not going to be violating due process to move them into a slot, because I have to take those things into consideration. I can't force people to go to trial before they are ready because there are due process considerations. I can't force them to go to a hearing before they are ready, sometimes because there are due process considerations. But I can find some time to fill part of that, but I cannot move another week-long trial and fully fill that space. That is what we call latent use of a courtroom, knowing that it is scheduled, but it may not ultimately be used. Mr. Diaz-Balart. I understand that, and I think the model did account for that. But however, look, again, I just want to make sure that you understand. You can't take humans and human nature out of this process. I understand that. I do think, however, that there is a pretty strong case that we have clearly overbuilt. There is a very strong case, I think hard to argue against the fact that--which you all agreed to, that the process that we have been using to determine what the needs are is not accurate. I would tell you that those two issues are, as the report said, and something that this Committee is arguing for a long time, we haven't had cooperation, frankly, of people agreeing with us until now. But I am glad that people are now agreeing with us. So is there a possibility that the models are not accurate? Yes, of course, because of human nature. However, I would respectfully tell you and I would like to say that it is very difficult to believe, to understand from our perspective that we cannot do a much better job, we cannot do more sharing, et cetera. And because the Chairwoman has been too generous with our time---- Judge Ponsor. May I say something to reassure you, Congressman Diaz-Balart? We aren't considering sharing. We are sharing. All of the courts on our current 5-year plan have sharing. Anniston, Alabama--sharing. Charlotte, North Carolina--sharing. Greenbelt, Maryland--sharing. Greenville, South Carolina--sharing. We have sharing. We are applying our sharing policies for magistrate judges and senior judges in all of those courts that are on the 5-year plan. It is not under consideration; it is happening. Mr. Diaz-Balart. I understand that. There is no doubt that we can always do better, and I think this report shows potential ways to do better, and I hope that we take those seriously. I do want to end with one point, however, going back to the L.A. courthouse. I think you heard from the Chairwoman and you hear from me, and I think you have heard from this Committee and the Full Committee, that this constant request to go from $400 million to $1 billion or whatever it is---- Judge Ponsor. That is not happening. Mr. Diaz-Balart. OK. And I just hope that we don't see that again. Thank you. That alone would be a huge step in the wrong direction. Judge Ponsor. That is not happening. Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you. Ms. Norton. Well, I appreciate that Mr. Diaz-Balart wanted to clarify that. If you hear some exasperation here, it is not because of the witnesses before us; it is because this issue has plagued this Committee for so long. For example, the L.A. courthouse. What a thorn in our side the L.A. courthouse has been. You all want to let the $400 million rot, so be it. But we could not in good conscience say, well, since they delayed 10 years, let us throw $1 billion at them. And also, before I go on to Mr. Johnson, I want to clarify this notion of the trenches, the notion that you are before people who don't understand the practice of the law. The Committee is full of lawyers, and the Subcommittee, including your chair, not only is an attorney who practiced before the Federal district courts, the courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court of the United States before she was elected; your chair also clerked for a very distinguished district court judge and saw up close how the system operates. I am now a Member of the United States Congress. Above all, I understand the separation of powers, and I understand the difference between our responsibility and yours. I have the utmost respect for the judiciary, but I ask you to respect the separation of powers as well and to understand that this Committee, which enjoys the broadest consensus on this issue, will be held accountable if we do not hold the courts and the GSA accountable as well. Mr. Johnson, have you any questions? Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you, Madam Chair. I would let you all know that, no, it was not any appointed cases that I tried. They were all paid, private-paid cases. And never did any advertising, you know, maybe other than an occasional Yellow Page ad that really didn't work, or in a local newspaper, something like that. But my 27 years of practice in private practice--I opened up my law office when I got out of law school, literally hung a shingle up and started practicing law. So I am proud of my humble beginnings, and I am proud of how far I came. And I got there based on word of mouth and reputation, and so my reputation among those who employed me and recommended me, and who I tried cases in front of and opposing counsel, they all know that when you have got Hank Johnson in the room, that he was going to be prepared. He was going to know what the issues are or were. So I bring that same skillset to this position. I am very proud to serve on the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. It is a very important Committee. Another one of my assignments as a congressman is as the chair of the Courts and Competition Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee. Wearing the hat as chair of the courts, let's leave off the other part of it, let's just deal with the court's aspect of the Judiciary Subcommittee, I work closely with judges. Now I know why the judges in the Judicial Conference are so enthralled with the fact that I am there. It is not because I am me, Hank Johnson, it is because they have a lawyer who has actually practiced and yes, in the trenches, who can utilize that expertise to assist our judiciary, which, quite frankly, has been under attack in this country since the 1980's due to decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education and others where politicians who sit in these great big, hundred-foot ceilinged committee rooms that are humongous in size, but yet not very often do we have the Full Committee meet. And when we do, it might be for 2 or 3 hours. No judicial officer took part in deciding how much space we need for a committee room. No executive officer, the President didn't come in and say I am going to tell you how much space you need and when you will have to share. Everybody respected the fact that the legislature should control its use of the space that it decided to build. And I will tell you, we have a lot of space in this building where there are committee rooms set up that we don't even use. And if we had somebody to take a look at that, they could always sling arrows at us. Every Committee Chairman wants to have a hearing room that he or she can call home, and every Subcommittee Chair has a room that they can call home. It is the committee room. So a lot of those Subcommittee rooms don't end up being utilized very much, but I am going to shift now from my perspective on the issues that we are dealing with here today, having given my experience and having shared with you my frame of reference for making the comments that I make, and also making sure that people understand that I said at the end I am going to ask questions, I am going to learn more. I have never been to the Los Angeles courthouse before. I have no idea about that, but I will tell you I do have an idea about one branch of government dictating to another branch what that branch thinks it needs without having a good appreciation of the real world. And so I will always be standing up for the third branch of government, the third equal branch of government. I will say this: When I was practicing law, Monday morning, 8:30 a.m., going to the courthouse, driving by the courthouse, I would see a long line of people, jurors, litigants, witnesses, some law enforcement waiting outside in the cold and in the wind and in the rain trying to get into the courthouse. That is one of the big reasons why atriums are a great idea. Those people have to be afforded some kind of comfort. That is why we have a justice system as the third branch of government, and we should not dog the people out who we are dispensing justice to. And I fight for that. I am going to ask a couple of questions. Mr. Peck, your role at GSA public building services is to overseeing Federal courthouse construction; is that right? Mr. Peck. Yes, sir, and management. Mr. Johnson of Georgia. And management. Now, with respect to the 33 courthouses completed since the year 2000, including 3.56 million square feet of extra space that has cost the government an extra $835 million we are told to construct, and an extra $51 million to rent, operate and maintain, can you tell the Subcommittee how those figures were arrived at? Mr. Peck. Again, it is the GAO's report. But what they did, they estimated the amount of square footage due to various causes that they felt was overbuilt in the courthouse, including, as I noted, atrium space, double height courtroom space, that counts as gross square footage technically. They multiplied that, what they calculated as gross square footage, by the average dollar amount it costs per square foot to build a courthouse, and calculated that as the excess cost, that plus some other scope increases. As I noted, that may be an interesting calculation, but we do have real numbers on how much it cost us to build the courthouses. And the real number that we had, as I noted, and my numbers are based on 32 of the 33 courthouses, I am noting, is that we appropriated $3.46 billion and change, and we built them for $3.314 billion. The difference there is $268 million. So in other words, the calculation that GAO made was a theoretical calculation, and we are saying that the assumptions on which they were made were erroneous. Mr. Johnson of Georgia. So you disagree with GAO's findings in that regard? Mr. Peck. Yes, sir. Mr. Johnson of Georgia. To the tune of about $268 million? Mr. Peck. Yes, sir. Mr. Johnson of Georgia. That is a lot of disagreement; $268 million worth of disagreement right there. When did GSA adopt a policy for measuring gross square footage of courthouses? Mr. Peck. Well, we have adopted different measures, different ways of measuring square footage. I am going to have to go back and see. My information is that we formally adopted a new measure somewhere in 2005, 2007. Mr. Goldstein says it was back in 2000. The point I would make is that the way of measuring what counts, it is not how big the building is. The building is as big as it is; anybody can see it by looking at it. The question is what counts as square footage for various purposes. And the issue we have had before the Committee, Congressman, is when we first bring a proposed authorization to the Committee, we have only a very generic program for a courthouse. And as we build it out, we come up with more detailed square footages. What we have a good record of doing in most instances, I will say Los Angeles is an exception, is holding fairly rigorously to the budget, the dollar budget we first came up to, and the square footage tends to move around. Mr. Johnson of Georgia. According to GAO, GSA relied on the architect of the building to verify the size of the building and did not expect its regional or headquarter's officials to monitor or check whether the architect was following GSA policies. Is this an accurate assessment of GSA policy at the time? Mr. Peck. I think in many cases it is, yes, sir. The architects and engineers, as I said, there are various standards that people use to decide what counts as gross square footage and what counts as rentable square footage, and net square footage is an entirely different measure in many cases. So in a lot of cases, we asked the architects to measure the square footage. We changed that so we now do our own independent evaluation. So what happened here is that the square footage that an architect reported may not have been the same as our standard, and so what got counted as square footage for various purposes can be different even though obviously the size of a building is the same. To make a long story short, I think in some cases, the architects and engineers whom we hired and said give us your calculation of the gross square footage did it on a commercial standard that they are used to, and may not have been the standard we were reporting to the Congress and in fact using ourselves. Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Judge Ponsor, to what extent are you or your office consulted by the GSA during its construction and operation of courthouses? Judge Ponsor. We work very closely with GSA, particularly in the areas where judges have special expertise. It is GSA's responsibility, and they are the ones who are in charge of the construction project; but they consult closely with judges as the construction unfolds. And I played a part in that process. For example, when we were designing the courtrooms, GSA built a plywood mock-up, a very inexpensive mock-up of the courtroom which I visited along with lawyers and assistant U.S. Attorneys, and we scoped out the sight lines in the courtroom to make sure that I would be able to see the witness from where I was sitting and the jurors could see the attorneys. We played a role in that manner. I did participate in discussions as the courthouse was being built. Now the people in charge were GSA, but they were open to listening to us and listening to our suggestions. I would add that part of the meetings were also attended by a senior staffer of Representative Richard Neal's office who ultimately had an office in the building and had an interest from the point of view of the community in making sure that the process moves along in a measured way and that we had a courthouse that corresponded with the original concept. Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Are you saying that you had a legislator in there helping to determine the use of courtroom space? Judge Ponsor. No. Let me make that very clear; no, we did not. But we had a GSA representative, an architect representative, and a contractor representative and various other people. We were interested in knowing the timing of how fast things were going along, whether there were going to be delays, what the courthouse ultimately was going to look like, and whether we were going to vindicate the architect's design concept that had been approved and authorized by this Committee. Mr. Johnson. So there was no nefarious intent on the part of the legislator? Judge Ponsor. None whatsoever. Mr. Johnson. And certainly the Judicial Conference and the GSA have not been involved in a conspiracy to defraud the taxpayers by overbuilding courthouses; have they? Judge Ponsor. Absolutely not. I think that is the most painful thing to read about in the GAO report. I can tell you, we were honestly not trying to deliberately mislead Congress at any point. You build a building out in the open. We were very transparent. I think we came in with a really tight project. There was no effort, no desire, no intent to horn-swaggle anybody as we were building our buildings. I am pleased, and I embrace the recommendation, and I know Commissioner Peck embraces the recommendation that we will inform you, we should inform you when we go more than 10 percent over the approved prospectus. I think that is a fair and a good suggestion, and it is a way that we can tighten up the process. But really, we were not trying to mislead Congress or thwart any intent of this Committee or of Congress. We understand that you have that sphere of responsibility, and we have every interest in making sure that you can do your job. Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you, Judge Ponsor. Judge Robinson, what is your committee's role in assessing--well, let me ask the question like this: At least 10 years ago, caseloads were projected. The number of judges projected, the number of courtrooms to serve those judges projected. How do we go about making those projections? Judge Robinson. The projection for number of courtrooms or judgeships? Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Both. Judge Robinson. My committee does not have a role in that. Court Administration and Case Management, CACM, has the broadest jurisdiction of all of the committees in the sense that it deals with any issues that deal with court administration or case management. The reason we are taking the lead in terms of the courtroom sharing ratio is all about case management because we understand that we need to strike a balance between sharing and cost containment. Those are very important objectives. But at the same time, we must have effective case management, ensuring constitutional rights, statutory rights, that the litigant's expenses are not out of control because of our delays or because of the requirements we place on them, in terms of moving from one place to another. So it is our role in case management that causes us to be the lead committee on this particular issue. Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Do you agree with the GAO's findings that question the judiciary's caseload projection methods? Judge Robinson. Again, that is not something with which I have particular familiarity. It is our Judicial Resources Committee in part that looks at that and does statistical analysis. But understand that we project on the basis of a number of things, and some are assumptions based on demographic shifts and those sorts of things. We would expect that they wouldn't be perfect projections. For example, I was a bankruptcy judge for 8 years before I became a district court judge, and I don't think any one of us could have projected 10 years ago what the bankruptcy filings would be now with any accuracy because we couldn't have projected that the economy would be in the state where it is now with any accuracy. So many of these projections are based on things that none of us can predict, and all of those have very direct effects on caseloads, weighted caseloads, filings, the need for judgeships, and all of those things. Judge Ponsor. If I can just chime in on that since the Space and Facilities Committee does do some projections, I guess I can put it this way. If anybody has a crystal ball, we could use it. If anybody can see perfectly where we will be 10 years from now, we would be happy to know. If anyone has a method to help us do that, we are constantly trying to refine our methods. We use different statistical approaches to try to triangulate to make our projections as accurate as we can. We don't want resources we don't need. We are not trying to get resources that can't be used. But this process of projecting is very, very difficult. For example, between 1970 and 2000, there were over 400 new judges authorized, a little over 100 a decade. In the 10 years between 2000 and 2010, Mr. Goldstein criticizes us by saying we were 119 judges over in our estimate. If we had congressional judgeship authorization bills during that 10 years that were even the average of the preceding 30 years, we would have been received 100 additional new judges. That didn't happen. Mr. Johnson of Georgia. In fact, the numbers requested by the Judicial Conference were more than what was actually approved by Congress; isn't that correct? Judge Ponsor. Far more. Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Four to one? Judge Ponsor. I would say that it would be that in that neighborhood. There are judgeship authorization bills pending now before the House and the Senate. I believe there is a bill that would authorize 51 new district and circuit court positions that is now pending before the Senate. We don't know when there is going to be a new judgeship bill. We do know some day there will be a judgeship bill; and if there had been a judgeship bill and 100 new judgeships had been authorized between 2000 and 2010, as they were between 1970 and 2000, and we hadn't planned for them, we would be sitting here and people would be saying: What on earth were you thinking by not planning for those additional judges? You could look at the figures for the past 30 years, it was plain as day, and you did nothing. Judge Robinson. If I can just illustrate how that affects courtroom sharing ratios in our consideration of what the appropriate ratio might be, we have unfilled needs in terms of judgeships. But we also have a labor force called senior judges, and that is the first population that we looked at in determining what is an appropriate sharing ratio. To call one senior judge the same kind of person as the next senior judge is not giving them the tribute that they deserve. Our senior judges today span the age ranges of 65 to 102. I happen to know the 102-year-old. We are going to celebrate his 103rd birthday next month in Wichita, Kansas, and he is still showing up for work every day and hearing cases. So when we talk about projecting the needs of senior judges, we have outliers, and we have had some problems in estimating. But we have to understand that senior judges vary from district to district and courthouse to courthouse. Some of them have the same caseload as the active district judges. Some of them have full caseloads. Some of them have 50 percent caseloads or 25 percent caseloads. Some of them hear specialized cases. Some of them take the whole panoply of cases. So when we talk about what a senior judge needs in terms of courtroom space, we have to consider they are different people and they have different workloads. Nonetheless, we determine that a 2 to 1 sharing ratio would be appropriate considering this vast array of individuals that we are considering and the outliers, and there really is no average. So I say all of that to say that when we talk about projections--again Judge Ponsor was illustrating that the projections were based on a history of having filled judgeships--and at the same time we are looking at courtroom sharing ratios that we hope reflect the fact that we have this active labor force in senior judges that are helping us get through our caseloads despite the shortage we have in unfilled judgeships. Mr. Johnson. Because your caseloads are going up in both civil and criminal litigation? Judge Ponsor. They skyrocketed between 1970 and 2000. We had about a tripling of our civil caseloads in that 30-year period. We had a 50 percent increase in our criminal law filings during that period. During the last decade, we had, in some parts of the country, a flattening out of that explosive growth. But if you are sitting in the year 2000 and you are looking back and trying to plan, that is what you would have seen. It is true and I have to concede that some of our filings have begun to flatten out in some areas of the country in the past decade. Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Let me tell you something, just like your son would agree with this maxim that I am getting ready to lay out, I agree with it also, and that is it is better to have and not need than it is to need and not have. With that, I will yield the balance of my time. Ms. Norton. Some statistics for the record. Since senior judges have been mentioned here, senior judges for the most part, do not wish to sit and don't have to sit in criminal cases and most of them choose civil cases, according to our statistics, and only two in 100 civil cases are tried. I want to correct, since Mr. Johnson is a new Member of the Committee, I want to correct your notion that there is a room for every Subcommittee. There is one Committee room for all six Subcommittees. We all share this one room. All six of us, and we have to bid and we do cooperate and bid in order to have a hearing. So I may have to postpone a hearing because someone from transit says he has something more urgent and that occurs. So I do not want to leave the impression that we are trying to put you under a standard that we ourselves do not conform to. That is not the case. I also want you to know that in the last decade, according to the statistics reported to the Committee in both civil and criminal cases in the Federal courts has been flat. That is 10 years. That means it gives us some basis to look forward based on the way statistics are handled in the first place. Judge Robinson, you say on page 14 of your testimony that we should not adopt the GAO recommendations because they are based on a flawed understanding of the judicial process. So let's see what your recommendations for sharing are based on. Has the judiciary ever modeled the Federal judiciary center data with computer software of any kind to determine how much courtroom sharing the empirical evidence actually supports? Judge Robinson. Madam Chair, I think there may be a role in modeling, use of modeling in making forward projections, particularly as they pertain to a particular courthouse or a particular area for which a courthouse is being constructed. But to say that modeling is a tool that should be used to try to develop some kind of national average on sharing ratios and without considered and great attention paid to what the experience has been, I think is a flawed analysis. Ms. Norton. Well, a model, of course, would take into account the experience. That is what a model does. A model is not just statistics, Judge Robinson. If you have not modeled-- and that is the way we do things today-- experience is a factor, and a very important factor for a correct model. If you look at how we do economic models, nobody just adds up, multiplies and subtracts. It is very complicated how to do a model, so complicated that we use computer models. If you have not modeled the data to determine how much sharing is possible, how did the Judicial Conference determine that two senior judges can share one courtroom? Judge Robinson. Well, we based that on a very intense look at caseloads, a variety of factors--caseloads, number of judges, age of judges, use of the courtrooms. I shouldn't say we, because it was the FJC. In the courthouses and the courtrooms that were studied, it was a very complicated process of measuring every minute that a courtroom was used and how it was used, to determine what these averages might look like. That was then supplemented by a questionnaire that was sent to all district judges and magistrate judges and senior judges, as well as to a great number of attorneys, to get that experiential piece. Ms. Norton. Can you demonstrate that the GAO's recommendation of three senior judges to one courtroom, which they report is supported by their modeling program, is wrong? Judge Robinson. What I can tell you is that a 2-to-1 ratio for senior judges is a dramatic increase from the 1 to 1 ratio traditionally that we have. We agree. Ms. Norton. We agree on that one, so let's not go back there. Judge Robinson. But to go beyond that, the GAO study doesn't tell us what their assumptions are. We don't know what those assumptions are underlying the modeling. All we can do is glean that from certain information. Ms. Norton. What you need from the GAO is an opportunity to look at their model so you can understand the assumptions underlying their model? Judge Robinson. I look forward to doing that because what I can tell you is there are a number of misstatements in their study that do not at all represent, one, the things that they were told during their experiential so-called piece of study when they talked to the panel judges; and, two, some of the other statements in their report are not correct or consistent with what any of us believe or what the FJC study would show. I mean, the length of trials, the average length of trials, for example, is a huge component that one must consider, and there is no such thing as a one to two day trial. Mr. Goldstein. That number comes from the AOUSC itself, ma'am. Second of all---- Ms. Norton. Mr. Goldstein, would you hold for a second. Judge Robinson, over and over again, and I think this needs to be on the record, you have acted as if he is using one set of statistics and you are using another. Would you clarify that, Mr. Goldstein. The data you used came from where? Mr. Goldstein. The data we used came from the FJC. We are using the judiciary's own data. It is completely modeled. As you yourself have said, ma'am, you can model, and the government models all the time, extremely complex things: nuclear fallout; we model global warming. We model all sorts of things in America today. To say we can't model Federal courtrooms when they are not being used half the time is preposterous on its face, I am sorry. Judge Robinson. If I can respond. My guess is, and again, if I can see all of the GAO's assumptions and how they used this data, I think I would be able to answer this question better, so I am somewhat hampered here. But I think when they came up with that average of 1 to 2 days, they were talking about all court events, or at least hearings and trials. But there are lot of hearings that take 30 minutes or an hour, but not trials. For some purposes you may want to look at those as one set of data, but for others purposes it doesn't make sense to; particularly when you are modeling the use of courtrooms for trials, it would be flawed to consider all of the other types of hearings that go on in courtrooms. Ms. Norton. That is a fair point. Mr. Goldstein, did you consider hearings, trials, all manner of things that go on in a courtroom? Mr. Goldstein. The model includes everything that occurs in a courtroom, including all unscheduled events and cancelled events for a previous week. Ms. Norton. Her point is a trial can take days, and an unscheduled event doesn't happen. Mr. Goldstein. Absolutely. I agree with that. But the point is trials generally take 1 to 2 days. That is the average time. That information was provided by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. If that is not correct, then we will have to take up that issue with the AO. Ms. Norton. So we are dealing with common data there. Mr. Peck. Mr. Peck. Madam Chair, may I suggest, as you know, we are all commenting on a draft GAO report. Normally there is a period in which we talk to GAO about the report. We don't always agree, and we submit our agency comments. Sometimes they are in the nature of a dissent. Sometimes it is to clarify. I have been involved in computer modeling, and one of the issues is that you do need to know what all of the assumptions are. I would suggest that you might ask us, I don't know if we need to come back, but I think we ought to sit down and see what the assumptions are, see what alternate assumptions the courts might make, and see how the model comes out. Ms. Norton. I think that is precisely what Judge Robinson is very justifiably saying, that she doesn't understand the assumptions. And as you say, the normal way, now that the draft report is out, is for her to respond, for all of you to respond, and then of course, the twain shall meet. And I think from the report will come some essential good. I can already see that from the testimony here today. But I do want to clarify the notion that we are not dealing with some kind of mysterious science here. For example, quoting from Judge Robinson's testimony: We would love someone to write an algorithm that really works. Let me ask whether you know about the experience of courtroom sharing in the Southern District of New York which I think we all would agree is one of the busiest district courts in the country. A case study in the FJC report shows that they share one active and one senior judge. This has been deemed a success in that no trial was delayed and no judge lacked for a courtroom when he or she needed one because, guess what, they decided they wanted to make it work. So they weren't dealing anecdotally with what would happen if we had witnesses waiting and they come from across the country, they wanted to make it work and that is one senior to one active. Existing experience that I would commend both of you and Mr. Peck to take a look at if you want to look at a busier court than probably most of you see that has made something work of a sharing nature that we are after. We are not laying down a rule of sharing here today. We have already gotten your understanding that some sharing, particularly given what we understand about the economy and about the expectations of the public, is in order. The only question is to get together and to figure out how to make that work. In your testimony, Judge Robinson, on the availability of courtrooms, you say many judges argue that the advantages of certainty, efficiency in cost savings gained, and let me say that again, advantages of certainty, efficiency and cost savings gained far outweigh the cost of additional courtrooms. Has the judiciary ever attempted to quantify the cost associated with sharing versus nonsharing? How could you arrive at the notion that it far outweigh? It sounds like you are talking about some set of data that has not been described here this afternoon. Judge Robinson. The costs we speak of are not costs to the judiciary, they are costs to the litigants. And we are charged with the just and inexpensive and efficient determination and resolution of cases, understanding that we serve litigants, American people who come into our courtroom. So it is those costs we are trying to strike in the balance. Ms. Norton. So are we, Judge Robinson. With all due respect, as I tried to make clear, we are not sitting here as a bunch of nonjudicial imbeciles not taking into account the rule of law and the importance of the system of law we operate under. I have tried to make that clear. You used the word ``costs,'' and yet you have not done any study that shows what the cost would be. At least GAO has done a study. You may disagree with the underlying assumption, and you are going to find out what they were. But when you come before us and make a statement that is as bald as this, many judges you say argue, you don't say a study finds, the advantages of certainty, efficiency and cost savings gained far outweigh the cost of additional courtrooms, I have to shake my head. Judge Robinson. Madam Chair, what I will say in response is that I think Congress understood that the costs were significant when they held us to a standard of completing a civil case within 3 years because they understood that the average case ought to be finished, whether tried or settled, in less than 3 years because of the attendant cost to the litigants--not just their emotional or their psychological cost, but the real dollars that they pay in terms of attorney time and expenses. So that is what I was speaking to, and that is the balance we are trying to strike. Ms. Norton. We have to find that balance, understanding we all are looking for that balance and we do not want to polarize this search. It is not the judiciary versus the Congress who can't find a balance. We believe that all of us working together can find a balance. The tone you hear from us really has to do with 20 years of no sharing, no balance, and overspending. We finally have come to a point where we have had to throw up our hands; but that does not mean that we do not intend to adopt the kind of problem solving that I think will come out of this hearing. Mr. Goldstein, your recommendations we understand are based on sharing by judge type as, for example, Article III judges sharing among themselves and magistrate judges sharing among themselves; is that right? Mr. Goldstein. That is correct. The reason we separate Article III judges from magistrate judges is because that is among the parameters that our national academy panel suggested were appropriate. Ms. Norton. Because magistrate judges don't handle jury trials; is that it? Mr. Goldstein. The kind of trials they handle are different. They are certainly different durations. They don't tend to interact all that much. These are some of the things we heard, and they felt it would be appropriate to model them differently. Ms. Norton. Have you modeled what courtroom sharing might be possible if all Article III judges were to share all courtrooms as a common resource, the way we do here, under the assumption that all courtrooms are built to the same size and with the same features so that they are indeed a fungible resource of some kind? Mr. Goldstein. We modeled all district judges and we also modeled senior judges and all magistrate judges separately. We also, just to see what it would look like, we did run a model, taking a look at if you had all judges on sort of a fungible level where any judge could use any courtroom. So yes, we did. Ms. Norton. You have to forgive me if I don't see that as more efficient. Mr. Goldstein. It is more efficient. We were following parameters that we felt were useful because they were developed through the panel process that we went through when we brought together judicial experts. But you are absolutely right, it is more efficient. Judge Ponsor. Let me say that magistrate judges do try jury trials. They don't try criminal felony trials, but magistrate judges do try lengthy civil jury trials. Ms. Norton. I was trying to take away all the differences and put all Article III judges in the same category. If you did all of that, why won't there just be a pool for centralized sharing? What would be wrong with that? Judge Robinson. That is the next thing that we are going to look at because we think that there are economies of scale that can be achieved. But understand that a number of courthouses are small to medium. Whether we can achieve economies of scale is questionable when you are talking about only two active district judges, or one. I sit in a division, I am the only active district judge, and I have two senior judges along with me who work full-time. So there are those differences. But magistrate judges also have a much more immediate need typically for a courtroom because they don't know when someone is going to be arrested. People are arrested and they are brought in for that initial appearance in short measure. So they need ready availability, but they do not need a 12-box jury. And bankruptcy judges, it is a different study. And I have been a bankruptcy judge. I have been in the trenches, if you will forgive me. It is very different. And they are in a period where they are experiencing a heavy caseload and a great number of filings. They are in the courtroom a lot is what I can tell you anecdotally. So I think there is a value by measuring by judge type because our work tends to differ. Although I will say this, looking at case management, case management is really a function of a district-by-district or courthouse-by- courthouse thing. There is no uniform national standard and that is because we are all trying to be as efficient as possible. There are districts where magistrate judges, except for criminal jury trials, are doing all of what Article III judges are doing. There are other systems or places where magistrate judges are not doing very many civil trials. It is all a matter of how can we effectively organize our work pool, our labor force, in a particular courthouse to handle the caseload that we are dealt. Ms. Norton. The differences you describe are real. But aren't there, in the interest of cost savings and efficiency, aren't there some standards that you think would work across the board for, for example, Article III judges, magistrate judges? No one is trying to custom-make courthouses the way we have before. If you don't custom-make them, then you have got to have some standard that everybody agrees to as a minimal standard. Maybe you rise above it on some occasion, otherwise we are back to where we were, custom-made courthouses, and why have we bothered in all of this. Judge Ponsor, how does the judiciary select its courthouse projects for your 5-year plan? Judge Ponsor. We have a number of steps that we go through. We start with a feasibility study when it is requested, and we look at the courthouse and we project forward as to whether we need that courthouse. We have had, since about 2007, a new process called asset management planning, which is an extraordinarily detailed very, very thorough analysis of all of our courthouse inventory that allows us to develop yardsticks to measure the urgency of the need of particular courthouses. And interestingly, as a result of that AMP process, which we are about a third of the way through now, we have actually eliminated a fairly large number of courthouses that were lining up on our 5-year plan for new courthouses. In other words, we have gone to these courthouses and said, We don't think that you need a new courthouse. We think you can deal with a renovation. So the fact that we are able to take a clear picture of what the courthouse actually needs and what it looks like, and to some extent sometimes, and I will be honest with you, pry the information out of the courts to get the information about what they have got there, how many people and courtrooms they have, and the data that we need to really plan, it has allowed us to begin to sequence the courts and deal with the courthouses that have the very greatest need. Ms. Norton. In other words, number one will be the courthouse that is most decrepit, shall we say, in greatest need and you have developed a system for deciding which courthouses get precedence for construction? Judge Ponsor. We have four criteria which are scored in the AMP process. First of all we look at the court systems. Is the air conditioning working? Are the windows leaking? We had a judge in North Carolina who was in the process of sentencing a defendant when a piece of the ceiling broke out and hit the defendant on the head. That is really adding insult to injury. So how is the physical plant holding up? Second, do we have enough space for all of the judges in the courthouse? So you have systems, you have space, and then we used to make this our primary consideration, and in fact, we have diminished it by a few points, and that is security. We look at how the judges, the public, the litigants, the lawyers are at risk when they come into the courthouse. What we have found is, if we make that qualification too far up on the scale, frankly, everybody is worried about security. There is hardly a judge anywhere who is not going to say we people in Chicago, we people in Puerto Rico, we people in Miami, we people in San Antonio, we people in Los Angeles, we have the worst security. And Detroit. We should get a new courthouse right away because somebody is going to get hurt. That is the hardest. It is not exactly a threat, but it is the hardest thing to hear: ``Somebody is going to get hurt and it is going to be on your head if you don't give us a new courthouse''. So we have had to step back from the security issue. It is now 25 percent. We have a 30-30-25 percent to try to make that just a little bit less and look at how is the court functioning, is it big enough, and secure enough? Then we look at the design guide and try to figure out whether we have problems with courtrooms that are tiny little courtrooms and are way below the design guide, way below what anyone in this room would want a judge to have to cope with. And we put that all together and it allows us to score all of the various courthouses and determine where in the sequence they should come. It is a refinement that has had a lot of very intelligent, hardworking and resourceful people putting a lot of time in on it, and which we continue to be committed to, and which will allow us, I think, to do our job a lot better. Frankly, it used to be back in the old days, and you probably know this better than I do, the district that could make the biggest noise, the district that had the biggest clout in some arena or other was the squeaky wheel that got the oil. That is what we are trying to get away from. We are trying to adopt an objective measure that will allow us to say to certain courts, I am sorry, you are just not in line right now. There are too many courthouses ahead of you. And believe me, in my role, I get calls from other judges. They accuse me of being a toady for the AO and not getting out and fighting for their courthouse. ``What is wrong with you? It is your job to deliver the goods''. We have to say to them: ``I am sorry, let me compare your courthouse to the other courthouses that are ahead in line''. So we are working hard to develop an objective yardstick that will allow us to prioritize these courthouses and put them in order. Ms. Norton. Judge Ponsor, while we may have differences on the number of square feet that we end up with or we are sharing, it looks like you have a fairly rational model for at least deciding which courthouse goes first and the like. But the Ranking Member couldn't resist saying, I wonder if, and I wonder right alongside him, if L.A. went through this rather rational process you are describing. Judge Ponsor. I don't know if it was part of our literal AMP process because it was selected prior to the time that process was really in gear. I can be corrected on that. Ms. Norton. I would bet that it would fit in terms of need. Judge Ponsor. Having been there, I think physical plant, and I have to look into this issue that Congressman Diaz-Balart mentioned about the number of judges going down and fitting them all in the courthouse. You are a step ahead of me. Ms. Norton. That is over time; it has been so long. What he is saying is now the number of judges have been reduced. Judge Ponsor. But its score as a physical facility has got to be really low, and certainly the security worries me a lot there. They have some of the toughest cases in the country. They have Mexican drug cartels cases with 30 and 40 defendants. I went into their high security courtroom. They have benches that will cover up the defendant's feet because they are shackled while they are in the courtroom. And I have to say, I almost never shackle defendants in a courtroom. But sometimes they have to do that during trials. They have got some really serious situations there. We are not going to be talking about a billion dollars, but we have to come up with some kind of solution for Los Angeles. Ms. Norton. We note that there is a funding for the Lancaster courthouse. Why is that not in the 5-year plan? Judge Ponsor. I believe that Lancaster was going to be a lease construct at one point. We had this tool, which the OMB has now told us they do not want us to use any more, where we could ocasionally do a lease construct project, and I think Lancaster was going to be a lease construct. Yes, it was not going to be a federally-owned building. It was going to be built and owned by a private entity and leased to the government. It was a tool that we could occasionally use in situations where you had a very small courthouse and very unique situations. OMB came to us, I think, a year ago and said we are not going to allow that any more, no more lease constructs, and that is the end of lease constructs. So we had just a little exception, kind of rotating out there where we would occasionally do lease constructs, and we got caught in the middle by a change in policy where OMB said you can't do lease constructs any more. So, we said if you say we can't do lease constructs, we won't do lease constructs. We are going to do all federally- owned buildings. But Lancaster was kind of hanging out there. I am not quite sure how far I should go with the Lancaster courthouse, but I guess I would have to say as tactfully as I can, that was a courthouse that was not driven by our AMP process but was prioritized as a result of external pressures, which I hope we will not be subject to much longer in developing our courthouse program. Ms. Norton. I am glad OMB got there before we did. This was below the prospectus level, and I understand there have been two built a year. Judge Ponsor. Very few. We had one in Yuma which we were hoping to build, and that was a lease construct. Mr. Peck. And that is now federally constructed. Ms. Norton. Imagine leasing a courthouse; suppose they decided to put you all out; my, my, my. I have another question for you, Judge Ponsor. Thirteen courthouse projects and the most recent 5-year courthouse plan have an aggregate of 33 new judgeships not as yet authorized. Do you think it is reasonable for the judiciary to expect the Congress to authorize this many judgeships for the 13 locations when the number constitutes roughly the same number of judgeships that the Congress has authorized during the last 20 years for the entire country, for all 94 districts and some 550 locations? Judge Ponsor. I was not aware that the number was that high. I have before me my own notes on all of the projects in our 5-year plan. I have a proposed new magistrate judge and a new bankruptcy judge in Charlotte--that is two, three. One new district court judge, a proposed new magistrate judge, and a proposed new bankruptcy judge--another three in Greenbelt. In Greenville, South Carolina, we have one new district court judge we are planning for who has already been approved by the Conference. In Harrisburg, we have one new magistrate judge already approved and one bankruptcy judge proposed. They go on. But I didn't think the numbers went up that high. In Mobile we have one proposed new judge and one bankruptcy and one circuit judge. We have two in Nashville, one district and one magistrate. We have one in Norfolk, Virginia, one bankruptcy judge. I am not doing the arithmetic as I am talking, but I agree with you that there are a number of judges that are planned for in our 5-year plan that have not yet been approved by the conference but which are statistically---- Ms. Norton. How could you plan for more judges than have been authorized by the Congress over 20 years for the entire country? That is concerning. The figures we have, and we have them here, 32 new, 19 senior, adding up to 52. So I wonder how you ever got to such an overestimation of judgeships given the fact that amounts to the number that Congress has authorized for the entire country for a generation. Judge Ponsor. First of all, if that is how high the numbers are, they are higher than I have calculated, and I have to agree with you, that number is too high. And we are certainly willing to work with you in collaboration to make sure that as these courthouses are authorized, that we aren't too high. There are people who say something else to me, and this maybe is a topic upon which reasonable people may differ. I have judges who are moving into new courthouses or are in the planning stages of their courthouses who say to me: How can you insist that we enter a courthouse that is full the day we move in? Ms. Norton. How often does that happen? Judge Ponsor. At least half a dozen times that I can think of. Ms. Norton. If that is the case, how do these poor judges make due? I bet they share courtrooms, Judge Ponsor. Judge Ponsor. Well, certainly under our policy, senior judges and magistrate judges will be sharing courtrooms. Let me say about courtroom sharing, I have no objection in principle to the notion of appropriate courtroom sharing, even by some district court judges. It is hard. I know it is going to sound whiny for me to give you anecdotal evidence about just how tough it is, but I think what really bothered me about Mr. Goldstein's suggestion was a cookie cutter 3-for-2 solution across the country, which would be in certain courts--and I don't want to sound melodramatic--but it would be something close to a catastrophe to make district court judges work under those circumstances. I agree in certain circumstances maybe---- Ms. Norton. Why would it be a catastrophe? I express no opinion, but somebody who tells me it would be a catastrophe, you must be basing that on something, and I would like to know what. Judge Ponsor. I will tell you what it is based on. And I am afraid I just have to break down to anecdote and 26 years of experience. Let me just tell you where I am right now. I started a 5-day nonjury race-discrimination case involving a man whose liquor license was turned down. I got 5 days into it. I had to suspend because I am now in the fourth day on a hearing of a motion to suppress on a criminal case that is going to trial later in June. It happens to be three young white kids who are charged with burning down an African American church in Springfield the day after President Obama was elected. It is a case that has gotten national attention. It is very high profile. So I have got one civil case I have stopped, a motion to suppress that I have tucked in there. I have had to bump a civil trial involving a local guy named Berkshire Blanket from Palmer, Massachusetts, who has a little blanket company, and he is suing his IT man. That case had to be postponed after they were all set to go so that I could make room for my hearing on---- Ms. Norton. In your courtroom? Judge Ponsor. I am the only frog in the pond. If I were trying to share that courtroom, if all three judges were trying to---- Ms. Norton. Just a moment. There wasn't another courtroom in the entire courthouse, sir? Judge Ponsor. In my courthouse? Ms. Norton. No. You have a courthouse. Judge Ponsor. Yes. Ms. Norton. You have a courtroom. Judge Ponsor. I have one courtroom. Ms. Norton. Suppose you had access to other courtrooms. Judge Ponsor. If there are three district court judges--I am doing a bad job of expressing this, and I am sorry. I will just step back and see if I can make it clear. If you have three judges trying to coordinate access to two courtrooms with that kind of complicated docket, it is an impenetrable---- Ms. Norton. I would agree with you. That is why I want Mr. Goldstein to share with me his modeling for centralized sharing. I think--and I think there has been some agreement here. I don't know how these two judges get together with three cases. Who in the world wants to put you through that? If there is centralized sharing--there might be problems with your time, Judge Ponsor, and I can understand that, but it seems to me it would be far less problems with courtroom assignments than if three judges have to get together and have a little conference every time they have to decide which of them gets to use a courtroom. That seems, to me, to build inefficiency into inefficiency. So as long as we are doing it, why don't we just say, look, we are one big family of Article III judges. None of us is better than the rest. And when one brother judge or one sister judge needs a courtroom, she ought to have it, especially if it is not being used. There is no ownership of something within a courthouse that belongs to the people of the United States. A judge cannot be assigned ownership of a courtroom. Judge Ponsor. I couldn't agree with you more. Judge Robinson. Madam Chairman, I think what Judge Ponsor was illustrating--and it is my experience, too, because I come from a small courthouse in a small district, that I am the only active district judge in my division. So if I am sharing my courtroom with a senior judge or a magistrate judge, and I have a schedule like Judge Ponsor has--and I have had that very experience--and the senior judge is in a trial session as well and also has strong needs and considerations to have his case or cases go to trial, now we have a problem. And there have been times that I have moved a case primarily because it was high-profile, and there were going to be a lot of people involved, and I have a courtroom that is small and can't accommodate a great number of people. I have moved that case 60 miles, but with attendant costs and more delays. And I say all that to say that we do share, and we do accommodate, and we are collegial, and we do step up and help each other. But sometimes--for example, if I can give you one more anecdotal piece of evidence, I twice have tried a 3-month trial in another division 60 miles away, and I needed a courtroom for 3 months. It was a 3-month criminal jury trial. It just so happened both of the times that I was there, all of the other judges in that division had heavy trials, back-to- back criminal or civil, and we were vying for limited court space, and it was difficult. And to try to choose between the small business owner who is being costed out by attorney fees and the criminal defendant that has speedy trial rights is a difficult thing. And when I spoke of the algorithm, that is what I was talking about. It is those sorts of real-world difficulties. And I am not suggesting it is like this all the time. Ms. Norton. And when I spoke of the experience--in response to your algorithm concern, when I spoke of the experience of the Southern District of New York and cited to you how they made it work, I was speaking from real-life experience, too, not anecdotes about having to move one trial, but about one of the busiest district courts in the United States. And the reason it works is because they made it work. You have indicated you want to make it work. Frankly, that is all we need to hear. We understand there are extraordinary differences, even hardships. The greatest hardship of all at the moment is on the taxpayers of the United States. And, frankly, that is the hardship that most concerns us at the moment. We will not be able to go before the Congress to get additional money for courthouses if this is all we have to show. Mr. Peck. Mr. Peck. You know, I think I have now been a party to these conversations with a break in service, obviously, for 14 years, and we have had a lot of conversations over courtroom sharing. One, I want to say that the judiciary presents a different face to GSA than they have before, because I want to make clear we have not abdicated our responsibility to build appropriate courthouses within the budget, and as much as we can, we have had a lot of conversations with the judiciary. And I want to make a suggestion, because I think we are getting to an important point. The judiciary under the leadership of Judge Bataillon and now Judge Ponsor and the space committee have, I think, been much more realistic about prioritizing courthouses in the first place. Second, I think they are much more open to looking at modern management and how we might do things differently. And so the suggestion I would make is that we look at actual data. I think Congressman Diaz-Balart suggested we see if we can make this work. Why don't we look at real data that we have on caseloads in different courthouses--I suspect we are going to find different answers in different places, and with different sizes of courthouses, and with different mixes of magistrate and bankruptcy and district judges--and then come up with some real data based on real facts that will tell us how and whether this could work, and what obstacles we would face if we went to a different kind of a policy. I think it would be instructive. I suspect that we will validate some of the concerns that the Committee has typically had, and I think we will validate some of the concerns that the judges have had about the hardships. But I think we could come up with a research model and run data fairly quickly if we all got together and did it. Ms. Norton. Well, I am certainly with you, Mr. Peck, that the judiciary is far more open to change. We have not heard the kind of stonewalling about a kind of virtual Article III right to build courthouses here. We have heard none of that from our witnesses today. The witnesses are open to sharing. I must say that I am dubious about your last suggestion. We are not going to customize courthouses based on docket, which changes from time to time. And if you want some real-life experience, Mr. Peck, I want you to study what the Southern District has done. Look at--if you want to talk about somebody who has spent some of her-- native Washingtonian, but spent some of the best years of her life in New York City, you want to talk about a courthouse that has complicated trials, that has a horrendous caseload, take that as a case in point and see if you can extrapolate from that. Because I can tell you right now, we are not going to be able to customize courthouses to dockets. There is no way to do that. Now, if--when you read Mr.--have a chance to study the assumptions behind what Mr. Goldstein has done, if you have differences with it, it is there that you ought to start to make changes. But I find it amazing to think about dockets as a way of doing this. We have got to--if we are going to be efficient, there are some models that have got to take into account most of what we are talking about. And if I may say so, this is not the most complicated model that we deal with in the Congress. So where you have differences, if you can, if you find a caseload isn't built in enough, even given the Southern District model where they have had no delays, where they have had no backup, if you are not satisfied with that, fine. If you are not satisfied with Mr. Goldstein's model, fine. But I tell you one thing, the courts have come up with no model, nor has GSA. So let us at least compare apples to apples, models to models. I am going to ask Mr. Diaz-Balart if he would finish. Mr. Diaz-Balart. I will be brief. Let me also then, since this will be my final one as well, let me thank all of you. And I agree, we have not heard the stonewalling we have heard in the past. So it has been very refreshing, and I want to thank all of you for being here today. I think this has been very helpful. Mr. Peck, your last recommendation, you know, Mr. Shuster pretty much did that 4 years ago. I thought that is what we did 4 years ago when he said we are not going to fund anything new until we have a study. We have a study. So I thought that is what already had been done. And I guess now it is your recommendation to do it again because we don't like the result of it or what? I thought that had already been done. Mr. Peck. No, sir. I am much more on the--what I was trying to say was that we can take real-life data. We are talking about trying to come up with a model. That is what GAO is trying to do. And I was saying there is real-life data. We don't quite know what assumptions GAO used. We can use data in various courthouses and see what works, have it worked out with the courts on what they think is usable and doable, and come back to you with a suggestion on what works. I am not talking about customizing for every courthouse. I am talking about coming up with a model. We need a policy. We need in GSA to have an agreement, because, as you can tell here, we catch the spears when there is disagreement over the policies. And we are tough, we can take it, but we would like everyone to have an agreed-upon policy as well. Mr. Diaz-Balart. I understand that. But I thought that is what was asked for 4 years ago; the FJAC then came up with the numbers, and then GAO used those numbers to come up with this. But I think it is already there, is my understanding. Mr. Peck. Like I said, we don't know how GAO took those numbers and turned them into their model. Mr. Diaz-Balart. FJAC also did their part, is my understanding. Mr. Peck. Thats right, they have. But I don't think what we ever came up with was the final analysis on what courtroom sharing could look like if you are talking about sharing beyond what the courts already have done. Mr. Diaz-Balart. Well, you have one model at least now. And I think what the Chairwoman is saying is we haven't gotten anything other than the GAO--thank God for them. But--all right. I just want to make sure that we are on the same page here. Look, a couple issues. We have heard no stonewalling, and I think it has been refreshing. However, there are a couple things that make us pause. We keep going back to the L.A. model. That is like a bad penny that keeps turning up. And I understand there is obviously a lot of issues. L.A. is a huge area with huge issues. My understanding is that when there are issues of security, that there is I guess two now, they use the one that is newer that has, my understanding, some very good security measures. And this Committee has never been shown any compelling reason why anything above that needs to be done. I think it would be a step in the right direction to show that things are different, that we all--we all have learned our lessons, our collective lessons, that that one, frankly, just is looked at, and that reality hit; and that look at the security steps that have been taken with the newer of the two courthouses that are down there, and that that one just finally gets real. Number one. Number two is it is not the only one. You know, there is the issue of, as was mentioned, the one in Pennsylvania. I guess now there is one in Redding. Now there is another small courthouse that was going to be put together and built in Pennsylvania, in, I guess, Lancaster, Pennsylvania. You know, those things have to start--if we are serious about changing the way we do business, which we all have to do, you know, things like that have to, frankly, go away. They have to get real. They have to start--we need to start to see some serious changes in the way we have been doing business. Judge Ponsor. Lancaster is a valid criticism. Mr. Diaz-Balart. Well, I think L.A.--by the way, I am sure there are some good ones and some bad ones. That is just life. I understand that. The reality is those that we know are bad-- bad is not the right term. I mentioned to you about what words mean. I shouldn't say ``bad.'' Ones that clearly are not the best way to spend taxpayers' money, those have to be corrected. They have to go away. They have to drop off the lists. And they shouldn't be around anymore. And I think that will show a lot of--that we are moving in the right direction. So I want to thank you all for your testimony. It has been very helpful. I want to thank you all for being very open and allowing us to do the same thing, and appreciate your service. Thank you. Ms. Norton. Let me say we do have one model. I suggest everybody look at that model and try to see if there are changes should be made in that model, because I want to say this: We are not going through a whole set of hearings on different models. We are going to change this program by law. So the kind of collaboration that would have everyone agree would be helpful to us, and if we don't get it, we are just going ahead anyway, because we have got to show in the Congress that we are taking care of this problem. This is one of the major construction projects or divisions of the GSA. I have to ask a final question of Mr. Peck. Given the extent to which judiciary has been given the last word often on courthouses, is the GSA fully willing and able to again take charge of a major Federal construction program as mandated by law? Mr. Peck. I would--first, I would not say that the judiciary has had the last word. But I think that we prove every day with the projects that we manage, the buildings we manage, the leases that we negotiate that we are a supremely competent public real estate agency, and that we certainly welcome the opportunity to work on the courthouses, and we welcome the opportunity with the Congress to put some bright policy parameters around this program and manage to them. We would welcome that. Yes, ma'am. Ms. Norton. And I do believe that the ball really is in our court. I think we have put GSA to a disadvantage, first of all, even within the executive branch, of dealing with peer agencies. Now, when they deal with another branch of government through administrations of all kinds, we have found GSA to be at a disadvantage. And we think the only way to correct that advantage, given the fact that this part of what the courts do has nothing to do with cases and controversies and has everything to do with what Mr. Peck just said--Mr. Peck and the GSA are experts in construction. They know how to do it. Judges don't know how to do it, aren't paid to know how to do it, and deal in the case in controversy business. They are absolutely indispensable advisers to GSA. This Committee will hold GSA responsible for the final product. I want that understood. I think Mr. Peck is very experienced, knows how to do it. I believe that we have short- changed him and the GSA in not putting more teeth in the law, because we believe that judges will follow the law. And if the law makes clear that GSA, and only GSA, is accountable when it comes to construction, with the advice of the judiciary in language that cannot be gainsaid, if we make it clear, then I think we will straighten out part of this problem. And we do intend to do this. We intend to change the law. And we believe that we put GSA at a disadvantage if we don't. And while we have had two very reasonable judges before us, they know well that others of their colleagues often see themselves as in charge of this process. And we think the only way to disabuse them is by something all judges respect, by law, and that is the change we intend to make. Your testimony, the testimony of all four of you, has been extremely helpful to us. I hope you don't mistake, judges won't certainly, the kind of cross examination, if I may say so, that we do here. That is how we are trained to extract from our witnesses the best testimony that will get--the deeper the cross examination, the better the answer, because the witness will defend her or his view. And then it will make us understand whether we have--the question posed, in fact, reflects or does not reflect what the facts are. So we have found you to be very good witnesses of great help to this committee, and you have given us a head start on what our part of the problem will be. We are especially--what our part of the mission is. And we are especially encouraged by the willingness of all four witnesses to work together to advise GSA and to advise this committee on how to proceed. Thank you very much. And this hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 1:25 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]