AIR MOBILITY PROGRAMS

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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HEARING HELD
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AIR MOBILITY PROGRAMS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 28, 2010.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. SMITH. Good afternoon. We will call the subcommittee meeting to order. The Air and Land Forces Subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on air mobility programs.

And we welcome our witnesses: Brigadier General Michelle Johnson, who is the Director for Strategy, Policy, Programs, and Logistics for the U.S. Transportation Command [TRANSCOM].

Welcome. Good to see you again.

Mr. David M. Van Buren, who is Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition.

Good to see you, sir.

Lieutenant General Philip Breedlove, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements.

Welcome, General.

And Brigadier General Richard Johnston, who is the Director of Strategic Planning at Air Force Headquarters.

Welcome, General.

Today's hearing follows the early March release of the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016, or MCRS 2016. MCRS 2016 was a significant study by the Department of Defense to identify mobility capabilities and requirements needed to support the U.S. strategic objectives in the 2016 time frame. The study assessed the major components of the mobility system, including aircraft, aerial refueling, sealift, surface transportation ashore and afloat, pre-positioning, forward-stationing, and infrastructure.

And that is, I think, the biggest questions that our committee is going to have, is how the plans that are put in place and that are reflected in the DOD budget that was submitted to us reflect those requirements, and also what has changed that has altered some of the numbers in those various requirements so that we can best understand why the Air Force and the Mobility Command think they need what they need, what has changed, and how we are going to meet those needs as we go forward, making decisions on the various airframes that we need to build and some, of course, which will be being removed from service at the same time; that, as we are doing all that, we are meeting those requirements.
MCRS developed three cases to evaluate a broad spectrum of military operations linked to notional strategic environments, which is a fancy way of saying trying to figure out what might happen and to make sure we are prepared for it. Those airframes will be necessary to support possible decisions regarding future mobility force structure. Those cases included two nearly simultaneous large-scale land campaigns, demanding homeland defense consequence management events, and a long-term irregular warfare campaign.

With few exceptions, MCRS–16 found the Department’s planned mobility capabilities sufficient to support the most demanding projected requirements. Regarding strategic airlift, the study determined that the capacity of the Department’s strategic airlift fleet exceeds the peak demand in each of the three MCRS–16 cases. Peak demand for one of those cases required 304 strategic airlift aircraft.

Of note, the previous mobility study, the Mobility Capabilities Study in 2005, or MCS–05, identified strategic airlift force structure of 292 to 383 aircraft as a moderate-risk force. We hope our witnesses will be able to talk to us today about the differences between the 2016 and the 2005, as to how they came up with the slightly different numbers.

Additionally, the current commander of the U.S. Transportation Command and his predecessor, who is now the Air Force Chief of Staff, have testified that a force of 316 strategic airlift aircraft is considered the sweet spot for strategic airlift inventory. Congress passed legislation adopting 316 as the minimum number of strategic airlift aircraft last year.

The current Air Force programmed strategic airlift and inventory includes 223 C–17s and 111 C–5s, for a total of 334 aircraft. In this year’s budget, the Air Force proposes to retire 17 C–5s in 2011, which would bring the inventory to 317 aircraft. We also understand the Air Force plans to retire five additional C–5s in 2012, which would bring the total strategic airlift inventory below 316.

For fiscal year 2012, we expect the Department of Defense will submit a legislative proposal seeking to change the Title X statute which mandates 316 strategic airlift aircraft be maintained in the Air Force inventory if the Department still plans to proceed with C–5 retirements beyond those now planned for fiscal year 2011.

So, obviously, we want to know how to balance that out. Do we need to maintain that 316 number, or is it possible to move below it—is it possible and responsible to move below it? We would want to know the explanations for that.

Regarding tactical or intra-theater airlift, MCRS–16 found that the programmed fleet of 401 C–130s exceeds the peak demand in each of the three MCRS–16 cases. The highest C–130 demand in these cases would have required 335 aircraft. However, the 2016 study notes that the direct support mission to meet the Army’s time-sensitive airlift requirements was not assessed and that C–130s may be required to supplement C–27s to support this mission.

Of note, MCS–05 identified a moderate-risk intra-theater airlift force structure of between 395 and 674 aircraft. We hope our witnesses can address the Air Force analysis of the Army’s direct sup-
port requirements today, as well as how tactical airlift inventory requirements have changed since the previous mobility study.

The budget request also includes $65.7 million for 15 aircraft in a new start program called the Light Mobility Aircraft. This program proposes to acquire commercial off-the-shelf aircraft to satisfy a new Air Force light mobility mission requirement designed to build partner capacity, especially in lesser-developed partner nations.

This program would support irregular warfare efforts to help prepare partner nations to defend and govern themselves by demonstrating an airlift capability that is consistent with their needs for infrastructure, methods of employment, acquisition and sustainment costs, and mission capability. We hope our witnesses can further expand on this new requirement in today’s hearing.

Before we begin, I would like to turn to my good friend and colleague from Maryland, the ranking member on the committee, Mr. Bartlett, for his opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 25.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, RANKING MEMBER, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This committee has been actively working to try to understand the risk the Department is taking in its aviation programs. I hope this hearing will clarify some things for us because I have some real concerns about the force structure decisions that have been made.

After reviewing the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget request, it is still not clear to me if force structure recommendations were made based on a real requirement or simply constrained by the budget.

As a case in point, I would like to highlight the tactical airlift programs and requirements. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council [JROC] validated a requirement for 78 Joint Cargo Aircraft [JCA], yet the current program of record reflects only 38. The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study recently concluded that we have excess tactical aircraft capacity; yet the study failed to account for the aircraft needed for the direct support mission to meet the Army’s time-sensitive intra-theater requirements.

To complicate matters further, the President’s budget proposes to retire several of the older C–130s in fiscal year 2011. However, we subsequently are informed that you will have to take assets from the Air National Guard to backfill the gap created by the retirements.

If the MCRS is at all accurate with respect to the tactical aircraft requirements, then why do we have to take C–130s from the Air National Guard to fulfill mission requirements in the active duty? I find this all very confusing and very concerning. I hope that our witnesses will shed some light on these decisions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I look forward to the discussion.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett.
We will proceed with the panel’s testimony and then get into questions. Without objection, all witnesses’ prepared statements will be included in the hearing record.
And, with that, we will begin with General Johnson.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. MICHELLE D. JOHNSON, USAF, DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGY, POLICY, PROGRAMS, AND LOGISTICS, UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

General JOHNSON. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bartlett, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is truly an honor to testify before you today on behalf of General Duncan J. McNabb and the 140,000 men and women of the United States Transportation Command.

Whether delivering equipment to give our warfighters decisive advantage over the enemy or flying wounded warriors home to receive the world’s best life-saving care, these men and women give everything to provide hope and to earn the trust of the greatest fighting force on Earth.

As you noted, Mr. Chairman, the MCRS results indicated that we have sufficient airlift, strategic and tactical, surge sealift, prepositioned material, and Continental United States transportation assets to satisfy the most demanding scenarios used to determine the requirements in this study.

However, the study did report a few exceptions where current programmed capacities were not sufficient to accomplish the mission: air refueling aircraft; offshore petroleum discharge system, or OPDS; and infrastructure at foreign locations. The advent of the new KC–X tanker will help address the air refueling shortfall, and the Navy is researching options for providing additional OPDS capability to ensure two systems are available.

With respect to infrastructure, TRANSCOM remains ever vigilant in exploring strategies to ensure we can accomplish our mission. We are working infrastructure in two fronts. First, we are developing and improving concepts and technologies to overcome the constraints in delivering warfighter requirements to austere destination theaters. Some of this work includes joint high-speed vessels, airships, cargo-carrying UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles], and precision airdrop.

Second, we are maturing our strategy for global access with the completion of a global access study this summer. This work goes hand-in-glove with the development of our en route infrastructure master plan to identify and obtain funding for investments for the most critical en route locations, particularly multimodal locations like Rota, Spain, and Diego Garcia, where their ports are connected by roadways to airfields and, thus, provide critical support for our global force projection.

Meanwhile, the men and women of TRANSCOM continue to transport supplies to our forces around the world. We rally to support humanitarian missions, such as Haitian earthquake relief, while remaining on track to meet the President’s requirement for additional troops in Afghanistan by the end of this summer.
Though sometimes challenging, these missions are the lifeblood of TRANSCOM.

And though I sit before you in the Air Force blue today and am proud to do so, I do represent soldiers, sailors, airmen, and basically our fourth component in the commercial fleets of sealift and airlift in performing our mission. We appreciate the congressional support that allows us to accomplish our mission and ensure that transportation and logistics remain an asymmetric advantage for the United States.

Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Bartlett, again, thank you for inviting me to discuss the remarkable work our TRANSCOM team accomplishes around the clock every day. Thank you for submitting my written testimony for the record, and I look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Johnson can be found in the Appendix on page 27.]

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much.

Mr. Van Buren.


Mr. Van Buren. Good afternoon, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bartlett, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Lieutenant General Breedlove, Brigadier General Johnston, and I thank you for the opportunity to address the committee regarding the Air Force’s current and future mobility requirements and programs.

Within acquisition, we are focused on our warfighting customers and our strategic planning, represented by General Breedlove and General Johnston. We are focused on what we buy and how we buy it. We are working very hard on the critically important KC–X program, with a planned award date this fall. We have much effort, as well, on modernizing our aging force, such as the C–5 reliability enhancement re-engining program, and we plan to acquire 15 light mobility aircraft in fiscal year 2011 to foster building partnership capacity.

With a key emphasis on assuring affordability and reducing cycle time of deliveries to our warfighter customer, our overall efforts for C–17, C–5 modernization, C–27J, C–130J, and C–130 modernization are currently proceeding relatively well.

The Air Force and its outstanding airmen remain focused on a mission, the continued security of our great Nation. And we thank the subcommittee for your shared commitment. We have submitted a combined statement for the record, and we look forward to answering your questions today.

Thank you.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much.

General Breedlove.

General BREEDLOVE. Sir, no opening remarks. I join in Mr. Van Buren’s remarks.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

General Johnston.

General JOHNSTON. Thank you, sir. No opening remarks, and I also join Mr. Van Buren.

Mr. SMITH. Okay.

Well, I think it is obvious from the statement I gave the questions that we have. I will start out in one general area, and that is focusing on the C-5s and the C-17s and the balance between the two and how you see that meeting the needs. And the degree to which money is constraining your choices here is something that we would like to know, as well, just in terms of planning.

But in terms of getting to the right number combination of those two aircraft, number one, if you could—and I guess I will start with General Breedlove—if you could explain to us better, you know, 316, 304, the differences in the outcomes between the 2005 and the 2016 studies. What has changed, and what makes you confident that 304 is enough to meet your needs and demands?

General BREEDLOVE. If you will let me just frame it, I might ask——

Mr. SMITH. Please.

General BREEDLOVE [continuing]. General Johnson to speak to that, since they did the study.

Mr. SMITH. Okay.

General JOHNSON. Thank you, sir, for the opportunity.

And as you noted in your opening comments, the MCRS did take us forward in the way we have analyzed the fleet and the mobility capacity. The fleet mixes that you describe can vary, as General Breedlove described, to achieve the same outcome and the same output capacity.

What the MCRS did that really improved over the fidelity of the MCS-05 was to take the three cases that you described in your opening comments and to stress air mobility in different ways so to bracket the, sort of, capacity requirements.
One scenario had two major land campaigns that stressed this air mobility, the strategic airlift requirement. One really stressed the air refueling requirement, with a naval and air campaign combined with an asymmetric land campaign.

And the third scenario took us to a new place to include irregular warfare scenario over a long term that required the rotation of forces and lacked infrastructure in a foreign environment that could accommodate the strat airlift, and so it put the strain on our system in a different way. And that was combined with another land campaign.

And so those three scenarios were meant to bracket the capacity which we would need with more fidelity, frankly, than we had in the MCS–05. So, in itself, there is a range within MCRS such that the least demanding requirement for strat airlift demanded 274. Three-hundred-and-forty was the greatest requirement.

As General McNabb has said before—and you cited him and General Schwartz as using the 316 figure. At the time, that was their best judgment based on MCS, standing by for the results of MCRS. And that is what General McNabb would express to you, that there is that other clause that he would want to add that was pending MCRS results.

And so the 304 provides the capacity that TRANSCOM is looking for, and then we count on the Air Force to manage that fleet internally to maintain that capacity.

Mr. SMITH. Okay.

General BREEDLOVE. Sir, if I could add just one thing——

Mr. SMITH. Sure.

General BREEDLOVE [continuing]. And I am sure General Johnson would agree with me, that, in each of the three cases, too, one of the biggest delimiters on how we could move men, material, and equipment was the throughput capacity of the APODs [aerial ports of debarkation] at the destinations. In most cases, more aircraft made no difference in how fast we could move the material through.

Mr. SMITH. I am sorry. The “throughput capacity of the APODs” exceeded my level of understanding. Could you——

General BREEDLOVE. I am sorry. The aerial ports of the debarkation, the places where we unload.

Mr. SMITH. Okay.

General BREEDLOVE. The capacity of the airport to receive the material and then transload it and move it on was, in most cases, the biggest delimiter in the study.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. So basically what you are saying, then, is that the mobility issues—and this would go back to General Johnson—you know, have as much to do with what we are able to accommodate on the ground as it is in the air.

General Johnson, do you want to comment on that?

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. Thank you. That is great insight.

And, as you know, for the business of Transportation Command, we have become more sophisticated in our mode selection and found that, even though it might be counterintuitive, most of our throughput comes from the surface. We do 90 percent of our support from sea and land and only 10 percent by the air in mature theaters.
Mr. SMITH. Okay, I get it.

General JOHNSON. So seaports and airports are the mainstays for what we do.

In places where there are severe environments and lack of infrastructure, throwing in more resources that require that infrastructure don’t actually help. It is counterproductive. So this infrastructure and this intermodal selection is really important, as we close the force.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. One more quick question, and then I want to get Mr. Bartlett in before we have to go vote.

As you are looking to retire C–5As going forward, I think, as I mentioned in my opening statement, you know, 17 this year, five next year, have you estimated how long you expect the life of all of the C–5s to be? Do you have projections in 2013, 2014, 2015, going forward, for how many more C–5s you are going to retire? And how does that impact the possible need for replacements, new C–17s basically?

General JOHNSTON. Sir, I can tackle that one.

You are correct, we have plans to retire 17 in fiscal year 2011 and then five in fiscal year 2012. And then we are also—you know, we have to get relief from the 316 number, and we have plans to, as the number of C–17s go up, to reduce the number of C–5s accordingly, in order to maintain that 316 number so far until we have relief down to a lower number, 304 or what have you.

Mr. SMITH. How many more C–17s above the 223 are you expecting, at this point?

General JOHNSTON. Right now, 223 is what we are planning on, sir. We have no expectations to go any higher than that. And if we have a higher number than 223, then you get into the issue of how many C–5s are you going to retire. And then you get to a fleet size of C–5s to a point where——

Mr. SMITH. I got that.

General JOHNSTON. Okay.

Mr. SMITH. You actually have all 223 right now?

General JOHNSTON. No, sir.

Mr. SMITH. That is what I am asking. How many more——

General JOHNSTON. Oh, I am sorry. We are at 197 right now.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. So as they come up——

General JOHNSTON. Yes, sir. We are at 197. Probably be about 205, should be at 205 by the end of this year, fiscal year 2010; 215 for C–17s in 2011; and then 223 in 2012.

And then, you know, depending on that mix, to stay at 316 or go below, we are planning on lowering the number of C–5s if we do get relief to a number around 94 in fiscal year 2011 and probably about 89 in fiscal year 2012 on the C–5s. Again, we still have to ask for relief from that.

Mr. SMITH. Okay.

I have C–27 questions, but something tells me Mr. Bartlett will take care of those, so I will yield to him.

Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

In my opening statement, I mentioned that the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study recently concluded, “failed to ac-
count for the aircraft needed for the direct support mission to meet the Army's time-sensitive intra-theater requirement.”

Can you tell me what kind of analysis the Air Force is doing to determine the number of aircraft required to perform the intra-theater aircraft mission and the direct support mission?

General JOHNSON. Mr. Bartlett, if I may, from the TRANSCOM perspective, frame this a bit and then have the Air Force fill in.

The direct support mission is still being analyzed. This 78 requirement that you mentioned was from the Army and JROC approved, and it is being analyzed in terms of the mix, the mixture that still matches up in terms of numbers.

But in the meantime, the Air Force and TRANSCOM are very intent on providing direct support to the Army. And so we have already, in the last year, provided a concept of employment test with two C-130s, because C-27s aren’t available yet, with which the Army was very pleased.

In addition to that, General Odierno and General McChrystal have both expressed great appreciation to General McNabb for the additional direct support that AMC [Air Mobility Command] and TRANSCOM are providing in the form of 30 to 40 of C-130s in theater right now at the beck and call of the Army to provide the support they need, in addition to the airdrop support each and every day.

And so, numerically, what we are looking at is, in addition to the 38 JCAs that you described, General McNabb and previously General White, in previous testimony in another committee, have cited that about 40 C-130 equivalents will be probably required to fill that bill. And so that is earmarked and set aside to make sure we can support the Army, and further supported by the notion that only about three airfields in Afghanistan are accessible by C-27s and not C-130s.

So we think we can continue to provide that support with C-130s until continued analysis can narrow down the exact number of C-27s. But it is tremendously important for us to earn that trust from the field commanders on the ground, and we seem to be doing so now.

General BREEDLOVE. Sir, if I could add just a short note, you are correct. And in the 78 number, I think our JROC used the number of 75, but they are close enough. The way we are addressing that is the 38 C-27s, which is the program of record, plus the 40 that General Johnson has mentioned, to bring the 78, a number that we will hold dedicated to that Army mission.

We are currently flying under a construct called “direct support apportioned.” It is the construct that was worked out specifically by the Army. They are, as General Johnson mentioned, very, very happy with the way that is working out. And, again, General McChrystal and General Odierno have both personally approved and look forward to the way ahead on direct support apportion via the 78 aircraft.

Mr. BARTLETT. It is interesting that 38 plus 40 is 78, but we really don’t have 40 C-130s or we wouldn’t be taking them from the Guard, would we?

General Breedlove, you know, over many months in many committees, I have asked the question, has there ever been any study
that came to a different conclusion than that we needed 78 Joint Cargo Aircraft? And the answer has always been, “No. That is still a validated requirement.” And if that is true, sir, why are we disregarding this validated requirement in our procurements?

General Brede-love. Well, sir, I think I would agree with you, there have been no other studies that indicate any other number other than 78. And it is our intention to fill that requirement with the 38 C–27s and 40 apportioned C–130s, not necessarily from the Guard but from the general pool of the C–130s in our TRANSCOM fleet.

And, currently, the absolute requirement on the ground downrange now is being fulfilled by those C–130s, which are earmarked every day on the Air Tasking Order as “direct support apportioned.” So we are going to meet that requirement via those 38 C–27s and 40 aircraft dedicated against the requirement of 78.

Mr. Bartlett. But we are taking those aircraft from our Guard and making them shorthanded. And the C–130 is not the 27, because it requires a longer field.

Where we are now, you may be able to meet the need; where we may be next month, you may not be able to meet the need. I remain very concerned that this validated requirement for 78 is just being ignored and filled by an aircraft that we are kind of stealing from the Guard that doesn’t really meet the requirements because it is not the same aircraft.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Smith. Thank you.

Mr. Coffman. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions at this time.

Mr. Smith. I actually have a few more questions. Actually, I wanted to ask about the Civil Reserve Air Fleet [CRAF], something I don’t understand as well as I would like to, and how that figures into all of your plans, how you would assess the utility of it at this point.

General Johnson, do you want to take a quick stab at talking about that a little bit?

General Johnson. Yes, sir. What has been helpful to us in this study is to be able to measure a steady state over a long period of time to see how we really do business with the Civil Reserve Air Fleet so we can understand better how we can surge with the organic fleet. So the study was able to measure that.

And you and I have had a chance to talk about—we tend to look at CRAF in terms of wide-body equivalents, in terms of the aircraft. But what is the bottom line is the amount we relied on CRAF, whether MCS or MCRS, is roughly equivalent, but what we have been able to look at is more of this steady-state rotational role the CRAF serves.

And they primarily carry passengers and bulk cargo. The overand outsized cargo and the weapons and the specialized sensitive equipment we carry on our “gray tails,” as we say it, or our organic fleet. So we look to CRAF to do bulk cargo, palletized cargo, and passengers. And so they manage that steady-state requirement day-in and day-out.

And, in a long conflict, as we are in now and as we measured in MCRS, we had a better way to see what the role is for the
CRAF. And our fleet seems manageable. We have requirements in each stage of CRAF to handle an activation surge, and we have participation from our fleet. And even right now, as we speak, there is a meeting with our civil carriers to help upgrade the CRAF program, to make it more responsive in this environment, and to upgrade the rules that really came into play in the Cold War.

Mr. Smith. Okay. Thank you.

We do have a series of votes, including a motion to recommit, which always adds a hour-hour, in the middle of it. So it is going to be a good 45 minutes to an hour, I suspect, before we are able to come back.

And I can't even guarantee we are going to have that many more questions. I have a few more. But there may be Members who went to the vote who would like to have the opportunity to ask questions. I hate to make you hang around for an hour, but I am going to have to, just to make sure the committee has an adequate chance to ask questions.

So we will be in recess until we can get back from the votes. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. Smith. The votes always take longer than they actually should.

We should also explain, Mr. Bartlett will not be able to come back. He had a 3:30 meeting with Ashton Carter from the Pentagon, as a matter of fact. And he informed me he will have to attend that.

And, General Johnson, we were talking a little bit during the break there. You have had some further clarification on some of the C–130 answers. And, please, elaborate.

General Johnson. Yes, sir. Thank you. I think if I could frame and then will look to my left for the Air Force to fill in some details.

But the reference, the 130 force and the excess tails that are available that we found in a study—and I say “excess” in quotation marks—there were sufficient airframes to handle all the scenarios.

One of the scenarios actually tested our intra-theater forces harder, in a sense that there are rotational forces and it goes over a long period of time, 7 years. And what we found that, even though the airframes were available, it is the crew force that is not able to sustain the rotations over time because of the way our policies work between the active duty and the Guard and the Reserve.

Without being too arcane, the crew ratios differ, and the access to the crews on the active-duty side can work, but the limited number cannot support the conflict on its own; we need the help from the Guard and Reserve forces. The crew ratios in the Guard and Reserve forces are different, and therefore it is difficult to access the crews to sustain a long rotational-type conflict. And that is the shortfall that the study found, was in the crew forces, not so much in the airframes.

And, with that, I think if I could yield to the Air Force to perhaps talk about the allocation of the crews and airframes within the force structure, that might bring some clarity. I hope that helps.

Mr. Smith. Yeah, that would be great. Thank you.
General Johnston. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to just further elaborate on Mr. Bartlett’s question.

The most stressing scenario from the study led us to a 335 number for C–130s. Of course, our current program of record is 401 aircraft. And in addressing the direct support mission to the Army, as I was explaining to Mr. Bartlett, there is a requirement, validated by our JROC, for 75 aircraft.

I think there may be a little confusion in that that 75 is very close to the 78 number that the Army was originally going to buy of C–27s. Currently, our program of record for C–27s is 38, and that is what we will proceed with.

Mr. Smith. And if I could clarify, building off Mr. Bartlett’s questions, it is true that since the original study came out and said we need this many C–27s, no new study has been done that says we need that many C–27s.

But I think what you are saying is, things have happened that have called into doubt, in your mind, whether or not you need the 78, I guess it was. We haven’t done a full, formal, 100 percent study that says, “Here is the new idea,” but there, as was discussed, the number of airfields that actually the C–130 can access.

Do you plan to do—not to shift subjects on you in mid-sentence here—but do you plan to do a more formal requirements study for the C–27?

General Breedlove. Sir, I would like to get back to you, take that for the record. I think it is prudent that we would look at that, but I don’t want to commit until I have gone back and taken a look at our requirements guys and asked them that.

Because we do agree that 78 was a number that was developed by the Army, not by us, and we need to take a look at what that is, especially now that we have the experience, that we gained in October through December of last year when we actually did this mission for the Army and did it well.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 49.]

Mr. Smith. Well, it would be helpful to the committee. Obviously, this is an issue of some concern to a number of Members. If we could have a more firmed-up requirements look at why you think this different ratio would work and play out for you.

General Breedlove. Sir, we got that, and we will get back to you.

And just to clear one point from our conversation with Mr. Bartlett, we do not intend to move any aircraft out of the Guard into the active duty to cover that 40. That 40 aircraft comes out of the general pool. That mission will be shared by active duty and Guard alike. So there is no movement across the active or the ANG [Air National Guard] to accommodate that 40 aircraft.

Mr. Smith. Okay.

I wanted to have you talk a little bit about the tanker. We are all very much aware of the fact that there is a huge need and that it has taken too long to fill that need. There is certainly a tortured history and many to blame for the fact that it has taken that long. But be that as it may, we need the new tanker. And we are optimistic that we are now on a path to get it.
But if you could quantify a little bit for us, either General Johnson or General Breedlove, you know, how bad is it right now in terms of our needs for tanker capacity. And in many of these studies, I did not see in front of me estimates of how many tankers we would need, how many we have, how we are going to handle the fact that they are getting old and, you know, will be out of service. And where are we going to have shortfalls as we wait to build the new tanker?

General JOHNSON. Sir, if I may lead off, the study found that in two of the three scenarios we did not have sufficient air refueling support in the fleet. And in one case, we would need 103 percent of what we have, and obviously did not have sufficient use; and then 120 percent in the more air and naval campaign kind of scenario. And this tanker fleet, the existing fleet consists of the 59 KC–10s and the 415 KC–135s and the 79 Marine Corps KC–130s.

And the thing that is telling, probably, about this fleet is that this study used KC–135 equivalents. And anything that a modern aircraft would bring would help, because up to 19 percent of the KC–135s are in depot at any one time. So a new aircraft would immediately provide more availability and better mission-capable rate right just to start with, let alone with the other capabilities it would bring in the requirements in the contract.

So, as far as TRANSCOM is concerned, not only do we need more, the better quality would facilitate this. And the better capability might reduce the top-end numbers because of what it can bring, but we had to model what we have in KC–135 equivalents.

So, again, I think the depot rate really spoke to the age of the aircraft in this.

Mr. SMITH. So when you come to those figures of the shortfall in your scenarios, you are assuming that at any given time roughly 20 percent of that fleet will not be available.

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. That is factored into your scenario.

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Okay.

Well, I just want to reiterate this committee’s commitment to do whatever we can to move that process forward as quickly as possible. We understand we now will likely—or will have a competitive bid with two companies. Certainly, I think that is good, to have competition. But we hope we will make a decision on that as quickly and as timely as possible. And it is my commitment on this committee to try and not muck with that, if you will. We want to get this decision done as quickly as possible. And just, you know, anything we can do to help or not hinder, please let us know.

I don’t have any further questions. I know Mr. Coffman—I am sorry—Mr. Coffman had been here, and he told me after the meeting that he did have a question, so I will give him a shot.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You know, when we look at the logistical support for Iraq and we are facing down in Iraq, we have port facilities that are available to offload key vehicles and various support equipment as well as weapons systems. But when we look at Afghanistan, it is incredibly logistically difficult to support. And we have really relied on airlift capacity to bring in things that we would not normally bring
into an airstrip. I think pretty much all of our weapons—I think that things like, I think, chow and fuel maybe go on rail and then are trucked in, but pretty much everything else, I think, comes in through airlift.

And so, are you able to meet the demands for Afghanistan now, number one? And, number two, when we phase down from Afghanistan, will we then have surplus capacity in terms of our airlift capability, or will the numbers and type of aircraft be reasonable to meet future challenges?

General JOHNSON. Sir, thank you for that question.

Afghanistan is about the most difficult location we could imagine to supply logistically, and yet a lot of the ratios remain. We provide about 80 percent of the supplies for Afghanistan by surface. And because it is an immature theater and, as you said, the infrastructure is not as robust, we provide about 20 percent by air. It is a sensitive, lethal type of cargo.

However, still 80 percent by surface, because that is the way we work. Normally, in a mature theater, we would provide 90 percent by sea and land and only 10 percent by air.

The other thing that helps us not build in too much of an excess when we are in a, you know, great push, as we are now, is that we really tap into our commercial capacity. And that is one of the asymmetric advantages that Transportation Command has. We work with our civil reserve air fleet. We work with commercial partners on the sea and on the land. And so we not only bring in supplies by the ground via Pakistan but also from the Northern Distribution Network, with which I am sure you are familiar, whether from northern Europe, through Russia, or through the Caucasus, through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

And we tap into existing rail lines. And the advantage of this is these are commercial lines with commercial products. And so, when they arrive in theater, they are supplying the forces, but when we step back down at the end of this, the commercial infrastructure remains, hopefully, for the benefit of the region and their development, but not at the expense of the DOD [Department of Defense] to maintain it because it is a commercial network.

In fact, I was able to travel with General McNabb to Manila last fall to be with him when he thanked the president of the Asian Development Bank for their investment in a railway link between Hairatan and Mazar-e-Sharif in Afghanistan to link the railway to the Ring Road. It helps us because it helps us get supplies in, but it helps the region be more viable. And a peaceful and stable Afghanistan is something that all of the neighbors seek. Even though the neighbors are interesting there, they see the advantage there, too.

So that is one of the great leverages that TRANSCOM brings. I hope that that comes to the nature of your question.

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, if I could—but I understand that all the vehicles—is it true that all the vehicles are coming by air, all the MRAPs [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles] are coming by air?

General JOHNSON. Over 2,000 of them have come now, sir, and we have probably about 6,000 to go. I mean, there is a large family of those vehicles.
But what we have started to do is an intermodal solution that will close it quicker to send 300 to 400 by sea and then to an intermediate staging base near Afghanistan but not necessarily within the country, then offload and shuttle and use C–17s to the advantage for which they were made, to be able to fly these long legs, and cycle in faster than if we do, you know, four at a time or eight at a time in a wide-body aircraft.

So, initially, yes, indeed, we have gone by air. We are looking at ways to do this intermodal system to get them faster. And we are able to, actually, now, keep up with the production rate and the integration rate so that we are getting them into theater over 500 a month, and we will be able to match the absorption rate that CENTCOM [Central Command] can take.

So it is something we are watching very closely, and there is not much room to spare, but we are on track.

Mr. COFFMAN. What is the dividing line between what is flown into the country and what is brought in by surface transportation?

General JOHNSON. Normally, it is this idea of sensitive and lethal. It is something that you need to have and we can't afford to have out of our eyesight. But we have actually done experiments up the Pakistan line of communication with trucks with close RFID [Radio Frequency Identification] tracking, so that we have an eye on where they are, to see how that would work on the surface and see what is possible. We do it very carefully to make sure that we don't lose, again, control of what we have.

It also provides us flexibility to be able to adjust to convoys with this RFID technology to be able to say, let's move this convoy ahead or adjust its order as we go through. So we try to use good supply-chain methods to have accountability for them.

But on the ground—and you cited it initially, very astutely—food, construction materials, lumber, fuel, sort of fungible commercial products that can come in.

General BREEDLOVE. Sir, if I could just add one little piece to that to get to your specific question about how the mission is being accomplished inside Afghanistan.

The tactical airlift piece of that, we are meeting the requirement and exceeding it, in some cases. If you were to talk to General McChrystal’s staff right now and ask them what their needs are inside Afghanistan, it would be rotary-wing lift, especially high-altitude-capable rotary-wing lift.

And, as was mentioned earlier, all the airfields that we use in Afghanistan, only three require an airfield that is smaller than a C–130 can service. A C–27 would be good for that, and that would be part of that mission set.

But almost all of the requirements that we struggle to meet are rotary-wing lift to distribute after we move it in via tactical air or via ground commercial.

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, if I could just follow up on the shortage on rotary-wing lift?

Mr. SMITH. Yes, go ahead.

Mr. COFFMAN. General, just as a follow-up, could you address the shortfall on rotary-wing lift and where we are in terms of meeting that capability?
General Breedlove. Sir, I would really like to get you a good answer for that, if I could take that for the record and get back to you. That is not exactly the detail I brought today.

In general, it is heavy rotary-wing lift that can essentially operate at higher altitudes above 6,000 feet.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 49.]

Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. Smith. Thank you.

I am going to recognize Mr. Kissell in just a second. I do have a 4 o'clock meeting back up in my office that I have to get to. So, at some point during the course of his questions, I will slip out and turn the committee over to Mr. Kissell to wrap up.

And I just want to, before I go, thank all of our witnesses for their testimony and their work on behalf of our country. Difficult decisions. I appreciate your work. We look forward to working with you on all those issues.

And, with that, I will turn it over to Mr. Kissell.

Mr. Kissell. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize for not being here for the opening comments. I was doing some work on the floor. So I am not sure if this would have been discussed earlier. I know parts of it have been discussed since I have been here.

But, a few weeks ago, right after the situation in Haiti first developed, there was a hearing that we had, and one of the questions that I was able to ask—and it concerned transport, and I am not sure if some of you might have been there or not—but I asked the question: Do we have lift capacity to be able to handle the situation in what is going on in Afghanistan and all of the challenges there, plus other places that we have to be, plus having a situation like Haiti come along, and to be able to accomplish all of this? And I was told that, yes, we did; we were able to rearrange some training exercises and move some equipment around; that we are fine.

About 3 weeks after that, I got a call from the head of our National Guard in North Carolina, General Ingram, saying that the Air Force had stated that they wanted to take two of the Air National Guard–North Carolina C–130s. And I think it was 10 all together from different States, two from North Carolina. And they were very concerned about this. We expressed that concern. We were advised last week that this was being worked out and that we should not worry about it anymore.

Mr. Kissell. In another hearing maybe a couple of weeks ago, somebody had said to me, to the same reference, to tell General Ingram it is going to be fine.

In what you said a couple minutes ago—and I am not even sure who said it. I apologize for that. Someone said that we have no intentions of taking Air National Guard equipment, C–130s, to regular Air Force for a certain mission. Now, can we still assume that you don't need those C–130s for any other mission also, at this point in time?

General Johnston. Sir, let me address the one that you asked first, which was directed more at the schoolhouse, providing C–130s to the Little Rock school house in order to continue that training.
The E models at Little Rock are, you know, they are retiring. They are coming out of inventory. We are going to retire all the C–130Es. And the airplanes that you are referencing, it was 12 Air National Guard C–130s we were looking at and six Air Force Reserve C–130s, for a total of 18. And that was part of the fiscal year 2011 presidential budget.

We heard you, and we are looking at a more efficient and effective way to manage the three components and come up with a solution that not only meets the State mission but as well as the schoolhouse mission at Little Rock Air Force Base. And we have been discussing with the Air National Guard as well as the Air Force Reserve and, of course, the active component, we have come up with a smart solution to address those concerns.

And it hasn't been formally presented to the Secretary. And once it is—Secretary Donnelly—he will work that through to you all, to Congress, with the solution. And my sense is that he will come up—or, you should see a response on that in the next few weeks.

Mr. Kissell. If you would keep us in the loop on that, it would be much appreciated.

And I missed some conversation here, and, once again, I do apologize. The C–27, the number we were looking, at one time, 78? Did I hear that we are down to 37?

And Mr. Bartlett's question I missed. But, at one time, there seemed to be some talk up on the committee that the development of this joint cargo plane for the Air Force and the Army, it seemed to be going to the Air Force, who didn't seem to want it; that the Army wanted it. You know, where do we stand now? Are we down to 37?

You mentioned earlier about the ability of this plane to be useful in a lot of situations in Afghanistan. What is the status of this plane right now and its needs and where we are going with it?

General Breedlove. Sir, I would be happy to take that question. The Army created the original requirement for a Joint Cargo Aircraft. And, in their study, they developed a requirement for 78 C–27-type aircraft, and that was the program that they embarked on.

Then the Department of Defense entered the discussion and decided that that mission was more appropriately provided by the Air Force. And the Air Force was given the mission of doing direct support mission for the Army.

At that time, the decision was also taken by the Department that 38 aircraft would be purchased of the C–27 variety. And since we have excess C–130 capacity in our Air Force—the current study says we need about 335, and since we have 401 in the total inventory, we would augment the 38 Sherpa buy with 40 aircraft from the general C–130 population to accomplish the Army direct support mission. And so that would bring us back to a level of 78 aircraft available for that mission.

And, as the chairman has aptly asked, we have as an Air Force now gone back and studied to see if the actual requirement is for 78. That was the number that the Army came to in their judgment.

Since that time, we have had a lot of experience. We conducted a direct support experiment in Iraq, from October to December of last year, and we gained a lot of insight into what the Army requires to do that mission. The Army commanders on the ground
were ecstatic with the performance of the Air Force in that mission.

And so we were able to gain enough knowledge to know that what we will be able to do, as we further look at this, is use the 38 C–27s, plus 40 aircraft from the general population, to do the direct support mission. And then, as I spoke to the chairman, we will go back and bring back to the committee an answer about when and how we will study to see if that is the right number.

In the meantime, we are accomplishing this mission currently in both Afghanistan and Iraq at the direction of General McChrystal and General Odierno. We are doing this via general support apportioned, which means we have aircraft that are set aside every day for direct support of the Army on the ground. And they, the aviation brigade commanders, can lay out the work for those aircraft on that day. And the Army is very happy with our performance in this general support apportioned role that we are doing now.

And so, that is sort of the status of the problem. Does that answer your question, sir?

Mr. KISSELL. Yes, sir. Thank you so much.

And the chair recognizes Mr. McIntyre from North Carolina.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you gentlemen for your service to our country.

As you know, we have been interrupted by votes, and so hopefully what we ask right now has not already been asked. We would ask for your indulgence.

But the average age of the C–5 is more than 27 years old. It has a very low mission-capable rate, I think about 30 percent below the C–17.

Since the C–5A is much less available than the C–17 and is 20 years older and will have to be replaced at some point, has there not been some consideration given to keeping the C–17 line open, in light of that situation?

Mr. VAN BUREN. Right now, the stated requirement for C–17 is 223 aircraft. It comes under the total force structure for strategic aircraft, which is 111 C–5s. So, right now, we have no acquisition plans for anything beyond the 223.

Mr. MCINTYRE. I mean, would you be willing to consider that, given the age situation with the C–5?

General JOHNSTON. Sir, as we compare the number of C–17s and number of C–5s that we have and we compare it against the MCRS number of 32.7, which is the highest case number of million-ton-miles per day, we feel that the number of 223 C–17s, based on the number of C–5s we feel will be in the force for the next 20 years or so, is about right.

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right.

No further questions right now, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. KISSELL. Being we have no other Members here, Congressman McIntyre, any other questions you want to ask?

Mr. MCINTYRE. No, sir. Thank you.

Mr. KISSELL. Okay.

We would like to thank the panel for being here. And we do apologize for the interruption. I know there are questions that you will be getting back to us on, and as individuals in the committee,
we appreciate that. And thank you for coming. Thank you for your service.
And this is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:07 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
AP P E N D I X

April 28, 2010
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

APRIL 28, 2010
Statement of Air and Land Forces Subcommittee
Chairman Adam Smith
Hearing on Air Mobility Programs

April 28, 2010

“The Air and Land Forces Subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on air mobility programs.

“We welcome our witnesses: Brigadier General Michelle D. Johnson, Director for Strategy, Policy, Programs and Logistics for the U.S. Transportation Command; Mr. David M. Van Buren, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; Lieutenant General Philip M. Breedlove, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements and Brigadier General Richard C. Johnston, Director of Strategic Planning at Headquarters Air Force

“Today’s hearing follows the early March release of the Mobility Capabilities Study 2016, or MCRS 2016. MCRS 2016 was a significant study by the Department of Defense to identify mobility capabilities and requirements needed to support U.S. strategic objectives in the 2016 timeframe. The study assessed the major components of the mobility system including airlift, aerial refueling, sealift, surface transportation, ashore and afloat pre-positioning, forward stationing and infrastructure.

“MCRS-16 developed three cases to evaluate a broad spectrum of military operations linked to notional strategic environments to support possible decisions regarding future mobility force structure. Those cases included two nearly simultaneous large-scale land campaigns, demanding homeland defense consequence management events, and a long-term irregular warfare campaign.

“With few exceptions, MCRS-16 found the Department’s planned mobility capabilities sufficient to support the most demanding projected requirements.

“Regarding strategic airlift, the study determined that the capacity of the Department’s strategic airlift fleet exceeds the peak demand in each of the three MCRS-16 cases. Peak demand for one of those cases required 304 strategic airlift aircraft. Of note, the previous mobility study, Mobility Capabilities Study 2005, or MCS 05, identified a strategic airlift force structure of 292-383 aircraft as a ‘moderate risk’ force, and we hope our witnesses will be able to talk to us today about the differences between MCRS-16 and the previous mobility study.

“Additionally, the current commander of the U.S. Transportation Command, and his predecessor who is now the Air Force Chief of Staff, have testified that a force of 316 strategic airlift aircraft is considered the ‘sweet spot’ for the strategic airlift inventory. Congress passed legislation adopting 316 as the minimum number of strategic airlift aircraft last year.

“The current Air Force programmed strategic airlift inventory includes 223 C-17s and 111 C-5s, for a total of 334 aircraft. The Air Force proposes to retire 17 C-5s in 2011, which would bring the inventory to 317 aircraft.
"We understand that the Air Force plans to retire five additional C-5s in 2012 which would bring that the total strategic airlift inventory below 316.

"For fiscal year 2012, we expect the Department of Defense will submit a legislative proposal seeking to change the title 10 statute which mandates that 316 strategic airlift aircraft be maintained in the Air Force inventory if the Department still plans to proceed with C-5 retirements beyond those now planned for fiscal year 2011.

"Regarding tactical, or intra-theater, airlift, MCRS-16 found that the programmed fleet of 401 C-130s exceeds the peak demand in each of the three MCRS-16 cases. The highest C-130 demand required 335 aircraft.

"However, the MCRS-16 study notes that the direct support mission to meet the Army’s time-sensitive airlift requirements was not assessed, and that C-130s may be required to supplement C-27s to support this mission. Of note, MCS 05 identified a ‘moderate risk’ intra-theater airlift force structure of 395-674 aircraft.

"We hope our witnesses can address the Air Force analysis of the Army’s direct support requirements today as well as how tactical airlift inventory requirements have changed since the previous mobility study.

"The budget request also includes $65.7 million for 15 aircraft in a new start program called the ‘Light Mobility Aircraft.’

"This program proposes to acquire Commercial-Off-The-Shelf aircraft to satisfy a new Air Force light mobility mission requirement designed to build partner capacity especially in lesser developed partner nations.

"This program would support irregular warfare efforts to help prepare partner nations to defend and govern themselves by demonstrating an airlift capability that is consistent with their needs for infrastructure, methods of employment, acquisition and sustainment costs, and mission capability.

"We hope our witnesses can further expand on this new requirement in today’s hearing. Before we begin, I would like to turn to my good friend and colleague from Maryland, Roscoe Bartlett."
Statement of
Brigadier General Michelle D. Johnson, USAF
Director of Strategy, Policy, Programs and Logistics
United States Transportation Command

Before the House Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces
On The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study
April 28, 2010
Introduction

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bartlett, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to testify today on global mobility issues. On behalf of General McNabb, I want to express United States Transportation Command’s (TRANSCOM) appreciation of this subcommittee’s support for our Command and for the military men and women and DOD civilians who strive every day to protect our Nation and its interests.

Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study

It is my honor to speak to you today concerning TRANSCOM’s mobility requirements in the context of the recently completed Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study (MCRS). This 18 month-long effort, accomplished by TRANSCOM and our components in direct partnership with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (OSD/CAPE), provides TRANSCOM with a look at requirements through 2016 in order to ensure our plans and investments provide us the mobility capability needed to support the future warfight.

Scope

MCRS assessed a broad spectrum of mobility systems including airlift, aerial refueling, sealift, surface transportation, ashore and afloat prepositioning, forward stationing and infrastructure. As in past mobility studies, we examined the mix of military and commercial lift assets, recognizing our commercial partners can and should be leveraged wherever possible. The analysis was based on illustrative conventional and irregular military operations over a notional seven year period and modeled after the National Defense Strategy, ranging from continuing current conflict levels to all out war with a major adversary. In each of the scenarios, the mobility assets required to get the warfighter to the fight, sustain them during the fight, and bring
them home safely was calculated in detail. It is these calculations that will be used to “right size” our mobility capabilities and force structure for the future.

**Methodology**

MCRS developed three cases to evaluate a broad spectrum of military operations in order to inform the QDR and support decisions regarding future mobility force structure. No single case defines a complete picture for the stresses our mobility forces may need to respond to in the future and the set of cases is intended to inform the spectrum of stress we anticipate for our mobility forces based on the National Defense Strategy. Mobility demand consists of several layers. Each case contains two surge events, defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) or otherwise often referred to as homeland defense (HLD), and a 2016 representation of steady state activity that must be supported and sustained around the globe for crisis response and to support overseas contingency operations. Surge events for the cases are outlined as follows:

- **Case 1:** Two nearly simultaneous large-scale land campaigns, plus three nearly simultaneous homeland defense (HLD) consequence management events. This case stresses our strategic and theater lift assets.

- **Case 2:** Consists of an air/ naval campaign that stresses our Air Refueling fleet combined with a response to an asymmetric campaign. During the peak activity there is a significant HLD or consequence management event. This case includes scenarios and operations directly from the QDR scenario set and steady state security environment.

- **Case 3:** U.S. forces surge to conduct a large land campaign against the backdrop of an ongoing long-term irregular warfare campaign that has been ongoing for two years and is not unlike OEF/OIF over the last many years in terms or size and scope. This case also includes three nearly simultaneous HLD consequence management events. It includes a scenario that represents the Department’s first in-depth mobility look at supporting irregular warfare into an infrastructure constrained environment. It is also the first in-depth look the Department has conducted for mobility that informs both the stresses on the total force mix to sustain a long war and addresses from a mobility perspective the Nation’s ability to surge for a second warfight under these conditions.
Transportation requirements to support each case were calculated and programmed capabilities were applied to identify gaps in planned capabilities.

**Assumptions**

The MCRS used the 2009 President’s Budget (PB) as the program of record with appropriate PB10 adjustments. Other assumptions included the following: non-mobility forces will not exceed programmed levels; force development planning assumptions are in effect; and the Defense Planning Scenario (DPS) guidance is in effect. The DPS states that U.S. forces must be prepared to support two nearly-simultaneous conventional campaigns or one conventional campaign if involved in a long-duration irregular warfare campaign. In addition, forces must be prepared to support three nearly-simultaneous domestic events and ongoing steady state operations.

**Overall Assessment and Impact**

The MCRS results indicated that the Department’s planned mobility capabilities are sufficient to support the most demanding projected requirements, with a few exceptions. Inter- and intra-theater airlift capabilities, surge sealift, prepositioned and Continental U.S. (CONUS) transportation assets are sufficient. However, the most demanding scenario identified shortfalls in air refueling aircraft, Offshore Petroleum Discharge System (OPDS), and infrastructure at foreign destinations required to support major force deployments. In general, the fundamental constraint when attempting to reduce deployment timelines is destination infrastructure.

Procurement of additional airlift, sealift and prepositioned assets by itself will not overcome this reality. The Department should continue to explore strategies to ensure we maintain global reach by reducing our reliance on destination infrastructure when possible.
The MCRS results differed from the previous mobility study due to changes in several planning factors. Since the Mobility Capabilities Study of 2005 (MCS), the definition of the Steady State Security Posture activities has been refined based on experiences in Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. Additionally, the program of record used for MCRS is updated from that used for MCS. For instance, MCS assumed that 112 C-5s would eventually be modernized whereas the program of record used in MCRS is 52 modernized C-5s. On balance with a reduction in overall C-5 fleet reliability was growth in the number of C-17 aircraft as the program of record of 180 used for MCS grew to 223 in MCRS.

Inter-theater airlift mission success requires a viable fleet of C-17s and C-5s, in addition to our Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). The MCRS determined that our CRAF is sufficient to support future requirements, as is the programmed strategic airlift fleet of 223 C-17s and 111 C-5s which provides a capacity of 55.9 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D). This more than covers the highest MCRS airlift demand of 32.7 MTM/D. MCRS reconfirms findings from previous mobility studies that C-17s and C-5s are largely interchangeable in the strategic airlift role. MCRS also reconfirms that MTM/D-equivalent fleet mixes provided very similar force closure profiles and that the MTM/D metric is valid for evaluating fleet mix options when supporting large-scale, high volume operations. Alternative fleet mix options with various levels of modernization ranging from 293 to 304 were reported as equivalent capability. The excess capacity will allow for retirement of the oldest, least reliable aircraft in the fleet and free up support facilities and personnel as well as aircrews for newer aircraft or other missions.

Intra-theater airlift capabilities are also sufficient to meet all of the MCRS scenarios. C-130s, C-17s and C-27s make up the preponderance of our intra-theater lift. The programmed aircraft fleet of 401 C-130s is sufficient to meet the peak C-130 demand of 335 aircraft which
occurred in Case 1. However, based on current total force planning objectives C-130 aircrews are unable to sustain steady state operations in combination with a long duration irregular warfight which occurred in Case 3. Neither the MCS nor the MCRS quantified the Army direct support mission. Although MCRS did not specifically model the C-27s, it did allocate appropriate ramp space and fuel to C-27s and other scenario specified aircraft.

With regard to the intra-theater airlift mission for supporting HLD, MCRS analysis determined that ground transportation provides the best rate of closure - more than 10 times the rate of airlift - when moving significant forces and large amounts of equipment from dispersed locations in response to major HLD events. In MCS, HLD missions were largely attributed to C-130s whereas in MCRS HLD missions are primarily accomplished with ground transport and a few DoD and short range CAF assets.

PB11 accelerates the retirement of a number of legacy C-130Es. The impact of these retirements on our global mobility operations is expected to be minimal as the Air Force finalizes a plan which will ensure the C-130 training pipeline remains viable while the fleet continues to meet contingency requirements.

Aerial refueling requirements exceeded programmed capability. The current tanker inventory consists of 474 USAF aircraft - 415 KC-135s and 59 KC-10s in addition to the USMC's 79 KC-130 tankers. The MCRS demand ranged from a low of 383 KC-10/KC-135R equivalents and 66 KC-130s to a high of 567 KC-10/KC-135R equivalents and 79 KC-130s - a shortfall of 93 aircraft in the most demanding case. This shortfall would be mitigated by a modernized fleet including the KC-X, requiring fewer aircraft to meet the same demand with improved reliability, better utilization and fewer aircraft in depot maintenance.
Sealift is the primary means for delivering large ground forces and is essential to building up combat power required to seize the initiative in major ground operations. MCRS indicated that the available sealift fleet of organic, commercial, alliance, and effective U.S. controlled (EUSC) roll-on/roll-off (RORO) ships and containerships was sufficient to meet the military objectives of the most demanding MCRS case, although there was no appreciable RORO reserve in two of the three cases studied. Maintaining viable Department RORO capacity is critical given there are only 276 in the worldwide market appropriate for carrying military equipment of which 92 are US Flag or EUSC. The MCRS demand slightly exceeded the U.S. and allied capacity fuel tanker ships; however, the study noted that this could be mitigated by gaining access to the 1,980 useful tankers available globally.

MCRS reports that Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS) and Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV) are critical enablers for deployment and sustainment and are sufficient to meet the most demanding case. Off-Shore Petroleum Discharge System (OPDS) is critical for carrying fuel over the shore where port infrastructure is lacking. MCRS found that one OPDS is insufficient to meet the demands of two overlapping land campaigns.

MCRS found that the fundamental constraint when attempting to reduce deployment timelines in support of U.S. objectives is generally the lack of foreign destination infrastructure required to support major force deployment timelines. MCRS reports that the Department should continue to explore strategies that seek mitigation and states there should be continued focus on flexible multi-modal nodes and capabilities that facilitate adaptable transportation networks to increase velocity and throughput.
Current Operational Impacts

Current operations in Afghanistan and recent requirements for transportation to assist in the Haiti earthquake response have highlighted the requirement to deliver support to areas without sufficient infrastructure. The Haiti earthquake provided an opportunity to operationally exercise two capabilities that TRANSCOM has developed to address areas with insufficient infrastructure. The Joint Task Force-Port Opening (JTF-PO) for airports and seaports and the JLOTS capabilities provide the means to transport supplies, personnel and equipment to areas with limited or nonexistent airport and/or seaport capabilities. JTF-PO units deploy rapidly to establish air and/or seaport operations in unimproved, austere locations. JLOTS provides the infrastructure required to deliver supplies and equipment from a ship to the shore in the absence of an established port. Together, these capabilities allow us to rapidly establish logistics operations in locations with little or no available port or airfield infrastructure.

In addition, we are undertaking a global access study to identify the most critical enroute locations with a nexus of air, sea and land capabilities. These multi-modal sites provide TRANSCOM with the maximum capability to rapidly mobilize forces and materiel anywhere in the world. Multi-modal locations like Rota, Spain, Diego Garcia and Souda Bay, Greece are vital to global force projection. The close proximity of seaports to airports and highway/railroad access provides TRANSCOM with options to support the needs of the Geographical Combatant Commanders. By allowing the volumes of equipment required for a contingency to travel partially by sea and onward by air or ground, we are able to increase supply chain velocity which results in decreased delivery times and reduced costs.
Looking Ahead

TRANSCOM’s requirement to support irregular warfare against a global enemy in difficult operating environments will continue far into the future. Lack of transportation infrastructure and the unfriendly terrain experienced in Afghanistan continue to pose challenges to delivering required support to the warfighter in the field. To overcome these issues, TRANSCOM continues to leverage emerging technologies to develop new delivery methods. For example, in partnership with the U.S. Joint Forces Command and the Marine Corps, we are exploring the possibility of utilizing unmanned aircraft to deliver cargo in austere and urban environments. We are also exploring improving the speed and accuracy of delivery through the development of the next generation of guidance, navigation and control systems for the Joint Precision Airdrop System (JPADS) - a combat-proven tool which has produced excellent results in the high terrain of Afghanistan.

TRANSCOM also supports the Air Force’s planned acquisition of a Light Mobility Aircraft (LiMA). These aircraft will be used to train partner nations in mobility operations. While there are no current plans to use these aircraft in direct support of TRANSCOM, the partnership capacity that will result from such a program will pay great dividends in our global logistics mission.

Final Thoughts

TRANSCOM’s mission is to get the warfighter to the fight, sustain them during the fight, and get them back home when the mission is complete - all while being responsible stewards of the taxpayers’ trust and dollars. We continually examine our processes to improve our effectiveness and our efficiency to provide the warfighter the support needed as quickly as possible, while also reducing costs. The men and women of TRANSCOM, our components and
strategic partners are proud to provide critical support to those who put themselves on the line every day. More than just a slogan, "a promise made is a promise kept," is the driving force that provides hope to those in the fight and illustrates a sacred trust that we will deliver what the warfighter needs, where they need it, when they need it at the best cost.

Thank you again for the opportunity to share the results of the MCRS study with the committee.
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

PRESENTATION TO THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

April 28, 2010

Subject: Air Mobility Programs

COMBINED STATEMENT OF:

Mr. David M. Van Buren, Air Force Service Acquisition Executive (SAF/AQ)

Lieutenant General Phillip M. Breedlove, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans and Requirements (AF/A3/5)

Brigadier General Richard C. Johnston, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs, Director of Strategic Planning (AF/A8X)
I. Introduction

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bartlett, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to address this committee regarding the Air Force’s mobility programs. The Secretary of Defense, in the recent 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), set four objectives to guide our current actions and future Planning: prevail in today’s wars, prevent and deter conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and preserve and enhance the all-volunteer force. The Air Force is vectoring to meet these objectives, balancing risk appropriately, and preparing to prevail, prevent, and preserve well into our Nation’s future.

II. Contributions of the Air Force

Today, the Air Force reliably provides global vigilance, global reach and global power as an integral member of our Joint and coalition teams. More than 38,000 Airmen are deployed, with nearly 30,000 in and around Afghanistan and Iraq, as we unwaveringly do whatever it takes to prevail in today’s wars. Airmen, Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines who cross outside the wire do so with the asymmetric advantage of armed overwatch, globally integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, combat search and rescue, and aero-medical evacuation.

The Air Mobility team provides airlift, air refueling, aeromedical evacuation, and airdrop, guaranteeing the world that the U.S. can rapidly project combat power or humanitarian relief anywhere, anytime. Air mobility often provides the only means to intervene quickly in a crisis, but also runs constantly and reliably in the background during persistent operations. Our joint force in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) is sustained by around-the-clock rapid global mobility operations that included, in 2009, 52,905 airlift sorties delivering 264,839 short tons of cargo, over 32 million pounds of airdropped cargo, and 1.3 million passengers. Since 2001, we have transported nearly 70,000 patients out of the CENTCOM AOR and achieved a nearly 98 percent success rate in meeting to “golden hour”
goal of transporting seriously wounded warriors to medical treatment facilities, achieving a 95 percent injury survival rate.

The Air Force’s response for Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE highlighted airpower’s speed and access to assist the victims of the earthquake in Haiti. Our first C-17 Globemaster arrived one day after the tragic event with an urban search and rescue team and 82,000 pounds of equipment. Within four days of the earthquake the Air Force flew nearly 100 sorties, transported almost 1,200 passengers and delivered more than 600 short tons to our devastated neighbors in Haiti. In addition, your Air Force evacuated over 19,000 U.S. citizens and medically evacuated over 230 Haitian citizens via our aircraft. We helped set up flightline operations to provide a lifeline of supplies and relief to the Haitians and ensured a safe and orderly worldwide response.

In response to the earthquake in Chile, the Air Force deployed 82 Airmen to provide expeditionary medical support units to the community in Angol. Upon arrival, our medical professionals demonstrated the flexibility and determination to turn a bare polo field into a fully-operational field hospital in only three and a half days. The Air Force partnered with USAID and the Chilean Army to accomplish this herculean task. As a result, our medical professionals tended to over 300 patients and performed over 40 surgeries in those facilities within the first two weeks of that field hospital’s operation. The devastated region surrounding Angol recovered 60 percent of the hospital beds lost in the earthquake. In addition to our support to the warfighter and humanitarian efforts, 43 percent of our total force is engaged daily in out-of-theater support to combatant commander operations; a remarkable contribution enabled by past investments in technology and infrastructure that allow the Air Force to impact operations anywhere on the planet, from bases both at home and abroad, and to do it efficiently and effectively.

III. Strategic Airlift Force Structure

C-17

The C-17 Globemaster III is the newest, most flexible cargo aircraft to enter the airlift force. The C-17 is capable of rapid strategic delivery of troops and all types of cargo to main operating bases or directly to forward bases in the deployment area. The aircraft can perform tactical airlift and airdrop missions and can also transport litters and ambulatory patients during aeromedical evacuations when required. The inherent flexibility and performance of the C-17
force improve the ability of the total airlift system to fulfill the worldwide air mobility of the United States.

The Air Force is executing Congressional direction to procure 223 C-17s. As of 20 April, 196 of those 223 aircraft have been delivered, including the U.S. contribution to the Strategic Airlift Capability C-17 Program with 11 European partner nations. Final delivery is planned in February 2012.

C-5

The C-5 Galaxy provides the Air Mobility Command airlift in support of United States national defense. The C-5 can carry fully equipped combat-ready military units to any point in the world on short notice and then provide field support to help sustain the fighting force. The C-5 Reliability Enhancement Re-engining Program (RERP) improves the C-5 fleet availability and performance by replacing the engines and over 70 unreliable components on 52 active duty aircraft. The Low Rate Initial Production is underway and the Air Force will seek a Full Rate Production decision in September 2010. The C-5 RERP Operational Test & Evaluation (OT&E) was completed in January 2010, and the program is meeting expectations to date. The C-5 RERP is effective, suitable and mission capable. The C-5M significantly increases the strategic capability of the entire Galaxy fleet. The Office of Secretary of Defense will provide the C-5 RERP OT&E report to Congressional Committees in mid to late summer 2010.

The Mobility and Capabilities Requirements Study (MCRS) confirms the Air Force has excess strategic airlift capability. The Air Force plans to reduce the 316 strategic airlift aircraft requirement of the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2010 by retiring 22 C-5As. The Secretary of the Air Force will submit a report on the retirement of aircraft required by section 137 of the NDAA and a report on strategic airlift aircraft required by section 138 of the NDAA in early summer 2010. These reports will provide the justification for retirement of C-5A aircraft and anticipated impact of the retirements on force structure and basing.

All C-5As reside in the Air Reserve Component (Stewart, NY; Memphis, TN; Martinsburg, WV; Wright-Patterson AFB, OH & Lackland AFB, TX). Wright-Patterson has been announced to receive C-17s and will lose all 10 C-5As. In addition, the remaining Air National Guard (ANG) C-5A units are being considered for C-17 conversion as part of the AF Strategic Basing Process. AMC, Air Force Reserve Command and the ANG are working
together to determine the specific tail numbers that will be retired.

IV. Tactical Airlift Force Structure

C-130

The C-130 Hercules primarily performs the tactical portion of the airlift mission. The aircraft is capable of operating from unimproved dirt strips and is the prime transport for air dropping troops and equipment into hostile areas. The C-130 fulfills a wide range of operational missions in both peace and war situations. The MCRS indicates an excess C-130 airlift capability with the most demanding scenario of 335 C-130 aircraft. The new fleet must meet expected intra-theater and direct support (DS) airlift requirements. Therefore, the FY11 force structure maintains a floor of 375 C-130s which incorporates the MCRS study plus 40 additional aircraft, which reflect our current judgment for the number of C-130s required to augment the DS mission. The Air Force will conduct further analysis to determine the force structure impact of the DS mission on the C-130 fleet.

"In the FY11 budget request we recommended retiring 34 C-130s, 28 from Little Rock AFB and 6 from the Puerto Rico Air National Guard in FY11. We are currently in discussions between the PRANG, ANG, AF and OSD to delay the retirements from Puerto Rico to allow time to determine a suitable follow-on mission for the unit."

V. Proposed C-130 Force Structure (FY11)

We are formulating a plan to backfill the retiring C-130E aircraft at Little Rock AFB and will bring together a Total Force Integrated team of active duty, Reserves and Guard to ensure projected student production levels are met. We are also working with ANG on the future of the Puerto Rico ANG unit.

VI. Planned C-130 Force Structure (FYDP)
In FY12 the remaining nine C-130Es are scheduled to retire from Little Rock AFB. Also, three C-130H1s will retire from Dyess AFB as C-130Js deliver. FY13 plans include retiring eight C-130H1s from Little Rock AFB and Dyess AFB as the C-130Js deliver. In FY14, eight additional C-130H1s are slated to retire as J models deliver. Finally, a few C-130J deliveries are planned for FY15.

VII. KC-X Selection Timeline

The KC-X remains the Air Force’s highest procurement and recapitalization priority. Air refueling is critical to the entire joint and coalition military team’s ability to project combat power around the world. The current fleet of Eisenhower-era KC-135Rs averages 49 years old.

KC-X tankers will provide increased aircraft availability, more flexible employment options, and greater overall capability than the KC-135R tanker. The KC-X will be able to refuel receptacle and probe-equipped aircraft on every mission and to receive fuel in-flight as well. The KC-X will also be equipped with defensive systems to enhance its utility to the warfighter.

The KC-X program is based on a planned purchase of 179 aircraft and is the first of three recapitalization programs to replace the entire legacy tanker fleet. The Air Force has budgeted approximately $3.5 billion per year for an annual production rate of 12-18 aircraft. Even with this level of investment, it will take several decades to replace the fleet of more than 400 KC-135s. Given the age of the fleet and the time required to recapitalize, it is critical for the Air Force to move forward on this program.

With the release of the RFP for a KC-X tanker on February 24, 2010, the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense moved forward in the procurement of a new tanker. We remain committed to ensuring that the process is fair, open, and transparent. The RFP originally called for proposals to be due on May 10, 2010. With this proposal submission date in May, the Air Force planned to award a contract in the fourth quarter of FY10. On March 8, 2010, Northrop Grumman notified the department that they were not going to submit a proposal. Subsequent to Northrop Grumman’s withdrawal, EADS North America notified the Department of its potential interest in bidding. On March 31, 2010, the Defense Department announced that if we received a formal notification from EADS-NA of their intention to make an offer, we would extend the deadline for bids from May 10 to July 9, 2010. On April 20, 2010, EADS-NA
announced that they will submit a bid in response to the KC-X RFP. With the entry of EADS-NA into the competition, the Defense Department will grant offerors an additional 60 days to submit their proposals. It is not uncommon to grant reasonable extensions in competitions of this sort, and the Defense Department considers 60 days to be reasonable. As the Defense Department does not want the delivery date to slip any later than it already has, we will continue working to award the contract this fall.

To give the Committee a sense of timing, the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) portion of the KC-X contract includes four development tankers that will be delivered in the production configuration after EMD. We estimate that the first flight test will occur no earlier than 18 months from contract award. Based on a proposal submission date of July 9, 2010, and a planned award in the fall, flight testing and delivery of the first EMD tanker is still projected to occur in FY12. The planned production schedule will then start in Fiscal Year 2013 with a planned buy of seven aircraft as part of lot one production. Given the projected build time per aircraft is approximately two years, we project the first production aircraft deliveries will be in FY15, and ramping up to an annual production of approximately 15 per year through completion of the 179 aircraft.

VIII. AF Preparations for Army’s Direct Support Mission

The Air Force conducted a DS Concept of Employment (CONEMP) Proof of Concept trial in Iraq from October to December 2009. This was accomplished by approximately 100 deployed personnel mostly from the 179th Airlift Wing in Ohio to form the 164th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron (EAS) in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The CONEMP specified that Air Force units would collocate with and be under the tactical control of an Army Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) Commander to provide DS. All participants were extremely satisfied with the results to include feedback from the 25th CAB Commander, “The 164th EAS exceeded my expectations with this Proof of Concept and the support we have received in such a short period of time; it is a leap ahead in joint capability.” AMC will lead the effort to incorporate lessons learned from this assessment into the final CONEMP. This CONEMP represents one way to provide DS to the Army, and we continue to work with the Army to determine the best way to support the Combatant Commander in this new and important role. Ultimately it is the
prerogative of the theater commander to employ his/her forces as required for mission accomplishment, and the Air Force stand ready to support that commander as necessary.

In addition to CONEMP efforts, the Air Force is considering C-27J installation locations. The initial six bases to receive four C-27J aircraft at each location are Mansfield, OH; Baltimore, MD; Meridian, MS; Battle Creek, MI; Fargo, ND and Bradley, CT. The final basing plan for the remaining 14 aircraft will be vetted through the Air Force Basing Executive Steering Group which is scheduled for late CY10. Currently, three C-27J aircraft have been delivered and the transition of program management from the Army to the Air Force is in progress, and will be finalized by the end of FY10.

IX. Light Mobility Requirements & Acquisition

The Air Force plans to acquire 15 Light Mobility Aircraft (LiMA) in FY11 to fill gaps in the light mobility mission. The requirement for LiMA comes from the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Irregular Warfare Tiger Team. The LiMA aircraft will be smaller in size and capacity than the Air Force’s C-27J twin-engine turboprop and will allow operation from austere or unimproved airfields. This capability will foster Building Partnership Capacity with our lesser developed Partner Nations by providing a proper solution which is easily maintained and employed. The Initial Capability Document was validated in January 2010, and the Capability Production Document is expected to be validated in August 2010. The current acquisition strategy is to leverage results from a full and open competition from an Afghan Foreign Military Sales program. With this strategy, Milestone C is expected in April 2011 and contract award in May 2011. Initial Operational Capability is expected in 4QFY12.

X. Aviation Safety

The Air Force experienced the safest year in Air Force history in FY09 with a .80 rate per 100,000 hours, and only 17 Class A Mishaps (accidents involving more than $1 million dollars, destroyed aircraft, loss of life or permanent total disability). So far in FY10, we have a rate of .71 Class A Flight Mishaps per 100,000 flying hours as of 16 April 2010. This is slightly better than last year’s record safety rates with a .73 at this same point in time. There are no mishap trends or
other "significant aviation-related safety issues" from those fleets impacting their ability to execute the National Military Strategy. The Air Force continues to pursue lessons learned and conducts thorough investigations making sure any and all critical safety information is delivered across the Air Force and to sister services, to ensure we continue to have a safe and effective fighting force.

XI. Conclusion

The Air Force and its outstanding Airmen remain focused on the mission---the continued security of our great Nation. We are convinced that a balanced force structure will enable us to extend our Nation's supremacy in the air domain, and---along with our joint partners---prevail today and tomorrow. USD/AT&L, Ash Carter, recently testified that: "I support, as does the secretary, the initiatives the Congress directed when it unanimously passed the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009. Acquisition reform is one of DoD's high priority performance goals presented in the analytic perspectives volume of the president's FY 2011 budget. The department is moving out to implement these initiatives. "The Air Force actions described above are part of and consistent with WSARA implementation and DoD's Acquisition Reform goal. We thank the Subcommittee for your shared commitment and for this opportunity to meet with you today."
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING

APRIL 28, 2010
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH

General BREEDLOVE. Yes, the AF is presently engaged in an Air Mobility Command led analysis to determine the Direct Support Mission requirement. We anticipate preliminary results mid to late summer 2010. [See page 12.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN

General BREEDLOVE. From an Air Force perspective, we are satisfied with the size and make-up of our rotary-wing lift fleet. The Air Force is currently recapitalizing the existing HH–60 fleet and pursuing the Common Vertical Lift Support Platform for Global Strike Command and Air Force District Washington. These programs will allow the Air Force to meet our anticipated commitments. Furthermore, as our rotary-wing missions evolve or additional missions added, the Air Force will continue to conduct the appropriate analysis to meet national security objectives. [See page 16.]
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

APRIL 28, 2010
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH

Mr. SMITH. The previous mobility study, Mobility Capabilities Study 2005 (MCS 05), identified a “moderate risk” range of strategic airlift aircraft as 292–383. Why does the current study identify only 304 aircraft as meeting the most demanding scenario?

General JOHNSON. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. SMITH. Last year, General McNabb testified that 316 strategic airlift aircraft is a “sweet spot” considering both wartime needs and the contributions of the civil reserve air fleet, or CRAF. His predecessor, General Schwartz, also identified 316 strategic airlift aircraft as the “sweet spot.” Has this belief changed in TRANSCOM? If so, why?

General JOHNSON. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. SMITH. In your remarks provided to the subcommittee, you noted that TRANSCOM supports the Air Force acquisition of light mobility aircraft and that it will “pay dividends in our global logistics mission,” but that TRANSCOM has no current plans to use these aircraft. Can you expand on how the light mobility aircraft will fit into the mobility mission from your perspective?

General JOHNSON. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. SMITH. MCS 05 identified a “moderate risk” range of 395–674 intra-theater airlift aircraft necessary to meet requirements. MCRS 2016 concluded that only 335 intra-theater aircraft are needed to meet the most demanding scenario examined. Why has the requirement for intra-theater airlift aircraft dropped so significantly?

General JOHNSON. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. SMITH. MCRS is anxiously awaited bedrock for many of the mobility-related decisions we will make in Congress this year, and for years to come. In order to provide some additional context, please share with us the major MCRS learning points for TRANSCOM, and how you intend to apply that information in your future decision-making.

General JOHNSON. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. SMITH. Current operations are a fact of life and the backdrop for many decisions involving DOD. Were current operations taken into account for this mobility study? Tell us about that?

General JOHNSON. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. SMITH. How is the MCRS-16 study tied to the priorities of USTRANSCOM?

General JOHNSON. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Smith. How has recent experience with the Afghanistan forces increase, the Haiti earthquake, and the Chilean earthquake either validated or questioned the results of the study?

General Johnson. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. Smith. Last year, DOD agreed to establish objectives and measure of effectiveness to monitor Craf modernization; what concrete steps have been taken to accomplish these improvements and what progress has been made?

General Johnson. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. Smith. A recent newspaper report noted that the Air Force plans to issue “technical corrections” to its solicitation for bids to build a fleet of aerial refueling tankers, and that these corrections would be revisions in the rules for foreign-owned prime contractors so that it would be easier for EADS to bid without a U.S.-based industry partner. What corrections will be made to the KC-X request for proposal?

Mr. Van Buren. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. Smith. Please describe the acquisition and sustainment strategy for the light mobility aircraft. How did you arrive at a quantity of 15? What validated requirement are these aircraft filling?

Mr. Van Buren. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. Smith. The average age of the C-5 is more than 27 years old, and has a very low mission capable rate (30% below the C-17). Since the C-5A is much less available than the C-17, and is 20 years older, and will have to be replaced at some point, why shouldn’t consideration be given to keeping the C-17 line open?

Mr. Van Buren. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. Smith. The KC-135 fleet averages 49.8 years old and the KC-10 fleet averages 26.3 years. MCRS 2016 noted that some scenarios require more aerial refueling aircraft than the 415 KC-135s and 59 KC-10s in the Air Force inventory. Is the Air Force funding modifications to these aircraft that will allow them to better meet requirements for availability until KC-X enters the inventory?

General Breedlove. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. Smith. MCRS 2016 determined that 335 intra-theater airlift aircraft were required to meet the most demanding scenario, but MCRS 2016 did not evaluate the Air Force’s direct support mission to meet the Army’s time-sensitive cargo requirement. How many intra-theater aircraft need to be added to that 335 number to meet total inventory requirements for intra-theater aircraft?

General Breedlove. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. Smith. We understand that the active Air Force was planning to move 18 C-130s from the reserve component to the active to meet training and operational requirements? If the force structure is, in fact, adequate, why is that move necessary? General Wyatt testified before the committee last week and indicated that there may be changes to that request. Can you please update the committee on the issue?

General Breedlove. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. Smith. On February 27, 2008, the Air Force and Army Chiefs of Staff sent a letter to the committee on the C-27 program noting a requirement to “build international partnerships around a common airframe.” Since we have a program to procure 38 C-27s, why does the Air Force need the Light Mobility Aircraft to also do this mission?

General Breedlove. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. Smith. Recent legislation passed by the Congress last year requires the Air Force to maintain a strategic airlift fleet of 316 aircraft. With 111 C-5s, we will reach 316 aircraft when the 205th C-17 is delivered in the first quarter of 2011. Does the Air Force plan to retire any of planned 17 C-5s before the first quarter of 2011?

General Johnston. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. Smith. We understand that the Air Force plans to retire an additional 5 C-5s in 2012. Does the Air Force plan to submit a legislative proposal to change the requirement for strategic airlift aircraft from 316 to a lower number?

General Johnston. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]
Mr. SMITH. What are long-term Air Force plans for inventories of C–130 and C–27 aircraft?

General JOHNSTON. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. SMITH. The MCRS only considered the program of record until 2016. Although the C–5 could fly until 2025 and beyond, realistically when do you expect to completely remove the C–5As from the fleet?

General JOHNSTON. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. OWENS

Mr. OWENS. EADS, the parent company of France-based Airbus, recently announced that they intend to bid without a U.S. partner for the KC–X tanker program. It concerns me that any foreign-owned and foreign government financed company could possibly control the development, production and support of such a key piece of our national military capability. I am also concerned about the delays in this program’s status. As an Air Force veteran I fully appreciate the tactical need for an upgraded fleet. I would have serious reservations about an award to EADS and any further delays. How would you resolve these concerns?

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]