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INTERAGENCY NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM: PRAGMATIC STEPS TOWARDS A MORE INTEGRATED FUTURE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

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[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

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[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]

INTERAGENCY NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM: PRAGMATIC STEPS TOWARDS A MORE INTEGRATED FUTURE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, June 9, 2010.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:03 p.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Dr. SNYDER. Welcome to the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee hearing on interagency national security reform. Over the past decade, dozens of major government commissions, think tanks, and other experts have recommended significant changes to better integrate and apply all of the country's capabilities to national security challenges. The 9/11 Commission, the Hart-Rudman Commission, the Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned Working Group—all have cited a lack of interagency coordination as a key weakness of our national security system.

I am pleased to see the administration of President Obama recognize these problems. Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, and National Security Adviser Jones also support reform. Most recently, President Obama's National Security Strategy released in May highlighted the need for enhanced integration, saying, "The executive branch must do its part by developing integrated plans and approaches that leverage the capabilities across its departments and agencies to deal with the issues we confront. Collaboration across the government must guide our actions."

I commend the President and his team on his leadership and am eager to see how he intends to implement this vision.

But Congress must play its part, too. In fact, Congress must lead the way, just as it did with the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. We have been here before. We have seen similar problems; the same inertia against reform. We have also seen success as the culture of our military shifted to fully embrace jointness as a fundamental operational principle. As with Goldwater-Nichols, interagency national security reform will be a long, difficult process. But we must start with practical steps in the right direction. And that is what we are here today to discuss—practical and realistic near-term steps that we can take to improve interagency coordination and collaboration.

The witnesses we have today have a variety of professional backgrounds and perspectives, but all are experts on how our inter-

agency national security system works and how it doesn't. I look forward to hearing their recommendations on practical, near-term steps the Armed Services Committee and the larger Congress should take to improve the system.

Now I recognize Mr. Wittman for any opening statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROB WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you so much to our witnesses for taking time out to be with us this afternoon.

I first want to commend Chairman Snyder for calling this hearing. As you know, we addressed the subject of interagency reform and the Project on National Security Reform's [PNSR's] December, 2008 report, "Forging a New Shield," just over a year ago, and in that hearing, we heard expert testimony on this vexing issue from distinguished experts who offered a range of opinions. We expected and welcomed a diversity of views, especially on this committee and especially on this topic.

There seems to be general agreement that we need a better system of coordinating our national security efforts, but not necessarily agreement on how. The nature of the Washington bureaucracy is to maintain the status quo both in the executive and legislative branches. If we are able to institute new structures and processes in the administration and Congress, we can expect those processes will remain in place for many years.

Whatever we do, if anything, has to be carefully considered, and we must be sure that national security will be improved by the changes because we will live with them for many years. The principle challenges lie in resolving command and budget authorities, yet another issue shared by the Congress and the executive branch. Last year, I cited the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 as a rare example of recent interagency reform. And while these reforms are real, the Congress struggled with how much command authority and budget authority to vest in the new Director of National Intelligence [DNI] with apparent consequences to this day.

I am pleased to see that the PNSR report published as part of a follow-up or the follow-up report itself last September entitled "Turning Ideas into Action," which does just that—proposes specific measures that can be taken to achieve a more cohesive and agile national security structure. I am pleased that the principal author of both reports is with us today. I appreciate that. I would like to have today's witnesses apply the PNSR suggested structure or their own thoughts to a couple of today's real world problems.

First of great concern to this subcommittee is the planning, coordinating, and executing of an effective interagency response to our national efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. What would you do differently? The second and no less urgent but less complex: How would you manage the Federal Government's response to the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico?

I am grateful to have such distinguished witnesses here before us today to comment on the PNSR's work, and I look forward to your testimony.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the Appendix on page 31.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Wittman, for your comments today and for all you have done on this full committee and subcommittee through your time and service here.

We are pleased today to have four witnesses: Mr. James Locher, III, the President and CEO of the Project on National Security Reform; Dr. Gordon Adams, Distinguished Fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center; Dr. James Thompson, Associate Professor and Head of the Department of Public Administration, University of Illinois, Chicago; Mr. John Pendleton, Director, Force Structure and Defense Planning Issues at U.S. Government Accountability Office.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you all for being here. We will start with Mr. Locher and then proceed right on down the line. We will have the light system go off. When the red light goes on, that mean five minutes have gone by. We will not hit you or anything, but the sooner you wrap up your time after that, the sooner we can get to our questions and discussions.

So, Mr. Locher, we will begin with you. Your opening statements will be made part of the record.

Mr. Locher.

STATEMENT OF JAMES R. LOCHER III, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, PROJECT ON NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM

Mr. LOCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Wittman, and members of the subcommittee. I am delighted to appear before you to testify on national security reform. I want to commend the committee for its leadership on this critical issue. It reminds me of this subcommittee's role in formulating the House's version of the landmark Goldwater-Nichols Act. And I should mention that a current member of the subcommittee, Mr. Spratt, was a member of the subcommittee back during the Goldwater-Nichols formulation.

The lessons of Goldwater-Nichols are instructive on the role Congress must play on national security reform. Goldwater-Nichols has been a historic success. It produced the world's premier joint warfighting force. But it must be remembered that entrenched Pentagon interests bitterly opposed this legislation. A 4-year, 241-day struggle between the Armed Services Committees and the Department of Defense ensued. The committees used every tool at their disposal to pressure, prod, question, and introduce new ideas. National security reform will require even more congressional energy to overcome executive branch inertia. Despite its difficulty, national security reform is not impossible.

Again, the Goldwater-Nichols experience is instructive. When work on that Act began, 95 percent of the experts predicted it would never happen.

Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned, President Obama's National Security Strategy has reinvigorated the drive to transform the national security system. Let there be no mistake. The strategy's goals cannot be achieved without sweeping transformation. In organizational terms, the strategy calls for, one, a strengthening of na-

tional capacity through a whole-of-government approach; two, updating, balancing and integrating all tools of American power; three, broaden the scope of national security; four, emphasizing the foundations of national power, sound fiscal policy, education, energy, science and technology, and health; fifth, aligning resources with strategy; sixth, taking a longer view; seventh, forming strategic partnerships with organizations outside of government, essentially taking a whole-of-Nation approach. These goals endorse many of the ideas that the Project on National Security forum has put forth.

With Congress's important role in mind, the subcommittee asked for testimony on pragmatic, near-term steps that can be taken to move forward on national security reform. My written statement identifies 10 such steps. I will speak to three important ones. By far the most important step would be to require the President to submit an implementation plan for the organizational changes prescribed by the new National Security Strategy. Most strategy documents contain a lofty set of goals which go unrealized when there is no follow-through. Congress must insist on executive branch attention to the organizational goals that the President established. For each of his 23 goals, the President should identify the specific reforms that are needed and milestones for their achievement. Every year, Congress should ask for a scorecard measuring progress towards these reforms and for an updated implementation plan.

The second and related near-term step would be to require the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to submit a plan for achieving the needed organizational capacity of the National Security Staff [NSS], realizing the whole-of-government integrated approach articulated by the National Security Strategy will require a significant strengthening of the National Security Staff. Today, that staff is under-resourced and institutionally weak. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, who does not even exist in the law, has only an advisory role.

The National Security Staff has become the most important staff in the national security system, if not in the world. This evolution has not been properly recognized. The staff totals 230 people; has a tiny budget—$8.6 million when General Jones took over; and is poorly supported. National security reform needs to start at the top of the system with the National Security Staff.

One of the most, if not the most, important reforms advanced by Goldwater-Nichols was joint officer management. By creating incentives, requirements, and standards for joint officers, those provisions significantly improve the performance of joint duty and led to creation of a joint culture. Congress acted on the joint officer issue because it had concluded, "For the most part, military officers do not want to be assigned to joint duty; are pressured or monitored for loyalty by their services while serving on joint assignments; are not prepared by either education or experience to perform their joint duties; and serve only a relatively short period once they have learned their jobs."

Analyses of the interagency personnel situation reveals similar problems. A near-term step with enormous potential would be to establish an interagency personnel system to create the proper in-

centives, education, and training for personnel assigned to interagency positions. This reform is being studied on Capitol Hill and could begin the major transformation that is needed.

In conclusion, I, once more, commend Chairman Snyder and Ranking Member Wittman for holding this hearing and for searching for pragmatic, near-term steps that would compel the start of the bold transformation that the Nation desperately needs. The national security system must be modernized to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The task will be monumental, but there is no alternative. Without sweeping changes, the Nation will experience repeated failures, wasted resources, and continue to decline in American standing and influence. We can and must find the resolve and political will to create a modern national security system.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Locher.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Locher can be found in the Appendix on page 34.]

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Adams.

STATEMENT OF DR. GORDON ADAMS, DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER, AND PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

Dr. ADAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join Jim Locher in congratulating the subcommittee on having these hearings and the Congress in general for beginning over the last few years to take this set of issues more seriously I think than has happened in a long time. So both Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Wittman, thank you very much for the hearing and the opportunity to talk at this hearing.

I can join in many of the suggestions and recommendations that my colleague and friend, Jim Locher, has put before you. I want to come at this issue from a slightly different angle and put some more fodder in the trough, if you will, for consideration by the Hill.

The process of reforming agencies and for reforming interagency process is enormously hard. If it wasn't, it would have happened. And it hasn't happened yet. A lot of good effort, including PNSR's, has gone into trying to push all aspects of the system in the direction of reform. We know how hard it is, having seen in recent years the experience of such changes as the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Homeland Security [DHS], the National Counterterrorism Center [NCTC], all of which have had their strengths and obvious weaknesses as instruments of reform in the national security system. So one goes at this issue with some caution in terms of the results you can expect from shuffling boxes, changing processes, changing committees, and so on. It is very difficult.

To me, the key issue here that I try to identify in my testimony is: What is the problem we are trying to solve? Because any set of reforms really needs to look at what is it we are trying to solve. Not just let's reform for the sake of reform, but what is the specific problem we are tackling, and what is the mission of the United States Government and its national security agencies in tackling an agenda of reform?

I would submit to you, as I suggest in my testimony, that one of the major reasons that we have this interest and these sets of hearings derives from an experience that Ranking Member Wittman mentioned—Afghanistan, but also Iraq. That is to say the performance of the American government in Iraq and in Afghanistan, and by relation, Pakistan, as you mentioned. The circumstances of those particular cases are quite unique, however. These are cases where the United States actually used a major kinetic capacity to intervene with the goal of overthrowing a regime inheriting instability, social chaos, economic reconstruction, governance, if you will, in those two countries by virtue of our own direct military action and ultimately an insurgency designed to oppose the government we supported and our own forces in those countries.

So the reform question that grew out of that set of problems, Iraq and Afghanistan, has been defined as the absence of a civilian capacity to deploy alongside U.S. forces on the civilian side of this kind of kinetic exercise. If we reform to that case, we run the risk of fighting the last post-war. And while there are real problems in those cases, and they identify some very interesting ones, we do need to ask ourselves, as we approach a reform agenda: Are we tackling the right problem if we reform to build that kind of interagency relationship and that kind of capacity.

So mission, to me, is the key starting point. My testimony posits that mission or problem is not so much the invasion, applied civilian capability, and terror. It is governance, which is the absence of weakness, fragility, brittleness in governance in key areas of the world where our interests are at stake. The key problem, then, is the absence of a clear civilian sense of mission in tackling this problem, which is primarily a civilian problem. It may be largely non-kinetic, preventive, and smaller in nature than the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan.

So the focus of reform needs to be on the civilian agencies and capabilities first. Not the interagency first, so much as the capabilities on the civilian side where, as I say in my testimony, we have a diaspora of organizations and institutions. We have the absence of a strategic planning culture in those agencies and inadequate resourcing dollars and people and appropriate training for its people to conduct their responsibilities in fulfilling that mission of governance.

We have a large imbalance as a consequence between State and DOD [the Department of Defense] in resources and culture, which has led to an expansion of Defense missions. But that runs the risk of every problem looking like Iraq and Afghanistan. One of the key issues for the interagency then is how do we restore that balance? I suggest in the testimony reforms that can be applied in DOD that would both discipline and clarify DOD's mission in the foreign affairs agencies where we can deal with civilians, capabilities, resources, and training, and in the interagency, where, in particular, I would focus on NSC/OMB [National Security Council/Office of Management and Budget] coordination, the creation of strategic planning capabilities and mission planning oversight. And in the Congress I suggest, among other things, a single budget function for 150 and 050, to use budget speak, and joint oversight hearings

in such areas as security assistance, governance, and civilian capabilities.

The only caveat that I will put in closing, Mr. Chairman, is that we be beware of the sin of hubris. That is to say, it is not clear that we can or should be responsible for dealing with these kinds of problems internationally in every instance, and it is not clear that we are always very good at doing it, even building the best interagency and agency capabilities to do it.

With that, I will submit the rest of my testimony for the record and look forward to your questions.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Dr. Adams.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Adams can be found in the Appendix on page 50.]

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Thompson.

STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES R. THOMPSON, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR AND HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS–CHICAGO

Dr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and honorable members, for the opportunity to testify here today. About a year ago, my colleague, Rob Seidner, who is here today, he and I received a grant from the IBM Center for the Business of Government to write a report on human capital reforms in the Intelligence Community. The reason we were interested in the Intelligence Community is it was the only example we were aware of in the Federal Government of what we call a federated human resource system, whereby personnel authorities were shared by the center—in the case, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence—and the elements or agencies, of which there are about 16.

The centerpiece of the Intelligence Community human capital reforms was the joint duty program, which was mandated by the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, and in turn, by the 9/11 Commission, which identified a lack of interagency collaboration as one of the causes of the unfortunate events of that day. The joint duty program, of course, is modeled after the Goldwater-Nichols program in the armed services, which is why they are considered to have been a success. The intent was to break down parochial attitudes among the senior officials within the agencies by having them serve time in agencies other than the agency in which they spent most of their careers.

The Intelligence Community also developed a series of other reforms, some of which were in support of the joint duty program. For example, one of the concerns was that officials would not participate in joint duty if they felt that their pay and/or promotion opportunity would be at risk. So the Intelligence Community spent a lot of time developing a common compensation system, which they called the National Intelligence Civilian Compensation program. That program includes a pay-for-performance element and pay banding, et cetera. That program has been halted temporarily at least by the National Defense Authorization Act. A report just came out last week from the National Academy on Public Administration which, by and large, gave the program a positive review. So it is possible that the community will restart implementation of that program.

The community also developed a common performance management program. That is, officials throughout the community are assessed according to the same performance elements, so that if an individual does in fact accept a joint duty assignment in another agency, he or she can be assured of having his or her performance appraised on the same basic elements regardless of where he or she goes.

Other elements of the Intelligence Community's reforms included a common human resource information system. There is also a training component. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence has created a National Intelligence University [NIU], and there is joint leadership training being provided through the NIU to officials who are participating in the joint duty program. I should add, by the way, that the joint duty program has been phased in and will not be fully effective until October of this year.

Lessons learned from our research. One is that as a consequence of the nature of the authority or lack thereof given the Director of National Intelligence, the Intelligence Community went through a highly collaborative process to design the joint duty program. A downside was it took them a long time to do it, but an upside has been that there is very significant buy-in among the agencies into the joint duty program, such that it is likely to be sustained over time.

A down side, however, is that it is somewhat vulnerable to having agencies kind of exempt from some of the provisions of their program. For example, the agreed-upon policy is that only the DNI and the Under Secretary of the Defense for Intelligence can provide waivers to the joint duty requirement. However, that is simply in the form of what the Intelligence Community calls a treaty among the agencies. Legally, any agency head could waive that particular provision and decide on his or her own to promote somebody without appropriate joint duty certification.

So the issue of the authority of the DNI does figure importantly in this discussion of how to structure a joint duty program more broadly.

Another important lesson that we had learned was the idea of making sure that an infrastructure is in place to support the joint duty program. I mentioned the common compensation system that the Intelligence Community is trying to put into place to facilitate transfers.

A final observation would be with regard to the Senior Executive Service [SES] itself, which is that program was intended to consist of a corps of generalists, but has never really achieved that vision. It is largely because most of the members of the SES spend most of their careers in a single agency. I think that is, in part, a consequence of the fact the SES assignments are made at the Department level. In Britain, in contrast, the senior members of the civil service are considered a corporate asset and SES assignments are made centrally at the government level. I think there is a lesson to be learned both by the government in general but also the national security community as to a possible way of structuring any prospective joint duty program across the community, which would be to make sure assignments are made centrally rather than by each department independently.

That will conclude my testimony. Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Dr. Thompson.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Thompson can be found in the Appendix on page 59.]

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Pendleton.

STATEMENT OF JOHN H. PENDLETON, DIRECTOR, FORCE STRUCTURE AND DEFENSE PLANNING ISSUES, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Mr. PENDLETON. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Wittman, and members of the subcommittee, thanks for inviting me today to discuss GAO's [the Government Accountability Office's] work related to interagency collaboration. Given the growing call for better collaboration, we recently published a report that summarized GAO's body of work in this area. Our report cites dozen of examples. Several of those are included in my prepared statement. Let me briefly highlight three that illustrate the challenges in working across agency boundaries toward common goals.

First, our work looking at the planning to manage a pandemic flu outbreak found that the strategies lacked clarity on who would lead efforts—Health and Human Services or Homeland Security. Should we have a significant flu outbreak, sorting out who is in charge could waste valuable time. Second, the differences in size and culture between the Defense Department and the civilian agencies create a number of difficulties. DOD dwarfs other agencies. DOD and State literally divide the world up differently and they take very different approaches to planning. In the past, DOD plans were drawn up in isolation, with interagency consultation largely an afterthought. We have made a number of recommendations on this. And to its credit, DOD has begun to take some steps toward involving civilian agencies earlier in its planning.

Third, a failure to connect the dots is often blamed after security lapses. This is often ultimately traceable to inadequate information sharing. Our recent work on biometrics data; information such as fingerprints and images of iris in the eye found that DOD was collecting information in the field in ways that made it incompatible with Homeland Security and FBI databases.

Next, I would like to describe a couple of organizations within DOD that have served as laboratories of a sort for refining interagency collaboration. Northern Command [NORTHCOM] and Africa Command [AFRICOM]. Such regional commands are where military efforts are conceived and planned. Both NORTHCOM and AFRICOM have missions that require them to work closely with other agencies and other nations, both are relatively new, and both have faced myriad problems that illustrate the challenges being discussed today. Hurricane Katrina made evident to me for NORTHCOM to synchronize its efforts with a range of federal, state, and local agencies. We recently completed a comprehensive examination of NORTHCOM's efforts to enhance interagency coordination for homeland defense and civil-support missions and found a number of gaps still exist. We found, for example, unclear roles and responsibilities still exist. DOD's overarching guidance is 15-, sometimes 20-years old, and it pre-dates the creation of

NORTHCOM. This creates a number of problems, not the least of which is many of these directives show the Army in charge, which they were before NORTHCOM was created. More concerning is that NORTHCOM's own assessments of its capabilities show a number of gaps concerned about the ability to share a common operational picture or plan in the interagency.

Looking outside the United States, DOD's newest combatant command is Africa Command. It spotlights how the lines of national security, defense, diplomacy, and especially development are becoming more and more blurred. A lot of what AFRICOM does is not traditional warfighting. It involves strengthening African military capabilities, helping nations respond to crises, building infrastructure, such as schools and hospitals. Creating a blended command with personnel from other agencies embedded and serving and key positions was one of the ways that AFRICOM sought to improve collaboration. However, interagency personnel just weren't available in the numbers that DOD had hoped. It was far from clear what those personnel would do when they arrived at AFRICOM. And possibly most important, it was uncertain to them what impact serving at AFRICOM would have on their own careers.

Finally, let me give you an example how interagency challenges can play out on the ground. Our recent work on AFRICOM's 1,600 person taskforce in the Horn of Africa region revealed that DOD personnel are not always adequately trained to work in Africa, and this has resulted in a number of cultural missteps. One example that seems small but I think illuminates a larger problem, AFRICOM'S taskforce distributed used clothing to local villagers. But that offended the Muslims during Ramadan. Had they talked to U.S. Embassy, State, and AID, they could have provided guidance on sensitive cultural issues like this. We found a number of similar issues.

Given that the type of work DOD is doing in Africa is different from what military personnel are normally trained for, we recommend that AFRICOM develop a program to increase cultural awareness and training on working in an interagency environment. Such training, not just at AFRICOM, but across DOD and the interagency, will become even more important as national security issues become increasingly blended across multiple agencies.

That concludes my statement. I would be happy to take any questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pendleton can be found in the Appendix on page 62.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you all for your testimony today, and also all four of you have a long history of public service in these areas and others. We will all put ourselves on the five-minute clock here and probably have time for at least a couple of rounds of questions and maybe a little bit more.

One of the challenges that I think, not just us, but anyone who looks at this topic has, and doesn't spend all their time in it as perhaps all of you do, is trying to get a handle around exactly what the problem is.

Mr. Pendleton, I thought your one-paged, bite-size morsel of what GAO found when we go right to the one-pager, which we are

House Members, so we look for the bouillon cubes in these things. But, of course, you called your report: The challenges and solutions to strengthen interagency collaboration. I am going to ask Mr. Locher in a moment if he thinks we should define the goal as being more than just collaboration. But you have four problems areas: Developing and implementing overarching strategies; creating collaborative organizations, which I think gets to a whole culture of different institutions; developing a well-trained workforce; and sharing and integrating national security information.

It seems like that is a construct that I can kind of get my mind around. We need a shared strategy; a culture that recognizes collaboration is important; a good workforce; and the ability to share information.

Mr. Locher, do you think that description is at the heart of what you all are trying to solve in the work you have done in the last several years?

Mr. LOCHER. Mr. Chairman, I think the things that have been mentioned in Mr. Pendleton's statement cover many things that need to be done—the strategy, collaborative organizations, better training and education of the workforce, and sharing innovation. But if you had foreshadowed this question to me about collaboration, I think in many cases we need a lot more than collaboration. We actually need integrated effort. We need to be able to create teams well in advance of any sort of crisis that can really formulate policy on an integrated basis, that can do strategy on an integrated basis, that can figure out planning on an integrated, can figure out how we are going to align resources, and then if we actually have to conduct an operation, can do so on an integrated basis.

Dr. SNYDER. So if I understand, what you are saying is you believe there is a difference between integration and collaboration. Collaboration implies perhaps two separate organizations that see a need to get together maybe on a regular basis, but they are still separate organizations. You are talking about somehow they are integrated together and locked in together on a more permanent basis.

How do you respond to Mr. Locher's comments there, Mr. Pendleton?

Mr. PENDLETON. When we wrote the paper, the four areas are interrelated and describing them as creating collaboration is just a construct to try to understand that you have got to start with strategy, you have got to work on the organizations and the people, and you have got to teach the individuals how to share information. If you turn this another way, over the years, looking at different organizations, what tends to happen to organizations is they start out with de-confliction. Just letting each other know what they are going to do. Then it hopefully moves up the integration chain. You are beginning to coordinate and ultimately you have an integrated strategy.

DOD's efforts in, I think, the drug wars is a good example of something that 20 years ago you heard many of these same concerns being raised. As a young man, I was down in Key West hearing this; DOD had no business and needed to stay in its lane. Today, I have got other work going on and you hear a very, very different story. This stuff takes time.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Adams, you made a comment that Iraq and Afghanistan should not be seen as the motivation of why we need to change, which, I think, came from those very public discussions we had several years ago from Secretary Gates that there was inadequate civilian personnel available. And I think if I am reading you right, your point is that we should not see that as a definition of the problem; that, in fact, more likely than not we will have situations where the civilians will be in the lead, where the military needs to support them, rather than the military saying we need civilian support? Would you amplify on that, please?

Dr. ADAMS. I would be happy to, Mr. Chairman. It is a very important question. It goes back to what I was saying at the beginning, what is the problem we are trying to solve, what is the mission we are trying to deliver. A lot of the undertone of the discussion of what we need in the interagency is a discussion of how we ought to anticipate and be prepared to intervene in crisis. But crisis means many things. The crisis that we tend to focus on is a very large intervention aiming at the use of military force to overthrowing another government where we do inherit an enormous problem of governance, one which we have demonstrated we are not good at dealing with or takes us a long time. As somebody once said, we will find almost all the solutions that are wrong before we find the right one. That, however, is not the typical kind of crisis that we are likely to come across. Typically, if we are focused on this problem of crisis, and that is just one set of where interagency has implications—what we are looking at ranges probably at its most demanding from the kind of, if you will, stabilization/peacekeeping mission that we did in the 1990s in the Balkans, down to humanitarian missions where we are delivering food assistance, humanitarian assistance, tents, water bladders, the kind of kit people need to survive in a disaster.

That is the typical range of issues that we deal with and arguably in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan, the kind of typical issue that we are going to want to deal with. Those kinds of problems tend, in my mind, to group themselves around a concept of governance. That the issue here is not so much insurgency as it is the inability of countries in various strategically important regions of the world to actually provide their own stability, their own public water, public services, their own social justice, their own legal justice, their own capacity to grow, develop and prosper. Governments have difficulties doing that in certain regions of the world.

Defined that way, the kinetic requirement for what we do in the American government arguably is rather small. It is not invisible, but it is rather smaller than the kinetic capability we would maintain to do like Iraq or Afghanistan. And it may be quite peripheral to the question of how a civilian architecture actually over the long-term plans and deals with strengthening governance in those countries, in those regions, not something arguably the United States can do alone.

I think the National Security Strategy recognizes this, that there are international organizations, allies, regional partners, all of which can play a role, even private NGOs, nongovernmental organizations, and business that can help deal with this issue of governance. It is an ongoing long-term problem, and arguably the pre-

cursor to any crisis that we are going to face that we need to plan for.

So what I am saying is structuring the interagency to be an anticipatory large crisis manager of the relationship between large kinetic forces and large civilian capability to intervene in or respond to a crisis in another country may be, in a sense, overplanning the requirement that we are actually going to face.

So the interagency, to my mind, involves both strengthening, particularly the civilian capacities, to deal with those kinds of governance problems and then finding a way in the interagency space to relate what the kinetic requirement might be to dealing with a particular situation where we are going to intervene.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Wittman, for five minutes.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to go back to my original comments and start with Mr. Locher and get your thoughts on this. Really, what we are talking about here and all the efforts whether it is in Pakistan or Afghanistan or in the Gulf is planning, coordinating, and executing efforts among a lot of different agencies and lot of different levels of operations. So let me pose this: If you look at Afghanistan, Iraq, and even efforts in Pakistan, are there things that we should be doing differently, and if you look at efforts in the Gulf as we see interagency cooperation there, what would your suggestion be as to that scenario? Obviously, we are in the beginning stages of that management. But looking at those two examples that obviously have attracted a lot of attention and are attracting a lot of attention, give me your thoughts about what would be done differently in theatre and what you would do as far as managing the current operations there in the Gulf?

Mr. LOCHER. A great question, Mr. Wittman. Let me start with Afghanistan and Pakistan. It also applies in Iraq. All of our efforts there are way too separate in the United States Government. We have had more collaboration more recently but we have not had the integrated effort that is absolutely required.

I want to take an example. There is a study that is going to come out from the National Defense University about interagency high-value targeting teams in Iraq, which many people in the military believe are more important than the surge. Special operation forces were going out and looking for high-value terrorist targets. When they did so on their own, they had limited success. There was no mechanism to create an interagency team to go off and do this. But they recognized that need. And sort of through the force of personalities, the leaders of the special operations teams actually put together an effort that involved 8 or 10 departments and agencies.

Now that capacity ended up producing tremendous results. It is that kind of effort that we need, whether we are talking about the oil spill in the Gulf or whether we are talking about operations in Pakistan or Afghanistan or in Iraq. And if you think about it, the military has taken the approach that we need to be able to operate from a regional basis. We have no civilian equivalent to that.

On the civilian side, we are down at the country-level linked straight back to Washington. And so when we are doing Afghanistan-Pakistan issues, you have that difficulty of how you work across there. But we don't have an integrated taskforce. When the

military goes off, it creates a joint taskforce with unity of command to do whatever is necessary.

Now, in Afghanistan, it is really a political issue. So we need a civilian at the top of this chain of command making certain that everything we are doing, whether it is political, economic, or military fits into our overall strategy. So it is in that direction that our government needs to move.

Dr. ADAMS. Can I take a crack at that question, Congressman? The Afghanistan-Pakistan situation in particular. I am not going to sit here as an expert on an oil spill effort that obviously is still underway. But in the Afghanistan-Pakistan situation, my own view is that the problem in Afghanistan and Pakistan results less from the absence of an integrated capability than it does from two issues; one is an inherent lack of attention to the importance of Afghanistan that goes back a number of years. In other words, we simply took our eye off the ball in Afghanistan while we focused on Iraq. The consequence was we let time slip by that was valuable time where we might have conceivably had greater success.

And secondly, arguably, what I came back to in my testimony, which is this is an inherently difficult situation. A better process and a better integrated effort still might not be able to resolve the challenges that we faced in Afghanistan, which are enormously complex and enormously local. So I say about the sin of hubris, it is being careful to know that even our best effort may not produce a better policy outcome or on that is optimal in terms of what our own interests might seek.

That said, I think in those cases in particular, again, I would not argue by extrapolation to other crises, the absence of a focused civilian capacity in some areas is obviously one of the critical factors. We might have developed it earlier. We might have applied it earlier if we had focused on Afghanistan to begin with as a problem we needed to deal with. But I will hold out the jury in terms of our capacity to actually on our own determine the outcome of that situation.

Mr. WITTMAN. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Wittman, I have to say you are looking very refreshed and sounding very intelligent for a man who won a primary election yesterday. Congratulations.

Mrs. Davis for five minutes.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. Thank you all for being here and discussing interagency with us. I think sometimes people just kind of gloss over it when we talk about that. But it is very important, and we are here to try and assess where are we and how far you think we have come at this point?

I wonder whether—I think, Dr. Adams, I think you mentioned getting to the balance of these issues. And I am wondering can we do that without a joint budget? Secretary Clinton mentioned a unified national security budget. She said we have to start looking at a national security budget. We can't look at Defense, State Department, and USAID without Defense overwhelming the combined effort of the other two and without us falling back into the old stovepipes that you have all mentioned that I think are no longer relevant for the challenge of today. So what do you all think? Would

you support a unified budget and how in the heck would we get there?

Dr. ADAMS. It is an excellent question. I do, in fact, support that concept because I think it is important—and this is what I was talking about earlier at the National Security Council [NSC] and OMB [Office of Management and Budget] level—it is important to have the White House taking a good look at all of the instruments of statecraft in relationship to each other. As somebody who spent five years as the associate director at OMB for national security, I can tell you that that did not happen. It was extraordinarily difficult to do at the White House level. And there are two reasons why it is difficult.

One is because there is no systematic way for those two White House institutions, OMB and NSC, National Security Staff, to actually formally interact with each other. So the interaction between the two is handcrafted at the beginning of every administration and then evolves over time. The National Security Council Web site still says the OMB director is invited as necessary to NSC principals' meetings. My view is that is just totally absurd; that the people who are in charge of the resources for the White House ought to be in every meeting the National Security Council holds with respect to any international crisis or international policy situation, because resources and policy are intrinsically linked, and those are the tools the White House can use to coordinate. So that is one of the difficulties.

The other difficulty on the White House level is that neither the National Security Council nor the Office of Management and Budget have a strategic planning staff of any consequence. That has been tried the last couple of administrations and currently—to stand up a strategic planning office at NSC. There is minimal capacity and not a staff really trained to the art of strategic planning over the long term. OMB, having served there for five years, I can tell you also lacks that capacity. You work to an annual budget, a daily calendar. The long-term is six months. So actually creating a capacity in both organizations and a bridge between the two that links them at the hip in every issue is an important part for joining this.

Now the other piece that the White House can do, and I don't believe this requires any particular congressional action except agreement that it is a wise thing to do, is that when the President's budget is transmitted to the Congress, it ought to come with a single budget function for the security institutions. That all of those institutions ought to be in one budget function at the Budget Committee level. This would minimally have the advantage of not leaving our foreign policy and civilian funding at the mercy of a Budget Committee which inherently will look for ways to cut and finds those particular agencies——

Mrs. DAVIS. We certainly need to recognize how stovepiped Congress is as well in that regard——

Dr. ADAMS. Correct.

Mrs. DAVIS [continuing]. So it is part of the problem, of course, if you look at this issue. I was wondering if anybody else would like to weigh in on this.

Dr. ADAMS. Just the other thought was, I think, along with that document there ought to come a document to the Congress which is a single security budget justification document that links priorities and missions and capacities and tools. That would have to emerge from a joint NSC–OMB process with the agencies that would literally look at how these capacities relate to each other and why one part supports capabilities and requirements in the other part of the budget.

Mrs. DAVIS. Mr. Locher.

Mr. LOCHER. Congresswoman, the Project on National Security Reform has recommended that there be an integrated national security budget. I think that would be hugely important, and it may have to be mandated by the Congress, requiring that the President's budget in the national security area be presented as an integrated budget. In my written testimony, I had proposed a first step of asking the Director of OMB to submit an integrated budget in two mission areas: in combating terrorism and in foreign assistance. That would give a start to this to be able to look across the entire departments and agencies and for the Congress to look at what an integrated budget might look like. But there is a tremendous amount that needs to be done in terms of national security budgeting. There is no guidance from the President down to the departments and agencies for their planning or development of their budgets. He ought to be able to articulate exactly what outcomes and missions he would like them to focus on. So this is an area that the Project has spent lots of time working on and hopes to develop further.

Mrs. DAVIS. I think my time is up. Perhaps I will come back to you afterwards. Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Platts for five minutes.

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly thank each of our witnesses for your testimony, both written and oral, and your insights. With the focus being jointness and better coordination and collaboration, following the tragic events of 9/11 the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 did a number of things—the creation of the DNI [Director for National Intelligence], the National Counterterrorism Center. I would be interested in your perspectives of what has worked or not worked with the National Counterterrorism Center as an example of how we have tried to get the interagency coordination focused on a specific threat, terrorist threat. What shall we learn from this operation that is working or what is not working that we should be very aware of in going forward and trying to replicate this type of effort in a broader sense.

Mr. Locher, given I am in your county, I understand you are a native of Lancaster next door, it is appropriate we allow you to start.

Mr. LOCHER. Thank you, sir.

The Project on National Security Reform has studied a part of the National Counterterrorism Center, the Directorate for Strategic Operational Planning, and I think while we understand that part of it best, the lessons there apply across all of the National Counterterrorism Center.

In that directorate, there is not sufficient authority for it to conduct its responsibilities. There is lots of ambiguity with respect to the roles of other departments and agencies. The President really needs to issue an executive order that clarifies the responsibilities. Now that the National Counterterrorism Center and the Directorate for Strategic Operational Planning have been created, what is the responsibility of the State Department compared to this, and what is the responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]?

We have the problem that often when the Directorate for Strategic Operational Planning is doing its work, State and CIA do not participate. 15 or 16 departments and agencies need to play there.

We also have the challenge of personnel; how are people recruited to go there from the departments and agencies? How are they rewarded afterwards? I can tell you when it was created, lots of people went there with enthusiasm because they saw the opportunity that was presented by this organizational innovation. And both NCTC and the Directorate for Strategic Operational Planning are really organizational innovations, but they were formed imperfectly by the Congress.

But as I was mentioning, people went out there for two-year details from departments and agencies. The military really rewarded the people that went there. My understanding is in civilian departments and agencies, they did not. But this is an area where we need a human capital system to give us the kinds of skills that are required.

This directorate is really an extension of the National Security Staff. The National Security Staff is way too busy to be able to do strategy and to be able to do linking of resources with strategy, to do planning. This work could be done in subordinate organizations, such as the Directorate for Strategic Operational Planning, but that institutional relationship needs to be clarified, because it is now all personality-dependent.

But the challenge the Congress had in the legislation was to balance between the authority of a central figure, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center or the Director of National Intelligence, and the continued independence of the components, the 16 departments and agencies who have intelligence capabilities or play in the combating terrorism world.

In my view, the Congress did not find the right balance. There needs to be some strengthening. But the first step could be taken by the President through an executive order.

Mr. PLATTS. So the DNI having a more clear command and authority over Navy personnel, or whoever is within that center, no matter what agency they come from?

Mr. LOCHER. Well, in terms of this particular center, the National Counterterrorism Center, the director there does not have authority over personnel matters. He also has no authority over budgeting. So his authority is somewhat limited. It is a coalition of the willing, and every once in a while that coalition can be put together, and when it is, it can produce some powerful answers for the United States. But it is very difficult to do, and because it is only a coalition, he has to be very careful as to how he tries to exert any authority he has.

Dr. ADAMS. Let me try to address this issue you raised, Mr. Platts, from a different direction, but complementary, I think, to what Jim Locher had to say.

The National Implementation Plan which emerged from the division that Mr. Locher referred to is probably the most ambitious exercise that we have studied at attempting to bring a coordinated approach to strategy and guidance to agencies. There has rarely been a more forward-thrusted interagency deliberate and conscious and statutorily demanded exercise at interagency coordination than the National Implementation Plan.

While an awful lot of that is classified, that was not an unqualified success. Part of the reason that I think it was not an unqualified success lies in part in some of the staffing issues that Jim Locher referred to. Part of it lies in the weaknesses that I was noting earlier in the White House, that at the White House level National Security Staff and OMB, the amount of time and commitment to the National Implementation Plan was extremely thin, very small at the NSC level, with it ending up being the Deputy National Security Adviser pushing the effort forward, and NCTC was not an NSS agency so it had to be done by an act of will. And OMB had two examiners dealing with the budgetary consequences of the National Implementation Plan, both of whom had full-time jobs, assignments to other agencies that they were responsible for coordinating.

What that meant was you got a very elaborate plan with, as I understand it, 500 or 600 different taskings to agencies to coordinate counterterrorism policy across agencies, no capacity at the National Security Council staff to follow through on whether those were actually done, and no capacity at the Office of Management and Budget in the White House to follow through and find out if agencies had actually put resources behind the tasking that had been handed to the agencies.

So the consequence of that, I think, was instructive as to how difficult it is without adequate staffing and resourcing at the White House level to make sure this followed through. NCTC, in my judgment, was probably the wrong place to focus the leadership of the effort because of that. It was just too weakly backed up at the White House level.

Mr. PLATTS. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Platts.

We will go a second round here. I think we are going to have votes sometime in the next 10 to 30 minutes or so. We will try to get through another round before then.

Mr. Locher, in your statement you talked about the National Security Advisor having a total staff of 230 people, and in your words, a tiny budget of $8.6 million when General Jones took over. You referred to it as, you say the National Security Staff has become the most important staff in the national security system, if not in the world, and you suggest, I think, a substantial increase in staffing and authority and budget.

How do you resolve this question? We have had this discussion before with Michelle Flournoy back when she was a think-tanker, as to the National Security Advisor. Congress doesn't have much oversight over the National Security Advisor. That is the Presi-

dent's, I don't know if I want to say personal advisor, but we can't call in the National Security Advisor and say why did you spend that money there, why did you use this person there, what did this person say to you? Let's see your records.

So you are asking the Congress to substantially increase the staff, authority, and scope of the job of the National Security Advisor, when, in fact, we don't have any oversight authority.

Comment on that issue, please.

Mr. LOCHER. Well, in our project, this was a major issue. The President has an adviser. He is the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, but he is known as an adviser because that is the limit of his role. We argue in the project that what the President needs today is he needs a national security manager, somebody who can make this system decisive, integrated, focused on national missions and outcomes; make it act quickly in an integrated fashion. We think the position should exist in law. It does not now, but it should exist in law, and have the Congress specify what the duties of the position are.

If you think about it, there would have to be a considerable discussion of whether this position should be confirmed by the Senate. Our project did not come down and make a decision on that issue, but it will have to be debated.

One of the things that we know is in today's world, it is a whole-of-government approach, and we have argued that the Congress needs the ability to take such an approach. It needs to be able to work in more than the committee stovepipes. It needs to be able to be up there at the level where it can oversee the entire national security system. And there will have to be some mechanism created in Congress to do that. We proposed a Select Committee on National Security.

Dr. SNYDER. I understand that issue. But I am talking specifically about the issue of National Security Advisor.

Mr. LOCHER. The reason I raised this is because right now the only person in the executive branch who can talk to the Congress more broadly is the National Security Advisor. When you hear from departmental secretaries or agency heads, you are hearing it from their perspective.

There needs to be much more of a dialogue between the National Security Advisor, whatever his title and position is, and the Congress, because the really important issues today are the issues that are out there in that interagency space, they are issues that cut across. And there is currently no opportunity for a dialogue because the National Security Advisor is seen as only an assistant to the President and does not appear before the Congress. This is an issue that will have to be addressed. We may not have thought through all of the dimensions of this issue, but it produces a void today.

Dr. SNYDER. I agree with that. And it creates an issue of let's suppose you go to it being a confirmable position that we can call him up here to testify and have General Jones sitting here, and then do you get into the line of authority issues where essentially the Secretary of State reports to the national security manager, who reports to the President, and then you have, at some point, the President say I need a confidential adviser; I can call in and have these discussions and make my will known without having that

person called before the Congress, so I will have the national security assistant.

I don't know. I think that is how this all came about. I do think it is an ongoing issue though, and it is one, I think, that will need to be resolved if the Congress were to follow the direction you suggest, which is a substantial increase in budget and authority and staffing for the National Security Advisor, because right now it is something we don't have the ability to provide the kind of oversight I think most Members of Congress would like to.

Mr. PENDLETON. I would like to weigh in on it, if I could.

Dr. SNYDER. Sure.

Mr. PENDLETON. I would like to confirm your concern about oversight. The NSS is pretty opaque to us at GAO. We occasionally meet with the staff. They are very busy and pretty small, and it is sometimes an issue. I have a job going on now for the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform looking at anti-piracy efforts, and we have been trying for several months to get a meeting to talk to the NSS staff about what they are doing to coordinate the efforts across the government, and we never seem to get it scheduled.

So I think working through those oversight issues so we can do our job for you, but also so the Congress can take a look at what is happening there, would be very, very important.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to maybe go from a little bit different direction on the question that you asked, and we will go to Mr. Locher.

It seems to me the paradigms that a couple of agencies use here differ. If you look at the Department of Defense, they look at setting up regional commands and doing things on a regional basis. Then you look at State Department, and the State Department does them on a country-by-country basis. There is a lot of discussion back and forth about which model is the best, which one is most effective, which one is most inclusive in trying to coordinate efforts across the spectrum.

How would you suggest resolving those differences? We have such crossover today with these agencies that are dealing with these issues and we see what is happening around the world, Afghanistan with the provincial reconstruction teams [PRTs], with the integration of different agencies there.

How do you resolve the differences between how DOD puts their paradigm in place on that regional basis and the Department of State that does it on a country-by-country basis?

Mr. LOCHER. Mr. Wittman, there is some good news in this regard because in the House version of the National Defense Authorization Act, there was a provision added on the floor, I think by Congressman Langevin and Congresswoman Shea-Porter, about a common map. It requires the President to do a study of how we are organized differently in the departments and agencies that have international responsibilities.

Right now, each department and agency has been able to define the geographic boundaries to suit its needs, and in an earlier era, that was fine. Today it is an integrated effort. It is a whole-of-gov-

ernment approach. And if we allow those boundaries to be different, it just creates more difficulty in working the issues.

So I think this is a great provision. When General Jones took over as the National Security Advisor, he indicated this is one of the things he would like to see so that how he is organized at the National Security Staff is also how the rest of the government is organized.

So there is a great start on this. I am hoping that this provision will remain, that this report will come from the President explaining both the benefits of doing it plus any downsides of organizing the same.

Dr. ADAMS. Could I address that question, Congressman, as well? I like to make a distinction here between how you look at the world in terms of policy and how you look at the world in terms of execution or implementation.

At the level of policy and at the level of resourcing, which I will combine together, if you will, with policy, clearly the State Department is not adequately, how shall I say, structured and empowered internally to deal at the regional level the way it should, and that is a critical issue at State.

My own of view of this, just to give you one example, is the budget capacity that is in the hands of EUR/ACE [the Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia], which is the assistance office inside EUR, regional bureau at State, is very capacitated, very empowered, to be a regionally focused budget planning mechanism dealing with assistance to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and has worked very closely with the Congress. It has done a remarkable job. In resourcing and planning terms, EUR is probably the best practice at the State Department.

The falloff from that, even through NEA [the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs] and into the African Bureau or South Asia or Southeast Asia or Pacific, is all considerable falloff. They are not empowered to think policy at the regional level. They are not empowered to think resources at the regional level, unlike EUR/ACE, which is the outstanding example at the State Department.

So in policy and resourcing terms, it makes a lot of sense, even if you find the right way to draw the map, to empower those offices in the State Department with capacities both for policymaking and for resourcing budget decisions that they do not now have.

It is different when you come to implementation. I am much less concerned about whether there is a country focus or a regional focus when it comes to moving forces, applying them in the field, having diplomats and chiefs of mission responsible in the implementation side on security assistance programs and economic assistance programs. I think all of that, provided you sufficiently empower the chief of mission authority at the country level on the implementation side, works reasonably well and can work reasonably well. But the policy/budgetary/resourcing side at State Department needs to be more greatly empowered and reinforced than it has been. None of them but EUR/ACE have a budget office. None of them are looked to in the policy sense.

The other caveat I would put on it is to be very careful in the Defense Department-side model as well. It is not so clear in policy terms that DOD policy is any more authoritative in policy terms

at the regional level than the regional bureaus at State. We have a slight apples-and-oranges issue here, because the DOD offices that look like they are active and good implementers and policymakers are actually the COCOMs [combatant commands], and COCOMs are not policymakers. They behave like they are sometimes, but they are not, in fact, policymakers. They are policy implementers.

So a close look I think needs to be taken at the COCOM structure as well to make sure that they, as it were, stay in their lane while policy and resource are on the civilian side and equally empowered in both institutions.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Dr. SNYDER. Mrs. Davis for five minutes.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

Dr. Thompson, perhaps you can enlighten us a little bit. You studied the Intelligence Community and human capital reforms over the last five years. So what did we specifically learn from that that can be applied here and I guess really that which cannot? I mean, looking at the obstacles. And in the remaining time, probably there won't be much, one of the concerns I have, and I am probably not going to get back to ask this question, is how do we really translate this for the American people?

We are struggling right now, we know that, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, but particularly Afghanistan, in terms of trying to establish and talk through the long-term efforts that are necessary for progress. We are talking about human capital and capacity building and all those kinds of things.

So how is it that we are able to talk through some of these efforts in a way that makes sense, and perhaps people might even want to support and not be frightened by in terms of a long-term effort itself? Dr. Thompson?

Dr. THOMPSON. Well, our interest was primarily in the human capital area, which is somewhat more narrow than some of these other topics that have been discussed here. But some of the same issues are the same.

For example, Mr. Locher mentioned the issue of the authority of the DNI, which has figured centrally in the whole effort by the Intelligence Community to deal with these human capital reforms. And I mentioned the example earlier of the issue of waivers, the joint duty certification, which is the agencies collectively agree to a program whereby waivers could only be granted by the DNI and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

However, that is simply in the form of an agreement, and legally any agency head could, on his or her own, simply decide to promote somebody to a senior position without joint duty certification, which would kind of abrogate the treaty, and, to a substantial extent, the program itself.

So I think the issue that Dr. Locher mentioned of providing the DNI with some greater degree of authority over the agencies would help. It doesn't have to be dramatic, but even an incremental change in authority would substantially, how shall we say it, put some teeth in the program that aren't there right now.

It is remarkable—the program has achieved remarkable success, given the lack of authority on the part of the DNI, simply by virtue

of the collaborative nature of the process they have gone through. But I would describe the program as somewhat at risk by virtue of this kind of lack of ability to kind of weigh in in certain circumstances.

Plus the other thing, it has been highly contingent on personalities, which is that the people that went to this process all kind of bought in, but since then there has been a lot of turnover at the agency head, at the DNI level, at the chief human capital officer level, which has also kind of destroyed some of the collective or collaborativeness that has developed over time.

So I would describe the program as vulnerable and somewhat at risk in that regard.

With regard to the broader question of how to communicate this to the American people, it is not an item that I have given a lot of thought to, so I would have to contemplate that more.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. Anybody else want to tackle that?

Dr. ADAMS. Let me take a crack at the communicating it to the American people, but I am afraid it is going to underline very much what Dr. Thompson had to say.

I look at this particularly with respect to our investment in civilian capacity, as you gathered from my original testimony and my comments. And while it is staggeringly easy to communicate to the American people how much time and resources and people and investment we should put in on the military side of our national security structure, communicating successfully about the time, level of effort, people, and resources that need to be put on the civilian side has proven enormously difficult.

Really I think it is a question of helping people understand that the civilian long-term investment has as much, if not more, payoff than the military investment that we are making, because especially to pursue some of the reforms that many of us have recommended, the investments that are being made are in the capacity to strengthen governance in various areas of the world that are of strategic concern to us.

That isn't going to happen via an AFRICOM or COCOM type of arrangement. It is going to happen, and here a lot of the problem is human resources, it is going to happen if we recruit, train, cross-assign the way Mr. Locher is talking about, incentivize, promote our civilian personnel, so they are, in fact, empowered to do programmatic work and to focus on this long-term governance issue.

We really have to focus the institutions. Getting the American people to understand that that long-term investment is in our security interests is the challenge that every Secretary of State has had since the year "zot" in trying to justify their budget request. That is the hard bridge to get over to the American people. It is even a hard bridge to get over to the Congress. Why should we put money here, when it is very hard to see the near-term payoff?

Mrs. DAVIS. We work a little on short term.

I was going to ask, Mr. Pendleton, in your looking at the right people and right jobs, would you agree? That is a big problem, partly because it is more long-term rather than short-term.

Mr. PENDLETON. When we distilled all these reports, you know, you put them in a thing and shake them and see what comes out, it usually comes out to people in the long run.

I would like to just comment a bit and tell a little bit more about the story of AFRICOM. I think it is telling.

Originally they hoped they would have a lot of participation from State and AID, and it ended up being a couple dozen, which is similar to what the other COCOMs have, because DOD just absolutely dwarfs the other agencies. AFRICOM is a year-and-a-half old. There are 4,300 people working for them in Germany and Italy and down in Djibouti. I don't know how many people State has in Africa, but that is a lot of folks doing planning and thinking. So one of the things the national security budget would do, for example, is bring that out in pretty sharp relief. If you put DHS and State together, they are about one-tenth the size of DOD, and that in itself is telling.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Platts, last but not least.

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just adding on to Congresswoman Davis about people, you know, when I have interacted out in Afghanistan and Iraq and examples of the country teams with the ambassadors and being able to come into any country and in a pretty good timeframe get a very good sense of what is going on from that country team, it is very effective, I guess. And then with PRTs, I have seen the same, especially in Afghanistan in some of the early years in my visits there.

But I think in all those instances, it was people and their ability, kind of at the operations level just to say hey, we have got a job to do, let's find a way to get it done, and they make it work. When we get to the strategic level it gets more and more tough to have that success.

With the people issue being one of the questions, and this might be Mr. Pendleton and Dr. Thompson, it is my understanding DNI is trying to promote interagency knowledge and cooperation, and with this program, Civilian Joint Duty Program, how you see that moving forward and I guess the effectiveness of it, and is it something we should look to as a model elsewhere to try to implement?

Dr. THOMPSON. The answer is yes, but a cautious yes, which is the real crunch will come this October 1st when, according to the program that they have agreed to, one cannot be promoted to a senior level within the Intelligence Community without joint duty certification. So if everybody adheres to that agreement that they thus far have, then I think you can describe the program as a success. But that is really going to be crunch time within the Intelligence Community.

Mr. PLATTS. Where they actually back that up.

Dr. THOMPSON. Right. But to date, from everybody we have talked to, I think the program is considered a substantial success. All the agencies seem to have bought in. There is active participation by the officers themselves. There is joint leadership training programs just gearing up. So as of now, I would describe it as a success.

Mr. PENDLETON. Nothing to add.

Dr. ADAMS. Just one thought on that, Congressman. I would say that probably one of the most revolutionary consequences of Goldwater-Nichols for the Department of Defense has been checking the joint box. That in order to move ahead, you have to have done that.

I think over time, I don't know whether Jim would agree with it, but I imagine he would, it has had revolutionary impact on the way across services the senior officers now respond to their responsibilities.

What could very easily be done in the Department of State is to make a similar requirement for a foreign service officer in the Department of State, that it is a requirement to have done interagency duty as part of your promotional package. It does not now exist, and it is my understanding of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 that it is permissive, that the Department itself could do that without the requirement for any congressional action. Over time, I think it would have a revolutionary impact similarly in the foreign service structure.

Mr. LOCHER. I think the joint officer provisions of Goldwater-Nichols have been a huge success. They have created the right incentives. They have built the joint structure. You can go out to a combatant command where you have people in five different uniforms, and they are focused on what is the national mission. We are lacking that in the interagency.

This committee last year took the initiative to require a study of an interagency personnel system, a career development and management, and that contract on that is going to be led by the Department of Defense. The Project today submitted a proposal on that, so we are hoping to do that. But that would be a huge step.

In my testimony I recommended that this would be a near term step that the Congress could take. It could have the same dramatic changes by creating a different set of incentives for people in the interagency space.

Mr. PLATTS. As one who has the privilege of representing the Army War College and is up there a lot, and as we have had tremendous hearings and the Chairman and Ranking Member's great leadership on professional military education and that jointness aspect of it, I certainly see when I am at the war college, when it is not just Army officers, but Navy, Air Force, Marine, civilian, Department of State, and then role-playing for them in some of their strategic exercises, how that joint approach, you know, is so important and ultimately critical when they get out into the implementation of that strategic leadership that they are developing.

Dr. ADAMS. I just did a presentation for one of the elite units at Carlisle on the subject, and, of course, it is a purposely impressive bunch of people. I have said many times the State Department needs to look at this element of their human resource development seriously.

The Foreign Service Institute [FSI] does a lot of great work, but it does it at the entry level. It is insufficiently interagency. They don't follow through at mid-career. They really ought to be focusing right through a career and right through an interagency approach to that career at FSI in the training and education. State doesn't do it anywhere as well as the Defense Department or the services do it.

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

Mr. Locher, I had one quick question for you. In your statement today, you say that there is no single sweeping package that will be adopted and somehow we do reform once and forever.

My recollection is when you came out with your 800-page report a couple of years ago, that, in fact, you all did advocate that there be very sweeping reform, I don't think you said one sweeping package, but you did say you pretty much need to take the whole package or don't do it.

Has this been kind of an evolution of your thinking in this whole issue of reform with this national security system?

Mr. LOCHER. Well, Mr. Chairman, maybe we did not communicate our intention well enough. When we did "Forging a New Shield," we were looking to study the entire system. Even at that time we knew it would be a 10-year undertaking.

We had gotten smarter on the ideas of implementation over the past year as we have worked with 10 or 12 agencies, and we have gotten a sense of how gradual the changes will have to be. And that is why I proposed this idea of a roadmap that gave us a sense of the sequencing of actions.

Now, we do see that at some point in time, the Congress will need to pass a new National Security Act. We have started by trying to identify to the administration what can be done under existing authority, and a tremendous amount can be done under existing authority. But at some point in time, we are going to identify authority that the President does not currently have to operate in the new ways that the challenges of today and tomorrow will demand.

So, in my testimony, I also talk about this roadmap which showed the path to legislation. But our 800-page report did not suggest that all of that would occur at one time. We understood that maybe we were not successful in communicating it.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Wittman, any further questions?

Mrs. Davis, anything further?

Mr. Platts, anything further?

Thank you all for being here. I don't think we have solved the problem today, but I think the job this subcommittee has played in the last two or three years is to keep reminding us all that there is a problem out there that needs to be scratched at, and your all's work today and in the past and the future is part of that discussion. Thank you all.

We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

June 9, 2010

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JUNE 9, 2010

Statement of Ranking Member Rob Wittman
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
House Armed Services Committee

Hearing on Interagency Reform

June 9, 2010

Thank you, Chairman Snyder, and good afternoon to our witnesses – we appreciate your being here today.

I commend Chairman Snyder for calling this hearing. We addressed the subject of interagency reform and the Project on National Security Reform's December 2008 report "Forging a New Shield" just over a year ago. In that hearing, we heard expert testimony on this vexing issue from distinguished experts who offered a range of opinions. We expect and welcome a diversity of views, especially on this committee and especially on this topic. There seems to be general agreement that we need a better system of coordinating our national security efforts, but no agreement on how.

The nature of the Washington bureaucracy is to maintain the status quo, both in the executive and legislative branches. If we are ever able to institute new structures and processes in the administration and Congress,

we can expect those processes will remain in place for many years. Whatever we do, if anything, has to be carefully considered and we must be sure that national security will be improved by the changes, because we will live with them for many years.

The principal challenges lie in resolving command and budget authorities, yet another issue shared by the Congress and the executive branch. Last year, I cited the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 as a rare example of recent interagency reform. While those reforms are real, the Congress struggled with how much command authority and budget authority to vest in the new Director of National Intelligence, with apparent consequences to this day.

I am pleased to see that PNSR published a follow up report last September, entitled "Turning Ideas into Action", which does just that—proposing specific measures to be taken to achieve a more cohesive, agile national security structure. I am also pleased that the principal author of both reports is with us today.

I'd like today's witnesses to apply the PNSR's suggested structure or their own thoughts to a couple of today's real world problems. First, of great concern to this subcommittee—planning, coordinating, and executing an effective interagency response to our national efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. What would you do differently? The second, no less urgent but less complex—how would you manage the federal government's response to the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico?

I am grateful to have such distinguished witnesses before us to comment on PNSR's work and look forward to their testimony.

Testimony of the Honorable James R. Locher III, President and CEO, Project on National Security Reform, before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Armed Services Committee, "Pragmatic, Near-Term Steps for Creating a More Effective and Functional National Security System," June 9, 2010

Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Wittman, and members of the subcommittee, I am delighted to appear before you to testify on national security reform. I want to commend the subcommittee for its leadership on this critical issue. It is most appropriate that this body is undertaking this historic work. This subcommittee – then under the leadership of Congressmen Bill Nichols and Larry Hopkins – formulated the House Armed Services Committee's version of the landmark Goldwater-Nichols Act.

National security reform is the number one national security issue. You may be wondering how I can rank national security reform at the top of the national security agenda given the priority missions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, challenges from Iran and North Korea, turmoil in the Middle East, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction threats, cyber-security issues and nontraditional threats to security including the world financial crisis. I give national security reform this elevated status because our performance in each one of these specific mission areas is undermined, if not crippled, by organizational dysfunction. This critique is not a criticism of national security professionals. They are working incredibly hard and with unsurpassed dedication, but the archaic system in which they must operate wastes much of their effort and talent.

The fundamental problem is the misalignment of the national security system with 21st Century security challenges. Rigid, bureaucratic, competitive, vertically-oriented departments and agencies have consistently dominated our government. But threats in today's world require a fundamentally different organizational model – one capable of tightly and effectively integrating departmental expertise and capabilities. We need highly effective horizontal teams able to work across departmental boundaries. We confront horizontal problems but are saddled with a vertical organization.

In recent years, there has been compelling evidence of the inadequacy of current arrangements: the terrorist attacks of 9/11, troubled stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,

poor response to Hurricane Katrina, and near-misses in the attempted terrorist attacks aboard Northwest Flight 253 on Christmas Day and last month in Times Square. These setbacks and near-misses are not coincidental. They are evidence of systemic failure. President Obama recognized this when he declared in reaction to the Christmas Day incident: "When our government has information on a known extremist and that information is not shared and acted on as it should have been, so that this extremist boards a plane with dangerous explosives that could cost nearly 300 lives, a systemic failure has occurred." Systemic failures require systemic reform, not the piecemeal, ambiguous reforms of recent years. Let me hasten to add, however, that systemic reform need not – and should not – be undertaken as a single package of sweeping reforms enacted overnight. It means rather that each pragmatic step in the near term and beyond ought to be planned and implemented in accordance with a larger reform framework and a longer view.

Although our attention is drawn to recent setbacks, the organizational performance of the national security system has been troubled for decades. The seeds of its problems were sown in the National Security Act of 1947, which was inadequate for the nation's needs then and is totally outmoded today. Over the past twenty-five years, the system's performance has been increasingly challenged by two factors: complexity and speed of change. Security issues have become increasingly complex – wider in scope, more varied, and with growing interconnectedness. This complexity demands the integrated engagement of more national security components, including many non-traditional ones. Rapid change especially challenges our system with its ponderous coordinating committees and inability to produce unity of effort. One of PNSR's most frightening conclusions is that the gap between the demands being placed on the system and its capacities and speed is growing.

President Obama's National Security Strategy has reinvigorated the drive to transform the national security system. Let there be no mistake, the strategy's goals cannot be achieved without sweeping transformation of the system. In organizational terms, the strategy calls for

1. Strengthening national capacity through a whole-of-government approach
2. Updating, balancing, and integrating all tools of American power
3. Broadening the scope of national security

4. Emphasizing the foundations of national power – sound fiscal policy, education, energy, science and technology, and health
5. Aligning resources with strategy
6. Taking a longer view in the national strategy
7. Forming strategic partnerships with organizations outside of government, taking essentially a whole-of-nation approach

I have attached to my statement a list of the specific organizational goals prescribed by the National Security Strategy. These goals endorse many ideas contained in the PNSR reports *Forging a New Shield,* released in December 2008, and *Turning Ideas into Action*, published in September 2009.

Consistent with the National Security Strategy and of particular interest to this subcommittee, Secretary Gates has repeatedly called for major national security reform, including a new national security act. The secretary has delivered three bold speeches on the subject – in November 2007, January 2008, and February of this year. In his most recent speech, the secretary described the situation: "America's interagency toolkit is a hodgepodge of jerry-rigged arrangements constrained by a dated and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy process." He noted that, "[f]or the most part, America's instruments of national power – military and civilian – were set up in a different era for a very different set of threats." Secretary Gates predicted that the need to adapt and reform our 63-year old national security apparatus will be the institutional challenge of our time. He envisions far-reaching changes, saying, "New institutions are needed for the 21st Century, new organizations with a 21st Century mind-set."

Since releasing *Forging a New Shield* in December 2008, PNSR has been working with stakeholders in departments and agencies and on Capitol Hill to refine its recommendations and identify implementation challenges. This work over the past eighteen months has provided profound insights on the impediments to achieving the organizational changes envisioned by President Obama and Secretary Gates and recommended by PNSR. The first impediment is an intellectual one. New concepts are alien to current government operations. The still dominant mental model is the Cold War system, centered on defense, intelligence, and diplomacy

operating separately in their stovepipes. The organizational requirements of the 21st Century are a great leap from these long-held beliefs. Before lasting progress can be made with stakeholders, a major, time-consuming education effort needs to be undertaken to build consensus on the potential of modern organizational practices.

A second impediment is political. Entrenched interests are attached to the status quo, especially in civilian departments and agencies and on Capitol Hill. Reform raises politically sensitive issues about power, influence, jurisdiction, and resources.

A third impediment is scope. The daunting size and complexity of reform inhibit commitment. Claiming that national security reform will never happen, many officials whose help is needed will not engage.

The fourth impediment is ownership. No one, except for President Obama, Vice President Biden, and General Jones, owns the national security system and accepts responsibility for improving system performance. There is no congressional owner of the national security system. Department and agencies own a component of the system but do not see an obligation to undertake system-wide reform.

The last and maybe most challenging impediment is bandwidth. Everyone is so busy handling the issues of today and tomorrow, there is no time for institutional reform. Despite working incredibly long days, top national security officials cannot escape the urgent to work on the important. National security reform will take leadership, political will, a plan for proceeding in mutually coherent steps, perseverance, and time.

These impediments can – and must – be overcome, but it will not be easy. Congress will have to play a major role in overcoming the inertia in the Executive Branch. Even in business, where the bottom line provides a powerful force for change and where corporations know that they can perish if they do not adapt rapidly, leadership frequently turns to outside consultants to help overcome internal inertia. Congress will need to be that outside force.

The lessons of the Goldwater-Nichols Act are instructive on the role that Congress must play on national security reform. The Goldwater-Nichols Act has proven to be a historic success: It produced the world's premier joint warfighting force. But it must be remembered that entrenched interests in the Pentagon bitterly opposed this legislation. A four-year, 241-day struggle between the two Armed Services Committees and DoD ensued. The committees used every tool at their disposal to pressure, prod, question, and introduce new ideas. National security reform will require even more congressional energy to overcome inertia in the Executive Branch. Despite its difficulty, national security reform is not impossible. Again, the Goldwater-Nichols experience is instructive: When work on that legislation began, ninety-five percent of the experts predicted it would never happen.

With Congress' important role apparently in mind, the subcommittee has asked for testimony on "pragmatic, near-term steps that can be taken to move forward on creating a more effective and functional interagency national security system." PNSR's report *Turning Ideas into Action* contains thirty-seven recommendations on immediate actions that could be taken by the president, assistant to the president for national security affairs, director of the Office of Management and Budget, secretaries of state, defense, and homeland security, director of national intelligence, and Congress. My testimony focuses on ten key near-term steps. Some of these are from *Turning Ideas into Action*; some result from more recent actions, such as the release of the Obama administration's National Security Strategy.

The first near-term step, and by far the most important, would be to <u>require the president to submit an implementation plan for the organizational changes prescribed by the new National Security Strategy</u>. As the subcommittee knows, most National Security Strategy documents contain a lofty set of goals which go unrealized when there is no follow-through. Congress must insist on Executive Branch attention to the organizational goals that have been established by the president. For each of the twenty-three organizational goals in the strategy, the president should identify the specific reforms that need to be undertaken and milestones for their achievement. Every year, Congress should ask for a scorecard measuring progress toward these reforms and for an updated implementation plan.

A second and related near-term step would be to require the assistant to the president for national security affairs to submit a plan for achieving the needed organizational capacity of the National Security Staff pursuant to the National Security Strategy. Realizing the whole-of-government, integrated approach articulated by the National Security Strategy will require a significant strengthening of and support for the National Security Staff. Today, that staff is under-resourced and institutionally weak. It is the headquarters of the national security system, but it lacks headquarters powers. The assistant to the president for national security affairs, who does not even exist in law, has only an advisory role. The National Security Staff has become the most important staff in the national security system, if not the world. This evolution has not been properly recognized. That staff totals 230 people; has a tiny budget ($8.6 million when General Jones was appointed); and is poorly supported. National security reform needs to start at the top of the system – with the National Security Staff. Congress will need to give special attention to providing the proper authority and resources.

The plans required by the first and second near-term steps would not cover the full national security reform agenda. A third near-term step that this subcommittee should undertake is to commission a ten-year road map for the entire national security reform agenda. National security reform will be a ten-year undertaking at a minimum. To be successful, it will require the expertise and engagement of many organizations outside of government. As noted above, the new National Security Strategy recognizes the importance of such collaboration, calling for "strategic partnerships with the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, foundations, and community-based organizations." The road map will be imperative to align all of this activity and to create the proper sequencing of reforms, including the path to legislation. The road map should be a relatively simple, accessible document created with three purposes in mind: (1) *communication* – providing a tool to inform and build alignment among key stakeholders in the government, private sector, and nongovernmental organization communities; (2) *guidance* – providing a framework to assist change management planners as they address specific aspects of implementation; and (3) *scorecard* – providing a set of categories for assessing and periodically reporting credible, reliable information about how reform is advancing.

At present, four national security components perform quadrennial reviews: the Departments of Defense, State, and Homeland Security, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. What is missing is a national-level quadrennial review to examine national security from a whole-of-government perspective and to establish national goals and priorities. A fourth near-term step would be to require the president to conduct a Quadrennial National Security Review to establish the security goals and priorities of the United States. Without a national-level strategic planning document, national security efforts will continue to be dominated by the priorities, plans, and programs of the individual departments and agencies.

Each major national security mission requires the contributions of many departments and agencies. This is why a whole-of-government approach has become imperative. Because resource decisions are made on an agency-by-agency basis, the Executive Branch is unable to allocate resources from a whole-of-government, mission-oriented perspective and to make tradeoffs that maximize progress toward desired outcomes. Many, including PNSR, have advocated the creation of an integrated national security budget that permits more informed decision-making. In letters dated May 21, 2010, to Speaker Pelosi and Majority Leader Reid, Admiral Mullen wrote:

> "We are living in times that require an integrated national security program with budgets that fund the full spectrum of national security efforts... The diplomatic and developmental capabilities of the United States have a direct bearing on our ability to shape threats and reduce the need for military action. It is my firm belief that diplomatic programs as part of a coordinated strategy will save money by reducing the likelihood of active military conflict involving U.S. forces."

I have attached to my statement a copy of Admiral Mullen's letter to Speaker Pelosi. Secretary Clinton also recently joined the call for an integrated national security budget. During a question-and-answer session at the Brookings Institution on May 27, she said:

> "We have to start looking at a national security budget. You cannot look at a defense budget, a State Department budget, and a USAID budget without . . . falling back into the

old stovepipes that I think are no longer relevant for the challenges of today. So we want to begin to talk about a national security budget, and then you can see the tradeoffs and the savings."

An appropriate near-term step for this reform would be to require the director of the Office of Management and Budget to submit illustrative, integrated budgets for two mission areas – combating terrorism and development – with the President's Budget Request for FY2012.

One of the most, if not the most, important reforms advanced by the Goldwater-Nichols Act was joint officer management. By creating incentives, requirements, and standards for joint officers, those provisions significantly improved the performance of joint duty and led to creation of a joint culture. Congress acted on the joint officer issue because it had concluded, "For the most part, military officers do not want to be assigned to joint duty; are pressured or monitored for loyalty by their services while serving on joint assignments; are not prepared by either education or experience to perform their joint duties; and serve only a relatively short period once they have learned their jobs." Analyses of the situation in interagency personnel matters reveal similar problems. A sixth near-term step with enormous potential would be to establish an interagency personnel system to create the proper incentives, education, and training for personnel assigned to interagency positions. This reform is being studied on Capitol Hill and could begin the major transformation that is needed.

Today, the national security community has inadequate mechanisms for providing comprehensive assessments of organizational performance and identifying the need for organizational innovation. The antiquated national security system evidences this void. A seventh near-term step would be to establish a Center for Organizational Performance at the National Defense University or another institution that would undertake comprehensive assessments of organizational performance in the national security community. As a center for excellence on all matters dealing with the organization of the national security community, the Center would conduct research and analysis, collaborate with other government organizations and private organizations, and make recommendations for organizational innovation.

The Department of Defense fully appreciates the whole-of-government approach that current national security missions require. Unfortunately, the military education system has not kept abreast of the need for more education on operating with interagency partners. An eighth near-term step would be to require the secretary of defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit a plan on how they intend to improve the curricula of the military war colleges to provide an appropriate level of education on interagency affairs and national security reform.

The Christmas Day terrorist incident revealed continuing challenges to the performance of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). With the full cooperation of NCTC, PNSR recently completed an eight-month study of NCTC's Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning (DSOP). The study documented many obstacles that DSOP faces in pursuit of its mission. Both NCTC and DSOP represent important organizational innovations, but in their initial formulation, they were not properly empowered. A ninth near-term step would be to require the director of NCTC to submit a plan for overcoming obstacles to improved performance by NCTC, especially by DSOP.

There is no congressional committee or subcommittee that has clear jurisdiction over multiagency national security activities. Given the whole-of-government approaches needed for today's national security missions, there is no place where Congress can address and oversee the most important national security issues. Eventually, Congress will need to create a mechanism for examining these critical issues. In the interim, a tenth and final near-term step would be for this subcommittee to hold joint hearings with a subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (maybe the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight, as it aligns with this subcommittee in its oversight and investigations jurisdiction) to examine interagency issues. Topics that could be addressed include: (1) the National Security Strategy; (2) the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan; (3) the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP); and (4) the strategic communications programs of departments and agencies.

In conclusion, I once more commend Chairman Snyder and Ranking Member Wittman for holding this hearing and for searching for pragmatic, near-term steps that the subcommittee

can use to compel the start of the bold transformation that the nation desperately needs. The national security system must be modernized to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. The task will be monumental, but there is no alternative. Without sweeping changes, the nation will experience repeated failures, wasted resources, and continued decline in America's standing and influence. We can and must find the resolve and political will to create a modern national security system.

Specific Organizational Goals Prescribed by the National Security Strategy

1. "must maintain our military's conventional superiority, while enhancing its capacity to defeat asymmetric threats" – page 5
2. "diplomacy and development capabilities must be modernized, and our civilian expeditionary capacity strengthened, to support the full breadth of our priorities" – page 5
3. "intelligence and homeland security must be integrated with our national security policies, and those of our allies and partners" – page 5
4. "must adapt to advance our interests and sustain our leadership" – page 7
5. "national strategy must take a longer view" -- page 7
6. "must ensure that we have the world's best-educated workforce, a private sector that fosters innovation, and citizens and businesses that can access affordable health care to compete in a globalized economy" – page 10
7. "strengthening national capacity – a whole of government approach" – page 14
8. "must update, balance, and integrate all of the tools of American power" – page 14
9. "must integrate our approach to homeland security with our broader national security approach" – page 14
10. "are improving the integration of skills and capabilities within our military and civilian institutions, so they complement each other and operate seamlessly" – page 14
11. "are improving coordinated planning and policymaking and must build our capacity in key areas where we fall short" – page 14
12. "achieve integration of our efforts to implement and monitor operations, policies, and strategies" – page 14
13. "foster coordination across departments and agencies" – page 14
14. "ensuring alignment of resources with our national security strategy" – page 14
15. "adapting the education and training of national security professionals to equip them to meet modern challenges" – page 14
16. "reviewing authorities and mechanisms to implement and coordinate assistance programs, and other policies and programs that strengthen coordination" – page 14
17. "must tap the ingenuity outside government through strategic partnerships with private sector, nongovernmental organizations, foundations, and community-based organizations" – page 16
18. "must continue to adapt and rebalance our instruments of statecraft" – page 18
19. "must also enhance our resilience – the ability to adapt to changing conditions and prepare for, withstand, and rapidly recover from disruption" – page 18
20. "must…strengthen public-private partnerships by developing incentives for government and the private sector to design structures and systems that can withstand disruptions and mitigate associated consequences" – page 19
21. "must build a stronger foundation for economic growth" – page 28
22. "calls for . . . a broad conception of what constitutes our national security" – page 51
23. "must be effective cooperation between the two branches of government" – page 51

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999
21 May 2010

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi
Speaker of the House of Representatives
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Madam Speaker,

As the Congress moves to finalize the budget for FY 2011, I want to offer my strong support for fully funding the Department of Defense and related agencies. I also want to reinforce the views expressed in Secretary Gates' letter of April 21 and Secretary Clinton's letter of April 20 (copies attached) to Senator Kent Conrad, requesting full funding of the Department of State and USAID. We are living in times that require an integrated national security program with budgets that fund the full spectrum of national security efforts, including vitally important pre-conflict and post-conflict civilian stabilization programs.

Diplomatic programs are critical to our long-term security. I have been on record many times since 2005 expressing my views of the importance of fully funding our diplomatic efforts. As Chief of Naval Operations, I said that I would hand over part of my budget to the State Department, "in a heartbeat, assuming it was spent in the right place." Diplomatic efforts should always lead and shape our international relationships, and I believe that our foreign policy is still too dominated by our military. The diplomatic and developmental capabilities of the United States have a direct bearing on our ability to shape threats and reduce the need for military action. It is my firm belief that diplomatic programs as part of a coordinated strategy will save money by reducing the likelihood of active military conflict involving U.S. forces.

I am told that the Senate Budget Committee reduced the international affairs budget by $4 billion, and I respect and appreciate the tough choices the committee had to make. I would ask that as you finalize the spending outlines for FY 2011, you underscore the importance of our civilian efforts to the work of the Defense Department, and ultimately, to our Nation's security. Because of the increasingly integrated nature of our operations, a $4 billion decrement in State and USAID budgets will have a negative impact in ongoing U.S. military efforts, leading to higher costs through missed diplomatic and developmental needs and opportunities. A fully-integrated foreign policy requires a fully-resourced approach. Our troops, Foreign Service officers and development experts work side-by-side in unprecedented and ever-increasing cooperation as they execute our strategic programs. We need to continue to

grow the important capabilities that are unique to our non-military assets, ensuring they have the resources to enhance our security and advance our national interests, in both ongoing conflicts as well as in preventative efforts.

As always, I appreciate your strong support of our men and women in uniform, and appreciate your considering my perspective as you finalize the FY 2011 budget.

The more significant the cuts, the longer military operations will take, and the more and more lives are at risk.

Sincerely,

M. G. MULLEN
Admiral, U.S. Navy

Copy to: Representative John Boehner
Minority Leader

Attachments
As stated

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

APR 21 2010

The Honorable Kent Conrad
Chairman
Committee on the Budget
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing to express my strong support for full funding of the President's FY 2011 foreign affairs budget request (the 150 account) which, along with defense, is a critical component of an integrated and effective national security program.

I understand this year presents a challenging budget environment, with competing domestic and international pressures. However, I strongly believe a robust civilian foreign affairs capability, coupled with a strong defense capability, is essential to preserving U.S. national security interests around the world.

State and USAID partners are critical to success in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. Our military and civilian missions are integrated, and we depend upon our civilian counterparts to help stabilize and rebuild after the fight. As U.S. forces transition out of war zones, the U.S. government needs our civilian agencies to be able to assume critical functions. This allows us, for example, to draw down U.S. forces in Iraq responsibly while ensuring hard-fought gains are secured. Cuts to the 150 account will almost certainly impact our efforts in these critical frontline states.

In other parts of the world, the work performed by diplomatic and development professionals helps build the foundation for more stable, democratic and prosperous societies. These are places where the potential for conflict can be minimized, if not completely avoided, by State and USAID programs -- thereby lowering the likely need for deployment of U.S. military assets.

In formulating his request for FY 2011, the President carefully considered funding needs for the budget accounts for both foreign affairs and national defense, taking into account overall national security requirements as well as economic conditions. I believe that full funding of these two budget accounts is necessary for our national security and for ensuring our continued leadership in the world. I hope you will take this into account when acting upon the President's FY 2011 budget request.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Gates

cc:
The Honorable Judd Gregg
Ranking Member

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 20, 2010

The Honorable Kent Conrad, Chairman
Committee on the Budget
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am asking your help in supporting the State and USAID budget request for FY 2011. I appreciate the difficult budget environment that confronts the Congress, but I strongly believe this budget request is critical to advancing U.S. national security and our interests around the world.

Our request totals $52.8 billion – a $4.9 billion increase over 2010. Of that increase, $3.6 billion goes directly to "frontline states" – Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. All other State and USAID funding grows by $1.3 billion or a 2.7 percent increase, and allows us to tackle the transnational problems of poverty, food insecurity, climate change, and disease that pose serious threats to American interests.

Our diplomatic and development tools enhance American leadership, strengthen our alliances, and build new partnerships to confront pressing global challenges. Full funding in FY 11 will allow us to continue making tangible progress in securing the hard fought gains achieved in Iraq, and to continue supporting and deploying hundreds of civilians in Afghanistan and Pakistan to help stabilize dangerous but improving situations.

The recent attacks on United States personnel and facilities from Juarez, Mexico, to Peshawar, Pakistan, reinforce what we already know – America's diplomats and development professionals are on the front lines, protecting, and securing our vital national security interests around the world.

Congress has rightly demanded that we use all the tools in our national security tool belt; that we put more diplomats and development experts on the ground, shoulder-to-shoulder with our troops; and that we do everything possible to secure America's interests around the world. We are doing our part at the State Department and USAID, but we need your help with the FY 11 request. Our

missions are increasingly integrated with those of our Defense Department counterparts, as we have seen demonstrated time and again in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other parts of the world. Cuts to the civilian components can no longer be seen in isolation or having little impact on our national security strategy.

Our investments in development and diplomacy are smart, cost-effective, and squarely in the best interests of American taxpayers and our national security. They are also relatively small compared to the cost of active military engagement, and they can end up delivering impactful savings. In Iraq, for example, our $2.6 billion request for State and USAID will allow the Defense Department budget to decrease by about $16 billion – a powerful illustration of the return on civilian investments.

I ask for your strong support of our budget request and you have my pledge that we will work diligently to ensure that this funding is used as efficiently and effectively as possible.

Sincerely yours,



Hillary Rodham Clinton

Testimony of
Dr. Gordon Adams

Distinguished Fellow
Project on Budgeting for Foreign Affairs and Defense
Stimson Center

Professor of International Relations
School of International Service
American University

Interagency National Security Reform: The Road Ahead

Before the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Armed Services Committee

June 09, 2010

Dr. Snyder, Congressman Wittman, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today on the critical subject of reforming the interagency national security machinery. I am glad this HASC subcommittee is tackling this difficult subject. My testimony today draws on work we have been doing at the Stimson Center's project on budgeting for foreign affairs and defense, which I direct, my own experience in the executive branch, and research I have done on budgeting across the Departments of State and Defense, as well as USAID.[1]

Problems within and across these agencies continue to make it difficult to design and execute a coherent approach to an increasingly complex world. That complexity arises from the international environment, on one hand, and from our own fiscal struggles, on the other. We cannot cope with that world unless we do better making the interagency process work. If the need for more integrated policy does not force us to improve, inescapable budget discipline will. As you know, our debt, presently at 61% of GDP, is projected to grow by the end of the decade to nearly 100% of GDP. Grappling with this reality will force us to be more efficient and to discipline agency spending.



Three premises inform the perspective I will offer today.

- The interagency reform agenda depends on having greater clarity about agencies' missions. Strong, mission-driven organizations can collaborate. Without agency mission clarity, collaboration is significantly more difficult.
- Budgets are policy. Collaboration in defining priorities and in matching resources to those priorities is an essential part of the answer to our interagency dilemmas.

[1] The Stimson project work is publicly available on the blog *Budget Insight* (http://budgetinsight.wordpress.com/). My own research is available in Gordon Adams and Cindy Williams, *Buying National Security: How America Plans and Pays for Its Global Role and Safety at Home (NY: Routledge, 2009)*

- Process and structure are as important as good leadership. The best process cannot make up for poor leadership, but even the best leadership cannot exercise its will if the process and structures are wrong.

Using these perspectives as a foundation, I want to diagnose interagency collaboration today, offer a set of pragmatic, actionable reforms that this committee and the Congress should consider to improve that process, and note some areas of caution in the process of reform.

The importance of strong agencies with clear missions and authorities

"Interagency" and "whole of government" are buzz words that arose after the September 11th attacks and in direct response to the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both of these operations, as well as counterterrorism missions elsewhere, raised important issues about agencies' capacities and their ability to work together. Since the interagency 'problem' grew directly out of military missions, the 'requirement' was driven by what the military thought it needed and did not have. Specifically, DOD was frustrated by the absence of a significant, flexible, well-funded civilian capacity at the State Department and USAID, able to take responsibility for post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization after U.S. combat operations concluded. Yet operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are not the best guidelines for future reform in the interagency space. Interagency needs of the future cannot be extrapolated from these cases because future commitments likely will not be the result of a sizeable deployment of US military forces.

Instead, future commitments likely will require the military to provide secondary support to a civilian mission. The question of agency strength and mission therefore is critical both to today's missions and those of the future. There cannot be an interagency process that is truly "whole of government" absent stronger mission statements for the civilian agencies that are clear and adequately resourced.

SELECTED NON-INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS	
Departments	**Programs and Offices**
Agriculture	Foreign Agriculture Service: CCC Export Credit Guarantees; Foreign Market Development Programs
Commerce	International Trade Administration, Bureau of Industry and Security
Homeland Security	CBP Container Security Initiative and Office of International Affairs and Trade Relations; Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
Energy	National Nuclear Security Administration; High Energy Physics Program
Justice	Legal Attaché Program; DEA Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force; INTERPOL
Education	International Education and Foreign Language Studies (Overseas); International Affairs Office
EPA	Office of International Affairs; Office of International Programs
Health and Human Services	CDC Global AIDS, Immunization, and Disease Programs; Office of International Affairs
Interior	International Technical Assistance Program, NPS Office of International Affairs, Minerals Management Service
Labor	Bureau of International Labor Affairs
NASA	International Space Program; International Space Science Collaboration Program; Export Control Program
Transportation	Office of International Aviation and Office of International Transportation; FAA's Office of International Aviation; FHA's Office of International Programs; Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Cooperation

Part of the interagency problem, then, is civilian agencies' weakness in strategic planning, mission definition, capacity building, institutional coherence, and resources.

This weakness is partly structural. For the past 60 years, we have created new program agencies to implement new program areas, from USIA and USAID decades ago to MCC and PEPFAR in recent years. International affairs activities now form a complex diaspora spread throughout all of the civilian departments of government.

Moreover, existing government agencies not traditionally part of the foreign policy process have become significant international actors as globalization causes more and more problems to transcend state boundaries. The Secretary of State does not influence many of these programs and activities, making it difficult to coordinate even just civilian institutions.

Another part of the problem is normative. 'Whole of government' now is invoked as a prescription rather than a description, and as though the chances of a mission's success go up with each department or agency involved. Reflexively applying the 'interagency' and 'whole of government' concepts to all of our overseas activities is wrong. Some circumstances are properly managed by just one department. .Managing this complex environment and improving collaboration across the government depends on better understanding the circumstances under which 'interagency' and 'whole of government' approaches are appropriate. There are areas where there is a need for the expertise of agencies that are primarily domestic in focus. In these circumstances they might operate under the development guidance of USAID. There are also areas where these domestic missions relate to international activities and these agencies have policy equities. In these cases, they might be part of the interagency process led by the Department of State and guided by foreign policy objectives.

Structure and norms do not explain all of the civilian agencies' weakness, however. There also is not a strong tradition of genuine strategic planning in the civilian foreign policy agencies. The long term is not typically a focus of agency policy and resource planning; missions do not typically drive program or budget decisions. This is in strong contrast to DOD. Although far from perfect, planning discipline has become part of DOD's institutional routine.[2]

Interagency reform proposals need to address this contrast in culture. Otherwise, 'coordination' simply will mean synchronizing the civilian agencies' missions in line with DOD's established strategic plan and the significant resources matched to it. This year's quadrennial plans provide an example of both the problem and the potential solution. The Defense Department has provided some input to the ongoing Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, but made no mention of the State Department's foreign policy leadership in the Quadrennial Defense Review's strategic assumptions and planning scenarios.

Despite this imbalance, it is important for the QDDR exercise to institutionalize planning discipline in the State Department because only though such discipline can a clear sense of missions emerge. This, in turn, will drive the need for resources (human and fiscal) and appropriate authorities and flexibility at State and USAID.

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[2] For a discussion of the contrast between DOD and civilian foreign policy agencies see Gordon Adams, "The Politics of National Security Budgets," Stanley Foundation Brief, February 2007.

The Problem of Resources Linked to Missions

The budget process inside agencies is the point at which strategy and mission meet resources. It is the key indicator of policy priorities. That indicator, however, must be read appropriately. The fact that DOD resources (funding and personnel) far outstrip those of the State Department and USAID does not mean that a funding rebalance between the two is needed. Rather, missions should drive requirements and resources, not some arbitrary algorithm.[3] They presently do not. This year (FY2010) the Department of Defense's real outlays ($719.2; constant 2010 dollars) will exceed any single year's spending since World War II.[4] This unprecedented amount is being committed despite the Soviet Union's collapse and the ensuing, significant improvement in our security and that of our allies.



Even without using a mechanical algorithm, however, it is clear that the share of spending and resources located at DOD is disproportionate to the changes in the global environment. This has skewed both the shaping and the implementation of foreign policy and national security missions. DOD has combined these resources with its strong commitment to strategic planning, crafting a number of missions for the future, testing its force structure against scenarios involving those missions, and developing the capacity to execute those missions in the field. This difference in resources and capacity has led to an imbalance of impact on policy and strained interagency relationships in the field.

One example of this strain and imbalance is the Defense Department's Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). CJTF-HOA includes substantial development elements rather than just military assistance. Yet a GAO investigation released in April determined that "some personnel lack needed skills for (1) applying funding to activities, (2) understanding African cultural issues, and (3) working with

[3] Nor should either department's fiscal resources be pegged to an arbitrary share of GDP or of the federal budget, as some have proposed.

[4] Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables 3-1 and 10-1.

interagency partners at U.S. embassies."[5] On the basis of this and other findings, GAO found the severity of the situation sufficient to warrant a recommendation that AFRICOM "evaluate...whether the task force should be retained."[6]

The relationship between Chiefs of Mission and Combatant Commanders can become problematic in such circumstances. Such tensions are sometimes described as part of our interagency problem. In reality, it may simply be a reflection of the disparity in resources. The solution may be less one of interagency coordination than it is one of recalibrating the responsibility for the mission and resourcing it adequately on the civilian side.

The interagency dimension

Not all problems can be resolved by strengthening the civilian toolkit and disciplining the military one. Relationships at the interagency level need attention and reform as well because clarity of mission depends on clarity in overall strategic policy. The National Security Strategy and a draft version of a Presidential Study Directive on development do not provide detailed guidance on mission, agency responsibility, authorities, and structure, though. This guidance is needed to identify which agencies are responsible for which missions and how they should resource those missions in their personnel and budget planning. Also absent from these documents is any indication of which decisions are going to be made to reform or institutionalize interagency processes.

The outline of that reform, however, is apparent. The National Security Staff and OMB lack a clear coordinating mechanism. Both in overall budgeting and in specific crises, the National Security staff and OMB do not systematically link policy decisions and resource implications. This often leaves the White House scrambling for resources and, in turn, creating unanticipated impacts on agency budgets across the government. My experience was that only regular interaction between the two staffs could ensure that such fiscal crises were contained. In the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, the National Security Staff and OMB created a process that included resources considerations in policy discussions and communicated priorities clearly to OMB, but this process was informal and personality-dependent in both cases. While both the Bush and the Obama administrations have created strategic planning offices at NSC, they have not led a systematic planning effort or solved the problem of coordination in the Executive Office of the President. There is still a need for a more systematic planning capacity at both organizations, interacting at the point of strategy planning and guidance to agencies.

Reform Options

Of course, this subcommittee will not be able to solve all these problems on its own, but exposing them is important and welcome. One step I would recommend strongly is more systematic interaction on the Hill between the defense authorizers and appropriators and their foreign affairs counterparts, including holding hearings like this jointly.

I make the following recommendations for your consideration as you work this agenda.

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[5] "DOD needs to determine the future of its Horn of Africa task force," GAO (GAO-10-504), April 2010: pp. 21-22

[6] Ibid, pg. 26

- Discipline defense budgeting by **including defense in the discretionary budget freeze proposed by the administration**. Generous resources in defense have contributed to a general tendency to expand the mission agenda in that department. It is now late in the day to begin such discipline, but I would recommend it strongly, as I did to the Senate Budget Committee this spring.
- Call for the administration to **end the practice of funding operations in Iraq and Afghanistan through a separate title in the budget request**. Even with improved restraint, separate funding has not encouraged budget discipline at DOD or led to more careful priority-setting. This is especially true for Operations and Maintenance accounts, which are highly fungible. After ten budget years of such operations, this spending is eminently foreseeable; it should be foreseen.
- Revisit the functions authorized for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the Goldwater-Nichols Act (P.L. 99-433) to **strengthen the Chairman's role, in support of the Secretary, integrating Service budgets and plans**. Budgeting is the last, uncrossed frontier of 'jointness' and, because budgeting is policy, it is among the most important.
- **End the annual 'unfunded requirements' exchange** between the armed services committees and the military services. The Secretary has imposed some welcome restraint here, but these letters weaken OSD and the Chairman's efforts to integrate Service budgets and make trade-offs.[7]
- **Impose accountability on Defense Department for meeting its schedule for financial auditability**. Section 1003 of the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act tasks the Defense Department with being ready for audit by 30 September 2017 and with setting milestones for reaching that goal. It is not, however, required to inform Congress of those milestones or report on its progress towards meeting them, but it should be.
- **Support Secretary Gates' efforts to discipline defense planning and budgeting.** The Department should be asked how it would prioritize missions and budgets if defense is held at a hard freeze, or even forced to decline in the coming years as pressures build from deficit reduction and lower requirements for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- **Ask the Defense Department to clarify the priority it puts on the numerous missions outlined in the QDR.** The QDR presently does not provide a strategic context for its mission discussion, the relative importance of these missions to U.S. national security, the likelihood of events that would trigger these missions, or the true risk associated with different challenges and threats. All missions therefore appear equally important, all are top priority, and DOD is largely responsible for the successful performance of all of them. Hearings on the forthcoming report of the QDR Independent Review Panel provide an opportunity to raise this question.

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[7] For additional discussion on this topic see http://budgetinsight.wordpress.com/2010/03/15/gates-battles-nominal-requirements/.

- In a future authorizing bill, amend the QDR authorization (10 USC §118) to **direct the Defense Department to solicit and incorporate inputs from the State Department and Intelligence Community** on the QDR's strategic assumptions and planning scenarios. These assumptions and scenarios drive the tools that the Defense Department develops to support U.S. foreign policy.

There are several other reforms that might be undertaken in cooperation with the Foreign Affairs Committee, as they involved both departments.

- Support the concept of **unifying the international affairs (150) and national defense (050) budget functions**. This can be done by the executive branch and it would encourage this committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee to work more closely together in examining priorities and capabilities between the two departments. At the least, it would make arbitrary cuts in International Affairs by the Budget Committees less likely.
- **Hold joint oversight hearings with HFAC on mission areas where defense, diplomacy, and development responsibilities overlap, especially in the area of security assistance.** A hearing should explore the purposes and objectives of security assistance programs and examine the appropriate roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the two departments in this critical area.[8] The committee might also consider a joint investigation with HFAC on security assistance, modeled on the excellent 2008 report on Provincial Reconstruction Teams. More generally, hearings such as this could systematically explore the balance and needs in capabilities, resources, and authorities between the departments.
- In the equally critical area of fragile state policy and response capabilities, the two committees could **carry out a joint review and hearings on civilian capabilities, examining the overlap between State's Civilian Response Corps and DOD's Civilian Expeditionary Workforce.**

The Limits on Reform

Reform efforts both in agencies and in the interagency space can overreach. The impulse to reorganize bureaucracies, rather than hold hearings and conduct investigations, is strong. But reorganizations do not always lead to efficient outcomes or save resources, and they often have unintended consequences or lead to fractious outcomes that delay solutions to the problem they were designed to address. Problems at DHS and ODNI are instructive examples.

Centralizing authorities in and around the White House also has its limitations. The experience of the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), the National Counterterrorism Center's Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning (NCTC/DSOP), and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDP) suggest the potential risks in creating extra-departmental authorities and coordinating responsibilities. S/CRS has not been able to carry out its interagency responsibilities as intended in NSPD-44. NCTC conducted a lengthy interagency

[8] For additional discussion on this topic see http://budgetinsight.wordpress.com/2010/05/13/relying-on-the-kindness-of-others-a-risky-partner-building-strategy/ and for one solution to this problem, Paul Clayman, "Building State Department Muscle," *Defense News*, 05 April 2010

planning exercise for counter-terror operations, but did not lead to significant changes in tasking, funding, or capabilities. ONDCP has not been able to operate effectively as a central coordinator for counter-narcotics policy and operations, subject, as it is, to the changing priority given the narcotics problem and the manifest unwillingness of agencies to accept direction from the Office.

Mission clarity will be key to defining what interagency or "whole of government" reforms are needed. For example, if the interagency "space" is given operational responsibility for coordinating contingency operations and the mission is defined as linking military and civilian capabilities in such missions, it risks being based on the assumption that what is needed is a capability that could operate more effectively than we did in Iraq and Afghanistan. But if civilian support for "governance" in fragile states replaces military-intensive "regime change" and "nation-building" operations as the primary model for future missions, the interagency responsibilities and capabilities we need may be substantially different.

Testimony of James R. Thompson
Associate Professor and Head, Department of Public Administration, University of Illinois – Chicago
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Armed Services Committee
June 9, 2010

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you on the topic of interagency national security reform and on how to promote greater interagency collaboration or "jointness" among agencies with national security missions. Inadequate levels of interagency collaboration have been identified as contributing to the failure of the government to apprehend the so-called Christmas bomber prior to his attempt to detonate an explosive on a civilian aircraft last Christmas Eve as well as to the shortcomings in agency performance in the 911 terrorist incident, Hurricane Katrina and the reconstruction of Iraq.

Recent discussion on how to promote greater cooperation and communication between agencies has centered on "joint duty"-like programs whereby executives accept temporary assignments in agencies with related missions. The idea is borrowed from the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 which is credited with inducing high levels of cooperation among the armed services that contributed to successes achieved in the Gulf War and the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. The intent is that by emulating the military's joint duty program, civilian executives will gain knowledge of the work practices, cultures and personalities of sister agencies which can facilitate long-term operational collaboration.

To date, the only formal civilian joint duty program is that created within the Intelligence Community as a consequence of the 911 commission and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004. Under the provisions of that program, as of October 2010, service in another intelligence agency will become a precondition for recieving an assignment to an executive-level position within the IC.

The balance of my testimony will focus on, 1) the lessons that the broader national security community can draw from the experience of the IC's joint duty program to date, 2) suggestions on how the national security community including this committee can proceed to foster greater jointness among its members. Information on the IC's experience is drawn from data gathered by my colleague, Rob Seidner and I for a 2009 report issued by the IBM Center for the Business of Government entitled, "Federated Human Resource Management in the Federal Government: The Intelligence Community Model."

One of the lessons drawn from the IC's experience with joint duty has to do with the highly collaborative process by which the program was designed. As a consequence of the ambiguous

authority provided the DNI under IRTPA, the DNI did not have the option of simply imposing a program on the other intelligence units community. Rather lengthy negotiations took place between ODNI and the agencies over how a joint duty program would work. The result was a "treaty" whereby each of the 17 agencies agreed to voluntary abide by the agreed-upon provisions. The discussions provided a venue for give and take among the agencies such that a very high level of buy-in among the agencies was achieved and acceptance of the program seems firmly anchored both at the deputy and chief human capital officer levels within the IC. A danger however is that given the purely voluntary nature of the participation, any agency can, with appropriate notice to the DNI, withdraw from program.

A critical test for the program will come over the waiver provision. Under the terms of the joint duty program as agreed to by the agencies, only the DNI and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence can issue waivers from the joint duty requirement. However, section 1018 of IRPTA states that the DNI cannot trespass on the authority of a cabinet secretary for example with regard to SES-level appointments. Thus an agency head would be within his/her legal rights to waive the joint duty requirement for an SES-level position within the agency even though such a waiver would abrogate the inter-agency agreement. A conclusion therefore is that while the DNI's lack of line authority over the other intelligence units helped promote collaboration and buy-in, that same lack of authority leaves the program vulnerable to actions that put agency priorities ahead of community priorities. Clarification by Congress of the DNI's role, for example by giving the DNI exclusive authority to waive the joint duty requirement could strengthen the program.

A second lesson that can be learned from the Intelligence Community's experience is that the necessary human resources infrastructure needs to be in place prior to joint duty implementation. For example, officials will be loathe to engage in joint duty assignments if their pay and/or promotion potential will suffer as a result. The Intelligence Community spent a great deal of time and effort designing a common human resources framework including both performance management and compensation elements. As a result, when an individual goes on a joint duty assignment, s/he knows that his/her performance will be assessed according to the same performance elements, using the same rating levels and according to same performance management cycle regardless of where within the IC s/he serves.

The IC also collectively designed the National Intelligence Civilian Compensation Program whereby the agencies agreed to a common set of compensation rules. In our report we describe this as a "federated" system within which agencies are allowed some degree of design flexibility within a common compensation framework. With this, and with the common competency framework which has been developed, jobs across the IC are defined and paid in the same terms and transfers across agencies lines can occur in a relatively seamless manner.

As the committee contemplates actions that can contribute to the exchange of executives asa means of achieving high levels of collaboration within the national security community, attention should be paid to promoting compatible performance management and compensation systems.

A third lesson from the IC's experience with joint duty relates to training. The ODNI recognized early in the process the importance of training as a means of mitigating parochial attitudes on the part of intelligence officials. ODNI has initiated a Joint Leadership Development Program whereby all new employees, all new senior executives as well as mid-career officials from across the community participate in joint leadership training. The intent is that the training itself promote jointness as a means of mission fulfillment. There is also a recognition that simply proximity, as these officials from different agencies take classes together, can facilitate communication and collaboration. This training is provided by ODNI as part of the National Intelligence University and thus the content is controlled by ODNI which has a strong stake in promoting jointness. As the committee looks at promoting interagency collaboration within the national security more broadly, collective training opportunities should be given priority.

To conclude, I would like to offer some general observations about obstacles that currently exist to collaboration at executive levels within the government. The original vision of the SES was of a corps of generalists whose managerial abilities and training would enable qualify them to accept assignments across the government. However, as a result of the "stovepiped" nature of the federal bureaucracy, the vast majority of SES members spend their executive careers in a single agency. An alternative model would be to treat the SES as a corporate asset and to manage this asset accordingly. This implies that key SES slots would be assigned centrally rather than at the agency level.

The Security Professional Development Executive Steering Committee (SPDESC) created by E.O. 13434 and chaired by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management could serve such a purpose within the national security community. Agencies represented on the committee would still have a say in these appointments. However, community considerations would trump agency considerations in case of disagreements. Importantly, the loyalty of the participants would be to the community rather than to a specific agency and strong incentives for collaboration would be thereby created.

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery
Expected at 1:00 p.m. EDT
Wednesday, June 9, 2010

NATIONAL SECURITY

Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen Interagency Collaboration

Statement of John H. Pendleton, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

GAO
Accountability * Integrity * Reliability

GAO-10-822T

June 2010

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Highlights

Highlights of GAO-10-822T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives

NATIONAL SECURITY

Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen Interagency Collaboration

Why GAO Did This Study

Recent terrorist events such as the attempted bomb attacks in New York's Times Square and aboard an airliner on Christmas Day 2009 are reminders that national security challenges have expanded beyond the traditional threats of the Cold War Era to include unconventional threats from nonstate actors. Today's threats are diffuse and ambiguous, making it difficult—if not impossible—for any single federal agency to address them alone. Effective collaboration among multiple agencies and across federal, state, and local governments is critical.

This testimony highlights opportunities to strengthen interagency collaboration by focusing on four key areas: (1) developing overarching strategies, (2) creating collaborative organizations, (3) developing a well-trained workforce, and (4) improving information sharing. It is based on GAO's body of work on interagency collaboration.

What GAO Recommends

GAO has recommended that federal agencies incorporate desirable characteristics of national strategies; take actions to create collaborative organizations; address human capital issues such as staffing shortages, training, and strategic planning; and establish or clarify guidelines for sharing national security information. Agencies have generally concurred with GAO's recommendations and have taken some actions to enhance interagency collaboration, but much work remains.

View GAO-10-822T or key components. For more information, contact John H. Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or pendeltonj@gao.gov.

What GAO Found

Federal agencies have an opportunity to enhance collaboration by addressing long-standing problems and better positioning the U.S. government to respond to changing conditions and future uncertainties. Progress has been made in enhancing interagency collaboration, but success will require leadership commitment, sound plans that set clear priorities, and measurable goals. The agencies involved in national security will need to make concerted efforts to forge strong and collaborative partnerships, and seek coordinated solutions that leverage expertise and capabilities across communities. Today, challenges exist in four key areas:

- *Developing and implementing overarching strategies.* Although some agencies have developed or updated overarching strategies on national security-related issues, GAO's work has identified cases where U.S. efforts have been hindered by the lack of information on roles and responsibilities of organizations involved or coordination mechanisms.
- *Creating collaborative organizations.* Organizational differences—including differences in agencies' structures, planning processes, and funding sources—can hinder interagency collaboration. Agencies lack adequate coordination mechanisms to facilitate this collaboration during planning and execution of programs and activities.
- *Developing a well-trained workforce.* Agencies do not always have the right people with the right skills in the right jobs at the right time to meet the challenges they face—including having a workforce that is able to quickly address crises. Moreover, agency performance management systems often do not recognize or reward interagency collaboration, and training is needed to understand other agencies' processes or cultures.
- *Sharing and integrating national security information across agencies.* U.S. government agencies do not always share relevant information with their national security partners due to a lack of clear guidelines for sharing information and security clearance issues. Additionally, incorporating information drawn from multiple sources poses challenges to managing and integrating that information.

Strengthening interagency collaboration—with leadership as the foundation—can help transform U.S. government agencies and create a more unified, comprehensive approach to national security issues at home and abroad.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss some of the key challenges for interagency collaboration on national security matters and to share with you ways U.S. government agencies could implement actions to enhance collaboration. Recent terrorist events such as the attempted bomb attacks in New York's Times Square and on board an airliner on Christmas Day 2009 are reminders that national security challenges have expanded beyond the traditional threats of the Cold War era to include unconventional threats from nonstate actors. Today's threats are diffuse and ambiguous. They include terrorist threats from extremist groups, cyber attacks, drug trafficking, infectious diseases, and energy threats. Moreover, they arise from multiple sources and are interrelated, which makes it difficult, if not impossible, for any single agency to effectively address alone. Effective collaboration among multiple agencies and across federal, state, and local governments is critical. The May 2010 National Security Strategy highlighted the need to take a whole of government approach to strengthening national capacity.[1]

Congress and other organizations are becoming increasingly focused on this topic and have recently taken steps to improve interagency collaboration. For example, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008[2] directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a plan to improve and reform the Department of Defense's (DOD) participation in and contribution to the interagency coordination process on national security issues. In the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009,[3] Congress gave authority to the Secretaries of Defense and State and the Administrator of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to jointly establish an advisory panel to advise, review, and make recommendations on ways to improve coordination among those agencies on national security issues, including reviewing their respective roles and responsibilities. Most recently, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010[4] required the President to designate an executive agency to commission a study on a system for the career development and management of interagency national security

[1]National Security Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: May 2010).

[2]Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 952(a) (2008).

[3]Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 1054 (2008).

[4]Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1054 (2009).

professionals. A number of commissions, research institutions, and congressionally mandated studies have also put forth proposals to reform part or all of the national security system. These proposals range from far-reaching restructuring of the system to smaller-scale proposals such as increasing resources for civilian agencies. A recurring theme of many of these proposals is the need for change to improve interagency collaboration on national security matters.

Last September, we issued a report discussing key issues and actions necessary to enhance interagency collaboration on national security for Congress and the administration to consider in their oversight and management agendas.[5] For that report, we reviewed GAO's body of work on interagency collaboration related to national security, which includes reports and testimonies on a variety of issues, including stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD's establishment of U.S. Africa Command to build partner capacity, planning and coordination for an influenza pandemic, information sharing, critical infrastructure protection, disaster recovery, acquisitions and contracting, strategic planning, human capital, and foreign aid reform. We also examined studies from U.S. government agencies and research institutions. Since that time, we have continued to conduct work on various aspects of interagency collaboration. We are conducting ongoing reviews of U.S. Africa Command's activity planning with interagency partners, U.S. Southern Command's efforts to enhance and sustain collaboration with interagency partners, interagency collaboration on counterpiracy efforts, and professional development activities intended to improve the federal workforce's ability to collaborate on national security issues. We plan to report on these issues later this year. My statement today will highlight opportunities to strengthen interagency collaboration by focusing on four key areas: (1) developing overarching strategies, (2) creating collaborative organizations, (3) developing a well-trained workforce, and (4) improving information sharing. I will also discuss the importance of sustained leadership in addressing these areas. This statement is based on completed GAO work, which was performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

[5]GAO, *Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information Sharing*, GAO-09-904SP (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 2009).

Summary

Federal agencies have an opportunity to enhance interagency collaboration by addressing long-standing problems and achieving meaningful results that better position the U.S. government to respond to changing conditions and future uncertainties. Progress has been made in enhancing interagency collaboration, but success will require leadership commitment, sound plans that set clear priorities, and measurable goals—as well as results-oriented performance measures that can be used to gauge progress and make adjustments. The federal agencies involved in national security will need to make concerted efforts to forge strong and collaborative partnerships, and seek coordinated solutions that leverage the expertise and capabilities across the community. Sustained and inspired attention is needed to overcome the many barriers to working across agency boundaries. Strengthening interagency collaboration—with leadership as the foundation—can help transform our U.S. government agencies and create a more unified, comprehensive approach to national security issues at home and abroad.

Opportunities for Strengthening Interagency Collaboration

National security threats have evolved and require involvement beyond the traditional agencies of DOD, the Department of State, and USAID. The Departments of Homeland Security, Energy, Justice, the Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, and Health and Human Services are now a bigger part of the equation. What has not yet evolved are the mechanisms that agencies use to coordinate national security activities such as developing overarching strategies to guide planning and execution of missions, or sharing and integrating national security information across agencies. The absence of effective mechanisms can be a hindrance to achieving national security objectives. Within the following key areas, a number of challenges exist that limit the ability of U.S. government agencies to work collaboratively in responding to national security issues. Our work has also identified actions that agencies can take to enhance collaboration.[6]

[6]GAO-09-904SP.

Developing and Implementing Overarching, Integrated Strategies to Achieve National Security Objectives

Although some agencies have developed or updated overarching strategies on national security-related issues, our work has identified cases where U.S. efforts have been hindered by the lack of information on roles and responsibilities of organizations involved or the lack of mechanisms to coordinate their efforts. National security challenges covering a broad array of areas, ranging from preparedness for an influenza pandemic to Iraqi governance and reconstruction, have necessitated using all elements of national power—including diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support. These elements fall under the authority of numerous U.S. government agencies, requiring overarching strategies and plans to enhance agencies' abilities to collaborate with each other. Strategies can help agencies develop mutually reinforcing plans and determine activities, resources, processes, and performance measures for implementing those strategies. The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) provides a strategic planning and reporting framework intended to improve federal agencies' performance and hold them accountable for achieving results. Effective implementation of GPRA's results-oriented framework requires, among other things, that agencies clearly establish performance goals for which they will be held accountable, measure progress towards those goals, and determine strategies and resources to effectively accomplish the goals. Furthermore, defining organizational roles and responsibilities and mechanisms for coordination in these strategies can help agencies clarify who will lead or participate in which activities and how decisions will be made. It can also help them organize their individual and joint efforts, and address how conflicts would be resolved.[7]

Our prior work, as well as that by national security experts, has found that strategic direction is required as a foundation for collaboration toward national security goals.[8] We have found that, for example, in the past, multiple agencies, including the State Department, USAID, and DOD, led separate efforts to improve the capacity of Iraq's ministries to govern, without overarching direction from a lead entity to integrate their efforts.

[7]GAO, *Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism*, GAO-04-408T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004).

[8]See, for example, GAO, *Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies*, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005); *Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas*, GAO-08-622 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2008); and Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield* (Arlington, Va.: Nov. 26, 2008).

Since 2007, we have testified and reported[9] that the lack of an overarching strategy contributed to U.S. efforts not meeting the goal for key Iraqi ministries to develop the capacity to effectively govern and assume increasing responsibility for operating, maintaining, and further investing in reconstruction projects.[10] We recommended that the Department of State, in consultation with the Iraqi government, complete an overall strategy for U.S. efforts to develop the capacity of the Iraqi government. State recognized the value of such a strategy but expressed concern about conditioning further capacity development investment on completion of such a strategy. Moreover, our work on the federal government's pandemic influenza preparedness efforts found that the Departments of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services share most federal leadership roles in implementing the pandemic influenza strategy and supporting plans; however, we reported that it was not clear how this would work in practice because their roles are unclear. The *National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza* and its supporting implementation plan describes the Secretary of Health and Human Services as being responsible for leading the medical response in a pandemic, while the Secretary of Homeland Security would be responsible for overall domestic incident management and federal coordination. However, since a pandemic extends well beyond health and medical boundaries—to include sustaining critical infrastructure, private-sector activities, the movement of goods and services across the nation and the globe, and economic and security considerations—it is not clear when, in a pandemic, the Secretary of Health and Human Services would be in the lead and when the Secretary of Homeland Security would lead. This lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities could lead to confusion or disagreements among implementing agencies that could hinder interagency collaboration.

[9]GAO, *Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges to Rebuilding Efforts Should Be Addressed in U.S. Strategies*, GAO-09-476T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 25, 2009); *Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Address Inadequate Accountability over U.S. Efforts and Investments*, GAO-08-568T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2008); *Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk*, GAO-08-117 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2007).

[10]The State Department hired a contractor in 2008 to develop a strategic planning document for ministry capacity development in Iraq. Additionally, the United States shifted its emphasis to helping Iraqi ministries execute their capital investment budgets based on the update to the U.S. strategy in Iraq in 2007.

Furthermore, a federal response could be slowed as agencies resolve their roles and responsibilities following the onset of a significant outbreak.[11]

We have also issued reports recommending that U.S. government agencies, including DOD, the State Department, and others, develop or revise strategies to incorporate desirable characteristics for strategies for a range of programs and activities. These include humanitarian and development efforts in Somalia, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership,[12] foreign assistance strategy, law enforcement agencies' role in assisting foreign nations in combating terrorism, and meeting U.S. national security goals in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas. In commenting on drafts of those reports, agencies generally concurred with our recommendations. Officials from one organization—the National Counterterrorism Center—noted that at the time of our May 2007 report on law enforcement agencies' role in assisting foreign nations in combating terrorism, it had already begun to implement our recommendations.[13]

Creating Collaborative Organizations That Facilitate Integrated National Security Approaches

Organizational differences—including differences in agencies' structures, planning processes, and funding sources—can hinder interagency collaboration. Agencies lack adequate coordination mechanisms to facilitate this collaboration during planning and execution of programs and activities. U.S. government agencies, such as the Department of State, USAID, and DOD, among others, spend billions of dollars annually on various diplomatic, development, and defense missions in support of national security. Achieving meaningful results in many national security–related interagency efforts requires coordinated efforts among various

[11]GAO, *Influenza Pandemic: Continued Focus on the Nation's Planning and Preparedness Efforts Remains Essential*, GAO-09-760T (Washington, D.C.: June 3, 2009); *Influenza Pandemic: Sustaining Focus on the Nation's Planning and Preparedness Efforts*, GAO-09-334 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 2009); and *Influenza Pandemic: Further Efforts Are Needed to Ensure Clearer Federal Leadership Roles and an Effective National Strategy*, GAO-07-781 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 14, 2007).

[12]The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership initiative is a multiyear, multiagency effort to support diplomacy, development assistance, and military activities aimed at strengthening country and regional counterterrorism capabilities and inhibiting the spread of extremist ideology.

[13]GAO, *Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists*, GAO-07-697 (Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2007).

actors across federal agencies; foreign, state, and local governments; nongovernment organizations; and the private sector. Given the number of agencies involved in U.S. government national security efforts, it is important that there be mechanisms to coordinate across agencies. Without such mechanisms, the results can be a patchwork of activities that waste scarce funds and limit the overall effectiveness of federal efforts.[14]

A good example of where agencies involved in national security activities define and organize their regions differently involves DOD's regional combatant commands and the State Department's regional bureaus. Both are aligned differently in terms of the geographic areas they cover, as shown in figure 1. As a result of differing structures and areas of coverage, coordination becomes more challenging and the potential for gaps and overlaps in policy implementation is greater. Moreover, funding for national security activities is budgeted for and appropriated by agency, rather than by functional area (such as national security), resulting in budget requests and congressional appropriations that tend to reflect individual agency concerns. Given these differences, it is important that there be mechanisms to coordinate across agencies.

[14]GAO-06-15 and *Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination*, GAO/GGD-00-106 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2000).

Figure 1: Comparison of the State Department's Regional Bureaus and DOD's Combatant Command Areas of Responsibility



Source: DOD and State Department.

In addition to regional bureaus, the State Department is organized to interact through U.S. embassies located within other countries. As a result of these differing structures, our prior work and that of national security experts has found that agencies must coordinate with a large number of organizations in their regional planning efforts, potentially creating gaps

and overlaps in policy implementation and leading to challenges in coordinating efforts among agencies.[15]

Given the differences among U.S. government agencies, developing adequate coordination mechanisms is critical to achieving integrated approaches. In some cases, agencies have established effective mechanisms. For example, DOD's U.S. Africa Command had undertaken efforts to integrate personnel from other U.S. government agencies into its command structure because the command is primarily focused on strengthening security cooperation with African nations and creating opportunities to bolster the capabilities of African partners, which are activities that traditionally require coordination with other agencies.[16] However, in other cases, challenges remain. For example, we reported in May 2007 that DOD had not established adequate mechanisms to facilitate and encourage interagency participation in the development of military plans developed by the combatant commanders. Furthermore, we noted that inviting interagency participation only after plans have been formulated is a significant obstacle to achieving a unified government approach in the planning effort. In that report, we suggested that Congress require DOD to develop an action plan and report annually on steps being taken to achieve greater interagency participation in the development of military plans.[17]

Moreover, we reported in March 2010 that DOD has many strategy, policy, and guidance documents on interagency coordination of its homeland defense and civil support mission; however, DOD entities do not have fully or clearly defined roles and responsibilities because key documents are outdated, are not integrated, or are not comprehensive.[18] More specifically,

[15]See, for example, GAO, *Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning*, GAO-07-549 (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2007); Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield* (Arlington, Va.: Nov. 26, 2008); and Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Era, Phase 2 Report* (Washington, D.C.: July 2005).

[16]GAO, *Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated with the U.S. Africa Command*, GAO-09-181 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 20, 2009).

[17]GAO, *Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning*, GAO-07-549 (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2007).

[18]GAO, *Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance Interagency Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions*, GAO-10-364 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2010).

conflicting directives assigned overlapping law enforcement support responsibilities to three different DOD entities, creating confusion as to which DOD office is actually responsible for coordinating with law enforcement agencies. DOD's approach to identifying roles and responsibilities and day-to-day coordination processes could also be improved by providing relevant information in a single, readily-accessible source. This source could be accomplished through a variety of formats such as a handbook or a Web-based tool and could provide both DOD and other agencies a better understanding of each other as federal partners and enable a unified and institutionalized approach to interagency coordination. We recommended, and DOD agreed, that the department update and integrate its strategy, policy, and guidance; develop a partner guide; and implement key practices for management of homeland defense and civil support liaisons.

We have reported other instances in which mechanisms are not formalized or fully utilized. For example, we found that collaboration between DOD's Northern Command and an interagency planning team on the development of the command's homeland defense plan was largely based on the dedicated personalities involved and informal meetings.[19,20] Without formalizing and institutionalizing the interagency planning structure, we concluded efforts to coordinate may not continue when personnel move on to their next assignments. We made several recommendations, and DOD generally concurred, that the department take several actions to address the challenges it faces in its planning and interagency coordination efforts.

In recent years we have issued reports recommending that the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Homeland Security and the Attorney General take a variety of actions to address creating collaborative organizations, including taking actions to

[19]The Incident Management Planning Team is an interagency team created by the Department of Homeland Security to provide contingency and crisis action incident management planning based on 15 national planning scenarios. Participating organizations include DOD; the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, Energy, Transportation, and Health and Human Services; the Environmental Protection Agency; and the American Red Cross.

[20]GAO, *Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues*, GAO-08-251 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2008).

- provide implementation guidance to facilitate interagency participation and develop clear guidance and procedures for interagency efforts,
- develop an approach to overcome differences in planning processes,
- create coordinating mechanisms, and
- clarify roles and responsibilities.

In commenting on drafts of those reports, agencies generally concurred with our recommendations. In some cases, agencies identified planned actions to address the recommendations. For example, in our April 2008 report on U.S. Northern Command's plans, we recommended that clear guidance be developed for interagency planning efforts, and DOD stated that it had begun to incorporate such direction in its major planning documents and would continue to expand on this guidance in the future.[21]

Developing a Well-Trained Workforce

Federal agencies do not always have the right people with the right skills in the right jobs at the right time to meet the challenges they face, to include having a workforce that is able to quickly address crises. As the threats to national security have evolved over the past decades, so have the skills needed to prepare for and respond to those threats. To effectively and efficiently address today's national security challenges, federal agencies need a qualified, well-trained workforce with the skills and experience that can enable them to integrate the diverse capabilities and resources of the U.S. government. Our work has found that personnel often lack knowledge of the processes and cultures of the agencies with which they must collaborate. Some federal government agencies lack the personnel capacity to fully participate in interagency activities and some agencies do not have the necessary capabilities to support their national security roles and responsibilities.[22] For example, in June 2009, we reported that DOD lacks a comprehensive strategic plan for addressing its language skills and regional proficiency capabilities.[23] Moreover, as of September 2009, we found that 31 percent of the State Department's generalists and specialists in language-designated positions did not meet

[21]GAO-08-251.

[22]Catherine Dale, Nina M. Serafino, and Pat Towell, Congressional Research Service, *Organizing the U.S. Government for National Security: Overview of the Interagency Reform Debates*, RL34455 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 16, 2008).

[23]GAO, *Military Training: DOD Needs a Strategic Plan and Better Inventory and Requirements Data to Guide Development of Language Skills and Regional Proficiency*, GAO-09-568 (Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2010).

the language requirements for their positions, an increase from 29 percent in 2005.[24] Similarly, we reported in September 2008 that USAID officials at some overseas missions told us that they did not receive adequate and timely acquisition and assistance support at times,[25] in part because the numbers of USAID staff were insufficient or because the USAID staff lacked necessary competencies.[26] We also reported in February 2009 that U.S. Africa Command has faced difficulties integrating interagency personnel into its command.[27] According to DOD and Africa Command officials, integrating personnel from other U.S. government agencies is essential to achieving Africa Command's mission because it will help the command develop plans and activities that are more compatible with those agencies. However, the State Department, which faced a 25 percent shortfall in midlevel personnel, told Africa Command that it likely would not be able to fill the command's positions due to personnel shortages. DOD has a significantly larger workforce than other key agencies involved in national security activities as shown in figure 2.

[24]GAO, *Department of State: Comprehensive Plan Needed to Address Persistent Foreign Language Shortfalls*, GAO-09-955 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2009). We explained that although it can be difficult to link foreign language shortfalls to a specific negative outcome or event, these shortfalls could be negatively affecting several aspects of U.S. diplomacy, including consular operations, security, public diplomacy, economic and political affairs, the development of relationships with foreign counterparts and audiences, and staff morale.

[25]Over the last few decades, as the U.S. government has increasingly come to rely on the private sector to perform various functions, USAID has shifted from conducting its own activities to managing acquisition and assistance instruments, which are awarded to and implemented by mainly nongovernmental organizations.

[26]GAO, *USAID Acquisition and Assistance: Actions Needed to Develop and Implement a Strategic Workforce Plan*, GAO-08-1059 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 2008).

[27]GAO-09-181.

Figure 2: Number of Civilian Government Employees and Military Personnel Employed by Key Agencies Involved in National Security



Source: DOD, State Department, and Department of Homeland Security.

Notes: Data are as of the end of fiscal year 2008 and do not include contractor personnel. Numbers are rounded.

Furthermore, agencies' personnel systems often do not recognize or reward interagency collaboration, which could diminish agency employees' interest in serving in interagency efforts. In June 2009 we reviewed compensation policies for six agencies that deployed civilian personnel to Iraq and Afghanistan, and reported that variations in policies for such areas as overtime rate, premium pay eligibility, and deployment status could result in monetary differences of tens of thousands of dollars per year.[28] The Office of Personnel Management acknowledged that laws and agency policy could result in federal government agencies paying different amounts of compensation to deployed civilians at equivalent pay

[28]GAO, *Human Capital: Actions Needed to Better Track and Provide Timely and Accurate Compensation and Medical Benefits to Deployed Federal Civilians*, GAO-09-562 (Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2009).

grades who are working under the same conditions and facing the same risks. In another instance, we reported in April 2009 that officials from the Departments of Commerce, Energy, Health and Human Services, and the Treasury stated that providing support for State Department foreign assistance program processes creates an additional workload that is neither recognized by their agencies nor included as a factor in their performance ratings.[29]

Various tools can be useful in helping agencies to improve their ability to more fully participate in collaboration activities. For example, increasing training opportunities can help personnel develop the skills and understanding of other agencies' capabilities. We have previously testified that agencies need to have effective training and development programs to address gaps in the skills and competencies that they identified in their workforces.[30] Moreover, we issued a report in April 2010 on DOD's Horn of Africa task force, which found that DOD personnel did not always understand U.S. embassy procedures in carrying out their activities.[31] This resulted in a number of cultural missteps in Africa because personnel did not understand local religious customs and may have unintentionally burdened embassies that must continuously train new staff on procedures. We recommended, and DOD agreed, that the department develop comprehensive training guidance or a program that augments personnel's understanding of African cultural awareness and working with interagency partners. Training and developing personnel to fill new and different roles will play a crucial part in the federal government's endeavors to meet its transformation challenges. Also, focusing on strategic workforce planning can support agencies' efforts to secure the personnel resources needed to collaborate in interagency missions. We have found that tools like strategic workforce planning and human capital strategies are integral to managing resources as they enable an agency to define staffing levels,

[29]GAO, *Foreign Aid Reform: Comprehensive Strategy, Interagency Coordination, and Operational Improvements Would Bolster Current Efforts*, GAO-09-192 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2009).

[30]GAO, *Human Capital: Federal Workforce Challenges in the 21st Century*, GAO-07-556T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 2007).

[31]GAO, *Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of Africa Task Force*, GAO-10-504 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2010).

identify critical skills needed to achieve its mission, and eliminate or mitigate gaps between current and future skills and competencies.[32]

In recent years we have recommended that the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Administrator of USAID, and the U.S. Trade Representative take a variety of actions to address the human capital issues discussed above, such as staffing shortfalls, training, and strategic planning. Specifically, we have made recommendations to

- develop strategic human capital management systems and undertake strategic human capital planning,
- include measurable goals in strategic plans,
- identify the appropriate mix of contractor and government employees needed and develop plans to fill those needs,
- seek formal commitments from contributing agencies to provide personnel to meet interagency personnel requirements,
- develop alternative ways to obtain interagency perspectives in the event that interagency personnel cannot be provided due to resource limitations,
- develop and implement long-term workforce management plans, and
- implement a training program to ensure employees develop and maintain needed skills.

In commenting on drafts of those reports, agencies generally concurred with our recommendations. In some cases, agencies identified planned actions to address the recommendations. For example, in our April 2009 report on foreign aid reform, we recommended that the State Department develop a long-term workforce management plan to periodically assess its workforce capacity to manage foreign assistance. The State Department noted in its comments that it concurred with the idea of further improving

[32]The five key principles that strategic workforce planning should address are: (1) involve management, employees, and other stakeholders in developing and implementing the strategic workforce plan; (2) determine the critical skills and competencies needed to achieve results; (3) develop strategies to address gaps in human capital approaches for enabling and sustaining the contributions of all critical skills and competencies; (4) build the capability to address requirements important to support workforce planning strategies; and (5) monitor and evaluate the agency's progress toward its human capital goals and the contribution that human capital results have made. GAO, *Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning*, GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003).

employee skill sets and would work to encourage and implement further training.[33]

Sharing and Integrating National Security Information Across Agencies

U.S. government agencies do not always share relevant information with their national security partners due to a lack of clear guidelines for sharing information and security clearance issues. The timely dissemination of information is critical for maintaining national security. Federal, state, and local governments and private-sector partners are making progress in sharing terrorism-related information. For example, we reported in October 2007 that most states and many local governments had established fusion centers—collaborative efforts to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity—to address gaps in information sharing.[34] However, we found that non-DOD personnel could not access some DOD planning documents or participate in planning sessions because they may not have had the proper security clearances. Moreover, because of concerns about agencies' ability to protect shared information or use that information properly, other agencies and private-sector partners may be hesitant to share information. For example, we have reported that Department of Homeland Security officials expressed concerns about sharing terrorism-related information with state and local partners because such information had occasionally been posted on public Internet sites or otherwise compromised. To facilitate information sharing, it is important to establish clear guidelines, agreements, and procedures that govern key aspects, such as how information will be communicated, who will participate in interagency information sharing efforts, and how information will be protected.

When agencies do share information, managing and integrating information from multiple sources presents challenges regarding redundancies in information sharing, unclear roles and responsibilities, and data comparability. For example, we reported in December 2008 that in Louisiana, reconstruction project information had to be repeatedly resubmitted separately to state and Federal Emergency Management

[33]GAO, *Foreign Aid Reform: Comprehensive Strategy, Interagency Coordination, and Operational Improvements Would Bolster Current Efforts*, GAO-09-192 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2009).

[34]GAO, *Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers*, GAO-08-35 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007).

Agency officials during post-Hurricane Katrina reconstruction efforts because the system used to track project information did not facilitate the exchange of documents. Information was sometimes lost during this exchange, requiring state officials to resubmit the information, creating redundancies and duplication of effort. As a result, reconstruction efforts in Louisiana were delayed.[35] In another instance, we reported in October 2008 that biometric data, such as fingerprints and iris images, collected in DOD field activities such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, were not comparable with data collected by other units or with large federal databases that store biometric data, such as the Department of Homeland Security biometric database or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) fingerprint database. A lack of comparable data, especially for use in DOD field activities, prevents agencies from determining whether the individuals they encounter are friend, foe, or neutral, and may put forces at risk.[36]

Since 2005, we have recommended that the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, and State establish or clarify guidelines, agreements, or procedures for sharing a wide range of national security information, such as planning information, terrorism-related information, and reconstruction project information. We have recommended that such guidelines, agreements, and procedures

- define and communicate how shared information will be protected;
- include provisions to involve and obtain information from nonfederal partners in the planning process;
- ensure that agencies fully participate in interagency information-sharing efforts;
- identify and disseminate practices to facilitate more effective communication among federal, state, and local agencies;
- clarify roles and responsibilities in the information-sharing process; and
- establish baseline standards for data collecting to ensure comparability across agencies.

[35]GAO, *Disaster Recovery: FEMA's Public Assistance Grant Program Experienced Challenges with Gulf Coast Rebuilding*, GAO-09-129 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2008).

[36]GAO, *Defense Management: DOD Can Establish More Guidance for Biometrics Collection and Explore Broader Data Sharing*, GAO-09-49 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2008).

In commenting on drafts of those reports, agencies generally concurred with our recommendations. In some cases, agencies identified planned actions to address the recommendations. For example, in our December 2008 report on the Federal Emergency Management Agency's public assistance grant program, we recommended that the Federal Emergency Management Agency improve information sharing within the public assistance process by identifying and disseminating practices that facilitate more effective communication among federal, state, and local entities. In comments on a draft of the report, the Federal Emergency Management Agency generally concurred with the recommendation and noted that it was making a concerted effort to improve collaboration and information sharing within the public assistance process.[37] Moreover, agencies have implemented some of our past recommendations. For example, in our April 2006 report on protecting and sharing critical infrastructure information, we recommended that the Department of Homeland Security define and communicate to the private sector what information is needed and how the information would be used.[38] The Department of Homeland Security concurred with our recommendation and, in response, has made available, through its public Web site, answers to frequently asked questions that define the type of information collected and what it is used for, as well as how the information will be accessed, handled, and used by federal, state, and local government employees and their contractors.

Importance of Sustained Leadership

Underlying the success of these key areas for enhancing interagency collaboration for national security-related activities is committed and effective leadership. Our prior work has shown that implementing large-scale change management initiatives or transformational change—which is what these key areas should be considered—are not simple endeavors and require the concentrated efforts of leadership and employees to realize intended synergies and to accomplish new goals.[39] Leadership must set the direction, pace, and tone and provide a clear, consistent rationale

[37]GAO, *Disaster Recovery: FEMA's Public Assistance Grant Program Experienced Challenges with Gulf Coast Rebuilding*, GAO-09-129 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2008).

[38]GAO, *Information Sharing: DHS Should Take Steps to Encourage More Widespread Use of Its Program to Protect and Share Critical Infrastructure Information*, GAO-06-383 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2006).

[39]GAO, *Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational Transformations*, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003).

for the transformation. Sustained and inspired attention is needed to overcome the many barriers to working across agency boundaries. For example, leadership is important in establishing incentives to promote employees' interest in serving in interagency efforts.

The 2010 National Security Strategy calls for a renewed emphasis on building a stronger leadership foundation for the long term to more effectively advance our interests in the 21st century.[40] Moreover, the strategy identifies key steps for improving interagency collaboration. These steps include more effectively ensuring alignment of resources with our national security strategy, adapting the education and training of national security professionals to equip them to meet modern challenges, reviewing authorities and mechanisms to implement and coordinate assistance programs, and other policies and programs that strengthen coordination. National security experts also note the importance of and need for effective leadership for national security issues. For example, a 2008 report by the Project on National Security Reform notes that the national security system requires skilled leadership at all levels and, to enhance interagency coordination, these leaders must be adept at forging links and fostering partnerships all levels.[41] Strengthening interagency collaboration—with leadership as the foundation—can help transform U.S. government agencies and create a more unified, comprehensive approach to national security issues at home and abroad.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have.

For future information regarding this statement, please contact John H. Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or at pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on the last page of this statement. Key contributors to this statement are listed in appendix II.

[40]National Security Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: May 2010).

[41]Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield* (Arlington, Va.: Nov. 26, 2008).

Appendix I: Related GAO Products

Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of Africa Task Force, GAO-10-504, Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2010.

Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance Interagency Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions, GAO-10-364, Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2010.

Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information Sharing, GAO-09-904SP, Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 2009.

Military Training: DOD Needs a Strategic Plan and Better Inventory and Requirements Data to Guide Development of Language Skills and Regional Proficiency. GAO-09-568. Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2009.

Influenza Pandemic: Continued Focus on the Nation's Planning and Preparedness Efforts Remains Essential. GAO-09-760T. Washington, D.C.: June 3, 2009.

U.S. Public Diplomacy: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight. GAO-09-679SP. Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2009.

Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight and Interagency Coordination for the Commander's Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan. GAO-09-61. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2009.

Foreign Aid Reform: Comprehensive Strategy, Interagency Coordination, and Operational Improvements Would Bolster Current Efforts. GAO-09-192. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2009.

Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges to Rebuilding Efforts Should Be Addressed in U.S. Strategies. GAO-09-476T. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 25, 2009.

Drug Control: Better Coordination with the Department of Homeland Security and an Updated Accountability Framework Can Further Enhance DEA's Efforts to Meet Post-9/11 Responsibilities. GAO-09-63. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 20, 2009.

Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated with the U.S. Africa Command. GAO-09-181. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 20, 2009.

Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. GAO-08-860. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2008.

Information Sharing: Definition of the Results to Be Achieved in Terrorism-Related Information Sharing Is Needed to Guide Implementation and Assess Progress. GAO-08-637T. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2008.

Highlights of a GAO Forum: Enhancing U.S. Partnerships in Countering Transnational Terrorism. GAO-08-887SP. Washington, D.C.: July 2008.

Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps. GAO-08-39. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 6, 2007.

Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers. GAO-08-35. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007.

Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning. GAO-07-549. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2007.

Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists. GAO-07-697. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2007.

Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. GAO-06-15. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005.

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact name above, Marie Mak, Assistant Director; Laurie Choi; Alissa Czyz; Rebecca Guerrero; and Jodie Sandel made key contributions to this testimony.

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