[House Hearing, 111 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] [H.A.S.C. No. 111-151] HEARING ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 AND OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING ON BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY AND CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION INITIATIVES __________ HEARING HELD APRIL 14, 2010 [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 57-837 WASHINGTON : 2010 ___________________________________________________________________________ For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, Chairwoman ADAM SMITH, Washington JEFF MILLER, Florida MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania JIM COOPER, Tennessee K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas JIM MARSHALL, Georgia THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana MAC THORNBERRY, Texas PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama SCOTT MURPHY, New York Eryn Robinson, Professional Staff Member Alex Kugajevsky, Professional Staff Member Andrew Tabler, Staff Assistant C O N T E N T S ---------- CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 2009 Page Hearing: Wednesday, April 14, 2010, Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act--Budget Request for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Chemical Biological Defense Program and Counterproliferation Initiatives............................... 1 Appendix: Wednesday, April 14, 2010........................................ 15 ---------- WEDNESDAY, APRIL 14, 2010 FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY AND CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION INITIATIVES STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Chairwoman, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee................................................... 1 WITNESSES Myers, Kenneth A., III, Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense..................... 4 Scarbrough, Brig. Gen. Jess A., USA, Joint Program Executive Officer for Chemical and Biological Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense........................................... 6 Weber, Andrew, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, Office of the Secretary of Defense........................................... 3 APPENDIX Prepared Statements: Miller, Hon. Jeff, a Representative from Florida, Ranking Member, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee............................................... 21 Myers, Kenneth A., III....................................... 36 Sanchez, Hon. Loretta........................................ 19 Scarbrough, Brig. Gen. Jess A................................ 59 Weber, Andrew................................................ 22 Documents Submitted for the Record: [There were no Documents submitted.] Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing: [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing: [There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY AND CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION INITIATIVES ---------- House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 14, 2010. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:06 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Loretta Sanchez (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRWOMAN, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE Ms. Sanchez. The subcommittee will now come to order. I would like to welcome all of you, and to thank you again for joining us today to receive the testimony on the budget request for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency [DTRA] and the Chemical and Biological Defense Program for fiscal year 2011. During this hearing, the assistant to the secretary of defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs will provide the context for the investment to be made by these two organizations, along with the updates on the current and future counterproliferation initiative. And I believe that this hearing comes at a good time, considering that we just saw the Nuclear Security Summit this week in Washington; and, of course, the release of our Nuclear Posture Review. As you all know--that the United States is facing new and more challenging non-traditional threats on a daily basis, including the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the spreading of chemical agents, and the increasing biological threat that faces our global community. We live in this interconnected world, where technology allows the transfer of information to be quick and easy; however, this high-tech environment we all live in also makes it more difficult for us to respond to weapons of mass destruction in a more timely manner. And as I was saying earlier to our panelists, one of my greatest fears is that one day we are going to detect a non- traditional agent or unknown pathogen in a certain part of the world, and before we can be able to figure out what it is and how we counteract that, it has already reached the United States' soil. And for this reason, the Department of Defense and interagency partners have articulated their commitment to expanding their capabilities to counter the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, or the QDR, as we know it, provides policy guidance on combating weapons of mass destruction. And the secretary of defense has directed that several initiatives be undertaken, including research and countermeasures to, and defenses against, non-traditional agents to counter the growing possibility of non-traditional chemical agents being used against the United States and on our soil; and securing vulnerable nuclear materials through the president's Global Lockdown Initiative; expanding the Biological Threat Reduction Program to create a global network for disease and pathogen surveillance and response. So we don't know what is going to come up in the future, but we do know that we need to be prepared for whatever may come forward. The Department of Defense has to have a reliable concept of how it would respond, what type of operations--should we face something--even something that, to this date--we have no idea or it is an unknown. It is also vital that we develop a firm and secure form of communication with our allies around the world in order to maintain good situational awareness of possible threats that may emerge, in particular, with respect to the security of our nation. Today, we have three witnesses before us that are key to the execution of these initiatives. First, we have Mr. Andrew Weber, who is the assistant to the secretary of defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. Welcome. And along with him, we have Mr. Kenneth A. Myers III, Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. And we have Brigadier General Jess A. Scarbrough, Joint Program Executive Officer for Chemical and Biological Defense. So, again, I would like to thank the three of our witnesses for being here today. I look forward to your testimony. I will tell you that we are very interested in your concepts today and what you have to tell us from an operational standpoint, and how you all work together. [The prepared statement of Ms. Sanchez can be found in the Appendix on page 19.] Ms. Sanchez. And, having said that, I am going to yield to---- Mr. LoBiondo. Lobiondo---- Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Lobiondo--I was looking for Mr. Miller, but I didn't see him. Mr. LoBiondo. No, he is not here, Madam Chair. Ms. Sanchez. Do you have an opening statement--I would assume--from the other side? Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Madam Chair. Ranking Member Miller apologizes. He was not able to be here for the beginning of the hearing. He has a statement he has asked me to have submitted for the record--if I could make that request, Madam Chair. Ms. Sanchez. So ordered. [The prepared statement of Mr. Miller can be found in the Appendix on page 21.] Mr. LoBiondo. Okay. Well, thank you very much. And I thank the panel for being here today. Ms. Sanchez. Great. I thank the gentleman. And without objection, the witnesses' prepared testimony has been submitted and accepted for the record. I will remind you that you each have five minutes or less in which to summarize your statements, or tell us something else that you want us to know that isn't in your statement. So we will begin with Mr. Weber. We will lead off with you, for five minutes. STATEMENT OF ANDREW WEBER, ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Mr. Weber. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. Members of the subcommittee, it is an honor for me to be here today. I welcome this opportunity to discuss Department of Defense efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction [WMD]. The president is determined to implement a comprehensive strategy to prevent, deter and defend against weapons of mass destruction. His leadership over the past two days, hosting the Nuclear Security Summit, clearly has demonstrated the priority he places on this issue. As he said this week, ``The danger of nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats to global security.'' From the outset, the president committed the United States to take ``concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons,'' and to ensure a safe, secure and effective arsenal for as long as such weapons are needed. In his national strategy for countering biological threats, the president warned that, ``Fanatics have expressed interest in developing and using biological weapons against us and our allies. Addressing these unique challenges requires a comprehensive approach that recognizes the importance of reducing threats from outbreaks of infectious disease, whether natural, accidental or deliberate in nature.'' Secretary Gates restated this strategic direction regarding the full set of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats. In the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the secretary directed the department to rebalance its policy, doctrine and capabilities to better support six key mission areas. One of these is to prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction. We are working diligently within the department to implement a comprehensive strategy to counter weapons of mass destruction. The president's fiscal year 2011 budget request seeks an 18 percent increase for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which is the U.S. government's resource for countering weapons of mass destruction. These additional funds are focused on high-priority efforts that will advance the nation's ability to counter WMD. They fund significant increases in programs, as you mentioned, to secure biological pathogens and vulnerable nuclear materials around the world, as well as to pursue technologies to strengthen arms-control monitoring and verification. In addition, the president announced, in his State of the Union Address, that we are launching a new initiative that will give us the capacity to respond faster and more effectively to bioterrorism or an infectious disease. The department is involved in shaping this White House initiative, which builds on the excellent work conducted by the Department of Defense Transformational Medical Technology Initiative, biodefense work at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, DARPA, and other organizations throughout the department. My colleagues here today, and I, are responsible for executing much of the DOD countering-WMD effort, in partnership with other actors across the department, the interagency, the United States Congress, and our friends and allies abroad. Mr. Ken Myers, here on my left, serves as the director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and he reports through me, to the under secretary of defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics, Dr. Ashton Carter. Brigadier General Jess Scarbrough, to my far left, serves as the joint program executive officer for Chemical and Biological Defense, which is the office that develops and procures chemical and biological- defense equipment for the department. The WMD threat poses an immense challenge. Our war fighters and our fellow citizens are vulnerable to WMD attack. We must shape our defense programs to more effectively prevent, deter and defeat this threat. To strengthen these programs, I ask for your support of the president's fiscal year 2011 budget request. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today, and would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Weber can be found in the Appendix on page 22.] Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Weber. And, now, we will hear from Mr. Myers for five minutes or less. STATEMENT OF KENNETH A. MYERS III, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Mr. Myers. Madam Chairwoman, members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to be here today to address the counterproliferation programs performed by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The mission of the nearly 2,000 civilian and military personnel of DTRA worldwide is to safeguard the United States and its allies from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, as well as high-yield conventional explosives. We do this by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate and counter the threat, and mitigate its effect. I am also the director of the U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. The center is responsible for the synchronization of planning and advocacy of related activities across the combatant commands. It is co- located with DTRA and fully integrated within the daily activities of the agency. All studies that have looked at the WMD challenge, including, most recently, the QDR, have concluded that countering WMD capabilities are crucial to our security. The department considers this to be among its top priorities; and, therefore, the DTRA fiscal year 2011 budget request is 18 percent higher than last year's appropriation. This is the first significant increase requested by DTRA since the agency's establishment nearly 12 years ago. I would like to explain how this increased funding responds to the president's non-proliferation goals and the QDR. In response to the president's initiative to secure vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide, DTRA is requesting an increase of $74.5 million in Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Funding, and $14.5 million in critical support funding for program execution. This will accelerate related efforts in the Russian Federation and the establishment of Centers for Nuclear Security Excellence in countries outside the borders of the former Soviet Union. In response to the president's initiative to counter biological threats, DTRA is requesting an additional $59 million to accelerate ongoing efforts across the former Soviet Union, and to permit biosecurity upgrades and implement globally integrated disease surveillance and reporting systems in Asia and Africa. To implement the president's strategy of revitalizing arms control as a tool for countering weapons of mass destruction, DTRA is requesting $9 million to establish a technology- development program for monitoring and verification of lower nuclear-warhead levels, a prohibition on fissile-material production, and a ban on nuclear testing. We are requesting $48 million to expand and accelerate our development of technologies and other support to the U.S. Special Operations Command for its Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism Activities. We are also requesting $24 million to accelerate technology development, provide expanded training, and procure equipment to improve the war fighter's capabilities to search for, locate and interdict nuclear and radiological threats. Lastly, we are requesting $38 million for expanded DOD and interagency information-sharing--provide rapid response to the combatant command's request for technical and WMD effects analysis; expand collaboration between WMD technical and intelligence expertise; and provide for reliable connectivity for the execution of the DTRA global mission. DTRA is contributing to many other capabilities, including nuclear forensics, chemical-biological defense, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the International Counterproliferation Program, system survivability against WMD effects, and force protection. For example, DTRA recently completed a series of tests in support of a massive ordnance penetrator, or MOP, the largest air-deliverable conventional weapon available for use against underground facilities, many of which are associated with WMD. The MOP program transitioned from DTRA to the Air Force, due to the close teamwork between our offices at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, Eglin Air Force Base, in Florida, Kirtland Air Force Base and White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. The MOP is just one example of the teamwork seen across DTRA and our other partners every day. Before concluding, I would like to express my commitment to the efficient and effective management of the additional funding that DTRA is requesting. Our past performance indicates that we can obligate and extend funding made available to us. We have a steady track record of efficient program execution. Recently, we effectively implemented a significant increase in nuclear-mission support that has produced real results. Second, we have contracts in place with sufficiently high- funding ceilings to permit the rapid obligation and expenditure of additional funding. Third, efforts are ongoing to aggressively monitor and refine implementation plans to ensure timely and effective execution, and eliminate any potential obstacles. I urge your support for the DTRA fiscal year 2011 budget request, the first significant increase in resources sought by the agency in some twelve years. We will put these resources to good use to better equip, train and protect our war fighters, and safeguard the American people. Thank you for your support of DTRA and the Strategic Command [STRATCOM] Center for Combating WMD [SCC-WMD] in prior years, and for the opportunity to be here today. I look forward to answering your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Myers can be found in the Appendix on page 36.] Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Myers. And, now, we will hear from General Scarbrough for five minutes or less. STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. JESS A. SCARBROUGH, USA, JOINT PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE General Scarbrough. Madam Chair and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am honored to testify on behalf of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program. I will identify what the program contributes in the areas of biosurveillance, medical countermeasures and non-traditional agents. Before I conclude, I will speak briefly about acquisition reform. The Chemical and Biological Defense Program is uniquely positioned to leverage its enterprise capabilities for biosurveillance. We produce Food and Drug Administration [FDA]- approved medical diagnostics and develop and field systems that monitor the environment for biological threats. For example, we have succeeded in tying medical diagnostic and surveillance capabilities together with biological detectors to provide a common operating picture within the United States Forces Korea theater of operations. Another example is our capability for medical response and preparedness, an important element of biosurveillance. In 2009, working with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, we added identification of H1N1 flu as a capability on a system we developed that provides the war fighter a way to identify and diagnose human disease. The Food and Drug Administration granted our emergency-use authorization request in short order. We are continuing to expand this diagnostic capability to include other infectious diseases. With respect to medical countermeasures, we partner with government, industry, academia and international organizations for material development and manufacturing of Food and Drug Administration approved products and systems. We have interagency agreements with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to share licensed anthrax and smallpox vaccines from the Strategic National Stockpile. The agreements establish the framework for the acquisition, storage, management and delivery of these vaccines to meet Department of Defense operational and inventory requirements. Another example of collaboration and coordination is the Integrated National Biodefense Portfolio Initiative, also known as the One-Portfolio, which synergizes efforts of the Department of Defense and the Department of Health and Human Services, as well as other agencies whose missions involve addressing the same challenges; the vision of government-wide coordination of research and development of medical countermeasures for biological threats. Regarding innovation, the Chemical and Biological Defense Program's Transformational Medical Technologies Initiative continues to gain momentum. Over the next 24 months, we will continue clinical studies in support of licensure of maturing hemorrhagic fever virus therapeutics and submit Investigational New Drug applications for additional medical countermeasures against intercellular bacteria pathogens and hemorrhagic fever viruses. With respect to non-traditional agent threat, we are working to field solutions in the areas of detection, medical countermeasures, decontamination and protection, along with associated doctrine, equipment and training. We are planning to rapidly field, in the near term, capabilities, in fiscal year 2011, and will continue to improve upon those capabilities and provide them to other units. Changes to the Defense Acquisition System, directed by Congress, are refocusing the way we manage acquisition programs. These are new requirements for analysis of alternatives prior to initiating the acquisition process: increased competition, competitive prototyping, and the evaluation of technology maturity so that our acquisition programs are ready for the next phase of development. In order to reduce the risk of failure, we are applying the tools of acquisition reform to programs that pose particular technical challenges. The bottom line for us remains providing capability to the war fighter. In fiscal year 2009, we fielded over 1.3 million individual pieces of equipment to our servicemen and women around the globe, representing improvements and capabilities they depend on for protection. While our investments in biosurveillance, medical countermeasures and non-traditional agents are the focus, we must neither underfund nor deemphasize the range of investments that establish the layered defense-in-depth strategy we employ to protect and inform our personnel. This strategy requires significant investment, as reflected in the president's fiscal year 2011 budget request for our program, which consists of $370 million for procurement, $812 million for advanced development, and $396 million for science-and-technology efforts, for a total of $1.578 billion. Madam Chair and members of the subcommittee, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, and look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of General Scarbrough can be found in the Appendix on page 59.] Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, General. And, now, as is the custom, I will remind the members that each of us will have five minutes to ask questions. And I will start with myself. Mr. Weber, when we met earlier, I asked you, ``What questions should I ask you guys?'' And you said, ``Ask us what keeps us awake at night.'' So I will ask it in a different way: What threat to the homeland--chemical, biological, nuclear--has the highest likelihood of happening in the next five years, and why? What do you see as the hardest-hitting thing towards the U.S.? Mr. Weber. The---- Ms. Sanchez. Is your mic on? Mr. Weber. Yes. Ms. Sanchez. Okay. Mr. Weber. The threat that I worry about--the two threats that I worry about most are the delivery by violent extremists of a ten kiloton blast with an improvised nuclear device in an American or allied city, and also a biological attack, for example, with one kilogram of anthrax, in a city. Each one would have potentially catastrophic consequences. And the Congressional Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction that Senator Graham and Congressman Talent co-chaired evaluated the risk of the different types of weapons of mass destruction. Their conclusion was that the biological-terrorist threat was the most likely. In terms of the accessibility of the technology and the materials--the seed materials--that would be required for a terrorist group to obtain a biological-weapons capability--I agree with that conclusion. Ms. Sanchez. Thank you. Are we appropriately allocating our budget with respect to that understanding? And, if not, what would you change? Mr. Weber. Okay. I will answer that, and ask my colleagues to add to that. But what you see in the president's fiscal year 2011 budget request is an increase in each of these areas. I believe this is the beginning of a trend. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which is the Department of Defense--really, the U.S. government's Center of Excellence for the Countering WMD mission was more or less flat-lined during the last ten years, even after the 9/11 attacks on the United States. So the Obama administration has, in its budget, proposed an 18 percent increase, which reflects the increased priority on this mission set. Those increases are at a level that we can absorb and execute responsibly. And I would ask my colleague, Ken Myers, the director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, to elaborate further. Thank you. Ms. Sanchez. Great, because that is the question I had for him. What are you going to do that--with that 18 percent, and is it enough? And---- Mr. Myers. Madam Chairwoman, the 18 percent is a significant increase in the funding that we will have available to confront the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction. As the QDR lays out, one of our major strategies is erecting layers or lines of defense between the sources of these threats and the American people. The most effective place for us to counteract and eliminate these threats before they adversely affect the U.S. war fighter, as well as the American people, is at the source, which is why I think the president has focused a lot of attention on global nuclear lockdown, eliminating these problems before they spread, and for countering biological threats, again, at their source. If our programs and our efforts at the source are incapable of stopping these threats before they leak out--before they begin moving to harm the American people--we will seek to engage governments and countries at the borders, increasing their ability to interdict, to detect and, if need be, destroy these weapons and these materials, before they threaten the American people. We are working to address the problem at each layer, each line of defense, that we are possibly able to erect between the threats and the American people. And I believe the 18 percent increase that we are requesting as part of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency budget is a good spread across all of the opportunities and all of the capabilities that we have to bring to bear against the threat. Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Myers. General, as of February, 08, 2010, less than two percent of the fiscal year 2010 Chemical and Biological Defense Program [CBDP] procurement, or Research, Development, Test and Evaluation [RTD&E] funds have been expended. And only about half of the fiscal year 2009 procurement have been expended. Why is the execution rate at these levels? And is the low execution rate impacting our chemical and biological-defense capabilities? And can you provide updated information that demonstrates that the execution of CBDP funds is improving? General Scarbrough. Madam Chair, first I would like to thank you for your support to the Chemical and Biological Defense Program. We have significantly improved our obligation and expenditure rates for both procurement and RDT&E in fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009. And we exceed the established Department of Defense goals in both of those appropriations. With respect to fiscal year 2010, we are a little bit behind. We have just received our allocation just a couple of months ago. But we are rapidly catching up, and we should be exceeding our goals by July of this year. Ms. Sanchez. So, at the last point where we saw it, it was at two percent appropriation expenditure. Are you saying that you have--how far have you caught up, when you say that, ``We have been working on this''? General Scarbrough. With respect to the fiscal year 2009? With respect to fiscal year 2009 expenditures, for the Chemical and Biological Defense Program, we are 60.8 percent expended for fiscal year 2009, which is above the established DOD goal of 43 percent. Ms. Sanchez. And for 2010? General Scarbrough. For fiscal year 2010, we are at--for expenditures, we are at 4.5 percent, and the goal is 11.5 percent. So we are below the goals, but we are rapidly catching up, given that we received our allocation authority a couple of months ago. Ms. Sanchez. Is your inability to--is this a problem? It seems to me like what you are saying is, ``Well, we didn't know the amounts--for maybe that way--we didn't really know what we had to spend, so we didn't really fully go into what we were going to do.'' Is that a problem as we try to gear up this program to face the threats that we have out there? General Scarbrough. Ma'am, I would say it is not a problem. We have been operating at the pace that has been approved by the Department of Defense and Congress. And, then, once we got our funding-allocation documents, once the budget was approved in fiscal year 2010--in January, we, then, accelerated that. And, as I mentioned to you earlier, we have contractual vehicles in place, or will be in place, to be on pace to exceed the DOD goals, you know, by July. Ms. Sanchez. Okay. Thank you, General. I will now recognize the gentleman from New Jersey for his question. Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Madam Chair. This could be, basically--be for anyone on the panel. What is the current plan for weapon-system survivability from a chemical or biological attack? General Scarbrough. Sir, may I ask for you to repeat the question again, please? Mr. LoBiondo. What is the current plan for weapon-system survivability from a chemical or biological attack? General Scarbrough. First off, sir, we have delivered, as I said in my oral statement, over 1.3 million individual pieces of equipment to our war fighters across all of the services-- Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine. Those pieces of equipment have included decontamination detection, medical diagnostics and individual protection such as masks, boots, gloves and suits. So we feel that we have equipped our soldiers, airmen, sailors and Marines with the capability to operate if they were to get hit with a chemical or a biological attack. Mr. LoBiondo. Anybody else that is---- Mr. Myers. Much of the work that the Defense Threat Reduction Agency does, sir, in that area, is with regard to Electromagnetic Pulse [EMP] and nuclear potential. In that area, we perform technology assessments. We provide technical assistance to our war fighters, and to our systems. We recently developed simulators and specialized equipment for testing of missiles, aircrafts or ships. We routinely provide support to STRATCOM, Northern Command [NORTHCOM], and the Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD] on a wide range of EMP threats. And we are also actively involved in assessing the impact of such an attack on the U.S. power grid, our telecommunications systems, as well as emergency-service infrastructures. Mr. LoBiondo. Can you, in an open setting like this, talk any more about how we prepare for EMP attack, and the--there is a lot of talk about what that may mean, and how we go about this. I don't know if we are in the right setting for that or not. Mr. Myers. I can talk--very general terms, obviously. We are seeking to harden all of those capabilities to the point where they would be, if not immune, able to withstand those types of strains and pressures that we--put on by that type of attack. Beyond that, sir, I would not---- Mr. LoBiondo. Okay. Well, maybe can--talk to Mr. Miller, and talk to you, Madam Chair, about a closed session to talk about that a little bit more? By which mechanisms are the intelligence community coordinating and sharing information pertaining to WMD threats with appropriate officials in the Department of Defense or other key U.S. agencies? Is that where it should be? Is it up to snuff? Does more need to be done? Mr. Weber. Congressman, we get briefed on a daily basis by the intelligence community on the whole range of WMD threats. In addition, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence [ODNI] participates in the Counterproliferation Program Review standing committee so we can align resources and investments that are being made in the countering-WMD area. I would say that the reporting that we get on the threats from state programs is excellent and extremely helpful in helping us prioritize where we should be expending resources. Generally, reporting on nuclear threats is quite good. There is, I would say, as a consumer of intelligence, room for improvement on collection and analysis on biological-weapons threats, which are a very difficult target. Mr. Myers. If I may just add very quickly--one of the efforts that is currently underway between the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency is working together in co-located spaces to work together on some of the potential WMD threats; in other words, bringing the intelligence analysts together with the technology experts, with those systems engineers that are responsible for designing the approaches that we would take in dealing with those WMD threats. So, as the assistant secretary mentioned, there is work to be had, and to move forward and improve. But I think one of the things that we have found is that bringing the experts together at a working level is a good step in the right direction. Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Madam Chair. Ms. Sanchez. Considering that most of our membership is not here today--I don't know if you have any other questions. I do know that they are about to call votes on the House floor. So if you have finished yours, I will end with one last question. And I will also let you gentlemen know that I am sure that the members will be submitting questions for the record. I don't know where they are. I am going to have to go round them up and push them a little bit about getting here to meetings. So they will be submitting, I am sure, by writing some questions. We ask that you answer them quickly so that we can glean as much as we can from this. Again, I appreciate you coming before us today. So my last question for you all would be: If there is something we should have asked, but we didn't ask about? Let us start with Mr. Weber. Mr. Weber. Well, you mentioned at the opening, our discussion about--you know, ``What do we lose sleep over?'' And what I worry about is the day after an attack using weapons of mass destruction. Is there something that we should have been doing faster and more effectively to have prevented that? Or I worry as much--is there something that we should have been doing, but weren't. And that is where we look to--certainly, we do some thinking internally within the U.S. government, but we also look to our partners in Congress to identify potential program areas where we don't have programs to address key gaps. I would say that one question that, by the nature of these threats, is a good one to ask, is: How are we working across the interagency because these are, by definition, crosscutting problems? The biological threat is one that the Department of Health and Human Services plays a very important role in countering. And the Department of Defense works very closely under the White House leadership. We have been meeting once a week with the Department of Defense and counterparts--the director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Tom Frieden, and the FDA administrator, Peggy Hamburg--Tony Fauci, from the National Institutes of Health, and my counterpart in the Department of Health and Human Services, Doctor Nicole Lurie. In the countering-nuclear-terrorism arena, we work on a daily basis with the Department of Energy--again, with very strong leadership from the White House, from the WMD czar and the so-called WMD czar, Gary Samore, and his staff, and also from the Homeland Security side, under John Brennan's leadership. So there is, I would say--having spent some time in Washington, working on these problems--there is better-than- ever integration of effort and high-level attention on this problem. And it certainly makes our jobs easier having a president of the United States who understands and has made these threats a very, very high priority. Thank you. Mr. Myers. Madam Chairwoman, the one item I think that I would enunciate a little bit more is our role as a combat- support agency--our support for our servicemen and women. Many don't consider the connection between the agency and our men and women in uniform because of our role in WMD. But we do our very best to support them in a number of ways--first and foremost, our role in helping them synchronize their planning and their activities to dealing with a WMD emergency or threat. Secondly, we provide 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week reach-back support. If the war fighter or combatant commander is in need of information analysis, we are a telephone call or a ``send'' button away in terms of being able to do everything from plume analysis to various different types of information provisions. Thirdly, we help them with consequence management, force- protection assessments. We have teams that go out to our men and women in uniform, deployed abroad, and provide them with the assessments they need to improve the security surrounding their facilities. And lastly, we do an awful lot of--provide an awful lot of support for both the functional as well as the combatant commands in terms of targeting; in terms of identifying the best planning that is necessary to take down these potential threats before they manifest themselves. General Scarbrough. Madam Chairman, I would also like to add to what Mr. Weber and Mr. Myers stated with respect to interagency coordination. Within the CBDP program, we do a lot of interagency coordination with the Department of Health and Human Services, specifically on the recent H1N1 outbreak, where we worked a diagnostic assay that we built for a biodefense mission set, but we applied it to diagnosing infectious human disease--a dual-use capability. At the same time, we were able to test potential broad- spectrum therapeutics via the Transformational Medical Technologies Initiative, to get capability out quickly to the war fighter, as well as to the population. The other thing I would say with--the Department of Homeland Security--we work very closely with them, with our Installation Protection Program, and support them with respect to BioWatch, as well as supporting the weapons of mass destruction civil-support teams, and providing capability to the National Guard to support those homeland missions. And, then, the last thing, ma'am, is I would highlight that we--one of my biggest priorities as a joint PEO [Program Executive Officer] is acquisition reform. And we work every day to improve our ability, taking the acquisition-reform initiatives before us under the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, to mitigate risk--do more work early on in the acquisition lifecycle to mitigate risk down the road. Ms. Sanchez. Great. I notice that Mr. Murphy, of New York, came in. Do you have any questions for our panel? Well, welcome. As I said, votes are ready to be called any moment. So I thank the gentlemen for being before us today. I thank you for your testimony. As I said, we will have, probably, some written questions from some of the members who weren't able to attend. And, again, I thank you, and thank you for the service to our country. And the subcommittee is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 2:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] ? ======================================================================= A P P E N D I X April 14, 2010 ======================================================================= ? ======================================================================= PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD April 14, 2010 ======================================================================= [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT