[House Hearing, 111 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] ARE FEDERAL AND POSTAL EMPLOYEES SAFE AT WORK? ======================================================================= HEARING before the SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL WORKFORCE, POSTAL SERVICE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA of the COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ MARCH 16, 2010 __________ Serial No. 111-69 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/ index.html http://www.house.gov/reform U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 57-976 WASHINGTON : 2010 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202�09512�091800, or 866�09512�091800 (toll-free). E-mail, [email protected]. COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York, Chairman PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania DARRELL E. ISSA, California CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York DAN BURTON, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland JOHN M. McHUGH, New York DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio JOHN L. MICA, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania DIANE E. WATSON, California JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JIM COOPER, Tennessee LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio JIM JORDAN, Ohio ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JEFF FLAKE, Arizona Columbia JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois AARON SCHOCK, Illinois CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland HENRY CUELLAR, Texas PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut PETER WELCH, Vermont BILL FOSTER, Illinois JACKIE SPEIER, California STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio JUDY CHU, California Ron Stroman, Staff Director Michael McCarthy, Deputy Staff Director Carla Hultberg, Chief Clerk Larry Brady, Minority Staff Director Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, Postal Service, and the District of Columbia STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts, Chairman ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah Columbia ANH ``JOSPEH'' CAO, Louisiana DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia William Miles, Staff Director C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on March 16, 2010................................... 1 Statement of: Goldstein, Mark, Director, Physical Infrastructure, U.S. Government Accountability Office; Steven Miller, Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement, Internal Revenue Service; Sue Armstrong, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of Infrastructure Protection and Gary Schenkel, Director, Federal Protective Service, National Protection and Programs Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and Guy Cottrell, Deputy Chief Postal Inspector, U.S. Postal Inspection Service............................. 17 Armstrong, Sue........................................... 39 Cottrell, Guy............................................ 51 Goldstein, Mark.......................................... 17 Miller, Steven........................................... 34 Schenkel, Gary........................................... 40 Kelley, Colleen, national president, National Treasury Employees Union; Jon Adler, national president, Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association; and David Wright, president, Local 918, American Federation of Government Employees.................................................. 70 Adler, Jon............................................... 79 Kelley, Colleen.......................................... 70 Wright, David............................................ 86 Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by: Adler, Jon, national president, Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association, prepared statement of................ 82 Armstrong, Sue, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of Infrastructure Protection and Gary Schenkel, Director, Federal Protective Service, National Protection and Programs Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, prepared statement of...................................... 42 Chaffetz, Hon. Jason, a Representative in Congress from the State of Utah, prepared statement of....................... 10 Connolly, Hon. Gerald E., a Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia, prepared statement of............... 15 Cottrell, Guy, Deputy Chief Postal Inspector, U.S. Postal Inspection Service, prepared statement of.................. 53 Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from the State of Maryland, prepared statement of............... 107 Goldstein, Mark, Director, Physical Infrastructure, U.S. Government Accountability Office, prepared statement of.... 19 Kelley, Colleen, national president, National Treasury Employees Union, prepared statement of..................... 72 Lynch, Hon. Stephen F., a Representative in Congress from the State of Massachusetts: Prepared statement of.................................... 8 Prepared statement of Mr. Thompson and a DOD employee.... 2 Miller, Steven, Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement, Internal Revenue Service, prepared statement of......................................................... 36 Wright, David, president, Local 918, American Federation of Government Employees, prepared statement of................ 88 ARE FEDERAL AND POSTAL EMPLOYEES SAFE AT WORK? ---------- TUESDAY, MARCH 16, 2010 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, Postal Service, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m. in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen F. Lynch (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Representatives Lynch, Norton, Cummings, Connolly, and Chaffetz. Staff present: William Miles, staff director; Jill Crissman, professional staff; Rob Sidman, detailee; Dan Zeidman, deputy clerk/legislative assistant; Howard Denis, minority senior counsel; and Alex Cooper, minority professional staff member. Mr. Lynch. Good afternoon. The Subcommittee on the Federal Workforce, Postal Service, and District of Columbia hearing will now come to order. I apologize for the brief delay. We have a lot going on here today. Members will be coming in and leaving periodically. Unfortunately, we seem to schedule everything at the same time here in light of the work that needs to be done. I want to welcome my friend and ranking member, Mr. Chaffetz from Utah, and members of the subcommittee hearing, witnesses, and all those in attendance. In light of the recent attacks and violent outbursts against Federal workers and facilities, I have called today's hearing to examine Federal and Postal employee workplace security. The Chair, ranking member, and the subcommittee members will each have 5 minutes to make opening statements, and all Members will have 3 days to submit statements for the record. I would also like to ask unanimous consent that the testimony of Congressman Benny Thompson, who is our chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security, and that of a DOD employee, be submitted for the record. Hearing no objection, so ordered. [The prepared statements of Mr. Thompson and the DOD employee follow:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.001 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.002 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.003 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.004 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.005 Mr. Lynch. Ladies and gentlemen, in recent weeks we have witnessed several brutal attacks and violent outbursts against Federal workers and facilities, which is why I have called today's hearing. Tragically, in 2010, alone, a U.S. court security officer in Las Vegas, and an IRS manager in Austin, TX, have lost their lives, while several law enforcement personnel, including a deputy U.S. Marshall and members of the Pentagon Force Protection Agency, have been injured in the line of duty. Given the rise of anti-Government feeling, as notably reported in the Southern Poverty Law Center's 2009 Report entitled, ``The Second Wave,'' I believe that, as chairman of the subcommittee, I have a duty to examine how well positioned Federal agencies and the Postal Service are for similar events. Today's hearing will also allow us to discuss what agencies are doing to provide comprehensive training and guidance to employees on how to respond to such threats and scenarios. It is one thing to hear about agencies wrestling with how to afford purchasing expensive security countermeasures, but it is quite a different matter to listen to Federal employees recount the lack of emergency preparedness of a particular office. It may be that an emergency plan exists, but if the individual workers aren't familiar with it and are not even practicing any type of evacuation drills, then what type of outcome can we expect if and when disaster strikes. An important item to note here is that the Federal and Postal employees warrant our respect. For some to look at the violence directed against IRS employees and to try to justify that deliberate intent to murder other human beings is simply inexcusable and unacceptable. Our Nation's public servants deserve nothing less than our full support, and to know that all of us, from the President to Congress, are grateful for their work and assistance in helping us govern our Nation. More importantly, our Federal employees need to know that we will do everything possible to keep them safe while they are at the workplace and away from their families. Today's hearing will provide us with the opportunity to hear from the IRS and its employee representatives concerning both the immediate and long-term impact of the February 18th attack in Austin. Additionally, we will hear from the Department of Homeland Security about its ongoing activities in the Federal building security area, as well as from the U.S. Postal Service's Inspection Service. It is my hope that the testimony and feedback we receive from today's witnesses will provide the subcommittee with precise guidance and direction. Again, I thank each of you for being with us this afternoon and I look forward to your participation. [The prepared statement of Hon. Stephen F. Lynch follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.006 Mr. Lynch. I now yield 5 minutes to our ranking member, Mr. Chaffetz. Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for holding this important hearing. I appreciate all of those witnesses that have come to testify today. Needless to say, we want to make sure that every Federal employee and the public who is engaging with the Federal Government at all times is as safe as possible. People should deserve and expect to work in a safe environment. We need to constantly evaluate the standards and procedures, so I think this hearing is particularly appropriate at this time. I look forward to hearing the discussion. For those very few but important men and women who have been on the wrong end of this violence, our hearts, thoughts, and prayers go out to those people. We need to continue to strive to improve and make the workplace as safe as we can, but also accessible, at the same time. I look forward to this hearing. I thank, again, the chairman for holding it and yield back the balance of my time. [The prepared statement of Hon. Jason Chaffetz follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.007 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.008 Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman. I would now like to yield 5 minutes to Ms. Eleanor Holmes Norton, the Congresswoman from the District of Columbia, who has also been at the forefront of this issue, because of the number of Federal facilities in her District, for a long, long time. Ms. Norton. Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am especially appreciative that you have called this hearing so soon after the attacks in Austin and right here in the National Capital Region, first with the IRS in Austin, and here in this region at the Pentagon. Mr. Chairman, in post-9/11 America there has to be a renewed appreciation for Federal workers and the kind of hammering of civil servants stopped. They recognize how important was the work of those who are spread across our Government. It is very disturbing to see the uptick in attacks on Federal employees once again. Mr. Chairman, during the last 10 years or so, the Federal Protective Service was literally drained of employees, and it got so bad that we asked and the Appropriations Committee mandated that a certain floor of Federal Protective Service guards and officers be retained. There was the notion that all you needed was security guards, you didn't even need a Federal Protective Service, even though that is the oldest of the police forces in the Federal Government. It was very disconcerting. Mr. Chairman, I chair a subcommittee with jurisdiction over Federal construction and leasing, and have some jurisdiction over the Federal Protective Service in that regard, and I am a member of the Homeland Security Committee, and if I may say so, Mr. Chairman, the so-called Interagency Security Committee is something of a joke. This is a committee that is supposed to sit and coordinate security for Federal buildings, sites, and employees. But to show you just how ineffective is the protection of Federal workers, take a building like the new Transportation, not so old, maybe about 5 years old, the new Transportation Department. That is not a high security building. Mr. Chairman, when my staff, with their congressional tags on, have gone to that building, they can't get in there. Somebody in the agency has to stop her work and come down in order for them to enter the premises, even though these people have the credentials of the U.S. Capitol on them. That is what you have at one end, in a building that we do not think Al Qaeda is much looking for. At the other end, we have more sensible security in some other parts of the Government. How could this be? The reason it is this way, Mr. Chairman, is that security gets decided on the premises. No matter what they tell you, it is some GS-9 somewhere who sits with a committee and decides who will come into this agency or not, and the rest of it. And if it goes up to the Secretary and the Secretary says, that is fine with me, well then even staff from the Capitol can't get in. If it is someone who has a more even sense of security and what it means, maybe they will. But I can tell you this, Mr. Chairman: I have seen security in buildings that I think Al Qaeda would be far more interested in entering that do not have the security of the Transportation Department. We have had hearings ourselves on it. I would like very much for my subcommittee, for the Homeland Security Committee, and you, Mr. Chairman, to get together so that we can, in a concerted way, make the Federal Government protect Federal employees by having one standard that is minimal and then tailor it to other parts of the Government which may require more or less. Again, I very much appreciate the respect you show for the safety of Federal employees by holding such a prompt hearing here this afternoon. Mr. Lynch. Thank you. Certainly we are looking for best practices to be adopted. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, for 5 minutes. Mr. Connolly. I thank you, Chairman Lynch, and thanks so much for holding this very important hearing. Last year we have witnessed a rise in violent rhetoric by extremist groups in America; therefore, we must consider not only those infrastructure improvements to protect Federal employees, to protection Federal employees from terrorism, but also the manner in which we may exercise justification of violence from public discourse. Less than 1 month ago, Andrew Joseph Stack intentionally crashed his small plane into a Federal building in Austin, TX that included offices of the Internal Revenue Service filled with Federal employees. This terrorist attack killed Vernon Hunter, a Federal employee who previously served two terms overseas in the Armed Forces. Incredibly, some political figures offered a tacit defense of that terrorist attack. One such individual was recorded as saying, ``I think if we had abolished the IRS back when I first advocated it, he wouldn't have had a target for his airplane.'' Previously, he told the Conservative Political Action Conference that he empathized with the terrorist who flew his plane into the Federal building in Austin. This defense of terrorism is remarkable, because under this logic the victims of terrorism bear the responsibility of the terrorist attack. This implicit figure's reprehensible defense of terrorism is consistent with the disturbing trend of violent, anti- government extremism we have seen in our country all too often. According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, the slaughter engineered by Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, men steeped in the conspiracy theories and white hot fury of the American radical right, marked the opening shot on a new kind of domestic political extremism, a revolutionary ideology whose practitioners do not hesitate to carry out attacks directed at entirely innocent victims, people selected essentially at random, to make a political point. Since 1995, there have been over 75 violent attacks by domestic terrorists like Timothy McVeigh and Andrew Joseph Stack, including the 1996 bombing at the Atlanta Olympics by anti-abortion fanatic Eric Rudolph and the 2009 murder of a guard at the Holocaust Museum by anti-Semite James von Brunn. It would be reprehensible enough for anyone to endorse violence generally, but even worse is endorsement of violence in response to non-violent policies with which one might disagree, such as the terrorist attack against the IRS to express tax grievances. Terrorism can never be condoned. Violence against Federal workers and installations is never acceptable. Those who, for cheap political pandering, find themselves justifying it most assuredly have the blood of its innocent victims, like Vernon Hunter, on their hands. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Hon. Gerald E. Connolly follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.009 Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman. The committee will now hear testimony from today's witnesses. It is the standard policy of this committee that all witnesses who are to offer testimony shall be sworn. Could I ask you to all stand and raise your right hands? [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Lynch. Let the record indicate that all the witnesses have each answered in the affirmative. What I will do is I will offer a brief introduction of each of our witnesses, and then we will afford each an opportunity to testify for 5 minutes. First of all, Mr. Mark Goldstein is the Director of Physical Infrastructure Issues at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. Mr. Goldstein is responsible for the Government Accountability Office work in the areas of Government property and telecommunications, and has held other public sector positions, serving as deputy director and chief of staff to the District of Columbia Financial Control Board, and as a senior staff member of the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. Mr. Goldstein is also an elected fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration. Mr. Steven Miller is Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement, providing direction and oversight for all major decisions affecting the four taxpayer-focused Internal Revenue Service divisions: wage and investment, large and mid-sized business, all business, self-employed and tax-exempt and government entities. He is also responsible for the IRS Criminal Investigation Division, which investigates income tax evasion, the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility, which administers the laws governing the practice of tax professionals before the IRS, and the IRS whistleblower office, which receives information on tax cheating. Ms. Sue Armstrong was named the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary in September 2009 of the Office of Infrastructure Protection, a division of the National Protection and Programs Directorate at the Department of Homeland Security. In this capacity, she supports the Assistant Secretary in leading the coordinated national effort to reduce the risk to the Nation's critical infrastructure and key resources posed by acts of terrorism, and increasing the Nation's preparedness and rapid recovery in the event of an attack, natural disaster, or other emergency. Mr. Gary W. Schenkel was appointed Director of the Federal Protective Service, a Division of the National Protection and Programs Directorate at the Department of Homeland Security, in March 2007. A retired Marine Corps lieutenant colonel, Schenkel has significant leadership and experience in a wide range of arenas, including organizational transformation efforts, security planning for public facilities, logistical planning and execution, and business administration. Mr. Guy Cottrell joined the Postal Service in 1987 as a letter carrier in New Orleans, LA. In 2008 Mr. Cottrell was asked to come to National Headquarters to lend his expertise and leadership to the Chief Postal Inspector's role as Chief Security Officer of the Postal Service as Inspector in Charge of the Secretary and Crime Prevention Communications Group. In 2009, Mr. Cottrell was selected as Deputy Chief Inspector, Headquarters Operation, with oversight of all Postal Service national security programs. Welcome to all of our witnesses. Mr. Goldstein, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. Let me just explain that box in the middle of the table will show green while your time is proceeding. It will show yellow when it is time to wrap up, and then red when you should probably stop offering testimony. Mr. Goldstein. STATEMENTS OF MARK GOLDSTEIN, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; STEVEN MILLER, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER FOR SERVICES AND ENFORCEMENT, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE; SUE ARMSTRONG, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OFFICE OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION AND GARY SCHENKEL, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE, NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; AND GUY COTTRELL, DEPUTY CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR, U.S. POSTAL INSPECTION SERVICE STATEMENT OF MARK GOLDSTEIN Mr. Goldstein. Good afternoon, and thank you for the opportunity to discuss GAO's recent work on the Federal Protective Service and its efforts to protect Federal facilities. Recent events, including last month's attack on Internal Revenue Service offices in Texas and the January 2010 shooting in the lobby of a Nevada Federal courthouse demonstrate the continued vulnerability of Federal facilities and the safety of Federal employees who occupy them. These events also highlight the continued challenges involved in protecting Federal real property and reiterate the importance of the Protective Service's efforts to protect the over 1 million Government employees and members of the public who work in and visit the nearly 9,000 Federal facilities. This testimony is based on past GAO reports and testimonies and discusses challenges FPS faces in protecting Federal facilities and tenant agencies' perspectives of FPS's services. To perform this work, GAO visited a number of Federal facilities, surveyed tenant agencies, analyzed documents, interviewed officials from Federal agencies and contract guard companies. Over the past 5 years, we have reported that FPS faces a number of operational challenges protecting Federal facilities, including the following: First, FPS' ability to manage risk across Federal facilities and implement security countermeasures is limited. FPS assesses risk and recommends countermeasures to the General Services Administration and their tenant agencies; however, decisions to implement these countermeasures are frequently made by GSA and tenant agencies who have, at times, been unwilling to fund the countermeasures. Additionally, FPS takes a building-by-building approach to risk management, rather than taking a more comprehensive strategic approach in assessing risks among all buildings in GSA's inventory and recommending countermeasure priorities to GSA and tenant agencies. Second, FPS has experienced difficulty ensuring that it has a sufficient staff, and its inspector-based work force approach raises questions about protection of Federal facilities. While FPS is currently operating at its congressionally mandated staffing level of no fewer than 1,200 full-time employees, the agency has experienced difficulty determining its optimal staffing level to protect Federal facilities. Additionally, until recently FPS' staff was steadily declining, and as a result critical law enforcement services have been reduced or eliminated. Third, FPS does not fully ensure that its contract security guards have the training and certifications required to be deployed to a Federal facility. We found that FPS guards had not received adequate training to conduct their responsibilities. Specifically, some guards were not provided building-specific training, such as what actions to take during a building emergency or evacuation. This lack of training may have contributed to several incidents where guards neglected assigned responsibilities. Fourth, GSA has not been satisfied with FPS' performance, and some tenant agencies are unclear on FPS' role in protecting Federal facilities. According to GSA, FPS has not been responsive and timely in providing security assessments for new leases. About one-third of FPS' customers could not comment on FPS' level of communication on various topics, including security assessments, a response that suggests a division of roles and responsibilities between FPS and its customer is unclear. Some 82 percent did not use FPS for primary law enforcement response. FPS is taking steps to better protect Federal facilities. For example, FPS is developing a new risk assessment program and it has recently focused on improving oversight of its contract guard program. While GAO is not making any new recommendations in this testimony, we note that FPS has not completed many related corrective actions to our previous reports. We look forward to continued progress from DHS in the near future. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer questions you and the subcommittee may have. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Goldstein follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.010 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.011 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.012 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.013 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.014 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.015 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.016 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.017 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.018 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.019 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.020 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.021 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.022 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.023 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.024 Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Goldstein. Mr. Miller, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for an opening statement. STATEMENT OF STEVEN MILLER Mr. Miller. Thank you, Chairman Lynch, Ranking Member Chaffetz, and Congresswoman Norton. Thanks for the opportunity to testify on IRS workplace safety and security, particularly in the wake of the senseless attack last month on the IRS building in Austin, TX, that took the life of Vernon Hunter. We are dedicated to ensuring safety and the well-being of our 100,000 employees, no matter what their job is nor where they are located. The IRS work force is our most valuable resource, and no violent act is going to deter us from doing our jobs with dignity and respect for the American public. At the IRS security is managed by our Office of Physical Security and Emergency Preparedness, which manages at a national level, ensuring we have consistent implementation of security policies and procedures. For 2010, we will spend just over $100 million on security at IRS offices. There are over 700 such facilities. As required under an Executive order, we utilize the Interagency Security Committee [ISC] standards, to determine what security to provide at a given facility. Depending upon the applicable security level under the standards, we will provide a variety of security tools, including highly visible guards and K-9s, explosive and intrusion detection systems. We also employ access control systems such as turnstiles, card key access, proximity cards, and lock and key control systems. Physical barriers include bollards, crash fencing, barriers, planters, and pop-up barriers. Screening measures focus on magnetometers, hand-held wands, and x-ray machines. We also have a detailed incident reporting system that is available and up and running 24/7, 365 days of the year that reports and tracks on these incidents. Mr. Chairman, the IRS employs a combination of strategies to plan, implement, and evaluate our security processes, and we promote security and awareness for all IRS employees. Our employees, in fact, are our partners in ensuring security, workplace safety and security. In this regard, we conduct periodic evacuation drills and shelter and place exercises which heighten employee emergency readiness. If you watched any of the coverage in Austin, you saw that among the things that went right down there--and some things did, in fact, go right, Mr. Chairman--our drills proved their worth. People did get out of the building on a timely basis and we lost only one life. We also issue recurring communications regarding security and safety to reinforce processes and to raise awareness, including annual security awareness fairs that are held across the country, and we maintain an IRS internet Web site that provides updated information on IRS physical security and emergency preparedness programs. From what I know today, Mr. Chairman, it is unlikely that there is anything we could have done to prevent the attack in Austin. Nonetheless, following that attack we took a series of immediate steps to enhance our security posture both in Austin and across the country while we assess our long-term security needs and whether they have changed over time. This increased vigilance includes 24/7 guard service in all 11 IRS Austin offices. There is also additional security at IRS facilities across the country, including additional guard service at this time. In conclusion, this area remains a top concern for the IRS, and we will be taking a hard look at what we can do in both the short and long term to ensure the safety of our folks. Nothing is more important to Treasury Secretary Geithner, Commissioner Shulman, nor myself. Thanks. I will be happy to take any questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.025 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.026 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.027 Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Miller. Ms. Armstrong, you are now welcome to offer testimony for 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF SUE ARMSTRONG Ms. Armstrong. Thank you, Chairman Lynch, Ranking Member Chaffetz, and Congresswoman. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the work of the Interagency Security Committee. The Interagency Security Committee was created as a direct result of the Oklahoma City bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in 1995, the worst domestic-based terrorist attack in U.S. history. The mission of the Interagency Security Committee is to develop standards, policies, and best practices for enhancing the quality and effectiveness of physical security in and the protection of the over 300,000 non-military Federal facilities in the United States. The Department of Homeland Security's Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection chairs the Interagency Security Committee, which is composed of senior executives from 45 member departments and agencies that contribute to the publication of innovative products to increase the security of Federal facilities, to protect Federal employees and the visiting public. For example, in March 2008 the Interagency Security Committee developed and published the facility security level determinations for Federal facilities, which defines criteria and processes facilities should use to determine their facilities security level. In June 2009, per recommendation from the Government Accountability Office, the Interagency Security Committee developed the use of physical security performance measures, the first Federal policy guidance on performance measures for physical security programs and testing procedures. In addition, the Interagency Security Committee is currently in the final stages of a comprehensive, multi-year effort to integrate 15 years of standards, lessons learned, and countermeasures for threats to federally owned and leased facilities. These documents will comprise the most comprehensive standards for Federal facilities created to date. The Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection also oversees the work of the Office of Infrastructure Protection, which conducts vulnerability assessments on the Government facilities sector. These assessments identify security gaps and provide the foundation for risk-based implementation of protective programs. The Office of Infrastructure Protection also distributes the infrastructure protection report series, which provides protection information tailored to address issues faced by Federal buildings such as large Government office buildings and Federal courthouses, and my colleague from the Federal Protective Service will describe the department's role in protecting these facilities in greater detail. I appreciate the opportunity to address the committee on this important issue and I look forward to answering any questions you might have. Mr. Lynch. Thank you. Mr. Schenkel, you are welcome to offer testimony for 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF GARY SCHENKEL Mr. Schenkel. Thank you, Chairman Lynch, Ranking Member Chaffetz, Congresswoman Norton. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the actions of the Federal Protective Service as the Federal Protective Service undertakes to ensure the safety and security of Federal Government buildings. The Federal Protective Service performs fixed post access control screening functions, roving patrols at 9,000 General Services Administration owned and leased facilities. In fiscal year 2009 the Federal Protective Service responded to 35,812 calls for service, including 1,242 protests and organized disturbances, made 1,646 arrests, conducted 1,115 criminal investigations, processed 272 weapons violations, and prevented the introduction of 661,724 prohibited items into Federal facilities, all with the significant assistance of our contract guards known as protective security officers. FPS was transferred at the start of the fiscal year to the National Protection and Programs Directorate, a component within DHS whose core mission is national resiliency that ranges from physical infrastructure protection to cybersecurity. While we are focused on ensuring a smooth transition of the organization, we believe this new structure will better position us within the department to receive the necessary support and meet our critical responsibilities moving forward. Primary among the Federal Protective Service's core mission requirements is the facility security assessment. The facility security assessment identifies existing and potential threats to Federal facilities and their occupants. The Federal Protective Service takes an all-hazards approach to facilities security assessment and evaluates the risk against possible mitigation measures built into our new risk assessment and management program. Those mitigating countermeasures are then presented to each facility's security committee, with recommendations on which countermeasures should be implemented, including the development of an occupant emergency plan. The Federal Protective Service systematically measures the effectiveness of our countermeasures through a variety of systematic progress, such as annual countermeasure effectiveness inventories, scheduled guard post and guard vendor inspections, and one of our most visible means, Operation Shield. Operation Shield conducts unannounced inspections to measure the effectiveness of contract guards in detecting the presence of unauthorized persons, potentially disruptive or dangerous activities in or around Federal facilities, and the guards' ability to prevent the introduction of prohibitive items or harmful substances into those facilities. Operation Shield also serves as a visible, proactive, and random measure that may be used as a deterrent to disrupt the planning of terrorist activities. In addition, the Federal Protective Service routinely provides security awareness training for employees which includes presentations on how to avoid becoming a victim of theft or violence, and we have also developed active shooter training, explaining what employees should do when faced with a violent situation and how to respond when law enforcement arrives. FPS has taken several actions and initiatives to address major areas identified by the Government Accountability Office, including human capital management, finance, guard contract oversight. FPS continues to develop additional information collection and analysis tools. FPS addressed the current GAO report regarding contract guard oversight and lapses in screening procedures by determining the cause of the lapses and recommending measures to prevent reoccurrence: increasing the frequency of guard posts and performance of protection security officers formerly referred to as contract security officers; requiring additional training in magnetometer and x-ray, including contract modification requiring the viewing of an FPS-produced training video that addresses screening for improvised explosive devices; ensuring that all protective security officers are compliant with certifications and qualifications, as stated in contract, by incorporating the certification system into our risk assessment management program or RAMP; developing and initiating a 16-hour magnetometer x-ray training program provided to protective security officers by Federal Protective Service inspectors titled the National Weapons Detection Program, which has begun in January 2010. As a result of the covert testing working group, FPS developed covert testing program which enhanced and complemented the ongoing efforts to improve oversight and improve the attentiveness and professionalism of the protective security officer. This current program further achieves FPS' strategic goals of effectively and efficiently securing Federal facilities and keeping their occupants safe. These are just some of the many ways the Federal Protective Service contributes to the safety and security of Federal buildings and their occupants. I look forward to the opportunity to answer any questions you may have, and I thank you and the committee for holding this important hearing. [The prepared statement of Ms. Armstrong and Mr. Schenkel follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.028 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.029 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.030 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.031 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.032 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.033 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.034 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.035 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.036 Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Schenkel. Mr. Cottrell, welcome. You are now recognized for 5 minutes for an opening statement. STATEMENT OF GUY COTTRELL Mr. Cottrell. Good afternoon, Chairman Lynch, Congressman Chaffetz, and Congresswoman Norton. My name is Guy Cottrell, Deputy Chief Inspector for the U.S. Postal Inspection Service. I am pleased to be here with you today to discuss safety and security practices at the Postal Service. While I am a postal inspector, please note that in today's testimony I am providing information that reflects security strategies across many different functions within the Postal Service. I will begin with the Inspection Service. Our mission is to protect the Postal Service and its employees, secure the Nation's mail system, and ensure public trust in the mail. Postal inspectors are Federal law enforcement officers who carry firearms, make arrests, and serve Federal search warrants and subpoenas. There are approximately 1,400 postal inspectors nationwide and abroad who enforce more than 200 Federal laws involving the use of the U.S. mail and the postal system. The Inspection Service maintains a security force staffed by roughly 650 uniformed postal police officers who are assigned to critical postal facilities across the country. The officers provide perimeter security, escort high-value mail shipments, and perform essential protective functions. The Postal Service has a number of ways we provide security for our employees and buildings. The Postal Service has a cross-functional program to comprehensively review a building's security. Program helps postmasters and installation heads achieve and maintain compliance with policies governing all aspects of security. The review includes comprehensive onsite observations, document reviews, and interviews of facility personnel. At the conclusion of each assessment, a plan is developed to address any issues identified in that review. Emphasizing the key role that each employee plays in each other's safety is one of our prime strategies. Special emphasis has been placed on developing employee communications safety materials. For example, each week at facilities nationwide, managers are required to give safety stand-up talks. Simple tips to employees such as reporting the condition of fences or public access to the workroom floor all contribute to employee safety. We will shortly begin an educational campaign aimed specifically at our letter carriers. A major component of the Postal Service's workplace violence prevention program is the district threat assessment team. Threat assessment teams use cross-functional team approaches to assess threatening situations and to develop risk abatement plans to minimize the potential risk of future violence. The Postal Service has established an agency-wide continuity program. The continuity program deals with issues that arise prior to, during, and after an event relative outstanding the employee's safety and welfare. This program is tested and exercised on an annual basis. Our plan calls for the notification of all employees of a facility that an event has occurred and where each employee is to report. We have a toll-free number for all Postal Service employees to use in the event of an emergency to receive information about facility closings and operating status. We are updating the computer program which will identify critical postal facilities in the path of approaching storms, provide floodplain modeling, and real-time storm updates, as well as estimate anticipated impacts on postal assets. The Inspection Service routinely works with other local and Federal law enforcement agencies. We also participate in training exercises. This ensures that postal employees, equipment, and procedures are ready to manage an emergency without interrupting operations. The Inspection Service conducts and evaluates training on procedures for emergency management personnel and other essential staff. This promotes preparedness, improves response capabilities, assures that all systems are appropriate, and determines the effectiveness of our command, control, and communications processes. Thank you for the opportunity to testify about some of the Postal Service's initiatives on safety and security. I would be pleased to answer any questions this subcommittee may have. [The prepared statement of Mr. Cottrell follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.037 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.038 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.039 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.040 Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Cottrell. I now yield myself 5 minutes. Director Goldstein, I had an opportunity to read your report from I think it was June 2009 where you did an assessment of the Federal Protective Service, and it was very, very helpful. I am not sure if it was a fair point in time to take a snapshot, however. I know that up until 2007 the Federal Protective Service was in the process of scaling down, downsizing. And then Congress, in 2008, said stop downsizing, start hiring. We came in with a minimum staffing requirement of, I think, 1,400. So then FPS had to reverse what they were doing and start hiring, which they were not prepared to do, and that is when you took the snapshot, so there is some difficulty here transitioning from one function to the other, one policy to the other. I am just wondering if you have had a more recent opportunity to do that analysis. I know you had folks, or perhaps you, yourself, went to various facilities and did this assessment. You talked to customers. You talked to a lot of people. I thought the report was fairly comprehensive in terms of the number of districts that you had reached out to, but is there a more recent assessment that you have made in terms of the readiness of the Federal Protective Service and its ability to meet Congress' more recent mandate? Mr. Goldstein. Mr. Chairman, we have done a number of approaches over the years. In 2008, we issued a report which was sort of our more recent baseline report which, again, to reveal a lot of the issues that were coming about as a result of the downsizing that the agency was undergoing. As you mentioned, since then a floor has been placed at 1,250 individuals, about 950 of whom must be law enforcement officers. We have done additional work since that time. We issued a report on human capital planning at the Federal Protective Service. We did testimony, preliminary findings, which you are referring to from last summer in which we did a variety of things, including some penetration testing of Federal buildings, as well as looking at the contract guard program. We will shortly issue a final report looking at those issues to a number of committees of Congress that requested that work. So we are continuing to do work on the agency, and there are some additional reports that Congress has requested that we also do, including taking a look at the transition into NPPD, as well as taking a look at RAMP and whether RAMP will be a successful program in helping the agency. So we have continuing work on the way. Mr. Lynch. One of the problems that I have in assessing system-wide Federal security is that, for example, here on Capitol Hill, the legislative branch, we have the Capitol Police. We sort of have our own security system that we operate, as does the Federal court system. They sort of have the marshals inside the building, they have FPS outside. We have the Capitol Police. It is really sort of organic. DOD does their own thing, and so it is tough to take one measurement. Is there a study or review that you are undertaking now that would help me with that, or are you just responding as requested from these different committees? Mr. Goldstein. Most of our time up until now we have focused on the Federal Protective Service because of the GSA properties, but we have received recent requests from the House Homeland Security Committee to examine just what you are suggesting, which is more broadly taking a look at how security of Federal property across the entire spectrum is managed, who is responsible for it, how it interacts, how they coordinate, what kind of challenges they face. So we will be getting that work soon, sir. Mr. Lynch. All right. I guess what I am asking, Are there gaps in what we are requesting in order to get a good sense of what is going on and what the entire picture is here in the Federal Government? Mr. Goldstein. We have recently received a number of requests from House Homeland Security which I think fills a lot of those gaps, but I will be happy to take a look at what we do have in that we are supposed to work on and talk with your staff about some of those gaps. Yes, sir. Mr. Lynch. That would be helpful. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Goldstein. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Chaffetz, our ranking member, for 5 minutes. Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Goldstein, if we could start, you used the word confusion when you are talking about the interaction with local law enforcement responding to situations in Federal buildings. Can you expand on that just a little bit more, because there are multiple jurisdictions that often would respond to some sort of incident, but explain to us a little bit more what you meant by confusion that was out there. Mr. Goldstein. Yes, sir. I would be happy to. Several years ago in 2008, when we began discussions with the Federal Protective Service on their relationships with local police, at that time they explained to us that as they were decreasing the size of FPS they would be relying more on local law enforcement and entering into memorandums of understanding with local law enforcement around the country to assist them in times of emergency. Over time, they realized that those MOUs probably would not be sustainable because many local law enforcement entities have enough of their own problems going on and would not wish to enter into such agreements, and that ultimately is what they found. What they told us at the time is that they were continuing, however, to develop relationships with local law enforcement and that they had sort of more informal and ad hoc relationships to help them in times of emergency, and that I suspect is true. We often see local law enforcement responding to the scene when situations occur. However, what has concerned us is we have done interviews in the course of our audit work in which we have spoken to precinct commanders, for instance, in a major metropolitan area literally within sight of level four Federal buildings, major level four buildings, who had no idea of when the last time they saw an FPS officer was, what kind of relationship existed with that building a block or two blocks away, and what their responsibility would be in an occurrence. Mr. Chaffetz. Let's do that. My guess is, my sense based on what the chairman was also asking, this is something we would like to explore further and learn a lot more about. Mr. Goldstein. Yes, sir. We would be happy to explore that with the staff. Mr. Chaffetz. That would be great. Mr. Goldstein. Yes, sir. Mr. Chaffetz. Can you help me, particularly Mr. Schenkel, understand, at least over the last 24 to 36 months, 2 to 3 years, what is the trend and the number of people that are working and helping to secure? Mr. Schenkel. It has been very positive. When we got the relief as a result of the 2008 omnibus bill, we were able to hire an additional 150 FPS inspectors. In addition to that, we were able to revamp the training curriculum at the physical security training program, our in-house academy down at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. Mr. Chaffetz. Again, I am sorry to cut you off. I have only got just 5 minutes and I want to touch on two other subjects. If you could provide us on the committee some additional details as to where that staffing is going for both the physical infrastructure and some of the other issues, that would be great. And then if you could also, you mentioned the confiscation of 600,000-plus prohibited items? Mr. Schenkel. Yes, sir. Mr. Chaffetz. I would love to see what is on that list and if there is a detail as to how many knives or how many this or that. Mr. Chairman, I am concerned about this, not only in these facilities but also at airports, as well. I think we need to look at what are we going to do about it. Is there enough of a deterrent, if you will, to try to get or bring these items in? I am sure a lot of these happen accidentally, but we are not talking about oversized shampoos here, is my guess. My guess is we are talking about something that is a little bit more nefarious in its nature. I recognize the demand on the security personnel to have to be right all of the time, but I worry that these numbers are so huge. And I have heard similar things at the TSA, as well, so I would like to explore that and get additional information about that as we move forward, because that is just not acceptable to have so many prohibited items trying to be pushed and moved through the system. Obviously, there is room for error along the way. My time is concluding here, so I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lynch. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Eleanor Holmes Norton for 5 minutes. Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Schenkel, you are perhaps, I am sure--I should not even say perhaps--aware of Mr. Goldstein's testimony some months back where the GAO used testers who were able to smuggle bomb parts into, I think it was perhaps as many as 10 Federal facilities, take them into a men's room, and, if necessary, assemble them. Can you tell this subcommittee today that has been corrected, since it is at least a year old, I think, that testimony was offered? Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am. We have taken dramatic steps as a result of that. We have taken a number of steps as a result of the penetration test that the GAO conducted, to include we initiated a gap analysis to identify where those problems came from. We revamped the x-ray magnetometer training. We have initiated the national weapons detection program, which is an additional 16 hours of magnetometer and x-ray training for all of our protective security officers. We have also instituted the Covert Testing Working Group, which I mentioned in my initial testimony, where our individual criminal investigators, with a standardized uniform policy and a standardized uniform testing kit. Ms. Norton. Mr. Schenkel, we have a call into my office from someone who called himself a Federal Protective Services employee who said to us that the FPS plans to eliminate its HAZMAT program. Of course, these are the programs that monitor dangerous packages and provide training for such monitoring. Is the FPS planning to eliminate its HAZMAT program? Mr. Schenkel. No, ma'am, it is not. Ms. Norton. Is it still the case that we have a proliferation of guards who remain stationary and cannot leave their posts, even to assist a Federal Protective Service officer? Mr. Schenkel. It depends on the building and the responsibilities of that post. Ms. Norton. Who decides that, Mr. Schenkel? Mr. Schenkel. It is a combination of the facilities security committee that writes the post orders and the relationships---- Ms. Norton. The facility security committee within each building? Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am. Ms. Norton. That is my problem, Mr. Schenkel. You know, if you are very highly qualified employee at HHS, you don't know a hill of beans about security. The delegation of so much of security to internal committees almost guarantees that what Mr. Goldstein found will happen. Mr. Schenkel, we know and there has been testimony that these guards not only can't leave their posts; they believe if they do leave their posts, even to engage in a chase on their own or assisting an FPS officer, they may face liability. Is that the case? Have they been told that if you leave your post, somebody is coming in with a gun, he runs, should the guard, not the FPS officer--you have a proliferation of guards, not FPS officers--should that guard run after that person who is trying to run away with a gun or with whatever he has in his hand? Mr. Schenkel. That is an identified training gap that we take on the responsibility for. We have to ensure that those guards are aware that they are not on their own personal liability when those---- Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman, what is so scary about testimony after testimony is this has been the case ever since guards have been used. This is not the case, Mr. Goldstein. I mean, this could have been corrected many years ago, but this policy of not leaving your post has been the policy all along, has it not, Mr. Goldstein? Mr. Goldstein. That is my understanding, ma'am. Ms. Norton. How is it that, with the Congress having said you should have no fewer than 1,200 officers, Mr. Goldstein reports that the FPS officers are on something called reduced hours? Why would they be on reduced hours? Mr. Schenkel. I am not aware of that, ma'am. If anything, they are on extended hours. Ms. Norton. Mr. Goldstein, you say in your testimony, you report reduced hours. That is where I got it from. Mr. Goldstein. Yes, ma'am. What we are referring to is during the period of time certainly that the Federal Protective Service was reducing its personnel, its officers, the law enforcement security officers and the remaining patrol officers, FPS made a decision that in most places there would not be weekend hours, there would not be hours that---- Ms. Norton. Mr. Schenkel, if there are Federal employees in a building during weekend hours, is there Federal Protective Service there during those hours? Mr. Schenkel. It depends on the location, ma'am. Ms. Norton. And, again, who decides that, Mr. Schenkel? Mr. Schenkel. It is a combination of the needs of the facilities, if they are isolated facilities, and/or of the region of they are in a regional facility. There is 24/7 covered here in---- Ms. Norton. Mr. Schenkel, isn't it true that the internal committee is who basically is making these decisions, not your officers? Mr. Schenkel. In some cases, but not in all cases. Ms. Norton. I think this is a very serious proposition, Mr. Chairman, that security is in the hands of civilians who happen to be sitting on these committees and who, given the power, is going to use it as they see fit. Is that not the case, Mr. Goldstein? Mr. Goldstein. We have found a number of weaknesses with the building security committees, now called facilities security committees. They are made up of representatives from the tenant agencies. Usually the largest tenant agency in the individual building serves as the Chair. I have attended a number of these meetings over the years, just to see how they operate, and, while I think they are well intentioned, and they certainly should have an advisory role, we have been concerned that you have a very balkanized, fragmented approach to the security of GSA's portfolio when every building gets to make significant decisions about how security is managed, as opposed to FPS being allowed to do a portfolio-wide approach that is based on risk management principles. Ms. Norton. You know, as competent and dedicated as, for that matter, a Member of Congress may be who is my colleague, I don't want a Member of Congress deciding security for entry into this building. Mr. Chairman, may I just say finally in closing that the time has come, I think, for the committees who have been concerned about this to mandate that security be in the hands of trained security officials, and I would like very much to work with you, the ranking member, and to ask the members of the Homeland Security Committee and the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, which also has some jurisdiction over FPS employees, to all get together. Maybe if we gang up on this problem we can get better security for Federal employees. Mr. Lynch. Thank you. I think that is a great suggestion about a joint effort, maybe joint hearings going forward. That is a great idea. The Chair now recognizes the distinguished gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, for 5 minutes. Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Schenkel, you talked about the Federal Protective Service conducting sort of fixed-post and roving patrols of Federal facilities. Are there other things preventively that the Federal Government can or should do, the FPS in particular, to try to anticipate and/or prevent possible terrorist attacks? Mr. Schenkel. Sir, FPS takes an integrated approach that we actually start using international and national intelligence resources. We have access to that through our regional intelligence agents. They provide a threat picture, a threat analysis, if you will, of each facility. That is coupled with local law enforcement and we get the predictions and threat analysis also from them and take that approach even further. We employ certain countermeasures that could be cameras, intrusion detection systems. Obviously, our most visible countermeasure is the armed contract protective security officer, and certainly our most professional and most proficient is our armed Federal Protective Service law enforcement security officer. Mr. Connolly. You make reference to the MOUs with local law enforcement, but Mr. Goldstein, if I understood your testimony, you raised some concerns about the sustainability of those MOUs, given the already heavy burdens borne by local law enforcement. Are those MOUs, with all the good intentions of the world, something we can count on to help protect our Federal employees? Mr. Goldstein. It is my understanding that, because of the difficultly arising from gaining commitments out of local law enforcement, that there are few, if any, MOUs that are actually in place, and that I think Mr. Schenkel can tell you that generally what they strive to do is create relationships with local law enforcement in some of the major metropolitan cities where risks are higher. But, again, we found some concerns, even in places where they had done that, that, while they have tried to do that, the communication and interaction necessary to ensure collaboration wasn't always in place. Mr. Connolly. Mr. Schenkel, did you want to comment on that? Mr. Schenkel. Mr. Goldstein is correct. It is difficult to get an MOU with a metropolitan law enforcement agency. Having come from one myself, I understand that difficultly because of the liability issues. However, we have not had a single instance in FPS, at least during my tenure, that we have had any difficultly in coordinating or occupying a facility when there is a threat. We have normally developed a command and control situation where FPS will take command and control of the situation of a Federal facility when local law enforcement responds. Mr. Connolly. Are the rules of engagement fairly clear between the FPS and the local law enforcement agencies? I can think of some events right here in the national capital region where the lines of authority become an issue in terms of whose turf are you on and whose the primary responsibility for X, Y, and Z in terms of security. I won't name what, but it can sometimes be an issue. Is that an issue sometimes for the FPS? Mr. Schenkel. That will continue to be an issue wherever any law enforcement or two units operate together; however, in our case, because 80 percent of our facilities are leased facilities, there is an obligation by local law enforcement to respond just as a local fire department is required to respond, and we coordinate those activities either through Federal Protective Service officers on the ground or through our mega centers, our communication and dispatch centers that all 9,000 of our buildings are tied in to. Mr. Connolly. Mr. Miller, in your testimony you indicated that there really was not much we could have done to prevent the attack in Austin, if I understood your testimony. Mr. Miller. I believe that is right, sir. Mr. Connolly. I assume you meant by that physically once someone decided to take his airplane and flying into the building, there just wasn't much we could do. Mr. Miller. Yes, sir. Mr. Connolly. You were talking about the physical ability to restrain that individual once he got in his airplane? Mr. Miller. That is what I was speaking of, sir. Mr. Connolly. But are there other things--you heard me in my opening statement. One of the concerns I have is that there are some people in the media and even in political life who have, presumably unwittingly, nonetheless empowered some people who might be on the edge emotionally anyhow, to think it is OK, if it is a Federal agency you don't like, to fly an airplane into a building. Are there things outside of the physical challenge once someone decides to do something we can or should be doing or anticipating to try to ameliorate or mitigate any possibility of such attacks? Mr. Miller. I would think, Congressman, that there are others at this table and otherwise that would be better. Obviously, there is tracking of intelligence and Internet catch and all of that. That sort of isn't within the IRS' purview, and I think we would look to other experts for that sort of explanation and help. Mr. Connolly. I know my time is up, Mr. Chairman. If I might ask if there is anyone else at the table who wanted to respond to that. [No response.] Mr. Lynch. No takers. Mr. Connolly. Thank you. Mr. Lynch. All right. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. First of all, Mr. Miller, my condolences for the loss of life. Mr. Miller. Thank you, sir. Mr. Lynch. I know Vernon Hunter was a Vietnam veteran, two tours of duty, very close to retirement, so there is a human dimension here that sometimes gets lost in all of this. Let me ask you, Ms. Armstrong and Mr. Miller, after the incident in Austin, as Mr. Connolly pointed out and you confirmed, there was a certain unforseeability, this was so bizarre, I understand the evacuation and the post-attack procedures seemingly went very well. Were there any changes that you adopted, Mr. Miller, in terms of the way you are doing business at the IRS within some of your facilities? Was there a reassessment that you did following that event? And, Ms. Armstrong, I understand that the Interagency Security part of this, its function is to make sure best practices are adopted across agencies. Mr. Miller, is there anything that you did or the IRS did in response? And Ms. Armstrong, was any of that translated across agency lines? Mr. Miller. Sir, I can speak to the IRS, Mr. Chairman. What we did almost immediately was increase the amount of security at all of our facilities until we were certain, during the weekend and a little later than that, because this happened late in the week on a Thursday, until we were sure that this was not a series of, the first of a series. We then have continued additional guard service and additional security awareness and security at all the facilities, especially in Austin, but across the country, as well. We are in the process of doing what you are suggesting, which is reassessing exactly where we are today, what is the general threat level with respect to IRS facilities, and do we have in place the processes and security we need to ensure the safety of our folks. Ms. Armstrong. Yes, sir. In terms of the actual incident in Austin, itself, as the Office of Infrastructure Protection we monitor all such incidents as they relate to Government facilities or a whole host of different types of issues that impact critical infrastructure, so we monitored the incident, reported again to the point of is this a series of attacks, up to the national operations center and our Secretary. In terms of the Interagency Security Committee, this incident and other recent incidents are certainly part of the ongoing dialog that the committee is having about how it gets to the final stages of a couple of years of work to put together a ground-breaking compendium of standards for physical security at Federal buildings. The Congresswoman mentioned the facilities security committee. That is actually the third piece of our work, the first two pieces being the physical security criteria for Federal buildings and then a design basis threat piece so that 31 different types of threat can be considered as a facility considers countermeasures. What we are hoping to do with the facilities security committee is take 15 years worth of lessons learned on what is not working in terms of Federal Security Committee composition, training, and guidance, and have the Federal Protective Service and GSA co-chair the working group that looks at the whole issue of Federal Security Committees, how they work, what guidance they need, what training they need, and who needs to be on them to make effective security decisions at Federal buildings. Mr. Lynch. OK. Let me just followup on that. I understand that the Interagency Security Committee is sort of a facilitator across agency lines, and I know it is responsible for coordinating security in all the non-DOD executive branch agencies, which is fairly expansive. You are talking millions of employees. Ms. Armstrong. Yes, sir. Mr. Lynch. And I also understand that you have one employee, one staff person, the ISC, that handles all of that. Now, at one point there was only one employee to do all of that. Have you increased staffing to get this thing done in light of the threat that is out there? Ms. Armstrong. Yes, sir. As you know, the Interagency Security Committee chair came to the Office of Infrastructure Protection in fiscal year 2008, and since then we have been resourcing it out of hide, if you will. We do have one Federal employee and a team of contractors who do the staff work of the ISC. But the ISC is a 45-member interagency body, and other Federal agencies provide subject matter expertise, personnel, brain power, and do the actual work of the committee. So we coordinate, but the whole interagency contributes in terms of resources. Mr. Lynch. OK. I am just interested in seeing that properly resources. If there is a weak link in this chain, it is probably that, so it is tough enough with so many players here. You definitely need somebody coordinating all that. For now we will leave it to the agencies to properly resource that, but we will keep an eye on it. I now recognize the gentleman from Utah, Mr. Chaffetz, for 5 minutes. Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. First, Mr. Chairman, if I could, with all due respect to Mr. Connolly, I could use some help with the clarification in both the opening statement and in the questioning as to the source of where potentially some of this terrorism and acts of violence are coming from. Mr. Lynch. You are not allowed to ask other Members questions. We brought in five witnesses here, and you can ask them. I guess that is why we have the witnesses here. So if you want to sort of probe that with the witnesses, because I think Mr. Connolly was asking folks or citing that. So if you want to ask the witnesses about that, that would certainly be relevant. Mr. Chaffetz. I appreciate it. Mr. Lynch. And I understand the sensitivity here, and I have tried not to impugn or imply any particular source. I am actually working from the side of protecting the Federal employees within those facilities, and not working from the point of the folks that might be motivated to do something like this. Mr. Chaffetz. Coming into this hearing, that wasn't my intention, either. It is just the idea of the suggestion that there was any Member of this body that would suggest or condone or even encourage somebody, I just wanted to make sure that he had that opportunity to help clarify. But we will move on here. There was a suggestion in David Wright, who is the President of the Federal Protective Service Union, in his comments that the Federal Protective Service having been ``slashed to the point of ineffectiveness.'' I wanted to give the FPS an opportunity to kind of respond to that assertion that it had been slashed to the point of ineffectiveness. Would you care to comment? Mr. Schenkel. I can't agree entirely with President Wright in regards to that. What I can say is that we had to refocus our protection mission, based on the available resources that we had. We got involved in some things through mission creep, as I would call it, that got us distracted from the facilities that we were charged to protect. Consequently, we had to revamp our strategic plan and focus on the protection of the facilities. It is a challenge. It is a constant maneuvering of resources that we have that are available. As the threat changes, we have to keep maneuvering those limited resources where possible. Mr. Chaffetz. Thanks. I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. Lynch. Thank you. The Chair recognizes Ms. Eleanor Holmes Norton for 5 minutes. Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Armstrong, as you can see, the Interagency Security Committee bugs me. And I do want to make it clear that when Mr. Schenkel talks about the gap--and I think he is candid in reporting a gap--the gap should be labeled for what it is. It is a gap between burdensome and unnecessary security on the one hand and lax security on the other. The example that I offered before at the Department of Transportation--and let me tell you how this plays out. This is a fairly new facility. It is located along N Street Southeast. There are 20 million tourists and visitors who come to the District of Columbia. If you go along that street, we are just filling it out with the kinds of shops that you might expect and will be there over the years. Imagine yourself as a visitor to our city and you say, well, there is a Federal building, Johnny. We can go to the bathroom there. And I am telling you that because an interagency committee has some kind of hubris of self- importance, that taxpayer who paid for that building cannot enter that building because somebody has decided--and we understand that the center of authority is in this committee-- that a taxpayer can't get into that building unless the taxpayer knows a staff person who can come down and give the OK for the person to enter the building. Do you consider that appropriate, that kind of entry requirement for ordinary, law- abiding citizens to be appropriate? Ms. Armstrong. Well, I think the key there is what is the agency, what is the---- Ms. Norton. I am giving you an example and I would like you to answer my example, not depending on the agency. I have given you a low security agency and I am asking you whether you consider it appropriate that a taxpayer with a child, or without a child, cannot get into that building to use the facility or, for that matter, to go to the cafeteria. Do you consider that appropriate? Ms. Armstrong. Well, I think it is appropriate to have security practices and procedures in place that would prevent the unauthorized entry of an unauthorized person into a Federal facility. Ms. Norton. And you don't consider the taxpayer I am talking about an unauthorized person, would you? Ms. Armstrong. Well, I don't know the actual person that you are talking about. Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman, this is what I mean. I have given you a hypothetical. You refuse to give me an answer to my hypothetical. Ordinary citizen with a child, should that ordinary citizen be able to enter the Department of Transportation building in order for the child to use the facilities? Yes or no? Ms. Armstrong. I would have to say no, ma'am. Ms. Norton. For what reason, Ms. Armstrong? Ms. Armstrong. For purposes of protecting the employees at that building. Ms. Norton. In which way would this taxpayer be considered a risk to the employees in that building? Ms. Armstrong. Well, if he were the ex-husband of a woman that he had abused and is using a ruse to try to get past security to get to her, then security---- Ms. Norton. You see, Mr. Chairman, what I mean. Meanwhile, if this is the way you do security, Ms. Armstrong, I don't want you in charge of my security. I want somebody who, as Mr. Goldstein said, has taken a risk assessment and has decided is there a risk that a parent entering the building poses, a security threat, or is there a more serious risk. Let me ask you, Mr. Schenkel, particularly in light of that answer, according to Mr. Goldstein's testimony--and I am reading--in 2008, FPS transitioned to an inspector--understand FPS, oldest Federal police force in the United States--the FPS transitioned to an inspector-based work force--this is page 6-- eliminating the police position, and is relying primarily on FPS inspectors for both law enforcement and physical security activities, which has hampered its ability to protect Federal officials. In essence, this testimony from Mr. Goldstein says that the Federal Protective Service is no longer a police force, it is an inspector-based work force. Since 2008, have you right-sided the agency so that the Federal Protective Service is today a police force and not an inspector-based force? Mr. Schenkel. The inspectors are police officers. Ms. Norton. I understand exactly that. These are people who were patrolling before, who were looking for people like the bomb makers that Mr. Goldstein said, who were looking to prevent criminal activity. They were switched to a new position called an inspector position. My question to you is: have you switched any of these inspectors back to patrolling buildings and to being police officers, as they always were before this transition? Mr. Schenkel. In some regions the inspectors do take the active patrol. Ms. Norton. What is your intent? Is your intent that the Federal Protective Service do engage in these patrols and not be an inspector-oriented-based work force as it had become? Mr. Schenkel. It is a matter of resources, ma'am. We had to get the facilities---- Ms. Norton. If it is a matter of resources, why aren't the resources put on the police part of the protective service as opposed to the inspector part of the protective service? Mr. Schenkel. Because 80 percent of our facilities are protected by local and State law enforcement agencies, and with the resources that we have available---- Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. That is just not true. Local police forces do not protect Federal facilities. I just want to say for the record, Mr. Schenkel, that is untrue. The D.C. Police Department will not, in fact, protect Federal-- and there has already been testimony here they all think they have liability. Let me tell you what else, Mr. Schenkel: they all have a lot to do protecting their own cities. So for you to sit here and say we depend upon the D.C. police force and the Fairfax police force to protect Federal facilities is quite an outrage. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lynch. I thank you. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly. Mr. Connolly. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know we want to get on to some other witnesses, as well. I just have one question. Ms. Armstrong, what does the Interagency Security Committee do to preempt or prevent violence against Federal facilities? Is it all on the physical structural side of hardening facilities, or do we get into other kinds of strategies in the preemption and prevention? Ms. Armstrong. We do get into the prevention area and we, in fact, have a working group on workplace violence working on issuing a compendium of best practices. Mr. Connolly. And presumably you are also plugged into some kind of stream of intelligence in terms of possible known threats or purported threats? Ms. Armstrong. Yes, sir. We use the Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center [HITRAC], which is part of the Office of Infrastructure Protection and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis at DHS, to help with the design basis threat that we will be issuing soon. Mr. Connolly. Thank you. Ms. Armstrong. Yes, sir. Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lynch. Thank you. I yield myself 5 minutes. Mr. Cottrell, this sort of gets to Ms. Eleanor Holmes Norton's issue. You have a situation where, with the Postal Service, the public is actually invited into the building, not for the bulk mail facilities but the regular post offices, even the large GMF facility at South Station. They have a big section there where they invite the public in, obviously. How do you handle that balance between maintaining security as you need to, taking in packages from the public, as well, and yet maintaining the security for your personnel? Mr. Cottrell. It is a challenge, Mr. Chairman, but to balance being a retail facility as well as a Government facility and protect employees, we rely on training--training our supervisors and employees how to recognize and react to potentially violent encounters. We don't experience many breaches of security into the back rooms of facilities, but, as you stated, we do have several, well, we have thousands of retail facilities where sometimes unhappy customers can come in and attack or assault our employees. So it is really an awareness training of what to watch for and making sure our employees know who to contact and the steps to take if such an incident does occur to try to de- escalate or report an incident. Mr. Lynch. I also know that there is, at some level, some coordination between the U.S. Postal Service and DHS. I was involved with the installation of some of the new technology that was put in place after the anthrax attacks here at the Brentwood facility and elsewhere, I think in New York, but how has that coordination worked out? Was that a one-time event or is that something that is ongoing? Mr. Cottrell. It is ongoing. We participate in the ISC, the Interagency Security Committee, and, truthfully, the anthrax attacks, really. The Postal Service learned a lot of valuable lessons about liaisoning with other Federal, State, and local agencies so that folks know what to do. That is part of our annual training is to work and liaison with these other agencies. Mr. Lynch. OK. You know, we have one more panel to come up here. I think all of you know we didn't have much time to put this hearing together. I appreciate the thoroughness of your written testimony. I will leave the record open so if some Members who were in another hearing, I know Budget Committee is meeting right now, as well, and some of our Members are on that committee. But I want to thank you for your willingness to come before Congress and to offer your suggestions to possible solutions. We will be working on this going forward, probably in coordination with the Committee on Homeland Security, Mr. Thompson, so you may receive some requests in writing for testimony, further testimony, and to answer further questions. Thank you for your testimony here today, and I wish you a good day. All right. Panel two. First of all, let me welcome you to this hearing. I appreciate your willingness to come before this subcommittee with your testimony. What I will do is I will read a brief introduction of our witnesses, and then we will open it up for questions after you are sworn. Colleen Kelley is the president of the National Treasury Employees Union, the Nation's largest independent Federal sector Union, representing employees in 31 different Government agencies. Ms. Kelley, a former IRS revenue agent, was first elected to the Union's top post in August 1999. Jon Adler has been the national president of the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association since November 2008. He began his career in law enforcement in 1991 and has served as Federal criminal investigator since 1994. His experience includes working a wide variety of investigations and enforcing most of the Federal criminal statutes. Mr. David Wright is the president of the American Federation of Government Employees, Local 918, the National Federal Protective Service Union. Mr. Wright is also a veteran Federal Protective Service Officer and Inspector for over 20 years. It is the custom within this committee to ask all those who are to offer testimony to be sworn, so may I please ask you to rise and raise your right hands. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Lynch. Let the record reflect that each of the witnesses has answered in the affirmative. Ms. Kelley, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for an opening statement. STATEMENTS OF COLLEEN KELLEY, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION; JON ADLER, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ASSOCIATION; AND DAVID WRIGHT, PRESIDENT, LOCAL 918, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES STATEMENT OF COLLEEN KELLEY Ms. Kelley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Chaffetz, and members of the committee. I am very pleased to be here on behalf of NTEU to discuss Federal employee workplace safety and security issues. As you know, on Thursday, February 18th, in what authorities believe was an intentional suicide attack, a pilot with a perceived grudge against the Government, in general, and the IRS, in particular, crashed his small plane into a building housing almost 200 IRS employees and NTEU members in Austin, TX. As has been noted, the attack took the life of Vernon Hunter, a 27-year IRS employee, a beloved husband, father, grandfather, and U.S. veteran. Vernon's wife, Valerie, works for the IRS, as well, and was also in the Echelon building when the plane hit. They both have been long-time NTEU members, and I share in the sorrow that this tragic loss has caused for their family and for so many others. I know many of you saw pictures on TV of the Austin IRS building engulfed in flames and probably wondered, as I did, how so many people were able to escape, but I am guessing that many thought about it for a brief time and understandably moved on to other things. I think hearing what went on immediately after the attack may help to increase the urgency of preventing this from happening again and ensuring that employees know what to do if it does. Treasury Secretary Geithner, IRS Commissioner Shulman, and I visited with the affected employees shortly after the attack and we heard incredible stories of terror and heroism that I would like to share with you. Upon impact, the burning fuel from the plane quickly filled the air with black smoke, making it impossible for many in the building to see anything, yet employees near exits delayed their own escape so others could follow their voices and find their way out. Employees who were outside the building went back in to help evacuate disabled employees who worked in the mail room. An IRS employee with a disability told her co-worker to leave her on the fourth floor because she could not walk down the stairs. He insisted she climb on his back, saying he had carried soldiers that way when he was in the service. He carried her on his back down the four flights to safety. Andrew Jackson and Morgan Johnson and four others were trapped on the second floor of the building, unable to get to the exit because of the smoke, flames, heat, and debris. They crawled on their hands and knees, breathing through clothing they had dampened with water, looking for a way out. Morgan shouted through a broken window and got the attention of Robin DeHaven, who was an employee of a glass company who was miraculously passing by with a 20-foot ladder on his truck. Robin, who was later dubbed Robin Hood by those that he rescued, stopped and he tried to reach the trapped employees, but the ladder could not reach to the window that had already been broken. Andrew remembered a 4-foot metal crowbar that was used for property seizures that was kept in the office. After a few attempts and several gashes to his hand and his wrist, Andrew and the others succeeded in breaking a window through which they could get out and reach the ladder, clearing the glass and helping each other down Robin DeHaven's ladder to safety. Mr. Chairman, I have included in my written testimony several detailed suggestions on improving safety and security for the Federal work force, including increased staffing and training for the Federal Protective Service. NTEU is also requesting that the IRS undertake and include employees in a comprehensive review of safety and security measures at all of its facilities around the country, many of which have no guard or armed presence at all. And we want to make sure that IRS employees have access to any information on taxpayers who may pose a threat to their safety as they perform their duties. But I would also like to urge this committee to take the lead not just on the issue of physical safety, but on the issue of holding public officials to a responsible level of discourse when it comes to the Federal Government and those who work for it. I have to say that I was shocked to hear comments from elected officials that expressed empathy for the man responsible for the horrific attack in Austin that took the life of a wonderful patriotic American who was carrying out the laws that this Congress writes. I am not asking for limitations on free speech rights, but I am asking for members of this committee and this Congress to forcefully denounce this kind of irresponsible rhetoric before it contributes to more misguided violence against Federal workers who are just doing their jobs. Mr. Chairman, I know that you and other members of this committee have spoken out forcefully on this issue, and I very much appreciate that. I also appreciate the strong statement of support from President Obama. And NTEU appreciates the fact that the House passed a bipartisan resolution authored by Congressman Doggett of Texas supported by members of this subcommittee with you, Mr. Chairman, as an original coauthor, condemning the attack in Austin. I thank you for that and I thank you for holding this important hearing. I hope it will encourage others to join in these efforts, and I would be happy to answer any questions. [The prepared statement of Ms. Kelley follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.041 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.042 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.043 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.044 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.045 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.046 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.047 Mr. Lynch. Thank you. Mr. Adler, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF JON ADLER Mr. Adler. Thank you. Chairman Lynch, Ranking Member Chaffetz, and distinguished members of the committee, on behalf of the 26,000 membership of the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. My name is Jon Adler and I am the National President of FLEOA. I am proud to represent Federal law enforcement officers from over 65 different agencies, including FPS, IRS criminal investigation, Treasury IG, Postal Inspection, and Secret Service. My statement includes specific comments from members from these agencies, as well as others. In the course of my 19 years in Federal law enforcement, I served as a first responder at Ground Zero on September 11, 2001, and in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina hit. From these two catastrophic events, I witnessed the devastation terrorism and acts of nature can have on the safety and security in a Government workplace. From these horrific events, there was a lot to be learned. It is our collective responsibility to apply this knowledge and not let it rest like an old gun trapped in an unworn holster. We can learn a lot from the feedback I received from seasoned law enforcement officers employed by a diverse group of agencies. Their comments reflect both the employee and protective perspective. Here are some examples: Regarding GSA, GSA had a program they called first impressions where they attempted to blend security screening into the aesthetics of the building. This pushed back the security screening from the immediate area of the entry to the facility into the building lobby. The Israeli security procedure is to identify the threat before it reaches and enters the protected facility. All new security screening stations need to be constructed and existing ones retrofitted with the protection of the security officers in mind. Regarding IRS, IRS employees work in GSA-owned or leased space which FPS has statutory authority to protect, which includes uniformed law enforcement response and criminal investigations. IRS agencies do not pass any information along to FPS regarding persons who have threatened an IRS facility or employee. Their withholding of threat information puts the facilities, their employees, and any citizen in the facility at risk. IRS has not prepared their special agents for responding to situations such as what happened in Vegas or Austin. Frankly, with all the training IRS employees receive, it is shameful that IRS has not implemented a workable plan to respond to incidents like the one in Austin. I believe it is time for IRS criminal investigation to create a program or training course that addresses terrorist type attacks against IRS. The fact that IRS is unwilling to refer to violent tax evaders as tax protesters shows their lack of commitment to workplace threats. Regarding the Postal Service, I watched automatic lawn sprinkling equipment installed while denied request for less than $5,000 worth of security improvements in the same facility. I have witnessed longstanding security specifications minimized or outright eliminated for perimeter facing, investigative observation, robbery countermeasures, vehicle breaking countermeasures, etc., where, if the Inspection Service is even consulted, the decision is pre-ordained to lower or eliminate the existing standards. There are post offices in desperate need of bullet-resistant screen lines but go unfunded due to their cost. Regarding courthouse and probation, there are six judicial districts where the chief judges will not allow qualified probation and pretrial officers to be armed and defend themselves in the work force. It is mind boggling that we have officers go through 40 hours of firearms training and not be allowed to carry a firearm. It is not uncommon for offenders and their associates to loiter outside public buildings before or after meetings or interviews with officers, and this poses a risk for the officers, the workers, and the community. Several Federal courthouses have no security presence after hours on weekends or holidays. Employees' only protection is their access card and their PIN. It is a total joke. The bottom line is, without a security presence the officers and their employees are vulnerable to an attack. FLEOA member recommendations include: FPS is available to assist in GSA-owned and leased space with occupant emergency planning and exercises and active planning and awareness training, which I believe Director Schenkel hit on. The Secret Service uses a continuity of operations plan in all of its offices to address emergency response, evacuation routes, relocation, and contact information. Each office is equipped with emergency equipment, and every employee is given a co-op card with pertinent emergency information. Other agencies may benefit from adopting all or some of this system. Each agency should run unannounced security tests aimed at improving layers of protection and not punishing those who don't succeed. Set up an interagency task force with experienced law enforcement officers to address building and equipment vulnerabilities, threat assessment, and response protocols, threat information sharing, and human capital needs. Agency heads should provide Congress with a list of their security needs to ensure funding for appropriate staffing levels, training, and functional security equipment. In turn, each agency head must commit to spending funds for specific security needs, with the expectation of enhanced security measures, the general Government employee audience must embrace the implementation of new technology such as the advanced imaging technology now being used by TSA. In closing, I will offer that the best playbook or operational plan accomplishes nothing when it is layered with dust. All agencies should practice emergency response protocols and periodically test their defense systems. With the appropriate level of funding, agency staffing, equipment, and training needs will be met. It is imperative that the agency have the means to take proactive measures to improve workplace security and emergency response capabilities. We all need to claim ownership of this challenge, and we all need to commit to its success. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Mr. Adler follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.048 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.049 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.050 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.051 Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Adler. Mr. Wright, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF DAVID WRIGHT Mr. Wright. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Chaffetz, and members of the subcommittee, Mr. Chairman, as president of the FPS Union, it has never given me pleasure to bring attention to this crisis. Indeed, I have dedicated the last 24 years of my life trying to make this agency the best law enforcement Homeland Security agency in the country, but when our members see every day how serious the problems are, I am obligated to speak out. Over the past 2 years, the Federal Protective Service has been investigated, analyzed, and studied. The GAO has performed six studies since 2008 addressing different aspects of FPS, and all concluded that the agency is rife with serious problems, each of which is impairing the ability of FPS to perform its critical homeland security mission. Taken together, the GAO analyses paint a portrait of an essentially dysfunctional agency. The mission of the FPS is to protect approximately 9,000 high, medium and low-security Federal buildings and properties around the country. These buildings include everything from Social Security offices, Federal courthouses, Federal congressional offices, and agency headquarters. Hundreds of thousands of Federal employees work in these buildings, and millions of Americans visit every day. Time and again, Federal buildings and employees have been demonstrated to be targets. Recent events in Washington, DC, Austin, Las Vegas, and even Kansas City serve as a wake-up call to both the administration and Congress that the time for discussion, studies, years of reports that highlight the same failures has ended. Action is required now, and not after the next major terrorist attack. Regarding manpower, in the period following the terrorist attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, it was determined that the minimum number of FPS personnel necessary to perform its mission was 1,480. Since the Department of Homeland Security was stood up in 2003, the FPS has seen its total number of inspector and police officer positions drop from 1,017 in 2003 to 830 at the beginning of 2010, an 18.4 percent reduction. Over the same period, U.S. Parks Service increased its security personnel by 45.5 percent. The Veterans Health Administration increased its security personnel over 35.9 percent. Even within DHS, security personnel increased over the 7-year period of 230.5 percent. The result of this resource starvation is that FPS security services have been slashed to the point of ineffectiveness. No longer do FPS police officers operate on a 24-hour patrol basis, even when responsible for protecting level four high-security facilities. No longer does the agency have the personnel necessary to adequately oversee private guards due to a lack of manpower. All of this has occurred in a post-9/11 environment that has made anti-terrorism efforts the highest of priorities in the White House and Congress. As a result of the extremely limited resources provided to FPS, the agency has been in disarray, leaving employees in certain of their jobs, contract guards, routinely unsupervised, and managers operating fiefdoms free of any central control of direction. Mr. Chairman, I believe we are on borrowed time when it comes to this very large gap in our national homeland security safety net. Contract guard issues, every day Federal protective officers put their lives on the line to accomplish their critical homeland security mission, to make sure facilities are protected and contract guards are correctly trained and proficient in their duties. Despite these efforts, FPS does not have sufficient staff to accomplish these vital tasks. One glaring example is the monitoring and training of contract guards. In 2001, there were 5,000 contract guards and FPS was authorized over 1,450 personnel. By 2009, there were 15,000 contract guards, but FPS was authorized only 1,225 total personnel. A threefold increase in guards coupled with a 16 percent cut in FPS staff is a recipe for failure. No one should have been surprised to discover shortfalls in contract guard management, performance, and ability to detect weapons and explosives. Clearly, OMB should have increased the resources for monitoring rather than imposing a cut. In conclusion, I would like to thank the members of the committee for holding this hearing. I hope that it will serve as the beginning of a process that will lead to comprehensive FPS reform legislation this year. I know that Senator Lieberman has announced his intention to introduce such legislation soon, and we urge the House to do so, as well. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Wright follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.052 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.053 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.054 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.055 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.056 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.057 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.058 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.059 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.060 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.061 Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Wright. I now yield myself 5 minutes. President Kelley, you had an opportunity to go to the IRS facility in Austin. You had a chance to talk to the employees. First of all, my condolences to your organization for that loss. Ms. Kelley. Thank you. Mr. Lynch. What were the suggestions, recommendations, urgings that you heard there in terms of trying to address that situation on the ground? Were there any concrete recommendations that came out of at least a preliminary investigation? Ms. Kelley. In the immediate aftermath, Mr. Chairman, there really have not been. The focus has been more on what happened that day and how so many were able to get out successfully. For example, when we were there and met with the employees, they thanked their co-worker who had been responsible for fire drills. And everybody knows whoever runs the fire drills, somebody is always trying to hide to not have to actually practice. And they made it a point of thanking her, because they knew what to do that day. So there really has been more thought to now getting them situated. They just returned to work last Monday in other buildings until there is a new replacement building for them to move to. So now the conversations are more leaning toward what can be done, you know, what are they concerned about, what should we pay attention to for the future, especially in the new site that they will be moving to. So as that develops, we will be working very closely with the IRS in an effort to put plans in place that make those suggestions reality. Mr. Lynch. Thank you. We are sort of doing an informal assessment across the board for IRS facilities, and I notice that there are--and I am not sure which level. I know you have different levels of sensitivity and security that are required. But I did notice that there were about 275 facilities that had no protection whatsoever, not even security guards. I am just curious, you know, each of you, what your thoughts are on that. I think that might be a function of this 1,250 minimum staffing requirement, that you just don't have enough folks. I know there is also an additional 15,000 private security guards that are hired as contractors to do some of the, I guess, basic security outside the building, that type of thing. Your thoughts on the manning requirement and also the status of having at least 275 IRS facilities that don't have any security whatsoever. Ms. Kelley. I will say for my part that employees would say there are too many IRS facilities without some guard presence. I am sure that Mr. Wright knows better than I the number that have FPS presence. Most of them that I am aware of, some of the larger buildings have FPS, but the majority of them have contract guards rather than FPS. Like I said, this is an issue for employees. Many of them believe their facility and the situation that they are in warrants a guard. It comes down to resources. It is an issue we are always debating the IRS with over the money, because there is a cost attached to it, definitely. But it is an issue that has been long a point of disagreement between us over how much is needed. Obviously, as someone had asked before, the Austin attack was not going to be prevented by having guards or FPS there, but it highlights, when things like that happen it makes you think about the things that can be controlled and the need for a focus and a recognition that there need to be resources to adequately protect these buildings. Mr. Lynch. Mr. Adler, same question. Mr. Adler. Yes. I agree. Colleen is exactly right. It is a resource issue. And in this instance, it is a matter of response. If you don't have a physical presence, if you put 2 people on a playing field to go against an 11 with a full bench, as well, you can't play. You are at a tremendous disadvantage and people are at risk. So what do you do? I think one of the disputes, I represent IRS special agents as well as TIG, or Treasury IG special agents, and they have a little ongoing dispute as to who responds to certain situations. So if you don't have perimeter or building security but in certain instances you may have special agents in there, well, guess what, they are responsible and they own it and they need to be trained to respond. They can't have any doubt. You can't play who is in charge when it hits the fan. One of the issues that needs to get addressed and needs to be resolved is who claims ownership and what training is in play to respond. Colleen is absolutely right: we are not concerned, well, we can't prevent a plane. That is beyond our Superman and Superwoman abilities. You can't prevent a plane from flying into a building. But what happens in a situation like what happened in the Las Vegas courthouse, only now it is an IRS facility? And instead of one elderly person with mental issues coming in with a shotgun, you have more highly skilled, trained terrorists coming in with assault weapons? Well, what do we do? We should have an answer. We can't make this up when it happens. We need to get it done and planned for now. Mr. Lynch. Thank you. Mr. Wright. Mr. Wright. Yes, sir, this kind of delves back into the ISC and the facilities security committees. The ISC is not codified. They are not the authority. They come up with recommendations, and once those recommendations reach the field it is up to an FPS inspector, when we are dealing with our buildings, our properties that we are responsible for, it is up to that inspector to take those recommendations, make those recommendations to the facilities security committee, which is mainly staffed by lay personnel. Very rare that you get a good security-wise person on those committees. So what happens, the reason you would have a number of properties, IRS properties that have no security personnel onsite is the recommendations have likely been made, they have been presented to the Facility Security Committee. That committee has to weigh that recommendation against their yearly budget, usually their operating budget. Sometimes they have security funds, sometimes they don't. Generally, these things get voted down. There is no authority at this time to mandate any building in any sector of the Government to provide security. I know of a case now of a very major Federal building where a GSA type is the head of the Security Committee and you would be very surprised how lacking that is. I would be glad to tell you about it behind closed doors, because it just does not happen. Mr. Lynch. All right. Thank you very much. I now yield 5 minutes to the ranking member, Mr. Chaffetz. Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. Ms. Kelley, there are many great acts of heroism that happened in Texas, and for that we are eternally grateful and thankful. I am sure we will never hear all of the stories of people who reacted the right way at the right time and woke up that morning and had no idea that was going to happen, so for that we are so grateful, and obviously saddened for the loss of anybody who should never have had to go through that, nor should their family. It is just absolutely and totally inexcusable. It is still early, but, based on what you have known or have seen or have heard, at least at this point, what is it in Texas that could have or should have happened that maybe didn't happen, because the results were in many ways miraculous, but at the same time there is always things you want to learn and share and grow from. So can you give us a little insight as to that perspective? Ms. Kelley. No. Again, the focus has been on whether it was the luck or just everyone acting together, just the pulling together. I mean, I really have not heard of anything that day someone said I wish this or I wish that. And the IRS has been very, very responsive and very, very understanding. They have been wonderfully supportive to these employees since the attack. So, like I said, in looking forward I will tell you when the Austin attack happened, even though it was an airplane, IRS employees from around the country felt very, very vulnerable because what they realized was it could have been their building. If the anger was at the IRS, it could have been any IRS building. And it reminded them of things that maybe are more within the control, whether it is about the need for armed guards, whether it is about lighting that isn't working in parking lots, whether it is about cipher locks not working or fire alarms not properly working in the building, things that you identify and you pursue and then something else happens and you kind of lose sight of it. So events like this bring all that back into focus. But really I have talked to many of these employees and to our local chapter president there, and they have not identified anything that went wrong that day. I mean, it really was a miracle. It was one life too many, but it was a miracle that there were not more. Mr. Chaffetz. And point well taken. I guess we should always continue to probe and understand and look at all the different scenarios, so I would obviously concur with that thought and hope that we continue to expand that. I guess, Mr. Chairman, one of the points I guess I would take away from that is we should also highlight everything that went right. You can never plan for everything. There is no end to the creativity of these nuts who want to create terror, but at the same time there are a lot of things that went well, and I think we should also highlight and explore and note those, as well. And perhaps, Mr. Adler or Mr. Wright, you can help me understand where your perception of the FPS, but also the difference between the contractors, if you will, as opposed to those. And help me understand the difference in where you see the fundamental flaws. Either one. Mr. Adler. And you are referring, just to clarify, to the FPS inspector versus the contract uniform? Mr. Chaffetz. Yes. The specific concerns about contracting that out. I have real concerns about doing that. Mr. Adler. Just from my perspective--and I am going to defer to Mr. Wright--but just, again, by way of background and training, the inspectors go through a different process. The contracting system obviously involves a private company which doesn't place the same emphasis on what it would take to become an inspector, whether it is going through the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center or certain agency-specific training modules. So certainly we place more reliance, if you will, on the inspector, the Federal uniform component within FPS. Mr. Chaffetz. Mr. Wright. Mr. Wright. The Federal Protective Service inspectors and police officers go through the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. Nowadays we are up to 24 or 26 weeks of training. The contract security guards are private guards. They have commitments to their companies. The other thing that needs to be stated in regards to these private guards is they get their authority basically State to State or more likely city to city. There is no Federal authority for a private guard. So in Kansas City, MO, where I come from, the Kansas City Police Department and the St. Louis Police Department have pretty good private watchmen commissions, and they do give the authority to arrest. Fifty miles up the road in St. Joseph, MO, the first requirement to get a commission there in St. Joseph is that they have a commission in Kansas City. Then 60 miles to the east in Chillicothe, MO, the way you get a commission license is to show your St. Joseph license. So this goes city to city, building to building, region to region. There just is no common sense there, and that is why one of our recommendations is let's get Federal security guards or Federal police officers, much like you have here at Capitol Police, give these individuals the authority, give them the training, and let them do their job. That being said, this is not to denigrate any of our contract guards. We have a lot of great veterans coming back and they are being picked up by these private companies, and no denigration at all to those troops, either. Mr. Chaffetz. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lynch. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Eleanor Holmes Norton for 5 minutes. Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My condolences, particularly to you, Ms. Kelley, and my thanks to you and to Mr. Adler and Mr. Wright for your service to the United States. Mr. Wright, I find your charts amazing. Mr. Wright. Yes. Ms. Norton. The charts at the rear of your testimony that rather much point up, I think, the difficulties that we are having with security for Federal employees. You point to what you call the exponential growth of security and law enforcement staff in virtually every agency except the Federal Protective Service, including a Government- wide growth for the last seven or so years of 56.5 percent, whereas FPS, alone, shows negative growth of 18.4 percent. Mr. Wright. Correct. Ms. Norton. Now, you cite some of these agencies. Doesn't this show that with this huge growth, that first these agencies know they are living post-9/11, so if they can't get it from FPS aren't we in effect forcing outsourcing to whatever contract guards they choose, without any relationship to any central security authority of the U.S. Government? Mr. Wright. Yes. Just this year, alone, I have heard of agencies coming forward and proposing to hire their own 083 police officers, and actually Social Security is probably the best security-minded agency out there that are our clients, but they have looked into hiring their own 083 police force. Ms. Norton. So what we have here, Mr. Chairman, I think, is agencies deciding that, since FPS has been shrinking, since the Federal Government has not been requiring Government-wide security, since we have outsourcing authority, let's set up multiple police forces replicating what the FPS is supposed to do Government-wide, without any central connection to minimum standards for these almost always contract guards and not people who are, as one of you has testified, police officers who go to be trained at the same place where our best police officers in the Federal Government go. So what we are talking about, I want to just get in the record, multiple police forces popping up, agency by agency, at the agency's discretion, just leaving the whole idea of a Government-wide Federal police force out there to flounder. Is that not the case? Mr. Wright. Much of that, Ms. Norton, is the way that FPS is funded. We are funded through a security fee of charges per square foot. At this point it is up to $0.66 a square foot. What happens is these agencies see all this money flowing to FPS. Ms. Norton. So how do they pay for the outsourced police forces that they set up without any expertise of their own? Mr. Wright. I don't know. Ms. Norton. See, here you have FPS saying you have to have it per square foot, and they say, OK, since nobody is compelling me to use them, who cares about those standards? Let's just hire our own independent police force and make our own standards. How anybody can tell me that is going to protect the IRS or any other agency, I don't know, but I think it important to note that we are not here talking about what FPS does or shouldn't do; we are talking about the existence of auxiliary police forces, or I should say alternative police forces in agencies where at will they can decide who they are, what their standards are, with virtually no Federal oversight through the FPS or, for that matter, through the Department of Homeland Security. What's the relationship, Mr. Adler or Mr. Wright, of the FPS to the local police forces of a particular city or county? Mr. Adler. It varies. I think Director Schenkel hit on it. But in my experience what I have seen, there can be a commonality, there can be a camaraderie, but ultimately most local law enforcement, first of all, they are not allowed to carry within a Federal facility. Most of them aren't familiar with the layout. So if you rang the alarm and they came, they might find the front door but they may not be familiar with the layout. I think the role of local law enforcement, to put it in proper perspective, is really to arrive on the scene quickly to provide perimeter security, crowd control, but really it is incumbent upon the police officers, the law enforcement components within the building working for the agencies to respond and prevent the situation from going from bad to worse. Ms. Norton. And I think that is important for the record, Mr. Chairman, since Mr. Schenkel said they depend on local police forces. The notion that busy police forces should do anything but what they would do anyway if there was something on the outside of the business is very disconcerting to hear. Mr. Chairman, if I could just conclude by noting that in Mr. Wright's testimony--and ask him if he knows what these cities are--he says that at a minimum--it is under FPS structural problems--at a minimum, around-the-clock protection by Federal law enforcement officers should be provided in the 18 to 22 cities with the greatest concentration of employees-- meaning Federal employees--and facilities. I think you say that 24-hour service is only provided in two cities. What are those cities? Mr. Wright. Can I approach that off the record? I am not sure it is appropriate to say in a public setting. Ms. Norton. Yes. Could you make sure that the chairman understands that? Mr. Wright. Yes. I think you will be very surprised as to who doesn't have it. Ms. Norton. Yes. Make sure the chairman gets that in camera so we can understand that. I just think that we know what those--almost anybody could guess what those 18 cities, 18 of 22 cities with the greatest concentration are, and everybody would know that those are the cities that we regard as most targeted, and what your testimony here today has informed us is that we have to get on the stick. What happened to IRS with extraordinary sadness from all of us was a kamikaze event of the kind that perhaps no police force of any kind could have deterred, but it certainly ought to be a shot across our so-called bow to remember that this is not the kind of attacks we should be expecting, especially in IRS offices. I work very closely with the IRS here. I have found IRS employees to be among the most collegial, the most customer oriented employees in the U.S. Government. But if you are out here in this recession paying taxes, lost your job, house gone, and you can't find anybody else to be mad at, there is always your local IRS employee, and we have a duty to protect these employees every day of the week that they are on duty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lynch. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, for 5 minutes. Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Kelley, welcome. I am sorry I was stuck up here the other day, and I thank you for your kind introduction in my absence. In your prepared statement you made reference to the fact that you were shocked at some statements by certain public officials after the tragedy in Austin. Would you elaborate? Ms. Kelley. There was a Member of the House of Representatives who--I don't have the quotes in front of me, so I would not want to misquote. I am sure most have seen them in the press, and I would be glad to provide them. And when I issued statements, and also to a Member of the Senate, and when I issued statements expressing shock and disappointment and looking for an apology, they were not forthcoming. Those apologies have never been forthcoming. I think that it is outrageous that anyone would make statements like those that have been made, much less someone, you know, anyone in a public position that should be supporting Federal employees who are just trying to do their jobs. Mr. Connolly. If you want to provide more for the record? Ms. Kelley. I will be glad to do that. Mr. Connolly. It would be welcome. Thank you. Mr. Adler, could you elaborate a little bit? You spoke fast, and although I am originally from Boston, I have lived in the south so long now I have trouble sometimes following a fast presentation, but you were making a point between the difference between, if I understood your testimony, GSA's first screen versus, say, the Israeli approach to security. Could you just elaborate on that a little bit? Mr. Wright. Yes. We have been addressing this in the TSA venue, as well. The concept of taking proactive steps in the law enforcement security arena, to not simply sit back and become reactionary, become a duck in a barrel, if you will, and pray the barrel is durable enough to withstand the attack, be proactive, but, of course, it is very convenient for me to come here and say we should be proactive. You need resources to accomplish that. You need human beings in uniforms with training and capability and authority to do it. Out of respect to Director Schenkel, he is making do with what he has, whether it is setting MOUs with local law enforcement or anyone else. Ideally, we would have enough. You know, we are talking about whether we have police officers or inspectors. I would like all of the above. I would love to have police officers at every law enforcement or Federal Government facility, but that would enable us to take a more proactive approach, to have the proper equipment like cameras and so forth so we can monitor the area, have the plain clothes contingent out there who know and are trained in behavioral actions and just things, little indicators we can pick up. I know firsthand FPS does an excellent job of that at 26 Federal Plaza in New York. That is the sort of thing that we do want to have happen but, once again, the starting point is having the resources to engage in that type of proactive investigative security law enforcement activities. Mr. Connolly. Although, as Mr. Miller of the other panel indicated, all of that, if we did everything you just said, it still would not have prevented the terrorist attack in Austin. Mr. Adler. Correct. There are two aspects we are talking about here for this hearing. One is prevention, the other is response. We have to concede. Colleen mentioned the plane coming into the building. We concede that. Then we are defined how we respond. So, taking it from initially, the Israeli approach will minimize the prevention side of things, but, and as we all know, human error will occur. Something will get in, whether it is an active shooter or an explosive device. The question then is: what are we trained and capable of doing in response? That was the other side of what I was trying to present. Mr. Connolly. All right. Thank you. In your testimony you also said, if I heard you correctly, that the IRS puts both the public and its own employees at risk. What were you referring to? Mr. Adler. I was referring to quotations that were sent to me. I received a lot of emails. I requested input. I have 65 agencies we represent. Each one has an agency representative. So when the email goes out, they have input. What that was reflecting was I think it is a lot of frustration among my CID special agent members who are concerned that they want to passionately get involved, they listen to what Colleen describes, and they feel as if they have to make it up at game time. You can't wing it; you have to plan for it and you have to step up and recognize IRS is always going to be a threatened component by virtue of what they do, so you have to commit resources to training the special agents who are there, who are the first responders, to make sure they are not going to make it up when it happens, to make sure they don't have to rely upon somebody who takes the initiative and heroic ability to help in a fire drill or put someone on their back. They should plan, and that will minimize, or actually it will increase their effectiveness in responding to one of these types of attacks. Mr. Connolly. And in what little time I have left, Mr. Wright, you talked about the FPS being dysfunctional, citing some studies that would say that. If you have a series of recommendations, I would welcome seeing them. One quick question: do you have a view about the relative merits between, say, a Federal guard, Federal employee, versus contract security? Mr. Wright. As stated earlier, private guards have basically a mish-mash of authority across the United States. Every city, every State is different. The benefits to having a Federal guard, our more likely recommendation is Federal police officers like you have here at the Capitol, they are FLETC trained and they have that Federal authority to immediately stop and detain threats or take action against individuals that enter the property. What we see now--and I will be glad to share later on the record--a major city where it has been documented--now, I have always had the anecdotal evidence over the years that private guards are afraid to put their hands on anyone. We have documented cases of individuals running from FPS police officers and guards standing by. And just here in the last couple of days I received some very disturbing information where it has been absolutely documented in our operation shield efforts across the country that these guards are witnessing threats or witnessing our attempts to penetrate. We are witnessing these guards say, I can't do anything. I have to stop. If I see something on that x-ray screen that looks threatening, I am not going to stop that individual, I am going to call FPS or in some cases I am going to call the company first. So that is a problem. Federal officers would have that authority right here, right now, stop that individual, take him down, and do what has to be done. You have a lot of private officers out there that are afraid for their own liability. Mr. Connolly. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. I want to thank the members of the panel for your willingness to come before the Congress and offer your suggestions and offer your testimony. I am going to leave the record open for 3 days for those Members who are on other committees and haven't had an opportunity to ask questions, but other than that we appreciate your testimony here today and we bid you good day. [Whereupon, at 4:21 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] [The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings and additional information submitted for the hearing record follow:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.062 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.063 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.064 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.065 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7976.066