[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-157]
SPACE POSTURE REVIEW AND THE FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE ACTIVITIES
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 21, 2010
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STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
RICK LARSEN, Washington DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
SCOTT MURPHY, New York
WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York
Bob DeGrasse, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Professional Staff Member
Kari Bingen, Professional Staff Member
Alejandra Villarreal, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2010
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, April 21, 2010, Space Posture Review and the Fiscal
Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Budget Request for
National Security Space Activities............................. 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, April 21, 2010........................................ 21
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 2010
SPACE POSTURE REVIEW AND THE FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE ACTIVITIES
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island,
Chairman, Strategic Forces Subcommittee........................ 1
Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Ranking Member,
Strategic Forces Subcommittee.................................. 3
WITNESSES
Butler, Robert J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Cyber and Space Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense..... 6
Kehler, Gen. C. Robert, USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command,
U.S. Air Force................................................. 5
Payton, Gary E., Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for
Space Programs, U.S. Air Force................................. 8
Sapp, Betty, Principal Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance
Office......................................................... 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Butler, Robert J............................................. 43
Kehler, Gen. C. Robert....................................... 25
Payton, Gary E............................................... 60
Sapp, Betty.................................................. 51
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Heinrich................................................. 78
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 77
SPACE POSTURE REVIEW AND THE FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE ACTIVITIES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Strategic Forces Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 21, 2010.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:15 p.m., in
room HVC-210, Capitol Visitors Center, Hon. James Langevin
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM RHODE ISLAND, CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Langevin. Good afternoon. This hearing of the Strategic
Forces Subcommittee will now come to order. Today we will take
testimony on the Administration's Space Posture Review (SPR)
and the Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Request
for National Security Space Activities.
I want to, first of all, welcome all of our witnesses here
today. First, we have General Bob Kehler, Commander of the U.S.
Air Force Space Command. He is responsible for organizing,
training, and equipping space and private space forces for the
North American Aerospace Defense Command, the U.S. Strategic
Command (STRATCOM), and other combatant commands around the
world.
Previously, he was Deputy Commander of STRATCOM. He served
in the Air Force for over 35 years with tours in
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) operations, space
launch and space operations, missile warning, and space
control. During his service, he earned a Master's in Public
Administration at the University of Oklahoma in Norman and a
Master's in National Security and Strategic Studies from the
Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. I have heard
something about that, General. Great job there. So welcome,
General. Appreciate you coming back and testifying here once
again. It is great to be with you.
Next, Mr. Robert Butler, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Cyber and Space, has agreed to appear before the
committee today to discuss the interim Space Posture Review and
the status of the Administration's work on space policy. Mr.
Butler is a former Air Force officer with over 30 years of
experience in intelligence and communications-computer systems.
He earned an MBA from the University of Maryland. Welcome to
you, Mr. Butler.
Our third witness, Ms. Betty Sapp, Principal Deputy
Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). It has
become a tradition of the subcommittee to have an NRO witness
discuss the unclassified aspects of your agency's mission at
our yearly hearing. And Ms. Sapp is also a former Air Force
officer and previously served as Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence from 2007 to 2009. She earned an MBA
from the University of Missouri, Columbia. Welcome to you, Ms.
Sapp.
Finally, we will hear from Mr. Gary Payton, Deputy Under
Secretary of the Air Force, on the status of space acquisition
programs. Mr. Payton retired as a colonel from the Air Force.
In the course of his 23 years of service, he flew as a payload
specialist onboard the Space Shuttle Discovery.
He also directed the development of missile defense sensor
and interceptor technologies while at the Strategic Defense
Initiative Organization and, more recently, served as Deputy
for Advanced Systems at the Missile Defense Agency. He has a
Master's Degree in Aeronautical and Astronautical Engineering
from Purdue University in Indiana. And I want to welcome you,
Mr. Payton and, again, our entire panel here this afternoon.
Well, in addition to thanking you for being with us here
today, let me say that the United States has unparalleled space
capabilities, as we all recognize. These capabilities are the
underpinning of our military superiority, our global
communications, and directly support our intelligence
capabilities and, in fact, our way of life.
At the same time, our space dominance underscores our
dependence on space-based assets, which have become
increasingly vulnerable as space becomes more congested and
other countries develop the ability to hold at risk our
satellites, our capabilities and, in fact, our operations.
Several events in recent years have increased the urgency
for an effective strategy to protect our military and economic
advantages in space: as we know, in 2007, China conducted an
anti-satellite (ASAT) test and, in 2008, a defunct Russian
satellite collided with a commercial communications satellite,
just by way of a couple of examples. These two events, which
created unprecedented amounts of space debris, underscore the
risk that an attack or accident could pose for continued
effective operation and safety of U.S. space assets.
Compiling the challenge, space is becoming more
competitive. European nations are expanding their commercial
and military space capabilities, while India, Japan, South
Korea, Brazil, Iran, and North Korea are all developing
indigenous space capabilities. These developments have created
challenges for protecting our assets, but also opportunities
for collaboration that could support U.S. strategic long-term
goals and interests related to security, commercial, and the
civil sectors.
The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2009
required the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National
Intelligence to conduct a comprehensive review of our national
security space posture. On March 12, 2010, the Administration
submitted an interim report, but indicated that the final
posture report cannot be completed until the White House
establishes the broader, national space policy. As a result, we
understand that the final national security posture review is
not likely to be available until later this year, but we hope
that when both the national policy and the Military Posture
Review efforts are complete, they will have answers to key
questions about our space capabilities.
For example, how do we adequately defend or, if need be,
reconstitute our capabilities? What are the potential gaps now
and in the future? How can we maintain the industrial base to
produce the needed satellites, ground equipment, software, and
launch vehicles that we need? Can we find ways to deliver these
products within established schedules and budgets? And finally,
how can we strike the balance between developing technical
solutions and pursuing diplomatic approaches to ensure that
U.S. space assets are protected from attack or disruption?
During the hearing today, we hope to hear a variety of
perspectives on the challenges that we face in national
security space.
General Kehler, as you contemplate your responsibilities
for organizing, training, and equipping our space forces, I am
particularly interested in hearing what, in fact, keeps you up
at night. What are the most important challenges that you face,
and what should we be doing to ensure that you continue to
deliver space capabilities to our warfighters?
Mr. Butler, I look forward to hearing your insights on the
progress that is being made to establish an overall national
space policy and the work remaining to complete the national
security space posture. We hope you can also share with us any
additional findings from these ongoing efforts.
Ms. Sapp and Mr. Payton, as you know, space acquisition
programs have had a poor history of performance over the past
decade. During your testimony today, I would like each of you,
if you would, to provide us with your assessment of the
progress being made to address cost and budget problems. Could
you also identify the key challenges that remain in achieving
stability in the acquisition process?
And finally, I would be interested in the views of each our
witnesses on how to best organize the national security space
enterprise. Each of you has had a long and distinguished career
in the field. We ask how we can better align the national
security space enterprise to rapidly respond to the challenges
that we face.
With that said, I again want to welcome you here today. We
appreciate you appearing before the subcommittee and we look
forward to your testimony in just a few minutes. Before that
though, before hearing from the witnesses, I would like to now
turn to the Ranking Member for any comments that he may have.
Mr. Turner is now recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO,
RANKING MEMBER, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join you in
welcoming General Kehler, Mr. Butler, Ms. Sapp and Mr. Payton.
I want to thank you all for your dedication, your expertise,
and for being here today to be able to answer some of our
questions and to give us highlights of the issues that you
think are the most important.
I would like to start by highlighting the interim report on
the Space Posture Review, SPR, that the committee received in
March. It described today's on-orbit and soon-to-be-launched
satellites, but doesn't describe a future space posture. One
could provide the same critique of the interim SPR as Ranking
Member McKeon did of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). He
said, ``We find a QDR that basically reinforces the status quo
despite serious threats to our current capability. Thus, this
QDR provides a force structure that is built for the wars we
are in today, when the purpose of review is exactly the
opposite--to prepare for the likely conflicts of tomorrow. One
must ask: what is new here?''
Well, I understand that the committee will receive the
final Space Posture Review later this summer and after a few
national space policy and strategy issues have been reviewed
and developed. I encourage the Administration to provide a
forward-looking posture that will guide near-term and future
investments in space.
With respect to the budget requests, a major space
acquisition program such as advanced extremely high frequency
(AEHF), Wideband Global Positioning (WGS), Mobile User
Objective System, Global Positioning System (GPS), and Space-
Based Infrared System (SBIRS) appear funded consistent with the
previous plans despite a 7 percent topline reduction. Finishing
these acquisition programs and giving them on-orbit is
important. Equally important are the investments in next-
generation science and technology and innovation and ingenuity
that can lead to new--and sometimes revolutionary--
capabilities, yet these investments appear to be on the
decline. How can our Nation retain its leadership in space if
our science and technology investments are on the decline? Our
committee required a Space Science and Technology Strategy in
last year's defense bill and I look forward to receiving that
in the future.
I would like to highlight a few other concerns that I hope
our witnesses can address. First, I am deeply concerned about
the industrial base for solid- and liquid-fueled rockets. Some
defense officials have suggested that Air Force space launch
costs could double in the out-years due to the termination of
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA)
Constellation program because all infrastructure costs
currently shared by the Department of Defense (DOD) and NASA
may be passed on to DOD. Exacerbating this issue is the
apparent lack of any real new development effort to sustain the
engineering and design talent, and a lack of funding to sustain
unique production and manufacturing capabilities, particularly
for ICBM solid rocket motors. So what is the magnitude of this
issue and how is the department--and the interagency--
approaching it?
Second, the Defense Intelligence Agency recently issued
guidance that restricts the National Air and Space Intelligence
Center, NASIC, from doing `original analysis' in certain
counterspace areas. I understand that many of your
organizations have a long history of reliance upon NASIC's
technological expertise and analysis. Limiting their ability to
continue to provide such support cannot be in our best
interest, especially with the Department's increased emphasis
on space situational awareness and space protection.
Third, we saw a major change in the joint National Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)
weather satellite program. The committee was told that
differences between DOD and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)/NASA could not be resolved.
The White House decided in February to restructure the program
and allow each party to go its own way. However, neither DOD
nor NOAA and NASA appeared to have a clear way forward.
It has been over a year since the Transformational
Satellite Communications Program was terminated, yet we still
don't have a plan for the way ahead in military satellite
communications. I am concerned that we see the pattern repeat
itself with the way ahead after NPOESS. Any insight our
witnesses can share on these activities is appreciated.
Fourth, I hope our witnesses will discuss their views on
Operationally Responsive Space, ORS. Later this year, an ORS
satellite developed in response to a United States Central
Command urgent need is planned for launch. Last December,
General Chilton issued an urgent need request for options to
augment the missile warning constellation. Is this the right
role and focus for ORS?
Lastly, we are fortunate to have witnesses that are also
experts in the cyber domain. General Kehler and Mr. Butler, I
am interested in your assessments of the Department's
cyberspace capabilities and challenges. What are the
Department's goals, and does it have the policies, tools,
people, and resources to achieve them?
I want to thank you all again for being with us here today.
You each possess a tremendous amount of expertise and insight
into our Nation's space policy and capabilities. Our Nation is
better off as a result of your service, and I look forward to
your testimony today. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin. I thank the ranking member. We received a
prepared statement from each our witnesses and these statements
will be entered into the record without objection. So if you
could, please summarize the key points so that we have
sufficient time for questions and answers. And we will begin
with General Kehler.
STATEMENT OF GEN. C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE
SPACE COMMAND, U.S. AIR FORCE
General Kehler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
Representative Turner, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today, both
as an airman and as the Commander of Air Force Space Command.
And on behalf of the 46,000 men and women of Air Force Space
Command, thanks for your continued support, both of the United
States Air Force and of the capabilities we provide to the
Joint Force Commanders.
I am very proud to lead a team of active duty airmen, Air
National Guardsmen, Air Reserve Command personnel, government
civilians, and contractors who deliver space and cyberspace
capabilities to America and its warfighting commands around the
globe. Everything we do begins and ends with the needs of the
Joint Force Commanders, and our measure of merit is how well we
contribute to the joint team, to civil needs and, in the case
of GPS, a global user base that expands every day.
Space and cyberspace capabilities provide our forces with
the ability to navigate with accuracy, see with clarity,
communicate with certainty, strike with precision, and operate
with assurance. These capabilities are woven throughout the
fabric of our joint warfighting activities and our everyday
lives. No question we have tough challenges ahead. Space is
becoming more contested and congested, but we have rounded a
few corners and are proud of the progress we have made since we
appeared before you last year.
Special thanks again to this committee, its leaders and its
members for taking the time to understand these important
issues and for providing the support we need to remain a
critical part of the joint team. And with that, sir, I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Kehler can be found in
the Appendix on page 25.]
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, General Kehler. Mr. Butler, the
floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. BUTLER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR CYBER AND SPACE POLICY, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE
Mr. Butler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative Turner,
and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am pleased and
honored to testify today on behalf of the Department of Defense
and Space Policy. As you mentioned in your opening statement,
we have delivered an interim Space Posture Review which
characterized the space environment in the terms of three Cs:
congested, competitive, and contested.
From the standpoint of congestion, we have talked about a
couple of examples already. It is a key element of what drives
and what will drive our response in terms of the future of our
space strategy. It is not only about debris management, but it
is also about spectrum and how we deal with that as well.
In terms of the competitive environment, we are in an
international space business of $250 billion, with 60 nations
or commercial entities involved. We are working through, now,
an environment where we are not at it alone, and that presents
its challenges and we are working through responses with
regards to the competitive nature.
And then with regards to the last C, dealing with the idea
of contested, we mentioned some examples about the Chinese
ASAT, but we also have nations trying to jam our commercial
signals and we are, again, engaged in developing responses to
deal with that. That environment then causes us to think
through the kinds of things that we will be focused on as we
move forward with a national space policy, the national
security space strategy, and where we are going in the future.
Some of the areas that we are exploring extensively is
space situational awareness. As you mentioned, the Department
of Defense was given the responsibility for providing space
situational awareness. We have, over the last year, taken on
that responsibility, and Strategic Command in particular is now
working to implement a concept of operations to help us with
that as we move forward.
In addition to dealing with space situational awareness and
the sharing of that information, we are also working
extensively within the Department to look at operations without
space in a degraded environment, based on the fact that space
is contested.
A series of tabletops and war games, the Schriever 10,
sponsored by General Kehler and Air Force Space Command coming
up next month provides an opportunity for us to continue to
walk down that path and look at issues regarding replacement,
augmentation and redundancy, a well as resiliency.
Beyond that, we are also focused on looking at different
ways of sharing and engaging, both on the international side
and commercial side. So in response to your questions about the
differences with regard to where we are headed, it is no longer
a kind of `go it alone' strategy. It is a foreshadowing of
where we were going to go in terms of partnerships.
On the international side, we have currently military-to-
military relationships, as well as intelligence relationships.
Those relationships give us the opportunity to grow in the
future with helping each other in an interconnected world.
Beyond that, on the commercial side, we have been involved
with looking at commercial capabilities to help us with
communications, as well as remote sensing augmentation to
national systems, as well as what we are doing with expansion
of wide-band communications to help us on the commercial
augmentation side.
These are just some of the themes that we are looking at as
we move forward beyond the characterization of that environment
to begin to address the challenges of a congested, competitive,
and contested space.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Butler can be found in the
Appendix on page 43.]
Mr. Langevin. Thank you very much, Mr. Butler.
Ms. Sapp, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF BETTY SAPP, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
Ms. Sapp. Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member Turner, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to be here today. On behalf of General Carlson, I
would like to just start with a little bit on where the NRO is
today.
You know, from launching the most technically-capable
systems, to keeping legacy satellites flying, to developing the
business practices that secured a clean financial audit for the
NRO, we believe the NRO remains the premier space
reconnaissance organization in the world.
We have had significant successes in the last year, and the
NRO is wholly focused on continuing that record of success by
delivering the space reconnaissance capabilities the Nation
requires, on time and on budget.
I would like to end my opening remarks today by
highlighting a critical mission for the NRO, which is
supporting the warfighter, with a specific story. Last month, a
helicopter went down in a remote location in Afghanistan. With
no organic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
assets available to the Army brigade involved, the brigade's
intel staff requested immediate imagery assistance from a
combined NRO-National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency cell. We
were able to rapidly provide multiple images of the area on the
very low bandwidth connection that they had available to them.
It allowed key imagery intelligence to be provided to the
operations and rescue teams within minutes. The craft site was
quickly secured and protected, and 14 wounded soldiers were
safely rescued.
One of the intelligence officers involved relayed the
following to us: ``I wanted to pass on my sincere thanks for
your support that night. An aircraft down is one of the worst
things we can experience as a unit and your timely imagery
support was pivotal to the rescue teams.''
This is just one example of the NRO's living its vision of
vigilance from above.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you today, and I thank you for
your continued support to the NRO and look forward to answering
your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sapp can be found in the
Appendix on page 51.]
Mr. Langevin. Thank you very much.
Mr. Payton, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF GARY E. PAYTON, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR
FORCE FOR SPACE PROGRAMS, U.S. AIR FORCE
Mr. Payton. Mr. Chairman, again, thank you for the
invitation to appear before the committee and the opportunity
to discuss the Air Force space program.
2010 is an important year for us. Within a few weeks, we
will be launching the first of the next generation of GPS
spacecraft, 2F-1, that will provide a new civil signal for the
world, a signal designed specifically for safety of life
applications in a part of the radio frequency spectrum that is
better protected from interference. That will launch, currently
scheduled on the 20th of May.
Later, in July, we will be launching the Space Based
Surveillance System. This will provide 24-7 observations of
space objects unhindered by atmospheric effects. Later in July,
we will be launching the first of the Advanced Extremely High
Frequency (AEHF) spacecraft. This is a large step in the
protected communications constellation, offering 10 times the
aggregate through-put of each spacecraft and five times the
data rate of the legacy systems.
Also, this is the communications system that provides the
President nuclear command and control for our deterrent forces.
So this is a critical mission and a large increase in
capability.
Finally, later in 2010, we will launch the first of the ORS
spacecraft, specifically designed to satisfy an urgent need of
a theater commander. This will satisfy a capacity shortfall in
surveillance and reconnaissance for Central Command.
Again, from the start of the program to the launch will
consume only two years. And so again, as a measure of
responsiveness, this is a huge step forward.
Thus, in 2010, we will see Air Force expanding our capacity
on communications constellations, improving our accuracy of the
GPS constellation, responding to urgent warfighter needs, and
large strides in our space situational awareness, all delivered
in 2010. And none of that would have been possible without the
help from this committee and Congress.
And so the Air Force thanks you and, more importantly, the
joint warfighter thanks you.
I eagerly await your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Payton can be found in the
Appendix on page 60.]
Mr. Langevin. To the panel, thank you very much for your
opening statements.
Let me begin with General Kehler. As I talked about in my
opening comments, as you contemplate your responsibilities for
organizing, training, and equipping our space forces, we
obviously are interested right now, General, in what keeps you
up at night. What are the most important challenges that you
face? And what should we be doing to ensure that we can
continue to deliver space capabilities to all of our
warfighters?
General Kehler. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Well, first of all, I would tell you what doesn't keep me
awake at night. What doesn't keep me awake at night are our day
in and day out space operations. Once we put the platforms in
the hands of our young men and women, they produce remarkable
results. And I think Ms. Sapp's vignette was very appropriate.
We hear those kinds of results from the forward forces all the
time.
In addition to that, I think we let our performance in
launch, where we have had now almost 10 years worth of launch
successes, and we allow our performance in GPS, which has now
become the gold standard for the world, to speak for
themselves. And so what does not keep me awake at night are the
operational activities that we conduct with those space
capabilities that you all have supported and put in our hands.
What does keep me awake at night, though, are a couple of
things. One is, if we want to continue to have a world-class
Air Force and a world-class space and cyberspace capability, we
have to have world-class people. And this is an all-volunteer
force and we are in competition for people. That is
particularly true, and we have seen that over the years in the
space professional ranks where we compete with civilian
industry for our space professionals. But in particular as
cyberspace is emerging, that is going to be an acute issue for
us as we go forward, is how do we recruit and retain those
people with the appropriate expertise in cyberspace?
So people and recruiting and retaining--around our command,
we call this, we want to build a world-class team of battle-
ready professionals. And that keeps me awake at night, is are
we doing the right things to do that? Are we stimulating the
right educational incentives, et cetera, et cetera.
The second thing that keeps me awake is the industrial
base. We have concerns about the long-term viability of our
industrial base. It is a far different industrial base than it
has been in the past. There are many reports, and many folks
have studied the industrial base and they all report that there
is more fragility, if you will, in the industrial base than
there has been in the past, which makes the industrial base
more sensitive to changes than they have been in the past.
And so that also concerns me, that I ask myself all the
time: Are we positioning ourselves correctly to make sure that
our successors will be able to look back and say they have
given us the right people to do the jobs that we need and they
have left us the appropriate industrial base to do the job that
we need to get done? And so those two things keep me awake at
night.
The final thing that is on my mind quite a bit, of course,
is making sure that we are adjusting, and this gets to
Representative Turner's question about the future. No question
about it: we have focused on deploying those things that have
given us such acquisition difficulties. And we have committed
ourselves to that. We have turned important corners. And
already, as Mr. Payton just very, very adequately talked about,
the number of things that will happen in 2010, we are there
because of the dedication and hard work of a lot of people in
the government and in the industrial base that supports us.
And so we have a way forward here for the near future that
is, essentially, the platforms that Mr. Payton just mentioned--
GPS-2F, Advanced EHF, Space-Based Infrared System as it comes
off the factory floor later this year, and I have got
confidence that it will come out of the factory floor, et
cetera.
The question is: What comes next? And it is time for us now
to start thinking about what comes next. We have block
improvements planned for many of these capabilities, but I am
concerned that we pay attention to innovation as we look to the
future and make sure that we are in a position to innovate, as
we have done in the past, at the appropriate times in the
appropriate ways, so that we can continue to provide the
leading edge capabilities that we need.
Those three things, sir, are the things that are keeping me
awake at night.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, General.
And on the--let me go back to the cyber component of your
answer since that is something that I pay a lot attention to as
well.
Does the Cyber Command that the Pentagon is standing up,
will that answer the concerns that you have in those areas?
Will that provide both enhanced capabilities, but also a career
path for those individuals that we hope to attract and retain
in the cyber workforce in our Nation's military?
General Kehler. Sir, I think that is a big step in that
direction. And I believe, you know, the Secretary of Defense
has looked at the services and has said, ``I need you to be
prepared to contribute capabilities and forces to the new U.S.
Cyber Command.'' And so the activities that we have taken to
stand up a new numbered Air Force, the 24th Air Force in our
case, and to begin new training efforts to set up a new cyber
career field to look at how we will acquire capabilities for
cyberspace faster because, you know, the shelf-life on
information technology-related things is pretty short.
All of those steps, Mr. Chairman, are under way in major
part because the Secretary elected to stand up U.S. Cyber
Command and has told the services to be ready to contribute
forces to that command. So I think that is a big step in the
right direction, recognizing that, you know, we are still only
a small piece of the bigger government effort, but it is
certainly a stimulus for us, and that positive direction, I
think, will make a big difference.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. On another topic, in 2007 the
Commander of the Army Space Missile Defense Command said that
within three years, China may be able to challenge the U.S. at
a near-peer level in space.
With the Chinese test of an anti-satellite interceptor in
January 2007 and the test of an anti-ballistic missile
interceptor in this past January, there is a real risk,
obviously, to our satellites, that the satellites might not be
able to--might not be available in a future contingency.
And I was kind of surprised that, of the things that might
keep you awake at night, that redundancy and contingencies were
not on the list. But, General, do we have the military
operational plans or contingency plans that reflect the
possibility that certain satellites may be unavailable during
times of crisis and war? And how quickly could we reconstitute?
General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, the message that we have
taken away from the recent activities that we have seen is that
space is not a sanctuary. Not only is it a naturally hostile
environment, but we have seen through the demonstration of the
anti-satellite test and ground-based jammers that are
proliferating around the world. You know, I tell people
sometimes if you are interested, go to your home computer and
go to a search engine on there and type in `GPS jammers,' and
see what you get. You will be surprised, I think. Maybe you
won't probably be surprised, but some would be surprised at
what you find there.
And so we know that space and the capabilities that are in
space are not a sanctuary. The question is, what do we do about
that? And in response to our concerns here, a little over two
years ago, the Director of the NRO and I decided to put
together a joint effort called the Space Protection Program.
And that is bearing fruit for us.
We understand that this is about layering protection
activities. In some cases and, in fact, in a couple of
important cases, I think, we find that the most important thing
we can do to protect ourselves is to be able to figure out with
high confidence what happened. And that is space situational
awareness, and we have to get better at space situational
awareness. In fact, the budget request contains some
enhancements for space situational awareness.
The second thing we have to do is we have to go back to
design and engineering. In some cases we are going to have to
build some protection in. Some of our assets today are very
well protected. We have mentioned Advanced EHF a couple of
times. Advanced EHF is designed to survive in a hostile
environment against certain kinds of threats--not all threats,
but certain kinds of threats.
Those were design considerations that were taken into
account when we were building AEHF. We are going to have to do
that in a bigger way. GPS is another example with some design
considerations.
The third thing we have to do, and what we are doing is we
are adjusting our tactics, our techniques, and our procedures.
This gets to the planning question that you asked. Do we have
contingency plans in place? And the answer is, we are in the
process of addressing all of those.
Much of this stems from a clear understanding of where our
vulnerabilities are and what our interdependencies are with all
of the things we use from space for national security purposes.
And we have a much better view of all of that today than we
have ever had before.
And then finally, contingency planning really gets down to
mission assurance. In some cases, we may not want to protect a
certain space asset at all. It may be best to back up that
capability with something else--an air asset, for example. And
so we are looking very carefully at those places where we must
protect something in space and then looking at what is the best
way to go about that.
So I think we have responded to this concern about space
not being a sanctuary--and by the way, that is not new. We can
go back to the Cold War. We watched the Soviet Union in those
days test anti-satellite weapons, et cetera. What is different
today is the consequences of loss. I would argue that today the
consequences are far greater than they probably would have
been, had the Cold War turned into a hot war.
So we are much more mindful of this issue today. It doesn't
keep me awake at night, because I think we have got a good
handle on it. We don't have all the fixes in place, but I think
we have a long way in the last two to three years in
understanding where the problems are and coming up with the
ways to deal with them.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Well, on that point there is
nothing better to undermine an aggressor's confidence that they
can disrupt those capabilities than to have multiple layers of
redundancy. And so the more we can do in that area, the better.
Thank you, General, for the work you are doing and for your
answers.
Mr. Butler, I wanted to address, if I could, your insights
into the progress that is being made to establish an overall
national space policy and the work remaining to complete the
national security space posture. And we hope that you could
share with us any additional findings from these ongoing
efforts at this point.
Mr. Butler. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman.
We have been meeting within the interagency here for the
last couple of months now on building up the national space
policy. We have a robust process in place that is moving us
through a sharing of ideas and common themes that move us
beyond guiding principles to a product which we believe will be
ready sometime late spring.
We have also gone ahead and, based on what we have been
asked to do from the congressional side as well as within the
executive branch, begun to sequence these activities in a much
more logical way. So the rationale for waiting on the final
Space Posture Review was to benefit from the insights of the
development of the national space policy and the national
security space strategy, which we will be working on as we
complete the national space policy.
We are also dovetailing into that in congressionally-
directed activity with regard to the space investment strategy
and looking at export control reform and the like.
As we move forward in time, the themes that I talked about
within the interim Space Posture Review have come up and have
been corroborated, for the most part, as part of the
overarching characterization of the environment that we will be
working in. And as we do that, there is a bridge that we are
working across the national security community, the science
community and the commerce community as we build the national
space policy.
So my sense right now is we have a good, coherent, and
integrated plan for moving forward from policy and guiding
principles to the ideas for response, and then moving toward an
investment strategy that will help us implement those
particular principles.
As we move forward, our intent, of course, is to share with
you these ideas as we work with the White House and get them
agreed upon, and then continue to look at ways that we can
build on the principles that I talked about in the latter part
of my opening remarks--namely, the ideas of international
cooperation, looking at ways that we can build upon, I know,
themes that you are concerned about with the industrial base as
part of the strategy principles that we would like to
implement.
If there is no other follow-up questions on that, I would
like to build on the cyber discussion for just a moment.
Mr. Langevin. Well, if--I would like to hear your thoughts
on that, but since we are on space policy and Space Posture
Review, we haven't completed it. Could you talk about how we
might apply deterrence in space, the threats that we face in
the 21st century? Can we deter others from holding our space
systems at risk?
What are the merits of a declaratory policy that signals
our intent and lays out consequences very clearly? And do you
see merit in establishing international rules of the road and/
or codes of conduct in space?
Mr. Butler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. All great questions,
and all questions that we are in the process of considering.
When we think about deterrence, our major focus is on
dissuading belligerent actions in space. And it begins with
what General Kehler was describing as space situational
awareness, having an understanding of what the environment is
like in space, and being able to be more predictive about how
that environment is changing.
Behind that idea of space situational awareness, then, is
the idea of improving the way that we protect our own space
capabilities. I mean, it goes back to the space protection
strategy that General Kehler outlined.
A key aspect of the thinking more broadly as we build out
in this process of deterrence is the idea of working with like-
minded nations in different ways. One way in which we look to
do that is through space situational awareness and data
sharing.
Another way is what you suggested in terms of looking at
rules of the road. We have done some of that already as we have
worked in our existing cooperation agreements. We have done
that with the United Nations over the last couple of years in
looking at debris mitigation rules of the road.
In terms of aspects of declaratory policy and red lines and
thresholds, we are working through that with the national space
policy. And as we work through that discussion and come to some
conclusions, I will be happy to come back and discuss, you
know, the specifics with regards to those particular areas.
Mr. Langevin. Good. Well, we would certainly welcome that.
Before I turn to the ranking member, you said you wanted to
comment on cyber.
Mr. Butler. Sure. I would just like to build a little bit
on General Kehler's thoughts. We are working within OSD (the
Office of the Secretary of Defense) on not only the standup of
Cyber Command, but an emphasis area for the Secretary is cyber
cadre development. Within that, we are looking at best pre-
models that are coming from the different services and looking
across generational issues as well as private-public sector
cross-flow.
I had the privilege this past weekend to be in San Antonio,
where I looked at one of those models, the National Collegiate
Cyber Defense competition, where colleges are getting together
now and competing in new and different ways on teams to promote
and create a dream about being involved with cyber defense.
My sense is, as we move forward with the development of the
defense cyber strategy, which is in progress right now, we will
have that as a major focus area, which will be a critical
element of organizing and resourcing Cyber Command for success.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you for that additional
comment. I have other questions for Ms. Sapp and Mr. Payton. I
hope we can do that in a second round when it is my turn, but
for now we are going to turn to the ranking member for his
questions.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have quite a few
members that are interested in asking questions. I am eager to
get to their thoughts also.
As I had said in my opening statement, we have concerns
about the NPOESS program restructure. The National Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System was a joint
50-50 cost share program between DOD, Air Force and NOAA and
NASA. It experienced significant technical costs and schedule
problems, including a Nunn-McCurdy breach in 2006, but was put
back on track.
However, differences among the defense and civilian users
could not be resolved, and in February 2010 the White House
decided to restructure the program, allowing each party to go
their own way. Neither DOD nor NOAA and NASA have made
decisions on whether to continue with the current contract with
Northrop Grumman or to acquire NPOESS satellite to terminate
that contract and pursue an alternative approach.
Without a clear plan, the FY 2011 budget request of $351
million to continue NPOESS system program design may be
unjustified.
General Kehler and Mr. Payton, what are your thoughts on
the next steps for NPOESS program? And should it be continued
by DOD or replaced by an alternative new approach? And are
there risks of a gap in capacity and capability?
General Kehler. Sir, I will start and then defer to Mr.
Payton. A couple of things that we know--one is that the
decision that was made was to separate the responsibility for
providing the satellites in the particular times of the day
that those capabilities are needed. We will retain a common
ground system and common command and control, recognizing that
all the data has to come and be fused together to be useful for
us. And so that is one feature of this.
Second, we have two Defense Meteorological Satellite
Program satellites left that are sitting here waiting to be
launched. And so we are looking very carefully at when we will
have to launch those, given this decision to make sure that we
have phased those satellites correctly so that we do not have a
gap in the time of the day that is going to be the
responsibility for DOD, in particular.
And then the third piece is, we are looking very hard at
the requirements so that we make sure that we have now
apportioned, if I can use that word, the requirements to the
various responsible parties across those orbits to make sure
that we have got that lined up right, and we are taking enough
time to go back and look at the requirements, because what we
know about acquisition programs that have gotten in trouble is
that they started off without a clear understanding of
requirements. So we are back looking at the requirements there.
And then finally, we are also looking with a mind toward
harvesting as much as we can possibly harvest out of the
program that has already gone on for NPOESS that has taken us
this far. The answers aren't in yet, but we are working very
carefully with our colleagues in the Department of Defense and
the air staff to make sure that we get the answers right and
that we are prepared to go forward smartly when the decisions
are made.
And with that, Mr. Payton, I will defer to you.
Mr. Payton. I would offer that the Air Force is not going
to get out of the business of Lower Earth Orbit weather
observation spacecraft. Truthfully, we view Strategic Command
as the first among equals for representing the warfighter for
global weather forecasting.
And Strategic Command has been very adamant that they
cannot tolerate a gap in that early-morning orbit. And so that
is the premier objective that we will maintain for future Air
Force acquisitions in the Lower Earth Orbit weather mission.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, we have votes coming up. To
ensure that everybody else gets an opportunity to ask
questions, I will defer to the other members.
Mr. Langevin. Fair enough. Thank you. I thank the ranking
member. Mr. Lamborn is now recognized.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for being here. And like I told you each
personally, thank you for your service in protecting our
country.
The first question is for General Kehler and Secretary
Butler, multipart: How will the Air Force Cyber Command work
with the new U.S. Cyber Command?
Secondly, will the U.S. Cyber Command have the resources it
needs?
And what do you see as key issues in the cyber arena?
General Kehler. Well, sir, let me start. Again, the first
part of the answer is how will 24th Air Force work with U.S.
Cyber Command?
We have stood up a numbered Air Force, a new numbered Air
Force, that is identical in construction to every other
numbered Air Force that is attached to either the regional
combatant commanders or the global combatant commanders.
So, for example, in space, we have 14th Air Force, and that
is assigned to U.S. Strategic Command, and that is how we
package all of our space capabilities and hand them over to
U.S. Strategic Command.
We will do the same thing with our cyber capabilities. We
will put them inside 24th Air Force, a step we have already
taken. And 24th Air Force will become the Air Force component
to U.S. Cyber Command when it is stood up.
In the meantime, it is the U.S. component to Strategic
Command where the cyber responsibilities still reside.
So we have constructed our method of presenting operational
forces to a combatant commander for cyberspace the same way we
do that if it was fighters or bombers or spacecraft or any
other part of the family of Air Force capabilities that we
bring to the fight.
And I will defer the other parts of the question.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Mr. Butler. Sir, in terms of the relationship that General
Kehler just described for the Air Force, that is exactly what
the Army and Navy are doing, in terms of presentation of forces
into U.S. Cyber Command.
With regard to the resourcing issue, I think we--one of the
key tenets of setting up Cyber Command was to leverage the
existing capabilities that we have in place within the
Department of Defense.
So as you heard last week in General Alexander's testimony,
we are working to ensure that we leverage the technical back
plane of the National Security Agency as we build capabilities
around that.
In terms of the future resourcing for the command, we have
efforts under way to look at what will be required above and
beyond.
In terms of the specific issues that we are dealing with
U.S. Cyber Command, again, I go back to General Alexander's
testimony from last Thursday to the Senate Armed Services
Committee. Authorities and policies need to be put in place for
greater protection of the networks.
We are working through that. That extends out to the
privacy and civil liberties groups, all the way out to doing
full-spectrum operations.
Certainly from the standpoint of capabilities, the ability
to do rapid technology insertion with continuous risk
mitigation is an important element that we need to continue to
work on and grow.
And then capacity--and inside of capacity is bridging with
not only within our own Department of Defense and with other
partners within the interagency, but building capacity with the
private sector and building capacity with international
partners.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you.
And my next question is for Director Sapp and Secretary
Payton. And it has to do with budget and resources. I am
concerned that this Administration is not prioritizing like it
should be with a number of defense priorities to protect our
country, as opposed to other budget initiatives that it is
taking.
So, specifically, do you think the national security space
programs have adequate funding to make sure they can be
executed in a timely manner, in support of the various
missions?
And what do you see as possible problems, or is everything
okay in the near future?
Thank you.
Mr. Payton. I will try that first. Our top priority is--and
I use the term ``constellation health.'' Other people use the
term ``continuity of service.''
But we have got--the Air Force has several missions in
space. And the warfighter needs those services more and more
every single day. And so as we lay out the projected lifetime
of the spacecraft that are currently on-orbit, and as we
project the acquisition time for new spacecraft, that
continuity of service is foremost in our minds.
And so that is what underpins our budget request. That is
what underpins our acquisition plans. And that is adequate to
satisfy that top priority need.
Mr. Langevin. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Franks is now
recognized.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, is it possible that we could hear from
Secretary Sapp?
Mr. Langevin. Certainly.
Mr. Lamborn. Because I think we will still have time for--
--
Mr. Langevin. That is fine.
Ms. Sapp. I would agree with what Mr. Payton said. We want
to make sure that we have continuous service to the warfighter.
We are budgeted to support that.
I think where we struggle is to make sure we have
continuity for our factories to support the industrial base.
And I think we struggle to put new engineering, new capability
insertion in those systems.
The research and development investment has suffered over
the past several years. So that is where we need to try and
recover a bit.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Mr. Franks is now recognized.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I guess I might just take just a quick step from the
previous questions. I know that when it comes down to
ascertaining our budgets and the things that you need, I
understand that probably one of the biggest challenges for
space is just the growing hunger for bandwidth.
And I know that, you know, our Global Hawk and the Predator
and a lot of these things are demanding more and more
bandwidth. And there is a review, a joint review that was due
to Congress at some point.
And I guess, General Kehler, I will put the first question
to you--not so much--this is not a punitive question. I just
appreciate all of you being here and appreciate your service.
But, probably, there will be nothing--be a greater leverage,
though, and I just want to make sure your budgets are
sufficient, knowing what the bandwidth is going to be, so that
we can make sure that we are dealing with the need first.
What are your concerns--I mean, when you look back at some
of the history, here, there have been cancellations in the last
couple years, you know, specifically the Transformational
Satellite (TSAT) system, which was set to be, really, a follow-
on program for the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite,
which itself was also a follow-on to Milstar. And that is not
scheduled to launch its first satellite until later this year.
So I guess--how can the DOD know, and how can they help us
know what those bandwidth requirements are, and where are we in
terms of what we need?
And I will start with General Kehler, and then, Mr. Butler,
if you would speak to it?
General Kehler. Well, sir, there are others at the table
who can talk about the status of the studies. There is a
bandwidth study under way. There is also a study under way
looking at the requirements for what we are calling the Joint
Space Communications Layer, the JSCL.
There are a number of other studies under way that are
coming to grips with this question about, what do we do after
Advanced EHF and as we have canceled TSAT?
What I would say is there is an insatiable appetite here.
And this appetite--we don't see it actually leveling off. There
is always a demand for more and more and more bandwidth.
And the way we have been managing that, to date, of course,
is with those things that the government is out buying, now
about to deploy the first of the Advanced EHF satellites,
already having deployed the third of the Wideband Global
satellites, all of which are performing very, very well.
And so we are at the beginning of a huge enhancement to
what the government is doing for itself.
And then, secondly, we have been taking up the difference,
if you will, with commercial.
We also have allied participation in the satellite
communications business. The Australians participate in WGS.
Other countries participate in Advanced EHF.
Those three elements, in my personal opinion, form the
basis of how we are going to deal with this as we go to the
future. There will be a government piece, and that is the piece
that we are trying to decide, is how much does the government
need to do for itself?
There will be, we think, continuation. There is certainly
goodness in continuing allied and friendly participation in
some of these programs. And then the third piece is commercial.
The question for us, I think, is what is that mixture as we
go to the future? And I think we have some opportunity, here,
to look at a way to do this with, maybe, a little bit more
flexibility and foresight as we go to the future, and not be
working to try to catch up as demand increases.
But, sir, I will defer to those who are a little closer to
this.
Mr. Butler. Let me pick up on the bandwidth requirement
study. We have completed the work within OSD on the National
Information Infrastructure side, with our CIO, our chief
information officer, and with the National Geospatial Agency.
And that is in coordination. That should be completed--it
should be finished, produced and over soon. I know it is late.
We have looked across, you know, a temporal period that
takes us from 2008 out to 2023. And it substantiates what
General Kehler was talking about, in terms of the expanded
communications requirements in narrow-band, wide-band, and
protected communications. It is also a kind of a pathfinder for
us as we think about how we would implement the types of things
that I described in the SPR in international engagement.
It is one of those areas that, you know, we talked about.
General Kehler mentioned Australia. It is not just unique to
the United States and to the Department of Defense, this
communications requirement need. There is opportunity to find
ways to share with others and engage with others in this arena.
But the bandwidth study has been completed, and you should
be seeing that soon.
I think Gary could take--Mr. Payton could take the TSAT
question and provide some thoughts with regard to that----
Mr. Payton. TSAT was one of the programs that benefited
from a conscious decision to prove the component technologies
before we settled on a design for the spacecraft itself.
What we are doing now, over these--current year and the
next year is working with the warfighter to find out which one
of those technologies should be fielded with the highest
priority.
And again, we want to take--we want to be responsive to the
warfighter and deploy those technologies on whatever platform
is best, but in the order and with the priority that the
warfighter drives us to.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you to the lady.
Mr. Langevin. I thank the gentleman. We have votes on--at
this point, there are just under 8 minutes left on the clock. I
have additional questions that I am going to submit for the
record, since I took more time than I planned in my opening
questions, and I will forego those right now, and I will turn
to the ranking member for five minutes or so, the time he needs
to ask some additional questions.
Mr. Turner. Thanks. Looking at the clock, here on the--just
on the House floor, with 7 minutes and 26 seconds to go before
you all have to finish votes, the interim Space Posture Review:
there was--you know, a number of members have made comments of
the concern that it was a status quo posture review and that
there is more that needs to be eliminated in it.
We heard from Mr. Butler. I guess it would be nice if we
took just our last moments to hear from General Kehler, Ms.
Sapp and Mr. Payton on--just a few minutes, obviously, for each
of you--what are some of the things that are missing that was
not in it, in the interim, that you believe need to be
addressed?
Mr. Turner. General Kehler.
General Kehler. Well, sir, I have--maybe I have a little
bit different perspective on this since I know it is an interim
report, and I know that there are other pieces that are being
worked.
What I think is positive about the interim report is it
begins to look at this question of opportunity for the future.
And although we find ourselves in a difficult position here
in terms of an environment, a domain that is congested and
contested, and complex--and I think those are the three words
that are actually used in the interim report, congested,
contested, and complex--it also lays out a way for us to begin
to look at the future here that leverages partnership
opportunities. And I think that is a positive.
I think that the final report will treat some of the issues
a little bit more fully, and I will look forward to that.
Mr. Turner. Ms. Sapp? Obviously, there are a number of
people who have concerns that there are things in it that are
missing. What do you see that is missing?
Ms. Sapp. I do not see anything that is missing. I think we
have some choices we will have to sort out as we go final with
the report. And some of those were brought up, in terms of how
declaratory are we, do we really lay out lanes in the road?
I think there are some choices there in what we show and
what we don't that we will have to make before we go final with
that report, and I think that is some of the things that are in
discussion right now.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Payton, anything you would like to
highlight that could be in addition to what we have seen?
Mr. Payton. Yes, sir. I helped work on the Space Posture
Review, and I read both the interim report and some early
drafts of the final report. And just as a foreshadow, I would
predict that the final report will have significant--much more
substance to it than what we have seen so far.
Mr. Turner. Great. Thank you. We will look forward to that.
Well, you were all very, very effective. We only have 4
minutes and 46 seconds left, which is a long time for us to get
there.
Mr. Chairman, thank you so much.
Mr. Langevin. I thank the ranking member.
With that, I again want to thank our panel today for your
statements, for your excellent answers to the questions. And
the members, myself included, will have additional questions
for you that we will submit for the record, and we ask that you
respond expeditiously in writing to those questions.
And, again, thank you for your service to our country.
General, in particular, I hope you will express our deep
appreciation to the men and women who serve under you in your
command.
And all of you, for the people that you work with as well.
With that, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:18 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 21, 2010
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. Air Force Space Command established 24th Air Force as
the Air Force's operational component to STRATCOM. While there is a lot
of attention being given to cyber, especially from a defensive
standpoint, we are still catching up to the threat. What have we done
in regard to cyber and what needs doing immediately in your opinion? I
would also be interested to hear if there is anything that we can do to
help speed our cyber defense from a policy, resources, or legal
standpoint.
General Kehler. The Air Force has evolved its defensive strategy
from a static perimeter defense strategy that focused on defending the
network to a more dynamic and operational approach that focuses on
assuring the mission and safeguarding the network.
Our previous strategy relied on a series of sensors located at the
entry point to each base. These intrusion detection systems were
leading technology 15 years ago, but are no longer suitable for
defending the Air Force portion of the Department of Defense (DOD)
network.
Twenty-Fourth Air Force (24 AF) has operationalized our approach to
network defense. They have stood up an operations center (the 624th
Operations Center) that has the ability to plan defensive operations
and strategies and then command and control, and assess the execution
of the plan by 24 AF units. They are also integrating network
intelligence capabilities with the National Security Agency (NSA) and
the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency
(AFISRA), to help make us more proactive and get ahead of the threat.
Finally, we are upgrading the Air Force Network to make it more
securable by migrating multiple network enclaves into a single, more
defendable, network. This will enhance our ability to patch and command
and control our network resources.
Mr. Lamborn. While the National Space Policy and the Space Posture
Review have not been completed, could you talk about how we might apply
deterrence in space to the threats we face in the 21st century? Can we
deter others from holding our space systems at risk? How might we
respond to attacks against our space assets, and how do we manage the
risk of escalation? Should we adopt clear ``red lines'' or thresholds
for attacks against our space assets? What are the merits of a
declaratory policy that signals our intent and lays out consequences?
Mr. Butler. The United States has not promulgated clear red lines
for attacks against our space systems (e.g., satellite, ground, and
space segments, and supporting links). However, our current National
Space Policy states that our space capabilities are vital to our
national interests, and we will preserve our rights, capabilities, and
freedom of action in space. The Administration is reviewing the 2006
national space policy and will update Congress accordingly on any
changes. On March 15, 2010, the Department of Defense (DOD) provided
Congress with an ``Interim'' Space Posture Review, which provided our
initial thinking on national security equities in space.
The United States reserves the right to take the full range of
appropriate responses, including military action as consistent with the
law of armed conflict. The United States considers space systems to
have rights of passage through, and operations in, space without
interference. This is consistent with U.S. law, applicable
international law including the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and existing
(2006) national space policy. The United States views purposeful
interference with its space systems as an infringement on its rights
and will take those actions necessary to preserve its freedom of action
in space.
DOD is addressing the possibility that some space systems may be
unavailable during times of crisis and war via its operational and
contingency planning processes. Numerous war games, such as the
``Schriever'' wargame series have shown that testing ourselves in a
framework of diminished access to space may be an important part of our
strategy development. Each of the Services conducted a ``day without
space'' study to understand the impact of losing critical space
capabilities; the results were stark and highlight the importance of
your question.
There may be merit in employing voluntary, non-treaty approaches
(e.g., international rules of the road and/or a code of conduct) for
the space domain. Over the past two years, the United States engaged in
dialogue with European experts regarding the European Union's proposal
for a ``Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.'' In addition, the
United States is participating in a multi-year study of ``long-term
sustainability of space activities'' within the United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. This study is examining
the feasibility of voluntary ``best practices guidelines'' to help
reduce operational risks to all space systems; it should serve as a
valuable cooperation opportunity with established and emerging members
of the space-faring community and with the private sector to enhance
spaceflight safety and preserve the space environment for future
generations.
In addition, DOD is continuing to develop concepts for best
practices in space, and the Air Force is planning on conducting a
simulation to assess the operational implications of a voluntary code
as part of its May 2010 ``Schriever'' series wargame. The DOD is
currently working with the office of the Director of National
Intelligence to develop a National Security Space Strategy, which will
further address questions of rules of the road/codes of conduct and
declaratory policy.
Mr. Lamborn. The Missile Defense Agency is commencing a new space
acquisition program this year with the Precision Tracking Space System
(PTSS). The bulk of our national security space acquisition has
traditionally been accomplished by the Air Force and National
Reconnaissance Office. What is the Air Force's reaction to MDA's
rationale and justification for wishing to undertake its own space
acquisition program?
Mr. Payton. MDA certainly has missile warning/missile defense
domain expertise, as well as large, complex system development
experience. Both of these are necessary to successfully develop PTSS.
MDA has also reached out to the Air Force to leverage our space
acquisition expertise. MDA has included an Air Force cell inside their
PTSS Management Structure. This Air Force cell will assist MDA in
designing the PTSS space segment and ground segment for long term
operations and sustainment. The Air Force is migrating towards
commonality among the space operations centers for command and control
of spacecraft to minimize personnel, development, and operations and
maintenance (O&M) costs. In addition, ground antennas, communications
links, and infrastructure must be leveraged in order to minimize
personnel and O&M costs as well.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HEINRICH
Mr. Heinrich. A reprogramming action submitted last month would
provide $45M for Operationally Responsive Space. Can you describe the
benefits this reprogramming will provide our warfighters?
General Kehler and Mr. Payton. The reprogramming will cover funds
required for the Operationally Responsive Space-1 (ORS-1) satellite
program: an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) system
being built in response to an urgent need communicated by CDRUSSTRATCOM
ORS-1 will be used predominately to address urgent Joint Force
Commander needs in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR).
Mr. Heinrich. It seems that much of the funding for ORS has
occurred through these kinds of reprogramming actions as opposed to
year-to-year budgeting. I fear this provides a lack of certainty and
focus for the office as a whole. Since CENTCOM has expressed that it
will likely need more of ORS-Sat 1's unique capability after its
lifetime, why isn't the Department budgeting for this capability in the
out-years?
General Kehler and Mr. Payton. Recent Operationally Responsive
Space (ORS) reprogramming actions have addressed near-term funding to
field the ORS-1 satellite system to meet a USSTRATCOM urgent need in
support of CENTCOM. The CENTCOM urgent need is met by planned ORS-1
spacecraft mission capabilities and projected lifetime. No funds for
additional spacecraft are required for the out-years in the President's
Budget.
Mr. Heinrich. With the preponderance of all military assets (smart
munitions, aircraft, tanks, naval ships, etc) relying on the Global
Positioning System (GPS) to target, navigate and conduct its daily
operations, one has to ask, are we ready to operate in a GPS denied
environment?
General Kehler and Mr. Payton. Efforts are underway on many fronts,
through testing, simulation, exercises and gaming to develop NAVWAR
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) and work through the effects
of GPS denial. For the Air Force, our Space Aggressor and Test
Squadrons, Weapons Schools and exercise teams are applying the most
recent analysis and lessons learned to develop subject matter experts
on GPS and NAVWAR to work through denial of service challenges.
[A portion of this response is classified and is retained in the
subcommittee files].
Mr. Heinrich. What are the current GPS denial capabilities of
known/perceived enemies of the United States?
General Kehler and Mr. Payton. [The information referred to is
classified and is retained in the subcommittee files].
Mr. Heinrich. What counter-measures are in place and on the horizon
to combat GPS denial?
General Kehler and Mr. Payton. On the horizon is the ability to use
a new military-unique signal call M-code, which is more robust and
powerful than the current signal. With the first GPS III satellites we
will also have additional power available on M-code to further mitigate
jamming.
[A portion of this response is classified and is retained in the
subcommittee files].
Mr. Heinrich. What impact would GPS denial have on current
operations (strategic)?
General Kehler and Mr. Payton. [The information referred to is
classified and is retained in the subcommittee files].
Mr. Heinrich. What impact would GPS denial have on the warfighter
(tactical)?
General Kehler and Mr. Payton. [The information referred to is
classified and is retained in the subcommittee files].
Mr. Heinrich. A reprogramming action submitted last month would
provide $45M for Operationally Responsive Space. Can you describe the
benefits this reprogramming will provide our warfighters?
Mr. Butler. The Department of Defense (DOD) submitted a March 2010
prior approval (PA) reprogramming action on April 8, 2010 that would
reprogram $44.2 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 Research, Development,
Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funds for Operationally Responsive Space
(ORS) (Budget Authority 4, Program Element (PE) 06040857F).
The explanation for the ORS PA reprogramming action stated the
funds were required to
maintain program schedule in support of the USCENTCOM's urgent
need for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
capability. During FY 2010, the program will complete fabrication of
flight hardware, integrate key components including payload and modular
bus, complete integration and test activities, and integrate the space
vehicle with the Minotaur launch vehicle in preparation for the planned
November 2010 launch. Without additional funding, the program will not
be able to meet USCENTCOM's need for the December 2010 Initial
Operational Capability.
All four defense committees (House Armed Services Committee, Senate
Armed Services Committee, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, and House
Appropriations Defense Subcommittee (HAC-D)) supported the ORS PA.
However, the HAC-D objected to the Global Hawk aircraft procurement
decrease (-$48.9 million), which would have funded the ORS PA
programming action.
The ORS PA reprogramming action is now authorized but remains
unfunded, which means the program will not be able to meet USCENTCOM's
need for the December 2010 Initial Operational Capability at this time.
We intend to submit another ORS PA reprogramming action to meet
USCENTCOM's need in the future.
Mr. Heinrich. It seems that much of the funding for ORS has
occurred through these kinds of reprogramming actions as opposed to
year-to-year budgeting. I fear this provides a lack of certainty and
focus for the office as a whole. Since CENTCOM has expressed that it
will likely need more of ORS-Sat 1's unique capability after its
lifetime, why isn't the Department budgeting for this capability in the
out-years?
Mr. Butler. The Department of Defense (DOD) budgeted for
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) funding via several program
elements (PEs) dating back to Fiscal Year (FY) 2003, when the Deputy
Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef) directed the Air Force and the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in December 2002 to establish
a joint program office to accelerate the ORS effort to meet the 2002
ORS Mission Needs Statement (MNS) requirements for responsive, on-
demand access to, through, and from space.
ORS funding started under DARPA in FY 2003 (PE 0603285E, Force
Application and Launch from CONUS (FALCON)) to comply with DepSecDef
direction. In FY 2004, the Air Force opened PE 0604855F (Operationally
Responsive Launch) in order to meet requirements from the 2002 ORS MNS.
In FY 2007, the Air Force closed PE 0604855F and transferred funding to
PE 0604857F (Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)) to recognize the
broader scope of not just responsive space launchers, but also
satellites and ranges, necessary for an ORS system.
ORS funding involves Budget Authority 4, Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriations, which are two-year funds.
DOD employs year-to-year budgeting and reprogramming actions in
coordination with Congress to ensure the best use of appropriated funds
to achieve ORS objectives. The President's FY 2011 Budget funds ORS
($93.978 million); FY 2012-2015 out-year budget estimates average over
$86.5 million per year, which demonstrates that DOD is planning and
budgeting for ORS capability.
Mr. Heinrich. With the preponderance of all military assets (smart
munitions, aircraft, tanks, naval ships, etc) relying on the Global
Positioning System (GPS) to target, navigate and conduct its daily
operations, one has to ask, are we ready to operate in a GPS-denied
environment?
Mr. Butler. Space-based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT)
assets provide essential, precise, and reliable information that
underpins nearly every military system and operation. PNT also
contributes to precision attack, thereby helping to reduce collateral
damage, and the ability to attack from stand-off distances, thereby
allowing friendly forces to avoid threat areas.
The Global Positioning System (GPS) is the cornerstone of U.S.
military PNT. The wide reliance on GPS, beyond the U.S. military, acts
as a deterrent against attack on the constellation of GPS satellites.
However, potential adversaries continue to seek means to counter the
advantages we obtain from space and to use space capabilities against
us. Navigation warfare (NAVWAR) ensures that friendly forces have
unfettered access to PNT, while denying adversarial use of the same.
The Department of Defense (DOD) is addressing the possibility that
space systems, including GPS, may be unavailable during times of crisis
and war via its operational and contingency planning processes.
Numerous war games, such as the ``Schriever'' wargame series have shown
that testing ourselves in a framework of diminished access to space is
an important part of our strategy development. Each of the Services
conducted a ``day without space'' study to understand the impact of
losing critical space capabilities; the results were stark and
highlight the importance of your question.
NAVWAR was established to address increasing military dependence on
PNT in the face of emerging threats to GPS. NAVWAR strategies include
employing tactics and technologies to gain and maintain a PNT
information advantage for the U.S. military and allies including the
prevention of hostile GPS exploitation within an area of operations
while preserving civil use of GPS outside the area of operations.
NAVWAR is deliberate military operations aimed at gaining and
maintaining a PNT information advantage. Desired effects are generated
through the coordinated employment of capabilities within Information,
Space and Cyberspace Operations. The Joint Navigation Warfare Center
(JNWC) was established under USSTRATCOM in Fiscal Year 2008 to
integrate and coordinate NAVWAR across the DOD. Precise PNT has become
one of the most critical enables of 21st century warfare. Therefore, it
is imperative that access to very precise PNT remain unimpeded. The DOD
can provide a classified presentation discussing specific NAVWAR issues
or concerns at the committee's convenience.
Mr. Heinrich. What are the current GPS denial capabilities of
known/perceived enemies of the United States?
Mr. Butler. Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites broadcast
navigation information on a continuous basis. The transmission has two
levels of service--a standard positioning service (SPS) and a precise
positioning service (PPS).
SPS is the unencrypted civilian positioning and timing service that
is provided to all GPS users. PPS is a more accurate, military
positioning, velocity, and timing service available to authorized
encrypted users (U.S. military and some allies) on a worldwide basis
with limited anti-jam capabilities. Access to PPS is controlled, and
permits very precise matching of receiver-generated and satellite-
generated waveforms; this allows precise measurement of the distance to
each satellite.
GPS has several limitations that known/perceived enemies of the
United States may use:
Adversary use/exploitation of the GPS civil signal in
their equipment can reduce the U.S. military advantage.
GPS receivers are vulnerable to jamming.
Jamming GPS can adversely affect civil and first
responder operations, as well as joint military operations within a
geographic area. The stronger the jammer, the larger the affected area.
False signals, also known as ``Spoofing.'' An adversary
could generate false signals to mislead an authorized user with respect
to PNT information. GPS has anti-spoofing technology designed to
mitigate receiver compromise caused by intentionally misleading
transmissions.
Combatant Commanders and their subordinate joint force commanders
should factor potential GPS jamming into their Operations Plans. The
Department of Defense can provide a classified presentation discussing
specific GPS denial issues or concerns at the committee's convenience.
Mr. Heinrich. What counter-measures are in place and on the horizon
to combat GPS denial?
Mr. Butler. Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites broadcast
navigation information on a continuous basis. The transmission has two
levels of service--a standard positioning service (SPS) and a precise
positioning service (PPS).
SPS is the unencrypted civilian positioning and timing service that
is provided to all GPS users. PPS is a more accurate, military
positioning, velocity, and timing service available to authorized
encrypted users (U.S. military and some allies) on a worldwide basis
with limited anti-jam capabilities.
Access to PPS is controlled by use of cryptography (encryption keys
loaded in the terminal units). The positioning code in each level of
service permits very precise matching of receiver-generated and
satellite-generated waveforms. This allows for precise measurement of
the distance to each satellite.
GPS has anti-spoofing technology designed to mitigate receiver
compromise caused by intentionally misleading transmissions. Future GPS
planning enhancements include efforts to provide improved anti-jam
capability.
The GPS acquisition strategy calls for continued development of GPS
user equipment (UE) to support current warfighter activities and GPS
Modernization aimed at maturing counter-measures. The GPS UE program
will continue Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM)
receiver production, prepare for Military code (M-code) receiver
development, and work with platforms/users to identify requirements and
upgrade paths for further GPS enhancements. Additionally, several anti-
jam technology efforts will be pursued to combat any potential threat
that may deny GPS signals. The Department of Defense can provide a
classified presentation discussing specific GPS denial issues or
concerns at the committee's convenience.
Mr. Heinrich. What impact would GPS denial have on current
operations (strategic)?
Mr. Butler. The impact of Global Positioning System (GPS) denial on
current operations (strategic) is dependent on the frequency and
intensity of the denial. Each GPS satellite can store information on
board for many days. In the event the GPS constellation cannot be
updated, accuracy will gradually degrade. The rate of degradation is
very slow in the first few days but increases with time. This allows
GPS to be used for several days in a current operations (strategic)
environment even if the update capabilities are interrupted.
GPS capabilities (e.g., space, control, and user segments) play a
key role in military operations in all four domains (land, sea, air,
and space). U.S. military forces use GPS for their space-based
positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) information. GPS assets
provide essential, precise, and reliable information that permit joint
forces to plan, train, coordinate, and execute operations more
effectively.
The Department of Defense (DOD) uses GPS time as its standard to
provide continuous global service. Service accuracy is determined by
receiver type, number of GPS satellites in view, and satellite
geometric configuration. However, GPS vulnerabilities to threats such
as adversary exploitation, jamming, lack of line-of-sight reception,
ionospheric scintillation, tropospheric errors, and signal multipath
issues warrant that communication systems have a back-up capability to
acquire timing information. The DOD can provide a classified
presentation discussing specific GPS denial issues or concerns at the
committee's convenience.
Mr. Heinrich. What impact would GPS denial have on the warfighter
(tactical)?
Mr. Butler. The impact of Global Positioning System (GPS) denial on
the tactical warfighter is dependent on the frequency and intensity of
the denial. Each GPS satellite can store information on board for many
days. In the event the GPS constellation cannot be updated, accuracy
will gradually degrade. The rate of degradation is very slow in the
first few days but increases with time. This allows GPS to be used for
several days in a tactical environment even if the update capabilities
are interrupted.
GPS capabilities (e.g., space, control, and user segments) play a
key role in military operations in all four domains (land, sea, air,
and space). U.S. military forces use GPS for their space-based
positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) information. GPS assets
provide essential, precise, and reliable information that permit joint
forces to plan, train, coordinate, and execute operations more
effectively. GPS gives the joint force the capability to improve
communications security and effectiveness.
The Department of Defense (DOD) uses GPS time as its standard to
provide continuous global service. Service accuracy is determined by
receiver type, number of GPS satellites in view, and satellite
geometric configuration. However, GPS vulnerabilities to threats such
as adversary exploitation, jamming, lack of line-of-sight reception,
ionospheric scintillation, tropospheric errors, and signal multipath
issues warrant that communication systems have a back-up capability to
acquire timing information. The DOD can provide a classified
presentation discussing specific GPS denial issues or concerns at the
committee's convenience.