[House Hearing, 111 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] [H.A.S.C. No. 111-124] HEARING ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 AND OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ FULL COMMITTEE HEARING ON BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY __________ HEARING HELD FEBRUARY 24, 2010 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 58-171 WASHINGTON : 2010 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202�09512�091800, or 866�09512�091800 (toll-free). E-mail, [email protected]. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES One Hundred Eleventh Congress IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas California GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii MAC THORNBERRY, Texas SILVESTRE REYES, Texas WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina VIC SNYDER, Arkansas W. TODD AKIN, Missouri ADAM SMITH, Washington J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia LORETTA SANCHEZ, California JEFF MILLER, Florida MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JOE WILSON, South Carolina ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey ROB BISHOP, Utah SUSAN A. DAVIS, California MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island JOHN KLINE, Minnesota RICK LARSEN, Washington MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JIM COOPER, Tennessee TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JIM MARSHALL, Georgia BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado HANK JOHNSON, Georgia ROB WITTMAN, Virginia CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DUNCAN HUNTER, California DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania GLENN NYE, Virginia CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama SCOTT MURPHY, New York WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York DAN BOREN, Oklahoma Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director Will Ebbs, Professional Staff Member Jenness Simler, Professional Staff Member Liz Drummond, Staff Assistant C O N T E N T S ---------- CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 2010 Page Hearing: Wednesday, February 24, 2010, Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act--Budget Request from the Department of the Navy........................................................... 1 Appendix: Wednesday, February 24, 2010..................................... 47 ---------- WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2010 FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' A Representative From California, Ranking Member, Committee On Armed Services........ 3 Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1 WITNESSES Conway, Gen. James T., USMC, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps....... 8 Mabus, Hon. Ray, Secretary of the Navy........................... 4 Roughead, Adm. Gary, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy... 6 APPENDIX Prepared Statements: Conway, Gen. James T......................................... 99 Mabus, Hon. Ray.............................................. 55 McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 53 Roughead, Adm. Gary.......................................... 75 Skelton, Hon. Ike............................................ 51 Documents Submitted for the Record: [There were no Documents submitted.] Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing: Mr. Bartlett................................................. 121 Mr. Skelton.................................................. 121 Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing: Mr. Akin..................................................... 126 Mr. Hunter................................................... 131 Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 130 Mrs. McMorris Rodgers........................................ 130 Mr. Thornberry............................................... 125 Ms. Tsongas.................................................. 125 Mr. Wilson................................................... 128 FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY ---------- House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 24, 2010. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES The Chairman. Good morning. Today the House Armed Services Committee meets to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2010 budget request for the United States Navy and Marine Corps. Appearing before the committee the Honorable Ray Mabus, Secretary of the Navy; Admiral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations [CNO]; and General James T. Conway, Commandant, United States Marine Corps. Now, Mr. Secretary, we note that this is your first time testifying before our full committee, and we welcome you--and Admiral Roughead. General Conway, thank you for your continued service, and thank you for the service of those that serve with you, and under you. Today the United States Navy has 194 ships under way. Of those 143 are deployed. These numbers equate to over 53,000 sailors deployed in support of the Navy's missions worldwide. To support combat operations, the Navy has 15,600 individual augmentees deployed in the CENTCOM [United States Central Command] area of responsibility. The United States Marine Corps is almost 30,000 Marines deployed. A little over 15,000 Marines are on the ground in Afghanistan. Many of those are currently engaged in hostile combat in and around the town of Marjah in the Helmand Province. I am sure I speak for all members of our Committee when I say that our thoughts and prayers are with all the deployed sailors and Marines, with their families, and with particular concern for those Marines who are currently engaged in the combat operations. And I have said this before, but it bears repeating. Our sea services are this nation's fast response force. The Navy power base is maneuvered from the sea. Marine Corps is and should remain an amphibious assault force and a crisis aversion force. Current operations over the last seven years have stressed our Marine Corps, and fashioned them to more the medium-heavy ground combat force. And I am a bit concerned about that. We remain committed to provide our sailors and Marines with equipment they need to accomplish the task before them. There are challenges. The Navy must recapitalize the main battle fleet to numbers which can support the COCOM's [Unified Combatant Command's] requirements. The 30-year Shipbuilding Plan submitted with the budget request only partially accomplishes this task. I will repeat that, only partially accomplishes this task. From that plan it appears the costs associated with replacing the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine is so high that efforts to restore numbers in the surface force and the attack submarine force may have to be sacrificed to pay for the national strategic deterrence mission of the ballistic missile submarine. Shipbuilding plans don't address the requirement of a 38- ship force of amphibious assault ships. At best the shipbuilding plan provides a force of amphibious ships in the low 30s. And it seems to me that might be an unacceptable risk. And I am sure that our Committee will carefully review this proposed Navy shipbuilding plan. I am very concerned about the looming strike fighter shortfall in Navy aviation. In short, I don't understand why the F/A-18 Strike Fighter program has not been extended. By any analysis, more Navy and Marine Corps fighters will be needed to meet validated inventory requirements by the middle of the decade. Delays in the Joint Strike Fighter Program only exacerbate the problem of a near-term strike fighter shortfall. The Navy and Marine Corps continue to be challenged in maintenance and recapitalization. I am pleased to see an increase in the Navy's request for operation and maintenance funds. I note that in Admiral Roughead's response to the ranking member's request for the Navy unfunded priority list, the CNO lists spare parts and deferred maintenance as his three most vital shortfalls. Year over year deferred maintenance seems to pile up. If we cannot seem to find the funding to maintain our ships and our planes and our equipment, I am deeply concerned about the additional cost of replacing them prior to the end of their expected life service. Deployments have always been a part and parcel to sea service. That happens every day. Sea services have always lived in a reality of deployment. Reset, retraining, redeployment. And I have been very concerned that the average Navy deployment cycle has gradually increased from a traditional 6-month deployment with an 18-month maintenance and retraining period to deployments averaging 8 months with comparable reduction in the maintenance and retraining period. The stress on the force, frankly, is increasing. I would like to address the relocation of the Marines from Okinawa. It is essential that we preserve the unique strategic relationship that exists between Japan and our country. At the same time it is imperative that we reduce our force structure in Okinawa and retain the strategic capabilities associated with the third Marine Expeditionary Force. While I understand the desire of the new government of Japan to review the current basing agreements, we need to move forward with the overall realignment that includes a replacement facility and the Guam relocation. In the end we need to ensure that the Marine Corps and the supporting communities are in a better position. We need to get this move right. We can't go back and undo a mistake. And now I turn to my good friend, the ranking member, the gentleman from California, Buck McKeon. [The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 51.] STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, General Conway, good morning. Welcome. In particular, General, with your forthcoming retirement, I guess this is your last posture hearing. I am sure you have been looking forward to this with mixed emotion. We look forward to all of your testimony here today. And really appreciate your service and what you do for the country, and your leadership. The President's Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget for the Department of the Navy requests $179.1 billion for discretionary and war funding. According to the Defense Department, this represents an increase of $5.2 billion over fiscal year 2010 enacted levels. From what I gather in the press, the three of you deserve a significant amount of credit for your advocacy for Navy and Marine Corps personnel and programs. However, I am concerned that the Department's [of Defense] efforts to make balance a fixture in the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] and the out-year budget is shortsighted, and puts the Department on the wrong path for the next 20 years. While the QDR states that U.S. forces must be able to deter, defend against and defeat aggression in anti-access environments, neither the Department of the Navy's fiscal year 2011 budget request, nor the long-term shipbuilding or aviation plans appear to make significant long-term investments in the capabilities that would be required to achieve that goal. We have previously received testimony that the QDR and the fiscal year 2011 budget proposed a number of new initiatives designed to provide robust capabilities for tomorrow's force, such as a new SSBN [Nuclear-Powered Submersible Ship with Ballistic Capability] submarine, the F-35 ballistic missile defense, the Virginia-class attack submarine. While I agree that investments in these areas are necessary, they are neither sufficient, nor do they tell the full story. For example, the decision to fund the new SSBN submarine from within the Navy's shipbuilding procurement account could decimate the shipbuilding program in the out-years because the new SSBN will cost at least $7 billion, or close to half of the Navy's recent ship construction budgets. The F-35 program continues to experience developmental delays that only exacerbate the Navy and Marine Corps' strike fighters' shortfall. Yet the QDR and the budget request do nothing to rectify this situation. We are building two Virginia-class attack subs per year starting in fiscal year 2011. Yet the shipbuilding plan we just received has our force falling to 39 by 2030, leaving our combatant commanders worse off than they are now. The proposed regional missile defense architecture relies on the Navy's surface combatants. Nevertheless, the shipbuilding plan proposes a smaller surface combatant fleet than the last plan did. I need not go on. I am hopeful that you can provide further insights for this committee to help us understand how the QDR and the fiscal year 2011 budget reflect a comprehensive approach to providing the capabilities the Navy and Marine Corps will need in the future. Lastly, the President has asked Congress to consider a major personnel policy change that could affect readiness. Therefore, Admiral Roughead, and General Conway, I will be requesting your views on whether the current law prohibiting the service of openly gay men and women should be repealed, and on the suggestion that a moratorium on implementing current law be put into effect while the Department of Defense studies and reviews the issue. I am disappointed that the decision has been made not to let the service chiefs testify before the military personnel subcommittee's hearings on ``don't ask, don't tell.'' That decision limits the ability of members to fully understand and explore the concerns of the service chiefs about a repeal of current law. I would hope that we could continue that discussion. Once again, I thank you for being here today. I look forward to your testimony. I ask unanimous consent that my full opening statement be included in the record. The Chairman. Without objection it will be. [The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 53.] Mr. McKeon. I yield back my time. The Chairman. Thank you so much. Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours. STATEMENT OF HON. RAY MABUS, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY Secretary Mabus. Mr. Chairman, Congressman McKeon, members of this committee, it is a real pleasure to be here today before the House Armed Services Committee. The CNO, the Commandant, and I are grateful for the commitment that the members of this committee have shown to our men and women in uniform in the Navy and the Marine Corps. We are exceptionally proud to be here today representing our sailors, Marines, civilians, and their families. The Navy and Marine Corps remain the most formidable expeditionary fighting force in the world, capable of global operations across the entire spectrum of warfare. Today, as the Chairman noted, 40 percent of our forces are deployed and over half the fleet is at sea. In Helmand province, Afghanistan, more than 15,000 Marines are engaged in major combat, counterinsurgency, and engagement operations, including the effort to clear the Taliban stronghold of Marjah. They are supported there by naval aircraft flying close air support from Eisenhower [USS Dwight D. Eisenhower], and from our forward-deployed expeditionary aviation assets. A total of more than 12,000 sailors are on the ground in Iraq, Afghanistan, and across the broader Middle East, and another 9,000 sailors and Marines are embarked on our ships at sea. Off the coast of Africa, ships are protecting international commerce off Somalia, and ships are operating as partnership stations with our regional allies. Off the coast of South America more ships are stemming the flow of illegal narcotics into the United States. Our ballistic missile defense forces are ready to defend against any threat to international peace in Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific Rim. Our forward-deployed forces continue their role as a strategic buffer and deterrent against rogue regimes and potential competitors alike. And in Haiti, nine ships and 1,900 Marines from the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit continue to provide humanitarian aid, disaster relief and medical assistance. The Navy and Marine Corps are flexible, responsive, and everywhere the nation's interests are at stake. Our global presence reduces instability, deters aggression, and allows us to rapidly respond to any crisis that borders a sea. I believe that the President's fiscal year 2011 budget for the Department of the Navy is a carefully considered request that gives us the resources we need to conduct effective operations and to meet all the missions we have been assigned. Our shipbuilding and aviation requests concur with the findings of the QDR and its objectives of prevailing in today's wars, preventing conflict, preparing for future wars, and preserving the force. With this budget, the Navy and Marine Corps will continue to maintain the maritime superiority of our forces, sustain a strong American shipbuilding base, and ensure our capacity for rapid global response. Across the 5 years we have requested the funds to build an average of 10 ships a year, including one carrier, one big-deck amphib, 10 Virginia-class submarines, and 17 Littoral Combat Ships. We will leverage the technologies captured from the canceled CGX [Next Generation Cruiser] program, and truncated DDG-1000 [Zumwalt-Class Destroyer] program, into what will become the Flight III Burke-class DDGs. These technologies include SPY-3 [AN/SPY-3 radar] and the air and missile defense radar. Through the submitted shipbuilding plan, we will increase the size of our fleet to approximately 320 ships by 2024. In our shipbuilding program I believe we have made the most cost- effective decisions to achieve the most capable force. One that achieves equal flexibility to confront missions across the spectrum of conflict, from the technically complex, like ballistic missile defense and integrated air defense, to low- intensity humanitarian response and regional engagement. In aircraft procurement, we have requested just over 1,000 aircraft across the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], including both fixed and rotary wing. Over the next year, the Navy and Marine Corps will continue to move ahead with changes to our acquisition process in compliance with the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act. We are aggressively developing our acquisition strategies to ensure that on-time and on-budget becomes standard for the Navy and Marine Corps. I am grateful for the support of this committee for the decision to recompete the LCS [Littoral Combat Ship] program when it failed to meet program standards. I can assure you that we will not hesitate to recompete or cancel other programs whenever substandard performance demands change. Change is also required to address the way in which the Navy and Marine Corps use and produce energy. Energy reform is an issue of national security, and it is essential to maintaining our strategic advantage, our warfighting readiness, and our tactical edge. By 2020, I have committed the Navy to generate half of all the energy we use from alternative sources. This is an ambitious goal. Nothing has ever been accomplished without taking some bold steps. Forty years ago I stood watch on the deck of the USS Little Rock as a very young junior officer. Today, I have the solemn privilege of standing watch on behalf of our Navy and Marine Corps in a time of war and national challenge. I am honored by the trust the President and the Congress have placed in me, and fully recognize the solemn obligation I have to those who defend us. I, along with the CNO and the Commandant, look forward to hearing your thoughts and answering your questions that you have concerning our budget requests, our programs, our policies. I also look forward to working closely with you as we move forward to sustain the Navy and Marine Corps as the most formidable expeditionary fighting force in the world. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Secretary Mabus can be found in the Appendix on page 55.] The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank you, and we think you are off to a great start. Admiral Roughead, please. STATEMENT OF ADM. GARY ROUGHEAD, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY Admiral Roughead. Thank you, sir. Chairman Skelton, Congressman McKeon, members of the committee, it is indeed my honor to before you again representing the more than 600,000 sailors and Navy civilians. As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, 65,000 of them are deployed, 12,000 on land in the Central Command Area of Operations, and 56 percent of our fleet is underway, carrying out our maritime strategy, a prescient precursor to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. They are projecting power into Afghanistan, building partnerships in Africa, delivering relief in Haiti, silently patrolling under the sea in every ocean, and providing ballistic missile defense in the Arabian Gulf, Western Pacific, and Eastern Mediterranean, with pride and determination. They are even deployed on the first Littoral Combat Ship two years ahead of schedule. And in the first week of that ship's deployment, she seized over a quarter of a ton of cocaine in the Caribbean. As our sailors and Navy civilians who make all things possible, and thanks to your support, we made important progress in building tomorrow's Navy, remaining ready to fight today and supporting our sailors and Navy civilians and families last year. This year's budget submission will take us even further. As the high demand for our Navy continues apace, we have stabilized end strength and the tone of the force remains positive. We will continue to aggressively improve wellness programs and medical and social services for our wounded warriors. Indeed, for all who serve. For our fleet as a continuously deployed force, we must continue to reset in stride, conducting regular maintenance and training so that our ships and aircraft reach their expected service lives. This year's budget aligns our baseline budget for operations and maintenance accordingly, and reflects a significant shift away from supplemental funding. I strongly request your support for this important change. While we reset, we must also procure ships and aircraft to reach our procurement of more than 313 ships. Last year, we commissioned 9 ships, and over the next decade our plan procures an average of 10 ships per year, significant growth for the near term. For aviation, I remain committed to bringing new capabilities online, the Joint Strike Fighter and unmanned aircraft, and maintaining the readiness of our current Naval Air Force, all of which give our nation flexibility and response, unencumbered by overseas basing. Affordability for all our plans will remain fundamental to our decisions. The effectiveness of our unmanned systems, ships, and aircraft is a feature of the systems which connect them. Last year, I brought information capabilities and resources under a single Information Dominance Directorate within the Navy staff, and commissioned Fleet Cyber Command 10th Fleet, and I see the benefits of that change every day. I am proud of our Navy's accomplishments last year, and I am confident we can achieve even more with this year's budget submission. Our risk continues to trend toward significant, and achieving the right balance, within and across, my priorities remains critical to mitigating it. But I remain optimistic because of the outstanding sailors and Navy civilians and the spirit of our nation. We have seen more challenging times and emerged prosperous, secure, and free. I ask you to support our 2011 budget request, and thank you for all you do to make the United States Navy a global force for good, today and into the future. Thank you, sir. [The prepared statement of Admiral Roughead can be found in the Appendix on page 75.] The Chairman. Admiral, thank you very, very much. General Conway, there is a lot of hard work left between now and the time we bid farewell to you. Carry on in the future. Thank you. STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES T. CONWAY, USMC, COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS General Conway. Mr. Chairman, Congressman McKeon, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to report to you on the posture of your Marine Corps. My pledge, as it has been over the years, is to provide you today a candid and honest assessment. Having recently returned from a trip to theatre, I am pleased to report to you on the magnificent performance of Marines and sailors in combat. If you count a full-year enlistment as a generation of Marines, we are now experiencing our third generation of great young patriots since our nation was provoked on 9/11. The first generation broke trail, leading the strikes into Afghanistan and Iraq. Our second generation quelled the once- volatile province of Anbar. Today there are less than 175 Marines in Iraq, but our third generation has more than 15,000 serving in Afghanistan. The Marines are fighting a skilled and determined enemy, but with the Afghan security forces, they are once again proving they are the strongest tribe in the Taliban stronghold of Helmand. Let me assure you from what SAR [Sergeant] Major and I have witnessed firsthand, the highest morale in the Corps resides in those units posted in Afghanistan. My written statement to the committee provides a snapshot of the Corps and describes our near-term focus, our long-term priorities, and our vision of the future. That vision matches closely the results of the Quadrennial Defense Review. The Secretary of Defense seeks to create a U.S. military more closely focused on hybrid threats, yet capable of responding to a major contingency. That combination essentially describes the Marine Corps that we have built today. A Corps that we call a two-fisted fighter, able to perform equally well in a counterinsurgency, or in a high-intensity combined arms fight. Our resource expenditures, moreover, reflect our dual or swing capacity. That is to say that 100 percent of Marine Corps equipment can be used in a hybrid conflict or in a major fight. Equivalent procurement is indeed our primary concern as we look at the fiscal year 2011 budget and beyond. Our requirements for equipment density in Afghanistan, and our resolve to reestablish our maritime pre-positions quadrants, have driven equipment stocks to an all-time low in our operating forces at home station. The ability to properly train for a deployment, and certainly the ability to respond to an unexpected contingency is at significant risk, based on this increasing shortfall. Congress has promised to resource us for a reset in constitution, but increasingly, we cannot wait for the guns to fall silent in Afghanistan for such an effort to begin. We ask for your help in this critical area. Our military construction accounts in the fiscal year 2011 budget and the FYDP are sufficient to help maintain the promise we have made to our Marines that they will have quality living spaces at home between deployments. One need only visit some of our major bases and stations to realize that we waited too long to begin this effort. Similarly, we believe that even in wartime we must continue a heavy emphasis on education of our officers and staff NCOs [Non Commissioned Officers]. A strong reservoir of strategic and operational thinkers is a must on sophisticated joint and combined battlefields. Therefore, a quality Marine Corps University with facilities to match our already world-class student body, faculty, and curriculum is a major priority. We trust we will receive your full support in our MILCON [Military Construction] investments that will repay huge dividends in the years to come. Ladies and gentlemen of the committee, I must admit my own surprise that our Corps of Marines and their families have remained so resilient over these nine years of conflict. They have been incredibly determined, loyal, and courageous in an effort to see these two wars to a successful close. Much of the credit goes to you in the Congress for providing them with the finest in equipment, warrior care, quality of life for our families, and compensation. The number one question in the minds of our troops is always: Is the country behind us? The members of Congress have answered that question in spades, both by your apportionment of the nation's precious resources, but also through personal efforts to visit troops in theatre, and those who are wounded at Bethesda and Walter Reed. As a result of all the above, and the natural tendency for Marines to stick around for a fight, our recruitment and retention are at all-time highs. I predict that for the second year in a row we will close out reenlistment opportunities for first-term and career force Marines at the halfway point of the fiscal year. Clearly, such a phenomenon would not be possible if Marines and their families were not happy in the service of their country. One day this long war with terrorists and Islamic extremists will be over. Your Marine Corps will cease being a second land army and gladly rejoin our Navy brothers aboard amphibious ships in order to project America's global presence, demonstrate American good will, and if need be, protect America's vital interests. Until that day comes, however, your Corps will continue, as we say, to do windows. That is, we will continue to take aboard the indomitable youth of America and make them Marines with the absolute conviction that as a result they will one day be better citizens. We will be trained and as equally prepared to rout Taliban fighters in Marjah as we are to feed beleaguered Haitians outside Port-au-Prince. With your continued support and that of our loyal countrymen, we will do whatever the nation asks us to do and do it exceedingly well. Thank you, sir, and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of General Conway can be found in the Appendix on page 99.] The Chairman. General, thank you very much. I think that all of us, and I know I speak for all the members of the committee, when I say we are immensely proud of the young men and young women who wear your uniforms, we are immensely proud and thankful for their families and the reflection of the high state of morale of which you gentlemen spoke. I have been blessed to be in the Congress several years, and I remember very well President Ronald Reagan aiming for a 600-ship Navy. That was a very worthy goal at the time. Today, we haven't even reached his halfway mark on that goal. We don't even have 300 ships out there. The oceans haven't gotten any smaller. Technology has gotten a lot better and one of the arguments is we don't need as many ships. Nevertheless, it is imperative that we have enough presence to make a difference, much less an ability to fight. How do you, Mr. Secretary, speed up your suggested building and numbers rate? We need to know. Secretary Mabus. Mr. Chairman, we have today, as you pointed out, 285 ships in our battle fleet and more than half of them are underway today. We are very cognizant of the fact that our force structure requirement of 2005 said that 313 ships are a floor and it is a floor that both the CNO and I recognize and need to build to get to that level. We think that the 5-year shipbuilding plan and the longer 30-year shipbuilding plan that we have submitted on this budget, which builds an average of 10 ships a year, 50 ships over this 5-year period, drives us toward that goal. By 2020, we will have reached the goal of more than 313 ships in the Navy. We think it is important to note as you did that these ships that we are building today are incredibly capable, incredibly technologically advanced and crewed by the best sailors and Marines that we have ever had, but at some point quantity becomes a quality all its own. And as you pointed out, the oceans haven't gotten any smaller and we do need to make sure that we are driving to increase the size of our fleet. And we believe that the budget that we have submitted to you and the shipbuilding plan that we have submitted to you do both of those things. The Chairman. One of the problems that we faced a few years ago and it was a surprise to my friend, Mr. Taylor, the Chairman of the Seapower Subcommittee, and as well to me, the retirement list of ships wasn't even made known to us officially. Of course, that was long before anyone sitting at the table here had any say on it. But a good part of it is the possibility of reviewing the retirement list and maybe we can get some more work out of some of these ships and help with the numbers. And as you have so correctly noted, quantity has a quality of its very own. I charge you with carefully deciding what ships should be with, should be on the retirement list. General, let me ask you the fact that so many Marines today, the whole generation of Marines actually, find themselves fighting as Army soldiers in a desert? What will that do to the Marine culture of future years? General Conway. Sir, as I said in the opening statement, we consider ourselves a multicapable force and therefore available to do whatever the nation would ask us to do. And, of course, as you note correctly, over the past 8 or 9 years, we have been asked to serve as a second land army alongside our brothers in the United States Army. Our gear has begun to, has accomplished the protection that is required and in the process has gotten heavier. We are a long way from salt sea air and our comfort zones as a naval force and yet, I would argue that we are doing it pretty well. That is not to say we want to continue to do it when the need is gone. We see the great value that we offer to the nation. We see our niche within the organization of the armed forces being just what you described in your opening statement and that is a naval force capable of extending America's presence and protecting our vital interests overseas. We have distinctly in our plans thought processes that will shed us of some of this heavier equipment, examine in detail what the amphibious lift, what the STRATCOM [United States Strategic Command] aviation lift would look like for rapid deployment and that is the Marine Corps we intend to be in the future. The Chairman. Admiral Roughead, what worries you the most as you sit there this morning? Admiral Roughead. What worries me the most, Mr. Chairman, as I look to the future as is insuring, as you pointed out in your statement, that as we get into what I consider to be the midterm of our shipbuilding plan that we have taken a good look at the costs associated with the replacement for the Ohio-class submarine and then the numbers of ships that were procured in significant numbers by class in the 80s as they reached the end of their service lives and the recapitalization that will be required for that. But that is beyond the scope of this budget that we have submitted, but as I look to the future and think about the issues my successors will deal with, that is what I think about. The Chairman. Can we take that decision on the new Ohio- class submarine down the road in favor of additional numbers of ships, other types of ships? Because you don't really need it until 10, 12, 15 years out. Admiral Roughead. No, sir. I think we have to be moving on that ship right now. The reason being is that that submarine will--the last submarine of the Ohio-class replacement--will come off of its last patrol in 2080. And the need to put in the types of systems and capabilities to take that ship out to that period of time requires significant thought and development and now is the time to start. It is absolutely consistent with where we have been with the Ohio class and I believe now is the time to be moving on that and I appreciate the support for that. The Chairman. You understand our concern about ship numbers, do you not? Admiral Roughead. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. I deal with the demands that we have coming in on a daily basis and I do believe that what we have done in the last couple of years to get some direction and stability in what I consider to be a workhorse of the fleet, the Arleigh Burke class, getting that line restarted is absolutely critical to field any capabilities we need getting to the downselect on Littoral Combat Ship is going to allow us to build those in the most affordable way. So I believe that this program that we have put together addresses the numbers in the best way. The Chairman. Thank you so much. Mr. McKeon. Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, in your personal view, should the current law prohibiting the service of openly gay men and women be repealed and what is your personal view with regard to the suggestion that a moratorium on implementing the current law be put into effect while the Department of Defense studies and reviews the issue taking place? Admiral Roughead. Mr. McKeon, my personal view is what is in the best interest of the United States Navy. And that is to go forward with the assessment that has been called for by the Secretary of Defense to allow us to assess the force that we have today. There are a lot of bits of information and surveys that have taken place, but there has never really been an assessment of the force that serves. And equally important to that force is the opinions of the families who support that force. That needs to be done because only with that information can we talk about the force that we have, not someone else's, not another country's--about the United States Navy in my case. So we need to proceed down that path. With regard to a moratorium, I believe that it would be extremely confusing to the force and I do not recommend that. Thank you. General Conway. Sir, our commander in chief has spoken and the Secretary of Defense has devised a way through a working group to examine the data, I think, in a way that has never been done and I support his efforts and we will contribute to that effort as it goes down range. However, I would encourage your work, mine and that of the working group to be focused on a central issue and that is the readiness of the armed forces of the United States to fight this nation's wars. That is what our armed forces are intended to do. That is what they have been built to do under the current construct and I would argue that we have done a pretty good job bringing that to pass. So my concern would be if somehow that central purpose and focus were to become secondary to the discussion because that is what your armed forces is all about. Mr. McKeon. And the moratorium? General Conway. Sir, in terms of the moratorium, I agree with the CNO. Our commanders out in the field are trying to execute the guidance to the absolute best of their abilities. There is an expression we have, keep it simple. I would encourage you either to change the law or not, but in the process half measures, I think, will only be confusing in the end. Mr. McKeon. Thanks very much. Admiral, as I alluded to in my opening statement, I remain concerned that the QDR's focus on today's wars is precluding the department from making the investments that are required for our long-term national security interests. Let me provide a specific example. The committee has been briefed that the far-term planning period in the long-range shipbuilding plan is characterized from 2031 to 2040. It is characterized by the emergence of a near-peer competitor. While one may debate whether a near-peer competitor could emerge sooner than that, it is reasonable to assume that the threat of a peer competitor, particularly one with significant anti-access capabilities, would increase the Navy's reliance on large surface combatants, attack and guided missile submarines and amphibious ships. Unfortunately, our force structure assumes the greatest risk in these exact platforms during this period. Large surface combatant force levels decrease from a high of 96 to a sustained low of 60 in the 60s and 70s. Attack submarines decrease from a high of 55 to 39 with sustained low levels in the low 40s during that period. Cruise missile submarines, which also provide significant capabilities for special forces, disappear entirely. Amphibious ships sustained lows in the--of 29 and 30--10 percent below the limit of acceptable risk for these forces, and over 30 percent below the current requirement. In your professional assessment are you confident that this force could deter or defeat at low to moderate risk a near-peer competitor with access capability? And if not, please characterize the risk that you see to our national security? Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. And as I look at the force that we have laid out--the force that exists today, and particularly the force that is addressed by the budget that is being submitted--I do believe that even though there is much talk and discussion about focusing on the wars that we are in--I will tell you that the United States Navy is all in, in Afghanistan, and in Iraq, and in that critical area. But at the same time I think it is noteworthy that we have increased our submarine production to two submarines a year. And the Virginia class is out--deployed. It is a terrific submarine. We are moving forward, as I said, with the ballistic missile defense--or the ballistic missile submarine. The advances and the investments that we are making with regard to ballistic missile defense in our surface combatants is exactly the type of capability that we are going to need in integrated air and missile defense. Not just for ballistic missiles, but against the cruise missile threat. Taking some of the technologies that we will prove in the DDG-1000. Coupling that with the direction that we are going with our ballistic missile force, and the Arleigh Burke class, and in our cruisers, I believe we will then be able to better inform the next surface combatant that will address those challenges that are out there in the future. In aviation we have to get to the Joint Strike Fighter. It is an incredible capability. And in this budget, I am extremely pleased with what we have been able to do with unmanned systems. Particularly the demonstration that we are moving forward with the unmanned carrier airborne system. That is also going to inform us about that time period that you are talking about there. That is going to be extremely important to us. And we need to be able to continue that demonstration project. And in the area of cyber that is not so much hardware, but the reorganization that we have made this past year in the Navy, and the stand-up of the 10th fleet, allows us to get into that battle space if you will. And that battle space is going to become equally important as that which is kinetic. So I do believe that we are laying in the right types of capabilities that we are going to need for the future. Mr. McKeon. Thank you. Understanding that technological advances will benefit both our forces, and those of a potential peer competitor in the interim, would you be in a better position with those--with this proposed force structure than you are today if you had more cruisers, destroyers, and submarines in the force? Admiral Roughead. Mr. McKeon, we are ramping up our ballistic missile defense capability, not just in the building of the new DDG-51 restarts, but also going back in. And the beauty of the weapons system that we currently have is that it allows us to modify the current ships so that they are BMD [Ballistic Missile Defense]-capable. We are also adding to our missile inventory in that regard. With respect to submarines, we are meeting all of the critical requirements that the COCOMs have levied on us. And I see the benefit of what our submarines are doing every day around the world. I have the privilege of being debriefed by the young commanders as they come back in. And our submarine force is meeting the critical requirements of the COCOMs, and doing it exceedingly well. Mr. McKeon. Well, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I think the three of you have done an outstanding job, given the limits of the top line for the Navy and the Marines. I am just concerned that the top line isn't what we need. And so I think, as the Secretary said earlier to us, that our numbers look good for the few years ahead. But in the out-years it is a fantasy. Not you, Secretary, Secretary Gates. And I think that that is a concern that we all need to be really aware of. I think that there are probably areas where we can save money. But even in our best efforts, I think we are still not getting all that we need to protect us in--out into the future. So thank you again for all that you are doing, and I appreciate it. Yield back. The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. Before I call Mr. Ortiz--Admiral, as we speak today, how many sailors do you have in either Iraq or Afghanistan doing Army type of work? Admiral Roughead. Right now, Mr. Chairman, we have 12,000 sailors on the ground in Iraq and in Afghanistan. And around 6,000 of them are doing things that are not necessarily within what we would consider our core or adaptive core capabilities. The Chairman. In other words, they are doing Army work? Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. They are working as--in support of our ground forces. They are doing extraordinary work I might add. And we benefit from that experience as well. Because that time that they spend in the fight, on the ground with other services--when they come back into the Navy, they bring perspectives, they bring leadership experiences. And observations on ways of doing things that they otherwise wouldn't have. And I am also very pleased that they promote at a higher rate than those who have not had this experience. The Chairman. Thank you. And we now go to the 5-minute rule. Mr. Ortiz. Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, General Conway, I want to thank you all for the great service that you have given to our country. And thank you so much for joining us today. I just have a few questions for all of you on the subject of wind farms, and military readiness. My district in South Texas trains half of the Navy and Marine Corps pilots in the country. And you can imagine that I am so proud of these young men and women. And I want to make sure that I do everything within my power to provide them the best training facilities in the country. Now multiple wind farms have emerged in my district--and God knows we need all the energy we can get--in very close proximity to my two Naval air training bases. These wind farms are impacting the use of radar throughout the district, and forcing changes in training routes. And interfering with air defense radars. And this is what I hear. And I understand that this same issue is also impacting other Naval installations. My concern is not with the development of the wind farm energy. But rather the negative impact that these wind farms have on our military readiness. Now I wonder what is the Navy doing to ensure that these wind farms do not impact radar or military training? And I just want to know, because we have different agencies. And I see where some departments are granting grants for wind energy, solar energy. And I just wonder if the agencies are talking to one another to see that whatever they do does not impact on the training that we have. Not only in my facilities in South Texas, but in other facilities throughout where we conduct training. And maybe all of you can respond, and give me some insight to my question? Secretary Mabus. Thank you, sir. We are proud of Kingsville, and we do think that they train the best pilots in the world there. We are very aware of the wind farm issue around Kingsville. And of the other issues that may impact training from various directions with various other government agencies. And we are keeping a close eye on the wind farms around Kingsville. Thus far it is our belief that it, they have not interfered with the core training, the essential training that is necessary for the pilots. If proposals were made to construct wind farms that did, we would of course want to take some action to make sure that that did not happen. We work closely with other agencies to make sure that military readiness, national defense capabilities, are not impacted. And that they understand how our needs would be affected. Mr. Ortiz. General, would you like to add to---- General Conway. Sir, we have several training aviation bases in Arizona, and California in addition to our training basis that we share with the Navy in Texas. And our concern actually is more with low-flying helicopters, and the potential danger that some of these wind farms could have if the pilots aren't well aware of their presence. And that is the sort of extraordinary effort that we are taking at this point to make sure that wind farms that we might put on our own bases--and we have some at the Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow. But others in the vicinity of some of our training bases are well noted on our aviation maps. And the pilots in low light or low-visibility conditions are certainly aware of their presence. Mr. Ortiz. Admiral. Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. We pay particular attention to all of our training space. Not just the air training space that affects the bases in Texas, but all around the country. And our local commanders pay particular attention to it. Here in Washington we do. And when we get a sense that there could be some encroachment, engage with the appropriate agencies, and communities. Because in many cases the communities are seeking this sort of development as well--to try to come to a solution that allows us to accommodate the important training needs that we have, and the needs of the communities. So we do pay very close attention to it. Mr. Ortiz. Again thank you so much for your service, and thank you for joining us today. Admiral Roughead. Thank you. The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Bartlett, please. Mr. Bartlett. Thank you all very much for your service. Admiral, I guess what you see depends on where you sit. My understanding is that the Navy is able to respond to little more than 40 percent of the requests of the combatant commanders for submarines. So I guess critical depends upon where you sit. I think that the new Chinese anti-ship missile may be a huge game changer. I see little recognition of that in the QDR, in the budget, or in your testimony today. Admiral, you mentioned that you were aggressively pursuing unmanned aircraft in the Navy. And yet we are not aggressively pursuing unmanned ships in the Navy. I know why. It is because we have too few ships. They are too valuable. We have people on ships not because we need them there to sail the ships, but because we need them there for damage control. We need to be moving to a very much larger Navy with very much smaller platforms so that we can move away from manned platforms. Half the cost of keeping the ships at sea as you know, sir, is the personnel. Which means if you get rid of half the personnel, you can have 50 percent more ships. If you get rid of all the personnel, you have 100 percent more ships. We are going to be attacked where we are the weakest. I know that during the Clinton years we largely waived EMP [Electromagnetic Pulse] hardening on most of our new platforms. To what extent are you EMP-hardened? How much fighting capability would remain if you had an EMP lay down of 100 kilovolts per meter, which is but half of what the Russian generals told the EMP Commission the Soviets had developed, and the Russians had available? Admiral, I am very pleased to note your emphasis on--focus on energy. I hope that means that you are aggressively supporting the increased nuclearization of our major platforms. Seems to me kind of silly to have a carrier that is fueled for 30 years, and it is supported by ships that are fueled for a few days. These are my observations, my comments, my questions. Could you respond? Thank you. Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. The--first off on the meeting of the 40 percent of the requirements. As I mentioned, the meeting of the critical requirements as a former fleet commander--I was the one that had to fulfill those needs. And I am very comfortable with the fact that the critical requirements are being met for our submarine force. The survivability relative to electromagnetic pulses is--it is indeed a consideration and something that as we put our network architectures together is working through that survivability is very key to us. With regard to your specific question about the strength of the pulse and the effect on our systems, it--with that detail of question, Mr. Bartlett, I would like to be able to take that one for the record if I could and get back to you. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 121.] Admiral Roughead. As we look at ships of the future and what that force must be in previous testimony and in discussions, I have said I do not have an aversion to nuclear power, but I think that there are more factors involved than simply the cost of the fuel itself. It is the construction cost. It is the maintenance cost. It is the cost of the people. And I believe all of that needs to be taken into the equation as we look at alternative energy systems for our force of the future. With regard to the unmanned systems, the one area that I would also add where we are moving forward on is an underwater unmanned systems which I think are extraordinarily important to our future and which they themselves have some unique power requirements and we are working on that. But all of that is on my scope and I look forward to working on them in the coming months and years. Mr. Bartlett. You will address the other two questions in writing, my question about the Chinese anti-ship missile and why you still have people on ships? Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. The one of the reasons that we have people on ships is that we have not gotten to the full automation that we need, but I think the LCS is a perfect example of what we are doing to bring people off of ships. The Chairman. I thank the gentlemen. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor. Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all of you including my former governor and attorney general, Secretary Navy Mabus--Secretary of the Navy Mabus for being here. I thank all of you for what you do. General Conway, let me start by saying that today's Washington Post had a very disturbing photograph on the front of a mine resistant vehicle that had been attacked in Afghanistan. I would like to take the occasion to say that it is my hunch that had that been an up-armored Humvee [High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle], every Marine in that vehicle probably would have died. It is my hunch that because of that vehicle, probably every Marine in that vehicle lived. And I want to commend your General Brogan for the job he has done in putting that program together on what seems to be now an afterthought, fairly short notice and the outstanding job he has done and I would hope that he would be properly recognized for that. Secretary Mabus, you had the distinction, if my memory is right, of being the youngest attorney general and the youngest governor in Mississippi. I want to give you a third distinction and that is the fleet only grew on your watch. The bleeding started about 1990 best of my knowledge. Last year for the first time, we actually grew the fleet. We went from 285, which is too small, to 287, which is too small, and the irony is that you and many other CNOs have come before this committee and said we need a 313-ship Navy, but your budget request would actually shrink about three ships. That is unacceptable. If administratively you can't get us towards 313, then we are going to have to do it legislatively. Now, one of the ways we can do this is we are going to commission 7 ships this year, but you are asking for permission to decommission 10. That doesn't get you there. That is going the wrong way. So I want to--I have had this conversation with our Chairman and I--and I just want to put you on notice as my friend and someone who I want to work with. Decommissioning 10 ships this year is unacceptable. It is going to be my intention with the support of our Chairman to introduce to have in this year's bill that we are going to have legislatively a three-to-two ratio. For every three ships that are commissioned by the Navy, you will be giving commissions to decommission two. That is going to get us finally on the right track towards 313. Again, if it's not done administratively we are going to have to do it legislatively. One of the proposals that Captain Ebbs has wisely asked the Navy to look into will be a SLEP [Selected Life Extension Program]-program certified fixed engine for your frigates--for about $3 billion, we can keep those approximately 25 frigates in the fleet for another 5 years. Now, that would be my first preference. If you have a better preference to grow the fleet, I want to hear your ideas, but I think that is certainly something we need to look into particularly for the missions you mentioned off of Latin America, for chasing pirates off of Somalia. That frigate is more than adequate. If we need to spend some money to get another 5 years out of those hulls, then let's do it and let's start planning on doing it. What I want you to look into now is, you know, we keep making mistakes. One of the concerns of the F-35, and I am totally in support of, the CNO's plan to get the F-35 into the fleet. The question that is being asked as far as the thermal footprint of the F-35, on the ships we are constructing today, are we planning ahead for the delivery of that vessel so that the thermal footprint as far as the backlash shield on the carrier and the deck, the large big deck amphibs--that this plane is going to fly off of, are we taking the steps today to build them to handle that thermal footprint for when that plane is delivered a few years in the future. Secretary Mabus. And to my friend, Gene Taylor, who I served with in other capacities, in terms of the last question that you asked, the thermal footprint, we are taking the steps both with the blast deflector on the carriers whether it will need to be strengthened at all, but if it does, that is a very straightforward fix for that blast deflector. We are beginning tests on the USS Wasp, a big deck amphib, in terms of the STOVL [Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing] version and the thermal footprint coming down from that for the Marine version. So yes, we are beginning to take steps to make sure that when the Joint Strike Fighter joins the fleet that the fleet is absolutely ready and capable of handling it. Mr. Taylor. Mr. Secretary, in the 8 seconds I have, take a look at the 10 ships you asked to decommission, narrow that down to two because we need to stop the bleeding this year. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank the gentlemen. Gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Akin. Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all of you in the panel here this morning. I had a couple of quick questions. I hope they are quick. The first would be Admiral Roughead and also General Conway. We have had some trouble with welding and--particularly welding, I guess, on some LPDs [Amphibious Transport Dock Ships] and part of that it turns out is a workforce problem where we don't have enough welders sometimes with the timing of when we build ships. So my question is I understand that there could well be a serious workforce problem at the shipyards out in San Diego and we currently have three LPDs scheduled for 2011, 2013 and 2015. My first question is would you be open-minded at least if it saves money and if it averts some of that work--it puts the work in a more consistent way across the yard to consider 2011, 2012 and 2013--excuse me, the MLPs [Marine Landing Platform]. Did I say LPDs? The MLPs which were the Marine landing platform ships. If we were to consider 2011, 2012, 2013 as opposed to 2011, 2013, 2015, are you open-minded to at least looking at that if it saves money? Admiral Roughead. Thank you for the question, sir, and I would say that the shipbuilding plan that we have in place is one that balances many factors to include how that money is spread over time and what the needs of the Navy are and the development of that. As you know, the MLP is also a new class of ship and acceleration there may not be possible. So I think as we look at that, we have to be very mindful and very careful of how that balance can be affected. Mr. Akin. Certainly. And obviously there is a lot of factor that goes into that. My second question is my understanding is that your intent is to meet the March 1st goal in terms of the Joint Strike Fighter situation to get the discount on buying F/ A-18s at a lower price. First of all, is it correct that you do intend to file that paperwork on March 1 to allow us to get a discount on the price of the planes? Secretary Mabus. We received the letter of intent from the contractor on Monday. We know that the deadline is March 1st. We are working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense who would have to make that notification to meet that--to meet that deadline. Mr. Akin. So the supplier did give us that 10 percent number that we had talked about then? Secretary Mabus. Yes. Mr. Akin. Okay. And so your intent then is to meet that deadline as far as you know? Secretary Mabus. As we are working hard to meet that deadline given the very limited time we have got to do it, and we are working very hard with the staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense to do that. Mr. Akin. Good. Thank you. Third question is, and this is something that I have been beating this drum for a couple of years, and--but I am confused and I finally started to figure out why I am a little confused in this subject. In March of 2008, the department briefed the committee that the shortfall of fighters was 188. In January of 2009, we were told it was 243. In March of 2009, we were told the shortfall was 312. As if by magic 2 months later of 2009, we are told the shortfall was 146. The beginning of this month, the Secretary of Defense testified the shortfall was 100 aircraft. Last week, the committee was told the shortfall was 177. And then 5 days later, my staff was told the shortfall was 100. So that is why I have been a little confused about this. We have gotten some different numbers. None of the numbers said zero and all of them said we do have a fighter shortfall. So I guess my next question would be in order to deal with that problem, would you consider purchasing more aircraft? Is that at least one option on the table, yes or no? Admiral Roughead. Mr. Akin, we have been working the strike fighter management very, very carefully and particularly in the case of Navy, we have made some adjustments to squadrons. So we have been bringing our number down and we will continue to look at how we manage our strike fighter force into the future. It in no way should detract from the imperative to get to Joint Strike Fighter and the foremost in my mind is---- Mr. Akin. Excuse me, sir. I--my clock has only got 5 seconds. Admiral Roughead. Okay. Mr. Akin. So the quick question is would you consider purchasing additional aircraft as one possibility to deal with that problem? Admiral Roughead. My focus right now, sir, is on looking at the SLEP program for our A's and D's [F/A-18 A and D models]. That is where I am going to be spending most of my time looking at. Mr. Akin. But you didn't answer my question. The Chairman. Admiral, would you like to answer his question so we can go onto the next one--questioner? Admiral Roughead. As we go into POM [Program Objective Memorandum] 12, sir, we are going to look at how to best manage the strike fighter fleet. We have some procurements of 18s [F/ A-18s] laid into this budget, but I also believe it is important that we look at the other levers as well. The Chairman. Dr. Snyder, please. Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Mabus, you talk about standing on the USS Little Rock and General Conway was born in Arkansas. Admiral Roughead, if you told me you ever served on the USS Razorback, which is a retired submarine sitting in the Arkansas River, my Arkansas trifecta will be complete. But General Conway, a quick question and you can give us a quick answer as you want. Are you satisfied that the rules of engagement in Afghanistan are satisfactory given the difficult challenge our men and women have there? General Conway. Yes, sir, I am. I ask that question every time I go which is about once every 4 months. My commanders are comfortable with it. We are pretty good at it and because it is who we are with our air ground team and they understand the rationale behind. So they support it. Dr. Snyder. Good. Thank you. Secretary Mabus, the topic has come up about ``don't ask, don't tell'' and I had a conversation yesterday with an officer who is currently serving on active duty who is a lesbian who says, ``Okay. We appreciate they are doing the study. How the hell am I going to be able to participate in that study?'' How will somebody who is currently gay or lesbian serving in the military be able to share their views on the impact on readiness, anything else intel, without being outed under the current policy? Secretary Mabus. It is at least my understanding that as this study is being shaped by general counsel, the Department of Defense, Jay Johnson, and the head of the U.S. Army, Europe, General Ham, that they are going to try to have mechanisms for anonymous input so that there would not be the jeopardy of violating ``don't ask, don't tell'' to simply respond to the survey. As I said, it is early in the process of developing this survey. But when--but Jay Johnson, the General Counsel of Defense, said that they are trying to structure it in that way. Dr. Snyder. Yesterday I asked General Schwartz, and you may have heard about this. I assume, Secretary Mabus, that you and the Admiral and General are familiar with this split of authority we currently have between the circuits regarding ``don't ask, don't tell'' between the Witt case in the Ninth Circuit, and the Cook case in the First Circuit. And so when the question is asked, ``Should there be a moratorium?'' we have this--you all have a challenge that has been laid on you in the fact that the law has changed in the Ninth Circuit. How are you all currently responding to the fact that the Ninth Circuit has conferred Constitutional protections of what they are calling intermediate scrutiny under the due process requirements? How are you all responding to that in how do you process cases in the Ninth Circuit? Secretary Mabus. Again it is my understanding, Congressman, that we are--and we do understand the split of decisions between the two circuits right now. That we are proceeding to follow the law as written across the Navy and the Marine Corps as the--I believe that---- Dr. Snyder. So you are going to ignore the Ninth Circuit opinion? Secretary Mabus. No, sir. But I believe that that opinion is being appealed. Dr. Snyder. No, it is not. Secretary Mabus. Try to recognize---- Dr. Snyder. It is not being appealed. Secretary Mabus. Then I am incorrect. Dr. Snyder. It is not being appealed. And that is the challenge. I am not harassing you all about this. I think this is a--this is one of the problems we are going to have when we say we can study this for a year, and put this off. We have a--we now have people that have Constitutional protection in the Ninth Circuit at some level that we expect you to respond to. The problem is when the admiral sends them to Little Rock, or General Conway sends them to the East Coast, they lose that protection. And I am not sure how this gets worked out. I suggested yesterday one way to do it would be to make the venue for all these cases be in the Ninth Circuit. Then you have some consistency. But you--General Conway, I think you appropriately said there is some confusion. That there would be a moratorium. You already have confusion. There is already legal confusion that you all didn't bring on yourselves. It is being laid on you. But I think you are going to need to figure that out, and fairly quickly. Cause it is currently the law in the Ninth Circuit. And it is not being appealed. So I think this will be an ongoing discussion. By the way, the--recognizing the venue of the Ninth Circuit might deal with some of Senator Levin's concerns. I haven't talked to him about it. But it may be a way of getting at some of this transition. I wanted to ask have you all--the Andy Krepinevich Group put out this study called ``Why AirSea Battle?'' and talks about Iran, and China, and where we look at things going in the future. Admiral Roughead, have--are you familiar with that--his report? Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. I am. And it is being reflected in the air-sea battle that the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps--the air-sea battle study that we are conducting-- -- Dr. Snyder. Its currently undergoing? Admiral Roughead. Right. Right. Dr. Snyder. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Who is next? The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes. Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General, and Mr. Secretary, and Admiral, we thank you for being here. You are all good men. And we appreciate your service to our country. But even good men can take positions some time that can be detrimental to I think the well-being of the country. And I was a little taken aback, Mr. Secretary, by your statement that the shipbuilding plan that was sent over is going to respond to the Chairman's concern about the number of ships that we have in the Navy. And I am concerned for two reasons. One is that the number of ships that we have in the Navy. And I am concerned for two reasons. One is that OMB [Office of Management and Budget] disagrees with your numbers. As you know they say it is on course to be at 270 ships as opposed to your projections. And when Secretary Gates sat exactly where you are sitting, he said that that shipbuilding plan was a ``fantasy.'' When I look, Admiral Roughead, at your concern that what keeps you up at night is your worry about having the resources to have the ships that we need down the road. And then I look at your specific decision on Mayport, which is going to spend $1 billion with all the other needs we have. This is the strategic dispersal plan, which I understand is the basis upon which at least the chairman of the Joint Chiefs said was the basis upon his decision to think a carrier should be shifted to Mayport. Have you read this plan? The strategic dispersal plan? Admiral Roughead. There have been several strategic dispersal plans over the year, sir. And I don't know which one that---- Mr. Forbes. This is the one that I understand was the one written by Admiral Robert Thomas. Have you ever read his strategic dispersal plan, which is the one that is always circulated as the basis for relocating the carriers? Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. We are looking at strategic dispersal. Mr. Forbes. Have you read his plan? Admiral Roughead. I would have to look at that copy, sir, to see if I have seen it. Mr. Forbes. Have you ever read a copy by Admiral Thomas? Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. I mean, we work on strategic dispersal, and determining where the best places for the fleet should be. Mr. Forbes. Are you familiar with Admiral Thomas? Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. I am. Mr. Forbes. Do you have respect for Admiral Thomas, and his decisionmaking capabilities? Admiral Roughead. He is a very good officer. Yes, sir. Mr. Forbes. Have you ever asked him the risk assessment that he placed on anything happening that would necessitate a shift to Mayport? Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. In fact Admiral Thomas works-- worked for me. So when we were---- Mr. Forbes. And did he tell you that that was a very slight risk? Admiral Roughead. The strategic dispersal plan is based on the consequences of what could happen in the Tidewater area should there be a manmade or natural disaster. Mr. Forbes. And it was a comparison specifically between that and Mayport. And did he ever tell you as he told me that the risk of that was very, very slight. In fact, less than 10 percent. Admiral Roughead. And what risk is that, sir? Mr. Forbes. The risk that you would have a disaster that would create a problem that would have necessitated the move of the carrier to---- Admiral Roughead. I think that we may be talking about two different types of risk--one natural, one manmade. Mr. Forbes. Let me focus, then, on the natural disaster risk. Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. Mr. Forbes. Because in that program it states that there is no advantage between Norfolk and Florida. And yet if you look, Florida since 1900 has had 225 hurricanes. Norfolk 7. If you look at that channel going out of Norfolk, it is a mile wide whereas in Florida only one carrier sunk there would stop all the ships in it. But this is what I want to get to. Recently you have submitted a list of unfunded priorities to Congress. These are requirements your commanders say they need to fulfill their mission. General Conway has submitted a similar list. There are some huge things in there. Engines that we can't do. Planes that we can't get. Ship maintenance that we can't get. The cost of moving that carrier to Mayport would cover every single one of the requirements unfunded on your list, and on General Conway's. So my question to you is this. Which is more important? Moving the carrier to Florida, or doing all the items on the unfunded priority list that you have submitted, and that General Conway has submitted? Second one is, how do you agree with Admiral Thomas' strategic dispersal plan, but disagree with his risk assessment? And then thirdly, how do you explain by any objective, legitimate analysis that there isn't a benefit to Norfolk over Jacksonville, or over Florida when you look at natural disaster situations? Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. I will take the first one last, because I think you are comparing Norfolk to Florida. I think it is important as you look at storm tracks to compare Norfolk to the Jacksonville area. And they are very, very similar. In fact, as a--yes, sir? Mr. Forbes. Just ask you to look at the charts of the two. Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. I have looked at them many times. And Mayport fares quite well in that regard. The Chairman. Ms. Sanchez. Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, again for being before us. I have various areas I want to ask you about. Just for note, I received today a copy of the letter, Secretary, that you sent to my senator, Dianne Feinstein, with respect to our Marine Base, Camp Pendleton. And one of the problems that we have in Orange County, which is moving traffic. Oh, and of course the--we have this toll road that we are trying to figure out how to build, et cetera. So I would like to in the near future have a discussion with you. We don't have to do it here today--about this and what we might do to maybe still try to find a solution with you all. I just want to say that on ``don't ask, don't tell''-- obviously; Mr. Snyder piggybacking on many of his remarks--is a big issue for us. And in California in particular being in that Ninth Circuit court. And just want to note that it is my understanding that, for example, out of all--I do a lot of work with our NATO allies, and out in the European theater as you-- many of you know. And just would like to note that I believe in speaking to most of my colleagues from other parliaments out there, that only Turkey and the United States as members of NATO are the only ones who have limited policies, or an actual ban on having gays in the military. So I think it is incredibly important that we address this sooner than later. And the parliamentarians out there--our colleagues--said that the--when they--when some of them went to implement this the quicker they went with it, the easier it was to get to it. So just from that standpoint--and I have said this to Mrs. Davis, our personnel subcommittee chairwoman, that I would like to see this addressed this year rather than sit around waiting for some more dialogue. I want to talk a little bit to something really positive that we heard the other day from the Secretary when the Department of Defense took a very commendable step to ban the prohibition of women from serving on our Navy submarines. I think it is very forward-looking. I think it is time to do that. We still sometimes even have a discussion about whether women should be in the military on this committee. Thank God we haven't had to vote on that for the last 5 or 7 years. And we all know that one of the reasons is that there is so much talent in that 50 percent of potential work force. My question to you, Mr. Secretary, is--that I understand that this is just the beginning, and there is a lot of work to get through in order to make this happen. I would like you to address what are the challenges that you are going to foresee-- that you foresee with respect to this. And how might this Congress help you to move forward that issue of doing that. And before you answer that, let me just pose another question out to our commandant. And then I will be quiet. And hopefully you guys can answer this. And that would be with respect--commandant to the U.S. Marines undertaking the operation Marjah there in Afghanistan in the last few days. I am interested to know the role that the Afghan national army played in that. How many of their troops were involved? And what you think the assessment is there? In particular, I think given to, and I believe it was General Petraeus who said, ``We might be at this at least for 12 to 18 months, and that may fly in the face of the 18-month limit that Mr. Obama discussed with respect to Afghanistan.'' So if, Mr. Secretary, you could answer that first question. And then, General, get your thoughts together to answer the other? Secretary Mabus. We learned a lot of lessons integrating female sailors onto our surface ships that we can apply to integrating women into the submarine fleet. For starters, the two platforms that women would be going to first. The SSBNs, and the SSGNs [Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missile Submarines] don't require any modifications to their--to their hull structure--to their compartments or berthing or anything. The challenges that were faced, and faced very successfully when women were integrated onto our surface fleet were things like making sure that we had a critical mass of women on a ship so that women were not too small a group. To make sure that we had a senior--a more senior woman officer at first. A department head to be a mentor to the younger women coming in for their first tour at sea. And also to make sure that we reach out to the submarine force, and to the families to make sure that any concerns that they have are addressed. And we think that they will be. And that this will be a very successful integration. General Conway. Ma'am, with regard to the Afghan national army and police, roughly 4,000 is the answer in terms of numbers. They have a good fighting spirit. They are not nearly as sophisticated as we are at company and battalion level. But in terms of actual small unit tactics, they mix it up pretty good. We think that Marjah will be a contested area for as long as we are there, or until the Taliban pack it up. It is a drug center. It is an area where they have had a long-term presence. In some ways they have families there. So although we intend to secure the area and put the Afghan police in eventually to help control it, the nature of an insurgency is that they could well be back in small numbers attempting to contest the area. So I think General Petraeus is probably right. The Chairman. Before I call on the gentleman from South Carolina, General, where are we on Guam? General Conway. Sir, at this point I think it is fair to say that we are awaiting the determination of the Japanese government in terms of how they see their part of this. In the meantime, it is fair to say we continue to look at what Guam means. Again, you nailed it in your opening statement in terms of the strategic importance, we believe, of armed forces in the Pacific, and of course particularly Marines. One thing that has changed somewhat since the original agreements is that we have grown the force by some 27,000 additional Marines, and 3,000 or 4,000 of those would be assigned to the Pacific. So we are trying to balance the numbers in our own thought process with regard to established agreements. So at this point, it is between governments and we very much await the next determination by the Japanese government in terms of how they think we should go forward. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Wilson. Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I actually appreciate your bringing up Guam before we could begin, because I visited, and I know how strategically located it is. Also, the people of Guam should be appreciated. They are so patriotic. The highest percentage of National Guard membership of any state or territory of the United States is Guam. And what wonderful people. And General, Mr. Secretary, Admiral, thank you for being here today. I was very grateful to grow up in Charleston, South Carolina. And I grew up in the shadow of the Navy base, and so I have a great appreciation of your service and Navy and Marine personnel, and we are grateful to have the Nuclear Power School in the community. It is a great opportunity for young people. I am honored now to represent Parris Island Marine Corps Station, Beaufort, Beaufort Naval Hospital. And then, I am particularly grateful I have a son, active duty Navy, and he is following in the tradition of his late grandfather and uncle, who were dedicated Marines. So Mr. Secretary, I am concerned about the current plans for wounded warrior support at the new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center when it opens at Bethesda in September, 2011--it is, or 2011. It is not in the same level of support currently furnished by the Army at Walter Reed. Wounded warriors who move to the new medical center will experience a significant degradation of services and support and I believe that is unacceptable. As an example, I understand that there will be a shortfall of 150 barrack spaces when the new medical center opens for the wounded warriors who are currently in the warrior transition barracks at Walter Reed. What assurances can you give that all of the wounded warrior support now provided at Walter Reed, including first priority for barracks space on the Bethesda campus, will be available when the new medical center opens in September, 2011? Secretary Mabus. Congressman, there is no more important thing that we do than to care for those who have borne the burden of battle and who return as wounded warriors. All three of us on a very regular basis visit Bethesda, visit our wounded warriors that are returning. And we are very focused in the Department of the Navy, and I think it is fair to say in the Department of Defense, to making sure that as the transition occurs, as Walter Reed moves to the Bethesda campus, that no wounded warrior fall between the cracks. That there is no degradation of care. That there is absolutely world-class care, as you in Congress and we in the Department know that there have to be. You can be assured that our attention is focused very directly on this. And not just on putting Walter Reed and Bethesda together, but also on the myriad of other things that wounded warriors require from our Wounded Warrior Regiment with the Marines, our Safe Harbor Battalion with the Navy, with their non-medical care, with making sure that they are transitioned either back to the fleet, back to their Marine brethren, or into their community, is seamless. We are trying to work with the VA [Veteran's Administration] to make sure that there is no gap there. And finally, one thing that I am particularly proud of, we just did a wounded warrior hiring conference to make sure that as wounded warriors recover, and as they transition out back to the civilian workforce, that they have a job waiting for them when they get there. Mr. Wilson. And Mr. Secretary, I want to commend you on just what you have cited. And even if it took up all my time, the issue is that important. But particularly on barrack space, that needs to be addressed, so I hope that as you pursue the other issues relative to this and the wounded warrior program, I wish the American people could see what has been done on behalf of the young people who have lost arms, legs. It is extraordinary the efforts that have been made, and very heartwarming. But I am very, very concerned about the barracks space, so I hope that will be an emphasis that you have. Secretary Mabus. Yes, sir. General Conway. Sir, if I can complement the Secretary's answer for just a moment, and perhaps allay some of your concerns. We certainly need barracks space, especially for our Marines, and I would argue potentially sailors, who come for initial treatment for their families, for themselves, and for people who are assigned back to Bethesda for follow-on treatment. But our intent with our casualty care is as soon as possible, to get them out closer to home station, closer to their homes if it is a recovery period. And we do not want to have them at Walter Reed-Bethesda for any longer a period of time than is absolutely necessary. So I think that will mitigate some of your concern in this regard. Mr. Wilson. Excellent. Thank you very much. General Conway. Yes, sir. The Chairman. The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Davis. Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and certainly Secretary Mabus, and Admiral Roughead, and General Conway, thank you so much for your extraordinary service to our country, and for worrying I think every day about the men and women who serve. I know you show a great deal of compassion for the mission that they are performing and how they are performing it. I wanted to actually ask several of the questions that have already been asked, but have sort of a brief follow-up to a few of those. On the MLP, I am wondering, once you have a better sense of how it is going to work together, if there is any opportunity to bring that schedule together so that there is more predictability on the part of those who are trying to build those for us? Is there any chance of trying to do that, rather than spreading it out once we get underway? Secretary Mabus. Well, as the CNO said, it is a new hull form---- Mrs. Davis. I missed your response, but I wanted to follow up. Secretary Mabus [continuing]. And one of things that we looked at was the health of our industrial base. And trying to ensure that there was a base of work spread out over the 5 years so that our shipbuilding yards would be able to maintain that critical workforce, that critical infrastructure that we need so much. And that was one of the factors, although not the determining factor, but one of the factors that went into putting those ships in 2011, 2013, and 2015. Mrs. Davis. Yes. I think they would probably suggest that it is better for them to bring them together in terms of their workforce, but perhaps that could be explored further at another time. And women on submarines, is there any role for Congress to play at this point? Is there anything that you need from us? Secretary Mabus. I think we are well along. The Secretary of Defense has done the notification to Congress that is required by law that we are beginning to proceed down the track. And I think that the support of Congress on this is crucial, but I think that we have all the levers that we need to move expeditiously to do this. Mrs. Davis. Okay. Nothing in the reauthorization language? You are set? Admiral Roughead. There is a 30-day wait period, ma'am, so any impediment to that would not be helpful. So---- Mrs. Davis. All right. Thank you. Admiral Roughead. And it is a good plan, I can assure you of that. And the submarine force is prepared to execute. Mrs. Davis. Thank you. I wanted to turn--very briefly, you may be aware there is a DOD-wide program called My Spouse Career Advancement Account that has recently been frozen. I know just from several weeks ago even speaking with many of the spouses, they count on this. I mean, this has really been so important to them. And could you enlighten us a little bit as to whether or not there is a possibility that, even though it has been frozen for now, that those spouses who are in the program can continue with their education? And do you think that there is, again, a role for Congress in weighing in on this right now? Secretary Mabus. After the question was asked yesterday, looked into this last evening. The information that I received, because this is a DOD-wide program, is that the site was frozen for software concerns for some other types of concerns on there. But that the people who were receiving the payments could expect to continue to receive those payments. That was the information I got, as I said, last night from DOD. Mrs. Davis. Oh, are you saying that people in the program will continue? What about just trying to apply now? Or is the program itself going to be discontinued for some time? Secretary Mabus. That is an answer I cannot give you. I don't know. General Conway. Ma'am, if I can help. I also researched it and it is my understanding that this is a temporary halt to the program, not a close-out of the program, pending the problems that the Secretary spoke of. Mrs. Davis. Okay. What might be important is communicating as best we can, obviously, to the number of people that are very concerned about this out in the community. And I think we all agree on, this is an important quality-of-life issue for our service men and women, and some way of clarifying that is very important right now. Secretary Mabus. The only thing I would like to add right now is that I completely agree with the importance of this program, with what you said. Mrs. Davis. Yes, thank you. The QDR points out the need to increase key enabling agents--assets, I am sorry--for the Special Operations Forces, including logistics, communications, intelligence, and other critical capabilities. And the Naval Special Warfare Command depends on the Navy, of course, for certain enablers. Yet at the same time that they are looking to the Navy for that, the Navy's end strength is coming down, as we know. And I am wanting to know whether there is an issue here in terms of being able to have out of that pool of specialists, some of our special warfare people that would be in the future? Admiral Roughead. As far as the Special Warfare, our SEALs [Navy Sea, Air and Land teams], we have a great plan there. There are many demands for people, and we are looking at how we can best resource that now. Mrs. Davis. Thank you. The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady. And Mr. Conaway, the gentleman from Texas. Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chief, thank you for being here. Mr. Secretary. Commandant, it is great to see you again. That was a great day in Fredericksburg, Texas, when you and your bride came down for the ribbon-cutting on the new wing of the Nimitz Museum. And with some training and hard work and dedication on his part, Mike Hagee might be able to MC something a little better than--next time. My issue is going to be a little bit more mundane. It is not nearly as glamorous as some of the other stuff, but it stretches across everything you do. And that is, the commitment by the three of you to audit the financial statements of the respective entities that you are responsible for. Mr. Secretary, you made the statement a while ago about bold steps required for the alternative energy. I appreciate the same bold steps for the Department of the Navy to be clean, unqualified, audited, financial statements and everything that entails. Internal controls, all the other systems that we have in place. And that the business transpiration agency has the dubious distinction of having responsibility but no authority to make things happen across a lot of lines. I want to brag on the Marine Corps. Commandant, you have said you will get it done, and I hope there is a way to hand off that same commitment to the 35th commandant of the Marine Corps, because it doesn't happen, period, without the three of you gentlemen saying make it happen. Now, I understand you got a zillion other things that might look more important, but the benefits are indisputable of being able to have good data, quick data. As I told the Air Force yesterday, if we ask you guys a question that stumps you, some person on the back bench will get into a panic mode to try to cobble together some answer out there with systems that may involve 50 different systems that are not integrated, they are not doing the things they do. So simple heading out, or at least an answer for the record, is that--is that commitment to get the Navy Department--Department of the Navy--audited, and the Marine Corps audited way up on your list of things that you need to get done? Secretary Mabus. Congressman, my first elected job was state auditor of Mississippi. Mr. Conaway. Oh, fantastic. Secretary Mabus. I understand the value of good audits in government. And I do want to echo what you said about the Marine Corps. We are way down the line on getting a fully auditable statement for the Marine Corps. And we are moving in that direction for the Navy. And in fact, we have got a Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy for Business Transformation that that is one of the prime jobs that that individual is accountable for. And I do check on that on a very regular basis. Mr. Conaway. Okay. CNO, I don't know if you have got a dog in that fight, but any push you could help to get the---- Admiral Roughead. Absolutely, sir, because I think your comments are right on the money. Mr. Conaway. Okay. General Conway. Sir, you know the term ``wind dummy''? We have volunteered to be the wind dummy on this one with some trepidation, but it is absolutely the right thing to do and we are proceeding apace. Mr. Conaway. Well, thanks. I mean, if the good citizens of District 11 keep sending me up here, I want to keep niggling you guys about this because I do think it is important. So with that, Mr. Chairman, thank you all for your long service to our country. Chairman, I yield back. The Chairman. Thank the gentleman from Texas. Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here, General Conway and Admiral Roughead. Thank you both for your service to our nation. I would like to turn my attention, if I could, to Ballistic Missile Defense issues right now. And as the long-range shipbuilding plan lays out, the President's new Phased, Adaptive Approach to providing missile defense to Europe will have a significant impact on the Navy's resources obviously in the years to come. How does the Navy plan to support its growing missile defense requirements while fulfilling its current missions including anti-ballistic missile ship defense? Admiral Roughead. The way that we will deploy it, sir, is in consonance with what the combatant commanders have requested. We have been performing the mission on the Western Pacific now for a few years and the demands have also been added into the Arabian Gulf and into the Mediterranean. So in our plan, we are taking the number of Ballistic Missile Defense ships in this FYDP from 21 to 38. We are increasing the number of missiles which is as important to be able to not have to be changing missiles around. But the fact that our ships are multimission ships allow them to do much more than missile defense and that is all managed by our Navy commanders in the regions where those ships are operating. So I am very, very pleased that not only are we building some more missile defense ships, but we are providing the back- fits and we are increasing the missile inventory. And we have also been spending quite a bit of effort and time and the coordination between commanders in different regions and I believe we have advanced our missile defense capability quite a bit. Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, do you have anything to add? Secretary Mabus. Just to emphasize what the CNO said. These are very capable ships in a number of missions and while we are retrofitting and building new missile defense ships, we are not losing sight of the other duties that they perform. And also, that in this budget we have asked for funds to fit a good many of our existing destroyers and cruisers, DDGs [Guided Missile Destroyers] and CGs [Guided Missile Cruisers], with the Aegis BMD [Ballistic Missile Defense] capability and in order to reach the end strength of those ships that we need to respond to all the demands. Mr. Lamborn. Let me ask that in a further point on anti- ballistic, anti-ship ballistic missiles. Have you had the opportunity to review the recent study on different possibilities for defending against anti-ship ballistic missiles? And as a following to that, what are the various technological and at what platform solutions to this challenge? Secretary Mabus. We are very focused on anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles. And one of the things that the CNO has said earlier in his testimony is that we are looking at technologies from other ships, particularly the truncated DDG- 1000, as we are going forward with the next generation of DDG- 51s to get sensor systems, radar systems. In the new DDG-51s, the SPY-3, coming off the DDG-1000, the air and missile defense radar so that we get a full picture of the battle space of both from anti-air and anti-ballistic missile and anti-cruise missile ships and an integrated hull on each ship and in a group of ships for integrated air and missile defense. Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Admiral Roughead, on the DDG-1000, last year the administration decided to continue funding the DDG-1000 program for three ships. How is this program progressing and with regards to--with regards to both the hull and the mission systems equipment? Admiral Roughead. The program is progressing on track with regard to the development of the systems and also, it--the DDG- 1000 is under construction. So the issue will be one of the Nunn-McCurdy breach as a result of the truncation and the departments working its way through the appropriate steps that have to be taken relative to that. Mr. Lamborn. On that, let me ask you. It is my understanding that the Navy is pursuing a fixed price contract for the second and third DDG-1000. Is this accurate and what does that mean for controlling overall program costs? Admiral Roughead. My hopes are is that it will maintain the cost where it needs to be and we are pursuing those contracts. Mr. Lamborn. A big firm fixed price? Admiral Roughead. I would like to get back to you on that one, sir. The Chairman. We have three votes. However, let's go as far as we can and we will break for those votes and then return. Mr. Wittman. Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, General Conway, Admiral Roughead, thank you so much for joining us today. We appreciate your hard work and efforts. I wanted to direct a question to Admiral Roughead just as a follow-up from Congressman Forbes' question. In looking at the analysis that was done, the risk analysis, about placing a home port facility there in Mayport and we had talked earlier with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen, about how much of a quantifiable risk assessment was done and then looking at that in that being very spongy as far as the--as a hard number on the risks that we are trying to mitigate with putting a carrier down there and then with the unfunded programs list that is out now that has about $530 million of unfunded needs there on that list, what that leads me to is to follow up on his question. And that is obviously your decisions revolve around ranking where your needs are. And can you tell me in relation to the unfunded needs list, would you say the unfunded needs are ranked higher or lower than the need to mitigate a risk to place a home port facility there in Mayport? Admiral Roughead. Well, I would say, sir, that the fact that when we built our budget and took it to the levels where it was, and as you know, our budget is a balance of many different needs that we have, that when I made the proposal on this year's budget, that--what we funded with regard to O&M [Operations and Maintenance] and the risk that we were taking was where I thought it was prudent to be and included in the budget are the preliminary steps for the home port in Mayport. So given the fact that the steps needed to build the port in Mayport were in our budget and those are the unfunded programs. Then the Mayport project has a higher priority for me. Mr. Wittman. Okay. I am trying to get from you where in the scheme of things though if you--obviously there are limited resources there and I know that you have--and we are still trying to figure out exactly where it is some of the planning dollars that go into beginning the process there at the location in Mayport, but also the unfunded needs list, you know, has, obviously, shipbuilding needs there, weapons procurement, ship maintenance and all of those things concern us because there are needs out there. What I am trying to figure is that within the finite universe of resources, if we are talking about a billion dollars to upgrade the port there in Mayport versus the $530 million in the unfunded needs list, would you say that the $1 billion needed in the years to come, and again, looking at your unfunded needs was that goes out in the same future, would you say that the $1 billion necessary to build the facility at Mayport is a higher or lower priority than the $530 million on the unfunded needs list? Admiral Roughead. Well, first, sir, the Mayport is not a billion dollar project. It is not a billion dollar project. It is just slightly over half of that. Mr. Wittman. Okay. Admiral Roughead. But what Mayport is, it is not a new carrier port. Mayport has been an aircraft carrier port since 1952 and that dispersion has given us some strategic flexibility on the East Coast. What we are doing is we are bringing that port as a carrier port to be able to service our carrier fleet which is now all nuclear. So for me, that strategic flexibility is important. That is why I made the recommendation to the Secretary to go forward with that and then that was affirmed. And so that money in the plan to enhance the carrier port of Mayport is a priority. Mr. Wittman. Sure. Well, in the decisionmaking, obviously you are looking at what risks you would be mitigating by having a duplicative facility there in Mayport. And I guess my question is with the lack of quantifiable risk assessment that is going on there, is that risk high enough to substantiate that being put in front of the--if you say $600 billion or $600 million versus the $530 million of the unfunded needs, tell me is there still--do you believe is the risk still high enough for having to move a carrier there that you would put the Mayport facility before the unfunded? Admiral Roughead. Sir, I believe that the risk of having all of our eggs in one basket for our aircraft carriers in the Tidewater area, and I don't dispute the value of--but having all of our eggs in one basket there when we have not done that on the East Coast or on the West Coast is not in the best interest of the Navy or the nation. Mr. Wittman. Okay. The Chairman. Thank the gentlemen. We have time for one more member, the gentlelady from Guam, 5 minutes. Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary and Admiral and General, thank you for your testimony. Mr. Secretary, I appreciated meeting with you recently to discuss the military buildup on Guam and working with my office and the government of Guam to make sure that we get this buildup done right as our Chairman, Mr. Skelton, has stated over and over again. However, there remains significant hurdles to the military buildup. The recent news that the Port of Guam was denied a Recovery Act Grant funding from the Department of Transportation was deeply disappointing. Simply put, without funding for the port, the buildup cannot occur. Mr. Secretary, while I appreciate your leadership in DOD to support the port's grant, we need to know what the Navy is doing to address Guam's civilian infrastructure needs. Is the Navy working with the Department of Interior, the White House and OMB to develop a strategy to address the funding of civilian infrastructure requirements? Yesterday, I was at a meeting from 1:00 to 5:00 p.m. with the Department of Interior and various federal agencies to discuss the buildup. We concluded with this, number one, we need a funding plan for this buildup. And secondly, we need one coordinator to handle this buildup so the DOD doesn't point to the various federal agencies for funding and the federal agencies go right back and say, ``Well, this is DOD's responsibility.'' We are caught in the middle. I think it is important to note the EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] and their comments on the draft EIS [Environmental Impact Statement] also stated that the lack of information on infrastructure funding is one major reason for their low scoring of the document. Also, many of the civilian impacts are exasperated by the 2014 completion date. When does the Department of Navy believe it can complete construction? Given the government of Japan's indecision, isn't this the right time to extend the timeline to reflect reality? Secretary Mabus. I enjoyed our meeting as well, Congresswoman, and as far as the grant to Apra Harbor, you know, from the Department of Transportation following the meeting and following my trip to Guam to look at Apra Harbor and other things, I met twice with the Secretary of Transportation to urge him to give that grant to Guam and to Apra Harbor to fulfill that. In the Department of the Navy and, I think, in the Department of Defense, we support a government-wide approach to the Guam buildup. It is a very important move for us as it is for the people of Guam to echo what General Conway said. The strategic value of Guam and of moving Marines to Guam is crucial. We have in terms of our processes elevated Guam inside the Department of the Navy with the Guam Executive Council which meets on a very regular basis to make sure the decisions move quickly. The Department of Defense has set up the Guam Oversight Council along with the Deputy Secretary of Defense to do the same thing. We do need, I believe, to make sure that there is a whole of government approach to this very important issue because it is crucial for the Navy, and the Marine Corps to-- for the strategic dispersal of our forces, and for the buildup on Guam that we do this right as the Chairman---- Ms. Bordallo. All right. Secretary Mabus [continuing]. Said in his statement. Ms. Bordallo. Mr. Secretary, my time is running out. But is there some way to recoup these funds for our port? Without the port development, the buildup just cannot continue. Secretary Mabus. My understanding is there may be other funds like this in the future that Guam can compete for. And once again, I will urge the Department of Transportation to fund that port in Guam, and to fund that particular grant that Guam has applied for, and I believe has made a very good case for. Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. This is my greatest concern right now. We just had news of that a couple weeks ago, and it was a real blow to our people. Because you know, we had made plans for this. And as I said, if this doesn't go on--and, of course, the Japan decision also is important to us. But I would appreciate anything you could do to help us in this area. Secretary Mabus. Yes, Ma'am. Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank the gentlelady. Mr. Secretary, is there any need or indication on where the Japanese government, is timewise? Ms. Bordallo. May. Secretary Mabus. In terms of their re-look at this issue, my understanding is that a decision is forthcoming by May. Ms. Bordallo. May. The Chairman. By May? Secretary Mabus. Yes, sir. The Chairman. Okay. We will return. We have three votes. We will return and resume. [Recess.] The Chairman. Who is next? We will resume. And thank you, gentlemen, for waiting for us. Mr. Courtney, 5 minutes. Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank all the witnesses for their great testimony this morning. I also want to recognize that all three participated in a funeral last week at Westmont Presbyterian Church to say good-bye to just a great friend, and a great American, Jack Murtha. General Conway, I want to particularly publicly thank you for the tremendous eulogy. Powerful words that painted a picture that I just think the whole country really needed to hear about his contribution to the people who wear the uniform. So bravo. It was just a splendid job. And again I would just say that his presence is actually felt in this budget today. The advance procurement in 2007, which Chairman Skelton and Chairman Taylor, along with Mr. Murtha fought for to get a Congressional plus-up for the Virginia-class program today is bearing fruit with the two-a- year 2011 shipbuilding plan. And that would not have happened without his intervention. This place moves pretty fast in terms of, you know, the process resuming, you know, after some of the folks here leave, and pass on. But I think it is important again just to recognize for a moment the contribution he made to the Navy, and to this important program. Earlier, Mr. Chairman, asked Admiral Roughead the question about whether or not the SSBN program could maybe be sort of put off. Because it does present financial challenges down the road as you pointed out. And you responded. But I want to actually give you a chance to maybe expand a little bit in terms of why that is a priority for the country right now. You know, a question which I always ask you, because people ask why submarines, and again if you could maybe enlarge on your earlier answer I would appreciate it. Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. Thank you. And now is the time to go forward with the replacement for the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine. As I have looked at this, and studied it, and considered several of the options as to how best to go forward. Given the fact that we will be taking this class of submarine out to 2080, we have to ensure that the technology that we put into that ship, that its survivability, its reliability, its operational availability enable it to operate not just for that length of time, but in the environments where others are going to try to negate that advantage that we have with our ballistic missile submarine fleet. So now is the time to begin that process. Now is the time to work closely with our friends in the U.K. to ensure that we go forward, and bring that submarine in on time. If we delay, I think you rush, you suboptimize. And at the end of the day you very well could end up spending more money on it than you otherwise would if you didn't have a good, thoughtful design. Mr. Courtney. And this year's budget, again, there is money for the design aspect of it, which again is consistent with the procurement reform bill that we passed last year, which is to avoid design-build happening at the same time. But to really sort of think things through. I guess what I would want to ask just in terms of--you know, hopefully this is not wishful thinking. But I mean if we do think ahead, and use the best talent possible, and look at successful programs like Virginia class and other shipbuilding, I mean, do you think that there is a possibility that we could, you know, potentially get a point where the $6 billion to $7 billion projected cost--I mean, we might be able to do a little better than that down the road. Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. I think we should look at every way that we can legitimately take cost out, but yet maintain that capability that we are going to need for the next seven decades. So I will be relentless in looking for those opportunities. But I emphasize that it has to legitimately be taken out. It can't simply be well we will build it cheaper, and then you compromise on a lot of other things. But we owe it to you. We owe it to the taxpayer to make sure that every ship that we buy, that we are taking cost out of it in every possible way. Mr. Courtney. All right. Mr. Secretary, you wanted to comment at all on that? Secretary Mabus. One of the things we tried to do with the 30-year shipbuilding plan was to be absolutely realistic in terms of what ships would cost. Realistic in terms historically of what Congress has appropriated for ships. But also to show the impact that putting the new SSBN in our core budget would have on the rest of the fleet. And to be realistic about that so that decisions could be made at the appropriate time in terms of how we fund our fleet, and how we fund this replacement. Mr. Courtney. All right. Thank you. I mean obviously this is going to be an issue for decades for committees like this. But I fully support the effort again to invest in, you know, the planning, and designing, because I think that will pay off long term. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. We have two members that haven't asked questions yet. But let me ask Admiral Roughead--I was at a shipbuilding port not too long ago. And I saw a ship being built for the United States Coast Guard. I think it is called the National Security Cutter. And I was just wondering why that particular ship that we don't have to redesign or reconfigure won't do for the Navy? I have seen no request for anything like it or for that particular ship itself. Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. And we have looked at a variety of options for the type of capabilities we need to meet our-- the needs of the maritime strategy. And the Coast Guard and the National Security Cutter, that ship is optimized for their missions. And as we look at what we have to do, and as a Navy, and as a Navy that has to have versatility and agility built into our ships. Because I think it is important that our ships be able to provide for a range of missions, and not simply be focused on one. I would say maybe perhaps the exception to that is the ballistic missile submarine because of what its mission is. But we have to provide for a range of capabilities. For us, speed becomes important. And that led us to the LCS. I, since becoming CNO, I have looked at the speed requirements again, and I have reassured myself that we are in the right place. But what we are building now meets the requirements that we have to deliver the type of navy the nation needs to be able to operate in the places where we expect to have to operate in the future. The Chairman. May I ask, Admiral, for the record, ask some bright shipbuilder over the Navy Systems Command to give us the pros and cons of that particular ship, including the cost? Would you do that for our record? [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 121.] Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, I will. The Chairman. No rush, 2 or 3 weeks, whatever. Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, I will do that. The Chairman. And it is easy to do, but that would--I really had to scratch my head when I saw that ship. You know, why can't we have the plans and we wouldn't have to start from scratch there. Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, I will do that. The Chairman. Would you do that then? Thank you so much. Mr. Coffman. Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you again for your service to our country. General Conway, what do you see as the primary force protection challenges in Afghanistan right now? And does the Marine Corps have everything it needs in Afghanistan? General Conway. Yes, sir, I think it is fair to say that we do have everything that we need. That of course has been my number one priority since I have been in this job, is to make sure those troops, especially at the point of the spear, have everything they need. That said, we push industry for more. And by that, I am talking about personal protective equipment in particular that is more lightweight and would not be as burdensome as some of the pictures you have probably seen coming out of Marjah, 80 to 100 pounds on the backs of some our Marines carrying their sustainment load and the things they need to work 24/7. We need a helmet that will stop 762 [7.62mm ammunition]. Right now, the biggest threat in Marjah is not necessarily the IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] for our killed in action, it is the sniper that can take a long-range shot and can penetrate our protective equipment, particularly the helmet. So we continue to pound the table on that with hopes that one day we will have that piece of gear in hand. Mr. Coffman. Thank you. General Conway, are you confident that the EFV [Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle] will provide adequate protection against IED threats? How has the program been modified to counter this threat? General Conway. Sir, it is an interesting question, because just in the last couple of days we have completed blast tests with the EFV as compared to an MRAP [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle], an RG33, which is actually the mid-level CAT-2 MRAP. I was very pleasantly surprised at how well it progressed. I mean, about the same for underbody explosions, and for underwheel or undertrack explosions, but actually the EFV was markedly better against direct fire and indirect fire. I will get you a copy of that study. And by the way, I would asterisk it by saying, because the report did, this is before we apply modular armor that we would want to incorporate if we were in an IED-rich environment. Mr. Coffman. Thank you, General Conway. General Conway, was the decision to delay the EFV's low-rate production in fiscal year 2014 to 2015 based on technology development concerns, or was it budget-driven? General Conway. Congressman, I would say it was probably a combination of both. We have seven new vehicles that are paid for and are going to be arriving in the test beds throughout the spring and summer. There are some KPs--knowledge points-- that we have to go through with those vehicles to determine what our full-rate production needs to be, to determine if they are going to be passed, the reliability concerns that they have had in the past. And I think in fairness, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Defense wanted us to have some of the answers to those issues before we got into a full rate of buy-in procurement. Mr. Coffman. General Conway, how do you plan to integrate the MATV [MRAP All Terrain Vehicle] and the MRAP vehicles into your current tactical wheeled vehicle fleet management program? General Conway. Well, sir, we see a future value in, again, the smallest of the MRAPs, the CAT-1s, and now the MATVs, which is in some ways a replacement for the up-armored Hummer. With regard to our combat engineers, our road clearance depths, perhaps some other small units. But as was answered earlier, in some ways it goes against two years, as a fast and relatively light expeditionary force. So we are going to preserve them, keep them available, so if we get into another static environment like this in the future, that we will have those vehicles available. But again, a small percentage of them will be incorporated I think into the TOE [Table of Equipment] of some of our support battalions. Mr. Coffman. General Conway, in looking at the shipbuilding plan, do you have any concerns about the forced entry requirement in terms of amphibious capability? General Conway. Sir, the CNO, under the observance of the Secretary of the Navy, have agreed that 38 is the requirement. We have said that we must be willing to accept risk down to about 33 ships. And if you look at the 30-year shipbuilding plan, it will sort of run highs and lows between that 30 and I think we get as high as 36 in the out-years. But we also need other parts of the fleet to be equally strong. You know, we want those surface craft out there that give us the force protection shield. We want the support of the aircraft carriers if we need their aviation strike capacity. And we want the subs out at distance screening the whole of the effort. So we need a strong and balanced fleet I think. More amphibs is always better, but we understand the fiscal pressures that we are dealing with today. Mr. Coffman. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. It looks like our last questioner is the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Nye. Mr. Nye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I want to thank you all for being here and for your service to our country. And I want to start by saying I just returned from a trip to Afghanistan, and I am particularly impressed with the continued dedication of our men and women in uniform out there. Not limited to, but particularly including the Marines and sailors who we may not expect to see in the desert, but often do. They are doing terrific work and I really appreciate what they are doing. I hope you will pass our thanks on to those folks. We know we have given them a tough mission. We have difficult decisions to make here as well, and I don't think anyone would suggest that any of you have an easy job. Just looking at an article from Inside the Navy recently, Secretary Mabus, you were quoted. ``Looking ahead at some of the potential future budget constraints that we might face in the coming years, having said expected future resource streams will severely constrain our choices, and that reducing Navy and Marine Corps programs to within available resources may require difficult and undesirable choices.'' I couldn't agree with you more. It is a tough position that we are in, having to make some decisions in a constrained environment. You were also quoted as saying, ``We need to be prepared to rethink old assumptions and re-evaluate past practices.'' Again, I agree with that. We have to make tough decisions based on scarce resources. We have heard a number of issues raised by many members of this committee about how we are going to spend our resources and our military dollars. And of course, we would all like to make sure that they are spent in the most efficient and effective way possible. I will tell you, and I am sure it is going to be no surprise to you to hear me say that I was disappointed to see in the final QDR language a sentence recommending moving a carrier to Mayport, Florida, and investing a substantial amount of money in building that home port, which would be the fifth U.S. nuclear carrier home port. We have talked about it before, that is why I don't think you are going to be surprised to hear from me about it today. But I will tell you, I was disappointed in a number of things, and one was in what I see as a lack of transparency in the decisionmaking process that led up to that. I will give you a couple of examples of why that troubles me. And we talked with the Secretary and Admiral Mullen about it in the past couple of weeks. We heard from Secretary Gates that he essentially affirmed a statement that Senator Nelson said that he had told him about a little over 2 months prior to the QDR being issued that--and I want to make sure that I get the wording right--but he said I think that they had nothing to worry about. We saw some drafts of the QDR come out around December that suggested that the optimal solution would be a backup port in Mayport, rather than a full home port. And then, different language come out in the final version a few weeks later. I asked Admiral Mullen about it in his testimony, and he said essentially that it was a judgment call. We have asked over the past year for some more strategic analysis of the risks that we are trying to mitigate in Norfolk, and I am unsatisfied with the fact that I don't think we have really received that now. Under Secretary Flournoy said essentially they had been given two viable options to assess and choose between. Having a backup port or having a full fifth nuclear carrier home port in Mayport. And apparently, according to the QDR language, a decision was made to go with the one that costs a lot of money. Now, we can argue about the costs, somewhere between half a billion and a billion. We think it is going to be on the upper end of that. As I mentioned now, I was disappointed with the transparency of the process, or lack thereof. But I have asked for a GAO [Government Accountability Office] study to be conducted, which has started to lay out on the table all of the potential costs included in this type of decision, so we can make that tough decision about how we are going to allocate those defense dollars. But Admiral Roughead, I just wanted to ask you one question. Admiral Mullen said in his testimony when I asked him about this, about the strategic dispersal issue. And I think you used the words today, ``eggs in one basket kind of idea.'' And I asked Admiral Mullen if that type of thinking or philosophy would apply to every military asset or base that we have got, not simply nuclear home port for carriers, but every other base, including SSBNs put in Georgia, and other things like strategic bombers. And he said essentially that, yes, it does apply to anything that we are going to have to evaluate like that. Would you agree with Admiral Mullen on that? Admiral Roughead. I would agree that we have to take a good look at where we have the redundancies that are important. And you cite the case of a strategic ballistic submarine. Their home port is in Georgia. But I can take that ship to Groton, Connecticut, and maintain it there. I can take that ship to Norfolk, Virginia, and maintain it there. So I have three options, even for ballistic missile submarines. The aircraft carrier on the east coast of the United States is the only ship that I have that I do not have another option to put into to do either routine or emergent maintenance. Mr. Nye. Another option on the East Coast, although there are three others on the West Coast, just to make sure we are clear on that. I think I am out of time. I will submit additional questions for the record. But I appreciate we are going to continue working going forward on this to find the right use of our defense dollars. And appreciate the work you have put into it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Sestak. Mr. Sestak. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. You bet. Mr. Sestak. Mr. Secretary, CNO, I want to first thank you very much for how well you have handled that Petty Officer Roach case on accountability of some sailor that had been accused of being gay, later was discharged, and you held those accountable for their mistreatment. And I very much appreciate it. If anyone doesn't think that the service doesn't care about accountability, they should know what you both did. Thank you very much. But I do have a question, Mr. Secretary, and it may I understand from my staff had been asked before. As in that incident we had been asking someone to live a lie, to quote the Chairman. It had to do against the greatest ideals that we have in the service, that is, of integrity, which you stood up and followed. I personally don't understand the year it takes to study the implementation. We can ask the Marine Corps to fly in off of amphibs into Pakistan--or into Afghanistan--in 30 days and they can put the operation together and make it happen. This is something that has to do with our principles, our ideals. Why, except for your concern potentially about the legality of it, if really does take a year to implement, we cannot at least put out an executive order under stop-loss in order to prevent these good men and women, particularly in a time of war when we need them, from being discharged? Besides the legality question that the Defense Department may have, because there is obviously various opinion. If that was not something, would you be opposed to it, Mr. Secretary? Secretary Mabus. Congressman, the legality argument on that seems to me to be the primary one. And to an earlier question, the CNO said that the confusion that would be inherent in something like that I think is an important consideration. Mr. Sestak. But besides that, would you be opposed if it was determined to be legal? Secretary Mabus. I do think that--my understanding that the way the President, as our Commander in Chief, requested Congress to change the law, to repeal the law. But also, at the same time, he asked the Department of Defense to take a careful look at how to implement this law so that--how to implement it should Congress decide to change it so that it would be implemented in a very smooth, very professional, very consistent---- Mr. Sestak. Only because of time then--and I don't mean to be rude interjecting--your support of then of that does take that long? But I mean you don't have an opinion then if the legality was turned out to be okay. You still feel it needs that type--that length of implementation? Secretary Mabus. Yes, sir. Mr. Sestak. A study? Thank you. I just was curious. I have seen the military do things so quickly, and so well. And just-- it kind of passes me by. But I appreciate your comment. Commandant, the Army has testified over the past years, and the Chairman agreed with this last month that it cannot meet its other war plans elsewhere like 2057 for South Korea-- because of Army readiness, and because of the lack of training in combined arms for example. Is the Marine Corps in a similar state? If so, and--because I have one last question for the CNO--and if so, how long would it take it to be back to where it could respond to that breadth of war plans that we have, because of Iraq. General Conway. Check. We are in the same place. We have been focused on counterinsurgency now for a number of years, and our forces are very good at that. But in the process we sacrifice sort of our combined arms kind of skill levels. We are encouraged that if we can stay below 20,000 in Afghanistan we are going to extend our home station time to about 14 months after a 7-month deployment. And we are going to use a chunk of that time to get back to combined arms. To get back to amphibious types of exercises with the Navy---- Mr. Sestak. What length of time do you think it would take if you had to guess if we stay below 20,000? General Conway. Sir, I don't think it would be one for one. You know, we have been away from it now for six years or so. I don't think we will be back in six years. I think we have got to develop that expertise, and get it embedded. So I am guessing probably the better part of a decade---- Mr. Sestak. Before we can meet the breadth of war plans again? General Conway. Well, we can meet the war plans now---- Mr. Sestak. On a different timeline? General Conway. To be as good as we were in 2002 I think-- -- Mr. Sestak. Okay. General Conway [continuing]. Is probably going to take 8 to 10 years. Mr. Sestak. And since I am a sophomore I have to be quick, because Mr. Skelton will cut me right off. But--very quickly. There has always been this question about 315 ships. Do you really think as we look at how technology--particularly knowledge is so important in warfare, that when using the long metric of numbers of ships as far as trying to determine our prowess in the future? Admiral Roughead. I do not believe we are wrong in looking at the numbers of ships. I think it is how we apply those ships, and the range of missions, and geographic areas where we are expected to be. And you do get to a numbers point as far as being in many places doing different things in large ocean areas. And that is where the number generates. I think there are many who say, you know, we are bigger than the next 13 Navies. But the fact of the matter is that our Navy really has existed not for a cataclysmic sea battle all the time. But rather for that presence, and the security, and the stability that it provides. The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. Before I call on Mr. Franks, I would urge and ask Mr. Secretary would you please provide the committee a copy of the ongoing force structure assessment when it is complete. We would certainly appreciate that---- Secretary Mabus. Yes, sir. The Chairman [continuing]. Very, very much. I am sitting here thinking listening to your testimony how blessed we are to have leaders such as you heading the services that you do, and do so ably, and so well--people who wear the uniform and work for you--I hope that you will carry our appreciation back to them. And General Conway we wish you Godspeed. And we are going to work you hard between now and the time we say farewell to you. Admiral Roughead, thank you so much for your excellent testimony. And welcome Secretary Mabus. We expect a lot of hard work out of you. With that, Mr. Franks, and Mr. Taylor will assume the chair. Mr. Franks. Well thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of you. Let me just echo the chairman's remarks related to your service. General Conway, I guess I would single you out here a little bit, you know? General MacArthur once said that, ``Old soldiers don't die, they just fade away.'' And I know that Marines have a completely different perspective. Old Marines don't die. They just charge in a new direction. And I want you to know that we are very, very grateful for your service. We talk about freedom in this place, and we know that it is people like you that--that carry it with you everywhere you go. And you have given your life to the cause. And I want you to know that I believe my children, and the children of this country even though they may not remember everything about you will live in a safer place, and walking the light of liberty, because you were once commandant of the Marine Corps. And thank you very much. With that, Secretary Mabus, you know how politicians are? They have to hit other politicians. And I don't--do you think that you have a clear unimpeded latitude to speak in complete-- in candor about the--in public about the short- and long-term resource needs of the Department of Navy? Secretary Mabus. Yes, sir. Mr. Franks. Okay. So I guess I have to--you know, I am stuck here. I have to ask given that the fleet is the smallest that it has been in several decades, and given the growing cost of shipbuilding we seem unlikely to reach Admiral Roughead's 313-ship fleet any time soon? I mean, every year for the past 15 years the shipbuilding accounts have been several billion dollars short of what is needed. And we primarily underestimate the cost of each new vessel. That kind of goes with it, I guess. We face a fighter gap based on of course the Navy testimony of upwards of 250 aircraft by 2018. And that is about one half of our carrier-based aircraft. And there is a widening gap in the Marine Corps reset funding that could approach $30 billion. I mean these are pretty short--serious shortfalls in my judgment. And of course on the threat side of the equation, the Chinese have launched 16 new submarines, and from 2005 and 2007. And they have announced that they will design and build a new class of destroyers that are also working on--that they are also working on the first of likely several carriers. Which in my opinion is it seems that China has developed, and is enhancing its--area-denial capability based on their aggressive submarine acquisition program, and their acquisition of several--and development of several different anti-ship cruise missiles. And, I mean, they are just projecting power in a lot of different directions. And I think it seems that they are deliberately basing that on our assessed vulnerabilities. At least it appears to me that way. So my point is--and there is a question in here somewhere--the best means of assuring peace in the western Pacific in my judgment is maintaining a sufficient military power in the region to deter aggression. It is not a new concept. But the QDR was eerily silent on China. And based on your recent comments--and Australia--I mean, it sounds like we maybe have a different perspective of that concern. So with all that said, do you think and believe that the Navy is programming sufficient funds both in fiscal year 2011, and across the future years to fully address China's military expansion? Secretary Mabus. Yes, sir. I do. And to talk just very briefly about a few of the things that you said. We try to be very realistic in this budget, and in this 30-year shipbuilding plan about the cost of each of our vessels. Because frankly it doesn't do us any good to come in low, and then continually to ask for more money. If we are going to get the size of fleet that we need, we have to be realistic about what they are going to cost. We are also taking some pretty aggressive actions to drive down the cost of ships. The downselect of the OCS is the thing that springs to mind. In terms of our capability in the Pacific, and particularly the western Pacific, we are very mindful of what is happening. The Chinese capabilities and the things that they are doing--they haven't been nearly as transparent about as we would like. But we do understand the types of ships they are building. We understand the types of anti-access missiles, both ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles that they are fielding. And we understand what they are doing with their fleet. We have great confidence that the ships that we have today, and the ships that we are building for the future, and our total force concept will meet whatever challenge--and I won't just limit it to the Chinese. That whatever challenge we face in the Pacific, we feel that--that the fleet can meet it, and that the Navy and Marine Corps team will be there to hedge and deter in a very effective way. Mr. Franks. All right. Well, thank you all. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Taylor. [Presiding.] Yes. Thanks to the gentleman. The Chair will recognize the gentleman from South Carolina. Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General Conway, on possibly your last presentation here before the Armed Services Committee, I want to thank you for your service. And in the last year I have had the extraordinary opportunity to visit with your Marines at Camp Leatherneck. I was so impressed. And then a great honor that I cherish. My wife and I being the--reviewing at Parris Island in November. You should be so grateful for the young people that you are providing opportunity. And Admiral Roughead, I always want to thank you for your service at the Naval academy, and then commanding the USS Port Royal, which is named after a port in South Carolina. And thank you for your service, and hospitality. I yield, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Taylor. The Chair thanks the gentleman. And I would like to take this opportunity to thank all three of you gentlemen for your service to our nation. Commandant, we are going to miss you. I know you are going to do great things no matter what you do after uniform. But we certainly value every day that you have served us. Secretary Mabus, we are very, very, lucky that you gave up your private sector probably cushy job for this, but we--again, we are lucky to have you. And Admiral Roughead, we always value you as the only--I believe the only commander of both the Atlantic and the Pacific fleets to have served the United States Navy. A very rare, and well-deserved distinction. Secretary Mabus, before you leave I would like to hand deliver to you a letter that--from myself, Senator Cochran, and Senator Wicker. A similar letter was delivered to Northrop Grumman last week. And it basically says that the Congress has authorized and appropriated five ships--already authorized, already appropriated. And yet for whatever reason Northrop and the Navy have not come to terms--gotten those ships started. The admiral has made an excellent case that he needs a bigger fleet. The Congress has already responded to that-- appropriating the money. We need to get going. And so I don't know if it is Northrop's delay. I don't know if it is the Navy's delay. But there is a delay that needs to be addressed that I am going to ask you to take a look at that. But again thank all of you for your service. And with that, this meeting is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 1:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] ? ======================================================================= A P P E N D I X February 24, 2010 ======================================================================= ? ======================================================================= PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD February 24, 2010 ======================================================================= [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.001 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.002 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.003 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.004 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.005 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.006 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.007 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.008 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.009 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.010 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.011 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.012 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.013 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.014 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.015 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.016 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.017 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.018 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.019 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.020 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.021 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.022 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.023 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.024 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.025 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.026 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.027 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.028 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.029 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.030 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.031 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.032 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.033 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.034 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.035 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.036 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.037 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.038 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.039 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.040 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.041 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.042 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.043 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.044 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.045 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.046 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.047 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.048 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.049 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.050 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.051 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.052 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.053 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.054 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.055 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.056 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.057 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.058 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.059 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.060 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.061 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.062 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.063 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.064 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.065 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.066 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.067 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.068 ? ======================================================================= WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING February 24, 2010 ======================================================================= RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON Admiral Roughead. The National Security Cutter (NSC) was designed to conduct an offshore patrol mission that is very different from Navy missions, and the NSC does not meet Navy requirements for speed, draft, survivability, and manpower requirements. The Navy is building the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to meet its Joint Staff-validated warfighting requirements. NSC would require significant and costly design changes to meet LCS capability requirements, which would likely result in the end cost of a modified NSC exceeding that of LCS. A more detailed comparison of LCS and NSC characteristics follows. In speed, LCS has a sprint speed of more than 40 knots; NSC sprint speed is 28 knots. In draft, LCS draft is approximately 13 feet to engage threats in the Littorals; the NSC draft is 22.5 feet, restricting its access in shallow waters. The inability of NSC to meet speed and draft requirements fundamentally limit the areas where the NSC can effectively operate. In survivability, LCS is built to Naval Vessel Rules and provides Level 1 survivability, which provides for shock hardening, protection against chemical, biological, radiological attack, and damage control/firefighting capability against destructive fires. NSC does not provide Level I survivability as it was not designed to operate in the same threat environment as LCS. In manpower requirements, LCS has a core crew of 40 personnel with 35 personnel comprising the mission package detachment and aviation detachment; the size of NSC crew is 110, 35 more than LCS at full mission capability. Additionally, LCS is designed to employ modular mission packages that address specific naval capability gaps in mine countermeasures, surface warfare, and anti-submarine warfare. NSC does not have the space or ability to employ these mission packages. [See page 37.] ______ RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT Admiral Roughead. Navy expects all recent ship classes to survive a 100 kilovolts per meter (kV/m) event with some degradation to mission possible. Regarding your specific question about remaining warfighting capability after an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) laydown of 100 kV/m, the answer is classified and I will provide it to you via separate correspondence. [See page 17.] ? ======================================================================= QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING February 24, 2010 ======================================================================= QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS Ms. Tsongas. The FY10 NDAA contained language that mandated that no funds could be obligated by the Navy for construction or advanced procurement of surface combatants to be constructed after FY11 until multiple conditions had been met:* Submission of an acquisition strategy for surface combatants approved by USD AT&L and briefed to and approved by the JROC;* Verification by an independent review panel that the Navy considered numerous factors including modeling and simulation, operational availability, life cycle costs including manning, cost and schedule ramifications of accommodating new sensors and weapons to counter future threats; and* Conclusions of a joint review by SECNAV and Director MDA defining additional requirements for investment in Aegis BMD beyond the number of ships planned to be equipped for this mission in the FY 2010 budget submittal. Further, the FY10 NDAA required an update to the Navy's Open Architecture report to Congress upon submittal of the FY12 budget to reflect the Navy's combat systems acquisition plans for surface combatants. It also mandated submission of an update to the 2006 Naval Surface Fires Support report to Congress identifying capability shortfalls. Finally, the language directed the Navy to develop a plan to incorporate new technologies from DDG-1000 and other surface combatant programs into ships constructed after 2011 to avoid redundant development, implement open architecture and foster competition. To date, the Navy has not satisfied these requirements. The FY10 NDAA contained language that mandated that no funds could be obligated by the Navy for construction or advanced procurement of surface combatants to be constructed after FY11 until several conditions had been met, including verification by an independent review panel that the Navy considered numerous factors as part of establishing their shipbuilding plan and considered new technologies from more recent ship classes than the DDG-51. Such an independent assessment of needs and options seems particularly germane to our hearing today. Both the FY11 President's budget and 30-year shipbuilding plan you submitted this year is heavily based on DDG-51, one would assume this is a result of the aforementioned analyses, strategies and reviews. When would you expect the Navy to submit the results of this independent assessment that supports the plan you've submitted? Admiral Roughead. On February 6, 2010, the Secretary of the Navy submitted to the congressional defense committees a plan for implementing the language contained in Section 125 of Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Public Law 111-84. In addition, the Navy has completed the following actions:Completed the development of the Technology Roadmap for Surface Combatants and Fleet Modernization February 2010 in accordance with Section 125(d) of the FY 2010 NDAA. The update to the Naval Surface Fire Support Report to Congress was delivered on March 11, 2010. As reported in the Navy's implementation plan report to Congress, an independent panel, jointly established by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN(RD&A)) and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Integration of Capabilities and Resources (OPNAV N8) reviewed the Navy's future guided missile destroyer hull and radar study of 2009. This independent panel was comprised of senior subject matter experts with extensive background in policy, acquisition, research and development, radar and ship design, combat systems integration, budget and cost analysis. Results of the Navy study, along with the independent review panel's report, have been briefed to the congressional defense committees' staff; members of the House Armed Services Committee received a brief on March 11, 2010. The full Navy study and independent review panel report will be provided this Spring. ______ QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY Mr. Thornberry. General Conway, you serve as the DOD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons. The 2009 Marine Corps S&T Strategic Plan identifies a number of capabilities required to address irregular warfare needs in the future including interim force capabilities. Yet the budget for these is stale at about $100 million per year and several promising programs aren't making their way from R&D into the field. What needs to happen to encourage wide-spread adoption of these capabilities across all services? Would legislation empowering your Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Office be useful to you? For example, does the office need to become a joint program office? General Conway. The DOD NLW Executive Agent has an ongoing independent assessment by the Center for Naval Analysis that is researching this question and that is nearing conclusion. Additional time is needed by the DOD NLWEA to review the CNA report, assess its findings and make a recommendation on the way forward. ______ QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. AKIN Mr. Akin. I have been briefed that the Navy requires a 5-to-1 ratio of non-deployed to deployed ships in order to support its surface combatant mission. Given the added requirement for afloat BMD, how many more BMD-capable ships will the Navy need in order to support this mission without negatively impacting the safety and support of the Carrier Strike Group? Admiral Roughead. In conjunction with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), we adjusted the Aegis BMD Program of Record (POR) to increase the total number of funded Aegis BMD-capable ships across the FYDP from 21 to 38, of which 27 will be deployable in FY15. Increasing the inventory of Surface Combatants with BMD capability gives the Navy greater flexibility to meet Combatant Commander surge and contingency operations requirements, and to provide an organic BMD capability to our CSGs. Mr. Akin. In your testimony you mentioned using SLEP as a primary mitigation strategy for the Strike Fighter Shortfall problem, yet I have been briefed by the Navy that Fleet OPTEMPO is the primary limiting factor for how many jets can undergo SLEP per year. If the Navy has already optimized the number of jets it is able to SLEP annually, how will this measure be able to do in the future what it is apparently unable to do now? Admiral Roughead. According to the current planning schedule, the SLEP window of opportunity for F/A-18A-D does not occur until FY 2012, when modifications to our F/A-18A-D aircraft begin. The Navy is developing a FY 2012 budget request that will include SLEP requirements. SLEP is only one aspect of the Navy's TACAIR inventory management initiatives targeted at preserving the service life of our existing legacy strike fighter aircraft (F/A-18A-D). The Navy will reduce the number of aircraft available in our squadrons during non-deployed phases to the minimum required. Navy expeditionary squadrons and those supporting the Unit Deployment Program (UDP) will be reduced from 12 aircraft to 10 aircraft per squadron on an as-required basis. These measures reduce the operational demand on legacy F/A-18s, making more aircraft available for induction into life extension events. The Navy is also evaluating depot level efficiency to maximize throughput and return legacy strike fighter aircraft to the Fleet. Collectively, these measures will extend the service life of the legacy aircraft and make the projected inventory decrease manageable. The management initiatives being implemented prudently balance operational risks and requirements today, while seeking to fulfill future projected capacity and capability requirements. Mr. Akin. The JSF continues to be plagued by delays. Most recently, it was reported that the IOC date for the Air Force will slide roughly two years to late CY 2015. In the past year the JSF completed only roughly 10% of its planned test flights. Given that the Navy has traditionally been the service with the most stringent OP/EVAL requirements prior to IOC, and given that the Navy is scheduled to receive the carrier variant of the JSF last, how will these delays effect the Navy's IOC date? Admiral Roughead. Based on the SECDEF approved F-35 program restructure and delivery of FY 2011 procured aircraft, the Navy F-35C IOC has been changed to 2016. The Navy IOC is based on three items: sufficient aircraft quantities, desired capability to conduct all Operational Requirements Document missions, and completion of operational test of delivered capability. The Navy's intent is to stand up squadrons as aircraft become available and declare IOC when sufficient capability is tested and delivered. Mr. Akin. Will the Navy accept an inordinate risk by abandoning its long-held standards for thorough test and evaluation in order to IOC the JSF in accordance with a predetermined timeframe, or will the Navy proceed with its customary diligence, thereby exacerbating the Strike Fighter Gap? Admiral Roughead. The Navy will not abandon its long-held standards. Based on the program and test schedule restructure and delivery of FY 2011 procured aircraft, the Navy F-35C IOC has been revised to be in 2016 based on three items: sufficient aircraft quantities; desired capability to conduct all Operational Requirements Document missions; and completion of operational test of delivered capability. F-35 test program risks will be mitigated through the continuation of a test program assessment and the support and advice of the OSD Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. An Integrated Test Review Team composed of experts in Developmental Test and Operational Test continues to mature test program plans to ensure program technical maturity is aligned with IOC dates; operational assessments are optimized; new opportunities for integrated test are matured; test schedule margins are realistic; and the proposed flow of technical data enables the planned operational test periods. To mitigate aircraft assets required during testing, the program is adding one carrier variant (CV) aircraft to the SDD program to expand developmental testing capacity; utilization of three Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) aircraft in support of development testing; and addition of another software development/test capability. The Navy, in conjunction with OSD and the USAF, is pursuing every opportunity to increase efficiency of test and accelerate delivery of required capability to maximize our strike fighter inventory. We will stand up squadrons as aircraft become available and declare IOC when sufficient capability is tested and delivered. Mr. Akin. I have been briefed that the Marine Corps intends to IOC the JSF on time, regardless of where the F-35 stands with respect to test and evaluation. Given the overwhelming delays in test for the F- 35, this could potentially require the Marine Corps to IOC a weapons system long before it is fully tested. Is it wise to take assets and resources away from our ongoing operational requirements in order to prematurely force the introduction of an aircraft that is not even optimized for the fight we are currently in today? General Conway. The Marine Corps plans to IOC with a multi-mission capable Block 2B aircraft as described in the JSF Operational Requirements Document (ORD) CN-3. A USMC IOC is projected to be 2012 for the F-35B which is based on operational requirements and the associated metrics that encompass capabilities, equipment, training, and support that will measure the progress of the program to meet the USMC requirements between now and December 2012 and enable the Marine Corps to ensure all the elements required for operational use of the F- 35B are ready. An IOC declaration will be dependent upon meeting these requirements. No assets or resources are being taken away from operational requirements to IOC. The USMC transition to the F-35B is structured and scheduled to meet operational requirements throughout the process without degradation. Mr. Akin. Your Harrier squadrons currently have 16 aircraft each. One of the ``Management Levers'' the DoN has briefed to me as a means of mitigating Strike Fighter Shortfalls is to reduce the number of aircraft in expeditionary F/A-18 squadrons by 2. Yet, they have also informed me that this ``management lever'' is not possible given existing operational requirements. Knowing that the Marine Corps requires its existing number of jets in order to support its current share of sorties, it seems reasonable to assume that the Marine Corps likewise requires its existing compliment of Harriers as well. Will you be replacing Harrier Squadrons with an equivalent number of F-35's? If not, how will this impact current operational demand? Will the rate at which you plan to replace Harriers meet current operational requirements? General Conway. The key enabler the AV-8B provides is the ability to deploy as part of a composite Air Combat Element (ACE) within the Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) as part of our basic Marine Air Ground Task Force maneuver element. An integrated Tactical Aviation capability at this level provides the ability to project, protect, and prosecute combat operations when and wherever required. The F-35B STOVL Joint Strike Fighter leverages off the AV-8B's proven legacy in this environment and adds the multi-mission capabilities of the F/A-18 aircraft that will evolve our MEU's into far more superior force in readiness. We have seven standing MEU's and the requirement to continue this force in the future has been repeatedly vetted and validated. Replacing the AV-8B's with a similar number F-35B's is the plan to maintain the capabilities to meet our operational requirements. Our procurement plans support the transition of the Harrier squadrons with the Lightening II aircraft, same number of aircraft supporting the same number of MEU's with one noted addition. When a 6 aircraft Detachment deploys with the ACE as it does today with the Harrier, the remaining combat capability of the F-35B in the ten aircraft left behind has the same resident capabilities of our other fourteen 10 aircraft squadrons that are replacing the Hornets. With this construct of the F-35B squadrons, seven 16 aircraft squadrons and fourteen 10 aircraft squadrons, we take our tactical aviation capabilities into a common single type of aircraft with all the associated synergy and savings while increasing our MAGTF combat capabilities. ______ QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON Mr. Wilson. Six amphibious ships will be decommissioned within the next three years, bringing the amphibious force to below 30. This brings the risk level to above what Navy and Marine Corps defines as the ``limit of acceptable risk.'' Understanding that the Navy plans to retain these vessels in the inactive fleet, rather than selling or dismantling them, what would be the cost of continuing to operate the vessels? What prevents the Navy from retaining these ships? Admiral Roughead. The cost of maintaining ships past their design life is difficult to forecast accurately; however, the table below provides Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) estimates absent specific ship studies to determine if extending the service lives of these ships through the FYDP is feasible. Navy retires ships from service when changes in mission or threat environment over the period of a ship's commissioned service, or deterioration in overall seaworthiness, make the ship no longer viable or cost-effective for future service. The LHA 1 Class does not meet the challenges of Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) integration. The LPD 4 Class ships have reached or exceeded their expected service lives of 40 years, and provide limited C5I capability to support USMC current and future missions. Our 30-year shipbuilding plan provides a projected battle force that balances the anticipated risk across the FYDP with the security uncertainties of the future to achieve the best balance of mission capabilities, resources, and requirements. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Unfunded Costs FY11-15 ($ Millions/FY11 dollars) Ship Date of Age in --------------------------------------------------- Commission FY15 Ops and Maint Manpower* Training** Total ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- USS NASSAU LHA 4 28-Jul-79.... 36....... 289......... 439....... 55......... 783 USS PELELIU LHA 5 3-May-80..... 35....... 322......... 250....... 30......... 602 USS CLEVELAND LPD 7 21-Apr-67.... 48....... 95......... 151....... 19......... 265 USS DUBUQUE LPD 8 1-Sep-67..... 48....... 149......... 151....... 19......... 319 USS DENVER LPD 9 26-Oct-68.... 46....... 176......... 87....... 10......... 273 USS PONCE LPD 15 10-Jul-71.... 44....... 146......... 120....... 14......... 280 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- TOTAL (FY11-15) 1177......... 1198....... 147......... 2522 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- * Manpower costs programmed in the year of decommissioning are \1/2\ of a full year requirement; reflects MPN/ RPN/DHAN/R and OMN. ** Training reflects MPN/RPN/DHAN/R for Individuals Account for ships listed. All values are in $M (FY11). Mr. Wilson. With the projected fighter shortfall and the further sliding of the JSF, why is the Navy not planning on purchasing additional F/A-18EIF aircraft? Though the JSF will show significant stealth improvements over the E/F, the SuperHornet has significant improvements in signature improvements over the legacy Hornets. Do you believe that advances in air defense over the next several years will lead to such a tactical risk that it is worth taking the strategic risk of such a substantial force structure gap? Admiral Roughead. The F/A-18E/F is a highly capable aircraft designed to meet and defeat today's threats with growth potential for the future; however, it cannot replace the F-35C. I remain committed to the JSF program because of the advanced sensor, precision strike, firepower, and stealth capabilities JSF will bring to our Fleet. We are monitoring the JSF program closely and managing our existing strike fighter capacity to meet power projection demands until JSF is delivered. The management initiatives being implemented prudently balance operational risks and requirements today, while seeking to fulfill future projected capacity and capability requirements. Mr. Wilson. The increased operational tempo of the past six years has led to much talk about strategies for increasing dwell times for Marines. Many units have been operating on a less than one-to-one dwell-to-deployed time. This has led to a substantial lack of training time, and hindered readiness. Have you abandoned the two-to-one dwell- to-deployed ideal? What strategies are you pursuing to ensure that Marines will be properly trained for both their primary and contingency missions? General Conway. To date, almost 75 percent of the available Marines have deployed in support of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM, or other operational commitments around the globe. Individual Deployment Tempo. We measure individual deployment tempo on a two-year sliding scale--the number of days deployed out of the previous 730 days. In the last seven years, we have seen a twentyfold increase in the individual deployment tempo of Marines in the active component. In October 2002, the number of Marines who deployed for at least 120 consecutive days in a two-year period was 4,845. As of January 2010, 100,760 Marines had deployed for at least 120 consecutive days. Unit Operational Tempo. The metric we use to measure unit operational tempo is the ratio of ``deployment to dwell''--months deployed to months at home station. We limit the duration of deployments for units and individual Marines to no more than seven months for battalions and squadrons. Higher headquarters units deploy for one year. Our goal is to achieve a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio in the active component and a 1:5 ratio in the reserve component. Our reserve units are currently operating at a ratio that more closely approximates a ratio of 1:4, while many of our active component units, on average, are nearing the goal of 1:2 (see Table 1). Table 1. MAGTF Unit Deployment-to-Dwell Ratios ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- MAGTF Element Average Ratio (Months Deployed: Months Home Station) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Command Element 1 : 1.43 Ground Combat Element 1 : 2.08 Aviation Combat Element 1 : 2.11 Logistics Combat Element 1 : 1.79 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Note: As of 18 Nov 2009. The subordinate units most frequently deployed are Intelligence Battalions, 1:1.01 (Command Element); Infantry Battalions, 1:1.78 (Ground Combat Element); VMU Squadrons, 1:1.10, and Attack Helicopter Squadrons, 1:1.28 (Aviation Combat Element); and Explosive Ordnance Disposal Companies 1:1.30 (Logistics Combat Element). Mr. Wilson. Sustained level of combat has led to a large gap between equipment the Marine Corps needs fixed or replaced and what has been fixed or replaced. Additionally the Maritime Prepositioning Ships' inventories have been greatly depleted. Do you have a proposed timeline for getting the Marine Corps back on track with the equipment they need? Is there a move to replenish the Maritime Prepositioning supplies? General Conway. Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Our Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadrons (MPSRONs) will be reset with the most capable equipment possible. We have begun loading them with capabilities that support lower spectrum operations while still maintaining the ability to generate Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) capable of conducting major combat operations. As we modernize, apply lessons learned, and reset our MPSRONs their readiness will fluctuate. However, our endstate is all three MPSRONs fully reset by 2012 and Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPP-N) reset within Marine Corps priorities as assets become available. The MPSRONs are currently rotating through Maritime Prepositioning Force Maintenance Cycle-9. MPSRON-1 completed MPF Maintenance Cycle-9 in September 2008 and is currently at 83 percent of its full equipment set. As has been addressed in previous reports, equipment from MPSRON-1 was required to outfit new units standing up in Fiscal Year 2007 and Fiscal Year 2008 as part of our end strength increase to 202,000. While the majority of combat systems are loaded, MPSRON-1 is short a portion of its motor transport, communications and bulk fuel/water storage capability. MPSRON-1 is expected to be fully reset at the completion of its next maintenance cycle in 2011. Equipment from MPSRON-2 was offloaded to support Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II. During its rotation through MPF Maintenance Cycle-9, between August 2008 and July 2009, the readiness of MPSRON-2 was substantially improved from 49 percent to its current readiness of 77 percent. Upon integration of MPSRON-2's fifth ship, a Large, Medium Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ship in Jan 2011 and completion of its MPF Maintenance Cycle-10 rotation in fiscal year 2012, MPSRON-2 is expected to be fully reset. MPSRON-3 was reset to 100 percent of its equipment set during MPF Maintenance Cycle-8 in March 2007. MPSRON-3 is rotating through MPF Maintenance Cycle-9 and currently has three ships of equipment downloaded at Blount Island Command. Two of MPSRON-3's ships were employed in Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE in Haiti and provided the Marine Expeditionary Units and Naval Support Elements with the additional equipment and supplies necessary to support immediate relief. The goal is, upon completion of its MPF Maintenance Cycle-9 and backload of all vessels, in July 2010 MPSRON-3 will return to 100 percent. Marine Corps Prepositioning Program: Norway The Marine Corps Prepositioning Program--Norway (MCPP-N) was used to source equipment in support of operations in Iraqi and Afghanistan, including the recent force increase. MCPP-N is routinely utilized to support theater security cooperation activities and exercises in the AFRICOM and EUCOM areas of responsibility. The Marine Corps continues to reset MCPP-N in accordance with our operational priorities while also exploring other locations for geographic prepositioning that will enable combat and theater security cooperation operations in support of forward deployed Naval Forces. ______ QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. MCMORRIS RODGERS Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. Like many, I am concerned about the lack of number of ships in the Navy. About 100 years ago, Great Britain was a world super power. It was also during this time that Great Britain dominated the sea. Are you concerned that if we don't make it a priority to build ships to maintain our sea dominance that this could weaken our country's super power standing? Admiral Roughead. As our security and prosperity are inextricably linked with those of other nations, a global Fleet is essential to deterring aggression, assuring our allies, building partnerships, and protecting our national interests. A Fleet of no less than 313 ships is necessary to meet those operational requirements. Our 30-Year shipbuilding plan grows the capacity of our Fleet to 320 ships by 2024, with the naval capabilities necessary to meet the challenges the nation faces over the next three decades of the 21st century. On balance, I believe the force structure represented by our 30-year shipbuilding plan maintains our ability to project power across the spectrum of challenges we are likely to face throughout the time period of the report, albeit with prudent risk where appropriate. Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. Wouldn't you agree that spouses relying on the Military Spouse Career Advancement Account (MyCAA) program to further their academic goals should have been notified prior to the temporary stay in order to make the necessary arrangements with their school? Admiral Roughead. I do agree that spouses should have been afforded additional notice in advance of such a significant change in program policies or procedures. The pause was necessitated by an unforeseen, unprecedented spike in enrollments, which not only pushed the program to its budget threshold, but also began to overwhelm the program's support systems. As a senior leader who recognizes the extraordinary role military spouses play in the lives and careers of our uniformed service members, I share the Department's deep regret in reaching the decision to temporarily suspend the program on such short notice. ______ QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN Mr. Lamborn. The Administration's Phased, Adaptive Approach to BMD drives BMD-capable ships to provide effects at three very different levels of war. First, they must provide theater effects for sea-base defense. They must also provide regional and cross-regional effects to areas like CENTCOM and/or PACOM. Finally they must be able to provide effects for homeland defense (global effects). This is a daunting task. Is the C3 (command, control, communications) architecture in place to enable BMD-capable ships to perform all of these functions? What initiatives are underway to connect the sensors and shooters to provide a layered missile defense that protects not only our forces abroad but the Homeland? Is there a cost to other missions when these ships are conducting their BMD mission? How would you quantify the risk based on this expanded tasking? Admiral Roughead. C3 (command, control, communications) architecture is in place to enable BMD-capable ships to perform all three levels of war. The Navy contributes to BMD as part of a Joint and coalition family of systems. As new capabilities are added, the existing Missile Defense Agency managed C3 architecture is updated to ensure interoperability and effectiveness. The key C3 interface between BMD ships and the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) is in place. In most Combatant Commands (COCOM), the capability exists but requires further upgrades and enhancements. The Navy is currently resourcing Maritime Operations Centers (MOC) with access to the Command and Control Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) applications to increase Command and Control connectivity with the Global BMDS. The Navy is addressing communication improvements to support seamless BMDS integration across Theater, Regional and Strategic Communications for BMD cueing and track management. A majority of this capability, such as Multi-TADIL-J, exists currently. Initiatives are being undertaken to connect the sensors and shooters in a layered missile defense that protects not only our forces abroad but also the Homeland. The spiral development of C2BMC includes continuous improvements which will enhance coordination across Navy, Joint and Coalition sensors, contributing to Homeland Defense and theater and regional missions. Mission prioritization is directed at the highest levels of the DOD and is based on Combatant Commander (CCDR) requirements. Naval operations, to include maritime BMD, are led by Maritime Component Commanders at theater Maritime Operations Centers (MOC), and effectively employ multi-mission Surface Combatants with BMD capability to meet CCDR requirements. Regular CCDR sponsored exercises and test events are used to benchmark and improve coordination among commanders in theater, cross-regional, and Homeland defense operations. Navy has also added BMD scenarios to Fleet battle experiments and exercises to identify and test additional enhancements. The BMD mission does not represent an increase in overall risk, but rather a reduction in risk to our deployed forces and interests around the globe. That said, the Navy has a finite number of surface combatants to conduct numerous missions. Combatant Commanders balance theater level requirements, forces and risk in carrying out their missions, to include BMD. Mr. Lamborn. Our potential adversaries have shown the capability and willingness to deny our forces access to satellite communications either through the use of anti-satellite weapons or communications jamming. While anti-satellite technology is a very real threat, proven by China's January 2007 shoot down of one of their aging satellites, the technology to interfere with satellite communications is simple and readily available worldwide from any local Radio Shack store. What specific measures has the U.S. Navy taken to ensure that it can continue to provide missile defense in a satellite communications denied environment? I understand if this requires a classified response, but I encourage you to share what you can with this committee in both an unclassified and classified response. Admiral Roughead. The Navy currently has a number of mitigation techniques to counter jamming threats available for use in a Satellite Communications (SATCOM) degraded environment. Use of frequency hopping, agile spot beams, and spread spectrum techniques provide low probability of detection and intercept of our SATCOM. The Department of the Navy studies SATCOM degraded environment mitigations through our Range of Warfare Command and Control initiative, better preparing our forces to meet their operational requirements despite others' efforts to disrupt them. The Navy is capable of conducting its missions in this challenging environment, to include missile defense. Through these efforts, and in cooperation with the joint and interagency community on the development of other mitigations, like the Joint Aerial Layer Network, the Navy will be poised to operate in the most challenging electromagnetic environments now and in the years to come. If you desire further elaboration on the Navy's mitigation techniques and initiatives, I can provide a classified response or have my staff brief you on the issue in more detail. ______ QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER Mr. Hunter. Secretary Mabus, as you may know, in the FY10 NDAA report language was included regarding the Miramar Air Station Trap and Skeet range. The provision in the NDAA directs the ``Secretary to submit a report to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives when the PA/SI is complete. The report should include a description of any mitigation measures needed and timeline to complete, and plans and timeline to reopen the range.'' It is my understanding that the PA/SI was completed in December 2009. Can you please tell me what the status is of your report to both the SASC and HASC as well as when it will be available for our review? Secretary Mabus. The Preliminary Assessment report is complete. The Site Inspection report was recently revised to reflect regulatory agency comments and was finalized March 18, 2010. Based on the results of these studies, the Report to Congress required by the House Report 2647 of the FY10 NDAA is currently being prepared and will be provided to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees in the next 60 days. Copies of the Preliminary Assessment and the Site Inspection reports will also be made available to the Committees. Mr. Hunter.. General Conway, it is my understanding that the Marine Corps has developed a roll-on, roll-off technology that expands the capability of the KC-130J. The Harvest Hawk program will enable the KC- 130J to fulfill multiple missions individually or simultaneously from refueling missions, including fire support missions and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. I am encouraged by the Marine Corps' work with Harvest Hawk and their plan to increase the capability of the KC-130J aircraft in order to take advantage of the extended endurance of the KC-130J. What is the status of the Harvest Hawk developmental effort and when do you expect to be able to field the capability? General Conway. Harvest Hawk is currently in developmental test and is expected to deploy during the summer 2010.