THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY AND FORCE STRUCTURE

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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. The Armed Services Committee meets today to receive testimony on the United States’ nuclear policy as well as the force structure in light of the recent Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) as well as the signing of the New Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Treaty.

Joining us today is a very formidable witness panel, and in the order of speaking, the Honorable Jim Miller, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; General Kevin Chilton, the Commander of the United States Strategic Command, or what we call STRATCOM; the Honorable Tom D’Agostino, excuse me, the Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).

And no stranger here, and we welcome her back, the Honorable, fantastic Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. It is a real thrill to have you back. And we appreciate each one of you appearing here today.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 required the Secretary of Defense to perform a review of our nuclear posture in coordination, of course, with the State Department and the Energy Department.

The Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review seeks to establish a bipartisan approach to nuclear policy and, in my view, properly balances the role of our nuclear deterrent forces with the goals of preventing nuclear terrorism and weapons proliferation.

It contains exactly the balance that former Secretaries of Defense Bill Perry and Jim Schlesinger recommended to our committee a year ago when they presented the findings of the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. “This is a moment of opportunity,” the commission concluded, “to reach consensus on U.S. nuclear strategy, but it is also a moment of urgency.”

The urgency, according to these experts, arises “internationally, from the danger that we may be close to a tipping point in nuclear
proliferation and, domestically, from an accumulation of delayed decisions about the nuclear weapons program.”

The Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review offers us the opportunity to act on the urgent issues, both internationally and domestically, that the commission defined.

Following the path first outlined by President Obama in his speech in Prague last year, the NPR calls for responsibly reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. This action opens the door to stronger steps against rogue states and those who would fail to protect nuclear technology and materials.

The NPR’s new approach recognizes that we live in a complicated world that demands immediate action to protect us from the threat of nuclear terrorism, such as locking down loose nuclear materials in concert with other nations. And in that regard, I want to congratulate the President on obtaining the agreement of 47 nations here in Washington at the nuclear summit to lock down these materials within four years. That is good.

At the same time, the NPR is grounded in the strength of our nuclear deterrent forces. It calls for retaining a nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers.

I am also pleased that the review concluded that, as long as nuclear weapons are around, they will be maintained safely. They will be maintained securely as well as reliably, and consistent with the Stockpile Management statute recommended by this committee last year and codified in law by the Defense bill.

In addition to the NPR, the Nation’s nuclear posture and force structure has recently been influenced by the announcement and signing of a New Strategic Arms Reduction, or START, Treaty with the Russians.

This new treaty comes at a critical time, as we approach the May Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by agreeing to reduce their nuclear stockpiles, and the U.S. and Russia have sent a clear message to the rest of the world.

This action by the two largest nuclear powers will only strengthen the President’s efforts at the conference to impose stiffer punishments on nations such as Iran that are accused of violating the NPT.

The road before us to a world free of nuclear threats is long and it will be, at times, difficult, but the signing of the historic New START Treaty moves us miles ahead toward reaching that final destination.

In his memoirs, Ronald Reagan noted, “For the 8 years I was president, I never let my dream of a nuclear-free world fade from my mind.”

Like President Reagan, President Obama is aiming high with his commitment to a world without nuclear weapons. But as I read it, the President’s nuclear posture and the New START Treaty are deeply rooted in a common-sense strategy that will enhance our national security by protecting us from the most urgent nuclear dangers.

So before calling on our distinguished panel of witnesses, let me recognize my friend, the ranking member, the distinguished gentleman from California, Mr. McKeon.
STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. “BUCK” MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. McKeeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would also like to extend a warm welcome back to our witnesses.

Before I begin, I want to express my deep condolences to the Polish people. Saturday's tragedy leaves us at a loss for words. Many of us here had met with President Kaczynski in previous trips to Warsaw as well as the distinguished civilian and military leaders who also perished in this unfortunate accident. Our thoughts and prayers are with their families, loved ones, at this time.

Today's hearing focuses on the Administration's changes to U.S. nuclear policy and posture. We have seen much fanfare accompany the release of the new Nuclear Posture Review, the President's trip to Prague to sign a New START Treaty, and the Nuclear Security Summit held earlier this week.

I commend the President's focus on these important nuclear security issues. However, my objective today is to understand how the policy has changed and why, as well as the consequences and implications.

Along these lines, I would like to highlight my primary concerns. First, the NPR appears to change our nation's longstanding policy of "calculated ambiguity." It adopts a "Negative Security Assurance" (NSA) policy, whereby non-nuclear weapons states that aren't proliferating are assured that the U.S. would never threaten the use of nuclear weapons against them, even if the U.S. or our allies are threatened with biological or chemical weapons.

At the same time, the NPR includes a caveat that adjustments could be made if conditions change. Furthermore, the NPR signals a desire to pursue a universal "sole purpose" policy by which the threat of nuclear use to deter a devastating chemical or biological attack would be taken entirely off the table.

Why embrace such muddled wording that sends mixed signals to both our allies and adversaries? I hope our witnesses will discuss why this policy change was made and the national security benefits they believe it provides.

I worry that these changes to U.S. declaratory policy, combined with the explicit signaling of what is yet to come, will weaken our deterrence rather than strengthen it.

Second, the NPR indicates the President has already "directed a review of potential future reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons below New START levels." What would be the strategic rationale for such reductions?

Without further assessments of the threat and understanding of our military commanders' requirements, much less seeing how the implementation of START goes, it would seem premature to rush into deeper cuts.

We have been told repeatedly that START would permit further development and deployment of U.S. missile defenses in Europe and the U.S. But Russian leaders suggest such deployments could lead to their withdrawal from the treaty.

How are these differing expectations being resolved, especially when some are suggesting that missile defense and conventional forces be included in the next round of negotiations? I am con-
cerned that our eagerness to do more arms control may further cost us important conventional capabilities. I hope our witnesses can assure us that this is not the case.

Third, any decision to reduce our nuclear stockpile, including those weapons we maintain in storage, should not be made unless we have high confidence that the remaining arsenal is highly reliable. This requires a sustained, long-term investment to modernize our aging stockpile and infrastructure, not just a one-year increase of funds.

Furthermore, how do we attract and retain top scientists and engineers to an enterprise that is shrinking and, as the NPR states, explicitly prohibits the development of new nuclear warheads? General Chilton, as you told the committee last year, our nuclear weapons are “chemistry experiments on the shelf.”

What young, bright engineer wants to work on that? How does the Administration propose to maintain required technical competencies in an environment that does not allow them to be exercised from start to finish?

Lastly, the NPR rightly places emphasis on addressing the threat of nuclear terrorism and nuclear nonproliferation. The President has announced an intentional effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years, yet we have not seen any plans for how this would be accomplished.

But there is another aspect to nonproliferation—U.S. assurance to our over 30 allies and friends who have agreed not to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for U.S. nuclear guarantees. Will our policy changes, reductions, and signaling lead to less confidence in our nuclear deterrent and, perhaps, drive some of our allies and friends to consider developing their own?

Fundamentally, the President appears to believe that U.S. nuclear reductions will restore our moral leadership to encourage others to do the same. However, it assumes regimes like Iran and North Korea will curb their nuclear ambitions, Pakistan and India will reduce their nuclear arms, and Russia and China will be more inclined to support tough sanctions against Iran, all as a result of U.S. stockpile reductions. However, none of these have yet to be seen.

I would like to thank our witnesses again for being with us today and for their dedication and service. And Mr. Chairman, I would like to have my full statement included in the record, please.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection the entire statement will be so ordered. Thank you, Mr. McKeon.

The order of testimony will be, as we face the witnesses from left to right, Secretary Miller, General Chilton, Secretary D’Agostino and finally then we are saving the best for last, Secretary Tauscher. We thank each of you for appearing before us today, and we have your written statements and each will be incorporated for the record without objection.

So, Secretary Miller, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MILLER, PH.D., PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Dr. MILLER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Mr. McKeon, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. It is a pleasure to join my esteemed colleagues in discussing U.S. nuclear policy and capabilities.

I will focus my remarks today on the recently completed and, as you know, congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Review, or NPR. The 2010 NPR provides a roadmap for implementing the President’s Prague agenda for reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons, with the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Because this goal will not be reached quickly, perhaps not in our lifetimes, the NPR outlines specific steps needed to sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons exist.

In the fiscal year 2011 budget requests from both the Departments of Defense and Energy are the first installments in this long-term effort.

As the chairman noted, the 2010 NPR identifies the most urgent nuclear dangers today as arising from proliferation and the potential for nuclear terrorism, and it outlines a comprehensive approach for dealing with these challenges that includes policy initiatives and increased investments in a number of areas.

More broadly, the NPR identifies five key areas and five objectives for U.S. nuclear policy and posture. First, and as I noted, the top priority is preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.

Second, reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and I will say more about that in particular.

Third, maintaining strategic deterrents and stability at reduced force levels.

Fourth, strengthening regional deterrents and reassuring U.S. allies and partners and fifth, sustaining the safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal.

Given that the committee has received the NPR report, I won’t summarize all of its conclusions; focus my remarks instead on declaratory policy and force structure issues. The 2010 NPR aims to make clear the benefits to other nations of complying with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the potential consequences of not doing so.

It strengthens the existing U.S. nuclear—sorry, excuse me—it strengthens the existing U.S. Negative Security Assurance associated with the NPT and states, “The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.”

At the same time, the NPR does reflect continued concerns about chemical and biological weapons, or CBW, and it affirms that “… any state eligible for this assurance that uses chemical or biological weapons against the United States or its allies or partners would face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response—and that individuals responsible for that attack, whether
national leaders or military commanders, will be held fully accountable.”

Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons in particular, and the rapid pace of biotechnology development, the NPR notes that the United States reserves the right to make any future adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat.

This clarified Negative Security Assurance does not apply to nuclear weapon states such as Russia or China, nor does it apply to states not in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations, such as Iran and North Korea.

For these states, the NPR makes clear that U.S. nuclear weapons still play a role in deterring not only nuclear attack, but also conventional or CBW attack against the United States or partners and allies. And as Secretary Gates noted recently, for Iran and North Korea, all options are on the table.

Finally, to address the potential nexus of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the NPR renews the “... U.S. commitment to hold fully accountable any state terrorist group or other non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts.”

This statement and the clarification of the U.S. Negative Security Assurance associated with the NPT are both reflections of the fact that the most urgent threats today are nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.

At the same time, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the U.S. must retain the safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter an attack on the United States and our allies. Therefore, one of the first tasks of the NPR, was continued throughout the review, was to find positions for the New START negotiations.

The Department of Defense (DOD)-led NPR team reached the following conclusions about U.S. strategic nuclear force structure. First, the U.S. should retain a nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and dual-capable heavy bombers under New START, and the fiscal 2011 budget request includes funding for each leg of the triad.

Second, all U.S. ICBMs should be “de-Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV)ed” to a single warhead each in order to reinforce strategic stability. And third, an ability to upload non-deployed nuclear weapons on delivery vehicles should be retained as a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise.

The Administration intends to provide additional details for strategic forces under New START in a report required by Section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2010. This report will include a 10-year estimate of budgetary requirements for sustaining delivery platforms, the nuclear weapons stockpile and the nuclear weapons complex.

My statement deals with questions of non-strategic nuclear weapons as well as long-range strike capabilities, and I would like to ask that that full statement be submitted for the record. And
then, in order to make more time for questions of the committee, I would like to just conclude by saying the following.

And that is that a key premise of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review was that an effective national strategy for reducing nuclear dangers and sustaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent will require support from a long succession of U.S. administrations and Congresses.

Laying the groundwork for sustainable bipartisan consensus has been and remains a central purpose of this NPR. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Miller can be found in the Appendix on page 58.]

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

General Chilton, please.

STATEMENT OF GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

General CHILTON. Thank you, Chairman Skelton and Ranking Member McKeon and members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to be before you today and to testify on these two very important topics.

The United States Strategic Command was closely consulted throughout the development of the Nuclear Posture Review and during negotiations on the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, and I look forward to discussing them with you.

I would like to note at the outset how proud I am of the extraordinary work the Command performed in support of all these efforts. We have an amazing team in Omaha and their diligence, expertise, and tireless work continue to ensure our ability to deliver global security for America.

The NPR reflects a current assessment of the global security environment, one which is markedly, but not entirely, different from the one we faced in the Cold War. It recognizes the need to confront global threats, including nuclear dangers, through the twin prongs of deterrence and nonproliferation. The NPR includes several key recommendations that will serve to both sustain and strengthen USSTRATCOM’s ability to conduct our deterrence missions.

Specifically, the NPR recommends moving forward with a number of nuclear enterprise sustainment projects, including strengthening our nuclear command and control structure; continuing development and deployment of our triad of delivery systems; maintaining a safe, secure and effective stockpile; and revitalizing the National Nuclear Security Administration’s aging infrastructure.

America’s triad of diverse and complementary delivery systems provides unique synergies that make our deterrent highly credible and resilient in the face of a variety of potential technological and geopolitical developments.

The NPR further endorses DOD efforts to explore future triad systems, specifically, to extend the Minuteman III ICBM through 2030 and conduct studies now to inform decisions on a follow-on land-based deterrent to replace the Ohio-class SSBN at the existing ships’ end of life, and to study future long-range bomber capabilities. It also supports moving forward with full-rate production for the W76–1 warhead for our submarine leg of the triad. Full-scope—
that is, nuclear and non–nuclear—life extension of the B61 bomb to sustain its strategic deterrence and extended deterrence roles, and initiating studies to develop life extension options for the W78 ICBM warhead, including the possibility of also adapting the resulting warhead for sea launched ballistic missiles and, thereby, reducing the number of warhead types.

Additionally the NPR and the President’s budget recognize the need to improve the nation’s nuclear infrastructure and address the challenges of human capital recruitment, development, and sustainment. These investments are required in order to confidently reduce the overall U.S. stockpile while sustaining the credibility of our nuclear weapons, which is fundamental to effective deterrence.

Investments that revitalize NNSA’s aging infrastructure and intellectual capital strengthen our security with the facilities and people needed to address technological surprises, geopolitical change, and a range of cutting edge national security challenges. The Administration’s request for a 13 percent increase in NNSA’s funding for fiscal year 2011 is an important first step in this process.

In regard to New START, the nuclear enterprise remains, today and for the foreseeable future, the foundation of U.S. deterrent strategy and defense posture. As the combatant command responsible for executing strategic deterrence operations, planning for nuclear operations, and advocating for nuclear capabilities, we are keenly aware of how force posture and readiness changes can affect deterrence, assurance, and overall strategic stability.

The New START agreement, in my view, retains the military flexibility necessary to ensure each of these for the period of the treaty.

In support of the New START negotiations effort, U.S. Strategic Command analyzed the required nuclear weapons and delivery vehicle force structure and posture to meet current guidance and provided options for consideration by the Department.

This rigorous approach, rooted in both deterrent strategy and assessment of potential adversary capabilities, supports both the agreed-upon reductions in New START and recommendations in the NPR.

Every day, U.S. Strategic Command remains focused on providing the President and future presidents with the options and flexibility needed to deter and respond to threats to our nation and its allies. Today, our deterrent is safe, secure, and effective.

Our forces are trained and ready, and the command is faithfully and fully carrying out its missions each and every day. I am confident that the NPR and New START outline an approach that continues to enable the men and women of U.S. Strategic Command to deliver global security for America today and in the future.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify before this committee, and I look forward to your questions and future discussions.

[The prepared statement of General Chilton can be found in the Appendix on page 64.]

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you so much.

Secretary D’Agostino, welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D’AGOSTINO, UNDER SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Secretary D’Agostino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I am very pleased to appear before you today with General Chilton, the Honorable Ellen Tauscher and Dr. Jim Miller to talk about the Nuclear Posture Review. I will focus my remarks on the Department of Energy’s equities in the Nuclear Posture Review.

As you know, or as you may not know, that NNSA has been actively engaged in the formulation of the NPR and we are pleased, along with General Chilton, to have had the opportunity to contribute significantly to the document.

The NNSA is actively engaged in direct support of the first NPR objective: preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. The most important steps we can take to keep terrorists from developing and using an improvised nuclear device or a radiological “dirty bomb,” is to prevent them from acquiring the nuclear materials or radiological materials themselves.

This is not a new job to the NNSA. We have led this effort for several years, and now we are accelerating and broadening the scope of these efforts.

Current NNSA programs include securing nuclear materials, including the most vulnerable nuclear materials, worldwide in four years; disposing of excess U.S. and international fissile materials; strengthening the international safeguard systems by developing new safeguards technologies, expertise, policies, concepts, and partnerships; developing an active nuclear and radiological security dialogue and cooperation with key domestic and international partners; and developing highly sensitive and wide-area nuclear detection technologies.

NNSA programs are supporting the President’s arms control and nonproliferation agenda by using these technical capabilities within the Nuclear Security Enterprise to demonstrate the technical ability to support the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and any follow-on arms control requirements.

The Department of Energy and NNSA are also actively engaged in direct support of the fifth NPR objective, “sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.” For more than 65 years, our program has been able to do just that: assure the nation that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and effective in meeting the nuclear deterrent needs of the United States.

The need to maintain the nuclear stockpile without nuclear testing has been a national policy for close to 20 years, and we will continue to do that into the future, consistent with the key principles included in the NPR.

To that end, the United States will not conduct underground nuclear testing and will not develop new nuclear warheads. However, we will study all options for ensuring the safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear warheads, and we will do so on a case-by-case basis.
Applying these principles, the NNSA will fully fund the ongoing Life Extension Program for the W76 submarine-based warhead for completion in the year 2017 and the full-scope life extension study for the B61 bomb to ensure first production begins in 2017. And, as General Chilton also mentioned, participate with the Nuclear Weapons Council on a study of life extension options and approaches for the W78 ICBM warhead.

The NPR also concluded that the NNSA needed to recapitalize the aging infrastructure and to renew our human capital, the critical cadre of scientific, technical, and engineering experts who carry out our stockpile management work and support other missions.

To that end, the NNSA will strengthen the Science, Technology and Engineering base needed for conducting weapon system life extensions, weapons surety, certification without nuclear testing, and providing annual stockpile weapons surveillance.

NNSA will also fund two key facility projects, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) project at Los Alamos National Laboratory to replace the existing 50-year-old CMR facility by 2021 and a Uranium Processing Facility at the Y–12 plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee to come on line for production operations by the year 2021.

Responsible stockpile management requires not only the supporting infrastructure, but also a highly capable workforce with the specialized skills needed to sustain the nuclear deterrent and to support the President’s nuclear security agenda.

The NPR noted the importance of recruiting and retaining the human capital needed in NNSA for nuclear security mission. In order to succeed in our mission, we need to be able to recruit and retain the next generation of nuclear security professionals, because our highly specialized workforce is, indeed, our greatest asset.

The President has now clearly outlined the importance of nuclear issues for our national security and the importance of keeping the U.S. nuclear deterrent safe, secure, and effective for the future.

And the Administration’s commitment to a clear and long-term plan for managing the stockpile and comprehensive nuclear security agenda ensures that the scientists and engineers of tomorrow will have the opportunity to engage in challenging research and development activities.

I would also want to share with the committee a statement from our national laboratory directors that provides their views on the Nuclear Posture Review. The directors universally state that “We believe the approach outlined in the NPR, which excludes further nuclear testing and includes the consideration of the full range of life extension options, provides the necessary technical flexibility to manage the nuclear stockpile into the future with an acceptable level of risk.”

“We are reassured that a key component of the NPR is the recognition of the importance of supporting a modern physical infrastructure—comprised of nuclear security laboratories and a complex of supporting facilities—and a highly capable workforce.”

Mr. Chairman, I would like to provide that statement for the record so the unanimity of support for the NPR is fully understood and is clear.
This Nuclear Posture Review is an important step toward adopting a 21st century approach to nuclear weapons and a broader array of nuclear security issues. This path forward will require a long term commitment from administrations and from future Congresses to provide the support and resources necessary to sustain our deterrent.

As a committee directed in 2010 language, we have formulated, and will soon submit to the Congress, a Stockpile Management Plan that will describe how the NNSA and the Department of Defense will work together to implement the policy strategy and force structure included in the NPR.

With the committee’s endorsement, the Nuclear Security Enterprise will have the science, technology and engineering expertise to carry out the full range of nuclear security missions, not just managing the stockpile but using those capabilities to address that full spectrum of national security efforts required.

Secretary Chu recently stated that “the Department of Energy must discover and deliver the solutions to advance our national priorities.” The NNSA and the Nuclear Security Enterprise are poised to provide those solutions.

Thank you, Mr Chairman. I am pleased to respond to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Secretary D’Agostino can be found in the Appendix on page 69.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Secretary D’Agostino. Without objection, the laboratory report to which you referred will be made part of our record.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 85.]

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Tauscher, we welcome you back, and we look forward to your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member McKeon, distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the State Department’s role in protecting the United States and our allies from today’s most pressing threats.

I am honored to appear today with my friends and colleagues, Tom D’Agostino from the Department of Energy, Dr. Jim Miller from the Department of Defense, and General Chilton.

Before I begin, let me thank you all for your service, and I want you to know how much I miss serving on this committee. It is an honor, however, to be part of the Obama Administration and to work with President Obama and Secretary Clinton to implement our arms control and nonproliferation agenda.

As you know, we have an ambitious agenda to reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons to make the United States more secure and the world more stable. The President set forth several goals in his speech in Prague last year; three of which have been advanced in just the last few days.
First, he wanted a new treaty that would make verifiable and mutual cuts in the United States’ and Russia’s nuclear arsenals. Second, he vowed to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our security posture. And third, he set a goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear material within the next four years.

At the same time, the President reaffirmed our commitment to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective deterrent to protect the United States and our allies so long as nuclear weapons exist.

Mr. Chairman, the State Department, working with our friends at the Department of Energy and Defense, and with the rest of the inter-agency team and the Congress, are fully engaged in implementing the President’s agenda.

Last week, the Administration released a report of its year-long Nuclear Posture Review. This review constitutes a clear break from past reviews, both in terms of process and scope. The Department of Defense led the review but, for the first time, the inter-agency, including the Department of State, fully participated in discussing the issues and making recommendations to the President.

For the first time, the Nuclear Posture Review is an unclassified document. The Obama Administration took a broad whole-of-government approach to addressing the United States’ nuclear policy and identifying concrete steps to enhance our national security.

Finally, last Thursday, President Obama traveled to Prague to sign the New START Treaty. I spent much of March at the table in Geneva and helped conclude the agreement.

The New START Treaty will improve United States and international security by reducing and limiting U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces, promoting strategic stability by ensuring transparency and predictability regarding U.S. and Russian nuclear strategic forces over the life of the treaty, and advancing our nuclear nonproliferation efforts.

The treaty sets meaningful lower limits on deployed strategic warheads and their delivery vehicles and launchers—limits that the Department of Defense validated through rigorous analysis in the early months of the Nuclear Posture Review. The treaty’s verification regime will provide each side with confidence that the other is upholding its obligations.

The treaty gives our military the flexibility to structure, deploy, and maintain our forces in ways that best meet our national security interest. And, perhaps most importantly, the treaty does not contain any constraints on testing, development, or deployment of current or planned United States missile defense programs, or current or planned United States long-range conventional strike capabilities.

Let me make one final point. Under the new treaty, the United States will continue to maintain a safe, secure, and effective strategic nuclear force to protect ourselves, our allies, and our partners.

The United States and Russia can safely reduce our nuclear forces because the threat environment has changed. Today’s most pressing nuclear threats come from terrorists and additional countries seeking nuclear weapons, not the risk of a large-scale nuclear attack, as during the Cold War.

The conclusions of our recent Nuclear Posture Review reflect that reality. The NPR directs us to preserve the effectiveness of our nu-
clear deterrent for as long as it is required, reduce the potential for conflict, enhance strategic stability worldwide, and strengthen the nonproliferation regime.

The NPR outlines a new approach that will ensure that our defenses and diplomacy are geared toward those objectives. Our updated Negative Security Assurance reinforces the President's objectives of reducing the roles and numbers of nuclear weapons by making it clear that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and are in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.

That is why we call it the NSA, because it is a very long bite of an explanation of who they are. The purpose of this change is to emphasize to non-nuclear states the security benefits of adhering to and fully complying with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and their nuclear nonproliferation objectives.

Some have suggested this might lead such states to be less fearful of consequences of using chemical or biological weapons. Nothing could be further from the truth. Let me be clear. No one should doubt the resolve and conventional military capabilities of the United States to respond to such aggression with devastating effect and to hold accountable those responsible.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in May is a critical opportunity to renew and revitalize all three pillars of the treaty: nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy under safeguards.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and an essential foundation for progress in nuclear arms control and disarmament. All nations must recognize that the nonproliferation regime cannot survive if violators are allowed to act with impunity.

Along with our international partners, the United States is pursuing diplomatic efforts to convince Iran and North Korea to resolve the world community's concerns about their nuclear programs, and to encourage them to cooperate in addressing all outstanding questions about those programs.

We are working to build international consensus for steps that will convince Iran's leaders to change course, including new United Nations Security Council sanctions that will further clarify their choice of upholding the NPT and safeguard obligations, or facing increasing isolation and painful consequences.

With respect to North Korea, we continue to send a message that simply returning to the negotiating table is not enough. Pyongyang must move toward complete and verifiable denuclearization through irreversible steps if it wants a normalized, sanctions-free relationship with the United States.

These steps send a clear message about this Administration's priorities and resolve. Our commitment to defend our national security interests and our allies and partners in Europe, the Pacific and elsewhere has never been stronger. In this regard, the NPR emphasizes close cooperation with our allies around the world and maintains our firm commitment to mutual security.

We will work with our partners to reinforce regional security architectures such as missile defenses and other conventional mili-
tary capabilities. And I want to repeat what I said earlier. The United States will continue to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for ourselves and our allies so long as these weapons exist anywhere in the world.

Last year, President Obama said he would seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. He was also very clear that it might not happen in his lifetime. The standards for a world without nuclear weapons are very high, but we are taking concrete steps in that direction which make us stronger, safer, and more secure.

That is why we are working to halt nuclear proliferation, to gain greater transparency into the programs and capabilities of key countries of concern and to create verification methods and technologies capable of detecting violations.

In order to reduce the risk of proliferation, we will establish effective and internationally supported mechanisms to address non-compliance with nonproliferation obligations.

Mr. Chairman, I am very happy to be here today. I am happy to answer any questions that you have, and I look forward to working with the committee on your bill. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Tauscher can be found in the Appendix on page 75.]

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, thank you for your testimony and your appearance.

General Chilton, under the Nuclear Posture Review, can we, with certainty, say that America is safer because of it?

General CHILTON. Mr. Chairman, what I can say with certainty is that the United States Strategic Command, under the construct of both the Nuclear Posture Review and the START Treaty, is able to fully execute the missions assigned to this command to provide adequate strategic deterrence for the United States of America. Of that I am absolutely convinced. And so in that respect we are secure.

And if I could add, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Please.

General CHILTON. There is a particularly important point that I think will strengthen us for the future under the NPR. It is something that I have advocated for in the past, and that is the funding and the commitment to funding and the focus on improving the nuclear enterprise under the NNSA.

This will truly strengthen the deterrent, not only for today but for 20, 30, 40 years from now. And the NPR’s endorsement of that, I think, is one of the most important aspects of that for strengthening our deterrence posture for the future.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Miller, the Administration rejected the notion that deterring a nuclear attack is the sole purpose for our nuclear stockpile. Why was that?

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, the Posture Review closely considered the option of establishing deterrence of nuclear attack as the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons, and concluded that the conditions for making such a statement, making such a declaratory policy, don’t exist today.
Nuclear weapons continue to play an important role in deterring non-nuclear attack, including conventional or chemical-biological attack arising from a nuclear weapons state.

So, Mr. Chairman, the NPR set forth an objective of trying to establish conditions over a period of time that would make it safe for the United States and, indeed, for others to establish a doctrine and policy in which the sole purpose of nuclear weapons would be to deter other nuclear weapons. We saw clearly that those conditions did not exist today.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Tauscher, are there any constraints of any kind on missile defenses within the New START Treaty?

Secretary TAUSCHER. No, sir. There are no constraints of any kind in the New START Treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McKeon.

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you for your testimony. It seems that much of the Administration’s policy is rooted in the view that if America leads in reducing its nuclear arms, others will follow. What evidence, if any, do any of you have that the moral leadership argument actually impacts the behavior of countries we are trying to change, such as Iran and North Korea?

Dr. MILLER. Sir, the change and clarification of declaratory policy is intended to affect more than one audience. One is specifically those states that have not lived up to their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty including, in particular, Iran and North Korea.

A second audience is the set of states that have lived up to their obligations and expect that, in exchange for that, they would not be held subject to nuclear threats. In making the changes that were made in our declaratory policy, the U.S. has really resolved a longstanding contradiction in our policy and updated it to correspond with the 21st century environment.

The contradiction was between a Negative Security Assurance that the United States first issued in 1978, reissued again in 2002 and several times in between, that stated that the United States would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, aside from states that were allied with a nuclear weapons state.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, that second part of that previous Negative Security Assurance was no longer relevant, so that was removed from the Negative Security Assurance. And with the increased concerns about nuclear nonproliferation and states that are—such as Iran and North Korea—that are not meeting their obligations, in its place was a statement that the U.S. would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against those in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations.

So we intend to affect the calculations of those states, Iran and North Korea. We also intend to affect the calculations of those states that are currently compliant but that might in future consider proliferation. And to have them understand that there are benefits to remaining non-nuclear and that there are costs to going nuclear.

Mr. McKEON. Any evidence that moral leadership argument actually impacts their decisions?
A number of states party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty have made clear in previous review conferences that the United States posture, sometimes called deliberate ambiguity, but as I—or calculated ambiguity, but also including a contradiction in a sense, makes it more difficult for them to agree to the types of steps that the United States has proposed to strengthen the Treaty—steps that would include having the Additional Protocol applied to all states that have nuclear energy capability. And so I think that there is reasonable evidence that for those states that we need support from for strengthening the treaty, for those states that we need support from for ensuring compliance, that U.S. leadership is important. They have said so many times in the past.

Mr. McKeon. Okay. I hope that is the case. The NPR appears to deliver a muddled message and sends mixed signals to both the allies and adversaries. Why did the Administration deem it necessary to change our nation’s longstanding policy of calculated ambiguity? What is the national security benefit of, and what do we gain by making this policy change?

Secretary Tauscher. I think part of the reason that, and what we want to make clear, Mr. McKeon, is that when we looked at both the changing security environment and history, a number of elements have significantly changed. The negative assurance policy was developed partly because of the Warsaw Pact, which doesn’t exist any longer.

And it is there to make clear to non-nuclear weapons states that are in compliance with the NPT that the United States specifically, and as we work with Russia and the New START Treaty, as the largest holders of nuclear weapons we have, obviously, we project the biggest threat to other folks, and that we wanted to make clear that we were not going to use our nuclear weapons in a certain number of cases and that we value people’s adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty significantly.

We want to get benefits from our adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and we want other countries to maintain their agreement to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We, frankly, want universal application of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

So the decision was made to clarify the Negative Security Assurance to make clear that non-nuclear weapon states, in compliance with their NPT obligations, we were not going to use nuclear weapons against them.

But we do have caveats, and one of them is about BW and CW, biological and chemical weapons. But what it also does, and that is why Negative Security Assurance is an interesting way of calling what this is, it negates and exempts many, many countries around the world.

At the same time, it makes very clear that all the nuclear weapons states and countries not in compliance with the NPT, specifically countries like North Korea and Iran, are not exempt. So it is a way to satisfy countries that their adherence to the NPT, which we believe is the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime and needs to be strengthened—and those commitments need to be strengthened—but that is what we are harkening to.

And secondly, countries not in compliance will pay a price, and they pay the price of not being on the list of those countries that
are exempt, and it causes us to have a different point of view about them. And those countries are, specifically, North Korea and Iran.

Mr. McKeon. Am I correct to understand the Administration will pursue a universal sole purpose policy where nuclear weapons are only used to deter nuclear weapons? Does this mean that the U.S. would take the threat of nuclear use to deter its devastating biological or chemical attack entirely off the table? Why is it in our national security interest to send such a signal?

Dr. Miller. Sir, the NPR set an objective of setting conditions so that the United States and, indeed, others, could over time move to a posture where the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear use by others. It is stated clearly, and was a result of detailed analysis and extensive discussion, clearly, that these conditions do not exist today.

And as you have suggested, one of the big reasons that they don’t exist today is that we have nuclear weapons states that have significant conventional and the potential, at least, for chemical and biological capabilities. And both we and our allies believe that sustaining the nuclear deterrent to cope with these challenges is necessary at this time.

Mr. McKeon. I guess we are just going to have a difference on that. It seems to me that deterrence should be the maximum that you can provide; that no matter what they attack us with, we will hit with our maximum use. A devastating chemical or biological attack that we say “we will just respond with non-nuclear weapons,” it just seems that we are taking a lot off the table but I, you know, I understand that we have a difference here.

Secretary Tauscher. Mr. McKeon, we have the largest nuclear force matching the Russians. And we have the most superior military in the world and the best conventional weapons in the world.

Mr. McKeon. And we also have nuclear, and why we would take that off the table if they only hit us with chemical or biological, it just seems that, like I say, I think that is something we are just going to have a difference of opinion on.

Dr. Miller. Sir, if I could add briefly, deterrence is a combination of capability and credibility. And with respect to non-nuclear weapons states, this NPR states explicitly that any use of chemical or biological weapons would result in a devastating conventional response and that the leaders, including political leaders and military commanders, would be held fully accountable.

That is a shift from calculated ambiguity. It is a very direct statement and, as Under Secretary Tauscher indicated, given the conventional military power of the United States, it is not only credible but it has a tremendous amount of capability behind it.

Mr. McKeon. But less capability than we have if we do not use nuclear.

The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Spratt.

Mr. Spratt. Thank you all for your testimony, but more than that, for what you have accomplished. I think it is monumental. It is a step towards something we have been seeking for a long, long time.

CTBT has been pending for years. It was submitted for ratification, and the Senate didn’t pass the test. My notes here indicate
that this Comprehensive Test Ban will be resubmitted for ratification with additions. What are the additions to the CTBT?

Secretary TAUSCHER. Right now the President is preparing the START package to go to the Senate, and the first priority of the Administration is to get the START Treaty ratified. The advice and consent of the Senate is enormously important. It is a super-majority needed to get START ratified.

As Vice President Biden, who is the head of the effort to get the CTBT ratified has said, START goes first, and then we will look at CTBT. Obviously, we are very much helped by the Nuclear Posture Review and the fact that the Administration has spent so much time making this debate a very public debate, one that is informing the American people and our allies.

So what is important is that we get the START Treaty put forward first. On whether we have additions to CTBT or not, we will have to see as we look at the submission. But as Vice President Biden has said, CTBT will not be submitted to the Senate until it can pass, and that is an environment that we are working on every day.

Mr. SPRATT. It is also mentioned in the materials and in your testimony of a nuclear materials cutoff. Is that treaty drawn? Do we have the text of that treaty? That is an interesting concept.

Secretary TAUSCHER. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva last May agreed in a very historic way for a program of work to look at, begin negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. There is one country, however, that is blocking the going forward of the program of work in the Conference of Disarmament.

We are all working hard to convince that country that this is just the beginning of negotiations and that they should go with what the majority has said under consensus to go forward and begin negotiations, and not stand in the way of that. But so far our efforts have been unsuccessful.

But once the FMCT, Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty begins negotiations, which we believe will be a long, multi-year process, eventually that will have to be ratified by the Senate.

Mr. SPRATT. So these things are not necessarily interdependent. They can stand on their own?

Secretary TAUSCHER. Yes.

Mr. SPRATT. I have been very much concerned about tactical nuclear weapons and whether or not as we dealt with these large systems, we have shown enough attention to the smaller systems which, really, could be dangerous if the wrong people or terrorists got their hands upon them. What do these agreements do for effective tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons? Jim.

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Spratt, what we have said is that, after ratification and entry into force of the New START Treaty, the Administration would like to engage with Russian follow-on, bilateral discussions that are aimed at addressing not just strategic weapons but strategic and non-strategic weapons, these tactical nuclear weapons and also deployed and non-deployed weapons.

We would like to get that on the other side of ratification and entry into force of New START and the President has asked us to begin to develop potential negotiating positions and objectives for that, including considerations of what are the likely future require-
ments for deterrence, what are likely postures of Russia and also we will begin a consultation with allies to address that problem.

We also have suggested that we intend to continue strategic stability discussions and expand them with Russia. And one of the issues we would like to discuss in those is the question of whether Russia might move back further into the interior of the country its tactical nuclear weapons and ensure they are as secure as possible.

Mr. SPRATT. One final question. There is a substantial increase in nonproliferation in this year’s budget request. I think it is $550 million. Could you tell us quickly or briefly what these additional funds will go for?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Spratt, these funds were largely focused on security work, material security work overseas. There is a significant amount of work that we are involved in converting research reactors from Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) to Low-Enriched Uranium. So a significant portion of those funds will go towards agreements and discussions that we are already looking at to make that happen.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlemen.

Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you all for your service. I note that the Posture Review, specifically, states that we are going to retain the triad. Relative to that, Dr. Miller, I note that the Chinese have developed the capability of taking out a satellite, and we can take out a ballistic missile.

This new deep strike bomber will fly considerably lower than a satellite and considerably slower than a ballistic missile. I know that they will be stealthy, but their radar cross section area is not zero, and radars are being improved.

Are you sure that, in the development of this new bomber, that the juice will be worth the squeezing, or is the jury still out on specifically what we will do?

Dr. MILLER. Sir, as a follow-on to both the Nuclear Posture Review and the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Department is currently looking at the mix of long range strike capabilities that the military will need for the coming decade or two.

Included in that mix is a consideration of a future penetrating bomber. Also included is an alternative standoff bomber, the mix of cruise missiles, both air-launched and sea-launched, for conventional capabilities and, finally, the supporting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and electronic warfare capabilities that are required as well.

We are also looking in that study at the appropriate scale of any conventional Prompt Global Strike capability, which could be either in the form of an ICBM or SLBM with a conventional warhead, which does raise some stability considerations, and/or Hypersonic Glide Vehicle, which is an alternative approach, so it would have a very different profile from the standard ballistic missile.

The Department is looking at those issues now and will submit its recommendations as part of the fiscal year 2012 budget request.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

General Chilton, the location of our missile silos, I gather, is pretty generally known?
General CHILTON. I would suspect so.

Mr. BARTLETT. Okay. It is also true, I believe, that they were developed in an era where there was not much precision on the part of nuclear weapons and that it was unlikely that there would be a direct hit. They, in fact, are not really hardened, are they, against a nuclear attack?

General CHILTON. Well, they are hardened against a nuclear attack, but as you point out, Mr. Bartlett, as certain countries have increased their accuracy on some of their delivery platforms, they put them more at risk than they were in the past.

Mr. BARTLETT. That, I think, is increasingly true, which means that you either use them or you lose them. Doesn't this markedly increase the probability of an exchange? And shouldn't we be moving to something that is not vulnerable, like mobile missiles?

General CHILTON. Actually, the posture that we have our ballistic missiles in, our land-based ballistic missiles in today, is quite stabilizing because it makes the calculus of a potential adversary much more difficult and much less likely for them to be incentivized for a first strike.

Mr. BARTLETT. But if we know, sir that——

General CHILTON. It would be because a large number of——

Mr. BARTLETT [continuing]. If we could take them out, doesn't that mean that we have an incentive to use them quickly, or we are going to lose them?

General CHILTON. We have——

Mr. BARTLETT. To me it does.

General CHILTON [continuing]. Because of the large amount of weapons that they would have to commit against this, it disincentivized that attack. And also, because of the ability to launch out from under attack and the uncertainty that exists because of that, they are an essential part of the deterrent today.

I would comment though, that your point on as we look forward to the replacement for the Minuteman III someday post-2030, that one of the things we ought to consider in that is whether or not the follow-on would be more survivable than the current force structure that we have today.

That is certainly the direction that the Russians went in with their land-based mobile missiles. So I would agree that it is something we need to consider as we look at the follow-on to the Minuteman III.

Mr. BARTLETT. Secretary Tauscher, I note that the new posture report talks about counting actual missiles rather than launchers, which is a big move forward because, in the past, we counted only launchers. As you know, the Soviets and the Russians now have a cold-launch capability where they can launch more than one weapon from a single launcher.

We burn up our launchers. So if you count launchers, you are equal in launchers. They would be superior in delivery capability. I am pleased that this new regime now equalizes that. Thank you.

I yield back.

Mr. SPRATT [presiding]. Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, gentlemen, for being with us. Ms. Tauscher, welcome back. General Chilton, I am looking out 10 years,
very much concerned about what the effect of the Ohio-class replacement is going to have on the overall defense budget.

If the Navy is estimating a ship that is going to cost $7 billion, it is probably going to cost $10 billion, based on the way things have been going. I am told that one of the driving factors on the Ohio replacement is that, within the Navy, the decision was made to build a ship around the D–5 missile. That the range of the missile is a factor of its width and length and that, basically, the Navy said we are going to keep the missile, change the ship.

To what extent has your command looked at options to that? I was fortunate enough to have a great tour at Kings Bay on Friday and, again, very professional. Everything was very impressive, but it reinforced my opinion that the Navy has made the decision already to build a ship to fit the missile, and that missile is the D–5.

Have there been any analyses of alternatives to that decision or are any planned because, again, you know, 2020 is not that far away when it comes to ships that we have got to start building in 2018. We have got to start budgeting even before that.

General CHILTON. Thank you, Mr. Taylor, and thanks for visiting our folks down there at——

Mr. TAYLOR. Very impressive.

General CHILTON [continuing]. Kings Bay. That is really important for them to be recognized for the great duty they do for our country, and I am sure they appreciated your visit. We have been, STRATCOM has been working closely from a requirements perspective, certainly, with the Navy and with the Strategic Systems Programs, the office responsible for developing the designs, maturing those designs for the follow-on to the current Ohio-class Trident submarine fleet.

And although the follow-on will be able to carry the D–5, part of the requirements are that it also be able to—anticipating a life of 40 years—to be able to do something other than just carry the D–5. And so as part of—and that, in fact, was part of the initial thought when the Ohio-class was built. The D–5 didn't exist.

Yet, the Ohio-class was built to accommodate a larger missile than the Poseidon at the time, fortunately, because that allowed us then to not have to build a new submarine as we advanced missile technology to the D–5 level.

The same will be true for the follow-on to Ohio-class. There will be room for growth and increased performance, either of a missile beyond the D–5 or for alternative mission sets that might be put into that platform should they be required.

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, I guess, to restate my question, is the decision to stick with the D–5, is that written in stone—or the closest thing to it within the Pentagon?

General CHILTON. Well, I would say, in the current plans that we are seeing that the Navy has, is to sustain the D–5 through the life of the current Ohio-class and to make it the initial missile that would be deployed on the follow-on.

But there is a view that we need to design into that follow-on a capability for some unknown future growth or capability in the future as we did with the Ohio-class in its original design. So right
now my understanding of the plans is that the D–5 would be the weapon that would be fielded first on the replacement.

Mr. TAYLOR. But going back to my question about, can you provide for me any sort of analysis of alternatives as to whether or not it made more economic and national security sense to build a ship that fits the missile, as opposed to building a missile that might fit a Virginia-class, which has been a very successful program, or some variant of a Virginia-class?

General CHILTON. With regard to studies, we certainly can show you everything that we have done at STRATCOM and what the Strategic System Program Office (SSP) has done as well, which is the Office in the Navy that has worked on the design trades——

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay.

General CHILTON [continuing]. That are still going on. We would certainly be willing to share that with you.

Mr. TAYLOR. I would welcome that, hopefully, sooner than later, sir.

General CHILTON. I will take that back to the Navy and talk to them about it, Mr. Taylor, and we will get that to you.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Appreciate you all being with us today. Virtually everybody agrees that an essential condition of START, of this Nuclear Posture Review, of reassuring our allies, is making sure that we have a strong, credible deterrent and a modern, agile infrastructure—and with infrastructure, I mean people, too.

I mean, if you don't have those things, the rest of this seems to all fall apart, so I want to pose two questions, probably for Secretary D'Agostino, but others may want to comment. The first question is this. Every declared nuclear power in the world is making new weapons all the time except us, and probably the undeclared ones are doing the same—are doing it as well.

France, for example, in 1995, 1996 decided that they saw this non-testing regime coming. They conducted a series of tests, specifically for designs that would be more robust and that would last out in the future. We did no such thing.

Now, I know we have got lots of smart people and we have got lots of fancy tools, but I have some doubt that we are that much smarter than every other nuclear power in the world. This Nuclear Posture Review says no more nuclear weapons—no new nuclear weapons, a strong preference for refurbishment, and only as a last resort would we replace any of the nuclear components.

So my question is, isn't this putting a political agenda ahead of the science with a certain degree of arrogance, maybe, that we can do something indefinitely that nobody else can do? My second question is this.

Paragraph after paragraph in this Nuclear Posture Review talks about all the Administration is going to do for the nuclear weapons complex. And there is no doubt funding is significantly up, particularly as opposed to the last Administration. Mr. Spratt mentioned a big chunk of it goes to nonproliferation. But even in the complex, funding is up.
And yet for this year's budget, Y-12, as I understand it, is about $100 million underfunded. Pantex is $125 million underfunded, and they are talking about layoffs this year. As I understand it, cuts in the test site budget, so my question is why should we believe that this increased commitment to the nuclear weapons complex is going to last any longer than the START ratification?

Secretary D'AGOSTINO. Mr. Thornberry, I will start with your first question and go to the second question. The Nuclear Posture Review provides, absolutely provides the flexibility we need to maintain our deterrent. That is the commitment to have a safe, secure, and effective deterrent.

The Nuclear Posture Review also provides for allowing all options, and I want to reinforce that, all options to be studied, including replacement options. Because the key is to go back to just to focus on what Congress authorized last year is the Stockpile Management Program, which says make sure that we can maintain our deterrent and drive as much safety and as much security and as much reliability into the warheads themselves.

That is very challenging technical work, frankly. It is also the kind of work that our scientists and engineers relish. They want that flexibility and the lab directors feel, and their statement that I mentioned earlier, describes that capability.

It is a challenge. And it is hard work to do this, and our scientists, and I have talked to many of them, feel that this NPR gives them the flexibility to maintain that stockpile out into the future. This is decades’ worth of work that we have identified in the NPR.

And what our scientists actually want is the understanding that the Nation cares about the work, knows that it is important, and that it is sustainable over multiple Congresses and multiple administrations. And, in fact, that is the balance that we feel that we appropriately struck here. So our focus is moving forward consistent with the principles of the Stockpile Management Program.

On your question on funding, what we typically do, what we always do in a budget year when we submit a President’s budget, where we know for sure where our allocations need to go on a site-by-site basis, we allocate those in the budget.

The last remaining category is what we call the headquarters account. It is resources that will always be spent out in the field, but because we are waiting for final adjustments, we haven’t allocated them yet to a specific site.

General Harencak is aware of adjustments that he needs to make, moving of resources into these accounts to make sure that the sites are appropriately maintained, and he is working with the sites on that.

And, in fact, that is a key element of our consideration of our fiscal year 2012 and out-year budgets, because as you know, sir, we submit our program and budgets in 5-year increments.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, let me just say, I think if you are going to really convey a commitment to the scientists and others that playing these games about holding some money back so that it can be allocated at the last minute to prevent layoffs, doesn’t provide that message. But let me get back to the lab directors.
I heard what you said. They support the full range of options. And I appreciate a Nuclear Posture Review is a political balancing act, but you can’t read these words about no new nuclear warheads, no new nuclear components, strong preference for refurbishment, and believe that the full range of options is really there. It looks to me more like words than real action, but I appreciate the response.

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Thornberry, if I could just reply. I want to assure you that we don’t play games with the budget. We take it very seriously. And the headquarters account line is merely to make sure that, when we allocate those resources, we know they are going to the right spot as a result of changes. And our focus, of course, is our people.

The one thing I would like to remind is that our key focus is to focus on the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, on the Stockpile Management Plan, which clearly outlines the principles of maintaining safety, security, and reliability. No new warheads, for new mission capability, no underground testing, and the ability to put in place a confidence in the stockpile that the country can actually start reducing the total numbers of the stockpile. So that is our focus and that is our plan.

Mr. SPRATT. Ms. Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for being before us again today and it is nice to see my friend, Ms. Tauscher, back and on the successful negotiation on that START Treaty, so congratulations to you and to all on our panel.

General Chilton, are you confident that the limitations on the Russians in the New START Treaty actually can be verified, and that the verification procedures imposed on the U.S. will not interfere or jeopardize our operation of our nuclear forces? And are there any inspection or verification challenges that aren’t addressed in this treaty that would concern you?

General CHILTON. Verification is an important part of this treaty, Ms. Sanchez, as you know, and it is one of the key elements that I supported for having a treaty, is that we would sustain some verification capabilities. The part of the Government that really paid most attention to whether or not the verifications were adequate or not in support of the negotiations was the Intelligence Community.

So the Director of National Intelligence was consistently brought in, his team, to be asked those questions, and I defer to their expertise along that way on whether or not the verification measures were adequate.

And my assessment in listening to the discussions along the way and what has been included in the current verification protocols in the proposed treaty, I think, will be adequate for us over the life of the treaty to ensure compliance.

Ms. SANCHEZ. The Nuclear Posture Review concluded that the threat of global nuclear war has become more remote, but the risk of nuclear attack has actually increased, especially in today’s immediate and extreme danger, which is nuclear terrorism, especially when we look at Al Qaeda and others trying to gain access to nuclear weapons.
So I would like to ask Secretary Tauscher, how will the NPR strengthen the President's ability to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism, and the effects of rogue states in particular, such as Iran or North Korea, from obtaining and proliferating this nuclear technology?

Secretary Tauscher. Thank you, Congresswoman Sanchez. The President relies on a number of tools in the toolbox to persuade countries from not acquiring nuclear weapons and for countries to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty's guidelines in the most strictest way. The first is the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review, which begins in the first week of May.

And as we state in the Nuclear Posture Review, and as we stated and both presidents stated when they signed the New START Treaty, that these commitments that we make, both in the New START Treaty bilaterally, with the reductions in the very strong verification regime that we have, and with the Nuclear Posture Review with the stronger Negative Security Assurance and the declaratory policy, and the new role and the diminished roles that the President has called for, what the President is saying is that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the most important opportunity we have to galvanize the world community.

And for those countries that find themselves in noncompliance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, then they come under the Negative Security Assurance in the most non-positive way.

Ms. Sanchez. Mrs. Tauscher, the concern I bring up is because we read today in the Washington Post, for example, that Syria has transferred long-range Scud over to Hezbollah, which is on our terrorist list.

So you know, when we look at that, our inability to really stop some of this from going on, and the fact that Iran has already declared, for example, that it wants to obliterate Israel from the face of the earth. And, you know, North Korea’s posturing, continued posturing with the western world, in particular with the United States, what real tools do we have to——

Secretary Tauscher. We have the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And what is important is, for countries like Syria, where we have asked the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to fully investigate some of the allegations and rumors that are aswirl about Syria, that is another important element where you need to have a strong verification regime and then strong inspection regime.

And that is why we have advocated for better funding and better management of the IAEA. We have a new Director General there, Dr. Amano. So there are a number of different things, Congresswoman, that the President relies on.

But once again, what we have to do is stand up very clearly for what we want to use nuclear weapons for, and make it very clear that we have the strongest deterrence we have ever had. That we are investing in the modernization of our stockpile in a way that doesn’t lead people to believe that we are outside of our commitments to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty calls on all nuclear weapons states to disarm. And so we are keeping it very much in mind with our commitments to the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the same time that we say that we are going to maintain our nuclear
weapons for as long as there are nuclear weapons, until we can actually disarm ourselves.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Madam Secretary. And I will just say to the gentlemen you didn’t have time. I was going to ask you all the same question about this issue of how, you know, what do we really use? What are the tools we really have? And of course, you will have different ones than maybe what Mrs. Tauscher mentioned.

I will submit that question for the record because I would love to get an answer back from you all. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all of you for being here. I have a great deal of respect for each of you and, Ms. Tauscher, it is great to see you back again. I am glad that you are visiting our committee.

Dr. Miller, the President, last May in Newsweek said, “I don’t take options off the table when it comes to U.S. security, period.” Well, the NPR, the Administration’s NPR, clearly takes options off the table.

It provides assurances that the U.S. will not use nuclear weapons defensively, even if we are attacked by an NPT-compliant state and even if that attack is by bio or chemical weapons. So an option is clearly being taken off the table.

When you were asked by Mr. McKeon the issue of why the Administration didn’t adopt the sole purpose doctrine, which was signaled in the NPT, that maybe the Administration in the future would like to go there—sole purpose being that a nuclear weapon’s sole purpose being to deter nuclear—you answered that we did not go all the way to sole purpose because nuclear weapons play an “important role in deterring non-nuclear attacks.”

How do you reconcile that, as your current statement, the “important role in deterring non-nuclear attacks” with this policy? Because I agree with you, I think that they play an important role in deterring non-nuclear attacks and, by taking them off the table, you are eliminating that as a deterrent. How do you reconcile those?

Dr. MILLER. Sir, there are two very different cases. The first is the case of a state possessing nuclear weapons or a state not in compliance with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations. And in that case, the United States reserves the right to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons in response to a biological attack or, indeed, as you suggest, to a conventional or a chemical attack.

This includes nuclear weapons states. It also includes Iran and North Korea. And, Mr. Turner, if you look at an assessment of the states with significant WMD capabilities, you will see a significant overlap between those different varieties of nuclear, chemical, and biological.

And the assessment of the NPR and of our leadership was that, where things stand today, the U.S. conventional capabilities, including with a very clear statement that any use of weapons of mass destruction would result in individuals, including leaders and commanders, being held individually accountable.
And including the statement that any use of WMD by a non-nuclear weapons state would result in a devastating conventional military response, the conclusion was that these clarified and strengthened statements about the nature of the U.S. response involving conventional capabilities were more than adequate to deter chemical and biological weapons used by that second category of states. And that is the states that are non-nuclear weapons states and are in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.

So it involved an assessment of where things stand today with respect to the threat. And projecting forward, they considered the possibility of future trends in chemical weapons, future trends in biological weapons as well.

And the conclusion was that we should have a greater concern about the future potential of biological weapons because of trends in biotechnology. And that is the reason for the caveat that——

Mr. TURNER. Well, I want to reclaim my time here.

Dr. MILLER [continuing]. In the future we reserve a right to——

Mr. TURNER. I appreciate your answer. I think there are a great deal of people, a number of people who disagree with you, that there is still a role for the deterrence that nuclear weapons provide.

Secretary Tauscher, question for you. I had the opportunity to travel with you to NATO, to Poland, to Czech Republic, and I know of your commitment to missile defense that you have stated clearly in hearings and in this committee and with our NATO allies.

As we look to the START agreement, there is language in the preamble that indicates that there is a relationship between missile defense and the subject matter of the START agreement. The Russian leaders have signaled that their view of that relationship may be more direct than our view, maybe even more significant.

They have gone as far as to indicate that they might withdraw from the treaty, depending upon what the United States does in deployment of missile defense. Now, Congress has yet to receive the complete information about the Administration's plans for the Phased, Adaptive Approach for missile defense that includes both Europe and defense of the homeland.

So it is my expectation, and probably others, that the Administration has not shared that with Russia yet. So the question that we have is, you know, what is being done currently to determine whether or not, as we are proceeding to START ratification, if the Administration is pursuing currently with the Phased, Adaptive Approach, a policy that the Russians might view as terminal to START?

Secretary TAUSCHER. Let me just bring three things forward, Mr. Turner. First and foremost, in the preamble of the START Treaty, there is an interrelationship acknowledged between strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons.

In Article 5, Paragraph 3, there is further conversation about that and its relationship, very similar to what was in the original START agreement; unilateral statements. When I went to treaty school, before I went to Geneva just recently, what is interesting about a treaty is, what is it? It is agreed statements. It is what the two parties agree.
What are unilateral statements? Things that people don’t agree on. In the original START agreement in 1991, both the United States and Russia included unilateral statements. The interesting thing is that it was—the Russian statement was very similar to what they are saying now, that if things that we do, either conventionally or on our strategic side, interfere with their strategic balance, they may withdraw from the treaty.

What was interesting about what happened then is that we also said something similar about, we are going to do whatever we are going to do to protect ourselves, which is something like what we said this time.

Interestingly, we abrogated the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and built missile defenses, and the Russians never left the START Treaty. So I think that, while much is being made of these unilateral statements, I think history shows us that everyone is going to have statements, which are sometimes political and, sometimes, are meant to indicate a red line.

On missile defense, there are no constraints to our missile defense systems. The Phased, Adaptive Approach is what has been up on the Internet since September and is what we have discussed with the Congress. And I am happy to come back at any time and refresh if I need to.

But it is a system that starts in 2011, as you know, in the Mediterranean with Aegis ships, and then 2015 in Romania, who has agreed to take Standard Missile 3 (SM–3), and then in 2018 in Poland with SM–3 land-based.

The Russians have read the Ballistic Missile Defense Review. They have been briefed like everyone else. There are always elements in each country that are more conservative than others, that have specific issues and are concerned about certain things.

We have done everything we can to convince the Russians that our missile defense system is limited and regional in scope. And what its architecture looks like and how it is not adaptable or it threatens them.

But I think the most important piece of this is that as of many of the good things that have happened in the START negotiations and the resetting that President Obama and Secretary Clinton embarked on last year with the Russians. We are also discussing with Russians a missile defense cooperation.

So there are many opportunities for us to move forward, but we have made clear what exactly the Phased, Adaptive Approach is. And it is not targeted against Russia, and it does not threaten Russia’s strategic balance right now.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Marshall.

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for your service. I understand the NPR and START both take off the table basically any additional research by the United States in the development of either tactical or strategic nuclear weapons. Is that correct understanding?

Dr. MILLER. Let me just answer very briefly and then turn it to Tom D’Agostino. What the policy statement in the NPR says is that the United States will not develop new nuclear warheads. That means that any warheads going forward will be based on previously tested designs.
It says that within the range of Life Extension Programs that are considered, which include refurbishment, reuse, and potential replacement, that all options will be studied. And the summary that we have received from the labs is that that is more than adequate to ensure that we have a very strong science, technology, and engineering base that is able to support our stockpile over time.

Mr. MARSHALL. And is that reflected in the START Treaty, that we will not be doing research on additional nuclear weapons?

Dr. MILLER. It is not addressed in the START——

Mr. MARSHALL. It is not.

Dr. MILLER [continuing]. Treaty.

Mr. MARSHALL. Okay. So it is just the NPR. The Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) is something we have been discussing for some time, and NNSA and Secretary Gates and others were interested in moving forward with research and development.

Do I understand you to be saying, Mr. Miller, that that is a possibility in the future depending upon——what? At the moment, we are not going to continue research in a replacement warhead, but we might in the future?

Dr. MILLER. Sir, the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program is terminated by Congress and is, in our view, it is not coming back. We don't propose to bring it back.

What we do propose, as we think about the statement of the stockpile over time, is to consider the full range of Life Extension Programs in which replacement of nuclear components is one of the options. Propose that all of the options be studied, and that preference be given to refurbishment or reuse.

Mr. MARSHALL. So whatever you call it——

Dr. MILLER. Yes.

Mr. MARSHALL [continuing]. The NPR leaves open the possibility that we conclude that it is advisable for us to replace existing nuclear weapons?

Dr. MILLER. That is——

Mr. MARSHALL. That we will continue to consider that and we will maintain the engineering and intellectual capital that we need in order to actually execute that if we conclude that is necessary.

Secretary D'AGOSTINO. If I could add to that, absolutely. The NPR allows us to study the full range of options, which is vitally important to extend the life of the stockpile. That there are differences, actually, key differences between what was proposed in the previous administration in RRW program and what we have right now in stockpile management.

Dr. Miller said the RRW program has been canceled. In fact it was canceled by Congress. In its place, we put in place the Stockpile Management Program. In the context of the NPR of the time, which was done in the year 2001, the RRW program sought a total transformation of the stockpile where the Nuclear Posture Review under Stockpile Management proposed to——

Mr. MARSHALL. Yes, I think I have got this. This START Treaty, if we decide to move forward with the replacement weapon, it wouldn't prohibit us from doing that?

Secretary TAUSCHER. The START Treaty is agnostic.

Mr. MARSHALL. On that subject.

Secretary TAUSCHER. Yes.
Mr. MARSHALL. Bunker busters, you know, those sorts of things that we talked about in the early, you know, parts of this decade, they are out?

General CHILTON. Congressman, I have no new requirements for new capabilities in our weapons. And, in fact, what we want are increased safety, security, and reliability in these——

Mr. MARSHALL. Yes, I have got that, but I am just wondering, in the START Treaty or NPR, are those things that we don’t have existing requirements, are we prohibited from at some point in the future—hopefully this doesn’t happen—but are we prohibited at some point in the future either by treaty or by this NPR from investing in a specific nuclear weapon designed to accomplish a specific objective if we conclude that we have that need?

General CHILTON. START does not limit anything that we need to do.

Mr. MARSHALL. NPR?

Dr. MILLER. As a matter of policy, the NPR says that the United States will not develop weapons for new military capabilities or new military missions.

Mr. MARSHALL. If we wind up having a new military mission or need we assess that we have a new need for a capability, NPR could change?

Dr. MILLER. The infrastructure and the intellectual capital necessary to do that would be in place, so it would be a policy choice.

Mr. MARSHALL. Okay, thank you.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you gentlemen for being here and Secretary Tauscher, delight to see you again, thank you for being here today.

I would identify with the remarks of Mr. McKeon and Mr. Turner about concerns of taking options off the table in deterrence. And I am tempted to beat on that horse some more, but I am not going to do that.

I would like to take advantage of the assembled presence here. And I think probably principally Secretary D’Agostino from the Department of Energy, to address another but somewhat related issue.

And that is my concern that the Secretary of Energy and the Administration have recently taken steps to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository program and withdraw the license application and put in zero funds for that program. And I was wondering if any of you could address what the defense community’s plans are for the short- and long-term disposal and storage of spent fuel—particularly defense, but any spent fuel?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Sure, Mr. Kline. The Secretary has put together a Blue Ribbon Commission of experts, bipartisan and across a wide variety of expertise—policy, programmatic, technical.

Mr. KLINE. And they are going to report in a couple of years as I understand, is that right?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Well, they are going to report in 18 months is when the final report comes out. We will have some indication in less time than that. An element of that look by the commission is not just this question about civil nuclear, but the defense material is clearly identified in that.
We are keenly looking at that. We are aware of our obligations to the states that we have right now. Admiral Donald, as part of his requirements for the state of Idaho, for example, we understand our obligations on moving the material and taking care of that material.

So we are looking at the Blue Ribbon Commission to address that, and I will be watching that. I am keenly interested in that particular piece, and I am confident it will be addressed very clearly as part of that.

Mr. Kline. I certainly hope so. I mean, this is very frustrating for many of us and those who have been on the civil side, nuclear waste piling up. In my case, I have got a nuclear power plant on an island in the Mississippi River co-located with an entire community. And we are just piling up the caskets.

And it is very, very frustrating to see this program—after all this time, all this money—terminated and now we have got another blue ribbon committee, commission of some kind going to study some more.

So just want to express my frustration and see if anybody had anything, you know, any more current notion than that. So I just express my frustration and hope this commission comes forward and we get a solution to this. And we stop piling this stuff up in places like Prairie Island.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Spratt. Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize because I may be asking something similar, but I wanted to just go back to the issue of the budget, because you spoke of the modernization and the need to upgrade.

And yet I have constituents that, in their words, and I am quoting, “I am outraged by the 10 percent increase in nuclear weapons funding at a time when so many other domestic programs are subject to a spending freeze.”

And this particular individual, and we have a number of letters like this, are a little confused right now because of what we are doing and the changes that are being made.

Could you, in perhaps greater detail, and I apologize if you have already addressed this, what exactly does that modernization entail that we are spending the additional money for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement facility in New Mexico, the Uranium Processing Facility? What does that do for our country?

Secretary D’Agostino. I would be happy to take that question, ma’am, if I could. And others might follow behind. The key thing that I look at is that there is an infrastructure that we are maintaining, which includes the people, the expertise. It is not just taking care of the deterrent. That is a key and very important job, but that is the same expertise that we need in order to do our non-proliferation work around the world.

In any given point in time, we are operating in 100 countries, but these are people that are from the Department of Energy and NNSA. These are experts in how to handle nuclear material, radiological material. They are providing security overseas. They are collecting U.S. material that is overseas and bringing them back.
These two facilities that you just described are the only places in the country where we will be able to work with those materials, to characterize those materials and make sure they are locked up tight. Not work for nuclear bombs, but work to make the country safer, make the world safer.

But at the same time, so this 10 percent increase that we talked about in the Weapons Activities account provides that core infrastructure that addresses nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear counter-terrorism, nuclear forensics, nuclear emergency management, that whole suite of nuclear security missions.

But of course, we are also spending some of that to take care of our stockpile, because the stockpile was designed for the large part in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s and it is getting older and older year by year.

And we have a commitment—I have an obligation to General Chilton, to the President, to make sure that the stockpile that we have is as safe and secure as possible. And it requires some work to do that.

General CHILTON. If I could add to that? Besides the important benefits to nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, to the science base that the Secretary pointed out, improvements to the infrastructure would support, in the 2020 time period, once they are complete, a strategy that could lead to the reduction of the total number of nuclear weapons that we maintain in our stockpile today. So it is another important point.

But finally, I would emphasize that we are at a, I think, appropriately characterized earlier, a tipping point with regard to sustaining our nuclear stockpile deterrent for the future.

And although it is safe, secure, and reliable today, what we have to be thinking about is what investments we need to make today to ensure that it will be safe, secure, and reliable in 2020, 2030, 2040 and beyond, because it will be required in that time period. And these weapons do support the safety of Americans as well as the safety of others throughout the world.

Mrs. DAVIS. I think that people are looking to understand if there aren’t some savings as well that we are going to be incurring so that, while these are very important facilities and the people that we need to keep focused on these issues, are there not some significant savings that we should be incurring as well?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. I would be happy to jump in real quick and then Dr. Miller. In fact, this is part of our overall plan. It is a plan that is going to take a number of years to put in place.

We want to shift from a Cold War nuclear weapons complex, which is where we have been for many years, into what we describe as a 21st Century Nuclear Security Enterprise. Much smaller, much more focused; get ourselves out of having plutonium facilities all over the country and focusing on having one good one. Making sure that the material that we have around the United States is in one place, in a place where we know it can work, and it can work for many decades out into the future as General Chilton described.

Jim. DR. MILLER.

DR. MILLER. I would just add that, while we look to long-term savings because of these investments, as Mr. D’Agostino said, we
are in a situation today where we systematically underinvested over the last couple of decades in these facilities, some of which date back to the Manhattan Project.

In order to sustain the stockpile and sustain the other non-proliferation and other activities that both Mr. D’Agostino and General Chilton have talked about, we really do need to increase the investment level for the next coming years.

Mrs. Davis. Thank you.

Mr. Spratt. Mr. Lamborn.

Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for being here. Before I ask my questions I would like to make a statement. I am very concerned about some of the issues involved in the Nuclear Posture Review. And I have got five major problems with it.

One, it seems to be based on the belief that our example will influence the actions of bad actors in a positive way. And I believe this has been refuted by recent history. The opposite will occur because our actions will be viewed as weakness.

Number two, writing off nuclear retaliation in cases of biological or chemical attack will invite bad actors to put resources into these areas and to contemplate exactly these kinds of attacks.

Three, making decisions about what kind of retaliation to take based on compliance or not of the Non-Proliferation Treaty will put undue importance on legal hair-splitting.

Four, swearing off all testing of existing nuclear weapons and development of new nuclear weapons, even if these capabilities only existed in undeveloped form within the context of “calculated ambiguity,” weakens the nuclear umbrella. This will invite development and proliferation of nuclear weapons by our allies.

And fifth, reduction of delivery vehicles to the level specified under the NPR will allow no margin for error, such as a recall of equipment or platforms based on technological problems that may arise. We shouldn’t put ourselves in this precarious position voluntarily.

So when I consider these kinds of concerns, it is hard for me not to conclude that President Obama’s views are dangerous and naive. And that is, frankly, where I come down on this, and I am very concerned.

To ask some questions here, I would like to start with General Chilton. Number one, General Chilton, is there any way that missile defense interceptors could be limited by the proposed New START Treaty?

General Chilton. And Mr. Lamborn, good to see you again, and I am happy to take your question. And I am sure Secretary Tauscher will correct me 100 percent, but no. There are no restrictions in START with regard to our missile defense capability.

Mr. Lamborn. As a follow-up, are there any other missile defense systems, either currently deployed or planned, or related future technology that could be limited by the New START Treaty?

General Chilton. For missile defense, no, there are none, sir. And sir, if I could address one of your questions that is right in my wheelhouse is—your concerns, I should say, about reduction of vehicles. We looked very carefully and supported the negotiations for START as far as vehicle limitations.
And I can tell you we are very comfortable with the limits that have been set, and that we would be able to adequately carry out the current deterrence mission that we have been given, today and for the foreseeable future, with the limits of 800 total deployed and non-deployed and 700 deployed. So I am comfortable with that.

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, along that line, I am glad to hear your reassurances on that, but along that line and for Secretary Tauscher also or anyone else, it is true that while the President has said we will deMIRV our ICBMs, are the Russians required to do so?

General CHILTON. They are not required to do so. We elect to do that and I think it is the right thing to do. I think deMIRVing our ICBMs will allow us, you know, under the warhead limitations, to better utilize the warheads that we will have within the warhead limitations.

At the same time, a single warhead, 450 or whatever the number turns out to be ICBMs, still complicates the adversary’s decision calculus in an adequate fashion, in my view.

Mr. LAMBORN. But isn’t this another example of where we are taking options off the table for ourselves that, you know, needlessly in my view?

General CHILTON. Not in deMIRVing, sir, because we still will retain the capability to reMIRV should that be required. And that is an important capability to retain to protect against both a technological failure, say, in a submarine weapon or a geopolitical change that would require us to add more weapons to our delivery vehicles.

So it is absolutely important, and was retained, the ability to reMIRV should we decide we need to do that.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Well, thank you for that. For anyone, Secretary, or anyone else, the NPR suggests that increased missile defenses and conventional forces will strengthen U.S. deterrence as nuclear forces decrease. However, the Russians believe that as nuclear forces decrease, missile defense becomes more of a concern—

Mr. SPRATT. Finish quickly, and then we will move along.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Does this seem to be contradictory and how do we resolve that? Thank you.

Secretary TAUSCHER. Well, I don’t think it is contradictory. The Russians have made clear that they are very concerned about their strategic balance and that their ability to rely on their nuclear weapons force. And they have a different orientation between their nuclear and conventional forces than we do. Some might say a dependence on them.

So what we have made clear in the START agreement is that while there is an interrelationship between strategic offensive and defensive forces, there are no constraints against our missile defense forces, either already deployed or planned.

And, you know, we made it also clear that our missile defense forces are not targeting the Russians. We have made that clear, and we will consistently make that clear. But, you know, I am happy to have a conversation with you, Mr. Lamborn, as a sidebar, as to why we are not relying on our own good example only to persuade people.
We are not trying to persuade those that, apparently, cannot be persuaded, like Iran and North Korea, not to have nuclear weapons. We are trying to persuade all those other countries that for decades have not had nuclear weapons, that you don’t have to have nuclear weapons to be safe.

And that is why, you know, it is not legal hair-splitting to rely on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is very important for us to have a strong Non-Proliferation Treaty. It has kept us at a limited number of nuclear weapons states for decades.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the witnesses for the historic work that you are engaged in. And you know, listening to some of the questions about how this document somehow weakens our defense systems or takes options away or reduces vehicles, when I read it—and Mr. Taylor’s questions sort of alluded to it—I mean, the fact of the matter is that the commitments that are being suggested in this document are going to create huge budget challenges for future Congresses. And coming from Connecticut, I mean, obviously, where submarines are a big deal, the commitment to SSBNs in the future is a perfect example of that. And the language could not be more adamant about the fact that our country should—to maintain an at-sea presence for the long term, the United States must continue development of a follow-on to the Ohio-class submarine. I mean, that is pretty strong language.

General, I don’t know if you want to just elaborate why the document is so forceful in making that recommendation?

General CHILTON. Well, sir, I think we—throughout the process the requirements for sustaining an adequate deterrence for today and for the foreseeable future were looked at. And as a result of that was a revalidation of the need for the triad of forces that we have today.

Certainly, the submarines are a key element of that and, certainly, our Ohio-class, we know, will time out at a time certain in the late 2020s. I would also add that there is a commitment to sustain the Minuteman III through 2030 and to look at follow-on options to it, as well as a commitment to the long-range bomber.

And so I think they are very strong and they are there because they are needed, and I would defer to Dr. Miller from a policy perspective on any other rationale.

Dr. MILLER. I just second what General Chilton said and note that our strategic submarines are the most highly survivable element of our nuclear force posture. And we intend to make the investments to ensure that that is true for the indefinite future.

Mr. COURTNEY. And given the fact that, as Mr. Taylor indicated, though, I mean these are big price tags that are carried with the construction of these vessels which, at this point, the guessimate at Seapower Committee was about $6 billion a copy. And the fact that it, again, it is a survivable deterrence unsurpassed, really, by any other part of the triad.

I mean, questions have been raised about whether or not we need to, sort of, move that investment into its own sort of budget place, à la the missile defense programs in the past. And because the pressure it is going to put on other shipbuilding programs,
which Chairman Taylor is going to have to juggle, is going to be pretty daunting in the future.

And I am just sort of throwing that out. I am not really expecting a response. I don’t know if the Under Secretary, I know she has experience with that system, how it worked for missile defense, but there is an interest level certainly, in this committee, about not allowing, again, unnecessary investment in Ohio-class to really end up damaging the overall fleet size.

The other question I just was hoping to spend a minute on was, the NPR states that “China’s nuclear arsenal remains much smaller than the arsenals of Russia and the United States, but lack of transparency raises questions about China’s future strategic intentions.”

And Secretary Tauscher, I don’t know if you wanted to, sort of, comment in terms of, you know, the conversations have really not been engaged at the same intensity with China as it has been with Russia. And how do you sort of see that given the NPR’s, sort of, editorial comment there?

Secretary TAUSCHER. Well, we engage with our Chinese counterparts. I actually met with my Chinese counterpart this morning on many issues on a day-to-day basis. I was impressed that President Hu came to the Nuclear Security Summit yesterday, and he and President Obama had a private meeting.

You know, I think what is important is that the nuclear weapons states, those declared five, the P5, that the United States and Russia still have 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons and the success of the New START Treaty is a very important one. But we certainly can’t stop here.

But we do have to work with our allies, because each of them has a different force posture and a different strategic vision and a different set of roles and declaratory policy for their nuclear weapons. And these are issues that, in the interagency, we work very strongly, including with our military counterparts like General Chilton and Admiral Mullen.

So I think that what we want to do, and I think the case in the NPR where we made those statements about China is one where we are making clear that we want more transparency and we want more verifiability. And we want to have more engagement as to those confidence building measures that will reassure not only the nuclear powers, but also the region and other people, exactly what China is doing.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Bishop.

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. Specifically to Mr. Miller and General Chilton, everyone has been talking about the broader picture. I am going to go in the weeds of this manual with you for just a second, specifically about the ICBM force and the Minuteman III sustainment concept.

Page 23 of the report it says, “The [Department of Defense] will continue the Minuteman III Life Extension Program with the aim of keeping the fleet in service to 2030, as mandated by Congress. Although a decision on [any] follow-on ICBM is not needed for several years, studies to inform the decision are needed now.”

Now, the Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP) was concluded last year. And last year, also, the Air Force recog-
nized that there needs to be a warm line sustainment for those solid rocket motors, for example, and other parts of that.

That is why I have some concern, still, within the budget there is money set aside for three solid rocket motor booster sets per year, when the industrial base says six is the minimum they need to maintain a warm line. And for fiscal year 2013 and on, there is zero dollars for any kind of sustainment for that program if we are going to go until 2030.

Assistant Secretary Flournoy assured us that this issue would be addressed in the Nuclear Posture Review. So I want to ask you, I think, four questions; three specific to this area. So let me give you all three of those first.

I would like either of you to elaborate what you exactly mean by the phrase “Life Extension Program,” because that is a confusing terminology. Does that, indeed, mean that the Propulsion Replacement Program will exist where the warm line will be maintained that you will be concerned about the maintenance of an industrial base to do that, especially in view of the three, six, and zero numbers that I mentioned earlier?

Number two, I want you specifically to talk about the booster set concept and zero and years to come. Is there any kind of recommendation of any kind of particular sustainment program that gives a specific number for those Minuteman III booster sets to make sure that the warm line is viable?

And the third one relates to it as well. As you know, the President and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has suggested that the Ares rocket and the Constellation program be discontinued. And that there are indeed dire impacts, both on the space and defense side, if that were to go through. The Augustine Commission on space recommended that that was a serious issue and needed to be addressed ahead of time. Obviously, NASA failed to do that.

So the question I have is, how we are planning for the future? Both Secretary Carter administered that there is an industrial base problem if, indeed, Ares III is canceled, or even slowed down. General Kehler said in an article that was published that he was not comfortable with the direction we were going.

Secretary Payton asked for a study, but in page 23 he said, “You will not have the capability of considering future ICBM options that are involved with large scale solid rocket propulsion systems if this capability is gone.” So I would like to know where you are moving in conjunction with what NASA may do.

And I will give one final one, maybe for Mrs. Tauscher or somebody up there, which simply means—this is the broader picture one, if you guys get done with the weeds first—you know, in our nuclear umbrella that we have, there are at least 30 countries that are depending on our assistance to provide deterrence for them.

As we ramp our deterrence down, what impact does it have on theirs and their credibility and their faith and what they may actually try to move forward? But Mr. Miller, General Chilton, if you could go to the weed issues first, I would be very much appreciative.

General CHILTON. Sure, Congressman, let me take a whack at your concerns with regard to solid rocket motors. First of all, the
language for investment in Life Extension Program, I think, is a commitment to the Congressional direction to make sure the Minuteman III is sustainable through 2030.

The PRP, Guidance Replacement Program, the Single Reentry Vehicle program, et cetera, address the missile itself, but there was other things that needed to be addressed that weren't fully funded to include support equipment, test equipment, et cetera, to make sure that weapon system is viable. So that is my understanding of what that language speaks to.

There are two different philosophies on producing solid rocket missiles between the Navy and the Air Force. The Air Force concept was to build them all once, all that you need, including your test assets, and stop. And the Navy's was to continue a warm production line of D-5s, which they do today.

That, as an issue, was not really brought up as far as sustaining the technology, I think, until the realization that Ares was going to go away. Well, as of now, the questions are starting to be asked—and I am one of the ones asking the questions—is do we have enough investment in the industrial base to sustain that critical capability to make large solid rocket motors, large solid rocket missiles?

And it is a unique capability. It is one the United States knows how to do today, but one we want to make sure we preserve for the future because it is critical for our defense.

And so I think you are asking some excellent questions about, what is the right amount do we invest in sustaining that industrial base? Secretary Carter and AT&L are looking at that, and I would expect them to bring forward answers to that in the fiscal year 2012 that is—

Mr. BISHOP. Because I have two seconds, let me just interrupt. And I appreciate your enunciation of what the issue is. I would hope it would have been answered in this particular document. We still have to go forward. Maybe deciding on what NASA actually ultimately aims to do will have an impact on the military side. And for the other question I will submit it in writing for the record.

General CHILTON. Yes.

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you.

Secretary TAUSCHER. Thank you.

General CHILTON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, Mr. Bishop.

Mr. Langevin from Rhode Island.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and I want to thank our panel for the outstanding work that you have all done on the NPR. And I thank you for the periodic updates that you have been giving me along the way to—it certainly gave me confidence that we are on track and this is being done effectively.

Let me just say, in my opinion, the Nuclear Posture Review offers a clear plan for focusing on nuclear policy on the gravest threats to our security. It is the risk that nuclear weapons might spread to other countries or to terrorists.

Along with new START agreement, the NPR, I believe, will help increase U.S. leverage in pressing for the strength of nonproliferation measures at the NPT, our Review Conference in May, and be-
yond. And at the same time the NPR endorsed our Congressional plan for managing the safety, security, and reliability or effectiveness, if you will, of our nuclear weapons.

It clearly seeks to establish a consensus on nuclear policy and endorses the revitalizing the nation’s Nuclear Security Enterprise, too. And I quote Vice President Biden and “reverse the last decades’ dangerous decline.”

The New START Treaty establishes a legally binding and state-of-the-art verification process that allows us to track Russia’s nuclear activities and verify that they are complying with their treaty obligations. And these verification measures, I believe, will support U.S. intelligence and insight into Russia’s nuclear capability.

The treaty also establishes a significantly lower, legally binding verifiable limits on deployed strategic warhead levels not seen, really, since the days of the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations. And this reduction and the limit of deployed and strategic nuclear weapons increases stability, transparency and predictability.

So, I just want to say that I applaud all of you for your outstanding work to increase U.S. security and thank you for your statements and your commitment to safeguarding national security. I know for many of you this has been a lifelong commitment and interest.

Specifically to the NPR, I know we have talked about some of these issues today already, but my first question is for Secretary D’Agostino. As you know, and as we have heard today, there is much, really, confusion about what constitutes a new nuclear weapon. And so could we for, you know, for the record, for further clarification, would you provide the committee with your views of this issue?

And as a follow up, General Chilton, could you discuss this issue from the perspective of military capabilities; specifically, how can we be sure that the stockpile maintenance work won’t result in new military capabilities? And, in fact, General, for the record, do you need new military capabilities?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Thank you, sir. I would be glad to. I think, in my view, a new nuclear weapon is a nuclear warhead that is not based on previously tested designs. I mean, this is a warhead that doesn’t have a test pedigree, that takes us into an area, a technical regime that drives us into some unknown areas.

We may have some good theoretical reasons why it might work, but it is not based on previously tested designs. Or it is a warhead that addresses a new military capability. Right now, the Stockpile Management Plan provides this guidance of not adding new military capabilities.

We are consistent with that with what Congress had asked for. You know, an example might be an enhanced electromagnetic pulse (EMP) device, for example. It is a new capability. It is not a capability that we currently have in our stockpile, but it adds to it.

In this thinking, discussion about new nuclear weapons versus not new nuclear weapons, we are very consistent, I believe, with the 2003 National Defense Authorization Act, which specifically excludes, when it discusses this concept of new or not, and says “life extension doesn’t fall into this category.”
Because what we are trying to do is extending the life and maintain the capabilities that we have using, that whole test base that we have. So, extending the life of an existing warhead, and maintaining that military capability, does not fall into that category.

Mr. Langevin. Very good.

General.

General Chilton. And I would echo Secretary D'Agostino's point that a new capability would be like a new EMP-focused bomb, or a neutron bomb, or some large increase in yield, none of which we need to meet our deterrent capabilities today.

I agree with you that the word "new" is one that has been debated a lot. And at some extreme, someone would call a new bomb one that we painted a different color. But that is not what we are talking about here. We are talking about new military capabilities.

And I am really encouraged by the language in the NPR that allows refurbishment, reuse, and replacement to be studied by our best and brightest engineers. To be put as options on the table for consideration to do one really important thing: to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile for future generations. And that is what is really important here.

I think it would be a mistake to say "you can't think about these solutions." We want to have all the solutions on the table to be examined and decided upon. And those decisions about how we go forward in each weapon will be voted upon by both the President and, of course, this body, who controls the funding for them. So I believe there will be adequate oversight, certainly, in whatever is brought forward as a recommendation.

And one final point, the point on previously designed components, are pretty important. The NNSA and the laboratories have a great storage of test data from previously designed nuclear components.

And those need to be the ones that we look at as we look at replacement options, because we don't want to have to go off into areas where we might argue for—some might argue for a test.

So that is an important point as we go forward, is that we make sure the nuclear components are based on previously tested designs. Thank you.

Mr. Langevin. Thank you.

Mr. Spratt. All right, thank you, General.

Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of you for being here. General Chilton, always good to see you, sir. And Secretary Tauscher, thank you. It is good to see you again. And I extend my appreciation to the other two gentlemen.

Secretary Miller, I, you know, in earlier testimony you spoke of the strategic ambiguity. And it occurs to me that the time-honored purpose for strategic ambiguity was really of a cautionary note to our enemies. It was to suggest that we might do something more than they realize if they proceed to test or to attack us.

And it appears to me that the new policy that you are advocating here is really one of foreclosing certain options and of going in the exact opposite direction, perhaps emboldening our enemies.

The concern I have there is that if there is some type of incursion or some type of where an enemy, being emboldened, might be a lit-
tle more aggressive than usual, that that includes the possibility of that escalating, and even increasing a larger conflict. So could you speak to that?

Dr. MILLER. Yes. With respect to calculated ambiguity or deliberate ambiguity, there is a reduction in that in this Nuclear Posture Review, specifically with respect to non-nuclear weapons states.

The United States has said since 1978 that we would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states. And what this Nuclear Posture Review does is remove that ambiguity.

It also significantly reduces ambiguity about the nature of our response, and that is that it would be devastating conventional military response to any use of chemical or biological weapons by a non-nuclear weapons state, and that the leadership would be held accountable—both the military and political leadership.

With respect to nuclear weapons states, essentially the same degree of ambiguity is present today as it was prior to this. And finally, with respect to those states, Iran and North Korea in particular, that are not in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations, I believe the ambiguity has been reduced. And as Secretary Gates said, we have made clear that all options are on the table.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, related to Iran, of course, you know, it occurs to me that we are missing, probably, the major rogue elephant, as it were, in the room. The fact is, if Iran gains nuclear capability all efforts to contain nuclear proliferation are essentially dead.

You know, the Iranian president himself, Ahmadinejad, has stated that, if gained this capability that they would supply this to other Islamic nations “according to their need.” And it just occurs to me that so much of our focus needs to be there.

I have two little children, and I don’t want to see them face nuclear terrorism, but I am absolutely convinced a nuclear Iran means exactly that.

That nuclear terrorism is loosed upon the world and it just astonishes me that this Administration doesn’t seem to be focusing on that to the degree that they should. You mentioned earlier that deterrent was a combination of capability and credibility.

If you are an Iranian—if you are the Iranian president right now and you see us reducing our capability, you can’t cut the equation any other way than that, regardless if we still have sufficient capability perhaps, but we are reducing our capability.

And if you are the Iranian president and you look at our posture towards North Korea and this President has made some strong statements toward North Korea in the past, and those have not resulted in any demonstrable action on our part. And so it occurs to me that our credibility has been diminished as well with Iran.

So let me just ask you, what are we doing now, demonstrably and specifically, to prevent Iran from gaining a nuclear capability?

Dr. MILLER. Sir, let me answer in three parts, and others may want to join in as well. First, this Nuclear Posture Review did put nuclear nonproliferation and combating the possibility of nuclear terrorism at the top of the agenda. And that is a principal reason why you see some of the policy changes that we have talked about.
Mr. F RANKS. But it essentially ignores the most dangerous terrorist state in the world in that regard.

Dr. MILLER. Second, with respect to the Negative Security Assurance, Iran is not subject to that assurance because they are not in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations and, as Secretary Gates has said, and as I would like to make clear, that means that all options are on the table with respect to Iran.

And if they wish to position themselves so that they are subject to that assurance, they need to make significant steps to terminate their nuclear activities in a verifiable way and subject themselves to the associated inspections.

And the third element, I would say, which we could spend some time on is that the United States is currently working hard to get strong sanctions in place on Iran and to press the international community, including at the summit, working with the Russians and the Chinese, to encourage them in as clear a way as possible, to agree to strong sanctions on Iran in order to push it to shift its policy and to meet its nonproliferation obligations.

Mr. F RANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.

Secretary TAUSCHER. Mr. Chairman, if I could just make clear that this Administration is using every one of its arrows in its quiver to deter Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. It is as frustrated as the previous Administration was.

But I will say that we have had tremendous success, most recently, in persuading members of the P5, the European Union, and other countries to work with us to deter Iran, to persuade them that having nuclear weapons is not something that we will sustain.

And I think that the President has worked very hard on this. It is a difficult situation because of the isolation of Iran and its leadership. But I think that both on North Korea and Iran this Administration has worked very hard to make clear that their nuclear ambitions are not in line with our plans for them.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. May I just suggest, Mr. Chairman, as difficult as it is to deal with Iran now, it will be much more difficult if we do not succeed in preventing them in gaining nuclear weapons.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. As I understand, there are two more members that wish to ask questions, but let me ask the same question I asked the General of Secretary Tauscher. Does the Nuclear Posture Review make us any safer?

Secretary TAUSCHER. I believe it does, Mr. Chairman, because the Nuclear Posture Review clarifies our Negative Security Assurance. It makes clear to non-nuclear weapons states that compliance with their NPT obligations, that they are not threatened by our nuclear forces. Secondarily, it makes clear to countries that are not in compliance with their NPT obligations, like North Korea and Iran, that we would use nuclear weapons against them.

And I think it generally puts in balance what is a very strong nuclear and conventional threat that the United States has had for many years. Keep in mind that we haven’t used nuclear weapons in over 65 years. There is a very high bar that every Commander-in-Chief would have to consider to use nuclear weapons.
But we have conventional weapons and a military force second to none, and it has kept us in relative peace and security other than the asymmetrical threats that we faced after September 11th, against allies and against other state actors. It has kept us in relative peace and security for many decades.

So I think that the Administration has moved forward with a Nuclear Posture Review that is much more clarifying, much more significant in its commitments to non-nuclear weapons states in compliance with NPT, to strengthen the NPT. And I think it does have a very strong nonproliferation piece which, in the end, the President believes will make us all safer.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Heinrich.

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to all of you. I want to start just by commending the Administration by moving us beyond the Cold War mentality that has gripped our deterrent for a long time. We are two decades, now, beyond that in terms of the reality on the ground.

And this begins to create a situation that is much more in line with the threats that we face today. And I also want to commend the Administration on really walking the walk versus the kind of lip service we have received in the past when it comes to investing in our infrastructure and, more importantly, our personnel. I really appreciate that shift.

I want to get fairly specific. First off, Secretary D'Agostino, I wanted to ask you what are the implications for our national security of not having the B61 Life Extension Program completed by 2017?

And how confident are you that the B61 Life Extension Program will be ready to deliver finished systems required to synchronize the weapon with the arrival of the new F-35 as a delivery vehicle?

Secretary D'AGOSTINO. Mr. Heinrich, the B61 bomb is, as General Chilton has noted previously in testimony and in other discussion, is one of our oldest warheads. It is in need of attention. It has got systems, electronic systems that need specific attention associated with, you know, vacuum tubes and the like. It needs some specific work—I'd prefer not to get into the technical details here, in an open session. We would be glad to provide you the details.

But it is very important for us to get started to work on that warhead itself, or on that bomb. Various—all aspects of it need a significant amount of attention. The other important thing, frankly, on the B61 in addition to our desire to satisfy the military requirements that I have asked General Chilton talk to, the year 2017 is the date you heard me mention in my opening remarks.

That date is important. Because of our infrastructure we want to time in the studies that typically happen at laboratories and the work that happened at laboratories as opposed to the actual production work that has to happen.

And the first production unit of 2017 fits in very nicely from our ability to layer in the work that we are currently doing right now on the W76 warhead, which is in its production stage, with the work when that work tapers off in 2017, entering into the production stage on the B61 bomb. It coincides nicely with the requirements of the Defense Department as well.
General CHILTON. Thanks. And if I could add to that, sir, a lot of folks are linking 2017 to F–35. We need the B61 in first production in 2017, regardless of the F–35, because the B61 also is a weapon that is used by the B–2, by our strategic deterrent. And so it is an important weapon, also, to be part of the F–35 as the dual capable aircraft strategy goes forward.

But any slip in the F–35 program should not say “well, we can take risk in the B61 program.” We need to be on schedule and get first production unit going. Complete W76, B61, both nuclear and non-nuclear parts of that, so that then we can move on to our next element of the stockpile that needs to be addressed, the W78.

And I would close by saying I am so encouraged by this NPR and the investment and the strategy and the latitude given here to the labs to address this particular weapon. Because it will be the model, I think, the first model for adding increased security and safety and reliability to the stockpile.

The W76 was purely a refurbishment. No added safety or security. No added reliability. The B61 will be an opportunity for this model to be put in place that will then be carried on throughout the rest of the stockpile.

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you, General. I couldn’t agree more with both of those points. So I appreciate you clarifying, especially the aircraft issue and the kind of improvements that can be made as we move forward to really increase safety and reliability.

Secretary Tauscher, and I am still getting used to you being down there as opposed to up there, but we heard a little bit earlier about moral leadership, as if that was the only outcome of the kind of leadership we have seen from the Administration with respect to New START and the NPR.

I want to ask you a little bit more about pragmatic outcomes. And I wonder if you can talk a little bit about the direct impact that New START seems to already be having on how Russia and China view issues like sanctions with some of the countries that are out, who are not complying with their international obligations?

Secretary TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. I think when President Obama came into office, he had a different point of view on engagement: to be tough but at the same time, as he said, reach out your hand, but if you come back with a fist we will not respond nicely.

And in both the case of Russia specifically, we had the inconvenience of a START Treaty that was going to expire, no matter what we did, on December 5th. And a little less than 10 months after the President came into office.

So the effort by the President and Secretary Clinton to restart and reset the relationship with the Russians was fundamentally important. And to get the atmosphere right to begin to get the START Treaty negotiated.

The President made clear that even though we had this inconvenient date of the START Treaty expiring that he didn’t want any treaty on December 5th. He wanted to make sure that we took the time to get a treaty that was going to not only create more stability in the relationship, but one that was going to serve the American people and the people of the Russian Federation for the 10 years
of the life of the treaty, and also help us make our case in our narrative for the dangers of nuclear weapons. And while nuclear weapons still have a very strong place in our deterrent posture and force posture, that the President wants us to, in the role as part of the Nuclear Posture Review, lessen the dependence of the United States on nuclear weapons because we still have the strongest conventional forces and weaponry in the world and the best military in the world.

And we have not used nuclear weapons in 65 years. And the bar to use them is extremely high. And we may not have a circumstance where that test to use a nuclear weapon is satisfied by the time we think we have to make some decisions.

So it is partly to have the moral leadership to have a very strong Non-Proliferation Treaty, which the President is committed to, to make sure that countries that, in the past, over the last decades, have not had nuclear weapons because we either extended our deterrence to them or because they had decided not to—don't decide to have nuclear weapons and are not reliant on them.

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you, Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Lamborn for a question. Then we go to Mr. Langevin.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I listened with great interest to your earlier remarks about a perceived connection between missile defense and the New START Treaty. And I understand that there is no such intention on our part.

Secretary TAUSCHER. Thank you.

Mr. LAMBORN. So I have no question about that. I am reassured by what you said about the language of the treaty and that there is no platforms or missile defense weapons that would be connected.

But my question and my concern is what is going on in the minds of the Russians? And let me read to you a quote from an official Kremlin statement regarding New START. New START "can operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities, quantitatively or qualitatively."

So in their mind, there does seem to be a connection. And that is my concern. I understand our position and I accept that. And there shouldn't be a connection because missile defense is defensive, not offensive. And secondly, it is so critical to our defense it should not be negotiable.

But if two parties to a treaty seem to have differing views on an essential matter like that, doesn't that potentially set up a possible failure of understanding and, therefore, implementation? And if you could address that, please, I would appreciate it.

Secretary TAUSCHER. Congressman Lamborn, I appreciate your comments. Let me just say, again, for the record, there is nothing in the New START Treaty that constrains any of our deployed or planned missile defense systems. Full stop.

I don't know when that statement was made. I don't know if it was made weeks and months ago or whether it was made in the last 20 minutes. But I will tell you that the Russians not only un-
derstand what our Phased, Adaptive Approach is, because it is on
the Internet. Anybody can understand what it is.

But every country has, inside of its very complicated infrastruc-
ture and bureaucracy, folks that, for their own reasons, don't like
what their allies and friends and treaty partners are doing. And ev-
everybody has a domestic audience that they have to play to at times.
And politics is a part of everything.

President Obama has made very clear that this treaty was never
going to constrain us in any way when it came to protecting the
American people, our forward deployed troops and our allies, spe-
cifically about missile defense. And when I was in Geneva, part of
my job in the negotiating was to make sure that that was what the
President got in the end of the deal.

What the Russians say and what certain Russians say, I notice
that that is not even a comment attributed to anyone. You know,
it is what it is. But we have every incentive and every reason to
believe that the Russians are serious about maintaining the life of
the START Treaty and their commitments to it. Certainly in
Prague I was very proud to sit and watch President Medvedev and
President Obama sign the treaty last Thursday.

It is very clear that our relationship, while we don't agree with
the Russians on everything, we have a much improved relation-
ship. It is accruing to the American people and to the things that
we want to do, including things like Iran and other issues.

This relationship is working for us and we are working diligently
to make sure that the stability created by a positive American-Rus-

sian relationship is accruing to our friends and allies at the same
time.

So I think I am glad that you are reassured. That is certainly
our position. But once again, I don’t know who this Russian was
that was quoted. It is not attributed and I don’t even know when
the quote was made.

But I can assure you they know what our limited missile defense
systems are. They know what they are constituted to do. They
know they are not targeted against them, and we are very satisfied
that we are going to have a good relationship going forward in the
New START agreement.

Dr. MILLER. If I could add very quickly, the Russians also know
now what is in our unilateral statement, which was put out just
a few days ago, which says “The United States intends to continue
improving and deploying its missile defense systems in order to de-
 fend itself against limited attack and as part of our collaborative
approach to strengthening stability in key regions.”

So, both for homeland defense and for regional missile defense,
it made absolutely clear that we intend to continue to improve our
capabilities.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. I wish the members to
know that tomorrow at our hearing we will begin having the junior
members of the committee and we work backward in our proce-
dural order. And I hope the junior members will arrive on time be-
fore the gavel starts.

Mr. Langevin.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the challenges
in serving on the committee is that when you are dealing with im-
important topics like these to get all your questions in in 5 minutes, which is next to impossible.

But I would—one question I wanted to get to, and I would be remiss if I didn't ask of Secretary Tauscher.

First of all, Ellen, it is great to have you back before the committee again, and thank you for your years of work on all these issues and your leadership on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee that you chaired, and now that I was privileged to succeed when you assumed your new role.

Yesterday, I had the privilege of attending the Nuclear Security Summit. And obviously, many positive things have come out of that summit already. In particular, I noticed the news that the Chinese have pledged to work more closely with us on the Iranian issue. And when I met with President Hu yesterday, I first expressed my appreciation for his willingness to do that.

Also, in particular, we saw over 47 countries come to come together to begin to address threats of nuclear terrorism, nuclear proliferation. And from my work both on this committee and also on the Intelligence Committee, I certainly share the President's concerns about the dangers from loose nuclear material and rogue proliferators.

And I am certainly happy to see this issue take prominence in this Administration. I give President Obama high marks in his Administration for convening the summit, which is probably long overdue and it is such an important topic.

Secretary Tauscher, can you elaborate on some of the commitments from other nations that came from this conference? And also, what progress needs to be made before nations reconvene in South Korea in 2012?

Secretary Tauscher. Thank you, Chairman Langevin. It is my pleasure to see you again, and congratulations on all your work on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee. Yesterday, Monday and Tuesday, the President convened 47 heads of state to talk about an issue that particularly animates him, which is nuclear terrorism.

And he made very clear that, while much has changed since the end of the Cold War, that it is less likely that the United States or our allies would be subject to a nuclear attack from a big power.

Unfortunately, countries that are looking to acquire nuclear weapons and terrorist organizations that are looking to either find material or know-how or technology have increased. And that has increased significantly our danger in the United States.

So he brought these 47 heads of state together and there was not only a communique that, I think, was very positive in the commitment of these 47 heads of state to work together on nuclear security and to eliminate nuclear terrorism, but there were a number of what we call “house gifts” that some of these heads of state brought along. Countries like Chile, Canada, the Ukraine, and Mexico have agreed, for example, to eliminate all of their HEU and to send it to the United States and Russia for disposal.

The United States and Russia were—we seem to be signing agreements almost every day these days—signed yesterday the Plutonium Disposition Agreement, which Tom knows about. It was 10 years in the making, had been stalled for many years. But this
eliminates plutonium that could make 17,000 nuclear weapons. The IAEA is going to help us monitor that agreement.

There were a number of other initiatives going on there, and probably one of the anecdotes to the whole conference was that, while you had 47 heads of state milling around, and many of them brought their foreign ministers and their ambassadors and members of their cabinets that deal with nuclear nonproliferation issues, there were many side meetings that were going on where there was a lot of very good work done.

And what was very clear while President Obama presided over this for a day and a half and made some, I think, very eloquent and very forceful statements, what was very clear was that this was an issue that these heads of state—most of them non-nuclear countries—believed was important, but it took the United States and President Obama to put this issue in the forefront of their minds and to convene them together.

And the good news is that the “sherpas”—these are the people that managed the process of doing the communique and the work product that goes forward—they will continue meeting over the next two years.

And South Koreans have agreed to convene what was meant to be one meeting, now will have follow-on in 2012 for the South Koreans to convene a similar kind of meeting where the work product will be reviewed, and these efforts will continue.

There were billions of dollars committed by nuclear powers to help do cleanups. So I think, overall, it was not only a success in the material things that were committed to but, once again, this is an issue that the President believes that publics and parliaments and, certainly, the American people and the Congress need to know more about.

For too long, these issues have stayed in the background; they are very opaque and complicated and complex and sometimes people say, “oh, you know, that is hard to understand. I didn’t take physics in high school.”

The truth of the matter is, every American and every person in the world needs to know these issues because this is the biggest threat we have. And it is a life-changing event if something bad should happen.

And their political will is important because they need to tell their Congress or their parliament or their head of state that this is important, that they want them to fix these issues. They want them to work collaboratively, and they want strong international regimes like the Non-Proliferation Treaty to be protected.

So thank you. I was so glad to see you there yesterday, and many Members of Congress came, but we all worked hard on it and I am glad that it had such a good outcome.

Mr. Langevin. Okay. Very good.

Secretary Tauscher. Thank you.

Mr. Langevin. Again, well, thank you for that answer and to all of you, I mean on the panel, thank you for the outstanding work you have done on the NPR as well. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I yield back.
The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate the gentleman, and to the excellent panel, and we certainly are grateful for your testimony, for your hard work and for what you do for our country.
And with that——
[Whereupon, at 1:09 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX

April 14, 2010
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

APRIL 14, 2010
Press Release

House Armed Services Committee Hearing Focuses on Administration’s Proposed Nuclear Weapons Policy and Force Structure

April 14, 2010

Washington, D.C.—The House Armed Services Committee today heard testimony from senior Administration officials on the Executive Branch’s nuclear weapons policies, posture, and force structure. Specifically, Ranking Member Howard P. “Buck” McKeon (R-Calif.) and Republican members focused their questions on the New START Treaty with Russia and the Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review. McKeon released the following prepared statement for the hearing:

“I would also like to extend a warm welcome back to our witnesses.

“Before I begin, I want to express my deep condolences to the Polish people. Saturday’s tragedy leaves us at a loss for words. Many of us here had met with President Kaczynski in previous trips to Warsaw as well as the distinguished civilian and military leaders who perished in this unfortunate accident. Our thoughts and prayers are with their families during this difficult time.

“Today’s hearing focuses on the Administration’s changes to U.S. nuclear policy and posture. We have seen much fanfare accompany the release of the new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the President’s trip to Prague to sign a new START treaty, and the Nuclear Security Summit held earlier this week.

“I commend the President’s focus on these important nuclear security issues. However, my objective today is to understand how the policy has changed and why, as well as the consequences and implications.

“Along these lines, I would like to highlight my primary concerns:

“First, the NPR appears to change our nation’s long-standing policy of ‘calculated ambiguity.’ It adopts a ‘negative security assurance’ policy, whereby non-nuclear weapons states that aren’t proliferating are assured that the U.S. would never threaten the use of nuclear weapons against them—even if the U.S. or our allies are threatened with biological or chemical weapons. At the same time, the NPR
includes a caveat that adjustments could be made if conditions change. Furthermore, the NPR signals a desire to pursue a universal ‘sole purpose’ policy by which the threat of nuclear use to deter a devastating chemical or biological attack would be taken entirely off the table.

“Why embrace such muddled wording that sends mixed signals to both our allies and adversaries? I hope our witnesses will discuss why this policy change was made and the national security benefits they believe it provides. I worry that these changes to U.S. declaratory policy, combined with the explicit signaling of what is yet to come, will weaken our deterrence rather than strengthen it.

“Second, the NPR indicates the President has already ‘directed a review of potential future reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons below New START levels.’ What would be the strategic rationale for such reductions? Without further assessment of the threat and understanding of our military commanders’ requirements—much less seeing how the implementation of START goes—it would seem premature to rush into deeper cuts.

“We’ve been told repeatedly that START would permit further development and deployment of U.S. missile defenses in Europe and the U.S., but Russian leaders suggest such deployments could lead to their withdrawal from the Treaty. How are these differing expectations being resolved, especially when some are suggesting that missile defense and conventional forces be included in the next round of negotiations? I’m concerned that our eagerness to do more arms control may further cost us important conventional capabilities. I hope our witnesses can assure us that this is not the case.

“Third, any decision to reduce our nuclear stockpile, including those weapons we maintain in storage, should not be made unless we have high confidence that the remaining arsenal is highly reliable. This requires a sustained, long-term investment to modernize our aging stockpile and infrastructure; not just a one year increase of funds.

“Furthermore, how do we attract and retain top scientists and engineers to an enterprise that is shrinking and, as the NPR states, explicitly prohibits the development of ‘new nuclear warheads’? General Chilton, as you told this committee last year, our nuclear weapons are ‘chemistry experiments...on the shelf.’ What young, bright engineer wants to work on that? How does the Administration propose to maintain required technical competencies in an environment that does not allow them to be exercised from start to finish?
“Lastly, the NPR rightly places emphasis on addressing the threat of nuclear terrorism and nuclear nonproliferation. The President has announced an international effort to ‘secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years,’ yet we have not seen any plans for how this would be accomplished.

“But there is another aspect to nonproliferation—U.S. assurance to over 30 allies and friends who have agreed not to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for U.S. nuclear guarantees. Will our policy changes, reductions, and signaling lead to less confidence in our nuclear deterrent, and perhaps drive some of our allies and friends to consider developing their own?

“Fundamentally, the President appears to believe that U.S. nuclear reductions will ‘restore our moral leadership’ to encourage others to do the same. However, it assumes regimes like Iran and North Korea will curb their nuclear ambitions; Pakistan and India will reduce their nuclear arms; and Russia and China will be more inclined to support tough sanctions against Iran—all as a result of U.S. stockpile reductions. However, none of these have yet to be seen.

“I would like to thank our witnesses again for being with us today and for their dedication and service. I look forward to a lively discussion.”

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STATEMENT OF

DR. JAMES N. MILLER
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR POLICY

BEFORE THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

APRIL 14, 2010
Mr. Chairman, Mr. McKeon, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. It is a pleasure to join Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, General Chilton, National Nuclear Security Administrator Thomas D’Agostino, and Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher in discussing U.S. nuclear policy and capabilities. I will focus my remarks on the recently completed Congressionally-mandated Nuclear Posture Review, or NPR.

The 2010 NPR provides a roadmap for implementing the President’s Prague agenda of reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons, with the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Because this goal will not be reached quickly, perhaps not in our lifetimes, the NPR outlines the specific steps needed to sustain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. The fiscal year 2011 budget requests from the Departments of Defense and Energy are the first installments in this long-term effort.

The 2010 NPR identifies the most urgent nuclear dangers today as proliferation and the potential for nuclear terrorism, and outlines a comprehensive approach to cope with these challenges that includes policy initiatives and increased investment in a number of areas. More broadly, the NPR identifies five key objectives for U.S. nuclear policy and posture:

1. Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism;
2. Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy;
3. Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels;
4. Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and
5. Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.

Given that the committee has received the NPR report, I will not summarize all of its conclusions, and instead request that the report be entered into the record. I will focus my remarks on declaratory policy and force structure issues.
U.S. Declaratory Policy

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review aims to make clear the benefits of complying with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – and the potential consequences of not doing so. It strengthens the U.S. “negative security assurance” associated with the NPT:

*The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.*

At the same time, the NPR reflects continued concerns about chemical and biological weapons (CBW). It affirms that:

*... any state eligible for the assurance that uses chemical or biological weapons against the United States or its allies and partners would face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response – and that any individuals responsible for the attack, whether national leaders or military commanders, would be held fully accountable.*

Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of bio-technology development, the NPR notes that the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in this assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat.

This clarified negative security assurance does not apply to nuclear weapons states such as Russia and China, nor does it apply to states not in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations such as Iran and North Korea. For these states, the NPR makes clear that U.S. nuclear weapons still play a role in deterring not only nuclear attack, but also conventional or CBW attack against the United States or its allies and partners. As Secretary of Gates noted recently, for Iran and North Korea “all options are on the table.”
To address the potential nexus of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, the NPR renews the:

... U.S. commitment to hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts.

Strategic Force Structure

One of the first tasks of the NPR, which continued throughout the review, was to define positions for the New START negotiations. The DoD-led NPR team reached the following conclusions about U.S. strategic nuclear force structure:

- The United States should retain a nuclear Triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and dual-capable heavy bombers under New START, in order to preserve strategic stability and hedge against any unexpected technical problems or operational vulnerabilities in one leg of the Triad. The fiscal year 2011 budget request includes funding for each leg of the triad.

- All U.S. ICBMs should be “deMIRVed” to a single warhead each, in order to reinforce strategic stability.

- An ability to “upload” non-deployed nuclear weapons on delivery vehicles should be retained as a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise. Preference will be given to upload capacity for bombers and strategic submarines.

The Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Chilton supported New START reductions in deployed warheads, and limits on deployed as well as non-deployed strategic delivery vehicles (SDVs). New START limits were validated by rigorous analysis in the NPR.

The Administration intends to additional details for strategic forces under New START in the report required by Sec. 1251 of the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act. This report will
include a ten-year estimate of budgetary requirements for sustaining delivery platforms, the nuclear weapons stockpile, and the nuclear weapons complex.

Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons

The NPR concluded that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States should retain the capability to "extend" nuclear deterrence to allies and security partners. Its recommendations:

- Retain the capability to forward-deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on tactical fighter-bombers and dual-capable heavy bombers.

- Proceed with full scope life extension study and follow-on activities for the B-61 bomb to ensure first production begins in fiscal year 2017.

- Retire the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (TLAM-N), as a redundant capability.

- Continue and expand consultations with allies and partners to address how to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. extended deterrent.

- Decisions about the future of NATO nuclear weapons should be made through NATO processes, and not unilateral decisions.

Non-Nuclear Long-Range Strike Capabilities

The Administration is currently examining the appropriate mix of non-nuclear long-range strike capabilities over the long-term. Today, these capabilities include conventional-only and dual-capable heavy bombers, and both sea-launched and air-launched conventional cruise missiles. Of these systems, only dual-capable bombers are accountable under New START. NPR analysis concluded the U.S. should develop non-nuclear prompt global strike capabilities, which are allowed under the New START Treaty – and should focus such capabilities on regional threats while not undermining strategic stability with Russia or China.
Toward a Sustainable Long-Term Approach

A key premise of the 2010 NPR was that an effective national strategy for reducing nuclear dangers and sustaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent are long-term challenges that will require support from a long succession of U.S. Administrations and Congresses. Laying the groundwork for a sustainable bipartisan consensus is a central purpose of this NPR.

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STATEMENT OF
GENERAL KEVIN P. CHILTON
COMMANDER
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
BEFORE THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
14 APRIL 2010
INTRODUCTION

Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member McKeon, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to meet with you today. United States Strategic Command was closely consulted throughout the development of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and during negotiations on the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and I look forward to discussing them with you today. I would like to note at the outset how proud I am of the extraordinary work the Command performed in support of these efforts. We have an amazing team, and their diligence, expertise, and tireless work continue to ensure our ability to deliver global security for America.

NPR

The NPR reflects a current assessment of the global security environment, one which is markedly, but not entirely, different than the one we faced in the Cold War. It recognizes the need to confront global threats, including nuclear dangers, through the twin prongs of deterrence and non-proliferation. The NPR includes several key recommendations that will serve to both sustain and strengthen USSTRATCOM’s ability to conduct our deterrence mission.

Specifically, the NPR recommends moving forward with a number of nuclear enterprise sustainment projects, including strengthening our nuclear command and control structure; continuing development and deployment of our triad of delivery systems; maintaining a safe, secure, and effective stockpile; and revitalizing the National Nuclear Security Administration’s aging infrastructure. America’s triad of diverse and complementary delivery systems provides unique synergies that make our deterrent highly credible and resilient in the face of a variety of potential technological and geopolitical developments. The NPR endorses DoD efforts to
explore future triad systems, specifically to extend the Minuteman III ICBM through 2030 and conduct studies now to inform decisions on a follow-on ICBM; to replace the Ohio-class SSBN at the existing ships’ end of life; and to study future long-range bomber capabilities. It also supports moving forward with full-rate production for the W76-1 warhead for our submarine leg of the triad; full-scope (nuclear and non-nuclear) life extension of the B61 bomb to sustain its strategic deterrence and extended deterrence roles; and initiating studies to develop life extension options for the W78 ICBM warhead, including the possibility of also adapting the resulting warhead for sea launched ballistic missiles and thereby reducing the number of warhead types.

Additionally, the NPR and the President’s Budget recognize the need to improve the Nation’s nuclear infrastructure and address the challenges of human capital recruitment, development, and sustainment. These investments are required in order to confidently reduce the overall U.S. stockpile while sustaining the credibility of our nuclear stockpile, which is fundamental to effective deterrence. Investments that revitalize NNSA’s aging infrastructure and intellectual capital strengthen our security with the facilities and people needed to address technological surprises, geopolitical change, and a range of cutting-edge national security challenges. The Administration’s request for a 13% increase in NNSA funding for Fiscal Year 2011 is an important first step in this process.

New START

The nuclear enterprise remains, today and for the foreseeable future, the foundation of U.S. deterrence strategy and defense posture. As the combatant command responsible for executing strategic deterrence operations, planning for nuclear operations, and advocating for
nuclear capabilities, we are keenly aware of how force posture and readiness changes can affect
deterrence, assurance, and overall strategic stability. The New START agreement, in my view,
retains the military flexibility necessary to ensure each of these for the period of the treaty.

In support of the New START negotiation effort, U.S. Strategic Command analyzed the
required nuclear weapons and delivery vehicle force structure and posture to meet current
guidance, and provided options for consideration by the Department. This rigorous approach,
rooted in both deterrence strategy and assessment of potential adversary capabilities, supports
both the agreed-upon reductions in New START and recommendations in the NPR.

ASSESSMENT

In Prague last year, President Obama emphasized that, "As long as these weapons exist,
the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and
guarantee that defense to our allies..." Meeting these demanding goals means that a strong and
enduring deterrence enterprise remains indispensable to U.S. and international security.
Accordingly, U.S. Strategic Command's contributions to both the NPR and New START focused
on ensuring America's ability to continue to deter potential adversaries, assure our allies, and
sustain strategic stability for as long as nuclear weapons exist. Based on our analysis and
through continued discussions with DoD leadership, my view is that these documents and
associated budgetary investments continue to support these deterrence requirements, and that the
New START agreement warhead and platform numbers provide appropriate military flexibility.

Finally, to ensure all necessary elements of a safe, secure, and reliable deterrence
enterprise, including weapons, delivery systems, warning and communications capabilities, and
their supporting human capital and technological infrastructures, we must make sustained
investments to adequately preserve our capabilities for the foreseeable future. In order to sustain the deterrent and implement the NPR, we must make long-term investments that begin with several increases outlined in the President’s Fiscal Year 2011 Budget. These investments are not only important—they are essential.

CLOSING

Every day, US Strategic Command remains focused on providing the President and future presidents with the options and flexibility needed to deter and respond to threats to our Nation and its allies. Today, our deterrent is safe, secure, and effective; our forces are trained and ready; and the Command is faithfully and fully carrying out its mission each and every day. I am confident that the NPR and New START outline an approach that continues to enable the men and women of U.S. Strategic Command to deliver global security for America today and in the future. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before this committee.
Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. I am pleased to appear before you to discuss the Department of Energy’s key elements included in the Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, released on April 6, 2010.

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reaffirms President Obama’s commitment to providing the Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) the resources required to support the President’s nuclear security agenda and maintain the safety, security and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent without underground testing. The NPR reflects the fact that protecting our nation’s nuclear security is an enduring government-wide responsibility. I am proud of the role this Department played in what was the first, truly interagency nuclear posture review in our nation’s history.

The NPR lays out five key objectives that provide a comprehensive path forward for implementing the President’s nuclear security agenda for reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. The five objectives are:

1. Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism;
2. Reducing the role of nuclear weapons;
3. Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels;
4. Strengthening regional deterrence and reassurance of U.S. allies and partners; and,
5. Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.

**Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism**

The Department of Energy and the NNSA are actively engaged in direct support of the first objective, “**preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.**” The Department’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 budget request includes a nearly 26 percent increase
in funding for NNSA’s nuclear nonproliferation programs. These programs encompass the first line of defense, second line of defense, and additional programs aimed at securing vulnerable nuclear materials within four years and providing key technical support to prevent proliferation in other nuclear arenas. The most important thing that can be done to keep terrorists from developing and using an improvised nuclear device (IND) or a radiological dispersion device (an RDD or a so-called “dirty bomb”) is to prevent them from acquiring nuclear material. The NNSA is accelerating and broadening the scope of its efforts to improve the security of nuclear materials in the United States and globally to achieve the President’s priorities first articulated in Prague. Current NNSA programs include:

- Securing nuclear materials, technology, and expertise, including the most vulnerable nuclear materials, worldwide within four years and disposition of excess U.S. and international fissile materials;

- Working with the Office of Nuclear Energy to support the development of a new framework for peaceful nuclear energy to promote civil nuclear power and nonproliferation objectives;

- Strengthening the international safeguards system by developing new safeguards technologies, expertise, policies, concepts, and partnerships;

- Developing an active nuclear and radiological security dialog and cooperation with key domestic and international partners; and,

- Developing highly sensitive and wide-area nuclear materials detection technology.

NNSA programs are also supporting the President’s arms control and nonproliferation agenda by using the technical capabilities within the Nuclear Security Enterprise to demonstrate the technical ability to support, monitor, and comply with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), and any follow-on arms control requirements.

**Managing the U.S. Nuclear Stockpile**

The Department of Energy and NNSA are also actively engaged in direct support of the fifth NPR objective, “sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.”

The need to maintain the safety, security and effectiveness of an aging stockpile without resuming nuclear testing has been a bipartisan national policy for nearly 20 years under both Democratic and Republican administrations. As the President said in Prague, we will sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal as long as nuclear weapons exist.
This NPR reflects that commitment and our budget request, if approved, would provide the resources required to make that possible. The NPR is based on several key principles that will guide future U.S. decisions on stockpile management.

- The United States will not conduct nuclear testing, and will seek ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

- The United States will not develop new nuclear warheads. The NPR makes clear that the United States will only use nuclear components based on previously tested designs, and will not pursue new military missions or provide for new military capabilities for our stockpile.

- The United States will study options for ensuring the safety, security, and effectiveness of nuclear warheads on a case-by-case basis, consistent with the congressionally-mandated Stockpile Management Program. The full range of LEP approaches will be considered: refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads, and replacement of nuclear components.

- Finally, in any decision to proceed to engineering development for warhead LEPs, the United States will give strong preference to options for refurbishment or reuse. The NPR makes clear that replacement of nuclear components would be undertaken only if critical Stockpile Management Program goals could not otherwise be met, and if specifically authorized by the President and approved by Congress.

Using these principles, the United States will extend the life of nuclear warheads required for the smaller force structure identified under the follow-on START agreement. Consistent with this approach, the NPR recommended that:

- The Administration fully fund the ongoing LEP for the W76 submarine-based warhead for a 2017 completion, and the full scope LEP study and follow-on activities for the B61 bomb to ensure first production begins in 2017.

- The Nuclear Weapons Council initiate a study in 2010 of LEP options for the W78 ICBM warhead to be conducted jointly by the NNSA and the Department of Defense. This study will consider, as all future LEP studies will, the possibility of using the resulting warhead also on multiple platforms in order to reduce the number of warhead types.

The NNSA, in close coordination with the DoD, will provide a new stockpile stewardship and management plan to Congress, consistent with the increases in infrastructure investment requested in the President’s FY 2011 Budget Request. A more robust and modernized infrastructure will enable the United States to shift away from retaining large numbers of non-deployed warheads as a technical hedge, allowing additional reductions in the U.S. stockpile of non-deployed nuclear weapons.
This consolidated approach will ensure high confidence in the technical performance of warheads retained in the stockpile. It will guarantee that their safety and security are aligned with 21st century requirements (and technical capabilities). This approach sets a high standard for the safety and security of U.S. nuclear weapons and, in support of nonproliferation goals, positions the United States to encourage other nations to maintain the highest levels of surety for their nuclear stockpiles.

Recapitalizing Critical Infrastructure and Renewing Human Capital

The NPR concluded that the Department of Energy needed increased funding to recapitalize the aging infrastructure used to support the stockpile and conduct a full range of nuclear security missions, and to renew our human capital—the critical cadre of scientific, technical, and engineering experts who underpin our stockpile management work and support our nuclear nonproliferation and counterterrorism missions.

In order to sustain a safe, secure, and effective U.S. nuclear stockpile as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States must possess a modern physical infrastructure—comprised of the national security laboratories and a complex of supporting facilities.

The NPR concluded that the following key investments were required to sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal:

- Strengthening the science, technology, and engineering (ST&E) base needed for conducting weapon system LIFs, maturing advanced technologies to increase weapons surety, qualification of weapon components and certifying weapons without nuclear testing, and providing annual stockpile assessments through weapons surveillance. This includes developing and sustaining high quality scientific staff and supporting computational and experimental capabilities.

- Funding the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory to replace the existing 50-year old Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility by 2021.

- Developing a new Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee to come on line for production operations by 2021. Without an ability to produce uranium components, any plan to sustain the stockpile, as well as support for our naval nuclear propulsion programs, will come to a halt.

More broadly, the Administration supports the needed recapitalization of the nuclear infrastructure through fully funding the NNSA. These nuclear security facilities will be sized to support the requirements of the Stockpile Stewardship Program mandated by Congress and to meet the multiple requirements of dismantling warheads and eliminating material no longer needed for defense purposes, conducting technical surveillance, implementing life extension plans, and supporting naval propulsion requirements.
Increased investments in the nuclear security enterprise are needed to ensure the long-term safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal and to support the full range of nuclear security work to include nonproliferation, nuclear forensics, nuclear counterterrorism, emergency management, intelligence analysis, and treaty verification.

Responsible stockpile management requires not only infrastructure, but also a highly capable workforce with the specialized skills needed to sustain the nuclear deterrent and to support the President’s overall nuclear security agenda. Like our physical infrastructure, over the last decade our human capital base has been underfunded and underdeveloped. The decrease in funding for the science and engineering basis of stockpile assessment and management meant that technical issues might remain unresolved and the best and brightest scientists were therefore less attracted to the endeavor. A number of leaders noted that a national consensus on the approach to sustaining warheads, and adequate funding of those challenges, was essential to sustaining our nuclear technical capabilities. The cumulative loss of focus, expertise, and excellence on nuclear matters in the United States remains a significant challenge, but one that we can now address.

The President has now clearly outlined the importance of nuclear issues for our national security, and the importance of keeping the U.S. nuclear deterrent safe, secure, and effective at the minimum numbers required. Further, the Administration’s commitment to a clear and long-term plan for managing the stockpile ensures the scientists and engineers of tomorrow will have the opportunity to engage in challenging research and development activities that are essential to their recruitment and retention.

A modern nuclear security infrastructure and highly skilled workforce are also essential to arms control and nonproliferation objectives. For example, by certifying the reliability of each weapon type we retain, the United States can credibly assure non-nuclear allies and partners they need not build their own, while we seek greater stockpile reductions than otherwise possible. We also enhance our ability to assess and render safe potential terrorist nuclear devices and support other national security initiatives, such as nuclear forensics and attribution, and to understand the technical challenges associated with verifying ever deeper arms control reductions, which is critical for managing risks on the path to zero.

Conclusion

We are already implementing the principles in the NPR. For example, the President’s FY 2011 Budget Request for NNSA includes $11.2 billion (a 13% increase from 2010) to manage the stockpile, recapitalize the NNSA infrastructure, and support the full range of nuclear security missions – including NNSA’s role in preventing nuclear proliferation, powering the nuclear navy, and promoting effective nuclear counterterrorism capabilities.

This Nuclear Posture Review is an important step toward ending Cold War thinking and adopting a 21st century approach to nuclear weapons and nuclear security issues. The Administration’s substantial FY 2011 Budget Request begins the turnaround to this NPR
path. With the Committee’s help, we can sustain our nuclear deterrent and enable future arms reductions.
Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member McKeon, distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss our shared role in protecting the United States and our allies from today’s most pressing threats.

Before I begin, I want to thank you for your service and I want you to know that I miss the Committee. It is an honor, however, to be a part of the Obama Administration and to work with President Obama and Secretary Clinton to implement our arms control and nonproliferation agenda.

As you know, we have an ambitious agenda to reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons to make the United States more secure and the world more stable.

The President set forth several goals in his speech in Prague last year; three of which have been advanced in the past few days. First, he wanted a new Treaty that would make verifiable and mutual cuts in the United States and Russia’s nuclear arsenals. Second, he vowed to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our security posture. Third, he set a goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear material within the next four years. At the same time, the President reaffirmed our
commitment to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective deterrent to protect the United States and our allies so long as nuclear weapons exist.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, the State Department, working with our friends across the river at the Department of Defense and with the rest of the inter-agency team and the Congress … are fully engaged in implementing the President’s agenda.

At the Nuclear Security Summit, President Obama worked with allies and partners to commit to strengthen nuclear security and reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism. As you know, he gained cooperation from Ukraine, Chile, Canada and others to help lock down this dangerous material.

Last week, the Administration released the Report of its year-long Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). This review constitutes a clear break from past reviews, both in terms of process and scope. The Department of Defense led the review, but for the first time the interagency, including the Department of State, fully participated in discussing the issues and making recommendations to the President. For the first time, the Nuclear Posture Review is an unclassified document. The Obama Administration took a broad, whole of government approach to addressing U.S. nuclear policy and identifying concrete steps to enhance our national security.

Finally, last Thursday, President Obama traveled to Prague to sign the New START Treaty. I spent the last few weeks of March at the negotiations in Geneva
and helped to conclude the agreement. The New START Treaty will improve U.S. and international security by reducing and limiting U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces; promoting strategic stability by ensuring transparency and predictability regarding U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces over the life of the Treaty; and advancing our nuclear nonproliferation efforts.

The Treaty sets meaningful, lower limits on deployed strategic warheads and their delivery vehicles and launchers – limits that the Department of Defense validated through rigorous analysis in the early months of the Nuclear Posture Review. Its verification regime will provide each side confidence that the other is upholding its obligations. The new Treaty gives our military the flexibility to structure, deploy and maintain our forces in ways that best meet U.S. national security interests.

The Treaty does not contain any constraints on testing, development, or deployment of current or planned U.S. missile defense programs or current or planned U.S. long-range conventional strike capabilities.

Let me make one final point. Under the new Treaty, the United States will continue to maintain a safe, secure, and effective strategic nuclear force to protect ourselves and our allies and partners.

The United States and Russia can safely reduce our nuclear forces because the threat environment has changed. Today’s most pressing nuclear threats come
from terrorists and additional countries seeking nuclear weapons, not the risk of large-scale nuclear attack as during the Cold War. The conclusions of our recent Nuclear Posture Review reflect that reality. The NPR directs us to preserve the effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent for as long as it is required, reduce the potential for conflict, enhance strategic stability worldwide, and strengthen the nonproliferation regime.

The NPR outlines a new approach that will ensure that our defenses and diplomacy are geared toward those objectives.

Nuclear proliferation and terrorism are global challenges and they demand a global response. That is why President Obama invited world leaders to Washington for a nuclear security summit earlier this week to seek commitments from all nations to take steps to secure vulnerable nuclear materials and prevent nuclear smuggling in order to stop terrorists or criminal organizations from acquiring these dangerous materials.

We must deny highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium to terrorists groups because they would surely use the material to develop a weapon and use the weapon itself.

Our updated Negative Security Assurance (NSA) reinforces the President’s objectives of reducing the roles and numbers of nuclear weapons by making it clear that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear-weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.

The purpose of this change is to emphasize to non-nuclear states the security benefits of adhering to and fully complying with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. Some have suggested this might lead such states to be less fearful of the consequences of using chemical and biological weapons. Nothing could be further from the truth. Let me be clear, no one should doubt the resolve and conventional military capabilities of the United States to respond to such aggression with devastating effect and to hold accountable those responsible.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference in May is a critical opportunity to renew and revitalize all three pillars of the Treaty – nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy under safeguards. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and an essential foundation for progress in nuclear arms control and disarmament. All nations must recognize that the nonproliferation regime cannot survive if violators are allowed to act with impunity.

Along with our international partners, the United States is pursuing diplomatic efforts to convince Iran and North Korea to resolve the world community’s concerns about their nuclear programs and to encourage them to
cooperate in addressing all outstanding questions about those programs. We are working to build international consensus for steps that will convince Iran's leaders to change course, including new UN Security Council sanctions that will further clarify their choice of upholding their NPT and safeguards obligations or facing increasing isolation and painful consequences.

With respect to North Korea, we continue to send the message that simply returning to the negotiating table is not enough. Pyongyang must move toward complete and verifiable denuclearization through irreversible steps, if it wants a normalized, sanctions-free relationship with the United States.

These steps send a clear message about this Administration’s priorities and resolve. Our commitment to defend our national security interests and our allies and partners in Europe, the Pacific and elsewhere has never been stronger.

In this regard, the NPR emphasizes close co-operation with our allies around the world and maintains our firm commitment to mutual security. We will work with our partners to reinforce regional security architectures, such as missile defenses, and other conventional military capabilities. And, I want to repeat what I said earlier, the United States will continue to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for ourselves and our allies so long as these weapons exist anywhere in the world.
Last year, President Obama said he would seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. He also was very clear that it might not happen in his lifetime. The standards for a world without nuclear weapons are very high. But we are taking concrete steps in that direction, which make us stronger, safer, and more secure. That is why we are working to halt nuclear proliferation, to gain greater transparency into the programs and capabilities of key countries of concern, and to create verification methods and technologies capable of detecting violations.

In order to reduce the risk of proliferation, we will establish effective and internationally supported mechanisms to address noncompliance with nonproliferation obligations. Together with our international partners, we will work to resolve regional disputes that could motivate rival states to acquire and maintain nuclear weapons.

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member McKeon, I look forward to working with this Committee and the Congress on these important matters. Thank you for holding this important hearing and I look forward to any questions you might have for me.
April 9, 2010

Tri-Lab Directors' Statement on the Nuclear Posture Review

Joint Statement from Sandia Director Tom Hunter, Los Alamos Director Michael Anastasio, and Lawrence Livermore Director George Miller

ALBUQUERQUE, N.M. — The directors of the three Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Laboratories—Dr. George Miller from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Dr. Michael Anastasio from Los Alamos National Laboratory and Dr. Tom Hunter from Sandia National Laboratories—today issued the following statement on the Nuclear Posture Review:

“A key responsibility of the three Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Laboratories—Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories—is to provide technical underpinnings that ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the United States’ nuclear deterrent. The recently released Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) provides the Administration’s policy framework and path forward for ensuring that ‘the nation’s nuclear weapons remain safe, secure and effective.’

“We believe that the approach outlined in the NPR, which excludes further nuclear testing and includes the consideration of the full range of life extension options (refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads and replacement of nuclear components based on previously tested designs), provides the necessary technical flexibility to manage the nuclear stockpile into the future with an acceptable level of risk. We are reassured that a key component of the NPR is the recognition of the importance of supporting a modern physical infrastructure—comprised of the national security laboratories and a complex of supporting facilities—and a highly capable workforce with the specialized skills needed to sustain the nuclear deterrent.”

About Los Alamos National Laboratory (www.lanl.gov)
Los Alamos National Laboratory, a multidisciplinary research institution engaged in strategic science on behalf of national security, is operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC, a team composed of Bechtel National, the University of California, The Babcock & Wilcox Company and URS for the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration. Los Alamos enhances national security by ensuring the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile,
developing technologies to reduce threats from weapons of mass destruction, and solving problems related to energy, environment, infrastructure, health and global security concerns.

**About Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (https://www.llnl.gov/)**

Founded in 1952, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is a national security laboratory that develops science and engineering technology and provides innovative solutions to our nation’s most important challenges. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is managed by Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration.

**About Sandia National Laboratories (http://www.sandia.gov)**

Sandia National Laboratories is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin, for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration. With main facilities in Albuquerque, N.M., and Livermore, Calif., Sandia has major R&D responsibilities in national security, energy and environmental technologies, and economic competitiveness.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

APRIL 14, 2010
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN

Mr. LAMBORN. Secretary Miller, the Administration has repeatedly assured the Congress that no limits would be placed on missile defense. However, Article 5 of the Treaty appears to restrict the conversion of ICBM launchers for use as missile defense silos—as we did with the Ground-based Interceptors at Vandenberg—and restrict the conversion of submarine tubes to fire missile defense interceptors. Is this correct? Why set such limits on missile defense?

Dr. MILLER. The New START Treaty (NST) does not constrain the United States from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor does the NST add any additional cost or inconvenience to our missile defense plans. As the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, our budget submission and projections, and the U.S. unilateral statement made in connection with the NST all make clear, the United States will continue to improve its missile defenses.

Article V, Section 3 of the Treaty prohibits the conversion of ICBM or SLBM launchers to missile defense launchers and vice versa; that is, the conversion of missile defense launchers to launch ICBMs or SLBMs. This section also “grandfathers” the five former ICBM silos at Vandenberg AB that were converted for use within Ground Based Interceptors (GBI) over the past several years. Should the decision be made in the future to field additional GBIs, we will already have eight extra, unused missile defense silos in the ground at Fort Greely, Alaska. In the event that we would need even more missile defense silos above and beyond the extra eight, we would build the smaller, much less expensive, tailor-made GBI silos rather than perform more expensive conversions of existing ICBM silos. Regarding SLBM launchers, the Missile Defense Agency examined the concept of launching missile defense interceptors from submarines and found it to be not cost-effective and to present unique operational challenges.

Mr. LAMBORN. I am concerned that the Administration may not fully implement its Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) plans for missile defense in Europe, or it may seek to slow down PAA implementation, to avoid Russian withdrawal from the Treaty. What types of activities will the U.S. avoid to diminish the chances that the Russians will withdraw?

Dr. MILLER. The United States has made clear to Russia, including in the unilateral statement released in conjunction with the New START Treaty, that U.S. missile defense systems do not and will not threaten Russia’s nuclear deterrent and that the United States intends to continue to deploy improved missile defense systems to defend the U.S. homeland from limited attacks and to defend its deployed forces, allies, and partners against regional threats. Moreover, the United States will not allow a Russian threat to withdraw from the New START Treaty to influence any national security matter, including the development and deployment of needed missile defense capabilities.

Mr. LAMBORN. Secretary Miller, in your professional opinion what is the number of warheads the U.S. needs to meet its nuclear deterrence objectives? I have heard discussions of much lower numbers of nuclear weapons in the future under a minimum deterrence strategy. Is it possible for the U.S. to pursue a minimum deterrence strategy, similar to China, with 500 nuclear weapons or less in the future? Has STRATCOM performed any force structure analysis based on a minimum deterrence strategy?

Dr. MILLER. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia have reduced operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons by approximately 75 percent, but today both retain more operationally deployed nuclear weapons than needed for deterrence. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), with analytical support from USSTRATCOM, examined the full range of factors that will allow reductions in U.S. nuclear force levels. The NPR team provided this information to the New START negotiators to guide negotiation of the recently concluded New START Treaty.

The United States has no plans to pursue a minimum deterrence strategy, and no analysis has been conducted by USSTRATCOM or elsewhere in DOD to explore such a strategy.

Mr. LAMBORN. Secretary Miller, as nuclear weapons are reduced and conventional Prompt Global Strike (PGS) capabilities are developed, to what degree can conven-
tional capabilities substitute for nuclear capabilities in providing deterrence? What are the limitations?

Dr. MILLER. Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capabilities, as well as other conventional and missile defense capabilities, are not intended to be a substitute for nuclear capabilities in providing deterrence against nuclear attack. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the U.S. will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter potential adversaries. However, these conventional systems and other non-nuclear capabilities may allow the U.S. to fulfill deterrence objectives at significantly lower nuclear force levels with reduced reliance on nuclear weapons.

The Administration is currently examining the appropriate mix of CPGS capabilities needed to improve our ability to address regional threats, without negatively affecting the stability of our strategic relationships with Russia or China. Specific recommendations will be made in the fiscal year (FY) 2012 Department of Defense budget.

Mr. LAMBORN. General Chilton, in your professional opinion what is the number of warheads the U.S. needs to meet its nuclear deterrence objectives? I have heard discussions of much lower numbers of nuclear weapons in the future under a minimum deterrence strategy. Is it possible for the U.S. to pursue a minimum deterrence strategy, similar to China, with 500 nuclear weapons or less in the future? Has STRATCOM performed any force structure analysis based on a minimum deterrence strategy?

General CHILTON. The analysis STRATCOM was requested to perform in support of the NPR and New START negotiations focused on our ability to meet current employment guidance at various force levels. We were not asked to examine the force requirements for a “minimum deterrence” strategy. Without knowing how “minimum deterrence strategy” is defined in terms of targeting requirements under various conditions it is not possible to answer the question “how much is enough to deter”?

Mr. LAMBORN. General Chilton, as nuclear weapons are reduced and conventional Prompt Global Strike (PGS) capabilities are developed, to what degree can conventional capabilities substitute for nuclear capabilities in providing deterrence? What are the limitations?

General CHILTON. Conventional Prompt Global Strike capabilities can provide the President additional options for striking targets promptly at very long ranges without concern over active air defenses. Thus, they can contribute to deterrence by helping to convince an adversary that we can deny them some of the benefits they might seek by attacking us or our allies, and impose costs on them in response to such an attack. However, I do not believe that such conventional PGS capabilities can effectively substitute for the deterrent effect derived from our nuclear forces. Nuclear weapons pose a qualitatively different threat than any conventional strike option. The scale, duration, and inevitability of nuclear weapons effects have a unique deterrent effect, as does the potential for escalation to a large scale nuclear exchange. This is why I have repeatedly stated that conventional PGS capabilities are not a one-for-one substitute, or even a ten-for-one substitute, for nuclear capabilities.

Mr. LAMBORN. Secretary Tauscher, the Administration has repeatedly assured the Congress that no limits would be placed on missile defense. However, Article 5 of the Treaty appears to restrict the conversion of ICBM launchers for use as missile defense silos—as we did with the Ground-based Interceptors at Vandenberg—and restrict the conversion of submarine tubes to fire missile defense interceptors. Is this correct? Why set such limits on missile defense?

Secretary TAUSCHER. The New START Treaty does not constrain the United States from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor does it add any additional cost or inconvenience. Rather, the Treaty enables the President to develop the missile defenses needed to defend the homeland, our deployed forces abroad, and our allies and partners from the threat of ballistic missile attack.

Indeed, Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly, Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), has testified that the New START Treaty places no constraints on current and future plans for ballistic missile defense development or deployment.

Lt. Gen. O’Reilly has made clear that the Article V, paragraph 3 ban on converting ICBM silos to house and launch missile defense interceptors does not constrain MDA’s plans. In 2002, MDA converted ICBM silos to operational silos for launching GBIs because they had not yet developed a silo specifically for GBIs at that time. Since then, MDA has developed a GBI silo that costs $20M less than converting ICBM silos and is easier to protect and maintain. Accordingly, should additional missile defense interceptor launchers be needed, we would build the smaller, much less expensive, tailor-made ground-based interceptor (GBI) silos rather than pursuing the more costly approach of converting ICBM silos.
Article V of the Treaty also prohibits the conversion of existing SLBM launchers into missile defense launchers. As Lt. Gen. O’Reilly stated in his testimony, MDA has examined the concept of launching missile defense interceptors from submarines and found it an operationally unattractive and extremely expensive option in part because submerged submarines are not easily integrated into our nation’s missile defense command and control network. In fact, the United States already has a very good, significantly growing and proven capability for mobile sea-based ballistic missile defense on Aegis-capable ships, which are not constrained by the New START Treaty.

The exhibitions provided for in the Seventh Agreed Statement will avoid ambiguities from arising with respect to converted ICBM silos that now serve as missile defense interceptor launchers at Vandenberg AFB, because the United States will be able to demonstrate that such launchers are no longer capable of holding and launching ICBMs.

It is also important to note that this Treaty provides greater flexibility for the missile defense program than did the START Treaty in several areas. For example, MDA’s intermediate-range LV–2 target booster system, used in key tests to demonstrate homeland defense capabilities and components of the new European Phased Adaptive Approach, was accountable under the previous START Treaty because it employed the first stage of the now-retired Trident I SLBM. Under New START, this missile is not accountable, and MDA will have greater flexibility in conducting testing with regard to launch locations, telemetry collection, and processing, allowing more efficient and realistic testing.

Mr. AMBORN. I am concerned that the Administration may not fully implement its Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) plans for missile defense in Europe, or it may seek to slow down PAA implementation, to avoid Russian withdrawal from the Treaty. What types of activities will the U.S. avoid to diminish the chances that the Russians will withdraw?

Secretary TAUSCHER. None. The United States will take all necessary steps to promote stability and foster cooperation while defending ourselves, our allies and partners, and our interests. With respect to ballistic missile defenses, the United States will continue to develop and deploy missile defenses to defend the homeland against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack and to defend against regional missile threats to U.S. forces, while protecting allies and partners and enabling them to defend themselves.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP

Mr. BISHOP. On page 23 of the Nuclear Posture Review Summary, it states, “The DoD will continue the Minuteman III Life Extension Program with the aim of keeping the fleet in service to 2030, as mandated by Congress. Although a decision on any follow-on ICBM development is not needed for several years, studies to inform that decision are needed now.”

The Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP) just concluded in calendar year 2009. Last year, as part of the FY 10 authorization process, the Air Force acknowledged the military requirement for a so-called “warm line” program to adequately sustain the Minuteman III with regard to the solid rocket boosters. For FY 11, the Air Force only proposes production of 3 Minuteman III boosters, when industry maintains that 6 booster sets are minimally necessary to sustain the industrial base. More disturbingly, the Air Force Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) contains $0 funding for Minuteman III Warm Line sustainment in FY 13 and beyond.

At an earlier hearing this year, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Ms. Michele Flournoy, assured me that the large scale solid rocket motor industrial base issue would be addressed by this Administration more fully in the NPR. However, in reviewing the document made available to me, I cannot determine that it has been addressed at all.

Please explain what is meant exactly by the phrase “DoD will continue the Minuteman III Life Extension Program.”

Dr. MILLER. The phrase refers to the requirements to sustain the Minuteman III (MM III) weapon system through 2030 in accordance with direction in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007. The U.S. Air Force is fully committed to achieving that objective and has budgeted over $1.3B in investments through the FYDP (FY10–FY15) to sustain the MM III weapon system through 2030. Minuteman III Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Warm Line terminates in FY2012 with funding provided only for closeout/environmental cleanup. OSD plans to provide a report to Congress on SRM industrial base sustainment in approximately September, 2010.
Mr. BISHOP. Does the NPR address what number of Minuteman III booster sets are minimally necessary to sustain a viable warm-line sustainment program?

Dr. MILLER. No. The 2010 NPR report does not address quantities of Minuteman III boosters necessary to sustain a viable warm-line sustainment program. It was decided to address this issue via an interagency task force that includes representation from DoD (the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Missile Defense Agency) and NASA. This task force will provide solid rocket motor industrial base sustainment recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for a subsequent report to Congress in approximately September, 2010.

Mr. BISHOP. What specific impacts would termination of NASA's Ares 1 and Ares 5 rocket motors have on the defense solid rocket motor industrial base?

Dr. MILLER. Cancellation of the NASA Constellation program would impact DoD programs that use Solid Rocket Motors (SRMs) to include strategic and tactical missiles, missile defense systems, and solid booster programs for our space launch platforms. These impacts could include cost increases, as component suppliers may have higher costs associated with lower production rates. However, reduction in excess production capacity may, in fact, ultimately create savings for the Department over the longer term.

Section 1078 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 directed the Secretary of Defense to "establish a plan to sustain the solid rocket motor industrial base, including the ability to maintain and sustain currently deployed strategic and missile defense systems and to maintain an intellectual and engineering capacity to support next generation motors, as needed." The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics established an interagency task force, including representation from DoD (the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Missile Defense Agency) and NASA, to address this issue. This task force will provide solid rocket motor industrial base sustainment recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for a Subsequent report to Congress in approximately September, 2010.

Mr. BISHOP. If NASA's proposal to terminate Ares 1 and Ares 5 is approved by Congress, is the DoD confident that the solid rocket motor industrial base will survive and be sufficiently robust to allow for future ICBM modernization options involving solid rocket motors, and what evidence would lead the DoD to having such an assurance?

Dr. MILLER. If the current Minuteman III (MM III) solid rocket motor (SRM) production capability is allowed to lapse, any requirement for follow-on MM III SRM production would include the time and costs required to reinstate a MM III SRM production capability.

Section 1078 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010, directed the Secretary of Defense to "establish a plan to sustain the solid rocket motor industrial base, including the ability to maintain and sustain currently deployed strategic and missile defense systems and to maintain an intellectual and engineering capacity to support next generation motors, as needed." The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics established an interagency task force, including representation from DoD (the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Missile Defense Agency) and NASA, to address this issue. This task force will provide solid rocket motor industrial base sustainment recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for a Subsequent report to Congress in approximately September, 2010.

Mr. BISHOP. Is retention of a healthy large-scale solid rocket motor industrial base of vital strategic importance to the Defense Department of the United States?

Dr. MILLER. DoD relies heavily on large solid rocket motors (SRMs) to provide the propulsion for our strategic systems, missile defense programs, and space launch. DoD relies upon SRMs for its strategic missiles for three primary reasons: rapid employment capability, long-term storability, and safety. The Department is evaluating its current research development and production programs to determine how to adjust the Department's SRM programs to the changing large SRM critical skills and sub-tier supplier base. The Department is committed to sustaining an adequate SRM industrial base to support both our strategic and tactical needs.

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Secretary of Defense for a Subsequent report to Congress in approximately September, 2010.

Mr. BISHOP. Approximately 30 nations rely upon the current U.S. nuclear shield for shared deterrence. How will the security of these U.S. allies be impacted by the U.S. downsizing both warheads and delivery systems as contained in the new START treaty recently signed by the President?

Dr. MILLER. As President Obama stated in Prague last year, we are committed to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter any adversary and guarantee that defense to our allies. Analyses conducted during the Nuclear Posture Review determined that the future U.S. strategic force planned for the New START Treaty will be sufficient to meet U.S. extended deterrence requirements. The security of U.S. allies will not be diminished by the reductions in U.S. strategic nuclear forces mandated by the New START Treaty. Allies have welcomed the outcome of the NPR, as well as the signing of the New START Treaty, with many seeing the Treaty as an important step forward in global nonproliferation efforts. For example, on behalf of NATO Allies, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen welcomed the agreement as an important contribution to arms control, and an inspiration for further progress.

Mr. BISHOP. On page 23 of the Nuclear Posture Review Summary, it states, "The DoD will continue the Minuteman III Life Extension Program with the aim of keeping the fleet in service to 2030, as mandated by Congress. Although a decision on any follow-on ICBM development is not needed for several years, studies to inform that decision are needed now."

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At an earlier hearing this year, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Ms. Michele Flournoy, assured me that the large scale solid rocket motor industrial base issue would be addressed by this Administration more fully in the NPR. However, in reviewing the document made available to me, I cannot determine that it has been addressed at all.

Please explain what is meant exactly by the phrase "DoD will continue the Minuteman III Life Extension Program."

General CHILTON. In the NPR, DoD committed to sustaining Minuteman III through 2030. Analysis conducted by U.S. Strategic Command in coordination with U.S. Air Force indicated Minuteman III is viable and sustainable through 2020. Additional sustainment efforts will be needed to extend operations to 2030. The Air Force is currently collecting data for use in analysis to determine the proper course to sustain our ICBM fleet to 2030. Once USAF completes the analysis, DoD will determine the best set of options to extend Minuteman III to 2030.

Mr. BISHOP. Does the NPR address what number of Minuteman III booster sets are minimally necessary to sustain a viable warm-line sustainment program?

General CHILTON. No, however, the NPR does commit to sustaining Minuteman through 2030. As you are aware, propulsion replacement program was completed in 2009 and a warm-line minimum production program was created to help sustain the industrial base while the Air Force studied the path forward.

Mr. BISHOP. What specific impacts would termination of NASA’s Ares I and Ares 5 rockets have on the defense solid rocket motor industrial base?

General CHILTON. There are no concrete estimates of the potential cost increases associated with the potential termination of Ares production. There is the potential that DoD programs could be impacted and share a larger portion of recurring costs. We look forward to Secretary Carter’s AT&L-led task force study on this issue to inform the Department’s investment strategy to ensure we can meet the nation’s strategic propulsion needs.

Mr. BISHOP. If NASA’s proposal to terminate Ares 1 and Ares 5 is approved by Congress, is the DoD confident that the solid rocket motor industrial base will survive and be sufficiently robust to allow for future ICBM modernization options involving solid rocket motors, and what evidence would lead the DoD to having such an assurance?

General CHILTON. The United States is the world’s premier manufacturer of solid rocket motors. If the industry is required to resize, special emphasis needs to be placed on managing risks and ensuring adequate investment to exercise the entire
design-to-production life cycle so we are prepared to meet the demands of strategic system sustainment and modernization. This is being examined closely by Dr. Carter’s AT&L-led task force and I defer to the results of his study.

Mr. BISHOP. Is retention of a healthy large-scale solid rocket motor industrial base of vital strategic importance to the Defense Department of the United States?

General CHILTON. The solid rocket motor industrial base is being reviewed by AT&L and will result in a full update report to the Congress. A viable solid rocket motor industrial base is a critical part of the broader industrial base needed to maintain safe, secure, and effective strategic force. As is the case with the nuclear weapons enterprise, we need to maintain sufficient and affordable capability and expertise required to recapitalize our deterrent propulsion needs. I am confident Secretary Carter’s AT&L-led task force study on this issue will inform the Department’s investment strategy to ensure we can continue to meet the nation’s strategic propulsion needs.

Mr. BISHOP. Approximately 30 nations rely upon the current U.S. nuclear shield for shared deterrence. How will the security of these U.S. allies be impacted by the U.S. downsizing both warheads and delivery systems as contained in the new START treaty recently signed by the President?

General CHILTON. As part of the development of the U.S. negotiating position in the New START negotiations, U.S. Strategic Command conducted an analysis of our nuclear forces’ capability to meet current employment guidance at reduced force levels. The New START treaty will allow the United States to deploy a nuclear triad capable of meeting that guidance. That guidance was developed with our current extended deterrence commitments in mind. Thus, from the perspective of the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command the reductions required by the New START treaty will not undermine our ability to provide extended deterrence.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. OWENS

Mr. OWENS. Former Secretary of State George Shultz, who served from 1982 to 1989, wrote in the Wall Street Journal that the recent Nuclear Posture Review is “more relevant” than its predecessors that relied on the stockpiling of nuclear weapons alone to deter threats against our country. Would you agree that this Nuclear Posture Review better addresses the modern-day threats facing America and our allies, and how confident are you that it will address those threats ten years from now when the next NPR is set for release?

Secretary TAUSCHER. I agree completely with Mr. Shultz’s characterization of the NPR. Our goal in developing our nuclear posture was to refocus our strategy on the most pressing threats today—nuclear terrorism and proliferation. We cannot address these threats through large stockpiles of nuclear weapons. This Administration’s NPR has adapted our policies to the realities of today’s world by placing these issues of nuclear terrorism and proliferation at the top of our nuclear agenda. In addition, the NPR lays out a strategy for working more closely with our allies, friends, and partners—including former adversaries—to strengthen international security and stability; increasing reliance on non-nuclear capabilities, including missile defense, and providing a necessary increase in the funding for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan that will ensure that the United States retains a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal for as long as nuclear weapons exist.

We are working hard to generate a close, durable relationship with our Russian partners to set the stage for even further reductions. We are also working with China to develop strong ties and mutual understanding that will strengthen international and regional security. However, it is likely that the threats of nuclear terrorism and proliferation will endure over this timeframe. This NPR is a strategy to address these long-term threats, and provides a “roadmap” for continuity in our nuclear posture that future reviews will be able to build upon.