[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
NUCLEAR COOPERATION AND
NON-PROLIFERATION AFTER KHAN AND
IRAN: ARE WE ASKING ENOUGH OF
CURRENT AND FUTURE AGREEMENTS?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 24, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-124
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
______
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York RON PAUL, Texas
DIANE E. WATSON, California JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri MIKE PENCE, Indiana
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, CONNIE MACK, Florida
FloridaAs of 5/6/ JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
10 deg. MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee TED POE, Texas
GENE GREEN, Texas BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
LYNN WOOLSEY, California GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
BARBARA LEE, California
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
JIM COSTA, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Thomas Graham, Jr., Executive Chairman of the
Board, Lightbridge Corporation (Former Special Representative
to the President for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and
Disarmament)................................................... 13
Ms. Sharon Squassoni, Director and Senior Fellow, Proliferation
Prevention Program, Center for Strategic and International
Studies........................................................ 23
Mr. Jamie M. Fly, Executive Director, The Foreign Policy
Initiative..................................................... 36
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Foreign
Affairs: Prepared statement.................................... 4
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Florida: Prepared statement.................. 8
The Honorable Thomas Graham, Jr.: Prepared statement............. 16
Ms. Sharon Squassoni: Prepared statement......................... 25
Mr. Jamie M. Fly: Prepared statement............................. 39
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 60
Hearing minutes.................................................. 61
The Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Missouri: Prepared statement...................... 62
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 63
The Honorable Gene Green, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas: Prepared statement............................. 65
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen: Material submitted for the
record......................................................... 67
Ms. Sharon Squassoni: Material submitted for the record.......... 73
Written responses from the Honorable Thomas Graham, Jr., to
questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Russ
Carnahan....................................................... 78
Written responses from Ms. Sharon Squassoni to questions
submitted for the record by the Honorable Russ Carnahan........ 79
Written responses from the Honorable Thomas Graham, Jr., to
questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Barbara
Lee, a Representative in Congress from the State of California. 83
Written responses from Ms. Sharon Squassoni to questions
submitted for the record by the Honorable Barbara Lee.......... 86
NUCLEAR COOPERATION AND NON-PROLIFERATION AFTER KHAN AND IRAN: ARE WE
ASKING ENOUGH OF CURRENT AND FUTURE AGREEMENTS?
----------
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 2010
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard L. Berman
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Berman. The committee will come to order. There is
no particular reason why you would know, since I didn't know
until this morning, but the House recessed for the week last
night. So your testimony is greatly valued, but there will only
be a few of us here to value it. But we will get the word out
to everybody because a number of members have gone back to
their districts.
The committee will come to order. In a moment I will
recognize myself and the ranking member for up to 7 minutes
each for the purposes of making an opening statement. I will
then, if they are here, recognize the chair and ranking members
of the Terrorism, Nonproliferation, deg. and Trade
Subcommittee for 3 minutes each to make their opening
statements. We have to end today's hearing by noon because of
another matter that members of the committee who are here will
be participating in.
Without objection, all other members can submit opening
statements for the record.
The Atomic Energy Act requires that this committee hold
hearings on pending U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements with
other nations. Today's hearing fulfills that requirement for
the Australia and Russia agreements, which were submitted to
the Congress in May.
However, this hearing is really intended to serve a larger
purpose--to consider changes that might be made in future
nuclear cooperation agreements, and to the Atomic Energy Act
itself.
The global non-proliferation regime has received two major
jolts in the last 6 years. The first was the revelation that
Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan had been running a clandestine
nuclear black market, which accelerated the spread of sensitive
nuclear facilities and nuclear weapon designs around the world.
The second has come from one of Khan's clients, Iran, where
centrifuges obtained from the Khan network continue to spin,
making enriched uranium that could be refined into fuel for
nuclear bombs.
U.S. non-proliferation policies are adapting to counter
these shocks to the global system. Congress has played a role
in this effort by passing legislation, including the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010. This law is already helping to ratchet up the
economic pressure on Tehran, raising the cost for its defiance
of the world's demand that it cease its illicit and dangerous
nuclear activities.
Regrettably, U.S. law and policy regarding civil nuclear
cooperation with other countries has not undergone a similar
evolution. The Atomic Energy Act was last amended in 1978 when
Congress added the current set of nine conditions that any
nuclear cooperation agreement--also known as 123 agreements--
must satisfy. Many argue--and I believe with great
justification--that the law is now sorely out of date.
Many suggestions have been offered to update the Atomic
Energy Act for the post-Khan, post-Iran environment. Some of
these include: A requirement for the foreign government to have
agreed to and implemented the IAEA'S additional protocol for
safeguards, which gives the IAEA more authority to inspect the
country's nuclear-related activities and facilities; another
suggestion is that the recipient country be willing to accept
near-real-time video monitoring of its IAEA safeguarded
facilities and activities, if the agency thinks it would be
useful to verify that no diversion of nuclear material from
civil purposes has occurred; if the recipient is a state that
supplies civil nuclear technology to other countries, that its
policies, practices, and regulations are comparable to, or at
least do not undermine, U.S. law and policy; and if the
recipient country, if it doesn't already possess uranium
enrichment and/or spent-fuel reprocessing facilities, undertake
a legally-binding commitment not to engage in such activities
or develop such facilities.
We have had five new or renewed nuclear cooperation
agreements submitted to Congress in the last 4 years--and one
before us today, Russia, twice. We will be seeing a raft of new
or renewed nuclear cooperation agreements in the next 4. Nine
existing agreements will expire between 2012 and 2015,
including the U.S. agreement with China; presumably, all those
will be renegotiated and submitted to Congress for review. We
may see new agreements with Jordan and Vietnam in the next
Congress. That makes at least 11 new or renewed agreements. In
addition, the U.S. has concluded Memorandums of Understanding
with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and we could eventually see
nuclear cooperation agreements with them, as well.
Given all this, it is clearly time to review whether U.S.
nuclear cooperation agreements are fully serving U.S. and
global non-proliferation objectives. This hearing continues a
process begun by Mr. Sherman and the Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, deg. and Trade Subcommittee at their
hearing in May on the future of nuclear cooperation agreements.
The linkage between civil and military nuclear applications
has never been clearer, or more pressing. The key linchpins are
uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing facilities.
For the majority of nuclear power reactors, natural uranium
needs to be ``enriched.'' This is usually accomplished through
the use of highly-sophisticated centrifuges--exactly what Iran,
by way of Khan, is using. Unfortunately, the same basic process
can be used to produce highly enriched uranium that can be used
in a bomb. Another process--called ``reprocessing''--allows
weapons-grade plutonium to be extracted from spent reactor
fuel.
The Khan network trafficked in the technology and hardware
of enrichment to Iran, Libya, North Korea, and possibly
elsewhere. In 2004, 2 months after the network was exposed,
President Bush announced that the U.S. would seek to prevent
the spread of enrichment or reprocessing facilities to any
state that did not already possess such technologies.
Regrettably, this approach ran into an immediate wall of
opposition from many developing countries, which viewed it as
an effort to deny their ``inalienable right'' to the benefits
of peaceful nuclear energy under the NPT. The Bush effort was
soon abandoned, and replaced by a drive to convince other
members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to institute more-
restrictive criteria when deciding whether to transfer
enrichment and reprocessing technology to others.
In this context, it is worth highlighting the importance of
the recent U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement with the UAE. On
its own, the UAE decided to forswear enrichment and processing,
and agreed to make that a legally-binding commitment in the
nuclear cooperation agreement itself.
Even though the UAE ultimately decided to purchase nuclear
reactors from a Korean vendor, the commitment in the U.S.-UAE
agreement applies unconditionally, regardless of who provides
equipment and material to the UAE.
The State Department has since described this agreement as
the ``Gold Standard'' for such agreements, and I agree. The
U.S. should seek the same commitment for every nuclear
cooperation agreement that it negotiates in all regions of the
world. We should also consider making this an additional
statutory requirement in the Atomic Energy Act.
I am going to put the rest of my opening statement into the
record because my time has expired, and yield to the ranking
member.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Berman follows:]
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Let me begin by expressing my great
disappointment regarding the missing subject of today's
hearing; namely, the proposed nuclear cooperation agreement
with Russia. As we understand it, the administration, despite
being informed of this hearing weeks in advance, has refused to
provide a witness. The result? The Russia and Australia
agreements will not be addressed. Apparently, it is as simple
as that. As a result, this committee is in danger of violating
the statutory requirements in section 123(d) of the Atomic
Energy Act which states that during the current period of
congressional review, ``the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate shall each hold hearings on the proposed
agreements for cooperation and submit a report to the
respective bodies recommending whether it should be approved or
disapproved.''
Mr. Chairman, this hearing does not fulfill the statutory
requirement to hold a hearing on the Russia 123 and Australia
123 Agreements. You can call it whatever you wish, but it does
not fulfill the requirement.
We can understand why the executive branch wanted to kill a
hearing on the Russia 123 Agreement. Certainly, none of us who
have been following the overtures to the Russian Government,
including the removal of sanctions on Russian entities
assisting Iran's nuclear missile program, are surprised. After
all, it is abundantly clear that the Russia 123 Agreement is a
political payoff to the Russians, pure and simple, and cannot
be defended on its merits.
The administration has as much admitted this by promoting
the nuclear deal as part of the ``reset'' of our relationship.
But the U.S. has no business engaging in nuclear cooperation
with any country with a record like Russia's, especially one
that continues to provide assistance to Iran's nuclear program.
From the outset, there has been strong opposition by many
Members in both Chambers to the Russia 123 Agreement, even
prior to its first submission to Congress by President Bush in
May 2008. The principal objection has been the inability of the
previous and the current administrations to certify that the
Russian Government, businesses, and individuals were no longer
assisting Iran's nuclear and missile program and that the
Russian Government was fully cooperating with the U.S. in our
efforts to stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
Does that not sound reasonable? Are these not the types of
requirements that should be met before a country is rewarded
with a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States?
Faced with the reality that both administrations were
determined to push through this agreement regardless of Russian
behavior, and to say nothing about similarly troubling
agreements such as the one with the United Arab Emirates, it
has fallen to Congress to shore up U.S. non-proliferation
policy. Even before President Obama resubmitted the Russia 123
Agreement to Congress in May of this year, Chairman Berman and
I, along with several other members of the committee,
introduced H.R. 2194, the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act,
subsequently known as the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act, or CISADA, which was signed
into law, as we know, on July 1. The House-passed legislation
included a prohibition on the entry into force of any 123
agreement with any country that was assisting Iran's nuclear
missile and other weapons program.
Now, while the administration requested that this be
removed and while the provision was weakened as the bill
proceeded through the House and the Senate conference
discussions, some limitations did survive. A key provision of
the act prohibits the issuance of export licenses or approval
of transfers under a 123 agreement for any country whose
nationals have engaged in assisting Iran's nuclear weapons and
missiles program, among others.
Nevertheless, the Russia 123 Agreement is moving forward.
The political pressure driving the agreement was underscored by
the latest report from GAO, the Government Accountability
Office, regarding the Nuclear Proliferation Assessment
Statement, or NPAS, that is required of all 123 agreements. The
GAO had found in its previous report on the Russia 123
Agreement submitted in 2008 by President Bush that the original
NPAS had been rushed through the vetting process and that the
intelligence agencies in particular had not been given
sufficient time or opportunity to thoroughly review the final
assessment. Then, in the report released last week on the most
recent NPAS submitted by the Obama administration, GAO found
that its recommendations to prevent a repeat of this flawed
preview had not been fully implemented and that once again the
process had been rushed to meet a suddenly urgent political
deadline. It's deja vu all over again.
So just what has the reset gotten us? Well, the nuclear
fuel is being loaded into the Bushehr reactor, which certainly
makes the Iranians very happy. And Russia has reiterated that
it wants to build several more reactors for Iran.
But the problem is far broader than simply Iran's nuclear
program, as disturbing as that might be. Just last week, Russia
announced it would proceed with the delivery of anti-ship
missiles and other weapons to Syria, despite U.S. protests that
these destabilizing weapons are a threat to the region and
especially to our ally, Israel. Brushing U.S. concerns aside,
Russia has said it will likely sell even more advanced weapons
to Syria even though that country continues to arm Hezbollah
and pursue chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.
I wish we had the opportunity today to have the
administration explain Russia's behavior, give us assurances
that Congress will be provided with the information members
have repeatedly sought on Russia's cooperation regarding Iran
and other adversaries, and reassure us that the provisions of
CISADA and Iran non-proliferation sanctions laws will be
faithfully implemented and enforced. But it appears that this
committee's responsibilities are to be determined by the
Department of State, and members will simply have to accept
that.
I hope that our constituents will let us know how well they
think we are carrying out our oath of office.
Turning to the expert witnesses before us today, we look
forward to receiving your recommendations on this vital
subject. And I have the rest of my opening statement to be
placed into the record.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent, if you please, to
enter into the record written testimony and two short articles
by Henry Sokolski on the subject of today's hearing. Mr.
Sokolski is not able to be here today, but is well known to
this committee both as a valuable witness and a trusted
resource. I look forward to working with him on revising the
Atomic Energy Act and other measures to strengthen U.S. non-
proliferation policy.
I thank the chair.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ros-Lehtinen follows:]
Chairman Berman. As to the Sokolski statements, without
objection, they will be introduced and included in the record
of this hearing.
Now I am pleased to recognize the ranking member of the
Terrorism, Nonproliferation, deg. and Trade
Subcommittee, Mr. Royce of California.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to make
three quick points.
First, I would just join the ranking member in her
observation and her concerns over the administration's absence
today. The administration really should be here to discuss and
debate the pending nuclear agreements, especially with Russia.
This is a very difficult time for nuclear non-proliferation.
The blurry line between commercial and military use of nuclear
technology makes it possible to run right up in having that
capability to manufacture nuclear fuel and then you are just
one step away from having a nuclear weapon. And that is because
the NPT has been distorted, really, to allow that practice.
I am glad that Mr. Henry Sokolski's testimony is being put
in the record. There are many out there in think tanks that
have looked at this that have urged the U.S. and the
international communities to address this issue in the past
because that is the game that Iran is playing here.
It is very unfortunate that the past administrations and
that the Obama administration has done nothing to challenge
this very critical weakness. I am not sure it is a weakness of
the NPT. It is the way in which it is being interpreted. Right?
It is the assertion. Congress needs to be more involved in
nuclear export policy.
We should pass legislation to reclaim powers surrendered to
the executive back when the world was a much simpler place. And
we should be made to positively, not passively, okay a 123
agreement.
The administration has embarked on striking a nuclear
agreement with Vietnam. It is reported that we would allow
Vietnam to manufacture nuclear fuel and that there would be no
requirement that it beef up IAEA nuclear inspections; in other
words, the additional protocol. That would be far from a model
agreement if we do that that way.
Vietnam's human rights record is abysmal. I have a
resolution calling on the State Department to designate that
country as a country of particular concern for its religious
persecution, and I think the State Department so far has
resisted this. I would suggest to our diplomats that they can
press human rights aggressively and still deal with nuclear
issues. It is called using leverage and standing up for human
dignity.
Lastly, the title of this hearing, which is ``Nuclear
Cooperation and Non-Proliferation after Khan and Iran,'' that
is basically a focus on the notorious Pakistani proliferator,
A.Q. Khan. Pakistan greatly damaged global security by allowing
this rogue free rein in that country. China's plan to build
another two nuclear reactors in Pakistan violates Nuclear
Suppliers Group rules. It should be stopped.
I remember years ago raising the issue of the ring magnets
that China was transferring to Pakistan to develop a nuclear
weapon. That was obviously what was intended on the part of
Pakistan. And now we know that yes, China's responsibility in
proliferation, and that gave rise to the capability of
Pakistan, which subsequently trumped China's irresponsibility
with its own because that knew no limits in terms of A.Q.
Khan's ability to proliferate.
So the fact that A.Q. Khan, supposedly Pakistan's most
popular man, 2 weeks ago went on Pakistani television and spoke
about his future as the nation's President--as the nation's
President--that should be more than troubling to us in terms of
Pakistan and the future. The government there just is not a
responsible nuclear power. That needs to be addressed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired. I
think regular order would require me now to introduce the
witnesses rather than respond to all the things that are said,
and so I think I will do that.
Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr. is executive chairman of the
board of the Lightbridge Corporation and is a former special
representative for arms control, non-proliferation, and
disarmament to President Clinton. He was general counsel of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for 15 years. He has
advised five U.S. Presidents on these issues and led the U.S.
delegation in 1995 that achieved the permanent extension of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Sharon Squassoni is a senior fellow and director of the
Proliferation Prevention Program at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies. Prior to joining CSIS, Ms. Squassoni
was a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for National
Peace. Ms. Squassoni served as an adviser to Congress from 2002
to 2007 as a senior specialist in weapons of mass destruction
at the Congressional Research Service and was director of
policy coordination for the Nonproliferation Bureau at State.
Did I pronounce your name right? Okay.
Jamie Fly is executive director of the Foreign Policy
Initiative, a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization to promote
U.S. international engagement. Prior to joining the FPI, Mr.
Fly served in the Bush administration at the National Security
Council as the director for counterproliferation strategy and
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He was an assistant
for transnational threats policy.
It is really an excellent panel on a very important
subject.
Ambassador Graham, why don't you begin with your testimony.
Your entire statements will be included in the record. So
feel free to summarize as you choose.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE THOMAS GRAHAM, JR., EXECUTIVE
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, LIGHTBRIDGE CORPORATION (FORMER SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ARMS CONTROL, NON-
PROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT)
Ambassador Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to
say to you, Mr. Chairman, and to Ms. Ros-Lehtinen and other
members of the committee how pleased and happy I am to be here.
I have been coming to this committee off and on for many, many
years, back into the eighties, and it is always a pleasure. I
have known your staff assistant, David Fite, for many years and
it has been a pleasure working with him.
Today's subject, principal subject, is the 123 agreement
concept in the context of non-proliferation. So I am going to
talk a little bit about non-proliferation first and then move
into the way I see the 123 agreement issue and then perhaps at
the end a few comments on Russia and Australia.
John F. Kennedy, when he was President, in a press
interview in 1963, said that he was haunted by the concern that
by 1970 there would be 10 nuclear weapon states in the world
and by 1975, 15 or 20. He said he regarded that as the
``greatest possible danger and hazard.'' I think those words
are ones that are worth remembering.
Later on, Mohamed ElBaradei, the distinguished Director
General of the IAEA, opined that more than 40 countries have
the capability to build nuclear weapons. If nuclear weapons had
spread that widely, every conflict would have run the risk of
escalation into nuclear weapons and it would have been very
difficult to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of
terrorists they would be so widespread. It would have created a
security situation that would have made today's world seem like
paradise to have nuclear weapons all over the world, such as
President Kennedy feared.
But the principal reason that this didn't happen--and it
didn't happen, as we all know--was the 1970 entry into force of
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, accompanied by the
extended deterrence policies of the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
Really, only two countries have acquired nuclear weapons since
that date. Israel already had a nascent capability in 1970, as
did India, and you can add Pakistan and North Korea to that
list--far from what President Kennedy feared.
But the NPT is based on a central bargain: Non-
proliferation for most of the world in exchange for nuclear
disarmament and peaceful nuclear cooperation by the NPT nuclear
weapon states. There has been a lot of difficulty in
implementing the commitment by the nuclear weapon states to
effectively pursue disarmament. The number one disarmament
issue that the nonnuclear weapon states wanted was the
comprehensive test ban. It goes back to 1968. We still don't
have it today. There was fissile material cutoff. We still
don't have that today. Much of the disarmament agenda that was
the quid pro quo for preventing nuclear weapons from spreading
all over the world has not been realized.
The other half of the obligations of the nuclear weapon
states--peaceful cooperation--has gone better. In my judgment,
it is important to support that process, not only for its own
sake but for the health of the NPT bargain.
We now are concerned as a society, as a world community,
about climate change. As a result, it is quite possible that
nuclear power will spread more widely than before. This is
consistent with the NPT, as I just indicated. But if this is to
happen, it is very important that we safeguard the non-
proliferation norm.
The standard 123 agreement that the U.S. uses follows
closely NPT obligations and thus doesn't have things in it such
as a prohibition on uranium enrichment. But while this has
worked well for years, perhaps it is in today's world no longer
sufficient.
The United Arab Emirates has embarked on a very significant
nuclear program. They are in the business of selling oil and
they import gas. In a few years they will face a great energy
shortfall. They didn't want to use coal. They looked at all
technologies and settled on nuclear energy as the soundest and
best choice for them to make on economic grounds. But they
wanted to make their anticipated quite large program a model. I
have heard that from many UAE officials, beginning with the
Crown Prince.
Working with Lightbridge Corporation, my company, the UAE
forswore, first on a nationally legally binding basis, and then
on an internationally legally binding basis uranium enrichment
and plutonium reprocessing. That obligation, as was stated a
few moments ago, is in the U.S.-UAE 123 Agreement, but it is
not yet a model as had been anticipated.
The NPT is the centerpiece of world security. Article VI,
even with President Obama's strong commitment, remains
uncertain. It is important that Article IV remain strong to
help the NPT. We need nuclear power now more than ever, but
proliferation remains a serious threat.
With respect to the specific issues, certainly a
requirement that the IAEA additional protocol added to the 123
agreement could be a useful addition. The United Arab Emirates
made it clear that it hoped its program, including the non-
proliferation commitments that they have made, which are
enshrined in the U.S.-UAE 123 Agreement, would be a model for
others. Thus far it has not been. There are no indications that
U.S. 123 agreements with other countries will follow this
model. But they should. While, of course, recognizing in some
cases there are difficulties.
It is not desirable that enrichment and reprocessing
technology spread more widely, as Mr. Royce said in his
comments. This is an issue on which both President Bush and
President Obama agree. Other efforts, such as the nuclear fuel
bank at the International Atomic Energy Agency, have been
pursued to reduce the incentive for additional countries to
acquire the full fuel cycle. Legislation requiring that the UAE
model be followed in future 123 agreements, perhaps absent
Presidential waiver, could help further to inhibit the spread
of fuel cycle technology. In my judgment, it is a good idea. In
today's interdependent world, such a change would make sense
and new technology can work with a non-proliferation system to
make nuclear power even more available to serve humanity, as
envisioned by the NPT.
So I applaud very much the committee's interest in this
subject and urge you to pursue it.
With respect to the Russian agreement, in my judgment, the
adoption of the U.S.-Russia 123 Agreement will correct an
historical anomaly. I understand the politics and the
difficulties we had 2 years ago and at other times. But
nevertheless, we traditionally over many years have done more
nuclear trade, more nuclear work with Russia than any other
country, both trade and cooperation.
There was a program nearly 20 years ago now called Megatons
to Megawatts. It has resulted in some 15,000 Russian nuclear
weapons being dismantled, the HEU and the weapons blended down,
which now provides about 50 percent of the nuclear fuel in U.S.
nuclear reactors. I was part of the delegation that negotiated
that agreement. But there were many other examples. And Russia
is our number one non-proliferation partner.
I have heard from many serious analysts of the situation,
such as former Secretary Defense Bill Perry, that we could be
on the verge of a whole new wave of proliferation. As has been
mentioned earlier, we have everything that A.Q. Khan did. We
have the Iranian situation, we have the North Korean situation,
and the possibility that those countries could trigger wider
proliferation throughout the Middle East or Northeast Asia.
Chairman Berman. Ambassador Graham, if you could just bring
it to a conclusion.
Ambassador Graham. 1 minute. In my judgment, we can't
succeed with our non-proliferation program without the help of
Russia. They are indispensable, and I think it is important to
have this agreement with them.
Australia has always had an outstanding non-proliferation
record, and they have a significant nuclear industry that
serves themselves and many other countries.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Graham follows:]
Chairman Berman. Thank you, Ambassador.
Ms. Squassoni.
STATEMENT OF MS. SHARON SQUASSONI, DIRECTOR AND SENIOR FELLOW,
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Ms. Squassoni. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ros-
Lehtinen, and members of the committee, for inviting me to
speak today about nuclear cooperation and non-proliferation. I
have a prepared statement that I would like to submit for the
record.
Chairman Berman. It will be included in its entirely in the
record.
Ms. Squassoni. Thank you. May I also submit for the record
an article from the Arms Control Today on the impact of the
U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement.
Chairman Berman. Without objection, that will be included.
Ms. Squassoni. Thank you.
I focus my remarks today on the challenges of restricting
transfers of uranium enrichment and reprocessing. We have been
working on this for decades, but the task is more urgent today,
as you have noted, because of A.Q. Khan and Iran and because
more states are interested in acquiring nuclear power and less
interested in restricting their fuel cycle options.
One exception to this is the United Arab Emirates, which
agreed to rely on the international fuel market and not to
develop domestic enrichment or reprocessing. I say it is an
exception because other countries don't appear to be following
its lead.
As the path-breaker for nuclear energy in the Middle East,
the UAE had much to gain. Other STATES that follow have less to
gain, and all have other nuclear supply options. Jordan has
signed nine nuclear cooperation agreements, but none yet with
the United States. It is considering reactors offered by
Canada, Russia, and Japan, and none of those suppliers will be
seeking commitments to forego enrichment and reprocessing by
Jordan.
This U.S. bilateral approach appears to be losing momentum
elsewhere. Turkey and Vietnam apparently do not intend to give
up their fuel cycle rights, which Turkey made very clear in a
most recent Nuclear Suppliers Group plenary meeting in June.
Well, if the U.S. can't do this alone, how does it seek to
persuade other suppliers to join it? The International
Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation--it is a funny
acronym, IFNEC, which is the successor to the Global Energy
Nuclear Partnership, that is one approach, and the other
approach is the Nuclear Suppliers Group. IFNEC, like its
predecessor, does not require partners to give up any rights.
Unless IFNEC promotes cradle-to-grave fuel supply, that is,
where countries are provided incentives to rely on the
international market, its value in this area will be extremely
limited.
As for the Nuclear Suppliers Group, 6 years of discussion
on new criteria for sensitive transfers have yielded no
consensus. At this point, the new criteria appear less helpful
than the old policy of restraint.
I would like to make one other point about the UAE
agreement as a model. This agreement included advance consent
for storage and/or reprocessing the UAE's spent fuel abroad,
and this is a unique feature in an agreement for a state like
the UAE. It would be unfortunate if other states concluded from
this that even modest reliance on nuclear power could require
reprocessing for spent fuel management. Reprocessing is costly,
creates more and different radioactive waste streams, and is
unnecessary.
Before my recommendations, I would like to briefly comment
on the Russian and Australia 123 Agreements. The Russian
agreement is critical to several U.S. objectives, especially
pursuing this kind of cradle-to-grave fuel supply system. It is
necessary but not sufficient. Russia and other states will need
to be persuaded to become such full service suppliers.
The Australian agreement is vital for another reason. As
Ambassador Graham pointed out, the U.S. procures significant
uranium supplies from Australia.
I have a longer list of recommendations in my prepared
statement, but I will summarize them here.
The additional protocol is a critical component of the non-
proliferation regime. All U.S. 123 agreements should require
it, and so should the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Congress should
amend the Atomic Energy Act to include the additional protocol
as a requirement in Section 123. To get agreement at the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, the U.S. should abandon current
discussions on enrichment and reprocessing criteria, which have
gotten in the way of NSG consensus on the additional protocol.
My second recommendation is that we should focus
internationally on the full nuclear fuel cycle and on
multilateral solutions. It is not enough to suggest that
cradle-to-grave fuel cycle assurances would be a good thing. We
need to create opportunities in this country and abroad. And if
you were listening to the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's
Nuclear Future this week, we heard some of these
recommendations to that group.
The U.S. should explore paths to ending national ownership
of uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities. It is not
enough to require new facilities to be multinational, since
this would be viewed as discriminatory. An agreement that
ensured that all facilities would be required to be
multinational would reduce the risks of states developing
latent nuclear weapons capabilities and then breaking out of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
A fissile material production cutoff treaty could include
such a provision. So structured, the FMCT could fulfill both
its disarmament and non-proliferation missions, level the
playing field, and help ease the tension within the NPT about
perceived rights to fuel cycle capabilities.
And lastly, Congress and the executive branch need to
implement current legislation and close some gaps. Funding,
implementing, and monitoring Title V of the 1978 Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act, which requires the U.S. to conduct
nonnuclear energy cooperation and energy assessment assistance
with developing states, could provide incentives for developing
countries to focus on nonnuclear solutions to their electricity
needs, and this would take the pressure off somewhat the non-
proliferation regime.
Finally, there is a provision in the Arms Export Control
Act, the so-called Symington Amendment, that restricts foreign
military and export assistance to countries that deliver or
receive enrichment equipment, materials, or technology unless
the recipient has full-scope safeguards and unless the supplier
and recipient have agreed to place all such items under
multilateral auspices and management when available. This
provision could be tightened by deleting the phrase ``when
available.'' If we are serious about multinationalizing the
fuel cycle, this could help.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Squassoni follows:]
Chairman Berman. Thank you.
Mr. Fly.
STATEMENT OF MR. JAMIE M. FLY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE FOREIGN
POLICY INITIATIVE
Mr. Fly. Thank you. I would like to begin by thanking
Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, and other members
of the committee for the invitation to appear today at this
very important hearing.
I am going to summarize key points from my written
testimony. The main point I want to convey today is that I
increasingly fear that we are on the precipice of proliferation
of nuclear weapons unlike anything we have witnessed since the
development of the atomic bomb. Ambassador Graham went into
some of the historical points about this issue, and others have
noted the jolt to the non-proliferation regime that we have
witnessed in recent years.
In addition to those that have already been mentioned, I
would like to add to that North Korea's actions over the last
decade. We have seen North Korea withdraw from the NPT, develop
nuclear weapons, transfer sensitive nuclear technology to
Syria, a state sponsor of terrorism, and now possibly do the
same thing with Burma, according to press reports. This action
by North Korea has added to the concerns that we should
currently have because of the actions of A.Q. Khan and Iran's
continued illicit nuclear weapons program.
Administrations of both political parties have failed to
prevent this proliferation, so this should not be a partisan
issue. My fear going forward is that in addition to just
failing to prevent this proliferation, we are contributing to
the problem by failing to refute the notion that all states
have the right to sensitive nuclear technology and processes,
and this will result in an additional cascade of proliferation,
especially if Iran develops nuclear weapons.
That is why it is so important for this committee and this
Congress to engage in a serious debate about our nuclear
cooperation policy.
The fact that we are meeting today to in part discuss the
Australia and Russia 123 Agreements without anyone from the
executive branch present, I believe says much about what is
wrong with the current state of affairs with the Atomic Energy
Act.
In my written testimony I go into greater detail about
concerns that I have with the timing of the Russia 123
Agreement. Some of the facts are that Russia still occupies
Georgian territory and continues to threaten its neighbors,
including our NATO allies. Despite the positive step this week,
where Russia announced that for now it will not fulfill its
contract to deliver the advanced S-300 air defense system to
Iran, other Russian officials have announced they will still
maintain their extensive military relationship with Iran, and
as others have noted, Russia recently announced that they would
send advanced cruise missiles to Syria.
There are ongoing questions about past Russian assistance
to Iran's nuclear program and, as others have already noted,
its cooperation with the nuclear reactor at Bushehr.
In recent weeks, on the human rights front, we have
witnessed a series of crackdowns on the Russian political
opposition. Prime Minister Putin, who is widely rumored to be
on his way back to the presidency in 2012, was quoted as saying
that peaceful protesters would ``be beaten upside the head with
a truncheon, and that's it.''
I believe all of this should give us pause and should mean
that we have a serious debate, including administration
officials explaining how the U.S.-Russia 123 Agreement fits
into our overall strategy toward Russia and why it is in our
interest to conclude it now.
Moving beyond Russia, I have four recommendations about how
this committee and Congress can ensure that we have a more
fulsome debate about future 123 agreements as well as actions
Congress could take to move away from the nuclear precipice I
described at the outset.
My first recommendations deg. has already been
mentioned by others. It is to modify the Atomic Energy Act to
allow greater congressional scrutiny of future 123 agreements.
As Congress did with the U.S.-India agreement, I would suggest
that Congress require an up-or-down vote on all agreements that
do not conform to the UAE model, and as others again have
noted, I believe that this is especially important given press
reports about the agreement in the works with Vietnam.
My second recommendation is that we as a country need to
get serious about stopping proliferation. I, unfortunately,
believe that administrations of both parties have become
fundamentally unserious about punishing proliferators. The
current administration's focus on disarmament and nuclear
security is only one aspect of the problem. We must punish
proliferators severely. I think that we as a country have
failed to use the case of Syria as a teachable moment. To this
date, under my understanding, there have been no Syrian
entities designated by the U.S. Government for their
construction of an illicit nuclear reactor. North Korean
entities have been designated, but some of them only years
after the fact.
I would suggest that the committee explore ways to make
sanctions automatic in such cases or require the executive
branch to designate certain entities and individuals involved
in proliferation or to justify to the Congress why they are
unable to do so.
My third recommendation is to restore the balance between
proliferation concerns and promotion of the U.S. Nuclear
industry. I do not think that we should be chasing after the
latest exotic market just because other countries' nuclear
industries are entering. We also need to work with countries
expressing an interest in nuclear energy to determine if it is
truly in their best interest, and I would suggest the committee
explore options for using international companies' interest in
operating in the United States to hold them to certain
standards.
I also would suggest to the U.S. Nuclear industry that they
first focus on existing markets before expanding. I was
recently on a trip through Central Europe where two of our
allies have bids out for nuclear reactors, and I heard frequent
complaints that U.S. companies are not doing enough to compete
for their business.
My fourth and final recommendation is that we should take
all actions necessary to prevent Iran from developing nuclear
weapons. If Iran goes nuclear, others in the region will
follow, including several U.S. allies currently interested in
civilian nuclear cooperation. The only way to avoid this
scenario is to prevent Iran from reaching that point.
The committee has passed significant legislation invoking
sanctions on Iran, but to date we have not been successful in
altering Tehran's calculus. I would thus advocate a serious
exploration by the Obama administration and this Congress of
all available remaining options, including the use of military
force, because the consequences of a nuclear Iran are truly
unthinkable.
Mr. Chairman, the challenges we face in this area are truly
unprecedented, but by recognizing that we need a serious
bipartisan examination of the pros and cons of future nuclear
cooperation agreements, I believe we can take a small step
toward a more sensible U.S. non-proliferation policy.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fly follows:]
Chairman Berman. Well, thank you, and thank all of you very
much. There are a lot of suggestions in all of that.
I will yield myself 5 minutes to begin the questioning.
I want to focus on a point that Ms. Squassoni referred to,
and her written testimony lays it out a little more fully, but
I think it is good to get all of you commenting on it.
Mr. Fly's testimony perhaps was a little broader, but I
think all of you seem to think that--well, let me ask you. Do
you buy, as a legal matter, the notion that the rights under
the NPT and the right to peaceful nuclear energy demands there
be a right to in-country enrichment and reprocessing?
I know one individual who has been mentioned here, Henry
Sokolski, has argued for a long time that that is not a right
within the meaning of the treaty. I am curious about your
opinions on that.
Ambassador Graham.
Ambassador Graham. Well, I regret differing with Henry
Sokolski, but the negotiating record of the NPT makes it
abundantly clear in spades over and over and over again that
many countries, such as Germany, Spain, Switzerland, would not
have joined the NPT if the Article IV inalienable right and
other inalienable right language and other provisions did not
give them access to that.
Chairman Berman. Access to?
Ambassador Graham. To sensitive nuclear technology, among
other things, not just that. But then after the NPT, the
Zangger Committee was created to provide some limitation on
such access, and then subsequently the Nuclear Suppliers Group
put still more constraints on it. The NPT itself does give that
right, but it has been significantly limited by the evolution
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
Chairman Berman. Do any of you disagree with that? Ms.
Squassoni.
Ms. Squassoni. I would just add to Tom's statement that
when the NPT was under negotiation gaseous diffusion was the
technology for uranium enrichment. It was incredibly expensive,
a huge industrial undertaking, and so the assumption there was
that many states would not go down that route. Clearly, that
has changed over the years, and I suppose because I am maybe a
purist on arms control, having worked for Tom at ACDA many
years ago, that it is better not to approach this problem as
taking away a right but to level the playing field. We should
come to an understanding as an international community that
this is a sensitive technology, and multinationalize it for
everyone.
Chairman Berman. Mr. Fly, do you have anything to add to
that?
Mr. Fly. I certainly would not question Ambassador Graham's
knowledge on this issue. I would just say, even if it is a
right under the NPT, going back to what was in my statement, I
believe it is imperative that we work with other countries that
want this technology to find alternatives, as Ms. Squassoni
just mentioned, whether it is fuel banks, multinational
enrichment centers, things like that. I think those are the
ways that we should go.
Chairman Berman. Taking that then to the point that Ms.
Squassoni specifically addressed in her testimony, what is our
leverage to get the UAE-type of provision not simply as part of
our agenda for new nuclear cooperation agreements, such as we
are now negotiating with Jordan and Vietnam, but to get other
countries who are being approached to have nuclear cooperation
agreements with these countries to insist on the same
provision, and what is our leverage to in a sense--how central
is a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States to
these countries' pursuit of nuclear energy?
Ambassador.
My time is--I am going to be a little looser, if it is all
right. That is my last question, but I would like to hear the
answers, and we will give, obviously, the other members the
same latitude.
So why don't we just answer that question?
Ambassador Graham. Mr. Chairman, that is a very important
question that to accurately answer it would take a small book,
but it is a very important question and one that needs to be
thought about very carefully. It is different for different
countries. A country like the UAE, it wants to demonstrate its
close relationship with the United States. It wants to
demonstrate that it is not pursuing this technology because of
Iran. It is because they want the nuclear power. There are
reasons why it makes sense for them.
I think that kind of argument might apply to some other
countries in that region, but perhaps not all. The issue is, of
course that--and this actually came out in the NPT
negotiations, to which I referred to before--as the Italian
delegate said that we have one level of discrimination with
nuclear weapons; we shouldn't have another with the fuel cycle.
So many countries see the fuel cycle as their sovereign
right, even though they don't intend to ever utilize it. I
don't know if there is any sort of magic formula. I think it is
probably just that the United States should champion this
outcome and should try to persuade, as Sharon said, some of our
allies, who are suppliers, that this is good for everybody,
that fuel cycle technology has spread far enough, and gradually
try to persuade countries such as Jordan that it would be a
good thing for them in various ways and then make the same
argument with countries in Asia.
For many countries, having an agreement with the United
States is politically a good thing. That can help. Not all
countries, but many.
But it is a very important question and one that needs
careful analysis and answer in detail.
Chairman Berman. Ms. Squassoni.
Ms. Squassoni. I agree largely with Ambassador Graham. It
is a tough question. From a non-proliferation perspective, a
U.S. 123 agreement is kind of the gold stamp. That is what
India found out, that is what the UAE found out. So from a
political perspective, these U.S. nuclear cooperation
agreements are still important.
On the supply side--you asked the question in the summary
of the hearing, What can we do with vendors? This is a topic a
lot of people have debated. I think my answer is ``not much,''
because the vendors themselves will follow the leads of their
governments. So AREVA will not require--will do business with a
country that doesn't have an additional protocol until the
Government of France says, ``You shall not do that.'' France is
not going to do that until the Nuclear Suppliers Group comes to
that agreement. Then you face the problem of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group and China and Pakistan. Consensus has eroded, I
believe, dangerously, since the U.S.-India deal because of the
pressure placed on other suppliers.
So I think we need to be creative in dealing with the other
suppliers, and it is not just the advanced suppliers. It is
China, South Korea, and India, also. So now is the time. India
is prepared to export its reactors. Now is the time to get
serious about India's commitments from the U.S. Agreement and
make sure that it does the right thing in terms of its export.
Chairman Berman. Mr. Fly, quickly, if you could, just
because my time has so expired.
Mr. Fly. Just very quickly, I would say I agree with what
has been said. We need to certainly use every element of
persuasion that we have to try to convince other countries to
adopt that standard.
I would also say though we need to be prepared to not
conclude cooperation agreements when necessary if we are unable
to conclude agreements that fit that model, and I understand
the argument that other countries will rush in, but we cannot
be the leader of global non-proliferation efforts if we are
chasing after AREVA and Rosatom.
My second point would just quickly be that we can't let the
market drive this.
One note I included in my testimony is, less than a year
after Israel bombed the al Kibar reactor in Syria, there were
press reports that AREVA was interested in building a nuclear
reactor in Syria. I think it is pretty clear cut, and most
Americans would agree, that that does not mean that we, the
U.S., should suddenly be conducting nuclear cooperation with
Syria. We cannot follow these other countries' standards.
And finally I think, as I mentioned as one of my
recommendations, we need to find points of leverage with these
foreign companies, whether we can somehow limit their ability
to do business in the U.S. if they do not follow these
standards. But I think all aspects of this need to be pursued
in addition to trying to work with members of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group and our allies.
Chairman Berman. Well, thank you very much.
Mr. Wilson, the gentleman from South Carolina, is
recognized for at least 5 minutes.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I thank all of you
for being here today.
Ambassador Graham and Ms. Squassoni, a question: If China
proceeds with the sale of the two new reactors to Pakistan,
what is the likely impact on the Nuclear Suppliers Group?
Should the U.S. attempt to persuade the NSG to disapprove the
sale? Should China be expelled from the NSG? What is the cost
of doing nothing?
Ms. Squassoni. The Nuclear Suppliers Group can essentially
not disapprove a sale. It is a voluntary gathering of nuclear
suppliers. There is nothing that the Nuclear Suppliers Group
can do as a body. And one example is, right before President
Bush went to New Delhi, Russia decided in advance of the
exemption for India that it would resupply the Tarapur reactors
with fuel. So it decided, well, you know, the game is up. We
can all go ahead and do what we want.
We shouldn't throw China out of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group. Even though that might be attractive, they are building
nuclear power reactors like crazy domestically, and they will
be a major exporter. So I think we need to keep them in that
group. There may be other ways outside of the nuclear realm
that we can influence their actions, but I think those reactors
are a done deal.
Mr. Wilson. And I would hope it would be in China's
interest to consider the consequences of what they are doing.
Ambassador Graham. Mr. Wilson, I entirely agree with what
Sharon just said. In addition, I might just say that for a long
time the Nuclear Suppliers Group held the line pretty well with
respect to most transfers. Prior to the U.S.-India agreement,
there was some Russian playing around with the guidelines, but,
overall, the record was reasonably good.
The U.S. has now made the exception for India, pursuant to
the Indian agreement, and pushed that through the NSG. It is
difficult to see how a proposal like China's could be stopped
within the NSG, given the Indian precedent. Perhaps--perhaps
the NSG can be persuaded that this exception for India is India
only and won't apply to any other country, most especially
Pakistan. But where does that leave China? And my guess is that
they probably go ahead and sell them anyway. It is not a
situation over which we have much control. The NSG is not quite
the effective instrument it was, in my judgment, a few years
ago because of various developments.
Mr. Wilson. Well, I appreciate both of your input; and, Mr.
Fly, I share your concern about the consequences of a nuclear
Iran being truly unthinkable. Even though it is unthinkable,
the American people need to know of what some of those
consequences would be, consequences to our country and to our
regional allies that are also important to us. So could you
expound a bit on the unthinkable?
Mr. Fly. Certainly. I guess my concern would be that,
setting aside the issue--and there is an active debate about
this--whether Iran can be contained in terms of its actual use
of a nuclear weapon. My concern is that, given its history of
sponsorship of terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, it
would certainly allow those terrorist groups--regardless,
again, of whether it actually transferred any sensitive
material--it would allow those terrorist groups to be
emboldened in terms of their attacks on a country, one of our
closest allies, Israel.
One of my greater concerns is actually the cascade of
proliferation I described previously. I don't see any way
around the fact that countries in the region will feel that
they need to develop their own nuclear weapons programs in
response. Many of them are U.S. allies. But I cannot come up in
my mind with a system under which the U.S. will be able to
convince countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt that we are
going to extend our nuclear umbrella to those countries; and I
doubt that the American people are willing to extend our
nuclear umbrella to those countries. I doubt the American
people are ready to commit to defend Riyadh as we would respond
to an attack on Chicago. I just don't think that is going to
happen.
So I see think we will see a polynuclear Middle East. And
it is the sort of situation which I don't think nuclear
strategists in the past have had to deal with, and I just think
it is a frightening scenario. That is why I argue that we need
to take every action possible to make sure that Iran does not
develop nuclear weapons.
Mr. Wilson. Again, thank you for your input; and I agree
with your assessment. Thank you all for being here.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentlewoman from California, Ambassador Watson, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Watson. Yes, I thank you for holding this hearing. This
is information that we need to start dealing with, and I see
that our members have gone back to their districts.
But, really, there is a bottom-line question in my mind,
and what forms of influence should we, as the United States,
use with foreign supplier countries and their nuclear vendors
to convince them to adopt these non-proliferation criteria in
their foreign sales or at least not undercut the U.S. goals? I
mean, what can we do? Mr. Graham.
Ambassador Graham. That is another very good question. I
don't have really a particularly good answer.
Ms. Watson. We are just kind of winging it, huh?
Ambassador Graham. We have to just use diplomacy and
negotiate with them and try to persuade them that nuclear bombs
in their backyards are not any better than in our backyard and
that we shouldn't want the fuel cycle to spread any further. It
is in their interest just as much as it is in our interest.
That kind of diplomacy, it might work with some countries. It
might work with all of them. But I don't see any other
alternative to just classic diplomatic discussions to try to
bring the governments around to our point of view.
Ms. Watson. Well, with Ahmadinejad's speech that he made
yesterday, I would hope that people would see the danger that
Iran offers not only us but the world. I mean, with the kinds
of remarks he made about 9/11--in some way, we were involved in
that? I would hope they would see what a true danger Iran would
offer not only us--you know, we are a little ways away--but
areas in----
But can I hear from the rest of you? What kind of an
approach can we use to convince? I hope everyone was tuned in
to Ahmadinejad's words yesterday because I think that really
would chill them, what an irrational human being he is. Do you
want to comment?
Ambassador Graham. Well, I think--maybe I am naive, but I
think statements like that are so extreme and so off the wall
that him saying them and giving them worldwide treatment is
only going to damage Iran. More and more countries are going to
think that Iran is led by a leader who is crazy, and that is
not good for a country. Now there may be a few countries that
liked what he said, although I offhand can't think of who they
might be. But, generally speaking, I don't see how Iran gains
from such incredibly, apparently, irrational behavior. Now I
assume, on the other hand, what his objective is is to be as
widely known as possible, and he is definitely succeeding in
that.
Ms. Watson. I kind of got the sense in the beginning that
maybe there was an issue with allowing him to develop it for
domestic use. But the more I watch the behavior coming from him
over the last year or so, I see that there is not a scintilla
of hope that that is going to change. I think he is really
being isolated, I feel, from people in his own country. He is
just kind of speaking off the top of his head, am I correct?
Ambassador Graham. He just damages his cause, I think.
Those kinds of statements are so absurd.
Ms. Watson. Please, I still have 15 seconds.
Ms. Squassoni. I would say, it is exactly Iran and the
danger of Iran that causes some states to want to develop
certain capabilities as a way to hedge against Iran.
But I would like to make a few points. One is, you attack
this problem of how do we convince other countries to do the
same thing we are doing from the supply side and from the
demand side. On the supply side, you support allies, like
Japan. It is one of the few countries that requires the
additional protocol as a condition of supply. Support them and
urge other countries to join them.
On the demand side, fuel leasing, and multinationalizing
fuel facilities dampen this demand for domestic enrichment and
reprocessing and, in fact, take away the prestige that has
accrued to these highly technical endeavors. The UAE is very
proud of its nuclear program because it will be the first to do
this in the Middle East.
And, lastly, there is a question about can we exert
commercial pressure on some of the other nuclear firms? And
Henry Sokolski had a very creative idea, which is we have a lot
of foreign investment in the nuclear energy in this country. I
would put a slight twist on that and say, well, are there ways
to give countries--firms from countries that adopt the same
requirements, as we do, preferential treatment? There are
certainly a lot of subsidies for the nuclear industry. Maybe we
can use those to our advantage.
Ms. Watson. Mr. Fly?
Mr. Fly. I actually agree with everything Ms. Squassoni
just said.
One additional point, I agree we need a multifaceted
approach to this problem. The one recommendation I would have--
and it is not a criticism of just this administration. I know
many outside observers accused the Bush administration of
focusing too much on counterproliferation and not focusing
enough on arms control. I would argue we have now reversed this
problem, and this administration has focused its efforts on
disarmament and arms control. And although it does still have
some of these programs to gain international agreement to limit
proliferation of the fuel cycle, I don't hear the President or
other senior members of the administration talking about those
programs on a regular basis and I would encourage them to do
so. We need to talk about both sides of the coin more
frequently.
Ms. Watson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentlelady has expired.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Royce, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Royce. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I will follow up with Ms. Squassoni's
observation there on the carrot approach. But I wonder if what
Henry Sokolski was thinking about was more the stick approach.
Chairman Berman. Sounds like it.
Mr. Royce. You know, that we use their access to the U.S.
market and the U.S. Government loan guarantees and so forth to
try to leverage these countries' support for our non-
proliferation policies, especially with respect to Iran. And I
would just ask you briefly what you think of strategy. More of
the stick end of this.
Ms. Squassoni. I am sorry. Could you repeat that? As
applied to----
Mr. Royce. Well, you know, there is access to U.S.
Government loan guarantees, to the U.S. market, to the
necessity of interacting with our own industry on this front.
What if we were to use that basically as leverage to say, if
you want to continue that relationship with the United States--
there are certain players here that we are talking about that
are the ones that aren't stepping up in the international
community and doing what needs to be done.
Ms. Squassoni. I think there is some merit in that
approach. I think it would be controversial for the U.S.
nuclear industry, which does not have the capital it needs to
go out there and build these plants itself. I mean, one of the
reasons why EDF, the French electric utility, is involved in
the new reactor or the proposed reactor at Calvert Cliffs is
because U.S. utilities don't have the kind of money.
Mr. Royce. Because GE is really the only American company
still on the field, right? And it runs in last place, if we
take the half dozen major companies.
Ms. Squassoni. There are two parts to this. One is foreign
investment in U.S. nuclear activities here, including
manufacturing. AREVA has built a facility down in Lynchburg.
They are pouring millions of dollars into our economy, and you
know better than I do the impact of that.
The other part is the reactor vendors like GE and
Westinghouse. And there it is hard to see how----
Mr. Royce. But the French are on board anyway.
But here is my other question to you.
Chairman Berman. The French are on board?
Mr. Royce. Well, in terms of--vis-a-vis Iran.
Chairman Berman. Oh, yes.
Mr. Royce. But my other question, the worry I have is that
our one player might quit the business at some point; and I
think that is a result of some policy decisions, bad decisions
that we made decades ago and have continued in terms of
abandoning nuclear power and also the red tape that the
industry faces today that really hasn't been addressed. I would
ask, does the U.S. nuclear industry's low standing weaken our
ability to shape the rules of the international nuclear game
going forward?
Ms. Squassoni. I would say our standing is certainly not
what it was in the 1970s. That is absolutely clear. We do have
some leverage through patents, through the fact that many of
the reactors around the world were based on U.S. designs. And
it is true that, you know, when the UAE made its decision and
bought a Korean reactor, that Korean reactor was based on a
Westinghouse design. So there is a window I think in which we
have some leverage through these complicated relationships. But
I would agree with your assessment that that is definitely
dwindling.
Mr. Royce. Now I wanted to ask Mr. Graham a question and
Mr. Fly. Mr. Graham, in discussing the NPT, you suggest that
the treaty is strengthened to the extent that the nuclear
weapons--that those states involved with nuclear weapons, if
they ultimately eliminate their nuclear weapons, that is going
to move us forward. Using that logic, are you suggesting that
North Korea or Iran may react this way?
Years ago, Hwang Jang Yop was the minister of propaganda
who defected; and in South Korea I had a chance to talk to this
former North Korean minister. He had told me that for 40 years
this was their objective. It is kind of like the old adage: We
build, they build; we have stopped building, they build. They
had one thing in mind, according to him, and that was
developing this nuclear capability. So I am just wondering, are
you sure with respect to Ahmadinejad or North Korea that that
is the logic?
And then, lastly, Mr. Fly, the 123 agreement with the UAE
is supposed to be the model, and its prohibition on the UAE
enriching nuclear material is a good thing. That was supposed
to be the cornerstone of other agreements. I think it was
supposed to be a cornerstone of the Vietnam agreement, but that
doesn't seem to be happening, and I was going to ask you why.
So, gentlemen, if you could respond. Thank you.
Ambassador Graham. Thank you, Congressman Royce.
I would just like to address briefly the previous question
before I answer that question.
In terms of the Henry Sokolski approach, I think it would
have merit as long as it is done in a very subtle, diplomatic
way. You don't just hit them over the head with it. What it is
that Teddy Roosevelt said, ``Speak softly but carry a big
stick.''
Yes, of course, various things like loan guarantees can
play a part. But that is not what you open with. You try to
work the problem with each one of these countries; and, in the
end, it might prove to be possible. Because, fundamentally, it
is in their interest to do these sort of things. It is in their
security interest, perhaps not their economic interest as much.
And the nuclear industry--I have been involved in that to
some degree in the last several years. And the United States,
primarily because of our 30-year hiatus with nuclear power, has
pretty much abandoned the field. The field today is dominated
by AREVA, the French company, and by the Koreans, using a
derivative of Westinghouse technology to be sure but moving on.
Westinghouse is owned by a Japanese company. GE does most of
their deals with another Japanese company, and it still only
represents about 1 percent of their earnings. Nuclear is a
small part of GE. And then, of course, there are the Russians
who are trying to get into various markets. So if the U.S.
wants to play a major role in nuclear commerce, it is going to
have to really change things.
Lastly, with respect to nuclear weapons and strengthening
the NPT, essentially what I was talking about was the basic
bargain that created the NPT, that it was nuclear disarmament
by the five nuclear weapons states and peaceful nuclear
cooperation in exchange for the rest of the world not having
nuclear weapons. So it was arguably a balanced treaty.
But not much was ever done with respect to the disarmament.
But the prevailing view at the time the treaty was signed and
the prevailing view when the treaty was indefinitely extended
in 1995 from the nonnuclear weapons states was not so much we
want to see zero nuclear weapons but we understand that that is
going to take a very, very long time. But at least you can stop
testing. That was kind of the attitude.
I think it is very important to strengthen the NPT to do
some of these interim measures, like the test ban, like the
fissile material cutoff treaty, and so forth. Zero is a very
long way off. And many problems, such as the one you mentioned
with North Korea, the one you mentioned in Iran, and a number
of others will have to be addressed over a long period of time
before the world community can get there.
Mr. Fly. Congressman, on the question about why the UAE
model may not be what the Congress ends up seeing in the
Vietnam 123, I don't have any information on the status of the
Vietnam agreement, other than what I have read in the press. So
I will just say, my sense is, as someone who just has limited
experience in some multilateral arms control negotiations,
Ambassador Graham probably experienced the same thing during
his years at ACDA. The party that is willing to walk away in
the end is the one that is going to be able to achieve whatever
principle they hold dear and whatever principle they want to
maintain through the agreement. So my guess is that, in the
case of Vietnam, the political concerns and our interest in
moving closer to Vietnam and improving ties between the U.S.
and Vietnam are probably outweighing our interest in
maintaining the UAE model.
Mr. Royce. It is a bad precedent, Mr. Fly.
Mr. Fly. Yes, and I completely agree.
Mr. Royce. I understand your point.
Mr. Fly. I completely agree.
One additional note I would add, just from my experience
working on these issues in the U.S. Government, unfortunately,
I think the proliferation bureaus and the various offices in
the U.S. Government that work on non-proliferation are treated
much like a lot of the other functional bureaus, including
those who work on democracy and human rights, which is an issue
this committee has done a lot on and our regional bureaus often
hold more sway over policy decisions. And I think if we as a
country are actually concerned about the potential
proliferation of nuclear weapons, that is going to have to
change.
Mr. Royce. We are undermining it while we undermine human
rights there, and we have failed to use what leverage we could
have even to obtain a modicum of change in behavior in Vietnam.
It is very unfortunate.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Berman. The Vietnam story is not over yet. Keep
hope alive.
I am going to ask the chair of the Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Nonproliferation, deg. and Trade if he
would be willing, at least for a while as he recognizes
himself, to sit here and recognize himself while I make a phone
call.
Mr. Sherman [presiding]. The chair recognizes himself for 5
minutes.
The Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear
Damages, the CSC, establishes an international liability regime
for compensation for nuclear damage. Some have argued that the
U.S. nuclear industry is at a competitive disadvantage for
nuclear contracts because competitors such as French AREVA and
the Russian Rostam are at least partially state owned and
consequently allegedly enjoy sovereign immunity from liability
in the wake of a nuclear accident.
Can the U.S. nuclear industry be competitive for nuclear
contracts in countries that have not signed on to the
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damages?
What are the benefits and drawbacks of an international nuclear
liability regime such as the one described by the Convention on
Supplementary Compensation? And should the United States
establish some sort of state ownership in order to compete and
to provide sovereign immunity to those American workers who
would like a piece of this world economic pie?
I am trying to determine--why don't I address that to
Ambassador Graham, unless I see any of you volunteer--and I do
not.
Ambassador Graham. Well, I will begin, Congressman, and
then perhaps Sharon could weigh in here.
In terms of state ownership, I mean, that is just not going
to happen in the United States. But we do have to face the fact
that all of our competitors are virtually state owned, if not
actually state owned. AREVA is 96 percent owned by the French
Government. The Russian program is entirely owned by the
Russian Government. The Korean program is very close to the
government.
Mr. Sherman. Close enough to enjoy sovereign immunity?
Ambassador Graham. I don't know. I would have to ask a
lawyer. But their bid in the United Arab Emirates was 50
percent subsidized by the government.
Mr. Sherman. I am not talking here about government
subsidies, although that could have been a separate question.
Let me build on this. Should the United States Government
build on a 123 agreement with any country which fails to adopt
the CSC?
Ambassador Graham. I think we shouldn't. But, I mean, that
is something we need to have. But it is unquestionably a
disadvantage that we have in dealing with these state-owned
companies, although even they worry a bit about unlimited
nuclear liability.
So, Sharon, do you want to add more detail there?
Ms. Squassoni. Sure. I think there are two things. The
Convention on Supplementary Compensation is something that
improves on the two existing conventions, the Paris and the
Vienna. So I am not sure--it is just essential that a country
with which we conduct nuclear trade has a liability, has signed
one of the conventions. A 123 agreement is just a framework for
cooperation. It doesn't guarantee----
Mr. Sherman. But it is the one opportunity for Congress to
have some role in the process, and we have a State Department
bureaucracy that is utterly disinterested in American jobs.
Ms. Squassoni. Well, do you care about just signing the
convention? Because it will be a while before it enters into
force.
Mr. Sherman. Clearly--well, if we can be guaranteed that it
will enter into force before the new nuclear plants begin
significant construction or reach a stage where liability would
be an issue, as a practical matter, that achieves the
objectives. But I have seen situations where the State
Department will consider something from 92 different angles and
produce 500-page position papers, and jobs isn't there. As a
matter of fact, if anything, if you could provide jobs to some
other country, that is thought of as a plus.
So I think Congress has to be involved in making sure that,
as the world tries to reduce carbon output, moves toward more
nuclear facilities, that the American worker has a place. And
hence my question.
My time has expired. I believe Chairman Berman already
announced that people would have time to enter statements into
the record. I will be entering my opening statement into the
record, and I thank the witnesses for being here.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Hearing RecordNotice deg.
Minutes deg.
Carnahan statement deg.
__________
Connolly statement deg.
__________
Green statement deg.
__________
Ros-Lehtinen FTR deg.__
Material submitted for the record by the the Honorable Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida
[Note: The statement of Mr. Henry Sokolski, Executive Director, The
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, is not reprinted here but is
available in committee records or may be accessed via the Internet at:
http://www.hcfa.house.gov/111/ros092410a.pdf.]
Squassoni FTR deg.__
Material submitted for the record by Ms. Sharon Squassoni, Director and
Senior Fellow, Proliferation Prevention Program, Center for Strategic
and International Studies
Carnahan QFRs deg._
__________
Lee QFRs deg._
__________