[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
VIEWPOINTS ON HOMELAND SECURITY:
PART I AND II
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 21, 2010 and MAY 19, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-63
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
April 21, 2010
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Mike Rogers, Alabama
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Henry Cuellar, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Laura Richardson, California Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Steve Austria, Ohio
William L. Owens, New York
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, Connecticut
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Dina Titus, Nevada
Vacancy
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
May 19, 2010
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Mike Rogers, Alabama
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Henry Cuellar, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Laura Richardson, California Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey Steve Austria, Ohio
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, Connecticut
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Dina Titus, Nevada
William L. Owens, New York
Vacancy
Vacancy
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Wednesday, April 21, 2010
Statements
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 1
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 3
The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Emanuel Cleaver, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Missouri:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Witnesses
Mr. Bob Graham, Former Commission Chairman, Commission for the
Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and
Terrorism:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 10
Mr. Jim Talent, Former Commission Vice-Chairman, Commission for
the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and
Terrorism:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 10
For the Record
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Department of Homeland Security Jurisdictional Chart........... 4
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for Bob
Graham and Jim Talent.......................................... 53
Questions From Honorable Christopher P. Carney of Pennsylvania
for Bob Graham and Jim Talent.................................. 56
Questions From Honorable Yvette D. Clarke of New York for Bob
Graham and Jim Talent.......................................... 57
Wednesday, May 19, 2010
Statements
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 61
Prepared Statement............................................. 62
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 62
The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California:
Prepared Statement............................................. 64
Witnesses
Mr. Lee Hamilton, Former Commission Vice-Chairman, The National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States:
Oral Statement................................................. 65
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 70
Mr. Thomas Kean, Former Commission Chairman, The National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States:
Oral Statement................................................. 68
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 70
Appendix
Question From Ranking Member Peter T. King of New York for Lee
Hamilton and Thomas Kean....................................... 105
Questions From Honorable William L. Owens of New York for Lee
Hamilton and Thomas Kean....................................... 105
Question From Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis of Florida for Lee
Hamilton and Thomas Kean....................................... 105
VIEWPOINTS ON HOMELAND SECURITY:
PART I
A DISCUSSION WITH THE WMD COMMISSIONERS
----------
Wednesday, April 21, 2010
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson
[Chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Harman, DeFazio, Jackson
Lee, Cuellar, Clarke, Richardson, Pascrell, Cleaver, Green,
Himes, Kilroy, Titus, King, Lungren, Rogers, McCaul, Dent,
Miller, Olson, Cao, and Austria.
Chairman Thompson [presiding]. The committee will come to
order. Good morning.
Today we are privileged to be joined by Senator Bob Graham
and Senator Jim Talent, the chair and vice-chair of the
Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation and Terrorism. It is disturbing to think that as
we meet today America's adversaries are seeking weapons of mass
destruction that could kill large numbers of our citizens and
inflict great harm to our Nation, but that is reality.
In 2008, the ``World at Risk'' report, issued by the WMD
Commission, brought into focus the seriousness of the threat
and the need to confront it with purpose and speed. As the
author of H.R. 1, the ``Implementing Recommendations of the 9/
11 Commission Act,'' I am proud to have played a part in
establishing the Commission.
Specifically, Title 18 of that comprehensive homeland
security law authorized the establishment of a bipartisan
commission to study the threat that the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction posed to our country. Notably, the
law directs the commission to give particular attention to
Federal efforts to secure nuclear materials around the world
from terrorists and states of concern.
In the ``World at Risk'' report the commissioners did not
mince words about the WMD threat. Specifically, the commission
stated that it believes that unless the world community acts
decisively and with great urgency it is more likely than not
that a WMD will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the
world by the end of 2013. The commission concluded that since a
biological weapon can more easily be obtained and used by a
terrorist than a nuclear weapon, the Government needs to move
more aggressively to limit the proliferation of biological
weapons and reduce the prospect of bioterror attack.
In January 2010, Senators Graham and Talent issued a report
card that assessed the Government's progress toward
implementing their 13 recommendations. They gave an ``F'' to
the Federal Government for failure to enhance the Nation's
capabilities for rapid response to prevent biological attacks
from inflicting mass casualties. Another ``F'' was for a lack
of progress on reforming Congressional oversight to better
address intelligence, homeland security, and crosscutting 21st
Century National security missions.
Given your extensive credentials, Senators, your insight on
what we need to do to fix Congressional oversight are
particularly welcome. As you know, we are currently working on
bipartisan legislation to improve domestic capabilities to
prevent, deter, detect, attribute, respond to, and recover from
WMD attacks in general, and based on your recommendations,
biological attacks in particular.
The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell, together with
Ranking Member Mr. King are collaborating on this legislation,
which should be introduced in the next few weeks. I know it is
a New York and New Jersey thing, but we wish them all success.
This hearing and the testimony we will receive from
Senators Graham and Talent are critical to this effort. Again,
I would like to thank the commissioners for their leadership
and continued commitment to educating us about the WMD threat.
I would also like to recognize your staff, led by Randy
Larsen and Gigi Gronvall, for working closely with the
committee as we develop counter-WMD legislation.
Before I yield back I would like to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank Senator Graham, Senator Talent, for the
service that they gave to this Nation when they served on this
side of the building and on the other side of the Capitol, and
the service you have rendered this Nation since leaving the
House. You have done--both of you--a terrific job; I am very,
very proud of what you have done.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for yielding time as well
as your leadership in offering H.R. 1, the ``Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act,'' which created the
WMD Commission whose commissioners are before our committee
today to talk about what I consider to be a very critical
issue.
The 9/11 Commission did a very thorough job of describing
the circumstances of the attack on September 11 and providing
recommendation designed to guard against future attacks.
However, one area they did not address was how to respond to
the threat of unconventional weapons, including nuclear and
biological.
The WMD Commission before us today has issued 13
recommendations, and in its report card released this January
gave very mixed grades, to be kind, of the actions we have
taken to date. But they have made one thing very clear, that
more than 8.5 years after 9/11 we still do not have a
comprehensive National strategy to counter the grave threat
that WMD poses to our Nation.
This is exactly why I am working with my good friend and
counterpart, Ranking Member King, to craft bipartisan
legislation, the ``Weapons of Mass Destruction Prevention and
Preparedness Act of 2010,'' which we plan to introduce very
shortly. We have worked closely with the Commission--with the
Commission staff--in order to write a bill that has a truly
comprehensive approach, a logical approach to securing the
Nation against weapons of mass destruction by looking at all
the angles, from prevention and deterrence, preparedness,
detection, attribution, response, and finally, to recovery.
It is especially important to note that our legislation
concerns all WMD threats, but we will give special focus to the
emerging threat of biological weapons, and with good reason, in
which the WMD Commission gave us a very poor grade for failing
to do enough to prevent a biological attack on our mainland, or
to be able to respond efficiently and effectively enough in the
event of a biological attack. The Commission highlighted the
urgency of this threat when it wrote that ``terrorists are more
likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a
nuclear weapon.''
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing the testimony from
the commissioners, Senator Graham, Senator Talent, on the
threat we face as well as the preliminary thoughts about this
legislation, and I yield back and I thank you for yielding to
me.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman appreciates the Ranking Member's agreement to
recognize the gentleman from New Jersey. Now----
Mr. King. I was not given a chance to object.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Thompson. The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking
Member of the committee, gentleman from New York, Mr. King, for
an opening statement.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me again thank Senator Graham and Senator Talent for
all their service to the Nation, especially on this vital,
vital issue, and it is great to see Jim Talent here. We got
elected in the same year. Jim has gone on and made something of
himself, and I am sitting here with Bill Pascrell, but what are
you going to do?
Seriously, Jim, I want to thank you for all your efforts.
Mr. Chairman, this is a vitally important issue. This is an
issue which, as you and Chairman Talent and Chairman Graham and
Congressman Pascrell pointed out, is an issue which is vital to
the security of our Nation but in many ways nowhere near enough
has been done since September 11.
I appreciate the hearing today. I will just for the record
point out that we have been asking for this hearing since last
September and I think the fact that we are having it today,
that Bill Pascrell is going forward in his legislation--and I
am proud to work with him on it--shows a bipartisan commitment
on this issue.
Obviously the administration is--has been given charges as
to what they should do, but also there is an obligation on
Congress. If I may, there is a chart we prepared showing how
Congress is still--there is such a disunity in the Congress.
Let me just show the display. You know, in the--Commissioners,
in your report and also in the 9/11 Commission report it was
pointed out how oversight just is spread out so much among
Congress.
Just the other day I received a letter from Secretary
Napolitano saying that the Department of Homeland Security has
to report to 108 different committees and subcommittees; they
have testified at 166 different hearings. To me, this, again,
this lack of cohesion really reflects poorly on the Congress
and prevents us from getting our job done.
So I think no matter what happens in November, Mr.
Chairman, I think we have to recommit ourselves to making sure
that we work to consolidate jurisdiction within this committee
and certainly to narrow the jurisdiction, because now it is
just all over the place and really almost makes no sense at
all.
There is the chart there. It just gives some example of how
bifurcated this is and how, again, what a puzzle palace we have
become.
[The information follows:]
Mr. King. Now, I would just, from my own perspective in the
New York-New Jersey area, we have particular threats when it
comes to weapons of mass destruction. Obviously radiation,
dirty bombs, nuclear bombs are a real threat to our subway
system, to the cities, whether it is New York, or Patterson,
Newark, any of them in that area are prime targets.
Also, the whole issue of biological warfare is something
which we have to do much more about. Certainly Bill Pascrell
and I, that is a main element of what we are trying to do.
Congresswoman Clarke and I are working as far as the
radiological attacks.
But I would hope that this hearing--it is really the first
we have had in the Congress, certainly in the House side, on
this issue--will give us the impetus to go forward. I don't
know how many markups we are going to have between now and the
end of the session, or before the summer, but, Mr. Chairman, I
would hope that we can, once Bill Pascrell and I--once the
legislation is ready that we can move on it quickly in this
committee and try to then start it, because it will probably
have to go to a number of other committees, as to get this
process on the way.
Hopefully we can get legislation passed; at the very least
we will send a strong signal to the administration, send a
strong signal to the entire Federal bureaucracy, and also start
a real debate in the Congress. The debate was started at the
National level by Senator Talent and Senator Graham, but I
don't think we in the Congress have taken this seriously
enough.
It is not the issue that is debated that often; it is not
the issue that is in the forefront. With everything else we
talk about, whether it is health care, whether it is taxes,
whether it is jobs, whatever, all of that will be forgotten
overnight if there is a biological attack anywhere in our
country. The impact it will have on our economy, the impact it
will have on the lives of everyday people, the devastation it
will cause will be unprecedented.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I
think the spirit on both sides sort of working toward a
bipartisan solution, bipartisan answers, but we can't just
debate it forever, we can't just talk about each other in a
nice way, we have to get the job done.
We can't allow details to stand in the way. If there are
one or two disagreements that I have or Bill Pascrell has, the
Chairman has, let's resolve them. Let's not try to stand on
ceremony.
I am not saying any of you are, I am just saying all of us
in Congress have a tendency to rely on one or two things we
don't agree with and use that as an excuse not to go forward.
We have to go forward on this, otherwise the work that is done
by Senator Graham and Senator Talent will not be taken
advantage of and we will have squandered and missed an
opportunity which could have very dire and tragic consequences.
With that I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The Chairman, for
the Ranking Member's information, plans to move forward after
this hearing and subject to you and Mr. Pascrell finally
agreeing on something--we will go forward.
Other Members of the subcommittee and committee are
reminded that under committee rules opening statements may be
submitted for the record.
[The statements of Hon. Richardson and Hon Cleaver follow:]
Prepared Statement of Honorable Laura Richardson
April 21, 2010
Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this hearing today on the
findings and recommendations of the Commission on the Prevention of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation and Terrorism. I
appreciate your commitment to this issue, and I would also like to
recognize our distinguished witnesses, Senator Graham and Senator
Talent, for their services to our country. Thank you both for taking
the time to appear before the committee today.
As a proud representative of the 37th district of California, I am
especially concerned about this topic. My district is home to many
high-value terrorist targets: the Port of Long Beach, two airports,
major freight rail lines, and 40 percent of the Nation's goods moving
along our rails and four major interstate highways. Each of these
represents a prime opportunity for a nuclear or biological attack, and
as these gentlemen can tell us, the threat is very real.
The Commission has concluded, as is highlighted in the testimony
today, that it is more than likely that a weapon of mass destruction
(WMD) will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the
end of 2013, a date that is rapidly approaching. In addition, the
Commission found that the U.S. Government needs to move more
aggressively to limit the proliferation of biological weapons to reduce
the prospect of a bio-terror attack. However, the report card released
by the Commission in January 2010 makes it clear that the Government is
not moving fast enough to mitigate this risk of attack.
For example, the Commission graded the work done to ``enhance the
Nation's capabilities for rapid response to prevent biological attacks
from inflicting mass casualties'' with an ``F.'' As Chairwoman of the
Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response, I
anticipate working with my colleagues to address some of this
shortfall. I also look forward to reviewing the bill about to be
introduced by my distinguished colleagues to enhance homeland security
by improving efforts to counter a WMD attack from every stage of the
threat, from the pre-event prevention and deterrence through post-event
recovery.
I am pleased that this hearing is providing a chance for committee
members to delve into the issues facing our Government and homeland
security with regard to WMD. Clearly, the Federal Government still has
work to do in terms of preparation and coordination. I look forward to
sharing this information with the stakeholders in my district, as well
as hearing from our distinguished panel of witnesses on this subject
with regard to public outreach, possible legislative ideas, and foreign
policy.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for convening this hearing. I yield
back my time.
______
Prepared Statement of Honorable Emanuel Cleaver
April 21, 2010
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, it has been 3 years since
the bipartisan Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass
Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism was authorized. In this time,
the Commission has issued both a report, as well as a report card on
the country's progress in working to limit the threat of biological and
nuclear weapons. While much has been done, we are still a long way away
from having a strong system of deterrence, prevention, and recovery
from WMDs.
The report issued by the Commission has boldly asserted that ``it
is more than likely than not that a WMD will be used in a terrorist
attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.'' With this very real
threat looming over our heads, it is extremely troubling that the
Commission has found that the country has failed to properly address
certain recommendations. For instance, the Commission gave the country
a failing grade when it came to working to ``enhance capabilities for a
rapid response to prevent biological attacks from inflicting mass
casualties.''
Given the uncertain times that we live in, we must do all within
our power to eliminate the threat of biological and nuclear weapons. To
that end, I am eager for the chance to speak with our witnesses today
and gauge their views on the new legislation that will soon be
introduced by my colleagues on the committee. From increasing
intelligence capabilities, to risk analysis and protection biological
agents, this bill aims to put many of the Commission's recommendations
into law. Our witnesses have a vast wealth of experience in working to
deter WMD threats, and their additional recommendations are essential
in our progress forward.
Chairman Thompson. I welcome our distinguished witnesses,
Senator Bob Graham, who obviously had to come a long way to get
here--we really appreciate it, Senator Graham--and Senator
Talent, the chair and vice-chair of the Congressionally-created
Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation and Terrorism.
Senator Graham is a former two-term Governor of Florida and
served for 18 years in the United States Senate. This is
combined with 12 years in the Florida legislature for a total
of 38 years of public service. He is recognized for his
leadership on issues ranging from health care to intelligence.
He served a decade on the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, including 18 months as Chair in 2001 and 2002. In
addition to his responsibilities associated with WMD Commission
work Senator Graham serves as the chair of the board of
overseers of the Graham Center for Public Service.
Thank you, Senator Graham, for being here today and for
your service to the country.
Senator Jim Talent was elected to the Missouri House of
Representatives in 1984 at the age of 28, where he served 8
years. At the age of 32 he was unanimously chosen as Minority
Leader. He served in that capacity until 1992, when he was
elected to Congress to represent Missouri's second district.
Senator Talent served in the U.S. House of Representatives
from 1993 to 2001. During his time in the House Senator Talent
distinguished himself as a thoughtful leader on the House Armed
Services Committee where he served for 8 years.
From 2002 to 2007 he represented the people of Missouri in
the United States Senate. While in the Senate, he distinguished
himself as a leader on a number of major committees, including
the Senate Armed Services Committee, where he served as
Chairman of the Seapower Subcommittee. Today, in addition to
his on-going WMD Commission work, Senator Talent serves as a
distinguished follow at the Heritage Foundation.
Thank you, Senator Talent, for being here today and for
your service to our country.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statement will be
inserted in the record.
Senators, the floor is yours.
Can you turn your mic on for us?
STATEMENT OF HON. BOB GRAHAM, FORMER COMMISSION CHAIRMAN,
COMMISSION FOR THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM
Comm. Graham. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and we are
deeply appreciative of your and Congressman King holding this
hearing as a critical part of the steps necessary to move us
towards a safer America. It has been an honor to have served
for the last 2-plus years with my good friend, Senator Jim
Talent.
I would say if there is an example of bipartisanship on an
important issue it is what we have tried to exhibit, and I am
pleased on our final report in a commission that was composed
of Republicans and Democrats was unanimous report reflecting a
unity of view as to the seriousness of the threat and the steps
that should be taken to reduce it.
Mr. Chairman, as you said, in December 2008 our commission
issued its report, called ``World at Risk.'' The word ``world''
was selected to recognize the fact that this is not a problem
that any one country can deal with alone, that it is truly a
global threat requiring a global response. I will talk about
that a little bit later.
Then, in January of this year we issued our first report
card on what has transpired in the year that passed since the
report. It was a mixed report card. The most negative aspects
related to the topic that Senator Talent and I will
particularly focus on this morning, and that is the potential
of a biological attack.
As the Chairman said, it is our conclusion that it is more
likely than not that there will be, under current
circumstances, a weapon of mass destruction used someplace on
earth by a terrorist group before the end of the year 2013 and
that it is more likely that that weapon will be biological
rather than nuclear. So that has been the particular focus of
our post-report activities.
My comments today are going to focus on the issue of
urgency. We have used the term in the commission report and in
our subsequent statements that the clock is ticking. I am going
to suggest this morning that we need to come up with a new
metaphor. The impetus for change has got to be stronger than an
analog clock slowly moving around the dial. We are dealing with
a digital clock where the numbers are now spinning.
It has been over 500 days since ``World at Risk'' was
issued. There has been some response by the administration and
we saw some of that recently in the nuclear summit. But this is
going to require action at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue,
and I am pleased that today this hearing is taking place, and I
hope that it will jumpstart aggressive Congressional response
to this issue.
There are four areas in which I think urgency is the word
of the day and the spinning digital clock. First, we must
construct an effective response to a biological attack. Unlike
a nuclear attack where there is very little you can do in the
aftermath, it is what you can do in the aftermath of a
biological that may both serve as a deterrent and a sufficient
reduction of the consequences to take it out of the category of
mass destruction.
We say it is a deterrent based on analysis done by our
intelligence community as well as foreign intelligence services
that the likely possessor of a biological weapon will have to
make a choice where to use that weapon. That choice is likely
to be determined by where it thinks it can do the most damage,
have the highest kill rate.
So if your community is relatively well prepared you will
be less likely to be the target of attack in the first place;
if you appear to be highly vulnerable and a source of high loss
of life you become an attractive target. So the degree to which
you are prepared to respond is a key element in whether you
will be attacked.
If you are attacked your ability to respond can reduce the
death toll. It would be horrendous if 1,000 people were killed,
but it would be an international disaster if 500,000 people
were killed, which is within the range of estimates of what
would happen with a biological attack in a major American city.
So we have a strong interest in being as prepared as
possible. Frankly, in our report of January we gave the
Nation--not just the Federal Government, but the Nation--an
``F'' in our level of preparedness to respond. This is my first
call for urgency, that this committee has the responsibility to
start an aggressive series of actions that will lead us to a
grade--to deserve a grade substantially better than an ``F'' in
our capacity to respond.
The second area of urgency is showing leadership to the
world. One of our recommendations is that the United States,
because of this global nature of biological attack, needs to be
a leader in bringing other nations to a high level of response
and security of things like Schedule 1 biological agents. That
next world conference is going to take place in 2011.
We think it is important for the United States to have
taken affirmative action before that conference so we will be
able to show to the world that we are committed and therefore
that they can follow our gold standard of what should be done.
If we have not taken any action by that conference I think our
position to influence other nations will be substantially
diluted.
The third area of urgency--the Chairman alluded to the fact
that I have had some travel difficulties. I have been in the
Middle East and Asia much of the last month. I think the two
most dangerous areas in the world where there is the greatest
potential of a transfer from a nation state to a terrorist
group of a weapon of mass destruction are the Indian-Pakistan
border and that arc that runs from Iran through Syria to Israel
and into Palestine. Those, in my opinion, are the two places in
the world that are the most likely to be the first point of
attack.
Both of those are driven by longstanding enmities that go
back to just after World War II--Kashmir, in the case of India
and Pakistan; the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians
in the Middle East. These issues, which we have allowed to
linger now for 6 decades, are a major threat to the security of
the entire world and need to get strongest attention from the
United States and the international community for their
resolution.
There has been no substantial progress on either of those
fronts since 1979, 31 years ago, when the Camp David Accord was
entered into between Egypt and Israel. That is the last major
successful effort to deal with those animosities.
Finally, the sense of urgency over the issue that the
Chairman and the Ranking Member have discussed, and that is
this issue of the Congress itself. Congress is not well
organized--and that is a very passive and understatement--to do
what it needs to do on these issues. This has been recognized
now for almost a decade, before 9/11.
Commissions who were looking at issues of National security
came to the conclusion that the Congress was not properly
organized. The 9/11 Commission said it again. We said it in our
``World at Risk'' document. I would urge that the Nation can be
a safer place if this body would take the steps to place
accountability and responsibility for these issues clearly in
one jurisdiction so that the Nation will know where to look to
for leadership.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, I, again, appreciate the
opportunity to be here. My colleague, Senator Talent, is going
to focus on some of the more specific aspects of our report,
and we would both then look forward to receiving your
questions.
I would like to also introduce at this time Dr. Gigi
Gronvall, who has been a major part of the development of our
efforts over the last year. Thank you very much.
[The joint statement of Mr. Graham and Mr. Talent follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Bob Graham and Jim Talent
April 21, 2010
Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members, thank you for the
opportunity to speak to you today on behalf of the Commission on the
Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism.
Congress created our Commission early in 2008, based on the
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, assigning us the task of
assessing the risk of WMD terrorism and recommending steps that could
be taken to prevent a successful attack on the United States. Our
Commission interviewed hundreds of experts and reviewed thousands of
pages of information. We want to thank those Commissioners--Graham
Allison, Robin Cleveland, Stephen Rademaker, Timothy Roemer, Wendy
Sherman, Henry Sokolski, and Rich Verma--who worked tirelessly to
produce our Report, World at Risk, in December, 2008.
In 2009, the Commission was authorized for an additional year of
work, to assist Congress and the administration to improve
understanding of its findings and turn its concrete recommendations
into actions. In accordance with that authorization, and based upon
close consultation with Commissioners, we submitted a report card
assessing the U.S. Government's progress in protecting the United
States from weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism.
This report card provided an assessment of the progress that the U.S.
Government has made in implementing the recommendations of the
Commission.
While progress had been made in many areas, the overall assessment
for biological threats was not good. We submit a copy of that report
card for the record. While certainly not every assessment was poor, we
found that the Government simply had not paid consistent and urgent
attention to the means of responding quickly and effectively so that
bioweapons no longer constitute a threat of mass destruction. The
failures did not begin with the current group of leaders. Each of the
last three administrations has been slow to recognize and respond to
the biothreat. The difference is that the danger has grown to the point
that we no longer have the luxury of a slow learning curve. The clock
is ticking, and time is running out.
The Commission has concluded its work as a Congressionally mandated
organization, as of February 26, 2010. We are committed to continuing
this bipartisan work, however, and will continue to monitor progress on
the Commission's recommendations in our newly formed WMD Center, a
bipartisan, not-for-profit research and education organization. It is
our hope that by identifying areas of progress, as well as those in
need of further attention, appropriate action will be taken to mitigate
the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction to the United States.
the commission's findings
The Commission's Report assessed both nuclear and biological
threats, and provided 13 recommendations and 49 action items. The
Commissioners unanimously concluded that unless we act urgently and
decisively, it was more likely than not that terrorists would attack a
major city somewhere in the world with a weapon of mass destruction by
2013. Furthermore, we determined that terrorists are more likely to
obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon. Shortly
thereafter, this conclusion was publicly affirmed by then Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) Mike McConnell.
There are several reasons for our conclusion that a bioattack is
actually more likely than a nuclear attack. Many pathogens suitable for
use in a biological attack are found in the natural environment, all
over the globe. The lethality of an effectively dispersed biological
weapon could rival or exceed that of an improvised nuclear device. The
equipment required to produce a large quantity from a small seed stock,
and then ``weaponize'' the material--that is, to make it into a form
that could be effectively dispersed--is of a dual-use nature and
readily available on the internet. The most effective delivery methods
are well known in the pharmaceutical, agricultural, and insect-control
industries. It is much more straightforward to stockpile weaponized
pathogens than nuclear material, raising the terrible specter that
terrorists could attack an American city using a bioweapon, then
quickly ``reload'' and attack again within a matter of days or weeks.
So, while it is certainly possible for terrorist groups to get a
nuclear weapon, it is less difficult for them to develop and disperse a
bio-weapon. There may be even fewer barriers for terrorist groups with
close ties to those nation states which are accumulating both the
materials and scientific capability for weaponization. All of the
ingredients are in place for a biological weapon to be in the hands of
a terrorist organization, which is subject to none of the international
law constraints and retaliatory consequences which might impede a
nation state from its use.
None of this is speculation. Al-Qaeda was well down the road to
producing such weapons prior to 9/11. Due to the ease in creating a
clandestine production capability, our intelligence community had no
knowledge of two such facilities in Afghanistan prior to their capture
by U.S. troops and a separate, but parallel bioweapons development
program al-Qaeda ran in Malaysia. Facilities with more sophisticated
equipment than those found could be in operation today without our
knowledge.
When would we find out about such a facility? It is possible, even
likely, that we would not know until after an attack took place.
Consider this scenario: A team of engineers sympathetic to al-Qaeda
bring a seed culture of anthrax spores to the United States from an
overseas laboratory. They purchase and modify a truck so that it sprays
anthrax spores into the air. The load up the truck with its deadly
cargo, and slowly drive it through the downtown traffic of a mid-sized
city during rush hour, at the end of the day. No one notices the truck,
or finds it at all unusual that the truck is emitting fumes. No
BioWatch sensors go off. Days later, however, desperately ill people
start flooding emergency rooms. In the following weeks, 13,000 people
die. The city may need to be cleaned up so that people can safely enter
the downtown area, at a cost of billions of dollars. As tragic as this
event could be, the terrorists remain at large, free to commit the same
murder twice. Antibiotics would likely arrive quickly, but there would
be National demands for a vaccine--but there is not nearly enough
anthrax vaccine to satisfy the demands from even one small city.
Unfortunately, this scenario is not considered ``worst-case'' or
unrealistic, but it is in fact the National Planning Scenario for a
biological attack. It was released 5 years ago this month. Five years--
the clock is ticking, and we are not prepared.
The Obama administration appears to agree with our concern
regarding the threat of 21st century bioterrorism. The following is a
quote from National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats signed
by President Obama on November 23, 2009.
``The effective dissemination of a lethal biological agent within an
unprotected population could place at risk the lives of hundreds of
thousands of people. The unmitigated consequences of such an event
could overwhelm our public health capabilities, potentially causing an
untold number of deaths. The economic cost could exceed one trillion
dollars for each such incident. In addition, there could be significant
societal and political consequences that would derive from the
incident's direct impact on our way of life and the public's trust in
government.''
weapons of mass destruction prevention and preparedness act of 2010
First, Mr. Chairman, we want to thank you and your committee for
the extraordinary leadership you have shown by holding this hearing
about the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2010. We realize that
the WMD issue spreads across many committee jurisdictions and will
required unprecedented leadership, coordination, and cooperation. The
biggest internal enemy we face in dealing with this threat is the
natural inertia of Government. The only way to overcome this inertia is
for our top political leaders to take bold actions.
As of the time we prepared this statement, we had not seen actual
bill language, but we appreciate the summary of the bill provided by
your staff, and are happy to provide comments based on that summary.
intelligence
As we understand it, the bill, if enacted, would require the DNI,
in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and other
appropriate Federal Agencies to develop and maintain a National
Intelligence Strategy for Countering WMDs. It also calls for improving
National capabilities to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence
related to WMDs. We understand the DNI is already working on the 2010
National Intelligence Strategy for Countering Biological Threats.
Based on a recently completed tour of nations in two of the most
vulnerable regions, there are significant gaps in our intelligence
relating the nation state-terrorist links. Recognizing the inherent
difficulty of collecting intelligence in these venues, doing so should
be the highest priority of American intelligence.
We commend these provisions. Increased attention in this area is of
vital importance and, we understand, would underscore the DNI's own
initiatives. We hope that the drive to produce this report would spur
the intelligence community to acquire and retain additional expertise
in the nuclear and biological fields; prioritize pre-service and in-
service training and retention of people with critical scientific,
language, and foreign area skills; and ensure that the threat posed by
biological weapons remains among the highest National intelligence
priorities for collection and analysis. Indeed, recommendation 11 in
our report, World at Risk, was that the United States must build a
National security workforce for the 21st century.
One important issued not addressed in the intelligence section is
the problem of not including public health personnel in many of the
fusion centers. Only a handful of these centers currently include
public health officials. We all need to understand, in the 21st
century, public health is a critical element of National and homeland
security. Public health resources need to be fully integrated with law
enforcement and traditional first responders.
We also recommend that the bill include a provision directing the
Secretary of Defense to provide a classified report to the committees
with primary oversight of the Department of Defense, intelligence
community, and Department of Homeland Security on the efficacy of the
biological weapons tests conducted by the United States during the
1950s and 1960s. Some commentators assert that bioweapons are not of
concern, primarily because they have not been used on a widespread
basis. We are entirely confident that the report we call for, if
properly done, would dispel any doubts about the threat that bioweapons
pose to the safety and security of our society and our allies.
preparedness: getting first responders ready, and engaging the public
We strongly believe that a well-informed, organized, and mobilized
citizenry has long been one of the United States' greatest resources.
An engaged citizenry is, in fact, the foundation for National
resilience in the event of a natural disaster or a WMD attack.
Consistent with the Commission's Report, we must create a culture
of preparedness and resilience across our Nation. There are vast arrays
of capabilities found across our society that can and must be organized
and, when needed, mobilized in the event of a natural disaster or WMD
attack. These capabilities are primarily the combined assets of State
and local governments, our diverse business communities,
nongovernmental organizations, professional and service organizations,
and all citizens. The Federal Government cannot hope by itself to
possess the capabilities needed in the event of a major disaster--but
it can lend vital support if local and regional actors have organized
beforehand. We submit for the record the WMD Commission's final
product, a brochure for community preparedness. We All Have A Role:
Working with Your Community to Prepare for Natural and Man-Made
Disasters.*
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* The information has been retained in committee files.
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We have found that the Federal Government can do more to make sure
that State, local, and Tribal governments can respond in a crisis, and
so we support this legislation's call for sharing security information
with State, local, and Tribal governments (Title 1, section 111). State
and local governments, as well as health departments, need more
comprehensive threat information in order to prepare for emergencies,
as well as gain support from leadership and staff in preparedness
activities.
We support the bill's provisions for the Department of Homeland
Security to put forward threat bulletins and guidance to local
governments (Title 2, section 202), and crafting important messages
ahead of a crisis (Title 204). We recommend that the public be involved
in the creation and approval of threat information and alerts. This
will help to ensure that these alerts effectively reach and motivate
their target audience.
secure, productive u.s. laboratories at the forefront of science
Certain principles animated the section of our Report dealing with
laboratory security. We were concerned about: (1) The proliferation of
high-containment labs, which were not only unregulated but often
unknown to the Government, (2) the fragmentation of Government
oversight among several agencies, (3) the need for a thorough review
and update of the Select Agent Program, and (4) the importance of
regulating labs in a way that enhanced security but did not discourage
robust scientific research in the United States.
Enhanced biosecurity measures should improve security, streamline
oversight, and focus our resources on the greatest risks. By correctly
applying risk management principles, the United States can increase
security without impeding science or critical U.S. industries. Without
robust scientific research, we will not have the drugs, vaccines, and
diagnostic tests needed to protect the American people in the event of
a biological attack. The work of developing medicines is difficult,
takes a long time, and is fraught with challenges. We still do not, for
example, have drugs or vaccines for many of the biological agents
weaponized by the Soviet Union. Therefore, it is in our National
security interest to make sure that our laboratories continue to
develop medical countermeasures, while still operating safely and
securely.
We believe that this legislation highlights many of the provisions
of our Report, and in certain respects improves on our recommendations.
For example, the bill introduces into the Select Agent Program the idea
of stratifying risks, which we think is a real advance in achieving the
right regulatory balance. Stratification of risks into tiers allows for
more realistic assessments of risk, and will benefit public health
investigations. The bill calls for the designation of ``Tier I'' agents
to be the most dangerous subset of the pathogens that have clear
potential for use as biological weapons. Multiple studies were
conducted as a result of our Report. Virtually all of them, from both
the public and private sectors, have called or will call for the
stratification of agents. The overwhelming recommendation from the
scientific community is that any legislation employs a tiered approach.
We therefore commend the committee for introducing the
stratification approach into this bill and recommend that the Tier I
list be developed by the Secretary of DHS in consultation with the
Secretary of HHS. Today, 82 Select Agents receive the highest level of
security focus and regulation. We believe the correct number of top-
tier agents is closer to 8 than 80.
Stratifying the Select Agent list should allow us to focus
increased security on the highest risks and allow public health-related
research involving non-Tier I agents to proceed without excessive
regulation. We suggest that care be taken to avoid duplicating the
unintended negative consequences of the current Select Agent program.
Security restrictions must not preclude international cooperation,
which is necessary for public health and infectious disease
surveillance, as well as our National security. For example, we should
not repeat what happened at the beginning of the H1N1 pandemic, when
flu samples from sick patients in Mexico were not shipped to U.S.
laboratory scientists to analyze, but to Canada--because U.S. import
and shipping regulations were so restrictive. We also do not want to
``close our windows,'' so to speak, into the activities of other
nations' laboratories. Scientists from the United States should be able
to collaborate on Rift Valley Fever or Venezuelan equine encephalitis
research with scientists where those diseases are endemic. If we don't,
other countries' scientists will. For these reasons, the Select Agent
program status quo needs to be changed, and we recommend calling for
adjustments to ease restrictions on non-Tier I agents.
Our recommendation to stratify biological agents for security
purposes is distinct from the measures that scientists need to take for
safety. Many pathogens, including those that cause tuberculosis, HIV,
and herpes B, require special safety precautions, though most experts
do not consider them to be feasible for use as bioweapons. We encourage
the further refinement of safety systems and procedures for all types
of biological research, so that research can be conducted with the
highest level of safety.
fragmentation of oversight should be eliminated in pathogen security
In our Report, we concluded that the fragmentation of Government
oversight of laboratories was a National security problem. We
determined that there should be one set of requirements concerning
pathogens for the scientific community to follow, instead of having
separate regulatory programs from multiple departments. The authority
to oversee and enforce these requirements must be vested in one lead
agency so that the regulated community has a single coherent,
consolidated, and streamlined set of regulations to follow.
Currently, under the Select Agent Rule, as defined by 42 CFR 73, 7
CFR 331 and 9 CFR 121, HHS and the Department of Agriculture (USDA)
regulate select agents. Human pathogens are regulated by HHS; plant and
animal pathogens are regulated by USDA, and facilities that house
pathogens that are a concern for humans and livestock are inspected
jointly. Accounts of this process suggest that HHS and USDA cooperate
well in meeting their regulatory responsibilities. Given the distinct
expertise on these pathogens in USDA and HHS, it is appropriate that
USDA's expertise be brought to bear on livestock and crops, and that of
HHS for human pathogens. However, it is our belief that in constructing
a regulatory system for pathogens that can infect humans, one cabinet
secretary should be in charge. As Commissioner Robin Cleveland stated
last December, we ``have too many agencies, too many turf fights, and
unclear oversight entities.'' That must end.
We recognize that the bill would require the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security to develop enhanced biosecurity
measures, and would require them to inspect all Tier I laboratories. In
our Report, we recommended that HHS ``lead an interagency review.''
This recommendation was implemented by Executive Order in January. The
review called for will soon be completed. The Report also called for
HHS ``to lead an interagency effort to tighten Government oversight on
high-containment laboratories.'' Based on what we have learned from
several recent studies, numerous meetings with representatives from the
Executive and Legislative branches, and the scientific community, we
continue to recommend that overall oversight authority and
responsibility for lab security be assigned to the Secretary of Health
and Human Services, with recommendations on scientific matters from
USDA and security matters from DHS. The Secretary should solicit,
possibly through the creation of an advisory council, the
recommendations from the scientific and security communities with a
view towards constantly improving the regulatory model given all the
concerns of the communities involved. To sum up, we recommend that HHS
take the lead. We continue to take that position, and believe that it
will lead to the improved regulatory process that we all seek. We also
do not have the luxury of time to bring another agency up to speed. HHS
has been doing a positive service in this area, and we do not want to
change ships in midstream.
building a response and recovery plan that acts as a deterrent
The bill requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services, in
coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and other
appropriate Federal agencies, to develop and implement a National
Medical Countermeasure Dispensing Strategy. A National strategy is
sorely needed to establish effective and timely distribution of
emergency medical countermeasures (MCMs). Countermeasures could serve
to blunt the impact of an attack, save lives, and thwart the
terrorists' objectives--but only if they are delivered when and where
they are needed. We commend the Obama administration for issuing an
Executive Order in December, 2009, to establish Federal capabilities
for the timely provision of medical countermeasures following a
biological attack, and we commend this committee for taking up this
important, as well as complicated, effort. But, dispersal of medical
countermeasures is but one link in the chain of actions that are needed
to respond to a bio attack. Rapid detection and diagnosis capabilities
are the first links, followed by providing actionable information to
Federal, State, and local leaders and the general public; having
adequate supplies of appropriate medical countermeasures; quickly
distributing those countermeasures; treating and isolating the sick in
medical facilities; protecting the well through vaccines and
prophylactic medications; and in certain cases, such as anthrax,
environmental clean-up. All parts of the chain need considerable
attention.
Public health agencies at the Federal, State, and local levels have
made great strides since 2001 to prepare the Nation for biological
attacks and other disasters. This is in spite of the challenges of
preparing for such events, especially in light of limited and
decreasing budgets. However, much more can be done to support public
health, and also traditional first responders, so that the Nation can
effectively respond to a biological attack.
One way that the burden on public health may be eased is if the
public is more prepared. We commend this committee for including
provisions for the public and especially first responders, to access
the vaccines and antibiotics they might need in an attack, before such
an event occurs. (Title 1, section 105) For example, anthrax vaccine
could and should be available to first responders, and we agree with
the committee that the Government should seriously review the issue of
whether and under what conditions home MedKits should be available for
concerned citizens who wish to prepare themselves and their families.
In considering the policies for vaccination and antimicrobial
distribution in light of known biological threats to the United States,
however, we recommend that public health responders also be given
priority, and that vaccination be done on a voluntary, not a mandatory,
basis.
We also feel obligated to comment on a key issue regarding medical
countermeasures not addressed in this bill. Yes, we must have a system
capable of rapidly dispensing MCMs during a crisis, but we must first
have the required items to dispense. A world-class delivery system that
does not have the appropriate products is of no value. Several months
ago the administration attempted to raid the BioShield Reserve Fund to
pay for H1N1 flu preparedness--certainly an important program, but one
that needed funding on its own merits. Thankfully, this raid was not
successful because leaders in Congress, who understand the importance
of BioShield to our biodefense program, prevented it. Unfortunately,
the story on funding for the Biomedical Advanced Research and
Development Act (BARDA) does not have a similar good ending--at least
not yet. There is, however, still time to correct this funding
shortfall. The current funding request for fiscal year 2011 is $476
million. The Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh
Medical Center recently estimated that $3.39 billion per year in
medical countermeasure development support would be required to achieve
a 90 percent probability of developing one FDA-licensed countermeasure
for each of those requirements. The cost estimates of developing these
pharmaceuticals were based on in-depth surveys of historical vaccine
and drug development data, and reflect the high failure rate of
biopharmaceutical development. It now falls to the U.S. Government to
fund the development of medical countermeasures based upon the level of
risk that is deemed tolerable. An amount of $1.7 billion per year would
meet roughly half the estimated need to provide a significant and
necessary down-payment on the Nation's preparedness. Given the threat,
$1.7 billion per year for prevention and consequence management is a
reasonable and comparatively sound investment.
America must develop the capability to produce vaccines and
therapeutics rapidly and inexpensively. Both the BioShield Reserve Fund
and BARDA will be key elements in reaching this goal, but only if they
receive proper support and funding. Developing this capability over the
long-term will lead us to a security environment where biological
weapons can be removed from the category of WMD. That must be the long-
term biodefense strategy for America, but it will be unattainable if we
do not properly fund these key programs. We submit for the record an
article we co-authored on this subject in the summer of 2009 for the
Journal of Biodefense and Biosecurity.*
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* The information has been retained in committee files.
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decontamination--resolving long-standing questions so we are prepared
We commend the committee for including the provision that DHS issue
guidelines in coordination with the Environmental Protection Agency for
cleaning and restoring indoor and outdoor areas affected by the release
of a biological agent. These guidelines should also address methods of
decontamination following a large-scale event, and should address some
of the remaining questions of a technical and scientific nature that
make decontamination of a large area difficult. Currently, U.S.
environmental laboratory capacity is insufficient for the challenge of
sampling and testing following a large biological release. Federal
leadership roles should also be clarified--many Federal agencies
currently have roles in decontamination, but it is still unclear which
agency would lead. Likewise, it is unclear who will cover the costs of
decontamination, as well as the temporary relocation of building
occupants. Private building owners would rightly question what their
role is, at this time--if private industry is to be responsible for
decontamination of their own property, there should be guidance for
decontamination practices and qualified decontamination contractors
available to industry in the event that they are needed.
The WMD Commission sponsored a small study to review current bio-
decontamination capabilities and responsibilities. The conclusions were
not encouraging. We submit the recently-published article for the
record.*
the biological weapons convention--an opportunity to lead
Section 112 of the legislation intends to require the Secretary of
State to promote confidence in the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
implementation and compliance by its States Parties. It also calls for
promoting universal membership in the Convention. One of the WMD
Commission recommendations in World At Risk was that the United States
should propose a new action plan for achieving universal adherence to
the BWC (recommendation 2-4). We are supportive of the goal, as well as
moving forward to address the other important gaps in our preparedness.
In order to provide leadership at the 2011 BWC Conference and take
advantage of this once-every-5-years opportunity, we should be doing
more to lead by example.
the clock is ticking
We cannot overstate the urgency of this crisis, and the need for
action, now. The international situation is fragile, with Israel and
its neighbors, on the India-Pakistan border, and this fragility
substantially increases the risk of terrorism with a WMD. While there
are issues at stake that have gone unresolved for over 60 years, we may
have only 3 more years of procrastination before the consequences
reveal not a World at Risk, but a world immobilized by crisis.
One of our recommendations was for Congress to reform Congressional
oversight to better address intelligence, homeland security, and cross-
cutting 21st Century National security missions. The fact that we are
having this hearing on April 21, 2010--more than 16 months after World
at Risk was issued--is evidence of the difficulty that Congress has in
organizing itself to protect the people of America, and the world, from
this ultimate catastrophe.
conclusion
We commend the committee for taking up this important issue. We
look forward to participating in a robust discussion on Capitol Hill
and with the administration and stakeholders as the WMD Prevention and
Preparedness Act of 2010 is introduced, and makes its way through the
legislative process, and stand ready to help where we can, to promote
important strides for our National security.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair has previously recognized the good work of Dr.
Gronvall, and it is obvious she has both of your gentlemen's
backs.
Senator Talent, for as long as you need to explain.
STATEMENT OF JIM TALENT, FORMER COMMISSION VICE-CHAIRMAN,
COMMISSION FOR THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM
Comm. Talent. Appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. Yes, Dr.
Gronvall will slip us notes when you ask the hard questions. We
may just actually refer them to her.
It is great to be here and to recognize your great work on
this, Mr. Chairman, and the Ranking Member, to see old friends,
because this is a hearing room I know very well, to see my
friend from Missouri, Mr. Cleaver, here, and to congratulate
him on his work on this. I am really pleased to hear about the
efforts between Mr. Pascrell and Mr. King, and knowing those
two personalities and all kidding aside, I think that something
is going to end up being done. So that is very important.
Yes, I am going to make some observations, Mr. Chairman,
and then let you all ask the questions and we can have a
dialogue, and I think it is important to do that. This hearing
is really important and I am glad you are holding it.
It has been my observation over the last 2 years studying
this whole area that while most of the problems are Executive
in nature--we have seen this now through two administrations,
just the difficulty of getting this big, fragmented set of
agencies to work together to do things, much less given the
Federal issues--and that it is important to have top-level
Executive leadership hold people accountable, that when
Congress gets active and people in the agencies seeing Congress
getting active it makes a big difference. Even if the
legislation that you are passing is just basically affirming
what the Executive is doing in certain areas it shows a level
of seriousness and unity and commitment, particularly when it
is done on a bipartisan basis, that people through the
Executive branch take seriously.
I think the model for this is probably the Intelligence
Reform Act. When Congress went through everything it had to go
through to pass that it made a big difference within the
intelligence community. It is not that everything is perfect
within that community at all, but there is no question that at
least some cultural change resulted as--occurred as a result of
that. So I think it is important that you are doing it.
Mr. Chairman, you ask about and the Ranking Member asked
for suggestions we might have about how to remedy the difficult
problems we have in the Congress regarding oversight, so I will
give you a practical response. As a person who served in this
body for 8 years in the Minority, in the Majority, in the
leadership, on the back bench, as a committee chairman, in a
lot of different capacities, I think the initiative ought to
come from you all because, let's face it, you are probably
going to be the gaining committee--ought to be, in my judgment.
Mr. Chairman, if you and the Ranking Member would talk--get
the Speaker's blessing; you are obviously going to have to have
that--and then talk with the Majority and the Minority leaders,
maybe get a staff person designated, and do all this low-
visibility. I mean, in the initial stages I would not want
surfacing and on the Hill or anything like that if you could
avoid it, in the magazines.
Talk to the Executive branch people and let them know that
they can let their hair down and try and identify the four or
five areas where the current fragmented system is causing the
biggest problem, and maybe begin focusing on those areas. Then
when you have got an agenda together and maybe three or four
ideas for what you could do about them--and between the two of
you you know the House well enough to know going in, probably,
what is possible and what isn't possible.
Then maybe in the Leader's office, with the Minority
Leader's person present there, get together the Chairmen, the
Ranking Members, and the key staff people and just begin asking
what can be done. Is there any low-hanging fruit in this? I
mean, what steps can be taken so you can begin making some
progress? Don't make the best the enemy of the good. I don't
know that you need some kind of global solution, but just start
taking some steps and emphasizing to people the seriousness of
this threat.
I mean, if they have not had--if these committees of
jurisdiction and oversight have not had the briefing on this
they need to get the briefing on this. This is something that
was impressed upon me through our initial deliberations. I am
not an intel guy the way Ms. Harman is, but when I saw what I
saw, and when I saw people like Bob Graham, and Graham Allison,
and Wendy Sherman, and Robin Cleveland, taking as seriously as
they took this threat, that impresses you.
This is a major threat and if we are going to make it a
priority to deal with it, I mean, that means--if something is a
priority it means you are willing to sacrifice other things for
it. I think if you can get the people in that room going in to
accept that--do this low-key, and then get the process moving
that way. It is going to take a major effort, Mr. Chairman, and
I know how busy you all are. But I think it is worth doing
because not only is fragmented oversight can it be negative in
the sense that it impedes the Executive, but it is the
opportunity cost, because good oversight can make a huge
difference, as those of you on the Intelligence Committee know.
So I would describe, and we did in the report, Congress'
efforts in this to this point have on balance, I think, been a
negative not because the Members haven't wanted to do it but
because this system is so screwed up, and it could be a big
positive. So that is just my practical advice and you can take
it for what it is worth.
I do want to say, because our report card was not good in
the area of bio-preparation, that we have--the two of us, I
think--been pleased personally at the administration's
response, and in particular the President's response,
personally. You know, our understanding is that he has taken a
personal interest in this, he is meeting with teams of people
particularly in the area of countermeasure development, and
that is all to the good. But we can't--I mean, having the
President pay personal attention to something, you know, when
you are talking about trying to unify a structural sort of
response is not the long-term answer because he is just too
busy. But it is still good that they are responding in that
fashion.
I also want to make a comment--Chairman Graham talks a lot
about the links in the chain of preparedness, and that all the
links have to be strong if we are going to be prepared for a
bioattack. Preparation for a bioattack is the key to deterring
it because if we are prepared well enough then--and if the
attack is likely not to be a major success, then they are
likely not to launch it. In contrast to a nuclear attack, this
is an area where preparation can actually be prevention.
If you look at the--if you think of the four links in terms
of stockpiling the countermeasures, distributing the
countermeasures, detecting, having good surveillance, and then
clean-up, I think we are showing some signs of life on the
stockpiling issue. Secretary Sebelius is conducting a review; I
think they are serious about it.
The follow-up has to be there. You know, and I am hopeful
that they will come out with a strategic plan. The problem
there was fragmentation among the different agencies--typical
story: FDA, CDC, HHS, all that--and then a lack of funding.
The distribution side of this, as much maligned as it has
been of the countermeasures, is the area where I think we are
the furthest--not where we need to be, but we are the furthest.
We have a model in place, you know, the CRI initiatives, with
points of dispensing that are more or less locally-controlled;
we are in 72 cities. Then they are overlaying a Federal
response through the Postal Service, which has been tested in
St. Louis, as a matter of fact, and seemed to work.
So at least we have a model in place of the local
dispensing sort-of settings with a Federal overlay. We have
gone some distance in getting it actually in place and in
testing it. So, I mean, that link--I think there is a long way
we need to go, but I think at least we have some idea of what
we are doing.
The two where I think we are failing the most right now is
in detection or surveillance and then clean-up. On the
surveillance side of it we have BioWatch. We have that in a
number of cities, and that is a good idea. We funded a lot of
different sort of studies and surveillance systems, so they
keep track of over-the-counter sales of drugs and that sort of
thing, but they are not linked together. There is no general
strategy or sense of priorities with regard to that.
We don't have good enough detection sort of tests so we can
tell whether somebody is sick. I mean, you have got a--the
pregnancy test has developed to the point you can tell whether
you are pregnant in a matter of minutes, right, but we can't
test for even--for swine flu that quickly, much less for some
of these other kinds of pathogens. So we need those detection
tests. I mean, it is a bad thing when, if the President asks,
you know, the head of CDC at any given time, ``How many people
were sick with the H1N1?'' they couldn't have told him. They
can't tell you today with certainty how many people died from
that, because they would just guess.
You all probably had this experience or know people who had
this experience: You call a doctor up and they say, ``Well, it
sounds like it, but it is, you know, it is not worth--you are
not in a high-priority enough group to bring you in and test
you to make certain whether you had it.'' That was a--that was
a pandemic we had 6 months' notice for. So we have got problems
with surveillance.
Then clean-up, we have recently--the Commission recently
funded a study on this. We have total fragmentation on this,
and environmental clean-up is important because we need to
clean up quickly and get people back into an affected area. It
is a hugely important response.
Think about this from the standpoint of, let's just take
New York, and I--that is the city most people use. You get an
attack, you are going to have your initial impact with people
getting sick and dying and then the problem is, you just can't
have half of New York that people can't go back into for 6
months because you are trying to clean it up.
I just think we are nowhere on that. Again, the typical
fragmentation--HHS, EPA, USDA has a piece of this. We have not
funded the research adequately, and there is a lack of training
and guidance for the first responders. They don't know what to
do and how to clean up. This would seem to be an area where we
could build a Federal reservoir of understanding and expertise
that we could be very flexible with.
So we have a long way to go. One other observation: There
is a mentality that I think that you all as leaders need to
adopt as you approach these issues. One of them is the urgency
of it.
It is relatively easy to grasp, but intellectually it is
hard to make it a working reality in your day-to-day operations
and decisions. It is just hard, because it is hard to
conceptualize something like this.
Some of you have, like, lived on the Intelligence Committee
for years--seen Ms. Harman up there, more adjusted your point
of view to this, but it is hard to do. Keep communicating the
urgency of the threat.
Then in terms of structuring solutions, I believe a
partnership rather than adversarial model with all the
different agencies and Federal--and State and local
organizations is the right one. So you include rather than
exclude, in terms of groups of people--so share the intel with
the public health people, unless you really can't; empower
rather than regulate, like with the labs--and I think you all
have that approach in this bill; and support rather than
punish.
We want people to take the initiative. We want people to
make decisions. You know, we want people to go out and do
things in response to this. If they know that you are going to
back them up rather than be looking to play gotcha with them I
think it will have a big impact.
But thank you again, Mr. Chairman. I think it is great that
you are having this hearing.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Obviously we appreciate both of your gentlemen's testimony,
and obviously it is revealing, but nonetheless very troubling,
that we are still only where we are and not where we need to
be. I thank you for your testimony.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
You both talked somewhat about the looming biological
threat.
I guess we will ask Senator Graham this question as it
relates to the 2013 prediction: If you would, tell us a little
bit about how you arrived at that number and--well, it is
obvious we are not prepared--what we need to do to get prepared
if that becomes a reality.
Comm. Graham. That number is a statistical estimate. We
interviewed over 150 experts in the United States and elsewhere
on this issue. We studied the literature. Our commission itself
has some people who have spent a lifetime, such as Graham
Allison, on this matter. So we present it as our best judgment
based on all of the above as to the time frame within which we
are operating.
I mentioned that I have recently returned from a trip to
Asia and the Middle East, and nothing that I learned in that
trip caused me to feel that we were overly or excessively
concerned with the date 2013. My concern would be that the
percentage of likelihood that that date will be the date by
which a weapon of mass destruction will be used by a
terrorist--the likelihood of that is higher than we thought it
was in December 2008.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Senator Talent.
Comm. Talent. Could I just add a quick comment on that? I
think we obviously didn't have intel saying, ``Well, there is a
plan underway that is going to come to fruition in 2013,'' but
we do want to emphasize, this is a short-term threat. This is
not something where we can say, ``Oh, it is terrible but it is
a generation from now.'' It is not.
We know they are trying to get this stuff. It fits their
strategy. It is proliferating all over the world, so it is
getting easier and easier for them to get it.
If they get it and they hit a major city with it--not
necessarily in the United States--from their perspective, you
know, they win. So everything we saw emphasizes the short-term
nature of it. So that is why 2013.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
With respect to that short-term nature, the legislation
that we are kind of working through right now to address so
many of the things you have identified, my charge to Mr.
Pascrell is to make sure that, regardless of how controversial
or cross-jurisdictional it might appear, it is the right thing
to do. So therefore, understanding that it is the right thing
to do, those are the marching orders that I have suggested to
him.
Your testimony today further highlights the fact that we
need to put aside some of the jurisdictional challenges that
have prevented things from going forward and do it, because it
is in the best interest of not just this country but the world
that we become that leader in this arena. To that extent about
the world leadership, it is your belief that if we took that
step we make a better argument with not only our friends and
enemies around the world that it is the right thing to do, but
it is difficult to make that argument without feeling the
predicate at home.
Comm. Graham. Yes, I think the fact that Congress would
take what anyone in politics recognizes as a difficult step,
because it is changing jurisdictions and areas of power and
influence in a critical legislative body, that would
symbolically send a very powerful signal that America was
taking this matter with the urgency that it deserves. But I
think it would be the actual product that would come as a
result of that reorganization that would be even more
influential.
If the United States could go to that conference in 2011
having passed legislation that provided some new standards for
security of high-risk pathogens--and you have very good
provisions in your preliminary draft of the legislation to that
effect--that would allow us to say to Malaysia and to Brazil,
these other countries that have significant capability to
develop and weaponize biological weapons--I am not picking on
those two countries as being likely candidates--but if we could
say to them, ``Look, this is what we have done to secure our
laboratories so they will be less susceptible to being invaded
by the bad people who would like to get access to these
material,'' I think our case would be stronger.
Conversely, if the facts are that we have known about this
now for a decade or more, it has been considered an urgent
matter for a couple of years and we have done zero, then what
is our moral authority to try to get anybody else to strengthen
their domestic situation?
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Senator Talent.
Comm. Talent. I would agree with that, and particularly
given the fact that this is something that--you know, other
governments don't want this kind of an attack to happen. This
is not a situation where there really are different ultimate
agendas that are being concealed here. I mean, I think there
are a lot of potential partners out there. So I think setting
an example is important.
We should say, there is a lot of good activity going on.
The Executive branch is doing a lot all the time. You all have
done and funded and authorized a lot.
The problem is, and Graham Allison puts it this way--he is
really correct--we are running towards our goal, but they are
running faster than we are. So even though we are making
progress, their lead is growing.
A lot of that is just because the nature of this kind of
conflict in weaponry favors them. I mean, it is easier--they
are able to attack very vulnerable areas that are hard for us
to defend and that we depend on a lot more than they do. That
is the nature of asymmetric weapons, and this is the ultimate
asymmetric weapon.
So the short answer is yes, I think it is a very important
model to empower the President with when he as the summit on
this in about a year now.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman now yields to the gentleman from New York, the
Ranking Member.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I regret that I had to step out of the room.
Ironically enough, it was Secretary Napolitano calling to make
sure that I had gotten a copy of her letter talking about the
multitude of committees that she has to testify before each
year. So I told here I did, and I told her we raised it and we
are going to continue to raise it.
Let me focus, if I could, on biological weapons. I think if
you went to the average Member of Congress and you spoke about
WMD they would think of an abbreviation, we think of dirty
bombs--the average American, certainly. It is hard to get
people focused on the issue of a biological weapon.
Having been here on September 11, I remember afterwards we
were asking ourselves, ``What did we know? What didn't we know?
What should we have known? What did we do? What didn't we do?
What we should have done?'' So, assuming the absolute worst
here, I just want to make sure that we are at least--you know,
leaving Congress aside; we have our own issues we have to deal
with--but just generally, for instance, in your dealings with
the intelligence community do you feel that they are
sufficiently alert to this and sufficiently concerned?
Comm. Graham. I think the answer is, they have certainly
given this a high priority. In the prepared testimony, however,
I inserted a statement to the effect that this potential of a
nation state developing weapon of mass destruction capability,
specifically biological, and then sharing it with a linked
terrorist organization--such as Iran and Syria have had a long-
time relationship with Hezbollah; Pakistan for many years has
had a close relationship with the Taliban--that represents the
ultimate threat because the nation state gets to have some
degree of deniable involvement in the matter, points its finger
at its surrogate that is actually carrying out the operation.
I think that this situation is accelerating and that our
intelligence agencies need to give it an even higher priority
than that which they have given it in the past.
Mr. King. Senator Talent.
Comm. Talent. Yes, I would say yes and no. Yes in the sense
that they recognize and I think believe that a WMD attack from
a terrorist organization is the greatest threat that we
confront that they have to deal with.
The problem is cultural, and it goes beyond just the intel
community. When people think of WMD they usually think of other
things. We have had whole establishments of people for
generations who have grown up understanding that nuclear
material can be put to bad use, but the idea that genetic
material or pathogens could be put to bad use is much newer.
So they all tend to respond a little bit slower. They don't
have the same high level of cultural awareness, as a community,
of these issues. So you get things like the fusion centers--and
we mentioned this in our testimony--where, you know, the local
fusion centers where everybody's supposed to come together and
share intel and all the rest of it. The public health--except
in a few cities that have really pushed hard, like yours--the
public health community hasn't got the clearance so they can
participate.
I don't think the--from what we have seen, the intel
agencies don't keep good enough track of just open-source
foreign public health information that could be really
important. There are dots they ought to have there to connect.
There are issues with workforce--they may not have enough
people in the workforce who really understand bio issues.
Plenty of people understand nuclear issues.
I don't want to point the finger and say, ``That person
doesn't care or isn't doing their job,'' because they all
really do care. It is a cultural issue, and culture takes a
little time to change.
Mr. King. My time is running down, so I will ask two
questions in one and then if you could answer the--both of
them.
If you could give the same--answer the same question
regarding State--Federal-State law enforcement--FBI, State
police, local police--how attuned they are, how concerned they
are about this? Also, even though we were on the committee, I
didn't realize until I read your report, or your report card,
that the budget for the Department of Homeland Security only
requested about one-tenth of what would be needed for medical
countermeasures in the event of a biological attack. I am sure
this is true in the previous administration, so I am not trying
to make this a partisan issue.
The fact is, of all the issues we debate with the homeland
security budget, I doubt if this would even come up if you
hadn't brought it to our attention. Obviously we are talking
about--you mentioned a half a million lives could be lost. So
on those two issues, the intensity with law enforcement, and
also with the Department of Homeland Security itself, why only
one-tenth is put in for the medical countermeasures?
Comm. Graham. Well, I think that is a perfect example of
what happens when you don't have clarity of responsibility in
terms of Congressional jurisdiction. There should be a place in
each of the two houses of Congress which wakes up every morning
asking the question: ``What can we do today to make our
response to a biological attack stronger?'' both in terms of
substantive legislation and advocacy before the Appropriations
Committee.
That number is the number which--the University of
Pittsburgh has a major center located in Baltimore that is
probably the Nation's premier medical entity on bioterrorism,
and it has calculated that in order to have an adequate supply
of the eight--for the eight pathogens that the Department of
Homeland Security has identified as the most likely to be used
in a weaponized form and to have that adequate supply within 5
years, which is outside the window of the 2013 prediction of
course, that it would take approximately $3.4 billion each year
for the next 5 years to get there.
The budget that Congress approved last year was approximate
10 percent, or roughly $300 million. $300 million is a lot of
money, but it means that we either are determining that we are
only going to prepare for one-tenth of the amount of
therapeutics that will be required or we are going to take 50
years to get there, neither of which, I think, is an acceptable
response to the American people. It is important that someplace
in Congress knows this issue and is the virulent advocate for
its remediation.
Comm. Talent. I certainly would agree with that, and again,
I think that Bob's point about oversight is important here.
Like when the stimulus bill went through, this would have been
a great opportunity to fund this program. It is not like
somebody brought this up with Mr. Obey and he said, ``Oh, I
don't want to fund countermeasures,'' right? Clearly, I know
how this system works; Bob knows.
For some reason this wasn't on the table, because you all
would have funded it. Or you would have looked at it--maybe
staff would have looked at it and said, ``Well, we have thought
about it and we don't want to fund it because we don't think
the structure is right and we need to''--I mean, you would have
had an intelligent response. There was nobody there at that
point who was raising this, and that is--that is the absence,
you see?
Not only does the fragmented oversight impede the
Executive, but the absence of that means you are not making the
contribution that all of you as Members want to make. I mean,
if somebody had set up--if we had attacked you, which we didn't
do, for not funding this, you would have gone to your staff and
said, what in the heck happened? Why didn't we fund this,
right?
Now, I will say this: You all need to watch OMB on this,
because they are on, like, autopilot, wanting to defund these
programs to fund other things. Somebody over at OMB has decided
that that is a good way to fund some other stuff, so watch
that.
In terms of local sharing, Bob or Ms. Harman have a better
view than I would. I think we said in the report we think the
FBI is doing a lot better job than it used to in sharing with
local groups, but there is a long way to go. Again, this is an
area where we have to look at whether they are including public
health officials. If they look at it and decide for some reason
not to, okay, but let's not just exclude them categorically
because we don't think that they are part of the solution.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman will now recognize the other Members for
questions they may wish to ask the witnesses. In accordance
with our committee rules and practice, I will recognize Members
who were present at the time of the hearing based on seniority
on the committee, alternating between Majority and Minority.
Those Members coming in later will be recognized in the order
of their arrival.
The Chairman now recognizes for 5 minutes the gentlelady
from California, Ms. Harman.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me welcome our witnesses. I believe that Jim Talent and
I were elected to the House in the same year. He has obviously
had----
Comm. Talent. I may say, Ms. Harman, the years have treated
you much more kindly than they have treated me, so----
Ms. Harman. Well, I notice your gray hair, my friend.
Hadn't seen that before.
Bob Graham, I want to commend you not only for your
friendship and enormous contributions, but for your mentorship
of me as I served on our Intelligence Committee when you
chaired the Senate Intelligence Committee, and for your superb
handling of the joint inquiry on 9/11, which was a bicameral,
bipartisan exercise by the Congress. Imagine--that seems like
a, you know, some kind of an old, ancient idea, given these
partisan times. But I thought we were very effective and I
thought your leadership was exemplary.
Let me also mention that when your excellent report came
out I made some comments about my view, which is that we should
prepare and not scare the American public. I think those
comments were construed to mean I was critical of your report.
I am not critical of your report; I applaud your report.
But I do believe that it is--that preparation, as Mr.
Talent said, is a key to prevention, and so I am glad that you
both see it that way.
Let me focus on just a couple issues that concern me
enormously, or that may offer some keys, and just to see if you
have thought about them. One is forensics and attribution. This
has been mentioned in the nuclear case, but I also think it
would apply in the biological case. If we can find out who
produced the stuff that was used, or if the bad guys know that
we will find out and the country transferring stuff to bad guys
knows that we will find out, I think that is a huge deterrent.
I just want to ask you whether you do, and what it is, exactly,
that you think we should do.
My understanding is that there is a Nuclear Forensics and
Attribution Act, which was signed fairly recently, but it
wasn't funded by this administration. I would suggest that this
is something we should fund and that this could be a very major
prevention strategy. I just want to know what you think.
Comm. Graham. I completely agree that if you are going to
deter your adversary it is critical that the adversary knows
that after the boom you are going to be able to determine from
whom that was dispatched. In our report we talk about the
importance of a forensic aspect to this issue and have urged
heightened funding of the Nation's efforts, both on the nuclear
as well as the biological side. That would be another example
of an issue that this committee might give some special
attention to see if, in fact, we are moving towards the
capability to be able to identify with sufficient clarity that
we could then justify a response.
On 9/11 we knew immediately who was responsible, and in
October 2001 started to send a massive military response to
Afghanistan. If we had not been able to have made such a quick
and internationally-accepted determination of who the
perpetrator was we would have been unable to have credibly
launched that response.
Ms. Harman. I agree.
Comm. Talent. This is an area--I just checked to make
certain--we gave the administration an ``A'' in this area
because they do have a--we had recommended that they develop a
strategy; they have developed one that more than met the
requirements that we had laid out in the report. But of course,
implementation is the key.
Ms. Harman. Funding is the key.
Comm. Talent. Funding. Absolutely. It would be a good
subject for this committee to interest itself in to make
certain that they do implement. But I completely agree with
you. You are absolutely right from the standpoint of, it is a
key deterrent if they know we can identify who did it,
particularly where a nation state is behind it.
Ms. Harman. Well, I think it needs more attention by
Congress. Time is short, but let me just commend you again for
your ``F'' for our efforts to reorganize the Congress. Sadly,
it is true. The committee, I believe, has way too little
jurisdiction for the responsibility vested in us, and I have
been through painful meetings where our Chairman has
courageously tried to augment our jurisdiction, and then he
gets jumped by the Chairmen of other committees who don't want
to give anything up.
Most of us are ready to criticize the Senate these days for
stopping all of our valuable legislation, but the one place
where the Senate has it right is that it has a committee,
chaired by Joe Lieberman, where Susan Collins is Ranking
Member, that has a lot more jurisdiction than ours and is
capable of doing a lot more than we can because of its larger
turf. Would you agree with that?
Comm. Graham. I would agree with that, but if I could be so
presumptive as to ask you and other Members this question: When
the Chairman or the Ranking Member or other Members of this
committee go to the leadership of the House with this request,
the reality is there is a degree of perception of self-
interest--you are trying to expand your power by taking it from
somebody else.
What has got to be at the table is the National interest.
My question is, who--what entities--do you think are capable of
presenting that National interest to the leadership of the
Congress, in this case specifically the House of
Representatives, that would give them the impetus to take the
action which we think is so critical for the Nation's safety?
Ms. Harman. Well, my time is expired, Mr. Chairman, and I
think it is probably a question to you both. But I would just
say, Bob, that your report and your calls for action and the
reports by Lee Hamilton and Tom Kean for action, this is an
unfinished item on the 9/11 agenda, and hopefully at some near
point a popular uprising, which is pretty effective around
here, might cause us to see this more clearly.
My time is up. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Gentleman from New York.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would say that Secretary Napolitano has been very
aggressive on this, and if we could have the administration
work with us, they really have no axe to grind one way or the
other other than to try to work it through.
So I would say if we could meet with people from the
administration to show, again, as Senator Talent said, hit the
low-hanging fruit first, then find areas where we look as if we
are acting responsibly but the right thing is being done. But I
think the administration can play a role, and obviously both
parties have to sit down on this----
Comm. Talent. It is going to have to be bipartisan.
I mean, you could explore, going so far--I don't think it
is something the President would want to mention in a State of
the Union address, but if on behalf of the Executive branch
agencies who have to live with this, you know, he made a
personal request at some point, I think that that might be
helpful. He is just representing the National interest. I know,
you know, he wants to show comity to how we operate on this end
of Pennsylvania Avenue.
I have got to believe the leadership wants to do this. This
isn't a leadership issue. I mean, the leadership is looking at
this and saying: A, it is probably impossible; B, we have 1,000
other things to do; C, we don't want to go out there and tilt
at windmills and end up offending everybody and we get nothing
anyway. I mean, if you talk with the Speaker and the leaders of
both parties that is probably what they will tell you.
So, as I said, some good work sort of beneath the surface
to try and figure out what can be done and give them some hope
might motivate them.
Chairman Thompson. Well, I appreciate everyone's comments,
and the one good part about the discussion is, up to this point
that has been a theme people on the right and left----
Comm. Talent. Absolutely.
Chairman Thompson [continuing]. Have displayed, that this
needs to happen. So in that respect there is no----
Comm. Talent. Mr. Chairman, I know it is easy for Senator
Graham and I to think of new things for you to do, because
largely--this is water you are largely going to have to carry,
but----
Chairman Thompson. Well, I mean it is, as I said earlier,
it is the right thing to do. So it makes it easier from our
perspective.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
McCaul, for 5 minutes.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Senators, for being here, and your work
products, your sense of urgency in terms of fixing the
Congressional oversight issue. I think over 100 committees and
subcommittees have jurisdiction currently, and I don't--I think
it is paralyzing.
Mr. Chairman, I hope we can work together in a bipartisan
way to fix this issue.
I think with your help and your credibility on the outside
helping us I think we can hopefully get there.
I have two quick questions with the limited time I have.
One is on the nuclear issue; one is biological.
In your report you describe Pakistan as the intersection of
nuclear weapons and terrorism. I agree with that assessment. It
has been an issue since the A.Q. Khan network.
Very concerned about the security of the nuclear stockpile
in Pakistan, very concerned with Iran close by, by some reports
maybe a year out from developing a nuclear weapon, very
concerned about their alliance with Venezuela, with Hugo Chavez
in this hemisphere, and with the potential of nuclear material
being smuggled and, you know, potentially being brought across
the border, which we know has some defects, I should say. It is
easy to cross, and I think it is still very easy to get this
type of material into the United States.
If you wouldn't--and I know, Senator Graham, you commented
on that area of the world being the most dangerous part of the
world, and I agree with that--what are your comments on how we
can better protect the Nation?
Comm. Graham. One, as I mentioned, we need to start dealing
with some of these long-simmering issues that have become the
flashpoint where this might actually occur. If, for instance,
something broke out in Kashmir that we ignited the vitriol
between India and Pakistan, that could be an incident that
could cause someone to make the decision, ``We don't want to
use these weapons, but we are going to let our surrogate,
Taliban, have access to these weapons and they will do our
dirty work.''
You may have read the story within the last week that there
are now suspicions that Syria has transferred Scud missiles to
Hezbollah in Lebanon. That could be a precursor of letting your
surrogate do the dirty work for you. So I think one of the
things that is very important is that we--that after 60 years
we give the urgency necessary to try to bleed off these long-
simmering disputes.
Second, I think also on a longer-range view, the United
States needs to work with our allies to try to better
understand the Muslim world. The Judeo-Christian world
represents about 1.2 billion people; the Muslim world
represents about 1.2 billion people. If we leave to our
children and grandchildren animosity between these two groups,
which together are roughly half of the population of the world,
we have left them a very incendiary legacy.
On the more immediate, I think one of our recommendations
was to work with India and Pakistan to develop some failsafe
procedures. Unlike the United States and the Soviet Union
during the Cold War where, although we were strong adversaries
and had the capability of destroying each other, we understood
that we didn't want to allow a misstep or an accidental event
to become the ignition for such a war, so we set up the red
phone in the Oval Office and a whole protocol. None of that
exists between India and Pakistan.
I have felt that this may be an area in which the United
States and Russia together, since we developed these protocols
for our own benefit and the world's benefit, might work
together with India and Pakistan to try to get them to develop.
I was encouraged that within the last month India and China
have started to develop some of those failsafe procedures, but
there is almost nothing has been done in a similar vein between
the real adversaries, which are India and Pakistan.
Mr. McCaul. I agree. With the limited time I have left,
again, the issue of Iran and their alliance with Venezuela,
putting that in our own hemisphere, what do you perceive as the
threat level of smuggling that type of material across our
border into the United States?
Senator Talent.
Comm. Talent. We didn't address in the report border
security as such. I am also very concerned about it, and I
think we do have, you know, as a political establishment, be
able to separate out the National security aspects of that from
the immigration aspects of it and reach an agreement on the
National security side of it. I mean, I think that is a
concern. There are a lot of ways they could try and get it in
the country and that is certainly one of them, and we are very
concerned about Iran. The report reflects that.
Pakistan is just incredibly difficult. Bob mentioned some
of the reasons. I would just say a couple of discrete things:
We are still not where we need to be in terms of--on workforce
issues within the intelligence community. This is something
that Senator Graham just hammers on, and correctly. We don't
have enough people who understand those issues. We haven't
recruited effectively enough. It just takes so long to hire
people in the intel community.
We can work particularly with India and Pakistan on
security of pathogens--this is in the bio area. Then one other
point that I made a lot and got into the report, because I am
coming from my--the DOD side--if you look at the speeches of
Secretary Gates he talks all the time about the importance of
developing the civilian elements of National power, what you
call ``smart power'' or ``soft power,'' the ability to
communicate effectively about American intentions and to help
build local grassroots economic and political institutions that
are a bulwark against this kind of instability.
I personally believe the State Department is going to have
to--and Secretary Clinton, I think, wants to do this--going to
have to undergo the kind of cultural angst and reform in
development that DOD did with Goldwater-Nichols that the intel
community has done so that the President has an option. You
know, you all in your campaigns, if you have got a part of your
district where you are not running as well as you like, you
know, you can instruct your consultants to build up your
numbers and they will have a plan.
Well, we should have the ability to say, you know, there is
this province of Pakistan or people where our goals, you know,
they are misinformed and they are angry at us, and the
President ought to have the option to say, ``Let's go out and
build up America's brand there.'' We don't have that organic
capability. So Presidents are, you know, reduced to options
none of which are very palatable.
Mr. Pascrell [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. I see my time is expired. Thank you.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you very much.
The Chairman recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Carney.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you both, Senators, for being here today. I have got
to tell you, I think this is probably one of the most important
hearings that we have held this year, maybe this entire cycle.
Juxtapose that when, you know--to me, we should have all the
major networks here listening to you two tell us what we really
need to pay attention to. You know, certainly when the Salahis
were here talking to us, you know, every damn network in the
world was here, and the well was full of photographers, you
know.
I suspect that we are stuck somewhere between Chicken
Little and an ostrich in looking at this issue. You brought up
Pakistan. You know, the Pew Organization did public opinion
polls of the United States and Pakistan just recently; we are
at 18 percent approval. Worse than Congress, actually, in
Pakistan. But we had to do battle with that, so----
Comm. Talent. President Obama gets that report and he would
like to do something about it, and who does he detail to do
something? We have no capability within the Government. We have
better capability as political actors to change our numbers
than we do to change our numbers, and why? We don't have that
organic capability within any of the civilian agencies.
Mr. Carney. There are organizations that can do that, I
think----
Comm. Talent. Right, from the margin, but----
Mr. Carney. Sure.
Comm. Talent. We haven't thought about how to develop. I am
sorry to interrupt.
Mr. Carney. No, you are right. I mean, I would like to have
the dialogue here.
But one thing that I was struck by, so it is about a $17
billion number you are looking at--$3.5 billion over 5 years--
--
Comm. Talent. Right.
Mr. Carney [continuing]. Or whatever, something like that,
over 5 years. Does that include things like a surge capacity
for hospitals? Now, I represent a district, for example, that
is in the eastern part of Pennsylvania--the northeast part of
Pennsylvania. We have a lot of hospital capability there.
Assuming that, you know, based on the premise that we are
going to have an attack in an urban area where it will do the
most damage, you know, we are talking about Mr. Pascrell's and
Mr. King's area probably. Well, do we have that surge capacity,
from your opinion on this, or----
Comm. Graham. Well, let me first--the number that I gave,
which was $3.4 billion for 5 years, that is for the BioShield
program. That is what it is going to cost to do the research to
determine the most appropriate therapeutic against these
pathogens that are most likely to be weaponized, and then to
produce enough of the material that 90 percent of Americans
could be treated in the event of a mass attack. It does not
include the cost of some of the other aspects of building this
response, such as surge capacity.
Yes, I think that is an important issue. I served for 18
years on the Veterans Committee during a period of time in
which we were dismantling a number of major VA hospitals as the
number of veterans was declining. Many of these were in urban
areas--big cities like New York and Chicago--which are the
places that are probably most likely to be called upon to have
some surge capacity.
I advocated that we should step back and think about, do we
really want to dismantle all this capability in the event that
we might wish that we had it available? I think that the
Congress needs to give some thought to how are we going to be
able to respond if suddenly there are thousands--hundreds of
thousands of people who are requiring immediate medical
attention. It is not going to be very satisfying, I think, to
the American people to say that we will just throw up our
hands, do nothing, and accept that as a cost of living in this
era of terror.
Comm. Talent. I think it ought to include--you want to be
careful because they need the money to develop the actual
medical countermeasures--but a decision-making process that was
working well might very well go through the following logic. It
might say, look, a lot of these pathogens attack, let's say,
people's respiratory systems. So if we have--if we are certain
that we have adequate capacity to get them on respirators and
we can lengthen their lives that way that gives us greater
time, then, for drugs to be dispensed and take effect. So it
ought to be thought of as seamlessly as possible.
I think you hit a really good insight. The surge capacity
is related to the medical countermeasure question. The on-going
challenge--none of us have complete answers to it--is how to
deal with this fragmented, you know, bureaucracy so that people
are cooperating enough that we get this seamless decision-
making, that we don't have--and in this case you have got FDA,
you have got NIH, you have got BARDA, you have got BioShield.
Now, Secretary Sebelius is looking at this and we are going to
be looking very carefully at what she comes up with, and we
think you should, also.
Mr. Carney. I agree, absolutely. You know, I want to echo
all my colleagues here on the sort of ridiculous requirements
that DHS has to go through in terms of committee reporting and
things like that. We should be the bellybutton in Congress for
all of this, to be quite honest.
I hope if you haven't had the opportunity that you share
that with the President also. You know, he needs to hear it
from a couple of credible people who are beyond the political
process now, not those of us still in the midst of it.
Comm. Talent. Well, I mean, he served--he knows----
Mr. Carney. Yes.
Comm. Talent [continuing]. What the jurisdiction is like. I
agree, by the way, with what Ms. Harman said, that it is
better--this is one of the few areas where it is better in the
Senate than it is here. They have more jurisdiction in their
committee there.
Mr. Carney. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Carney.
The Chairman recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senators, I thank you for being with us here today and
talking about this WMD issue, particularly the concerns about
biological attack. I assume that you believe that a biological
attack would be more likely than, say, a nuclear attack because
it is probably easier to develop or engineer a biological
pathogen even though it may be easier to contain it and it is
easier to prevent, obviously, a nuclear attack by controlling
fissile material, and the President has been a leader on that
issue, as have others.
I read Graham Allison's book, ``Nuclear Terrorism,'' and
how it is easier to prevent that--of course, harder to contain
the nuclear attacks. So I assume that that is the reasoning
behind why you feel that biological attack is more likely.
Comm. Graham. That is certainly a part of the reason. The
difficulty of developing a nuclear weapon is being demonstrated
by Iran. Iran has had some 5,000 centrifuges working for
several years trying to develop enough highly-enriched uranium
to produce one bomb.
Mr. Dent. It was always my understanding, if I read
Allison's book correctly, that if one had fissile material, was
able to obtain it, steal it, buy it, that--and they had the
know-how--they could develop a crude device--nuclear device--
usually within a year, assuming they could get the fissile
material. Is that your understanding, too?
Comm. Graham. Well, if you had gotten the Sears Roebuck
catalog from A.Q. Khan----
Mr. Dent. Right.
Comm. Graham [continuing]. And ordered the actual physical
vessel in which that highly-enriched uranium was going to be
introduced it wouldn't be a matter of months or weeks, it could
be a matter of days before you could have a weapon that was
ready to be used. But with biological, so many of those most
likely to be weaponized items are from nature itself. They
don't require much human intervention. Anthrax is a naturally-
developing product from dead cows. In fact, the word
``anthrax'' is a Russian word that means ``Siberian boil''
because the first place it was seen was in Siberia in dead
cattle.
Other synthetic pathogens are readily developed in high-
containment laboratories. The ability to then take that
weaponized product and distribute it effectively, which has
been a major impediment for biological weapons, witness the
failed attempt to use it in the subway in Tokyo, the Department
of Homeland Security feels that those distribution problems
have now largely been solved, and that in the hands of
competent technicians that there will be the ability to
distribute it in a way that will be largely unnoticed until
sufficient number of people have been impacted to have a weapon
of mass destruction.
Mr. Dent. Can I also ask you quickly about the dirty bomb's
radiological impact? I mean, I often don't refer to that as a
weapon of mass destruction, but a weapon of mass disruption----
Comm. Talent. Right.
Mr. Dent [continuing]. Because it will probably not--it may
not kill as many people but it will certainly be a terrible
disruption in the midst of this country and this economy, and
contamination issues are very great. What are you predicting,
or what do you see in the future as it relates to the
likelihood of a dirty bomb attack somewhere in this country?
Comm. Talent. Well, when we started the Commission off the
chairman and I had to make a decision about what we were going
to get into and not get into. The problem is how to say
something without trying to say everything.
Mr. Dent. Right.
Comm. Talent. Actually, models developed within the intel
community about how to--when something becomes a weapon of mass
destruction. There was, like, grids, you know, impact,
disruption, death, et cetera. We made an executive decision not
to go heavily into chem or radiological weapons, and so I just
don't know that we are the best ones to answer that.
Mr. Dent. Okay. That is fine. So you see it more as a
weapon of mass disruption as----
Comm. Talent. Yes. I mean, I agree totally with what you
are saying, and----
Mr. Dent [continuing]. Destruction. Okay----
Comm. Talent [continuing]. And there is a tremendous danger
of it. I just don't know that we are the--Bob might, out of his
general knowledge of intel, be able to give you an answer
whether the--to the extent that that is a specialized issue. We
do know that, from the intel, that they are emphasizing bio as
well as nuclear, and for all the reasons you indicate: Easier
to get, easier to weaponize, easier to stockpile. The only
advantage of bio over nuclear is that we can prepare for it a
lot better.
Mr. Dent. We can contain it a little better than nuclear.
Comm. Talent. You are right. You have got the whole--you
know, you have got the concepts down right and you are reading
a great author on this subject.
Mr. Dent. I yield back. My time is up.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you very much, Mr. Dent.
Now the Chairman recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman
from Oregon, Mr. DeFazio.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you two for your work.
Just a couple of quick questions about our capabilities in
terms of responding on biological attacks. I had brought to my
attention by some folks from Corvallis, Oregon who are working
with DOD that they have developed a capability, as have some of
their competitors, to very quickly take an agent and develop,
you know, an effective countermeasure vaccine, and they have
demonstrated this capability. They have been working closely
with DOD.
I mean, I guess my question is, are we, in some places,
making progress but we are not recognizing them over here
because we are so fragmented? Because apparently there is a
program called Transformational Medical Technologies Initiative
at DOD----
Comm. Graham. Right.
Mr. DeFazio [continuing]. Which has been working with
private sector folks who have come a long way in terms of being
able to quickly respond to a diverse range of threats, but I am
not sure that Homeland Security is aware of it or has any
capability of digesting this or working with them. Are you----
Comm. Graham. Sorry. Well, the answer is, I hope so,
because we--one of the strengths of America is our
entrepreneurship and our innovation. One of the things,
however, we learned with the H1N1 is it is one thing to know
what you need to have in order to have an effective
therapeutic; it is another thing to scale it up quickly to be
able to respond to the attack. We had 6 months' notice with
H1N1 and we still had a period where----
Mr. DeFazio. We are still using eggs.
Comm. Graham. Yes.
Mr. DeFazio. I mean, that is the problem. But this is a
breakthrough technology that these folks have worked with which
would not require extensive large factories and those sorts of
things and can be rapidly replicated.
Comm. Talent. I think you put your finger on a real
strength that we are not taking advantage of. You know, our
diverse country, our Federal system is a disadvantage in the
sense that it is fragmented; it is an advantage in the sense
that we have all these really great people out there thinking
about things and doing things in Oregon, or in the public
health system, whatever, but we don't--you know, the others
don't know about it.
Mr. DeFazio. Right.
Comm. Talent. It is the need for integration within the
system of decision-making. This is where, you know, you all who
know the Government and just--you have years and years, Mr.
DeFazio, I know you do--in thinking about how this Government
operates, could maybe think outside the box about practical
solutions for solving that problem.
Now, one of the things Bob and I have talked about, and we
have never put it in an official report, and the reason we
haven't is because we get people coming to us, just as you do,
just as you have home district people who say we have this
tremendous solution and you saw them, right?
Pick the right agency and to set up maybe a group of
people--and this could even be experts from the outside who are
sitting in on this--and just inviting those around the country
who have solutions--you would have to screen it a little bit
because you know you will get people who have developed
something--but who have solutions to some aspect of this
preparedness problem that is working in some context. Maybe
their local fire protection districts picked it up or
whatever--to bring it to this group which is then connected to
all the other parts of the system, Federal and State, and can
say, ``Hey, this is really a great device for
decontamination.'' I think I have just seen decontamination
technology out there that could probably solve this problem if
we knew the right agency to get it to and--whether it is EPA or
whatever.
I think you have put your finger on a very important
empowerment tool here. It would be a good thing for you--I am
giving you more work, now, to do--to think in terms of how to
do this, and maybe as this bill moves to put it in there.
Mr. DeFazio. Right. It is an on-going frustration, and I am
sure you had it when, you know, when you were in the Senate and
representing folks with good ideas, is how do you connect them
with the decision-maker, because the decision-makers are out
there putting out an RFP somewhere to other people who haven't
had this breakthrough, and, you know, we are floundering
around, it just seems to me, spending a lot of money and we are
not getting to the effective----
Comm. Talent. There are a lot of technologies resident in
DOD that are not being used in the rest of the system, and we
shouldn't blame DOD. I am sitting on another panel that Bob was
able to escape--it is the independent panel reviewing the
Quadrennial Defense Review--and we just heard a report from the
assistant secretary who does homeland for them. She is really
great, and she was talking about, they have these resident
capabilities, but then chain-of-command issues because the
Governors want--in the event of it, the Governors want to run
the show, and how do they do all this stuff? It is just this
constant problem you run into of fragmentation within the
Executive branch, and as between the Executive and the State
and local.
This body here and this committee is an institutional
integrator, because everybody respects you, believe it or not,
and people have to listen to you on a certain level. But what
you do with that is the challenge.
Mr. DeFazio. Yes. Thank you.
One other quick question. This is just sort of a personal
crusade. There is a chemical that is produced in the United
States. It is no longer allowed for new production or broadcast
use. It is called Compound 1080, and it is an odorless,
colorless, antidoteless, highly-concentrated poison that is
used for wildlife--you know, for killing wildlife and
predators. It has been identified, you know, by both the FBI
and DOD as a particularly high threat.
I have been trying to get, you know, the production of this
stuff stopped. They found some of it, if you remember, in
containers in Iraq, you know, Saddam was apparently playing
around with it, trying to figure out what to do with it maybe.
You know, I think producing something like that here in the
United States--and it is still out there in the United States--
it has been stockpiled in different places--is a real problem.
Have you come across this, or has it been brought to your
attention--okay. All right. Because I have had a bill----
Comm. Talent. We have now. I mean----
Mr. DeFazio. Yes. Okay.
The facility that produces it has virtually no security. It
does have sort of a dilapidated barbed-wire fence around it,
but anyway, I would just raise that hopefully to get someone's
attention or support for my proposal to ban the production of
it.
Comm. Graham. If you are looking for a homework assignment
there are people--significant numbers of people--who start with
the premise that biological weapons aren't capable of being
utilized in a way that would constitute a weapon of mass
destruction. What we encountered was, up until President Nixon,
who terminated the U.S. development of an offensive biological
weapons program, we probably had the best biological weapons
program in the world in the 1960s, and it was enormously
effective.
If you want to get some sense of what was capable of being
done 50 years ago you might ask for a briefing on what our own
program was and then speculate what 50 years of further
scientific engagement with the worst biological materials might
have brought us to. That will keep you up at night.
Comm. Talent. As another suggestion, if--because you all
have to deal with this issue--learn a scenario that is relevant
to your districts, and when you talk about it run through the
scenario, because people get it then. I mean, the one I use is,
St. Louis we gather on the Fourth of July at the riverfront,
you know, to celebrate the holiday. Isolate anthrax, turn it
into a slurry or a powder, get a pickup truck, put a shell in
the back of it, punch a hole in the top of it and drive up and
down Memorial Drive with a paint sprayer blowing it up in the
air. Let the winds take it.
I mean, Mr. King, we have seen, and Mr. Chairman, we have
seen the modeling for New York. You know, in the summer you
expose several million people in New York; you kill, depending
on how effective it is, a tenth to, like, a third of that.
Mr. Pascrell. It brings it home.
Comm. Talent. It absolutely does.
Mr. Pascrell. It brings it home.
Comm. Talent. Think how many times people are gathered in
New York over the summer for one reason or another. It is----
Mr. Pascrell. Mr. DeFazio, thank you for your questioning.
On target, as usual.
I would like to turn now--the Chairman recognizes for 5
minutes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Olson.
Mr. Olson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you much to our witnesses for coming today. I want to
thank you for your service as elected officials. Thank you for
your expertise and thank you for your commitment to protect not
only Americans but the citizens of the world.
My question: I kind of want to follow up on some of the
discussion we have had about the threat of India-Pakistan, and
on a daily basis we are learning more about the threats that
are posed by terrorist groups not in the places that are
covered on the news, you know, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan,
but other places, like Yemen, where al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, and Somalia, with the Al-Shabaab movement. They are
no longer a regional threat. Their stated goal, as you all
know, is to strike the United States and our allies.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has already shown some
signs that attest--on Christmas day with the bomb on the
aircraft, and possibly having some connections with the
shootings in my home State of Texas at Fort Hood. My question
to you all is, what is the likelihood that the next WMD attack
will be from one of these groups, that it will be forthcoming
from them and not where kind of our focus is? I appreciate your
comments on that issue.
Comm. Graham. I can't give you a statistical probability of
that occurring, but I think it is certainly within the realm of
reality. To me, one of the most frightening things about what
happened on Christmas day is that it broke what we had assumed
to be a relationship.
There are about 60 of these regional or sub-regional groups
that have an affiliation with al-Qaeda--big al-Qaeda in the
caves of Pakistan. In the past the assumption had been that
those affiliate groups were disciplined by big al-Qaeda and
they would not take a major operation without approval. This
situation in December seemed to be a break from that tradition,
that these regional groups are starting to be self-initiating
in their operations.
If that is, in fact, the case, the level of risk has just
gone up significantly, because now we don't have a small group
of people making decisions; we have got a large group of
people, frequently with a diverse set of motivations behind
their actions. So whether they end up being the one who
delivers the WMD or whether it is their older parent, it won't
make much difference to the people who are affected by it.
Comm. Talent. I can't say it better than the Chairman said
it.
Mr. Olson. Okay. Well, thank you very much.
Just another question: You know, a lot of our focus here in
preventing terrorist attacks is on aircraft, because that is
how we have been attacked in the past. I represent a district
that is within the greater Houston area, and unfortunately, I
would argue--I could argue that we are the best target for
terrorists to attack. I mean, we are a major city, the Nation's
third-largest city.
We have a port that you could, you know, drive a tanker
very close to the downtown area, close to the urban areas. It
is for our commerce; it is the second-largest port in our
country. We have got a huge medical center there which serves
the entire region, and if you were to have a biological attack
and take out its capabilities you could have a very, very
serious situation there.
I guess my question is, in some of your studies are you
seeing any evidence that the terrorists out there who--again,
with the folks on aircraft right now as their mechanism to
attack us--are going to get wise and realize, you know, we can
get a tanker, you know, a tanker on a ship in the Port of
Houston, or we can just get something across our borders. Our
State has the largest border with Mexico, and, you know, we can
achieve our goals not by folks on aircraft but by folks on
these very--I think very easy ways, unfortunately, to hurt our
country.
In your studies do you see any evidence that the terrorists
are actually thinking about that way of coming at us instead of
on aircraft?
Comm. Graham. Well, I will give you another homework
assignment. I spent 3 weeks last summer in Great Britain in
large part talking to their intelligence, law enforcement,
political groups as to terrorism in United Kingdom. They have
been dealing with terrorism much longer than we have.
One of the things they do is they engage citizens to a much
higher level than has been our practice. They told me a story
about a citizen who came to an appropriate law enforcement
agency and said, ``I think I know how a terrorist would deliver
a weapon of mass destruction in London, or Manchester, or
Birmingham,'' and the answer was they would do it with an
ambulance. Why an ambulance? Because that is a vehicle that
people tend to defer to, allowing it to get close to the target
before detonation.
Well, this led Scotland Yard to ask the question, ``Do we
know where our ambulances are in the United Kingdom?'' They did
a survey and were stunned to find out how many were unaccounted
for.
I would suggest you might take as a question in your own
community, is somebody responsible for knowing the whereabouts
of all emergency vehicles which might provide the platform for
a relatively safe and unimpeded vehicle of mass destruction? So
yes, I think we have tended to solve yesterday's problem.
If a fellow named Reed gets on an airplane from London to
Miami and has something bad in his shoes the next thing we are
doing is having everybody take their shoes off at the airport.
If somebody, as the man did in December, has it in his
underwear, we are now going to take pictures of everybody's
underwear.
We have got to get out of this chasing the past and take a
more futuristic approach asking, what are the most likely ways,
not the ways that have already been shown to be used, but that
a thoughtful, considerate, smart adversary would likely choose?
Comm. Talent. Just a couple of quick comments. Senator
Graham said some things that triggered some thinking.
First of all, it is really important that we get a lot of
this thinking and intensity level coming from the grassroots
and local communities upward in the system. You all in Houston
know, if you think about it and you are motivated to think
about it, where these threats might come from better than the
FBI is going to know sitting there in Washington.
So this is one of the reasons we do repeat the urgency of
the threat, keeping in mind what Ms. Harman said. This is not
an attempt to get people to panic at all. It is so people will
recognize a threat, get past the sense of panic or despair, and
then just adopt it as sort of a working reality in their lives
so that people, as they have done in Britain, as they have done
in Houston, as they have done to some degree in New York, which
is a leader in this, just people recognize this is part of the
world that we have to live in.
So somebody in Houston has got to be thinking about, how
could this--how could they hit us here differently than they
have done it before?
The other point I want to mention that is related to this,
because it is--it has to do with community action and
preparedness: I really want to applaud the draft bill, as we
understand it, because you raised the subject of making sure
first responders and their families have the med kits.
You mentioned the big hospital you have got there. Well, if
those people are working in that hospital, if there is some
kind of bioattack and they are worried about their families,
then that is what they are going to pay attention to, and who
can blame them? So we need to make certain that this group of
people has the medical countermeasures, that they have it for
their families at minimum.
Then you also raised, I think, a very important issue--it
is gutsy of you to raise it--the question of giving med kits
out just to the general population. Under what circumstances is
that an appropriate thing to do? I think you ought to--we ought
to be studying that. Just particularly in certain high-risk
cities, you know, Houston, New York, whatever, to what extent
do we just say to people, ``You can empower yourself and your
family by having these med kits.''
Now, there are plusses and minuses to that, but we have got
to be thinking outside the box and your legislation pushes the
Secretary in the direction of studying that, and I think that
is good.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Olson. Good questions.
The Chairman recognizes for 5 minutes the gentlewoman from
Texas, Ms.--I am sorry--Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very
much for your recognition and for this hearing.
Let me thank the two co-chairs and probe Senator Graham on
a point that you have made, and then pursue the line of
questioning that my colleague just engaged in with respect to
Yemen and other African nations. I think we have had this
discussion before, even as the Homeland Security Committee was
being crafted, and that is, what is the jurisdiction and how do
we find a home for National security and antiterrorism efforts
on behalf of this Nation and allow one entity to be in power?
Senator Graham, in your testimony you mentioned the
jurisdictional complexity that we are in, and I note that in
grading us with a grade that most students don't want to
receive--an ``F''--you have reform Congressional oversight to
better address the intelligence. If you would respond to that
along with the question of what I think is crucial, is training
the next generation of National security experts--I am going to
add another question in and then I will listen.
I, too, I have just come back from Yemen and looked at it
in two different directions. One, of course, the government's
commitment, if at all, to nonproliferation, and I would like
your assessment of that; but also, the social issues of large
numbers of unemployed youth who are obviously ready targets for
al-Qaeda recruitment.
What role do we have to play in that aspect to quash the
ripeness of those who are there to be engaged in terrorism, and
what role is Saudi Arabia playing, if you are familiar with
them completely closing the border and not, themselves, dealing
with their neighbor in a number of ways--of course, the
nonproliferation and al-Qaeda getting their hands on nuclear
materials, but also, is there another way Saudi can be more
involved in what potentially might be happening in Yemen? I
thank you both for your presence here.
Senator Talent, you may join in on some of those questions
that I have asked. Thank you, again.
Comm. Graham. Well, let me take the prerogative of picking
one of your questions, and I will answer it, and then if
Senator Talent would like to pick another one, and that is this
issue of preparing the next generation of National security
officers. I think this is a very significant issue.
Our inquiry into 9/11--the joint House-Senate--in my
opinion, our most important single conclusion was that the
fundamental lapses that led to--led the intelligence community
to be blind before 9/11 were found in the quality of people who
were involved in their responsibilities.
The Congress, I hope, after more than 5 years of
procrastination, is about to pass legislation to establish what
has been referred to as the intelligence equivalent of the
Reserve Officer Training Corps for the military, where we will
have a regularized process for the recruitment, preparation,
particularly in areas of science and languages, of the next
generation of our intelligence community leadership, and then a
smooth process for their integration into the community. I
think that is of extremely high importance and I am pleased
that it looks as if it is about to happen.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you think we are moving fast enough?
Comm. Graham. Well, I think we should have done it 5 years
ago, but better late than never.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Senator Talent, would you take the
jurisdictional question about whether or not we have a strong
enough jurisdictional oversight, one place, one unified place
on this issue, and how do we move to that? You know that is a
challenge here in the United States Congress----
Comm. Talent. Yes, it is.
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. House and Senate.
Comm. Talent. While Senator Graham and I know the practical
obstacles, and I have made this point in a number of contexts,
I think you are exactly right to be concerned about it, and it
takes what ought to be a real positive Congressional
oversight--I am a believer in Congressional oversight because
the agencies pay attention when Congress gets involved--but it
takes what should be a positive and turns it into what I think
we all have to admit is a negative.
I mean, there is a reason Secretary Napolitano has
contacted the Chairman, and Mr. Pascrell, and Mr. King to say,
``Could you be certain to raise this issue?'' It is not because
she--I mean, because she is hearing from her under secretaries
and assistant secretaries that they are having to spend too
much time in too many committees that they ought to be spending
doing all of this other stuff we are talking about, and that is
the practical matter.
Now, you all know the Cabinet Secretary is the last thing
in the world they want to have to do, is get involved with
telling Congress how to change its internal procedures. So if
she is doing that that means this is a big problem over there.
I think a combination of making certain that the key
committee staff people and Chairmen and Members on the
committees here have got these threat briefings so they know
this is the security of the country at stake, this is not a
fight over a typical oversight issue, and then if we can make
the problem their problem--in dealing with the Congress, once
you get the other person to accept the fact, this is a problem
I have to participate in solving, I can't just be an obstacle
to solutions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you think one department should be
strengthened with--such as Homeland Security?
Comm. Talent. Within the Executive branch, yes. Then here
in the Congress I think a committee should be--and it is easy
for us to say here because it ought to be this committee. I
mean, we are not testifying now before Judiciary or something
where we would have to tell them, you probably need to give
something up.
I agree completely with what you and Senator Graham were
saying about, within--experts within intel.
Let me add one comment, because it is relevant to your
other point, ma'am. In order to get the kind of workforce that
we need, they are going to have to be empowered to move more
quickly in setting up this reserve and hiring people. That
means they are going to have to cut down on some of this
review, you know, so that they--think about this: You get a
great person graduating from, you know, you pick it, some great
school, and they have studies in this area and they know it,
and the CIA wants to hire them.
Now they have got to get--go through clearances and this
stuff, it takes a year. Well, what top-notch person is going to
sit around for a year waiting to see whether an offer can be
made? So we are going to have to shorten that procedure of
time. That means there is a possibility some mistakes could get
made if you are hiring hundreds of people.
I think it is important, Mr. Chairman, that this committee
and the Intelligence Committee, if a mistake occurs that way,
unless somebody clearly was negligent, that you not play gotcha
with them. Don't have a hearing and then hammer on them. You
see what I am saying? Then back them up, because we are going
to have some mistakes of commission rather than omission.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee, for your questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you. I just want to conclude to
you, Mr. Chairman, and say that I think Yemen is an important
issue for this committee. Several Members have been and I hope
the committee will--I didn't hear their answer on that, but I
hope the committee will also have input on that as we go--the
Commission, rather, as we go forward.
Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Pascrell. The Chairman now recognizes for 5 minutes the
gentleman from the great State of Alabama, Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here. This has been a really good
hearing, and I agree with Mr. Carney, it is unfortunate that we
don't have the same media attention for what you have had to
say that we had for the Salahis, which was just a joke.
But I want to talk, obviously, first about something that
you said, Senator Graham, earlier to Ms. Harman about how we
get this jurisdiction issue resolved. I think it is going to
take people like you, who don't have a dog in the fight, to
help push this issue with the administration. Secretary
Napolitano has talked with us, and she is just--it is a real
problem, as you just said, Secretary--Senator Talent.
But I was pleased after the Christmas day bombing when Lee
Hamilton was interviewed the next day, and this is one of the
things he mentioned. He said it is time for the Congress to
have the political will to implement that last 9/11 Commission
recommendation on jurisdiction, because we have this diluted
focus right now in the House as a result of this jurisdictional
problem. So I hope that Lee Hamilton and Tom Kean will do what
I am asking you to do, and that is communicate to the President
and to the Speaker, this is an issue that does not need to be
left undealt with.
But having said all that, I want to talk about rural
preparedness and mass evacuation. I have the Center for
Domestic Preparedness in my district. It is the only facility
in the country that trains first responders as to how to deal
with an attack of mass destruction, and it is a great facility.
One of my concerns, as being a Member who represents a
rural Congressional district, is that we don't push that
training out into rural America, because I am of the opinion
that when there is an attack in a major urban area--and I don't
think it is just going to be New York, New Jersey; could be St.
Louis, or it could be Birmingham, Alabama, or Charlotte, North
Carolina, or financial hubs of the region, these people are
going to be evacuated out into rural America to get them out of
there.
While we are doing some work in this area and training
first responders, I don't think we are pushing that training
out into rural America.
I have been an advocate to try to get the Center for
Domestic Preparedness funded to take that training to rural
America, because a general rule in rural America, as you know
in Florida, and I know you know in Missouri, it is volunteers
that are working in these fire and rescue departments, and they
can't leave and take 2 weeks to go to the Center for this free
training because they can't leave their jobs. They are not a
professional firefighter. So anything that you could do to help
let the Department know that you think this is an area
unattended to I think would be beneficial.
I am pleased that at the Center they also have the Noble
training facility--Noble Hospital--which trains, as you talked
about a few minutes ago, these hospital workers, if there is an
attack, they could be thinking about their loved ones. We are
trying to deal with that and trying to bring hospital
administrators as well as caregivers in and train them as to
what it is going to be like, what the environment is going to
be like.
It is very state-of-the-art, but we need more messaging to
get that information out there. We need more hospitals to
recognize that it could be them that has this problem and they
need to be prepared to deal with it.
But having said that, do you think that there is enough
being done in the way of preparedness in rural America for the
mass evacuations out of an urban center after an attack?
Comm. Graham. I guess I am not aware of any comprehensive
planning for that eventuality. So that would lead me to say
that no, we have not assessed where these urban populations are
likely to go in the aftermath of such an attack.
States like yours and mine, which have had some experience
with evacuations for hurricanes, know what those circumstances
are, and they would be much more difficult if the reason for
the evacuation was a man-made nuclear or biological attack
rather than nature giving us a hurricane. I think you put your
finger on an important issue, and one that I think would be
worthy of some further exploration by this committee, to
heighten the sensitivity of the appropriate Federal agencies to
this likelihood.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I was pleased in your earlier answers to
questions to see you all both recognize that we have a real
problem, and you talked about the funding with Ms. Harman--the
inadequate funding for health care providers in the--to prepare
them for training.
I don't know if you all were aware, but I talked with Mr.
Carney and Ms. Richardson, who both chair subcommittees in this
full committee, there has been an effort internally within the
Department to basically dismantle the Office of Health Affairs,
which we spent 5 years configuring to deal exactly with what
you are talking about. Fortunately, in the last couple of weeks
Secretary Napolitano came in and stopped that effort. But it is
important that we remember that that is a critical element of
being prepared to respond to a weapon of mass destruction
attack.
Comm. Talent. I think ``we don't know'' is the question. I
mean, you say, ``Are we prepared enough?'' I would answer,
``No,'' but then I would also answer, ``We don't know.''
You know, I was approached by some people locally in
Missouri who explained to me that our technology, in terms of
organizational directories--just very simple of these various
first responder groups--is so unsophisticated and so poorly
linked together that they don't know what capabilities their
fellows--their brothers and sisters in the same service have.
So the fire protection districts in suburban St. Louis
don't know, if there is a disaster, what fire trucks, or hazmat
outfits, or diving outfits are available around the State of
Missouri, and there is no easy way to find out except pick up
the phone and call the chiefs.
So we don't know, and if you don't know how can you
structure a plan where you are engaging? Because an intelligent
plan would probably say, ``Well, we don't need to train
everybody in every rural fire protection outfit about
everything, but we ought to have some of them trained in some
things so that they can contribute and help in the event of a
disaster in Birmingham, or whatever.''
We don't know, and that is the lack of integration and
fragmentation that is such a huge issue. So, you know, failing
that, yes, you have got to keep these organizations alive so
you can keep these folks in the game. I mean, I would agree
with you.
On the jurisdictional, let me just--I am sitting here
thinking about the ideas we have had. Maybe this is not the
place to air a plan, maybe I should be more secret about it.
But if you all had a hearing where you encouraged Secretary
Napolitano to testify as to the practical consequences--and
maybe you have already done this--and the President just
privately let her know that even though she would take some
flack from some other people for it, that he would support her
in it, and then you guys came up with a resolution for both the
caucus--the Democratic Caucus and the Republican Conference at
the beginning of the next--where you got up and offered a
resolution instructing the leadership, and maybe they knew
about it beforehand and privately supported you, to come up
with a solution and put it to the Members in both parties----
Mr. Rogers. That is a good idea.
Comm. Talent [continuing]. And just let them, you know, let
them vote on it, you know, in the context of some publicity
and, you know, do you want a solution to this or not? At a
certain point the people are blocking this, and I understand
that. I mean, I was a committee Chairman; I was there for the--
you know, I know all that, but at a certain point they are
going to say, ``You know what? The reasons to do this are
beginning to outweigh the reasons not to do it.''
Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Rogers. I think encouraging
points you brought up, and the response from the panel is very,
very, very important.
We have to bite the bullet on turf. We are so frightened to
go near that issue. Thank you for your encouragement.
Comm. Talent. It is easy for me. I don't have to stand----
Mr. Pascrell. Leader King and myself have been talking
about this for many, many moons, but now we have a Secretary
finally coming forth and saying she really wants to work with
us, so----
The Chairman now recognizes for 5 minutes the gentlewoman
from Nevada, Ms. Titus.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Senators, for taking time to come and talk to us
about this important topic of keeping Americans safe, and our
allies and people around the world. I represent southern
Nevada, and----
Comm. Graham. I gathered that.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Titus. We have 450,000 hotel rooms in some of the
largest hotels in the world, and they are like small
communities unto themselves. I know that your report you stress
the need for increased involvement from individuals
communities, and I think we are moving towards that, and I am
very pleased that we are going to be working on this
legislation.
But something that I see that is missing that I would ask
your advice on is how do we involve the private sector as we
move forward? I know that is not on your score card, but could
you give us some advice that we might take into account as we
draw up this legislation, and also tell us how you think we are
doing on that measure, if we are doing anything at all?
Comm. Graham. There is an organization--it is called BENS,
that is the Business Executives for National Security--which
has as its mission to bring the private sector into these
issues of homeland and National security, and our assessment
was they had done a very excellent job where they had been
employed to do this, and I use the word--not that they were
hired, but that they were engaged.
I would suggest that might be a place for you to start to
have a conversation between the business community of southern
Nevada and this BENS organization to see how they might be able
to work together. They bring a lot of expertise to the table.
Comm. Talent. I was going to say, Congresswoman, that I
think a key to this is that private actors need to know that
the partnership model is going to be followed, rather than the
adversarial model. So, for--and your legislation reflects that,
for example, in the lab regulation.
People who are running these high-containment labs, yes, it
is a potential security problem, which we recognize in our
report; it is also the answer to the problem, because they are
the ones developing the research, the life-saving
countermeasures, and they need to know that their regulators
are not going to treat them like the enemy, okay, that they are
going to partner with them, unless they have some reason.
Now, obviously if you discover some security risk or
something, and I would say this the same thing with the
businesses that import and export pathogens, et cetera, they
all--all the people leading this that we run into want to be
part of the solution. So if they are treated as partners, if
you have negotiated rulemaking, if you include them in on
this--this would include the travel and tourism community.
You know, you don't want the Government to hand down from
on high, ``This is what you now have to do.'' You know, you
want to include them in as partners rather than as adversaries.
I think that is a very important model and an important signal
for you all to send to the Executive branch.
Ms. Titus. Well, I say that it is especially important in
the hospitality industry. Nobody has better security than we
have in Las Vegas, so we should be taking advantage of some of
that expertise.
On the other hand, when you are on holiday you are away
from home and so you have less awareness of what resources are
available, what road to take to get out of town, where you can
access evacuation points, all of that, so having the
hospitality industry involved--and I will look at the BENS
group, too--I think would be very important and useful to us.
Thank you.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Ms. Titus.
Before I ask a question, Peter King has a question.
Mr. King. I am going to have to leave in a second, so I
appreciate the Chairman giving me this.
I would just ask Chairman Graham and Chairman Talent if you
can get back to us on this: In the Lieberman-Collins bill in
the Senate they seem to focus more on the international aspect
than we are so far in our legislation. Is that going to be very
costly? You mentioned the OMB before.
But if you could just get back to us, take a look at their
bill, with how significant you think it is that maybe we should
expand more of an international component, or should we try and
get what we can by focusing domestically? So if you would just
take a look at that for us I would appreciate your input. Thank
you.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Peter King.
It has always been my belief that if our State and local
officials are not an integral part of our homeland security
strategy--both pointed this out many, many times--then we have
no such thing as homeland security. All we have then are some
fancy bureaucratic plans, because the great majority of our
first responders, the people who actually help prevent and
respond to emergencies, are at the State and local levels. They
are there first, before the Federal Government is involved,
before anybody is involved; they will be the first to be
moving.
That is exactly why Mr. King and I made State and local
coordination an integral part of weapons of mass destruction
legislation, both at the preparedness and response levels. I
would like you both to comment on your thoughts on this issue,
especially in regards to the need for this coordination both
before and after a possible weapons of mass destruction attack,
be it nuclear, biological, radiological, chemical, whatever.
Senator Graham.
Comm. Graham. Yes. I could not agree with you more. It is
particularly true on the biological aspect because the public
health service, which is in most areas a combination of State
and local responsibility, will play such an absolutely central
role that is illustrative of the broader issue of coordination
of State and local with the Federal partnership.
When we gave an ``F'' to our response capability we were
giving an ``F'' to the Nation, not to one level of government,
because we think that fundamental failure has been the failure
to develop a means by which all of the critical elements that
are actually going to be out there and will make a difference
on the ground, life or death, for people who have been
impacted--how effectively they will understand their mission,
be able to execute their mission and not stumble over each
other or leave gaps of unprotected people.
Comm. Talent. I would agree, and I think this is an area,
Mr. Chairman, where we could do a lot informally as between
leaders. If, for example, Secretary Napolitano, or the DNI, or
somebody presented at a National Government's Association
meeting, and to emphasize the nature of this threat, so to say
to the Governors, ``Look, you are an integral part of this. We
are going to recognize that, but we need you to make certain
that your offices don't treat this as a business-as-usual
thing. This is not an excuse for you to cut your public health
spending and hope that you can get Federal dollars to replace
it.''
So once you get to the top--the Governors themselves and
say, ``This is going to be a National effort; you are an
important part of it,'' you need to recognize personally and
make sure your key people recognize that this has to be
reflected in State priorities as well as Federal. I think that
is own for their seat at the table, but that is informal. It is
not something you legislate, it is just something that--as
between leaders ought to occur.
Mr. Pascrell. You pointed out earlier, and we have been
there several times, that how they approach these particular
sensitive, urgent issues in England is very different than we
approach it here. It would seem to me--I have come to this
conclusion; I don't know if my good friend, Mr. Lungren, would
agree with me--that there is a bottom-up approach, that you are
looking at the folks who are on duty in the local level to
foster ideas so that they really focus, and this is really
homeland security.
I have got one other quick area, and then we will ask Mr.
Lungren if he has any questions.
We have neglected, I think, looking at how our vaccination
policy plays in our deterrence for the effects of a possible
biological attack. You and I both agree--I think we do--that
the next attack will be biological. We expect it to be between
now and 2013.
Our legislation, that Peter--Mr. King and I have been
working on diligently, with your staff and everybody else's
staff, calls for the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
review the adequacy of vaccination and antimicrobial
distribution policies, guidance and information provided to the
public in light of known biological threats to the United
States.
Realizing we can't vaccinate everybody against every
possible disease, I think we should at least let the first
responder community volunteer to get immunized against those
biological agents we have been told pose material threats to
the United States. Do you agree with that? In addition to HHS,
who else do you think should be involved in reviewing our
vaccine policy?
Comm. Graham. Mr. Chairman, could I ask your indulgence? I
am afraid I have a commitment this afternoon in New York and I
have got to catch a plane, which is going to leave without me
unless I leave fairly soon. So if I could conclude by
expressing my appreciation for the opportunity that you
afforded this, and Senator Talent has indicated that he can
stay----
Comm. Talent. Decidedly the ``B Team,'' but willing to stay
for you or Mr. Lungren if you like.
Mr. Pascrell. Great. I would appreciate that very much.
I really want to thank you, Senator Graham. Your
contributions before and now to this Nation--your service has
been impeccable, and we want you to catch that plane, but we
are going to be talking as we go along and finishing this bill.
Thank you.
Comm. Graham. We look forward to that very much, and thank
you for your leadership.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, sir.
Comm. Talent. Yes, you have put your finger on a real
problem, Mr. Chairman, and we have talked a lot about this. I
mean, we are still making vaccines using chicken eggs. I don't
know if your staff has informed you, we actually--Senator
Graham actually did a video on it, which was quite an
experience.
You know, we had 6 months' notice with H1N1, and we didn't
have enough vaccine, which is like, just, it is incredible.
Now, I think it is very important that we do what you talked
about, that we make certain the first responder community has
whatever medical countermeasures we can come up with to protect
them so they feel secure and, you know, can then do their job
of protecting the rest of us in the even of an attack.
You do raise an issue here, which is--I think you are
raising this issue, if I understand your question correctly--
should we expedite procedures, for example, with FDA approval
to get them these vaccines quicker?
Mr. Pascrell. Right.
Comm. Talent. You know, that is a controversial subject. We
did that with anthrax and there have been some issues involved
with it.
I think we need a decision-making structure where that is
an open possibility to be decided on a case-by-case basis. You
know, I think it depends on how crucial it is, how high-risk
this population is, how much--how far along FDA is. I think it
depends on a series of things.
But we need a decision-making structure so that somebody is
capable of saying, ``Yes, we need to let this go and do this in
this instance with regard to this drug.'' We don't really have
that.
Now, we are putting some pretty high hopes in the review
that is going on now in the Executive branch. We think they are
energized, and I am certain you and the staff on the committee
are watching it, so let's see what they come up with, is what I
would say to you, which should be completed pretty quickly,
shouldn't it?
So let's see what happens, but it is a crucial issue. You
are right, we have to have this first responder community
protected or they are not going to be able to protect us.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you very much.
The Chairman recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman from
California, Mr. Lungren.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry
I missed a good deal of the proceedings, but I was handling the
suspension bill that was honoring the 10th year of Father
Coughlin as our chaplain, and there were a lot of people
speaking, including the Speaker, so it took me more time than I
thought. So I thank you.
If I had a lot of time I could address each question with a
different manner of referring to Mr. Vice President Talent,
there. I could call him Senator, I could call him Congressman,
I could call him Leader, I could call him Chairman, but I know
we don't have enough time so I will just call him----
Comm. Talent. Jim is fine.
Mr. Lungren [continuing]. Jim.
You mentioned early on about the failure of the Congress
where we got a big ``F'' on reorganizing ourselves, and you
briefly mentioned opportunity costs lost. Could you just tell
us what you mean by that?
Comm. Talent. Sure. The negative of it is that people in
the Executive branch have to spend too much time before too
many committees and subcommittees, so that is the area where
damage is positively done to what they are trying to do----
Mr. Lungren. It is not just testifying; it is all the
preparation of testimony, going over it and getting other staff
to do it, and so forth.
Comm. Talent. So you would become an obstructive force,
let's just be--not you, but the institution. Then the positive
does not happen because you don't have clear channels of
oversight.
Nobody from this authorizing committee was there when the
stimulus bill, which, again, forget about what you think of it
as economic policy, this was an opportunity to fund a lot of
this stuff and there wasn't anybody there to go to Mr. Obey and
his people, and Jerry Lewis and his people and say, ``Look, you
have got to make certain this money is in there,'' because
nobody had the clear responsibility; whereas, had it been a DOD
priority you would have had Mr. Skelton there, and the Ranking
Member there, and somebody would have done it.
We all know how this place operates. If everybody has
responsibility over something nobody has responsibility, and so
it doesn't get done. You were right to point it out.
We are not just saying it because Congress is an easy
target for commissions like us. I will say one other thing to
you, Mr. Lungren. Within this community of bipartisan
commissions, and I am sort of operating in this world now,
there is an increasing sense of resolution that they are going
to keep hitting this institution with this issue. I mean, the
political cost to you all of continuing not to do anything is
going to go up.
I am on other commissions, because everybody is saying it
is time for you guys to get with it. Again, I don't mean you
personally, I mean as an institution----
Mr. Lungren. Well, you should mean us personally, because
the institution is made up of Members and we have found the
enemy. We found the enemy and he is us.
Comm. Talent. Yes.
Mr. Lungren. That is not because the Democrats are in
control; it happened when the Republicans were in control.
Whatever happens in November, I hope we are going to have an
absolute dedication to the proposition that we ought to fix it
and fix it right, because in response to the threat that you
talk about, to have Congress with institutional prerogatives,
and protections, and parochialism makes no sense whatsoever.
Let me ask you this other thing: Senator Graham mentioned
that a biological attack could render 500,000 Americans dead.
Comm. Talent. Yes.
Mr. Lungren. Is that an exaggeration or is that an----
Comm. Talent. No. Again, if you have not had it I would
encourage you, and maybe as a committee--Mr. Pascrell, you and
Mr. King could arrange this easily--get the briefing, the DHS
modeling an anthrax attack on New York, and that is----
Mr. Lungren. So we are talking about a half a million
people, potentially, which I consider to be a huge attack----
Comm. Talent. Oh, it would be----
Mr. Lungren [continuing]. Which would be more devastating
than any single attack that has ever been made on American
soil.
Comm. Talent. Mr. Lungren, you have got to understand from
their point of view, they have a strategy to win this thing.
They--I know it is hard to define them. But to use asymmetric
weapons to hit us at vulnerable points and basically force us
to stop resisting whatever it is they want, you know, they
don't really know.
So you hit New York with that, let's say, and I don't like
to pick New York. It could be St. Louis; it could be Houston.
You hit them with it and----
Mr. Lungren. Could even be in the West. We are sometimes
forgotten here, but, you know, there is something west of the
Mississippi.
Comm. Talent. One of the things they have told us is that
the further west you go the less conscious the local leadership
is of this, unfortunately. You might want to check in Los
Angeles, and San Francisco, and places. Yes, it could be Los
Angeles.
So you hit a California city with it and then a month later
you hit it again. You kill an American city. Now, how long do
we continue the struggle against them? I mean, the last time a
weapon of mass destruction was actually used in a war the
country it was used against surrendered within a week.
Now, this is their thinking, okay? We may not think of it
in these terms, but they think of it in these terms.
Mr. Lungren. That could come from both a transnational
terrorist organization or a rogue nation that has utilized
terror as its purpose and its----
Comm. Talent. It is used us as the stumbling block, or is
upset with how----
Mr. Lungren. Okay, well then I would just ask you this: In
anywhere in your report did you suggest it would be good
National policy for us to say that we would unilaterally decide
not to use a nuclear response is someone used chemical or
biological attack on us?
Comm. Talent. Did we address declaratory policy in the
report, do you know? No, you don't know, or no, we didn't?
I don't think we addressed declaratory policy. Bob and I
are careful not to go outside the four corners of the report,
even though he and I, obviously, as individuals have opinions
about all this.
Mr. Lungren. But it is just interesting that we talk about
deterrence and we talk about all prevention and deterrence,
which means that you prevent the other side from attacking or
you deter them from attacking, and for 50 or 60 years we have
had a nuclear deterrence even though I think most of us would
agree that we can bring down our stockpile. That deterrence has
worked fairly well nuclear-to-nuclear, and when you tell me of
the devastating impact of a single biological or chemical
attack on the United States, in my view that is equivalent to
the threat of using a nuclear weapon.
It is a different weapon but it is equivalent, and I just
question whether we ought to then say we will refrain from
using a retaliatory weapon that we have had, as much as no one
knows what the scenario would be. So that is why I was just
trying to figure out what you think the dimensions are, and I
just wanted to make sure we are not exaggerating when we talk
about a half a million people that could be lost with a single
attack.
Comm. Talent. We are not exaggerating. Look, I will take my
hat off as the vice chairman and just put on the Jim Talent
hat.
I don't think we should leave any doubt in our declaratory
policy that that is an option that is on the table. Now,
whether the changes leave that doubt or not, you know, I leave
up to you all to decide. That is my own opinion.
One of the things that, in communicating about this in the
district, that is so important, I think, to get across to
community leaders and just average Americans or voters is that
deterrence in the traditional concept doesn't work against a
terrorist because they don't have a national base that you can
respond against. I mean, now, you are right--if we can assign a
national actor, if we can use the forensics and figure out,
then we can deter them.
But it may not come that way. It may just be al-Qaeda on
their own, and what do you do? I mean, what are you going to
blow up?
Mr. Lungren. It is also difficult when an enemy says that
if you kill them you have given them the greatest path to
immortality that they can have. I mean, deterrence usually
works well with someone who doesn't want to die.
Comm. Talent. Right.
Mr. Lungren. Although I have noticed that most of the
leaders of al-Qaeda themselves don't want to die, they want all
their followers to die.
Comm. Talent. It works when you have a clear, I mean, enemy
or other party that you are dealing with, when it is bilateral
rather than multilateral----
Mr. Lungren. Right.
Comm. Talent [continuing]. When you have secure lines of
communication so the policy is clear. In short, when there are
a lot of things present that are not present here, which is why
our ability to deter this is much weakened regardless of what
declaratory policy says to end.
Mr. Lungren. I thank you for your testimony. I thank----
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Lungren. Thank you for your
questions.
We do have to get a list, and the DHS--Department of
Homeland Security--does submit a list of priorities at budget
time. This was not a priority.
So we get our, you know, priorities out of whack here, we
have got major problems. We are more concerned about--and I am
not saying this is not important, but choices had to be made--
we spent more money ``fixing the border.''
Secondly, your point is very well taken about, this is not
nation-to-nation when we are talking about terror. It doesn't
necessarily have to be and it hasn't been. But homegrown terror
is just as onerous, and we need to take a look at that a lot
more closely because that is an issue that we are afraid to
talk about, literally speaking.
I want to thank you for your testimony today, Senator
Talent. Having worked with you in the past when you were here I
know that you are dedicated to the protection of America--the
United States of America. I know that you and Senator Graham
really worked, put a lot of time in the last couple years along
with your staff members.
We are trying to work in the spirit with which you provided
us, and that is why we do not live in a cocoon, but rather, we
are trying to talk to everybody--the Homeland Security staff,
your staff, the 9/11 Commission staff, professionals in the
field, in order to come up with legislation that is going to be
meaningful and logical so that we do approach this with the six
major categories that you laid out. I think that is important
and I think that is significant.
A lot of food for thought today for every one of the
Members. I know some had to come in--well, you know how it
works.
Comm. Talent. Right.
Mr. Pascrell. We have a lot more Members in the beginning.
But we hope that within the next couple of weeks the bill
will be completed, and we hope it meets with your approval. So,
there being no additional witnesses I am going to ask--we might
have some questions that the Members didn't ask, you know, we
will provide to you and we hope that you would respond
expeditiously.
Hearing no further business, the committee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for Bob
Graham and Jim Talent
Question 1. In your view, does the intelligence community have
adequate resources and capabilities to identify and thwart a biological
attack?
Answer. Regarding the identification aspect of your question, both
the intelligence community and the Departments of Homeland Security and
Defense have clearly ``identified'' the threat of bioterrorism,
however, thwarting (preventing) an attack is a low probability event,
no matter how much we spend on intelligence efforts.
With a large percentage of our intelligence resources focused on
the Soviet Union during the 1970s and 1980s, we failed to adequately
detect a massive offensive bioweapons program in the Soviet Union that
included 50,000 scientists and technicians working in scores of
facilities spread across 12 time zones. The intelligence community
failed to properly identify both the intent and capability of the
Soviet's BW program. Furthermore, we now know that al-Qaeda began their
bioweapons program in the late 1990s with two labs in Afghanistan and
one in Malaysia. Once again, the intelligence community failed to
identify both intent and capability prior to DoD's discovery of the two
labs in Afghanistan after 9/11.
While it is important that bioterrorism remain a high priority for
the intelligence community, we must also realize that we will most
likely have only strategic warning of an attack, not tactical warning.
We can achieve higher quality of strategic warning, and perhaps
tactical warning, by ensuring that the intelligence community has the
top-quality scientific staff required to properly analyze the emerging
threat of hi-tech bioweapons through better use of human and open
source intelligence.
Tactical warning, however, is highly unlikely. This was
demonstrated in 1999 by a Defense Threat Reduction Agency program
called Biotechnology Activity Characterization by Unconventional
Signatures (BACUS). Nuclear programs and large-scale chemical programs
produce large intelligence signatures. BACUS demonstrated that there
would be virtually no intelligence signature for a bioweapons program--
a program capable of producing enough weaponized pathogens to attack a
dozen American cities.
Al-Qaeda's stated intent to kill large numbers of Americans,
combined with the facts that virtually all likely bioterrorism
pathogens are available in nature and that the biotechnical revolution
now gives non-state actors the technical capability required to produce
and deliver sophisticated bioweapons, led the WMD Commission to the
conclusion that America's primary defense against bioterrorism is
robust response capability. Major improvements in response capabilities
not only limits the effect of an attack, it also serves as a deterrent.
Bottom line: The best way to improve America's intelligence
capabilities against the bioterrorism threat is to provide the IC with
an increase in highly-qualified personnel dedicated to this mission. As
we stated in World At Risk (recommendation 10), ``highly-qualified''
includes people with appropriate language/cultural knowledge and
scientific/technical skills.
Note: We suggest all Members of this committee receive a briefing
on the Population Threat Assessment from the Department of Homeland
Security Office of Science and Technology. We also suggest all Members
receive a briefing on the former U.S. offensive bioweapons program to
better understand the capabilities of bioweapons.
Question 2. As of today, do you believe that the intelligence
community has enough baseline information about terrorist actors, their
claims, and plans to conduct WMD attacks against the Nation?
If not, what should the intelligence community be doing
differently?
Answer. We cannot fully answer this question in an unclassified
format, however, our answer to question No. 1 addresses much of this
issue.
Question 3. The Department of Homeland Security conducts a number
of risk assessments, including the BioTerrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA).
The National Academy of Science has identified a number of fundamental
concerns with the BTRA, ranging from mathematical and statistical
mistakes that have corrupted results to more basic questions about how
terrorist behavior should be modeled. Do you share the National
Academy's concerns? What do you think can be done to overcome these
problems?
Answer. The best thinking needs to be brought to bear in assessing
the bioterrorism threat, as well as determining the best use of
resources for countering it. Therefore, we believe that the BTRA should
be subject to rigorous peer review and objective analysis, as occurred
in the 2006 NAS report.
Our understanding is that many of the NAS concerns have been
addressed, or are in the process of being addressed. DHS is investing
in adversary behavior modeling and, most importantly, peer review has
been institutionalized in the BTRA. The 2010 BTRA underwent an
extensive, refereed 10-week review process which included external
professional reviewers. In general, we believe that transparency should
continue to be encouraged so that DHS has ready access to the
scientific talent outside of the agency to ensure that the modeling
methods employed are cutting edge and useful. For example, some of the
DHS findings were briefed at the Los Alamos National Laboratories Risk
Analysis for National Security Applications Meeting in April and the
Society for Risk Analysis meeting in December. These types of
activities should be strongly encouraged in the future.
Question 4a. First responders have been asking for specific
guidance regarding what to do when responding to WMD attacks for some
time. For instance, in response to a dirty bomb attack, questions have
been asked as to whether law enforcement should ``scoop and run out''
with injured people or whether EMS should be called in to ``treat in
place''. Do you believe that is the responsibility of the Department of
Homeland Security to develop and distribute this guidance?
Answer. Absolutely. One of the most valuable things DHS can provide
first responders is knowledge, particularly knowledge of issues
involved with low probability, high consequence events such as WMDs.
Much of this information comes from our National laboratories. DHS can
take this highly technical, scientific information and put it in a
format useful to those working on the front lines of homeland security.
DHS will soon release version 2 of Planning Guidance for Response
to a Nuclear Detonation. Version 1 of this document provides valuable
information to first responders regarding response to an improvised
nuclear device (IND). This document was produced by an interagency team
and backed up with hard science from years of work at our National
labs. The real value of this document was the practical advice that was
included. For instance, first responders will want to rescue people
following an IND, but there will be great concern about how close they
can get to ground zero without causing severe risks to themselves. This
document provided clear guidelines, such as: If more than half of the
windows have been blown out of a concrete building, it is likely to be
``too hot'' (radiological risk) to enter that area. The document also
provided valuable information on what equipment would be most needed in
the first hours after an IND explosion--snow plows. Not really
intuitive, but critical equipment to clear the rubble out of streets.
This sort of document should be produced for all DHS planning
scenarios. Most notably, it does not exist for biological attacks--part
of the reason the WMD Commission gave an ``F'' for bio-response
capability.
Question 4b. Do you agree that the Department should develop such
guidance in coordination with first responders?
Answer. Yes, without question. The National Response Framework was
a major improvement over the National Response Plan because DHS
solicited input from first responders, and incorporated their inputs
into the final document.
Question 5a. Together with the authorization for your Commission,
we authorized the DHS National Biosurveillance Integration Center
(NBIC) in the 9/11 Act. Our vision was for this Center to receive and
integrate input from 13 different Federal Departments and agencies
(including DHS) to provide a common biosurveillance picture.
Unfortunately, over the past 3 years, participation by other agencies
has been minimal and the products paltry. Given your extensive
political experience and knowledge of workings of the Federal
bureaucracy, would you agree that it is time for us to mandate the
participation of these Federal Departments and agencies in the NBIC?
Question 5b. How do you believe the NBIC could be made efficient,
productive, and valuable?
Answer. In order to accurately detect and manage biological
threats, multiple data sources need to be integrated and analyzed at
the National level. A prime demonstration of why this is important
occurred during a 2008 outbreak of salmonella in the United States that
sickened nearly 1,500 people. The true cause of the outbreak--
jalapenos--was determined only when shipping manifests became available
to public health authorities. Before that private sector information
was available, public health authorities believed tomatoes were the
culprit. That misdiagnosis resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars
in losses to the tomato industry. This incident also demonstrates that
the private sector should have a clear interest in sharing as much
information as possible with public health authorities to avoid harmful
mistakes.
What is most important about NBIC is that it is a place where
information from agencies can be integrated. Unfortunately, it does not
appear that Federal agencies see the ``value added'' in providing data
and analysts to NBIC. While participation could be mandated, that is
not likely to sustain collaboration, and it may result in agencies
sending junior staff there without giving NBIC the attention it
deserves. For NBIC to be successful, it should provide added value to
the agencies, such as providing access to data or analytical
capabilities, which would facilitate the work of individual agencies,
or NBIC could provide tools to support multi-agency investigations,
such as outbreaks of zoonotic diseases or food contamination events.
Many successful Federal biosurveillance systems rely on voluntary
data sharing. The National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance system is a
Federated system that conducts surveillance for a wide range of
important diseases, including novel influenza strains, anthrax, and
food-borne illnesses. States participate voluntarily because they value
access to the CDC's aggregated data and analysis. NBIC should heed this
example.
Question 6. In your testimony, you said that the funding level for
the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Act (BARDA) is not
sufficient. Can you please comment on the current funding level for
BARDA and why you believe it is important that the funding be
increased? Specifically, where should we be dedicating new resources?
Answer. BARDA is one of our Nation's first lines of defense against
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear public health threats,
supporting the development of new drugs, vaccines, and other medical
countermeasures. It was created by Congress in 2006 with unanimous
consent in both chambers. As these medical products have no commercial
market--the Government is the sole customer--finding private investors
willing to fully support development of medical countermeasures is
nearly impossible. For this reason, a public investment in BARDA is
necessary if these needed countermeasures are to be developed.
BARDA has already hired top talent, and has been working
effectively with the private sector. However, they have received little
funding. It's time to correct that. This is a National security issue--
and it is just as important as the capability to produce world-class
military hardware and technology.
BARDA funding is wholly inadequate to their mission. The Center for
Biosecurity of UPMC recently estimated that $3.39 billion per year in
medical countermeasure development support would be required to achieve
a 90 percent chance of developing a countermeasure for each of the
eight biodefense requirements laid out in HHS's Public Health Emergency
Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE) Strategy for Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threats. While this amount may be
a large sum in the context of health budgets, it is quite small when
considered in the context of National security expenditures. In spite
of limited funding to date, BARDA has developed the infrastructure,
workforce, and expertise to manage the necessary portfolio of new MCMs.
All that remains now is for the program to be funded. Fully funding the
program will not give us the countermeasures to protect us from all
bioweapons, but it is a necessary downpayment for our security.
Recently, even the funds intended for purchasing medical
countermeasures for National security were under threat--the
administration considered significantly depleting the Project BioShield
Special Reserve Fund (SRF) to fund the development and/or procurement
of H1N1 influenza vaccine. We continue to urge that BioShields funds be
used only for their intended purpose: The procurement of medical
countermeasures against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
(CBRN) threats to National security. Depleting the SRF will severely
diminish U.S. efforts to improve preparedness for CBRN events, thereby
undermining the President's commitment to a strong National biodefense
program.
Without a significant increase in BARDA funding, and security for
BioShield funds, the status quo will persist: A serious and potentially
catastrophic vulnerability to CBRN agents. Furthermore, funding BARDA
would have an immediate and significant stimulative impact on the
biodefense industry, as well as the broader economy. The U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis estimates that each new biotech job results in the
creation of 5.8 additional jobs in other industries. Furthermore, for
every dollar of labor earnings or output in the biotech sector, another
$2.90 or $1.70, respectively, are produced in other parts of the
economy.
Preparedness for catastrophic health events requires stable,
continuous funding, planning, and oversight to build the capacity to
prevent and mitigate the effects of an attack with a bioweapon. If you
do not act to fully fund BARDA, the organization will wither, the
private sector will turn away from biodefense, and the American people
could ultimately pay a horrible price in the wake of a terrorist attack
with a biological weapon.
Question 7. Considering the Commission's findings regarding the
need for developing and distributing medical countermeasures, what do
you think of making medications, including vaccines, available to the
public for use on a voluntary basis?
Answer. America would be far better prepared to respond to a
bioattack if a large percentage of our civilian first responders
(medical, public health, and law enforcement personnel) were also
vaccinated against the two bio-threats included in the Department of
Homeland Security's planning scenarios--anthrax and smallpox (both of
which have FDA-approved vaccines). The Department of Defense has
vaccinated a large percentage of its active duty, National Guard, and
reserve forces against anthrax and smallpox. Why should we not do the
same for our civilian responders? They will provide the majority of the
response force to a bioattack on our homeland, not the military.
Obviously, we cannot order civilians to take these vaccines, but
they can be offered to all volunteers. The cost would be minimal since
the most likely source of vaccines would be from the National
stockpile. Instead of destroying vaccines once they reach their
expiration date, we should use them prior to expiration.
This action would significantly enhance preparedness at minimal
cost.
Based on lessons learned from exercises and natural disasters, we
should also consider offering these vaccines to the families of these
first responders. During a major crisis, we want first responders
focused on the needs of their communities. Protecting the families of
first responders is a key component for success.
Questions From Honorable Christopher P. Carney of Pennsylvania for Bob
Graham and Jim Talent
Question 1. If we are going to ask laboratories that possess Tier I
Material Threat Agents to meet higher standards for biosecurity, it
seems fair and necessary to see to it that they have access to more
funds to make this happen. Since this is a homeland security issue, I
think grants should come through DHS. What do you think of the need for
grants to increase laboratory biosecurity, and having those grants go
through DHS?
Answer. This bill advances sound risk management principles for
pathogen security by introducing the idea of stratifying biosecurity
risks. The bill calls for the designation of ``Tier I'' agents to be
the most dangerous subset of the pathogens that have clear potential
for use as biological weapons. Today, 82 biological select agents and
toxins receive the highest level of security focus and regulation. We
believe the correct number of top-tier agents is closer to 8 than 80.
Multiple studies were conducted as a result of our Report, and in
virtually all of them, from both the public and private sectors, there
have been calls for the stratification of agents.
Stratification of biological agents into tiers should allow for
more realistic assessments of risk, it will benefit public health
investigations, and it should also encourage security monies to be
concentrated on the highest risks. Therefore, it may not be necessary
to increase funding for security improvements, as this approach could
lead to a more judicious allocation of existent security funding.
Question 2. Has the commission examined the extent to which our
Nation has adequate laboratory capacity to respond to a large-scale act
of bioterrorism? What are your suggestions for increasing laboratory
surge capacity?
Answer. See answer to Question No. 4.
Question 3. In our efforts to prepare for and combat acts of
bioterrorism, do you believe that our Nation has invested enough in the
physical laboratory infrastructure needed to develop new
countermeasures to biological agents? Can we do more to coordinate the
laboratory resources we currently have available across agency lines?
Answer. See answer to Question No. 4.
Question 4. I have been a strong proponent of the Regional
Biocontainment Laboratory program that was established by the National
Institutes of Health to conduct research on biological pathogens. I
believe we should bring these 13 university-based labs into our
National response system and invest in their ability to provide
diagnostic support during a National emergency. Do you believe these
labs can play a more active and useful role beyond their core research
role?
Answer. The Commission did not explicitly examine the extent to
which our Nation has adequate laboratory capacity to respond to a
large-scale act of bioterrorism. We also did not specifically examine
whether the Nation has invested enough in the physical laboratory
infrastructure to develop new countermeasures, or whether there is
sufficient capacity of the type that is needed. For example, there may
be enough laboratory capacity for basic research into pathogens of
bioweapons concern, but not enough capacity for animal testing of
diagnostic tests and countermeasures. From a small study that the
Commission sponsored, it appears that there is not enough laboratory
capacity for testing environmental samples. Given the lack of clarity
on this topic, it would be an excellent idea for there to be an
investigation to determine whether the Nation has enough laboratory
capacity, as well as what the appropriate amount of capacity and
physical infrastructure would be.
On a strategic level, it appears entirely appropriate that these
university-based laboratories play a role in National response and
provide support during a National emergency. The legislation that you
introduced, the Laboratory Surge Capacity Preparedness Act, (H.R. 1150)
is one step that should move forward to address this need. As we
understand it, the Laboratory Surge Capacity Preparedness Act directs
the Secretary of Homeland Security to award grants to regional
biocontainment laboratories for maintaining surge capacity that can be
used to respond to acts of bioterrorism or outbreaks of infectious
diseases. If these laboratories can share materials and protocols so
that they are useful additions to the normal laboratory capacity in an
emergency, it would be a step forward for preparedness.
Questions for the Record from Honorable Yvette D. Clarke of New York
for Bob Graham and Jim Talent
Question 1. There have been several white powder incidents in New
York City and across the country over the past few years. The ETCS&T
subcommittee, which I chair, has looked into a number of white powder
incidents over the past few years. In December 2008, before the most
recent incidents at some of the foreign consulates, Congressional
offices, and the Wall Street Journal in New York City, my subcommittee
looked at how the U.S. Government was investigating the white powder
letters and packages that were being sent to various Governmental
offices here in the United States and to U.S. embassies and consulates
overseas. As far as we know, the perpetrator(s) of those events has not
yet been identified. Since the anthrax events of 2001--and despite the
white powder letters and packages that continue to be sent throughout
the United States and the world--guidance is not yet available
regarding remediation after a biological attack or incident. Almost 10
years later, we clearly need to require DHS, EPA, OSHA, and NIOSH to
undertake a concerted effort to develop and issue guidelines for
cleaning and restoring indoor and outdoor areas that have been affected
by the release of a biological agent. Do you agree?
Answer. It is certainly true that guidelines for cleaning and
restoring indoor and outdoor areas are needed. As we said in our
testimony, we commend the Homeland Security committee for including the
provision that DHS issue guidelines in coordination with the
Environmental Protection Agency for cleaning and restoring indoor and
outdoor areas affected by the release of a biological agent. These
guidelines should also address methods of decontamination following a
large-scale event, and should address some of the remaining questions
of a technical and scientific nature that make decontamination of a
large area difficult. Currently, U.S. environmental laboratory capacity
is insufficient for the challenge of sampling and testing following a
large biological release. Federal leadership roles should also be
clarified--many Federal agencies currently have roles in
decontamination, but it is still unclear which agency would lead.
Likewise, it is unclear who will cover the costs of decontamination, as
well as the temporary relocation of building occupants. Private
building owners would rightly question what their role is, at this
time--if private industry is to be responsible for decontamination of
their own property, there should be guidance for decontamination
practices and qualified decontamination contractors available to
industry in the event that they are needed. The WMD Commission
sponsored a small study to review current bio-decontamination
capabilities and responsibilities. The conclusions were not
encouraging.
Question 2a. During your tenure in Congress, I expect that much of
your situational awareness about the WMD threat was based on classified
information. In the case of the biological threat, do you believe that
it is possible for the United States to develop accurate biological
situational awareness without combining classified and unclassified
information?
Question 2b. At the other end of the spectrum, do you believe that
there should be more unclassified analytic materials distributed to
non-Federal partners, most especially in the public health community,
to enhance their situational awareness?
Answer. We have both held Top Secret/SCI security clearances for
decades, and during the 2 years of our Commission, received a number of
classified briefings. However, the information available in
unclassified documents clearly identify the serious threat posed by
bioterrorism. The following quote is from page 1 of the National
Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, November, 2009:
``The effective dissemination of a lethal biological agent within an
unprotected population could place at risk the lives of hundreds of
thousands of people. The unmitigated consequences of such an event
could overwhelm our public health capabilities, potentially causing an
untold number of deaths. The economic cost could exceed $1 trillion for
each such incident. In addition, there could be significant societal
and political consequences that would derive from the incident's direct
impact on our way of life and the public's trust in Government.''
Classified information can sometimes give specific details about a
particular organization or groups of individuals, but the threat we
face today can be more than adequately presented in an unclassified
document or presentation.
Here is a specific example. Colonel Randall Larsen, USAF (Ret), the
former executive director of the WMD Commission has provided briefings
on bioterrorism to the Joint Staff Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection
Executive Course for the past decade. The course is taught three times
a year for 125 senior officers who all possess TS/SCI clearances.
However, the briefing is given at the unclassified level. This allows
the senior officers to freely discuss all information when they return
to their units around the world, without requiring them to remember
which part is classified and which part is not.
Classified information is not required to understand the serious
threat of bioterrorism.
Question 3. Given the challenges inherent in enforcing export
control measures, I believe there is value in the Federal Government
reaching out to manufacturers and exporters of materials sought by
terrorists, the terrorist-sponsoring governments, and any other
countries that seek to proliferate WMD. At the Department of Homeland
Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement currently conducts this
sort of outreach regarding materials, technology, and WMD of all types.
Do you agree that this is a valuable activity?
Answer. Reaching out to the private sector is a very important part
of a part of a layered defense against the proliferation of WMD
technology. One of the most effective means of countering proliferation
is to ensure that it does not get into the wrong hands in the first
place and the Federal Government should leverage its existing
relationships to partner with manufacturers and exporters on this
important mission. There are a number of existing efforts underway,
including at the Department of Commerce, that should be strengthened.
Question 4a. There are many companies that now legally provide
strains of organisms, some of which could potentially be used to create
biological weapons. Considering your experience with the Export
Council, what role, if any, do you think the criminal justice community
should have with respect to the sale, distribution, and potential
misuse of such strains?
Question 4b. Do we need to review and update the relevant criminal
statutes?
Answer. At this time, it does not appear to be necessary to review
and update the relevant criminal statutes. In the United States, access
to those pathogens that are considered to be most likely to be used in
bioterrorism (``select agents'') is already regulated.
Within the United States, select agents are regulated by the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of
Agriculture (USDA), and the possession and transfer of the toxin is
restricted to those people who have received a Security Risk Assessment
(SRA), which entails a background check performed by the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and are working in a facility that is cleared for select
agents, and has been inspected by either HHS or USDA. According to the
USA PATRIOT Act (2001) aliens from countries determined by the State
Department to have been provided support for international terrorism
are considered to be restricted persons and are prohibited from
possession of select agents.
For export of select agents, the regulatory regime is likewise
extensive:
According to the Treasury's Department of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC), U.S. persons generally may not enter into any
transactions, including exports of goods or services, to Cuba,
Iran, and Sudan or to foreign nationals from those countries.
Articles of military significance are subject to export
controls that are part of the State Department's International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). ITAR-controlled items and
services may not be exported from the United States without a
license from the State Department's Directorate of Defense
Trade Controls.
U.S. companies may not engage in export transactions
involving persons whose export privileges have been revoked or
suspended, or with entities known to have ties to embargoed
countries, terrorist organizations, or international narcotics
traffickers. There are lists maintained by Treasury and State
for this determination.
Export control regulations prohibit exports of any items
when the exporter knows that the items will be used in
connection with the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons. Of course, for select agents, there are
limitations to what laws and export controls can accomplish:
they apply only to the United States; all but two of the
regulated pathogens (smallpox and 1918 influenza) can be found
in nature, sick people and animals, laboratories and hospitals,
all over the world; new technologies circumvent the need to
acquire many pathogens, as they can be made from scratch; and
the select agent list will never be able to include all deadly
pathogens. However, these limitations are not likely to be
addressed by additional criminal penalties.
Question 5. I know that the Export Council works to assist
businesses in exporting to foreign countries. Do you believe that
companies that sell strains of organisms that could be weaponized are
capable of effectively differentiating between legitimate customers and
potential terrorists?
Answer. This is not an issue we examined at the Commission. This
question should be directed to the State Department.
Question 6. Senators, I represent the 37th District of California,
home to one of the largest ports in United States, the Port of Long
Beach. The 9/11 Act mandated that all U.S.-bound cargo be scanned for
nuclear materials by 2010. Since 2007, there is scant evidence that DHS
intends to meet the mandate. Given the nature of the nuclear threat, do
you support the deployment of additional nuclear detectors in ports
throughout the world--either for use by U.S. operators or by host
countries?
Answer. The best way to prevent a mushroom cloud over an American
city (or port) is to locate, lockdown, and eliminate loose nuclear
material.
There is very good reason why DHS has not aggressively pursued 100
percent screening of cargo containers. Highly-enriched uranium (HEU) is
the most likely material terrorist would use in an improvise nuclear
device (IND). HEU is a very low emitter of radiation. One millimeter of
lead, or even something as common as aluminum foil would prevent our
current state-of-the-art detector from discovering a Hiroshima-style
IND in a shipping container. Furthermore, we think it highly unlikely
that a terrorist would put something as valuable as a nuclear weapon in
a container, put a good padlock on it, and ship it to the United
States. They would not likely take their hands off of the device. (To
see the most likely way terrorists would attempt to smuggle an IND into
the United States, we recommend you see the video, Last Best Chance,
produced by the Nuclear Threat Initiative and available at
www.nti.org.)
We suggest you talk to Beth Ann Rooney, chief of security at the
Port of New York and New Jersey regarding her opinion of 100 percent
screening. She will ask you why Congress wants to screen every
container entering her port, but none of the 700,000 cars that come off
of RO/RO ships each year. An IND will fit in the trunks of these cars,
but Congress has no plans to have them screened. Furthermore, Dr. Peter
Zimmerman, a science advisor to the WMD Commission (and currently a
consultant at DHS's Homeland Security Institute) will advise you that
there is no technology to detect a nuclear weapon inside bulk
containers such as grain ships and oil tankers.
Bottom line: the best way to prevent nuclear terrorism in the
United States is through programs such as Global Threat Reduction. If
funds are to be spent on detection, it should be on research and
development programs to improve capabilities, but we should not be
spending large sums of money deploying current technology that has a
very low probability of detecting nuclear material.
Question 7. Do you believe this action would help to prevent or
deter the nuclear threat in any significant way?
Answer. Spending more resources on scanning in ports with current
technologies makes us less secure. This money will be better invested
in locating, locking down, and eliminating loose nuclear materials.
VIEWPOINTS ON HOMELAND SECURITY:
PART II
A DISCUSSION WITH THE 9/11 COMMISSIONERS
----------
Wednesday, May 19, 2010
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson
[Chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Harman, Norton, Jackson
Lee, Carney, Richardson, Kirkpatrick, Pascrell, Cleaver, Green,
Himes, King, Smith, Lungren, McCaul, Dent, Bilirakis, and
Austria.
Chairman Thompson. The committee will come to order. The
committee is meeting today to receive testimony on ``Viewpoints
on Homeland Security: A Discussion With the 9/11 Commission.''
A lot has changed in this country since the attacks of
September 11, 2001. In every facet of American life, there is
greater awareness of the risk of terrorism. From the alert
citizens in Times Square, to the fast-acting passenger on
Flight 253, to other ordinary Americans who said something to
the appropriate authorities when they saw something that was
concerning, a culture of vigilance is taking hold in America.
At the same time, at all levels of government, there are
some major changes in the way we view the risk of terrorism and
collaborate to address it. From the establishment of the
Department of Homeland Security, to intelligence reform, to the
creation of a consolidated, integrated terrorist watch list
system, the way that Government organizes itself to make the
homeland more secure has changed in significant ways.
The Christmas day terrorist plot brought to mind
observations made in your report. You determined that the
attacks reveal four kinds of failures--failures of policy,
failures of capability, failures of management, and failures of
imagination. Had Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab successfully brought
down Flight 253 last December with a bomb in his underwear, we
would have certainly concluded that despite years of
significant investment and reform, it was a failure of policy,
capability, management, and imagination.
I look forward to receiving your testimony today about what
we still need to do to effectively identify and thwart plots
well before they are launched. I also am interested in hearing
your thoughts about the degree to which the intelligence
community and DHS are mindful of emerging threats. For
instance, last month, we received troubling testimony from the
former WMD commissioners about the threat of a biological
attack. Another novel threat for this country, but a common
scenario in other countries, is an attack on a busy rail
system.
Finally, you have been great champions for reform of
Congressional oversight over the Department of Homeland
Security. You acknowledge that consolidation of jurisdiction is
one of the most difficult challenges in Washington, yet it is
critically important. As Chairman of this committee, I have a
special appreciation of the extent to which the lack of
centralized legislative jurisdiction has damaged the
Department. As the prime advocate for needed jurisdictional
reform, I am particularly interested in hearing testimony from
you on this issue.
Thank you again for being here.
[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
A lot has changed in this country since the attacks of September
11, 2001. In every facet of American life, there is greater awareness
of the risk of terrorism. From the alert citizens in Times Square to
the fast-acting passenger on Flight 253 to other ordinary Americans who
``said something'' to the appropriate authorities when they ``saw
something'' that was concerning--a ``culture of vigilance'' is taking
hold in America.
At the same time, at all levels of government, there are some major
changes in the way we view the risk of terrorism and collaborate to
address it.
From the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security to
intelligence reform to the creation of a consolidated, integrated
terrorist watch list system--the way that the Government organizes
itself to make the homeland more secure has changes in significant
ways.
The Christmas day terrorist plot brought to mind observations made
in your report. You determined that the attacks revealed four kinds of
failures--failures of policy, capability, management, and imagination.
Had Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab successfully brought down Flight 253
last December, with a bomb in his underwear, we would have certainly
concluded that, despite years of significant investment and reform, it
was a failure of policy, capability, management, and imagination.
I look forward to receiving today's testimony from the
Commissioners about what we still need to do to effectively identify
and thwart plots well before they are launched.
I also am interested in hearing your thoughts about the degree to
which the intelligence community and DHS are mindful of emerging
threats. For instance, last month, we received troubling testimony from
the former-WMD Commissioners about the threat of a biological attack.
Another novel threat for this country, but a common scenario in
other countries, is an attack on a busy rail system.
Finally, you have been great champions for reform of Congressional
oversight over the Department of Homeland Security. You acknowledge
that consolidation of jurisdiction is one of the most difficult
challenges in Washington; yet, it is critically important.
As Chairman of this committee, I have a special appreciation of the
extent to which the lack of centralized legislative jurisdiction has
damaged the Department. As the prime advocate for needed jurisdictional
reform, I am particularly interested in hearing testimony from you on
this issue.
Chairman Thompson. I now recognize the Ranking Member of
the full committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. King, for
an opening statement.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me, at the outset, commend Governor Kean and Chairman
Hamilton for the terrific job that they have done, not just in
their years of public service prior to September 11, but
certainly with the 9/11 Commission recommendations and the way
you have stayed on this ever since. As each year goes by, the
recommendations you made in the 9/11 report seem to be more and
more on target and absolutely necessary.
Let me, at the beginning, fully agree with the Chairman. It
is now almost 6 years since your report came out, and the
consolidation in Congress has barely improved at all; in some
situations it has even gotten worse. It is now 108 committees
and subcommittees that the Department of Homeland Security has
to report to, and it makes absolutely no sense. This isn't any
territorial grab by us at all, but if there is going to be
consolidation--in fact, I would just refer the Commissioners,
that is, right now, the spider web of committees and
subcommittees that the Department has to report to.
It is impossible, I think, for the job to be done. The
Department gets mixed messages, they have to spend an
inordinate amount of time preparing for this testimony, and it
just gets involved in parochial issues and to me it is so
diffuse that it makes absolutely no sense whatsoever. So
whatever you can do to, again, in the public eye, encourage
consolidation would be very helpful. No matter what happens in
November, the Chairman and I are going to be working with our
leadership in both parties to again try to consolidate much,
much more than we have right now.
Also, on the question of Homeland Security grants, we still
have the issue where so much money is sent to, I believe, areas
that do not need as much as others. We had a recent situation
in New York last week--and I am not trying to make this a New
York-centric meeting, but I think that was a microcosm of the
debate we are having Nation-wide in that just 2 weeks after the
Times Square bombing, there were dramatic reductions made in
mass transit security aids in New York, and also port security
aid.
As the debate went back and forth as to who was
responsible, I pointed out that there was a $38 million grant
made several years ago to harden the path tunnel from New
Jersey to New York which was being held up because of an
historic review that was going on because the tunnel was more
than 50 years old--which is why it had to be hardened in the
first place--and it was sitting there.
Finally, after I brought this out on Friday, last night the
money was finally released. But it is that type of
bureaucracy--and last July, the GAO issued a report, I believe,
talking about more than $400 million that was being held in the
pipeline. So that also, I think, is important, No. 1, to make
better use of the Homeland Security funding, but also to
eliminate some of the red tape and bureaucracy which prevents
the money from being distributed.
I think we can say that both administrations have been
successful in keeping foreign terrorists from the country. I
think al-Qaeda central has been weakened, it is harder for them
to send over a team like they did on September 11. The other
side of that, though, is that they are now recruiting people
from within the country; for instance, Zazi last September,
obviously Major Hasan in Fort Hood, and now Shahzad 2 weeks ago
or 3 weeks ago in Times Square, which means that we are dealing
with people living legally in the country, people who are not
on the radar screen, people who do not have terrorist
connections, and it is harder for us to have any advance notice
of them, to know where they are coming from or what is going to
be happening.
So when we do capture someone, it is important to get as
much intelligence as possible, which is why I welcome that
Attorney General Holder said last week about beginning to look
into what we are going to do with Miranda warnings and how we
are going to treat these people who are legally in the country,
in many cases, American citizens, when they are captured,
because this may be the only way we can get intelligence from
them. FISA would not be of much help, our allies would not be
of much help, but when we actually get someone, we can get--as
we see now from Shahzad, we are getting a lot of information.
But if he had availed himself of the right to remain silent, we
wouldn't have gotten that.
So I think it is important that we ensure that reforms do
go forward and that at the very least, the Attorney General
consult with everyone in the intelligence community before any
Miranda warning is given so we ensure that whatever information
we believe is essential to head off upcoming plots to find out
who else are co-conspirators in the country, who he was trading
with overseas, and all of that, would be at least delved into
before any Miranda warning is given.
How we are going to address this new type of terrorist in a
way which is going to be, I think--the battlefront, I think,
has shifted to the United States in many ways, and we have to
find ways to cope with that.
So with all of that, I thank you for your service, I look
forward to your testimony today, and I also want to thank you
for those report cards you have given out over the years, which
I think have been a good way of prompting Congress to move
along. Just because we haven't been attacked doesn't mean that
we are doing everything right. So I just want to thank you
again and I look forward to your testimony.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that under
committee rules opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
[The statement of Hon. Richardson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Honorable Laura Richardson
May 19, 2010
Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this hearing today on the
state of homeland security and intelligence and the status of efforts
to address the recommendations set forth in the Report of the 9/11
Commission.
It is a privilege to be joined by our distinguished witnesses:
Former Representative Lee Hamilton and former New Jersey Governor
Thomas Kean. America owes you a debt of gratitude for your skillful
leadership of the 9/11 Commission. Thanks to the work of the Commission
you led, ``America is `safer but still not safe,' '' to quote your
famous words in the 9/11 Report. Thank you both for being here.
Since the 9/11 Commission's report was released, Congress has taken
a number of actions to implement the 9/11 Commission's recommendations.
However, it is crucial to hear from the 9/11 Commissioners to identify
both our successes and areas where work remains. In particular, in the
discussion of strategies for aviation and transportation security, the
9/11 Commission Report highlights the need for a ``Layered Security
System'' that includes security measures to address the wide array of
threats, including the use of insiders, suicide terrorism, and standoff
attack.
The Commission Report states that ``the U.S. border security system
should be integrated into a larger network of screening points that
includes our transportation system and access to vital facilities, such
as nuclear reactors.'' As a proud representative of the 37th district
of California, I am especially concerned about this topic. My district
is home to the Port of Long Beach/Los Angeles, which receives 40
percent of the Nation's cargo. The 9/11 Act set forth a goal of working
towards 100 percent cargo screening, and I am sorry to say that almost
10 years later, we are not closer to reaching it.
In addition, as Chair of the Subcommittee on Emergency
Communications, Preparedness, and Response, I look forward to hearing
the Commissioner's reflections on the Commission's recommendations on
emergency preparedness and response. Citizen preparedness and private
sector preparedness is an important component of our homeland security
strategy. However, according to Citizen Corps National surveys, in 2007
only 42 percent of survey respondents reported having a household
emergency plan. Again, this is another area where we have not yet
reached the goals of the Commission recommendations.
I am pleased that this hearing is providing a chance for committee
Members to delve into the issues facing our Government and homeland
security with regard to progress on the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission. Clearly, the Federal Government still has work to do. I
look forward to sharing this information with the stakeholders in my
district, home to a target-rich environment, including the airports,
water treatment facilities, and ports.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for convening this hearing. I yield
back my time.
Chairman Thompson. I also would want to again welcome our
distinguished witnesses, Governor Thomas Kean and
Representative Lee Hamilton, the chair and vice-chair of the
Congressionally-created National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States.
In addition to his service as chairman of the 9/11
Commission, Thomas Kean served as Governor of New Jersey from
1982 to 1990, and Speaker of the New Jersey Assembly. He also
served as president of Drew University from 1990 to 2005.
Today, Mr. Kean serves on the boards of a number of prominent
National organizations, including the Robert Wood Foundation.
Also, I would like to, in his absence, recognize Mr.
Pascrell from New Jersey, who never lets us forget about New
Jersey on this committee.
Lee Hamilton represented the citizens of Indiana's Ninth
District for 34 years in this body. During his tenure, he
served as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the
Intelligence Committee. Today, Representative Hamilton serves
as the president and director of the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars at the Indiana University
Center. Without objection, the witnesses' full statement will
be inserted in the record.
I now ask the witnesses to summarize their statement for
somewhere about 5 minutes, or the best you can do.
The Chairman recognizes the gentleman from Indiana.
STATEMENT OF LEE HAMILTON, FORMER COMMISSION VICE-CHAIRMAN, THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman, I think I will speak first and
then the Governor will follow me, if that is all right with the
Chairman.
Tom and I are very happy to be with you this morning. We
are very appreciative of the leadership that has come from this
Committee on Homeland Security ever since its creation.
We are here as co-chairmen of the Bipartisan Policy
Center's National Security Preparedness Group, which is a
successor to the
9/11 Commission, and our principal hope and thrust in that
group will be to try to play a constructive role in supporting
you and other people in the Executive branch who work very hard
on homeland security.
Tom and I will be talking about two separate topics; one is
the nature of the threat that we confront, and then secondly on
intelligence and some of our observations as a result of a
conference we held on that just a few weeks ago.
I think as Mr. King said in his statement, we believe that
al-Qaeda has been seriously weakened, but I am not at all sure
that we have a firm grasp on how seriously. There are disparate
elements to the radicalism across the globe, and it is just
extremely difficult to keep track of all of it. Overall, then,
we think perhaps the threat has been reduced, but it certainly
has not been eliminated, and the struggle goes on.
A few quick observations about the threat in general.
Pakistan is the new hub and center of the terrorist threat;
more plots against the United States emanate from Pakistan or
have a strong connection with Pakistan than anywhere else. As
Mr. King also said, we are witnessing the emergence of a new
generation of terrorists, American citizens, lone actors
trained abroad, and I think we can expect more from persons
with limited resources and perhaps limited training. So in some
ways, the threat is as much internal as it is external.
We have often said, and you have heard others say, that we
are safer today, but not safe enough. Many of the statements
coming from our leaders today about the progress that has been
made in homeland security are correct. We have already referred
to the setbacks for al-Qaeda; we talk a lot about the success
of the Predator Drone attacks. We were advised the other day
that we should all feel pretty good about the accomplishments.
The problem, of course, is that the attacks keep coming, over
Detroit, in Times Square, at Fort Hood. The problem may be that
we do not fully appreciate the diversity of the possible
attacks. We focus more now on home attacks originating here,
but we must not rule out the possibility of attacks coming from
abroad. We certainly have to understand the evolving nature of
the threat that we face.
One of our colleagues on the National Security Preparedness
Group wrote the other day in one of our leading magazines, ``We
seem able to focus only on one enemy at a time in one place. We
do not understand the networked, transnational, multifaceted
nature of the attack.'' So the defining trait of today's
terrorist threat is its diversity. The Attorney General has
stated the Times Square attempted attack was directed by the
Pakistani Taliban. The attempted attack in December was the
work of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In both of these
cases, al-Qaeda affiliates thought previously as regional or
local threats demonstrated their ability to reach the United
States. Of course, we are all aware of the threats coming from
the tribal regions of Pakistan.
As we have come to recognize the evolving nature of the
threat, we as a country need to consider what policy
recommendations should follow this assessment, and our group,
and I am sure others in this town are beginning to work on
that. We will be working during the summer to complete the work
and draw conclusions and recommendations that you and others in
the Congress and the administration may want to utilize.
Just a word before I turn it over to Tom Kean on the state
of intelligence reform. I believe, and I think most people
believe, that a lot of progress has been made on intelligence
reform. Specifically, data is more widely shared than it was a
few years back. We still have a long way to go. The analysts,
rather than the collectors, have begun to drive data
collection; that is a significant change that is now occurring
in the intelligence community.
The technology has improved. The transformation is underway
from a confederation of bureaucracies in effect in the
intelligence community--some 16 of them--to a network of
collection and analysts. The establishment of the Mission
Managers is, I think, a positive development. The increasing
focus on cybersecurity is a positive development. Reform has
been made on speeding up security clearances. I think the
establishment of a joint duty program, likewise, is part of the
progress. All of that needs to be emphasized and recognized as
a positive step. My point of view, of course--perhaps yours--is
that we cannot achieve perfection, but we can continue to
reduce the likelihood of human error to an acceptable level,
and that is what we have to do.
Now, there are a lot of challenges before the intelligence
community today. I will mention in a moment the ambiguity with
regard to the role of the DNI, a critically important problem.
The President has stated oftentimes that he is not satisfied
with the Presidential daily brief. I don't know that I can
remember a President who has been satisfied with the
Presidential daily brief, but Tom and I have seen a good many
of them dating a few years back--I don't think they are
available to Members of Congress so far as I know--and I think
Tom and I would very much agree that there is a long way to go
in improving the daily brief. That is an enormously important
step in the intelligence dissemination.
There certainly has to be the development of leadership
towards a more integrated intelligence community; that is
happening, but not nearly fast enough. You all are familiar
with the problems the intelligence community has with the
Congress. I think there has been some improvement--at least
that is my impression, I don't know how you feel about it--in
that under Mr. Panetta's leadership in the CIA, but you would
know that probably better than I.
We certainly need more sophisticated analyses--signals,
human, technical have to be integrated much better than they
are. The relationship of the intelligence community generally
to the general public I think needs a lot of work. Tom will
talk a little bit about the necessity of civil liberties and
privacy.
But on the challenges, what impresses me more than anything
else is that we get this massive amount of data--it just comes
in by the truckload per minute--and it overwhelms the ability
of the intelligence community to analyze it. We have simply got
to do that better through a lot of different means than we have
been able to do it. So the greatest challenge in a sense to the
intelligence community is the management of the data that comes
in.
Now, the final point I want to make with regard to
intelligence is that I think because of the ambiguity of the
law where the authorities of the Director of National
Intelligence with regard to budget, with regard to personnel
simply are not as clear as you would like them to be. The
ambiguity creates a lot of problems within the intelligence
community. You would know better than I, but my observation is
that law is not going to be changed soon. It took a long time
to get that law on the books, and I don't see any great effort
at the moment to correct it.
So what does that mean? It means that the role of the DNI
is not clear. Is he a strong leader of the intelligence
community empowered to lead the intelligence community, or is
he a coordinator, a convening authority charged with helping to
facilitate inter-intelligence agency? Now, that is a huge
difference, and it makes all the difference in the world as to
how the intelligence community is shaped. My view--and I think
Tom's--is that we favor the former point of view, that is to
say the DNI should be a strong leader in the intelligence
community with sufficient power to carry out his
responsibilities.
The burden is on the President now to clarify who is in
charge of the intelligence community, where the final authority
lies on budget, personnel, and other matters. As long as you
leave it to the interagency process without clear direction
from the President, you are not going to have an integrated
intelligence product. So we put a lot of responsibility, of
course in almost every subject, on the President. But here the
President's leadership is crucial and it must be enduring, not
just an intervention. He has got to stay on top of this in
order to make it work.
Tom will handle other points of interest on the
intelligence community.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. We were very
generous with the time, but obviously we appreciate the clarity
of your comments.
Governor.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS KEAN, FORMER COMMISSION CHAIRMAN, THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Kean. Thank you. I, likewise, also appreciate very much
your work and the chance to appear before you today. I will
talk just a minute about another lesson that we think we can
learn, and that is the nature of the domestic intelligence
mission and how it demands really greater clarity. The
intelligence community must become more competent in obtaining
and using appropriate information on people who cross the
borders and may have a nefarious intent, that is including
Americans. The failed attack of 12/25, cross-border drug
violence, and other events last year highlighted the challenges
we face in our porous borders and the rapid mobility of modern
society. In addition, we have seen that some of our practices,
such as No-Fly Lists, must be more dynamic, responsive, capable
of triggering quick action, including warnings sometimes that
are based on incomplete information. Our procedures for
collecting and using U.S. personal data must adapt to these new
challenges. Last, the Attorney General's guidelines for
intelligence agencies operating domestically needs to be
updated and harmonized so that the intelligence community can
perform its mission successfully.
We don't really believe that domestic intelligence has
received enough attention, especially, and as we have all said,
the evolving nature of the terrorist threat. In the Commission,
we place great emphasis on the need for the FBI to reform
itself and build an organization that places more emphasis on
preventing attacks. To refocus attention on these issues, we
are going to host a conference in the fall with top Government
officials and other experts to ensure that we are still taking
the right steps so that the agency is reformed to meet the
modern needs of the terrorist threat as we know it today.
Another fact, as evidenced by the reviews following the
failed attempt of the Christmas day bomber, the DNI needs to be
a leader in managing and improving analyses in the intelligence
community. As Lee said, we are awash with data coming in from
every direction all the time. We are collecting more
information than ever before, but we have got to understand it,
we have got to manage it, we have got to integrate it. The good
news is that we have got the technology. We need to continue to
push forward, however, on policy innovations to ensure that we
manage the data properly and that the right people are getting
the information they need, always having in mind that when we
do this, we also have to protect civil liberties.
We are cosponsoring a serious of events with the Markle
Foundation to continue to push for innovative policies,
including making information discoverable and building
interfaces that allow for sufficient exchange while at the same
time protecting civil liberties. Making progress in these
issues is critical for mounting an effective fight against
terrorists that are going to be increasingly sophisticated.
I just want to mention briefly two other items that are
left over perhaps from a 9/11 report. Civil liberties, of
course, has been mentioned already, and Congressional
oversight. We always have to worry about the balance between
civil liberties and our security. It will always be part of the
struggle with terrorism. America must never sacrifice one for
the other. Following the 9/11 Commission recommendations, this
Congress created the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board to advise the Executive branch and to oversee over
efforts to defend civil liberties. The board was staffed and it
became operational in 2006. After some little activity in 2007,
the board has been dormant since that time. We have, in other
words, no members and therefore no board protecting civil
liberties. Now we have got massive capacity now to develop data
on individuals, and we need somebody to ensure that the
collection capabilities do not violate our privacy and the
liberties we care about.
Mr. Chairman, we support the sentiment expressed in your
letter to President Obama, supported by many Members of this
committee, that he should quickly appoint members of the board.
We continue to believe this board is a critical function, and
we urge the President a swift reconstitution.
Now, you have said as well as I could the problem with
Congressional oversight. As you know, this is one of our main
recommendations in our report. It is fractured and overlapping
on both sides of the Hill. It is in an unsatisfactory state. We
note, as Congressman King said, the number of over 100
committees now that DHS officials report to. It has led to
conflicting mandates for the division of Homeland Security. As
you have said, without taking serious action, we think this
confusing system is going to make this country less safe. We
want to continue to work with the Congress to help improving
oversight of our homeland security, and will do everything we
can to cooperate with you in this regard.
Thank you very much for having both of us, and we would be
glad to answer your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Kean follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lee Hamilton and Thomas Kean
May 19, 2010
i. introduction
We are very happy to be before this committee this morning. We are
grateful to Chairman Thompson and Congressman King for the invitation
to discuss the challenges the serious and evolving terrorist threat
poses to our Nation.
Today, we are appearing in our capacity as co-chairmen of the
Bipartisan Policy Center's National Security Preparedness Group (NSPG),
a successor to the 9/11 Commission. Drawing on a strong roster of
National security professionals, the NSPG works as an independent,
bipartisan group to monitor the implementation of the 9/11 Commission's
recommendations and address other emerging National security issues.
NSPG includes the following membership:
Mr. Peter Bergen, CNN National Security Analyst and Author,
Schwartz Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation
Dr. Bruce Hoffman, Georgetown University terrorism
specialist
The Honorable Dave McCurdy, Former Congressman from Oklahoma
and Chairman of the U.S. House Intelligence Committee,
president of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
The Honorable Edwin Meese III, Former U.S. Attorney General,
Ronald Reagan Distinguished Fellow in Public Policy and
Chairman of the Center for Legal and Judicial Studies at The
Heritage Foundation
The Honorable Tom Ridge, Former Governor of Pennsylvania and
U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, Senior Advisor at Deloitte
Global LLP, Ridge Global
The Honorable Frances Townsend, Former Homeland Security
Advisor and former Deputy National Security Advisor for
Combating Terrorism
Dr. Stephen Flynn, president, Center for National Policy
Dr. John Gannon, BAE Systems, former CIA Deputy Director for
Intelligence, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council,
and U.S. House Homeland Security Staff Director
The Honorable Richard L. Thornburgh, former U.S. Attorney
General, Of Counsel at K&L Gates
The Honorable Jim Turner, Former Congressman from Texas and
Ranking Member of the U.S. House Homeland Security Committee,
Arnold and Porter, LLP
Mr. Lawrence Wright, New Yorker Columnist and Pulitzer
Prize-winning author of The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the
Road to 9/11
The Honorable E. Spencer Abraham, Former U.S. Secretary of
Energy and U.S. Senator from Michigan, The Abraham Group.
Over the course of 2009 and 2010, our group met with Obama
administration officials and former senior officials from the Bush
Administration, including:
Director of National Intelligence, Admiral Dennis Blair
(July 2009)
CIA Director Leon Panetta (July 2009)
Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano (July 2009)
FBI Director Bob Mueller (September 2009)
Former CIA Director Mike Hayden (September 2009)
Former DNI Mike McConnell (September 2009)
John Brennan, Deputy National Security Adviser (January
2010)
Mike Leiter, Director of the NCTC (April 2010).
We believe the strength of our group will allow us to be a voice on
National security issues and a resource to you and the Executive
branch. First and foremost, we are here to help play a constructive
role in support of your work.
Recent events have reminded us, especially the failed attempts on
12/25 and in Times Square, that the country needs to continue to
improve its defenses and strengthen Governmental institutions designed
to fight international terrorism and other threats to the United
States. At the Bipartisan Policy Center, our National Security
Preparedness Group has been studying the implementation of the 9/11
Commission's recommendations, especially those regarding intelligence
reform, and new threats to our National security.
We look forward to working with you, and benefiting from the work
of this committee, as our study continues.
Today we would like to discuss with you two on-going projects that
have a direct bearing on the important work of this committee.
First, as we testified in January, the threat from al-Qaeda,
remains serious. What we and other experts are studying is how the
threat of terrorism is evolving. The conventional wisdom for years has
been that al-Qaeda's preferred method was a spectacular attack like 9/
11. But the defining characteristic of today's threat seems to be its
diversity.
Second, the 5-year anniversary of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act recently passed. Our group marked this
anniversary by hosting a conference on the State of Intelligence
Reform. The Director of National Intelligence and host of other former
intelligence officials participated in the conference and I will share
with you today some of the conclusions from the discussion.
the terrorist threat
The defining trait of today's terrorist threat is its diversity. As
you well know, the Attorney General has stated that the Times Square
attempted attack was directed by the Pakistani Taliban. The attempted
attack in December was the work of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
In both of these cases, al-Qaeda affiliates thought previously as
regional or local threats demonstrated their ability to reach the
United States. We're well aware of the threat emanating from the tribal
regions of Pakistan. We've also come to appreciate the increasing
threat of homegrown terrorism as some Americans have become
radicalized.
As we have come to recognize the evolving nature of the threat, we
as a country need to consider what policy recommendations should follow
this new assessment. Our National Security Preparedness Group is
studying this issue. Professor Bruce Hoffman from Georgetown and Peter
Bergen of the New America Foundation are leading a series of interviews
and meetings with terrorism experts to take a fresh look at the nature
of the threat in light of the increased activity. We will work over the
summer to complete this work and draw conclusions and recommendations
that Congress and the administration can utilize. We have already
arranged for Bergen and Hoffman to testify on this assessment in
September, along with homeland security experts Fran Townsend and
Steven Flynn. We look forward to working with you on this study and the
opportunity to return in the fall to your committee.
state of intelligence reform
The determination of terrorists to attack the homeland remains
unabated, reminding us of the need for viable and agile Governmental
institutions to counter the threat. To us, these episodes further
suggest the importance of creating a Director of National Intelligence
and a National Counter Terrorism Center in the first place. At their
core, the problems evident on September 11, 2001, reflected failures of
information sharing among the Federal partners charged with protecting
the country. No one in the Federal Government was charged with fusing
intelligence derived from multiple foreign and domestic sources. The
DNI has been charged with breaking down bureaucratic, cultural,
technological, and policy barriers to the sharing of information among
Federal agencies and the NCTC has been successful in thwarting a number
of potential terrorist attacks.
There has been good work done since September 11, 2001, but we need
to continue down the path toward further integration and insist on a
greater level of effectiveness within the intelligence community. To
further these goals, we hosted a conference on the State of
Intelligence Reform in April with Director Blair, General Hayden,
Admiral McConnell, Fran Townsend, Jane Harman, John McLaughlin, and
Steve Cambone. The conference was a success in highlighting the
importance of the issues this committee is dedicated to, including
information-sharing and improved counter-terrorism policy within our
borders.
Today, we are releasing a brief summary of the proceedings, and we
would like to offer you several key observations.
First, the President needs to be very active in defining roles and
responsibilities within the intelligence community. We think the
conference showed that the DNI has achieved a meaningful measure of
success in its first years--that has made it worth the inevitable
turmoil--but that the successes relied too heavily on key personalities
within the Executive branch. We want to continue to look closely at the
authorities of the DNI to make sure he has the authority to do his
work, but it is our sense that the success of the DNI in the short term
is not dependent on additional statutory adjustments to IRTPA.
Nonetheless, there are still ambiguities that can contribute to
mission confusion and lack of clarity about lanes in the road. This is
perhaps the greatest challenge facing the DNI. Is the DNI a strong
leader of the intelligence community empowered to lead the IC as an
enterprise? Or is the DNI a mere coordinator, a convening authority
charged with helping facilitate common inter-intelligence agency
agreement? The lack of clarity in its mission invites a host of other
criticisms, including that the ODNI is too large, too intrusive, and
too operational.
The burden is on the President to clarify who is in charge of the
intelligence community and where final authority lies on budget,
personnel, and other matters. In our estimation, we need a strong DNI
who is a leader of the intelligence community. The DNI must be the
person who drives inter-agency coordination and integration. At the
same time, the DNI's authorities must be exercised with discretion and
consideration of the priorities and sensitivities of other intelligence
agencies. But the President's leadership is crucial and must be
enduring or we run the risk of mission confusion and decrease the
prospect of achieving long and lasting reform that was recommended
after September 11, 2001. The DNI's ability to lead the intelligence
community depends on the President defining his role and giving him the
power and authority to act.
Second, the nature of the domestic intelligence mission demands
greater clarity. The intelligence community must become more competent
in obtaining and using appropriate information on people who cross
borders and may have nefarious intent, including Americans. The failed
attack of 12/25, cross-border drug violence, and other events last year
highlighted the challenges we face due to our porous borders and the
rapid mobility of modern society. In addition, we have seen that some
of our practices, such as No-Fly Lists, must be more dynamic and
responsive, capable of triggering quick action, including warnings
based on incomplete information. Our procedures for collecting and
using U.S. person data must adapt to these new challenges. Lastly, the
Attorney General's guidelines for intelligence agencies operating
domestically needs to be updated and harmonized so that the IC can
perform its mission successfully.
It was clear in the conference that in many ways, ``domestic
intelligence'' has not received enough attention especially in light of
the evolving nature of the terrorist threat. The 9/11 Commission placed
great emphasis on the need for the FBI to reform itself and build an
organization that placed more emphasis on preventing attacks. To
refocus attention on these issues, we will host a conference in the
fall with top Government officials and other experts to ensure we are
taking the right steps along the path of reform.
Third, as evidenced by the reviews following the failed attempt on
12/25, the DNI needs to be a leader in managing and improving analysis
in an intelligence community awash with data. In an age when we are
collecting more information than ever before, a major challenge is
understanding, managing, and integrating a huge amount of information.
The DNI needs to develop ways of dealing with intelligence information
overload. The good news is that the technology to do the job exists. We
need to continue to push forward on policy innovations to ensure that
we manage the data properly and that the right people get the
information they need, while protecting civil liberties. We're
cosponsoring a series of events with the Markle Foundation to continue
to push for innovative policies, including making information
discoverable and building interfaces that allow for its efficient
exchange while at the same time protecting civil liberties. Making
progress on these issues is critical to mounting an effective fight
against increasingly sophisticated terrorists.
privacy and civil liberties
The balance between security and liberty will always be a part of
the struggle against terrorism. America must not sacrifice one for the
other. Following the 9/11 Commission recommendations, the Bush
administration created a Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board to
advise the Executive branch and oversee Government efforts to defend
civil liberties. The board was staffed and became operational in 2006.
In 2007, Congress restructured the Board as an independent agency
outside the White House. Despite early criticisms of undue delay and
inadequate funding, the Board held numerous sessions with National
security and homeland security advisers, the attorney general, and the
FBI Director, among others, on terrorist surveillance and other issues
arising from intelligence collection.
However, the Board has been dormant since that time. With massive
capacity to develop data on individuals, the Board should fight to
ensure that collection capabilities do not violate privacy and civil
liberties. Mr. Chairman, we support the sentiment expressed in your
letter to President Obama, supported by many Members of this committee,
that he should quickly appoint members to the Board. We continue to
believe that the Board provides critical functions and we urge
President Obama its swift reconstitution.
congressional oversight
Third, the DNI and IC must provide greater transparency, foster
greater trust with the American people, and avoid over-reaction during
troubled times. While much intelligence must remain classified and out
of public view, the intelligence community still needs support from the
media, Congress, users of intelligence, and foreign partners, among
others, to successfully pursue our National goals. The DNI should work
to promote a robust relationship/partnership with Congress, which
serves as the proxy for the public in overseeing the IC and affirming
its direction.
The 9/11 Commission also placed great emphasis on rigorous
Congressional oversight. This recommendation helped precipitate the
creation of a House Homeland Security Committee and a Senate Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. However, enduring
fractured and overlapping committee jurisdictions on both sides of the
Hill have left Congressional oversight in an unsatisfactory state. DHS
entities still report to dozens of separate committees hundreds of
times per year, which constitutes a serious drain of time and resources
for senior DHS officials. Furthermore, the jurisdictional melee among
the scores of Congressional committees has led to conflicting and
contradictory tasks and mandates for DHS. Without taking serious
action, we fear this unworkable system could make the country less
safe.
The 9/11 Commission also called Congressional oversight over
intelligence dysfunctional. We made recommendations to strengthen the
oversight committees which were not accepted by the Congress, though
some progress has been made. Today we want to emphasize the enormous
importance we attach to rigorous oversight of the intelligence
community.
Congress is the only source of independent advice to the President
on intelligence matters. Such oversight requires changes in the
structure of Congressional committees, specifically the creation of
powerful oversight committees in both the House and Senate. Today, the
appropriations committees' monopoly on the provision of funding weakens
the ability of the intelligence authorization committees to perform
oversight and wastes much of their expertise.
Congressional oversight can help ensure the intelligence community
is operating effectively and help resolve disputes about conflicting
roles and missions. We urge the Congress to take action to strengthen
the oversight capabilities of the intelligence committees.
Chairman Thompson. I thank both of you for the very
enlightening testimony given today before this committee.
I would like to remind each Member that he or she will have
5 minutes to question the panel. I now recognize myself for 5
minutes.
As both of you noted, it is hard to break down the
stovepipes when there are so many stoves. While information-
sharing has improved since 9/11, many--myself included--are
troubled that despite undergoing significant reforms, the
intelligence community did not uncover and prevent the
Christmas day plot. It now seems that while the intelligence
community is doing a better job of collecting and sharing the
information, it does not have the analytical capability, human
and technical, to connect the dots. Now, both of you addressed
this issue in your testimony, and I want to give you a little
time to elaborate on it because we have this humongous data
collection effort underway, but the question is: What and how
are we doing with it after we collect it, and is that our next
challenge?
Governor.
Mr. Kean. I think you have put your finger on it, it is our
next challenge. We haven't always treated analysts with the
same respect we treat other people in the intelligence
community. We know now that it is no good collecting all this
data if we don't have the means and the personnel who can
seriously analyze it, condense it, and turn it over to the
policy people who are going to act. We don't think we are there
yet by any means. This requires, in my mind, giving the
analysts the kind of status, the kind of pay, the kind of
promotions that are available to other people in the
intelligence agency and that we recognize them for the very
important function they hold. This is going to be a continuing
challenge. We are going to get more information, not less.
Unless we analyze it and put it quickly into people's hands so
that action can be taken, we are not going to do the job to
protect the American people.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman, I believe, as you have
suggested, information sharing remains the core problem in
intelligence. You referred to the stovepipes of the 16
intelligence agencies correctly. I do believe there is a lot
better sharing, there is a lot better connection of the dots
than several years back, so we have made a good bit of
progress, but it is not seamless, and it is still a very
formidable challenge for the intelligence community.
I connect this problem to the authority of the DNI. What
you have in the intelligence community today are 16 very able,
very patriotic, very professional groups with a lot of very
talented people. They have operated traditionally very much
within their own stovepipe, within their own agency. They have
felt that it is not necessary to share, the heavy emphasis has
been on need to know rather than need to share. They are very
protective of their jurisdiction and their bailiwick. I do not
believe you are going to get the sharing that you need without
somebody forcing it, and that somebody has to be the DNI. I
don't know where else it comes from. If he does not have the
authority to do that, you are not going to get it. That is my
view, basically. So the authority of the DNI is absolutely
critical to resolving the question of better information
sharing.
Chairman Thompson. Well, I guess the question is: Do we
need a legislative fix, or can a fix be done administratively?
Or is it a matter of having the will to do it?
Mr. Hamilton. It should be a legislative fix eventually,
but to be blunt about it, you are not going to get around to it
quickly and the problem is right now. So the only solution can
come from the President now, and he has to make it clear, in my
view, who has the authority and who doesn't. He has this
ambiguous law out there, which is less ambiguous because of
work in the Bush administration than it was, but it is still
ambiguous, and as long as you have that ambiguity, you are
going to have these agencies fighting for jurisdiction and
power.
That is what you are really talking about, the distribution
of power here. So I think the immediate action has to be
Executive, the longer-term action has to be Congressional and
Executive. That law has to be clarified.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. One last question.
A number of us, Governor, as you indicated, sent a letter to
the President about the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board not
being constituted. We received a reply, but to date no action
has been taken to fill the vacant positions. We will renew that
request after this hearing, given your testimony and your
standing within this whole homeland security arena.
So you may receive some calls prompted by our letter, but a
substantial number of the Members of this committee felt that
this board had an integral part in this whole process and that
to leave it vacant was not in the best interests of that data
collection effort. So we will pursue it.
We now recognize the Ranking Member from New York for 5
minutes for questions.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have to continue to
call Congressman Hamilton ``Mr. Chairman'' because I served
with him on the International Relations Committee and the
Foreign Affairs Committee, and he was an outstanding Chairman.
Chairman Hamilton, you were talking about the DNI. If I can
follow up on that. I am on the Homeland Security and the
Intelligence Committee. My perspective is that the DNI has very
little real power in this administration. More and more I find
that intelligence policy is being driven by the Homeland
Security Advisor to the White House, John Brennan. We saw that
after the Christmas day bombing. He was the one who was
convening the public conferences, speaking to people in the
community. I believe he has an inordinate amount of power in
the intelligence community, as opposed to Admiral Blair, for
instance, or even Director Panetta, and he is beyond
Congressional oversight because of Executive privilege being in
the White House. That, to me, adds a real problem, that we are
finding more and more policy being driven from the White House
on these intelligence issues.
In addition to that, as we are finding more and more
domestic cases, the Department of Justice obviously is involved
early on; and as a result of that, it is declared a law
enforcement or criminal justice matter, and Congress is not
being briefed. I can speak for myself--and I believe there can
be some degree of bipartisan agreement on this--we get very
little information, I would say less information now than
before for two reasons; one I think because the White House is
controlling intelligence more, but secondly, because we are
going to have an increased number of domestic cases, which
become criminal justice cases, and they tell us information
can't be given out because a law enforcement investigation is
going forward.
So in many ways we are going backwards, and we have to find
a way to address that because I do believe we are going to find
more and more of these domestic cases, and that is going to be,
in many ways, the center of terrorism, and yet we are not going
to get the information we need. So if you have any thoughts on
that, or just take it back and consider it. Again, from my
discussions, this is a bipartisan concern to one degree or
another.
Mr. Kean. I lead off by saying that I think we agree that
it is absolutely essential that Members of Congress have the
information that you need because you are unique in the
intelligence area. I mean, if those of us who are citizens are
interested in transportation, we can go listen to the
Transportation Committee or the Environment, the environmental
committees, or so on. But a lot of intelligence is secret, and
so you have got to have that information in order to do your
job, which is oversight. If you are not doing the oversight,
then nobody is, the public and the press isn't allowed the
information to do it properly. So I believe that your
committees are more important in this area than any other
committees in the Congress because you have that unique
responsibility.
I might say, as far as the DNI goes, it concerns me a bit
because the DNI, both Lee and I believe, has got to be the
strong leader of the intelligence community. If somebody else
is taking even the public lead on some of these questions, the
DNI is not where it is supposed to be in the public perception,
which is part of the problem.
Mr. King. As far as the public perception, I don't know we
heard from Admiral Blair on Fort Hood, very little on the
Christmas day bombing, and nothing, to date, that I am aware of
on Times Square. So the public perception, and also the
perception of the community, is that the DNI does not have the
gravitas or the power or the clout that is needed to really get
the job done.
Mr. Hamilton. I think we have been quite clear as to how we
think it ought to be; the DNI ought to have the power.
Your observations about Mr. Brennan were of great interest
to me. You are certainly right, I think, when you say he has
had the public role in a number of these cases, but I don't
think the intelligence community is going to function in all of
its parts unless the DNI has the authority.
The second question you raised has been a difficult one. I
come, of course, from the Congress, and I believe very strongly
in the right of the Congress to get information. I know how
vitally important that is to a Congressional committee. I
conducted a number of investigations, four or five of them
probably, where we had a conflict between the Congress on the
one hand wanting to get information and the prosecutors, in
effect, saying if Congress gets the information, they are going
to screw up the prosecution. That is not an easy question to
resolve. I don't know any blanket rules that applies, there may
be one but I don't know it.
What it takes, I think, on an ad hoc basis, is for the
principals to sit down and try to work it out so that the
Congress gets the information in a timely way and the
prosecutor's case is not disrupted too greatly. So I don't have
any words of advice for you on this. It is an inherent problem
that comes up again and again. There is a problem of it right
now with the Senate committee--I guess that is the Homeland
Security Committee--seeking information and the Department of
Justice holding it back. So that is the only observation I have
on that.
Mr. King. Mr. Chairman, if I could just make one further
point. In this regard, I believe that the Department of
Homeland Security, since you are going to be faced more and
more, literally, with homeland threat, actually threats
emanating from the homeland, I think it is more essential than
ever that the Department of Homeland Security be able to
establish itself in that world, in that community. I don't
believe the Department has been aggressive enough on that.
Again, and this is not being critical of Secretary
Napolitano, but again, when you look as these cases evolve, the
Secretary of Homeland Security is not a major player in them as
far as the public is concerned. I know in the Times Square case
it was many, many days before we got any information from the
Department of Homeland Security. I felt they were, at best,
ancillary to what was happening, even though that was clearly a
homeland security issue. So I am concerned that the Department
is losing status, losing ground in that community. There is a
lot of turf fighting in there. If the Department does not
establish itself and get itself firmly implanted in that world,
I think that also is going to weaken the Department as we go
forward.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady from California
for 5 minutes, Ms. Harman.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As most people know, 9/11 and the recommendations of the 9/
11 Commission have been central to my activities in Congress. I
am passionate about fixing this problem, and I am enormously
respectful of what our witnesses bring to this. I appreciate
the fact that you have hung in for all these years and that you
are continuing, on a bipartisan basis, on a beautiful
bipartisan basis to work at this. I also want to applaud the
Bipartisan Policy Center's National Security Preparedness Group
and your staff leader, Michael Allen--an old friend of ours--
for sponsoring the kinds of conferences that you have.
I participated in your recent conference on intelligence
reform, and as one of the four principal coauthors of the
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, which was based on your
bipartisan recommendation, I think the subject is fascinating.
Let me just offer my view, which I offered there. I don't think
the law is perfect. It was very difficult to get anything
passed. But I think now we are down to 50 percent law and 50
percent leadership. The law is adequate for the right leader,
supported by the President, to be the joint commander that we
envisioned. That is the role. It is not just coordinator--and I
know wouldn't even call it leader, I would call it commander,
as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is, over 16 intelligence
agencies to leverage their strength and pull them together and
use both the knowledge building and budget executing
authorities that he or she has to make the concept work. So
that is my two cents.
On Peter King's point about the lack of Congressional
reform, I strongly agree. It is an embarrassment that we have
not acted in this Congress to reform our committee structure to
have a sharper focus on the homeland security threat, which is
the primary threat to our security in the world. This committee
is jurisdictionally challenged. The Chairman knows I have
spoken out everywhere I can about the need for us to get more
jurisdiction and to be the focal committee here, as the
homeland committee is in the Senate, of more legislation and
more effort, both to provide oversight and to legislate where
necessary. So that is a disappointment.
I want to focus on a couple of things that were mentioned
in the testimony and one that wasn't. First of all, the Privacy
and Civil Liberties Board needs to be formed yesterday. My
understanding is that the White House is currently vetting
nominees. That is an improvement, but they are a year and a
half late. This committee should have been actively
participating over the last year and a half as we have tried to
navigate an ever-evolving and very dangerous threat. So I hope
that they will nominate people soon. I hope that their list is
impressive. I think that once we have this committee at work,
we will be doing what is essential, which is pointing out, as
Tom, you said, that security and liberty are not a zero sum
game, we really have to have both--more of both I would argue.
If we don't live our values, I think the bad guys win. That
is why, by the way, Mr. King--I don't see a need to reform
Miranda, I see a need to use the public safety exception well
and to have the best interrogation teams on the case. I think
we will get farther that way and build more trust with the
communities we need to come forward to tell us that there are
family members or neighbors who are acting strangely. I also
think that is the way we will win the argument with the next
generation that is deciding whether to be suicide bombers or
good citizens around the world.
My time is running out, so let me just ask you about
something you didn't touch, but it was one of your
recommendations, and that is the need for a National
interoperable communications network. I have only got about 40
seconds, but I continue to believe that that is as serious a
gap as the connecting the dots problem. I think we are doing
much better with connecting the dots, I think we are not doing
better with this interoperable capability problem.
What is your view?
Mr. Kean. Well, I would agree. Whenever there is an attack
on the United States, it becomes immediately important that the
first responders and others are able to communicate with each
other immediately, on site, using the same wavelengths. There
is no question. We were not there on 9/11, we were not there
with Katrina, and we are not there yet. So I couldn't agree
with you more. It is something we have got to concentrate on.
It could have saved a lot of lives and it will save a lot of
lives when we get this right. It is better, we are getting
there, but too slowly given the threat.
Mr. Hamilton. I don't know of anything that has frustrated
us more than not solving the problem of the ability of first
responders to talk to one another. It is an absolute no-brainer
that the help, the police, the safety people, the fire people
have to be able to talk with one another, and we are not there
yet. It is amazing that 6 years after our report--or whatever
it is--we haven't been able to accomplish that. What that means
is that lives are at risk because of the inability to
communicate. Some municipalities have made considerable
progress, many have not. But we have got to keep pushing, and I
thank you for bringing it up.
Ms. Harman. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Texas for 5
minutes, Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Kean, thank you all for being here.
The Ranking Member just left, but I join him in welcoming back
Mr. Hamilton, who when he was in Congress, was absolutely one
of the most respected Members with whom I have served. So I
appreciate your both being here.
My first question goes to the 9/11 Commission's
recommendation for a biometric entry-exit system. It so happens
in a 1996 bill that I introduced that became law we had an
entry-exit system. That has not been fully implemented; both
Republican and Democratic administrations have not fulfilled
their responsibility to obey the law. I wanted to ask how
important you think it is that this administration implement
that entry-exit system that you all recommended and that in
fact is required law today? I don't know who wants to answer
first, but I look forward to hearing from both of you all.
Mr. Hamilton. Well, I commend your initiative. I think you
are right on the mark. That was a unanimous recommendation; you
had to have some means of identifying people coming in and
going out of the country, and so we suggested the biometric
system. I am delighted that you are still pushing it. I agree
with you that it ought to be of the highest order.
We have done better on the entry side than the exit side.
We haven't done anything on the exit side, there has just been
too much opposition to it. But we have got to override that
opposition. You have got to keep track of these people coming
in, you have got to keep track of them while they are here, you
have got to keep track of them when they leave. We are not able
to do that. I don't know how you do that without some kind of
an identification system if you don't have it. So your
initiative is, I think, very worthy.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Kean, anything to add?
Mr. Kean. I would just echo, I think the initiative is
praiseworthy. I don't know of any other way we are going to
make our borders safe.
Mr. Smith. Another recommendation of the 9/11 Commission
was to set standards for the issuance of sources of
identification, such as driver's licenses. You all know that in
2005, we passed the REAL ID Act, it is now on the way to being
implemented by a majority of States. Yet, frankly, this
administration wants to change it and wants to eliminate the
requirement that the States check the identification documents
that are being used when applicants try to obtain a driver's
license. Do you feel that that is somehow weakening our
homeland security defenses? It seems to me we want to leave
REAL ID as it is, require that the identification be confirmed.
Do you feel that we should do just that, or do you feel that we
should repeal the REAL ID Act as this administration seems to
feel?
Mr. Kean, Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. Hamilton. I am not sure I can get into the details of
that because I haven't followed it closely, but I will tell you
how radical I am on it. I believe we ought to have an
identification card. I know there are objections to that on the
left and on the right. Someday we will get there, other
countries have it. We are going to have to have it for purposes
of--a lot of purposes, but certainly in controlling our
borders. That may go a lot farther than you or others may
support, but we have to have confidence in the identification
or the system just doesn't work.
Mr. Smith. The administration on the REAL ID Act actually
wants to, as I say, eliminate the requirement that States
verify the validity of identity documents that are used when
applicants apply for driver's licenses. So I assume you would
be opposed to any elimination of that.
Mr. Hamilton. I think I would, Mr. Smith, although let me
emphasize that I haven't looked at that very hard.
Mr. Smith. If anything, it sounds like you want to
strengthen it.
Mr. Hamilton. That is exactly right. The necessity of
having an accurate identification is key to homeland security,
I believe. I want to emphasize the 9/11 Commission did not
approve the idea of an identity card, I was kind of out here in
the wilderness on that one. So we kind of compromised on it.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. The last quick question is, what
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission that has not been
implemented do you think is the most important?
Mr. Hamilton. Well, I think the one we just talked about
with Representative Harman is No. 1, and No. 2----
Mr. Smith. You are welcome to use either of the two
examples I just gave, by the way.
Mr. Hamilton. Well, they are very important observations. I
would add another one, I think you have to have somebody in
command at the site, and we haven't solved that problem either.
That is another no-brainer. Somebody has to be in charge.
Somebody has to make literally hundreds of decisions very
quickly when a disaster strikes. You are going to make some of
those decisions wrong, but you have got to make them because
there are all kinds of problems that pop up, food, water,
safety, sanitation, security.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton. My time is up, but I
want to give Mr. Kean an opportunity to briefly respond as well
if he wants.
Mr. Kean. I would agree with Lee, as we usually do. The
ones that have only been partially followed, such as the
sharing of information, that is key, that we have got to keep
on pressing and pressing--and I hope this committee will keep
on pressing on that one. Then some of the others seem easy
because they are so logical, but they haven't been done yet,
like the interoperability of communications networks on the
site. They are obviously not easy because they haven't been
done, like the creation of civil liberties or obviously
Congressional reform.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri for
5 minutes, Mr. Cleaver.
Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank both of you
for being here.
I have a rather well-known blood relative who was the
subject of a lot of controversy due to his best seller, ``Soul
On Ice.'' As a result of the fact that we have the same last
name, I ended up on the watch list as a Member of Congress. It
took a lot of work and help from American Airlines and my staff
to get that changed.
Based on what happened, both with regard to the attempted
Christmas day bombing and the recent Times Square failed
attempt, do you believe that there is something awry with the
watch list system? I mean, if we have to take somebody off an
airplane, it has already failed. Then when I look at my own
personal experience, something is wrong, and something needs to
be done, I think. I would like to get your opinions, and
perhaps even to make some suggestions on what needs to be done.
Mr. Hamilton. I think the fact is that we don't have one
watch list, we have dozens of watch lists. It seems to me we
ought to have a single watch list and be very careful about the
names that go on it, obviously, and it has to be managed and
screened very carefully. My impression is that various
departments have different watch lists, and that we have a
conglomeration of them. I think our idea on the 9/11 Commission
was that we have a single watch list, which would be an
integrated watch list from all of the departments of Government
that have some responsibility in homeland security. But the
need to refine that and make it more accurate is hugely
important.
My impression there is that we have not done a very good
job of integrating the watch list or sharing its accuracy, and
we just keep adding thousands and thousands of additional names
to it. So I think the watch list needs a lot of work.
Mr. Kean. I don't know if this is still true, but for a
long time, the very worst actors or people we worried about,
most weren't on the watch list. Somehow it violated to let the
airlines have those names, somehow they thought it was going to
jeopardize National security, so they weren't on it. That is
obviously, to me, another no-brainer; of course, they should be
on it.
I think the Christmas day bomber and perhaps the Times
Square bomber did us a huge favor because it got us to look
again at the watch list and the problems with it. It got us to
look at the problem of information sharing again and the
problems with it. It focused our attention at a time when our
attention had quite naturally wandered, it was being diverted
by all sorts of other important problems facing this country.
What they did, we can't always count on people being
incompetent or using faulty technology. We found out some of
the things that we did wrong and we are not going to repeat
those mistakes, like the problem with the watch list being one
of them.
But we can't count on our luck. We can't make those
mistakes again and we've got to get in front of the problem and
anticipate some of these problems and try to correct them ahead
of time. The watch list is certainly one of them. You are
right.
Mr. Hamilton. We have got multiple watch lists. We have got
a Selectee list; we have got a No-Fly List. I frankly get
confused with it all. It seems to me we ought to have a system
where the fellow at the airline counter can hit the button and
he can tell whether this guy is a dangerous person getting on
an airplane or not. Now, that is, I guess, overly simplistic,
but that is what you have got to have, and you have got that
information available instantly. You can't take a day to find
out about it. I think the technology is that we can achieve
that. But we are not there.
Mr. Cleaver. Thank you. I thank both of you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from California
for 5 minutes, Mr. Lungren.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank both of our guests here today because of the great work
they have done, Governor and Lee. They talked about your being
former Chairman, but I know you also were someone who played
Hoosier basketball before they had the movie ``Hoosiers,'' and
I don't want to forget that.
One of the things that has been so frustrating for me since
I came back in 2005 and it appears to me frustrating for the
two of you is what I call the lack of urgency to deal with this
problem.
Governor Kean, you just mentioned that maybe we should be
thankful for the failed attacks because it caused us to be
concerned again, but we can't depend on failed attacks to keep
that level of urgency that's necessary. This hearing is
reflective of that, where the multiple TV cameras discussing
one of the most important issues facing this Nation. It almost
appears that we in the Congress are still reactive rather than
proactive.
We had the Christmas attempted bombing, and then we were
concerned about it and it was an issue of high import here for
3 weeks. Then we had the failed attempt in Times Square and
that's been on people's minds for about 2\1/2\ weeks, although
I see that ebbing away as well. So I want to thank you for your
continued effort to try to provide that sense of urgency. I
note the words that you used about the failure of us to respond
to one of, I believe, the important recommendations of the
Commission, that is, the consolidation and direction of
Congress on this issue where you used words, without taking
serious action, we feel this unworkable system could make the
country less safe.
I hope you stand by that statement because oftentimes,
people's normal reaction is that it is just about process here.
So what we have 100 and some committees and subcommittees? So
what that there's jurisdictional wrangling? How could that
impact us in the way you have just stated? But you have
stated--our failure to deal with this jurisdictional milieu can
make the country less safe. Could you sort of elaborate on
that?
Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Lungren, I thank you for mentioning the
lack of urgency. I guess if there has been a common theme to
what Tom and I have talked about since the Commission
disbanded, it was just that point. We have an enormous problem
in the country of course in establishing priorities. We all are
very much aware of that. But we don't think there is any higher
priority than the protection of the--and the security of the
American citizen.
We have said over and over again that a lot of good work is
being done, a lot of good people working on it, but when you
visit these various places and you talk to the officials
involved, you come away with a feeling that they do not have a
real sense of how urgent the problem is. There are people out
there still and a lot of them who want to kill us, and we have
got to be very much attuned to that and do everything we can to
protect ourselves against it. I like your point about the
jurisdiction in the process. I know that gets to be a highly
technical matter and an enormously controversial matter in this
Congress.
I don't know of any tougher problem--I served on every
Congressional reform committee that came along during the 34
years I was in the Congress and I have dealt an awful lot with
the question of jurisdiction, and I know how difficult and
sticky it is and what passions it arouses in Members of
Congress, but they have to keep their perspective, their eye on
the ball here, and that means the security of the American
people.
When you are fighting about jurisdiction and you are
splitting jurisdiction among 108 committees on homeland
security, all of that energy, all of that effort is not going
towards what it ought to be going towards, which is the
security of the American people. It is an enormous diversion
from what the Congress ought to be focusing on. So we were very
critical of the Congress on this question. We remain very
critical of the Congress on it, and you have to get your house
in order.
Mr. Lungren. I appreciate that. To point out a number of
things that the two of you have contributed in the testimony
today, the DNI needs to be a real position with real leadership
and either legislatively or administratively that has to be
done; otherwise it just gets in the way, adding another layer
that we didn't have before we made the changes.
Second, you have told us here in the Congress we need to
get our act together so that we can concentrate on these things
because as you say, if we don't, the consequence is it could
make the country less safe.
Just the third thing I would just mention, and we don't
have time to get into this, but I do fear we have a continued
problem with understanding the nature of the threat against us
and understanding that as we utilize the criminal justice
system and the counterterrorist system or concept, there are
challenges there that we need to deal with first and foremost.
I am sorry my friend from California left because on Judiciary,
we have been trying to deal with this question of the
Mirandizing issue. It is not as simple as just extending the
public safety exception because the public safety exception
deals with an imminent danger such as a loaded gun being within
the reach of a suspect as you are questioning him, not the
extended kind of danger we have from a terrorist situation. We
are going to have to deal with that up front and not just kind
of pass it by. So I thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Carney [presiding]. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentlewoman from Arizona,
Ms. Kirkpatrick.
Ms. Kirkpatrick. Gentlemen, thank you so much for being
here today and thank you for your great work. I am very
impressed with your clear concise recommendations, and I will
continue to press for their implementation as quickly as
possible.
Representative Hamilton, I wanted to follow up on Mr.
Smith's question about the Biometric Exit Program. You know, it
is clear to me we need to do that. I am just wondering what are
the obstacles that have prevented that implementation?
Mr. Hamilton. It is my understanding that the airlines have
strongly objected to exit checks because they think it would
slow the process of boarding passengers and the like and so far
as I know, that is the principal objection, but there may be
others as well.
Ms. Kirkpatrick. Do you know if there are any objections at
the ports of entry, the land crossings?
Mr. Hamilton. I do not know about that.
Mr. Kean. I think there was some actually because some of
the border States there are people who cross the borders back
and forth sometimes seven or eight, nine times, ten times a day
because of the kinds of jobs they have in some of those border
States. So some of the Governors and some of the States, as I
understand it, put up an objection to anything that would
impede that process or slow it down.
Ms. Kirkpatrick. I represent a border State, Arizona, and
recently toured the border. Both the citizen traffic--and I
also went to the port of entry and it is really clear that the
agents have a very difficult time identifying folks who are
coming and going, and I think that should be a top priority of
the administration.
But I am also concerned about funding. In Arizona, we have
hundreds of thousands of dollars of cash going across the
border, and it occurs to me that it is very important for us to
attack the financing of these terrorist groups. So, Governor,
would you address what we are doing to cut off financing? Do
you think we are doing enough? What more should we be doing?
Mr. Kean. Actually, when we graded the various Government
agencies, I think we gave Treasury one of our highest grades,
as I remember, for the tracking of money. We thought they were
doing a very good job at that time. I have not personally
reexamined that issue, but there were a number of--some of
which have become public in what used to be private, but there
are a number of tools that they have been using in cooperation
with other governments to track dollars to terrorist
organizations, and my impression was that they were doing a
pretty good job in that area.
Ms. Kirkpatrick. Do you have any information about the use
of these prepaid cash cards going toward funding of terrorist
organizations?
Mr. Kean. I don't.
Mr. Hamilton. I don't think anyone believes that you can
stop terrorist activity just by going after their finances. But
I also believe that almost everybody believes that going after
their finances is an absolutely essential tool and it takes a
good bit of sophistication as to how the financial world works.
I think we have learned a lot on that, and my impression is--I
may not be up to date--is that we have improved our tools at
identifying financial transactions involving terrorists. So it
is an element of our anti-terrorism activity that has to be
always strengthened wherever we can. It is an important part of
it, but we will not in the end by that tool alone cut off
terrorism, but it is an important part of it.
Ms. Kirkpatrick. I have about a minute left. I have one
other question and this is about stopping terrorist travel. You
have made a number of recommendations for tightening border
controls and fostering international information sharing to
impede the ability of individuals with terrorist aspirations to
enter the United States but with the high-profile arrests of
Faisal Shahzad and Colleen Rose known as Jihad Jane, have we
entered a new phase of terrorist activity in America where we
now see American citizens carrying out terrorism on behalf of
foreign terrorists?
Mr. Kean. This is the strategy now. I mean, this seems to
be the way that terrorists have decided to attack us. We
strengthened after 9/11 ways in which we stopped terrorists of
certain nationalities coming from various countries. So the
gold standard for a terrorist now is to try to get an American
citizen, and if it is an American citizen who looks different
than somebody might conceive of a terrorist looking that's even
better.
So their emphasis of them trying to track these kinds of
people--and it is very dangerous for us because these people
can travel freely in and out of the country because they are
American citizens. We also know that Mr. Alawi who we actually
first identified in the 9/11 Report, has become extraordinarily
dangerous because he understands how to talk to vulnerable
Americans and he understands how to recruit in a way that
people have not been able to recruit before for al-Qaeda. So
this is the new--this is the new threat. This is what we have
to get ahead of. This is not what we are used to. This is not
9/11. This is a new threat. American citizens who have been
lured by somebody like Alawi because of whatever problems occur
in their own lives and it is a much more difficult problem. It
is a problem we have got to get ahold of and get ahead of.
Mr. Hamilton. We mentioned in our testimony that there are
certain trends that are taking place in the terrorist threat.
One of them, for example, the decentralization of al-Qaeda, but
another one certainly is the increasing emphasis they are
putting on recruitment of people who are homegrown, who speak
English, who have a Western passport, probably have American
citizenship. As Tom has mentioned that has become the focal
point of a lot of our National security conversations now. This
is not an easy problem. We have about 200,000 Americans a year
who travel from here to Pakistan. As I said earlier, Pakistan
is often at the core of these attacks in one way or the other.
Keeping track of 200,000 people is no easy task, but we are
trying to do it and we have become much better at it than we
were. But obviously 99.9 percent of them are good people doing
legitimate things, and it is a problem picking out the bad guy.
Two hundred thousand just in the one country. Add Somalia, add
Yemen, add another a number of other countries, Afghanistan,
Iraq, and so forth, and you can see the problem that confronts
us.
Ms. Kirkpatrick. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Chairman,
for allowing me a little additional time.
Mr. Carney. Of course.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, gentlemen. I think one area that we really
haven't fully explored about Faisal Shahzad is the process by
which he became a naturalized citizen. He reportedly entered
the country more than 10 years ago on a student visa; then he
obtained a work visa before marrying a citizen and then
becoming naturalized himself. Given that he tried to blow up
Times Square a little more than a year after becoming a
citizen, questions are now surfacing regarding the security
check requirements for naturalization.
Do you think there are limitations on the ability of
Federal immigration officials to conduct robust security
screening on those seeking to become citizens or legal
permanent residents?
Mr. Kean. That is a good question. I am not as familiar
with that as I perhaps should be. He, of course, had gone and
gotten an advanced degree as well which would indicate to
somebody he was well on the way to being a productive citizen
of this country and so he was a tough one I think to figure
out. Something obviously--we don't know what it is yet--
something went terribly wrong in his life or somebody got to
him or something, but it is important we follow procedures and
get these people ahead of time. But he would have been a
difficult one to catch, I think, because he seemed to be in the
right path to becoming a good American citizen.
Mr. Dent. Right.
Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Dent, it is a good question. I must say I
just haven't examined it. When we did the 9/11 Commission
Report, I don't think the question ever arose as far as I can
remember. We want to welcome people into this country. We want
to be a welcoming country so far as new citizens are concerned.
But I think the events that you have identified clearly put us
on the alert that we have got to be a lot more careful before
we make a person a naturalized citizen.
Mr. Dent. Thanks, and I appreciate your honesty there.
Perhaps maybe going forward no one will ask any question about
it, but we need to better integrate our naturalization process
with our National security apparatus and I am not sure that any
of us have that answer here today how we should do that, but it
is something that we as a committee and as a Congress may want
to look a great deal more at, naturalization and National
security interests.
My next issue revolves around the Secure Flight Program,
which I know that you were--both of you. I thank you again for
your leadership on the 9/11 Commission, but I know that one of
your big recommendations was for TSA to assume the
responsibility for airline passenger prescreening against a
terrorist watch list, and I think that was on page 393 of the
9/11 Commission Report. As you know, in 2004 Congress passed
the Intelligence and Terrorism Reform Act, which included the
Commission's recommendations that advanced airline passenger
prescreening be conducted by TSA. TSA, as you know, after many
fits and starts, created the Secure Flight Program to carry out
this important function. The passage of the Intelligence Reform
Act was nearly 5\1/2\ years ago and Secure Flight is not yet
fully implemented, although we are told it will soon be.
Had Secure Flight been fully implemented, the Times Square
bomber would have not been permitted to board a flight to Dubai
because TSA would have caught the recent addition of Shahzad's
name to the No-Fly List. TSA tells us that Secure Flight will,
in fact, be fully implemented for domestic air carriers by the
end of June and for foreign carriers by the end of this year.
As you know, there have been many factors that have delayed
the implementation of Secure Flight, including pressures from
privacy and civil liberties groups and criticisms from the GAO.
Are you concerned that nearly 9 years after 9/11 and nearly
5\1/2\ years after Congress mandated the passage of
prescreening against the terror watch list be done by the
Government, we still have terrorists boarding commercial
flights?
Mr. Hamilton. I think, Mr. Dent, the ability of screening
the checkpoints and screening the passengers, the inability to
detect explosives is a point of high frustration for us. We
have--here we are--this was a problem well before 9/11. Here we
are, we do not yet have a detection device that can spot all
the explosives that a terrorist may bring on. We do not have a
device, as I understand it, today that could have stopped the
underwear bomber. You might have gotten him with one of these--
--
Mr. Dent. Whole body scans might have----
Mr. Hamilton. Body scans, but not necessarily.
Mr. Dent. Correct.
Mr. Hamilton. We have put a lot of money into this in
trying to develop detection equipment. I am kind of frustrated
by it. I don't understand the science of it, of course. But we
have to come up with devices that can detect all of the
explosives the terrorists can think about. You know the kinds
of metal detectors we now have when you stop to think about it,
the terrorists have moved beyond that and they have outfoxed us
and they now have new ways of exploding things. It is a catch-
up game all of the time, it seems to me. But I do not
understand why we cannot detect these things.
I am all for the money being spent to try to find out the
right device, but when you consider all of the superb
scientific talent we have around this country, it seems to me
we ought to be able to figure out a device that will detect
explosives.
Mr. Kean. I think also--I am frustrated obviously by the
length of time that has gone by, but I noticed--I came in this
morning through the airports, and the public is willing to
accept anything in the name of security, and they have accepted
all sorts of inconvenience. Yet if it is going to make them
safer, they will accept it. So unlike other things, that is not
our problem. I mean, the public is with us. So we need, what we
need is the technological and the Governmental will to get
these things done and get them done yesterday.
Mr. Dent. Thank you. I see my time has expired.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Dent. According to the sheet,
here, it is my turn.
I, first of all, thank you both for being here. This is an
honor I think for everybody in the committee to have men of
your background and intelligence and clarity and wisdom
speaking to us. I only have really a couple of questions. One
is kind of operational and one is perhaps existential. The
first one: Do we have the correct mix of ints employed in this
challenge?
Mr. Hamilton. Mix of what?
Mr. Carney. Intelligence capabilities employed in this mix,
the mix we have, employed in this challenge of the global war
on terror or whatever it is called now?
Mr. Hamilton. Well, the heavy emphasis on intelligence has
been collection. We are superb at it. We can really produce the
data. We have had a great deal of difficulty in developing the
analytical capability, and if you go downtown and talk to these
Executive branches like the FBI and the CIA and DHS and all the
others, DOD, they will tell you that one of their greatest
needs is developing the analyst.
You don't develop a good analyst in a year or 2. It takes
several years. As I indicated early in my testimony, the
analyst now drives intelligence. You can't--you simply cannot
operate in the intelligence world today unless you have
effective analysts. So your question about the capabilities
are--I would put much less emphasis on collection and much,
much more emphasis on analytical capability. That is what will
drive your intelligence as a preventer of terrorism.
Mr. Kean. Another--this has always been true, it seems to
me, ever since I have been in this field. We still don't have
enough what is called human intelligence. We don't have the
language skills. We don't have the people employed. We are
technologically terrific, but we just simply haven't been able
to bring in the trained people into the human intelligence area
that we need to if we are going to be successful in this area.
Mr. Hamilton. When I chaired the Intelligence Committee
decades ago, we were worried about the inadequacy of human
intelligence. We have been worried about the inadequacy of
human intelligence ever since I can remember, and that goes
back 40 years. The conventional wisdom in this town has always
been we have got to have better human intelligence. When Mr.
Tenet came before us to testify--Tom, you will remember--he
said we are going to put more emphasis on this and it will take
us 5 years, and we were astounded because it was going to take
so long. It has taken longer than that and we are still not
there.
Mr. Carney. Why don't we have it?
Mr. Hamilton. Look, the problem is this: There are a lot of
problems, but you are asking a person to put their life on the
line for years. You are going to pay them--I don't know--
$100,000 a year. You cannot take a guy from the Midwest like me
and expect he is going to penetrate Osama bin Laden's cell. You
have got to have a person with a specific background and so
forth and makeup, ethnicity.
Mr. Carney. We had a high school kid from California do
exactly that.
Mr. Hamilton. Okay. You bet. So you have to pick these
people out. You have to train them. How many people do you
know, Members of Congress, who would be willing to go 4, 5, 6
years living under the harshest conditions in Iraq or
Afghanistan or Pakistan, you pay them $100,000 a year, and
their life is on the line every single day? They can't come
back home for vacation. That is the tough problem and that is
why the human intelligence is such a formidable task for us.
Mr. Carney. My final question, my second question: We are
directing our resources to prevent them from gaining victory.
But what in their minds, our enemies' minds, constitutes
victory?
Mr. Kean. Well, if you take the statements of Osama bin
Laden, it is to have the United States totally outside of their
the Arabian peninsula, in some cases to have the State of
Israel destroyed and the Palestinians regiven their land. Those
are about the two biggest objectives that Osama bin Laden has--
--
Mr. Carney. What about the caliphate from Indonesia
across----
Mr. Kean. Well, that is out there. I don't think he has
been explicit in that one but certainly it is out there, yes.
Mr. Hamilton. I think we have to be very cognizant of their
tactics. They want to exhaust us on many fronts. They want to
cause us turmoil. They are--Tom, what did we figure it cost 9/
11, five----
Mr. Kean. Not much.
Mr. Hamilton. A few hundred dollars.
Mr. Kean. It was not expensive.
Mr. Hamilton. The reason they look upon 9/11 as such a huge
victory is not just because of the 3,000 people they killed but
because they spent a few hundred dollars and we spent multiple
billions of dollars in homeland security, defense, fighting two
wars and all of the rest. If you look at it from their
perspective, that is a big victory. So they want to exhaust us.
They want to cause turmoil. They want to bankrupt us. They want
to drive divisions among our allies and our friends. They want
to destabilize things. They want to put fear into our hearts.
All of these things are tactics that they employ. The ultimate
is what you suggested probably, but that they recognize is
very, very far off, establishing a caliphate.
Mr. Carney. So the sense of a strategic victory by tactics
is what we are struggling with here in this question.
Mr. Hamilton. I think that may be a good way to put it. But
they really are focused, I think, much more on tactics at the
moment than trying to achieve their ultimate goal.
Mr. Kean. It is interesting by the way, they considered the
Underwear Bomber a victory because it disrupted us. Even though
it was unsuccessful, all of a sudden everybody was running
around saying what did we do wrong and Congressional hearings
and newspaper headlines and all of that. They considered that a
victory.
Mr. Carney. Okay. Thank you. My time is way up there.
Mr. Austria, please, for 5 minutes or so.
Mr. Austria. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank
both of you, Mr. Chairman and Governor, for being here today
and providing the committee Members with testimony as far as
updating us as far as the 9/11 report and the progress we have
made. I think it is very important. My line of questioning was
going to go down to traveling, but we have had three questions
in that area particularly with flight safety and I appreciate
your responses as far as technology that is being used and
investments being made, as far as the multiple watch lists out
there, having a single watch list, and having that information
brought together and integrated together and the fact that you
brought up we need one person or a single point or a principal
point of oversight to review the homeland security.
One of the areas I wanted to go into to talk a little bit
about was emergency communications at the local, State, and
National level, because I know when the initial report came
out, you noted the tragic consequences of the inability of
first responders to be able to communicate with each other
effectively because of all the multiple agencies and the
different jurisdictions. I guess my question would be how would
you assess that today?
Have we made progress on that? Where are we compared to
what those recommendations were, where we should be? Do you
believe if there was another large-scale terrorist attack today
in the United States, with the multiple agencies, would they be
able to be respond with all the multiple jurisdictions out
there to be able to effectively communicate with each other, in
particular, our first responders?
Mr. Hamilton. I think it might depend a lot on where it
occurred. But in most cases, I don't think we have the ability
to get effective, reliable communications at the point of the
disaster because we haven't got that worked out yet. Have we
made a little progress on it? Yes, maybe 25, 35 percent there,
but we are not there yet. Now, this gets into complicated
questions of the radio spectrum. The radio spectrum, of course,
is a very valuable piece of property, and yet our view is that
a sufficient amount of that radio spectrum should be set aside
for the public interest in being able to respond and some
progress has been made in that direction, I think, but not
nearly enough. So I think it remains a huge problem, and if we
were to have another disaster again, we would lose lives
because we have not resolved it.
Mr. Kean. Let me give you another example because one
person in charge is so important at the time--one agency at
least. In New York City, which I know best, Mayor Bloomberg has
made a lot of progress because he finally solved the
controversy between the police and fire department. Now in an
emergency, he said the police are going to be in charge, as
they weren't--when the 9/11 attack came, we didn't know who was
in charge; so now it is the police. But what happens if happens
in the subway? It is the transit authority. Who appoints them?
The Governor. What if it is in the tunnels or bridges? It is
the Port Authority. Who do they report to? The Governors of two
States. So there still isn't the command authority, even in New
York City, which may be prepared as well as anybody now, that I
think we need. Every city, every State, every area ought to
have a command authority in charge. So any emergency that
happens, there's one agency to report to. That is absolutely
vital and we are not there yet.
Mr. Austria. Do you have any recommendations as far as how
can we move forward and make progress? Because a big concern of
mine is--and when you are dealing with all of these different
jurisdictions at local level, State, Federal, who has
jurisdiction over what, who would be the entity to take a lead
on this in moving this forward?
Mr. Kean. Maybe it is my background, but I think the
Governor. I think that is the logical, logical person in every
State. If it is an entity as large as New York City, then I
think the mayor. The mayor has got to make those
determinations. For instance, in my example, I think the mayor
should be asking if he hasn't already the Governors of New York
State and the State of New Jersey if necessary to give him the
authority in case of an emergency so that there is one agency
in charge.
In the case of New York, that would be the police. In the
case of New Jersey, I know it is the State police that are put
in charge during an emergency. But every State under the
Governor, I think, ought to have that responsibility and have
it clear.
Mr. Hamilton. It is an easy problem to State and we have
done a reasonably good job of stating it. It is a very
difficult problem to resolve.
Mr. Austria. One last question I have, Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Hamilton. If you have a disaster taking place in one
State, the Governor probably ought to be in charge, but even in
that case, you have got to think of resources. For example,
when Katrina hit, the Governor of Louisiana, as I recall, made
a statement saying that she had at her command a handful of
helicopters. She needed 150. Where are you going to get 150
helicopters? There is only one place: the DOD. So in so many of
these areas where you have massive problems as a result of an
attack, the Federal Government is certainly going to have to
come in at some point.
Now, the reason this problem has been so difficult to solve
is because it is a tough political problem. The mayor likes to
think he is going to be in charge, or she. The Governor thinks
that he or she ought to be in charge. They don't have the
resources often to do it. The Federal Government is going to be
involved heavily one way or the other. Working that problem out
in advance is very hard to do, but I think we have to work hard
to try to figure out who is in charge at the scene of a
disaster.
Mr. Austria. I know my time has expired. So thank you, Mr.
Chairman, and thank both of you for your hard work on the 9/11
Commission report. I appreciate it very much.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Green, 5 minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses.
I have just so much respect for your clarity of thought. It
is very obvious, in fact, intuitively obvious to a casual
observer that you have given a lot of thought to these
questions and it is important that we receive the benefit of
your thinking and I cannot tell you how important this hearing
has been and thank you and I trust that we will continue to
benefit from your clarity of thought in the years to come. I am
one of those persons who had the misfortune of being involved
in the stock market at one time and I had a great analyst. He
could always tell me the day after why I lost money the
previous day. He could never quite get it right before. I would
always marvel at his ability to do this.
It seems to me that some of what we have is a benefit of
great hindsight that allows us to connect dots because we see
how important the dots are. But before with the foresight is
sometimes difficult. I am mentioning this only because I just
want to say a kind word in defense of the people who have to
connect these dots. When you are inundated with just an
inordinate amount of material and intelligence, and it just
seems that so much of it is important, it really is sometimes
difficult with trying to use the benefit of foresight to
connect these dots.
After an event, it becomes so obvious to you: Well, why
didn't--we should have, sure, there, it was right there before
our eyes, somebody should have, why didn't you call, why didn't
you send the information to--it is easy after the fact. These
people have some of the toughest assignments in the world, and
when I hear us criticizing them for getting a break, it hurts
my heart because we got a break and it so happens that that
break helped us to solve a mystery as it were. But that happens
in this business. You need a break to solve some of these
problems because there is just so much information. I want to
compliment them, all of them. I just don't know how I can ever
be grateful enough, but I want to say thank you to them for the
work that they do.
Something that you said I want to reemphasize. You talked
about how we compensate them and what we expect from them. I am
taking that to heart. I am not sure how we can resolve the
question of giving them adequate compensation. Whatever we pay
them it won't be enough, but we ought to try to pay them such
that they become a part of a class of professionals that we can
respect and people will want to do this because if you want
compensation as a reward, then you will get that reward. But I
also think that appreciation is a great part of the
compensation that is needed to attract and retain people in
this area of endeavor because human intelligence is just
absolutely a necessity.
Now, with 1 minute and 16 seconds left, I have to go to one
other place and that is first responders are an absolute
necessity, but as we learned from Times Square, it is not only
the officer on the beat but also the vendor on the street that
makes a difference too. I think that while we get a lot of
intelligence we have to continue to encourage the public to
play a role in this because the public has a vital role in
seeing that. I think it originated in New York--``See
something, say something.'' It is important for the public to
be involved in this process and helping us to acquire the
intelligence so that the analysts can give us a proper
assessment of what the intelligence reveals.
I wish I had a great question for you, but I have heard my
colleagues and they have all gone into areas that were of
interest to me; so I just conclude with a word of thank you for
the outstanding contribution that you have made to the safety
of our country. We throw these words around calling people
patriots. Sometimes they deserve it, sometimes they don't. But
I think it is fair to say that you are both great patriots and
we owe you a debt of gratitude. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. Richardson [presiding]. Mr. McCaul is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mr. Green. I apologize, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Richardson. No problem.
Mr. McCaul. Let me, like everybody else, thank you for your
great work not only on the 9/11 Commission, but Mr. Hamilton on
the Iraq Study Group as well. I think that report help turned
that war around in a profound way and I want to thank you for
that as well.
I know my colleague from Texas talked about, it is true,
hindsight is 20/20. It is easy to find where the dots weren't
connected after the fact. But one of the main recommendations
coming out of the Commission was information sharing. I am the
Ranking Member on the Intelligence Subcommittee. We had a
recent hearing with the Director of Intelligence and Analysis
on this issue. We have had some intelligence successes but we
had to be right every time. They only have to be right once.
But I want to just highlight two failures in terms of
lessons learned and how we can improve. One is in the case of
the Fort Hood shooter Hasan. We know that the Joint Terrorism
Task Force had information that Mr. Hasan was communicating
with a cleric in Yemen, Mr. Awlaki, one of the biggest threats
we have today, and yet--with the DOD representative on that
task force, and yet that information was not shared with the
commanding officer, General Cohen, at Fort Hood, which is right
next to my district in Texas.
He was very concerned about that, I understand, in terms of
sensitivities of investigations. But at a very minimum they
could have said, you know, you have a major on your base who
has been talking to one of the top al-Qaeda recruiters and you
may want to keep an eye on him, and just maybe that would have
prevented that horrible disaster from happening.
The second is the Christmas bomber. We know that the father
came into the embassy and warned about his own son being with
extremists in Yemen. We know that the NCTC had threat
information streaming in as well and yet that--he was allowed
to still have his visa and his passport and he got on an
airplane. The Senate Intelligence Committee found 14
intelligence failures leading up to the Christmas day attack
aboard that flight. As we had the hearing with I&A, the issue
of a National Fusion Center came up, and they have been tasked
by the administration to be the lead--DHS as the lead agency in
charge of this National Fusion Center.
Now, ideally, you would want to include the joint terrorism
task forces, the HIDA, the DOD certainly in that Infusion
Center. This is more horizontal intelligence sharing that I am
referring to more than just vertical.
So the question came up--this is a monumental challenge in
my estimate, how they can possibly pull this off and whether
they have the requisite authority or authorities given to them
by Congress to go to the Joint Terrorism Task Force or to go to
the Department of Defense and say you need to be a partner and
you need to be sharing this kind of information. I personally
don't think they have those authorities today. I think that is
something that Congress needs to be taking a look at in terms
of providing them with the requisite authorities to carry out
that mission. With that, I would love to get your comments on
that.
Mr. Hamilton. I want to be clear. Who does not have the
authority under your view?
Mr. McCaul. Well, I don't think--DHS has been tasked with
this monumental challenge of putting together a National Fusion
Center, and again ideally you want the partners to be the
intelligence community, the military, Joint Terrorism Task
Forces. I think it may be difficult for them to go to these
agencies and get the buy-in necessary with the current lack of
authority.
Mr. Hamilton. I think I would be in accord with your view.
I think there is a huge amount of ambiguity with regard to the
authorities in DHS and this has made it more difficult for them
to carry out the responsibilities they have. As you were
talking about the Fort Hood case and the Christmas bomber case,
and the comment you also made with regard to hindsight, it
occurred to me that it is important that we go, as you
obviously have, through a very careful analysis of what
happened in these events.
The Senate committee report yesterday, which I have only
seen a press release on, is an example of that. We have to
examine these things so that we learn as much as we possibly
can from one of these incidents occurring and we take steps to
correct it. Quite frankly, one of the problems is--and this is
part of the system, but we often go through an awful lot of
political gamesmanship here. You are responsible, you are
responsible, the Republicans are responsible, the Democrats did
it, and so forth.
I am not so naive as to think that doesn't and won't
happen. That is part of the discussion. But I like--I think in
terms of how we investigate an airline crash in this country,
it is done very, very professionally, and I don't recall people
popping up on television saying it was the Republicans' fault
or the Democrats caused this airline to crash. We send in
experts, they identify the cause, and then they try to correct
it. All of that takes weeks and even months.
Now, I may be a little naive here, but I think that is the
way we have to respond to these incidents that occur. You are
going to have the political charges for sure, but I really
think you have to go into it in very great depth for the
purpose of trying to find out how to correct it. We have kind
of gone through that process painfully, but by and large, our
system does that although it takes a little more time than we
would like it to. I am not sure this is responsive at all, but
the Fort Hood case is so frustrating, and of course, the
Christmas bomber case too. It is hard to understand how a man
like that could be operating as a psychiatrist and it not
become known to his colleagues ahead of time. So we have got to
analyze that very carefully and try to find out how to avoid
it.
Mr. McCaul. I agree. Thank you very much.
Ms. Richardson. The gentleman's time has expired.
Ms. Jackson Lee from Texas is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you so much.
Governor, chairman, let me thank you over and over again
for the vision of the 9/11 Commission. It strikes me as an
enormous task to have taken up the cause and the challenge
right after or in the midst of the smoke rising at the 9/11
site and project into the future what has been a valuable
roadmap, and all we can say to you is thank you as we have now
morphed into something that is enormously challenging for
Americans. We relish our freedom. We grow up learning about our
freedom. As those of us who have been blessed to be in this
institution, have traveled internationally and seen the
different forms of governance even if they happen to be a
democracy--many people don't realize that London in Great
Britain have community cameras that watch every step almost of
their citizenry. I wonder what we would say about that.
So I ask these questions in the context of our culture and
the concept that I have written an op ed a couple of weeks ago
after the horrific tragedy of Fort Hood. It was so intrusive,
so unexpected because those of us from Texas know that Fort
Hood is an enclave of family and it is secured but unsecured,
and I said human intelligence has to be the new focus, that
terrorism is franchised, it is the individual--we use this term
lone operator, but it is not even that. It is who wakes up in
morning and through whatever reasons decides to strike. So I
want to pose these questions if I might collectively.
One, the genius of this committee and the Chairman, I might
say, we organize the Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection Committee, and of course, there is an assistant
secretary. I don't think we do enough protecting the
infrastructure of America. I think Times Square is an
infrastructure and certainly in the querying of the Times
Square alleged bomber, they gave another list of sites.
So my question is where are we in the infrastructure scheme
and what should be the urgent next step? Focus, then, if you
would more clearly on the Secure Flight to determine whether or
not we have gotten it right--maybe you can see that. Are we
where we need to be on surface transportation? We are all
focused on mass transit and aviation, and lo and behold a car,
a bus--everybody knows, those of us went to college, the
Greyhound bus, Trailways--maybe they don't exist anymore. Then
we have a new assistant secretary.
Is there a hot item, TSA, that that assistant secretary
should immediately look at? I am going to close on this. I just
want to say that I am a convert. This is the jurisdiction of
homeland security in America. This is a Lego set or something
else. I was hoping somebody could see this. I know you can just
see sort of a page, but you can see it is so thick you can't
even see it. I think that had something to do with the
translation of information to TSA, which gets blamed for
everything. You are a genius to have organized that. It is the
right organization to be in place. But the newspapers reported
that when the call came out of the National Counterterrorism
Center, they said to TSA look at five airlines, limiting their
direct action.
Who is at fault with that? Just by the grace of God, I will
say it, we got the person but they were on an international
flight.
So I yield to you.
Mr. Hamilton. Well, let me pick up first on your comment
about infrastructure protection because I think it is a classic
homeland security problem. The problem is we are unwilling to
establish priorities. In every community you go into, there are
certain facilities that everybody knows would be the target of
the terrorist. We are engaged in this unending process of
talking about priorities without establishing them. The fact of
the matter is you cannot protect everything. You can protect
some things and you can't protect others. You simply don't have
the resources to protect everything. So you have to make
judgments that you are going to protect this, that, and the
other. You would like to protect it all, but you can't. Many of
those infrastructures that you mentioned are not public. They
are privately owned. So the private sector here has an
important role to play as well.
In short, I think the problem of infrastructure is a
question of establishing priorities in a community, in a State,
and in the Nation, and although we talk about it constantly in
homeland security, we don't do it very well. So I think
priorities have to be established on infrastructure.
Mr. Kean. I think also Lee is absolutely right, as he
usually is. You can't protect everything. But the role of the
citizen here becomes absolutely essential because the citizen--
it was a citizen who identified that problem in Times Square
and brought it to somebody's attention. So we have got to have
people who are alert and also a system so that the citizen, if
they see something wrong like they did in Times Square, is
confident in calling over the local law enforcement person, and
the local law enforcement person can recognize what the problem
is and can go up the chain and have confidence to go up the
chain so that the local law enforcement is respected by Federal
authorities and State authorities.
That works because my view is that much more often we
depend totally on the good people in the FBI and so many other
agencies. That is not going to be the first alarm on a piece of
infrastructure. It is going to be somebody who sees something
is wrong and somebody who has the confidence to go to somebody
in law enforcement and point it out and that line of response
that goes from there. So I think we have got to train citizens
and we have got to make sure the links between local law
enforcement and the Federal authorities are clear and there is
respect on both sides.
Mr. Hamilton. One of the fundamental concepts of homeland
security is a layered defense. You have many different layers
of defense. The first layer is the citizen that Tom has been
talking about. Other layers are obvious. But I think we have
fallen short as a Nation in terms of educating the American
people on their responsibility on homeland defense. There is a
tendency to look to Washington, to look to the DHS, to look to
the intelligence agencies to defend us on homeland security.
They all have important roles to play, but so does every
American citizen and if the American citizen doesn't do the
job, then you are--they are going to get through, the
terrorists.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Surface transportation too?
Ms. Richardson. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Ms. Richardson. Mr. Pascrell is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you. I have more respect for each of
you than for any public official in this country, and I just
want you both to know that because of your forthrightness and
directness. I never have to ask: What was he talking about? So
I commend you, Tom and Lee, for the great work that you have
done not just a few years ago and it took us a little time to
respond but again this is Congress. We expect more and there
isn't a sense of urgency.
I came here today to ask you questions about legislation
that Peter King and I are putting in and we will probably drop
it this week or next week, and we have been working on it for a
long time in a bipartisan nature on weapons of mass
destruction, which you just about touched on. I know this
wasn't really your main objective, but now we have a WMD
Commission and the WMD Commission has made some recommendations
as you guys, a few moons ago, made recommendations, but it took
us a little while to catch up.
Their recommendations were very specific, and Peter and I
have tried to respond to the great hazards of the biological
attacks. The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission very
specifically stated that they expect a biological attack in
this country within the next 2 or 3 years; you can't get any
more specific than that.
But something that you both touched upon and something that
Congressman Lungren pursued strikes me as a little bit more
timely right now. So if I may, Governor Kean, you described in
New York City situations that depended upon where the location
of the attack was; whether it was in the tunnel connecting the
States or whether it was someplace in the city itself. The
question is: Who is in command and who is in charge?
The thing that was disturbing to a lot of American people
after the December 25 incident was nobody was in charge, I am
convinced of that.
Something that you talked about, Lee, strikes me as making
this even more urgent, and that is on the subject of DNI, the
Director of National Intelligence. I think that this position,
as it stands right now, needs to be reviewed and inspected very
carefully. There are close to 3,000 people that work under the
Director of National Intelligence. That same Director of
National Intelligence, as Mr. Lungren pointed out, has very
little authority, but his job is to talk about gathering intel,
which is the only privy of the Homeland Security Committee.
The Homeland Security Department only collects
intelligence, there is no analysis whatsoever. So this brings
about even more interesting situations. I would contend, and I
would like to know your opinion of this, that we need to take a
very close look at the DNI because we have created a dinosaur;
neither of you envisioned it, neither of you asked for it,
because you are not dinosaur people: If you can't get it done,
get out of the way.
Well, we chose to create an erector set of a dinosaur that
George Tenet has frequently said of yesteryear, but very, very
significant now, once in a while, the tail of the dinosaur
needs to be whacked. It is almost a description of democracy, I
guess. So we are at that point.
Nowhere is there more obvious danger to this country than
in the intelligence apparatus. I don't believe that the
intelligence apparatus understands the mission--I know the
Members of Congress don't--so maybe there is not a clearly
defined mission, generally speaking. Then in each of the
agencies that have to gather--and some analyze this
information, and very few analysts, very few people in the
field--this used to be the width and breadth of intelligence,
having folks out into the field, gathering--who are not afraid
to stay there 3 or 4 years. You two spelled it out very
specifically.
I personally believe that the DNI has to be somebody other
than--we are not talking personalities now--that the DNI is
something of an albatross in that one of the leading intel
gatherers and analysts should be in the position and therefore
be responsible when something happens.
Let me give you my suggestion. I think that to avoid the
confusion on gathering the information, in the analysis of the
information, that I would like to see the head of the CIA in
that position. I would like to see the Director of the CIA.
Remember of past year the DNI was no longer there. The Director
of the CIA has his feet on the ground, has access to all the
other agencies. That agency has been given a very specific
responsibility. I would rather see the Director of CIA report
to the President of the United States because his feet are on
the ground, whomever that person would be. I know the role of
the CIA, I know the role of the Director of the CIA; I am not
sure what the role is of the DNI, since he has no authority.
Ms. Richardson [presiding]. Please summarize.
Mr. Pascrell. So I am very concerned, with urgency, that we
take a very close look--and I would really respect not only
your opinions about the WMD legislation, which I mentioned
before as a commercial, but as I am asking you now about who
should be directing the intelligence of the United States of
America, and how do we not only gather it, but analyze it and
put it to good use to defend the America that we know? I think
it is a critical question right now. Too many problems have
occurred down the line, and who pushed Jake? We never know who
is responsible. That is what you do when you build a
bureaucracy; you build a bureaucracy so you don't know who is
responsible, so nobody is held accountable.
If you may, Madam Chairwoman, may they please quickly
respond? I mean, am I on Mars, or do we have possibilities
here?
Mr. Hamilton. The important thing is that the person who is
the head of the intelligence community--that is 16 agencies--
have the authority to be in charge. Now, your suggestion that
it be the CIA Director makes sense so long as he has the power.
For a long time, the Director of Central Intelligence had two
jobs: One was running the CIA, and the other was he was in
charge of the intelligence community. The problem was that he
had no authority to run the intelligence community because all
of the budget was in the DOD. So one director after the other
focused on the CIA, trying to make that a good organization,
and simply did not pay any attention to the rest of the
intelligence community.
Okay. We have come along now and we have established the
DNI. Our whole plea here is that you have authority in a person
with budget and personnel authority to manage the intelligence
agencies. If you want to put it in the CIA, that is okay; but
if you do it, give them the authority to act beyond the CIA to
the other 15 agencies of the intelligence community. So what we
are really arguing for is unity of command, if you would,
within the intelligence community.
Ms. Richardson. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Pascrell. Can Mr. Kean respond?
Ms. Richardson. Very briefly, because we are going to call
for votes.
Mr. Kean. Very briefly, we wonder whether the Director of
the CIA isn't a full-time job and whether they can take on the
whole thing as well. In addition, we knew when the legislation
was passed that the role of the DNI was not made definitive.
Lee and I talked about that. Lee said the only way to cure that
is the President; the President can give the authority, even if
it isn't in the legislation.
So I think we come here today to say, unless you are going
to pass legislation--which I don't think you are going to do
too fast--the President has got to give the person in charge of
intelligence the responsibility and the encouragement and the
power to do the job.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Richardson. The Chairwoman is going to defer to Ms.
Holmes Norton, and then I will wrap up.
Ms. Holmes Norton is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Norton. I thank the Chairwoman very kindly.
I really have two questions; let's see if I can get them
out and get answers in in the time allotted to me.
You are both heroes of the Congress as well as the American
people. That is a dual heroism that you both deserve.
Substantial portions of your recommendations are already law.
I would like your guidance, first, on an issue that I found
too seldom discussed, and that is weighing risk with the cost
of securing ourselves. We are all pretty much amateurs; 9/11
people who were cops all of a sudden became security officers.
One of the ways in which I have noted this is in what we
protect and how much we think we are protecting.
I will give you a good example. To get into the Capitol on
weekends--and since I represent the Nation's Capital, I am
sometimes here. There is one entrance open. No one stands
there. No Capitol Police at the other entrance. Those are in
the Senate as well as the House. That is a good thing, because
you know there has been a risk and cost analysis, and somebody
figured out that having a Capitol policeman at all four
entrances on Saturday and Sunday on weekends, in light of what
we know about risk and threat, didn't make sense.
Let me give you another example. I sit as Chair of a
subcommittee that has to do with building and leasing, and we
found a real disparity between GSA, which leases for employees
who--forgive the expression--push papers, and DOD, which leases
for employees that push papers. DOD has a setback and
requirements for shatterproof glass and all the rest of it that
aren't heard of for civilian employees anywhere else.
Now, notice I am not talking about people who deal with
security. In fact, some people who have just moved out of BRAC
as contractors because of BRAC ended up further down into
Virginia. DOD has problems with these people being replaced
with Federal employees who would now be doing the same kind of
work, because the setback isn't there and the shatterproof
glass.
Now, if we are going to spend our money on shatterproof
glass and setbacks, the first thing we are going to do is run
out of money for real risks, I think--I am giving you my
opinion. I want yours. But in the midst of a recession, we also
must note that these kinds of setback requirements and
shatterproof, et cetera, requirements, would mean that large
parts of urban and suburban America would be off limits for
many Federal employees.
I wonder what you think about the notion of weighing risk
and cost to come to some kind of balanced and expert decisions
about how to in fact spend our money now, 10 years or so after
9/11.
Mr. Hamilton. Well, I am quite receptive to the idea. What
is interesting to me is that you bring it up, because in all of
the other hearings we have had on homeland security, I don't
think it has ever been brought up. But I do believe that the
whole idea of costs associated with homeland security, with
protection, has not been adequately considered and that we have
not weighed in very many instances the costs and the risks, the
cost-benefit ratio as we try to do in other things. So I think
as we move along, we will do more of that kind of analysis
because we can't protect everything and we do have to make
judgments.
When I was talking a moment ago about priorities, I was
really talking about the same thing that you are bringing up,
Ms. Holmes, and that is, you cannot do everything you want to
do in homeland security. We have lived through a period since
9/11 when the security people win almost every argument--maybe
not all of them, but almost all of them--and we have paid for
that. The Homeland Security budget--I don't know what it is
today, but around $40 billion I think, whatever it is--has gone
up and up and up. So I think the whole idea of cost-benefit
ratios, assessment of risks, has to become a much more
important part of the discussion of homeland security.
Ms. Norton. Thank you. I don't want to abuse my time, but
Governor Kean.
Mr. Kean. As unusual, I agree with Congressman Hamilton. He
is absolutely right. Priorities, risk assessment.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much.
Ms. Richardson. Mr. Kean and Mr. Hamilton, now as the
acting Chairwoman, I will be able to ask a few questions.
Let me first of all say to both of you gentlemen, it is a
pleasure to meet you in person. As all the Members have said,
we are in great gratitude for all of your work; not only with
what you did with the 9/11 Commission report, but what you
continue to do. Every time I see your comments in the press,
everyone has to acknowledge the tremendous work that you have
done, I think the selflessness in terms of the recommendations
that continue to come forward. I just want to encourage you to
continue to do so.
I have two simple questions that I would like to focus on.
One, our former Secretary of Homeland Security and our current
Homeland Security Secretary, neither have been able to move
forward in terms of us achieving the goal that is in the report
of 100 percent cargo inspection. My district is the home of the
ports of both Los Angeles and Long Beach, which is 45 percent
of the entire Nation's cargo, and a bridge alone carries 15
percent of the entire Nation's cargo.
My question is, you obviously spent much time to make that
recommendation. What would you recommend that we could do to
get us moving on this point? It seems like the Secretaries have
moved more into screening, which is a paper situation, versus
inspection. I really wanted to get your thoughts on that.
Mr. Kean. Well, it is absolutely, as you know, a matter of
homeland security essential. I am on the other end of the
country at a great port, and it is frustrating that after all
this time we still haven't got what you refer to. It should
have been done, it should be done. Every time I ask questions
about it they say, well, we are almost there. We are not almost
there. We haven't done it yet.
I know we are doing a lot more of screening things before
they get to our ports, and that is enormously helpful, but the
goal has still got to be as you enumerate. The goal has got to
be there, and we have to keep the pressure on to make sure that
is done. We talk about setting priorities, that has got to be a
priority.
Ms. Richardson. Well, I would respectfully ask if you would
consider in your work, continuing to look at this issue. I had
an opportunity to go to the Port of Barcelona and I asked the
question: Other than the containers that are pulled out,
screened, asking for you to inspect, how many others do you
look at? The answer was none.
It is, I believe, going to be our biggest mistake, our
continued failure to address the issue. So any efforts you can
make to help us with that.
The second question I would like to ask, and I have just a
couple minutes left. Yesterday I had an opportunity to view the
National exercise program. It has been dramatically scaled
back, and this committee has some concerns with that, in that
the scaled-back version really includes the agencies walking
through, paper-wise, what they would do; but the whole normal
exercise of 6,000 people really seeing a disaster and having to
move from point A to point B has been minimized. I wanted to
get your thoughts of whether you view this committee should
recommend the scaled-back version or really push for the real
exercise.
Mr. Kean. I would just like to push for the real exercise.
There is nothing like it. Do it. Even when I was Governor of
New Jersey, we used to have those exercises. State police were
in charge. I would go as the commander to the building. We
would simulate a disaster, whether it was a terrorist kind of
disaster--more often we were always worried about a hurricane,
or what have you. But we would spend most of the day there
going through a real-time exercise, so when it happened,
everybody knew what their job was, and coordination was there
and lives could be saved.
It disturbs me. I didn't know they were scaling that back.
I think it is very important that they go through a real-time
exercise.
Mr. Hamilton. I agree.
Ms. Richardson. In defense of the Department, the agencies
operated as they would, but unfortunately the site that was to
be considered, which was Indianapolis, they did not do a real
live exercise. So it was more agencies talking, but not the
real people moving. But thank you for your comment.
Mr. Chairman, did you want to add anything?
Chairman Thompson. Yes. Thank you very much.
Governor, as you can see, your former constituent is still
here, Mr. Pascrell. I told you he is a great American.
I want to thank both of you gentlemen for your very timely
and important testimony. Part of what we are trying to do is to
get it right. As I shared with you before the hearing started,
it is all about keeping Americans safe. It has nothing to do
with party, it has nothing to do with anything other than
keeping Americans safe. To the extent that the two of you have
helped set the roadmap for us to make that happen, it is
incumbent upon Congress to get it right and make sure it
happens.
I have committed myself to a couple of issues that we will
address. I want to ask that if at any time you think there is
something this committee can be helpful with, please call on
us. We are here, we want to do it. We have, I think, one of the
most bipartisan committees on the Hill. We understand the
critical mission that we are charged with.
Jurisdiction is an issue we absolutely need to fix. Of
course, jurisdiction is a sacred, holy grail in this
institution; but nonetheless, we have to call it like we see
it, and we are in the process of helping make that record. What
you have said here today helps us create the legislative record
that is necessary to move it forward, and I thank you for it.
Apart from that, Madam Chairwoman, I yield back to you.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pascrell, votes have been called and we have 9 minutes.
We will allow 1 minute to wrap up because it is my
understanding the witnesses have another engagement.
Mr. Pascrell. I will be very brief, if that is possible.
I want to get back to the WMD legislation that is coming
aboard. In this legislation, which we consulted with the staff
of the WMD Commission, we are looking at this from all angles--
prevention, deterrence, preparedness, detection, attribution,
response, and, finally, to recovery.
I wanted to ask both of you: Do you believe the threat of
bioterrorism is as dire as anything we face in our homeland
security strategy?
Mr. Kean. It is a dire threat, and so are other weapons of
mass destruction. I mean, the one that, frankly, bin Laden has
mentioned over and over again is a nuclear operation. He would
love to get a nuclear bomb detonated on American soil. You can
imagine what that would do. No, all these weapons of mass
destruction.
I commend you for the legislation. We need to be aware of
it, it has got to be up-front. We have got to do everything in
our power to prevent what could be catastrophic in this
country.
Mr. Hamilton. I agree. The emphasis you are putting in your
legislative proposal for weapons of mass destruction is
terribly important because it has been much neglected, we just
haven't thought of it in those terms. The problem is, of
course, as you recognize, that the potential consequences of a
WMD attack, including bioterrorism, are just horrendous. We
lost 3,000 people on 9/11, and all of us can think of what the
impact of that was on the country and indeed on our personal
lives.
Just think what would happen if you had a massive
bioterrorism attack or a nuclear weapon going off. We
estimated, what, 500,000 people dead if a nuclear weapon went
off in Manhattan; not casualties, dead.
So the consequences are just horrendous and may even
approach a threat to the existence of our country. That is how
serious a WMD attack could be.
If I may add something else in there, we have to pay a lot
more attention to cybersecurity because we are such an
interconnected country--our water systems, our electrical grid,
our communications systems, on and on and on are dependent upon
computers. A skillful enemy, adversary, could cause enormous
disruption in this country with a cybersecurity attack on the
country. So I hope, Bill, as you proceed with that worthy
effort, you will think about cybersecurity as well.
Mr. Pascrell. Well, thank you both for all of your
testimony today. We are counting on both of you. I know that
you don't see your job as over, and we certainly don't see it.
Please steer us away from this bureaucratic nightmare we have
constructed into a much more sane approach. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Richardson. I thank the witnesses, Mr. Kean and Mr.
Hamilton, for your valuable testimony, but as has been said,
even more so for your service as well.
I thank the Members for the questions. Before concluding, I
would remind the witnesses that the Members of the committee
may have additional questions for you, and we will ask for you
to respond in a timely fashion in writing to those questions.
Hearing no further business, the committee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:23 p.m., the committee was adjourned, and
the hearings were concluded.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Question From Ranking Member Peter T. King of New York for Lee Hamilton
and Thomas Kean
Question 1a. One of your most important recommendations in the 9/11
Commission report was the need for Congress to ``create a single,
principal point of oversight and review for homeland security.'' The 9/
11 Commission noted that, at the time, there were 86 committees and
subcommittees exercising oversight of the Department of Homeland
Security. Now, nearly 6 years later, there are up to 108 such oversight
panels. In your written testimony, you state that ``without taking
serious action, we fear this unworkable system could make the country
less safe.''
How do you believe that this failure to consolidate jurisdiction
has or will make our country less safe?
Question 1b. How would you recommend building support for
consolidating homeland security jurisdiction within Congress?
Question 1c. How could individuals or organizations outside
Congress help facilitate a solution to this problem?
Question 1d. Do you believe a hearing by the Committee on Homeland
Security to examine the detrimental impact this jurisdictional web has
on the Department would provide useful information that could help
achieve progress on this issue?
Question 1e. Could you please submit what you believe would be the
ideal jurisdiction for this committee?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable William L. Owens of New York for Lee Hamilton
and Thomas Kean
Question 1. I recently read an article about DHS telling a dairy
farmer living along a port of entry in Vermont border that if he
refuses to sell his land for $39,500, the Government intends to seize
it by eminent domain so that they can upgrade a port of entry. This
port saw under 15,000 vehicles cross it in 2009. Do you believe DHS
takes into consideration the small business and economic impacts of
their border policies?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. I have a land port of entry in my District that was
denied much-needed funding in the President's fiscal year 2011 budget.
While I understand the need for fiscal restraint during this economic
downturn, I understand that a private group offered to provide the
upgrades to the facility and lease it back to the Federal Government
but their proposal was denied by the Feds because DHS believes that
land ports are an inherently Governmental function. Do you concur with
this opinion?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question From Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis of Florida for Lee Hamilton
and Thomas Kean
Question. Governor Kean and Congressman Hamilton, you've noted your
concerns about the detrimental effects of Congressional committees
fighting for jurisdiction and not working together, and as you know
this is an issue on which we agree.
I am also interested in your thoughts on whether we've made
sufficient progress on interagency security efforts. For instance, I
have long been concerned about the security of our visa issuance
process. Congress authorized the Visa Security Program in the Homeland
Security Act of 2002. Yet, nearly 8 years after the Act's passage, we
have less than 20 Visa Security Units in high-risk countries.
I don't think there is a sense of urgency in establishing these
units, which provide enhanced security screening of those seeking
temporary visas to enter the United States. In fact, the State
Department has denied DHS requests to place these specially trained ICE
agents in consular posts because they were concerned about space
issues. Unfortunately, DHS has taken no for an answer when such
objections are raised.
There are too many examples of terrorists exploiting our visa
issuance system. After all we've learned, how can this still be a
problem nearly 9 years after September 11?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.