[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
LOST IN THE SHUFFLE: EXAMINING TSA'S
MANAGEMENT OF SURFACE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY INSPECTORS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 28, 2010
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Serial No. 111-78
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Daniel E. Lungren, California
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Mike Rogers, Alabama
Columbia Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Zoe Lofgren, California Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Henry Cuellar, Texas Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Pete Olson, Texas
Laura Richardson, California Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Steve Austria, Ohio
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey Tom Graves, Georgia
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, Connecticut
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Dina Titus, Nevada
William L. Owens, New York
Vacancy
Vacancy
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas, Chairwoman
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Steve Austria, Ohio
James A. Himes, Connecticut Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Dina Titus, Nevada Officio)
Vacancy
Vacancy
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
Thomas McDaniels, Staff Director (Interim)
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Joseph Vealencis, Minority Subcommittee Lead
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection.......... 1
The Honorable Charles W. Dent, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Pennsylvania, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection.......... 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 7
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. Lee R. Kair, Assistant Administrator, Security Operations,
Transportation Security Administration:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Mr. Carlton I. Mann, Assistant Inspector General, Office of
Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Panel II
Mr. Thomas C. Lambert, Chief of Police, Senior Vice President for
Public Safety, Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris County,
Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 26
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
Mr. Clyde J. Hart, Jr., Senior Vice President, Government Affairs
and Policy, American Bus Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 28
Prepared Statement............................................. 29
FOR THE RECORD
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection:
Statement of the Association of American Railroads............. 3
APPENDIX
Questions From Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas for Lee R.
Kair........................................................... 47
LOST IN THE SHUFFLE: EXAMINING TSA'S MANAGEMENT OF SURFACE
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY INSPECTORS
----------
Wednesday, July 28, 2010
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:35 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Jackson Lee, Thompson (ex
officio), Dent, and Lungren.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The subcommittee will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
``Lost in the Shuffle: Examining TSA's Management of Surface
Transportation Security Inspectors.''
Let me, first of all, thank the witnesses who are present,
thank the first panel for their patience as we had debate and
votes on the floor.
I would also like to acknowledge the nomination and
confirmation of the new Administrator of TSA Mr. Pistole, who
we have been in conversation with. We know that he is with the
Secretary, I believe, of Transportation today, and we respect
and appreciate his desire to be present today. But we will have
a long history of working together, and, as I indicated, we
know we will have an opportunity to hear from him in the coming
weeks, and we look forward to doing so.
Our witnesses today will testify about TSA's Surface
Transportation Security Inspection Program and about how it is
organized and staffed to meet the statutory mission of securing
surface modes of transportation.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for an opening
statement.
We are here today to discuss TSA's management of the
central piece of its surface transportation security efforts,
the Surface Transportation Security Inspection Program. TSA has
been tasked with a complex and evolving mission to secure our
transportation systems while maintaining the healthy movement
of goods, services, and people.
Since it was created nearly a decade ago in the wake of the
9/11 attacks, TSA has focused the vast majority of its
resources and assets on aviation security. Clearly the threat
to aviation is still present, but TSA cannot ignore the obvious
trend of terrorist attacks on surface transportation assets
worldwide.
Attacks in Spain, Great Britain, India, and Russia over the
last few years have exposed surface system vulnerabilities, and
we must take action to implement the lessons learned in
securing our own transportation assets here in America. The
attacks we have witnessed abroad have been well executed with
devastating consequences. They demonstrate that securing a
surface environment presents unique obstacles and
vulnerabilities that do not exist in other modes.
The Zazi case, the New York City case, was a chilling
reminder that American transit systems, like those in Europe
and Asia, are enticing targets for al-Qaeda and other terrorist
groups. We must be vigilant. We must be prepared. Our Nation's
mass transit and passenger rail systems provide 34 million
passenger trips each weekday, compared to the 1.7 million
passengers flying daily on commercial, domestic, and
international flights. That is why this subcommittee, working
with our Chairman, Chairman Thompson, was keenly engaged in the
H.R. 2200 surface transportation legislation that we passed
effectively out of this committee and on the floor of the House
and is now awaiting Senate action.
Yet 85 percent of TSA's resources are dedicated to aviation
security, while just over 1 percent is dedicated to surface
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
transportation security. This disparity calls into question
TSA's commitment to implementing effective surface security
programs. We recognize that the pressure has been on aviation,
but this is a drastic and almost devastating distinction and
disparity.
TSA's Surface Transportation Security Inspection Program is
authorized in section 1301 of the 9/11 Act, which outlines
specific parameters for the mission and make-up of surface
inspectors. In February 2009, the DHS inspector general
released a report on the effectiveness of TSA's surface
transportation security inspectors that raised serious concerns
about TSA's deployment of surface inspector resources.
The report found that the program was understaffed for a
long time, and that an aviation-focused command structure had
undermined the quality and morale of the workforce. Although
TSA concurred with one of the three IG recommendations, there
has been little evidence of progress made by TSA in
implementing them.
Largely based on the IG's findings and recommendations, a
robust provision addressing the surface inspector program was
included in our TSA authorization bill, H.R. 2200, which passed
the House by an overwhelming bipartisan majority in June 2009.
However, over the past year TSA has implemented new changes to
the surface inspector program that ignore these efforts, and
further changes are being implemented under an initiative
called TSI Evolution, which significantly redefines surface
inspector activities and training.
We are concerned that TSI Evolution minimizes the
importance of the surface-focused mission and expertise
required by statute in order to remake surface inspectors into
jack-of-all-trades first responders who will be employed to all
transportation modes. Currently new surface inspectors are
required to complete 2 weeks of aviation and cargo training,
but are only given 1 week of surface mode training.
Even as it implements these changes, TSA has still not
completed a staffing plan or any risk-based assessment to
demonstrate how TSI Evolution will enhance security. Further
complicating matters is the challenge presented by forthcoming
security regulations required by the 9/11 Act. Rules on front-
line employee security training and security assessments for
surface modes are more than 2 years overdue. These rules will
drastically change the security landscape for surface
transportation systems and will likely require an expansion of
the surface inspector workforce, making the completion of a
staffing assessment all the more imperative.
As you can see, I have many concerns about the direction
TSA is taking with its surface transportation security program,
but I also know that it is a new day at TSA now that the agency
has confirmed an administrator. I have met with the new TSA
Administrator Mr. Pistole, and I know that he shares my concern
about improving our surface security efforts. He has even asked
to allow him to begin an assessment and to engage in his own
reform and answers to our concerns that we have just expressed.
We will look forward to giving him that ability, but we ask
you today to address our questions. I will be asking him to
look at this program closely, and I look forward to working
with him in addressing the issues that we will be raising
today.
At this time, without objection, I would like to enter into
the record a statement from The Association of American
Railroads. Hearing no objection, it is so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Statement of the Association of American Railroads
July 28, 2010
On behalf of the members of the Association of American Railroads
(AAR), thank you for the opportunity to submit this statement for the
record concerning the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA)
Surface Transportation Security Inspection Program. AAR members account
for approximately 72 percent of U.S. freight rail mileage, 92 percent
of freight rail employees, and 95 percent of freight rail revenue.
Amtrak and several commuter passenger railroads are also members of the
AAR.
Assuring the security of the Nation's passenger and freight
railroads requires a multi-faceted, cooperative effort that taps the
full-range capabilities--in the private sector and at all levels of
government--and applies them to best effect to assure preparedness and
to deter and respond to acts of terrorism. Our Nation's railroads
strive continuously to meet this objective.
Immediately following 9/11, more than 150 officials representing
railroads, shippers, suppliers, and other stakeholders came together to
complete a comprehensive risk assessment of the rail network and to
develop an industry-wide security management plan. Key focus areas
included critical infrastructure, operations, hazardous materials,
communications and control systems, and military shipments.
In effect by the end of 2001, the industry's security management
plan remains the foundation both for individual railroads' security
programs and for the industry's proactive approach in this vital area.
A standing industry security working committee, supported by AAR's
security staff, coordinates the overall effort. Particular emphasis is
given to maintaining situational awareness and vigilance through
intelligence and security information sharing via an active Railway
Alert Network.
Regular exercises, conducted both industry-wide and by the
railroads individually, appraise the effectiveness of the industry's
security plan. This week, for example, railroad personnel are meeting
in St. Louis to train operations and security officials in anticipation
of the next industry-wide exercise this October. Lessons learned from
exercises and actual security-related incidents inform reviews and
updates and assure that the plan continues to evolve to meet changing
circumstances.
Maintaining a constructive relationship with TSA and its Surface
Transportation Security Inspectors (STSIs) is a top priority of the
rail security effort. In this regard, commendable progress has been
made:
In 2006, a joint Government-industry effort produced
agreement on security actions that are foundational to
effective programs. With distinctive approaches for freight
rail and passenger rail, the action items formed the basis for
comprehensive security assessments by TSA surface inspectors.
In passenger rail, the results of Baseline Assessment for
Security Enhancement (BASE) reviews inform security grant
program priorities and awards, and enable wide dissemination of
a compilation of the most effective security practices
observed.
In freight rail, Security Action Item Reviews emphasize
mitigating the risks associated with transport of toxic
inhalation hazardous (TIH) materials. According to the
Department of Homeland Security's Annual Performance Report for
2009, there has been a 53.6 percent reduction in risk against
the fiscal year 2006 baseline. This progress reflects an
effective public-private partnership: It occurred without
regulation (the TIH transport provisions of TSA's Rail
Transportation Security Rule did not take effect until well
into 2009) and exceeded the 50 percent target rate reduction
for the period.
Over the past year, TSA's Freight Rail Division has
initiated vulnerability assessments on the Nation's most
critical rail bridges, guided by the industry's prioritization
of structures. An integrated assault planning cell views the
bridges as a terrorist or saboteur would in evaluating
potential threats and their likely effects. Completing the
circle, in fiscal year 2010 some 86 percent of funds awarded
under the Freight Rail Security Grant Program went to projects
to mitigate rail bridge vulnerabilities identified in the TSA
assessments.
TSA's Freight Rail Division has initiated recurring
coordination meetings with the railroads. These sessions, long
requested by the industry, foster constructive relationships
and effective communication. They allow for open and candid
discussion of current programs and initiatives, future
priorities, and prevailing security issues and concerns. The
Freight Rail Division should be commended for establishing
these forums and for its willingness to enhance them. One
recent noteworthy enhancement is the integration of Amtrak and
commuter railroads for the next meeting in September.
The most recent coordination meeting with rail personnel and
personnel from TSA's Freight Rail Division took place in St. Louis on
May 12-13, 2010, and featured a thorough discussion of TSA's Surface
Transportation Security Inspection Program. During a presentation by
the agency's Deputy Director of the Compliance Division, the railroads'
representatives raised a number of concerns, including:
Inconsistency and lack of standardization in inspectors'
interpretation of, and action on, regulatory requirements,
especially with respect to transport of TIH. Many railroads
have experienced differing interpretations of specific
provisions in the Rail Transportation Security Rule and
different guidance regarding the nature and scope of actions
deemed acceptable in meeting requirements.
Disparities between the policies and guidelines issued by
TSA's Freight Rail Division and the actions of surface
inspectors in the field. Many railroads have encountered
situations in which an inspector has been unaware of policy
positions expressed by the Freight Rail Division.
Apparent lack of coordination with TSA Headquarters on
decisions concerning letters of investigation or violation
served on railroads. As a result, actions accepted as compliant
by some TSA field offices produce official citations as
violations by others.
Inspections and related activity seemingly driven more by
the need to meet a defined quantity than to advance security
enhancement objectives.
Prior to the May 2010 meeting, railroads expressed these concerns
through various means to TSA officials. Additionally, these points were
reiterated by AAR's Assistant Vice President for Security, who served
with TSA for nearly 6 years until March of this year, during a training
conference in late June attended by all of TSA's surface inspectors and
representatives of the Office of Compliance.
TSA's recent appointment of Regional Security Inspectors (RSIs) as
liaison to the Class I railroads offers a potential means to resolve
these long-standing issues. With the appointment letters sent to each
railroad and through other public statements, TSA officials have
ascribed broad responsibilities to the RSIs for outreach and
coordination with the railroads and for oversight of compliance-related
actions. To their credit, the RSIs have been proactive in engaging the
railroads' security and law enforcement officials to maintain open
lines of communications and build constructive relationships. A number
of RSIs attended the joint meeting with TSA in May. Each will be
invited to attend future sessions. All participated in the surface
inspectors' training conference in June.
The railroads see some cause for optimism in the RSI concept, but
judgment remains reserved. The RSIs' ability to spur progress,
particularly with respect to consistency in inspections, depends upon
their authority to oversee and manage the inspectors' activities in the
field. In this area, the organizational structure may pose a
substantial obstacle--the RSIs are not in the chain of command of the
field inspectors. At the joint meeting with TSA in May, the railroads'
representatives cited this point as a specific concern, questioning
whether the RSIs could practically attain the role described in their
appointment letters.
The railroad community welcomes Assistant Secretary John Pistole
and looks forward to working with him to meet the full range of
security challenges. In furtherance of this commitment, AAR's security
staff, acting on behalf of the railroad security committee and joined
by the Executive Director of the American Short Line Railroad
Association (ASLRRA), just last week held a thorough, half-day
discussion on strategic priorities with TSA's Freight Rail Division.
This dialogue will bear fruit in the agendas of future joint meetings
of the railroads with TSA and consequent actions.
Again, thank you for this opportunity to address a subject of great
importance to the Nation's security.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The association president Mr. Hamberger
could not participate in the hearing today because he is on a
trip to the Transportation Technology Center in Colorado with
the new TSA administrator. While I am disappointed he could not
be here, I am glad to see that he is participating in one of
the first trips taken by the new administrator, which happens
to be to a facility that conducts rail security, research, and
training.
I wanted to have this hearing because I believe when we
come back after our work recess, it is very important to put a
full-press push on addressing these concerns, but, more
importantly, to allow these concerns to be addressed by the
administration as many of us are working in our districts. We
have got to move on surface transportation, and it has to be
done now. Holding this hearing now was imperative so that our
instructions and concerns can be taken into consideration by
TSA as quickly as possible.
Before I yield to the Ranking Member, let me say quickly
for the record that I am concerned that the testimony was late
in its submission from TSA. We received the testimony this
morning, well past the deadline, and I must say that we hope
that we can work together so this will not happen again. We
welcome your interaction with the staff on any concerns that
you may have.
We have a new administrator, and I know there is some
transition occurring, but I also know that he has as high
standards as we do, and we expect the committee rules to be
respected by the Department.
I am also still waiting for a response to my July 9 letter
to TSA about my concerns with the very programs we will be
discussing today.
As an aside, let me also say that I believe a letter will
be coming or has been drafted to talk about our concerns about
collective bargaining as well, and we hope and look forward to
responses on that issue.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the Ranking Member, Mr. Dent
of Pennsylvania, for an opening statement.
Mr. Dent. First, thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Thank you
again for holding this hearing to address TSA's plans to
strengthen its surface inspector workforce and the greater
emphasis to surface transportation issues. I think it is
something that we all embrace.
We have all become aware of the threat against mass
transit, in Moscow in March 2010; in Mumbai in July 2006; in
London, July 2005; and in Madrid, of course, in 2004. The
threat nearly hit home last year when the plot by Mr. Zazi and
his co-conspirators to bomb the New York City subway system was
uncovered. A potentially devastating attack was avoided by good
fortune and the excellent teamwork between Federal and local
law enforcement. The indictment discloses that Zazi's plan was
only part of a much larger conspiracy to carry out many more
similar attacks.
The threat against surface transportation systems is clear,
and they are highly vulnerable due to the open infrastructure
and multiple access points. As you know, it is an open system.
We cannot secure our surface systems as we have with our air
systems.
Nevertheless, TSA funding for surface transportation
security remains highly skewed. In TSA's 2011 budget request,
the $8.2 billion total request consisted of $6.5 billion for
aviation security, and contained only $137.6 million for
surface transportation security. Given that homeland security
funding needs to be risk-based, we should be evaluating whether
that imbalance accurately reflects the current state of risk in
our Nation.
I appreciate the recent comments of TSA Administrator
Pistole's indicating he will be place greater emphasis on
surface transportation security. I believe the growth of the
surface transportation security workforce is an important step
in that process. I am eager to learn greater specifics from the
TSA today on how they plan to deploy that additional workforce.
I am also looking forward to hearing from industry what
issues should be considered as the role of surface
transportation inspectors expands. I am concerned that surface
transportation inspectors are being reassigned to airports from
time to time, and transportation security officers typically
stationed at airports are being used for surface transportation
security. I anticipate learning how the TSA plans to divide
this labor among its ever-increasing workforce this afternoon.
In our country surface transportation includes more than
100,000 miles of rail, 600,000 bridges, 300,000 tunnels and 2
million miles of pipeline. Clearly the task of securing those
open systems is significant. We should make every effort to
ensure that the resources we have are used as effectively as
possible to fulfill that goal.
So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today.
Before I yield back my time, I did want to submit for the
record testimony from LANTA, a mass transit organization in my
district. LANTA comments that they want to improve emergency
planning, but lacks staff resources. It is a great opportunity
for TSA to work with a small transit agency in Pennsylvania.
With that, I yield back my time, Madam Chairwoman. I will
submit this for the record.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Without objection, so ordered.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the Chairman of the full
committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson for an
opening statement, who has worked with this subcommittee very
closely on the issues addressing surface transportation
security.
The gentleman is recognized.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Jackson Lee.
I compliment you for convening this important hearing and
continuing your rigorous oversight into the security of all
modes of transportation.
Today we will evaluate TSA's management of the Surface
Transportation Security Inspection Program and discuss the role
of surface transportation security inspectors. We want to
understand how effective this program is in securing our
Nation's transit systems, highways, and rail lines against
terrorist attacks.
Like the Chairwoman stated, just last year a plot to attack
the New York City subway system was uncovered, and in recent
years we have seen the horrific attacks of a commuter rail line
in Madrid in 2004, and on the London transit system in 2005,
and on the Mumbai subway railway in 2006 and 2008, and on
Moscow's subway earlier this year. The question in all of our
minds is what are we doing here at home to address the
terrorist threat on our Nation's highways, transit, and rail
systems?
TSA is responsible for the security of all modes of
transportation, yet TSA's record to date for implementing
functional surface security programs has been poor. For
example, two critical surface regulations required by the 9/11
Act to address front-line employee security training and
security assessments are more than 2 years overdue.
Earlier this month I met with the new TSA Administrator
John Pistole, and I have his assurance that addressing surface
transportation security will be a priority for him. The Members
of this committee stand ready to work with the new
administrator on this very important issue.
Today the inspector general will discuss his critical
assessment of how TSA is carrying out its surface
transportation security mission, with a particular emphasis on
the management of the surface transportation security
inspectors. This evaluation will help our Members and
Administrator Pistole in developing a roadmap for TSA to
improve this program and other surface transportation security
programs in the future.
I welcome our witnesses today and look forward to a frank
assessment of the problems and potential solutions for moving
forward and strengthening TSA's surface transportation
inspector program.
Madam Chairwoman, I yield back the time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman very much.
At this time I welcome our first panel of witnesses. Our
first witness is Mr. Lee Kair, assistant administrator for
security operations at TSA. Mr. Kair was named TSA's assistant
administrator for security operations in October 2008 and is
responsible for providing executive management of daily field
operations for a workforce of approximately 48,000 employees at
more than 450 airports Nation-wide.
Mr. Kair is also responsible for regulatory compliance,
program planning, partnering with security operators and other
transportation modes, and the development of strategic plans
for the future operational role of TSA.
Prior to this position, Mr. Kair was a Federal Security
Director in Orlando, Florida. That means that he was enormously
busy.
The second witness is Mr. Carlton Mann. Mr. Mann has
appeared before us before and has served as the Department of
Homeland Security's Assistant Inspector General for Inspections
since August 2006. In that position Mr. Mann provides the
inspector general with a means to analyze programs quickly and
evaluate operational efficiency and vulnerability across the
spectrum of DHS components.
Mr. Mann was previously a senior program analyst with the
Federal Emergency Management Agency's Office of Inspector
General.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record. I now ask each witness to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Kair.
First of all, welcome to the committee. We look forward to
your testimony.
Mr. Kair, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF LEE R. KAIR, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, SECURITY
OPERATIONS, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Kair. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking
Member Dent and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. My
name is Lee Kair, and I am the assistant administrator for
security operations. Thank you for the opportunity to speak
with you on the Transportation Security Administration's
Surface Inspection Program. I look forward to updating you
about a number of changes we have made to the program that are
beginning to produce solid improvements in security.
First I would like to acknowledge John Pistole's
confirmation as TSA's administrator. In his recent confirmation
hearings, Mr. Pistole stated that he would assess TSA's surface
transportation efforts in concert with State and local
authorities. In the mere weeks since he was sworn into office,
Administrator Pistole already has initiated that review, and
just yesterday visited the Surface Transportation Training
Center in Pueblo, Colorado.
So as I discuss the recent improvements to the program,
please also be aware that the administrator's review is on-
going. This includes the program's organizational structure and
role within TSA's overall mission.
Before I highlight the four key improvements we have made,
I would like to take a moment to acknowledge the hard work,
dedication, and professionalism of the men and women of the
Office of Security Operations, including our transportation
security officers and inspectors on the front line ensuring the
safety of the traveling public.
The first improvement I would like to discuss is the
reorganization of the TSI-Surface leadership. First, this past
January we realigned the most senior TSA personnel devoted to
surface transportation security. This change was designed to
promote a Nationally-balanced approach to regulatory compliance
activities that recognizes the need for regional and localized
strategies.
Keeping the GAO and IG recommendations in mind, we assigned
six regional security inspectors, or RSIs, to cover the entire
country. We also assigned each RSI as the single point of
contact for each Class One railroad to standardize the
application of National policy. The RSIs each average over 25
years of surface transportation experience and are recognized
as the subject matter expert in their field. They report to an
assistant general manager in our headquarters who has 31 years
of surface transportation experience, including experience in
running the Transportation Security Center, or TSOC, surface
watch desk.
I am pleased to report that these RSIs have quickly
developed strong ties with each of their rail security
coordinators for these railroads in their respective areas of
responsibility. As importantly, these RSIs provide robust
oversight of all surface inspection, assessment, and
operational activities. They work closely with our local
Surface TSIs and Federal Security Directors to drive local
accountability for carrying out the National work plan.
This model provides National oversight with local insight
and includes strong mentorship of our TSIs as well. Often the
RSIs will spend time on-site in demonstrating hands-on how to
interpret the nuances of the trade. The RSI framework allows us
to enhance security across modes by leveraging strong
professional networks and relationships with local security
officials and operators within the industry. It is also
essential in supporting the local framework, where we emphasize
consistent and clear reporting lines from Surface TSIs to FSDs.
Second, expanded role of TSI-Surface in the VIPR Program.
The second improvement I would like to discuss is the expanded
role of Surface TSIs in the Visible Intermodal Prevention and
Response, or VIPR, Program. We have added one primary senior
TSI to each VIPR team. Their role is to provide invaluable
surface transportation expertise and force multiplication to
these teams.
The TSI involvement varies by location from acting as the
designated VIPR coordinator for non-aviation VIPR activity to
participating in the planning and our execution of the VIPR
operations. This change takes on added significance with the
expansion of the VIPR Program from 15 to 25 dedicated teams.
TSA has also expanded the full-time representation of TSIs
for National VIPR planning, coordination, and deployment. Three
full-time TSI staff are located in the VIPR Joint Coordination
Center at the TSOC. These TSIs have greatly increased the level
of modal expertise and awareness for the VIPR Program, as well
as much-needed insight during the planning and coordination of
VIPR deployments.
Third, risk-based TSI-Surface deployment methodology. The
third improvement I would like to highlight is the development
of a risk-based approach to allocate Surface TSI staff and to
open new surface offices in the field. While TSA does not have
the resources to assign TSIs to every major city in America, by
carefully assessing areas with the greatest risk and defining
geographic areas of responsibility, this approach helps ensure
both complete access to regulated parties as well as
comprehensive VIPR coverage.
Fourth, building the TSI-Surface training infrastructure at
Pueblo, Colorado. The fourth and final improvement I would like
to discuss with regard to this program is the on-going
development and investment in the surface training facility in
Pueblo, Colorado.
The Surface Training Center in Pueblo currently orients
inspectors to the railroad operating environment and provides
safety awareness training. Courses under development for fiscal
year 2011 will provide training in advanced railroad
operations, VIPR operations, and highway and motor carrier
over-the-road bus operations. This facility is essential to our
on-going efforts to improve the overall National security
posture of the surface transportation in this country.
In conclusion, I want to thank you for the opportunity to
provide this update on TSA's on-going improvements to the
Transportation Security Inspection Program, and I would be
happy to answer your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Kair follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lee R. Kair
July 28, 2010
Good afternoon Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify on the Transportation Security Administration's
(TSA's) management and guidance of the surface transportation security
inspection program authorized in section 1304 of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act).
The subcommittee's choice of this topic for the hearing today is
timely for a number of reasons. The first reason is the need for TSA to
continue to focus attention on surface transportation. Secretary
Napolitano has demonstrated her commitment to improving surface
transportation security, and in his confirmation hearings, our new TSA
Administrator, Mr. John Pistole, stated a number of times that, if
confirmed, he planned to ``assess TSA's non-aviation surface
transportation efforts in concert with State and local authorities.''
Administrator Pistole further noted the terrorist attacks on foreign
rail and mass transit systems, the planned but thwarted attacks on U.S.
mass transit systems that carry millions of people every day, the
content of intelligence reporting that drives TSA efforts, and the
challenge of hardening surface transportation systems as reasons for
his plans to review TSA surface transportation security efforts.
Because of Administrator Pistole's recent arrival at TSA, his review of
this vital topic is not complete.
The second reason that this hearing is timely is because TSA has
initiated a number of improvements to its surface transportation
security inspection program. These changes address concerns expressed
by Members of this subcommittee, by Members of the full Homeland
Security Committee and others in the Congress, and by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO). I will update you on the most significant
of these changes in a few moments.
The third reason why this hearing is timely is that it provides us
an opportunity to receive guidance from this subcommittee as TSA moves
forward to improve surface transportation security. While the statutes
drafted and enacted by the Congress provide general guidance, hearings
like this provide the opportunity for additional dialogue. During his
confirmation hearings, Mr. Pistole heard from members of the Senate on
this topic, and this hearing provides TSA with the opportunity to hear
from you. Again, this is particularly relevant as Administrator Pistole
begins his comprehensive review of TSA's surface transportation
security program.
I would like to update you on four important and recent
improvements involving the surface transportation security inspection
program.
new rsi-s positions established
In an effort to provide more direct oversight of the surface
transportation security program, a realignment of personnel devoted to
surface transportation was accomplished in January 2010 pursuant to TSA
Operational Directive (OD) 400-54-5. Six Assistant Federal Security
Director--Surface (AFSD-Surface) positions that previously reported to
Federal Security Directors (FSDs) were abolished, and six new Regional
Security Inspectors--Surface (RSIs-S) positions were established. The
RSIs-S report directly to the new TSA headquarters Surface Inspection
Oversight Assistant General Manager, not to FSDs.
The Surface Inspection Oversight Assistant General Manager, Carl
Ciccarello, has 31 years of surface transportation experience,
including 17 years in military operations, 7 years running the port of
New York for the U.S. Coast Guard, and 7 years with TSA running the
Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC) surface watch desk.
Since then, he has been building, managing, and leading the TSA Surface
Transportation Security Inspection Program.
The six field RSIs-S are positioned throughout the country to more
easily provide active on-site oversight of surface inspection,
assessment, and operational activities. Each of these six RSIs-S are
also assigned as TSA corporate liaisons to all Class One and large
regional railroads, which promotes a Nationally balanced approach to
regulatory compliance activities and operational issues for large
railroad corporate entities related to rail security.
The six regional RSIs-S average more than 25 years of surface
transportation experience and are recognized as the surface security
subject matter experts in the field. The RSIs-S quickly developed
strong communication ties with each of the Rail Security Coordinators
for Class One and large regional railroads to facilitate continuous
dialogue. The work of the RSIs-S thus far has provided consistent
application of security regulations across railroad entities. Issues
discussed in recent months have included Rail Sensitive Security
Materials (RSSM) chain of custody requirements, including location
information, paperwork evidence, and U.S. border implications and
jurisdiction.
The RSIs-S organizational change, providing direct headquarters
surface transportation oversight, already is bearing fruit. Prior to
the change in organization, TSA surface transportation inspection
programs in both Los Angeles and St. Louis were struggling to meet TSA
work plan mandates. The RSIs-S provided audit reviews of each
operation's work products, and then worked with and provided on-site
assistance and leadership to local TSA staff, who took corrective
actions. TSA staff in both of those cities now are meeting or exceeding
the work plan requirements for fiscal year 2010.
a collaborative security-based workforce
The Regional Security Inspectors (RSIs) provide day-to-day support
to the Area Directors (AD) with overall program direction and
supervision being provided by the Office of Compliance Programs at
headquarters within the OSO. In addition to other assigned surface
transportation duties, RSIs serve as liaisons between TSA OSO and large
freight rail corporations whose operations are multi-regional or
National in scope and will support regional activity as directed by the
AD. RSIs focus on National/corporate level compliance issues, and
generally do not have a role in compliance activity that is local in
nature (that is, routine compliance and enforcement activity); rather,
such compliance activity will fall within the purview of the FSDs.
Transportation Security Inspectors--Surface (TSIs-Surface) report to
Assistant Federal Security Directors for Inspections (AFSD-Is), who in
turn report to the FSD and are responsible for, at a minimum, all
inspection, compliance, and enforcement activity within the areas of
responsibility of the FSD offices in which they reside.
TSA is currently building a workforce of 404 TSIs-Surface to be
employed throughout the Nation. The TSI-Surface workforce conducts
comprehensive assessments, inspections, and investigations of surface
transportation systems; oversees compliance with applicable
transportation security policies, directives, standards, and
agreements; identifies potential problem areas or deviations from
prescribed standards; and ensures overall adequacy, effectiveness, and
efficiency of the security posture of surface transportation systems.
The FSDs are the operational field component of OSO and are charged
with the implementation of all field operational activities across all
modes of transportation. TSA uses this command structure because FSDs
are equipped to leverage the security network in their area. FSDs
frequently interact with State and local law enforcement and surface
transportation system operators and understand the vulnerabilities and
challenges of the surface transportation modes in their backyard, some
of which also feed into airports.
TSA has adopted this network decision-making model in all modes of
transportation, including its other inspection divisions in aviation
and cargo. This approach recognizes the need for regional and localized
strategies to enhance cross-modal prevention, detection, response, and
recovery efforts based on accurate and thorough domain awareness,
strong professional networks and relationships with local security
officials and transportation mode operators, and consistent and clear
reporting lines to the local FSD.
expanded role of tsi-surface in the visible intermodal prevention and
response (vipr) program
With the expansion of the FAMS VIPR program from 15 to 25 dedicated
teams, TSA has assigned one primary senior TSI-Surface official to each
team. Their role is to provide surface transportation expertise to the
teams that did not previously exist. The TSI-Surface involvement varies
by location, from acting as the designated VIPR coordinator for non-
aviation VIPR activity to actively participating in the planning and/or
execution of VIPR operations. The TSI-Surface assignments will be
rotated among the surface inspectors at each of the 25 TSA dedicated
VIPR team locations on a 60- to 90-day schedule. This provides for work
role expansion for each of the TSIs while allowing for practical
application of inspector skills and training when not assigned to the
dedicated VIPR team.
TSA also has expanded the full-time representation of TSI-Surface
officials for National level VIPR planning, coordination, and
deployment. The full-time TSI-Surface staff is located in the VIPR
Joint Coordination Center, and includes two TSI-Surface staff and one
Supervisory TSI-Surface official. These officials join the Office of
Security Operations VIPR Branch Chief, who was added to the Joint
Coordination Center in January 2010.
The addition of these personnel has greatly increased the level of
surface transportation experience for VIPR operations, and also adds
important surface transportation perspectives into the planning and
coordinating VIPR deployments. For example, TSI-Surface staffers
assigned to dedicated VIPR teams carry out comprehensive security
surveys of rail stations and verify physical security measures already
in place. The station profile data are an integral part of an
initiative currently underway to enhance and improve the VIPR
deployment planning, operations, and reporting processes.
risk-based tsi-surface deployment methodology
As the TSA surface transportation security inspection program has
expanded and matured, TSA has used a risk-based approach to allocate
TSI-Surface staff and to open new surface offices. Other qualitative
data also are considered to better serve surface transportation
security based on the division of geographic areas of responsibility.
While TSI-Surface staff are not assigned to every major city in
America, defining geographic areas of responsibility helps ensure both
complete coverage of regulated parties as well as comprehensive VIPR
coverage.
The risk-based approach considers four key factors before assigning
a final risk based score to a city, including:
location within a high-threat urban area;
location of a top 100 mass transit/passenger rail system
within the home city;
toxic inhalation hazardous (TIH) materials flow within that
city; and
whether the city is located in the northeast corridor (NEC).
Currently, a total of 54 cities have TSI-Surface staff, including
robust coverage in the NEC. Over the coming months, TSA plans to add
surface offices and TSI-Surface staff in:
Austin, TX,
Baton Rouge, LA,
El Paso, TX,
Fresno, CA,
Honolulu, HI,
Mobile, AL,
Nashville, TN,
Ontario, CA,
Tulsa, OK,
Queens, NY,
Moline, IL, and
Tucson, AZ.
All surface offices are staffed with at least two persons. Through
the use of a new standing National register, TSA has received tens of
thousands of applicants for inspector positions, greatly increasing the
pool of qualified applicants and reducing the time needed to fill
vacancies.
The large number of Risk Reduction Survey (RRS) assessments and
inspections that have been conducted by TSIs-Surface since 2006 has
provided TSA with additional data on the cities that are the best
candidates for new surface offices. The RRS survey program also has
been successful in reducing surface transportation risks: Freight rail
systems have reduced the percentage of Rail Sensitive Security
Materials that pose a toxic inhalation hazard and that are unattended
while at rest from over 80 percent in 2006 to approximately 7 percent
in 2010.
building the tsi-surface training infrastructure at pueblo, colorado
In anticipation of the need to train new TSIs-Surface on railroad-
specific safety and security issues, TSA began training the workforce
at the Transportation Technology Center in Pueblo, CO in 2006. After
realizing the value and potential of this site, TSA entered into
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Federal Railroad Administration
to build out a portion of the facility in Pueblo to allow for more
advanced training capabilities. TSA also has partnered with other
Federal agencies and stakeholders to obtain rail cars for practical
training purposes and to build infrastructure at the site.
Administrator Pistole visited the facility earlier this week as part of
the significant outreach he has been performing since being sworn-in as
our new administrator this month.
The development of consistent, thorough training for TSIs-Surface
is key to ensuring that TSA has a technically proficient and agile
workforce, and to ensure that its inspectors operate safely and
appropriately in the surface transportation environment. To further
deliver on our commitment to improve surface transportation security
training, TSA has assigned personnel to develop the TSI-Surface
curriculum and to deliver training material. This team is also
responsible for the future expansion of the Pueblo site, and the
development of expanded training courses that will cross all surface
modes of transportation.
Current training at the Transportation Technology Center for TSI-
Surface staff includes coursework focused on orienting inspectors to
the specific railroad operating environment and providing safety
awareness. Future courses at the facility will provide TSI-Surface
staff with an advanced railroad operating course, VIPR training, and a
highway motor carrier/over-the-road bus course. All courses will
include both classroom instruction and on-site practical application
and exercises. TSA is very excited about the future potential of the
Surface Transportation Security Training Center.
In conclusion, I want to thank you for the opportunity to provide
this update on TSA's on-going improvements to its surface
transportation security inspection program, and I would be happy to
answer your questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Kair, thank you so very much for your
testimony.
Mr. Mann, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CARLTON I. MANN, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL,
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Mann. Good afternoon, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member
Dent, Chairman Thompson. Thank you for the opportunity to
testify on the Transportation Security Administration's
management of surface transportation security inspectors.
As each Member of the subcommittee noted, terrorist
incidents abroad have underscored the need to focus more on
mass transit, highway, maritime, pipelines, and freight rail.
Surface inspectors play a critical role in helping secure those
transportation modes.
Within the last 2 years, we have issued two reports related
to surface transportation issues, including the Surface
Transportation Security Inspector Program. I would like to
highlight briefly the results of those reviews.
In June 2008, we issued a report, TSA's Administration and
Coordination of Mass Transit Security Programs. That report
addressed strengths and weaknesses of TSA's oversight and
assistance programs for mass transit rail, including the
Surface Transportation Security Inspection, Transit Security
Grant, VIPR, and the National Explosives Detection Canine Team
Programs. Our goal was to evaluate how well TSA managed those
programs and how well the programs met the security needs of
the major mass transit rail systems.
We identified important challenges to improve transit rail
security and reported that TSA could improve certain aspects of
each program. We observed unclear and unduly complex chains of
commands, an unclear mission or insufficient guidance, and
insufficient communication. We noted that TSA needed to
integrate stakeholder expertise further, to implement its
oversight of assistance programs and fulfill its responsibility
for mass transit security.
As mandated by the 9/11 Commission Act, we conducted a
follow-up inspection of the Surface Inspection Program. In
February 2009, we issued a report, Effectiveness of TSA's
Surface Transportation Security Inspectors. We determined that
TSA needed to look critically at how it is deploying resources
and assess how planned exercises could use inspectors better.
The program appeared understaffed for the long-term, and an
aviation-focused command structure had reduced the quality and
morale of the workforce. We sought to convince TSA to integrate
surface inspectors and their unique transit and rail expertise
into VIPR planning and deployment, and it is good to hear that
that apparently is happening.
TSA concurred with our recommendation to examine how many
inspectors it needed to perform necessary functions by
assessing current and anticipated future duties. TSA did not
concur with our recommendation to place the surface inspectors
under the direct authority of a TSA headquarters official
responsible for surface transportation.
The Surface Inspection Program organization chain of
command continues to evolve, but in a manner which is not
consistent with our recommendations. Both inspection reports
recommended that TSA place the responsibility for the program
with an official at TSA headquarters.
TSA did not agree that the transportation security
inspection command structure inhibited its effectiveness. TSA
indicated that it was taking steps to strengthen communications
between the Surface Inspection Program and the Federal Security
Directors.
In September 2009, we learned that TSA was planning to
restructure its surface resources, and, as my colleague
mentioned, in January 2010, TSA executed the reorganization.
Last week we received TSA's reorganization plan. The
restructuring plan affected numerous senior staff within the
Surface Inspector Program. TSA has abolished positions,
established new positions, realigned some functions among
positions, and reallocated resources among field offices
throughout the country.
Specifically, TSA abolished the position of Assistant
Federal Security Director for Surface and assigned those
responsibilities to the position of Supervisory Transportation
Security Inspector for Surface and a newly created Regional
Security Inspector. Supervisory TSIs for Surface report to the
Assistant Federal Security Directors for Inspections, who
report to the Federal Security Directors.
As we continue to study the reorganization, we remain
concerned whether these changes will enhance TSA's
relationships and communication with the surface transportation
partners. The presence of dedicated Surface Assistant Federal
Security Directors afforded TSA recognizable liaison to transit
systems and enabled information sharing. Without further
review, we do not know whether this plan will better enable
surface resources to operate effectively and adequately in the
aviation-centric environment.
We look forward to continuing our work with the Department
to identify ways to strengthen the surface transportation
mission, and at this point I would be glad to answer any
questions that you may have.
[The statement of Mr. Mann follows:]
Prepared Statement of Carlton I. Mann
July 28, 2010
Good afternoon Chairwoman Jackson Lee and distinguished Members of
the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) management of surface
transportation security inspectors.
When discussing transportation security, people usually think of
aviation security first. However, terrorist incidents abroad have
underscored the need to focus more on surface transportation modes--
mass transit, highway, maritime, pipelines, and freight rail. Surface
inspectors play a critical role in helping secure these transportation
modes.
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 gave the
Transportation Security Administration authority and responsibility for
security on all modes of transportation. Congress further clarified
TSA's oversight role with the 9/11 Commission Act. Beginning in 2004,
TSA increased its efforts to mitigate the vulnerability of mass transit
rail systems across the United States. This was accomplished by
introducing mass transit stakeholder security forums; developing
guidance, memorandums, and directives; using its Surface Transportation
Security Inspection (STSI) Program to provide voluntary vulnerability
assessments; and, providing support through grants and direct
operational assistance.
Within the last 2 years, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) has
issued several reports related to surface transportation issues,
including the STSI program. I would like to highlight the results of
those reviews. Most of my statement focuses on our findings and
recommendations. However, it is important to point out that we also
reported that TSA's surface inspector assessment and domain initiatives
have been effective, and have helped the program achieve many of its
goals.
In June 2008, we issued an inspection report, TSA's Administration
and Coordination of Mass Transit Security Programs (OIG-08-66). This
report addressed the strengths and weaknesses of TSA's oversight and
assistance programs for mass transit rail, including the STSI Program,
the Transit Security Grant program, the Visible Intermodal Prevention
and Response (VIPR) program, and the National Explosives Detection
Canine Team Program. Later that year, we conducted a follow-up
inspection and in February 2009 issued another report, Effectiveness of
TSA's Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (OIG-09-24). This
report addressed the strengths and weaknesses of TSA's Surface
Transportation Security Inspectors. Most recently, in March 2010, the
OIG issued a report, TSA's Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger
Rail Emergencies (OIG-10-68). This report was prepared by the OIG's
Office of Audits. It does not directly address issues involving the
management of surface inspectors. However, it addresses TSA's
effectiveness in supporting mass transit and passenger rail
stakeholders with preparing for and responding to emergencies. In
total, the OIG made 14 recommendations to TSA to promote more
efficient, effective, and economical operations.
In our mass transit report, we identified important challenges to
improve transit rail security, meet the needs of mass transit
authorities, and comply with legislation which expanded TSA's statutory
authority and responsibility. In our review of the Surface
Transportation Security Inspector program, we concluded that TSA needed
to look critically at how it is deploying resources. The central issue
in both reports was the mission, organization, and command structure of
its surface inspectors. In particular, its command structure appeared
to be aviation-focused.
Subsequently, the Office of Audits evaluated TSA's effectiveness in
supporting mass transit and passenger rail agencies in preparing for
and responding to emergency incidents. Their audit report overlapped
with the inspection reports in one aspect. The inspection reports
discussed TSA's use of the Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement
(BASE) program. It pointed out that they have led to security
improvements in the mass transit systems reviewed, but did not analyze
the BASE program or processes. The auditors did, and they identified
weaknesses in the BASE program's ability to assess passenger rail
stakeholders' emergency preparedness and response capabilities.
Following is a more detailed summary of each report.
tsa's administration and coordination of mass transit security programs
(oig-08-66)
The purpose of our review was to evaluate TSA's four largest
oversight and assistance programs for mass transit rail: The Surface
Transportation Security Inspection Program, the Transit Security Grant
Program, the Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response program, and
the National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program. Our goal was to
evaluate how well TSA managed these programs and how well the programs
met the security needs of the major mass transit rail systems.
The 9/11 Commission Act, which was enacted shortly after we began
this review, introduced new mass transit rail standards and
responsibilities for TSA. Where we obtained information on the then
current status of TSA compliance with standards introduced by the 9/11
Commission Act, we included it in our report. The review did not
encompass TSA's responsibilities for freight rail and for intercity
passenger rail, or for other forms of mass transit, such as buses. We
conducted our fieldwork from June 2007 to October 2007.
We reported that TSA could improve certain aspects of each of these
mass transit security programs. We observed unclear or unduly complex
chains of command; an unclear mission or insufficient guidance; and
insufficient communication. TSA needed more consistency in its
interactions with mass transit rail stakeholders--who were at odds over
the best approach for allocating funds and prioritizing projects for
the Transit Security Grant Program--although it acknowledged and
attempted to address some early missteps that strained stakeholder
relationships. Nonetheless, we noted TSA should further integrate
stakeholder expertise to effectively implement its oversight and
assistance programs and fulfill its responsibility for mass transit
security. We reported considerable satisfaction among mass transit
agencies using the National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program.
The report contained seven recommendations aimed at improving TSA's
oversight and assistance programs for mass transit rail. TSA concurred,
or concurred in part, with recommendations to direct its Transportation
Security Network Management office to provide Transportation Security
Inspectors (TSI) information and updates on the rail-related programs;
develop procedures for incorporating asset-specific risk and
vulnerability assessments, including information provided by TSIs, into
the grant decision-making process and grant guidance; include in its
annual report to Congress on how it used grants to implement its
transportation security goals each grant recipient's assessment of the
grant application and award process; seek Memorandums of Agreement with
all relevant transit authorities regarding VIPR deployments; and revise
grant program eligibility criteria to allow start-up funds for mass
transit systems that do not already have a canine explosive detection
unit.
TSA did not concur with two recommendations: Place the
Transportation Security Inspectors--Surface under the direct authority
of a TSA headquarters official who is responsible for surface
transportation, and develop specific, feasible security standards for
mass transit systems.
A few of the report's recommendations are not yet resolved, pending
additional information from TSA and the resolution of recommendations
in the follow up STSI report.
effectiveness of tsa's surface transportation security inspectors (oig-
09-24)
The 9/11 Commission Act directed the OIG to evaluate the
performance and effectiveness of TSA's Transportation Security
Inspectors--Surface and whether there is a need for additional
inspectors. The act stated: ``Not later than September 30, 2008, the
Department of Homeland Security Inspector General shall transmit a
report to the appropriate congressional committees on the performance
and effectiveness of surface transportation security inspectors,
whether there is a need for additional inspectors, and other
recommendations.'' We conducted our fieldwork from February to July
2008.
We determined that TSA needed to look critically at how it is
deploying resources, and assess how planned exercises could better use
the inspectors and their activities. The program appeared understaffed
for the long term and an aviation-focused command structure had reduced
the quality and morale of the workforce.
TSA agreed that TSIs and their unique expertise in mass transit and
rail should be integrated into VIPR planning and deployment. TSA stated
that it has addressed the potential role of TSIs in its VIPR Team
Capabilities and Operational Deployment guide. TSA did not agree that
TSIs' comprehensive inspection activities, such as BASE and SAI
reviews, should be integrated into VIPR operations.
TSA concurred with our recommendation to examine how many
inspectors it needed to perform necessary functions by assessing
current and anticipated future duties, and then expand the TSI
workforce to ensure that each field office has sufficient staffing.
However, at the time of our report we did not agree with the approach
TSA proposed to take to carry out this recommendation.
TSA did not concur with our earlier recommendation, which we
repeated in this report, to place the Transportation Security
Inspectors--Surface under the direct authority of a TSA headquarters
official who responsible for surface transportation. TSA did not agree
that the TSI command structure inhibited TSI effectiveness and we were
unsuccessful in persuading TSA to carry out this recommendation.
Ultimately, in the absence of a commitment from TSA management to
modify its command structure, we retracted our original recommendation
and instead recommended that TSA eliminate practices that undermined
efforts to establish a more transparent chain of command. In its last
update, TSA indicated that it was taking steps to strengthen
communication between the STSI program and Federal Security Directors
and their staffs in the field.
tsa's preparedness for mass transit and passenger rail emergencies
(oig-10-68)
The purpose of this audit was to evaluate TSA's effectiveness in
assisting passenger rail and mass transit stakeholders with preparing
for and responding to emergencies. The Office of Audits conducted this
performance audit between April and August 2009, and the OIG issued its
final report in March 2010.
The OIG determined that TSA can better support passenger rail
agencies by improving its assessments of emergency preparedness and
response capabilities. The agency can also improve its efforts to train
passenger rail agencies and first responders, and ensure that drills
and exercises are live and more realistic to help strengthen response
capabilities. The agency has focused primarily on security and
terrorism prevention efforts, while providing limited staff and
resources to emergency preparedness and response. As a result,
passenger rail agencies and the first responders that rely upon may not
be adequately prepared to handle all emergencies or mitigate their
consequences.
The report made four recommendations. TSA concurred with, and took
corrective actions for, all four recommendations.
evolution of the surface transportation security inspector program
The STSI program's organization and chain of command continues to
evolve, but in a manner which is not consistent with our
recommendations. As discussed above, we reported our concerns twice
about the organization and authority for the program and in both
reports recommended that TSA place the responsibility for the STSI
program with an official at TSA headquarters. After considering TSA's
comments on the STSI report, we revised our recommendation to TSA to
eliminate practices that undermined efforts to establish a more
transparent chain of command.
In December 2006, TSA shifted from a system where TSIs reported to
surface-focused supervisors to a system where TSIs reported to
aviation-focused supervisors. TSA reorganized the program to match the
field command model for aviation and cargo inspectors. Supervisory TSIs
became Assistant Federal Security Director--Surface (AFSDs-Surface) who
reported to the local Federal Security Director (FSD). The FSD was the
administrative manager, but the STSIP headquarters office still set the
priorities and provided the budget resources for the inspectors in the
field. AFSDs-Surface, therefore, effectively had two chains of command.
In May 2008, TSA made further changes. In primary field offices
that have an AFSD-Surface, TSIs were reporting to that individual. In
satellite field offices without an AFSD-Surface, inspectors were
reporting to the local Assistant Federal Security Director--Inspections
(AFSD-Inspections). However, the AFSD-Surface at the nearby primary
field office still mentored and advised all surface inspectors within
that area, even when they were not under his or her direct command.
Under this structure (at the time of our report), 55 (37%) of TSIs were
reporting to an AFSD-Surface, and the remaining 95 (63%) were reporting
to an aviation-focused AFSD-Inspections.
At the time, we also observed several problems regarding FSDs'
involvement with the STSI program that were leading to tension and
confusion over the program's chain of command. In response to our STSI
report, TSA stated that it chose this command structure because FSDs
are better able to use the security network in the area. TSA noted that
FSDs frequently interact with State and local law enforcement and mass
transit operators. TSA believes that FSDs understand the
vulnerabilities and challenges of the mass transit modes ``in their
backyard.'' In our final report, we maintained that the program
continued to operate differently than that outlined in a management
directive that TSA cited.
In August 2009, TSA informed us that it was in the process of
conducting a formal independent comprehensive staffing study of the
entire inspection workforce, to include surface, with the results due
in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2009. TSA has not communicated the
results of its study.
In September 2009, we learned that TSA began to implement a multi-
phased restructuring of its Office of Security Operations (OSO), Office
of Compliance, Surface Inspection and Oversight to meet mission demands
and to better utilize resources. TSA planned to abolish positions,
establish new positions, realign some functions among positions, and
reallocate resources among field offices throughout the country. The
restructuring plan appeared to affect numerous senior staff within the
surface inspector program.
In January 2010, TSA reorganized the surface program. We requested
that TSA update the OIG on any organizational changes that have
occurred within the surface program to establish a more transparent
chain of command, and last week TSA forwarded details of the
reorganization. Specifically, TSA has abolished the position of
Assistant Federal Security Director--Surface and assigned those
responsibilities to the position of Supervisory Transportation Security
Inspector--Surface and to newly created Regional Security Inspectors.
Supervisory TSIs-Surface report to Assistant Federal Security
Directors--Inspection, who report to Federal Security Directors.
We continue to study the reorganization. We remain concerned
whether these changes will enhance TSA's relationships and
communication with its surface transportation partners. The presence of
dedicated Assistant Federal Security Directors--Surface afforded TSA
recognizable liaisons to transit systems and enabled information
sharing. Without further review, we do not know whether this plan will
better enable surface resources to operate adequately and effectively
in an aviation-centric environment.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss these matters. I would be
pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, gentlemen, both of you, for
your testimony. We look forward to engaging.
Let me acknowledge and recognize a Member of this
committee, Mr. Lungren of California.
I thank the witnesses for their testimony, and I remind
each Member that he or she will have 5 minutes to question the
panel. I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes of
questioning.
To Mr. Mann, your report made recommendations for how TSA
could better utilize Assistant Federal Security Directors for
surface transportation. In fact, the latter part of your
testimony went directly to this systems change.
In fact, these AFSDs provide critical information to the
IG, as I understand it, revealing safety and employee morale
issues highlighted in your report. In fact, you based a lot of
your report on some of the vital information that these AFSDs
gave. Yet months after the report was released, TSA removed
every sitting AFSD-Surface from their post and terminated the
position altogether.
When did TSA inform your office it was eliminating this
position? Is it fair to say that because your report
specifically suggests utilizing Surface AFSDs to solve problems
with the Surface Inspector Program, eliminating this position
directly seems to contradict your recommendation?
Might I just add a bit of editorialism and suggest and hope
that it might not smack of retaliation. If you could in your
answer give how much you relied upon these AFSDs, whether they
were an effective source, and what your assessment is on this
reorganization plan.
Mr. Mann. Well, we rely heavily on a lot of testimonial
evidence that we get from all of the components that we talked
with, and certainly the AFSDs were among several people who
provided valuable information.
We have no reason to disbelieve, although we don't take
sworn testimony from our witnesses and our interviewees--we
have no reason to disbelieve them. Frequently it has been our
experience to know that the individuals who are most affected
typically have the answers and the solutions to what will make
their situation better. The horsepower that the inspector
general brings to a report oftentimes gives the organization
the impetus to actually make a change.
There is no reason to--I think it would be speculative to
believe that the reorganization was a retaliatory move.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you have concern with them being
eliminated in totality? You mentioned it in your testimony. Do
you have concern?
Mr. Mann. Well, our bigger concern for us is really the
reporting chain. We stick by our recommendation that a person
responsible for surface transportation in headquarters should
run the Surface Transportation Security Program.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me move to TSA. What became of the
existing Surface AFDs when their position was eliminated? Did
they simply take over as new AFSDs for Inspection, and can you
get us that information for all of the former Surface AFDs as
to what happened to them? Did they retire? What was the basis?
Let me ask the OIG to bring some feedback, if you can
follow up to his point or answer. The feedback from surface
AFSDs turned out to be very valuable, as I said earlier, in
bringing a lot of important issues to light. Have you done your
own independent investigating--you said you don't want to
speculate--as to what might have been the reason also of the
change?
Let me ask Mr. Kair as to what happened to them, and then
if you did any further investigation in looking at the chart as
to why it was changed that way.
Let me go to Mr. Kair first. Thank you.
Mr. Kair. Thank you, ma'am.
For the most part, those AFSDs for Surface actually became
RSIs that had large geographic regions and/or are now directly
aligned to the headquarters, reporting to the Assistant General
Manager for Surface there at headquarters.
What I noted, I was a Federal Security Director prior to my
current position, and what I noted from the field perspective
was that the AFSDs, there weren't very many of them, and they
had large geographic regions, but they were reporting to FSDs
locally. So it made the lines of authority as they were
structured there very difficult to operationalize in the field.
Our new construct is to have those Regional Security
Inspectors reporting directly to headquarters to provide broad,
strategic, programmatic oversight and, in the day-to-day
operational inspection, reporting directly to the Federal
Security Director, who does have the most relationships locally
with the local stakeholders.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So did you, in essence, take the same
personnel and utilize them in new positions?
Mr. Kair. I believe we provided line-by-line each of the
individuals, what happened to them. For the most part, most of
them actually became Regional Security Inspectors, and they
were located in the locations with the major Class One
railroads.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Mann, do you want to answer? Did you
do any follow-up when you saw this new chart as to what they
had done and whether they had taken into consideration your
recommendations?
Mr. Mann. No, ma'am, we have not. We just saw the chart
last week. But it is our understanding that the former AFSDs
had to compete for the positions that they now hold.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Will you do a follow-up and analyze the
chart, since you just received it recently, to see whether that
responds to a lot of the concerns that you made in your report?
Mr. Mann. I am sorry. Say that again, please.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Will you review the chart to determine
whether or not it complies with the concerns that you expressed
in your report?
Mr. Mann. Of course we will.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I would like to have this committee
receive a follow-up report from you on the changes that TSA has
made.
Mr. Mann. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman
from California, Mr. Lungren.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Mann, on the audit evaluation of TSA's
effectiveness in assisting passenger rail and mass transit
folks, the stakeholders, in preparing for and responding to
emergencies, your general assessment is TSA could better
support the passenger rail agencies by improving its assessment
of emergency preparedness and response capabilities. You made
specific recommendations on that, and corrective action was
taken.
Are you satisfied with the corrective action taken by TSA
in that, and if you are partially satisfied rather than fully
satisfied, what further needs to be done?
Mr. Mann. Well, we are satisfied with the action that TSA
has undertaken.
Mr. Lungren. That is good news. I am glad to hear that.
The tenor of your comment seems to suggest the real concern
about the reorganization in the Security Inspector Program, and
you detailed some of that. What I am trying to figure out is
whether you just have a specific question about the need for
this reorganization, or you fundamentally disagree with the
manner in which they have determined they are going to carry it
out, or the way it is being implemented?
Mr. Mann. Well, sir, we have not studied that issue, and as
I mentioned, without studying it further, we are not certain of
whether the plan is going to be appropriate, whether it will be
what the doctor ordered in order to resolve any issues that are
out there.
Mr. Lungren. So you don't have any opinion on that?
Mr. Mann. Not at this time, sir.
Mr. Lungren. Okay. That is all the questions I have got.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The gentleman yields back.
The gentleman from Mississippi, the Chairman of the full
committee, Mr. Thompson, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
In my comments I talked about to Mr. Kair that there were
two critical regulations required by the 9/11 Act to address
front-line employee security training and security assessment,
and that those regulations are 2 years overdue. Where are we on
that?
Mr. Kair. Yes, sir. The new administrator has come in. He
has expressed that surface transportation, as well as these new
rules, are a priority for him, and we are in the process of
working those now, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Is it your job to do it?
Mr. Kair. Those regulations would be promulgated from our
Office of Transportation Sector Network Management. It is a
different part of TSA, and I would be happy to get more detail
on that. I do know that it is a priority for TSA, and we are
working on those as we speak, sir.
Mr. Thompson. It is a priority, and it is 2 years overdue.
All right. Do you handle training of inspectors under you?
Mr. Kair. Yes, sir, I do.
Mr. Thompson. Can you tell me why surface inspectors have 2
weeks of mandatory aviation and air cargo training, and only 1
week of surface training when they are first hired?
Mr. Kair. Sir, the core curriculum they go through is a 5-
week program. The first 2 weeks of that is general training on
how to become--you know, what the inspection force actually
does. They have 1 week of surface inspection, 1 week of
aviation, 1 week of cargo.
Then that is also why we were very excited about this new
training facility in Pueblo. There they will also be receiving
1 week of basic rail school and 2 weeks of hazardous material
handling for surface, which is 6 weeks of surface-specific
training. We are also in the process of developing more
advanced training for our surface inspectors in this new Pueblo
training facility.
Mr. Thompson. So 5 weeks, 6 weeks, how many weeks training?
Mr. Kair. Right now, sir, they have 6 weeks. A brand new
surface inspector has 6 weeks of surface-specific training when
they are hired, and we are in the process of developing more
advanced training in this Pueblo facility as we go farther.
Mr. Thompson. Okay. Well, obviously what we have is the old
model. Can you provide us with the current training
requirements for your inspectors?
Mr. Kair. We are happy to do so, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Are they still required to have mandatory
aviation and air cargo training?
Mr. Kair. Yes, sir. They still receive 1 week of aviation
and 1 week of cargo. The rationale for that is that surface
inspectors often times are in multimodal facilities, and they
do need to have at least an understanding of what the
regulations are in those other modes so that when they do
identify issues which are of a multimodal nature, they can
highlight other inspectors and understand when there might be a
vulnerability.
Mr. Thompson. For the record, how many inspectors do we
have?
Mr. Kair. Right now, sir, we have a little over 200
inspectors. We are in the process of hiring up to--in the 2010
budget, we were authorized a little over 400 inspectors. We are
in the process of hiring them now.
Mr. Thompson. Can you provide the committee where you are
along that process?
Mr. Kair. Yes, sir. In fact, we recently changed the hiring
process for our inspectors, which I think is a great
improvement. We now have a new program where it started just
this spring where we currently have 181 openings on a National
Register, so that inspectors can apply anywhere for any
position in the country.
For those 181 openings, we had 134,000 applications for
those positions. We are in the process now of completing those
hiring actions, and we expect that they will be complete this
fall, and that we will begin the on-boarding process for these
final positions.
Mr. Thompson. One of the questions that I am confronted
with quite a bit, can you provide me the diversity of those
inspectors----
Mr. Kair. Yes, sir, we will be happy to provide that.
Mr. Thompson [continuing]. So that we can look at it?
Mr. Mann spoke of the change in the structure that had just
recently been provided to him. Is that something of your doing,
or was that passed on, in terms of the direction of the
training of the inspectors and the supervision?
Mr. Kair. The organizational change that occurred was under
my watch. That was implemented last January, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Can you tell me why that change didn't go as
to what Mr. Mann was talking about versus what you did?
Mr. Kair. Yes, sir. The concern that we had was that we
wanted to have the same model that we had for other National
transportation programs. So, as an example, we have a National
program in our TSNM division. They handle the policy
development and the stakeholder outreach for all modes of
transportation. Then we have Regional Security Inspectors who
have the corporate interaction and the National plan out there
for all modes of transportation, if it is airport, airline, air
cargo. We wanted to replicate that also for the surface areas
as well. So you have National forward-deployed people who do
report to headquarters. So it is very consistent, that thinking
was very inconsistent with what the IG was recommending.
What we also wanted to ensure was that locally our
Transportation Security Inspectors also reporting into the
FSDs, who had the primary responsibility for the stakeholder
liaison and assessing all vulnerabilities for all modes of
transportation in their areas of responsibility.
Mr. Thompson. All right. Can you provide the staff and this
committee with the study that went into that change or what you
did to reach that conclusion?
Mr. Kair. Yes, sir. We would be happy to.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Mann, I know you received that kind of
late in the process, and from the comment that I have
understood you to say to the Chairwoman, you plan to review
what was sent to you versus what you had suggested.
Mr. Mann. Yes, sir, we will. As long as there are clear
chains of command, that TSIs are not being tasked by multiple
sources, which was an issue before, and that TSIs are doing
surface work, not handing out plastic bags at airports and some
of the other functions that we understand that some of the TSIs
were actually doing, I think that is a program that the OIG can
buy into.
Mr. Thompson. So is it your testimony, Mr. Kair, that they
are no longer passing out plastic bags and these other items?
Mr. Kair. Sir, the items Mr. Mann just described was
exactly the reason that we made the change that we did. I was
also concerned about lines of authority and clear tasking so
that we had a National program that everyone understood with
clear lines of authority to implement those things. So that is
exactly the reason why we did the reorganization that we did
last January.
Mr. Thompson. Well, let me be clear. Now, Mr. Mann, you are
going to, I guess, provide an addendum to the committee once
you have had a chance to review what was submitted, or do we
need to get another request to you to look at it?
Mr. Mann. Well, a request would be great, sir.
Mr. Thompson. We will get you that request. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The gentleman yields back.
Let me have you complete your answer, Mr. Kair and Mr.
Mann, on, I think, two points that were left unanswered. It is
my understanding that the new makeover of the AFSD is not in
the chain of command. Mr. Kair, if you would just clarify that.
While you do that, let me ask as well as to why did TSA begin
to implement yet another reorganization of the Surface
Inspector Program before issuing the overdue rulemakings on
security training and assessments? The rulemakings will
significantly impact the role of surface inspectors and likely
require a corresponding expansion of Federal interaction with
stakeholders, I would think. You might want to answer that, and
is TSA putting, in essence, the cart before the horse on this?
In addition, Mr. Kair, OIG has recommended TSA perform a
staffing study, which to me seems like a reasonable good
Government practice. When can we expect TSA to complete a
staffing study for the Surface Inspector Program, and that
follows the Chairman's comments about issues dealing with
diversity?
First start out, you are not in the same chain of command,
so it is really apples and oranges and what reasoning went
behind that, and if you can finish with the other two
questions. Thank you.
Mr. Kair. Yes, Madam Chairwoman. First, let me say what I
am describing, the current organizational structure, was the
thinking at the time that the change was made. As I mentioned
in my opening statement, the new administrator has taken the
stance that he wants to review how we have structured this, so
there may be other changes pending on this after his full
review of our organizational chain as well as the role of the
TSIs out there.
The way that the program is currently structured after this
last change is that the Regional Security Inspectors are
responsible for the strategic look across the country and the
direct corporate interaction from an inspections standpoint
with our major stakeholders out there. So they do provide a
mentorship and oversight of the inspectors out there from a
programmatic standpoint.
Tactically the Transportation Security Inspectors in the
field have the best knowledge of the environment that they are
working in, and they do report in locally to the AFSD for
inspection at the local site, who does report to the Federal
Security Director.
One of the things that we are working on and including in
the job tools for the analysis of the job description for our
AFSDs for Inspection is a much more multimodal requirement for
filling those positions in the future.
Ma'am, as to your question why not wait until the
rulemaking is complete, I thought it was important at the time
the decision was made that we did have clear lines of
authority, clear tasking, and a clear understanding of what
those roles and responsibilities of our inspectors are, and
also so that our stakeholders knew who that point of contact
was for any issue they had from a corporate perspective, and
that we could get those RSIs to provide oversight and
leadership to our TSIs in the field. So we wanted to go ahead
and make that change in advance of the rulemaking taking place
in the future.
As for the OIG's recommendation for a staffing study, we
concur with that, and we actually have a third party that is
just now completing that staffing study. It is due back in to
us imminently. We will be validating that staffing study and
will be happy to provide the results of that to the committee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We would like to do that.
I would like to yield to the gentleman from Mississippi.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you. I will be brief, Madam Chairwoman.
Staff has provided me with the chain of authority for field
inspectors. Mr. Mann, is this what you were provided with? Have
you seen this?
Mr. Mann. Yes, I have seen that, Chairman.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you. I am just concerned that these
Regional Security Inspectors are on the policy side of the
chart, and their work is over on the field side. Can you just
help me out right there?
Mr. Kair. Is that for me, sir?
Mr. Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Kair. The idea here, sir, is in the field our TSIs will
be directly responsible for doing the inspections and report in
through the FSD the operational chain. But the program itself,
the policy side, will be delivered by the Regional Security
Inspectors, and that is actually very consistent with how we
are currently structured for air cargo, for airports, for
airlines. The way the program is actually delivered, the policy
is handled from headquarters, the actual implementation is
handled from the field, so that the required responsibilities
for the Federal Security Director for all modes of
transportation can be fulfilled out in the field.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Mann, you will get your letter, I promise you, because
we need to kind of clear that up. We are just trying to make
sure that the supervision is there, because ultimately it is
the people doing the work that really need direction, and if it
is not clear on the chart who is supervising, who is doing
things, then you can imagine how those individuals who are
tasked with trying to actually perform the work, how confused
it could be with them.
So, Madam Chairwoman, I will be happy to work with you on
making sure we get some additional review on this matter.
I yield back.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The gentleman yields back. Let me thank
the Chairman.
Let me just thank the witnesses and say that this is a
query that we would want to continue. This organizational chart
could stand additional vetting. We know that the administrator
will have the opportunity to review it. Please acknowledge, as
we acknowledged on the record, that we have an interest in his
assessment. As the Chairman has indicated, a formal inquiry
letter will come to the OIG so that we can have a more detailed
analysis of the changes. I think the change in command, or the
answer to that, brings about more questions. But we would like
to be able to allow you to go back and provide us with some of
your reasoning.
So, with that being stated for the record, and there being
no further questions for our first panel, I thank the witnesses
for appearing before the subcommittee today. The Members of the
subcommittee may have additional questions for you, and we ask
that you respond to them expeditiously in writing.
We now welcome our second panel to the witness table.
This being the time for our second panel, let me suggest to
you that we would look forward to a summarizing of your
statement in a shorter time if you desire so that we can pose
questions to both of you, and that we would have additional
time for questions, as we are getting notification that we may
be voting. The two of you have been very patient, and I am just
delighted to have you today.
So I welcome our second panel of witnesses. Our first
witness is Mr. Thomas Lambert, senior vice president and Chief
of Police of the Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris
County, Texas. At Houston Metro, Chief Lambert is responsible
for directing and managing police operations, traffic
management activities, high-occupancy vehicle lane operations,
and management emergency preparedness and operations,
intelligent transportation systems projects, and safe--system
safety.
Before joining Houston Metro in 1979, Chief Lambert served
as a senior police officer with the Austin, Texas, Police
Department.
I do want to add that as the Houston Metro grows, the
responsibility of Chief Lambert is expanding. But more
importantly, since I want to welcome a fellow Houstonian, I
want the record to note that Chief Lambert collaborates with
all other police agencies inasmuch as the Metro system, because
of its bus system, really overlaps county and city
jurisdiction, more than one county, and he has the
responsibility from the surface perspective to be the eyes and
ears and the front line of safety in our community. I think as
a witness he embodies the issues and concerns we have on
surface transportation security.
So you are very welcomed, Mr. Lambert.
We are delighted to have our second witness, who is Mr.
Clyde Hart, senior vice president for government affairs and
policy at the American Bus Association, where he has served in
that capacity since 2001. The American Bus Association
represents approximately 1,000 motorcoach and tour companies in
the United States and Canada.
Mr. Hart also serves as a member of the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration's Motor Carrier Safety Advisory
Committee, which advises the administrator on motor carrier
safety issues.
We note that one of the severe inadequacies of homeland
security is dealing with our bus transportation. We are
gratified of your long-standing leadership and your presence
here today.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted into the record. I now ask each witness to summarize
their statement, beginning with Chief Lambert.
Chief Lambert, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS C. LAMBERT, CHIEF OF POLICE, SENIOR VICE
PRESIDENT FOR PUBLIC SAFETY, METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY OF
HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
Chief Lambert. Madam Chairwoman and Chairman Thompson,
thank you for the opportunity to appear today. I am going to be
brief. I want to highlight several points.
We are very encouraged by Administrator Pistole's comments
that he really wants to place greater significance on surface
transportation security, and we look forward to working with
him to make sure that we strengthen that opportunity and that
commitment.
We want to recognize that the Transportation Security
Administration has done some very positive things, and I will
give a couple of examples. The Peer Advisory Group that
represents transit police chiefs and security directors from
across the country have had an opportunity for the past several
years to meet with TSA mass transit representatives monthly in
conference calls to really focus on issues and problem
resolution of how we can collectively work together to
strengthen the safety and security of the transit systems, both
rail and bus modes, across the country, and we want to
recognize them for that.
The Safety and Security Roundtables that TSA and the
Federal Transit Administration that jointly sponsor, bringing
in safety police and security chiefs from across the country,
the top 50 properties, that is a great opportunity to really
frame issues and problem solve, and so we want to recognize
them for that.
But we also think it is very important, the topic today,
and the Surface Transportation Inspector Program, that we
believe it has lost some focus, and it has lost some clear
responsibilities by being associated more with aviation. The
view is, we believe, it should be focused back on surface, and
I would take the position perhaps mode-specific, and we would
look forward to working with TSA.
But look at mass transit. There is an existing structure
today under the Mass Transit Division that has already got a
stakeholder network, the peer group working with stakeholders
every month to talk about issues. Isn't this an opportunity to
systematically approach the surface inspector mode-specific to
help reinforce that across the country? We think that is an
opportunity. So we look forward to working with the
administrator as he looks at that.
We also think that mass transit is an opportunity that does
not shy away from guidelines, that does not shy away from
rulemaking. We think this is a great opportunity, but we would
encourage using the Peer Advisory Group industry practitioners,
folks that are responsible every day to police and secure our
transit systems across the country, to be very active
participants in helping to find practical, reasonable rules to
make sure they can help us meet those needs.
Madam Chairwoman, with that I will conclude. We look
forward to answering any questions you may have.
[The statement of Chief Lambert follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas C. Lambert
July 28, 2010
Good afternoon Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to visit with you today on this very important topic. As a
mass transit security practitioner, I know all too well the challenges
of protecting our riding public, employees, and infrastructure.
Let me begin by stating that we support the efforts of the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the intended mission
of the Surface Transportation Security Inspector program. We are also
encouraged by Administrator John Pistole's commitment to placing mass
transit security on the same priority as aviation security. We look
forward to working closely with him as he strengthens TSA's leadership
in this regard.
TSA has taken some positive steps in helping transit agencies
secure their systems. Programs like the Peer Advisory Group and the
Transit Safety/Security Roundtable are valuable tools that must
continue to be used. The Peer Advisory Group, made up of Transit Police
and Security Chiefs, is a great forum for the discussion of transit
security issues and initiatives. The Roundtable, a joint effort between
TSA and the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), fosters an open
exchange of information between Transit Police, Security, and Safety
Chiefs. Through this forum both the TSA and FTA maintain a partnership
with their mass transit stakeholders.
Another important TSA component is the reason we are here today,
the Surface Transportation Security Inspector program. In this program,
TSA has committed resources and personnel designed to enhance the
security of our Nation's surface transportation system. Surface
Transportation Security Inspectors have a presence today that did not
previously exist. They act as local liaisons between TSA and transit
agencies, conduct needed assessments via BASE reviews, and ensure that
transit agencies follow guidelines and rules established by TSA. While
we believe the Surface Transportation Security Inspector program to be
a necessary and vital part of transit security, we would like to offer
some suggestions for enhancing the program that would increase the
effectiveness of Surface Transportation Security Inspectors, in our
view.
It is our strong opinion that TSA's Mass Transit Division should be
responsible for managing, directing, and administering the Surface
Transportation Security Inspector program, especially for Surface
Inspectors who are responsible for duties related to mass transit.
Furthermore, the Surface Inspectors should be modal specific and have a
background in transit security or transit policing along with an
understanding of their application to a transit environment. The
current structure, which dictates that Surface Inspectors report to
Federal Security Directors, is not conducive to a focus on mass transit
and has fostered a lack of clear and defined roles for Surface
Transportation Security Inspectors. We feel that by reporting to
Aviation Management the mission, focus, and effectiveness of Surface
Inspectors is diluted. Furthermore, we feel that TSA's Mass Transit
Division is better suited to understand the specific needs and unique
security environment of mass transit agencies, both bus and rail.
Additionally, the Mass Transit Division's regular interaction with
local transit agencies will allow for enhanced partnerships and
networking that will serve to further strengthen the Surface
Transportation Security Inspector program. Lastly, we believe that not
only will the Surface Inspector's mission focus be better served by
reporting to the Mass Transit Division; their training and
communication of mass transit security issues throughout TSA will be
strengthened and be of greater benefit to all stakeholders. A greater
positive impact on transit security can be achieved by deploying well
trained and experienced Surface Inspectors who focus specifically on
mass transit and answer to TSA Headquarters through the Mass Transit
Division.
The final area of TSA's efforts I would like to discuss with you
today is rulemaking. There is no doubt that many industries shy away
from Federal rulemaking, but here we have a great opportunity to
establish guidelines and regulations that will strengthen transit
security Nation-wide while taking into consideration the uniqueness of
various transit operations across this country. We firmly believe that
this can be accomplished through an open, honest, and positive dialogue
between TSA and the transit industry. We cannot stress enough the
importance of establishing a partnership between TSA and local transit
police and security chiefs in order to develop rules, regulations, and
policies that are realistic and have a true positive impact on transit
security. No place is there a better opportunity for this than TSA's
Peer Advisory Group. This group of experienced transit police and
security practitioners can play a vital role in working with TSA to
develop appropriate rules and regulations that will create a win-win
situation to enhance the security of our transit systems. Here again
the value of the Surface Transportation Security Inspector program can
play a key role by bringing a global transportation security view to
transit agencies who can then act locally to secure their transit
systems.
In closing, I want to reiterate my support for TSA and the mission
of the Surface Transportation Security Inspector program. Recent events
continue to illustrate that we face a constant threat from those
wishing to do us harm. While much of this threat and the security
resources to respond have been directed at the aviation sector, history
has clearly shown that mass transit continues to be a target of choice
for terrorist attacks. We are confident that given the opportunity to
work together with TSA on these important issues we can build strong
relationships that will serve to greatly enhance the protection of our
riding public, employees, and the systems they utilize on a daily
basis. Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today
and I will gladly answer any questions that you may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you very much for your testimony.
Now I recognize Mr. Hart.
STATEMENT OF CLYDE J. HART, JR., SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS AND POLICY, AMERICAN BUS ASSOCIATION
Mr. Hart. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and Chairman
Thompson. It is an honor to be here.
First of all, let me say to Chief Lambert, amen. We agree
with his statement.
ABA has noted several shortcomings in the way TSA interacts
with the private bus industry in fulfilling its security
mission. We do appreciate the difficulty of that mission. But
we must agree with the conclusions of the GAO report in
February 2009 when it said industry officials stated that they
generally desire greater communication with TSA. More
specifically, the officials noted that they did not fully
understand TSA's strategy for securing the commercial vehicle
sector or what roles and responsibilities the agency expected
from industry.
The lack of communication between TSA and the industry is
not limited to the Sector Coordinating Council, which was set
up by TSA to bring what the Chief notes as the stakeholders
together so that we can together find our way to manage
security, but over the years we have noticed that the SCC has
withered on the vine for lack of attention by the TSA.
We also, I guess bemoan is a proper word, the lack of
communication between TSA and the programs that they set up,
Highway Watch, First Observer, and the Homeland Security
Information Network.
A further shortcoming in TSA's approach is the failure to
complete the Congressionally-mandated threat vulnerability
assessments for the motorcoach industry. In the 9/11 Act,
Congress mandated new assessments. In January 2009, the ABA
worked with TSA officials on the threat scenario evaluation
portion of this project, and to date there has been no sign
that the new study is near completion.
The failure to complete this assessment is particularly
exasperating to the bus industry, because the Office of
Management and Budget has for the last 2 years recommended the
elimination of the Congressionally-approved Bus Security Grant
program on the ground that any such security funding should
await the completion of TSA's threat vulnerability assessment.
As a further irritant, the bus industry is sure that
evidence of risk exists, but we won't find it until TSA
finishes their threat vulnerability assessment.
Finally, ABA is concerned about the duplication of security
efforts that seems to be going on by TSA and the Federal Motor
Carriers Safety Administration. ABA perceives that TSA plans to
conduct security audits with its own cadre of TSIs, yet the
security audits are not that different from the safety and
security audits now conducted by the FMCSA. It appears to ABA
that it would be far more efficient and less expensive if the
FMCSA were to conduct the security reviews with FMCSA personnel
who are very familiar with the bus industry rather than to try
and train new TSI inspectors on a completely new industry.
That concludes my statement. I would be willing to answer
any questions anybody has. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Hart follows:]
Prepared Statement of Clyde J. Hart, Jr.
July 28, 2010
Chairman Jackson Lee and Members of the subcommittee, my name is
Clyde Hart and I am the Senior Vice President for Government Affairs
and Policy of the American Bus Association (ABA). First of all,
Chairman Jackson Lee, the ABA would like to applaud your leadership in
holding this hearing. Security is our No. 1 concern and we share with
you your insistence that we all do everything we can to improve the
security of the transportation system and infrastructure that so many
of the Nation's citizens depend upon every day.
The ABA is the trade association for the private over-the-road bus
and motorcoach industry. The association is comprised of some 3,500
member organizations and companies including 1,000 motorcoach
operators. There are approximately 3,800 privately operated motorcoach
companies in the United States. The ABA motorcoach companies provide
all manner of transportation services to the Nation. These services
include scheduled service, charter and tour, commuter services, and
airport shuttle operations.
ABA members are large (Greyhound Lines, Coach America domiciled in
Dallas, Texas; Coach USA, in New Jersey) but other than a handful, are
mostly small family-owned businesses (Transbridge Lines in Pennsylvania
and Indian Trails in Michigan with fleet sizes of about 70
motorcoaches). In fact, the vast majority of bus companies operate
between two and ten motorcoaches. The motorcoach industry is varied in
many other ways. For example, some 28,000 motorcoaches provide access
to all critical infrastructure and key resources in the Nation. In
addition, there are approximately 1,200 identified station/terminal
locations for intercity fixed route operations. Over the past several
years there has also been a rapid growth in intercity on-demand/
curbside pickup service. A recent New York Times article noted with
cuts in airline flights and ``ridership on trains . . . relatively
flat'' bus transportation has grown 15% in the last 2 years (``The
Humble Bus Takes Off''. New York Times, Sunday, July 25, 2010, Travel
Section, pg. 3). A copy of this article is appended to my testimony.*
Moreover, these same trends in other transportation modes have fueled
growth in charter and tour services which continues to provide the
greatest portion of the industry's annual revenue. Finally, over the
past decade we have also seen a rapid growth in urban/suburban commuter
service. What binds all of the bus operators together is our ability
and expertise in safely and efficiently transporting people throughout
the Nation. All told in the past year private bus and motorcoach
operators provided service to 750 million passenger trips, more than
the domestic airlines. And the industry does all of this with only 0.06
percent of all Federal funding for transportation.
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* This document is also available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
07/25/travel/25Prac.html.
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As you will imagine, given our responsibilities, safety and
security is the industry's first priority and ABA strongly supports the
efforts by Congress to enhance security for bus transportation by
creating a level playing field, where all bus companies operate under
consistent security policies and training standards. ABA and its
members are well aware that globally buses and bus facilities are an
attractive target for terrorists, as the large number of such attacks
over the past decades clearly demonstrates. Most recently, in a March
2010 report entitled: ``Terrorist Attacks on Public Bus Transportation:
A Preliminary Empirical Analysis'' (MTI Report WP 09-01) the Mineta
Transportation Institute reported that since 1970 buses and bus
stations were the targets of more than 51% of the total number of
attacks (p. 19). We note that in the Mineta Report ``public bus
transportation'' also includes the facilities, passengers, and
employees of private motorcoach companies.
The ABA, as the voice of the private bus industry has been a
partner in providing security with the Federal Government since 9/11.
Shortly after the attacks on 9/11 ABA worked with this committee and
with the Appropriations Committee to implement an Intercity Bus
Security Grant Program (IBSGP). The IBSGP is a small competitive grant
program which allows bus operating companies to compete for grants to
implement security measures to protect their passengers, employees, and
facilities. Since the fiscal year 2002 this program has seen ABA
members use these funds, as well as their own money, to provide
emergency communications between dispatch and emergency first
responders; allowed bus companies to ``wand'' passengers at larger
terminals; install cameras in bus staging areas and maintenance
facilities and install engine ``kill'' devices on motorcoaches. The
IBSGP, never funded at over $12 million each year, is making a positive
difference in our ability to protect those who depend on us.
But while ABA is proud of our accomplishments to date we recognize
that we have more to do and we are concerned about several aspects of
TSA's on-going efforts. Shortly after 9/11 transportation security
efforts were conducted under the authority of the United States
Department of Transportation (USDOT). One DOT project was a bus
security threat/vulnerability study conducted by the Volpe
Transportation Center. While the complete content of the study remains
classified, it did establish priorities for the hardening of both
public and private bus transportation facilities as an aid to security.
With the aid of grants from the IBSGP, ABA developed a detailed bus
company security training program as well as a company security plan
and vulnerability assessment template. Both of these tools are now
under TSA control and are being revised. However, one ABA concern is
that TSA's revisions are being driven by what is now a 9-year-old
study.
Under the 9/11 Act Congress directed TSA to conduct a new threat/
vulnerability assessment. In January 2009 ABA worked with TSA officials
in the threat scenario evaluation portion of this project. To date
there is no sign that this new study is near completion. This is the
study that should be driving the forthcoming TSA regulations and any
subsequent training or policy changes. I must also note here that for
the past 2 years the Federal Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has
recommended eliminating the IBSGP on the ground that there is no
threat/vulnerability assessment for the motorcoach industry. The ABA
continues to argue that the need for such a program is great and other
studies have documented the need for such a program, including the
GAO's February 2009 report titled, ``Risk-Based Approach Needed to
Secure the Commercial Vehicle Sector''. And as noted above the Mineta
report clearly highlights the need for the IBSGP program. Even more
fundamentally, ABA and its members believe that the evidence of risk to
the industry is unavailable solely due to the lack of movement by TSA
to complete the required threat/vulnerability study. TSA must finish
this study and do so before there is any further action taken on
motorcoach security regulations or the development of training
standards. Failure to finish this study before regulations are
announced will put the industry at risk of always lagging in security
via ``out of date'' regulations.
In addition to our request for TSA to complete the threat/
vulnerability study, ABA also has concerns regarding the lack of
information sharing between TSA and the industry. Until 5 years ago ABA
and industry operators were kept informed about security issues and
emergency matters by DOT and then TSA personnel through initiatives and
communications pathways such as HITRAC, Highway Watch, First Observer
(which has no motorcoach module) and the Homeland Security Information
Network (HSIN) to name a few. These and other regular sources of
information ceased to provide updated security information to the
motorcoach industry in the middle of 2007 and have not been
reactivated. Our industry now relies solely on information from the
Department of Homeland Security Infrastructure Protection private
sector liaison officer. But it is ABA's belief that it and its members
still lack vital information and no security program can be sustained
if it is starved of up-to-date and accurate information. The industry
does not receive any information on possible threats in which our
expertise would be useful and perhaps vital. As one example, ABA notes
a recent incident aboard a private motorcoach in Portsmouth, New
Hampshire in which TSA specifically informed ABA that the association
would not receive any information relating to the incident. The reason
given was that the agency official ``did not believe in broadcasting
threats''. The industry was left to watch the events unfold on the
news. The partnership the industry had is now decidedly one-sided and
ABA believes this turn of events is a detriment to the industry, the
agency, and the public.
Finally, ABA is concerned about the duplicative security efforts by
two separate Federal agencies. Motorcoach companies currently undergo
safety audits conducted by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA) to determine the carriers' fitness to operate.
The TSA intends to establish a separate, parallel program to conduct
security audits using its own cadre of TSIs. ABA's concern with this
proposal is a matter of the proper use of resources. FMCSA and State
safety inspectors operating under the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance
Program (MCSAP) conducted some 3,300 so-called compliance reviews on
motorcoach companies between 2005 and 2008. In addition, it also
conducts Security Contact Reviews (SCRs). This SCR program was
previously called Security Sensitivity Visits (SSVs), of which FMCSA
conducted approximately 30,000 between October 2001 and April 2002.
These SCRs are primarily directed towards hazardous materials carriers
that fit certain criteria, but they fundamentally include an assessment
and verification of a company's security posture. In 2009, FMCSA
conducted 1,958 security contact reviews. The FMCSA is funded at the
level of $400 million per year for safety inspections. Furthermore, the
FMCSA and the States' inspectors are generally very familiar with bus
companies operations. In sharp contrast, only 15 corporate security
reviews were conducted by TSA on motorcoach companies from 2005-2008.
It is safe to say that TSA inspectors, no matter how well trained, will
not have the level of knowledge of the bus industry as their FMCSA
colleagues.
From the ABA's perspective, safety and security are not mutually
exclusive. Security is a component of safety. ABA made this concern
known to TSA through comments submitted to the public docket on this
issue in August of 2009, a copy of those comments are appended to this
testimony. Also, appended to our comments is a copy of TSA's response
to our filing. ABA continues to insist that there is no reason why the
Corporate Security review process cannot be incorporated into the FMCSA
safety process. It appears to ABA that it would take less funding to
increase the scope of the FMCSA program than to fund a new separate
program. In addition, the risks attendant with maintaining a separate
data base that comes with a separate program is eliminated.
Since 9/11 the ABA has been in the first rank of the transportation
industry stakeholders who have put security at the top of the list of
concerns. Right after 9/11 the ABA incorporated security as a prime
duty of the ABA's Bus Industry Safety Council (BISC), the ABA funded
organization that is comprised of the safety and security directors of
ABA member companies. Our members never forget that they are
transporting someone's children, grandparents, or breadwinner to work,
home, medical care or on vacation. We want to do everything we can to
ensure that our passengers, employees, and citizens stay as safe and
secure as possible. The ABA wants to assure you, Chairman Jackson Lee,
and the Members of the committee of our willingness to work with you at
every turn.
Thank you and I am happy to answer any questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the witnesses for their
testimony. As we proceed with our questions, I would like to
remind each of us who are here today that we will have 5
minutes to question the panel. I would like to start by
recognizing myself.
Mr. Hart, you caught us by surprise with that innovative
suggestion, but that is what Congress is all about, and I look
forward to questioning you about that.
Chief Lambert, your transit authority--and we are glad that
you accepted our invitation, because we are creating a record
that will allow us to proceed in our efforts to pass surface
transportation legislation and have the President sign it. Your
transit authority operates bus and rail systems in a large
metropolitan area, servicing hundreds of square miles. From
what you have observed, do you think TSA has adequate resources
in the field to fulfill the mission of the inspection programs?
Chief Lambert. No, ma'am, I do not.
Ms. Jackson Lee. In your thinking of that, you are asking
TSA--when I say that, by speaking to Congress--that more
inspectors, more resources over a certain period of time or
right away needs to be in place?
Chief Lambert. Madam Chairwoman, I think a couple of things
need to happen. Again, I think you have to look at it from a
systems approach. I think really defining roles and
responsibilities and the reporting relationship is critical.
Again, this is a challenging job, and so I recognize that and
fully support TSA in trying to do the right thing. I always
want to come from that standpoint.
But I think defining roles and responsibilities, fixing
organizational reporting relationships, answering whether or
not it should be mode-specific until you get the opportunity to
go through cross-training that then can be multimodal in
approach. Once you do that, then, in my view, you get the
opportunity to get the relationship of what is the right fit
and what is the right size, are the staff resources necessary
to deliver that core business mission. I think it is very
important to make sure that there is clear understanding of
that mission and those definitions of roles and
responsibilities before you really, in my view, can get to what
those resource needs may be.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I know that you have a number of National
organizations that you are involved in. I also know that TSA or
DHS has included you on a number of discussions, and I would
hope that it would be TSA, but I would think working with
surface transportation leaders around the country would be
helpful as well on how we can further design a security system.
Chief Lambert. Madam Chairwoman, I agree with you. I
actually had an opportunity to talk with Mr. Kair before the
hearing started, and I look forward to having more discussion
with him as well. I look forward to do so.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We will focus our attention and maybe
create opportunities and encourage those opportunities to take
place.
Chief Lambert. Thank you, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Unlike airports where security is largely
Federalized, the local transit and law enforcement agencies
bear the brunt of implementing effective security programs for
surface transportation. As we discuss moving forward TSA's
program, I would like to know what your major resource
operational challenges are and how TSA can use inspectors with
proper surface experience and expertise to help you.
Would you also comment on trying to wire or make
interoperable your buses in Houston with respect to your bus
operators and the resources that may be needed in doing that?
Chief Lambert. Madam Chairwoman, as you know, I would
always take the position that training front-line employees is
extremely critical to ensuring the safety and security of
transit systems. I think we really understand those individuals
that know the nature of what is out of what place when it is
out of place is the front-line employee. So TSA in the past did
a very good job, I believe, in fast-track training, giving an
opportunity to fund operators, front-line employees that go
through training, police employees who go through training. We
are now extending that to maintenance employees that we believe
should have a role and responsibility in that as well. I would
hope that TSA would continue to look at fast-track training
opportunities to get that training out to front-line employees.
Second, they have been very good in working with us where
we have clearly set a qualitative competitive project to get
funding. Cameras on buses, as you know, Madam Chairwoman, give
us an opportunity to really leverage the technology and really
a multiplying effect of how that assists boots-on-the-ground in
securing systems. So we are very supportive of that technology,
and continuing to look at that and working with them to get
best practices across the country that can be leveraged out to
other systems that can be applied and used. So they have been
very good with that.
The VIPR Program that exists today came about through the
leveraging of the Peer Advisory Group members and working
previously with Administrator Hawley. There were some
disconnects initially; but at meetings at headquarters, the
practitioners in the field came to work with TSA to say, this
is how we think it can work better. John O'Connor, the chief
from Amtrak, really kind of worked the model that TSA accepted.
Now most systems across the country are using that model. So
VIPR has been a very important tool.
But the real thrust, in my view, is making sure that before
ultimate strategic decisions are made that are going to be
applied on the local level, that that global thinking involves
practitioners in the field that can help influence win/win
situations that have a direct benefit to securing the traveling
public. We think that is very important where practitioners
stay a part of that process.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Quickly, bus communication.
Chief Lambert. Interoperable communications. As you know,
mass transit assists community not just in helping us move
people safely and regionally through the community every day,
it is a mobility management tool, it is also an emergency
management tool.
In our area we have hurricanes and natural disasters.
Public transit supports evacuation of community members with
special needs. They need assistance to get out of their homes
to safe locations and ultimately to areas of last resort where
you need to do that. It is critical to have interoperable
communications, we believe. So we have worked very hard with
the county structure in our region to make sure that our
communications system is tied into that interoperable
communications network, and we will continue to expand upon
that in the future. We think that is the right approach.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you very much.
I am going to yield to the gentleman from Mississippi, the
Chairman. The gentleman is recognized.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
One of the things that is a goal of the committee and, we
hope, the Department is to make what we do a seamless
transaction so there is really no difference between aviation,
mass transit, and all of these other things. But as you know,
as far as your area, we have been a little slow out of the
chute, to be quite blunt. But what we want to do now after we
have put focus on it, we want to do it the right way.
One of the things that we want to be sure, and I think I
heard it in your testimony, as an operator, Mr. Lambert, you
have been involved in discussions, from a planning perspective,
from TSA's perspective, and I would hope that some of your
suggestions have been not only solicited, but taken to heart. I
would hope that your nodding kind of tells me that you are
comfortable with that process at this point?
Chief Lambert. Mr. Chairman, again, I want to compliment
the Mass Transit Division and the Transportation Security
Network staff that I do most of coordination with. They have
been a group that has been very open to the industry. They have
been very open to, and I guess we have a view that there is a
relationship that has been developed that issues are very
easily put on the table, and they are challenged, and it is
okay to disagree. The end result is by having open dialogue and
honest dialogue and candid dialogue, the end result is you get
an end resolution that tends to come about for consensus sake.
That is a good thing, I think. So I want to compliment them for
that. They have allowed us to participate, and we look forward
to continuing to do so.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Hart, do you want to respond to what
involvement your trade group has had?
Mr. Hart. Well, we have tried to work with TSA. We have had
less success than Chief Lambert with the Sector Coordinating
Council. It seems that they set it up and then largely forgot
about us and what we do.
Let me here agree with Chief Lambert. I think it is
critically important that the front-line people of any
organization, be it private bus or mass transit or train--just
as an aside, my brother is a serving police officer and his
main mantra always is, ``Read the streets,'' and only the
person on the streets every day can read the streets and know
what is there, and that is the frontline personnel of whatever
industry we are talking about. I think that is where TSA misses
a bet with the private bus industry is we don't hear from TSA.
We have suggestions. We have good people. ABA a couple of
years ago did a Train the Trainers Program, which we could at
that time under the grant program. That worked very well. We
got lots of suggestions. We passed them up the line, but we
don't seem to get any feedback from TSA about next steps, what
we need to do, what we need to do together. That is missing.
Mr. Thompson. I guess that is part of what I am trying to
get at. Is this like an effort every day then with your
organization, or is there a standard meeting?
Mr. Hart. There is a standard meeting. Sector Coordinating
Council is a stood-up organization. It meets regularly. But
again, we get suggestions, we give suggestions, and then we
don't seem to hear from TSA.
Mr. Thompson. I think we can help you a little bit with
that. If you would, if there is some outstanding issues that
you have with TSA, please provide that information to us, and
we will be more than happy to work with you on it.
Mr. Hart. Thank you.
Mr. Thompson. The other point I am trying to get at is,
going forward, do you see a need to do anything else from a
communications standpoint with TSA?
Mr. Hart. We have a couple of issues. One, I agree with
Chief Lambert, we don't think that TSA has near enough
resources that it needs. I was a little taken aback to realize
they only had 200 inspectors. That, to me, is amazing. There
are almost 40,000 motorcoaches alone in the United States.
There are maybe 150,000 school buses in the United States. It
is amazing to think that those 200 inspectors working 24/7
could do the job. So I think that certainly resources are part
of the problem.
Also, I think our culture, and maybe the Chief doesn't see
it as much as we do, where the private industry is seen like,
well, you guys are an irritant; we will call you when we need
you. I think that is wrong.
Chief Lambert. Mr. Chairman, I would like to build off of
that as well, if I may, because there are opportunities in the
future. I will use this as a perfect example. I mentioned
earlier the Peer Advisory Group that TSA mass transit started
several years ago. We actually had a conference call, which was
our monthly conference call, today, earlier before the hearing,
and we got into a discussion about surface transportation
inspectors. What I found fascinating, one of the chiefs on the
line made the comment, what is lacking here is the surface
transportation inspector focus on the things we were talking
about in the peer group.
So I think there is an opportunity. They have to be brought
into the mass transit arena of what role they are going to play
in supporting mass transit's capability to secure systems. When
you get into vulnerability assessments and you get into base
assessments, and then you get into the actions to address those
problems, they are going to be part of that resolution, and
they need to be a part of the conversation collectively, where
are we going from there.
Mr. Thompson. That is why I think the committee's approach
is we want to get it right. There is no better way to get it
right than to deal with the people tasked with the
responsibility of moving the public and all of that.
I don't want us, TSA, to just be a top-down, tell people
what to do, and end of story. I am looking for the back and
forth and the sharing of ideas to come up with the best ideas.
I hope, Madam Chairwoman, we can continue to promote this.
I asked the question about the 200 inspectors because I
know in my heart of hearts it is not enough. The 400 is not
enough. So we are still short, and it takes too long even to
bring 200 more on. I am not certain what the magic is, but we
will get into that a little later. So we will look at that.
We don't want the regulatory burden to become a financial
burden on the industry. To the extent we can do best practices
and some other things and make that a part of the regimen, I
think we are going to accomplish what we want.
I agree with you, the men and women who work for you can
probably spot things when they are out of place, but we need to
have them know what they need to do once they see it. So that
kind of training is, I think, part of the real thing that we
have to do as far as a panic button or communication or
something to just let somebody else up the chain know that
there is a potential problem. So I hear you.
Madam Chairwoman, I think we are onto something. We need to
make sure that as we look beyond aviation, we don't set up some
real issues to prevent the traveling public from being as
secure with these modes of transportation as we have done with
aviation.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let me just say, Mr. Chairman, thank
you. I think you have framed our marching orders, and I want
the witnesses to know that you probably provided the most
provocative testimony. I made the decision to hold this
hearing, albeit that we are in the midst of several overlapping
matters to finish up. I wanted this hearing in July so we would
be able to spend the next weeks looking seriously at your
testimony and looking at the needs. You have indicated that we
have to get moving, get going, along with our new
administrator.
Mr. Hart, if I can get an answer from you. You said
something, and I know that you didn't say it cavalierly, but it
needs to be restated: 40,000 motorcoaches and then add on
school buses.
Mr. Hart. One hundred fifty thousand school buses, and I
can't even guess how many transit buses there are.
Ms. Jackson Lee. There has to be immediate attention given
to the number of surface transportation inspectors and the
recognition that that represents a vulnerable, if you will,
aspect of our security. Is that not right, Mr. Hart? Do you
want to comment on that?
Mr. Hart. Well, I think you are right on, Madam Chairwoman.
We do need to really get on that issue.
During the summer, 1,000 tourist buses, tour buses, come to
the District of Columbia alone every summer carrying 53
passengers per bus. That is each summer, 1,000. That is just
one city. We have to find better ways to make sure that the
infrastructure is protected.
The grant program that Congress has put together is
certainly one thing that works very well. We like that. Some of
my members have done kill switches on their buses with that.
Some have also instituted communications between emergency
first responders and dispatch. So there is any number of things
we need to try and keep trying that work out, and we just need
to start. We need to start somewhere and go from there.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Hart, Chief Lambert, you have given
this committee--as you well know, this is a record testimony.
Let me just say we are going to begin to move the process. I
know you have good relationships with TSA. We are not trying to
suggest that that is not the case, but we also have a new
administrator. We are going to look at some institutionalized
ways of those who engage in surface transportation security to
have the interaction that is necessary. Certainly, Mr. Hart, on
the buses, Chief Lambert is looking at a rail system and a
transit--a bus transit system, but certainly on the buses, we
know that we have much to do. Needless to say, any of us who
have read stories about suicide bombers on bus transportation,
maybe not in the United States, we are not trying to give
ideas, but it has happened. We need to be conscious, current,
and ready to address the needs you have expressed.
Let me thank you gentlemen for your testimony, and
certainly we want to express the fact that it is valuable
testimony, and we appreciate the questions that have been
asked. The Members of the subcommittee may have additional
questions for the witnesses, and we ask that you respond to
them expeditiously in writing. I would also suggest if you have
additional information that you would like to submit to the
committee, we would welcome it. We would include it as part of
the record.
Hearing no further business, the subcommittee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:59 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Questions From Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas for Lee R. Kair
Question 1a. The OIG report made recommendations for how TSA could
better utilize Assistant Federal Security Directors for Surface (AFSD-
Surface).\1\ In fact, these AFSDs provided critical information to OIG,
including tasking and morale issues highlighted in the report. Yet,
months after the report was released, TSA removed every sitting AFSD-
Surface from their post, and abolished the position altogether.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Office of Inspector General, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Rep. No.
OIG-09-24, Effectiveness of TSA's Surface Transportation Security
Inspectors (2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When did TSA inform OIG that it was eliminating this position? Did
TSA ever provide OIG with any explanation or analysis explaining how
elimination of the AFSD-Surface position would impact resolution of the
third recommendation? Please provide all correspondence with OIG
relating to this matter.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) informed
the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) that it eliminated the
position of Assistant Federal Security Director--Surface (AFSD-S) and
created the Regional Security Inspector (RSI) for Surface positions in
its June 2010 update to the OIG report 09-24 issued in February 2009.
The establishment of the RSI positions occurred in January 2010.
Therefore, TSA informed OIG of the establishment of the RSI position in
the first regular progress report following the decision to implement
the restructuring. As a general business practice, TSA keeps OIG
updated of its efforts to address OIG report recommendations through
the regular reporting process and does not necessarily consult with OIG
prior to implementing internal organizational or staffing changes. The
elimination of the AFSD-S position, which was done concurrently with
the creation of RSIs for Surface, created uniformity in field reporting
lines, while also increasing headquarters oversight. These changes
directly addressed the thrust of the OIG's third recommendation to
``[e]liminate practices that undermine efforts to establish a more
transparent chain of command'' for Transportation Security Inspectors--
Surface (TSIs-S).
attachment
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Response to Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) ``Draft Report, Effectiveness of TSA's
Surface Transportation Security Inspectors'', September 2008
Progress Report (July 2010)
TSA generally concurs with and has already taken steps to address
several of OIG's recommendations. TSA's specific responses to the
recommendations contained in this report are:
Recommendation 1.--Assess how Visible Intermodal Prevention and
Response (VIPR) exercises can better use Transportation Security
Inspectors (TSI) resources and inspection initiatives, then develop and
execute a plan to conduct VIPR exercises that integrate inspection
activities.
TSA Partially Concurs.--TSA recognizes the importance of
integrating the TSIs and their unique expertise in mass transit and
rail into VIPR operations. TSIs routinely engage with their mass
transit and rail counterparts when conducting Baseline Assessment for
Security Enhancement (BASE) reviews in mass transit and passenger rail
and Security Action Item (SAI) reviews in freight rail. TSIs enhance
the effectiveness of VIPR deployments by sharing their expertise in
local transit system security issues during VIPR planning and
deployment. TSA has addressed the potential role of TSIs in the VIPR
Team Capabilities and Operational Deployment guide, which assists mass
transit and passenger rail security officials as well as FSDs and FAM
SACs in the collaborative planning and coordination process for VIPR
operations.
TSA agrees that TSI expertise should be used during VIPR planning
and deployment. Prior to a VIPR operation, TSIs should brief other VIPR
team members on security vulnerabilities that they have identified
during the BASE and SAI reviews and interact with mass transit and rail
personnel. TSA does not concur with the recommendation that TSIs'
comprehensive inspection be integrated into VIPR operations. Doing so
would fundamentally alter the nature and meaning of these operations.
VIPRs are intended to supplement existing security activities at a mass
transit or passenger rail agency by randomly and unpredictably
integrating TSA's capabilities for an added deterrent effect.
Update (August 2009)
The TSA has taken additional steps to enhance coordination efforts
specific to TSI-Surface involvement in VIPR operations. The TSA has
dedicated two TSI-Surface positions to the VIPR Joint Coordination
Center (JCC) located at the Freedom Center. The primary responsibility
of this position is to coordinate with OLE/FAMS specifically in the
reviewing of VIPR Draft Operational Plans (DOPs) that are submitted
from the field. In doing so, the TSIs ensure that Surface TSIs are
appropriately integrated into surface-related VIPR operations and
identifies areas where their expertise would prove beneficial.
Additionally, the Office of Security Operations (OSO) is in the process
of identifying additional staff, including at the senior level that
will be assigned full-time to VIPR Surface operations. This will
greatly enhance VIPR planning and coordination efforts specifically as
it pertains to the utilization of OSO resources (includes TSIs).
With regard to the TSI-Surface role in VIPR operations, the TSA
continues to identify areas where TSIs can provide added value to the
team. For example, TSI-Surface has provided Station Profiles, BASE
reviews, and other assessment-related documentation pertaining to the
transportation entity where the operation is taking place. This assists
VIPR team members in enhancing their domain awareness during the
operation. Additionally, TSIs continue to provide the surface
transportation subject matter expertise to VIPR teams before and during
deployments.
Update (July 2010)
With the expansion of the FAMS VIPR program from 15 to 25 dedicated
teams in fiscal year 2010, TSA has assigned one primary senior TSI-
Surface official to each team. Their role is to provide surface
transportation expertise to the teams that did not previously exist.
The TSI-Surface involvement varies by location, from acting as the
designated VIPR coordinator for non-aviation VIPR activity to actively
participating in the planning and/or execution of VIPR operations. The
TSI-Surface assignments will be rotated among the surface inspectors at
each of the 25 TSA dedicated VIPR team locations on a 60- to 90-day
schedule. This provides for work role expansion for each of the TSIs
while allowing for practical application of inspector skills and
training when not assigned to the dedicated VIPR team.
TSA also has expanded the full-time representation of TSI-Surface
officials for National-level VIPR planning, coordination, and
deployment. The full-time TSI-Surface staff is located in the VIPR
Joint Coordination Center, and includes two TSI-Surface staff and one
Supervisory TSI-Surface official. These officials join the Office of
Security Operations VIPR Branch Chief, who was added to the Joint
Coordination Center in January 2010.
The addition of these personnel has greatly increased the level of
surface transportation experience for VIPR operations, and also adds
important surface transportation perspectives into the planning and
coordinating VIPR deployments. For example, TSI-Surface staffers
assigned to dedicated VIPR teams carry out comprehensive security
surveys of rail stations and verify physical security measures already
in place. The station profile data are an integral part of an
initiative currently underway to enhance and improve the VIPR
deployment planning, operations, and reporting processes.
Recommendation 2.--Determine how many inspectors are needed to
perform necessary functions by assessing current and future duties,
then expand TSI workforce to ensure that each field office has
sufficient staffing.
TSA Concurs.--TSA has already developed and implemented a prudent,
risk-based approach that has produced a flexible, mobile force,
affording the agency the ability to maximize TSI coverage around the
country while supplementing many FSD staffs that have no surface
inspectors. By deploying inspectors to new locations, TSA is crafting a
surface security inspection and support network that is better able to
respond to local and regional surface incidents and increased
assessment work throughout additional cities and regions. Assigning a
minimum of two inspectors per office ensures the capability to meet
security assessment, inspection, and support demands while maintaining
operational safety.
Update (August 2009)
The TSA has hired a contractor to perform a formal comprehensive
staffing study of the entire inspection workforce, to include surface.
It was initiated in the second quarter of fiscal year 2009 with the
results due to TSA in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2009 (they are
not yet final as of the date of this update). The study has the
following objectives: (1) Analyze the current placement of inspectors,
supervisors, and Assistant Federal Security Directors (Inspections and
Surface) based on location, work volume, and threat; (2) identify
optimal placement of inspector resources based on current and future
needs; and (3) determine optimal ratios of inspectors and supervisors
based on current assignments and predicted future needs. The results of
the study will allow TSA to better plan future staffing needs and
deployments of TSI-Surface resources, and will inform future budget
requests.
The TSA was appropriated funds in fiscal year 2009 to hire an
additional fifty TSI-Surface. The TSA continued to use a risk-based
deployment approach when determining work locations for these
resources. With the exception of two FTE, which were allocated to open
one new field office, all other appropriated FTE were used to increase
staffing existing field office. The TSA currently only has two one-
person offices, with all others having a minimum of two inspectors.
However, a majority of the field offices (over two-thirds) have three
or more TSI-Surface assigned.
To support one- or two-person offices, the STSIP has successfully
been able to augment resources in smaller offices with resources from
other larger offices when the need arises. Several of the two-person
offices are located in close proximity to other larger field offices,
which can provide prompt support if needed. Additionally, the STSIP has
a team of TSI-Surface at headquarters that can be deployed to the field
if necessary.
The STSIP has also provided training to other TSIs (such as
Aviation) and FSDs at the Railroad Operations training course in
Pueblo, CO. While this training does not qualify a TSI-A as a TSI-S, it
does allow a TSI-A to work alongside a TSI-Surface in the rail
environment in order to provide additional eyes and ears for safety
reasons, as well as an added presence for operational security
purposes. Therefore, should one TSI-Surface from a two-person office
not be available to perform field work for some reason, a TSI-A that
has been trained at Pueblo could be used in a back-up capacity and
support the TSI-S as he/she would have a level of safety orientation to
the rail environment. However, it has been the guidance of the STSIP
that non-surface TSIs should not perform field activities in rail
environments that pose safety concerns without being accompanied by a
TSI-Surface.
Update (July 2010)
All modes in the Compliance Office, including the STSIP, recently
completed a data analysis in coordination with the Office of Human
Capital to determine inspector allocation requirements. The data
analysis is in the final stages of development, with an anticipated
outcome and corresponding implementation in fiscal year 2011.
The total number of inspectors needed to carry out and enforce new
regulations that will be established as a result of 9/11 Act
requirements is also evaluated in conjunction with the development of
the Notice of Proposed Rule-makings (NPRMs), which are currently in
process. Data such as number and locations of entities covered and the
depth of the regulatory requirements is a driving factor in determining
the inspection numbers required to ensure compliance. Once the NPRMs
are published, a final request for additional inspector positions based
on the data analysis will be forwarded through official budget
channels.
In anticipation of the need to train new inspectors, TSA has
partnered with other Federal agencies and stakeholders to obtain buses,
rail cars, and build infrastructure at the Surface Transportation
Security Training Center (STSTC), located at the Transportation
Technology Center in Pueblo, Colorado. TSA has assigned five personnel
to develop the curriculum and training material for the STSTC. TSA will
be well-positioned to determine the number of inspectors required using
the model and provide training once the final rule is established.
Lastly, with the additional surface inspector positions allocated
in fiscal year 2010, there will no longer be any field offices that are
staffed with only one inspector. All offices will be staffed with a
minimum of two.
Recommendation 3.--Place the Transportation Security Inspectors--
Surface under the direct authority of a TSA headquarters official such
as the Office of Security Operations' Assistant General Manager for
Compliance.
TSA Does Not Concur.--As stated in TSA's response to the DHS OIG
report titled Transportation Security Administration's Administration
and Coordination of Mass Transit Security Programs and as described in
this response, TSA does not agree that the present TSI command
structure inhibits TSI effectiveness. The reporting line of all TSIs in
field assignments is to designated FSDs who report to the General
Manager for Field Operations, Office of Security Operations (OSO). The
FSDs are the operational field component of OSO and are charged with
the implementation of all field operational activities. TSA has chosen
this command structure because FSDs are better equipped to use the
security network in their area. FSDs frequently interact with State and
local law enforcement and mass transit operators. They understand the
vulnerabilities and challenges of the mass transit modes in their
backyard. TSA has adopted this network decision-making model in all
modes of transportation, including its other inspection divisions in
aviation and cargo. This approach recognizes the need for regional and
localized strategies to enhance prevention, detection, response, and
recovery efforts based on accurate and thorough domain awareness,
strong professional networks and relationships with local security
officials, and consistent and clear reporting lines to the local FSD.
OSO's Office of Compliance oversees the Surface Transportation
Security Inspection Program (STSIP) and directs the work plan,
training, and other aspects of field inspector activity. The STSIP
office informs FSDs of TSI priorities and programs in several ways,
including dissemination of an annual work plan written by the STSIP in
close coordination with Office of Transportation Security Network
Management, and via written directives and communications distributed
through the OSO Leveraging Information, Networks, and Communications
(LINC) system (formerly Net Hub). Additionally, FSDs are kept informed
of key activities and programs of the TSIs Nationally by a written
report issued weekly by the STSIP office. AFSDs-Surface participate in
weekly or bi-weekly National conference calls hosted by the STSIP
office and informs FSDs within their respective regions of new
processes in STSIP programs. AFSDs-Surface and local lead TSIs are
required to attend FSD meetings and routinely report STSIP activities
to FSDs. In summary, the reporting lines are clear, as detailed in
Operational Directive 400-54-3 and published specifically for this
purpose, and the flow of information from Headquarters to FSDs is
efficient and comprehensive on the priority activities of TSIs-Surface
in security inspections, assessments, and support.
Update (August 2009)
The TSA continues to enhance the communication and coordination
between the STSIP and the FSD and their staffs in the field. The STSIP
held a series of twelve regional training sessions from December 2008
through May of 2009. The regional training sessions were held for the
FSD inspection staffs which include TSI-Surface, AFSD-Surface, as well
as Assistant Federal Security Directors for Inspections (AFSD-Is) that
have TSI-Surface assigned to them. The sessions instructed attendees on
the latest STSIP programs and initiatives, including the Highway
Corporate Security Review (CSR) process, the STSIP Assessment Tool, and
49 CFR Part 1580 (recently issued rail security regulations), among
other topics.
Additionally, the TSA continues to send FSDs to the Executive
Railroad Operations training course located at the Transportation
Technology Center in Pueblo, CO. FSDs that have TSI-Surface assigned to
them must attend the course. The course provides FSDs with a detailed
overview of STSIP functions, including field activities and performance
goals, as well as general background on the rail industry and safety.
Seventy-nine FSDs attended this training from 2007 through 2008. At the
conclusion of the August session of the Executive Railroad Operations
training, TSA will have trained all FSDs and Deputy FSDs at the SES
level, as well as all non-SES level FSDs who work in the twenty largest
rail/mass transit environments Nation-wide.
With regard to OIG's concern regarding the command structure and
specifically the dual tasking of TSI-Surface from STSIP and FSDs, it
should be clarified that the STSIP does not directly task FSDs or TSIs
in the field. Formal requests for field activity originating from the
STSIP are routed up through OSO leadership and are generally
disseminated from leadership to FSDs through the OSO Communications
Network (formerly the Leveraging Information, Networks, and
Communication (LINC) and NETHUB). The STSIP holds monthly
teleconferences in an effort to enhance communication with FSDs and
Surface Inspector Supervisors. The STSIP continues to communicate
significant program information through FSDs to the field via its
monthly reports as well as the Office of Compliance's periodic
conference calls.
OSO has also taken steps to ensure that significant policy or
program decisions pertaining to the TSI-Surface workforce are generally
funneled through the FSD Advisory Council for feedback and
recommendation. The FSD Advisory Council ensures that the FSDs are
fully represented in and able to contribute to the decision-making
process on such issues.
Lastly, AFSD-Surface, as well as representatives from the STSIP at
headquarters, continue to regularly attend regional FSD conferences to
brief FSDs on the latest developments and programs relating to the TSI-
Surface workforce and its mission.
Recommendation 3 (Revised).--Eliminate practices that undermine
efforts to establish a more transparent chain of command. Instruct the
STSIP office to direct new policies and actions to FSDs for
implementation and require FSDs to solicit comments from AFSDs prior to
hiring surface inspectors.
(Indicate TSA Concurs: or TSA Non-concurs:) If we non-concur,
provide reasons why? If we concur, provide what we will do to
implement.
June 2010 Update
Response.--TSA Partially Concurs. Since issuance of this revised
recommendation in February 2009, the TSA has taken steps to establish a
more transparent chain of command. In January 2010, the TSA realigned
reporting structure of Transportation Security Inspectors--Surface
(TSI-S) in the field, placing them under the supervision of the local
Assistant Federal Security Director for Inspections (AFSD-I) that
reports to the local Federal Security Director (FSD). This resulted in
a greater uniformity and clarity in reporting lines from location to
location, and further aligned the TSI-Surface position with TSA's
overall field organizational structure. The TSA eliminated the
Assistant Federal Security Director for Surface (AFSD-Surface)
position, which was source of reporting line ambiguity as some TSI-
Surface reported to and AFSD-Surface, while others reported to an AFSD-
I. Concurrent with abolishing the AFSD-Surface position, the TSA
created the Regional Security Inspector--Surface (RSI-Surface)
position. The RSIs are charged with ensuring consistent and effective
regional implementation of surface inspection programs.
The TSA does not concur with OIG's recommendation that the STSIP
office direct new policies to FSDs for implementation and require FSDs
to solicit comments from AFSDs prior to hiring surface inspectors. The
STSIP office does not direct FSD policy, and doing so would not be
consistent with agency protocols in place. If such an action were to be
performed, generally direction would come from the General Manager for
Field Operations (with support provided by the General Manager,
Compliance Programs) within the Office of Security Operations.
Additionally, the FSD establishes local hiring protocols for his/her
area as the senior TSA executive in charge of transportation security.
Requiring the FSD to solicit comments from a subordinate AFSD is
unnecessary and inappropriate. Often the local AFSD is already involved
in the hiring of local inspectors, so generally speaking this
recommendation is superfluous. (OSO/Compliance--Carl Ciccarello and Dan
Tragesser)
Question 1b. Please explain why TSA abolished the position in
direct contradiction to the OIG's recommendations.
Answer. While TSA did not concur fully with the OIG recommendation,
TSA did agree that a more transparent chain of command was needed for
TSIs-S. As a result, TSA strongly considered the OIG recommendation in
establishing the RSI positions. The RSI position for the surface
program is more independent with strengthened modal expertise, compared
to the former AFSD-S position. Eliminating the AFSD-S position and
concurrently creating RSIs for Surface also produced uniformity in
field reporting lines of TSIs-S, eliminated areas of confusion in TSI-S
tasking, and increased headquarters oversight of field surface
inspection activities. By establishing the position with a direct
reporting line to headquarters and a dotted line to the Area Directors
(ADs), the RSI for Surface has greater influence over the surface
program in his/her geographic Area of Responsibility (AOR). TSA
believes this new organizational structure addresses the core concern
of OIG's third recommendation rather than contradicting it.
Question 1c. Please indicate what happened to each of the existing
Surface AFSDs when the position was eliminated, including whether each
individual assumed the duties and title of the new AFSD-Inspections
position; had to re-apply for a different position; retired, early or
otherwise; was demoted in pay band, seniority, or responsibility; or
any other process or change each employee has undergone due to the
abolishment of the position.
Answer.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Former AFSDs-Surface (12 total) Employment Action Responsibility Change New Title
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFSD-Surface No. 1............... N/A--Retired............. N/A..................... N/A.
AFSD-Surface No. 2............... Demoted in Pay Band--K to Lost regional Supervisory TSI (STSI)
J (retained pay). responsibilities. with local
responsibilities.
AFSD-Surface No. 3............... Remained K Band.......... RSI w/ regional Regional Security
responsibilities. Inspector, Northeast.
AFSD-Surface No. 4............... Demoted in Pay Band--K to Lost regional Supervisory TSI (STSI)
J (retained pay). responsibilities. with local
responsibilities.
AFSD-Surface No. 5............... Remained K Band.......... RSI National Coordinator RSI National
Coordinator.
AFSD-Surface No. 6............... Remained K Band.......... RSI w/ regional Regional Security
responsibilities. Inspector, Southeast.
AFSD-Surface No. 7............... Transfer/Remained K Band. Supervise TSI-Surface at VIPR JCC Supervisor.
Joint Coordination
Center (JCC).
AFSD-Surface No. 8............... Remained K Band.......... RSI w/ regional Regional Security
responsibilities. Inspector, North
Central, resigning 9/
2010.
AFSD-Surface No. 9............... Remained K Band.......... RSI w/ regional Regional Security
responsibilities. Inspector, South
Central.
AFSD-Surface No. 10.............. Remained K Band.......... RSI w/ regional Regional Security
responsibilities. Inspector, Northwest.
AFSD-Surface No. 11.............. Remained J Band (was only Lost regional Voluntarily accepted an
J-Band AFSD-Surface). responsibilities. I Band TSI-Surface
Position at new
Location.
AFSD-Surface No. 12.............. Remained K Band.......... RSI w/ regional Regional Security
responsibilities. Inspector, Southwest.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: A selection board was convened, resumes were reviewed, and interviews were conducted for the RSI
positions. Only former AFSD-S personnel were eligible for the RSI positions, with the exception of AFSD-S No.
11 who was not eligible.
Question 2a. With respect to the second recommendation in the OIG
report, TSA stated that it has developed and implemented a prudent,
risk-based approach that has produced a flexible, mobile force,
affording the agency the ability to maximize TSI coverage around the
country while supplementing many FSD staffs that have no surface
inspectors' in the Management Comments to the Draft Report.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Id. at 31.
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Provide a detailed description of this approach, including an
explanation of how this approach accounts for each of the three
elements of risk threat, vulnerability, and consequence in order to
enhance surface transportation security, and specifically how this
approach satisfies or is consistent with subsections (b), (c), (d),
(g), and (h) of section 1304 of the Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act).\3\
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\3\ 6 U.S.C. 1113(b)-(d), (g)-(h).
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Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA's)
primary approach for allocating Transportation Security Inspectors--
Surface (TSIs-S) and opening new surface offices includes a scoring
system to prioritize office openings. At times, other qualitative
evidence is factored in to better serve surface transportation
security, based on geographic division of Areas of Responsibility
(AORs). While there are not enough resources to assign surface
inspectors to every Federal Security Director (FSD), Area Directors
(ADs) are directly involved in working AOR issues to ensure complete
oversight of regulated parties and comprehensive Visible Intermodal
Prevention and Response (VIPR) coverage. The approach considers four
key factors before assigning a final score:
1. Location within a High Threat Urban Area (HTUA);
2. Top 100 mass transit/passenger rail systems within the home
city;
3. Toxic Inhalation Hazardous (TIH) materials traffic flow within
that city/airport location; and
4. City/airport located in the Northeast Corridor (NEC).
Using the application of these factors, as of September 2010 TSA is
adding the additional 179 Transportation Security Inspectors (TSIs)
appropriate in fiscal year 2010 to offices throughout the country. The
additional positions will allow TSA to expand from 54 to 67 locations
Nation-wide.
Additionally, all programs in the TSA Office of Security Operations
Compliance Office, including the Surface Transportation Security
Inspector Program (STSIP), recently completed a data analysis in
coordination with the TSA Office of Human Capital to determine
inspector allocation requirements. The data analysis is in the final
stages of development, with an anticipated outcome and corresponding
implementation in fiscal year 2011. Careful consideration also is given
to workload demand. TSA evaluates and appropriately balances both risk
and workload demand in making resource allocation decisions.
This is consistent with section 1304 as inspectors have been
primarily positioned in locations throughout the country that optimizes
the agency's ability to directly support the surface transportation
security mission as defined in 1304(b) and under the authorities
outlined in 1304(c). With regards to sections 1304(g) and 1304(h)
(coordination and consultation), the TSA has periodically consulted
with mass transit and freight railroad modes, which are inspected under
49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1580. TSA holds monthly conference
calls with transit police and security officials who represent the
broader transit security community on the TSA Mass Transit Peer
Advisory Group. TSA also provides forum discussions and training to the
mass transit industry twice yearly as part of the National Transit
Security Round Table. Further consultation is conducted at periodic
meetings of the Transportation Sector Coordinating Council and at
regional Transportation Security Grant Working Group meetings. From
time to time, the duties, responsibilities, authorities, and mission of
the Transportation Security Inspectors--Surface (TSIs-S) and the
strategies to improve transportation security to ensure compliance with
transportation security requirements are discussed during these
activities. In the freight rail environment, the RSIs are specifically
assigned as corporate liaisons to all Class I and large regional
railroad stakeholders, which promotes a Nationally balanced approach to
regulatory compliance activities and operational issues for large
railroad corporate entities.
Question 2b. Provide a list and description of all risk
assessments, evaluations, consultants, or other formal processes used
by TSA to determine that a flexible, mobile force, affording the agency
the ability to maximize TSI coverage around the country while
supplementing many FSD staffs that have no surface inspectors, was the
best approach to strengthening security of surface transportation
systems under section 1304 of the 9/11 Act.\4\
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\4\ U.S.C. 1113. See 1113(h).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA's)
primary approach for allocating Transportation Security Inspectors--
Surface (TSIs-S) and opening new surface offices includes a risk-based
scoring system to prioritize office openings. At times, other
qualitative evidence is factored in to better serve surface
transportation security, based on geographic division of Areas of
Responsibility (AORs). While there are not enough resources to assign
surface inspectors to every Federal Security Director (FSD), Area
Directors (ADs) are directly involved in working AOR issues to ensure
complete oversight of regulated parties and comprehensive Visible
Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) coverage. The approach
considers four key factors before assigning a final score:
1. Location within a High Threat Urban Area (HTUA);
2. Top 100 mass transit/passenger rail systems within the home
city;
3. Toxic Inhalation Hazardous (TIH) materials traffic flow within
that city/airport location; and
4. City/airport located in the Northeast Corridor (NEC).
Question 3a. Please provide a detailed explanation, including any
relevant data collected through stakeholder outreach and other
appropriate mechanisms, of why TSA did not concur with the third OIG
recommendation, what sources or processes were used to determine that
TSA did not concur with the third recommendation, and the extent to
which TSA continues not to concur with the third recommendation.
Include a detailed explanation of the grounds on which TSA based
the decision to designate surface inspectors to report to Federal
Security Directors (FSDs), and state clearly whether any stakeholder
outreach or a comprehensive, risk-based analysis was conducted prior to
that decision.
Answer. The OIG's third recommendation (as referenced above) was to
``Place the Transportation Security Inspectors--Surface under the
direct authority of a TSA headquarters official such as the Office of
Security Operations Assistant General Manager for Compliance.'' The
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) considered the placement
of surface inspectors and decided the best approach to placement of
those assets was under the Federal Security Directors (FSDs). The FSDs
in the field are responsible for implementation of all operational
activities across all modes of transportation. TSA decided to integrate
surface inspectors into this command structure because FSDs are
equipped to leverage the security network in their areas. Additionally,
such a structure allows for maximum efficiencies and reduces
duplication of effort and ambiguity and overlap in roles and
responsibilities. The organization maintains strong National oversight
through the headquarters Office of Compliance and Regional Security
Inspector (RSI) positions, but allows local flexibility to address
local security concerns. This allows TSA to ensure the mission is
completed in the most effective and fiscally responsible manner, with
the greatest security benefit.
Question 3b. Include a detailed analysis of why FSDs are better
equipped to use the security network in their area for the purpose of
strengthening security of surface transportation systems, and why that
analysis is the best approach to carrying out section 1304 of the 9/11
Act.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Answer. TSA has chosen this command structure because FSDs are
better equipped to leverage the security network in their areas. FSDs
frequently interact with State and local law enforcement and mass
transit operators and understand the vulnerabilities and challenges of
the surface transportation modes in their areas of responsibility. TSA
has adopted this network decision-making model in all modes of
transportation, including its other inspection divisions in aviation
and cargo. This approach recognizes the need for regional and localized
strategies to enhance prevention, detection, response, and recovery
efforts across the supply chain based on accurate and thorough domain
awareness, strong professional networks and relationships with local
security officials, and consistent and clear reporting lines to the
local FSD. The organization maintains strong National oversight through
the headquarters Office of Compliance and Regional Security Inspector
(RSI) positions, but allows local flexibility to address local security
concerns. This allows TSA to ensure the mission is completed in the
most effective, efficient, and fiscally responsible manner, and
provides greater security benefits.
Question 3c. Indicate and elaborate on any evaluation programs or
assessment mechanisms conducted by TSA or another component of DHS that
have been implemented to ensure that surface inspectors are hired,
trained, deployed, and managed to the greatest extent possible in a
manner consistent with section 1304 of the
9/11 Act.\6\
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\6\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Answer. Since the program's inception, the STSIP's training program
has been one of the agency's training cornerstones. Using the
Department of Transportation's (DOT's) Transportation Safety Institute
(TSI) and the developing the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) Core inspector class, the training program has remained steady
and industry-current. Recently, TSA opened the new Surface
Transportation Training Center in Pueblo, Colorado. Two rail safety
courses are taught at the new facility and TSA is developing courses in
Advanced Rail Operations and Highway Motor Carriers Operations. This
new facility will allow TSA to ensure its inspector workforce is well-
trained and remains industry-current for years to come.
Question 4. How does the new organizational structure for the STSIP
that no longer aligns the inspection program and its chain of command
with the surface program offices ensure that the deployment of the
surface inspectors, as well as the information and findings they
obtain, are linked to the needs of and reported back to the respective
surface program offices? Please explain fully and be specific.
Answer. To provide more headquarters-driven oversight of the
Surface Transportation Security Inspection Program (STSIP), surface
resources were realigned in January 2010, establishing new Regional
Security Inspector (RSI) positions for surface. The RSIs report
directly to the Surface Inspection and Program Oversight branch within
the Office of Compliance at headquarters, instead of Federal Security
Directors (FSDs). TSA has adopted this network decision-making model in
all modes of transportation, including its other inspection divisions
in aviation and cargo, with headquarters providing the policy,
guidance, and oversight, and with implementation in the field. There is
one headquarters RSI Surface Coordinator and six field Surface RSIs,
who are positioned throughout the country to more easily provide on-
site oversight of surface inspection, assessment, and operational
activities. RSIs review inspection reports in the Performance and
Results Information System (PARIS) in an effort to track field office
performance in meeting work plan objectives, as well as to address any
inconsistencies or quality control issues. RSIs are also responsible
for compiling formal Compliance Oversight Reports for airport
locations, which provide comprehensive feedback to surface inspectors
and their supervisors on issues such as work plan accomplishment,
quality control, and overall problem areas that need to be addressed.
The RSIs are also assigned as corporate liaisons to all Class I and
large regional railroads, which promotes a Nationally balanced approach
to regulatory compliance activities and operational issues for large
railroad corporate entities.
Question 5a. Surface transportation stakeholders have raised
concerns about the lack of consistency and standardization in STSIP
field activities, particularly with respect to regulatory
interpretation and enforcement. TSA has stated the Regional Security
Inspectors (RSIs) appointed for the freight railroads will address this
problem.
Describe how often and in what form surface transportation
stakeholders have been consulted about TSA's Surface Transportation
Security Inspection Program (STSIP), and explain fully whether that
record of consultation is consistent with the consultation requirement
in section 1304 of the 9/11 Act.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Id. 1113(h).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Answer. In accordance with Section 1304(h) of the 9/11 Act, the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has periodically consulted
with mass transit and freight railroad modes, which are inspected under
49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1580. TSA holds monthly conference
calls with transit police and security officials who represent the
broader transit security community on the TSA Mass Transit Peer
Advisory Group. TSA also provides forum discussions and training to the
mass transit industry twice yearly as part of the National Transit
Security Round Table. Further consultation is conducted at periodic
meetings of the Transportation Sector Coordinating Council and at
regional Transportation Security Grant Working Group meetings. From
time to time, the duties, responsibilities, authorities, and mission of
the Transportation Security Inspectors--Surface (TSIs-S) and the
strategies to improve transportation security to ensure compliance with
transportation security requirements are discussed during these
activities. In the freight rail environment, the RSIs are specifically
assigned as corporate liaisons to all Class I and large regional
railroad stakeholders, which promotes a Nationally-balanced approach to
regulatory compliance activities and operational issues for large
railroad corporate entities.
Question 5b. Describe how TSA has deployed surface inspectors in
order to carry out the statutory requirement that surface inspectors
shall be used to assist surface transportation owners, agencies,
carriers, and operators in strengthening security, other than through
compliance, inspection, or enforcement activities.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Id. 1113(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Answer. A large portion of surface inspector duties are focused on
conducting assessments that are not regulatory in nature. These
assessments include conducting in-depth Baseline Assessment for
Security Enhancement (BASE) reviews with the largest mass transit
agencies in the Nation. It also involves risk reduction surveys in the
freight rail environment which promote risk reduction of intentional
Toxic Inhalation Hazardous (TIH) material releases within major urban
areas. Other non-regulatory assessments include corporate security
reviews of trucking companies that transport hazardous materials,
corridor assessments of the TIH risks within major urban areas, and of
course, Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) activity in
all modes of transportation.
The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA's) primary
approach for allocating Transportation Security Inspectors--Surface
(TSIs-S) and opening new surface offices includes a risk-based scoring
system to prioritize office openings. At times, other qualitative
evidence is factored in to better serve surface transportation
security, based on geographic division of Areas of Responsibility
(AORs). While there are not enough resources to assign surface
inspectors to every Federal Security Director (FSD), Area Directors
(ADs) are directly involved in working AOR issues to ensure complete
oversight of regulated parties and comprehensive Visible Intermodal
Prevention and Response (VIPR) coverage. The approach considers four
key factors before assigning a final score:
1. Location within a High Threat Urban Area (HTUA);
2. Top 100 mass transit/passenger rail systems within the home
city;
3. Toxic Inhalation Hazardous (TIH) materials traffic flow within
that city/airport location; and
4. City/airport located in the Northeast Corridor (NEC).
Question 5c. What authority do RSIs have over Area Directors and
Federal Security Directors (FSDs)? Be specific about the reporting
relationship between RSIs and each of the two field directors
positions, as well as how each relationship fits into the broader
context of the Office of Security Operations (OSO) at TSA; and include
organizational charts depicting each relationship and OSO context.
Answer. RSIs do not have authority over ADs or FSDs. As part of
their duties, RSIs are responsible for providing day to day support to
the ADs. RSIs are responsible for supporting their assigned regions and
for a variety of other assignments and activities as directed by the
ADs, including activities within FSDs' staffs to build multimodal
security networks that maximize transportation security and incident-
response capabilities. The following chart provides an overview of the
reporting structure of the RSIs, FSDs, and ADs within the Office of
Security Operations (OSO). The RSIs are also assigned as corporate
liaisons to all Class I and large regional railroads, which promotes a
Nationally balanced approach to regulatory compliance activities and
operational issues for large railroad corporate entities.
Question 5d. If RSIs do not have authority over Area Directors or
FSDs, how will they be able to address consistency problems effectively
from outside of the STSIP chain of command in the field?
Answer. As part of their regular regional oversight duties, RSIs
are responsible for monitoring surface inspection field activities at
airports within their Area of Responsibility and for identifying
problems of consistency. RSIs then report such issues to Area
Directors, Federal Security Directors, and the Surface Inspection and
Program Oversight office, as appropriate, for resolution.
Question 5e. Have RSIs been appointed for Amtrak and the public
transportation systems for metropolitan areas designated as ``Tier 1''
by the Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP)? If not, describe the
process by which it was determined that Amtrak and the highest-risk
public transportation systems would not be assigned RSIs, and explain
fully the grounds on which that determination was made.
Answer. A new RSI position for Amtrak has been established and TSA
is in the process of filling it as of September 2010. TSA recognizes
the need for such a position due to the large geographical area in
which Amtrak operates. TSA also realizes the benefits that the new RSI
position holds, and is evaluating options for potential future
expansion of the program. However, it has not yet determined if TSA
will expand the program to include designating RSIs for Tier 1 transit
agencies.
Question 5f. Please provide a map or chart indicating the number of
RSI positions currently deployed by TSA and the geographical region or
area of responsibility covered by each position.
Answer. There are currently seven RSIs for Surface; six of these
positions are in the field with regional oversight, and one is at
headquarters as the RSI Coordinator. One additional RSI for Amtrak is
in the process of being established, which will bring the total number
to eight. See the following chart:
Question 6a. Please provide all documents, directives, guidance,
memoranda, slides, and other materials distributed or presented to TSA
employees relating to the development and implementation of ``TSI
Evolution,'' as well as any related training initiatives, and provide
responses to the following: With respect to ``TSI Evolution'' and its
incorporation of multi-modal training and deployment, how does TSA
reconcile administering the STSIP in a way that dilutes the focus on
surface transportation experience, expertise, and activities with the
Federal authorizing statute which requires a specific emphasis on
surface systems and carriers?\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Answer.* Transportation Security Inspector (TSI) Evolution does not
dilute surface modal expertise. While an introductory orientation to
all modes is provided to all inspectors, each inspector spends 80
percent of initial formal instruction in training for their primary
mode and core skills. In the initial core training, TSI-Surface receive
2 weeks of general Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
training (includes TSA compliance and enforcement philosophy), 3 weeks
of modal specialty training (one each in surface, cargo, and aviation),
and 1 week of railroad operations training. After completing the
initial core classes, surface inspectors receive additional surface
specific training including Transportation of Hazardous Material (1
week), Transit Rail Incident Investigation (1 week), and Transit System
Security (1 week). The training provided to surface inspectors is
robust and comprehensive. Additionally, new inspectors must go through
an extensive on-the-job training (OJT) process within mode and be
observed and qualified at a National strike. Both of these training
processes focus solely on surface inspections and mode expertise over
the course of at least 1 year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* TSA's Compliance Personnel Evolution Handbook was also submitted
in response to this question and retained in committee files.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
All inspectors are then firmly grounded in developing depth of mode
expertise. It is only after 3 or 4 years of extensive qualification
that inspectors receive an orientation in another mode. As
transportation becomes more and more multi-modal, all security
inspectors need domain awareness to ensure they have a general
understanding of other modes so they can recognize security breaches
and summon an inspector with modal expertise. As an example, one multi-
modal yard may have aviation Unit Load Devices (ULDs), freight rail
cars, and maritime multi-modal containers, and may be required to
comply with various security programs. As another example, many
airports have mass transit facilities entering or bordering the airport
environment. One goal of TSI Evolution is to provide each inspector a
level of training that will allow them to be ``surge capable'' and be a
force multiplier in the event of a significant threat or terrorist
attack. All inspectors must have domain awareness to recognize security
violations; however, no inspector will specialize in more than one mode
at any given time to ensure deep subject matter expertise.
Question 6b. On what evaluation or assessment did TSA base the
decision to proceed with TSI Evolution? Was any outreach to
stakeholders conducted or was any kind of risk assessment performed
that demonstrated how de-emphasizing the distinctions between surface
and non-surface modes would benefit surface transportation security in
a substantive way?
Answer. The decision to proceed with TSI Evolution was based upon
the recognition that TSA inspectors could be provided with additional
technical and professional development training to increase their
proficiency. All TSA inspectors currently gather compliance information
using surveillance, interviews, document review, and testing. TSI
Evolution training standards focusing on infrastructure protection,
fraudulent document detection, and interview skills will enhance the
ability of inspectors as they gather perform inspections. TSA
inspectors routinely assist with threat mitigation activities, such as
Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) deployments, and TSI
Evolution training standards regarding terrorist methodology, detecting
surveillance, and detecting suspicious behaviors will provide
inspectors greater tools to help protect the traveling public.
Inspectors also perform investigations and provide incident response,
and TSI Evolution training in criminal investigations support and
crisis management will increase inspector skills in those activities.
While inspection environments differ (aviation, cargo, surface), the
inspection methodology is similar across all modes. TSI Evolution will
enhance the skills and transportation domain awareness of all TSA
inspectors.
Question 7. Has TSA considered an organizational structure for the
STSIP that would separate it entirely from aviation and the non-surface
inspections, similar to the structure described in section 302 of the
TSA Authorization Act of 2009? Please explain in detail the grounds on
which this type of organizational structure was or was not considered,
and if it was considered, why it was rejected.
Answer. The original organizational structure of the Surface
Transportation Security Inspection Program (STSIP), after its
establishment in February 2005, was separate from the aviation
inspection program and thus was similar to that described in Section
302 of the bill H.R. 2200, the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) Authorization Act of 2009.\10\ Under this structure, surface
inspectors had a direct reporting line to the headquarters surface
program office through twelve Area Inspection Supervisors. However, in
December of 2006, TSA decided it would be more effective to restructure
the reporting lines and integrate the surface inspectors and area
supervisors into reporting lines of the Federal Security Director (FSD)
with the other inspection modes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Transportation Security Administration Authorization Act of
2009, H.R. 2200, 111th Cong. 302(b) (as passed by House, June 4,
2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TSA considered the placement of surface inspectors and decided the
best approach for placement of those assets was under the FSDs. The
FSDs are responsible for implementing all operational activities across
all modes of transportation. TSA decided to integrate surface
inspectors into this command structure because FSDs are equipped to
leverage the security network in their areas. Also, such a structure
allows for maximum efficiencies and reduces duplication of effort and
ambiguity and overlap in roles and responsibilities. The organization
maintains strong National oversight through the headquarters Office of
Compliance and Regional Security Inspector (RSI) positions, but allows
local flexibility to address local security concerns. This allows TSA
to ensure the mission is completed in the most effective and fiscally
responsible manner, with the greatest security benefit.
Question 8a. Explain how, if at all, TSA is implementing a risk-
based strategy that clearly links resources to risk in deploying its
surface inspectors under the new TSI Evolution structure.
What mechanisms are in place to ensure that surface transportation
systems receive security resources and support at a level consistent
with the significant threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences of
terrorism that they face?
Answer. Transportation Security Inspector (TSI) Evolution is a
process to develop the professional skills of all Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) inspectors through enhanced training and
quality control standards; it will not affect the deployment of surface
inspectors. With regard to risk, the current TSA inspections program
can reduce risk as it directly relates to the stakeholders' ability to
implement the regulations and the inspectors' ability to identify
anomalies, while performing a regulatory oversight inspection. The
training and quality control standards identified in TSI Evolution will
enhance the ability of the TSA inspector to detect anomalies, and
therefore reduce risk. For example, if a surface inspector is handed
forged, altered, or fraudulent documents from a rail operator, they may
appear normal to the untrained eye; however, to a surface inspector who
has received fraudulent document examination training as required by
TSI Evolution, those same documents may be detected as fraudulent. TSI
Evolution reduces risk by providing surface inspectors with additional
training to increase their proficiency at performing security and
regulatory compliance activities.
TSA deploys its surface inspection assets primarily based on the
four key factors listed below to ensure that its available resources
are efficiently distributed.
1. Location within a High Threat Urban Area (HTUA);
2. Top 100 mass transit/passenger rail system within the home city;
3. Toxic Inhalation Hazardous (TIH) materials traffic flow within
that city/airport location; and
4. City/airport located in the Northeast Corridor (NEC).
TSA's grant programs and policy are part of a comprehensive set of
measures to strengthen the Nation's critical infrastructure against
risks associated with potential terrorist attacks. The programs provide
funds to owners and operators of surface transportation systems
(transit, intercity bus, passenger rail, freight rail, etc.) to protect
critical transportation infrastructure and the traveling public from
acts of terrorism. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continues
to prioritize projects and awards based on their effectiveness in
reducing risk. Grant funding focuses on ``prevent and protect''
operational activities, such as training, drills and exercises, public
awareness campaigns, security planning, visible, unpredictable
deterrence, and critical infrastructure remediation. Fiscal year 2010
funding priorities also include protection of high-density stations
(both multi-user and single-user), key operating asset protection, and
other mitigation activities including interoperable communications,
evacuation plans, and protection of low-density stations.
Question 8b. What safeguards are in place ensures that surface
transportation security funding and personnel are used only for surface
activities, and not commingled with non-surface resources?
Answer. TSA obligates resources only after programmatic and
financial reviews to certify that each obligation is properly charged
against the correct fund and program, project, and activity. TSA
maintains financial system data, as well as programmatic data, that
support the proper allocation and obligation of resources. This ensures
Surface Transportation Security resources are used only on surface
initiatives.
Question 9a. Regulations governing public transportation agencies,
rail carriers, and inter-city buses required by sections 1405, 1408,
1512, 1517, 1531, 1534, of the 9/11 Act are more than 2 years
overdue,\11\ but TSA has yet to issue Notices of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRMs) for them. The scope and focus of these regulations will affect
the operations and planning of surface transportation systems in a
considerable way, and will likely require a corresponding expansion of
Federal interaction with stakeholders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ U.S.C. 1134, 1137, 1162, 1167, 1181, 1184.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In view of these facts, why did TSA change the STSIP command
structure and begin implementation of the TSI Evolution initiative
before these regulations have been issued? Explain fully and be
specific.
Answer. TSI Evolution is a professional development program for all
TSIs-S and will not affect enforcement of regulations. There is no
linkage between any changes to the Surface Transportation Security
Inspection Program (STSIP) command structure and the implementation of
Transportation Security Inspector (TSI) Evolution. As discussed above,
TSI Evolution provides all Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
inspectors with increased professional, technical training, and also
institutes quality control standards. TSI Evolution is not centric to
the surface inspections program, and it will affect all TSA
inspectors--aviation, cargo, surface, and canine.
Question 9b. When will TSA issue NPRMs for these regulations?
Answer. A notice of proposed rulemaking for security training is in
the final drafting and review stages within TSA and is expected to be
published in the Federal Register in early 2011. As required among the
various provisions of the 9/11 Act, this rulemaking process has
included identification of high-risk tiers, review and consideration of
other training programs and best practices, and consultation with a
broad range of stakeholders.
TSA has also started developing the framework for the first of the
three proposed rules implementing the assessment and planning
requirements for surface modes. As required by the 9/11 Act, the
rulemaking process has involved, and will continue to involve, a review
of other similar programs and extensive consultation with stakeholders.
Question 9c. When will TSA submit a risk-based staffing plan, which
specifically incorporates any anticipated expansion or other changes
relating to these forthcoming regulations?
Answer. All programs in the OSO Compliance Office, including the
STSIP, recently completed a data analysis in coordination with the
Office of Human Capital to determine inspector allocation requirements.
The data analysis is complete, and corresponding implementation will
occur in fiscal year 2011. The staffing model adjusts to account for
updated requirements, such as the issuance of new regulations and
resulting increase in regulated entities.
TSA will evaluate the total number of inspectors needed to carry
out and enforce new regulations that will be promulgated as a result of
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
This evaluation will occur in conjunction with the development of the
Notice of Proposed Rule-Makings (NPRM), which is currently in process.
Data, such as number and locations of entities covered and the depth of
the regulatory requirements, are driving factors in the model.
Question 10a. Over the past 2 years, TSA reported more than
doubling the size of surface inspectors, expanding from 93 inspectors
in June 2008 to 201 inspectors in April 2010. However, as of April
2010, TSA reported having completed only 5 assessment reviews of
transit systems for the year leaving the agency far short of efforts in
previous years (49 in fiscal year 2009, 42 in fiscal year 2008, 54 in
fiscal year 2007), even though a significant number of new staff were
hired.
Please explain this discrepancy between the added resources and the
significantly lower productivity in the BASE reviews and please
discuss, in light of the above information, how TSA determines the size
of its inspector workforce and how TSA plans to allocate inspector
resources across the various modes in the future.
Answer. As of August 2010, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) has completed 15 Baseline Assessment for Security
Enhancement (BASE) reviews in fiscal year 2010, and there are several
currently underway; therefore, it is yet to be determined how many will
be completed by the end of fiscal year 2010. BASE reviews are
comprehensive assessments that require a significant amount of time and
stakeholder coordination to complete. They are voluntary on the part of
the stakeholder, and therefore must be completed with consideration
given to the stakeholder's availability and schedule. Fiscal year 2007
and fiscal year 2008 were the years when initial BASE reviews were
conducted on many transit agencies, with fiscal year 2009 and fiscal
year 2010 focused on BASE revisits.
TSA surface inspectors work in all modes including freight, mass
transit, and passenger rail. Workload requirements for inspector
activity are developed at the onset of each fiscal year, with
consideration given to the priorities established by the TSA Office of
Transportation Sector Network Management (TSNM). This is published to
the field in the form of an Annual Work Plan.
Question 10b. TSA's fiscal year 2010 inspector workforce plan
comments that follow-up action to address performance weaknesses
identified by BASE assessment results is an essential component of
TSA's continuous improvement process and the implementation of its
security strategy for mass transit. What progress has TSA made to set
and meet its performance targets for conducting the BASE reviews and
for following up with agencies to address areas identified as needing
improvement?
Answer. TSA's Surface inspector workforce has conducted 159 BASE
reviews and 48 BASE re-assessments since the inception of the BASE
program in the latter part of fiscal year 2006. Of the 159 completed
BASE reviews, 15 have been completed in fiscal year 2010. For fiscal
year 2011, the Surface Transportation Security Inspection Program
(STSIP) will continue to conduct BASE reviews focusing on high-risk
transit agencies that have a 60,000 or more average weekday ridership.
In fiscal year 2011, 32 high-risk transit agencies are scheduled for
re-assessment based on previous BASE results. Another 30 transit
agencies are outside the high-risk category and may be re-assessed
depending upon local workload and resource availability.
In the fiscal year 2010 inspection workforce plan, Transportation
Security Inspectors--Surface (TSI-S) personnel did initiate follow-up
visits to BASE assessed transit agencies to address performance
weaknesses identified by the results; however, the follow-ups visits
were not part of a formal performance improvement program. Beginning in
fiscal year 2011, TSA is set to introduce a formal follow-up program
called the Performance Improvement Action Plan (PIAP). The PIAP program
will support and monitor the efforts of transit agencies to improve
security vulnerabilities discovered through BASE reviews. TSI-S
personnel will evaluate the transit agencies improvement efforts and
prioritize lists of security improvements necessary to make public
transportation systems, facilities, and passengers more secure. TSI-S
personnel will also work closely with transit agencies to offer
additional tools and TSA programs to help bolster the low-scoring
sections found in the BASE reviews and re-assessments.
Question 11a. Given how important surface transportation experience
and expertise is to maintaining credibility with the surface
transportation community, such as with freight railroad and mass
transit system representatives what steps has TSA taken in hiring
hundreds of new inspectors to ensure that it is hiring individuals with
this type of critical surface background?
Provide detailed information identifying the background, including
qualifying experience and expertise, for the inspectors that have been
hired in the past 2 years.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has taken
steps to ensure that all field offices throughout the Nation hire
surface inspectors with relevant surface experience. The hiring process
requires surface experience for the highest level positions within
surface inspections, including the supervisor and lead positions. There
are more candidates hired in at the lower levels without surface
experience, but they are high-caliber candidates who have the requisite
qualifications and skills to learn the surface inspection processes and
be productive within this field.
During the last 2 years (from August 1, 2008 to July 31, 2010):
Total number of Transportation Security Inspectors--Surface
(TSIs-S) hired was 146.
Of those 146, 63 were hired at the ``G'' Band level (lowest
level inspector position).
15 of those ``G'' Band hires had previous surface
experience.
Of the 83 other TSIs-S hired above the G band level, 45 had
previous surface experience as detailed below:
Total ``J'' Band hires was 4 and of those 1 had surface
experience.
Total ``I'' Band hires were 28 and of those 18 had surface
experience.
Total ``H'' Band hires was 51 and of those 26 had surface
experience.
Question 11b. Provide a detailed explanation of why surface
inspectors receive two weeks of mandatory aviation and air cargo
training when they are first hired.
Question 11c. In addition, indicate TSA's view as to whether this
practice is consistent with the requirement in the authorizing
statute,\12\ which states that the Secretary of Homeland Security,
acting through the TSA administrator, has the authority to ``train,
deploy, and utilize'' surface inspectors exclusively for statutorily
defined mission,\13\ and ``shall require that [surface inspectors] have
relevant transportation experience and other security and inspection
qualifications.''\14\
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\12\ 6 U.S.C. 1113.
\13\ The statutory mission states that the Secretary, acting
through the administrator, ``shall use [surface inspectors] to assist
surface transportation carriers, operators, owners, entities, and
facilities to enhance their security against terrorist attack and other
security threats and to assist the Secretary in enforcing applicable
surface transportation security regulations and directives.'' 6 U.S.C.
1113(b).
\14\ 6 U.S.C. 1113(d).
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Question 11d. Explain the factors on which TSA bases this view and,
specifically, the evidence and process by which TSA determined that
training surface inspectors for aviation and air cargo activities is a
risk-based, cost-effective use of funding and personnel resources.
Answer. In June 2010, a newly developed TSI Multi-Modal Basic
Course was implemented to provide all new TSA inspectors (aviation,
cargo, and surface) with 6 weeks of initial training. In the initial
training, TSIs-S receive 2 weeks of general TSA training (includes TSA
compliance and enforcement philosophy), 3 weeks of modal specialty
training (one each in surface, cargo, and aviation), and 1 week of
railroad operations training. After completing the initial core
classes, surface inspectors receive additional surface-specific
training including Transportation of Hazardous Material (1 week),
Transit Rail Incident Investigation (1 week), and Transit System
Security (1 week). In TSA's view, the training received by surface
inspectors is extensive and overwhelmingly applicable to surface
security activities. The Compliance Program also provides multi-modal
recurrent training on a quarterly basis for Transportation Security
Inspectors that is designed to deliver current information and
direction regarding changes in programs, inspection guidance, methods
and techniques, and other subjects pertinent to the aviation, cargo,
and surface modes.
The reason for giving surface inspectors basic information about
aviation and cargo is to enable them to help in the aviation and cargo
environments in the event of a significant threat to the traveling
public or terrorist attack targeting aviation or cargo; likewise, the
reason for giving aviation and cargo inspectors basic information about
surface is to enable them to assist in the event of an incident or
attack targeting the surface mode. With numerous airports--such as
Chicago O'Hare (ORD), Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA),
and Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport (ATL) to name a few--that
are multi-modal centers which contain air, rail, bus, etc. in one
location, the significance of this capability is magnified. All
inspectors must have domain awareness to recognize security violations
in other modes. TSIs-S are not expected to perform routine work in
other modes. In this way, TSA views this training as risk-based and
cost-effective.
Question 12. Over the course of fiscal year 2009, what portion, as
a percentage of total surface inspector work hours, of all surface
inspector activities was devoted to freight rail? What portion was
devoted to passenger rail and mass transit activities? What portion was
used for non-surface activities? What portion was used for Visible
Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) activities? Please also
provide data for each of the aforementioned categories covering the
period October 1, 2009 through July 31, 2010.
Answer.
Question 13. Please provide detailed budget data showing how
funding and personnel resources appropriated for ``Surface
Transportation Security Inspectors and Canines'' for fiscal year 2008,
fiscal year 2009, and fiscal year 2010 were allocated and spent (or are
planned to be allocated and spent), including a description of all
activities and administration that involved, directly or indirectly,
non-surface modes.
Answer.
OLE/FAMS SURFACE TRANSPORTATION/RAIL SECURITY INSPECTORS AND CANINES
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2008 Fiscal Year 2009 Fiscal Year 2010*
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amount Amount Amount Amount Amount Amount
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Funding Received.................................. $5,500,000.00 .............. $5,500,000.00 .............. $5,500,000.00 ..............
Travel.................................................. .............. $42,700.00 .............. $183,837.00 .............. $165,578.00
Facility Management..................................... .............. $0.00 .............. $1,991.00 .............. $39,158.00
Contracts............................................... .............. $7,852.00 .............. $884,573.00 .............. $2,366,094.00
COOP Agreements**....................................... .............. $5,335,000.00 .............. $2,134,500.00 .............. $3,761,294.00
IT/Training............................................. .............. $0.00 .............. $2,192.00 .............. $183,313.00
Equipment............................................... .............. $0.00 .............. $348,492.00 .............. $251,760.00
Maritime training lab................................... .............. .............. .............. $750,000.00 .............. ..............
Explosive Magazines..................................... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. $75,084.00
Total Teams at end of fiscal year....................... .............. 85 .............. 95 .............. 114
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Notes: The funding received by the Canine Program does not support Rail Security Inspectors. This funding directly supports State and Local LE teams in
the Mass Transit and Maritime transportation venues.
* Fiscal year 2010 had carryover funds of $1,196,607.
** Fiscal year 2008 amount includes $2,287,500 that was used for forward funding for fiscal year 2009 activities.
Question 14. Please provide the current number of surface
inspectors employed by TSA as of July 31, 2010; the total number of
surface inspectors authorized through fiscal year 2010, as well as the
number authorized through fiscal year 2011; and the number of surface
inspectors TSA is planning to hire by the end of fiscal year 2010, and
by the end of fiscal year 2011.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was
authorized a total of 404 Surface Transportation Security Inspector--
Surface (TSI-S) positions in fiscal year 2010. TSA's goal is to fill
the vast majority of vacant positions by the end of the fiscal year. A
National job announcement was closed in June 2010, and several
positions have been filled while others are in various stages of the
hiring and selection process. As of July 31, 2010, there were 251
surface inspectors employed with the TSA. Authorized levels for fiscal
year 2011 are still to be determined.
Question 15. TSA has deployed Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS)
personnel, as well as other non-surface transportation security
personnel, to lead VIPR team deployments in public transit and
passenger rail systems. Since the FAMS' primary mission, training, and
experience are in supporting aviation security, how did TSA determine
that FAMS personnel should be deployed as a part of surface VIPR teams?
Answer. The VIPR program was originally conceived to deliver two
fundamental types of operations, law enforcement and screening. Public
Law 110-53, Section 1303(a) authorized the deployment of the VIPR teams
by the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and
specifically mentions Federal Air Marshals as assets available for use
with those teams. This authorization was delegated to the TSA
Administrator. The Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) is TSA's Law
Enforcement Resource; therefore FAMS resources were utilized for VIPR
involvement. TSA will continue to monitor improving State and local law
enforcement capabilities when determining whether to deploy FAMS
resources to VIPR operations.
Question 16a. Recently, TSA has significantly expanded its
resources dedicated to deploying VIPR Teams at the Nation's surface
transportation systems since establishing the program in late 2005.
However, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) previously reported
that TSA lacks qualitative performance measures to determine the
effectiveness of these operations in enhancing the security of surface
transportation systems.\15\
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\15\ U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, Rep. No. GAO-09-678,
Transportation Security: Key Actions Have Been Taken To Enhance Mass
Transit and Passenger Rail Security, But Opportunities Exist To
Strengthen Federal Strategy and Programs, 31-32 (2009). See also
Securing the Nation's Rail and Other Surface Transportation Networks
Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Trans., 111th Cong. 14-15
(2010) (statement of Stephen M. Lord, Director, Homeland Security and
Justice Issues, U.S. Gov't Accountability Office).
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Has TSA developed these qualitative performance measures and, if
so, what are they?
Answer. Since this GAO report, the VIPR program now has processes
in place to implement outcome-focused metrics. In the first quarter of
fiscal year 2010, TSA accomplished its goal of establishing metrics for
the VIPR Program. TSA though continues to refine these metrics to
evaluate and adapt to improve VIPR reporting.
Future metrics will rely on stakeholder and location information as
well as risk measurement information captured from the Transportation
Sector Security Risk Assessment (TSSRA) methodology.
Question 16b. Has TSA submitted an expenditure plan for the VIPR
program to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, as required
by fiscal year 2010 homeland security appropriations legislation?\16\
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\16\ Pub. L. 111-83. See also H. Rep. No. 111-298 (2009); H. Rep.
No. 111-157 (2009); S. Rep. No. 111-31 (2009).
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Answer. Yes, TSA submitted an expenditure plan for the VIPR Program
to the House and Senate Appropriations Committee on March 2, 2010.
Question 16c. What office or program possesses the budget authority
to obligate funding and personnel resources for VIPR teams and
activities?
Answer. TSA's Office of Law Enforcement and Office of Security
Operations have the budget authority to obligate funding and personnel
resources for VIPR teams and activities.
Question 16d. What office or program possesses the budget authority
to obligate funding and personnel resources budgeted and appropriated
under ``Surface Transportation Security Inspectors and Canines?''
Answer. TSA's Office of Law Enforcement and Office of Security
Operations have the budget authority to obligate funding and personnel
resources budgeted and appropriated under the ``Surface Transportation
Security Inspectors and Canines'' Program Project Activity (PPA).
Question 16e. What mechanisms are in place to ensure that resources
appropriated under ``Surface Transportation Security'' are not
commingled with or used for non-surface VIPR activities or TSA
employees other than surface inspectors?
Answer. TSA obligates resources only after a programmatic and
financial review which certifies each obligation is properly charged
against the correct funding stream. TSA maintains financial system data
as well as programmatic data which ensures Surface Transportation
Security resources are used only on surface initiatives, including
surface VIPR activities and positions in support of securing surface
transportation modes. This includes surface inspectors and other
positions funded by the appropriation as identified in the
Congressional Budget Justification and in subsequent reports to
Congress. Staff in the office of TSA's Chief Financial Officer also
stays in close communication with the VIPR Program Manager to ensure
that resources are spent properly.
Question 17. In June 2009, GAO recommended that DHS develop a
strategy for using surface inspectors to assist in monitoring grant
projects funded through TSGP.\17\ In June 2010, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) reported that it will work toward development
of a cost-effective monitoring plan to include the use of TSA surface
inspectors when their expertise in transit security would be
appropriate for monitoring grant program functions. What efforts, if
any, are being made by TSA and FEMA to include surface inspectors in
the oversight of TSGP grant projects?
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\17\ U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, Rep. No. GAO-09-491, Transit
Security Grant Program: DHS Allocates Grants Based on Risk, But Its
Risk Methodology, Management Controls, and Grant Oversight Can Be
Strengthened, 40 (2009).
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Answer. There is substantial interest in advancing a more effective
capability for monitoring progress in the execution of security
enhancement projects in mass transit and passenger rail funded under
the Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP). The Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
are working together to develop a program that takes advantage of the
two agencies' respective expertise. To further this effort, two pilot
programs using surface inspectors will be conducted in fiscal year
2011; one will take place in the western United States, and another in
the eastern United States. The focus will be reviewing transit agency
security enhancements that are made with grant funds to determine their
level of security effectiveness and/or appropriateness. The pilot
programs will not entail an accounting or administrative review of
expenditures of funds, which falls within the scope of FEMA's grant
oversight responsibilities. Results from the pilot programs will help
shape the final monitoring plan.
Question 18. Please provide a description and salient details of
the contract with Lockheed Martin concerning the hiring and recruitment
of TSA surface inspectors, including whether this human resources
contract is part of a larger contract.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) HR
services contract was awarded to Lockheed Martin after full and open
competition. The service provider is responsible for recruiting,
hiring, payroll, personnel transaction, and help desk support under
strong Government oversight both at program and contract level. This is
a performance-based fixed price contract. The hiring and recruitment of
TSA surface inspectors falls under Management, Administrative, and
Professional (MAP) support of the contract, however all selection
decisions are made by Government officials.