[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
COMBATING THE BP OIL SPILL
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 27, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-128
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
energycommerce.house.gov
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman
JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan JOE BARTON, Texas
Chairman Emeritus Ranking Member
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts RALPH M. HALL, Texas
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia FRED UPTON, Michigan
FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey CLIFF STEARNS, Florida
BART GORDON, Tennessee NATHAN DEAL, Georgia
BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky
ANNA G. ESHOO, California JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
BART STUPAK, Michigan JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York ROY BLUNT, Missouri
GENE GREEN, Texas STEVE BUYER, Indiana
DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado GEORGE RADANOVICH, California
Vice Chairman JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
LOIS CAPPS, California MARY BONO MACK, California
MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania GREG WALDEN, Oregon
JANE HARMAN, California LEE TERRY, Nebraska
TOM ALLEN, Maine MIKE ROGERS, Michigan
JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina
CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
JAY INSLEE, Washington TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
JIM MATHESON, Utah STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana
G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana
JOHN BARROW, Georgia
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
DORIS O. MATSUI, California
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin
Islands
KATHY CASTOR, Florida
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio
JERRY McNERNEY, California
BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa
PETER WELCH, Vermont
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts, Chairman
MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania RALPH M. HALL, Texas
JAY INSLEE, Washington FRED UPTON, Michigan
G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
BARON HILL, Indiana JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
DORIS O. MATSUI, California STEVE BUYER, Indiana
JERRY McNERNEY, California GREG WALDEN, Oregon
PETER WELCH, Vermont SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina
JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
ELIOT ENGEL, New York
GENE GREEN, Texas
LOIS CAPPS, California
JANE HARMAN, California
CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
JIM MATHESON, Utah
JOHN BARROW, Georgia
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hon. Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress from the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, opening statement............... 1
Hon. Fred Upton, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Michigan, opening statement.................................... 3
Hon. Henry A. Waxman, a Representative in Congress from the State
of California, opening statement............................... 4
Hon. Joe Barton, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Texas, opening statement....................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Michigan, opening statement................................. 13
Hon. Cliff Stearns, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Florida, opening statement.................................. 14
Hon. Jay Inslee, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Washington, opening statement.................................. 15
Hon. John Shimkus, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Illinois, opening statement.................................... 16
Hon. Gene Green, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Texas, opening statement....................................... 16
Hon. Joseph R. Pitts, a Representative in Congress from the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, opening statement................ 17
Hon. Lois Capps, a Representative in Congress from the State of
California, opening statement.................................. 18
Hon. Mary Bono Mack, a Representative in Congress from the State
of California, opening statement............................... 19
Hon. Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress from the State of
California, opening statement.................................. 19
Hon. Michael C. Burgess, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas, opening statement.............................. 20
Hon. Tammy Baldwin, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Wisconsin, opening statement................................ 21
Hon. Steve Scalise, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Louisiana, opening statement................................ 22
Hon. Charlie Melancon, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Louisiana, opening statement.......................... 30
Witnesses
Jo-Ellen Darcy, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works);
accompanied by Terrence ``Rock'' Salt, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Army................................ 23
Prepared statement........................................... 26
Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency.. 33
Prepared statement........................................... 36
Larry Robinson, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and
Atmosphere, NOAA............................................... 46
Prepared statement........................................... 49
David J. Hayes, Deputy Secretary, Department of the Interior..... 67
Prepared statement........................................... 59
Rear Admiral James Watson, Deputy, Unified Area Command, United
States Coast Guard............................................. 68
Prepared statement........................................... 71
Answers to submitted questions............................... 151
Submitted Material
BP interim report, dated May 24, 2010............................ 101
Letter of May 24, 2010, from Mr. Burgess to United States Army
Corps of Engineers............................................. 149
Letter of May 26, 2010, from Mr. Burgess to the White House...... 150
COMBATING THE BP OIL SPILL
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 27, 2010
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:09 p.m., in
Room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward J. Markey
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Markey, Inslee, Butterfield,
Melancon, McNerney, Dingell, Green, Capps, Harman, Baldwin,
Matheson, Barrow, Waxman (ex officio), Upton, Stearns, Shimkus,
Blunt, Pitts, Bono Mack, Sullivan, Burgess, Scalisle, Griffith,
and Barton.
Also Present: Representative Castor.
Staff Present: Phil Barnett, Staff Director; Bruce Wolpe,
Senior Advisor; Greg Dotson, Chief Counsel, Energy and
Environment; Joel Beauvais, Counsel; Michal Freedhoff, Counsel;
Melissa Cheatham, Professional Staff Member; Caitlin Haberman,
Special Assistant; Meredith Fuchs, Chief Investigative Counsel;
Karen Lightfoot, Communications Director, Senior Policy
Advisor; Elizabeth Letter, Special Assistant; Jen Berenholz,
Deputy Clerk; Mitchell Smiley, Special Assistant; Mary Neumayr,
Minority Counsel; Aaron Cutler, Minority Counsel; Peter
Spencer, Minority Professional Staff Member; Andrea Spring,
Minority Professional Staff Member; and Garrett Golding,
Minority Legislative Analyst.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
Mr. Markey. Good afternoon. It is day 38 of the BP oil
spill disaster. Over these 38 days, BP has misled the public on
the amount of oil spewing into the ocean. They waited until day
23 to release a 30-second clip of the oil spill. They waited
until day 31 to release a live feed of the spill. They
continued to use dispersants that EPA has directed them to
replace. And while we all hope that the top kill is successful,
it is one of several untested strategies to address oil leaks
at this depth, signaling BP's utter lack of preparedness.
Through BP's obfuscation of the truth, the Federal
Government has been working to determine the impacts of the
spill and to mitigate the damage done to our environment,
economy, and coastal communities. This is BP's spill, but it is
America's ocean.
After the initial explosion of the oil rig on April 20, the
Coast Guard was first on the scene for a search and rescue
operation that saved the lives of 115 workers. The
administration immediately established a command center.
A day after the explosion, the Coast Guard, EPA, and the
Departments of Interior, Commerce, and Homeland Security joined
State and local groups to coordinate resources and oversee BP's
response.
Within a week, Secretary Napolitano and Secretary Salazar
signed on to an order for a joint investigation to determine
the causes of this disaster.
Homeland Security designated this event as a spill of
national significance to fully leverage resources for the
Federal Government's response.
The Department of Commerce declared a fishery disaster in
the Gulf to mobilize assistance to fishermen and fishing
communities.
NOAA has taken a lead role in evaluating the impacts of oil
on marine resources and advising cleanup efforts.
EPA has been monitoring air quality and has directed BP to
use less toxic and more effective dispersants.
However, in addition to the spill under the sea surface, we
are also confronting the spillover from the Bush
administration. This culture was established during the Bush
administration when it compromised the Minerals Management
Service, or MMS, responsible for offshore drilling oversight.
On Tuesday, the Department of Interior released a report
detailing how during the Bush administration MMS personnel
routinely accepted expensive gifts from the very people they
were supposed to be regulating. The Obama administration has
responded with a plan to fundamentally restructure the MMS into
separate entities for leasing, safety, and revenue collection,
with independent missions to strengthen oversight of offshore
energy operations. Any changes in MMS personnel will not change
their dedication to effective oversight of our energy
resources.
Congress has also been working to determine the causes and
consequences of this disaster, holding the companies involved
accountable. BP, Halliburton, and Transocean have been
questioned about the events leading to the accident. Chairman
Waxman and Chairman Stupak are leading that investigation, and
they will get to the bottom of what efforts were actually taken
to stop the leak and attempts to clean up the mess.
Ocean experts have testified to the effects of the oil on
marine ecosystems. I sought and succeeded in making BP's live
feed from the ocean floor available to the public, working with
members of this committee.
For years, the oil industry told us an oil spill was
impossible. Then they said stopping the leak is mission
impossible. It is clear that BP was unprepared for this.
America is looking to the administration to provide
oversight and to prevent this from ever happening again. There
has been an impressive Federal response. To date, the Federal
Government has deployed 1,300 vessels, over 1.85 million feet
of containment boom, and directed 22,000 Federal employees to
work on the BP oil spill.
As this work continues, we must realize that we cannot
drill our way to energy independence. We have 2 percent of the
world's oil reserves, 5 percent of the world's population, and
we consume 25 percent of the world's oil on a daily basis. The
BP oil disaster is another reminder that we must move to a
clean energy future, buoyed by increased fuel economy, wind,
solar, hydropower, and efficiency and other technologies that
can help us in the long run to avoid this ever happening again.
Let me turn now and recognize the ranking member of the
subcommittee, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Upton.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRED UPTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do appreciate you
calling this hearing today.
We are all outraged and saddened by the disastrous oil
spill in the Gulf that left 11 dead and has spread untold
barrels of oil into the sea. It is a very, very tragic event
for our country. I would hope to see more hearings from this
committee so that we can get answers and the companies
involved--from both the administration as well as the companies
involved about what happened, how we can fix it, and how we can
ensure that a disaster like this cannot and does not happen
again.
It is not time for knee-jerk policy reactions but for
answers. We must first determine what caused the accident and
how we can prevent similar accidents from happening in the
future.
Second, we need to make sure, crystal clear to all
involved, that the polluter will pay. The American taxpayers
should not be on the hook for a dime for the cost of this
accident.
I was a member of the Conference Committee for the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990. There is no doubt in my mind that the
President and his administration have both the authority and
the obligation to take control of the crisis. Clearly, from
where we stand today, it has not happened.
The spill from the Deepwater Horizon rig a month ago is the
first major spill since enactment of the 1990 law. The Oil
Pollution Act gives the President the authority to oversee the
cleanup managed by the responsible party or federalize the
efforts. It is the obligation of this committee and the
Congress to scrutinize what procedures were taken by BP and the
Obama administration and how these actions or inactions led to
the mess that we see today. Hindsight is 20/20, but lessons can
be learned and applied in the future.
The Coast Guard has been charged with a Herculean task.
However, I am concerned that the delays of the administration
have set them up for failure. For example, it was 9 days after
the accident before the administration tapped the Department of
Defense to assist by deploying needed equipment to combat the
spill site a mile underneath the water surface.
I am also particularly interested in the Coast Guard's
delay of initiating the controlled burn of the surface oil
immediately after the spill occurred. It appears that there
could have been a delay in using that tactic because of air
pollution concerns.
Was EPA involved in that decision or the delay? Did
CO2 or climate change concerns play a role in that
decision?
Additionally, why were chemical dispersants that make oil
less harmful to the environment not fully used from the onset?
Again, was this due to environmental concerns that may not have
been warranted in that instance?
Unfortunately, this is not the first safety or
environmental problem that we have seen from BP. Clearly, they
were not prepared to deal with a leak 5,000 feet below the sea.
There is plenty of blame to go around, but as The Washington
Post indicated this week, you cannot plug a well with
regulation, speeches, or paper.
There has not ever been a disaster like this in the 30
years that they have been drilling in the deep water or the
Gulf. After such a stellar safety record, you would start to
think that things like this could not happen.
While we can't turn our back on offshore drilling, we need
to do a much better job and be prepared for the future. We need
to do what we can to prevent this from ever happening again
and, at the same time, be prepared for the worst. I look
forward to the testimony and interaction.
I yield back my time.
Mr. Markey. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair recognizes the gentleman from full committee, the
gentleman from California, Mr. Waxman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Chairman, it is now 5 weeks since the
Deepwater Horizon disaster; and each day brings more
discouraging news of the devastating impact this oil spill is
causing to the economy, to the environment, and the people of
the Gulf Coast region. Each day we are learning more about the
cascade of mistakes and misjudgments that caused this
catastrophe.
On Tuesday, May 25, committee staff received a briefing
from BP officials, including the Group Vice President For
Safety and Operations and the leader of BP's internal
investigation. BP shared with the committee a 48-page document
summarizing the company's interim incident investigation, and I
ask that this document be made part of the hearing record.
Mr. Markey. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
Mr. Waxman. We learned a great deal from that presentation
about BP's preliminary observations of possible causes of the
blowout and explosion at the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in
the Gulf of Mexico. We summarized this in a memorandum that
Chairman Stupak and I released on Tuesday.
What we are now learning is that BP's investigation appears
to omit key issues. There have been several reports today
concerning questionable well design choices made by BP,
including the decisions to use a type of casing that could
allow gas to flow up the annular space to the wellhead to limit
the number of spacers centering the casing, despite objections
by Halliburton, and to curtail the length of time that drilling
fluids were circulating to clean gas out of the well. Yet none
of these issues were mentioned by BP when they briefed our
staff. That raises the possibility that BP's internal
investigation is not examining the consequences of BP's own
decisions and conduct.
Our investigation is examining all potential causes of the
blowout, including the responsibility of BP. That is why we are
sending a letter to BP today seeking more information on these
issues.
I want to thank Chairmen Markey and Stupak for their
leadership in this investigation. The committee's first hearing
was held by the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee on
May 12 where Chairman Stupak revealed new information about
problems with the blowout preventer. Chairman Markey has led
the way in Congress in investigating the amount of oil coming
from the well and providing video feeds of the leak.
Our next hearing will be a field hearing by the Oversight
and Investigations Subcommittee in Chalmette, Louisiana, on
Monday, June 7, 2010, at 10:00 a.m., where we will explore some
of the impacts of this oil spill. We will continue a broad and
aggressive investigation throughout the month of June.
I pray that the efforts today will seal up this well and
stop the damage that is being done. But that can't be the end
of it. We have got to make sure that this kind of disaster
never happens again and we know what went wrong so we can hold
the proper parties responsible.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Markey. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair recognizes the ranking member of the full
committee, Mr. Barton from Texas.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE BARTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS
Mr. Barton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I thank you and
Chairman Waxman for asking our witnesses to come today and
holding this hearing at this important time.
As we speak, it is unclear whether the so-called top kill
procedure has been successful, but it does appear that it has
been at least partially successful, and hopefully we will know
by the end of the day that it has been totally successful.
No one can bring back the 11 individuals who lost their
lives on the drilling rig back in April. We can't put the oil
that has been spilled back into the reservoir, but perhaps, if
we work together, we can find out what caused the problem, what
can be done to fix the problem right now, and what can be done
to prevent it in the future.
I am disappointed with the President's decision today to
stop drilling in the deep Gulf and in Alaska. I think putting
our drilling programs in those areas in a deep freeze is
exactly the wrong approach. All we are going to do is cause
unemployment and cause the price of oil to go up, which is
going to hurt our economy even more, and we are already hurting
with almost 10 percent unemployment. So I think that the
President has made a decision that will come back to hurt this
country.
I want to make one thing perfectly clear, Mr. Chairman.
Under current law, the President is in charge of this cleanup.
This accident occurred in the Federal waters in the Gulf of
Mexico outside the State limits. We have a law that makes the
President in charge from day one.
I do think the President made the right decision to put
British Petroleum in charge of day-to-day decision making under
the supervision of the Coast Guard, the EPA, the MMS, and other
Federal agencies. It is BP's responsibility. They are the
primary owners of the well, and I don't second-guess that
decision at all.
But, make no mistake, there has not been one decision that
I am aware of, unless some of the panelists tell us so today,
that BP or Halliburton, Transocean or Cameron has made that
wasn't acknowledged by Federal officials and wasn't approved by
Federal officials.
And, again, it is real easy to sit up here on the podium,
Mr. Chairman, and second-guess. I went down to Louisiana with
you and others of this committee and went to the command site
and then went out and overflew the accident site. It is tough
to be there and have to make decisions on what to do when there
is no easy, obvious answer. So I don't think it is fair to
second-guess some of the decisions that have been made.
But I think it is fair, if you are going to try to pin the
blame on somebody, as President Truman said, ``The buck stops
here.'' And under current Federal law, the President of the
United States is ultimately in charge.
It is not BP that has not given the OK to build the berms
down in the State of Louisiana that the Corps of Engineers
until today had been sitting on for a month. That was not a BP
decision.
It is not a BP decision to be using one dispersant and then
be told by the EPA to use another and then be told again to go
back and use the other dispersant. In fact, while it was a BP
recommendation to use dispersants to try to keep the oil under
the surface, that in itself I understand could be a
controversial decision. That was a decision that was ultimately
approved by the Environmental Protection Agency.
I think, Mr. Chairman, that this committee, under the
leadership of Mr. Stupak and yourself and Mr. Waxman, with the
help from Dr. Burgess and Mr. Upton and myself, have conducted
a fair investigation.
My position on this is pretty straightforward. Let's stop
the spill, and hopefully today we will accomplish that. Let's
soon clean up the damage. And I know everybody is trying to do
that. Let's conduct a fair, fact-based investigation and, based
on that, decide what policies need to be changed, what best
practice procedures need to be changed to prevent a situation
like this from happening in the future.
If we do that, Mr. Chairman, while this, again, is a tragic
accident, 11 people have lost their lives, hundreds of
thousands of barrels of oil have been spilled into the Gulf,
our ecology has been impacted, our economy has been impacted,
if we learn from this, though, we can hopefully prevent it from
happening in the future.
And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Barton follows:]
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Mr. Butterfield [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Barton.
At this time, the chair recognizes the chairman emeritus of
the committee, Mr. Dingell.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. DINGELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, thank you; and thank you for
holding this important hearing today.
The Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee held a
hearing a couple of weeks ago where we heard from BP,
Transocean, Halliburton, and Cameron. Today, we have the
administration officials. Mr. Chairman, I commend you for
having the administration officials here today. Their testimony
and their answers to questions are equally critical in terms of
finding out what went wrong and why and what to do about it.
To our witnesses, thank you for being here today.
Mr. Chairman, as I have mentioned in previous hearings, I
have been a supporter of offshore oil and drilling; and I must
say that the oil companies are making this support increasingly
difficult. I have tried to support this when it was right and
in compliance with our environmental laws and hoped that it was
for many years.
I come from Michigan, and we are a manufacturing State, and
domestic manufacturers need domestic energy sources. Domestic
oil and gas drilling is as much a part of a comprehensive
energy policy as anything else and can reduce our dependence on
foreign energy sources and increase our manufacturing
competitiveness.
On the other side of that, Mr. Chairman, I am an avid
conservationist. I wrote many of our cornerstone environmental
laws. That includes the National Environmental Policy Act, the
Endangered Species Act, and the Marine Mammal Protection Act.
These laws are a little like my children. I protected them for
years and intend to do so as long as I am able. I have observed
that they do not appear to have been properly enforced by the
administration, nor do I see that they have been properly
carried out by the oil companies.
Balancing these views is challenging. Today, I am forced to
come to a difficult conclusion. We need to establish a complete
moratorium on all leasing and all drilling activities until it
is established that all of it is done and is being done in full
compliance with the environmental laws and with full attention
to safety and to avoiding the kind of disastrous spills that we
are seeing going down in the Gulf. And so full compliance with
the environmental laws has to be the responsibility of the oil
companies but also of the administration; and I refer very
specifically to NEPA, which appears to have been significantly
disregarded, and the Marine Mammal Protection Act.
I don't believe that new regulation is necessary at this
time. Quite frankly, because we have our current environmental
laws in place for a long time, it is my belief that if they had
been properly followed we would probably not be in the mess in
which we currently now find ourselves.
And the fact is that NEPA and the Marine Mammal Protection
Act are good laws that work when properly enforced, but they
were set aside for BP Deepwater Horizon in behavior that is
unacceptable by our government.
I am extremely dismayed, disappointed, and just plain angry
about the process or lack thereof used by the Minerals
Management Service. Drilling at any cost seems to be the modus
operandi. Cash bonuses have been handed out for meeting
deadlines for offshore leasing. Broad exemptions from
environmental laws have been made, including in the case of
Deepwater Horizon, and scientists have been ignored.
After everything we have learned over the years about BP, I
might expect this kind of behavior from them but not from the
Federal Government. I would note we have from time to time seen
BP before this committee and its investigative committees to
talk about the failure in terms of wells on pipelines, major
spills and explosions; and always we were promised that BP
would do better. They have not.
I do appreciate and do commend the administration's efforts
to reform the way we do oil and gas leasing, but I am not sure
that is enough. Very frankly, we need a timeout. We need to be
taking stock of what is wrong with the system, what we are not
doing right, what we can do better, how we didn't comply with
the laws, and how we are going to make sure that our laws are
being complied with. The stakes are too high to do otherwise.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Butterfield. I thank the gentleman.
The chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Stearns.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CLIFF STEARNS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Mr. Stearns. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I regret that Mr. Markey, the chairman of the subcommittee,
is not here. I would like to answer his opening statement where
he said the Bush administration is at fault for this. I think
that is, obviously, a stretch.
If you read any of the air pollution act, which I am going
to read to you, the Clean Water Act section 311(c)(1)(A), the
President shall ensure effective and immediate removal of a
discharge and mitigation or prevention of a substantial threat
of discharge of oil or a hazardous substance.
So the President is involved here. He is responsible. If
there is any problem, it is he and the U.S. Coast Guard who
report to him.
Now, Mr. Markey went on to say there was an impressive
Federal response. Well, it is not enough. And, in fact, even as
we speak here this afternoon, officials in Louisiana are still
waiting--still waiting for the Federal Government to provide
millions of feet in boom to approve an emergency permit to
fully--not partially--implement their plan to dredge and build
a new barrier island to prevent even more oil from reaching
their marshes and wetlands.
Mr. Chairman, Saudi Arabia had an oil spill in the Gulf. It
was many, many times this; and they used their ships and barges
to vacuum up the spill. In fact, there are many countries
around the world who have volunteered with the State
Department, including Canada, France, Germany, and others, the
United Kingdom, to help with the idea of providing technical
expertise, booms, chemical dispersants, oil pumps, skimmers,
and wildlife treatment; and none of that has been accepted by
this administration. The vast majority of assistance has not
been utilized.
The blunt fact is, the administration is on the watch. It
is their responsibility. Everybody knew that the Minerals
Management Service was not effective. There were so many
inspectors' reports about this. It should have been reformed,
and it should have been done on the President's watch, and
certainly he has responsibility for this.
Mr. Butterfield. Thank you.
At this time, the chair will recognize the gentleman from
the State of Washington, Mr. Inslee.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAY INSLEE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
Mr. Inslee. Thank you.
Well, I am shocked that the Republicans are blaming this
disaster on Barack Obama. It is shocking to me that that could
happen. And I guess maybe I shouldn't be shocked, but I am.
It is sort of like H. Rap Brown, who I think coined the
phrase ``burn baby burn.'' He didn't blame the government for
the arson; and those who pushed the ``drill baby drill''
positions as the solution to our energy woes, it seems to me,
ought not to be blaming the government for this particular
tragedy.
There are legitimate issues about everyone's performance,
and it is appropriate to look at everyone's performance. But it
wasn't Barack Obama's decision not to use 20 centralizers on
the rig which, in fact, the BP people thought should be used
and only used six. So that they didn't have any centralizers.
Centralizers are the things that keep the pipe centered in the
well board so you don't get voids in the cement. And the BP
staff said, well, you should use 20. Well, somebody delivered
the wrong ones to them, so they only used six, and they didn't
have any in the cement area above the hydrocarbon area. That
wasn't Barack Obama's decision.
It wasn't Barack Obama's decision to use a casing system
that created higher risks of a blowout in order to save some
dollars. That was British Petroleum's decision.
It wasn't Barack Obama's decision to have a dead battery in
the blowout provider. It was someone, either BP or one of the
other subcontractors, had and didn't tighten up the valve so
you had a hydraulic leak.
So I think we are going to find we need to have, yes,
greater oversight over this industry. But I will tell you,
Lamar McKay, who was just down at our Natural Resources
Committee, looked a little sheepish trying to explain why
British Petroleum didn't use the centralizers that they thought
they should use. And he wasn't blaming it on Barack Obama.
So I think it would be helpful to really focus on what
really happened here, and I look forward to the testimony.
And, by the way, just one comment. Administrator Jackson,
we are not going to let people take away your authority to
prevent all the invisible oil spills that are going on from
carbon dioxide making our oceans acidic either. We are going to
keep that authority.
Thank you.
Mr. Butterfield. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Shimkus from Illinois.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SHIMKUS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
Mr. Shimkus. Now, Mr. Inslee, I was telling Administrator
Jackson how nice I was going to be today; and you go rile me
up. Because we could go into the climate debate, which I don't
want to do. But I do want to talk about the impending issues.
So we are pleased to have you all here.
I will direct some questions on the dispersant issue and
just getting clarification. A lot of us have been informed now.
We are trying to gather information. And I will talk about the
type being used, how it is certified, questions made that it is
not good and then the need for it. And I will go in that
direction.
I think there is some valid concern about, when we have an
emergency--responding in an emergency situation, the marshes
are being polluted, we do have some delay from the locals who
want to protect their marshes by the permitting process. I
think we should be able to expedite that.
And I think there will be some emotions on all sides. These
locals want to do all they can, and there is some delay on the
local elected officials and their ability to do everything they
want to do.
But we are all in this together. This is a huge
undertaking. No one is happy about it.
I am a ``drill baby drill,'' and I still believe that is
important to our national energy security. Three thousand
drilling operations in the Gulf. Katrina went by, no effect. We
just can't be Pollyannish about our energy needs. I am one that
will also continue to talk about our energy security and
national security needs.
Thank you all for coming. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Butterfield. Thank you Mr. Shimkus.
The chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GENE GREEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding the
hearing.
The Gulf of Mexico is in the midst of an incident that is a
tragedy we have never seen, and my thoughts and prayers go out
to the families and communities affected by this terrible
incident.
I appreciate the administration being here to answer our
questions. I know your colleagues are diligently working to
stop that leak.
While I agree that we should look at how effective our
government response has been, certainly look at the adequacy of
BP's response plans, I believe that our efforts should focus at
this time mainly on plugging the well instead of casting blame.
We are certain to continue hearings on this issue for
months to come. There is no doubt the eventual lessons learned
from Deepwater Horizon spill will impact on how our offshore
resources are obtained. The industry should provide an accurate
response plan for every rig; and, conversely, MMS should have
adequate oversight to ensure that these response plans are
adequate.
Having said that, I want to caution my colleagues against
rushing through any legislative proposal that adversely affects
our ability to develop domestic resources, for example,
automatically raising the liability cap to $10 billion when
maybe a BP or a major company could afford that, but so much of
the Gulf of Mexico is produced by independents who don't have
the capitalization of the majors.
These proposals should be thoroughly vetted by the
committees of jurisdiction. Our energy resources are vital to
our national security, economic growth of our country; and our
country requires a safe and effective and steady development of
its offshore oil and gas resources.
I have been on this committee since 1997, and I remember
about 3 years ago we were all lamenting $4 a gallon gas. If we
continue the prohibition against deep water or even shallow
water production, you can guarantee it that we will be back to
$4 a gallon gas, and we won't be able to blame Saudi Arabia for
it.
Thank you for the work you are doing, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back my time.
Mr. Butterfield. Thank you, Mr. Green.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Pitts.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. PITTS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
Ms. Pitts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
this hearing.
I want to begin my comments today also by expressing my
deepest regrets to the family members and friends who have lost
their loved ones.
This is a tragic event. Not only have lives been lost but
an unknown amount of oil has been leaked into the ocean,
causing great damage and horrible effects, some of which we
know now and some of which will take years to discover.
In the wake of this event, questions regarding the cause of
the explosion and leak have naturally arisen, along with
questions on the appropriateness of the response from BP and
the administration. Particularly, I am eager to hear from our
witnesses today regarding whether or not sufficient response
plans were put to work in order before the incident occurred
and, if they were, whether or not they are currently working.
It seems to me that the Federal response has been not only
disjointed but confusing and frustrating for those on the
ground trying to bring relief. A prime example would be the
EPA's convoluted instructions regarding the use of dispersants.
In addition, Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal said on Monday
that, quote, we have been frustrated with the disjointed effort
to date that has too often meant too little, too late for the
oil hitting our coast, end quote. This is incredibly
disappointing.
As I have said, this is a tragic event. We need to make
sure due diligence is done in investigating the causes and the
appropriateness of the response in the aftermath. However, we
need to make sure the response of this body and the
administration is prudent, one that still encourages our
country's energy security and independence.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today.
I yield back.
Mr. Butterfield. I thank the gentleman.
The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Capps.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LOIS CAPPS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Mrs. Capps. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to our
witnesses. Thank you for your testimonies in advance.
Thirty-eight days after BP's Deepwater Horizon rig exploded
and killed 11 workers, 15 to 40 million gallons of toxic crude
oil have spilled into the Gulf of Mexico. The oil from the
slick now equals the size of South Carolina, has soiled more
than 100 miles of Louisiana's coastline. Fishermen working on
the cleanup have become ill after working long hours near
waters fouled with oil and dispersants, reporting nausea,
dizziness, headaches, and chest pains. It has gotten so bad
that yesterday the unified command recalled the vessels
operating in Breton Sound after crew members reported health
problems.
Today I, along with Health Subcommittee Chairman Pallone,
wrote to BP, urging the company to take the necessary steps
that it apparently is not now doing to ensure the health and
safety of the workers and volunteers who are cleaning up this
giant mess.
Quite frankly, it is an outrage that this company, which
made $16 billion in profits last year, has such a terrible
record on safety for the drilling itself and for the workers
who are trying to clean up the mess; and that is why it is so
important that the Federal Government is bringing every
resource necessary to put a stop to this catastrophe.
Last week, the President established an independent
commission which was modeled on legislation I introduced with
Chairman Markey to investigate the cause, the response, and the
impact of BP's spill. Earlier today, he announced tougher
safety requirements for offshore drilling and a stronger
inspections regime; and he took steps to ban new deep water
wells for 6 months, cancelled exploratory drilling in Alaska,
and cancelled a proposed lease sale off of Virginia's coast.
Mr. Chairman, this whole tragedy brings into stark relief
what many of us have been saying for years and which the
chairman, in his opening remarks, said as well. We need to end
our addiction to fossil fuels. My only hope now is that perhaps
there is some measure of good that can come out of the
sickening sights of toxic sludge in Louisiana's wetlands, the
oil slick on the open ocean, the underwater toxic plumes that
continue to kill marine life, wildlife, and birds at an
alarming clip. Finally freeing ourselves from this costly
addiction would be a fitting tribute to the terrible tragedy
being borne by the people of Louisiana and the Gulf.
I yield back my time.
Mr. Butterfield. Thank you, Mrs. Capps.
The chair recognizes the gentlelady from California, Mrs.
Bono Mack.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARY BONO MACK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Mrs. Bono Mack. Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by also
sending my condolences to the families of the 11 brave men who
lost their lives as a result of this tragic accident.
I also appreciate very much the time of our witnesses to be
here with us today to discuss the issues related to the massive
spill off of Louisiana's coast.
I know that today's hearing will delve into the details of
who knew what and when they knew it, which we must examine, yet
we seem to be spending so much time pointing fingers and
playing politics, which is exactly what has the American people
frustrated beyond belief.
What we have in front of us is a disaster that has extreme
environmental and economic effects. Millions of Gulf Coast
residents wake up every morning knowing that they are providing
the food on our plates and the gasoline to power our vehicles.
Yet I am extremely frustrated to see both BP and politicians,
plus, truthfully, this entire town, continue to point fingers
and play a game of gotcha instead of collaboratively and
aggressively seeking solutions and taking action.
We cannot afford more bureaucratic barriers to addressing
the need to cap the well as well as lessen the spill's effects.
The excuses have been many, and the press excuses even more
numerous. But today we need to get clear answers about the
levels of preparation for the deep water drilling taking place
in this region and the clear path forward for cleanup
operations of this epic disaster. The fact is, wasting time,
playing politics, and placing blame on past actions when
confronted with this national emergency is, frankly, insulting
to the hardworking people of the Gulf region.
With that, Mr. Chairman, again, I thank our witnesses; and
I yield back the balance of my time. I look forward to the
testimony out of our panel. Thank you.
Mr. Butterfield. I thank the gentlelady.
We will now recognize another gentlelady from California,
the third in a row, Ms. Harman.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We plan to take this
committee over very soon.
Mr. Butterfield. Please don't ask unanimous consent for
that.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JANE HARMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Ms. Harman. No, I was just stating our intention.
As Chairman Markey said in his opening remarks, quote, this
is BP's spill, but it is America's ocean.
That ocean touches my district, which hugs almost 20 miles
of California coastline. I have always opposed drilling off the
coast of California and have cast 20 votes--more than 20 votes
against offshore drilling over my eight terms in Congress,
including a vote against the 2006 Deep Ocean Energy Resources
Act.
Further, I am an original cosponsor of the Garamendi bill
that seeks to ban all drilling off the entire west coast.
The events of the last month have only reinforced my
opposition. Like millions of Americans, I have watched the days
mount and the strategies fail. The crude oil gushing from BP's
blown well is now threatening Florida's Atlantic coast and when
it gets into the Gulf stream could potentially spread thousands
of miles.
There is a Washington lesson and a national lesson here.
For the Washington lesson, we have to dramatically ramp up
government oversight of drilling activities and end the
sweetheart relationship between MMS and industry. President
Obama was right to force the resignation earlier today of the
MMS director, who obviously is not before us now. And he and
Secretary Salazar and everyone on today's panel all must do
more, as we must.
The national lesson is that America's insatiable thirst for
oil must be stemmed. It is dirty, poses major environmental
risks, and when we buy it from abroad, it enriches our enemies.
We must seize this moment to end our crippling dependence on
oil. Enough is more than enough.
I yield back.
Mr. Butterfield. Thank you.
I believe Dr. Burgess is next.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL C. BURGESS, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS
Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We have heard a number of things today. We are going to
hear a number of things from our witnesses, and I am anxious to
do so.
Again, I will just reiterate some of the questions that
came up in earlier hearings that we have had. Particularly I am
glad we do have a representative from the Minerals Management
Service.
The application that was submitted for the Deepwater
Horizon drilling permit in March of 2009 raises some serious
issues.
A section 2.7 blowout scenario, a scenario for a potential
blowout of the well from which BP would expect to have the
highest volume of liquid hydrocarbons, is not required for the
operations proposed in this exploration plan.
Section 2.3, BP Exploration Production, Inc. does not
propose to utilize new techniques or unusual technologies for
these operations or drilling in 5,000 feet of water, going down
18,000 feet. That does sound new and unusual to me.
Section 14.2, in the event of an unanticipated blowout
resulting in an oil spill, it is unlikely to have an impact
based on industry-wide standards for using proven equipment and
technology for such responses.
Implementation of BP's regional oil spill response plan,
which address available equipment and personnel techniques and
recovery and removal of the oil spill.
Why was this application--I mean, shame on BP, shame on BP
for submitting an application that was so scant on details. But
why was an application like this ever accepted in the first
place?
And we have heard other people in their opening statements
make comments about folks around the country that are concerned
about this and want to help. I did two town halls on Saturday,
town halls in north Texas. A fellow brought in this contraption
and showed it to me. That is basically a coke bottle that has
been cut in half. He has got this thing filled with what looked
like sawdust, but it was some sort of polypropylene material
that he has. And, apparently, it has another Federal use, so it
is something that has already been approved by the EPA.
He poured a bottle of gunk like Ed Markey had in here the
other day, poured the bottle of gunk in the top, and you could
see down in the bottom of the mayonnaise jar--his equipment was
not very sophisticated--it looks like clear water is coming
out.
This individual had been trying to get some recognition of
his technique. There are people like this all over the country
that are willing to help. They want to help clean up their
coastline. Governor Jindal wants to help the coastline, and he
has been prevented by the Corps of Engineers and the
Environmental Protection Agency. It is time to relax those
standards and give him the authority that he needs to do what
needs to be done.
I will yield back.
Mr. Butterfield. I thank the gentleman.
At this time, the chair recognizes the gentlelady from
Wisconsin, Ms. Baldwin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY BALDWIN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WISCONSIN
Ms. Baldwin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just came from a hearing at the Judiciary Committee on
the BP oil spill and liability issues where we heard from Keith
Jones, the father of one of the men who lost his life. We also
heard from two survivors from the explosion. And I daresay
there wasn't a dry eye in the audience as the three of them
testified.
Like so many of my colleagues and my fellow Wisconsinites
and all Americans, I am really angry about the oil spill in the
Gulf of Mexico and sad and angry about the loss of life. I am
horrified by the negligence and the conflicts of interest that
have been revealed and exhibited leading up to this tragedy,
and I am furious that for over a month oil has been spewing
into the Gulf of Mexico, endangering lives and livelihoods and
our precious ecosystem with no end in sight.
There are several aspects of this crisis that are
particularly troublesome: the conflicts of interests at the
Minerals Management Service, which allowed the agency to
oversee the safety of offshore drilling while simultaneously
collecting royalties from the companies they were overseeing,
and this is unacceptable. We have heard the reports of staff
members of the agency repeatedly accepting tickets to events
and lunches and other gifts from industry.
Equally disturbing is that BP has used unprecedented
volumes of chemical dispersants to break up the oil offshore
that we now learn could further imperil the mammals and fish
and birds and turtles that inhabit the Gulf region. And despite
EPA belatedly telling BP to limit use of this product, the
company has continued to do so.
The situation in the Gulf appears to be one of a company
continuously believing that it is above the law, ignoring
warning signs, shortcutting proper procedure, failing to
properly plan for a disaster, and putting profits over other
considerations.
Mr. Chairman, this spill is a tragic reminder that we must
rethink our Nation's energy policy and move toward a post-
petroleum economy.
I thank our witnesses, and I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Butterfield. I thank the gentlelady.
The gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Scalise.
Mr. Scalise. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to ask unanimous consent to submit this into
the record. It is a statement from the U.S. Travel Association
about combating the BP oil spill.
Mr. Butterfield. Without objection.
[The information was unavailable at the time of printing.]
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. STEVE SCALISE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF LOUISIANA
Mr. Scalise. Thank you.
Yesterday, we paid respects to the 11 men who lost their
lives in the explosion of the rig, and our prayers go out to
them and their families. And I know some of the families are
here today. I hope to have the opportunity to meet with them.
I hope the top kill is successful today, and we may not
know that for a few days, but we can't forget that more than a
month's worth of oil has already spilled into the Gulf and is
moving its way into our marshes, and that is something we are
going to have to be working for a long time to clean up that
mess.
But today the President held a press conference where he
said that he has been in charge from day one, and I have just
got to disagree. If this has been his top priority, if he has
been in charge from day one, then why is it that it took more
than 16 days to get an answer from our Governor and our local
officials who submitted a plan to protect the marsh from the
oil?
They submitted this plan more than 2 weeks ago before any
oil was in the marsh. It sat on bureaucratic desks, didn't go
anywhere. If all hands were on deck, the President would have
rolled up his sleeves day one when the Governor submitted that
plan and say, we are going to figure out a way to get this done
and to give you the Federal permit, so y'all can go and protect
your marsh.
It didn't happen. It didn't happen for over 2 weeks, and
now we are hearing from the Governor's office that the plan
that might have been approved today only covers about 2 percent
of the Governor's plan. That is just not acceptable. We are
trying to protect our marsh right now; and if the President has
got a better plan, put it on the table. But we haven't seen
them come up with any plan to protect our marsh. We have put
one on the table for over 2 weeks, and nothing from the
President. That is inexcusable.
If all hands were on deck, then why is it that on Sunday--
on Sunday as oil was coming into our marsh in Grand Isle I
heard reports from officials who said the boom-laying beats
were sitting at the dock. They weren't putting out boom. They
were sitting at the dock instead of putting out the boom as oil
is coming into our marsh.
That is not all hands on deck. That is not a top priority
of the President. If he is in charge, as the law says that he
should be under the Oil Pollution Act, that should have never
happened.
So I am glad that today he acknowledged that some mistakes
were made, but we don't have time for the mistakes and the
excuses. We need action. And when he comes down tomorrow--and I
know he won't share with our delegation where he is going or
what he is doing, but I hope he meets with those local
officials, and I hope he finally solves these problems instead
of all of the red tape and all of the excuses that we are
getting.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Butterfield. Thank you, Mr. Scalise.
Before proceeding, it has come to my attention that one of
our scheduled witnesses, Ms. Jo-Ellen Darcy, is going to have
to leave at 1500, 3:00 this afternoon. So we are going to allow
you to be excused in just a moment. But thank you very much for
your willingness to come.
I am told that your deputy, Mr. Terrence ``Rock'' Salt,
will be available to answer any questions. But we thank you for
your service. We thank you for your willingness to come today.
I will say for the record that Ms. Darcy is the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, a position that
supervises the Army Corps of Engineers' Civil Works Program.
The Army Corps of Engineers is an environmental preservation
and restoration agency that regulates activities in the
Nation's wetlands. That is a very honorable position, and we
thank you for all that you do.
All right. Without objection, we might go ahead and
recognize you for your 5 minutes. I am told that that may be in
order. Let me consult with the ranking member just a moment.
Mr. Upton. I just wanted to ask, too, for all members, we
ask unanimous consent that their opening statements might be
put into the record at this point, too.
Mr. Butterfield. Without objection.
Do you consent to the witnesses' testimony being given at
this time?
The witness is recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JO-ELLEN DARCY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF THE ARMY (CIVIL WORKS), ACCOMPANIED BY TERRENCE ``ROCK''
SALT, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
Ms. Darcy. Thank you Congressman Butterfield, and I want to
thank all members of the subcommittee for inviting me here
today.
My name is Jo-Ellen Darcy. I am the Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Civil Works; and I am joined by ``Rock'' Salt who
is my Principal Deputy, who will come up here when I finish
delivering this testimony.
And I ask that my written statement be submitted for the
record in full, because I will summarize here for you.
In the midst of the response to the tragic Deepwater
Horizon oil spill, the Corps of Engineers continues to provide
reliable navigation on the river systems and waterways along
the Gulf Coast as it maintains vigilant monitoring and
assessment of the oil impacts.
In addition, the Corps has provided modeling support for
river discharges and is offering emergency review under section
404 and section 10 authorities of a proposed barrier plan
developed at the local level intended to prevent the oil from
reaching the coastal wetlands.
The Corps has also reviewed and provided input to an
interim EPA region six oil solidifier policy and supports its
implementation.
Currently, the oil spill is not affecting dredging
operations or navigation in any rivers or waterways along the
Gulf. There have been no incidents of deep draft vessels
getting oil on their hulls as they approach the southwest pass
on the Mississippi River.
The U.S. Coast Guard, working with navigation interests,
has established cleaning stations in the lower Mississippi
River to clean those vessels before they proceed up the river
to the New Orleans district as well as similarly this was done
after the 2009 Mississippi River oil spill.
The Corps continues daily monitoring of any impacts to
navigation and dredging operations as a result of the oil spill
and maintains continued coordination with navigation interests
and appropriate agencies.
The Corps has analyzed a number of water management
conditions and possible actions to determine whether we could
modify river flows to keep oil away from the mouth of the
Mississippi River and wetlands on either side of the river.
This analysis included possible deviations from the statutory
70/30 split at the Old River Control Structure between the
Mississippi River and the Atchafalaya Basin. Numerical modeling
analysis has shown that diverting water from the Atchafalaya
Basin to the Mississippi River at the Old River Control
Structure would have minimal influence on the movement of the
oil in the Mississippi River Delta.
Due to the extreme flooding on the Tennessee and the
Cumberland Basins earlier this month, Mississippi River
discharges below New Orleans will nearly double. Even with
these forecasted increases in discharge, we do not anticipate
increased flows that would allow opening the Bonnet Carre
Spillway to reduce the oil from entering the Mississippi Sound
area.
With respect to the smaller freshwater diversion
structures, those are currently operating near design capacity,
and the modeling again suggests that this may help slow the
movement of the oil into the project marshes from the marsh and
the open water boundaries in the immediate vicinity of these
structures. Our team continues to evaluate other water
management scenarios to determine if they will help address the
oil spill issues.
The Corps' Engineering Research and Development Center is
also working with the United States Geological Survey program
to collect and analyze baseline sediment samples in the
wetlands and the navigation areas. These pre-oil spill samples
will provide critical comparisons to post-emergency sediments
that will be required for efforts to continue with Louisiana
coastal restoration through the beneficial uses of dredged
material.
I would like to update my written testimony based on
actions taken today.
The Corps of Engineers has proffered a permit to the State
of Louisiana which grants partial approval for Louisiana's
barrier island project proposal, covering the State's original
request and includes six different areas. Once this permit is
finalized, the State would be authorized to construct the
barrier islands as long as this construction meets the terms
and the conditions established in the Corps permit. The
conditions in the permit respond to all issues and concerns
raised by the other Federal agencies.
Additionally, the Corps has issued a total of 12 permits
using our emergency authorities throughout the Gulf. There are
seven additional permits that are still pending.
Seven people have been deployed from our research lab to
support the Fish and Wildlife Service natural resource damage
assessment activities. Activities include but are not limited
to providing expert NRDA strategy development, development of
bird injury study plans, global positioning systems collection
and integration of field data, primary GIS and mapping support.
Our research lab stands ready to assist in the development
of a common operating plan for the multi-agency oil spill
response. As the Department of Army lead for environmental
restoration research and development, our research lab is
prepared to assist in formulating and implementing strategies
for long-term monitoring and remediation of wetlands and
barrier islands areas affected by the oil spill. Our research
lab is also prepared to provide analysis for the eventual
remediation of contaminated barrier sediment and material
removal and ecological restoration.
That concludes my testimony, Mr. Chairman; and, again,
thank you for having us. I apologize for having to leave, but
Mr. Salt will be here.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Darcy follows:]
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Mr. Markey [presiding]. We very much appreciate your
ability to be here, and we also appreciate the responsibilities
which you are discharging simultaneously in the Gulf. So we
thank you for being here. And when your assistant sits at that
table, then we will I think still be able to get the expert
advice from your agency. Thank you.
The chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.
Barrow, for an opening statement.
Mr. Barrow. I thank the chair.
I am more interested in hearing from the witnesses than I
am from hearing from me, so I will waive an opening.
Mr. Markey. The gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Melancon.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLIE MELANCON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF LOUISIANA
Mr. Melancon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you
having the hearing today. I thank the witnesses for attending.
First, I would like to say to those that want a political
posture, having been through Katrina, Rita, Gustav, Ike, and
now the oil spill, I am sick of it. I would appreciate it if
y'all would respect the people and the people of the State of
Louisiana, the people that died in this accident.
It has not been fun for 5 years in south Louisiana. The
press reported today that even using the most conservative
estimates that the new flow rate estimates on the leak have
grown to nearly 19 million gallons over the past 5 weeks,
surpassing the size of the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster in
Alaska.
Having flown over this disaster this past week, I can tell
you personally that the scale and the scope of this disaster is
greater than one can ever imagine. My constituents in St.
Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, Terrebonne, and Lafourche and
those that have not yet been impacted are watching this slow-
motion tragedy unfold in front of them; and, as of today, there
is still no absolute assurance that this leak will be brought
under control in the near future.
I am heartened to hear initial reports that the top kill
effort appears to temporarily have stopped the flow of oil and
gas into the Gulf, and I hope and pray that these efforts as
they continue lead to a permanent solution.
The response to this leak has consumed a tremendous number
of resources and much manpower since the rig first sank weeks
ago. I have been in constant contact with the administration
and first responders on the ground. I have also reached out to
local officials in my district to take inventory of their
response needs, booms, vessels, whatever, and work towards
providing these resources as best I can.
And while I know this hearing today is to discuss the
current response to the leak, I would like to remind my
colleagues and the distinguished panel of witnesses today that
the recovery phase is just as critical as the response phase.
Our culture is threatened, our coastal economy is threatened,
and everything that I know and love is at risk. Even though
this marsh lies along coastal Louisiana, these are America's
wetlands.
I just wish to submit the rest of my statement for the
record. Thank you.
Mr. Markey. We thank the gentleman.
Every member of our committee and every American is praying
for the people of Louisiana and the people of the Gulf. It is
just an unimaginable tragedy.
The chair recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr.
Griffith.
Mr. Griffith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I appreciate
Congressman Melancon's feelings and deep emotion.
I grew up in south Louisiana, on Big and Little Alabama,
Atchafalaya Basin, the wetlands and spent a lot of my youth in
the canals down there. And I can tell you that it is
heartbreaking, heartbreaking to lose the lives of the young men
from that area whose culture was working on the rigs. And if
there is blame to go around, I think it will be many, many
people who will accept responsibility ultimately.
I would like to thank the chairman and ranking member for
calling this important hearing today and the witnesses for
taking the time to come.
I was upset, however, to hear the announcement this morning
that the administration has chosen to cancel the western Gulf
and Virginia lease sales.
The American Petroleum Institute estimates that from the
time a lease is sold, it is 3.5 years before drilling begins;
and if successful, it is 6 years before any production takes
plays.
As we learn from these tragedies, these cancellations do
not reflect the stated President's view that we must have oil
and gas production in our energy portfolio that we can produce
safely. Canceling these leases does not protect us, and it
actually is nondiscriminating in that we are punishing
companies that have an exemplary safety record. We must
remember, too, that the Deep Horizon oil--Deepwater Horizon rig
had drilled over 70 successful wells.
As we learn the outcome of the many investigations that are
taking place, it is vital that we learn lessons from this
incident so that we can keep our workers and environment safe
to produce our valuable oil and gas.
We must also question the effectiveness of the response on
the Federal side as the reports come out stating that this may
be the Nation's biggest oil spill. Has the bureaucracy been
unable to facilitate a quick response? Reports from the ground
say it is not clear who is in charge, which leads to chaos. As
we see changes in drilling plans and officials suddenly
resigning, it seems that there are unknown facts surrounding
the oversight of this project both before and after the
explosion.
And thank you both, and all, for coming. Thank you.
Mr. Markey. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr.
Butterfield.
Mr. Butterfield. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
convening this very important hearing.
I thank the witnesses for their testimony today.
I think I am sort of like Mr. Barrow, Mr. Chairman, I am
eagerly looking forward to the testimony of the witnesses.
One thing for sure, there is so much we don't know about
this tragedy. And what complicates the tragedy is that we are
not getting much help from BP or Halliburton or from
Transocean. And perhaps the witnesses' testimony today will be
enlightening on this very important subject.
In time, though, we will find out what happened, or the
courts will find the facts and will report them to the American
people. It is absolutely clear that more should have been done
to prevent this disaster.
Over the past 30 years, the oil industry has used some of
the most advanced technologies to drill in increasingly deeper
waters. The rapid ingenuity that allows us to drill miles under
the ocean floor may have outpaced the commitment to safety. We
really don't know the extent of this still. I am looking
forward to discovering the true facts of this matter and to
report them to the American people.
And so the President is right. I happen to agree with the
President. He made a very wise decision today, and I support
the President entirely.
Thank you, witnesses, for your testimony. I yield back.
Mr. Markey. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr.
Sullivan.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Chairman Markey.
Thank you for holding this hearing today on combating the
BP oil spill and examining the Federal response to the
disaster.
I am interested in learning from our witnesses their
thoughts on what went wrong and their ideas moving forward to
prevent this from ever happening again.
I am disappointed that no one from the Mineral Management
Services is here to testify on their role in response to this
effort. Given their integral role of the Federal oversight in
offshore drilling operations, it is critically important to
hear the MMS's point of view directly and to get their take on
what safety lapses occurred and if any regulatory breakdowns
happened that may have contributed to this terrible accident.
We still have work to do to uncover exactly what went
wrong. There are many questions that will be asked today on
ongoing efforts to contain the leak, whether the Federal
response plans were in place prior to the incident and whether
those response plans had been inadequate in light of the
ecological disaster.
I commend the brave men and women who are working day and
night to stop the leak and to protect the shoreline in the Gulf
region. This is a challenge of epic proportions, and it is the
job of this committee to conduct a fact-based investigation
into the disaster to find out what went wrong and how we can
prevent it from ever happening again. I look forward to getting
to the bottom of this tragedy and finding solutions to it.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Markey. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
McNerney.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This disaster and tragedy has been a sobering lesson.
Technology exists to bring great benefit but also, if not
properly overseen, can cause great damage.
Our responsibility now in this body is to provide all the
resources at our disposal to stop the leakage and to help the
people that are impacted.
But next, we need to expose the facts about the causes of
the leak and implement whatever is necessary to prevent this
from happening again.
I intend to pursue those responsibilities with vigor. But
beyond that, this morning, along with Chairman Markey, Anna
Eshoo, Judy Biggert, and myself, we introduced the Electric
Drive Vehicle Deployment Act of 2010. We need to move
aggressively to make our vehicles more efficient so we can
reduce this country's overwhelming demand for oil. I invite all
my colleagues to support this initiative. I thank the panel for
your participation in this effort.
I yield back.
Mr. Markey. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr.
Blunt.
Mr. Blunt. Mr. Chairman, I have no opening statement.
Mr. Markey. The chair does not see any other members who
are looking for recognition at this time.
STATEMENTS OF THE HONORABLE LISA P. JACKSON, ADMINISTRATOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY; THE HONORABLE LARRY ROBINSON,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE,
NOAA; THE HONORABLE DAVID J. HAYES, DEPUTY SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR; AND REAR ADMIRAL JAMES WATSON,
DEPUTY, UNIFIED AREA COMMAND, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
Mr. Markey. So we will turn to our first witness, who is
Lisa Jackson, the administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency.
Before becoming the EPA administrator, she served as the
commissioner of the State Department of Environmental
Protection in New Jersey. She is a former New Orleans resident
who graduated summa cum laude from Tulane University and earned
a masters degree in chemical engineering from Princeton
University.
We welcome you, Administrator Jackson. Whenever you are
ready, please begin.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LISA P. JACKSON
Ms. Jackson. Chairman Markey, Ranking Member Upton,
Chairman Emeritus Dingell, and members of the committee, thank
you for inviting me to testify about EPA's role in responding
to the BP Deepwater Horizon rig explosion. First, let me join
you all in expressing my condolences to the families of those
who have lost their lives in the explosion. We owe them our
very best.
As we all know, efforts to stop the oil release continue.
While the environmental disaster that the Gulf of Mexico is
facing right now certainly has no easy answers, EPA is
committed to doing its job: Protecting communities, the natural
environment, and human health from the spill itself, as well as
any concerns resulting from the response to the spill.
Since the crisis began, EPA has had nearly 200 staff
working on the emergency response, from scientists, engineers,
contractors, and others, in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana and
Mississippi. We are performing rigorous testing and monitoring
of air and water quality, and we are sharing that data with the
public every day. I have personally traveled to the region, the
region I grew up in and still consider my home, several times
over the past week.
For nearly a month, EPA has been monitoring the air and
water for pollutants which could pose a health risk to
communities. This monitoring is essential to ensure that
communities are protected as we respond to the BP spill. All of
this information is being made public at EPA.gov/BPspill, as
quickly as we can compile it.
One of our top priorities is the safe application of
chemical dispersants. Oil spill dispersants are chemicals
applied to the spilled oil to break down the oil into small
drops below the surface. Ideally, the dispersed oil mixes into
the water column and is rapidly diluted and degraded by
bacteria and other microscopic organisms.
We know that dispersants are generally less toxic than oil.
They decrease the risk to the shoreline and to organisms at the
surface, and they biodegrade over weeks, not years, as oil
would. But in the use of dispersants, we are faced with
environmental tradeoffs. The long-term effects on aquatic life
are still unknown, and we must make sure that the dispersants
that are used are as nontoxic as possible. To date, BP has used
850,000 gallons of dispersant, a volume never used before in
this country.
Since this crisis began, EPA has not only demanded, but has
ordered, with the full force of law, that dispersants must be
limited in use, in volume, and toxicity.
EPA was first asked by BP on April 30 to authorize
unlimited use of dispersants in a novel manner, underwater, at
the source of the leak. The goal of their approach was to break
up and degrade the oil before it reached the water's surface
and came closer to our shorelines, our estuaries, and our
nurseries. EPA demanded scientific data from the company to
prove that such use of the dispersants was indeed effective.
After that data showed that this approach was effective, EPA
required the implementation of a rigorous monitoring system to
ensure that underwater application would continue to be
effective and would also track measurable environmental
impacts, if any.
Two weeks later, on May 14th, after the system was in
place, EPA conditionally granted authorization for use after it
was made clear to the company and to the public that EPA
reserved to use the right to halt the use of subsurface
dispersant if we concluded that at any time the impact to the
environment outweighed the benefit of disbursing the oil. EPA
will also continue to push BP to switch to less toxic
alternatives due to the volumes of dispersant being used and
the lengthening period of this crisis.
Mr. Chairman, we are not satisfied that BP has done an
extensive enough analysis of other dispersant options, and it
appears that BP seems more interested in defending their
initial decisions than analyzing possible better options. That
is why, on May 21, EPA, along with the Coast Guard, ordered BP
to evaluate alternative dispersants. We continue to hold BP to
this requirement, and I have further committed EPA's best
scientists to independently evaluate alternative dispersants as
well as verifying BP's science.
And this week, on May 26, along with the Coast Guard, we
have instructed BP to significantly scale back the subsurface
use of dispersants to only what is needed to be effective. And
we have ordered BP to halt use of surface dispersants unless
they get prior approval from the Federal on-scene coordinator.
That order has yielded results: Four days ago, the total
use of dispersants on a daily basis was 70,000 gallons;
yesterday, it was less than 12,000 gallons.
Mr. Chairman, we are in a position with no perfect
solution. As we emerge from this response, I commit to
revisiting the regulations surrounding EPA's response,
particularly regarding dispersant registration under the
National Contingency Plan. I also commit to sharing the results
with this committee and working with you to tighten the
underlying laws, as necessary. As a New Orleans native, I know
firsthand the importance of the natural environment to the
economy, the health, and the culture of the Gulf Coast.
As I mentioned, this month since the accident, I have been
to the region three times. I have listened to people in
numerous town halls from Venice, Louisiana, to Waveland,
Mississippi, and other communities in between. I have learned
in those meetings that the people of the Gulf Coast are eager
to be part of this response. They want to be informed and,
where possible, empowered to improve their own situation on
their own.
We have a great deal of rebuilding to do both in material
terms and in terms of restoring this community's trust that
government can and will protect them in a time of need. This is
one of those times. I urge that we do everything within our
power to ensure a strong recovery and future for the Gulf
Coast. And, of course, I welcome any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson follows:]
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Mr. Markey. Thank you, Administrator Jackson.
Our next witness is Dr. Larry Robinson.
He is the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and
Atmosphere at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration. Dr. Robinson guides policy and program
direction for NOAA's conservation protection and resource
management priorities.
Upon being confirmed for the position on May 7, 2010, Dr.
Robinson went to the Gulf Coast to help coordinate NOAA's
scientific resources throughout the region. Prior to his
appointment, Dr. Robinson was the vice president for research
and a professor at Florida A&M University.
Whenever you are ready, Mr. Robinson.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LARRY ROBINSON
Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Upton, and members of the subcommittee, for the opportunity to
testify on the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration's role in response to the BP Deep
Horizon oil spill.
I wish to begin by letting the families of the 11 people
who lost their lives in the explosion and sinking of the Deep
Horizon know that we think of them every day. The 12,800
employees of NOAA working in the Gulf of Mexico and those
around the country send our deepest condolences.
Because you already have my written testimony, I would like
to simply summarize NOAA's role in the oil spill response and
then provide a short update on NOAA's latest efforts.
NOAA's mission is to understand and predict changes in the
earth's environment, and conserve and manage coastal and marine
resources to meet our Nation's economic, social, and
environmental needs. NOAA is also a natural resource trustee,
and is one of the Federal agencies responsible for protecting
and restoring the coastal natural resources when they are
affected by oil spills. As such, the entire agency is deeply
concerned about the immediate and long-term environmental,
economic, and social impacts of the Gulf Coast and the Nation
as a whole as a result of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
NOAA is the Nation's scientific resource for the unified
command and is responsible for coordinated scientific, weather,
and biological response services. NOAA's experts have been
assisting with the response from the very beginning of this
spill. Offices throughout the agency have been mobilized, and
hundreds of NOAA personnel are dedicating themselves to assist.
Over the past few weeks, NOAA has provided 24/7 scientific
support to the U.S. Coast Guard in its role as Federal on-scene
coordinator both on scene and through our Seattle operation
center. This NOAA-wide effort support includes data of the
trajectories of the oil spill, information management,
overflight observations, and management, weather and river flow
forecast, shoreline, and resource risk assessment, and
oceanographic modeling support.
Now, a few specifics on seven activities of which NOAA has
responsibility. NOAA's oceanographers continue to release
updated oil spill trajectory maps showing the predicted
trajectory of the oil spill. These maps help inform shoreline
operations, placement of booms, and oil recovery efforts at the
surface.
NOAA's current forecast show offshore winds through
Saturday morning with magnitudes of 6 to 12 knots. Yesterday's
overflights observed significant amounts of oil offshore around
the Mississippi Delta and near the Southern Chandeleur Islands.
Although offshore winds may eventually lead to a reprieve in
new shoreline impacts, the Mississippi Delta west of Timberlier
Bay, Breton Sound, and the Chandeleur Islands continue to be
threatened by shoreline contacts during NOAA's current forecast
period of 72 hours.
The loop current. We continue to track the small amounts of
oil that was detrained in the loop current late last week. Most
of that surface oil is now caught in a counterclockwise eddy on
the northern side of the loop current. And because the top of
the loop current has now pinched off, any oil that was in the
loop current will most likely be retained in the Gulf and not
routed to the Florida strait or the Gulf current.
Flow rate. NOAA's scientists are part of the National
Incident Command's flow rate technical group, which is designed
to support the response and inform the public by providing
scientifically validated information about the amount of oil
flowing from the leaking well, while ensuring the vital efforts
to cap the leak are not impeded.
Fisheries disaster declaration. On May 24, Commerce
Secretary Gary Locke determined that there has been a fishery
disaster in the Gulf of Mexico due to the economic impact on
commercial and recreational fisheries from the ongoing Deep
Horizon oil spill. The affected area includes the State of
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. Secretary Locke made the
determination under section 312(a) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act.
The declaration was made in response to requests from Louisiana
and Mississippi based on the loss of access to many commercial
fisheries and the existing and anticipated environmental damage
from this unprecedented event.
Fisheries closure and seafood safety. This past Tuesday,
NOAA's National Marine Fishery Service modified the boundaries
of the fisheries closed areas based upon the latest oil spill
trajectories. The modified area increased the closed area to
54,096 square miles. This represents 22.4 percent of the Gulf
of Mexico's exclusive economic zone. NOAA is sampling seafood
inside and outside of the closed areas and working with the FDA
to ensure that seafood is not contaminated and to guide
decisions about when closed areas can be reopened.
Natural resource damage assessment. NOAA is coordinating
the natural resource damage assessment effort with the
Department of the Interior as a Federal co-trustee, as well as
co-trustees in five States and representatives of at least one
responsible party, British Petroleum. The focus currently is to
assemble existing data on resources and their habitat, and
collect baseline or pre-spill impact data. Data on all
resources and habitat are also being collected.
Number seven. Social and environmental impact. NOAA is
aggressively working with other agencies and non-Federal
scientists to understand where oil is on the surface and below
the surface and to evaluate the environmental impacts of both
the spill and any associated mitigation efforts.
To close, I would like to assure you that we will not
relent in our efforts to protect the livelihoods of Gulf Coast
residents and mitigate the environmental impact of this spill.
Thank you for allowing me to testify on NOAA's response
efforts. I am happy to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Robinson follows:]
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Mr. Markey. Thank you, Dr. Robinson.
Our next witness is Mr. David Hayes. He is the Deputy
Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior. Mr. Hayes
served as counselor to Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt and
Deputy Secretary of the Interior during the Clinton
administration.
I understand that you will have to leave at 4:00 to attend
to spill response matters, Mr. Hayes. So please begin your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAVID J. HAYES
Mr. Hayes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, also Ranking Member
Upton, and members of the subcommittee. I will give a few oral
remarks to accompany the written testimony from the Department.
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Mr. Hayes. We have been, as you would imagine,
extraordinarily busy here on this matter since day one. The
morning after the accident, I went down to the Gulf and was the
first administration person working with Admiral Landry on
setting up the command center. We have been working every day
since then virtually 24/7 with several streams of work,
obviously working to plug the leak.
Secretary Salazar has been in Houston four times. Dr.
Marcia McNutt, the director of the U.S. Geological Survey, has
been in Houston for most of the last three weeks working with
Secretary Chu and the directors of the National Labs to provide
Federal oversight and direction in connection with those high-
tech activities.
Thirdly, we have been very active on the response effort
side. The Department of the Interior has more than 600
personnel mobilized in the four command centers in the Gulf
region, including some of our highest-ranking folks. Jon
Jarvis, the director of the National Park Service, is our lead
in the Mobile, Alabama, office, by way of example.
We have significant assets in the area. We have 40 National
Park units and/or National Wildlife Refuge units in the area.
And we are leading a lot of the natural response efforts on the
natural resource damage response efforts.
We also have been doing some special science projects. As
Dr. Robinson referred to, there has been a Flow Rate Task Force
established, and Dr. Marcia McNutt has led that task force, our
director of USGS. And she provided a briefing earlier today
that updated and provided independent governmental estimates of
the flow rate coming out of the leaks.
More broadly, I will just mention a couple of other
important aspects of what we have been doing. Obviously,
because of our jurisdiction over the Minerals Management
Service, we have been deeply involved in addressing the safety
issues that have arisen in connection with this disaster. We
have started our own investigation, working with the United
States Coast Guard. Secretary Salazar also commissioned an
independent investigation by the National Academy of
Engineering, which is under way.
Today, we submitted to the President a 30-day safety report
that he requested, suggesting interim additional measures to
increase the safety for offshore drilling. And, as you know,
the President accepted that report and took a number of steps
to ensure that we would not have additional problems until we
could fully implement those safety requirements and also get
the benefit of the input of the Presidential commission that he
established and which is now under way.
We also, of course, have been undertaking broader reform
efforts at the MMS. As you know, we have taken reform efforts
with the Royalty-in-Kind Program and, most recently, have
reorganized the MMS to separate out the enforcement function
from the permitting function, and also to separate out the
revenue function, which collects an average of $13 billion per
year.
I will leave it with that, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to
questions.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Hayes, very much.
Our next witness, Mr. Salt, is the principal deputy
secretary of the Army. He provides policy for the Army Corps of
Engineers. Assistant Secretary Darcy delivered the Army Corps
prepared testimony, so Mr. Salt will be there to answer
questions moving forward.
Our next witness is Rear Admiral James Watson.
Rear Admiral Watson assumed duties as deputy commander of
the United States Coast Guard Atlantic Area Command in April of
2010. Prior to that, he served as the Atlantic area's first
director of operations.
Rear Admiral Watson graduated from the Coast Guard Academy
in 1978 with a degree in marine engineering, and he
additionally has masters degrees in mechanical engineering,
naval architecture, and strategic studies.
When you are ready, Admiral, please begin.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL JAMES WATSON
Admiral Watson. Good afternoon, Chairman Markey,
Representative Upton, distinguished members of the committee.
First, I want to say that this is an incident that is a
tragic incident for the people of South Louisiana, Mississippi,
Alabama, and even parts of Florida.
I have been down there, and we are terrifically sensitive
to the impacts that this has on them, and particularly also the
people who have lost their loved ones on the Deepwater Horizon.
Since the night of the explosion, Federal, State, and local
authorities and the responsible parties, BP and Transocean,
have been working around the clock to secure the leak and
mitigate environmental damages. My role as the deputy Federal
on-scene coordinator is to support Rear Admiral Mary Landry,
the Eighth Coast Guard District Commander. We will carry out
our national policy and direction, and have oversight of all
response operations as directed by the National Contingency
Plan.
The Deepwater Horizon explosion on the night of April 20
set off an unfortunate chain of events. The event began as a
search-and-rescue case, and within the first few hours of the
explosion, 115 of the 126 crew members were safely recovered.
After 3 days of continuous searching, the Coast Guard suspended
the search for the 11 missing crew members. My deepest
sympathies are for the families and friends of the Deepwater
Horizon crew who lost their lives in the line of duty.
A massive oil spill response followed the sinking of the
Deepwater Horizon, unprecedented in its scope, complexity, and
indeterminate nature, the spill has required an extraordinary
unified response across all levels of government, industry, and
the communities of the five Gulf Coast States.
A federally-led incident command was quickly established to
coordinate this massive operation. Employing lessons learned
from the Exxon Valdez, the Cosco Busan, spill of national
significant exercises, and through the implementation of the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, the response community galvanized
their efforts under a common framework provided by the National
Contingency Plan.
This framework, developed over the last two decades,
enables us to respond to these catastrophes in a way that
leverages the strengths of private industry under the
leadership of a Federal on-scene coordinator. In accordance
with the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, we integrate the best of
Federal, State, and local resources alongside the best and
brightest of industry, academia, and the public in a unity of
effort to protect our natural resources, livelihoods, and the
security of the Nation.
From the President down, the Federal Government has taken
an ``all hands on deck'' approach from the moment the explosion
occurred, including the designation as a ``spill of national
significance,'' with Admiral Thad Allen as the national
incident commander.
From the start, our objectives have remained constant and
clear: Stop the leak, fight the spill offshore, protect
environmentally sensitive areas, and mitigate the effects on
the environment, the economy, and the local communities.
Despite several aggressive measures, including the top hat
and the riser insertion tube, engineers have been unable to
stop the flow of oil. Today, we eagerly await the outcome of
the top kill. We continue to monitor the progress in operation,
which is expected to take 3 to 4 days.
In parallel, BP is drilling relief wells from two
additional rigs. I meet personally with BP's chief of
operations officer, and I know their drilling contractors are
working around the clock to secure the source of the oil.
While we are working permanently to secure the leak, we are
attacking the spill as far offshore as possible. As the oil
moves from one large slick to multiple ribbons of oil, we
continue to deploy traditional removal methods. These include
in situ burning, skimming, and pre-approved surface
dispersants.
The magnitude of this spill has required us to look at
nontraditional mitigation strategies. Subsurface dispersants
and satellite imagery are just a few of the innovative
technologies responders are using offshore. Near shore, almost
2 million feet of hard boom has been deployed, according to
environmentally and economically sensitive areas, as outlined
in local area contingency plans. This includes different types
of booms and other nonconventional barriers methods, including
National Guard deployment of Hesco barriers in Mississippi and
sandbags in Louisiana.
As oil reaches the shoreline, we will continue to be
aggressive in monitoring BP's contractors and launching
coordinated Federal and State actions. We require BP to obtain
and deploy whatever resources are necessary, including new
technologies, to ensure we are doing everything we can to
protect the shoreline environmental sensitive areas in the Gulf
region.
Mitigating the effects of this spill extend beyond
environmental impacts and include damages to surrounding
communities who depend so heavily on the Gulf of Mexico for
their livelihood. The fishermen and small business owners are
anxious to do whatever they can. Recognizing the desire of so
many to help and support the local economies, the unified
command has established a volunteer and vessel of opportunity
program to maximize the opportunities available to the local
communities to support response and cleanup operations.
Although the incident remains under investigation by a
joint Minerals Management Service and Coast Guard Marine Board
of Investigation, it may be months before we fully understand
what caused the explosion. However, the spill has heightened
the need for building resiliency into our Nation's critical
infrastructure so we are better prepared to respond to system
failures and prevent spills of national significance from
occurring in the future.
Our response to this historic spill is far from over, but I
want to reassure you, the entire responsive community is fully
committed and will continue to aggressively pursue all
available options to mitigate the environmental and economic
impacts of the spill.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Watson follows:]
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Mr. Markey. Thank you, Admiral Watson, very much.
The chair will now recognize himself for a round of
questions.
Deputy Secretary Hayes and Admiral Watson, this is BP's oil
spill. BP hired Transocean to drill the well. BP hired
Halliburton to cement the wellbore. BP owns the equipment
necessary to stop the oil leak and has sole responsibility to
stop the leak and pay for the cleanup cost. But BP gave
deflated estimates about the flow rate, how much oil was
actually going out into the ocean on a daily basis, couldn't
provide a live feed of its efforts to the public for over a
month after the explosion, and has not yet stopped the leak.
What oversight authorities of the Federal Government have
been engaged to ensure BP gets the job done?
Admiral Watson.
Admiral Watson. Sir, as soon as the oil spill response
started, we have had a designated Federal on-scene coordinator
who is responsible for that oversight. BP was given a letter
that made that very clear, and the organization was
established. All of the activities involving the response have
been under the oversight and direction of the Federal on-scene
coordinator.
As the incident grew larger and larger, we expanded that
organization from a local incident command to an area command,
and finally to a national incident command with the commandant
of the Coast Guard, Admiral Thad Allen, in charge.
Mr. Markey. Thank you.
Administrator Jackson and Rear Admiral Watson, yesterday
the Coast Guard ordered all ships participating in the BP oil
spill cleanup to cease operations after crew members on three
boats reported health problems. Since the start of this spill,
EPA has been stating that the oil spewing under the sea is
harmful to human and animal health.
Such illness is nothing new. Following the Exxon Valdez
spill in 1989, Exxon reported 6,722 cases of upper respiratory
infection from workers participating in the cleanup. Yet, BP
spokesman Graham McEwen said this past Tuesday that he was
unaware of any health complaints amongst cleanup workers. And
fishermen working on cleanup are saying they weren't provided
with protective equipment.
Did BP consult with the EPA or the Coast Guard on the
health effects of deploying volunteers?
Admiral Watson. We have at each of our incident command
posts and at the area a safety officer. And our plans, our
daily plans are updated according to the changing conditions of
which these workers are exposed.
One of our highest concerns has been for the workers
actually over the well, which caused the explosion in the first
place, from the volatile organic compounds. As we hire
contractors, we ensure that they are in compliance with the
OSHA standards for working in these conditions, and volunteers
are given specific training and equipment for the conditions
that they would be volunteering to participate in.
For the fishing vessels, there is one set of training
requirements; for the shore-side people, there is another. And
then there is the wildlife people.
Mr. Markey. Do you think that these reported symptoms
experienced by people involved in the cleanup efforts could be
a result of exposure to the chemical dispersants?
Admiral Watson. Sir, I can't comment on that specifically.
But I know that the unified command is responding to those and
making changes when we determine what it actually is that is
being reported.
Mr. Markey. How is the EPA going to evaluate the long-term
public health concerns associated with the use of dispersants,
including the ingestion of contaminated seafood?
Ms. Jackson. Chairman, we will first rely on data. That
data is a collected now. Primarily along the shoreline, air
data is being collected along the shoreline in conjunction with
the States, and also with two roving labs. We call them our
TAGA vehicles, and also by the ASPECT aircraft, which is able
to take air samples, especially during surface burning
operations.
EPA is monitoring for particulate matter, volatile organic
compounds, specifically compounds that would tend to cause odor
from oil, BTX, benzene toluene, xylene. And we have added those
components that are most volatile in the dispersant. We are
just getting that data in. We haven't seen any dispersant
chemicals, but we have seen elevated levels of some of those
volatile organic compounds. We have also seen occasionally
elevated levels of hydrogen sulfites, which we are monitoring
for.
There is more and more data added every day, and I think it
is EPA's job to assess both any short-term impacts--we haven't
seen numbers that give us concern. We did have one volatile
spike in the last few days and a hydrogen sulfite spike at one
location--and then interpret for the people of the Gulf Coast
what that means.
Right now, if you go on our Web site, it says that what you
smell probably can make you nauseous, give you a headache,
irritate you. So the first thing to do is if you are not
participating in the cleanup or response is to remove yourself,
because some people are quite susceptible to that. When I was
there, it didn't bother me, but I am notorious for not being
able to smell.
If you are a worker, then we refer--whether we are getting
those complaints from the workers themselves or NGOs--those
complaints to OSHA, which is part of the unified command,
because worker protection and safety is their responsibility.
We are not doing as much monitoring out over the wellhead
itself.
Mr. Markey. Thank you.
The chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr.
Upton.
Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like each of you to give me what your estimate is
of your cost thus far to the agency and what you might think it
will be for the foreseeable future. Obviously, a ballpark
figure is sufficient.
Ms. Jackson. I will go. To date, EPA has spent
approximately $6.7 million. Of that, we spent about $5.2
million in the regions in reimbursable funds and approximately
$1.5 million in headquarters.
Mr. Upton. And what do you anticipate for the next 30 to 60
days or so?
Ms. Jackson. Double it. You know.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Robinson?
Mr. Robinson. Thank you. NOAA has expended $4.6 million on
Deepwater to date. This includes $2.9 million in reimbursable
funds from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund and $1.7 million
in recurring activities. I don't have the benefit of an
estimate of what those expenses might be within the next 30
days. We will make that calculation and get back to you.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Hayes?
Mr. Hayes. Mr. Upton, our estimate to date is about $8
million. That is fresh from a House Appropriations hearing this
morning. About 60 percent of that we believe will be directly
reimbursable under agreement with the Coast Guard from BP. Some
of the balance of that will not be. So that is our estimate at
this point. And like Dr. Robinson, we can try to project
forward, but that is pretty speculative.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Salt, you get the added importance, I guess,
of if we go ahead with these permits that have been approved,
you all may be doing some extensive work there as well. So what
are your estimated costs?
Mr. Salt. Sir, I don't have a good answer to that. The
Corps' work so far has been on providing certain technical
analysis, particularly the hydrologic analysis, as Secretary
Darcy testified, with respect to options managing the
Mississippi River. And then with respect to our regulatory
effort the bulk of our future efforts will be in the monitoring
part of that. It is not expected that we would do any of the
work. At this time, it is not expected that we would do any of
the work with respect to those permits.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Watson?
Admiral Watson. My estimate is about $19 million at this
time.
I have to say, though, that one of the things that I am
responsible for in my position as the deputy Federal on-scene
coordinator is management of the ceiling of the emergency fund
under the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. It is a portion of
the overall trust fund that we use for responding to
emergencies. And we provide funding to other Federal agencies,
State agencies. We use that fund to hire contractors directly.
It is not used for damage costs or claims.
That fund, when I was down there just a couple days ago,
was up to $85 million total. And that is--when you are in a
Federal response, that is the number that you are managing. As
opposed to----
Mr. Upton. My clock is running here fast. I want to get in
a couple more questions. So as you all look at your costs thus
far and going ahead, I would imagine that all of you will be
seeking full reimbursement from BP.
Is there any argument to that statement?
Good. All five are unanimous.
Ms. Jackson, you indicated that you have done rigorous
testing, sharing the data, particularly of the subsurface
disbursements. Did they work? Are they working? Is that the
reason why it has been reduced from 70,000 gallons to 12,000
gallons, because they are working? Because, based on what I
have seen, there is not a lot that is working.
So tell me how they are working if in fact you are reducing
the flow by a considerable amount.
Ms. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Upton.
One of the reasons that BP first requested the ability to
use the dispersants in the subseas, something that has never
been done as far as we can tell, anywhere in the world, is that
they claim they can use much less dispersant and still be much
more effective. And that is exactly what we are seeing right
now. They use about--of the amount I told you, the 12,000, they
used 11,110 gallons in the subsurface; they used 1,029 at the
surface. The day before that, they used 200 at the surface.
Mr. Upton. 200,000 or 200 gallons?
Ms. Jackson. 200 gallons. The Coast Guard would rather, at
the surface, use surface burning whenever possible. Surface
burning obviously depends on the wind, and of course skimming
and other collection operations.
You asked about the monitoring that we do in the
subsurface. There are three basic pieces of data that are
reviewed every night by a team of Federal scientists. The first
is particle size. The smaller particle size is a measure of
dispersion, if you will. The second is dissolved oxygen. There
has been lots of concern that there would be too little oxygen
in the system. And when that happens, the system becomes
hypoxic and creatures die, to put it mildly. And the third is a
toxicity test, which is done on a critter called rotifer. And
those tests were agreed to by a panel of scientists because we
can get them back quickly. And right now, we are seeing usually
above 90 percent survivability when we expose this creature to
the oil dispersant water mixture. I think we have had one or
two samples maybe in the high 80 percent survivability.
Mr. Markey. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair recognizes the chairman emeritus of the
committee, Mr. Dingell.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
This question for the witness from the Coast Guard and from
the Army.
Louisiana has proposed building a chain of sand barriers
along the Louisiana coast to prevent oil from the coastal
wetlands. The plan has not yet been approved. Why, and when?
Admiral Watson. There is a consideration that the Federal
on-scene coordinator uses in a proposal like this, and it is
primarily: How effective is it going to be? Is it the most
effective thing in the tradeoffs?
Mr. Dingell. By the time you decide that, I have a notion
that the oil will be well into the wetlands. How long is it
going to take to come to this decision?
Admiral Watson. First of all, we have to get a reading from
the Corps and the other agencies as to whether it is going to
be more hazardous to the environment than it would be if you
didn't do it. Then, secondly, we have to make a determination
if it is going to be effective stopping the oil.
Mr. Dingell. Now, which agency down there has
responsibility for the environmental impact? It is the
Department of the Interior, is it not?
Mr. Hayes. That is correct.
Mr. Dingell. Now, you did not require the environmental
impact for the particular--impact statement for the particular
well that we are talking about in the spill. Is that correct?
Mr. Hayes. That is correct. There is a legal restraint.
Mr. Dingell. Let me continue, please, because I only have a
certain amount of time.
Why did you not have an environmental impact statement?
Each drilling undertaking is different, and each part of that
of the tract on which you had the general environmental impact
statement is different, and the equipment is all different. Why
was there not an environmental impact statement on that?
Mr. Hayes. The administration has asked the Congress to
change the law under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. The
Department is required to process an exploration plan and
permit within 30 days.
Mr. Dingell. Let me ask you about 30 days; I want to hear
about that later. But the environment, the National
Environmental Policy Act is still in force. It requires you,
wherever there is going to be a significant environmental
impact, to file one of these environmental impact statements.
Why was that not filed here?
Mr. Hayes. CEQ has a categorical exclusion for this
activity that they----
Mr. Dingell. Why did that do that?
Mr. Hayes. They did that in 1986. The chair has started to
review that----
Mr. Dingell. What year did they do it in?
Mr. Hayes. 1986.
Mr. Dingell. OK. Now, explain to me, if you please, why I
am hearing about the risks of drilling or failure to drill
properly and I am not hearing anything about the steps that the
agencies have taken to ensure that good drilling practices are
followed?
Mr. Hayes. Congressman, the Minerals Management Service
spends about $30 million a year on an inspection program, has
66 full-time inspectors. We are doing a stem-to-stern
evaluation, however, of whether that enforcement mechanism
where they check against the prescriptive requirements and the
regulations is adequate or not. And that is going to be an
important outcome, I think, of the investigation that has
started and the Presidential commission that has been
established.
Mr. Dingell. Now, you tell me that you are required to come
to a decision within 30 days on these permits. Is that in the
statute?
Mr. Hayes. It is in the statute.
Mr. Dingell. Do you have any authority to waive or to
extend that?
Mr. Hayes. No authority, unfortunately. It is a shell. And
legal counsel, since this law was passed in 1978, have said
there is no authority to extend it.
Mr. Dingell. All right. Now, MMS has granted 27 categorical
exemptions to oil and gas companies. Would you submit to the
committee the list of the categorical exemptions that you have
given and why those categorical exemptions have been given in
each instance, please.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the record stay
open so that can be received.
Mr. Markey. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Dingell. Now, I note that you have given categorical
exemptions to a well at 4,000 feet deep. Here, you gave one at
5,000 feet. And you now have one that I note is given to
Anadarko Petroleum for a plan that will be for a drilling
undertaking that will be more than 9,000 feet. Why are these
given? And explain why they are a, quote, category of actions
which do not individually and cumulatively have a significant
effect on the human environment and for which, therefore,
neither an environmental impact assessment nor an environmental
impact statement is required.
And I am quoting from the actions of the agency. Please
explain that.
Mr. Hayes. Congressman, I would have to look at those
specific examples. They have been--those are preceded by two
environmental impact statements, one in connection with a 5-
year plan under which those leases were granted, and then a
second environmental statement was prepared for each specific
lease sale under the 5-year plan.
You raised a very important point, though. And Chairman
Sutley and Secretary Salazar 10 days ago suggested a top-to-
bottom review of the NEPA approach taken by the Minerals
Management Service.
Mr. Dingell. Can you make a bald statement that every
action that was taken by the drillers in each of these cases
conformed in full to the environmental impact statement and to
the permit?
Mr. Hayes. I personally cannot.
Mr. Dingell. Would you submit for the record a statement
that you can or cannot; and, if so, why?
Mr. Hayes. Certainly.
Mr. Dingell. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Markey. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair recognizes the ranking member of the full
committee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Barton.
Mr. Barton. Thank you, Chairman Markey.
The first thing I want to establish is chain of command.
Admiral Watson, when I was in Louisiana with Chairman
Markey several weeks ago, the top Federal official on site was
an admiral named Mary Landry. Is she still the top Federal
official on site?
Admiral Watson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Barton. Who does she report to?
Admiral Watson. She reports to Admiral Thad Allen.
Mr. Barton. And who does he report to?
Admiral Watson. He reports to Secretary Napolitano.
Mr. Barton. And who does she report to?
Admiral Watson. The President.
Mr. Barton. So that is the chain of command?
Admiral Watson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Barton. The President, Napolitano, Admiral Allen, and
the Admiral Landry?
Admiral Watson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Barton. Is there any private representative on site
that doesn't have to report to Admiral Landry?
Admiral Watson. There is a requirement under the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 that we have a unified command and that
the Federal on-scene coordinator is the person with the 51
percent vote.
Now, we do have a unified command in which we have a State
on-scene coordinator, so the States are well represented, as
well as a coordinator from the responsible party.
Mr. Barton. The point that I am trying to get across, the
British Petroleum representatives, the Halliburton
representatives, the Cameron representatives, the Transocean
representatives, any other contractor that works for a private
company, they have an independent chain of command through
their companies, but they have to work with Admiral Landry or
her designee; they cannot act independently. Is that not
correct?
Admiral Watson. That is correct. The COO of BP is in our
command center. He is right next to Mary Landry.
Mr. Barton. Now, I want to go to Administrator Jackson.
We have talked quite a bit, and you mentioned in your
testimony the dispersant issue. And I want to say right off the
front, that I think that is a judgment call, and I think EPA
has made the right judgment. I think it is the right judgment
to try to use these dispersants to try to keep the oil under
water as opposed to letting it get on the top of the water
where it would wash onshore and could foul up the beaches and
the marshlands.
So I am not negative at all about the decision to use
dispersants. And I understand some of your testimony about the
qualitative differences on how much to use. I think the least
you can use, the better. I am not second-guessing that.
My question is, as the administrator of EPA, has British
Petroleum received approval before using dispersant? And have
they ever used dispersants in a way that EPA specifically
disapproved of?
Ms. Jackson. The answer to your first question is they have
been--they were approved, pre-approved through the Federal on-
scene coordinator's regional response plan that use of
dispersants at the surface, as long as it was on the EPA
product schedule, was allowable for surface applications. So
that is yes. I believe you said, were they approved? Yes,
throughout the--by the FOSC ultimately, but in conjunction with
the ROT.
They specifically requested approval to use it in the
subsurface and received that, I believe it was, May 14. The
date is in my testimony, my oral and written testimony.
And then you asked if at any time their application of
dispersants has been in violation of an order. I would say the
closest that we got to that was Sunday night when my concern
was that we had already approved use of subsea dispersants. All
the testing and science was showing that it was working, and
yet the amount of spraying at the surface kept going up. And
the conversation that I had with Admiral Landry, and then she
brought in Mr.--I am sorry, I don't remember his name. His
first name is David. I am sorry--was that we wanted to see that
go down. Their initial response was that they didn't understand
that. But they did come around. And we have seen the amounts go
down, as I mentioned in my testimony.
Mr. Barton. Again, there can be honest differences of
opinion about just the fact that you use dispersant or not,
about the qualitative differences. But in terms of the policy,
they have gotten approval before beginning and they have--while
they have had differences of opinion, they have not continued
to do something that EPA or the on-site Federal official
Admiral Landry didn't approve of. That's a true statement.
Ms. Jackson. It is. The one piece of color I add to that,
sir, is just that we--at this point I do not feel like I have
the science to say with certainty that they are using the least
toxic dispersant out there. So we are getting that science. It
will take time.
Mr. Barton. I understand that.
Know my time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
I have two more questions. One is for the representatives
of the Corps of Engineers.
I want to know why in God's name Louisiana hasn't gotten
approval to begin to build these berms. They have been waiting
for over a month. Why would you not assign responsibility to
the Governor of Louisiana, and tell them to do what they can to
protect their marshland?
Mr. Salt. Sir, we actually received the permit request on
May 11. We quickly coordinated that request, went back to the
State. They agreed that they needed to modify the request based
on some issues that were developed. We took their modified
request, and we have been working with that.
One of the main issues is the time it would take to do it.
The State's request, you can think of it as 19 increments of
berm. We just coordinated an analysis of how long it would take
to construct the shortest, and it was 5 months. Part of the
analysis then is, how much of this is it reasonable to permit
under the emergency provisions? The Jacksonville district
commander proffered that to the Governor.
Mr. Barton. So basically you have sat on your bottom for a
month, and nothing--and I think you got some permitted today.
Isn't that correct? Six sections got permitted. And in the
meantime, the oil is in the marshland. Even if it didn't work--
--
Mr. Salt. Sir, my math is 13 days. But, yes, in that
process of trying to sort--I mean, the question really is, is
it more harm than good to throw up a berm for over 100 miles
along the coast?
Mr. Barton. And so the Corps' judgment is it is more harm.
Mr. Salt. There is a part of that proposal that is
beneficial. That is the part that it worked through with the
State and others. I am not sure that--the State hasn't accepted
the offer yet, but that was offered.
Mr. Barton. If the Corps had given approval immediately,
could not some of the oil that had gotten in, has been able to
infiltrate into the marshland, would it not have been prevented
from getting into the marshland?
Mr. Salt. Sir, I honestly don't think so. We are talking
about large berms. And to achieve some of the benefits you are
talking about, like I said, to complete the shortest of the
berms, the Corps' estimate was 5 months.
Mr. Barton. Well, maybe if Louisianans did it, it might not
take 5 months.
Mr. Salt. Even if we accept those kinds of proficiencies,
sir, I think--the Corps was trying and is trying and is
committed to try----
Mr. Barton. I encourage you to try to harder.
I thank the chair's discretion.
Mr. Markey. The gentleman's time has expired.
And, Mr. Hayes, we know that you have an important meeting.
Obviously, because of your responsibilities, you have to go
there right now. So we thank you for coming here today.
Mr. Hayes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to
respond to any further questions for the record.
Mr. Stearns. Point of information, Mr. Chairman, is it
possible that someone from MMS could be here as his
replacement? Since we do have a hearing and we are in Congress,
we would like to have somebody here; and many of us still want
to ask him questions.
Mr. Markey. I don't know that there is anyone designated by
the Secretary to replace Mr. Hayes.
Mr. Hayes. We do not have anyone else here.
Mr. Stearns. Can he possibly wait for one series of
questions?
Mr. Markey. Again, I know that they are part of the spill
response team, and Mr. Hayes is responsible for it, and I just
don't want our hearing to interfere with his ability to
participate in the important decisions which are being made
right now.
Mr. Hayes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Hayes.
The chair recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms.
Capps.
Mrs. Capps. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank each of our
panelists. It has been a very arduous process, both down in the
Gulf and here answering questions.
Workers and volunteers and local residents are at risk as
we speak here for a host of negative health affects. Just
yesterday, the unified command recalled fishing vessels working
on the spill due to workers' experience of nausea, dizziness,
headaches, and chest pain. Previous spills have shown that more
serious health problems may arise over time.
Administrator Jackson, according to an L.A. Times interview
with some fishermen working on the results of the spill
yesterday--or the interview was yesterday--while they were told
not to touch the oil in their training, they weren't provided
with any protective equipment by BP. Instead, they wore leather
boots, regular clothes on the boat to work the spill.
When asked what BP told them, the fishermen responded that
they--meaning the BP officials--told us if we ran into oil it
wasn't supposed to bother us.
Do you think that BP has done enough to protect the health
of the oil spill responders in the Gulf Coast communities?
Ms. Jackson. Based on that story, no, ma'am.
Mrs. Capps. Just for the record, I was at a hearing earlier
today with the CEO of BP, and I asked the same question, and I
didn't get any response. So it seems to me that, while BP does
have some technical expertise and experience in drilling, when
it comes to public and worker health there is no reason that we
should assume that BP has the expertise, the willingness to use
its resources or incentives to really address the issues that
are involved here.
Now EPA is already taking steps to protect the health of
workers in communities, as you mentioned in your opening
remarks. You are collecting data, you are doing monitoring and
surveillance, but are there some other ways that EPA is
communicating about health risks to the public?
Ms. Jackson. The primary means that we use are for those
who have Internet access we put up information to help
communities. It is a right to know. A basic tenet of
environmental protection is that people have the right to know.
We do that in conjunction with our partners and with the
command.
We also have put up a translation in Vietnamese. So that
there is access to not everything but some information,
particularly that related to human health.
We continue to get data. We have had a series of public
meetings, and we have been fortunate enough to be joined with
our partners. Often, the Coast Guard, NOAA, Department of
Interior, Fish and Wildlife are there to answer questions.
Just as your particular issue we would normally refer that
to OSHA. Dr. David Michaels I believe has been very adamant
about the need for OSHA to stand up and be very available
through the unified command for any questions related to work,
specifically to worker health.
Mrs. Capps. Thank you.
I am assuming EPA is also translating--while you are
translating literally to other languages, but as data is being
collected, as this ongoing process occurs, you will use this.
Do you use any other methods as well to keep the local
communities and workers and volunteers apprised of new data as
it comes along?
Ms. Jackson. Oh, absolutely. We are trying everything we
know to help the communities understand what we do. Just the
other day when I was out there, we had NGOs who were
particularly concerned about odor complaints ride along in our
mobile lab so they can understand and tell us where they might
want us to go to focus on information.
It is a continual process, and it is one that we do under
the direction of the Coast Guard. They have been very
supportive of any efforts EPA makes to bring in and inform the
local community.
Of course, since I am from Louisiana at least and the Gulf
Coast region for sure, that I think nothing could be more
important.
Mrs. Capps. And, also, to follow up even more, you
mentioned OSHA and you talked about collaboration with the
Coast Guard. Are there other agencies as well that should be
involving in some of these public health responses.
Ms. Jackson. Certainly when it comes to seafood safety, it
is the Food and Drug Administration, along with any partnership
with NOAA, because NOAA is collecting so much data out there.
I believe either today or yesterday EPA was asked by NOAA
to join some of their deep sea cruises. We generally don't do a
lot of sampling out in the deep sea. That is NOAA's
responsibility. But there is good cooperation there. And we are
working very closely with our Federal partners to ensure that
all data is getting up on the Web. EPA has a bit of experience
in that regard as well.
Mrs. Capps. You know, earlier this week, this full
Committee on Energy and Commerce, we held a markup for a bill
that will provide necessary health care to 9/11 responders--if
you can believe this many years after that--who continue to
face negative health consequences when their heroic work after
the Twin Towers fell.
Responders to this oil spill, including local shrimpers and
fishermen and volunteers and community residents, shouldn't be
choosing to save the life of the Gulf region, which they
definitely want to participate in doing, while having the
choice then to put their own health and lives at risk. And this
time I hope we can, as I am encouraging to continue doing what
you are doing and even expand it, all of these agencies here,
that we don't find ourselves in the same position 10 years from
now that we did before.
Ms. Jackson. I thank you.
I just want to acknowledge the Coast Guard's very strong
precautionary action yesterday when there was the first sign of
complaint. It is very warm down there. That oil is light crude,
sweet light crude. It does volatilize, and it can have effects
on folks, even folks in the Gulf. We think we are pretty tough
as it is. And so I could not emphasize more strongly, although
it is out of my lane per se, that proper protective equipment,
erring on the side of precaution is extremely important for
anybody down there.
Mrs. Capps. I know that I have run out of time. If there
were more time or maybe you can submit for the written record,
Admiral Watson or any others that wish to submit some
statements about this fact.
Admiral Watson. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
I just want to emphasize that safety is the first thing
that we discuss at every one of our meetings; and, of course,
we are reactive immediately if we find there is a concern. I
have been in personal discussions with Dr. Michaels, and OSHA
is a very much a part of our team.
Mrs. Capps. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Mr. McNerney [presiding]. At this point, the chair
recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Shimkus.
Mr. Shimkus. Mr. Chairman, I think Mr. Stearns. The order
we had when we started with the opening statements is when the
gavel drops by seniority, and he was here when the gavel
dropped.
Mr. McNerney. The chair recognizes Mr. Stearns.
Mr. Stearns. And I thank the gentleman, Mr. Shimkus.
Admiral Watson, recently, the press secretary for the
President, Robert Gibbs, indicated, ``There's nothing that we
think can and should be done that isn't being done, nothing.''
He was pretty emphatic about that. And I guess the question for
you is, in your present position, do you think absolutely
everything is being done that possibly could be done to clean
up this oil spill?
Admiral Watson. Sir, I was sent down there to do everything
that could be done. My assignment was to be----
Mr. Stearns. Oh, I understand your assignment, Admiral.
Admiral Watson. I really feel like I have done my duty.
Mr. Stearns. Have you done everything possible that could
be done to clean this oil spill, in your best opinion?
Admiral Watson. Personally and from my perspective inside
the organization, yes, sir.
Mr. Stearns. Now, ABC ran a news story yesterday in which
they interviewed a lot of the small fishermen. They say, we
have boats. We are ready to go out and skim off the oil to help
out. Why aren't all those unemployed fishermen--why aren't you
using a lot of their boats to help out?
Admiral Watson. Sir, I think we have over 500 fishing
vessels. I think the number is closer to 600. They are----
Mr. Stearns. They showed boats after boats on ABC, and they
interviewed these individuals.
Admiral Watson. Well, I just know that we have accepted
vessels of opportunity from all the fishing vessel communities.
We have given them the training, the equipment, and we have
deployed them, and they are being used to recover.
Mr. Stearns. Well, you heard Ranking Member Barton indicate
that Governor Jindal has asked for approval to put these oil
spill booms out and hasn't got it. And he has also got partial
approval for building the berms. Why wasn't that done earlier
if you think everything has been done that has been done? Why
haven't you given the approval for the Governor on the oil
spill booms?
Admiral Watson. Sir, on the berms, that is a tactic that
hasn't been used before. We need to know----
Mr. Stearns. No, let's take the first one, the booms. He
has been asking that for some time.
Admiral Watson. Oh, booms. There is 1.8 million feet of
booms out. We have put booms down to the maximum level of
effort possible, and there is----
Mr. Stearns. He has indicated in a press conference
yesterday, the Federal Government--he wants them to approve
millions of feet of boom, and he is waiting for their approval,
and he hasn't got it. This is the Governor. So you are saying
you have approved everything and you are not going to approve
more?
Admiral Watson. We are still flowing booms in as fast as we
can into the State of Louisiana.
Mr. Stearns. OK, well, I am just telling you what the
Governor says.
Now it is also reported there are lots of countries who
want to help out. They want to send their ships over here. They
want to provide research, technical expertise, oil pumps,
skimmers, wildlife treatment. All these countries have listed,
and yet it doesn't appear to be--I mean, you have had Mexico,
maybe one other country. Why haven't you accepted help and
support and assistance from all these other countries? I think
there were 15 countries that were cited.
Admiral Watson. Yes, sir. I can't address each one of
those, but we do have State Department in our organization, and
we are using the presence of BP around the world to access
those resources. We are flying Canadian aircraft. We are using
booms from the Middle East and from Europe.
Mr. Stearns. It was also reported that Holland has a ship
and a mechanism to take up 80 percent of the oil by skimming
it. Did you know about that?
Admiral Watson. We do have----
Mr. Stearns. Have you contacted Holland to see what the
process is they have in place?
Admiral Watson. We have a dedicated group of engineers that
are working with proposals like that, sir. I can't speak to
that specifically.
Mr. Stearns. OK, it has been 5 weeks. It seems like from
day 1 if you would had boats out there to take off the skim and
oil pumps and skimmers, this expertise would have delayed
hitting the shores of Louisiana. Don't you agree with that,
that you should have had on day 1 somebody out there doing
that?
Admiral Watson. Sir, we responded on day 1 with everything
that we had. This equipment takes time to flow in, and these
novel things need to be evaluated before----
Mr. Stearns. Well, how about day 21? Day 21, you did
nothing. There was no skimmer boats out there. There was
nothing being done. And I don't see any foreign countries out
there that you have approved coming in. And, you know, the
Governor now has for 2 weeks been asking for you to give
waivers. Why didn't you do it earlier for the oil spill booms?
Admiral Watson. We have a total of 1,500 vessels, sir. I am
not sure which ones you are referring to that we don't have
working.
Mr. Stearns. Well, the first couple weeks you weren't out
skimming the oil at the site. You weren't trying to contain the
oil. The oil was--I was out there. I saw it. I was on a Coast
Guard aircraft. It was flowing everywhere. And you could see it
come up. It was emulsified orange. Everywhere you looked, you
saw it. And there was--nobody was skimming it up, nothing. This
was about 3 weeks ago.
So for you to sit here and tell me, Admiral, that you have
done everything possible and let this thing hit the Louisiana
shore, you have to take some culpability here; and you have to
stand up and say, we could have done more. You can't go with
the administration that keeps saying, oh, yes, we have done
everything possible. Because it is clear you haven't.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you, Mr. Stearns.
At this point, the chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes.
First of all, I would like to ask if there are any known
methods out there--maybe Mr. Salt can answer this or
Administrator Jackson could answer this--that would be
effective in protecting the marshes. Are building dirt walls
effective or putting human hair booms? Is there anything out
there that would be effective?
Mr. Salt. Sir, I believe we are trying everything we know
to try.
Mr. McNerney. Well, I mean, is there any method that is
known that would be effective, whether or not you are using it,
whether or not you are deploying it? Getting oil, to prevent
oil from coming ashore, is there anything out there that can
prevent that?
I know that the oil is dispersed in the water. It is not
just on the surface. So it is a difficult problem. Is there any
known technique or method that would be effective in this, in
this situation?
Mr. Salt. Sir, beyond what is being tried right now, no,
sir, I don't know anything more.
Mr. McNerney. Ms. Jackson.
Ms. Jackson. Sir, as we heard the Admiral say, we are using
all the methods that are typically used. I have almost every
day someone who e-mails me with an idea of some sort. There
have been so many that there was a technical group put together
under the leadership of the command to try to evaluate them. It
is very, very difficult, sir, to do science on the fly right
when you are in the middle of something of this magnitude and
not do harm. One of the concerns is that in our rush to want to
do something we want to make sure we are not making the bad
situation worse in the long term.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you.
Rear Admiral, looking in the mirror a little bit now, is
there anything that the United States government could have
done that would have been more effective, taking control of the
administration of this, or any administrative or technical
thing that we could have done that the United States government
could have done that would have been more effective?
Admiral Watson. My personal feeling is that once this
manifests itself with all of that oil coming up onto the
surface--we did have weather conditions that did provide--that
did force us to retreat on occasion. I think that from what we
could have done differently it could have been in the time
since drilling has moved outward we could have changed our
readiness and increased our planning factors for this kind of a
spill. We have contingency plans. They are really based on
worse-case scenarios that aren't as worse as this one is, and
that would have potentially changed our resources that were
available when the event occurred.
Mr. McNerney. In your opinion, would it have been hurtful
or more effective to take control of this from BP? In other
words, my understanding is that BP is running the show with
oversight of the Federal Government. Would it have been more
effective for the Federal Government to take control and to
give direction to the various players?
Admiral Watson. Well, let me just explain the type of
control that we have over BP.
First of all, they are required to have a contingency plan.
They are required to have oil spill response contractors and
other contractors to respond to the type of incident that they
might have. And then when the incident occurs, they have to
become a part of the organization. If we find that they are
nonresponsive, then we would begin to give them more direct
orders. But in this particular case we have been working this
response as a unified command, and we found that the resources
that BP has been able to bring have been valuable, and there
have been no circumstances that I have observed where they have
not complied with the plan of the day for the oil spill
response.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you.
I am going to yield my time back and recognize--is it your
turn--the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Shimkus.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am not trying to
manage time, but I appreciate that.
Obviously, thank you all for coming. Again, we wouldn't
wish this on anybody. This is what we have, and I know there is
a lot of frustration. I think part of the frustration is we are
the representatives of the people. I know the folks in
Louisiana are frustrated. The whole country is really
frustrated.
With new technology today, we see every ``gee whiz dang''
solution that can save this thing, from putting straw on the
thing and soaking it up--that was one that went around last
week. And, you know, Kevin Costner is going down there to get
his little whirlybird thing down there to help. People want to
help. They see all these things.
I think the other part of the frustration--you know, if I
was Governor of Louisiana, I would just do it. I would just do
it and suffer the consequences. The court of public opinion he
wins by trying to save his marshes. I wouldn't wait for the
Federal Government. But I am not the Governor of Louisiana, so
I guess I don't have to make that call.
Administrator Jackson, I said I would be very kind, and I
am going to be. What is the name of dispersant that we are
talking about?
Ms. Jackson. COREXIT. There are two different formulations,
COREXIT 9527A and 9500A.
Mr. Shimkus. Are they both being used, or is one over the
other?
Ms. Jackson. Yes, they both have been used. I think the
only one that is currently being used is 9500A.
Mr. Shimkus. You mentioned some type of list. Can you
explain for me that list? And the 9500, is that on that list?
Ms. Jackson. 9500 is on the product schedule which is
authorized and listed in the national contingency plan.
Mr. Shimkus. So this 9500 is what is being used. The only
kind of different thing about this is there has been approval
for it to be dispersed deep, right at the spill.
Ms. Jackson. Yes, the novel application is this injection
right as the spill was coming up. That stopped yesterday,
actually, as they initiated the top kill operation. I don't
think it is happening right now.
The other novel thing is the volume use. It is usually used
over a shorter period of time. So there are certainly U.S.
record volumes used here.
Mr. Shimkus. And so then on this--so it is usually
dispersed on surface, and this is new. And so could part of
this--I give credit to Chairman Markey. This whole debate of
how much is being spilled is very important. I sat through
people taking pictures and trying to do the flow diagrams, and
I had some thermal fluids at my military school that I
attended.
If we had a lower projection of what was being released and
then this dispersant was being used volumetrically in
proportion to what we thought it was, would that not make the
case that that is why we have probably some more surface
appearance versus, you know--could that have been a reason, you
think?
Ms. Jackson. I am not sure I understand the question.
Certainly when you use a dispersant as I understand it at
the surface you have to set your nozzles to a certain rate of
application. And one of the important things is making sure you
are not wasting it, if you will, accidentally spraying it or
having it drift over open water. It is not going to do any
good. And one of the big lessons that we will learn, frankly,
on the fly here with this subsea application is maybe we found
a tool that could be used in future, God forbid, accidents.
Mr. Shimkus. Could be used positively.
Ms. Jackson. Yes. If we continue to believe that this is a
much more effective way to get at the problem, this means you
can use less of the chemical. And we are seeing issues. Now the
one thing that people are pointing out is that there is no data
on the long-term fate of this material, this dispersed
material, so we are going to----
Mr. Shimkus. So we don't know if it is biodegradable or
stuff.
Ms. Jackson. It is biodegradable.
Mr. Shimkus. Is there a time line for that?
Ms. Jackson. There is a French study and some other work
that has been done that says within a month it biodegrades.
What is a little unusual is that is assuming surface
application, and we are in 5,000 feet of water here.
Mr. Shimkus. And you mentioned France. I guess the French
use this or other countries use of this, especially use the
9500 one. I mean, is that commonly used around the world?
Ms. Jackson. Let me get the answer back to you on the
record on that. There has been some back and forth about a
British ban. The British don't use COREXIT in their rocky--in
their shallower water, and they are testing it in deeper water.
Mr. Shimkus. Again, thank you for all you do, all hands on
deck. We have got to get this solved. Hopefully, we were
successful today.
I yield back my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you, Mr. Shimkus.
The chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for having
to run in and out, but we also have other committees and
issues. I appreciate our panel being here.
I represent a very urban district in Houston. We have the
Houston ship channel, and so we wouldn't be there without the
Coast Guard. And needing dispersant--just recently, we had two
ships collide in the upper channel, and we had the booms, and
nothing on comparison of what is going on now. So our
experience is in much smaller spills, and we are literally
finding out what we can do on these huge spills, and we never
had one before.
In fact, a lot of the technology we have today--I was a
State legislator in 1979 when the well exploded in the Bay of
Campeche, and we saw oil on the Texas coast, and it was much
more tragic than what we are seeing now. But, again, I don't
want to see that or this or anything.
I appreciate the panel being here. I know the Department of
Interior left, and I had some concern about the--and I know the
President just announced the expansion or the 6 months on
drilling in deep water or floating rigs; and there are a lot of
Members, including on this committee, who have some concern
about the shallow water which is a thousand foot or less. So I
have some concern to make sure that can continue. Because,
actually, we need the natural gas safely produced.
Let me talk about dispersants. Because, Madam
Administrator, again, we are making history. We have never had
to disperse this much, and we have never had the underwater
plumes that are so deep, I guess. Because, again, a ship
channel, even where it was at, it wasn't 45 foot. So it was
very small compared to what we are experiencing.
Correct? It is--from what I understand, it biodegrades
rapidly and does not bioaccumulate. And does it not include any
known carcinogens or endocrine disrupters? Ms. Jackson, is that
information that you can share with us?
Ms. Jackson. There is testing that I have asked my
scientists to do. It will take about a week to look
specifically at endocrine disrupters.
Listen, it is a chemical, sir, so it has a toxicity to it.
It is less toxic than oil, but it is--it has toxicity.
Mr. Green. I can understand your response to Congressman
Shimkus. You see the planes flying over and, you know, it is
kind of like trying to put out a forest fire. Once you put the
dispersant out, it is going in open water as well as water that
has the plume or the oil on the surface.
Are there any other alternatives other than COREXIT and the
secondary one that can be used and what are the availability of
alternatives other than that?
Ms. Jackson. Sir, I believe there are 14 or 15 different
dispersants listed on the national contingency plan product
schedule. The way the area response plan reads, potentially any
of them could have been used.
The concern became that, as this thing has become a longer-
term release, whether or not the original decision to use
COREXIT might not be looked at again, whether there was
something less toxic out there. BP has not identified anything
less toxic. My belief is that there is more science needed on
that, and so we are going to do it.
Mr. Green. Our concern is the secondary, you know, but is
that particular dispersant--has it improved the situation of
the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico?
Ms. Jackson. Sir, it is a tough tradeoff, but I believe it
has been a useful tool. Again, as I understand it from the
Coast Guard, the FOSC would rather use burning and booming.
Surface dispersant application is really her last choice,
because it is inefficient.
The subsurface method certainly bears further study for
potential options in the future. But I think we owe it to
everyone--especially when I go down there and I talk to
shrimpers and others, there is a lot of concern. And, right
now, I can't give them all the answers they would like about
whether or not this dispersant is in the water. So we are
taking the samples. We have gotten some very, very limited
water samples back; and so far we don't see any of the
constituents from the dispersant in the water. But we will get
another 60, 70 samples back in the next few days.
Mr. Green. Any other panelist on the dispersants?
Admiral Watson. Congressman, I would just add dispersants
have been in our inventory to respond to oil spills for a long
time, 20 years. We have never used this much, but over those
years I think we have found them effective, and they have been
effective in this particular spill particularly.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you, Mr. Green.
The votes have been called. There is about 12 minutes left,
so I ask the remaining members to be mindful that there are
three members that wish to speak.
At this point, the chair recognizes the gentleman from
Texas.
Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
They will hold votes for us. This is important.
Administrator Jackson, oil, is it biodegradable?
Ms. Jackson. Yes, sir, oil does biodegrade. It takes a
while.
Mr. Burgess. By what action does it do that? Does it
oxidize, does sunlight change it, or do bacteria digest it?
Ms. Jackson. Bacteria under aerobic conditions digests oil,
sir.
Mr. Burgess. What research has been undertaken by EPA to
investigate the ability to use normal occurring bacteria to
deal with an oil spill?
Ms. Jackson. There are products listed on the national
contingency plan schedule that are--I forget the name for them,
but they are considered to be aids to biodegradation. That is
different than dispersants. So there is some work authorized
under the NCP for the EPA to evaluate and potentially list them
as tools that can be used in response.
Mr. Burgess. Exxon Valdez, some people felt that some of
the mitigation efforts were actually as harmful or more harmful
to the shoreline than was the oil itself. Given that
information, has EPA been actively engaged in any research with
any university or academic arrangement to try to develop these
bacterial digesters?
Ms. Jackson. Well, EPA wouldn't necessarily develop them.
That is the innovation and ingenuity of the American people,
sir. But EPA does have a lab. I believe we partner with
Environment Canada up in Nova Scotia to look at----
Mr. Burgess. How many of these are you evaluating?
Ms. Jackson. Sir, I don't have an answer for you on what we
are evaluating right this second.
What I mean to say, as part of our regulatory
responsibilities, we would have to list these----
Mr. Burgess. We have to go fast, because he has a quick
gavel.
We have been very fortunate since Exxon Valdez--and Mr.
Green mentioned the Gulf of Campeche. We have been very
fortunate with oil spills, but we have got a lot of activity in
the Gulf. We have driven our exploration out to deeper and
deeper levels because we put so many areas off limits and yet
we still demanded the energy. So, with that in mind, would it
have not been prudent for the Environmental Protection Agency
to have opened this up, request for proposals, to have people
bring in their products and understand better how to deal with
these problems up front.
Ms. Jackson. Well, I think EPA relied on the oil industry
and, in this case, specifically BP, who said that this would
not happen. So that is why we are----
Mr. Burgess. That is a real troubling aspect. I realize we
lost our Department of Interior person, and we fired the MMS
person, but this application is--I mean, it is a scandal in and
of itself, and it is not just EPA but from a regulatory
standpoint. Yes, shame on BP for turning this in.
A scenario for potential blowup of the well, which BP would
expect to have the highest volume of liquid hydrocarbons, is
not required for the operations proposed in this exploration
plan. Well, that is bad judgment on BP's part, but the agency
in charge of regulating and approving, it is really bad
judgment on their part.
It seems like the EPA really should be more forward leaning
in this regard. We do have a lot of activity going on in the
Gulf of Mexico. The President did outline a plan for other
areas to be open for exploration. We have been very lucky not
to have spills, but spills are going to happen. Maybe not of
this magnitude again in our lifetimes, but spills are going to
happen. And it does seem to be prudent that the EPA would take
a forward-leaning role in this regard. The industry to be sure.
Now the injection of this dispersant at 5,000 feet under
water, whose idea was that?
Ms. Jackson. The request to do the injection came from BP.
And, sir, I just want to make sure--I know you know this,
but many in the room may not realize that EPA does not review
drilling applications. So I think you should get a response
from them.
Mr. Burgess. I would love it if they were here, but we were
denied that opportunity, as you saw. They left before those of
us on the lower ends of the dais got a chance to question, and
they fired the other lady this morning. So that was unfortunate
for us.
It just seems like after all this time--we have heard it in
this committee, and we have heard it on television, on Rachel
Maddow last night, the anxiety of people because we have not
developed these contingencies. And maybe it is not EPA's place
to do that, but it seems like EPA would have an ongoing,
forward-looking strategy to deal with spills as they occur.
Let me ask you a question. Are we going to--is this going
to eliminate deep water drilling in the Gulf? We have got a 6-
month moratorium the President proposed today. Is deep water
drilling in the Gulf over?
Ms. Jackson. Oh, I don't have a crystal ball, sir.
Mr. Burgess. Is this the Three Mile Island for deep water
drilling in the Gulf? No deep water drilling, no nuclear, with
hydrologic fracturing prohibitions that are being--we heard in
this committee just yesterday, are we going to have anything
left as far as producing energy for the American people that is
of an American origin? Are we going to lock everything off?
Ms. Jackson. Sir, I don't have a crystal ball, but I would
refer to what the President said today, which is that until he
can assure this can be done safely--first, let's remember 11
people died here and then that it can be done safely so that
the States around the Gulf Coast, all of whom use it for
varying purposes, including energy production, can feel certain
that their interests are protected. I think he said he believes
we need to have more time to make sure we understand exactly
what happened here.
Mr. Burgess. I don't disagree with that. If it is to be
done safely, though, the applications must be followed to the
letter.
Mr. Markey [presiding]. We have to go back to Mr. Scalise.
I give you 3 minutes, Mr. Scalise.
Mr. Scalise. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to get in
as much as we can.
I know Mr. Barton talked about the chain of command. I have
got a real interest in what that command chain of command
really was. Because when I read the Oil Pollution Act it is
very clear the President is the one who is directly responsible
for ensuring effective and immediate removal of the discharge.
For too long, especially in the first few weeks but even
still today, our local officials are still being sent through
BP to get approval for various things that they are trying to
do to protect the marsh and the coast. And so I will throw it
out to whoever will answer this question--I guess the Coast
Guard, since technically we were told the Coast Guard is in
charge. Why is BP still in charge of certain recovery
operations? I can understand if they are dealing with the well,
but why are they dealing with things that have nothing to do
with the well?
Admiral Watson. The Coast Guard Federal On-Scene
Coordinator is responsible for the response, sir. And if there
is any other activities that go on outside of that organization
under the Federal On-Scene Coordinator, those things can be
done; and the recourse for compensation for those is back to
the responsible party. So I think we may be seeing some of
those independent activities and when----
Mr. Scalise. Well, let me be specific, because my time is
short.
What about boom, the boats that are supposed to lay out
boom? We were told our local fishermen were going to be hired
to go do that. Many fishermen say they have not gotten any
involvement in this.
This is what really irritated me. On Sunday in Jefferson
Parish, the parish where I live, the Homeland Security chief
told me that they actually went out and found 50 boats sitting
idle at the dock that were contracted out to be laying boom.
This is a day that oil is permeating into our marsh, and yet
the boats that were employed to go put out boom were sitting
idle at the dock. They went and commandeered a few of
themselves to go put out the boom on their own. Why did you all
let this happen?
Admiral Watson. I can't explain that particular situation.
Mr. Scalise. Who was in charge of that situation?
Admiral Watson. We have a staging director.
Mr. Scalise. Coast Guard? BP?
Admiral Watson. This is a unified command, specifically----
Mr. Scalise. Somebody is in charge. The President said
today that he is in charge. Is the President in charge of boom?
Admiral Watson. The President has put Admiral Allen in
charge. Admiral Allen has Admiral Mary Landry report to him on
a daily basis, twice daily.
Mr. Scalise. So who signs the contract? I am trying to get
an answer. I have got 30 seconds left. You are running my clock
out.
I want to know who was in charge of putting out the boom
and who let those boats sit idle at the dock on Sunday of this
past week when you had oil coming into our marsh? Who did it?
Can you tell me?
Admiral Watson. I can't tell you the specific person----
Mr. Scalise. Nobody wants to accept the responsibility for
this. You know why we are frustrated right now? We are seeing
the passing of the buck. Who did it? Who let that happen?
Admiral Watson. The person on the ground who was
responsible for that----
Mr. Scalise. Who is going to be held accountable? Give me a
name. Give me a name.
Admiral Watson. I don't know.
Mr. Scalise. Who can give me that?
Admiral Watson. Well, I can get back to you, sir, if I know
the location.
Mr. Scalise. Inexcusable.
Let me move on then, because, again, that is inexcusable as
an answer. That should not have happened. If the President was
all hands on deck, that wouldn't have happened.
Let's talk about the Governor's plan, and I will ask the
Corps of Engineers, Mr. Salt. We are being told that what was
approved that the President announced today was only 2 percent
of Governor's plan that he submitted. And in fact if it was
done 2 weeks ago they would have laid out already 10 miles of
protected barrier in front of the marsh that is now inundated
with oil. Why didn't the President get everybody in a room or
did he get everybody in a room and say we are rolling up our
sleeves and we are not leaving until this problem is solved 2
weeks ago when this was submitted?
Mr. Salt. Sir, we wouldn't agree with those numbers.
Mr. Scalise. Was everybody brought in the room by the
President to say let's solve the problem or did they let 2
weeks go by where people went around--I have reports from the
Corps and others where they are talking about doing an
environmental study on this while the environment is being
destroyed. That is ludicrous.
Mr. Salt. Sir, all of this is under emergency protocols. I
would be happy to talk to you more after the hearing, if you
would like.
Mr. Scalise. I want answers on this. Because this is going
on right now. We are not talking about let's study this after
the fact. This is happening right now. Sunday, the boats were
sitting at the dock while oil was coming into the marsh. There
is no excuse for that.
I yield back.
Mr. Markey. The gentleman's time has expired, and the
gentleman did have 5 minutes.
The gentlelady from Florida, I can just recognize her very
briefly; and I apologize.
Ms. Castor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Pictures of the oil from the BP disaster washing up in
Louisiana are horrendous, but I am very concerned about the
pollution that we cannot see. In Gulf waters, in places where
marine life has been abundant, marine scientists are reporting
today that they have detected a wide area of elevated levels of
dissolved hydrocarbons throughout the water column. This
follows on what the LSU pelican found a couple of weeks ago.
The highest concentrations are in the recesses of the Gulf
of Mexico about 35 kilometers northeast of the disaster site
south of Mobile, Alabama. Part of this area is known as the De
Soto Canyon, which a deep valley that cuts through the
Continental Shelf south of the Florida panhandle. It is an
upwelling of very nutrient-rich Gulf waters, where marine life
is abundant and plentiful, our fisheries interact and produce
enormous amounts of marine life. This pollution can't be seen
from the surface, but it is a severe threat to habitat and
marine life, nonetheless. It is going to get into the food web,
our marine scientists say.
I am very concerned that NOAA doesn't have the tools to do
the monitoring. I think what I have heard from scientists is
over the past decade are data gathering and monitoring
capabilities have been severely degraded, and I know NOAA is
relying on a lot of the university and academic research
institutions.
What are your plans to build back the capability to do this
long-term data analysis that we are going to need? Do you
understand the impact of this disaster? What is your plan for
being able to monitor and survey the subsurface oils and
impacts of the toxic nature of this disaster?
Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Ms. Castor.
As you know, we have been looking at both surface and
subsurface oil. In fact, as you know, we are utilizing academic
as well as our own resources in this effort, in particular the
Weatherbird from the University of South Florida. We have seen
from some of that data--from some of those monitoring data that
indicate that part per million levels of oil are at the
subsurface.
Mr. Markey. To the gentlelady--and I apologize to her.
There is no time left on the roll call on the House floor, and
I apologize to you, but----
Ms. Castor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will look forward to
visiting with NOAA and EPA.
Mr. Markey. And I do apologize to her for that.
I have members who sent a request that a statement from
U.S. Travel Associates be included in the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Burgess. Mr. Chairman, I would also ask unanimous
consent that letters from Steve Scalise and myself to
Lieutenant General Robert Antwerpen and to Barack Obama
regarding allowing the Governor of Louisiana to build the sand
berms be included in the record.
I ask the record be held open for 5 days for written
questions.
Mr. Markey. Without objection, it will be included in the
record.
[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
Mr. Markey. We thank all of you for being here. We know
that you are very busy and thank you for your service to our
country and the work you are doing in this very difficult
circumstance. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4:52 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]
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