NATO: A STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY

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NATO: A STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22, 2009

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Cardin, Webb, Shaheen, Kaufman, Lugar, Corker, DeMint, and Barrasso.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing will come to order. Thank you all for joining us this morning.

Today we will discuss the future of our NATO alliance. Earlier this week in Afghanistan, I saw firsthand NATO’s single largest present-day commitment. Let me tell you, whatever our differences, we need to acknowledge that our allies have made enormous sacrifices in Afghanistan. They, too, are serving heroically. While questions remain on both sides of the Atlantic about the future of our Afghan mission, our confidence in the idea and the cohesion of NATO remains strong. Our commitment to defend our NATO allies is unwavering.

NATO turned 60 this year. As we all know, there have been times when NATO’s critics called it “an alliance in search of a mission.” Today, as new challenges multiply and as old ones resurface, it’s become clear that as long as NATO continues to adapt, it will remain essential going forward. The Strategic Concept review is an important vehicle for NATO to evolve. Recalibrating its priorities, reinventing itself, and preparing to protect the West from challenges both new and old. That’s why, even as we grapple with Afghanistan, and other present concerns, it remains the right time for a public dialogue about NATO’s future.

In a recent speech at the Atlantic Council, our ranking member and my friend Senator Lugar was once again ahead of the curve in emphasizing the need for the alliance to incorporate emerging threats, such as terrorism and drug trafficking. I agree with that. We don’t choose threats to our security, they choose us. If the alliance is serious about the security of its members, then it has to focus on the real threats.

Of course, while the world has changed, we are still dealing with some of the same geostrategic and ideological concerns that
brought NATO into being initially; in particular, the deep and durable commitment by like-minded democracies to cooperate closely and deter aggression, with a promise to rise up in defense of any NATO member under attack. This guarantee has actually helped to keep the peace. NATO has a proven record as a positive transformative force in Eastern and Central Europe, where an aspiration to NATO membership helped to bring about democratic reforms and stability. I hope we can also use this hearing to address the prospects for future NATO enlargement, to include Balkan nations, Georgia, and Ukraine. NATO Secretary General Rasmussen has made the establishment of strong relations with Russia a priority.

If we are to consider President Medvedev’s proposal for changes to Europe’s security architecture, we should realistically build on the foundations that we already have, such as the OSCE. The potential for constructive relations, frankly, is enormous, but it will take an investment of trust and of confidence in order to break the bad habits of the past.

Finally, the impending passage of the Lisbon Treaty, which consolidates power within the EU, makes it all the more important that we get the NATO–EU relationship right. As the EU grows in importance, we need to find a way for those two organizations to collaborate effectively. This is an opportunity to help bring about the stronger European partner that we have always sought, one more willing to share the burden of defending our ideals.

I think we have two very highly qualified, very special panels here today. It’s an honor to welcome our first witness, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, again coming back to this committee for I don’t know what number visit, but the umpteenth. She served as America’s top diplomat during a pivotal moment in NATO’s history, when NATO countries used military force to end ethnic cleansing inside Europe. And that is, incidentally, not a fully resolved issue. I’ve been meeting, in the last days, with folks deeply concerned about the turn of events in Bosnia and what is happening, something that a strong European leadership will be essential to help us resolve.

Secretary Albright also made history by helping to initiate the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO. As the sole American representative in Secretary General Rasmussen’s Strategic Concept working group, Secretary Albright will help shape the future of an alliance to which she has already made extraordinary contributions.

On our second panel, we have GEN John Craddock, who, until recently, served with distinction as Supreme Allied Commander–Europe. We also have Ambassador Kurt Volker, formerly America’s permanent representative to NATO. So, each of them bring first-hand experience to answering questions about the nature of NATO, the challenges that it faces, and its future.

And finally, we are pleased to welcome Charles Kupchan, professor of international relations at Georgetown University, and a very respected scholar on European security.

And I thank all of them for being here today.

Senator Lugar.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to continue our examination of the future of the NATO alliance. And I would add, as a personal thought and thanks to you, Mr. Chairman, for your own remarkable diplomacy in the past week. I admire your stamina, your ability to be present for this important hearing today, and I think——

The CHAIRMAN. My body is here at least. [Laughter.]

Senator LUGAR. Well, both in wisdom and in spirit, you are here. We appreciate that.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator LUGAR. And I join you in welcoming Secretary Albright and our other distinguished witnesses.

For decades, as you pointed out, discussions of NATO frequently have begun with the premise that the alliance is at a crossroads, or even in crisis. When evaluating NATO, I start from the presumption that after 60 years it is still a work in progress. If one takes the long-term view, current alliance deficiencies, though serious, do not seem insurmountable. It’s important to take stock of just how remarkable it is that NATO has enlarged from 12 to 28 countries and is now involved in combat 3,000 miles from Europe. NATO possesses enormous geopolitical assets and a history of achievements that, with the proper leadership, can undergird success in the future.

The paramount question facing NATO today is how to strengthen the credibility of Article 5. Recent developments have eroded some of NATO’s deterrent value. This erosion has occurred as members of the alliance have expressed less enthusiasm for NATO expansion and found an increasing number of reasons to avoid committing forces to Afghanistan. The decline in the deterrent value of Article 5 became more apparent with the onset of a string of energy crises in Europe and the adoption by several West European governments of beggar-thy-neighbor policies with respect to oil and natural gas arrangements with the Russian Federation.

The Obama administration’s decision to alter missile defense plans also has implications for alliance confidence in Article 5. Iranian missiles never constituted the primary rationale for Polish and Czech decisions to buy into the Bush administration’s plan; rather it was the waning confidence in NATO, and Article 5 in particular, that lent missile defense political credibility in those countries. The United States must be sensitive to events that have transpired in the broader European security environment since the Bush plan was proposed and negotiated. Our commitment to NATO remains the most important vehicle for projecting stability throughout Europe and even into the regions of Asia and the Middle East. It is critical that we reestablish the credibility of those assurances.

An invigoration of NATO military exercises in Eastern Europe and joint planning for contingencies would be a first step. The administration also must raise the profile of United States political and economic cooperation with Eastern Europe and intensify military contacts with selected countries. The political and military reforms undertaken by NATO aspirants—to a large extent self-driven and self-funded—have been not only an important element
of European stability during the last two decades, but also a foreign policy bargain for the United States and alliance taxpayers. We must continue to hold out the prospect of membership to qualified nations, including Ukraine, Georgia, and the entire Balkan region.

We also must articulate a vision for NATO that both prepares for any potential threat from traditional rivals and develops new capabilities in meeting unconventional threats such as terrorism, drug trafficking, cyber warfare, WMD proliferation, and energy manipulation. The long-term success of the alliance may turn on how it deals with these threats.

One particular gap in the last Strategic Concept, exposed by a series of crises and myopic responses, was its failure to incorporate energy security into NATO’s mission. At the 2006 Riga summit, I encouraged the alliance to make energy security an Article 5 commitment in which any member experiencing a deliberate energy disruption would receive assistance from other alliance members. We should recognize that an energy cutoff to an ally in the middle of winter could cause death and economic calamity on the same scale as a military attack. The Atlantic community must establish a credible and unified energy strategy.

I have been encouraged that NATO has shown progress in making energy security part of its operational duties, including strategic planning, infrastructure protection, and intelligence analysis. This July, I witnessed firsthand how seemingly parochial interests can be surmounted for the common cause of energy cooperation. I was asked to represent the United States, along with our envoy for energy security, Ambassador Richard Morningstar, in Ankara for the signing of the landmark agreement among 12 countries and the European Union, to move forward on the so-called Nabucco gas pipeline, a breakthrough that had only dim prospects even 1 year ago.

Though some allies have called for geopolitical retrenchment in response to perceptions that Article 5 guarantees have declined in value, I believe the proper response is to strengthen those guarantees and find creative ways to address the more nuanced threats we face today. A new Strategic Concept simultaneously must reaffirm the fundamental value of NATO and reinforce those principles that led to its creation.

I look forward very much to our discussion this morning.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.

Again, Madam Secretary, we’re delighted to have you here. Thanks so much for taking time.

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE, PRINCIPAL, ALBRIGHT STONEBRIDGE GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC

Ambassador Albright. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I am really delighted to be here again.

And I do want to begin, Mr. Chairman, by congratulating you for your very creative and successful diplomacy in Afghanistan, and also to compliment the whole committee for holding this hearing.
NATO is, above all, an alliance of democracies. Public discussion is a key attribute of democracy, and a discussion about NATO's present and future could not be more timely. Although I speak this morning only for myself, I am honored to serve as chair of that recently appointed group of experts which will offer advice to NATO Secretary General Rasmussen on a new Strategic Concept for the alliance.

Last week in Luxembourg, our group participated in the first of four planned seminars as part of a broader process to collect a range of views about NATO's strategy and operations. We plan to provide our conclusions and recommendations to the Secretary General by next May. After consulting with member governments, the Secretary General will then draft the Strategic Concept for consideration at the Lisbon summit. And, when approved, this document will serve as a guide for the alliance through the coming decade.

Mr. Chairman, I think you'd agree that the stakes involved in the strategic review are very high. For 60 years, NATO has been the world's preeminent multinational security institution, and, like many of you, or at least the more senior members, I grew up with this alliance. In fact, NATO's birth was hastened by the Communist takeover in 1948 of my native Czechoslovakia. From then until the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO defended freedom in the West while preserving hope in Europe's East, and as a daughter of Prague living in America, I had one foot on each side of that divide.

Since the end of the cold war, the alliance has remained open to qualified new members, it has responded to threats both in and outside the North Atlantic region, and it has begun working with others to counter global threats, including proliferation and terrorism. Despite this, there are some who have raised doubts about NATO's ongoing relevance.

So, let me address the question directly. Does NATO still matter, or is it as obsolete as a Senate spittoon? The answer is clear. NATO was created in response to the Soviet threat, but not only in response to that threat; it was also designed to rein in the many national rivalries that had ripped Europe apart. And this purpose of creating a Europe whole and free did not disappear with the Soviet Union and has not grown obsolete over time. The same can be said of the core mission of collective defense. Under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the allies, "will consult together whenever the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the parties are threatened." Under Article 5, the allies agree that, "an armed attack against one shall be considered an attack against them all."

Now, these provisions were designed to protect the security of every ally against external threats, and making good on that commitment—in deeds, not just words—remains the heart of NATO's purpose. Fulfilling that objective, however, is a more varied task than it was. Time and technology have brought many benefits to the world, but also new dangers, including weapons of mass destruction, missiles, cyber sabotage, and violent extremism. Not even NATO allows us to predict all the threats, but NATO does give us a predictable military and political framework for responding to even the most surprising perils. And in this sense, NATO is
as relevant to the security of its members as a fire department is to the well-being of a community.

Most prominent among present dangers is that posed by al-Qaeda and its allies. Their attacks have been felt in many countries. But, if there is a center to the struggle, it is in Afghanistan, spilling over into Pakistan's western frontier. NATO's mission is to promote stability by helping Afghanistan's security forces to protect local populations from the Taliban, and this effort has contributed to a stronger and more professional Afghan Army, but the mission has also suffered from divisions within the alliance and from the lack of a more effective government in Kabul.

Thanks to your discussions in the past week, Mr. Chairman, the democratic process in Afghanistan has been strengthened, and the Afghan people should know that the United States and NATO are committed to helping them to exercise their rights fully, fairly, and safely.

Yesterday, the National Democratic Institute, which I chair, listed some useful steps that should be taken between now and the November 7 election, including an effort by NATO and Afghan security forces to expand the area where voters can feel protected. I expect that the runoff election and issues related to it will be among the factors taken into account by President Obama as he continues to review U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.

The opinions of our allies will be another vital factor. Based on my own discussions, I can say that NATO members agree on the right goals in Afghanistan. Our challenge now is to come together on behalf of the optimum means. Accordingly, it is essential that NATO members focus not on past differences but on how best to contribute to future success. As Secretary General Rasmussen recently declared, NATO's operation in Afghanistan is not America's responsibility or burden alone. It is, and will remain, a team effort.

Obviously the NATO mission in Afghanistan is an important test for the alliance. However, NATO has known other tests and will inevitably face more. And that's why the experts group will be looking ahead both broadly and well into the future. Among the many other issues we will consider is NATO's preparedness in responding to emerging threats. We will look for ways to ensure that the capabilities of the alliance are brought into balance with its responsibilities. We will discuss the prospects for reforming NATO's decision-making process. We will explore NATO's relationship with the European Union, the U.N., and other international organizations. We will review ideas for helping people around the world to understand the alliance's actions and aspirations. And we will be examining NATO's future relationship with Russia.

When I was Secretary of State, I spent many hours discussing NATO with my counterparts from Moscow. Our talks were typically cordial, but blunt. No matter how often I reassured my Russian friends about the alliance's intentions, their suspicions remained. To them, NATO's very existence served as an unwelcome reminder of the cold war.

From what I've been able to observe in the past decade, this mindset has not changed, and this makes dialogue more difficult, but it does not make cooperation impossible. Russia and NATO
have important interests in common, and these include support for stability in Central Asia, countering terrorism and piracy, and curbing the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Despite these shared interests, there are some in Moscow who would like Washington to choose between loyalty to our NATO allies and cooperation with Russia, as if these two options were mutually exclusive. In fact, the United States can and should combine strategic reassurance for allies and realistic engagement with Moscow. When I was Secretary of State, our policy was that, on matters of European security, Russia was entitled to a voice but not a veto. Both halves of that equation remain valid.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, you know that the story of NATO and the United States was written, in significant part, by members of this committee. It was before this panel that Secretary of State Acheson first made the case for American participation, and it was here that administrations from both parties sought and received support during the difficult cold war years. It was to you that Defense Secretary Bill Cohen and I came in search of consent for NATO enlargement during the 1990s. For six decades, this committee has done a superb job of overseeing America’s participation in NATO and of helping our citizens to understand why this alliance matters and why its future should be of concern to us all.

Today’s hearing is a continuation of that tradition, and I thank you again for the chance to participate, and I’d be very happy to answer whatever questions you might have.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Albright follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE, PRINCIPAL, ALBRIGHT STONEBRIDGE GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC

Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, and thank you for the opportunity to be here.

I want to begin by complimenting you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Lugar, for the outstanding work you are doing with this committee and also for holding this hearing.

NATO is, above all, an alliance of democracies; public discussion is a key attribute of democracy; and a discussion about NATO’s present and future could not be more timely.

Although I speak this morning only for myself, I am honored to serve as chair of the recently appointed Group of Experts, which will offer advice to NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on a new strategic concept for the alliance.

Last week, in Luxembourg, our group participated in the first of four planned seminars, as part of a broader process to collect a diversity of views about NATO strategy and operations. To this end, we listened to a number of distinguished scholars and former officials. We also met with NATO’s military leaders.

We plan to provide our conclusions and recommendations to the Secretary General by next May. In close consultation with member governments, the Secretary General will then draft the strategic concept for consideration at the Lisbon summit toward the end of the year. When approved, the document will serve as a guide for the alliance through the coming decade.

Mr. Chairman, I think you would agree that the stakes involved in this strategic review are high. For 60 years, NATO has been the world’s preeminent multinational security institution, and like many of you—or at least the more senior members—I grew up with the alliance.

In fact, NATO’s birth was hastened by the Communist takeover, in 1948, of my native Czechoslovakia. From then until the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO defended freedom in the West while preserving hope in Europe’s east; as a daughter of Prague living in America, I had one foot on each side of that divide.

Since the end of the cold war, the alliance has remained open to qualified new members; it has responded to threats both in and outside the North Atlantic region;
and it has begun working with others to counter global threats, including proliferation and terrorism.

Despite this, there are some who have raised doubts about NATO's ongoing relevance. So let me address that question directly: Does NATO still matter or is it as obsolete as a Senate spittoon?

The answer is clear. NATO was created in response to the Soviet threat but not only for that purpose. It was also designed to prevent a repetition of Europe's past, in which the capitals of the continent took up arms against one another. NATO was intended to ensure that the many national rivalries that had torn Europe apart would finally be reined in so that a larger, peaceful and democratic whole could be created. This worthy goal did not disappear with the Soviet Union, and it has not grown less urgent with the passage of time. A peaceful Europe and a democratic trans-Atlantic community are among the valuable assets and accomplishments of modern civilization. NATO helped bring them into being and continues to preserve them. The time and treasure we invest in the alliance toward that end alone would be well worth the price.

This fact is highlighted by France's recent decision to participate fully in NATO's integrated military structure, hardly a sign that the alliance is diminishing in function or stature. The French move shows that country's political commitment to the alliance and enhances prospects for even closer cooperation between NATO and the European Union (EU). This could help the organization to maintain its trans-Atlantic balance by increasing participation on the European side; and it validates the conviction that I had when in office, which is that NATO and European defense capabilities should be seen as mutually reinforcing. As Gen. Jim Jones recently pointed out, a strong and independent Europe is good for a strong and independent alliance.

Of course, NATO does more than maintain the unity of its members. It also provides for their collective defense. A critic might scoff and ask what exactly that term means in the world today, but that question can be answered. Yes, international borders are vulnerable to dangers that are less obvious and tangible than foreign armies, but that does not mean that traditional forms of aggression are necessarily a thing of the past. Since the end of the cold war, the world has witnessed numerous attempts to change national borders through the use of force—in the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and even in South America.

Under Article Four of the North Atlantic Treaty, the allies "will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties are threatened." Under Article Five, the allies agree that "an armed attack against one . . . shall be considered an attack against them all."

These provisions were agreed upon to protect the security of every ally against external threats. Making good on that commitment—in deeds, not just in words—remains the heart of NATO's purpose.

Fulfilling that purpose, however, is a more varied task now than it was. Time and technology have brought many benefits to the world, but also new dangers, including weapons of mass destruction, missiles, cyber sabotage, and violent extremism. Not even NATO allows us to predict all threats; but NATO does give us a predictable military and political framework for responding to even the most surprising perils. In this sense, NATO is as relevant to the security of its members as a fire department is to the well-being of a community.

Most prominent among present dangers is that posed by al-Qaeda and its allies. Their attacks have been felt in many countries but if there is a center to the struggle, it is in Afghanistan, spilling over into Pakistan's western frontier. NATO's mission is to promote stability by helping Afghanistan's security forces to protect local populations from the Taliban. This effort has contributed to a stronger and more professional Afghan Army, but the mission has also suffered from divisions within the alliance and from the lack of a more effective government in Kabul.

Thanks to your discussions this past week, Mr. Chairman, the democratic process in Afghanistan has been strengthened. The Afghan people should know that the United States and NATO are committed to helping them to exercise their rights fully, fairly, and safely. Yesterday, the National Democratic Institute listed some useful steps that should be taken between now and November 7, including an effort by NATO and Afghan security forces to expand the area where voters can feel protected.

I expect that the runoff election and issues related to it will be among the factors taken into account by President Obama as he continues to review U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. The opinions of our allies will be another vital factor. Based on my own discussions, I can say that NATO members agree on the right goals in Afghanistan; our challenge now is to come together on behalf of the optimum means.
Accordingly, it is essential that NATO members focus, not on past differences, but on how best to contribute to future success. As Secretary General Rasmussen recently declared: “NATO’s operation in Afghanistan is not America’s responsibility or burden alone; it is and it will remain a team effort.”

Mr. Chairman, NATO’s current missions in Afghanistan and off the coast of West Africa (to counter piracy) have cast new light on an old debate concerning the proper scope of NATO activities. Although a consensus exists that missions conducted outside the transatlantic region are sometimes necessary to protect populations within the alliance, there are no formally established criteria for separating appropriate missions from those that are not.

Some suggest that these external missions have opened a faultline within the alliance, placing on one side those who believe that NATO should assume the role of global police and on the other those who insist that NATO stay close to home. I see no such faultline but instead a sensible search for a reasonable balance. There are limits to what NATO can do and also to what it should attempt; it is a regionally based security alliance and cannot be all things to all people. Article V and collective defense remain, properly, the cornerstone of our alliance. However, we must also be prepared to respond in a selective way to threats that arise beyond alliance territory, taking into account the urgency of those threats, the availability of other security options, and the likely consequences of acting or of failing to act.

To our benefit, NATO is both a leader and a partner. The alliance is linked to a broader network that is addressing problems of peace, justice, development, and humanitarian response. Accordingly, we should draw a distinction between what NATO must do and what others can do—and between situations where the alliance must act on its own and where a team approach is preferable. NATO’s new strategic concept should recognize that the work of the alliance will often rely on a comprehensive approach, involving cooperation with such organizations as the U.N. in all its aspects, the EU, the OSCE, the African Union, other regional entities, and major NGOs.

It is vital that NATO be able to work with others; it is also essential that NATO be understood by others. The story of the alliance is a proud one, even glorious, but it has grown more complex as new chapters have been written. Each year, across the globe, there are fewer people who recall NATO’s creation, fewer who remember its cold war resolve, and fewer who have a clear sense of why NATO’s survival and success should matter to them. So as we think about NATO’s strategic concept, we should bear in mind how such a document will be read not only within the Euro-Atlantic community but by people in every region. The alliance must strive to explain its policies and actions persuasively and in real time, making full use of modern information technology.

Communication is, however, a two-way street, requiring both an effort to explain and a willingness to listen. When I was Secretary of State, I spent many hours discussing NATO’s activities and plans with my counterparts from Russia. Our talks were typically cordial but blunt. No matter how often I reassured my Russian friends about the alliance’s intentions, their suspicions remained. To them, NATO’s very existence served as an unwelcome reminder of the cold war. From what I have been able to observe in the past decade, this mindset has not changed. This makes dialogue more difficult, but it does not make cooperation impossible.

Russia and NATO have important interests in common. These include support for stability in Central Asia, countering terrorism and piracy, and curbing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Despite these shared interests, there are some in Moscow who would like Washington to choose between loyalty to our NATO allies and cooperation with Russia—as if these two options were mutually exclusive. In fact, the United States can fully meet its obligations to allies without harming the legitimate interests of Russia. At the same time, we can seek the cooperation of the Kremlin on issues related to international stability without diluting our commitments within NATO. In fact, the United States can and should combine strategic reassurance for allies and realistic engagement with Moscow.

When I was Secretary of State, our policy was that, on matters of European security, Russia was entitled to a voice but not a veto; both halves of that equation remain valid. In the interests of clarity, certain facts bear repeating. First, NATO’s purposes are defensive in nature. The resources of the alliance are not directed at any country, and the organization does not consider any country to be its enemy.

Second, the alliance neither asserts, nor recognizes, a sphere of influence. On the contrary, NATO is a defender of the rights of nations to exercise sovereignty legitimately and independently within their borders.
Third, NATO governments remain open to a cooperative relationship with Russia, including regular consultations and, when possible, joint actions. Such a relationship can only mature, however, if Russia demonstrates a genuine willingness to engage with NATO in a constructive fashion.

Fourth, when I was in government, I told Central European leaders that the United States would have no important diplomatic discussions about them without them. That policy, too, should remain our guide.

Finally, we should reiterate that, whether or not Moscow approves, NATO’s doors will remain open to qualified candidates. Decisions about membership are for the alliance alone to make. Those decisions should be made on the basis of objective criteria related to the contributions and obligations the admission of a new member entails. No country outside the alliance should be permitted to exert influence over these internal judgments. At the same time, NATO membership must not be used to prove a political point about the alliance’s willingness to stand up to external pressure. NATO membership is not a status symbol or a bargaining chip; it is an agreement between old members and prospective new ones to make the alliance stronger and more effective for purposes that all can support.

As NATO leaders draft a new strategic concept, they will also need to consider political and military reforms to ensure that the commitments made at next year’s Lisbon summit can be implemented. Such reforms will be critical in light of the limited financial and human resources that are likely to be available to the alliance in coming years. At this early stage in the work of the Group of Experts, it would be premature to pronounce on the specific reforms and implementation plans that should be considered. There can be no doubt, however, that there is room to improve the efficiency of NATO decisionmaking and the effectiveness of alliance expenditures.

Mr. Chairman, during the cold war, NATO’s main objective was to defend freedom from the threat of aggression by the Communist Bloc. Today, we understand that neither the defeat of communism nor our own freedom is sufficient to guarantee security. NATO must strive for a world in which differences are resolved without violence; where people are allowed to live without fear of aggression or attack; and in which the rule of law is legitimately constituted, broadly recognized and widely enforced.

By its nature, this is an enterprise to be waged on many fronts, simultaneously and continuously. It will lead not to some climactic or universal triumph, but to the hope that our children can grow up in a world more peaceful, free, and humane than it has been. For that to happen, NATO must operate in the future with all the energy and focus it has shown in the past—and each member of the alliance must meet its obligations fully and without fail.

Looking back, we can see that many of the threats we faced have vanished or shifted in shape; looking ahead, we can expect that many of the problems we worry about today will also wax or wane. Global and regional dangers must naturally command NATO’s attention, but these impermanent perils must never define our alliance.

In 1949, the founders of NATO came together not because they were afraid, but because of their faith in the values of democracy, free expression, and respect for the dignity of every human being. We have learned since that the organization must constantly adapt to the demands of political and technological change. But we have also learned what must not change. NATO’s strategic concept must begin and end with NATO’s founding ideals.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, the story of NATO and the United States was written in significant part by the members of this committee. It was before this panel that Secretary of State Acheson first made the case for American participation. It was here that administrations from both parties sought and received support during the difficult cold war years. It was to you that Defense Secretary Cohen and I came in search of consent for NATO enlargement during the 1990s.

For six decades, this committee has done a superb job of overseeing America’s participation in NATO, and of helping our citizens to understand why this alliance matters and why its future should be a concern to us all.

Today’s hearing is a continuation of that tradition—and I thank you again for the chance to participate.

The Chairman. Well, thank you. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary. We do have questions, and we’d love to explore some of the thoughts that you laid out, and others.

The Strategic Concept is a vision of NATO’s future of, “How do we construct an alliance where we have an ability to be able to ful-
fill our ambitions?” And there’s been a lot of struggle through the years, as you know, to try to define that mission, and even a heavy lift to get people to say there ought to be some engagement in Afghanistan. It’s out of theater, different concept, et cetera. We’re there. But it’s been a very difficult process to assemble the means necessary to achieve the mission. When you make a mission, you want to achieve the mission, your relevance obviously is affected significantly if you don’t, and yet the troops, the equipment, the financing necessary for ISAF, are all a struggle, and they remain a struggle. They’re inadequate, in fact, today.

As the President makes a decision about the numbers of troops, one of the impacting factors that hit me very hard in the last days is the lack of adequacy of two critical components of any effective counterinsurgency: governance and development. And those both depend significantly on a NATO commitment.

How can we use the Strategic Concept to better prioritize our objectives and reform the structure of the alliance to get rid of some of this inefficiency and procrastination and reluctance to actually fulfill the mission?

Ambassador Albright. Well, that is the challenge for this group of experts. We are looking at a variety of those issues through these seminars, and ultimately we’ll also be looking at the decision-making process, which does seem to have accreted in a way that makes it difficult to make decisions. Obviously, an alliance discarded——

The Chairman. “Accreted” is an interesting word. Can you fill that out a little more, maybe?

Ambassador Albright. Well, I think that what has happened is, as you look at an alliance that started at 12 and is now at 28, and it’s trying to sort out how the process works, there seem to be more and more levels where consensus is required and consensus is difficult to achieve. And so, as you look at the charts, which I have been doing recently, in terms of how decisions are made, “accreted” is the only term that seems to fit. Every month, it seems that a new subcommittee is being created. This makes it hard to diagram exactly how decisions are made.

I think the point, again, is that re-reading the Washington Treaty is an exercise that’s worth doing. It is very elegant, and it is quite short. And there are articles within it that I think can be expanded on in some way, especially in response to the question you just asked. Article 2 has something to do with looking at development and looking at other aspects of what NATO could in fact do. I just put that on the table.

I also think that we know more and more that civilian and military activities go together. You mentioned in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, that we should understand that the NATO allies are, in fact, contributing more than is sometimes evident in our press reporting on it. I think they could perhaps do more not just militarily, but also in helping on the civilian aspects of the mission. But I do think we need to keep in mind that there are 43 countries on the ground in Afghanistan.

The Chairman. Well, let me ask about that. Does the NATO decisionmaking process—and I appreciate you may not agree completely with the premise of this question, but—to some degree, to
some people, there seemed like a fair acceleration of the pace to try to reach out to expand NATO, largely because for so many years it was the focus of the balance of power against the Soviet Union. And today, Russians are still sensitive to that fundamental premise upon which it was based. And we’ve seen that with the counter-pressure and thoughts about spheres of influence and so forth. My question is, Does the decisionmaking have to refocus more effectively on these other kinds of threats somehow making Article 5 and 4 less the center of its purpose today, I guess is the way to phrase it?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, the threats are clearly different. I mean, when you think about an alliance that was established against the threat of the Soviet Union crossing the frontiers with tanks and foot soldiers, it is very different from what is going on now. In our discussions in Luxembourg, we talked a lot about protecting populations, not just territory, and about the danger posed by cyber attacks and, as Senator Lugar pointed out, energy security is also an issue. Another question is, What does “armed attack” mean? And so, those are the kinds of questions that we are going to be exploring.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there thoughts about actually changing—making recommendations with respect to amendments to the charter, et cetera?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. The truth is I can’t answer that yet. I don’t know. In some of the discussions last week people did talk about Article 5, and what it means under current conditions, while reiterating that it’s central to the alliance. I think everybody understood that.

People are also looking at Article 4, which provides for consultation in circumstances that go beyond just dealing with an armed attack. So the question that you asked is totally central to what we’re going to be looking at, and all I can do at this point is tell you that these are questions that need to have public exposure. We are an alliance of democracies, which means that there has to be public support. And so, having open discussions about what this all means, I think, is crucial to the whole process.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I couldn’t agree with you more. And you are absolutely correct at how elegant and straightforward the treaty is. I’m holding it here, I’m looking at Article 4. One sentence. I think the same is true of Article 3. I mean, you run through it——

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. It’s very simple, very straightforward.

But, I have one last question pertaining to the relevance of today and the simplicity of that elegant treaty then. Given the recognition that Afghanistan’s struggle cannot be won solely by military force, of which we are all convinced—generals and civilians alike—it's even more important than ever that the international community prepare and execute a coordinated civilian and governance assistance program. So far, the coordination has been, for better or worse, just absent; lacking. And so have the civilian resources. And that hit me full square in this trip, in the last days, as we think about what we can achieve on the ground in this country—where
I think there are great possibilities to achieve things, incidentally. I don’t want to suggest there isn’t the framework within which we can’t. We can.

But so far, it’s just a mishmash. Countries are operating independently in their spheres of influence. UNAMA has not stepped up to provide the type of international coordination that’s required. That type of mandate is outside of NATO’s mission. So, the default position seems to be to allow the U.S. military to run the entire show, which winds up, in my judgment, not only sending the wrong message to Afghans about our motives, but actually undermines the very core of the mission itself.

So, I wonder if you think there’s a way to quickly shape up NATO with respect to this, and even allies who aren’t part of NATO, who have an interest in the stability of this region.

Ambassador Albright. Well, first of all, I fully agree with you about the lack of organized assistance or functioning, here. And I think that part of what has happened is that the way things evolved over the last 8 years in terms of the military really taking over a large number of functions, frankly because some of our own civilian activities were not being fulfilled. There are also an awful lot of nongovernmental organizations that are operating on their own, and the United Nations, too.

There are ways that NATO can help on this, especially in the more civilian aspect and on governance issues. Such an initiative might also help the various NATO members to feel that they are contributing in a more meaningful way to what is a joint effort. But, the organizational aspect of this is not easy and that is part of the problem with the decisionmaking process that I think we have to look at.

I find the new Secretary General has been very forward-leaning on this, and has, in fact, indicated the importance of Afghanistan in this larger framework as something that is the role of NATO, and my sense is that he will push on these things. And we will, obviously, look at it also.

The Chairman. Thank you, Madam Secretary.

Senator Lugar.

Senator Lugar. I’m curious about your thoughts on the problems that governments in Europe have in either making available to their publics word about NATO, news about NATO, reasons for the importance of NATO, because I am under the impression that the general publics in several countries do not have either a great interest in this subject or are worried about obligations that may come, that have not been fully explained by their governments. Now, this seems to me to be especially the case with many countries in Eastern Europe. I don’t want to suggest a division in which Germany and France and maybe Italy and Spain are in one camp and those countries—Poland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, what have you—are in another; but, nonetheless, when I visited NATO headquarters, the EU—and two of our witnesses today, General Craddock and Kurt Volker, were extremely helpful, in my understanding, about a year ago—it was apparent to me that the Article 5 issue arose very frequently and with regard to those that were close to Russia. And they were not really clear exactly who would
come, physically, they would ask you as an American, “Would you come?” And so, I think this is a critical situation.

Now, it’s not entirely a function of energy. I’ve suggested this is an important point. Maybe it’s just sheer proximity. Maybe it’s history or ethnic groups within countries. But, addressing the energy question for a moment, I was impressed, at the summit in Ankara on the Nabucco signing, that two of the large German energy companies are, in fact, stockholders and very much involved with Gazprom. Another, RWE, is not. And I’ve been impressed, subsequently, to see Joschka Fischer, here in Washington, talking about RWE. Now, if Gerhard Schroeder was here, he might be talking about something else. So, even within Germany, an interesting division as to what ought to be the future of energy and its relationship to other countries has arisen.

Now, I expressed the thought, in my opening statement, that when I raised this at the Riga summit in 2006, the response was very—not necessarily covert, but rather guarded. Foreign Ministers saw me in the hallway afterward and they said, “This is very important. But, this is so existential, we don’t talk about it publicly. This is something our country tries to deal with, the energy problem behind the barn, so to speak.” Now, it’s in front of the barn now, and we really are beginning to meet it.

But, I raised this question in this complex way. Now, energy is very important to the publics of all the NATO countries—the security of jobs, heating of homes in the winter, all the rest of it. It is an existential question. Now, is it possible that—not that NATO needs a resurgence per se as the strategic group meets, tries to think through the future of this, there can be more concentration on—if not energy independence, energy dependence on NATO. Or the question of whether we would come to the rescue, that there is real relevance—even in the face of the fact that there might be al-Qaeda terrorists from time to time in European capitals or subways or what have you—but that thinking for most citizens and their industries comes down, right now, to the energy equation. I’d like some further discussion, as you’ve thought about this, and you’ve touched upon it a little bit in your opening remarks. This has come to the fore, perhaps, in some of your discussions.

Ambassador Albright. Well, first of all, what we did in Luxembourg was kind of lay out the subjects that we would be talking about, and clearly energy is among those. There are different views, as you can well imagine.

On the issue, generally, of communications—and I’ll return to energy in a minute—as the Secretary General, as well as other people that I’ve talked to there, are bound and determined to have a different approach on communications. Part of what they’re looking at is a new way of doing strategic communications and getting things up on a Web site. Everyone understands that this is going nowhere if, in fact, there is not an awful lot more done in terms of communication with the public.

In our work plan, we are using this first several months as kind of a reflection period, where we’re bringing all the issues in, and then we’re going to go around as experts on consultations to all the NATO capitals and we even will have meetings outside of the NATO family.
The energy issue, I think, is absolutely key, and because nothing in life is simple, it also involves what’s going on in Turkey. I recently created a group of former Foreign Ministers and we met to talk about Turkey, and we had all these unbelievable maps of the pipelines that have to go in, around, and through Turkey, how one competes with another. This whole issue of the pipelines and who controls what is, I think, one of the major issues of the 21st century. It’s something that we will be talking about in some detail.

An additional component that we’re looking at is the effect of global warming in the Arctic. One of our subjects for discussion is the High North and the issue of oil tankers and other vessels transiting Arctic waters.

Senator, I read your speech to the Atlantic Council. I fully agree with the way that you’re framing the issue. Getting others to see the whole instead of just the component parts is what we’re going to be working on. But I think it is a big issue and one that does appeal to public understanding.

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Well, thank you very much.

Senator Cardin.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, it’s a——

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Senator, good to see you.

Senator CARDIN [continuing]. Pleasure to have you back before the committee. It’s nice to see you.

NATO has taken on a different meaning and a different role, and I just want to engage you a little bit as to what impact this is having on the recommendations that you are going to make. We look at countries today that view membership in NATO as graduating, as showing the nations in transition and innovation in Europe.

I think of Bosnia-Herzegovina today and recognize that 14 years ago it was involved in a war. Genocide was occurring, and hundreds of thousands lost their lives. And now, Bosnia’s future is uncertain today. We have made progress. Most of the people you talk to about what’s happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina say that the prospect of joining NATO is one of the unifying factors, that it has the country focused on what it needs to do with constitutional reform. So, I would just like to get your observations as to how important NATO expansion is to the United States goal of stability in Europe, and whether that’s a factor as you look at when considering NATO in the future.

For example, concerning membership application action plans, there is a question as to whether we should pursue one with Bosnia at this point or whether constitutional reform progress must be made in advance of an application.

I guess I look at NATO today—I think we all do—as an extremely valuable institution, not just for its military presence and capacity, but also as an institution that shows that nations have something to look forward to and as an incentive to further progress in the region.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. First of all, let me just restate that I am here only in my personal capacity, and not as chair of this group. We don’t have any conclusions on anything like this yet.

It’s interesting, Senator, I’ve been through this from the very beginning, because when we began the process of enlarging NATO
in the middle 1990s, and I was the Ambassador to the United Nations, I went around with General Shalikashvili, who was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs at the time, in order to lay out what the paths were. This is when we developed the Partnership for Peace and began to emphasize that NATO was not just some kind of a do-goody organization; there were responsibilities that came with it, privileges and responsibilities.

And that—it was not an easy pass, and the Partnership for Peace was really a way to get people to make sure that there was civilian control over the military, that there were a series of governance aspects to it. That was something we looked into as we enlarged NATO in the first go-around. I think that there is a magnet approach, in terms of the hope of getting into NATO that does make people and the countries adapt their behavior in a positive way.

And so what has happened in the intervening years is that more steps have been established—the membership action plan and individual national plans. So, I do think that the hope of coming into NATO is something that is a very good either catalyst or magnet that does serve a purpose, and that NATO is not just a military alliance. It also creates political space, and it does allow for movement in the right direction whether it’s in Bosnia or elsewhere.

But membership in NATO is not a gift. It is a responsibility. And therefore those standards are very important. And I like the approach that it takes a while to get in, but that there is a goal at the end.

Senator CARDIN. Well, I agree with you, and particularly as it relates to Bosnia. There are some disturbing trends right now in that country. The one unifying factor that gives us hope for constitutional reform is that all sectors are convinced that NATO membership would be in Bosnia’s interest——

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Right.

Senator CARDIN [continuing]. Which gives up hope that we won’t slide back to the ethnic fighting that took place just a few years ago.

I think, as we look at NATO in the future, it is a different organization when it has 28 members and more that are likely to be joining. We need to figure out a way in which it strengthens not just the reforms that take place—the responsibilities that nations undertake to become members—but also a continuing responsibility as members in NATO.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I think—if I might add to one of the issues here—one requirement in the acceptance process is that a country, whether Bosnia or any other, should not have any internal fights. Therefore, an incentive is created to settle ethnic conflict as when Romania came into NATO. And that is another one of the attractive aspects of the magnet part of this.

Senator CARDIN. Of course, in Bosnia one of the major concerns NATO has is whether there is a functioning government control of the military, rather than having it subject to local vetoes. But, that’s true really as a government, that you need to have a national government that can function and protect the rights of the nation.
So, you know, I just think that this is an important function as we look forward to NATO in the future. And I thank you for the work that you're doing.

Ambassador Albright. Thank you, Senator.

The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Corker.

Senator Corker. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I had the opportunity to say a word to you, back before we came out, and sometimes preparation and opportunity sort of meet each other, and I just want to say in public that, as it relates to what you've done over the last week, I am proud of you and proud for you, and actually thought, when you stepped into the room there might be a standing ovation. But, anyway thank you for that.

I also want to thank you for having this hearing. I know that this is result of a business meeting we had regarding the support of additional countries coming into NATO. I thank you for that, and Ranking Member Lugar.

And with that, Madam, thank you for your tremendous service to our country, Ms. Secretary. I appreciate the long history you have with NATO, and your understandings, that many of us don't have, because of that.

I guess one of the—I'm a NATO supporter, but I do realize that NATO is evolving right now. And I guess one of the issues that I have, it appears to me that NATO is being divided between security providers and security consumers. Only 5 of the 28 countries that exist in NATO actually are living up to 2 percent of their GDP being utilized to support defense mechanisms. So, what's really happening is, we have countries coming in to NATO. It almost appears, in some cases, we do that in a willy-nilly way. And we're providing the security, it seems. We're expending the American citizens' dollars to make sure that NATO is protected, and certainly our lives—our military men and women's lives—and yet, we have most of NATO being security consumers. That, to me, is troubling, and I wonder if you might comment on that.

Ambassador Albright. Well, I think that it is a very large alliance now, with different capabilities, but I think that if one looks at what the various countries are providing, many of them are, in fact, providing above what one would expect. I won't go through the list with you. I do think that there is the issue—and we are going to be looking at this—of whether providing 2 percent of GNP to defense is the right way to measure support for the alliance. Perhaps there are ways to supplement defense contributions with efforts that are more in the civilian line.

I think those are the kinds of questions that we have to ask. I do not think that anybody should be a free rider in this alliance.

Senator Corker. But they are.

Ambassador Albright. Well, I think those are exactly the kinds of things that we are going to be looking at.

Senator Corker. Well, should we be adding new members that we know are going to be free riders, or should we change the way we look at this? And when people come in, they know that they have responsibilities not to be free riders.

Ambassador Albright. Well, I believe yes. I think that one has to make—that's what I was saying to Senator Cardin is that basi-
cally there has to be a set of standards that are met. Membership in NATO is not a gift; it is a responsibility. On the other hand, I think that we do need to understand the extent to which the prospect of NATO membership can help to generate changes that we want to see in particular places.

I have to say, you know, that one of the reasons we spent so much time on the Balkans is that it was the missing piece of the puzzle in a Europe that we wanted to become whole and free. And a lot of what we did by having a NATO mission in Kosovo and in Bosnia was to pull this all together, not because we were just thinking about the goodness of Europe, but because it is in the United States national interest.

Senator CORKER. And I want to be clear, I agree with that. I really do. And I thank you for making that point. But, I am concerned about this huge disparity in security providers and security consumers.

I was in Georgia, about a week, right after the bombings. I went up to Gori. And I very much like President Saakashvili. I very much appreciated the Prime Minister that was in charge at that time. And some of the folks I met were in my office just yesterday. I have to tell you, when I realized that President Saakashvili, who I respect, and certainly appreciate what's happening in Georgia right now—when I realized that he had—if, for lack of a better word, had "taken the bait"—OK— with Georgia coming down—I mean with Russia coming down from where it was, that under Article 5, had they been in NATO at that time, I suppose there would have been some United States response to the fact that Russia came into part of their sovereign territory. And I just wondered if issues like that, in some of these more fledgling countries, caused you concern as it relates to Article 5.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, I think this is why we are looking at how Article 5 relates today; what does it mean, with so many more countries? But Article 5 is the central aspect of NATO, and these are the questions that the group is asking itself.

There was a declaration at the Bucharest summit, that Georgia and Ukraine would ultimately become members, but they have to meet a set of standards to get there.

We have all signed onto the territorial integrity of Georgia, but, there has to be a way that some of the issues related to the internal problems of Georgia are properly resolved.

But that is the question. That is absolutely the question.

Senator CORKER. And it seems like it's an important question. It seems like, as we continue to look at new nations coming in, new countries coming in, it's important.

This is my last question. I wasn't going to talk about Afghanistan, but I noticed you brought it up in your testimony, and I'm, I think, one of the few Republicans that has actually said that I think it's perfectly legitimate for President Obama to take some time to analyze where we are. I think taking too much time becomes a little Shakespearean, but you know, taking a little time looking at the situation, I certainly appreciate what Senator Kerry has done, as I mentioned.

What I haven't found particularly interesting is—I know, in February or March, when the President announced his new strategy,
everybody talked about it being a narrowed mission. I knew immediately that it was nation-building. And if you look at the matrix by which we've been measuring progress in Afghanistan, it is nation-building. And I notice you or Senator Kerry, one, mentioned governance and development being part of the NATO mission, civilian and military activities. I don't know which said which. But, much of that leads to, in essence, what we now are embarked on in Afghanistan, which is nation-building.

And I just—you mentioned that the NATO allies were allied in their goals in Afghanistan. I'm not trivializing the problems that we have there, but that's never been articulated in a way that I can understand it. And since NATO is allied in what those goals are, I'd love for you to share with me what that is, and if you do see what we're doing in Afghanistan today as being nation-building.

Ambassador Albright. Well, first of all, I apologize in saying this, but nation-building has gotten to sound like a four letter word. The term is thought by some to have all kinds of implications, which I don't fully understand, because it seems like it is being portrayed as the worst thing you could possibly do.

I think that what has to happen in Afghanistan——

Senator Corker. You have to do that in counterinsurgency, right?

Ambassador Albright. Well, I think, partially, what we're trying to do is stop Afghanistan from being a place that provides a safe haven for al-Qaeda. After all, this is where the 9/11 people came from.

I think it is very important that Afghanistan not be such a haven. Now, what does that really mean?

Some of it does have a political context in terms of having a form of governance that the people can trust enough so that they don't find themselves harassed or terrified by the Taliban.

I think that one of the things that Chairman Kerry really did was to explain and make clear that there has to be some political context to it.

We're not trying to create a “perfect country” over there, but this is a society that was able to govern itself for some time. What we have to do is try to figure out a way that the political powers over there are not corrupt, the people are not terrified, and governance procedures are improved.

So even though people hate the term “nation building.” I do think that the military and the civilian aspect of this go together.

Senator Corker. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Albright. Thank you.

The Chairman. Good questions. Thank you.

Senator Webb.

Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I'd like to add my congratulations to you, and to echo what Senator Corker said, for all the energy that you have put into attempting to bring a proper resolution to this situation over the past couple of weeks.

And also would like to express my appreciation for the decision to hold this hearing. I was one, along with Senator Corker, who had suggested this during the business meeting that we had. I
think it’s vitally important for us to have a good hold on what this relationship really is with NATO.

And, Madam Secretary, I appreciate very much your testifying today. I’ve been watching a good bit of this hearing from my office.

My major concern with respect to NATO is along the lines, a little bit, of what Senator Corker said at the beginning of his comments. I raised this issue in the Armed Services Committee last year and in this committee. We seem to have progressed from an alliance to a sort of a three-part entity in NATO, much more divided than it ever was when I was in the Pentagon 25 years ago, for instance, which I spent a lot of time in NATO. We have the United States now, as a—sort of, the principal military guarantor. The United States has always been more involved militarily than the other countries, as you know, from 1949 forward, when Eisenhower as SACEUR called for six divisions to be sent to Europe. When I was Assistant Secretary of Defense I did a lot of work for Cap Weinberger in NATO. At that time, we had 206,000–216,000 Army soldiers alone in Germany—United States Army soldiers alone in Germany, and not including family members—which was about 60,000 more soldiers than the U.K. had in their entire army worldwide. There were a lot of discussions then about the United States, and the imbalance between the United States and others. But, that seems to me to have been accentuated in the period following the fall of the Berlin Wall.

And we have a situation now where the United States remains the major military guarantor. Many of the other countries in the old alliance are repairing their relationships in Eastern Europe, their historical relationships in Eastern Europe, as well they should. And we’ve been bringing in these other countries that—you can put a label on them, you can call them an ally, but in reality they’re protectorates.

So, the question really, for me—and I would appreciate hearing your thoughts on this—is, When we are obligating ourselves to come to the defense of countries that really are contributing very, very little in terms of their own military capabilities, which is the foundation of what you would call an alliance—where are we on this? This is more like a commonwealth than an alliance at this point. Or, what would your thoughts be?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, I would not call the new members protectorates. We could talk about that. But, I think that it’s clear; there’s no question.

An alliance that was set up for one purpose has been reconfigured to do something else. I do think that the political aspect of it is important in terms of what it does to create an area where democracy and a variety of rule-of-law issues are taking hold—albeit slowly, but they are.

And I think that—and again, I welcome your question so that I can make something very clear; I have always been a supporter of NATO, for a variety of reasons.

But I took this assignment on for a very different reason, which is that I think it does need to be examined. That’s the whole point of this Strategic Concept. I don’t want to be a part of producing or delivering a set of information that is just kind of regurgitating all the various things that we’ve been saying for the last 60 years.
And so, I am taking this on in terms of looking at exactly the kind of questions that you and Senator Corker are asking, and others are asking, “What is this about?” And I think part of it is about keeping a linkage between the United States and North America with Europe. I think that despite whatever issues are out there, that continues to be a really important part.

I find the trip that Vice President Biden is on right now to be significant in terms of the things that he was saying in Warsaw and Romania; he’s on his way to the Czech Republic. He is contributing to the sense of reassurance and trust that we need in a community of countries that I think can, in fact, be counted on for a variety of issues.

But I want to look into exactly what you were all talking about. And what I hope is that I can come and visit with you more often through this process, because this does have to have the support of the American people.

The Europeans have to get support from their people and we have to have these discussions and not just kind of say that we should continue on just because we’ve always done it this way.

But I would not call them protectorates. I think that they, in many ways, are trying to figure out ways to be contributing members. We may not be asking enough of them. As we move ahead, we will be looking at the importance of a match between the problems we face and the capabilities that allies have. Finding the right match is what this is about.

Senator WEBB. Well, I appreciate that response. First of all, I personally would still say, in classic military terms, they’re protectorates. They’re not really offering military capabilities to the strategic situation of the United States. But, setting that aside, it’s very interesting to hear your comment, because as you know, I spent 4 years in the Reagan administration in—under Cap Weinberger, and then as Secretary of the Navy—and what you just said was very much in line with what his mantra was, even 25 years ago. And I think Cap Weinberger’s actually a very underrated Secretary of Defense, in terms of history, when we look back at him. And the concept that he continued to push, when there were many questions then about the imbalance of the relationships, was that NATO was the vital link between the United States and the countries of Europe, for reasons beyond simply the military portion of it. And I wouldn’t disagree with that.

But, I do have a lot of concern, when we start talking about expanding the number of countries and, as a result, even more than the issue of provoking Russia, mandatorily involving us in certain situations because of the nature of the treaty. I’m very happy to hear that you would want to come over and discuss this further, and I would look forward to that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Webb. You raise very important and yet unresolved questions. But, you’re going to resolve them, right, Madam Secretary?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I will certainly push.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator DeMint. You’re up. Timely arrival.

Senator DE MINT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for being late.
Thank you, Madam Secretary, and I apologize if I'm asking a question that has already been discussed, but I'm particularly interested in the role of Russia in NATO, and the rumors of NATO going to Moscow to get their cues from Russia. And I know that's not true, but I would just like to hear you talk a little bit about the impact of Russia and their goals, versus NATO, how that affects the strategic plan.

Ambassador Albright. I mention in my testimony, Senator, that Russia could have a voice about what issues were going on in Europe, but never a veto. I think that the reality is that this alliance was set up to be against the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union is gone. I had the rather interesting time, in the 1990s, when we were enlarging NATO, of going to Moscow any number of times and telling them that NATO was not against them, and they still have very much that mindset.

But Russia and its relationship to Europe is complicated—and Senator Lugar was talking about the whole energy issue. The bottom line is that we need to reassure our allies and at the same time have some kind of a realistic relationship with Russia.

Russia is not a member of NATO. There is a forum for developing a relationship between Russia and NATO, the Russia-NATO Council, where subjects are discussed—which is where the voice comes in—but they cannot veto anything that NATO decides.

And so I don't think anybody's going to Moscow to get instructions. I think that, at some stage, our group of experts will have some consultations with the Russians, as we are going to with other countries and with various organizations.

But it is a very—it's an interesting mindset, when you look at an organization that was set up against something and then has to deal with a very different situation.

Senator DeMint. Right.

Ambassador Albright. And I did have a discussion with President Yeltsin at the time and he said, "Why are you doing this? This is a new Russia." And I said, "Well, this is a new NATO. It is not against you."

And so, I think it is important to realize the presence of Russia. Moscow still does things that make some of its neighbors uncomfortable in terms of spheres of interest. And yet there are other aspects of their policies in which we can and should cooperate. And here I have in mind such issues as nuclear nonproliferation, the environment, drug smuggling, and some others.

Senator DeMint. Without the motivational glue that came from the threat of the Soviet Union, the sense of urgency to create NATO and to maintain it, do you sense, in your meetings and developing a strategic plan, that that sense of urgency to maintain a strong and united NATO still exists?

Ambassador Albright. We just had a seminar in Luxembourg, with a lot of different people—experts, military people. And I think that there is a sense that it is essential to figure out what the alliance is about. The new Secretary General sees a very strong role for NATO. He has laid out that it's important to do the right thing in Afghanistan, develop some kind of a more functional relationship with Russia, and take on the assignment of developing a new Strategic Concept.
I do think there is the sense that the 1999 concept doesn’t work anymore. The word I kept hearing over and over again last week in Luxembourg was that we are living in a completely unpredictable time. And so, what people want to do is create some predictability in the form of what has been, and can continue to be, a major military alliance.

This is why I welcomed this assignment, because I thought that it really does allow for a discussion on exactly the kinds of questions that you all are asking. And with the prejudice that this is an alliance that has been the greatest military alliance in the history of the world, so it has something going for it, but that we really do have to look at it and ask ourselves very honest questions.

I personally do believe we gain a lot out of the NATO alliance. But in the course of this discussion we are asking these questions.

Senator DeMINT. When I was in Brussels last year, we met with a number of European ambassadors. They tried to stress that, without strong U.S. leadership, NATO would not continue. The concern, obviously, the Europeans developing their own strategic forces could further dilute a NATO that maybe doesn’t have the same sense of urgency to exist that we did several decades ago. Again, as you go through this, do you feel like that the United States will play a parity role, a strong leadership role, a—what are the other NATO partners asking of us as part of this new strategic vision?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I think that they are obviously prepared to contribute their share. I’m having trouble answering this, because I believe in American leadership. And I think that we would not want it in a way where NATO—where we don’t have a crucial role in NATO, and where we are the ones that are in charge of the command structure—this goes to Senator Webb’s point.

And I think that we have to be careful, in terms of saying how to broaden the sense of responsibility, but, I believe in American leadership. And so, I would want to see that we continue to really have that.

Now, on the EU structure, I think there are ways. We’re going to be meeting with the EU and trying to find ways where EU forces and NATO can cooperate.

Senator DeMINT. Well, as you know, NATO has been one of the most important stabilizing forces in the world, and it—I believe that we need to continue it as a strong organization with American leadership. I very much appreciate your leadership and your service here.

Mr. Chairman, I’ve got a full statement I’d like to submit for the record, and I’ll yield back——

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it’ll be placed in the record.

Thank you, Senator DeMint.

[The prepared statement of Senator DeMint follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DEMINT, U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA

Thank you Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lugar, for holding this hearing today. Security and stability remain vital issues in the Transatlantic relationship and arguably this relationship sets a standard for the rest of the world.

For more than 60 years NATO has flourished because it has defended the ideals of freedom, democracy, and stability not just for members of the alliance but for all
of Europe and indeed the world. Whether contributing to peacekeeping missions in Bosnia or on patrol in Afghanistan, NATO has been a leading contributor toward peace in the face of incredible challenges to global security. While NATO has much to celebrate from its storied past, we have constantly heard the refrain that now is “the” decisive moment for NATO. In the 20th century, NATO was created to counterbalance the growing influence of the Soviet Union, but since its collapse NATO has moved on. In the 21st century, some traditional threats still linger, but NATO has new threats to consider and confront. NATO at times has been slow to adapt to these emerging challenges. For these reasons and many more, NATO’s efforts to write a new Strategic Concept are helpful. The current Strategic Concept was written before September 11, Afghanistan, cyber warfare, energy manipulation, and Iran’s ballistic missile threat.

STRATEGY DRIVES REQUIREMENTS AND RESOURCES

A new strategic concept should create a framework to resolve these important issues, but it should also provide a way for NATO’s partners to focus their effort in important areas like planning, procurement, and training. A focused NATO with an overarching vision of its purpose and mission in the world provides the necessary context to influence major decisions regarding defense procurement. Imagine the impact a strategic concept could have played in the September announcement of abandoning ground-based interceptors in Europe. In the vacuum of a clear vision for the organization, the GBI system became a victim and the alliance is now left with a less capable, more expensive, and unproven system. For example, forces participating on the front lines of the battle against terrorism were trained for a conventional fight against Soviet tanks in the Fulda Gap. But the last 15 years have seen NATO forces conduct peacekeeping, humanitarian, and counterinsurgency missions. Few could predict that global conditions would dictate major operations in the Balkans, let alone in Afghanistan, but “out of area” operations will likely become more necessary to maintain stability in Europe.

To construct a proper strategy, NATO must not only understand the heritage and purpose of the alliance from 60 years ago and its most recent past, they must recognize today’s context and more importantly the emerging challenges of the next 60 years.

EMERGING CHALLENGES

These challenges are both internal as well as external. NATO must transform itself and improve its processes. In a resource constrained environment this is vitally important. But removing duplication is also an external issue. NATO must remain the preeminent security structure in Europe, and I fear the duplication that can come from the European Union’s Security and Defense Policy. Parallel planning and operations structures duplicate effort. And if this and other organizations simply mean more demands on the same limited amount of resources and people, then no organization will be effective. Efforts to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa this past summer highlighted many of these problems.

The list of external security challenges have been widely discussed and are well known, but my bigger concern with a new Strategic Concept is that it have sufficient flexibility for the alliance to respond to threats and challenges that no one can envision today, but may emerge in 5 years.

THE ALLIANCE

That is why the Strategic Concept must address the development of a range of capabilities. Things like crisis management, stabilization and reconstruction operations, missile defense, counterterrorism, cyber security, energy security, and anti-piracy operations are just a few of the skills sets NATO people must be able to perform and more importantly be able to scale the size of the situation. At the same time, the Strategic Concept must address the question some members are asking: “is NATO an alliance of equals or a two-tier alliance where some nations shoulder more than their fair share of the risks and burdens?” While the spectrum of NATO’s members’ resources and contributions will never allow a small country to match U.S. contributions many countries do fight above their weight. U.S. policy has always insisted that NATO is a single alliance, and the new strategic concept should maintain this.

And this brings us to the bigger question of enlargement. Some argue that NATO is too large, consensus is too difficult to reach, and new members are a drag on the alliance. This is an easy view to express from inside the alliance. However, tell that to any country that has experienced a cyber attack, an invasion, or energy disruptions in the cold of winter purely for political reasons.
Every nation—including the United States—joined NATO because it faces security threats, and believed that working together provided more strength than standing alone. Any country that is dedicated to support and defend the principles set forth 60 years ago should be eligible for membership as long as they meet the criteria established by the alliance for all members.

RUSSIA

I do have deep concerns about the role of Russia inside the alliance, especially in drafting a new Strategic Concept. The NATO-Russia Council is a useful mechanism for dialogue and finding areas of cooperation, such as supply lines and overflights to support operations in Afghanistan.

However, Russia is not a member of NATO and they should have no role helping draft a new Strategic Concept. These is especially true because until there is some level of consensus on Russia inside the alliance, finding common ground on some of the most difficult issues for NATO will likely prove elusive.

CONCLUSION

Nonetheless, NATO has endured because it has been successful, and the United States is the beneficiary of the alliance’s Article 5 commitments. Still to some in America, NATO’s processes can be frustrating and time-consuming, and things like caveats and decreasing defense budgets lead some to question European commitments to the alliance.

However, in an uncertain world with a growing number of security challenges, NATO has proven to be one of the only security alliances that has actually worked. And it’s relevance to global security can only increase.

I support moving forward with NATO strategic concept and I look forward to hearing your testimony on this important issue.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shaheen.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me add my congratulations and thanks for your work in Afghanistan.

Madam Secretary, we’re delighted to have you here this morning. And I very much appreciate your pointing out the history that this committee has had with NATO over the years.

I also have a statement that I’d like to submit for the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it’ll be placed in the record.

[The prepared statement of Senator Shaheen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE

I want to thank Chairman Kerry and Ranking Member Lugar for holding this important hearing today and for their past efforts to build and foster the critical trans-Atlantic alliance. Today’s discussion builds on the active role this committee has played throughout the years in shaping the future of NATO. Just this spring, the Subcommittee on European Affairs held a hearing to mark the 60th anniversary of NATO and to consider our alliance’s future moving forward.

We are thrilled to have Secretary Albright here today to discuss her leadership efforts in guiding NATO toward a sound, new strategic footing, which will ultimately help adapt and transform NATO to better meet the complex challenges of the 21st century. I want to welcome all of the witnesses here today. We look forward to your testimony.

As each of you well know, the relationship between Europe and the United States touches nearly every critical global challenge. From national security to climate change to the international economy, a robust United States-Europe bond is vital to global stability and progress. We cannot afford to take this relationship for granted, and strengthening and adapting the NATO alliance to better meet today’s challenges should remain near the top of our trans-Atlantic agenda.

As perhaps the most successful regional security alliance in history, NATO celebrated its 60th anniversary this year. Like any institution which has reached its sixth decade in existence, NATO must find a way to transform and reinvigorate itself on a regular basis in order to meet shifting realities and rapidly changing environments. The “Strategic Concept” process is an important opportunity to make
a bold and ambitious, yet realistic, statement on the future of this alliance. We should not let it slip by.

As a coalition that operates on consensus, it will be difficult for NATO to find unanimous agreement among its 28 members on complex issues like NATO enlargement, the nature of its relationships or the scope of its missions. Despite the complexities, we should not avoid these discussions for fear of conflict. Disagreement should be a healthy exercise for any large, consensus-seeking body, and we should robustly engage in these important discussions in a transparent and constructive manner.

In examining the challenges before the alliance, Afghanistan—NATO’s first “out of area” military commitment—remains the most pressing issue, and success there should be the priority for NATO into the near term. The question of enlargement remains contentious between alliance members. In addition, NATO’s complex and uncertain relationship with Russia permeates nearly all of the issues the alliance faces and will require our constant attention. It is equally important, however, that we also consider NATO’s evolving relationship with institutions like the EU and the U.N., as well as our ties with new and emerging partners in Asia and beyond.

One of the more difficult areas to find consensus will be in determining the scope of NATO actions into the future. What will NATO do? What missions should it take on? When should NATO lead the international community? When should it take a back seat?

The threats of the 21st century are more complex and ambiguous than ever before. Though territorial defense still remains a priority, new challenges like cyber warfare, climate change, energy security, missile defense, pandemic disease, and proliferation constitute threats to our alliance members. NATO will simply not be able to meet every challenge that threatens its members. With the understanding that NATO’s resources and capabilities are limited, the alliance will need to clearly define where and when it will engage on these threats.

Consensus on any of these issues will be extremely difficult. All institutions—if they are to be successful in the long term—must make difficult decisions on their future.

After two devastating world wars fought on European territory in the first half of the 20th century, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has succeeded in bringing together a Europe that is whole, free, and at relative peace over the last six decades. If our alliance is to be successful for another 60 years, we will need to tackle these difficult questions today. I hope the United States will take the opportunity of the “Strategic Concept” process to the lead in pushing the alliance to make bold, ambitious, and definitive decisions on the future of NATO.

Senator Shaheen. You’ve talked a little bit about the Strategic Concept debate as an opportunity for us to rethink our commitment to NATO and what its role should be in the future. As we’re looking at that, what should the United States priorities be for developing the new Strategic Concept?

Ambassador Albright. Well, my answer is in two parts. I think one is, obviously we are in NATO and believe in NATO because it’s good for American national interests. And I think we have to figure out to what extent it does address itself to these new threats and to what extent it is prepared to take on antiterrorist activity and issues having to do with cyber terrorism and energy. I think we need to prepare it to deal with new threats, since it’s no longer against the Soviet Union.

I also think, though, that among our priorities has to be—and it’s some of what you all have been talking about—is how to make sure that the burden is shared better, that there really is an understanding. I do believe in American leadership, but not in the way that, you know, we do all the work and the heavy lifting.

So, it’s a combination of making sure that the alliance actually does deal with the 21st century and also that there is an equitable distribution of what has to be done.
Senator SHAHEEN. How important is success in Afghanistan to the outcome of the Strategic Concept discussion? How will that be affected by Afghanistan and to the future of NATO?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. This, again, is one of the issues that we touched on in Luxembourg and that we talk about all the time. Clearly it is the prime NATO mission at this time. And people are saying that the success of NATO is dependent on the success in Afghanistan. I think it will play a very important role, but it isn't the only thing that NATO has to look at. So, it's very important, but I don't think that the whole future of NATO should be judged on the basis of what happens in Afghanistan.

But I do think NATO has to perform well in Afghanistan. And its role has to evolve a little bit, in ways that both the chairman and the new Secretary General have described. But I don't think it can be the be-all and end-all for NATO.

I think what is interesting is what has changed about NATO—and this is what we did in the 1990s—is to move it out of area. That is a very different issue. Do you deal with something that is not specifically in Article 5? And how far out of area is out of area?

All I can tell you, as the person—I actually took NATO to war in Kosovo; that it was not a simple issue to persuade people that this was the right thing to do. It is an evolution. And I think that's what we're looking at in the Strategic Concept.

Senator SHAHEEN. And so, how much will what's happening in Afghanistan affect the burden-sharing discussion when it comes to the Strategic Concept?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I think it will affect it. There are discussions internally in the countries. I think there is this question about how much of the burden-sharing is all military and how much something else. But I definitely do think that it will.

Senator SHAHEEN. And is the Strategic Concept process going to look at NATO's role in the rest of the world, and what strategic significance it should have when it comes to Africa, say, or Asia, and what's happening in other parts of the world?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Yes. We are going to have a seminar that looks at NATO in the wider world. We are also going to be consulting and dealing with other aspects of various organizations that are out there; obviously the OSCE is one of them. There is also the Istanbul initiative and ongoing activities in the Mediterranean. And piracy—antipiracy is one of the unpredictable 21st century issues. So, yes, we are going to be looking at that.

Senator SHAHEEN. OK. Thank you, Madam Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Kaufman.

Senator KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to join what should be, and is, a chorus of folks thanking you for what you did these past several weeks. I think, to me, the single most important question we have to answer in Afghanistan has to do with governance and whether—as we know, in counterinsurgency there's a battle between the government and the Taliban, not between the United States and the Taliban. And I think without what you did, we would be in real trouble over there, in terms of not moving the ball forward. And I think it was—having just returned from there—extraordinarily difficult to accomplish what you accomplished. So,
I want to thank you for what you did, and how important it is. And I think it's one of the reasons why the President's taking time to make his decision. Governance is an important part of it, and how the government over there behaves is key, and you really took us a long way toward being successful.

Madam Secretary, you have just made my day. I've been a NATO supporter in the trenches all these years, and I'm really starting to have doubts. And what you said, in terms of how we should approach this, sums up my feelings on NATO. And I think that the members here have asked you good questions, everything from, "Will it become an organization that just—you get in—it's really important to get in, but after you get in you don't do anything?" Is that the standard? Or is the standard we're still a military alliance?

And I'd like to kind of have you put on your former Secretary of State hat, as opposed to Commission, and just kind of go to 50,000 feet on just two main questions. One is the military. You know, in Bosnia, 19 Foreign Ministers had to sign off on targeting, which was a nightmare. We now have 28 members. When you travel to Afghanistan—we keep coming to Afghanistan, because that's really the test case for all this—and you start hearing about the caveats that individual NATO countries are required to have on each one of their involvement. Just give me some hope that there is—that NATO can really, honestly, be a military alliance that can work in the field to reach some kind of a military objective or political objective.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Senator, I think it can. I think that what has to happen—and we will get to this—is to look at the decision-making process. First of all, I'm sorry I made your day in that particular way, because I don't want to sow doubts about the alliance, generally. I think that there are questions about what its role is and how it operates and how it moves in this very unpredictable environment that we're in, but having been somebody that was a decisionmaker, there are not a lot of tools out there in order to accomplish what we want.

And I think that a multilateral alliance, such as NATO, has been and will continue to be a very important way of operating in an unpredictable world.

And so, what I'm hoping is that this particular exercise that we're involved in will actually make NATO more useful for what we're dealing with now.

So, I don't want you to think I'm not supportive of it, because I am; I just think it needs to be looked at within the tasks that are accepted now.

The other part, though, that I have to tell you, we do want to run a completely transparent process, here. And so much of what we do these days has to do with public opinion, as it should. And if the United States begins to doubt the value of NATO, that will have a follow-on effect, in terms of what's going on in other countries. So we have to ask these questions in a way that, I think, allows us to have an honest discussion, but without diminishing the importance of NATO, because, you know, all of a sudden people will start to say, "The United States doesn't want to be in Europe." And again, I point to Vice President Biden. He is involved in a
really important trip, in terms of giving the necessary reassurance. And I think that the Strategic Concept, one of its priorities, Senator Shaheen, is finding a way to reinforce this idea of reassurance.

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes, and I—and that's where I am. I think there are real doubts. I mean, I think the questions raised here are, by and large, really valid in terms of going from 19 to 28. Can you make decisions? What are we trying to do? Are there free riders? And I think the fact that you're addressing them is really what we need. And that's the part that made my day.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. OK.

Senator KAUFMAN. I just think—you know, the idea that you understand that there are doubts, that we all agree—I mean, Senator DeMint just said about how—the historical role that NATO has played. We all know that they've been great players in the past. They've been key. They're important. And I don't—frankly, don't know what we'd do without them. But, in the meantime, we have to face these doubts about functioning in places like Afghanistan and Bosnia. Can we really have a decisionmaking process that works?

Second part is the civilian surge. I mean, obviously a civilian surge is hard. And I just had a briefing yesterday from S/CRS and the State Department in how incredibly difficult it is to just have the right civilians available when you need them, who—at the time that you need them. And then going, again, to Afghanistan, and going around to each one of the PRTs and seeing the kind of civilian help they need, and how the different—you know, one country decides to give this, another country kind of gives this—like a food bank. You know, you just wake up one morning and you've got all this kind of food. You don't know whether it's really healthy for the people, but it's all there.

So, again from 50,000 feet, in terms of civilian surge, how are we going to operate that, with so many diverse players in the puzzle, to make sure that we end up with troops—civilians on the ground—that we need, when we need them?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, I think that is a huge question. In the U.S. Government, it goes to the whole issue of the relationship between State and Defense. Internationally, I think that there are numbers of countries that want to help. And again, it's the coordinating mechanism. And the question is whether that coordinating mechanism comes through NATO or through the EU or through the U.N., but something has to happen to coordinate that. I mean, the worst part that I've noticed is that there's either no effort or a duplication of effort. And so, there has to be something there.

The other part is that there has to be more reward, so to speak, for the civilians. We don't focus enough on the dangers that are there for them and the hard work that they put in, and that they are very much a part of the effort. We need to recognize the very important part they play, and then push for a variety of coordinating activities.

Senator KAUFMAN. One final thing. You're at NDI; you're an expert on strategic communications. What can we do in bettering strategic communications, not on the total mission, but where our troops are deployed?
Ambassador ALBRIGHT. As you know, NDI is there in Afghanistan, and we’re going back for the planned runoff election. NDI’s efforts underline for me the importance of listening a little bit more to what Afghans have to say, instead of telling them what to do all the time. I think that what is interesting is the number of people that actually did go out and vote. You know, we’ve kind of forgotten about that. And the people that went there for NDI saw the bravery of the people coming out. And so, I think listening more to what they do have to say, and understanding that strategic communications is a two-way activity is valuable.

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Kaufman.

And I thank all my colleagues for their comments about the last few days. I appreciate it very, very much.

Let me just very quickly say, because we have another panel—I’m informed we have a vote at around 11:50, and that means we’ll have a grace period, so we’ll have about half an hour before chaos will envelop us. So, I want to try to push it forward. But I did just want to ask you a question very, very quickly before we switch, if I may.

It’s become clear that the European Union, through the European Security and Defense Policy, is something of a factor. Call it a major factor, but it’s certainly an important factor in transatlantic security policy decisionmaking. A lot of observers are concerned that cooperation between NATO and the EU is poor and inefficient. And now we have this kind of pyramid—convoluted defense-security relationships, none of which are streamlined and working as effectively as possible, and some of which leave out the enormously important countries, with respect to the kind of threats that we face today.

So I haven’t figured it out yet, but I’m very troubled by the process. And I hope that you all are going to think very clearly about, Are we matching our methodology to the threat? And if I were to ask you today, “What is the greatest threat that, in your judgment, links the NATO members and the United States?” what would the answer to that be?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, I——

The CHAIRMAN. What is the biggest threat to our security?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT [continuing]. I think it is trying to deal with the combination of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and energy.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with that, pretty much. I’d add, the overall climate change——

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. But, that—it goes to the——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Energy piece, so, if you take that context, you’ve got to have Russia. You’ve got to think about the “stans” and what’s happening there, and down into South Asia. And they don’t figure directly into NATO, except to the degree that NATO is in Afghanistan, which sort of leads you to say, “OK, why aren’t we getting a better effort out of them with respect to that?”

So I would simply comment to you that we have to match the threat—the cold war was the cold war, very clearly delineated, East/West, bipolar relationship. And things were a lot simpler in
that context. And we exploited it, to a degree, because we were able to put almost every major decision in that context. That is not the world we live in today, but we live with NATO, which is not responding adequately to the reality of the real threat that we face. And nations that we need to have respond to that real threat are outside of it.

So, there’s a fundamental paradigm conflict. I’d just leave it on the table, at the last moment here. It bears much more discussion, and I hope the second panel will get into that. But, it’s what troubles me in this conversation, Madam Secretary.

Ambassador Albright. Well, Mr. Chairman, I do think that we are going to have a seminar of the experts looking at moving out of area in that particular way. I think that the whole world has shifted over to the East on this particular issue. And I agree with you on—specifically, we are going to have an experts meeting with the EU so that we can see some of those things.

I hope very much that if we can’t solve everything, we will have, in fact, put all these questions on the table. But, we are all going to be working very, very hard. This expert group, I think, has a very good rapport already. We’ve kind of subdivided the work. We will be giving building blocks to the Secretary General. But, I hope very much that we can keep a running conversation.

The Chairman. Well, we will, and this is probably a very, very poor analogy, but you know how kids get that little block, and it has round holes and——

Ambassador Albright. Yes.

The Chairman [continuing]. Triangles and squares, and you fit the things in it? We’ve got to ask ourselves if we’re trying to take a whole brand new one and take one of the pieces from that and fit it into the old one and see whether or not it’s round or——

Ambassador Albright. Yes.

The Chairman [continuing]. Square or triangular, and doesn’t fit any of the holes. I don’t know the answer, but we’re operating in a very convoluted——

Ambassador Albright. Yes.

The Chairman [continuing]. Exclusively slow responding, and not completely fulfilling structure, and it is greatly complicating the challenge to us in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, proliferation and other issues.

Ambassador Albright. Yes.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Ambassador Albright. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. I don’t know if other colleagues want to have any last words—before we——

Senator Corker. I know it’s time to press on. I guess the bottom question would be, Should we wait until you complete your work to move ahead any more with any additional NATO admissions?

Ambassador Albright. Whether we should wait? Well, I don’t think there’s any immediate proposal. We’re supposed to be done with our work by the spring. But, really—that’s your problem. [Laughter.]

Senator Corker. But——

Ambassador Albright. No. I really do—I think that there are various ways——
The CHAIRMAN. I’ll bet you wouldn’t have said that if you were the sitting Secretary of State. [Laughter.]

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. There are some advantages to not being the sitting Secretary of State.

Thank you all very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much—

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. For being with us.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Thanks. Yes.

The Chairman. We really do appreciate it.

Could we try to get the second panel up as rapidly as possible? And I think Senator Shaheen is going to chair the second-panel portion of this.

Senator SHAHEEN. I’m happy to do that, Mr. Chairman.

I guess what I’d like to ask the panelists, since, as you point out, we have a vote that starts at 10:50, so we’ve only got about a half an hour, is if you could try and condense your remarks, please. And we will get to the questioning, but I’m also going to shorten the question time so that each person gets 5 minutes, so that hopefully everybody who’s here will have a chance to get in their questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, why don’t you come up and take the chair here.

Senator SHAHEEN [presiding]. Senator Kerry introduced our panel at the beginning of the hearing, so I would like to go ahead and begin, and ask General Craddock, who is the former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, if he would begin with his statement.

STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN CRADDOCK, U.S. ARMY (RET.), FORMER SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER-EUROPE, U.S. ARMY, MYRTLE BEACH, SC

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Senator Shaheen, Ranking Member Lugar, distinguished members of this committee. I appreciate you asking me to appear before this committee today to testify on the NATO Strategic Concept.

As my last assignment on Active Duty, was as the Supreme Allied Commander of Operational NATO Forces, I will focus my comments on the military perspective of the Strategic Concept that’s being developed over the coming year.

First, I firmly believe that development of the Strategic Concept must include timely and relevant input by the NATO military authorities, not only from the military committee, but also from the supreme commanders for operations and transformation. This input is essential to inform the process of just what the two components of NATO’s military forces—the command structure and the force structure—currently are capable of, and what changes or adjustments to those forces might be required based on strategy development.

Now, while the military committee interfaces directly with the North Atlantic Council—the NAC—and is the recognized body in NATO to provide the NAC military advice, only commanders are responsible and accountable for NATO forces and therefore may have distinctly different views than the military committee.
That fact, plus the advice they may render, is not a result of a consensus process, and they both compel me to advocate that the strategic commanders be consulted in this development process.

Second, much of the 1999 Strategic Concept document is still relevant today. And I might provide an example. A sentence from paragraph 4 is particularly cogent. It states, “The Alliance must maintain collective defense and reinforce the transatlantic link, and ensure a balance that allows the European allies to assume greater responsibility.” Indeed, all good words. The challenge today, as then, is not in the development of what NATO wants to do, should do, or feels compelled to do; the challenge for NATO is matching its level of ambition with political will to resource the means to accomplish its ambitions, or, more specifically, creating and sustaining military capability. The development of a strategy or strategic concept must address a vision of the endstate, the ways possible to accomplish that vision, and the means or the resources needed to create the required capabilities.

The 2010 Strategic Concept must, unlike its predecessor, address the ways and means. I believe, absent that, once again the disconnect between the vision or level of ambition and the political will to commit the resources will continue.

And while potentially a product of the consensus process, I believe the use of such terms and phrases, such as “allows greater participation,” in practice is not strong enough to accomplish the specified intent of greater burden-sharing. If the intent is for the next NATO Strategic Concept to strengthen the alliance, then that document must be written to mandate opting in, not accommodating opting out.

Third, the Strategic Concept must address the development by both NATO collectively and nations individually of capabilities specified in the strategy. Capability development in the alliance is a complex and difficult task. Defense shares of national budgets are shrinking among NATO member nations. The Strategic Concept must address this critical area, not only from the context of balancing both NATO and national investments, but, additionally, I believe, opening linkages to regional and international organizations to enhance this military capability development.

And last, may I offer two related points of consideration:

First is, we have seen repeatedly over the last several years in every military operation NATO has undertaken, civil-military component to operations is critical and must receive more attention. The 1999 Strategic Concept gave this area short-shrift, dedicating about seven sentences to it.

Second, NATO can’t continue to spar with the European Union concerning security capabilities. We’ve talked about cooperation, but have really not done much in terms of working together in any meaningful way. The new Strategic Concept must set the conditions for real, serious cooperation with the European Union. There have been, and will continue to be, myriad opportunities, and we must get this right. I believe this to be a priority political deliverable for the Strategic Concept.

Once again, thank you for the opportunity to appear, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Craddock follows:]
Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for asking me to appear before this committee today to testify on the NATO strategic concept. As my last assignment on Active Duty—ending on the 2d of July this year—was as the Supreme Allied Commander of operational NATO forces—I will initially focus my comments on the military perspective of the strategic concept that is to be developed by NATO over the coming year, followed by addressing other key NATO issues that I believe may be germane to this committee’s areas of interests.

First—I firmly believe the development of the strategic concept must include timely and relevant input by the NATO military authorities—not only from the military committee—but also from the Supreme Commanders for operations and transformation. This input is essential to inform the process of just what the two components of NATO’s military forces—the command structure and the force structure—currently are capable of and what changes or adjustments to those forces might be required based on the strategy development. While the military committee interfaces directly with the North Atlantic Council—the NAC as it is known—and is the recognized body in NATO to provide the NAC military advice, only commanders are responsible and accountable for NATO forces and therefore may have distinctly different views than the military committee. That, plus the fact the advice they may render is not a result of a consensus process, compels me to advocate that the strategic commanders be consulted in the strategy concept development process.

Second—much of the 1999 strategic concept document is still relevant today. For example, a sentence from paragraph 4 is particularly cogent: “it (the alliance) must maintain collective defence and reinforce the transatlantic link and ensure a balance that allows the European allies to assume greater responsibility.” Indeed, all good words. The challenge today, as then, is not in the development of what NATO wants to do, should do, or feels compelled to do. The challenge for NATO is matching its level of ambition with its political will to resource the means to accomplish its ambitions—or more specifically—creating and sustaining military capability. The development of strategy, or a strategic concept must address a vision of the end state, the ways possible to accomplish that vision, and the means—or the resources—needed to create the required capabilities. The 2010 strategic concept must, unlike its predecessor, address the ways and means. Absent that, once again, the disconnect between the vision—or level of ambition—and the political will to commit the resources, will continue. And while potentially a product of the consensus process—the use of such terms and phrases as “allows greater participation”—in practice is not strong enough to accomplish the specified intent of greater burden-sharing. If the intent is for the next NATO strategic concept to strengthen the alliance—then that document must be written to mandate “opting in”—not accommodate “opting out.”

Third—this strategic concept must address the development—by both NATO collectively and nations individually—of capabilities specified as required in the strategy. Capability development in the alliance is a complex and difficult task. Defense shares of national budgets are shrinking among NATO member nations. The strategic concept must address this critical area—not only from the context of balancing both NATO and national investments but, additionally, opening linkages to regional and international organizations to enhance this military capability development.

Last—I offer two related points of consideration. First—as we have seen repeatedly over the last several years in every military operation undertaken, the civil-military component to operations is critical and must receive more attention. The 1999 strategic concept gave this area short shrift—about 7 sentences. Second—we can’t continue to spar with the European Union (EU) concerning security capabilities. We have talked about cooperation but have really not done much in terms of working together in any meaningful way. This new strategic concept must set the conditions for real, meaningful cooperation with the EU. There have been and will continue to be myriad opportunities—we must get this right. I believe this to be a priority political deliverable for the strategic concept.

If I may, I would like to touch on a few other topics relevant to this committee’s interest.

First—the implications for NATO of operations in Afghanistan. While the saceur—and at every opportunity since—I have stated publicly and privately that NATO members must fully source the International Security and Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan if the alliance is to prevail. First and foremost, NATO must resource the NATO training mission—Afghanistan—that the heads of state and gov-
ernment agreed to at the 60th summit this past April. Building competent, capable, uncorrupt security forces is the highest priority task in Afghanistan. I do not believe Afghanistan is on the verge of falling to the insurgents, but I do believe the insurgency has spread—not surprisingly—to the west and a bit to the north of the country. There are 2 reasons for this in my mind—a lack of security forces available in all districts and municipalities—but more importantly—a growing trend of lack of confidence in government at all levels by the people of Afghanistan due to increased corruption by any level of government to deliver social services and infrastructure, and a general feeling of disenfranchisement. NATO is eagerly awaiting the outcome of the U.S. strategy/resource discussions and the decision that will follow. I believe once decided, another window of opportunity will be open to enlist greater NATO member contributions to ISAF and Afghanistan, both in the military and the civilian sector.

Another key activity in NATO is the full participation of France in the military structure. My assessment is that effort is on track, though much remains to be done. An important and high visibility activity is the allocation of flag officer posts of the NATO command structure to NATO members to bid on—to include France. That process was completed by the military committee last spring, approved by the NAC, and is now—and for the next 9 months or so—a work in progress. Of note is the fact that two of the senior positions—the Supreme Allied Command for transformation and the Commander of the Joint Forces Command headquarters in Lisbon, Portugal—both changed to French-flag officers in July and September respectively. At the staff level, the French are now identifying staff officers and non-commissioned officers to fill positions on many of the NATO command structure headquarters staffs. In sum, my assessment is that all is working as intended at this time but it will be several months before a judgement can be made with regard to efficacy.

NATO’s political leadership has stated that enlargement is in the best interest of NATO and its doors remain open. From the military perspective on enlargement, we must maintain the rigorous standards already established to ensure that new members are providers of alliance security—not consumers of security. Additionally, we have learned much over the past two decades concerning the processes and programs for enlargement—partnership for peace (PFP), membership action plan (map), etc. Based on that experience, it is now time to update our templates to reflect the new strategic environment and different security capability assessment tools. Every potential member is unique and we must recognize that in our approach. With regard to Ukraine and Georgia—while military engagement, cooperation, and assessments are ongoing—any progress toward NATO membership remains firmly in the political arena.

Military-to-military cooperation with Russia remains difficult and complex. NATO military authorities must receive political guidance to fully reengage with Russian military authorities—if that guidance has been forthcoming, it has been very recently. I believe the key for opening this effort is to find areas of common military interests for both NATO and the Russian Federation and pursue those. Counterproliferation, counterterrorism, humanitarian and disaster relief, and counternarcotics efforts are but a few of the areas of common interests. These become the start point for this essential cooperation.

In my previous comments on the NATO strategic concept I indicated more must be done with the EU. My experience during my time as asecu was that from the military perspective, there was interest and enthusiasm on behalf of both EU and NATO military authorities to find opportunities to train and operate together. That same experience informs my judgement that significant political difficulties exist that, until eroded or breached, will prevent this needed cooperation. This is a high-priority area for the politicos of both NATO and the EU, and bilaterally for the United States and European nation leaders. Our mil-to-mil efforts are repeatedly thwarted by old feuds and rivalries that do not serve alliance nor EU interests. They can't continue to be ignored.

Once again, Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity. I look forward to your questions.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.

Next, we have the Honorable Kurt Volker, who is the former Permanent Representative to NATO and currently the managing director at the Center on Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins.

Very nice to have you here. Thank you.
Ambassador Volker. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And thank you, Senator Lugar, and all the Senators for being here. I have a written statement I’d submit for the record.

As you know, I served as Ambassador for 1 year, and I’m very grateful to the members of this committee for supporting my nomination in 2008.

In over 20 years of dealing with NATO issues, I’ve observed NATO transform a lot: from being a cold war alliance to one focused looking outward, engaged in civil-military operations, taking on a new range of security threats, together with partners and around the globe.

Yet, despite this transformation, I’m deeply concerned about the state of our alliance today. NATO is in trouble. It faces significant challenges from both outside and from within. In my view, we need a renewed political compact on security between Europe and North America. The firm establishment of the past is fading. The establishment of a new compact at a political level should really be the central task of the ongoing effort to produce a new strategic concept. Such a compact would not change U.S. or any other allies’ obligations under Article 5; rather, it would constitute a fresh, common understanding of what those obligations are in today’s vastly changed security environment.

At the heart of it is the idea that the United States remains committed to Europe itself, a reliable ally that will share decision-making and do its part to guarantee a strong, secure, democratic Europe. But in return, Europe must put its full weight behind joining the United States in tackling the global security challenges that affect us all. Such a compact would have to address a common approach to dealing with Russia; a common commitment to facing new threats and challenges, both inside and outside of Europe; a renewed commitment that our shared goal remains a Europe whole, free, and at peace; and a commitment that each of us will put the full measure of our human and financial resources behind making NATO’s work a success.

There are a few fundamentals that I want to touch on; they’ve been addressed in some of the earlier question-and-answer.

First, NATO has always been about values. Having an organization that serves as a means of pulling the transatlantic community together to produce joint action in support of shared democratic values remains essential.

Second, NATO’s purpose was never really about perpetuating itself or its own relevance, but about helping people to live in freedom, democracy, and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO underpinned the growth of a Europe whole, free, and at peace, and that work is not done. We have Ukraine and Moldova, Georgia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Serbia—many of Europe’s neighbors still struggling to implement democratic systems, economic reform, live in security, and be part of our community.

Third, since the end of the cold war, there emerged serious new threats and challenges, and Senator Lugar spoke about these elo-
quently. It’s a greater diversity of threats than at any time in the past. We have to come together at NATO as to how to deal with these.

Fourth, it’s essential that the United States and Europe do work together to address common challenges. It doesn’t work for either of us to try to go it alone. We—it only is effective when we work together.

And fifth, if I—if you permit me, I’d just like to observe that NATO has always been an issue that has enjoyed bipartisan support in this country. I think that’s terribly important and is one of the things that has contributed to the success of NATO over its 60-year life span.

Despite NATO’s ongoing transformation, as it has transformed, differences have grown among allies at the same time. Today, I would say that our allies disagree over the importance of Afghanistan, the nature of our relationship with Russia, what constitutes an Article 5 threat; whether NATO is the principal venue for security and defense of Europe, whether, when, and how NATO should continue to enlarge, what solidarity means in the face of 21st century challenges, how much our societies should invest in security and defense, and how much NATO should focus inside the Euro-Atlantic area versus outside.

We need to rebuild a firm consensus on these issues, and that should be the work of the Strategic Concept group. I think we should feel lucky that we have a former Secretary of State representing the United States in this process. It needs to be a process that engages the political leadership of every allied country, because it has to, in the end, result in that political compact that I discussed.

I’d be happy to go on in the question-and-answer, particularly to focus on Afghanistan, some of Senator Corker’s questions about enlargement and the future of that, dealing with Russia, and then energy issues and new threats and challenges.

Thank you again for having me here.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Volker follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. KURT VOLKER, FORMER PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO NATO, SENIOR FELLOW AND MANAGING DIRECTOR, CENTER ON TRANS- ATLANTIC RELATIONS, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC

Thank you Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, and all the distinguished Senators here today for the opportunity to testify about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

As you know, I served as the 19th U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, from August 2008 to May 2009. I remain extremely grateful to the members of this committee for supporting my nomination to that position in 2008.

That posting came at the end of a career spanning over 20 years in government in which I worked on NATO issues from a number of different perspectives during the course of five U.S. administrations:

• As a desk officer for NATO issues in the State Department;
• As a political-military officer in Budapest when it was aspiring to join NATO;
• Here in the Senate as a legislative fellow during the year of the Senate’s ratification of the first modern round of NATO enlargement;
• As Deputy Director of the NATO Secretary General’s Private Office;
• As a senior official in both the National Security Council and the State Department;
• And finally as U.S. Ambassador.

In these various capacities, I had the opportunity to contribute to NATO’s 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts, NATO enlargement, NATO’s partnerships, NATO operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, the 50th and 60th anni-
versary summits, and countless ministerial and summit meetings. It has been a unique privilege to serve both my country and the greatest alliance in history in so many ways and I am thankful for the opportunity.

During these two decades, I have seen NATO transform dramatically: from a cold war alliance focused on deterrence and preparing for the defense of Europe against the Soviet Union, to a much larger, outward looking alliance—one that is engaged in civil-military operations, and aimed at tackling a new range of security threats, together with many partners, in places around the globe.

Despite this remarkable transformation, I am deeply concerned about the state of our alliance today. NATO is in trouble. It faces significant challenges from both outside and within.

A NEW TRANSATLANTIC COMPACT

In my view, we need a renewed political compact on security between Europe and North America. The firm establishment of the past is fading. The establishment of a new compact, at a political level, should be the central task of the ongoing effort to produce a new NATO Strategic Concept.

Such a compact would not change U.S. or any other allies’ obligations under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Rather, it would constitute a fresh, common understanding of what those obligations are in today’s vastly changed security environment.

At its heart is the idea that the United States remains committed to Europe itself—a reliable ally that will share decisionmaking and do its part to guarantee a strong, secure, democratic Europe. And Europe, in turn, must be prepared to put its full weight behind joining the United States in tackling the global security challenges that affect us all.

Such a political compact needs to encompass:

• A coherent transatlantic approach to dealing with Russia;
• A common commitment to facing new threats and challenges both inside and outside of Europe;
• A renewed commitment that our shared goal remains a Europe whole, free, and at peace; and
• A commitment that each of us will put the full measure of our human and financial resources behind making NATO’s work a success.

FUNDAMENTALS OF THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP

Before discussing in greater detail these current challenges to NATO and ways to address them, let me stress some fundamentals.

First, as clearly stated in its founding document, the Washington treaty, NATO has always been about values. Having an organization that serves as a means of pulling the transatlantic community together; to produce joint action in support of shared democratic values, remains essential today.

After defeating fascism and faced with expansionist Soviet communism, the transatlantic community established NATO out of the recognition that the universal human values that underpin our societies—freedom, market economy, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law—remained under threat and had to be actively defended.

We recognized that the democracies of Europe and North America—though by no means having a monopoly on values—nonetheless had a special place in defining, sustaining, protecting and promoting these values for ourselves, and in the world. This “values foundation” remains at the heart of NATO today.

Over the years, we have seen that we cannot be indifferent when these fundamental values are under threat—whether within Europe or in other parts of the world—even if the threat to our own societies may seem less immediate. Our democracies are safest in a world where democratic values are in ascendance, and at ever greater risk when they are in retreat.

Second, NATO’s purpose was never about perpetuating itself, or assuring its own “relevance.” Rather, it has always been about helping people to live in freedom, safety, and growing prosperity—first by defending the West, and then, when possible, by being open to new members from the east and south joining this values-based community.

In other words, NATO underpinned the growth toward a Europe whole, free, and at peace. This work is far from over, and indeed we have seen regression in recent years. We need to get back on track.

The 15 years that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall marked a period of remarkable construction and progress in this historic mission. NATO grew from 16 countries in 1989 to 28 today. Likewise, the EU grew from 12 to 26 members. Today,
over 100 million people now live in free societies that are more prosperous and fundamentally secure, compared to the divided Europe of pre-1989.

Yet the work of creating a Europe whole, free, and at peace is far from complete. Indeed, we have seen a rise in authoritarianism, and curtailments of freedom and justice in Russia and some other states of the former Soviet Union. We have seen flareups of nationalism and ethnic rivalry in the Balkans and even Central and Eastern Europe. Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Serbia and others of Europe’s neighbors need to continue their development—and thus far, they remain outside of NATO and the EU.

Some argue that further growth of this democratic community is a “threat” to Russian interests. I firmly disagree: The growth of freedom, prosperity, and security in Europe is a threat to no one. There is no “zero-sum” between the interests of the Euro-Atlantic community as a whole, and Russian interests—we are part of a common space. Indeed, Russia should be a vital part of this democratic community in Europe—but to do so, Russia must live up to the same democratic, good-neighborly standards as the rest of us.

Acceding to the logic that the growth of a democratic space in Eurasia is a “threat” to Russia would subordinate the interests of the millions of people living in states near Russia to the wishes of an increasingly nondemocratic Russian leadership.

It is essential that the transatlantic community renew momentum toward the creation of a Europe that is truly whole, free, and at peace, anchored on democratic values, for the benefit of all of its citizens, whether in the East, West, North or South. NATO remains vital to the realization of this vision.

Third, since the end of the cold war, there have emerged serious new threats to the security of the allies. Indeed, there is a greater diversity of threats—in terms of both geography and nature of challenge—than at anytime in the past.

Washington, London, Madrid, and Istanbul have all been subject to terrorist attacks linked to an ideology of violent extremism, and inspired from territories outside of Europe. Failed or weak states create havens for terrorism, crime, and proliferation. Our information societies are at risk from cyber attacks, and our developed economies can be at risk from energy shutoffs. All of these are examples of threats that can come, as one of my predecessors, Nick Burns, used to say, from “the dark side of globalization.”

But we must remember that state-level threats have not entirely disappeared. We see Iran developing missiles and nuclear technology. Last year, in Georgia, we saw Russia abuse its position as a peacekeeper to invade Georgia and break off Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgian territory by military force. This comes on top of Russia shutting off gas supplies to Ukraine, affecting NATO ally Bulgaria, and suspicions of Russian involvement in cyber attacks against Estonia.

Fourth, it is essential that the United States and Europe work together to deal with our common challenges. The temptation for the United States to decide things on its own, or to assemble a coalition of willing states—or alternatively, the temptation that Europe should act on its own, or act as a counterweight to the United States—is a chimera.

The United States and Europe share the same fundamental, democratic values; we face the same challenges in the world; and we can only deal with these challenges effectively if we deal with them together. It is hard work, but necessary.

This is true in practice as much as it sounds good in theory: whether it is Afghanistan, or nonproliferation, or counterterrorism, or antipiracy, or dealing with a more assertive Russia, we are in fact working together everyday. We are most successful when we have the most coherent and committed transatlantic set of policies—and least successful when we don’t.

That is why having a strong Europe, and a strong EU, is fundamentally in America’s interest. And also why being a “good European” must include also being a “good Atlanticist.”

And fifth among these fundamentals, permit me this observation: In contrast to a number of other foreign policy issues, NATO has always enjoyed bipartisan support and commitment in the United States. I believe this has contributed to the success and strength of NATO over the years, and I believe all of us must do whatever we can to continue this bipartisan support for NATO.

These foundation stones—values, a Europe whole and free, facing real threats in the world today, genuine transatlantic partnership, and bipartisan U.S. commitment—are all essential. Let us not forget them.
In building on these foundation stones, NATO has already adapted to the 21st century world in four principal ways:

- By enlarging, in three waves thus far;
- By creating partnerships—the Partnership for Peace and Mediterranean Dialogue, the NATO-Russia and NATO-Ukraine, the Istanbul Initiative, the growth of partnership with friends around the globe, and the NATO-Georgia Commission;
- By becoming operational—from zero operations before 1995 to Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Active Endeavor, airlift to Darfur, and humanitarian relief;
- By moving away from large, heavy militaries to smaller, lighter, more expeditionary forces.

Each of these aspects of transformation has been vital to NATO carrying out its founding mission of collective defense, but in a vastly different security environment.

SERIOUS CHALLENGES FACING NATO TODAY—AND THE ROLE OF THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Yet as NATO has transformed, the consensus within the transatlantic community about NATO’s roles and its future has weakened. Despite its successful transformation, we now find ourselves with a NATO that is at serious risk.

Allies disagree on such key issues as:

- The importance of Afghanistan;
- The nature of our relationship with Russia;
- What constitutes an Article 5 threat;
- Whether NATO is the principal venue for the security and defense of Europe;
- Whether, when, and how NATO should continue to enlarge;
- What “solidarity” means in the face of 21st century challenges;
- How much our societies should invest in security and defense; and
- How much NATO should focus inside the Euro-Atlantic area, versus addressing threats that arise far from our own territory.

Rebuilding a firm consensus on these critical issues should be the work of the Strategic Concept. We are lucky to have a person with the stature of a former Secretary of State representing the United States in this process.

For the work of the Strategic Concept to succeed, however, it must become a personal priority for leaders on both sides of the Atlantic—at the Head of State and Cabinet levels. Otherwise, it risks becoming a piece of paper adopted by experts, but without harnessing the genuine political will and commitments to provide the necessary resources from each of the NATO nations.

SPECIFIC AREAS OF CONCERN

Finally, I would like to make a few observations about some of the specific issues on which allies are divided. I’ll do so in three clusters.

First is Afghanistan. What happens in Afghanistan is vital to the future of NATO, and indeed a test case for NATO. Can it survive in the 21st century or not?

I believe that the attacks on September 11, 2001, and later in Madrid and London, and now the events in Pakistan today, all show that what happens in Afghanistan and Pakistan is vital to the security of the wider region, to Europe, and to the United States. What happens there has a direct effect on our own security.

In addition, the majority of people in Afghanistan and Pakistan want to live in a peaceful society open to improved economic growth, health care, education, human rights, and so forth—but they face an armed enemy hostile to these aspirations and they need our help.

Unfortunately, allied leaders have seldom made the case to publics about the importance of Afghanistan for European security or human rights. If their own leaders are not explaining the case, publics are understandably deeply skeptical about NATO’s efforts there.

And in turn, public skepticism means that many governments seek to minimize what they do in Afghanistan—making “contributions” but not taking “ownership” of the outcome. This applies to European civilian and financial contributions, including through the EU, as well as military contributions.

This is a dangerous situation. By having agreed to the NATO operation, but then in the case of many allies failing to provide as much civilian, financial, and security support as possible and necessary, we risk failure on the ground, failure for NATO, and strain on the solidarity within the transatlantic community. In turn, it will
increase temptations within the United States to conclude that working within NATO, or even working with Europe more generally, is simply not worth the time and effort.

Second is Dealing with Russia, and a host of issues that arise in association with Russia. The emergence of a more authoritarian Russia that seeks a sphere of influence in neighboring states has drawn divergent reactions from Europe. Central and Eastern Europe, which recently emerged from Soviet domination, seeks strategic reassurance and protection.

Western Europe prefers a strategy of engagement with Russia, in the hopes of winning better Russian behavior.

These two conflicting orientations play out within NATO and elsewhere—on issues such as NATO-Russia relations, Article 5 defense planning, Georgia, Ukraine, CFE, energy, democracy promotion, and the future of NATO and EU enlargement.

In a way, both Central and Western Europe are right. Yet neither Central Europe’s demand for protection, nor West Europe’s demand for engagement, can succeed alone. Only if we do both simultaneously can we forge a unified transatlantic policy and conduct an effective approach to dealing with Russia and its neighbors.

We need to be firm and clear in our expectations of Russia—especially on democratic values, and on the freedom, sovereignty, and independence of Russia’s neighbors—while at the same time stressing our desire that Russia be a part of our community, and our desire to work together with Russia in areas of common concern.

There should be no limits to the extent of our cooperation with Russia, provided Russia implements in practice, both at home and in its neighborhood, the same democratic values we expect of ourselves. This is, after all, the genius of the Helsinki Final Act and the foundation of the OSCE.

In the past, the United States has played the role of uniting Europe around a set of policies, and we need to do so again today. I believe this set of policies should include:

* Article 5 defense planning concerning the full range of potential threats facing NATO;
* Continued commitment to the vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace—including working actively with countries that seek to join NATO (Montenegro, Bosnia, Georgia, Ukraine) to assist them in implementing necessary reforms; and
* Active engagement with Russia through the NATO-Russia Council wherever common interests make real progress possible.

Third is the way we deal with new threats and challenges. There are those who point to the NATO treaty and say that NATO is meant to deal only with military attacks on the territory of NATO members. This view asserts a military and geographically limited view of NATO’s collective defense role.

An alternative view, to which I subscribe, is that there are now many more actors and many more means of “attacking” a NATO member today than there were in 1949, yet our obligations to each other for collective defense remain the same.

As Senator Lugar has rightly pointed out, the effects on a society of seeing its energy shut off—deliberately, by an outside actor—can be just as devastating as any military attack.

Thus our view of what can trigger NATO’s Article 5 collective defense commitment needs to change. Energy security, cyber attacks, terrorism, WMD proliferation, and the consequences of failed or weak states, such as in Afghanistan, all have the potential to be Article 5 issues.

And similarly, our view of the ways in which NATO needs to deal with these threats also needs to change. We should not limit our thinking to military force, or to European geography. NATO should develop some civilian capacities—such as police training, which it is already leading in Afghanistan. NATO should work with other organizations and partners as much as possible. And NATO’s out-of-area operations—such as in Afghanistan or Iraq or off the coast of Somalia—are not exceptions, but the new norm.

Neither should we limit our thinking to using NATO as the instrument for action just because we use NATO for broad-based strategic coordination. We should be able to use NATO for consultations, and agreement on joint action, even if we also agree that NATO as an instrument will not be in the lead on execution.

U.S.–EU cooperation—as important as it is—is not a substitute for cooperation through NATO. The United States is not present in EU discussions, and when the United States and EU meet, we do so as partners across a table. NATO is the one place where all sit together around one table, deliberate, and agree common action.
Related to all this is a question of priorities and resources: The United States and Europe are diverging on the priority that our societies place on investment in security and defense capacities, and our willingness to use them.

European spending on security and defense as a percentage of GDP is at record lows. European politics drives leaders toward coordination first within Europe, with transatlantic coordination as a far lower priority. Europeans are divided on the use of military force, even when Europe’s development, governance, and human rights goals cannot be achieved without the use of force when faced with armed groups such as we see in Afghanistan.

**CONCLUSION**

Adopting a common view of these issues—the nature of the threats we face, how they relate to our commitments to each other as allies, on using NATO for strategic coordination, and on how far we go on using NATO as an integrating mechanism for civil-military efforts—must all be a core part of a new security compact embodied in the Strategic Concept.

Mr. Chairman, the challenges facing NATO today are deep, complex, and extremely difficult to overcome. They threaten the very future of the alliance. Yet they can be overcome with political will and commitment—and followthrough—on both sides of the Atlantic.

The effort to produce a new Strategic Concept is just getting started. It should be a shared goal for people who prize our democratic values on both sides of the Atlantic that this Strategic Concept rise to the monumental challenge of building a new transatlantic security compact for the 21st century.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify at this hearing.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. I’m sure you will get some of those questions as we get into the next phase.

Dr. Charles Kupchan—am I pronouncing that correctly?—is the professor of international affairs at Georgetown University, and a senior fellow on the Council on Foreign Relations.

Welcome. Please begin.

**STATEMENT OF CHARLES A. KUPCHAN, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, SENIOR FELLOW, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, WASHINGTON, DC**

Dr. Kupchan. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, Senator Lugar. I appreciate the opportunity to share my thoughts with you.

Let me begin simply by reiterating what General Craddock said a few minutes ago, and that is that it’s very important to get this right. And that’s in part for the reasons that we’ve been discussing this morning: the military effectiveness of NATO, collective defense, engaging Russia, succeeding in Afghanistan. But, I would throw one other idea into the hopper, and that is that NATO is not just a military alliance, but it is also perhaps the most important institution that binds the West together, that keeps the West a meaningful political community.

And maintaining Western solidarity is not going to be as easy, moving forward, as it has been in the past, in part because I think there are different threat perceptions that have emerged—the United States looking globally, Western Europe focused mainly on expanding and consolidating the EU, Central Europe still very concerned about Russia—but also because I think we will not have the luxury of only focusing on the Atlantic community. The rise of China, India, Brazil and others means that the Atlantic community has to be as much focused outward as it is inward. And in that respect, I think we have our work cut out for us.
Let me just touch on the few key concepts that I would put at the core of a discussion about a new Strategic Concept: I'll touch on collective defense issues; Russia, Georgia, and Ukraine; and then end with a comment on Afghanistan.

I think that the core of the NATO alliance remains collective defense, and that if there is an issue that is at the heart of that, it is strengthening the European pillar within the alliance to make sure that there is a more equitable distribution of responsibility between the two sides of the Atlantic.

And I think there are two pieces of good news on that front. One is the Lisbon Treaty, which is going to give Europe a more collective voice, and more centralized institutions; and the other is the reintegration of France into NATO's integrated structure, which hopefully will mean less competition and more cooperation between NATO and the EU.

But, there are also two pieces of somewhat less good news: One is, I think, is that beneath the service you are seeing the re-nationalization of politics in Europe, and if, for example, the conservatives win the next election in the U.K., as a party that is less pro-European, it will perhaps be more difficult to get the aggregation of European voices on defense. And I do think that if Europe does not aggregate its will and its resources, it will gradually become of less strategic relevance to the United States. We need to do everything we can to encourage Europe to become more self-standing and more capable.

I also worry about the Turkey question—rather, there are many Turkey questions. But a key issue is that Turkey is in NATO and not the EU, and we need to find some way of bringing Turkey into EU defense planning to get the NATO-European linkage better.

On the question of collective defense in Central Europe, I sympathize with the concerns of Central Europeans about the reset button with Russia, about the change in missile defense plans, and I think the best response to those concerns is to increase NATO's operational capability—more training, more planning, more exercises, more investment in modernization, particularly on the Europe side. I would not move forward with the remilitarization of NATO's eastern frontier, as I simply think that a Russian threat to NATO countries is, at this point, a very, very low probability.

Finally, I would add to the mix the importance of looking at new issues like cyber security, terrorism, and energy, but certainly not at the expense of core collective defense defined in a more traditional way.

And finally, I think we do need to address decisionmaking. NATO is becoming bigger and bigger, more and more unwieldy, and I think it's time to think about changing the decisionmaking rules away from consensus to a more flexible approach.

On Russia, Georgia, and Ukraine, I think we are at a point in which we need to do as much as we can to anchor Russia in the post-cold-war settlement. And I fear that we aren't doing enough to include the Russians as we did in 1815 when the Napoleonic Wars ended and France was brought in. In 1945, a defeated Germany was brought in. I think today we need to work as hard as we can to make sure that Russia is somehow anchored in the Euro-
Atlantic community. How we do that is less important than that we start a concrete work plan.

And so, I think OSCE, working with the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the NATO-Russia Council, and concrete cooperation on issues like arms control—these are the best ways to advance that agenda.

And on Georgia and Ukraine, I think our policy is where it should be. The door is open, but let’s move slowly while we try to get the relationship with Russia right.

Finally, I think, on Afghanistan, it is great news that NATO is there. But I take away some sobering lessons about the degree to which NATO can be turned into a global alliance. I think one of the stories of NATO in Afghanistan is how difficult it has been to get unity of command, to get rid of national caveats. And moving forward, I would therefore be reluctant to see us try to turn NATO into something it’s not. Instead, I would focus more on getting NATO to do better what it already does well, and that is lock in democracy and security in Europe.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kupchan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES A. KUPCHAN, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY AND SENIOR FELLOW AT THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, WASHINGTON, DC

NATO has undergone a remarkable transformation since the end of the cold war. Not only has the alliance persisted despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, but it has redefined its core purposes, extending democracy and stability into Central Europe, bringing peace to the Balkans, playing a major role in the effort to stabilize Afghanistan, and building a host of strategic partnerships in the Black Sea and Mediterranean regions. NATO has also demonstrated that it remains the primary institutional pillar of the West, consolidating the Atlantic democracies as a meaningful community of common interests and values. The durability of the alliance is testimony to the fact that North America and Europe remain each other’s best partners.

At the same time, making the most of the Atlantic partnership requires recognizing that in a world of diverse threats, NATO no longer enjoys the unity and solidarity that it did during the cold war. Alliance members have diverging views of the nature and urgency of the operation in Afghanistan and have varying levels of capability to contribute to the mission, leading to an inequitable sharing of burdens. Disagreements have emerged across the Atlantic and within Europe on numerous other issues, including the future of NATO enlargement, alliance relations with Russia, and an appropriate division of labor between NATO and the European Union (EU).

Such differences are hardly fleeting. Rather, they reflect alternative strategic visions for the alliance: The United States tends to see NATO as a tool for addressing global security challenges; members in Western Europe envisage NATO as a vehicle for tethering the United States to Europe and stabilizing and expanding Europe in step with the EU; Central European members focus more on the need to hedge against the potential resurgence of a threat from Russia. The alliance will not be able to overcome these deep-seated differences. Instead, members will need to learn how to tolerate them and strike reasonable compromises if NATO is to remain effective in the absence of a clear strategic consensus.

The global nature of threats such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation begs the question of NATO’s geographic and functional scope. In addition, the West, which has been the strategic pivot of global affairs since World War II, is confronted with the challenge of adapting the international system to the rise of China, India, and other powers. In this respect, the Atlantic democracies no longer have the luxury

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1 For discussion of the alternative strategic visions that have emerged among NATO members, see Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, “Does a multi-tier NATO Matter? The Atlantic alliance and the process of strategic change,” International Affairs, vol. 85, no. 2 (2009), pp. 211–226.
of focusing primarily on their own affairs, but must also address the role that the West should play in shaping the international order that comes next.

In the analysis that follows, I lay out a risk-averse approach to NATO's future—one based upon the supposition that it is preferable to conserve NATO's integrity by keeping its will and resources in balance with its commitments, rather than to tax the alliance with responsibilities that risk compromising its credibility and coherence. NATO should continue to anchor the West while the Atlantic democracies address a global agenda, but efforts to turn NATO into a global alliance risk stretching it past the breaking point. Instead, NATO should serve as a model for and assist with defense cooperation and integration in other regions, meanwhile putting its focus on seeing through its mission in Afghanistan and addressing unfinished business in the broader European theater: improving its operational capability, in particular by strengthening its European pillar; locking in peace in the Balkans; deepening ties to partner countries to the south and east; building a more cooperative relationship with Russia; and addressing unconventional threats such as cyber attack, nuclear proliferation, and terrorism. I begin by discussing NATO's core purposes, then turn to NATO's role in Europe and its responsibilities beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, and end with a brief reflection on Congress and the alliance.

DEFINING PURPOSES

Anchoring the West. During its first 40 years, NATO's main purpose was to integrate and defend the West. During the past 20 years, it has focused primarily on expanding the West and, following the attacks of September 11, contributing to the mission in Afghanistan. Looking forward, NATO's defining purpose should be to anchor the West while simultaneously serving to coordinate its political and military engagement within and beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. It is essential to view NATO as much more than a military toolkit: it is perhaps the primary institution responsible for preserving the coherence and effectiveness of the West as a political community. That function, backstopped by transatlantic cooperation in a multiplicity of other forms, will grow increasingly important over time as global power shifts away from the Atlantic democracies, and Western-dominated bodies such as the G8 turn into far more diverse bodies such as the G20.

Collective Defense. In the aftermath of the war in Georgia and the Obama administration's outreach to Russia and alteration of plans for missile defense, Central European members of NATO have grown uneasy about the alliance's commitment to collective defense and what they perceive as insufficient concern in Western Europe and the United States about Russian intentions. In this respect, NATO should bolster the integrity of Article 5 and reassure Central Europeans about its commitment to collective defense. The alliance can do so through planning, exercises, and military modernization and reform (including missile defense). Shortcomings in the NATO operation in Afghanistan (see below) further underscore the need to enhance NATO's operational capability. At the same time, the remilitarization of NATO's eastern frontier would be both unnecessary and needlessly provocative in light of the extremely low probability of overt Russian aggression against NATO territory. Looking forward, NATO should also pay increased attention to unconventional threats to its members, including cyber attack, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation. Energy security warrants a place on NATO's agenda, although that issue should be addressed primarily through EU efforts to formulate a coherent energy policy and through EU–U.S. consultation.

Complete the Pacification of Europe. NATO, working in tandem with the EU, needs to consolidate peace in the Balkans and work to extend stability to Ukraine, Georgia, and other states on Russia's periphery. It should meanwhile pursue engagement with Russia and, should Moscow prove to be a willing partner, work toward drawing Russia as well as its neighbors into the Euro-Atlantic community.

Engage Beyond Europe, But With Due Modesty. Many of the most pressing international challenges of the day arise from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO has a role to play in meeting some of these challenges, but seeking to globalize NATO would saddle it with unsustainable burdens and insurmountable political divides. The mission in Afghanistan, although a top priority for NATO, continues to reveal the difficulties entailed in sustaining alliance solidarity in out-of-area missions. Accordingly, even as it stays the course in Afghanistan, NATO should view additional missions outside the Euro-Atlantic area with caution, and in general limit the scope of its global engagement to training and assistance, serving as an exemplar, and helping other regional bodies help themselves.
NATO remains the primary institution of the Euro-Atlantic security order. As it seeks to broaden and consolidate the Euro-Atlantic community, NATO should seek to strengthen its ties both to the EU and to those countries in Europe’s east which have yet to be formally included in either NATO or the EU. A more capable and more collective EU and better linkages between NATO and the EU are needed to help rebalance the Atlantic partnership. The Atlantic link will be well served if the EU enhances its ability to share burdens and be a more equal partner of the United States. Meanwhile, by reaching out to Russia and its neighbors, NATO has the opportunity to spread its pacifying and integrating effects further eastward and southward.

The European Pillar. With the United States bearing the burden of two costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and a wide range of commitments elsewhere, strengthening the EU pillar within the alliance is of growing urgency. Unless EU members do a better job of aggregating their political will and resources, Europe risks becoming of declining strategic relevance to the United States. On the other hand, if EU members allocate their defense spending more effectively and take advantage of the institutional changes foreseen in the Lisbon treaty to forge a more common security policy and assume greater international responsibilities, NATO and the Atlantic link will be primary beneficiaries. France’s integration into NATO’s military structure advances the prospect for better cooperation between the EU and NATO, helping the two organizations reinforce, rather than compete, with each other. Overcoming Turkey’s discomfort with European defense—perhaps by including it in EU deliberations and planning on security matters—would also advance the cause of strengthening the EU pillar. Building a more capable EU is primarily up to Europeans: they must increase their deployable military and civilian assets and ensure that the more capable institutions envisaged in the Lisbon treaty are not offset by the renationalization of European politics. But the United States can help by making clear its unequivocal support for a strong Europe and engaging the EU at the collective level as its institutions mature.

Decisionmaking. In addition to strengthening its European pillar, NATO must also address potential changes to its decisionmaking apparatus to ensure its effectiveness. In the absence of the unifying threat posed by the Soviet Union, NATO solidarity is more difficult to sustain—as made clear by the inequitable division of labor in Afghanistan. To ensure that divergent perspectives do not become a source of paralysis, the alliance should consider moving away from a consensus-based approach to taking decisions. Options such as the formation of coalitions of the willing and the use of constructive abstentions (members opt out of rather than block joint action) are worth exploring to provide NATO greater flexibility in decisionmaking.

Russia. As the new Secretary General of NATO recently affirmed, it is time for the alliance to embark on a “new beginning” with Russia. This objective is in line with the Obama administration’s call for “resetting” relations between Washington and Moscow. Russia has indicated a willingness to explore these potential openings. President Medvedev has called for a “new European security architecture”—although it is not yet clear what the Kremlin has in mind. More importantly, it remains to be seen whether Russia pursues policies toward Iran, Georgia, arms control, energy, and other issues that would indicate its willingness to be a reliable partner of the West.

If such cooperation from Moscow is indeed forthcoming, then the United States, NATO, and the EU should work together to anchor Russia in the Euro-Atlantic community. What form such inclusion can and should take needs to be determined as the options become clearer. At this point, efforts should focus on making more of the NATO-Russia Council and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), engaging Moscow’s call to explore potential links between NATO and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, and advancing concrete cooperation on issues such as Afghanistan, arms control, missile defense, and maritime security.

Ukraine and Georgia. As the United States and its NATO partners reach out to Russia, they should make clear that a “new beginning” depends on Russia’s willingness to respect the independence and autonomy of Ukraine, Georgia, and other countries on Russia’s periphery. Moscow may well rebuff the West’s overtures and instead opt for a more distant relationship. But should confrontation prevail, it should be the consequence of Moscow’s missteps, not because the members of NATO failed to do their best to include Russia in Europe’s post-cold-war settlement. In this respect, even as NATO’s door remains open to Georgia and Ukraine, the question of membership is best dealt with later rather than sooner. Neither country is ready
for entry and many European leaders have reservations about moving forward on membership. Moreover, by focusing on concrete work plans rather than formal membership, the alliance can advance its links with both countries while simultaneously buying time for its relationship with Russia to deepen. The EU also has an important role to play in the broader Black Sea area, especially if NATO moves cautiously on the pace and scope of its engagement. As a strategy of anchoring Russia in the Euro-Atlantic space advances, then dealing with Ukrainian and Georgian membership in NATO becomes a much less complicated and volatile issue.

NATO BEYOND EUROPE

Afghanistan. Afghanistan will remain at the top of NATO’s agenda for as long as its mission there continues. There is much good news about the NATO operation, including the fact that the alliance invoked Article 5 after the United States was attacked and proceeded to contribute to a multinational coalition that consists of 41 countries and some 35,000 non-American troops. Nonetheless, the mission exposes the imposing obstacles to NATO engagement in areas far from alliance territory. Public skepticism about the mission has constrained the size and operational scope of many national contingents—even while the Canadians, British, Danes, Dutch, and Romanians have taken on more demanding missions. Unity of command has proved elusive as has coordination between NATO and EU efforts. At this point in the mission, it would be unrealistic to expect major new troop contributions from Europe, which is more likely to focus additional efforts on training Afghan soldiers and police and on civilian assistance—tasks which promise to take on increasing importance as U.S. and NATO strategy evolve. Moreover, it will be a major task maintaining the NATO coalition at current levels, with domestic pressure mounting in several Member States for the winding down of their national contributions.

In drawing lessons from its shortcomings in Afghanistan, the alliance should concentrate on improving operational effectiveness. Providing for common funding of alliance missions, doing away with national caveats, setting requirements for spending on modernization and interoperability, improving unity of command—these are the types of reforms that can enhance NATO’s ability to conduct coalition warfare and improve its performance on the battlefield.

A Global NATO? NATO’s experience in Afghanistan also provides good cause for being soberly cautious about the alliance’s ability to become an all-purpose alliance on a global basis. To be sure, fashioning useful partnerships with willing non-members such as Australia, as NATO has done in Afghanistan, makes good sense. But in most regions of the world beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, constraints on the political will and capabilities of Member States mean that the alliance will usually have to limit its engagement to providing training and assistance and helping defense organizations elsewhere do for their own regions what NATO has done for Europe. In this respect, it would make sense for NATO to enhance significantly the manpower and technical skills that would enable it to contribute more effectively to training programs and civilian assistance.

Preventing NATO’s overstretch and husbanding its political will and solidarity is especially important as the West heads toward a global landscape in which it enjoys less material—and perhaps ideological—primacy. The Atlantic democracies should make the most of their common interests and values as they work to adjust the international system to the rise of China, India, Brazil, and other emerging powers. Even as NATO completes its mission in Afghanistan, reaches out to Russia, and consolidates the pacification of southeastern Europe, it must continue to serve as the institutional and political anchor of the West amid a changing world.

BIPARTISANSHIP AND THE WESTERN ALLIANCE

During the second half of the 20th century, American engagement abroad rested on solid bipartisan foundations. Faced with the strategic imperatives of defeating Soviet expansionism and communism, legislators generally heeded Senator Arthur Vandenberg’s call in 1950 “to unite our official voice at the water’s edge.” Since the end of the cold war, however, the domestic politics of foreign policy have become more fractious. Bipartisanship has eroded, regularly exposing the conduct of statecraft to deep political cleavages.

The Western alliance and America’s link to Europe constitute a notable exception. The time-tested value of the alliance, the fact that it has withstood countless strains, and the thriving transatlantic commerce that has grown alongside strategic partnership have won NATO well-deserved support across the political spectrum. Not only has NATO earned the indefinite continuation of such bipartisan support, but perhaps the political lessons learned from NATO’s continuing successes can help rebuild the bipartisan foundations of U.S. foreign policy in the years ahead.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.

General Craddock, you talked about the importance of getting buy-in from military commanders, on changes to NATO. More and more it seems to me that the threat is not just conventional military might, but it’s coming from terrorism—certainly that’s what we’re fighting in Afghanistan—and that one significant element in being effective against terrorism is getting the right intelligence and being able to share that intelligence in a way that allows us to go after the terrorists. How comfortable are you that intelligence-sharing is where it should be among the NATO nations? And is there more that needs to be done on that? And should the Strategic Concept address that specifically in other ways than have been done in the past?

General Craddock. Thank you, Senator.

The short answer to your question is intelligence-sharing is still inadequate in the alliance; more must be done. Within the past few years, we have established in NATO an intelligence component. It’s collocated in the United Kingdom, along with a United States intelligence organization. It is resourced by nations, but the United States is the lead framework nation. It is not a part of the command structure.

I think that needs to be developed further. The output, the analysis, from that goes to commanders in the field—in the field—where we find the problem.

We still have too many national restrictions in the sharing of intelligence. We’ve been able to, in Afghanistan, develop categories of intelligence that would enable us to share with partner nations who are participating there, as well as optimize what can be shared from national sources with alliance members.

So, in the operational theater, there’s still more to do, but we have come a long way.

Second, I think the Strategic Concept should address it in a framework context and along with other aspects, not just intelligence, of how, in operations, nations must subordinate their forces and functions to the unity-of-command effort. That is where the addressment needs to be, as opposed to the ability to address each specific item, which, I think, then, quite frankly, will get bogged down in the consensus-approval process.

Senator Shaheen. So, when you were talking about opting in versus opting out, is that a place where that might be done? And how do you see that being structured?

General Craddock. Indeed, it could be there. I think that what we have to do also is recognize that, through no malintent or malfeasance, the command structure in Afghanistan, the arrangement of forces—national forces—is something that, upon scrutiny and analysis, we would never do again, knowingly. But, we did that in order to get nations to go, to buy in, to arrange themselves in a short period of time. And those decisions, individually, were fine. Collectively now, over time, as the environment has changed, they have led to constraints and restraints and inflexibility for the commanders on the ground. And I think we also must address that. When you commit your force, you provide it under operational control, and if you have a caveat, then I think NATO has a reject clause in that operation.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.

Ambassador Volker, you talked about NATO, inside and outside. Most of our conversation today has been on the outside efforts of NATO. Can you briefly say whether you think there are any institutional reforms inside NATO that need to be addressed as part of the Strategic Concept, recognizing that I only have 42 seconds left?

Ambassador Volker. Yes. Substantial. [Laughter.]

Senator Shaheen. So, we’d be happy to take some of this for the record.

Ambassador Volker. Yes, I’d be happy to.

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The information to the question above is covered in a question from Senator Kerry to Ambassador Volker on page 57 in the Additional Material Submitted for the Record.]

Ambassador Volker. One quick word, though. I don’t think the issue is decisionmaking by consensus. We need everyone’s buy-in when they make a decision, so they’ve got to be part of the decision. What we need is political will to implement and execute, and I think we need to focus the NAC and the decisionmaking of the alliance upward strategically, and leave the execution to the Secretary General and to our military commanders.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you.

Senator Lugar.

Senator Lugar. Well, thank you, Madam Chairman.

I just appreciate each of the three statements. I thought they were really remarkable, and I will—we’ll all review them carefully—that is, the full statements, in addition to the precise answer that you gave.

I’d just like to ask you, Mr. Volker—and this may sound very simplistic—but, as the nations go through the criteria you’ve suggested, could there be a decision on the part of some of the members to opt out of the alliance? In other words, as the criteria become very difficult politically or economically for them, could some say that, “By and large, you just can’t count on us. Our public support and our country would not support these problems which impinge upon our sovereignty of our decisionmaking in some way?” Most countries probably don’t act in such decisive, abrupt ways as that, but, nevertheless, the debate internally may commence which may lead an undermining of enthusiasm for the alliance. What thoughts do you have, even as you impose these stricter criteria?

Ambassador Volker. I think it’s a very fair question to raise, because we see those kinds of debates in allied countries today.

I take it back to first principals again, which is why I even mentioned some fundamentals in my statement, because I think if we allow that to happen, as leaders on either side of the Atlantic, we’re digging our own graves. We need to be together to deal with the type of world that we live in. If we don’t, we’re doomed to be failures at this.

So, while that would be a temptation that would exist, I would think, in some European countries—it may even exist in this country—I think it would be a very dangerous road to go down to see that. Rather, I think we—part of the political compact of our alliance is that we owe it to each other to roll up our sleeves and fig-
ure out how, rather than just walking away and saying, “Well, I don’t want to.”

Senator LUGAR. What would be the reaction, leaving aside our NATO allies, of Russia to these new criteria, as Russians take a look at that discussion? Now, granted, each of you, in a way, have said, “Well, we ought to be continuing a more intense, comprehensive dialogue with the Russians while we’re doing this strategic work ourselves.” But, nevertheless, they peer into this conversation. And what is their reaction likely to be?

Ambassador VOLKER. That’s a—it’s a very interesting question. And Madeleine Albright, when she testified, addressed that to some degree.

We have to start by remembering that Russia is not a democratic country today. It is talked—it has talked about “spheres of influence” in neighboring countries. So, we have to be—we have to know what kind of Russia we’re talking about when we’re talking about the way Russia reacts.

I would say that, as many have, we need to be inclusive of Russia in our thinking. We need to think of Russia as a European country. We need to want Russia to be part of a Euro-Atlantic community. But, simultaneous with that, Russia, therefore, would take on obligations, like the rest of us, to adhere to democratic values and good neighborly relations. And we need to hold those standards very high. And as an alliance, we need to be prudent about the way we deal with a country that doesn’t share those values today.

Senator LUGAR. Madam Chairman, in view of the fact that the vote has been underway for a bit, I will yield back whatever time that I have.

And I thank, again, the witnesses very much.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would—we are very short of time, but I would like to just follow up on the one question that you asked, with Dr. Kupchan, about Russia, because, recognizing your comments about further engaging Russia, having sat next to the Foreign Minister of Poland and hearing, in very great detail, his concern about United States further engaging Russia, how do we do that in a way that doesn’t threaten the other countries in Eastern Europe that, as Ambassador Volker, in Russia, has said, they consider part of their sphere of influence? So, how do you balance that need to further engage without creating other issues within NATO?

Dr. KUPCHAN. It’s a tough act, and I think the United States has to work on two fronts simultaneously. One, is to reassure the Central Europeans about their status in the alliance and the integrity of Article 5. And I think doing things like Vice President Biden’s trip, deploying Patriots, doing defense planning, are the types of things that need to be done on that front.

At the same time, I think that we have to realize that there are differences in threat perceptions within the alliance, and that we should do what we can to engage Russia—with our eyes wide open, making it clear to the Russians if they cross certain red lines such engagement would end, and these lines would include threatening the autonomy or the independence of countries like Ukraine and Georgia.
But, I think, while we have the opportunity to do so, we should have an open-door policy to Russia. Not open-door in the sense that, “We want you to be members.” Maybe, yes, one day. But, for now, let’s look at the concrete ways that the United States and Russia, that NATO and Russia, can work together. And it may well be that, 2 years down the road, once that relationship has been repaired, then the whole question of the defense of Central Europe, whether or not Ukraine and Georgia are in NATO, those issues become much, much easier to solve.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

Thank you all very much for appearing here. We apologize that we’ve gotten cut a little short due to votes. That happens often around here, as you know.

The record will stay open until Monday for members to submit their questions.

Thank you.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY MADELEINE ALBRIGHT TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. At the 2009 Strasbourg/Kehl NATO summit, the participatory heads of state and government at the North Atlantic Council meeting on April 4, 2009, acknowledged the progress of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina on “co-operation with NATO, including through implementation of its current IPAP, and the country’s expressed intention to apply for MAP at an appropriate time.” The declaration also urged “Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political leaders to take further genuine steps to strengthen state-level institutions and reinvigorate the reform process to advance the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations.”

The Summit Declaration also welcomed Montenegro’s “successful and active implementation of its current Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO” and expressed encouragement regarding “the reforms it has made in a number of areas that are essential to its Euro-Atlantic integration and also by its contributions to cooperation and security in the region. . . . The Council in permanent session is keeping Montenegro’s progress under active review and will respond early to its request to participate in the Membership Action Plan (MAP), on its own merits.”

• Can Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro contribute to NATO’s security rather than act as net consumers of it? As the alliance considers enlargement, what specific capabilities could these two countries add to NATO? How, if at all, do Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro currently contribute to NATO?

Answer. The question of admitting specific new members to NATO is one for alliance members to decide. The Group of Experts may discuss more generally the mechanisms for interacting with prospective members and partners, but at this stage of the process, no recommendations have been formulated.

Question. Do you believe that Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro are essential elements of U.S. and European security? Does Russia object to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro’s further integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions in the same way it perceived Georgia’s relationship with the West? Should this matter? How, if at all, should NATO address such concerns?

Answer. As I said in my testimony, I believe that NATO’s doors should remain open to qualified candidates. Decisions about membership are for the alliance alone to make. Those decisions should be made on the basis of objective criteria related to the contributions and obligations the admission of a new member entails. No country outside the alliance should be permitted to exert influence over these internal judgments. NATO membership is not a status symbol or a bargaining chip; it is an agreement between old members and prospective new ones to make the alliance stronger and more effective for purposes that all can support.
Question. NATO has already assisted Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro in reforms to the countries’ military and ministry of defense, allowing further participation with the alliance through programs such as Partnership for Peace.

- Based on your experience as Secretary of State, could NATO help reform Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political and economic situation, as well as help calm ethnic tensions? In what ways has the alliance already helped resolve such issues in Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere?

Answer. In my experience, the prospect of NATO membership and/or partnership can provide an incentive for countries to resolve internal problems, especially those stemming from historic ethnic rivalries or a lack of effective democratic institutions. NATO members possess a wealth of expertise about how to address such difficulties and have helped to spur progress in Central Europe, the Balkans, and elsewhere.

Question. As NATO’s relations with the EU evolve, how can the two organizations cooperate and complement each other, especially on 21st-century challenges, such as energy and cyber security, post-conflict reconstruction and global climate change? How can NATO and the EU effectively delineate shared responsibilities and resources on issues like these that combine civilian and military capabilities? How are you coordinating and consulting with the EU in formulating the new Strategic Concept?

Answer. The issue of coordination between NATO and the EU (and between NATO and international organizations more generally) is an important one and central to the deliberations of the Experts Group. Accordingly, the Experts Group will be holding formal meetings with the EU, among others, to share perspectives and ideas. I should point out that there has been an extensive history of dialogue between NATO and the EU, and that the two organizations continue to work together as partners in Kosovo.

Question. Do you think NATO should make energy security an Article Five commitment? If so, how?

Answer. Energy security is one of many topics that will be discussed by the Experts Group and its interlocutors as the process of developing a new NATO Strategic Concept goes forward. Similarly, the interpretation and application of Article V in a changing world environment will also be a subject of great concern.

Question. How should the new Strategic Concept address the issue of NATO reform? More broadly, what reforms should be made to NATO’s operational and political decisionmaking? How, if at all, should the position of NATO Secretary General evolve?

Answer. There is widespread interest on the part of the Secretary General and members of the Experts Group in the issue of NATO efficiency and internal reform. The Experts Group is currently in the ‘listening phase’ of its deliberations and will be soliciting ideas on the subject from a wide range of sources. The Group is scheduled to present its conclusions and recommendations to the Secretary General by the beginning of May 2010.

Question. How would you describe the current relationship between NATO and Russia? NATO Secretary General Rasmussen has spoken of building a more constructive relationship. What are the opportunities and limits of that relationship?

Answer. Russia and NATO have important interests in common. These include support for stability in Central Asia, countering terrorism and piracy, and curbing the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Despite these shared interests, there are some in Moscow who would like Washington to choose between loyalty to our NATO allies and cooperation with Russia—as if these two options were mutually exclusive. In fact, the United States can and should combine strategic reassurance for allies and realistic engagement with Moscow. When I was Secretary of State, our policy was that, on matters of European security, Russia was entitled to a voice but not a veto; both halves of that equation remain valid.

RESPONSES OF GEN JOHN CARRADOC TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. Much has been said about the necessity of training Afghan National Army and Afghan police forces. Training would appear to be one area where NATO countries can make substantial contributions without alarming their publics at home or violating restrictions on use of force. However, there continues to be an apparent lack of resources on this front. The EU had pledged about 400 trainers
for its police training mission last year, yet there are only about 230 on hand. What are the chances of persuading the EU and NATO to dramatically increase their commitment to this vital task?

Answer. While I do not believe both EU and NATO nations (21 Euro nations are in both the EU and NATO) will ante up what we believe they are capable of, I do believe with new NATO leadership in Brussels and a greater focus by European nations on the soft components of effective counterinsurgency strategies the likelihood is better than in the past. There are many civil components for which help is needed in Afghanistan that are resident in EU and NATO nations. U.S. leadership will be essential in creating a “can’t say no” environment for these nations to opt in. But for this to happen the United States will have to develop a framework which will permit these nations to buy into with resources and capabilities.

Question. In your October 22, 2009, testimony, you stated that “from the military perspective on enlargement—we must maintain the rigorous standards already established to ensure that new members are providers of alliance security—not consumers of security.”

At the 2009 Strasbourg/Kehl NATO summit, the participatory heads of state and government at the North Atlantic Council meeting on April 4, 2009, acknowledged the progress of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina on “cooperation with NATO, including through implementation of its current IPAP, and the country’s expressed intention to apply for MAP at an appropriate time.” The declaration also urged Bosnian and Herzegovina’s political leaders to take further genuine steps to strengthen state-level institutions and reinvigorate the reform process to advance the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

The Summit Declaration also welcomed Montenegro’s “successful and active implementation of its current Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO” and expressed encouragement regarding “the reforms it has made in a number of areas that are essential to its Euro-Atlantic integration and also by its contributions to cooperation and security in the region. . . . The Council in permanent session will monitor Montenegro’s progress under active review and will respond early to its request to participate in the Membership Action Plan (MAP), on its own merits.”

• Can Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro contribute to NATO’s security rather than act as net consumers of it? As the alliance considers enlargement—what specific capabilities could these two countries add to NATO? How, if at all, do Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro currently contribute to NATO?

Answer. I fully believe that after the MAP process runs its course both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro can contribute to NATO security in a meaningful way. The MAP process is an orderly, rigorous process to develop democratic security institutions through structure and practice. This process takes time and focus from appropriate NATO political and military authorities. In the future, the development of niche capabilities needed by NATO—likely small, technical capabilities—such as movement control, deployable surgical capability, air-traffic control, etc.—would enhance both alliance and national military capabilities. Currently Bosnia and Herzegovina contribute two personnel to ISAF. Montenegro is preparing to deploy a platoon of infantry to ISAF.

Question. Do you believe that Bosnia and Herzegovina are essential elements of U.S. and European security? Does Russia object to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro’s further integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions in the same way it perceived Georgia’s relationship with the West? Should this matter? How, if at all, should NATO address such concerns?

Answer. I am of the opinion that stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an essential element of European security given the history of this region. As for the United States, not so much, but rather as how the pursuit of stability and security in this region impacts relationships with the Russian Federation. During my tenure as SACEUR I did not experience the Russian Federation approaching Bosnia and Herzegovina in any context like that of Georgia or Ukraine. NATO has held for some time that while Russia may be consulted with regard to NATO enlargement plans, they do not have a veto over those plans. Issues in this context can be discussed by NATO in the NATO-Russia Council forum.

Question. NATO has already assisted Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro in reforms to the countries’ military and Ministry of Defense, allowing further participation with the alliance through programs such as Partnership for Peace.

• Based on your experience, could NATO help reform Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political and economic situation, as well as help calm ethnic tension? In what
ways has the alliance already helped resolve such issues in Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere?

Answer. NATO’s MAP program addresses political institutions as well and security and military institutions, so yes, a NATO MAP for Bosnia and Herzegovina could further the political and economic institutions. However, there are other organizations that can do that better than NATO—OSCE and the EU are but two as an example—for judicial, political, and economic institutions. NATO should offer its good offices to engage these other regional and functional organizations.

Question. In your October 22, 2009, testimony, you stated that the “Strategic Concept must address the developments—by both NATO collectively and nations individually—of capabilities specified as required in the strategy.”

- How should the new Strategic Concept differ from the 1999 Strategic Concept regarding its focus on capabilities? What is NATO’s formal process for developing capabilities and shifting transformation to match the new Strategic Concept? In your estimation, how long does it take to reorient NATO capabilities to align with a new Strategic Concept?

Answer. I believe the next Strategic Concept must address the habitual tension between national interests and NATO force capability development. Budgets for security and defense needs are declining throughout the alliance. We can no longer describe the capabilities needed by NATO and see which of these that nation(s) may be willing to resource given that these nations need that capability also. This process is far too problematic, complex, and untimely to support the alliance’s needs in any relevant way. And this situation is further aggravated by fast-paced technology changes that to date NATO has been unable to react to. The Strategic Concept must prescribe a framework for development of NATO capability packages and the ground rules for participation by nations. In my opinion, a strong, focused addressing of the NATO capability development process in the Strategic Concept will be essential to achieve reasonable progress by the alliance within the 5 years.

Question. As NATO’s relations with the EU evolve, how can the two organizations cooperate and complement each other, especially on 21st-century challenges, such as energy and cyber security, post-conflict reconstruction and global climate change? How can NATO and the EU effectively delineate shared responsibilities and resources on issues like these that combine civilian and military capabilities? How is NATO coordinating and consulting with the EU in formulating the new Strategic Concept?

Answer. I believe that in both the military and political components of each organization continuous and transparent dialogue must be established concerning both current and potential missions. Such dialogue is essential to discover opportunities for shared or autonomous operations, shared capability development, focused, niche capability development, and reduction in research, development, and procurement costs. The NATO/EU military information-sharing is gaining momentum, but has yet to yield any big wins. Unfortunately, the political dimension of Cyprus and Turkey are such—that for NATO—we have been precluded from going further due to protests from a Member Nation of our failure to follow prescribed operating procedures between the two organizations—but no agreements on operating procedures are extant to address these types of issues. NATO and EU political leadership must bring the problem nations to the table to work out arrangements which will enhance—not impede—coordination and cooperation.

Question. Do you think NATO should make energy security an Article Five commitment?

Answer. If in this context the term “energy security” means a denial of access based on contractual agreements that could lead to widespread suffering and potentially loss of life—yes.

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR KURT VOLKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. Much has been said about the necessity of training Afghan National Army and Afghan police forces. Training would appear to be one area where NATO countries can make substantial contributions without alarming their publics at home or violating restrictions on use of force. However, there continues to be an apparent lack of resources on this front. The EU had pledged about 400 trainers for its police training mission last year, yet there are only about 230 on hand.
What are the chances of persuading the EU and NATO to dramatically increase their commitment to this vital task?

Answer. EU civilian police training has indeed been a disappointment. It is difficult for civilian police to operate without an adequate overall security environment, which the EU cannot provide on its own. The EU’s ability to reach an agreement with NATO on the security, reinforcement, and potential evacuation of its personnel is limited by the institutional blockages between the EU and NATO. (These are caused mainly by EU-Turkey and Cyprus-Turkey issues.) I see little prospect for substantial new EU police training contributions.

On the NATO side of the equation, allies agreed at the NATO summit in April 2009 to establish a NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM–A) aimed at bringing new European contributions into the ongoing police training effort. These new contributions were aimed at focusing in particular on the training of Afghan paramilitary police, using European gendarmerie capabilities such as those from France, Italy, and Turkey. My understanding is that this work is progressing, albeit slowly. Paramilitary police trainers integrated into the larger U.S. training mission should have the capacity to deploy throughout the country with Afghan units without encountering the institutional blockages that EU trainers face.

Provided the initial augmentation of European paramilitary police trainers proves successful, there should indeed be potential for expanding this training capacity over time.

Question. At the 2009 Strasbourg/Kehl NATO summit, the participatory heads of state and government at the North Atlantic Council meeting on April 4, 2009, acknowledged the progress of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina on "cooperation with NATO, including through implementation of its current IPAP, and the country’s expressed intention to apply for MAP at an appropriate time." The declaration also urged "Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political leaders to take further genuine steps to strengthen state-level institutions and reinvigorate the reform process to advance the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations."

The Summit Declaration also welcomed Montenegro’s "successful and active implementation of its current Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO" and expressed encouragement regarding "the reforms it has made in a number of areas that are essential to its Euro-Atlantic integration and also by its contributions to cooperation and security in the region. . . . The Council in permanent session is keeping Montenegro’s progress under active review and will respond early to its request to participate in the Membership Action Plan (MAP), on its own merits."

Can Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro contribute to NATO's security rather than act as net consumers of it? As the alliance considers enlargement, what specific capabilities could these two countries add to NATO? How, if at all, do Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro currently contribute to NATO?

Answer. NATO’s first operational missions were the air campaign to stop Bosnian Serbs from shelling Sarajevo, the IFOR and SFOR peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Kosovo air campaign, and the ongoing KFOR operation in Kosovo. These missions were undertaken because of security and humanitarian challenges in the Balkans that threatened broader security in Europe.

So in a very important respect, the most important contribution each of these countries can make to the security of the alliance, and Europe as a whole, is to be a source of stability, prosperity, interethnic integration and security—both within their own borders, and in contributing to a better Balkans region. In other words, to build a better neighborhood, so that NATO never has to intervene in the Balkans again. The prospect of NATO and EU membership can be an important incentive to getting countries to implement such reform.

This notion of building a common security space for NATO members is entirely consistent with the original development of NATO. Countries such as Luxembourg or Iceland offered little direct military capacity, and even somewhat larger founding members, such as Belgium and Portugal, had relative small military capacities compared to those of the United States, the United Kingdom, or France. But by their joining together to form a larger shared security space, they made a vital contribution to the security of Europe as a whole.

Montenegro, despite continuing difficulties in dealing with organized crime, corruption, and in protecting democratic rights, is making faster progress in these areas than Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in my view should be admitted to NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the December 2009 meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers.

Montenegro has had particular success in seeing its ethnic Albanian minority integrated in society in ways that exceed what other Slav-majority states in the Bal-
kans have been able to achieve. Bosnia and Herzegovina has been regressing and is not, in my view, ready for MAP at this time.

Even as non-NATO members, both countries have made modest contributions to NATO operations. Given their small size, one should not expect massive contributions. As they become more stable and prosperous, they have the opportunity to develop niche capabilities that can make valuable, albeit small, contributions to NATO operations. And as they eventually become NATO members, they should be able to make modest contributions to operations on a par with other small NATO allies.

**Question.** Do you believe that Bosnia and Herzegovina are essential elements of U.S. and European security? Does Russia object to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro's further integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions in the same way it perceived Georgia's relationship with the West? Should this matter? How, if at all, should NATO address such concerns?

**Answer.** I believe that long-term security and stability in the Balkans is a vital interest of the United States. I say this because if security breaks down again as it did in the 1990s, it directly affects the security of U.S. allies—to whom we are bound by treaty—and it is highly likely that the United States would again have to intervene militarily in the Balkans, together with European allies, to stop any fighting. It is far easier, far cheaper, and far better for the people of the region to prevent such a breakdown of security by building stable democratic, market economic structures, than to neglect the region until it is too late, and only a new intervention would put things right.

As for Russia—I believe that Russian concerns about NATO enlargement are seriously misplaced and we should not allow our decisions on enlargement to be affected by such outdated, zero-sum thinking. Rather, we should demonstrate through our actions—as has been done in the cases of Poland, the Baltic States, and long-standing NATO members such as Norway and Turkey—that NATO membership does not pose any threat to Russia. Indeed, the presence of democratic, prosperous and stable nations on Russia's borders is in the interests of all of Europe, including Russia.

NATO should also be open and transparent in its dealings with Russia. We should seek to build better understanding and confidence that NATO does not see Russia as an enemy and does not threaten Russia. And Russia should make similar efforts vis-a-vis NATO. We should seek to have NATO and Russia work together in tackling common security concerns. But we should not give Russia a veto over the rights of people living in sovereign, independent nations in Russia's (and Europe's) neighborhood.

Indeed, one must think first about the interests of those very real people living in real countries, rather than the power political models of leaders in the Kremlin. NATO has not enlarged because it sought to grow bigger: Rather, NATO enlarged because people living in countries on the outside of NATO's borders were clamoring to get in. They have long historical memories of insecurity—and in some cases Soviet domination—and seek simply to be part of a common, defensive security community so their futures need not look like their past. NATO provides such a blanket of security, without threatening anyone. In doing so, it therefore also provides a space for democratic and economic development.

Russia does indeed seem to draw a distinction between the potential NATO membership of States in the Balkans (which it could tolerate) and states that were part of the Soviet Union (Georgia and Ukraine). This distinction, however, is again based on an outdated, enemy image of NATO as a threat, which has nothing to do with the NATO of today.

**Question.** NATO has already assisted Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro in reforms to the countries' military and Ministry of Defense, allowing further participation with the alliance through programs such as Partnership for Peace.

- Based on your experience, could NATO help reform Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political and economic situation, as well as help calm ethnic tensions? In what ways has the alliance already helped resolve such issues in Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere?

**Answer.** Yes, I believe that NATO can help to play a wider role in stimulating political and economic reform, and defusing ethnic tension. To do so, NATO should be even more clear than it has been thus far about the prospect of eventual NATO membership—as well as the conditions that must be fulfilled in order for a country to receive a membership invitation. NATO leaders can use visits and diplomatic and military engagement to push for continued reform. A visit by the North Atlantic
Council to Sarajevo and Banja Luka, for example, could convey important messages of both commitment and expectations to the parties inside Bosnia and Herzegovina. That said, NATO is not alone in promoting such reform. The EU in particular also has an important role to play—both through offering the realistic prospect of EU membership, and through the day-to-day work of the EU High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In recent years, the perception has grown that both NATO and the EU have lost commitment behind their enlargement processes—and this has coincided with a rise in ethnic tension and lack of movement on reform. That negative cycle needs to be reversed through a positive commitment to further enlargement that demands positive movement on reform.

**Question.** As NATO’s relations with the EU evolve, how can the two organizations cooperate and complement each other, especially on 21st century challenges, such as energy and cyber security, post-conflict reconstruction and global climate change? How can NATO and the EU effectively delineate shared responsibilities and resources on issues like these that combine civilian and military capabilities? How is NATO coordinating and consulting with the EU in formulating the new Strategic Concept?

**Answer.** NATO–EU cooperation remains hamstrung by EU-Turkey-Cyprus issues, by institutional bureaucratic and cultural differences, and by the preference of some European states to conduct strategic consultations through the European Union and not through NATO. As a result, formal NATO–EU coordination on the NATO Strategic Concept is severely circumscribed, although informal contacts take place, and some nations that are members of both organizations provide visibility in both directions.

On substance, however, both NATO and the EU face complex challenges that span civil and military dimensions. Both organizations should have some measure of both civil and military capacities, though each will have its own relative strengths and weaknesses. Coordination and delineation of responsibilities should be done on a case-by-case basis, taking account of relative capacities brought to the table, and the security environment, in each particular case.

Thus far, some NATO members have blocked NATO from adopting certain civil capacities. This needs to change. For example, NATO should increase its capacity in the area of police training, recruiting and staffing PRTs where civil and military skills are integrated, and in providing civilian, diplomatic engagement in areas where NATO is engaged operationally.

NATO is also the only venue that brings the United States and European allies under a single roof for strategic consultations. While the U.S.–EU relationship should also serve as a vehicle for consultation, it has thus far not been effective in providing a vehicle for genuine consultation among all Member States and forging common action. In this respect, NATO’s role as the principal forum for consultation among the allies, and the venue for decision on issues affecting the security and defense of its members under the Washington treaty, should be reinforced.

**Question.** Do you think NATO should make energy security an Article Five commitment?

**Answer.** Article 5 expresses a commitment of allies to consult and take appropriate actions in the event of an attack. This should not change. We should, however, recognize that the security environment in which we must carry out this commitment has changed dramatically over time. I believe that the shutoff of energy supplies to a NATO Member State—if done deliberately by an outside actor to influence or cause harm—should be considered an “attack” just as if it were a military attack. This does not mean that all energy issues, including supply disruptions, should be seen as Article 5 issues. But it does mean they have the potential to be Article 5 issues, depending on the circumstance.

With that in mind, NATO should consult among allies at strategic levels, coordinate with outside entities, such as the EU, national energy ministries, and energy companies, and conduct prudent planning that in the event energy disruptions do rise to the level of an “attack” and thus an Article 5 concern.

**Question.** How should the new Strategic Concept address the issue of NATO reform? More broadly, what reforms should be made to NATO’s operational and political decisionmaking? How, if at all, should the position of NATO Secretary General evolve?

**Answer.** The new Strategic Concept should focus principally on defining what NATO is for in today’s world. It should articulate a view on the security environment NATO faces in the early 21st century, and on NATO’s role in providing for the security of its members within that environment.
While there are substantial organization and reform issues that should be dealt with, I do not believe that the Strategic Concept is the right vehicle for tackling them. One exception could be a reaffirmation that policy decisions at NATO should be made by consensus. Such a statement would provide a framework within which reforms could be implemented by the Secretary General over time.

That said, substantial reform needs to be enacted within NATO. Far too often, nations micromanage NATO action, blocking actions needed to implement agreed political decisions. Nations assert the need to reach consensus on micro-level decisions such as staffing, budgetary allocations, personnel assignments, or other aspects of implementing military operations decisions already taken by the North Atlantic Council at various political levels.

The work of the North Atlantic Council has increasingly become an “operations oversight” board—with weekly (or even more frequent) briefings on NATO operations, extensive question and answer sessions, and little or no decision making at ambassadorial level.

This should be fundamentally changed. The NAC should act at a strategic level, not a micromanagement level. It should act as a decisionmaking body giving strategic guidance to NATO civil and military authorities, based on clear guidance from capitals. Proposed decisions should be written up in advance, and meetings called principally to debate and agree final decisions.

In addition, while reinforcing that broad policy decisions will only be made by consensus of the Member States, the role of the Secretary General should be strengthened to become more like that of a CEO. The Secretary General should have broad authority over the organization of the NATO Headquarters and staff, budgets, staffing assignments, and implementation of agreed policy decisions. He should be held accountable for results on implementing policy decisions—not micromanaged in how to carry out those decisions.

The military structure of NATO should be radically streamlined. We have far too many headquarters and officer staff assigned to headquarters, with too few people in the field. We should reject the idea of a geographic footprint for the headquarters structure, and instead adopt a model of overlapping geographic and functional responsibility.

We should also look for ways to eliminate the practice of imposing political caveats on military forces assigned to NATO operations. Practical caveats—such as night missions for troops that lack night vision and mobility—are appropriate. But political ones—such as geographic limitations on the deployment of forces within NATO’s theater of operations—should be eliminated. Once nations make the decision to commit force to a NATO operation, they need to understand that military effectiveness and the political solidarity of the alliance depend upon a unified effort.

Responses of Charles A. Kupchan to Questions Submitted by Senator John F. Kerry

Question. Much has been said about the necessity of training Afghan National Army and Afghan police forces. Training would appear to be one area where NATO countries can make substantial contributions without alarming their publics at home or violating restrictions on use of force. However, there continues to be an apparent lack of resources on this front. The EU had pledged about 400 trainers for its police training mission last year, yet there are only about 230 on hand. What are the chances of persuading the EU and NATO to dramatically increase their commitment to this vital task?

Answer. As U.S. strategy shifts toward building up the Afghan state and its army and police, the training function will grow in importance. Whereas I do not expect to see European countries make substantial contributions to Afghanistan, I do believe that it is possible to expedite and increase Europe’s contribution of trainers and civilian assistance. These missions are much less controversial than those involving combat forces. It would make good sense for the United States to stress this issue in its diplomacy with Europe; it will not only cause less tension than focus on combat troops, but also will more likely result in concrete deliverables. It would be advisable to look to the EU to step forward on the training mission as an investment in its ability to deploy missions abroad. If so, it will be important to improve NATO–EU linkages to ensure good cooperation and communication. It is worth noting that at the recent meeting of NATO Defense Ministers in Slovakia, European officials expressed strong support for the Obama administration’s strategy in Afghanistan.
Question. At the 2009 Strasbourg/Kehl NATO summit, the participatory heads of state and government at the North Atlantic Council meeting on April 4, 2009, acknowledged the progress of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina on “co-operation with NATO, including through implementation of its current IPAP, and the country’s expressed intention to apply for MAP at an appropriate time.” The declaration also urged “Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political leaders to take further genuine steps to strengthen state-level institutions and reinvigorate the reform process to advance the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations.”

The Summit Declaration also welcomed Montenegro’s “successful and active implementation of its current Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO” and expressed encouragement regarding “the reforms it has made in a number of areas that are essential to its Euro-Atlantic integration and also by its contributions to cooperation and security in the region. . . . The Council in permanent session is keeping Montenegro’s progress under active review and will respond early to its request to participate in the Membership Action Plan (MAP), on its own merits.”

• Can Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro contribute to NATO’s security rather than act as net consumers of it? As the alliance considers enlargement, what specific capabilities could these two countries add to NATO? How, if at all, do Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro currently contribute to NATO?

Answer. The urgency of bringing into NATO all the countries of the Balkan Peninsula is in the first instance about consolidating peace in the region, not strengthening NATO. The prospect of NATO membership, as it has done in other parts of Central Europe, serves as an important incentive behind political and military reform. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the allure of NATO membership may help bring about much-needed political reform—of immediate importance due to the dysfunction and ethnic division that continues to compromise the country’s stability and integrity. Indeed, defense reform has been one of the few areas of institutional progress in Bosnia since the Dayton Agreement. From this perspective, integrating Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia, and Kosovo are important investments in the future, making it less likely that NATO will again have to intervene in the region.

That having been said, even countries with small defense establishments can make important contributions to NATO missions. Albania, for example, sent a sizable contingent to Afghanistan, and Georgia, another prospective NATO member, dispatched troops to Iraq, as did Bosnia. Moreover, the countries of Central Europe often share America’s strategic perspective on key issues, making them important players in helping to forge consensus within the alliance.

Question. Do you believe that Bosnia and Herzegovina are essential elements of U.S. and European security? Does Russia object to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro’s further integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions in the same way it perceived Georgia’s relationship with the West? Should this matter? How, if at all, should NATO address such concerns?

Answer. Russia opposes the enlargement of NATO whenever and wherever it occurs. However, apart from its staunch opposition to the independence of Kosovo, developments elsewhere in the Balkans are not of direct and intense interest to Moscow. Whereas Russia for now takes a firm position against NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine, membership for Bosnia and Herzegovina or Montenegro is not likely to cause undue strain between NATO and Russia. Moreover, Russia has no interest in another round of bloodshed in the region, and thus may grudgingly accept NATO enlargement as a useful instrument of stability. The immediate priority is breaking the political stalemate in Bosnia and advancing its fortunes as a unitary state. Diplomacy with Moscow is hardly irrelevant, but it should not loom large as the United States and NATO advance their own diplomacy in the Balkans.

Question. NATO has already assisted Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro in reforms to the countries’ military and Ministry of Defense, allowing further participation with the alliance through programs such as Partnership for Peace.

• Based on your experience, could NATO help reform Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political and economic situation, as well as help calm ethnic tensions? In what ways has the alliance already helped resolve such issues in Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere?

Answer. The political discipline that regularly results from earnest efforts to qualify for NATO membership holds out hope of prompting political reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Civilian control of the military is another important by-product of the process of accession.
NATO has already made clear that it expects Bosnia and Herzegovina to move expeditiously to reform its constitution so that the central government can function effectively. The alliance has also identified measures needed to strengthen the civilian chain of command. Moreover, all three of the country’s three main communities support NATO membership, giving the alliance considerable leverage over political reform. The prospect of joining the EU offers an over-the-horizon incentive for Bosnia to put its house in order. Inasmuch as NATO membership can occur more quickly and speaks directly to the country’s security and integrity, it provides a more immediate impetus behind political reform.

NATO, in contrast to the EU, does not have a direct role to play in speeding economic growth. But accession to the alliance will certainly help create the political and security conditions needed to attract foreign investment.

**Question.** As NATO’s relations with the EU evolve, how can the two organizations cooperate and complement each other, especially on 21st-century challenges, such as energy and cyber security, post-conflict reconstruction and global climate change? How can NATO and the EU effectively delineate shared responsibilities and resources on issues like these that combine civilian and military capabilities? How is NATO coordinating and consulting with the EU in formulating the new Strategic Concept?

**Answer.** The transatlantic community sorely needs a stronger European pillar, one that would strengthen both the EU and NATO. As part of that development, it is important to deepen institutional linkages and channels of communication between the two bodies. Some issues, such as climate change, do not fall squarely on NATO’s agenda. Accordingly, it may make sense to upgrade and institutionalize U.S.–EU contact. Especially if the institutional reforms contained in the Lisbon Treaty succeed in providing the EU with more effective leadership and a more common voice, U.S.–EU linkages should evolve in step with Europe’s collective character.

**Question.** Do you think NATO should make energy security an Article Five commitment?

**Answer.** No. NATO should prepare for operations to defend energy infrastructure, such as ports and pipelines. But energy security requires a much broader energy policy, much of which lies beyond the scope of NATO. Moreover, expanding the definition of Article V might risk diluting its core and essential purpose—collective territorial defense.

**RESPONSES OF GEN JOHN CRADDOCK TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR.**

**CIVILIAN-MILITARY COOPERATION IN NATO**

General McChrystal’s strategic priority in Afghanistan—securing the population—requires an integrated and comprehensive civilian-military approach that includes our NATO allies’ military and civilian forces, nongovernmental organizations, and local Afghans.

**Question.** General Craddock, in your statement, you mentioned that the civil-military component to operations is critically important. In regard to Afghanistan, what role should our NATO allies play in contributing to the civilian surge supported by the Obama administration? For NATO allies unlikely to commit more troops, can we expect a commitment to assist with reconstruction efforts or Afghan police and military training?

**Answer.** Our NATO allies can contribute far more in civilian expertise than they have done so to date. Every nation in NATO is a democracy, with democratic institutions more mature than the current state of representative government in Afghanistan. Our allies have capabilities and capacities to deploy civilian experts to Afghanistan and employ them in a coordinated, integrated effort with UNAMA and other international and nongovernmental organizations. The U.S. Department of State has made assessments of which nations have a depth of capacity which would permit them to send civilian trainers and mentors to both federal and provincial ministries in Afghanistan to build their capabilities. Can we expect that contribution? Not without a strong push by the alliance leader—the United States. With regard to our allies’ commitment to train the police and military—a good step forward is NATO’s agreement to support a NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan—NTM-A. NATO has yet to provide the needed resources for that new mission—and
once again—U.S. leadership will be essential for pushing the alliance to resource this critical mission.

*Question.* NATO’s 2008 Comprehensive Approach created a framework to improve civilian-military cooperation and coordination in operations planning, stabilization and reconstruction, and public outreach. What is your sense of the status of the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach on the ground in Afghanistan?

*Answer.* In my estimate the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach in NATO is a mixed bag. In the fall of 2008, NATO produced a document called the Comprehensive Strategy for the Political-Military Program (CSPMP) in Afghanistan. Tasks were identified and assigned to various NATO agencies for action. Unfortunately, few metrics were established, nor was a program for periodic review and assessment implemented, thereby leading to an uneven or unevaluated response. I believe the military component of NATO in Afghanistan—ISAF—used the CSPMP well as an additional tool for resource prioritization and assessment, as it fit nicely with the construct of the ISAF Operations Plan. With new leadership in NATO headquarters, the time is right to push the Secretary General for greater visibility and focus on the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach through the CSPMP and the military operations plans.

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**RESPONSE OF SECRETARY MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR.**

*Question.* Our European allies provide about half of the troops in the NATO-led International Security Force (ISAF). I commend them for their bravery and sacrifice that is often overlooked. I do often hear complaints, however, of the caveats imposed by ISAF contributors regarding where and how their forces can fight.

- Secretary Albright, do you anticipate the new NATO strategic concept to limit the number and types of caveats that NATO participants can impose?

*Answer.* NATO’s experience in Afghanistan will be a primary source of discussion both within the Experts Group and between the group and outside interlocutors. We will be particularly interested in the lessons that can be learned both about the positive and the more troublesome aspects of the NATO mission. One challenge the alliance will face is that of applying such lessons in an appropriate and effective way to future, perhaps as yet unforeseen, contingencies. Certainly, the controversy surrounding the so-called caveats exercised by some allies in Afghanistan will fall within the confines of this discussion.

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**RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR KURT VOLKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR.**

**NATO AND RUSSIA**

Despite the NATO-Russia Council partnership and common interests such as non-proliferation, counterterrorism, preventing the spread WMD’s and counternarcotics with NATO, Russia continues to view NATO as a chief threat to its security.

*Question.* In your opinion, does Russia really want to maintain a comprehensive partnership with NATO?

*Answer.* I believe that in the 1990s, Russia did indeed want to build up a genuine partnership with NATO. Today, however, we have seen the emergence of a more authoritarian Russia whose priority is to reestablish a sphere of influence in neighboring states. It is increasingly apparent that this Russia does not seek a genuine partnership with NATO, but rather seeks to constrain NATO. At home, the Russia deliberately fans a “NATO-as-enemy” sentiment through state-controlled media as a means of rallying the public to the Kremlin’s more aggressive policy both at home and in neighboring states.

Russia’s current engagement with NATO seems opportunistic at best, and often aimed at sharpening differences among allies—particularly between Central and West Europe—while agreeing to work together with NATO only in a few select areas.

*Question.* What can be done to alleviate the level of mistrust that exists between Russia and NATO? Given its incursion into Georgia and its increasingly autocratic tendencies, can Russia truly remain a valuable partner on what NATO and the United States perceive as common interests?
Answer. By simple virtue of the fact that NATO and Russia must live side by side on the Eurasian landmass, we must actively seek to engage with Russia, and to work together on common interests. But we must do so based on three things: a clear sense of standing up for our democratic values; a realistic assessment of Russia’s own actions, such as in breaking off part of Georgian territory; and a willingness to combine both engagement and firmness.

NATO can also provide some measure of reassurance—such as noting that it is a defensive alliance and threatens no one. And that while open to new members, it insists on nations being stable, democratic, and contributors to common security in the Euro-Atlantic area in order to be admitted to the alliance.

At the moment, NATO is not living up to such an approach. NATO is deeply divided over how to deal with Russia—with Central Europeans demanding protection and West Europeans insisting on constructive engagement. With no unified position, there is no capacity for firmness, and Russia continues to see benefit in acting assertively in its neighborhood and treating NATO somewhat opportunistically.

NATO needs to come to a common, balanced, and realistic view of dealing with Russia. If we manage this, however, we then will have a strong and confident basis from which to engage with Russia. Whether this leads to Russia acting as a valuable partner is in Russian hands, but this kind of strong, confident outreach from NATO offers the best chance to build such partnership.

RESPONSES OF GEN JOHN CRADDOCK TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JIM DEMINT

Question. Afghanistan has brought the issue of burden-sharing among the alliance members to the forefront. Do you see the issue of resources for NATO missions as largely a political problem or purely a lack of assets? As the former commander in Europe, what concerns do you have about allies’ forces and capabilities? What strengths do they bring to the table? How would you describe the contributions from the newer members of NATO to alliance missions (those who joined the alliance in 1999 and since)?

Answer. I see the sourcing of forces and capabilities for NATO missions as both a political and a military capabilities problem. I also believe that if all the military capabilities were present as needed, shortfalls would still exist in ISAF due to a lack of political will by many NATO nations to accept the burden of financial cost and the risk of casualties assumed by the deployment of forces. While it is true that several of the military capabilities needed in Afghanistan are either in short supply or not available outside the United States—in the mainstream the capabilities exist. What most of the allies have not done well is to provide their forces with all the combat enablers needed to effectively operate in the austere Afghan environment—either because they don’t have those enablers in their force structure (yet to transform) or because for national reasons they refuse to deploy them. With regard to contributions to alliance missions from the newer nations—it has exceeded on a per capita basis the contributions from most of the older NATO nations. If the newer nations can get help from partners for the enablers or modules they may not have in their force structure—and sometimes airlift and fiscal support—they send their forces almost always when pressed. I believe the severity of the economic downturn in Eastern and Central Europe will negatively impact on their ability to finance continued high levels of support to these missions.

Question. Do we have the appropriate force structure in Europe to meet the training needs and requirements of the alliance as well as maintain our bilateral security relationships? If not, what recommendations would you make?

Answer. I am on the record—for the past 2 years—of holding the position that the objective U.S. force posture in Europe is inadequate for the missions and tasks assigned to the U.S. European Command. Of particular note will be—by 2012 if not changed—an acute shortage of ground forces and a shortage of tactical fighter aircraft. I have recommended to the Department of Defense on several occasions to freeze the EUCOM force structure at current levels. Key to this is four brigades of Army forces (currently in the U.S. Army Europe force structure) and no downsizing of fighter aircraft from current numbers.
RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR KURT VOLKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JIM DEMINT

Question. I am sure you still maintain close relationships with your former colleagues at NATO. From their perspective, what type of role do they believe the United States needs to play right now in Europe and global security? Is the United States leading the way they want or need us to?

Answer. I believe that our allies continue to want the United States to provide committed leadership to NATO, while consulting closely and reaching decisions jointly. Allied capabilities are limited, and political will is diminishing for the mission in Afghanistan—yet they are committed as an alliance to our common cause. In the wake of ISAF Commander McChrystal's recommendations, they seek to agree together within NATO on our common strategy, and are looking for clear signals of U.S. resolve, commitment, and political leadership on Afghanistan.

A second major issue is Russia. Allies are deeply divided over how to deal with a newly assertive, authoritarian Russia: Central Europe seeks strategic reassurance and protection, while Western Europe favors a policy of entangling Russia through engagement. Only the United States can play the role of unifying the transatlantic community around a common, well-balanced strategy for dealing with Russia, and allies are looking for the United States to assume this role.

Question. Some have argued that NATO is not worth the effort any more, that the United States puts far too much into the alliance for what we get out and that NATO's bureaucracy can rival that of the United Nations. And with this backdrop, even more people argue that NATO enlargement should not occur—especially for countries in the Balkans or Eastern Europe that may be seen as a burden on NATO's resources rather than contribute to them.

What are your thoughts on the importance of the existing alliance, its enlargement, and where we go from here?

Answer. Thank you for this important question. It gets to the heart of NATO issues today.

First: NATO has a number of serious problems—but these are not the result of NATO enlargement, nor are they a reason to block further enlargement. The new members of NATO are among the most committed of allies, providing significant contributions to NATO operations as percentages of population and national troop strength. Estonia has more troops in Afghanistan per capita than any other ally. Every ally, no matter how small, has troops in Afghanistan. Because of their history and geography, they intrinsically grasp the importance of close alliance with the United States—supporting the United States in global security efforts, while urging continued U.S. engagement in security within Europe.

Moreover, NATO enlargement has increased the secure space in Europe where democracy and free markets flourish—enriching the lives of over 100 million people, and eliminating what would otherwise be a security vacuum and strategic vulnerability for NATO in the heart of Europe. This is a strategic, security value for the United States.

Second, the spread of democracy, prosperity, security and stability throughout Europe is in the long-term strategic interest of the United States, Europe, and the world. NATO enlargement has facilitated the movement toward a Europe whole and free, and should continue to do so.

Western Europe has developed a sense of enlargement fatigue—particularly because EU enlargement, with its economic integration, has gone hand in hand with NATO enlargement. The “Polish plumber” featured in the French referendum against the EU Constitution because French voters feared that past and future enlargement would take away French jobs.

Here again, NATO’s newest members—because of their history—are the most ardent advocates of further NATO enlargement. They see more clearly than others the strategic value for our own security of further development of democratic, market-oriented, stable and secure societies throughout the entire Euro-Atlantic area.

Europe is incontrovertibly better off with an enlarged NATO and enlarged EU, and the process of performance-based enlargement should continue.

Third, NATO is in serious trouble because of a fundamental lack of consensus among the old members of NATO on some of the basics of today’s security environment: how important is Afghanistan, how to deal with Russia, whether NATO is the principal forum for Europe’s security and defense, how much to invest in defense capabilities, and whether NATO should take on certain civil as well as military dimensions of global challenges. New members are closer to American views on
these issues. Old members have differing perspectives, leading to “conditional” contributions.

To Americans, this is deeply frustrating, given our massive commitments within NATO. But the fact is that without our allies, America would be facing the challenges in Afghanistan, or Kosovo, or piracy, or counterterrorism alone. Afghanistan would be “America’s war” rather than the democratic international community supporting the weak population against the strong (and well-funded) violent extremists. NATO is not working well today. But for NATO to work well, America must lead within NATO—offering ideas, sharing decisionmaking, leading with commitments and implementation, and in doing so, bringing NATO allies together and bringing NATO as a whole forward effectively as a strategic contributor to our shared foreign policy requirements.

**Question.** It appears that Europeans more often are using other organizations and structures to discuss important issues—including security. Do you believe this is true and if so what are the implications for NATO and the larger issues of U.S., European, and global security? What should the United States do to address these developments?

**Answer.** Yes—to a significant degree, some European allies prefer to consult, decide, and act within the EU rather than NATO. This was especially apparent over the past year in decisionmaking about dealing with piracy off the Horn of Africa.

There should be no doubt: The emergence of a stronger, more cohesive, more decisive, and more effective Europe is clearly in the U.S. interest. We need global partners dedicated to democratic ideals, and the stronger and more effective they are, the better.

That said, there are serious risks that must be avoided at the same time. Thus far, the EU has not proven itself to be a strong, effective partner. To the extent that European nations restrict NATO’s freedom of maneuver in order to protect a weak EU, we run the risk of letting global problems spiral out of control.

This is a serious danger on its own merits, but also because it exposes a larger problem. Some Europeans have in the past seen the EU, or “Europe” as an alternative to transatlantic partnership with the United States. To the extent this attitude would persist, it would become a strategic problem, because it divides the democratic, prosperous, transatlantic partnership into pieces.

The one place where the European nations and the United States sit together at one table is NATO—and for this reason alone, it is critical that NATO continue to serve as a vehicle for strategic consultation and decisionmaking among the U.S. and European allies.

To address this set of challenges, the United States should actively support the development of the European Union, and work to build an effective U.S.–EU relationship. This will take a great deal of time, and in large measure depends upon Europeans overcoming internal divisions within the EU.

But the United States should never allow U.S.–EU consultations to become a substitute for U.S. engagement within NATO on security and defense issues, where we all sit together around a single table. This is the one place where effective U.S.–European consultations are guaranteed—provided the United States does its part in bringing its own strategic deliberations to the table. It is also the one place that assures interoperability between U.S. and European forces, and recognizes the preponderant weight of U.S. capabilities in overall transatlantic security efforts. Thus our work within NATO must be maintained, even as the EU increases its own capabilities.

**Question.** After the invasion of Georgia last year, NATO suspended the NATO-Russia Council and over the past year Russia has endorsed the idea of a new Pan-European security concept. With your personal experience in Brussels, what role have you seen Russia play inside the alliance, and their effect on policies and the ability to reach consensus? What role do you believe they should play in developing a new Strategic Concept?

**Answer.** During my year in Brussels, Russia had no serious interest in NATO-Russia cooperation, and instead viewed the NATO-Russia relationship opportunistically: how Russia could take advantage of, and even sharpen, differences among NATO allies over issues such as missile defense, Kosovo, nuclear deterrence, and more. When NATO opted to resume NATO-Russia military-to-military cooperation after a hiatus because of Russia’s invasion of Georgia, Russia itself held back on such cooperation.

Russia’s call for a new pan-European security concept appears to be an effort to break up the three pillars of the Helsinki Final Act, which has served as the heart of European security in a broad sense since the 1970s. Russia seeks a new deal on
hard security in Europe, divorced from human rights and economic freedoms. While being open to specific Russian proposals to improve existing arrangements, the United States and Europe should oppose efforts to dismantle the fundamental architecture of European human, economic, and hard security that has proved its worth over 30 years.

As for NATO's Strategic Concept, Russia should play no role whatsoever. Because of the commitment that allies have toward each other through the Washington treaty, the Strategic Concept is a document for their agreement only. It is intended to record consensus among allies on the nature of today's security environment, and NATO's role in addressing it. As a country that is not a member of NATO, Russia—as well as any other nonmember—should have no role.

Question. Do you believe energy or climate change are issues that should be dealt with in the context of the NATO alliance? If so, do you believe they should be included under the guarantees of Article V?

Answer. Climate change itself should not be an Article 5 issue. There is no “attack” involved. The consequences of climate change could, in their most extreme, theoretical variants, contribute to localized conflict. Insofar as this occurs, NATO should address this on a case-by-case basis.

Energy security is a different matter. Article 5 expresses a commitment of allies to consult and take appropriate actions in the event of an attack. This should not change. We should, however, recognize that the security environment in which we must carry out this commitment has changed dramatically over time.

I believe that the shutoff of energy supplies to a NATO Member State—if done deliberately by an outside actor to influence or cause harm—should be considered an “attack” just as if it were a military attack. This does not mean that all energy issues, including supply disruptions, should be seen as Article 5 issues. But it does mean they have the potential to be Article 5 issues, depending on the circumstance.

With that in mind, NATO should consult among allies at strategic levels, coordinate with outside entities, such as the EU, national energy ministries, and energy companies, and conduct prudent planning in the event that energy disruptions do rise to the level of an “attack” and thus an Article 5 concern.