[Senate Hearing 111-877] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] S. Hrg. 111-877 HIGH-RISK LOGISTICS PLANNING: PROGRESS ON IMPROVING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT ======================================================================= HEARING before the OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE of the COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ JULY 27, 2010 __________ Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 58-404 WASHINGTON : 2011 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN McCAIN, Arizona MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada JON TESTER, Montana LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk Patricia R. Hogan, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman CARL LEVIN, Michigan GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware Lisa M. Powell, Staff Director Roger Yee, Legislative Fellow Evan W. Cash, Professional Staff Member Jennifer A. Hemingway, Minority Staff Director Sean M. Stiff, Minority Professional Staff Member Aaron H. Woolf, Chief Clerk C O N T E N T S ------ Opening statements: Page Senator Akaka................................................ 1 Senator Voinovich............................................ 2 WITNESSES Tuesday, July 27, 2010 Alan F. Estevez, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, U.S. Department of Defense........................................................ 5 Jack E. Edwards, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office, accompanied by William M. Solis, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office............................... 7 Alphabetical List of Witnesses Edwards, Jack E.: Testimony.................................................... 7 Joint prepared statement with Mr. Solis...................... 34 Estevez, Alan F.: Testimony.................................................... 5 Prepared statement........................................... 19 Solis, William M.: Testimony.................................................... 7 Joint prepared statement with Mr. Edwards.................... 34 APPENDIX Background....................................................... 52 Questions and responses for the Record from: Mr. Estevez.................................................. 58 Mr. Edwards.................................................. 71 HIGH-RISK LOGISTICS PLANNING: PROGRESS ON IMPROVING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT ---------- TUESDAY, JULY 27, 2010 U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Washington, DC. The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m., in room SR-418, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Akaka, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. Present: Senators Akaka and Voinovich. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA Senator Akaka. Good afternoon everyone. This hearing of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia is called to order. Aloha and welcome to our witnesses and guests. I would like to thank you all for joining us here today for this hearing, which is on High-Risk Logistics Planning: Progress on Improving the Department of Defense Supply Chain Management. Senator Voinovich and I have held several hearings on the Department of Defense (DOD) supply chain management, an issue critical to making sure our brave men and women serving in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere have what they need to be safe and successful. At our most recent hearing in July 2007, DOD was making progress, but there were still challenges that needed to be addressed. Three years later, DOD's supply chain management still remains on the Government Accountability Office's High-Risk List, where it first appeared in 1990. It is true that DOD's logistics operations are complex and extend throughout the world, but we must remain focused on moving forward to resolve the remaining weaknesses. Longstanding issues such as inefficient inventory management, poor responsiveness to war-fighting requirements, and weak demand forecasting result in high costs. In May 2010, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) had over $1 billion worth of excess spare secondary inventory in fiscal year 2008. We must exercise better stewardship over taxpayer money. Even more importantly, DOD's supply chain management is essential to our military forces. It is critical that DOD effectively supply our warfighters, who risk their lives every day, with the right materiel in the right place at the right time. DOD supply chain management still suffers from inadequate strategic planning. DOD must formulate a comprehensive and integrated Strategic Plan that addresses all of DOD's current and future logistics capabilities and challenges. This is vital to give senior leaders a means to effectively guide logistics programs across the Department and measure results. DOD has produced multiple strategic plans over the years aimed at improving supply chain management. However, it is unclear how these plans align with each other. The plans also lack some key elements. For example, at this Subcommittee's urging, DOD released a Logistics Roadmap in July 2008. According to GAO, the Roadmap failed to identify the scope of logistic problems, lacked outcome-based performance measures, and did not clearly define how the Roadmap would be incorporated into the overall DOD decisionmaking processes. In September 2009, Senator Voinovich and I sent a letter to Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn expressing our continued concerns about DOD's ability to effectively and efficiently deliver critical supplies to military personnel. We also noted that DOD still had not included outcome-based performance measures in the Roadmap more than a year after its release. DOD responded that the Department was developing a 2010 Logistics Strategic Plan that would update the Roadmap and address GAO's findings. DOD recently released this plan. Although it includes specific logistics measures and key initiatives, I am concerned with how it can be used to achieve DOD's supply chain management goals. Despite the remaining challenges, I do commend DOD for making progress on important issues. For example, the Joint Regional Inventory Materiel Management Initiative on the Island of Oahu, in my home State of Hawaii, has proven a success. It improves support to the warfighter by reducing customer wait times, providing better asset visibility, eliminating duplicate inventories, and streamlining delivery of parts to end users. The principles learned with J-RIMM have now been applied to other key areas, such as the Inventory Management and Stock Positioning Initiatives at the Defense Logistics Agency. Again, I want to thank our witnesses for being here today to discuss the 2010 Logistics Strategic Plan and what DOD is doing in working toward removing supply chain management from GAO's High-Risk List. Senator Voinovich has championed this issue for many years and he is due much of the credit for the progress that has been made. With that, I would like to call on Senator Voinovich for his opening remarks. Senator Voinovich. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for holding this hearing. This is, I think, the fourth hearing that we have had in the Subcommittee on this issue, and over the years, I have met with people at the Department of Defense and in my office and I am glad to see that some progress has been made in this. As I said to Lieutenant General Durbin when he was in to see me recently, I would really like to know from the time that former Under Secretary of Defense Ken Krieg was involved just what we have accomplished. Are we more efficient? Have we saved any money? Are we working harder and smarter? I will say this, that last month, I had the opportunity to travel to Iraq, and while I was in Baghdad, we visited with Lieutenant General Kenneth Hunzeker and Lieutenant General Robert Cone, and they briefed the delegation on the gradual transition of personnel and equipment out of Iraq. I was encouraged by how the Department is addressing the great challenge posed by the simultaneous drawdown in Iraq and surge in Afghanistan. For those tasked with delivering the right materiel to the right place at the right time, sustaining more than 100,000 troops in Afghanistan, poses a great challenge to everyone. I just saw the route used to get equipment out of Iraq and to Afghanistan. I can't believe the way they have to go in order to get it in there, because they can't go through Iran, so they have to go all over the moon. As the supply chain increasingly shifts to Afghanistan, the Department will face a critical test to determine whether the dangerous logistical gaps that emerged during the early days of Operation Iraqi Freedom have been closed and whether progress will continue in the areas of requirements forecasting, asset visibility, and materiel distribution. Again, I was impressed that they seemed to know where everything was. They had it categorized as either going to Afghanistan, coming back to the United States so that we can do some rehabilitation to it, and they are going to leave stuff in Iraq. The Department must have an effective strategic plan that decisionmakers can use to prioritize, coordinate, fund, and account for the hundreds of existing supply chain initiatives. In anticipation of this hearing, Senator Akaka and I sent a letter to the Department in September 2009 in which we posed a number of questions about the new Administration's supply chain management priorities. We focused on shortcomings in the Logistics Roadmap that were identified by a January 2009, and Senator Akaka has already mentioned this GAO report. The response that we got back from Dr. Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics indicated that a new DOD Logistics Strategic Plan would soon be issued and would serve as an update of the existing Roadmap. And again, I am being repetitious, but we are really interested to know about the Department's approach to strategic planning in this area. You had the Roadmap. Now you have the Logistics Strategic Plan. How do they relate to each other? Mr. Estevez, you have been around here for a while and I will be interested, because you were there at the beginning of this, how does this kind of segue into the Strategic Plan that you folks have put together? Finally, I look forward to hearing from the Department about the measurable improvements in the supply chain management that have resulted from several years of concerted effort. I would like you to brag a little bit, Mr. Estevez. What increased supply chain efficiencies can the Department demonstrate? What cost savings? Most importantly, though, how are deployed personnel better able to accomplish their missions as a result of past logistics planning? These are the real questions that have to be asked. I am glad that Mr. Solis will aid in the discussion by providing insight into how many of the initiatives contained in the Department's logistics planning documents are being applied in the field, particularly in Afghanistan. When we started with this, Secretary Rumsfeld said we would save about $26 billion if we managed the supply chain right, and you know that this function has been on the High-Risk List since 1990. For the new people on board with the Obama Administration, I have to say that if I were the President of the United States, one of the things that I would do is look at this High-Risk List to see how I could impact it and get items off the list. DOD supply chain management, I think, is one of the most important things that we need to get off the list and I am prayerful that you all understand that and you will give it the very best that you have. I am pleased that there has been some continuity here, because one of the things that bothered me, and one of the things Senator Akaka and I have been trying to do is to get everybody to put together some kind of a strategic plan over a 5- or 6-year period, because transformation takes a long time. I know that because I was a mayor and I was a governor. It just takes a long time. And so often around here, one Administration comes in, they have a plan. The next generation comes in and they start all over again. But it appears we have continuity, and I am going to be really interested to hear from you how this thing is moving along and where do you see the light at the end of the tunnel. Thank you very much, Senator Akaka, for holding this hearing. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich. Now you have heard the history of our work along these lines, and the reason for the history is it is changing, but we want to move it as quickly as we can here. I would like to at this time recognize and introduce our panel, so it is my pleasure to welcome Alan Estevez, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, and Jack Edwards, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management at the Government Accountability Office. Mr. Edwards is accompanied by William Solis, also Director of Defense Capabilities and Management in the Government Accountability Office. Mr. Solis, it is good to see you again, always. Mr. Solis. Thank you. Senator Akaka. It is the custom, as you know, of this Subcommittee to swear in the witnesses, so I ask you to please stand and raise your right hands. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give this Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God? Mr. Estevez. I do. Mr. Edwards. I do. Mr. Solis. I do. Senator Akaka. Thank you. Let the record show that the witnesses answered in the affirmative. I want our witnesses to know that although your remarks are limited to 7 minutes, your full statements will be included in the record. Mr. Estevez, will you please proceed with your statement. TESTIMONY OF ALAN F. ESTEVEZ,\1\ PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL READINESS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Mr. Estevez. Thank you, Chairman Akaka and Senator Voinovich. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the current status of DOD's supply chain management and logistics processes and to review with you the efforts we have taken to address areas of risk. As you mentioned, I have been here for all four of the hearings and we are dedicated to doing this, like both of you do. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Estevez appears in the Appendix on page 19. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- DOD has made significant measurable progress over the past 3 years, since the Department was last before this Subcommittee, and I believe my testimony today will show our continued dedication toward implementing a comprehensive end- to-end logistics strategy that provides effective support for our deployed warfighters and provides value to the American taxpayers who pay for that support. Before I address those areas, I would like to compliment your respective staffs, your Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and GAO, who continue to work with us in addressing the Department's supply chain management. I would also like to specifically acknowledge from GAO, both Bill Solis and Jack Edwards. Our collaboration has contributed significantly to the successful improvements in the Department's supply chain and logistics support. The DOD supply chain is unparalleled in its scope of operations and the complexity of its mission. Over one million uniformed civilian and contract employees support all aspects of the Department's supply chain, managing $90 billion in inventory, processing over 117,000 national orders for materiel daily, keeping 15,000 aircraft, 285 ships, and 30,000 combat vehicles capable of fulfilling their mission, and in many cases performing this mission while deployed in harm's way. The DOD logistics mission is to provide globally responsive, operationally precise, and cost effective joint logistics support for the projection and sustainment of America's warfighters. Every day, DOD logisticians support troops forward deployed in some of the world's demanding environments and are frequently called upon to support operations on short notice in parts of the world where we have little or no presence. Most notably today, DOD logisticians are key enablers to simultaneously executing the drawdown of our forces in Iraq and to providing full spectrum support to our mission in Afghanistan. Since the President announced the Iraq drawdown time line, we have systemically been responsibly drawing down our force in Iraq. To date, we have moved out 32,000 pieces of rolling stock, closed over 300 bases, and are on track to bring the force down to 50,000 troops by August 31, 2010. This has been accomplished by simultaneously sustaining and rotating the remaining force in Iraq, no small feat. At the same time, we have moved the majority of the 30,000 troops and their equipment to Afghanistan as the President directed last December while providing the needed sustainment in food, fuel, medical supplies, construction materials, clothing, and spare parts. I just returned from Afghanistan 2 weeks ago, along with Dr. Carter, I might add, who was looking at the logistics lay- down. Every place I visited, the troops and their commanders reported that, for the most report, they are receiving the materiel as they need it, when they need it. Since the troop increase was announced, we have moved over 17,000 relocatable buildings to house our forces. We are meeting a 1.1 million gallon-a-day demand for fuel for United States and coalition forces while feeding 435,000 meals a day to U.S. troops on the ground. In addition to moving the force, their equipment, and their needed supplies to a landlocked country, we have also moved approximately 4,000 mine-resistant, ambush protected all-terrain vehicles (MATVs), and a significant number of Mine resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) variants to protect our forces as they perform their mission. We are sustaining the readiness of all MATV and MRAP vehicles at over 90 percent, and that is with battle damage as the major factor in decreased readiness. Even with this enormous challenge on our plate, DOD logisticians were still able and ready to support disaster relief earlier this year in Haiti. Since we last appeared before this Subcommittee, we have issued the DOD Logistics Strategic Plan incorporating our major supply chain initiatives. This plan is synchronized and consistent with both the 2010 Quadrennial Review and the DOD Strategic Management Plan published in July 2009. It incorporates logistics-related priorities, outcomes, goals, measures, and key initiatives depicted in the DOD Strategic Management Plan while adding more detailed information relating to logistics strategy. Actual progress against each of the plans' top-level performance targets will be collected and reported via the DOD Chief Management Officer level dashboard and reviewed quarterly. The Logistics Strategic Plan incorporates and builds on our previous efforts, including the 2005 Supply Chain Improvement Plan and the 2008 Logistics Roadmap, while simultaneously guiding our future actions as there are successes and improvements in the three GAO supply chain high-risk areas: Forecasting, asset visibility, and distribution. With respect to forecasting, we have made considerable progress in plan accuracy with the measurement of forecasting demand when compared to actual need. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), which satisfies 95 percent of customer demands, has seen demand forecast accuracy improve by 24 percent for key items. That is complemented by improvements we have seen in our readiness-based sparing efforts, which use analytics to establish inventory levels and locations to maximize readiness. Using a commercial readiness-based sparing tool, the Navy is currently determining aviation on-board spares for several of its aircraft carriers and has noted $216 million in cost savings per carrier for the six carriers outfitted and a 50 percent reduction in high-priority requisitions. This was achieved during a 7 percent increase in operational tempo flight hours. In the area of asset visibility, we continue to use active Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology, to provide us with needed visibility for our critical cargo moving to Iraq and Afghanistan. At DLA's Defense Distribution Depot-San Joaquim, where we are using passive RFID, we have seen a 62 percent decrease in receiving process errors for small parcel shipments on passive RFID-enabled receiving lanes, and at Pearl Harbor, we have seen a ten-day reduction in response time for our most critical requisitions. The Distribution Process Center is driving process improvements that have significantly enhanced overall materiel distribution for our deployed forces and in the United States. For example, the Defense Transportation Coordinator Initiative has produced $91 million in cost avoidance in key transportation expenses while on-time delivery is running better than 96 percent. In closing, as we press forward with executing the Logistics Strategic Plan, the Department remains committed at the most senior levels to addressing our supply chain processes in order to support our warfighters at best value for the taxpayer. We continue to make real and measurable improvements to that end. Again, I thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Voinovich, for the opportunity to testify today on the important issues associated with the DOD supply chain and logistics and I will be happy to answer any of your questions. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Estevez. Mr. Edwards, will you please proceed with your statement. TESTIMONY OF JACK E. EDWARDS,\1\ DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM M. SOLIS, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE Mr. Edwards. Mr. Chairman and Senator Voinovich, thank you for this opportunity to discuss DOD's progress and challenges in strategic planning to resolve longstanding problems in the supply chain management area. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The joint prepared statement of Mr. Edwards and Mr. Solis appears in the Appendix on page 34. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As you are aware, supply chain management and other logistics functions are critical to supporting military forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Also, they constitute a substantial investment of resources. I am here today with my colleague, Bill Solis, that you mentioned earlier. Our GAO reviews cover supply chain management and other logistics areas. Mr. Solis's work tends to focus on the Combatant Command's and supporting the warfighter in operational situations. I am responsible for issues such as inventory management and also weapon system sustainment. As requested, we will focus on three issues today: One, DOD's prior strategic planning efforts; two, key elements in the new plan; and three, opportunities to improve that plan. Regarding DOD's prior efforts, DOD has issued strategic plans for logistics and supply chain management since at least the 1980s. The 2008 Logistics Roadmap that we have been talking about is one example of such a plan. While it documented goals, joint capabilities, objectives, and numerous initiatives and programs, we found that it was missing some elements that we would expect in a strategic plan. Those missing elements included things that you just mentioned earlier, such as outcome-based performance measures and descriptions of problems and capability gaps. We recommended to DOD that it include these missing elements in future updates to the Roadmap and DOD concurred with that, and we have had discussions with them. Earlier this month, DOD issued its new Logistics Strategic Plan, our second issue that we would like to discuss. The new plan identifies the Department's logistics mission and its vision. It also reiterates Department priorities that have been stated in important documents such as Quadrennial Defense Review and in the Strategic Management Plan for business operations. The Logistics Strategic Plan contains high-level goals. There are four of those, and for each one of the goals, it has success indicators, performance measures, and key initiatives. And the goals and initiatives that are mentioned in there, many of those we have investigated in the past and we have identified some of those needing management attention. While all four goals do touch on supply chain management, goal four explicitly deals with that issue. The discussion of goal four very briefly lists four success indicators, three performance measures, and 12 key initiatives. Now that we discussed some of what the plan has, let us move to the third area or third topic, and that is opportunities that we see that might help move this plan along a little more. The opportunities fall into two general categories or types. First, the plan lacks detailed information on how and when the goals and initiatives will be achieved. For example, the plan does not identify performance targets or timetables. It does not include logistics problems or capability gaps. And also, there is no mention made of what types of resources are going to be required in order to implement this plan. The other area of improvement concerns addressing the absence of linkages between DOD's DOD-wide Logistics Strategic Plan and the service-specific and other types of plans and activities for accomplishing and improving supply chain management. Similarly, it is not clear how this plan will be used within DOD's existing logistics governance framework to help make budgetary and other decisions. The continued absence of important details from the Logistics Strategic Plan may make it difficult for DOD to efficiently implement this plan and to fulfill the Department's vision of providing a cost effective joint logistics support for the warfighter. Mr. Chairman and Senator Voinovich, Mr. Solis and I would be happy to answer any questions that you have at this time. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Edwards. Mr. Estevez, I commend DOD's efforts to improve the efficiency of its logistics processes, but the recently released 2010 DOD Logistics Strategic Plan is intended to provide strategic direction on future logistics improvement efforts. Would you please describe the plan's goals and key measures and how the plan will be used by senior leadership in the logistics decisionmaking process? Mr. Estevez. I will be happy to, Senator. Thank you. Let me start off by saying the Logistics Strategic Plan encompasses the gamut of logistics activities, more than just the supply chain activity that we are focused on, because it is a holistic continuum if you look at it. You can't have a good logistics system unless you have a good supply chain. It has four goals in it. First, there is support for the warfighter, support for our deployed forces and what is going on in our current contingency operations. Second, related to that is management of the contractor workforce that we have out there and doing that better in the future. We all know that we have had some problems in the past and we believe we have got our arms around that going forward, but not just for this contingency, for future contingencies past this one. So we put in a process. We put in planning processes out at our CoComs, recognizing that we are going to have a contractor workforce on the battlefield with us going forward. Third, is looking at the acquisition process for our weapons platforms and building in a sustainment capability so that when you design a platform, you are thinking about the long-term operating costs of that platform and what you need to do today in the acquisition process. Acquisition people tend to focus on it until it is bought and then my folks worry about it after that. But the design affects the long-term costs, so we are trying to instill logistics and sustainment thought into the early part of that process, and Dr. Carter recently signed out a memo to the service acquisition executives ensuring that at Defense Acquisition Boards, we will be discussing sustainment strategies as well as the acquisition strategy for a particular platform. And fourth, are the initiatives related to the supply chain. Inside that and for each of those, we have what the measures of our success will be, and then there are initiatives under each one of those goals. Frankly, under each one of those initiatives, there will be sub-targets that will relate up to the higher target. I co-chair with the Director of Logistics for the Joint Staff, Lieutenant General Kathy Gainey, something called the Joint Logistics Board, which brings together the senior logisticians in the Department of Defense from the service staffs, from the service Materiel Commands, from U.S. Transportation Command, and from the Defense Logistics Agency, and at that board we discuss how we are going forward and the issues that we need to resolve to make all those things come into compliance, and then the services manage their budgets and how they do their business underneath that structure. Senator Akaka. You last mentioned about the supply chain, Mr. Estevez. What are some of the major supply chain management challenges that DOD still needs to address? Mr. Estevez. Let me start off by saying, and it is going to be mostly in the area of inventory management and procurement of that inventory. So our ability to forecast demand needs to be better. We have a number of initiatives, things like I discussed in my opening statement, readiness-based sparing, to do that. We are drafting, as required in last year's National Defense Authorization Act, a comprehensive Inventory Management Strategy. We are using that opportunity to actually go after some focused areas so that management not only of the forecast, and the forecast should be better at our industrial activities, at our maintenance depots, in other words, than out in the deployed force, where things like environment and battle damage and unintended consequences change the demand plan accuracy. But collaboration between the buyers, the Defense Logistics Agency and the Materiel Commands, and the users of that materiel, that is probably No. 1. Using our systems, and we have issues in some of our systems--DLA probably has the best Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) that is out there--other services are working to implement--to gather the data needed to more timely affect buys, so that we don't buy more than we need. Even though that materiel may be consumed down the road, it is a lost opportunity cost that the money could have gone to something more important. So that is probably the biggest area that I say that we can really affect big change to the benefit of both the warfighter and the taxpayer. The final area we continue to work on is visibility. We have pretty good visibility, and frankly, I think our inventory accuracy is as good as anyone out there in the commercial sector, given the amount of materiel we have and given the fact that we deploy to places like Helmand Province, where tracking it can be difficult. But we continue to work those processes, as well. Senator Akaka. Thank you. Let me call on Senator Voinovich for his questions. Senator Voinovich. I guess the first question I would have is that you got started with this process. You had the Roadmap. Now you have the Strategic Plan. The Department has been criticized in terms of including outcome-based performance metrics in strategic planning documents and, GAO says, failed to include adequate outcome-based performance metrics in both the Roadmap and Logistics Strategic Plan. Why is this the case and how can this be remedied? Although I can't believe that, Mr. Estevez, if I said to you, how have you judged your performance over the last several years and what criteria did you use? Now, I know that one of the criteria is customer wait time, but what would you point to to show what metrics were used to evaluate the performance of your operation in achieving the goals that were set? And do you have a difference of opinion with GAO in terms of their analysis of the issue of metrics that you are using? Mr. Estevez. Let me start at the top of that, how I would measure, and as you pointed out, customer wait time has been our consistent measure throughout. But I would go past that to readiness and a customer satisfaction metric. So if I look at our capabilities, if I look at the performance of a logistics system as what it is doing right now in sustaining our forces and deploying our forces to Afghanistan, which is about as hard a place as we could have picked to go to war, short of Antarctica, maybe---- Senator Voinovich. In fact, this morning on the plane coming in, I had a public document that shows the circuitous route you have to go through. It is just amazing. OK. Go ahead. Mr. Estevez. And there are dangerous countries around there that we are going through and diplomatically problematic countries, to say the least. So nonetheless, and let me just give you an example, in May of this year, the Marines in Helmand had a fire in their supply support activity, in the activity that sustains a good chunk of the Marine forces. There are other ones in Helmand Province. A massive fire destroyed a big chunk of the materiel that was there. Nonetheless, we were able to reconstitute that in pretty much no time and we had a 1 percent uptick in readiness while we were doing that reconstitution to the point where--and I was talking when I was there 2 weeks ago--to the Marine Logistics Command, a Marine one-star on the ground, who told me he had to put the brakes on the logistics system for pushing the supplies to him so that he could target the supplies he really needed right now and get them out into the field. That, to me, shows a logistics system that is working the way it is supposed to work for our deployed forces. I can likewise give you good stories on Iraq---- Senator Voinovich. Have you ever sat down with anybody that was in Iraq in the beginning to kind of compare and contrast the situation that you had there versus what you have in Afghanistan? Mr. Estevez. In fact, today, and I guess he wasn't there right at the beginning, the Director of Logistics for General Rodriguez, the U.S. Forces Director of Logistics, was also General Petraeus's Director of Logistics and is still there in Afghanistan, in Iraq in the 2007 and 2008 time frame. So that is not the beginning. And certainly I am around many logisticians who were there and it is leaps and bounds better than we are doing. There are a number of reasons for that. Some of those are political reasons and some of those are just that we are looking long and that we have learned lessons and we are more flexible and more adaptable, and that is all good. To me, going forward, the trick is to codify those good things so that we incorporate them, recognizing that you don't want to get down to fighting the last war, the next war, and everything has to be dynamic. And frankly, if you go to the commercial sector and look at great supply chains, they have to adapt, as well. But there is a massive difference between what we were doing early on and what we are able to do right now in Afghanistan and what we are doing drawing down, including putting in depots and looking at those capabilities. Going back to your measurements, that would be how I would say, yes, we are doing great. With that said, I would also say GAO has some legitimate arguments that there are areas we could do better. I would call those the efficiency areas, more of the business operations versus direct support for the warfighter. Again, that is my No. 1 metric. But I will go back to those things I talked about. Forecast accuracy, we could do much better and we are driving to do that. Some of those are not necessarily outcome-based metrics, so it is customer readiness is the outcome-based metric. I need a cross-metric underneath that and driving that relationship is not as easy as one would like in our business. So, I think you had a third question in there that I may not have answered. When I look at the way these plans have been drafted, we drafted the first plan to address some of the things that were laid out on the High-Risk List and we are still driving to those initiatives and they are consistent over time. As you point out, this is a complex area and transformation is not overnight. I wish it was, so I wish we could get off this list more than anyone probably out there right now. Second, the Roadmap was a list of all initiatives across the Department, not just the ones directed at that list. They are encapsulated inside the Strategic Plan. So there is a continuum of efforts as we move forward, and I personally think this is a pretty good plan. Mr. Edwards has laid out some areas where we could improve. We will look at those going forward. But as I have discussed with him, I would also look at the initiatives and how we are doing and driving them underneath, the cost savings that we are garnering, the increases in the response time, etc., and I think that is what we need to be measured on. Senator Voinovich. In my next round of questions, I will give you an opportunity, Mr. Edwards and Mr. Solis, to comment on what Mr. Estevez had to say. Senator Akaka. Thank you. Yes, we will have another round here. Mr. Edwards, DOD supply chain management has been on the GAO High-Risk List for 20 years. DOD, GAO, and this Subcommittee have been committed to this issue. Can you tell us what key factors GAO plans to examine when deciding whether to retain DOD supply chain management in its upcoming High-Risk List series update? Mr. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have mentioned some of those issues in the past, and also Mr. Estevez has mentioned some of them. We have had numerous conversations. You have urged us to talk to one another. Recently, Mr. Estevez and I met with Beth McGrath, Deputy Chief Management Officer, to discuss what types of steps might need to go forward. We recognize that there are some issues that are still out there, such as visibility over some of the assets, also looking at the supply chain projections of what are we going to need into the future. And Mr. Solis will talk about some of the things that he has recently observed in some of his trips to Iraq and Afghanistan to complement the things that I am talking about. But as we move forward, one of the things that we are particularly looking for, Mr. Estevez has mentioned that they will be issuing a mandated report that was part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2010. In that report, DOD is required to address eight issues, and among those issues are some of those very things that originally led DOD to have the supply chain management or initially, at least, the inventory part of supply chain management put onto the High-Risk List. So we hope to see that plan when it comes out and hope that some of these issues will be addressed. Mr. Solis. Could I just jump in here just a little bit, too? Senator Akaka. Mr. Solis. Mr. Solis. I think a couple other things, just very quickly, and I think Mr. Estevez alluded to one. I think we can focus on Iraq and Afghanistan, and let me say, I think for Iraq, I think in terms of the briefings that you got, Senator Voinovich, I am in agreement that I think the drawdown is moving ahead as scheduled and I think everything from the disposition of equipment to the movement of personnel, those things, I think, are on time and moving quite well. I think Afghanistan, I think from my view and some of the work that we have done, the preliminary work, granted, it was back in December, we still have to see how that is going to turn out. I have some different things in terms of some of the unit readiness pieces that I have picked up which I testified about. Again, that was back in December. We are at a different point in time and we are going to be taking a look at that. So again, we will be looking at that in terms of making the assessment of the high risk. I think the other piece, and I haven't thought this through completely, but the other thing I think, not only just for logistics but particularly the supply chain, in terms of the workforce, that has become a contractor workforce, particularly for the current operation. When you look at the transportation, the distribution, that is all becoming very integral in terms of the fuel and supplies. How is that going to be built into future operations? And so I think the kind of thing that Mr. Estevez talked about in terms of codification of these kinds of things, I think are the kinds of things that we are going to be looking for, as well. Senator Akaka. Mr. Solis, distribution of materiel to deployed forces in Afghanistan presents distinct challenges due to the country's location, infrastructure, and its terrain. Would you please discuss some of these key challenges. Mr. Solis. And again, as Mr. Estevez alluded to, Afghanistan is probably the worst nightmare for a logistician to try to plan an operation, and so by many accounts, they have done a great job. In terms of some of the challenges going into this, I mean, there were things like limited visibility over shipments. I think there is limited RFID capability coming out of Pakistan. I think on the Northern distribution route, because of security concerns by other countries, there is limited visibility over that. It takes a number of days to get those shipments from the United States through those different routes. And then when they get within country, there are even periods of time where they may have to wait outside the gates because of security considerations. So there is a long stretch of time just to get the equipment and supplies in. I think in terms of just working in the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATO) environment, our priorities are not necessarily the other NATO countries' priorities in terms of getting key equipment or key supplies within a particular base. There were limits on the infrastructure at the air fields, the ramp space. Some of that was going to be taken care of during the surge, but there were some other things that were not going to be addressed during the surge. We still had reports of some units, and this is going back to the prior surge, to the spring and the summer, that still had not received all of its equipment and supplies. Again, we haven't looked at that going forward, and let me say I have attended different drills or planning conferences where I think the Department and the Army and the Marine Corps have sat together to figure out how they are going to do this. So we are going to have to take a look at that as to how it is working. But I think there are a number of challenges. Afghanistan is so much different than Iraq in terms of those challenges, but I think there are a number of things that are there that could limit the ability of the supply chain to work effectively. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Solis. Senator Voinovich, do you have further questions? Senator Voinovich. Yes, I do. You have heard the testimony of Mr. Estevez. Your testimony is very impressive, Mr. Estevez, about what has happened. On a scale of 1 to 10, Mr. Edwards, going back to, say, 2006 or 2007--you pick the date and tell me where it is--what would you rate the improvement in their performance in terms of the supply chain management challenge? Mr. Edwards. I think I would rather defer this one to Mr. Solis. He has had a lot more of the time over in Afghanistan and he is better positioned to answer the specific issue about how Afghanistan has changed, if that is all right with you, Senator. Senator Voinovich. That is fine. I mean, I go back to anecdotal stuff, when we were buying and selling supplies at surplus, not having a lot of the equipment that was needed for the warfighter, etc. That was really awful. So, Mr. Solis, why don't you share with me what you think is really going on and if they really wanted to do a better job, where would you focus in on? Mr. Solis. Well, let me just start, again, with the plan, if I may first. The plan itself, I think was alluded to, that there are metrics out there. In fact, one of the things that I still think is lacking are overarching metrics. I will give you one example. One of the things that is in the plan is cost effective, yet I can't find anything in the plan---- Senator Voinovich. Wasn't that the same thing you had to say about the Roadmap? Mr. Solis. Yes, sir. Senator Voinovich. OK. Mr. Solis. And so let me say this. I was pleased to see a lot of the overarching plan that is there today covers a lot of the same things that we have recommended that the Department look into beyond just the supply chain, planning for the use of contractors in future contingencies, not just Iraq and Afghanistan, looking at their business processes for urgent needs, supply chain management. So there are a lot of things that are very positive in that plan from maybe the priorities. But it is hard even there to tell which are the largest priorities. It is hard to tell which ones are going to provide the most cost effective solutions. For example, I think RFID-- -- Senator Voinovich. I was just going to ask about that. Mr. Solis [continuing]. Is one that has a dual purpose, an increase in visibility and potentially providing cost effectiveness. And we are still looking for some of that. And I think those are the kinds of things that if they were added to the plan, and I know those are things that are going to be added, I think, at some point, according to even the latest version I see now, I think it would go a long way in terms of the plan itself. And I think that would be very helpful in terms of Members of Congress, different folks who have vested interests, decisionmakers, about how the Department is doing overall with respect to a lot of the initiatives and the goals now that they have set out in this plan. So I think there are still things, there are still some details, particularly the metrics. I think another one might be in terms of how they will continue to evaluate this, which is one of the things that we talk about in any plan, you have to be able to evaluate it. But again, there are a lot of things out there in this current plan that I see as positives in terms of the priorities and the kinds of things that they are going after. But I don't know--and one more, if I could give--in the planning part for future contingencies, I think the metric is-- all the contractor equities will be reviewed, but it doesn't say by when. It doesn't say how it is going to be done. So I think there are some of these details, and even if it was in an appendix somehow or something where folks could look at that, I think that would help a lot. Senator Voinovich. How often do the two of you talk, Mr. Estevez and Mr. Solis and Mr. Edwards? Mr. Solis. We talk quite a bit. Mr. Estevez. We do talk quite a bit. Mr. Solis. In fairness, I think we have a running conversation on different things. We agree and disagree on different things. I try to tell them where I think things are moving well. I think, again, the Iraq drawdown is moving pretty well. I still am not sure about Afghanistan. I mean, I know there are a lot of positives that are happening there. Don't get me wrong. But I think in terms of is it as good as it could be or are we doing the things--everything that we should be doing, I think that--and we are doing some work that will try to shed some light on the current efforts. Senator Voinovich. One of the things that Senator Akaka and I have done on a couple of instances is we have really worked with GAO and the agency that GAO is reviewing. I think in the whole Department of Homeland Security, for example, the question was, are they moving forward, are they making progress, in integrating the Department's functions? We had hearings where DHS said, we are doing one thing and GAO said DHS was doing another thing and there wasn't a meeting of the minds. So we have been trying to get them together to kind of get a consensus on what needs to be done. A more narrow initiative would be security clearance process, which we are hoping gets off the GAO High-Risk List. But the fact is that the agency and GAO have sat down. They have talked to each other. They have reconciled some differences. They have a plan. There is a meeting of the minds as to what needs to be done, and then you have something that you can look at and there is an agreement on what the metrics should be. Now, I am sure that is a lot of work, but it seems to me that if you haven't gone through that exercise, you ought to begin it and figure out just here is what we are doing, and you talk to each other and try to get, as I say, some meeting of the minds in terms of what the metrics are going to be and what is going to be accomplished, and from my selfish point of view and Senator Akaka's and the country's, when are you going to get off the High-Risk List and what is it going to take in order for it to happen? Mr. Solis. And I would say again, I think for us, we can make the recommendations. I can talk to Mr. Estevez. Ultimately, Mr. Estevez, and the Department have to decide which route they are going to go. Senator Voinovich. Yes, and the other thing I am interested in knowing if you are not able to hit your targets, is it because you are not getting the budget support that you are supposed to be getting from the Department, or are we doing something over here in Congress that is standing in your way. What are the hurdles that you are having to get over, that if you didn't have those hurdles, you could be moving at a quicker pace than you currently are? Mr. Estevez. Let me just address a couple of things there. If you go back in time when we first developed the High-Risk Implementation Plan, Mr. Solis, I, and OMB, crafted that together, and at one point, we were meeting probably quarterly, if not more. We are not quite at that point now, though we see each other quite often. When the Secretary announced his effort to drive efficiencies in the Department, I asked both of these gentlemen to come over and meet with me and look for ideas on where we could do it. So there is definite collaboration going on inside the Department. When we agree, that is easy. When we disagree, we disagree on some of the metrics, we are going to go where the Department needs to go. And we think we are doing the right thing. So it is not that I am trying to not do what GAO says. It is where we have a disagreement over technique. For some of the things, I would love to get a cost metric. That is easier said than done, on how you put a cost on management of inventory inside the Department. It is easy if you are Wal-Mart. Your hold time versus your sales, it is done. For us, holding a bunch of inventory that I am holding for war reserve, I am holding inventory that I bought for economic buy, so I bought more than we needed over the objective, we are holding Navy inventory. We have weapons systems that are raging that we are just going to hold on to. So it is a more difficult thing. On the other hand, I would also say in that case, for example, that I would rather have the inventory that I might need for that person in Iraq or Afghanistan than not have it. It is worse not to have it. So there are areas where we need to work through. We continue to work with GAO on honing the metrics. As you know, we made a run at getting off the list back when Ken Krieg was the AT&L. Mr. Solis and I were over at OMB pushing through that, didn't quite get there. Nonetheless, my view is the work that we are doing is not about a list. It really still goes back to what is right to do for the warfighter or what is right for the taxpayer. I would love to get off the list at the same time that we are doing that. Senator Voinovich. Well, I would encourage you to get together a little bit more and try to dot the ``i''s and cross the ``t''s and move ahead, not only for the betterment of the warfighter, but I think that with the financial situation that we have in our country today, with this unbelievable national debt, with budgets that are not being balanced, the American people finally are realizing that last year, out of every dollar we spent, we borrowed 41 cents. I mean, our fiscal situation is really ratcheting up and I think that in terms of our Defense Department, there is going to be a lot more scrutiny about what you are doing, how efficient you are, what are you doing with your budget, with acquisitions and what are some of the tradeoffs and so forth. The big light, I think, in the next several years is going to be more on you than ever before. The more that you can demonstrate progress, the better. And you have made progress. The efficiencies that you brought to bear, which are important to the warfighter, will need to continue. Second of all, you need to try to identify the cost savings to the Department that have resulted from supply chain improvement efforts. For example, we started out with this and today we are over here. And I don't mean fudge on the numbers, but to be able to identify, these are specific things that you can do, even though, as you point out, that may be difficult on occasion. Mr. Estevez. And I would say that my guidance from the Secretary, from Secretary Lynn and certainly from Secretary Carter, who I see daily, is to do just that. So we will take you up and I will work with these gentlemen to press forward, sir. Senator Voinovich. Thank you. Senator Akaka. I want to thank you very much. Let me just follow this up. Of course, there is no question that whatever the troops need, we need to move them. The supply chain has to be used and we just hope that it gets there in a timely manner. During the last discussion, talking about metrics, let me just ask this question. Can you tell us how your efforts and the metrics being used to gauge effectiveness of these actions, can you explain a little more about that? What do you do with those metrics? Mr. Estevez. Sure, and again, different initiatives have different looks. Every one of them were, every single initiative to drive cost out versus an initiative to drive effectiveness. We are calculating the savings. So something like the Defense Transportation Coordination Initiative (DTCI), we have identified savings out of the transportation accounts. Those are real savings that the services accrue. And people are getting their stuff faster, so that is a true benefit. Even in areas like movement to Iraq, for every 500 MRAPs that we move what we call intermodal move--most MRAPs we were flying in out of Charleston direct into Afghanistan, a fairly expensive move but important to get those vehicles out there for the force. Once we had enough on the ground, we moved to something we called intermodal movement. So we move them through countries in the Middle East where we then fly them on a leg. You can turn the airplane that much faster put more on the ground. It is actually operationally more effective in getting more MRAPs on the ground, and $55 million for every 500 MRAPs moved. That is one of the ways, even though in January when we looked at it and said, to close the force, there is no white space. How are we going to move all these MATVs, which was the contract in August, over 4,000 on the ground being used in Afghanistan today. But we managed to squeeze them into the flow at a rate that they are out there, plus other MRAPs. We moved from what we thought was going to be 500 a month to, at some points, 1,200 a month being fielded in Afghanistan, and calculating cost savings while they are doing it. So it is a variety of things, looking at readiness, if it is a direct readiness output, like the readiness base sparing, and calculating those cost savings. Now, what happens, of course, is that in the services, they take those savings and apply them to other places. I don't necessarily see them in the logistics budget because that is not where they are. They are operation and maintenance, or operational and support account savings. Those monies can be fluctuating. If it is a direct acquisition program, then we can calculate that, or if it is in the working capital fund, I can see how that moves around. So it is tracking those things, customer wait time, readiness, either savings or cost avoidances would probably be the three areas that I look most. Senator Akaka. Well, I want to thank you very much. We have further questions that we will send to you. But I want to thank you for appearing here today. As we have heard, supply chain management is critical and directly affects our men and women in uniform in the field. The Department of Defense must continue to improve its ability to deliver the right materiel to the right place at the right time. Although much progress has been made in addressing the DOD supply chain management weaknesses, many challenges remain, and I am so glad to hear that you continue to talk to each other. As always, I want to thank Senator Voinovich, who has been a leader on this issue. While our time together grows shorter with each passing week, we have a joint commitment to improve supply chain management and remove it off the GAO's High-Risk List. The hearing record will be open, as I said, for 2 weeks for additional statements or questions that other Members may have. This hearing is adjourned. 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