[Senate Hearing 111-648]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-648
MIDDLE EAST PEACE: GROUND TRUTHS, CHALLENGES AHEAD
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 4, 2010
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
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C O N T E N T S
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Page
Asali, Dr. Ziad, president, American Task Force on Palestine,
Washington, DC................................................. 21
Prepared statement........................................... 23
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Kurtzer, Hon. Daniel, lecturer and S. Daniel Abraham Professor in
Middle Eastern Policy Studies, Princeton University, former
U.S. Ambassador to Israel and Egypt, Washington, DC............ 6
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 4
Makovsky, David, Ziegler Distinguished Fellow and director of the
Project on the Middle East Peace Process, Washington Institute
of Near East Policy, Washington, DC............................ 30
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Malley, Dr. Robert, director of Middle East/North Africa Program,
International Crisis Group, Washington, DC..................... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 16
(iii)
MIDDLE EAST PEACE: GROUND TRUTHS, CHALLENGES AHEAD
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THURSDAY, MARCH 4, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Dodd, Feingold, Casey, Shaheen,
Kaufman, Lugar, and Risch.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. Good morning. The hearing will officially
come to order, though you have all unofficially already come to
order. We welcome you here today. Thanks so much.
We have a terrific panel, and we're very grateful to have
you, and to be able to take a moment to reflect on one of the
longest and most complex and sometimes frustrating challenges
that we have, all of us, faced over the years. Today, we will
take a moment to talk about where we are in the effort to
revive the Middle East peace process.
Yesterday, as I think most know--certainly all those who
follow these matters--in Cairo, the Arab League endorsed
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas's entry into United States-
mediated indirect talks with Israel. With negotiations likely
to resume soon, we're really reaching a critical juncture. And
after meetings, just this past weekend, that I engaged in with
Israeli and Palestinian leaders, in Jordan and in the West
Bank, and in Israel, I personally am confident that this really
is a moment of opportunity.
Of course, we're all well aware that we've had those
moments before. I remember standing on the White House lawn
when the great handshake took place, and we had a sense of
great optimism, and the President visited Gaza at the airport
opening, and so forth. We've been down this road, and we're all
well aware of the obstacles.
There is a profound trust deficit between Israelis and
Palestinians, deep divisions between Palestinian factions in
Gaza and the West Bank, perhaps even to some degree, with some
leadership ensconced in Damascus, an Israel coalition
government that initially retreated from prior peace
initiatives, and a profound frustration in the region with the
lack of progress since the President's Cairo speech raised
expectations and new hopes.
While some are deeply skeptical, I do continue to believe
that, to a greater extent than many realize, the conditions are
in place for significant progress, but only if all sides can
summon the leadership, the commitment, and the courage
necessary to make lasting peace possible.
One thing on which I might just comment. I spoke at the
Doha Conference on Islam and the West a few weeks ago. And in
conversations that I had with different people, including the
Emir of Qatar and the Prime Minister/Foreign Minister--same
person--increasingly, from the people that I talked to, there
is a growing realization and awareness of the few tracks that
really can work. There's a unanimity out there, if you will,
among many different parties, who don't often talk to each
other, and, for political reasons, can't get together, but all
of whom kind of have a good sense of the end game. And the
bigger question is not, What's it look like? It's more, How do
you get there? And these various restraints stand in the way of
it.
The fact is, most Israelis and Palestinians still recognize
that a two-state solution remains the only workable solution
and the only just solution. The demographics in Israel simply
demand a two-state solution if Israel is to remain a Jewish
democracy.
Israelis are troubled by what they see as growing efforts
to delegitimize Israel around the world. And, while many
Israelis are understandably gravely concerned about the
existential threat posed by Iran, and the danger of a rearmed
Hezbollah and Hamas, nothing will do more to undermine
extremists and rejectionists than progress--real progress--
toward peace with the Palestinians. I have heard--in Pakistan,
in Afghanistan, in Sudan, in other parts of the world--the
constant drumbeat of the way the Palestinians are treated, and
of Israel-Palestine relations. It is a recruitment tool. It is
an albatross around all necks, in so many ways, and it needs to
be resolved.
In President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad, I am
convinced we have genuine partners for peace. And the Israelis
seem to recognize this, as well, now. They've made
unprecedented strides in the West Bank toward building a future
Palestinian state, from the ground up, by increasing security
capacity, fighting corruption, building institutions that can
govern effectively. And if you talk to General Dayton or
others, there's clear proof that, at times of great stress--
i.e., during Gaza and the war--the West Bank stayed quiet. And
large credit is given to the development of the security forces
in that having happened.
But, we have to show progress now, in the peace process, to
capitalize on Hamas's weakness at this particular moment and to
build greater credibility with the Palestinian people.
Ultimately, we all know it is the Israelis and the Palestinians
who must reach agreement, but America has a vital role to play
as an energetic and effective broker, ensuring that both sides
make good-faith proposals that bring the parties closer to
peace. And at the right moment, we will have a role to play in
bridging any gaps between the respective positions.
Personally, I suspect that progress will likely come,
first, on the combination of borders and security. And the
reason is that they're closely integrated. Israelis cannot and
will not accept a repeat of what happened when they withdrew
from Lebanon and Gaza, and nor should they be expected to. And
it is entirely anticipatable and expected and appropriate that
the Prime Minister of Israel should have a concern about
security, and needs that concern met.
By the same token, as you resolve the issue of borders and
you begin to build the security structure, you begin to give
confidence on both sides about those issues. Focusing on
borders and security initially, in my judgment, resolves the
issue of West Bank settlements and lays the groundwork for
reaching agreement on the other issues.
While a final agreement may seem far off, remember, it was
not so long ago that Israelis and Palestinians came closer than
ever to comprehensive peace at Taba. And the Clinton Parameters
included tough sacrifices, on both sides, as part of a
compromise that was fair to all. A contiguous Palestinian state
based on 1967 borders, with land swaps, security guarantees for
Israel, a capital for both states in Jerusalem, significant
compensation for refugees, with a right of return to Palestine,
and any resettlement in Israel subject to negotiation--that was
the framework. And they came this close. I remember having a
luncheon, in Ramallah with Chairman Arafat, at which he said to
me, very directly and boldly, that he regretted that he hadn't
taken advantage of Taba.
In 2002, the Arab Peace Initiative, endorsed by every Arab
country, provided another key piece of the final puzzle: the
promise for Israel that a comprehensive peace agreement would
bring normalized relations with the Arab world, a regional
shift more plausible at a moment when Israelis and Arab
governments share profound concerns about Iran. And you need to
focus on that. There's sea change in the discussions when you
go over there. The first words out of the mouths of most of the
leaders I met with in the region, and have over the last years,
is not Israel; it's Iran.
I still believe the Clinton Parameters and the Arab Peace
Initiative provide the only realistic basis--basis, I
emphasize--with changes to reflect where we are today--but the
basis for lasting peace and security. And I am confident that,
deep down, most of the Israeli and Palestinian people
understand that, as well.
America's role is vital, but we must all be partners in
this effort. Prime Minister Fayyad has laid out a detailed plan
for strengthening Palestinian institutions. And that effort,
frankly, needs much greater support from the Arab world and
from the West. I will never forget, being in Ramallah, the day
he was elected--and I was the first person to meet with him--in
2005--and he looked at me and said, ``Senator, I know exactly
what you expect of me,'' meaning the United States, ``We need
to disarm Hamas. Now, you tell me how I'm supposed to do that.
I have no radios, no police, no cars, no capacity. Hamas can
deliver services, on any given day, more easily than we can.''
And we were just absent for the next 4\1/2\ years, literally.
So, we all must encourage Palestinians in this peace
effort, and that's why the Arab League decision was really so
significant. And I congratulate the administration, and those
involved, in their efforts to help to bring about the kind of
cohesion that was exhibited in that. I was particularly pleased
to hear the Syrian Foreign Minister, Walid Mouallem, praise
President Abbas's decision to enter proximity talks.
Finally, even as we move ahead with negotiations and
building capacity in the West Bank, we must address the dire
conditions in Gaza. One year ago, I personally saw, firsthand,
the devastation there. And it's a great disappointment that so
little has been rebuilt since then. In Southern Israel, I also
saw the toll that Hamas rockets had inflicted in a barrage that
no country should or could endure interminably. I recognize the
importance of Gilad Shalit to the Israeli people. But, our
grievance, and theirs, is not with the people of Gaza. And
based on my recent visit and discussions with all the parties,
I believe there is a way to work with international
organizations to get more construction material into Gaza in a
way that empowers the Palestinian Authority, and not Hamas. And
that will help the peace process significantly, in my judgment.
We have a terrific panel today to bring a range of
perspectives. Daniel Kurtzer is the former United States
Ambassador to Israel and Egypt; Rob Malley directs the Middle
East North Africa Program at the International Crisis Group;
Ziad Asali is president of the American Task Force on
Palestine; and David Makovsky is director of the Project on the
Middle East Peace Process in Washington Institute of Near East
Policy. So, we look forward to a frank and insightful
conversation.
And I will have to step out for a couple of phone calls
during this, and I ask your indulgence for that during the
process.
And we also ask, if you could, to limit your prepared
comments. We'll put your full testimony in the record as if
read in full, but if you could summarize it in 5 minutes, then
members would have a little more opportunity to be able to have
a dialogue.
Thank you very much.
Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Chairman Kerry, for
convening this hearing, and I join you in welcoming our
distinguished witnesses.
The United States continues to support a negotiated
Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement that would address Israel's
security concerns and satisfy Palestinian aspirations for
statehood, while resolving the full range of final status
issues. I have welcomed the administration's efforts toward
this end.
On his second day in office, President Obama appointed our
former colleague, Senator George Mitchell, as Special Envoy for
Middle East Peace. I was pleased that Senator Mitchell was able
to meet with members of the committee a few weeks ago to share
his perspectives.
The task before Senator Mitchell is daunting. Peace talks
were suspended in the aftermath of the fighting in Gaza, and
the parties have been at an impasse over the demand for a
settlement freeze. Rhetoric on both sides remains incendiary.
Whether through proximity talks, or some other mechanism, we
are searching for a way to move forward. The question is, What
can be done to build confidence and increase the likelihood of
success?
New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman suggested in an
editorial last November that the United States approach to the
Middle East peace process had reached a point of inertia that
is contributing to bad behavior by the parties. He proposed a
dramatic shift in strategy, saying that the United States
should end our participation in the peace process, publicly
informing the parties that we will come back when they get
serious. Friedman argues that by continuing active United
States mediation efforts regardless of the behavior of both
sides, ``We relieve all the political pain from Arab and Israel
decisionmakers by creating the impression in the minds of their
publics that something serious is happening.'' This allows
Israeli and Palestinian leaders to associate themselves with
the peace process without making any political sacrifices or
tempering their ideological agendas.
I would not want to take the ball out of Senator Mitchell's
hands at this time, but I share Tom Friedman's frustrations and
believe we should be thinking beyond conventional mediation
strategies. I'd be interested to hear our witnesses' views on
the likely impact of the move suggested by Tom Friedman.
Meanwhile, Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salaam
Fayyad has been working quietly to build governing institutions
for the day when a Palestinian state is established. General
Dayton, the U.S. security coordinator, and his international
team have been helping to build the capacity of Palestinian
security forces and the Interior Ministry. Substantial progress
has been made, and the program merits continued support. Other
ministries are making headway and becoming more accountable and
transparent. But there is a limit to how much progress can be
made absent results on the diplomatic front.
The administration has not limited its ambitions to the
``Palestinian track.'' It has articulated a vision for a
comprehensive Middle East peace. I would appreciate hearing
from our witnesses today about how we can best capitalize on
regional dynamics to advance this goal. To what extent has the
common threat of a nuclear Iran influenced calculations on the
part of key regional actors?
The administration has made overtures to Syria in recent
weeks, including a visit to Damascus by Under Secretary William
Burns and the nomination of a U.S. Ambassador to Syria,
following a long hiatus. Nevertheless, the joint press
conference last week by the Presidents of Iran and Syria
produced provocative anti-American statements. What are the
prospects, in the coming few years, for a meaningful
advancement of United States-Syrian dialogue or of Israeli-
Syrian peace talks?
I look forward to hearing the assessments of our witnesses
regarding the situation on the ground in the Middle East and
their prescriptions for making progress toward the goal of
comprehensive peace.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.
Mr. Ambassador, if you would begin first, and then we'll
run down the table. We appreciate it. Thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL KURTZER, LECTURER AND S. DANIEL
ABRAHAM PROFESSOR IN MIDDLE EASTERN POLICY STUDIES, PRINCETON
UNIVERSITY, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO ISRAEL AND EGYPT,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Kurtzer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
distinguished members of the committee.
I want to thank you, first of all, for the invitation to
appear here today and to use this opportunity also to thank you
for the support that you gave me during the years that I served
as our Ambassador in Egypt and Israel. It was really quite
remarkable that we were able to actually accomplish something
during those years, with the cooperation of the Senate, and
what we did in the field.
Mr. Chairman, in some respects I could end my statement now
by simply saying that I agree with everything that you and
Senator Lugar said in introducing this subject. But, you asked
us to address the question of ground truths and the challenges
ahead, and I want to dig a little deeper, perhaps, in looking
at both sides of those questions.
First of all, I think it's quite imperative to remind all
of us that the pursuit of peace in the Middle East is not a
favor that we do for the parties in the region, but is an
imperative of our national interests. We benefit immediately
from the process of peacemaking, and, of course, we would
benefit from the success of peacemaking. And this also touches
on Senator Lugar's point, which is, to the extent that we are
seen as conducting a strong policy in pursuit of peace in the
Middle East, it helps us build alliances and conduct our
diplomacy much more strongly, with respect to the threats we
face in the region, including Iran.
With respect to ground truths, there's no question that the
situation on the ground today is challenging, and, as was
indicated in the opening statements, this results from ongoing
settlement activity, ongoing infrastructure of terrorism that
exists, and incitement. There is a rightwing coalition in
Israel which presents its own problems, with respect to
developing its policies in favor of peace, and Palestinian
governance is divided very badly, both politically and
geographically.
But, frankly, this is no more challenging an environment
than we have faced in the past. Resolute, bold, creative,
determined, persistent American diplomacy has succeeded in
dealing with similar challenges in the past. The Egyptian-
Israeli Peace Treaty and the Madrid Peace Conference were not
achieved in perfect environments for peacemaking, but required
the kind of leadership that our leaders are capable of, and the
kind of strong diplomacy of which we are capable, to try to
translate potential opportunities into successes.
In this respect, the ground truth is actually not as bad as
some analysts would try to convince us. Violence is down. The
Israeli security agency, the Shabak, indicated that 2009 was
one of the best years in recent memory, with respect to
violence conducted by Palestinians against Israel. The West
Bank economy is in good shape, and it's growing. Public opinion
polls, on both sides, indicate consistent support for peace and
consistent support for a two-state solution. So, it's not just
that determined leadership can overcome challenges; it's also
that the situation on the ground is potentially conducive to
exploiting opportunities for peacemaking.
What's needed, then, is a U.S. policy and a U.S. strategy.
I must say, as much as I hope for the success of what the
administration is doing these days, I have been disappointed
this past year with the lack of boldness and the lack of
creativity and the lack of strength in our diplomacy with
respect to this peace process. We have not articulated a
policy, and we don't have a strategy. We pursued a settlements
freeze, and then we backed away from a settlements freeze. We
pursued confidence-building measures on the part of some Arabs,
and we backed away from confidence-building measures. And in
neither case were these initiatives seen within a context of a
larger strategy of peacemaking.
I would suggest, therefore, that we also reexamine this
question of proximity talks. As much as I hope for their
success, the very fact that we are conducting proximity talks
these days, or thinking about conducting proximity talks, is a
throwback to what we did 20 years ago. Palestinians and
Israelis have negotiated, face to face, in direct talks for 20
years. And it's not understandable why we would now have them
sit in separate rooms and move between them. If we had strong
terms of reference, perhaps we would need to conduct proximity
talks, but there is, so far, no suggestion that the terms of
reference for these proximity talks are strong enough to
warrant the absence of face-to-face negotiations.
Therefore, let me spend 2 minutes on what I think needs to
be done, the challenges ahead.
First of all, I think it's time, after 43 years from the
1967 war, that the United States articulated our own views on
the way this conflict should end. I'm not suggesting a U.S.
plan, and I certainly am not suggesting that we try to impose a
settlement. A settlement must emerge from negotiations between
the two sides. But, we have views about how this conflict
should end. We have views about territory, about Jerusalem,
about settlements, about refugees, about security, about
cooperation between the two sides with respect to economic and
other matters. And it is really quite surprising that we are
hesitant to express our views and let the sides in the Middle
East understand where the United States is coming from.
As we do so, we also need a strategy, which I would suggest
needs to be multipronged; not simply getting to negotiations,
but, rather, getting to negotiations on the basis of strong
U.S. parameters so that the parties don't start from scratch,
but, rather, pick up from where they left off. They
accomplished a great deal, as Senator Kerry suggested, at Taba.
They also accomplished a great deal between President Abbas and
Prime Minister Olmert in 2008, and we should try to capture
that progress in establishing parameters within which the
parties should negotiate.
If they choose to start with a negotiation on borders,
which I support, then we need to articulate the principles, so
that the parties don't wander into areas that are not going to
be productive. We should also build regional and international
support structures, including better use of the Arab Peace
Initiative. We should revive the multilateral negotiations, so
as to bring, again, the strength of Arab support for
peacemaking. We should continue to advocate for a settlements
freeze and for action by the Palestinian authority against
incitement and against terrorist infrastructure. In other
words, between having a vision and having a strategy, the
United States will be back in the diplomatic game, something
where we have been absent for too many years.
Finally, I would suggest there are two contextual issues
which need to be addressed. One question has been raised as to
whether or not we should open up a dialogue with Hamas at this
time. I think we should not. I have seen no indication on the
part of Hamas that it's changed its policies or its practices,
and therefore, it does not meet any of the conditions that are
proper for the United States to engage in dialogue.
And second, I think the humanitarian situation in Gaza, as
Senator Kerry and Senator Lugar suggested, needs to be
addressed immediately. There is no excuse for having 1\1/2\
million people suffer as a result of a failure of peacemaking,
and we can find ways for the international community to deliver
assistance in a manner that protects both Israeli and Egyptian
security.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Kurtzer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel Kurtzer, Lecturer and S. Daniel
Abraham Professor in Middle Eastern Policy Studies, Princeton
University, Former U.S. Ambassador to Israel and Egypt, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for
the opportunity to testify today about United States policy in the
Arab-Israeli peace process. Let me take this opportunity to thank you
for the support you gave me during my time as the United States
Ambassador to Egypt and Israel. It was a real pleasure to work with you
and the committee.
I have devoted almost 40 years to the study and practice of
American diplomacy in the Middle East. From this experience, I believe
the pursuit of peace between Arabs and Israelis is as important to our
country's interests as it is for the parties themselves. I believe
peace will enhance Israel's security and well-being. And I believe
peace will help the United States build stronger relations with our
Arab friends in the region.
You have asked this panel to examine ground truths and challenges
ahead, and I will address both issues with candor.
GROUND TRUTHS
The environment for peacemaking in the Middle East has almost never
been ideal, and it is not ideal today. But, the challenge of leadership
is not to await the perfect circumstances, but to build on the
imperfect. Opportunities rarely present themselves; they almost always
have to be created. The situation on the ground is hardly ideal, but it
certainly is not as bad and the challenges to reviving the peace
process are not as daunting as some analysts and pundits would want us
to believe.
Today, the Palestinians are divided geographically and politically.
Hamas governs Gaza. Palestinian public discourse, including public
education, about Israel and Jews is still infused with anti-Semitism,
and the infrastructure of terrorism has not been dismantled. In Israel,
a right-wing coalition governs, perceived by the Palestinians and
others as more interested in enhancing Israel's grip on the West Bank
than negotiating a peace settlement based on Resolution 242. Settlement
activity continues, despite the highly conditioned and temporary
moratorium on new housing starts. Some Israeli actions in East
Jerusalem are provoking Palestinian protests that threaten to upset a
relatively calm situation. So, this is not a perfect environment for
peacemaking.
But it is no more challenging an environment than U.S. diplomacy
has had to cope with and operate in the past. Creative, active,
sustained, bold and determined American diplomacy helped bring Menahem
Begin and Anwar Sadat to agreement at Camp David in 1978 and to a peace
treaty in 1979. Equally resolute U.S. diplomacy helped bring Yitzhak
Shamir and the Syrians, Palestinians, Jordanians, Lebanese, and most of
the Arab world to the Madrid Conference in 1991--launching bilateral
and multilateral peace negotiations. Indeed, U.S. diplomacy has
operated at times within far more complicated and challenging
environments than the current situation and has transformed the
imperative of peace into progress toward the achievement of peace.
Today, the ground truth in the Palestinian-Israeli arena actually
has some important positive elements. Violence is down. According to
the Israel Security Agency (www.shabak.gov.il/English/EnTerrorData/
Reviews/Pages/terrorreport09.aspx), 2009 saw ``a significant decline in
the amount of attacks coming from the Palestinian Territories as
opposed to previous years.'' There were no suicide attacks in 2009.
Perhaps most importantly, the Shabak attributes the main reason for the
decline in terrorism to ``continuous CT (counterterrorism) activity
conducted by Israel and the Palestinian security apparatuses''--i.e.,
those security forces trained by General Keith Dayton.
President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad are making
serious efforts to build the institutional infrastructure necessary for
statehood. Fayyad announced an expedited program of state-building,
something that we and the international community have long advocated.
The West Bank economy is in good shape and growing. I saw this
firsthand recently in Ramallah.
Public opinion polls in Israel and Palestine still favor a peaceful
solution. According to the ``War and Peace Index'' compiled at Tel Aviv
University, as of last October, ``about three-fourths of the Israeli
Jewish public currently supports holding negotiations between Israel
and the Palestinians--the highest level of support registered in recent
years.'' And, according to noted Palestinian pollster Khalil Shikaki,
``a majority of Palestinians (65-70 percent) support a two-state
solution. Similarly, a majority (75-80 percent) supports efforts to
negotiate a permanent agreement, a package deal, one that ends the
conflict and all claims.'' The idea of a one-state solution does not
enjoy significant support among Palestinians or Israelis; and proposals
for doing nothing--often couched in language of ``managing'' the
conflict--will accomplish nothing except to allow the situation on the
ground to deteriorate further.
Key leaders have spoken out in favor of the two-state solution.
Prime Minister Netanyahu said last June 14, in a major policy speech:
``In my vision of peace, in this small land of ours, two peoples live
freely, side by side, in amity and mutual respect. Each will have its
own flag, its own national anthem, its own government. Neither will
threaten the security or survival of the other.'' On February 2 in
Herzliya, Prime Minister Fayyad said the Palestinians want to ``live in
freedom and dignity in a country of our own, yes indeed alongside the
State of Israel, in peace, harmony and security.''
For Israel, in particular, the choices have never been starker.
Defense Minister Ehud Barak made this clear when he told the Herzliya
Conference on February 2: ``As long as in this territory west of the
Jordan River there is only one political entity called Israel, it is
going to be either non-Jewish or nondemocratic. If this bloc of
millions of Palestinians cannot vote, that will be an apartheid
state.''
The situation on the ground is not static. If it does not get
better, it will get worse. Absent a dynamic peace process, violence
could erupt yet again in the territories. The triggers for such
violence are present in the territories, and will become more evident
if the two peoples lose hope in the peace making process.
So, the current ground truth in the Middle East is neither a self-
evident moment of opportunity, nor what the naysayers and pessimists
would have us believe. It is a moment in which deterioration will
surely accompany diplomatic stagnation, but also a moment in which
strong and determined leadership can move the peace process forward.
There is also substantial reason to believe that a most important
element of success will be the role exercised by the United States. Let
me then turn to the challenges ahead and the role of the United States.
CHALLENGES AHEAD
I speak with great respect for President Obama and Senator George
Mitchell, but also great disappointment over what can most gently be
described as meager results of American diplomacy this past year. The
President got it right, at the outset of the administration, in
declaring that resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a U.S.
national interest, not a favor we do for the parties. He got it right
when he said that helping to resolve the conflict would be among his
administration's foreign policy priorities. And he got it right when he
appointed Senator George Mitchell, a man of great character and
integrity and with a proven record in international peace negotiations,
as special envoy for the peace process.
From that point on, however, the administration got everything
wrong. In May, Secretary of State Clinton articulated a strong,
insistent position on the need for an Israeli settlements freeze: the
President, she said, ``wants to see a stop to settlements--not some
settlements, not outposts, not natural growth exceptions. We think it
is in the best interests of the effort that we are engaged in that
settlement expansion cease. That is our position. That is what we have
communicated very clearly, not only to the Israelis but to the
Palestinians and others. And we intend to press that point.'' And yet,
some months later, after prolonged discussions that resulted in a
suspension of some Israeli settlement activity in only some part of the
West Bank and for only a limited period of time, Secretary Clinton
hailed this achievement as ``unprecedented.'' The fact is that
settlement construction activity has not stopped for even one day in
the West Bank or East Jerusalem. And Israel has even expanded economic
benefits to out of the way settlements as a kind of ``compensation''
for the government's decision not to make new housing starts in
settlements for 10 months. The U.S. diplomatic volte face was
surprising enough in its own right; however, it also left the
Palestinians in a lurch. President Mahmoud Abbas summed it up recently
when he said that Palestinians could demand no less than the United
States on settlements, and thus the U.S. abandonment of a total
settlements freeze cut the legs out from under the Palestinians.
The administration also tried to elicit confidence building
measures from the Arabs, in particular to gain the agreement of Saudi
Arabia for the overflight of Israeli civilian aircraft. The President
sought this gesture from the Saudis with apparently no groundwork
having been done in advance. The President traveled to Saudi Arabia,
asked for the confidence-building step and was turned down. I want to
make clear that I do not understand why, in 2010, the Saudis do not
allow normal Israeli civilian air traffic over its territory. Boycotts
and similar actions against Israel are unacceptable. But how did this
issue rise to the level of personal Presidential attention? Why was
there no preparatory work done to see how the Saudis would react and to
condition the Saudis to be more receptive? Why wasn't this issue
packaged as part of a larger strategy, instead of being advanced as a
stand-alone measure?
It would have made far more sense, in my view, for the President to
talk to the Saudis about the Arab Peace Initiative, the Saudi-inspired
plan that offers peace, security, and recognition to Israel in return
for Israel's withdrawal from the territory occupied since 1967, the
creation of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital and an
agreed resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem. This statement of
Arab policy--which need not be seen as the basis for negotiations and
does not have to be formally endorsed by the United States or Israel--
represents a major advance in Arab thinking. And yet almost nothing has
been done, by either the Arabs or us, to use it as a supportive element
in the peace process. It seems to me the President should have had a
deep discussion with the Saudis about their policy and ours, rather
than ask for a single Saudi gesture.
The administration also hastily arranged a trilateral meeting in
New York in September with Netanyahu and Abbas, out of which nothing
emerged and which sent Abbas home empty-handed. Since then, the
administration has been trying to arrange proximity talks based on
general terms of reference. The very idea of proximity talks is odd and
disappointing. After 20 years of direct, face-to-face Israeli-
Palestinian negotiations, is this the best the United States can do?
Equally, the absence of detailed terms of reference is also
problematic. After Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas have noted
publicly that their talks in 2008 advanced peace issues rather
substantially, are general terms of reference the best the United
States can do? Indeed, from press reports, it appears that these terms
of reference are based on statements made by Secretary Clinton to the
effect that the United States would seek ``an outcome which ends the
conflict and reconciles'' two competing visions: ``the Palestinian goal
of an independent and viable state based on the 1967 lines, with agreed
swaps, and the Israeli goal of a Jewish state with secure and
recognized borders that reflect subsequent developments and meet
Israeli security requirements.'' Also, as the Secretary has said, the
United States believes ``that it is possible to realize the aspirations
of both Israelis and Palestinians for Jerusalem, and safeguard its
status as a symbol of the three great religions for all people.''
These are not terms of reference. These don't reflect a U.S. vision
of what needs to be done. These don't articulate a strategy for moving
forward. They don't send a message to the parties that the United
States is determined to try to make this effort a success. Strong terms
of reference can help shape the negotiating process. They can define
what needs to be done and can provide a specific set of guidelines and
a compass for arriving at the sought-after destination. Combined with a
determined leadership role by the United States, strong terms of
reference can make the difference between negotiations that simply get
started and negotiations that have a chance to end with success.
A POLICY AND A STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES
To meet the challenges ahead, the United States must adopt a sound
policy and commit to sustained diplomacy. We have known for years that
interim, incremental or step-by-step approaches will no longer work. We
know that confidence-building measures, in a vacuum, do not work and
instead inspire lack of confidence. We know that building peace from
the ground up, while important, cannot work in the absence of serious
negotiations within which this edifice of peace will fit.
There are, in my view, two critical ingredients for American
policy--a clear vision of how the peace process should end; i.e., a
U.S. view on the core issues in the negotiations; and a multipronged
strategy for trying to achieve that vision. Even with these, we cannot
assure success, but we would have a policy and a strategy which are
sound, strong, and sustainable. I do not favor, and my views do not
imply, a U.S. ``plan'' that would be imposed on the parties. Rather,
the process needs a U.S. substantive set of ideas to get the parties
focused on what we will support and what we will not support.
First, the United States should articulate its own views on the
shape and content of a final peace settlement. Our policy will not be a
surprise to anyone, and many of our views will in fact reflect the
positions of the parties themselves. These U.S. positions would
constitute the substantive core of strong terms of reference:
A territorial outcome based on the 1967 lines that results
in a 100-percent solution, that is, Israel would retain a
limited number of settlements in the major blocs (consistent
with President Bush's 2004 letter to Prime Minister Sharon) and
would swap territory of equal size and value to the
Palestinians in a manner that assures the territorial
contiguity and viability of the State of Palestine. Borders
would be demarcated to reflect these minor territorial
adjustments, in a manner that would also optimize security and
defensibility for Israel and Palestine.
All Israeli settlements and settlers will be evacuated from
the area agreed as constituting the State of Palestine. The
Israeli army will be evacuated consistent with the timetable
and other provisions of the final agreement.
In Jerusalem, outside the walls of the Old City, a division
of the city along demographic lines that will result in two
capitals for the two states. The border in Jerusalem, outside
the Old City, should be demarcated to reflect sensitivity to
religious and security issues affecting both sides.
In the Old City of Jerusalem, the two sides should agree to
withhold claims of sovereignty and develop a common approach to
the management of the city that protects the claims of the two
parties and the interests of all stakeholders in the city.
Palestinian refugees will be permitted to exercise their
``right of return'' to the new State of Palestine, consistent
with the laws of that state. Israel will decide on how many
refugees will be permitted to move to Israel under family
reunification or humanitarian hardship considerations. The two
parties will establish a claims commission to reach agreement
on compensation for refugees whose status resulted from the
conflict. The two sides should examine whether a special
commission should be established to study the historical
grievances of the two peoples. The international community
should establish a fund to help the parties deal with claims.
In the negotiations, priority should be given to security
concerns and measures that address the needs of both sides. The
parties should consider the range of mechanisms available to
assist this process, including international or multilateral
peacekeepers, observers and monitors; intelligence cooperation;
liaison mechanisms; and the like.
These positions and others to be decided by the administration
would constitute the vision of the United States regarding a final
peace settlement. They would flesh out the ideas first enunciated by
President Bush in 2004 and repeated by President Obama in 2009. They
would represent a sound policy basis for our country.
Once having decided on this vision, the administration should
develop a strategy for trying to realize its vision of peace. This
strategy will need to be multidimensional, and our diplomats will need
to ``walk and chew gum'' simultaneously. This should also be
incorporated into the operational part of the terms of reference.
1. The United States should lay out a substantive negotiations
agenda, drawn from the results of previous negotiations, that defines
where the negotiations should begin and channels the negotiations
toward possible agreements. This would constitute an action-focused
negotiating framework that would launch negotiations from where they
left off and avoid having the parties start from scratch.
a. The United States should consider starting negotiations on
borders, since an agreement on borders would frame and resolve
many other issues.
b. If the United States decides on a borders-first approach,
it should lay out the following principles to underpin the
negotiations:
i. A borders/territory agreement should reflect the
equivalent of 100 percent of the territory occupied in
1967;
ii. There should be territorial swaps of equal size
and quality based on a 1:1 ratio;
iii. There should be equitable sharing/allocation of
shared resources (water, minerals, etc.);
iv. The negotiations on territory should focus on a
narrow definition of settlement blocs which hold the
largest concentration of settlers;
v. The negotiations should avoid as much as possible
impacting on Palestinian daily life, should ensure
territorial contiguity and the viability of Palestinian
state, and should not include population swaps;
vi. Borders-first negotiations will need to be
complemented by simultaneous final status negotiations
on Jerusalem.
2. Throughout the negotiations process, the United States would
need to decide on a proactive, interventionist U.S. role in order to
narrow gaps and bridge differences.
3. The United States and others should work cooperatively to build
regional and international support structures and ``safety nets'' for
the process. In the region, the Arabs should be encouraged to activate
the Arab Peace Initiative, to transform it from an outcome of
successful negotiations into a living catalyst and support mechanism
during negotiations. Outside the region, the United States should work
closely with the many special envoys and international elements
interested in supporting negotiations, so as to minimize duplication of
effort and maximize benefits to the parties themselves.
4. The United States should revive and restructure multilateral
discussions on issues such as economic development, regional
infrastructure, health, water, environment, security and arms control,
and the like. These discussions should be led by strong chairs, involve
primarily regional parties, and have action- and goal-oriented agendas.
5. Palestinian state-building activities need to be encouraged and
accelerated, using Prime Minister Fayyad's 2-year plan as basis. The
United States and others should increase resources directed to building
up Palestinian security capacity, and Israel should take steps to
facilitate these efforts.
6. Firm U.S. diplomacy should seek a complete cessation of Israeli
settlement activity and sustained Palestinian action against terrorist
infrastructure and incitement. The administration and the Congress
should reach understanding on a set of calibrated consequences should
one or both parties continue activities seen by the United States as
inconsistent with the peace process.
This vision and this strategy will put the administration's policy
on strong footing. They are not a guarantee of success, and the
diplomacy of getting the parties to the negotiating table will be
arduous. But we have the diplomatic experience and expertise to make it
work.
As we engage in the period ahead, several contextual issues will
need to be addressed. Some analysts believe that the United States
should engage Hamas now and thereby help Palestinians achieve political
reconciliation. I disagree. There is no evidence that I have seen
indicating any change in Hamas' firm rejection of a negotiated
settlement of the dispute or willingness to reconcile with Israel.
There is no reason now to reward this radical behavior and ideology. To
be sure, if an agreement is reached between Israel and the PLO, there
will need to be a method for validating this outcome among
Palestinians, for example, a referendum or a new election. At that
time, against the backdrop of a successful negotiation, Hamas will have
an opportunity to argue its views before the Palestinian public and
before world public opinion.
A second issue relates to United States-Israeli bilateral relations
which have been strained during the past year. The Obama
administration, and the President himself, need to do a better job of
talking to the Israeli people. We need to explain our policies better,
and we need to give Israelis a chance to see who our leaders are and
how they think. Israelis need to feel confident that Americans will
stand by Israel to assure its safety and well-being. At the same time,
Israelis would be advised to dismiss the curious idea that Obama is not
a friend of Israel's. He is, and he is a supporter of the idea of
peace. Better dialogue and communications should remove this irritant
from the atmosphere.
Third, there is no reason for humanitarian stress to persist in
Gaza or for the people of Gaza to suffer because of the misdeeds of
Hamas. Both Israel and Egypt need to be encouraged to open Gaza's
borders to necessary humanitarian relief and to the requirements of
normal life, such as building materials and the like. Neither Israel
nor Egypt needs to sacrifice its security interests in this regard, but
they must apply those interests in a manner that don't further
exacerbate the humanitarian distress of Gaza's population.
Finally, there are two critical populations which have essentially
been excluded from the peace process but whose views are critical for
the process's success--namely, Israeli settlers and Palestinian
refugees. There is little that the administration can do to persuade
these constituencies of the long-term value of peace. But we can
support Track II and people to people activities that encourage
refugees and settlers to talk among themselves about these issues. Both
of these communities need to move from the unrealities that they cling
to and begin thinking about pragmatic outcomes that serve the best
interests of their respective peoples.
ISRAEL AND SYRIA
Before concluding, let me share one thought with respect to the
situation between Israel and Syria. The ground truth on the Syria-
Israel front is equally complex but not a reason to avoid peacemaking.
Syria continues to support terrorist groups, including Hezbollah, and
has joined with Iran in threatening Israel's security and well-being.
The Syrian alliance with Iran--which Syria argues helps to serve
important Syrian interests--also poses challenges for the United
States, for example with respect to Syrian behavior in Iraq and Syrian
activities in Lebanon. Syria is also improving relations with Turkey at
a time when Israeli-Turkish ties have become more complicated.
However, there is no substitute for peace in breaking out of this
negative downward spiral. At the Herzliya Conference several weeks ago,
Defense Minister Barak emphasized that the failure to demarcate
Israel's borders represents a bigger threat to Israel than Iran, and
Barak warned against complacency in this regard lest the process of
delegitimizing the State of Israel gain momentum.
The time to act, therefore, is now. The four issues that divide
Israel and Syria--borders, security, political relations and water--are
not irresolvable. When the two sides last negotiated, indirectly under
Turkish auspices, it was believed that further progress was made in
narrowing differences.
To be sure, I am not entirely persuaded that either party really
wants to conclude negotiations, for the status quo, however fraught it
is with the possibility of small actions escalating into large
confrontations may be easier for both sides to handle than the ultimate
concessions that would be necessary for peace. But this should be
tested through quiet but sustained diplomacy. If it becomes clear that
either or both are unwilling to proceed, then the United States can
turn its attention elsewhere. Until that point, the Syrian-Israeli
issues ought to figure prominently in our peace process strategy.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Very helpful, and
obviously raises some questions. We'll come back.
Dr. Malley.
STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT MALLEY, DIRECTOR OF MIDDLE EAST/NORTH
AFRICA PROGRAM, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Malley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. Thank you for inviting me.
In the 17 years since the peace process began in earnest at
Oslo, there have been better times, and, as Ambassador Kurtzer
said, there have been many worse times. I can't recall a time
that was more complex, contradictory, and confusing. And the
reason for that, I think, is that, since the last time that we
were engaged in a genuine effort, a real diplomatic effort to
achieve comprehensive peace--in 2000, at the time of the
Clinton Parameters and of Taba--since that time, the ground
beneath the peace process has changed and been transformed in
radical ways.
First of all, U.S. credibility, unfortunately, has
decreased and diminished. And anyone who travels in the region
hears that every day.
Second, the entities, Palestinian and Israeli, have changed
and have fragmented since the time that we were last involved,
in the year 2000.
Faith in the peace process, on both sides--there may be
support for a two-state settlement, but belief in a two-state
settlement, and even interest in plans, is waning in both
Israel and on the Palestinian side.
And finally, on the regional--in the regional landscape,
we're seeing polarization, fragmentation between different
camps, which is making it much harder to achieve a consensus on
how to move forward.
Now, U.S. efforts--and I agree with everything, Mr.
Chairman, you said, and Senator Lugar, and Ambassador Kurtzer--
U.S. efforts need to be pursued. But, they have to adjust to
these changing realities, and, so far, unfortunately, they
haven't fully done so.
Now, you've entitled the hearing, ``Ground Truths and
Challenges Ahead,'' and I think that's the absolutely befitting
title, because what we need to do is take a sober look at what
the ground truths are today, what are these changes that have
occurred over the last decade, and see how we adapt to them to
overcome the challenges. And that's what I'd like to do now,
just mention four areas in which I believe the situation has
changed, and how we need to adapt.
The first is waning U.S. credibility. We need to devise a
policy that takes that into account and tries to restore our
credibility. I think Ambassador Kurtzer just mentioned that
what we need is a strategy that has a clear vision of what we
want to accomplish, a realistic way of accomplishing it, and a
strategy to deal with failure, in the event failure were to
occur. That wasn't the case, so far, in the instance of the
settlements policy, which serves as, sort of, a counterexample
of what we ought to be doing, but now, if we're moving toward
final status talks, then we need, at some point, as a number
have already suggested, to put ideas on the table, but do it at
a time when we actually think we could back them up, do it with
international support, and do it in a way that will resonate
both with the Israelis--Israeli and Palestinian publics.
Senator Lugar, you asked about Tom Friedman's suggestion.
My answer would be that certainly I wouldn't endorse it now,
but if the United States were to put on the table clear
principles for final status agreement--not an imposed solution,
but just parameters--and one or both parties were to say no, it
might then be time to reconsider our approach and tell them--
whichever party said no--that they have to reconsider their own
position.
Second, we need a policy that's going to take into account
the changed political outlooks on both sides, what I call the
dramatic loss of faith in the two-state settlement. These are
not--it's not a personal issue. When President Abbas says he
doesn't want to engage in direct negotiations, we may lament
it, but this is the cry of the last true believer, on the
Palestinian side, in negotiations. He is not expressing a
personal view. What he's doing is, after long years of being a
true believer, expressing a much more deeply held belief by the
vast majority of Palestinians that talks at this point would be
for naught. He is the most moderate expression of that deeply
held and deeply entrenched collective disillusionment.
Likewise, on the Israeli side, when Prime Minister
Netanyahu calls for Palestinian recognition of a Jewish state,
or when he calls for much more stringent security measures than
had been in place--than had been contemplated, even in Taba or
Camp David, these may be his personal thoughts, but they go
well beyond. They express deep disillusionment on the Israeli--
on the part of the Israeli public, and the need that the
Israeli public have today to believe that the Arabs truly
recognize their right to exist as a Jewish state, and for
security measures that would deal with the kind of
unconventional threats that emerge in Gaza and South Lebanon.
So, let's understand what we're dealing with, that these are
deeply held popular views.
The third adaptation we need is to adapt to the growing
fragmentation in both Israel and Palestine, and the fact that
dynamic groups have emerged that we are not really equipped to
deal with. And, in fact, the peace process today is doing the
least, and matters the least to those who can do the most to
disrupt it. I'm talking about settlers and the religious right
in Israel, and I'm talking about Islamists, the diaspora and
refugees on the side of the Palestinians. We need a process
that reaches out to them and that tries to address some of
their concerns.
Ambassador Kurtzer mentioned the question of Hamas. I'm not
going to advocate engagement with Hamas; the time is not ripe.
I'm not even saying that the United States, at this point,
should openly promote Palestinian reconciliation. But, I would
ask a simple question: Do we truly believe that a Palestinian
national movement, as divided, fragmented, and unwieldy as it
is today, is in a position to sign a historic agreement, to
implement it, and to sell it to its people? I believe not. And
so, I think we need a policy that at least does not object to
efforts by Palestinians to come together.
Fourth, and last, we need a policy that reflects and adapts
to the changed regional landscape. Today, the Palestinians
cannot make peace on their own. It's not clear whether they
could have in the year 2000. Today, they're too weak, they're
too fragmented, and too subject to foreign interference to do
so.
That brings me directly to the question of Syria. If we
want to have peace between Israelis and Palestinians, I
believe, today, moving toward peace between Israelis and
Syrians is not an obstacle, it's a precondition.
Bringing Syria in would do three things. First, it would
provide cover to the Palestinians, and they need it. Second, it
would provide a real incentive to Israelis, who would know that
if they reach peace with Palestinians, Syrians, and Lebanese,
they would get full recognition and normalcy with all Arab
States, which is the real incentive. Much more than a piece of
paper they would sign with the Palestinians. And third, if the
Syrians were engaged and involved, and if progress was made
toward peace, other actors in the region--Hamas, Hezbollah, and
perhaps even Iran--would have to read the writing on the wall
and adjust their own behavior.
So far, the engagement with the Syrians has produced mixed
results, as both sides see it. Both sides are disappointed.
But, we shouldn't have the unrealistic expectation that Syria
would break with Hamas, Hezbollah, or Iran, certainly not in a
time of great uncertainty. What we ought to be doing is having
a genuine conversation with the Syrians, a strategic
conversation, on a blueprint for future bilateral relations,
and doing everything we can to relaunch Israeli-Syrian talks.
Finally, one word about Gaza. And, Mr. Chairman, you were
there, and I think that was absolutely the right thing to do.
And I would hope that members of the administration would visit
Gaza, as well. It is a humanitarian and political catastrophe,
both.
I don't need to get into the details of the humanitarian
situation, which you saw firsthand. But, politically, it is
completely self-defeating. Yes, Hamas is being weakened in
Gaza. We have people who work with the international crisis
group, there, and they testified to Hamas's dwindling--dropping
popularity. But, Hamas is not going away. It controls Gaza. And
the more the siege remains, the more we're bringing up a
generation of Palestinians who are going to be tempted by more
radical forms of behavior. The economy is falling, in the hands
of Hamas, because the private sector is being dried up. And who
knows, if the situation continues, whether Hamas will be
tempted with a new round of violence, which would bring to
naught all our efforts on a peace process. So, we need a new
policy toward Gaza, a more energetic policy that opens it up to
normal trade and traffic. It's also in our interest. You were
in Doha, Mr. Chairman. You know how Gaza has become the lens
through which so many Arabs view United States policy.
My recommendations, obviously, entail a long haul, revising
our approach toward Israelis, Palestinians, and the region.
There are no shortcuts, but I also think we have no choice,
because our credibility and national interests are at stake.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Malley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Robert Malley, Middle East and North Africa
Program Director, International Crisis Group, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, first, let me express my appreciation to you for the
invitation to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In
the 17 years since it was first launched, the peace process has gone
through times that were better and through times that were worse, but
none that were more complex, confusing, or contradictory as today. That
is because of late so much that had been relatively stable--in terms of
the character of local actors, shape of the regional landscape and
assessment of the U.S. role--has undergone dramatic shifts. Only a
handful of these recent transformations need mention: the death of
Yasser Arafat, father of Palestinian nationalism, and incapacitation of
Ariel Sharon, Israel's last heroic leader; Fatah's crisis; Hamas's
electoral triumph and takeover in Gaza; the 2006 Lebanon and 2008 Gaza
wars, which shook Israel's confidence and bolstered that of Islamist
militants; the failure of the Abbas-Olmert talks; U.S. regional
setbacks in Iraq and diplomatic disengagement elsewhere; Iran's
increased influence; and the growing role of other regional players.
This is not a mere change in scenery. It is a new world. As the ground
beneath the peace process has shifted, U.S. efforts have yet to fully
adjust.
This hearing is entitled ``Ground Truths, Challenges Ahead,'' and
there could not have been more fitting title. Only by taking a sober,
honest look at where things stand today might we have an opportunity to
overcome the challenges and begin to reshape the region in ways that
serve our national interests.
Mr. Chairman, at the outset it is important to acknowledge several
stark, uncomfortable realities.
Among Palestinians, the national movement, once embodied by Fatah
and led by Arafat, is in deep crisis, weakened, fragmented, and without
a compass. Fatah is divided, lacking a clear political program, prey to
competing claims to privilege and power. Rival sources of authority
have multiplied. Mahmoud Abbas is President, though his term has
expired; he heads the PLO, though the organization's authority has long
waned. Salam Fayyad, the effective and resourceful Prime Minister,
cannot govern in Gaza and, in the West Bank, must govern over much of
Fatah's objection. Hamas has grown into a national and regional
phenomenon, and it now has Gaza solidly in its hands. But the Islamist
movement itself is at an impasse--besieged in Gaza, suppressed in the
West Bank, at odds with most Arab States, with little prospect for
Palestinian reconciliation and with internal divisions coming to the
fore. Meanwhile, diaspora Palestinians--once the avant-garde of the
national movement--are seeking to regain their place, frustrated at
feeling marginalized, angered by what they see as the West Bankers'
single-minded focus on their own fate.
Both symptom and cause of Palestinian frailty, foreign countries--
Arab, Western, and other--are wielding greater influence and in greater
numbers. All of which leaves room for doubt whether the Palestinian
national movement, as it currently stands, can confidently and
effectively conduct negotiations for a final peace agreement, sell a
putative agreement to its people, and, if popularly endorsed, make it
stick. There is insufficient consensus over fateful issues, but also
over where decisions should be made, by whom and how.
To this must be added more recent travails: the Goldstone affair,
which damaged President Abbas's personal credibility; the U.S.
administration's course correction on a settlements freeze, which
undercut Palestinian as well as Arab trust in America; and steps as
well as pronouncements by the Israeli Government, which depleted what
faith remained in Prime Minister Netanyahu.
The backdrop, of course, is 17 years of a peace process that has
yielded scant results, not a few of them negative, and has eroded
confidence in negotiations as a means of achieving national goals. The
Palestinian people, as much as its political elite, sees no real
alternative option, and so for now will persist on this path. The
acceptance of indirect talks, after some hesitation and after rejecting
their direct version, is the latest indication. But the acceptance is
grudging rather than heartfelt, and resigned rather than hopeful. They
are hoping for guarantees now, a sense that talks will not last forever
even as facts on the ground change in their disfavor.
In far less pronounced fashion, Israel too has witnessed a
fragmentation of its political landscape. Endemic government weakness
and instability as well as deepening social splits have combined with
the rise of increasingly powerful settler and religious constituencies.
Together, these developments call into question the state's ability to
achieve, let alone carry out, an agreement that would entail the
uprooting of tens of thousands of West Bank settlers.
Nor has disillusionment with the peace process been an exclusively
Palestinian affair. Israelis too are losing hope; fairly or not, they
read Abbas's rejection of former Prime Minister Olmert's offer as a
sign that peace will remain elusive. Instead, they focus on the violent
aftermaths of their withdrawal from South Lebanon and from Gaza; on the
rise of militant forces in Palestine and throughout the region that
reject their nation's very existence; on those groups' acquisition of
ever more deadly and far-reaching weapons. Although still confident in
their military superiority, Israelis have begun to doubt. The Lebanon
and, to a lesser degree, Gaza wars were warning signs to a nation for
whom the security establishment has from the start been a pillar of
strength even amid political turmoil. The threat to Israel, real or
perceived, from Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah, supplants much else.
Israelis are looking for security guarantees that take into account
these broader regional shifts in any eventual agreement; they also are
looking for signs of genuine acceptance of, rather than temporary
acquiescence in, their existence.
Political fragmentation has hit the regional scene as well and the
balance of power has been one victim. So-called moderate Arab regimes
on which the United States long relied no longer can dictate or expect
compliance from their counterparts. They too have suffered from the
peace process dead-end, the Lebanon war and the conflict over Gaza
which exposed them to their people as impotent or, worse, on the wrong
side of history. Increasingly, they appear worn out and bereft of a
cause other than preventing their own decline and proving their own
relevance. Gradually, they are being upstaged or rivaled by other, more
dynamic players, states (such as Iran, Syria or, to a lesser degree,
Qatar) or movements (most notably Hamas and Hezbollah). They still can
carry the day--witness the Arabs' decision to back proximity talks. But
they do so with greater difficulty and so with greater reservations,
feeling the pressure of dissenters both domestic and regional.
The final change, and one that arguably must concern us most, is
the United States loss of credibility and influence. There are many
reasons for this--setbacks in Iraq; Iran's rise; the failure of
diplomacy in the 1990s and the disengagement from diplomacy in the
decade that followed; and the unavoidable disappointment of
unreasonably high Arab expectations coupled with the avoidable U.S.
missteps that followed President Obama's election among others. The
bottom line is that large numbers in the region wonder what the United
States stands for and seeks to achieve and that--an evolution far more
worrisome--growing numbers have begun not to care.
U.S. peace efforts toward a two-state solution have a chance to
succeed only if they take into account these profound alterations and
adapt to them. They cannot assume that our credibility, the outlook, or
nature of the Israeli and Palestinian polities, or regional dynamics in
2010 are even remotely similar to what they were in 2000. In this
sense, the fate of some of the administration's early efforts should
serve as a warning sign.
1. Any approach must take account of reduced U.S. credibility and
influence while seeking ways to restore them. The first lesson, self-
evident but too often honored in the breach, is to define a clear and
achievable goal, assess what actions are required--domestically,
regionally, and internationally--to realize it and make sure there is a
strategy to cope with the fallout in the event one or both parties
resist. It means avoiding high stakes risks at a time when neither the
United States nor the region can afford another high-level failure. It
means avoiding raising expectations and allowing actions to speak for
themselves. And it means working closely with others to increase our
leverage.
One particular idea that receives regular attention is for the
United States to unveil a set of parameters that can serve as its terms
of reference for negotiations--e.g., a Palestinian state on the 1967
borders with one-to-one swaps; Jerusalem as the capital of two states
based on demographic realities; a third party security presence in the
West Bank. I believe the time for such an initiative almost certainly
will come. It would not be a concession to either of the parties but
rather the prudential step of a mediator seeking to narrow negotiation
positions within realistic bounds; if such terms cannot be agreed upon,
it is hard to see what purpose negotiations might serve or how they
could possibly succeed. Nor would it be dictating a specific outcome so
much as defining a zone of possible compromise, making clear to leaders
on both sides what the United States believes to be a reasonable
outcome, giving their publics something to debate and rally around, and
suggesting the costs of forfeiting this chance. But this should be done
only at the right moment, in the proper context. It should only be done
with strong regional (especially Arab) and international backing. And
it should be done only if the United States is prepared to deal with
the prospect of either or both sides saying no.
2. Our strategy must be mindful of, without being captive to, both
sides' politics and the mutual, collapsing faith in the old plans and
formulas. Mahmoud Abbas's refusal to engage in direct talks under the
auspices of a more sympathetic and engaged administration was, seen
from the United States, frustrating and puzzling almost to the point of
incomprehension. Much of it was explained on account of his personal
trauma--what the Goldstone humiliation meant to him and his close
ones--and anxiety. Yet the impasse must be understood as going far
beyond personal pique (though there is some of that) or the
apprehensions of a single man (though he has a considerable amount of
that too).
Abbas's reaction is, above and beyond all, a reflection of an
enormous popular disappointment in the process that began in 1993. He
is, in a sense, the last true believer, holding out hope in the promise
of a negotiations strategy of which, among his colleagues, he was the
first and most ardent supporter. But even he could no longer ignore
that he sits at the centre of three concentric circles of failure: 16
years since the Oslo accords, 5 since he was elected President and 1
since Barack Obama took office. And so it has become that much harder
for him to justify or defend a process that is deprecated in Ramallah,
whether to a skeptical population, to his Fatah movement or even to
himself. His demands for a settlements freeze (prompted, he believes,
by the U.S.), then for robust terms of reference are not a sign that he
has given up on negotiations. They are a sign that he wants to enter
them under conditions that, in his mind, offer a chance of success. It
would be a mistake for us, or for Israel, to see Abbas as a temporary
obstacle rather than as the more moderate expression of a deeply
entrenched collective disillusionment.
The same is true on the Israeli side. Benjamin Netanyahu can be
maddening in his grudging acceptance of a two-state solution, numerous
caveats, political maneuvering and foot-dragging. His coalition
partners--a mix of right wing, xenophobic, and religious parties--
certainly complicate the path toward a peace agreement. But Netanyahu's
insistence on Palestinian recognition of a Jewish state as much as his
demands for far more stringent security--and thus, territorial--
arrangements--are not mere pretexts to avoid a deal and are far more
than the expressions of a passing political mood. They reflect deep-
seated popular sentiment regarding the yearning for true Arab
recognition and acceptance and fear of novel, unconventional security
threats. New coalition partners or new elections might change the
atmosphere. They are not about to change the underlying frame of mind.
In short, we should no more underestimate how deep runs Palestinian
skepticism than we should downplay how broadly Netanyahu's positions
resonate.
3. A successful strategy must reflect the changing nature--and
increased fragmentation--of both Palestinian and Israeli politics. New
actors and forces have emerged on both scenes. As a result, we need to
find a way to reach out to skeptical constituencies that often are the
most energized, the most dynamic and the most indifferent to talk of a
two-state solution. These include settlers and religious groups on the
Israeli side; the diaspora, refugees, and Islamists on the Palestinian.
This will entail finding ways to communicate with them, but also to
reflect some of their concerns in an eventual peace deal.
Mr. Chairman, any talk of inclusiveness inevitably raises the
difficult, controversial question of Hamas and how the United States
ought to deal with it. I have long believed that the issue of direct
U.S. engagement with the organization is a distraction, a diversion
that prevents us from thinking clearly and rationally about a more
basic issue--namely, whether we believe a politically and
geographically divided Palestinian national movement is in a position
to reach, implement, and sustain a historic deal.
My view is that it cannot. By challenging President Abbas, Hamas
can make it more difficult for him to resume direct negotiations. By
resuming rocket attacks from Gaza, it can once again disrupt talks
should they begin. By mounting a campaign in the territories and
refugee camps, it can torpedo the chance of passage in a referendum,
should a deal be reached. And, throughout--by its activities, rhetoric
and presence in Gaza--it lowers the Israeli public's belief in peace.
Hamas almost certainly has lost popular support and its freedom of
maneuver in the West Bank has been sharply curtailed. But it remains a
powerful political and military presence, with strong domestic backing
and the capacity to act. Conventional wisdom has it that Hamas should
be dealt with only once the peace process has shown significant
progress; the theory neglects the Islamist movement's ability to ensure
that it does not.
It ought not to have escaped notice that, amid the flurry of
discussions between Abbas and Olmert and then the drama surrounding the
initiation of direct or indirect talks between Abbas and Netanyahu,
some of the more practical, implicit arrangements and serious
negotiations have been struck between Israel and Hamas--over Gaza for
example, or the prisoners exchange. That does not mean that Hamas--any
more than Fatah--can claim to represent the Palestinian people or speak
on their behalf. It does not mean that the United States must deal
directly with Hamas. And it does not mean that the United States should
openly promote Palestinian unity, a Palestinian decision that they need
to take themselves. But at a minimum, the United States should stop
standing in the way of a possible reconciliation agreement and signal
it would accept an accord to which President Abbas lent his name.
4. A successful strategy must adapt to changing regional dynamics.
The Middle East is far more polarized and decentralized than a decade
ago and our traditional partners no longer have the power they once had
to carry the region with them. With too many actors able and willing to
intervene, an Israeli-Palestinian track cannot proceed on its own, let
alone succeed on its own.
Syria is not a central or perhaps even decisive actor in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But it undoubtedly is a crucial one, and
its importance has risen as the regional landscape has changed. In
particular, its allies--Hamas and Hezbollah--have gained considerable
power. Damascus can take on a spoiling role or a stabilizing one. It
can facilitate Middle East peace or retard it. How United States-Syrian
relations evolve will go a long way toward determining what part the
Syrian regime ultimately chooses to play.
Improved relations between the United States and Syria as well as a
resumption of Israeli-Syrian peace talks are, in this respect, of
critical importance. It used to be feared that movement on the Syrian
track would impede progress on the Palestinian one. No more. There are
several reasons. On its own, an agreement between Israel and the
Palestinians, but without agreement with Syria or Lebanon, would not
produce peaceful relations between Jerusalem and the rest of the Arab
world. Without Syria, in other words, the most powerful incentive for
Israelis to make the compromises required for a peace deal--recognition
and normalcy--would be lacking. Nor would Syria see any reason to
discourage its allies in Palestine from undermining the deal or
Hezbollah from maintaining military pressure in the north. In other
words, the benefits for Israel of a Palestinian deal are partial and
political costs are high. A comprehensive accord, by contrast, would
magnify the payoff: Arab States would establish normal relations with
Israel; Hezbollah and Hamas would have to readjust their stance; even
the Iranian leadership would be compelled to adapt.
Progress on the Syrian track also would bolster the Palestinians'
ability to move in their talks. Palestinians need Arab backing and
cooperation to legitimize compromises, most notably on issues that are
not strictly Palestinian--the status of Jerusalem or the fate of the
refugees--and for which Damascus's acquiescence would make a
difference. This is all the more true given the state of Palestinian
politics, weak, divided and susceptible to outside interference. Should
Syria feel excluded, it could undermine the accord and mobilize its
allies to do the same.
Finally, U.S engagement with Syria could be put to use to seek to
establish new redlines between Israel and Hezbollah. The border between
Israel and Lebanon might seldom have been calmer, but the threshold for
renewed--and large-scale confrontation--rarely has been lower.
To date, the Obama administration's experience with the Syrian
regime has left many doubtful. Despite signs of engagement, including
high level visits and the decision to dispatch an ambassador,
Washington sees little evidence of reciprocity. To the contrary, it
sees are signs of deepening ties to Hezbollah and Iran and, most
recently, opposition to indirect Israeli-Palestinian talks.
It was always to be expected that engagement with Syria would be an
arduous, painstaking affair; prospects remain uncertain. But to judge
results at this stage or on the basis of its ties to traditional allies
is to misunderstand the regime and how it makes its decision. Syria
itself sees little of value emerging from the first 14 months of the
administration--continued sanctions; repeated calls for it to sever
ties to reliable allies; paralysis on the peace process; and lack of
cooperation on regional issues.
There is a broader point. In Western capitals as well as in Israel,
considerable time and energy is spent on the question whether Syria is
genuinely interested in a peace deal; whether it would be prepared to
fundamentally shift is strategic orientation--shorthand for cutting
ties to current allies; and, if so, what it might take (returning the
Golan, neutralizing the international tribunal on the murder of former
Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri, lifting U.S. sanctions, or providing
vast economic support) to entice Damascus to make that move.
At its core, the question is ill-directed and the conceptual
framework underpinning it is flawed. However much Syria aspires to
these political or material returns, and notwithstanding the importance
it places on the bilateral U.S. relationship, the key for the regime
relates to its assessment of regional trends, domestic dynamics as well
as the interaction between the two. The end result is a debilitating
perceptions gap: whereas outsiders ponder how far Syria might be
willing to go in helping reshape the region, Damascus considers where
the region is headed before deciding on its next moves. What Washington
can do for Damascus matters; what it can do in and for the region may
matter more.
The temptation in Washington so far has been to test Syrian
goodwill--will it do more to harm the Iraqi insurgency, help President
Abbas in Palestine, loosen ties to traditional allies or stabilize
Lebanon? On its own, that almost certainly will not succeed. The United
States is not the only one looking for evidence. So too is Syria--for
proof that the risks it takes will be offset by the gains it makes. The
region's volatility drives them to caution and to hedge their bets
pending greater clarity on where the region is heading and, in
particular, what Washington will do.
Ultimately, we do not know how far the Syrian leadership can or
will go. It likely will make up its mind only when it deems it
absolutely necessary--when it is faced with a concrete and attractive
alternative strategic role in the region and peace offer. Today,
Syria's incentives--strategic, economic, and social--to adjust its
posture and policies are high but uncertain; the risks are profound and
tangible. In particular, as long as the current situation of neither
peace nor war that defines Syria's relations with Israel endures,
Damascus most likely will seek to maintain--and play on--the
multiplicity of its relations and will continue to use its ties to
Hezbollah, Iran, and Hamas to provide it with what it considers a form
of leverage and deterrence. For Washington, the challenge was and
remains to adopt regional and bilateral policies that help Syria's
calculations in the right direction.
One thing is clear: Syria will be careful not to move prematurely
and risk alienating current allies without at a minimum having secured
complementary ones (regional or international). In this sense, Syria's
ability to adjust its strategic stance also will be, in part, a
function of its allies' situation and perceptions at the time. The more
Iran, Hezbollah, or Hamas feel pressured, the more they interpret
Syrian moves as betraying them at a critical juncture, the harder it
will be for Damascus to display signs of greater autonomy or distance
from them. As a result, the more Syria's historic partners are
embattled and the United States clamors for a break between Syria and
them, the more Damascus will redouble signs of loyalty toward them. The
recent summit meeting between Presidents Assad and Ahmadinejad, and the
highly dismissive tone adopted toward the United States are exhibit A.
Because sanctions will not be lifted until Syria changes its
relations with its allies and because Syria will not modify these
relations in the absence of far more substantial regional changes, a
wiser approach would be for the United States and Syria to explore
together whether some common ground could be found on specific issues
and work on a blueprint for their relationship. If successful, this
could provide a more realistic test of both sides' intentions, promote
their interests and start shaping the Middle East in ways that can
reassure Syria about what the future holds. On Iraq, Damascus may not
truly exercise positive influence until genuine progress is made toward
internal reconciliation. The United States could push in that
direction, test Syria's reciprocal moves and, together with the Iraq
Government, offer Damascus the prospect of stronger economic relations
with its neighbor. In Palestine, Syria claims it can press Hamas to
moderate its views but again only if there is real appetite in the
United States for an end to the internal divide. Likewise, both
countries could agree to try to immunize Lebanon from regional
conflicts and push the state to focus on long-overdue issues of
governance. Given the current outlook and suspicion in Damascus and
Washington, these are all long shots. But, with little else in the
Middle East looking up, it is a gamble well worth taking.
One cannot conclude an overview of the situation in the Middle East
without warning about real and potential flashpoints, either one of
which risks steering the region in unpredictable--but predictably
perilous--directions. There are many--the explosive situation in
Jerusalem is one, the tense situation on Israel's northern border
another--but I will focus briefly on one.
Mr. Chairman, you have visited Gaza recently and so there is no
need to describe the appalling humanitarian conditions of a population,
40 to 60 percent of whom are unemployed, in excess of that living
beneath the poverty level. Israel has legitimate security concerns; it
also has an interest in obtaining the release of Corporal Shalit, held
in captivity in Gaza for over 1,300 days.
But to inflict collective punishment on the people of Gaza is both
morally unconscionable and politically self-defeating. Hamas has lost
backing as a consequence of the siege, it is true, but at what price
and to what end? It is nowhere nearer losing control over Gaza and
elections are nowhere in sight. The end of all legal commerce and
flourishing of a tunnel-based economy is destroying the business class
and granting more power to those who currently hold it. A generation of
Gazans is being brought up knowing nothing but want and despair.
Hamas--although hardly eager for renewed confrontation after Operation
Cast Lead--might soon conclude its best bet is to provoke a new
escalation in order to break out of its current impasse. Arab public
opinion, which harbored such high expectations for President Obama,
increasingly is viewing U.S. policy through the lens of Gaza's ordeal
and Washington's seeming obliviousness to this plight.
It is hard to see how any of this is good for Israel's security or
U.S. national interests. There are options for opening Gaza up to
normal trade--through Israel, through Egypt, or by sea--in ways that
meet Israel's legitimate security concerns. We should press for them
and help put them into place.
Mr. Chairman, at the dawn of this new Presidency, my colleague
Hussein Agha and I wrote: ``so much of what the peace process relied
upon has been transfigured. It was premised on the existence of two
reasonably cohesive entities, Israeli and Palestinian, capable of
reaching and implementing historic decisions, a situation that, today,
is in serious doubt; continued popular faith and interest in a two-
state solution, which is waning; significant U.S. credibility, which is
hemorrhaging; and a relatively stable regional landscape, which is
undergoing seismic shifts.''
The challenge for the administration is to devise a strategy that
strives for our traditional goals but in a radically transformed
environment. It will take persistence and flexibility, determination
and creativity, a retooled approach toward local parties and the
region. It likely will take time. There are no shortcuts. There is no
choice.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Malley.
Dr. Asali.
STATEMENT OF DR. ZIAD ASALI, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN TASK FORCE ON
PALESTINE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Asali. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, I wish to thank you
and the esteemed members of your committee for the privilege of
testifying before you.
The situation facing Israel, the Palestinians, and all
other interested parties, especially the United States, is
difficult, but it also presents new opportunities. I'm
confident that negotiations will resume soon with measures in
place to maximize the possibility of success.
Yesterday's Arab League's decision facilitates Special
Envoy Mitchell's efforts to bring the parties together.
Proximity talks, regional cooperation, and more constructive
rhetoric by the parties will all help. But, past experience
should temper our expectations for the immediate future.
The PA has initiated an important innovation with regard to
Middle East peace: the program issued last August by Prime
Minister Fayyad under the leadership of President Abbas.
Palestinians plan to build the institutional, infrastructural,
and economic foundations of their states while under
occupation, to end the occupation. All parties, including
Israel, say it is their intention to realize a two-state
solution.
The Palestinians are taking up the responsibilities of
self-government as they continue to insist on the right of
self-determination. In extemporaneous remarks at the Herzliya
conference last month, Fayyad explained this, and the Israeli
leadership applauded. He addressed accusations of unilateralism
by noting that only Palestinians can build up their own state.
It must be clearly stated that the Palestinian state can only
be established through a negotiated agreement. The Israeli
establishment, that understands that a peace agreement with the
Palestinians is a strategic imperative, should recognize this
program as a serious pathway to that end. And there should be
no doubt about the negative strategic consequences of thwarting
it.
Institution-building is not a substitute for diplomacy.
They support each other. The PA innovation is to add a bottom-
up approach, based on palpable achievements, to top-down
diplomacy. Convergence between these two will result in a
mutually reinforcing dynamic toward peace.
At the heart of the state-building enterprise are the new
Palestinian security forces. The restoration of law and order
and increased security cooperation, along with Israel's removal
of several checkpoints, has led to an economic upturn in the
West Bank. This demonstrates what Palestinians can accomplish
and how Israeli concerns can be overcome, given appropriate
levels of coordination, international aid, technical support,
and sustained political engagement. It is vital that
Palestinian security forces are allowed access and mobility.
Israeli incursions undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness
of these forces as state-builders. Despite the harsh realities
of life under the occupation, conditions have improved under--
areas in--under PA control. But, significant challenges remain.
Last week tensions were raised by Israel's decision to add
holy sites in the occupied territories to its international
heritage registry. Continued settlement activity,
confrontations in East Jerusalem, excavations near holy sites,
evictions of Palestinian families, travel and visa
restrictions, belligerent conduct by extremist settlers, and
sporadic violence by individual and organized Palestinian
extremists, all undermine the viability and credibility of
negotiators and negotiations. In this context, I acknowledge
Prime Minister Netanyahu's intervention to defuse a crisis over
building plans in Silwan.
The situation in Gaza is dire. Israel's blockade has
produced a humanitarian tragedy without weakening Hamas
control. Isolation helps Hamas increase its hold on the long-
suffering people of Gaza, and to create a totalitarian
theocracy that systematically takes over civil society and
harasses international NGOs, the very organizations best placed
to lead the reconstruction effort. In short, the people suffer
while Hamas benefits politically from this unconscionable
blockade. I strongly recommend that reconstruction commence
soon, and that legal and orderly operations of the crossings be
resumed.
I also call for ending the frankly mystifying and
counterproductive pattern of Israel preventing Gaza students
from traveling to study abroad.
I commend Congress for the substantial aid it provided to
the Palestinians last year. This positive trend needs to be
expanded by offering the necessary financial and political
support for the PA to successfully pursue the state- and
institution-building program. This is not simply a development
project, it is a serious political program that advances a key
American national interest. I believe that this program should
be funded by Congress, and that the United States Government
should lead others to fund and support it, as well. I look
forward to Special Envoy Mitchell's enlisting necessary
partners to achieve coordinated political, economic, and
security progress.
The United States is the indispensable partner that can
bring all parties to negotiations and agreement. And in this, I
see the answer to Tom Friedman's suggestion. The United States
is the indispensable partner that can neither outsource this
issue, nor can let anybody else handle it alone. The regional
alliances needed to be formed, considering the challenges of
this year and next year, can only be dealt with by a
coordinated effort through the United States diplomacy.
I thank you for the opportunity and look forward to
answering questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Asali follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Ziad J. Asali, President, American Task Force
on Palestine, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you and the committee's esteemed
members for the privilege of testifying before you. The bipartisan
leadership of this committee has for many years been a bulwark for all
those seeking peace and compromise in the Middle East.
The situation facing Israel, the Palestinians and all other
interested parties, especially the United States, is difficult but also
presents important new opportunities for moving forward.
I am confident that negotiations will resume soon, with the
appropriate measures in place to maximize the possibility of success
and minimize the consequences of stalemate. Yesterday's Arab League
decision will facilitate Special Envoy George Mitchell's efforts to
bring the parties together in the near future. Proximity talks and
regional cooperation will all be helpful in resuming negotiations.
It is also extremely important that the parties employ more
constructive, positive messaging aimed at each other and their own
constituencies, and avoid incitement and provocative, belligerent or
counterproductive rhetoric. Words matter. It is unacceptable for
officials and political figures on either side to pander and try to
score cheap debating and political points at the expense of
jeopardizing the serious effort to resume the negotiations and to end
the conflict. There should be political consequences, short of
censorship, for individuals and organizations on both sides that engage
in provocative and belligerent rhetoric. We strongly encourage the
United States Government to pay more attention to this serious problem,
and to become more engaged in public diplomacy on Middle East peace.
In addition to the vital diplomatic track, the Palestinian
Authority has initiated the most important innovation in many years
with regard to Middle East peace: the program of the 13th Palestinian
Government issued last August by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and his
Cabinet, under the leadership of President Mahmoud Abbas. The plan is
for Palestinians to build the institutional, infrastructural, economic
and administrative framework of their state in spite of the occupation
with the intention of ending the occupation. All parties, including
Israel, say it is their intention to realize the two-state solution. By
adopting this program, Palestinians are taking up the responsibilities
of self-government as they continue to insist on the right of self-
determination.
The document, entitled ``Palestinian National Authority: Ending the
Occupation, Establishing the State,'' \1\ affirms that, ``The
establishment of an independent, sovereign, and viable Palestinian
state is fundamental for peace, security, and stability in our
region,'' and pledges that, ``Palestine will be a peace-loving state
that rejects violence, commits to coexistence with its neighbors, and
builds bridges of cooperation with the international community. It will
be a symbol of peace, tolerance and prosperity in this troubled area of
the world.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State.''
Palestinian National Authority. Aug 2009. Accessed 1 March 2010.
.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prime Minister Fayyad explained this policy at the annual Herzliya
security conference in Israel a few weeks ago. His extemporaneous
remarks reflected his determination and the logic of these policies,
and the Israeli political and security leadership in attendance
applauded. He addressed the charge that this program is inadmissible
because it is unilateral by pointing out that only Palestinians can
build their own state and develop their society. This has to be a
Palestinian program. It has to be conceived by the Palestinians and
coordinated by a Palestinian central nervous system in order to channel
global donor assistance in a purposeful and meaningful way that has
political and economic coherence and impact. The Prime Minister cited
numerous examples of what this means in practice, including more than
1,000 community development projects that have already been completed,
the implementation of a transparent and accountable public finance
system, the creation of the nucleus of a Palestinian central bank and
the performance of the new Palestinian security services.
It must be clearly stated that the actual establishment of a state
can only be the consequence of a negotiated agreement based on the 1967
borders. The Israeli national security establishment that understands
that a peace agreement with the Palestinians is a strategic imperative
should recognize this program as a serious pathway to that end. As
Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak noted here in Washington just last
week, ``A successful peace process--especially with the Palestinians--
is not just in the interest of Israel. It is a compelling imperative
for the state of Israel. And that's why I say it's the uppermost
responsibility of any Israeli Government. Not as a favor to the
Palestinians, but out of our own interests--out of strength and without
compromising our security.'' \2\ Therefore Israel too has a vital
interest in the success of the Palestinian state and institution
building project. And there should be no doubt about the consequences
of thwarting it. That would play into the hands of extremists
throughout the region and beyond, and promote and accelerate the
process of radicalization. Indeed, it would have a powerful negative
impact on the strategic balance in the region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Barak, Ehud. ``Unedited Transcript,'' The Washington Institute
for Near East Peace. Washington DC. 26 Feb 2010. Accessed 1 March 2010.
.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The state and institution building program is not a substitute for
diplomacy, it compliments and supports it. The PA innovation is to add
a bottom-up approach to the top-down diplomatic track, adding
substance, credibility and political momentum based on concrete,
palpable achievements that are especially important when diplomacy
seems to be moving too slowly. What is needed is convergence between
the bottom-up and top-down approaches. Strategically significant,
positive, changes on the ground and diplomatic progress should be
mutually reinforcing.
However, the Palestinians will not be able to fully realize this
ambitious and potentially transformative program on their own. It will
require a sustained global effort to provide the PA with the financial
and technical support and the sustained political engagement that will
be required for it to succeed. The Obama administration, the Middle
East Quartet, Arab Governments and the Israeli Government all have a
stake in the creation of a Palestinian state. Now is the time for them
to act.
In January 2010 the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of
Planning and Administrative Development issued a new budget document,
``Palestine: Moving Forward, Priority Interventions for 2010,'' \3\
which spells out priorities for the Palestinian Government in the
coming year, and includes cost estimates and funding status. The
document lists the following priorities:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ ``Palestine: Moving Forward, Priority Interventions for 2010.''
Palestinian National Authority. Jan 2010. Accessed 1 March 2010.
.
Finalize the building of central and local government
institutions that are essential to the establishment of a
modern and sovereign State of Palestine on the June 1967
borders.
Upgrade public service delivery to all citizens throughout
the Palestinian territory occupied in June 1967.
Launch major projects to build strategically significant
infrastructure throughout the Palestinian territory occupied in
June 1967.
Improve and promote the image of Palestine internationally
and the role which the State of Palestine will play in bringing
stability and prosperity to the region.
Building on the August 2009 Cabinet document, this detailed
financial agenda is a clear guide to what the Palestinian Government
seeks to accomplish in 2010 and how this can be supported financially,
technically and politically by all those seeking to promote peace based
on the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel.
The program is ambitious, but those who closely follow events on
the ground in the occupied West Bank will know that projects are
already under way and things are beginning to happen in both the public
and private sectors. Public/private partnerships are also being
developed with international support. The U.S. Overseas Private
Investment Corporation and the nonprofit Middle East Investment
Initiative, together with U.S., international and Palestinian partners,
have established a loan guarantee program that is helping to generate
$228 million in lending to small- and medium-sized Palestinian
businesses; are launching a half-billion dollar lending facility that
will provide Palestinians living in the West Bank with access to
affordable mortgages for home ownership; and are creating a risk
insurance product to protect Palestinian businesses against losses
resulting from trade disruption and political violence. The Palestine
Investment Fund concentrates on placing new strategic investments in
Palestine, including companies such as PALTEL, PADICO, Palestine
Electricity Company, the Palestine Commercial Services Company, the
Arab Palestinian Investment Company, and Salam International Investment
Limited. Its current major projects include the $200 million Ersal Land
Development Project to develop a new commercial center in the heart of
the Ramallah-Al-Biereh Metropolitan Area, the PIF Housing Program which
aims at developing 30,000 housing units in all of Palestine during the
next 10 years beginning with the Al-Reehan neighborhood of northern
Ramallah, and the Wataniya Palestine Mobile Telecommunications Company.
The first planned Palestinian city in the West Bank, Rawabi, is
underway. The Palestinian Investment Promotion Agency will be hosting
the 2nd Palestine Investment Conference on June 2-3, 2010 in Bethlehem,
entitled ``Investing in Palestinian Small and Medium Businesses:
Empowerment of SMEs.''
However, in spite of these important public and private initiatives
and partnerships, the PA budget document contains too many line items
that are either unfunded or have funding pending.
Conditions in the occupied West Bank remain difficult, with
restrictions imposed by Israel's occupation that limit the ability of
Palestinians to have a normal life and that complicate state and
institution building and economic development. The problem of access is
improved but not yet resolved. Travel restrictions include onerous
required permits and military closures. Checkpoints, though
significantly reduced, continue to add to unpredictability and delay in
travel. Israeli-only highways which Palestinians are not allowed to
approach are a further restriction. In a recent and welcome decision in
December 2009, Israel's High Court ruled that Palestinians should no
longer be prevented from access to Israeli Highway 443 that runs
through the occupied West Bank.\4\ Finally, Israel's West Bank
separation barrier cuts many Palestinians off from each other and, in
some cases, their relatives and even their own privately owned land.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Zarchin, Tomer, ``High Courts Allows Palestinians To Use
Israeli highway,'' Haaretz.com. 29 Dec. 2009. Accessed 1 March 2010.
.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The occupation involves significant disparities in resources and
social services provided to settlers and Palestinian residents.
Settlers are Israeli citizens living under Israeli civil law, with all
the rights and protections accruing from that status. Palestinians in
the occupied territories are not citizens of any state, and are dealt
with by Israeli authorities through civil administration regulations
that are separate from Israeli civil law. Such disparities are too
numerous to list in this written testimony. But these fundamental
realities define the hardships of daily life under the occupation and
demonstrate the moral and political necessity of Palestinian statehood.
Despite these harsh realities, conditions have been improving in
the areas under PA control. At the heart of the state-building
enterprise are the new Palestinian security forces. Their restoration
of law and order and coordination with Israeli authorities, along with
Israel's removal of several checkpoints, has led to an economic upturn
in the West Bank. This model demonstrates what Palestinians can
accomplish, and how Israeli concerns can be overcome, given appropriate
levels of coordination, international aid, technical support and
sustained political engagement, and this process can be repeated in
sector after sector. It is vital that Palestinian security forces are
allowed access and mobility. Israeli incursions undermine the
legitimacy and effectiveness of these forces as state builders.
The most recent State Department Country Report on Terrorism noted
that, ``In the West Bank, PA security forces (PASF) followed up on
efforts to establish law and order and fight terrorist cells with
security deployments to Jenin, Bethlehem, and Hebron. All observers,
including Israeli security officials, credited PASF with significant
security improvements across the West Bank.'' \5\ Dov Weissglas, a
former senior advisor to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, noted that the
new Palestinian security forces ``are efficient, disciplined and
determined, they have good working relations and coordination with
their Israeli counterparts and their performance is immeasurably better
than it was in the past.'' \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ United States State Department, ``Country Reports on Terrorism
2008,'' Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. 30 Apr. 2009.
Accessed 1 March 2010. .
\6\ Weissglass, Dov, ``Working with the PA,'' Yedioth Ahronoth 29
Dec. 2009. Accessed 1 March 2010. .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But significant challenges remain, and a number of Israeli actions
in the occupied territories are complicating both the situation on the
ground and the prospects for renewed, successful negotiations.
Belligerent conduct by extremist settlers, confrontations in occupied
East Jerusalem, and travel and visa restrictions, along with sporadic
violence by both individual and organized Palestinian extremists,
undermine the viability and credibility of negotiators and
negotiations.
New claims on holy sites in the occupied West Bank: Last
week tensions were raised by Israel's decision to add holy
sites in the occupied West Bank to its national heritage
registry. On February 21, 2010, Prime Minister Netanyahu
announced that Rachel's Tomb/Bilal ibn Rabah Mosque in
Bethlehem and the Tomb of the Patriarchs/Al-Haram Al-Ibrahimi
in Hebron would be included in an Israeli-government $107
million ``national heritage'' restoration program.\7\ Both
sites are considered holy by both Jews and Muslims. The U.N.
and several European countries expressed serious concerns about
the move, and State Department official Mark Toner called it
``provocative.'' \8\ Anger about the announcement, combined
with the commemoration of the 1994 massacre of 29 Palestinian
worshipers at a mosque by the Israeli settler Baruch Goldstein,
led to significant clashes between Palestinian protesters and
Israeli troops in Hebron and other West Bank cities over
several days last week.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Mitnick, Josh, ``Israel Names Two Biblical Tombs in West Bank
Heritage Sites,'' The Christian Science Monitor. 23 Feb. 2010. Accessed
1 March 2010. .
\8\ ``Hebron Clashes Over Israel's West Bank Heritage List,'' BBC
News. 26 Feb. 2010. Accessed 1 March 2010. .
\9\ Berger, Robert, ``Israeli Troops Clash With Palestinians in
Biblical Hebron,'' Voice of America News. 26 Feb. 2010. Accessed 1
March 2010. ; see
also Mitnick, Joshua, ``Israeli Settlement Freeze Shields Dismantling
of Illegal Outposts,'' The Christian Science Monitor. 11 Dec. 2009.
Accessed 1 March 2010. .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Continued settlement activity: Settlement activity is
continuing, especially in and around occupied East Jerusalem,
in spite of the partial moratorium, both by the Israeli
Government's own admission and according to numerous credible
reports from NGOs, journalists and others. The Israeli
Government itself has identified 28 \10\ settlements that are
continuing construction in defiance of the partial moratorium,
and the Israeli NGO Peace Now has said the actual number is
33.\11\ This does not include areas specifically excluded from
the partial moratorium, including Jerusalem in which hundreds
of new settlement housing units are planned.\12\ State
Department spokesman Philip Crowley said the recent approval of
600 new settler housing units in the Pisgat Ze'ev neighborhood
of occupied East Jerusalem is ``counterproductive and
undermines trust between the parties.'' \13\ A February 2010
report by Chatham House warns that, ``The settler-driven
entrenchment of the Israeli Government in East Jerusalem is
reaching the point at which a peaceful division of the city
between Israel and a future Palestinian state may no longer be
possible.'' \14\ A March 2010 study by the Applied Research
Institute--Jerusalem found that ``during the years 2006 and
2009, Israel escalated its settlements construction activities
in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, particularly in and
around East Jerusalem, in an attempt to change realities on the
ground.'' \15\ On January 7, 2010, Defense Minister Barak
issued additional construction exemptions easing restrictions
even in areas where the moratorium does apply.\16\ Moreover,
data compiled by Brigadier General (res.) Baruch Spiegel on
behalf of the Israeli Ministry of Defense reportedly
demonstrates that about 75 percent of all Israeli settlement
construction has been carried out either without the
appropriate permits or in violation of permits that were issued
by the government.\17\ This suggests that historically and
typically, settlement activity has proceeded outside of the
control of formal Israeli government regulations. The database
also reportedly confirms that at least 30 percent of Israeli
settlements are built on privately owned Palestinian land. None
of the data cited above includes so-called ``illegal
outposts,'' which further complicate the problem, many of which
are not being dismantled by the Israeli authorities.\18\
According to a report in the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz just 2
days ago, ``Under the cover of the partial and temporary
freeze, the outposts are putting down deeper roots.'' \19\ In
another troubling move, in December 2009 the Israeli Government
added many settlements throughout the occupied territories to
the list of ``national priority areas,'' providing Israelis
with special benefits and incentives to stay in or move to
these settlements.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Levinson, Chaim, & Haaretz Service, ``Defense Ministry Reveals
West Bank Settlement Freeze Abuses,'' Haaretz.com. 15 Feb. 2010.
Accessed 1 March 2010. .
\11\ Ofran, Hagit, ``Ministry of Defense Acknowledges: One Quarter
of all Settlements Breached the Settlement Freeze'' Peace Now. February
2010. Accessed 1 March 2010. .
\12\ Hasson, Nir, ``Israel Planning To Build 600 More Homes in East
Jerusalem,'' Haaretz.com. 26 Feb. 2010. Accessed 1 March 2010. .
\13\ ``U.S. Slams New East Jerusalem Homes,'' Ynetnews.com. 3 Feb
2010. Accessed 1 March 2010. .
\14\ Dumper & Pullan, ``Jerusalem: The Cost of Failure,'' Chatham
House. Feb 2010. Accessed 1 March 2010. .
\15\ Isaac & Khalilieh, ``Jerusalem Governorate: Israeli Occupation
Practices in Jerusalem Governorate,'' Applied Research Institute-
Jerusalem (ARIJ). 2 March 2010.
\16\ Levinson, Haim, ``6 Weeks Into Settlement Freeze, Barak Eases
Restrictions,'' Haaretz.com. 8 Jan. 2010. Accessed 1 March 2010.
.
\17\ Blau, Uri ``Secret Israeli Database Reveals Full Extent of
Illegal Settlement,'' Haaretz.com. 1 Feb. 2009. Accessed 1 March 2010.
.
\18\ Mitnick, ``Israeli Settlement Freeze Shields Dismantling of
Illegal Outposts.'' 2009. Accessed 1 March 2010.
\19\ Eldar, Akiva, ``Supreme Court Abetting, Not Curbing, Illegal
Settlements,'' Haaretz.com. 2 March 2010. Accessed 2 March 2010.
.
\20\ Ravid, Barak, ``Netanyahu Extends Benefits to Isolated West
Bank Settlements,'' Haaretz.com. 9 Dec. 2009. Accessed 1 March 2010.
.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Excavations near holy sites: Archaeological excavations
conducted by the Israeli Government in the occupied
territories, especially in the so-called ``Holy Basin''--the
area of and surrounding the Old City of occupied East
Jerusalem--are another significant source of anxiety and
tension. Excavations beneath the Mugrabi Gate,\21\ underneath
the ``Isaac's Tent'' structure which is adjacent to the Temple
Mount/Haram al-Sharif,\22\ and underneath Palestinian homes in
the Silwan neighborhood \23\ have all proven highly
controversial.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ ``The Mugrabi Gate,'' Ir-Amin. N.D. Accessed 1 March 2010.
.
\22\ ``Excavations at `Isaac's tent','' Ir-Amin. N.D. Accessed 1
March 2010. .
\23\ ``Excavations at Silwan,'' Ir-Amin. N.D. Accessed 1 March
2010. .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Evictions of Jerusalemite Palestinian families: The most
noteworthy recent case reflects ongoing disputes in the Sheikh
Jarrah area of occupied East Jerusalem. On August 2, 2009, two
Palestinian families (al-Hanoun and al-Ghawi), consisting of 53
persons, were evicted from two homes in Sheikh Jarrah, a move
that was officially protested by the United States
Government.\24\ Jewish settlers immediately seized control of
and moved into the residences. The Palestinian families have
been keeping a Friday vigil outside the homes ever since.
Israeli authorities in Jerusalem have repeatedly announced
plans for additional settlement housing units in the area.\25\
Tensions in the area are running high, as indicated by a
violent confrontation on February 24, 2010, between Palestinian
residents and ultra-Orthodox Jews which left a Palestinian
woman and child hospitalized.\26\ In this context, we
acknowledge Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's
intervention to defuse a crisis over building plans in
Silwan.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Eldar, Akiva, ``U.S. Protests Eviction of Arab Family From
East Jerusalem Home,'' Haaretz.com. 27 July 2008. Accessed 1 March
2010. .
\25\ ``Sheikh Jarrah,'' Ir-Amin. N.D. Accessed 1 March 2010.
; see also ``Evictions
and Settlement Plans in Sheikh Jarrah: The Case of Shimon HaTzadik,''
Ir-Amin. 25 June 2009. Accessed 1 March 2010. ; see
also Hasson, Nir, ``Jerusalem to turn Sheikh Jarrah land into parking
lot near Jewish Tomb,'' Harretz.com. 1 March 2010. Accessed 1 March
2010. ; see also U.N. Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Occupied Palestinian Territory,
``Sheikh Jarrah,'' United Nations Information System on the Question of
Palestine. 15 Aug. 2009. Accessed 1 March 2010. .
\26\ Hasson, Nir, ``Ultra-Orthodox Jews, Palestinians Clash in
Sheikh Jarrah,'' Haaretz.com. 24 Feb. 2010. Accessed 1 March 2010.
.
\27\ Sofer, Roni, ``Barak To Suspend Silwan Plan at PM's Request,''
Ynetnews.com. 3 Feb. 2010. Accessed 1 March 2010. < http://
www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3856753,00.html>.
The situation in Gaza is dire. Israel's blockade has produced a
humanitarian tragedy without weakening the political grip of Hamas. In
January 2010 the World Health Organization said Gaza was facing an
``on-going deterioration in the social, economic, and environmental
determinants of health,'' and outlined a generalized health care crisis
involving all levels of care, the increasing unsuitability of the
drinking water supply, and the serious impact of lack of building
materials on public health and the health care system.\28\ The
findings, which incorporate the work of 80 NGOs, concluded that, ``the
economy of Gaza is in virtual collapse with rising unemployment and
poverty which will have long-term adverse effects on the physical and
mental health of the population. The environment is also in decline
including water quality, sewage and waste disposal and other
environmental hazards.'' The WHO also pointed out that, ``Rising
unemployment (41.5 percent of Gaza's workforce in the first quarter of
2009) and poverty (in May 2008, 70 percent of the families were living
on an income of less than $1 dollar a day per person) is likely to have
long term adverse effects on the physical and mental health of the
population.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ ``Gaza Health Fact Sheet,'' World Health Organization. 20 Jan
2010, Accessed 1 March 2010. .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A March 2009 report \29\ by the EU listed the following priorities
for reconstruction in Gaza:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ ``Damage Assessment and Needs Identification in the Gaza
Strip,'' European Network of Implementing Development Agencies
(EUNIDA). March 2009. Accessed 1 March 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Short term:
Rubble removal is a priority as reconstruction cannot start
if the rubble is not cleared. This operation should take place
together with the clearance of UXOs, for the sake of safety;
Private sector as it is the key to economic recovery and job
creation;
Agriculture to reduce the risk of food insecurity;
Water, wastewater, and solid waste as there are a number of
critical health related issues and a looming environmental
crisis;
Housing is one the basic needs of the population, although
Arab States have shown interest in financing this sector
entirely.
(b) Medium term:
Public buildings, particularly schools, health care
facilities, and buildings providing social services.
(c) For the longer term, infrastructure rehabilitation will be
essential for economic development:
Energy, as there is no economic recovery without access to
energy, for both the population and the private sector;
Roads, to increase access to social services and improve
movement of persons and goods.
A February 2010 letter \30\ to President Barack Obama signed by the
Foundation for Middle East Peace, Americans for Peace Now, the Arab-
American Institute, J Street, Churches for Middle East Peace, B'Tselem
and Rabbis for Human Rights--North America points out that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ ``Letter to President Obama on Israel's Gaza Closure Policy,''
Foundation for Middle East Peace. 4 Feb. 2010. Accessed 1 March 2010.
.
850 trucks daily with food, goods and fuel entered from
Israel, preclosure; 128 today.
The closure and the war have virtually halted manufacturing
and most agricultural exports. Before 2007, 70 trucks a day
carried Gazan exports for Israel, the West Bank and foreign
markets valued at $330 million, or 10.8 percent of Gaza's GDP.
11 percent of Gazan children are malnourished, to the point
of stunting, due to poverty and inadequate food imports. Infant
mortality is no longer declining.
281 of 641 schools were damaged and 18 destroyed in the war
because of the closure. Few have been rebuilt, and thousands of
students lack books or supplies. There are daily 8-hour power
shortages.
The war and Israel's refusal to allow imports of cement and
material to rebuild 20,000 destroyed or damaged homes have left
many more thousands of Gazans in tents, temporary structures,
or with other families.
Many war-damaged or deteriorating water and sewage
facilities are health and environmental hazards, for lack of
rebuilding supplies and equipment.
The war damaged 15 of 27 hospitals and 43 of 110 clinics.
Imports of medicine and equipment are delayed. Doctors cannot
leave for training, and patients face long delays to visit
Israeli hospitals; 28 have reportedly died while waiting.
Movement of people in and out of Gaza, including students,
aid and medical workers, journalists, and family members, is
severely limited.
The main issue holding back an effort to engage in the necessary
reconstruction has been the legitimate concern that measures benefiting
the long-suffering people of Gaza will advantage the de facto Hamas
rulers. However, we believe that as long as Gaza is cut off from the
outside world, Hamas will use smuggling to increase the people's
dependence on it. Gaza's isolation has allowed Hamas to increasingly
move from an authoritarian regime to a totalitarian theocracy that
harasses international NGOs--the very organizations best placed to lead
a reconstruction effort--and that systematically takes over civil
society organizations. Over the past year or so, Hamas has been
increasingly imposing ultraconservative social restrictions in Gaza,
particularly impacting the rights of women. Campaigns to enforce the
Muslim headscarf and other forms of ``modest dress,'' prevent women
from riding on the back of motorcycles, ban ``improper'' literature and
similar measures suggest a creeping fundamentalism of Hamas rule in a
Gaza Strip cut off from the outside world. Even more alarmingly, under
these circumstances Hamas itself is being increasingly challenged by
even more radical armed groups of Muslim extremists, including a
violent clash at a mosque in August 2009 between Hamas fighters and al-
Qaeda-like fanatics which left 24 Palestinians dead and 130 injured.
The bottom line is, the people suffer while Hamas and other extremists
benefit politically from this unconscionable blockade. We strongly
recommend that reconstruction commence as soon as possible, and it is
vitally important that the legal and orderly operation of the crossings
is resumed.
I'd like to emphasize the plight of Gaza students, and the
counterproductive and frankly mystifying pattern of Israel denying them
the ability to travel to study abroad. To illustrate the extent of this
problem, in September 2009 the Palestinian Interior Ministry said that
of 1,983 students who were accepted by universities abroad and applied
for the necessary permits, only 1,145 were cleared to travel through
the Rafah crossing. \31\ According to Israeli press reports, ``Since
June 2008, Gaza students are required to be accompanied by an official
diplomatic delegate from the county they are bound to. The complexities
of coordinating such efforts, as well as the fact that the Rafah
crossing is mostly closed, have resulted in only 12 percent of students
having been able to cross through it.'' \32\ I have been personally
involved in efforts to encourage the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem to
escort Gaza students as required for their visa interviews, and I can
attest to this complexity. Some students had to wait for over a year,
sometimes meaning their scholarship opportunity had expired. I'd like
to thank the consulate and the State Department for their efforts to
deal with this difficult complication and their efforts to encourage
Israel to drop its onerous requirement. However, a systematic solution
clearly needs to be found. It is imperative that this unacceptable
practice ends.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Zelikovich, Yaheli Moran, ``Gaza Students Stuck in Strip,''
Ynetnews.com. 21 Oct. 2009. Accessed 1 March 2010. .
\32\ Zelikovich, Gaza students stuck in Strip. 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is also the deeply troubling case of Berlanty Azzam, a 21-
year-old student at Bethlehem University who was arrested and removed
to Gaza by the Israeli military in October 2009. Azzam was completing
her last semester of a bachelor's degree program in Business
Administration, with a minor in Translation, and was 2 months away from
graduation. She was blindfolded and handcuffed during her expulsion
from the West Bank.\33\ The U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem said it was
``very concerned'' by this troubling incident.\34\ Azzam, a practicing
Christian, said she made the decision to study in the West Bank because
she was concerned about possible discrimination in Hamas-controlled
Gaza.\35\ In December 2009 the Israeli High Court ruled that she would
not be allowed to return to the West Bank.\36\ On February 4, 2010, she
participated in a panel discussion on ``The Right of Palestinians to
Study and Travel'' at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
but had to do so via telephone as Israeli authorities refused to allow
her to leave Gaza for the event.\37\ We should all carefully consider
what the likely consequences will be of policies that in effect deny
Gaza students the chance at a decent education.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ ``As Military Lawyer Gives False Promise, Bethlehem University
Student is Blindfolded, Handcuffed, and Taken to Gaza by Force,''
GISHA: Legal Center for Freedom of Movement. 29 Oct. 200. Accessed 1
March 2010. .
\34\ Bekker, Vita, ``U.S. `Very Concerned' About Palestinian
Student Deportation,'' The National. 12 Nov. 2009. Accessed 1 March
2010. .
\35\ Bekker, ``U.S. `Very Concerned' About Palestinian Student
Deportation.'' 2010.
\36\ Tang, Anne, ``Israel Expels West Bank Resident to Gaza,''
English.news.cn. 4 Feb. 2010. Accessed 1 March 2010. .
\37\ ``BU Student Recounts Forced Deportation to Carnegie Endowment
in DC,'' Ma'an News Agency. 5 Feb. 2010. Accessed 1 March 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I would like to conclude by commending Congress for the substantial
aid and support it provided to the Palestinians last year. This
positive trend needs to be expanded and developed by offering the
necessary financial, technical and political support for the PA to
successfully pursue the state and institution building program. This is
not simply a development project but a serious political program that
advances a key American national interest. Therefore this program
should be funded and supported by Congress as well as the executive
branch. The United States Government as a whole and with its full
weight should lead and encourage others to shoulder their own
responsibilities by embracing, funding and supporting the program as
well. We look forward to Special Envoy Mitchell enlisting necessary
partners to achieve coordinated political, economic, and security
progress.
Convergence between the top-down diplomatic track and the bottom-up
state and institution-building program constitutes the best prospect
for realizing a two-state agreement. A conflict-ending agreement
negotiated on the basis of the 1967 borders is vital to Israeli and
Palestinian interests, but, more importantly, it is in our own national
interest.
The United States is the indispensible partner that can bring all
parties to negotiations and to an agreement. This role can neither be
relinquished nor outsourced.
The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Asali. I appreciate it.
Mr. Makovsky.
STATEMENT OF DAVID MAKOVSKY, ZIEGLER DISTINGUISHED FELLOW AND
DIRECTOR OF THE PROJECT ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS,
WASHINGTON INSTITUTE OF NEAR EAST POLICY, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Makovsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Lugar, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you
for the opportunity to appear before this committee this
morning.
I'd like to just briefly touch upon some of the key points
of my written testimony.
To date, the Israeli-Palestinian issue has not worked out
as the Obama administration had hoped. While the developments
on the ground in the West Bank have shown great promise, as
we've all agreed upon here this morning, the top-down political
negotiations have not only made little progress, but have even
regressed. While proximity talks will commence very soon, they
can only be effective as a transition to direct talks between
the parties themselves, or as a political cover for those
talks, or they are bound to fail. It's impossible for any party
or country to make the requisite vital decisions without the
confidence of dealing directly with the other side.
Is there a role for the United States? Surely, there will
come a time for a U.S. bridging proposal. But, as you know, you
can bridge over a river; you can't bridge over an ocean. Until
the parties come close enough, it seems to me a bridging
proposal by the United States will fail.
The issue, then, is where to focus the talks now. I believe
the prospects of Israelis and Palestinians reaching a grand
agreement on all the core issues is very unlikely at this time.
The four core issues are known: the rights of refugees;
Jerusalem; security; and territory borders. Refugees and--the
refugees and Jerusalem are narrative issues. Both are tied to
the historic connection of the people to this conflict. And, in
my opinion, both are unlikely to be resolved anytime soon.
Leaders have not conditioned the societal landscape for
accommodation and breakthrough.
We should, instead, focus these coming talks on what is
attainable in our quest for a two-state solution. And the issue
where the gap between the parties is narrowest is land. And, of
course, security and land go together. In negotiations between
Olmert and Abbas in 2008-2009, their differences were only over
4\1/2\ percent of the land. Both said that any land taken by
Israel could be swapped for an equal amount of land inside
Israel. This narrow percentage difference, coupled with the
fact that both parties agreed to the idea of equal land swaps,
suggests that the differences regarding land are bridgeable.
And I was happy, Chairman Kerry, that you made your comments
this morning, as you did in Doha.
Moreover, a successful deal on borders would be a major
victory for all the concerned parties. The Palestinians would
obtain 100 percent of the land they seek through negotiations,
undermining Hamas's rejectionist narrative.
With a demarcation of the border, the settlement issue
would become moot. Therefore, Israelis could annex the majority
of the settlers, which live in less than 5 percent of the land
and largely adjacent to Israeli urban areas, and finally
resolve their different--their difficult legal status. They've
been in a legal limbo for 40 years.
For our part in the United States, we would be free of the
thorny issue of settlements disrupting American-Israeli
relations and the idea of a two-state solution would look to be
a reality.
Now, what are the challenges to this negotiating strategy
on borders/territory/security? The first is the deferral of the
issue of Jerusalem. While no border can be complete without
dealing with Jerusalem, it is interesting that the Oslo
Declaration of Principles of 1993 made clear that Jerusalem was
a separate final-status issue from territory. If the
disposition of the West Bank could be worked out, the city's
municipal border--boundary--should be the line until an
agreement on Jerusalem is ultimately reached.
However, to allay Palestinian concerns that ``deferring the
issue is now tantamount to conceding the issue,'' there would
have to be a baseline agreement now, between the parties, where
it is understood that Jewish and Arab neighborhoods in east
Jerusalem will not expand into each other.
A second challenge to the borders-first approach will be
the timetable for implementing it. It would be up to the
parties to decide whether they would implement it immediately
or wait until an overall agreement is reached. Some would say
nothing should be agreed until everything's agreed. But, in the
Middle East, when it's all or nothing, it often tends to be
nothing.
Implementation of a territorial agreement before solving
all the core issues would cause considerable pain for Israeli
leaders, as this would mean they'd have to evacuate tens of
thousands of settlers--maybe 60,000 of them--without
guaranteeing a final peace treaty. To alleviate this problem,
the parties could agree to a nonbelligerency agreement, and a
statement could be made by both sides, in which Israel would
accept the idea of a Palestinian state as a homeland for the
Palestinian people, and the Palestinians would accept the idea
of Israel as a homeland for the Jewish people, with equal
rights for all its citizens.
A third set of challenges are related to security. Much has
changed since President Bill Clinton convened Camp David summit
of 2000. Since then there's been a Palestinian intifada, a
Hamas coup in Gaza, and the introduction of stand-alone
rockets. Furthermore, many Israelis see the Gaza withdrawal in
2005 as triggering thousands of rockets, which culminated in
the Gaza war of 2008-2009.
While Palestinians have been despairing about the
enterprise of peacemaking because they see it as producing
insufficient results, Israelis have been equally despairing as
they increasingly equate withdrawal with vulnerability, and not
with security. Therefore, the security dimension needs to be
handled very carefully.
Another set of challenges deals with Iran, and that's
regardless of what issue is first on the agenda. It's been
mentioned here. I think it's clear, if Iran has nuclear
weapons, the prospects for Middle East peace are very bleak.
Rejectionists will be emboldened, and moderates will be
intimidated.
A fifth challenge will be the role of the Arab States. You
correctly point out, the Arab Peace Initiative has been
constructive compared to the past, but I think we need to be
clear that it is completely backloaded. Just as it would be
unacceptable for it to be completely front-loaded, for Israel
to receive the benefits without getting--paying the price; so,
too, the reverse is not acceptable. Israel can't be asked to
give all the land--West Bank, East Jerusalem, Golan Heights--
before the Arabs do anything. For the Arab Peace Initiative to
have real impact, it must be done in parallel, that Israeli
moves to the Palestinians are matched by moves by Arab States
toward Israel.
It's been stated here about all the economic progress of
Prime Minister Fayyad and Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton. They've done
an excellent job. Indeed, Fayyad's approach of institution-
building is nothing short of a new paradigm for Palestinian
nationalism. His idea of a--of building an accountable,
nonviolent movement as the ticket to statehood is a dramatic
departure from Yasser Arafat's sense of entitlement.
The relationship between Fayyad and Israel will be
important. Ziad touched on some of the issues of unilateralism.
Ultimately, bottom-up cannot be done without top-down. They
must go hand in hand.
And therefore, to conclude, I would just say, as
negotiations begin, direct talks will need to come forward.
Time is not on the side of moderates, but if they--the
moderates do not come together, it will not be surprising if
extremists exploit the situation for their own benefit.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Makovsky follows:]
Prepared Statement of David Makovsky, Ziegler Distinguished Fellow and
Director of the Project on the Middle East Peace Process, The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lugar, and distinguished members of
the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before this
committee this morning to discuss a subject whose future holds great
importance for U.S. foreign policy.
To date, the Israeli-Palestinian issue has not worked out as the
Obama administration had hoped. The picture is mixed. While the
developments on the ground in the West Bank have shown promise and
hope, the top-down political negotiations have not only made little
progress, but have even regressed. We have gone from a point where
Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas
were at advanced stages of negotiations, to a point where there have
been no negotiations at all between the parties for nearly a year.
There may be several reasons for this, yet as President Obama himself
has publicly admitted, it is due in no small measure to an early
miscalculation by Washington that triggered a series of events and
expectations that could not be overcome during the administration's
first year.
On Wednesday March 3, Arab Foreign Ministers gave their long-
awaited support for Abbas to participate in proximity talks, whereby
Senator Mitchell will shuttle between Israelis and Palestinians. Such
talks must be a transition to direct talks between the parties
themselves. In contrast, if these talks become an alternative to direct
talks, they will fail. It is impossible for any party or any country to
make the most vital decisions possible without the confidence of
dealing directly with the other side.
The issue is where to focus on the substance of talks. My point of
departure on this issue is that I think the prospect of the Israelis
and Palestinians reaching a grand agreement on all the core or so-
called final status issues is very unlikely at this time. The four core
issues are: the rights of refugees, control of Jerusalem, security and
territory/borders. The first two issues seem unlikely to be resolved
anytime soon.
Refugees and Jerusalem are narrative issues, and both are tied into
the historic connection of the people to this conflict. Jerusalem has
both religious and nationalistic dimensions for Israelis and
Palestinians and for key constituencies in and outside the region. The
refugee issue taps into the self-definition of Palestinians, including
many Gazans. Yet, neither Israeli nor Palestinian leaders have
conditioned their respective publics to deal with these third rail
issues. In the case of refugees, many of the descendents come from
Gaza, which is not even under the control of the Palestinian Authority
at this time, but rather is controlled by Hamas. This even further
complicates the refugee issue. In short, whenever it is all or nothing
in the Middle East, it is always nothing. We should not set ourselves
or the parties up for failure. Too much is stake. Hamas rejectionists
are waiting in the wings for pragmatists like Abbas to fail.
Furthermore, Israel will be facing demographic challenges, which will
threaten its goal of ensuring its future as a democratic and Jewish
state. With these increasingly high stakes, it is vital that we
concentrate our efforts on areas that are amenable to progress.
Instead, we should focus on what is attainable. The issue where the
gap between the parties is narrowest is land. This might sound
counterintuitive to some because many think the conflict is only about
land, but this is not the case. This is why I have advanced the idea of
``borders first'' for the past year, and was delighted to see that
Senator Kerry endorsed it in a recent speech in Qatar. In a press
conference in November, Senator Mitchell said, ``My personal and
fervent wish is that we will during this process at some point have a
resolution of the issue of borders so that there will no longer be any
question about settlement construction, so that Israelis will be able
to build what they want in Israel and Palestinians will be able to
build what they want in Palestine.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ From Senator Mitchell's press conference on Nov. 25th, 2009;
found at: http://www.
america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2009/November/
20091125160029ihecuor0.3026021.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In negotiations between Olmert and Abbas in 2008 and 2009, their
differences were over only 4.5 percent of the land. Olmert suggested
retaining 6.4 percent of the West Bank in return for equivalent land
inside Israel. In a November 2009 interview Olmert stated, ``It might
be a fraction more, it might be a fraction less, but in total it would
be about 6.4 per cent.'' \2\ Abbas thought the figure should be 1.9
percent. Both said any land taken by Israel could be swapped for an
equal amount of land inside Israel. The narrow percentage differences
coupled with the fact that both parties agreed to the idea of landswaps
suggests that the differences regarding land are bridgeable. For
example, 80 percent of all Israeli settlers, which is approximately
240,000 people, live in less than 4.5 percent of the territory being
negotiated, largely adjacent to the pre-1967 boundaries. The remaining
60,000 settlers live in the 95.5 percent remainder of the West Bank. As
these statistics illustrate, the so-called insurmountable obstacle of
settlements is actually relatively open to resolution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ From Ehud Olmert's interview with The Australian, published
November 28, 2009; found
at: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/ehud-olmert-still-
dreams-of-peace/story-e6frg
76f-1225804745744.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The only way to deal with the settlement issue is to render it moot
by subsuming it into peacemaking efforts and heading straight into the
final negotiations on territory. There are three distinct advantages to
focusing the negotiations on territory now. First, this approach allows
the Palestinian Authority to tell its people that it has obtained the
equivalent of 100 percent of the land to be part of a contiguous
Palestinian state. As such, negotiations and not Hamas terrorism will
be vindicated. The Palestinians can say they obtained what Anwar Sadat
received in peace talks with Israel--full withdrawal. Second, Israelis
will have something to gain and not just to give. Until now, no Israeli
leader has succeeded in legally annexing a single settler, let alone a
large majority of them. This approach would give many of the settlers
who live in the major blocs a stake in being part of the solution,
rather than being part of the problem. They would have their legal
status normalized as part of Israel and they would no longer live in
legal limbo, where they have been human bargaining chips for several
decades. Their status will be clarified. Finally, for the United
States, after many years, the settlements issue would no longer be a
thorn in United States-Israel relations.
This approach alone will not guarantee successful resolution of the
Jerusalem and refugee issues. After success on land, these issues will
have to be addressed and a timetable set. At that time, a conscious
effort must be made by all parties, including Arab states, to condition
public opinion to deal with the remaining contentious issues. Over
time, Israel will need to make concessions on Jerusalem, and the
Palestinians will need to concede that refugees can only return to the
Palestinian state and not to Israel.
The prioritization of land negotiations is not without its
problems. I would like to address some of the challenges to this idea.
One such challenge is Jerusalem. A Palestinian may ask if by deferring
Jerusalem, one is actually conceding this issue. This is a fair
question. Obviously nobody wants to trade a political conflict for an
incendiary religious one. Moreover, no border can be complete without
dealing with Jerusalem. Yet having written a book about the origins of
the Oslo accord in 1993, it is not coincidental that Article V of the
Declaration of Principles signed on the White House lawn and sealed
with a famous handshake listed Jerusalem as a separate category from
the issues of borders and settlements.\3\ The municipal border should
be the line until an agreement on Jerusalem is ultimately reached. To
allay Palestinian concerns about the changing character of the city,
there should be a baseline agreement between the parties, perhaps with
the assistance of the United States, whereby it is understood that
Jewish and Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem will not expand into
each other. A strict freeze has shown to be impractical, but a no-
expansion approach into the neighborhood of the other is something that
should be attainable. An assurance that Jerusalem will be addressed in
the future would be an important sign of confidence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The Oslo Declaration of Principles, Article V, Provision 3
states: ``It is understood that [permanent status] negotiations shall
cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements,
security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other
neighbors, and other issues of common interest.'' Full text can be
found at: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/
Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Declaration+of+Principles.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another challenge will come from some Israelis who may ask whether
such an approach will minimize their leverage in future talks, since
they are playing their ``land card'' now, so to speak. Clearly, if a
grand deal on all of the core issues could be struck it would be
preferable, yet privately, many of the same hesitant Israelis are
extremely dubious that a grand deal is achievable. Moreover, it is hard
to escape the idea that there will be trade-offs between the narrative
issues anyway. In other words, it is unlikely that playing a
``territorial card'' will obviate the need of addressing Jerusalem.
A third set of challenges will be the timetable of when a borders
first approach will be implemented. This could be left to the parties.
Some may say that a full agreement on the core issues is within reach
and therefore, implementation should happen all at once. Others say
full agreement will take considerable time, and therefore, it is best
to implement the territorial dimension now. This second approach will
create considerable political pain for Israel as it may mean Israel
evacuating--many forcibly--at least 60,000 settlers when there is no
guarantee of a peace treaty. (To give one a sense of context, this
would be more than seven times the number of settlers who were
withdrawn from Gaza in 2005. Moreover, the withdrawal would be taking
place in the West Bank, which Jews deem as the heart of biblical
patrimony.) In this context, it may be advisable to have not just a
non-belligerency agreement, but also a statement by both sides that
would have resonance. It would be useful for each side to agree in the
borders negotiations that they recognize one other. Specifically,
Israel would accept the idea of a Palestinian state as a homeland for
the Palestinian people and Palestinians would accept the idea of Israel
as a homeland for the Jewish people. Each has a historic claim to the
land, but it must be shared for the benefit of each. Neither party
should be seen as prejudicing in any way the full civil rights of any
citizen of either country, nor should it prejudice negotiations over
refugees.
This will enable an Israeli leader who will lead such a very
difficult withdrawal to tell the settlers that their mission is
completed as there will be an acknowledgment of a historic Jewish
connection to the land. (Some have argued that the settlers on the
wrong side of the line should be allowed to stay within Palestine. This
has surface appeal, but it will run into a host of problems. The
Government of Israel will not want to leave behind settlers whom it
cannot protect with its own security forces, especially given the
trauma between the Palestinians and settlers over the last four
decades.)
A fourth set of challenges will be the issue of security. At the
Camp David II talks in 2000 led by President Clinton, this was the most
straight-forward issue that was technical in character. Much has
happened subsequently. Security cooperation crashed in the second
intifada between 2000 and 2004. Hamas came to power in Gaza, stand-
alone rockets became a factor, and the idea of borders management after
Israeli withdrawal has been undermined by the expansion of cross-border
tunnels under Gaza for rocket smuggling. Many Israelis see the Gaza
withdrawal in 2004 as triggering thousands of rockets which culminated
in the Gaza war of 2008-09. Therefore, as part of the growing cynicism
of publics on both sides about the very enterprise of peacemaking,
Israelis increasingly equate withdrawal with vulnerability and not
security. (Palestinians and Israelis are equally jaded about the idea
of grand peace conferences that do not yield results.) Therefore, the
security dimension needs to be considered very carefully.
A fifth set of challenges are not unique to a borders first
approach, but will be present in any serious peace effort. These
challenges are related to Iran's quest for a nuclear weapon. I recently
wrote a book with Dennis Ross, who is currently a senior White House
official in the Obama administration, entitled ``Myths, Illusions and
Peace.'' In this book, we deal with the issue of linkage. There are no
strict linkages between the Palestinian and Iranian issues. Regardless
of progress on peace, Iran will seek a nuclear weapon. Moreover, senior
Arab security officials say privately that they do not see progress on
peace as decisive in influencing Arab efforts to halt Iran in any way.
The Arabs face many problems, including domestic challenges, in this
regard. However, a change in climate could at the margins make it
somewhat harder for Iran to exploit this issue. Yet, if it is clear
that Iran will have a nuclear weapon, the prospects for the Middle East
peace process are very bleak. Rejectionists will be emboldened and
moderates will be intimidated. Alternatively, there is no doubt that if
the Israelis and the Palestinian Authority did not think Iran was on
its way to being a nuclear problem and a regional power in a manner
that will boost Hamas, their evaluation of risk would certainly drop.
These challenges lead many to believe the current proximity talks
will fail. In order for the talks to succeed, it is important that they
are not pro forma and not just a means for the Palestinians to force
the United States to put forward its own plan. Historically, the Arab
states and the Palestinians have always hoped that the United States
would ``deliver'' Israel, but this has virtually never materialized.
Last summer, the Obama administration raised Arab expectations that it
would deliver a settlement freeze, but it fell short. Obama did not
even mention these negotiations in the State of the Union. The United
States is smarting from the fact that the Arab states were supposed to
match Israeli moves on settlements with gestures toward Israel, but
failed to do anything. The Arab states may say that the settlement
moratorium is not 100 percent of what they would like. No negotiation
is what one side wants. Yet, even if they think Netanyahu only moved 70
percent, they have responded with zero percent reciprocity. It is
unlikely the United States will go down this road again.
There is a big difference between the United States imposing a
solution on the parties and the United States putting forward a
bridging proposal after direct negotiations have brought the parties
closer to a deal. It is possible to bridge over a river, but not over
an ocean. A U.S. bridging proposal may occur, but only after direct
negotiations have been tried in earnest. The Palestinians need to be
careful what they wish for. If the Palestinians want the United States
to be explicit in its views regarding the final disposition of
Jerusalem, they will get a United States that is every bit as explicit
about the Palestinian refugees returning to Palestine, and not to
Israel.
In short, the United States can supplement negotiations but cannot
substitute for them. Speaking at the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy last Friday, Israel's Defense Minister Ehud Barak said that
Abbas should ``test'' Netanyahu's sincerity instead of presupposing any
outcome. Netanyahu feels he has traversed an ideological distance over
the last year as he overturned his own opposition to a Palestinian
state.
For all the problems of restarting peace talks during 2009, there
was an important bright spot between Israelis and Palestinians. There
were signs on the ground in the West Bank of economic progress, as well
as heightened security cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis.
Of course, economic development is not a substitute for political
progress, but it is a key component that could facilitate steps forward
and moderation. Economic progress enables the public to gain faith that
the future can be better, and it creates political space for the
leadership to gain more political capital with success. The hope is
that economic improvement facilitates political moderation as people
develop a stake in success. Palestinian polls consistently show that
Gazans living under Hamas and West Bankers alike would prefer to live
in the West Bank where there is economic progress, rather than living
under the repressive hand of Hamas in Gaza.
International Monetary Fund officials report that economic growth
in the West Bank is making major strides despite a worldwide recession.
They say that growth could reach as much as 7-8 percent in 2010 if
Israel continues its current policy of relaxing security restrictions,
most notably the removal of roadblocks. It is estimated that Israel has
removed all but a dozen of the 45 roadblocks that were in place to
prevent suicide bombers. Among the benefits of the relaxation of
restrictions is that it enables Israeli Arabs to enter the West Bank,
engage in commerce and generate jobs. Unemployment in the West Bank may
be high by American standards, but it has been cut by a third in the
last few years.
The following examples of growth provide a glimpse of the changes
occurring in the West Bank. There have been an approximately 2,000 new
Palestinian small businesses and other companies registered with PA
since 2008. A second new cell phone company in the West Bank, Wataniya
Palestine, was recently launched. The introduction of this second
mobile phone company is expected to inject US$700 million investment
into the Palestinian Territory and to generate $354 million in fiscal
revenue for the PA. It will also create thousands of jobs. Another
project underway is Rawabi, or ``hills'' in Arabic, which will be the
first-ever planned Palestinian city. Located about 5 miles north of the
Palestinian provisional capital of Ramallah, it is expected to have
40,000 residents at its formation. In Bethlehem, the rise of tourism
has already yielded 6,000 new jobs, and tourists are filling up hotels
in the city, marking a significant change. Previously, due to an
uncertain security situation, tourists feared staying overnight in the
West Bank, but the security is indeed improving. Palestinian security
forces have been trained with American and European money and guidance.
In 2002, it is estimated that 410 Israelis were killed in attacks
emanating from the West Bank. In 2009, the figure was five.
Barak has publicly stated that a key factor in this improved
situation is Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation. This dramatic
drop in deaths from attacks originating in the West Bank has allowed
Israel to take more risks than it would have even 2 years ago. The
improvement in security has not just facilitated economic progress, but
has meant that chaos no longer reigns in the West Bank. In a sharp
departure from the past, Palestinian polls show that most Palestinians
feel safe in their towns. For the first half of the decade, Israeli and
Palestinian officials shot at each other, but now they are working
together to prevent Hamas from expanding a foothold in the West Bank.
Beyond the security establishments of both sides, there are other
factors at play. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Palestinian
Prime Minister Salaam Fayyad have a set an antiviolence tone. Fayyad
has worked very closely with his commanders on the ground to ensure
coordination with Israeli counterparts. Added special mention should be
given to the excellent work of U.S. Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton and his team.
Dayton has spearheaded the training of over 2,000 Palestinian troops in
a bid to professionalize the Palestinian security services. Netanyahu
also deserves credit in prioritizing economic growth by lifting some
key restrictions. Israeli military officials say that their cushion to
lift such restrictions as West Bank roadblocks is a function of the
Israeli security barrier, which limits the amount of suicide bombers
who can penetrate into Israel.
Perhaps the most exciting idea that emerged from the West Bank in
2009 is Fayyad's idea of state-building or creating institutions as a
precursor to Palestinian statehood. Fayyad has won over the
international community during the last few years with his focus on
transparency and his opposition to corruption. He has a doctorate in
economics, and excelled at the World Bank/International Monetary Fund
before first becoming Palestinian Finance Minister and now Prime
Minister. The U.S. Congress, which was reluctant during the Arafat
period to give any money to the PA, no longer worries that its
financial assistance will go to private coffers. This is a tribute to
the stature of Fayyad.
Fayyad's idea of state-building is a departure from the approach
favored by his predecessor Yasser Arafat. Fayyad's approach is nothing
short of a new paradigm for Palestinian nationalism. Arafat always
defined Palestinian nationalism in revolutionary terms--physical
defiance, armed resistance, while Fayyad seems to be identifying
institution-building as the ticket to statehood.
There are profound implications to these very different approaches.
Arafat viewed the Palestinian condition as guaranteeing a sense of
victimhood and entitlement--Palestinians were responsible for nothing.
The world owed them. In contrast, Fayyad seems to see institution-
building as a way of creating a culture of accountability among
Palestinians. In the Arafat era, airports, railroads, and sea ports
seemed like adornments of a sovereign state, not central vehicles to
achieving statehood. In contrast, Fayyad has said that building the PA
institutions is important ``to gain the international community's
respect and pass its unjust test of building these institutions under
occupation.'' While Fayyad has yet to fully elaborate about how state-
building would be accomplished beyond using donor aid from around the
world to assist the formation of legal, economic and security
institutions, he wants to maintain the momentum of his previous
economic plans until a political breakthrough occurs. This way he can
keep his security plans in place during a time of political void that
might devolve into unpredictable violence.
It is said that after George Bush visited Israel for its 60th
anniversary in May 2008, Fayyad told him that he should look to the
example of the Zionists, meaning to point out that the Israelis built
the institutions of their state for 30 years before they declared it.
While Fayyad certainly would not accept that timetable, he accepts the
principle that statehood should be earned. In general, these economic
and security developments provide hope of a brighter future for both
peoples in 2010.
While my remarks make abundantly clear that I have a favorable view
of Prime Minister Fayyad for the important new elements that he has
introduced to the political equation, I would be remiss if I did not
voice caution about two sets of relationships that will be important to
focus on in the future. One is the Abbas-Fayyad relationship. On one
hand, Abbas's veteran credentials in the Fatah party provide cover for
Fayyad as he pursues his course. Yet, there have been clear differences
between the two over appointment of personnel and even a sense that
Abbas may be somewhat envious at times of the international attention
showered on Fayyad.
The second set of relations that merits attention is Fayyad's
relations with Israel, which have cooled somewhat of late.
Specifically, Israel is unsure if Fayyad's focus on nonviolent protest
will spill over in an unintended violent direction. Moreover, in a bid
to cool episodic tensions on the ground, Fayyad has on several
occasions in the last few months visited families of Palestinians whose
sons have been involved in fatal violent actions against Israel.
Israelis see this behavior as sending the wrong signal to the
Palestinian people especially because it is coming from someone
identified with nonviolence. At least, in one of the two incidents
Palestinians claim the violence was not premeditated. Finally, the
third source of concern in the Fayyad-Israel relationship is his sense
that institution-building is a unilateral enterprise that is part of a
2-year sprint toward statehood. Israelis suspect that this bottom-up
state-building is a unilateral move coming at their expense. The irony
is that the only way for Fayyad to deliver on institution-building is
by working with Israel, given the security dimension of proposed
projects and Israel's control over West Bank land. A good working
relationship is key for the Fayyad plan to succeed. In short, there are
no substitutes for negotiations.
This is precisely why the bottom-up approach cannot substitute for
top-down negotiations. The two must go together. Without a top-down
approach, the bottom-up approach will be unsustainable over time.
Palestinian soldiers will think security cooperation is designed to
make Israeli control more palatable, and Israelis will harbor doubts
about Palestinian state-building intentions.
While there have been important signs of progress on the ground in
the last few years, one must be careful not to extrapolate too much in
looking ahead. Much is at stake. If moderates on the Palestinian and
Israeli sides do not come together, it will not be surprising if the
extremists discredit the moderates and exploit time for their own
benefit.
The Chairman. Well, thank you. Thank you, all of you.
We have a good summary of complexity and of hurdles that
can always be put in the way.
One of the things that strikes me, as you listen to all of
that--and it has struck me for some period of time--is that
these hurdles underscore the need to get to final status talks
as fast as you can. Would you all agree with that?
Dr. Asali, go ahead.
Dr. Asali. Yes, sir.
I think that getting to a final status is crucial and
important. The question of timing is a major issue. At the
present time, as we speak, with the present political standings
of the Israeli and the Palestinian entities, it is hard to see
meaningful progress done right away. I think some other things
have to be done first.
The Chairman. Let's be more articulate about that, because
I understand and to some degree I share, Ambassador Kurtzer,
your comments about the disappointment of being where we are,
based on 20 years ago. I mean, obviously it is a
disappointment. It's almost pre-Madrid, in terms of having a
proximity talk. On the other hand, because of the Goldstone
report, and because of the way in which the settlement issue
was handled, publicly hanging President Abbas out to have an
expectation that that was the standard, and then going back
from it, left him weakened. Would you agree with that?
And therefore, the reality is, you've got to find a way to
get him back. So, I think what happened with the Arab League is
a big deal, in terms of opening up this process. I think, once
you've begun that, the sooner you get concrete things
happening, of one kind or another, in the privacy of the talks,
the faster those talks can expand.
Ambassador Kurtzer.
Ambassador Kurtzer. Mr. Chairman, while I would like to see
success in proximity talks, there's a relationship between the
methodology of negotiations and the substance of what's being
negotiated. Now, if there are strong terms of reference that
have been put before the two sides, then maybe proximity talks
can help narrow differences, because it would be impossible to
bring them to the table on the basis of very strong terms of
reference without such talks.
But, frankly, I haven't seen any indication of strong terms
of reference. Secretary of State Clinton has talked about
finding a way to reconcile the views of the two parties. Well,
that's the natural purpose of diplomacy. It's not a strategy,
it's not a U.S. policy. Where is it that we say to the parties,
``We think you ought to be considering X, Y, and Z''--a full
return to the 1967 lines with swaps, a solution on Jerusalem
based on demography outside the old city, and so forth?
The Chairman. If I can interrupt you just one second, to
pursue that. I mean, timing is important in those things. If
you lay that out publicly, which we could do--I certainly, in
Doha, said some things that could create a framework. I can say
them. I'm chairman of this committee. I'm not in the talks, and
I'm not the administration and the executive that's responsible
for leading those talks. But, if you are that entity leading
them, and you put it out there yourself as the stated position,
it's a big move in the context of all the other perceptions.
And if it were to be refused because, in terms of the politics
of one side or the other, it's simply unacceptable, you've
actually done more damage than good at that point in time.
Ambassador Kurtzer. Mr. Chairman, I'm not persuaded that
you do more damage by putting out U.S. views, and I'll explain
why. We've been at this business----
The Chairman. But, isn't timing important?
Ambassador Kurtzer. Timing is critical, but----
The Chairman. We know what U.S. views are.
Ambassador Kurtzer. We've been at this business of
intermediation now for more than 30 years. And the parties keep
turning to us. And yet, in a sense, what we do is try to
provide auspices. What we do is set the table. We cater for
peace. And I think it's important, both for our own people, but
also for the people in the region, for the Israeli public and
the Palestinian public, to understand what it is that the
United States believes.
Now, I don't see this as an action-forcing event. In other
words, this is not a U.S. plan that's ``take it or leave it.''
But, it gives our diplomats a tremendous amount of material to
work. And I wouldn't expect that we would demand from the
parties a ``take it or leave it'' response, but, rather, an
ongoing set of diplomatic contexts to try to reach some kind of
understanding.
The Chairman. Well, I have urged, and I am for, putting out
what we believe ought to happen at the right moment. I think
the right moment is going to be soon. But, I do believe that
the mistrust on both sides has been expanded over the course of
the last months to such a degree that the first thing you've
got to do is get people back to the table to see what room
there is to really have that discussion. Prime Minister
Netanyahu was very clear to me. He wants to talk about
security. You know, President Abbas was very clear to me. He
wants to talk about a bigger picture of what final peace is
going to be. So, there's a difference, in terms of those terms
of reference, right now. And you've got to get something
cooking here that I think we need to encourage, since we're not
brokering it in that way at this point. But, I think one can
move very quickly to a better term-of-reference basis on which
you are then proceeding.
Yes, Mr. Malley.
Dr. Malley. Mr. Chairman, I mean, you touch on a--something
that I think is very important, which is--I was involved in the
last grand effort at Camp David. I don't regret it. But, there
are consequences to failure. And I think we have to be very
mindful--if we were to now rush, for example, to direct talks--
at what would happen if, in fact, those talks were to fail. So,
I've--I'm not as perturbed by the notion that we're going to go
through proximity talks if we use them smartly to probe the
parties, to push our ideas, but also to get a sense, What is
the realistic achievement that we could--that's possible?
Because the worst thing would be to have something that ends in
failure.
And I also agree, in terms of putting ideas on the table--
I've been a strong advocate of it over the years. Right now, I
think timing is critical. Content matters--context matters just
as much. And if we were to put ideas on the table and they were
rejected by one or both sides, then the good ideas could be
discredited--and could have been more useful in the future, but
discredited now because the timing wasn't right.
I think we need to work with the parties, I think we need
to work with Arab countries and the international community to
make sure that, when we put those ideas on the table, we
maximize the chances of a positive reception.
The Chairman. There is always the potential that, in the
privacy of a room, without the public forces that pull this
apart continually--you may be able to have some much deeper
discussions that actually advance things, providing you can
keep that privacy. And I think that's a concern I heard
expressed on both sides. And particularly, there are concerns
of one party about the other party leaking a lot more, and that
that then clouds the atmosphere within which they're trying to
have a negotiation.
I was particularly struck, Dr. Asali--you mentioned these
groups that are out there--if you look back at Oslo, Oslo set
out, ``You do this, we'll do that, then this'll happen, and
we'll do this.'' You go that route, and you leave extraordinary
opportunity, every step of the way, for the people who don't
want anything to happen to blow it up. And we've learned enough
about that now. And that is a critical reason for why you want
to get to the big pieces as privately as you can, and get them
done. If you get them done, you have stripped those people of
their power to pull it apart.
Mr. Makovsky.
Mr. Makovsky. I just wanted to endorse what you said on
timing, too. Because I think that that's crucial, what you
said, that--look, if we learned something in 2009, it is that
there are consequences when America raises expectations. That's
why, I think--respectfully--Ambassador Kurtzer and I may
differ, because I believe we raised expectations too high on
settlements, and we couldn't deliver on those expectations, and
the net effect was we hurt our relations both with the Israelis
and with President Abbas, who said in two interviews, with
Asharq Alawsat and Der Spiegel, that left alone, he wouldn't
have gone that way, but now he was out on a limb. So, I think
we've got to be very careful when we put forward an American
bridging proposal. That doesn't mean we shouldn't probe. And
our mediator will be active, I'm sure. Senator Mitchell will do
that very well. But, I think timing is everything, and I think
that's one of the lessons of 2009.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Let me just follow through on the themes
that have already been expressed in Senator Kerry's questions.
I agree with your view, Ambassador Kurtzer, that the importance
of stating United States views is really paramount in this. Now
there's some modification necessary, as I heard Mr. Makovsky
and others saying, but it's very important for it to be clear
as to what the views are, and maybe when they are stated. We
did state a view on settlements fairly early on, although, for
a variety of reasons, to date this has not worked out as well
as we had hoped.
Let me just question you all further about this issue, but
in a different way. Let's state, for the sake of argument, we
finally decide, as an administration and as a country, when the
timing is right to clearly state our views. Now, some of you
would say, ``Well, you've got to prime this to find out when
the timing is right. You can't simply observe and say this is
about the time.'' I understand that. But, let's say that we've
come to some conclusion that the timing is right for the United
States to state very strong views; in other words, to adopt a
strategy, on our part, which states, essentially, how we
believe things ought to come out, or what the parties ought to
do.
Ambassador, after we have done that--and this presumes the
timing is right--let's say it turns out that--perhaps due to
the fragmentation of authority in Israel or on the Palestinian
side, or maybe other events in the Middle East that have
arisen--the parties, although aware of our views and knowing
that we are committed to a strategy that has staying power and
is meaningful, still do not really come to a conclusion. Now,
for the sake of argument, in this instance, should we state the
consequences if there is not some assent to our strategy on the
part of the actors involved? In other words, not that we've
been involved in amateur hour with others trying to do the very
best they can, talking a bit here or there--but, if we take
ownership of and lend our prestige to this stragegy and say,
``This is what needs to happen if we are to be a party to
this,'' and if it doesn't happen, what sort of consequences
should we state so that the seriousness of the effort is
apparent?
Now, having heard the consequences, the parties may still
say, ``This is just too much for us. Politically we can't get
it done. There are other forces that intrude upon us. You don't
understand.'' Well, in response, we say, ``We do understand.
We've been at this for a number of years and enough is enough.
You know, get on with it, because the peace of the world
depends upon it. Our security depends upon it. Our commitment
of Armed Forces and all the infrastructure depends upon it.
This is expensive for us. So it's not, once again, incidentally
one of five or six things we send envoys to do. American
interests are at stake here. We need to get on with it.''
What would be the consequences that we could state?
Ambassador Kurtzer. Senator, when I had the privilege of
serving our country as Ambassador in both Israel and Egypt, one
of the most critical lessons I learned was that, when the
United States speaks its views, people actually pay attention.
Sometimes we indicate what consequences are, and sometimes we
don't. Sometimes we articulate those views to initiate
prolonged periods of diplomatic contact. But, the point is that
we deal every day, not only with governments, but we deal with
publics. And until the Israeli public and the Palestinian
public, and the Arab public generally, understand what it is
that the United States stands for in this conflict, I think we
do our diplomats a disservice.
Now, there's a difference between articulating our views on
how the conflict should end and putting them out as a ``take it
or leave it.'' And I do not advocate the latter. I do not
advocate saying that this is a U.S. plan to be imposed. I don't
advocate putting it out for a period of time and then
withdrawing it or somehow taking our plan and going home. But,
rather, using it as a means for our diplomats to actually work
this issue.
There are elements of what we would articulate that should
have consequences for the failure of the parties to agree, and
I would suggest that those be confined to what I would call
behavioral issues--settlements, on the one hand, and
Palestinian violence and incitement on the other hand. I think
on behavioral issues, we should make clear to the parties--
privately at first; if necessary, publicly--that there are
consequences for behaviors that don't contribute to peace. But,
with respect to substantive issues, our views on Jerusalem or
on settlements, these are our views. And it gives our diplomats
something to argue and to try to bring the parties closer
together.
Senator Lugar. Let me just add, anecdotally, because--this
is far away from this--but, at the time of the Ukraine
elections in 2004, 3 days or so before the second election,
President Bush asked me to go to Kiev and to carry a letter
from him to President Kuchma. Basically, the letter said that,
``We want a free and fair election--unlike the one you just
had, in essence--and ultimately there will be consequences if
this does not occur.''
President Bush didn't state in his letter what the
consequences were going to be. But, after I gave President
Kuchma this letter, and he sort of wearily dropped it to the
side, I heard fairly quickly, within hours, from those who were
very important to him. As a result, they invited me to appear
on Ukraine television to at least give the American point of
view. Someone even asked me, ``Would the consequences be lack
of visas and passports, and so forth?'' In any event there was
an inquiry right away.
Now, that was just one situation. It was an election. It
was a pointed affair. The issue at hand today has assumed all
sorts of manifestations. But, I'm attracted by your idea that
we keep sending envoys, and they keep having talks, visiting
with various parties, and exploring options. But, in terms of a
decision to enunciate very clearly the strategy of our country,
this may lead people to ask, ``What are the consequences?''
Well, the consequences might be that, ``You really don't
receive our support. For a while, you're on your own. Take it
or leave it.''
Some may say, ``Well that's impossible. Our relationship
with Israel is something in which you just can't say, `Take it
or leave it.' '' Likewise, the Palestinians are important with
regard to everybody we're dealing with in the Middle East, and
have been for 50 years.
But, at some point, there really has to be a concentration
of the minds. Why in the world would the fragmentation or the
politics ever change? I mean, you know, there are no
imperatives here at all. Why wouldn't intrusion by Syria or
Iran always outplay what seems to be an indecisive lack of
strategy on our part?
And so, I don't mean to pin you down from your testimony.
I'm just saying, in the event we do come forward with this--not
necessarily through a ``take it or leave it'' approach--but,
the consequences of failure to move ahead have to be evident at
some point. Somebody has to worry about this. If they don't,
then we're in trouble. We will continue to consult, to send
folks back and forth, thus making this a profession for tens of
folks. But, really, without taking any steps related to the
formulation of the consequences that we want, I don't foresee
the parties taking the necessary steps forward to pursue a
lasting peace.
Ambassador Kurtzer. Senator, I couldn't agree more. And
that's why I would distinguish between what I think should be
consequences for behavioral misdeeds, as opposed to policy
issues.
Israel and the Palestinians have every right in the world
to hold to their views with respect to territory in Jerusalem,
as we will have a right to hold to our views. But, there are
behaviors that are matters of choice, not matters of necessity,
that need to change. And, in that respect, any implicit U.S.
support for settlements should come to an end; any means by
which American citizens may be funding settlements and getting
tax breaks should come to an end. In other words, there are
steps that can be contemplated, short of the ``nuclear
option,'' which we wouldn't want to do anyway, with our friend
Israel--but, there are steps that need to be contemplated on
behavioral issues, as opposed to issues where we differ on
policy terms.
The one issue that I would fence off in all of this
discussion has to do with Israel's security. I think none of
the discussions about consequences should touch on that issue.
Our strategic and intelligence cooperation with Israel has
proved beneficial to both sides, and should continue. But those
are matters of necessity--where I would build a fence; on
matters of choice that involve the bad behaviors, I think there
are options before us with respect to those consequences.
Senator Lugar. Well, then, in that case, you've stated a
policy of Israeli security, so the other side understands the
consequence of continuing whatever lack of dialogue there is.
It is still going to be the United States that defends Israel,
and therefore they'll need to accept that. Now, that is an
important factor all by itself. It doesn't fence off Israel
from bad behavior, as you're suggesting. But, on the other
hand, it does, perhaps, slant the dialogue somewhat, because we
haven't said we're going to come to the defense of the
Palestinians, or necessarily defense of anybody else who
happens to be in this process.
Yes, sir.
Mr. Makovsky. Senator, I would agree with some of the
points that Dan made on security and behavior. I think the
following, though. Where I might, respectfully, disagree with
you is to suggest that, if there's not external pressure of
some kind, however we define that--it might be walking away--
and you could argue, ``Well, if the U.S. makes best-faith
efforts and it doesn't work, the U.S. will definitely put in
less resources in the future.'' But, I think I disagree with
the premise that there's no internal drivers for a solution--
that if there's no external pressure, it's not going to work. I
think what Senator Kerry said about the demographic challenges
to Israel and, I think, the fact that people like Abbas know
that, if they don't succeed, you have Hamas waiting in the
wings--those two challenges alone are what are going to drive
this process. And frankly, I think that external pressure could
be counterproductive. I mean, it could be natural that, after
making the best efforts we decide, ``Well, we can't try as
hard, because we tried.'' But I don't--respectfully, I don't
think I accept the premise.
Senator Lugar. My time is over. I'm sorry not to be able to
recognize others, but the chairman has asked me to pass things
along to Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd [presiding]. Well, thank you, Senator Lugar.
And I apologize being a little late getting here. We had a
hearing on--in the Labor Committee. In fact, Senator Casey was
there briefly on health-related matters. So, I apologize for
not being there at the outset to hear all of your opening
comments.
And found this exchange, as I always do--Senator Lugar
always asks great questions, and I find myself very comfortable
with your questions, as well as the answers you solicit.
Let me ask about the Gaza, if I can. And I don't know who
wants to respond to this, but--what's our end game here, in a
sense? I mean, it seems to me--and I guess this--you're at a
different level, I guess, than this question. I'm going to
bring you back down to Earth, in a way, here. Given the
conditions in the Gaza, at some point, it seems to me, we've
got to go beyond what has been the policy, right now, of just
allowing, basically, I guess, some foodstuffs in, and so forth,
but not much more than that. Now, the danger of this--of
course, people assume that, by saying this, you're somehow
endorsing Hamas, which is hardly the case. But, the conditions
are dreadful, and the reconstruction efforts just don't exist.
And I wonder if you might comment on what is going on there and
how would you assess the political strength of Hamas in Gaza at
this point? And how much aid is getting in? What more should be
done, in your views, with regard to Gaza? Because it seems to
me this is just a festering situation that needs to be
addressed in some way.
Yes.
Dr. Malley. Well, Senator, I agree with what you said. I
think, first of all, what's happening in Gaza is both morally
unconscionable and politically self-defeating. And I think I
want to focus on the politics. The humanitarian side, we all
could sympathize with, but I think the politics are what are--
somewhat get lost.
If the notion was to weaken Hamas's hold of--in Gaza, I
think one thing is clear. We have people who work with us at
the International Crisis Group who live in Gaza, and they
testify that Hamas's popularity has fallen, and in some cases
quite significantly. But to what end? It's not as if there are
going to be elections in Gaza anytime soon. It's not as if
people are going to rise up to overthrow Hamas. So, Hamas's
ability to control the situation has, in fact, not only not
lessened, it has increased. The blockade has meant that the
formal economy has dried up. All of the goods come in through
tunnels. Hamas can exact a tax on that, it can control the
tunnels. It becomes, as in many cases of sanctions, the sole
provider of the people. So, Hamas's grip on Gaza has increased,
even as its popularity has decreased. But, that has no
relevance today, unfortunately, because there are no elections
or no way to gauge popular support.
What's happening, as--the future of Gaza is being held
hostage. The business community is drying up, the civil society
is drying up, as Dr. Asali said. And what we're seeing also is
a generation of Gazans--1.5 million Gazans--who have known
nothing but deprivation, want, and humiliation. I'm not sure
that's best for Israel's security, in the long term. And there
are articles now--and we see it, as well, on the ground in
Gaza--of more radical groups that are challenging Hamas. That's
not good for Israel's security either.
It seems to me what we need to do is devise a plan--and
there are many ideas out there--about how you can get normal
traffic resumed in Gaza, but make sure that weapons don't get
smuggled, and make sure that the money doesn't get diverted
into the wrong hands. The U.N. has plans to go that way, other
organizations have developed plans.
The two--there are two legitimate--or two Israeli
counterarguments. One is security. There, you need real
monitoring. The other is the fate of Corporal Shalit. Now, we
all would like to see a prisoner exchange take place, but I
don't see--there's no evidence that, over the last years, the
fact that we've held Gaza in the situation it is today has led
Hamas to be more flexible on the issue of the prisoner
exchange, and punishing a million and a half people because of
that issue, I think is--again it's--it doesn't stand up to
moral scrutiny, it doesn't stand up to political scrutiny
either.
And I would add one point, which is, in terms of our own
credibility in the region. This has become one of the filters
through which--the prisms through which U.S. policy is viewed
in the region. People say, ``If the U.S. can't do anything to
lift the siege of Gaza,'' what good are we? And I think we have
to be front and center on this issue, work with the Israelis
and the Egyptians to make sure that Gazans can recover as
normal a life as possible.
Senator Dodd. Yes.
Ambassador Kurtzer, do you have any comments on that?
Ambassador Kurtzer. I would add one historical context to
what Rob Malley has said, and that is, there's no proven
experience that imposing this kind of a siege, of a closure,
actually affects political views or behavior in Gaza. I had
discussions, during the course of the intifada, with Prime
Minister Sharon all the time on this issue. Something would
happen, a terrible terrorist event in Israel, and people would
get killed and injured, and the Israel military would shut Gaza
down. And I would then go see the Prime Minister, and we'd have
a conversation that basically went as follows: ``The terrorists
did something terrible, and the punishment is now being felt on
the part of a population whose views you should want to affect
to isolate the terrorists; but, by, in fact, isolating the
population, you are simply creating solidarity between them and
the terrorists.''
The Prime Minister had a different view. He felt that this
was a way to enhance Israeli security; it was a way to put some
burdens on the part of the population to pressure the
terrorists to not act. It never worked.
So, I would be extraordinarily sympathetic to Israeli
security concerns with respect to any desire on the part of
Gazans to export something out of Gaza. That's where security
is most directly affected. And I'd be very careful with respect
to what, besides humanitarian goods, go into Gaza, so that you
don't have dual-use items. But, the idea of somehow affecting
political views in Gaza by maintaining this tight grip makes no
sense, and it has never proved to be correct in the past.
Senator Dodd. Let me ask you quickly, about something Dr.
Malley said here, and that is that the--at least the
appearance, absent an election, that the popularity of Hamas
has declined, as has the conditions in the Gaza declined. It
seems to me one might draw the conclusion that, in fact, we are
having a political impact on what's happening in the Gaza. I'd
like to ask the other two members of the panel to comment.
Dr. Asali. Yes, Hamas has benefited from the blockade, the
siege, whatever you call it, and it has benefited politically,
while the people of Gaza suffer. There is no question that this
policy is unsustainable, on not just moral and political and
human conditions, it's just not sustainable.
So, we have to divide it into specifics. What can be done?
What can be done? One thing is to look at the crossings. The
crossings have to be open. The crossings have to be open. The
management of the crossings is something that can be worked out
between the United Nations, the PA, et cetera, and the
Egyptians and the Israelis, to allow goods in, to allow more
goods in.
And the other thing is the reconstruction business. The
reconstruction issue is a very sensitive issue. This is
rebuilding after the damage. And this also has been resisted,
primarily by Israel, for a long time. Not for security reasons,
obviously, alone; for other considerations. This has to--this
has to be ameliorated.
There are other things that can be done to combat Hamas,
politically. This is--as long as Hamas stands up for the
Palestinians, heroic defense against everybody else, it will
score political points, even though it has been a political
failure as a manager. So, that issue, in itself, has to be open
to eventual elections. Elections have to take place at some
point in time, and elections start by influencing the hearts
and minds of the people. The policies of the United States, in
coordination, in this particular case, with the Palestinians,
the Israelis, and the Egyptians, will determine the outcome of
the elections, whenever that takes place.
Senator Dodd. Mr. Makovsky, do you want to comment?
Mr. Makovsky. Thank you, Senator Dodd.
Look, I think the question is--we all agree that we would
like to see some humanitarian approach on Gaza. The question
is, How do you craft it in a way that--as I think your question
implied--that Hamas doesn't benefit?
Because if you look at Khalil Shikaki's polls--that's the
Palestine Survey Research Polls in Ramallah--and you look at
his last six polls, what you see is that Hamas is down by 20
percentage points. They spiked up due to sympathy right after
the Gaza war in late 2008-09. Now they're below where they were
before the war. So, they're 20 points below Abbas. Everyone
likes to say Abbas is weak, but Abbas is running 20 points
ahead of Hamas.
So--and Gazans say they'd rather live under Fayyad in the
West Bank than live under Hamas--so there's something going on
here that's interesting. So, I just think we have to be very
careful. How do we craft this humanitarian approach, which we
all favor, in a way that the Palestinian Authority in the West
Bank gets the credit?
By the way, another factor--a player we have to look at is
Egypt. They're the ones building a wall on the Egypt-Gaza
border. They're frustrated by their efforts to mediate with
Hamas that have failed. So, they have to be approached, as
well.
It's not an easy solution, but we have to think creatively
of how do you do something, in a humanitarian context, where
it's the PA and Hamas that doesn't accrue the political credit?
Senator Dodd. Well, thank you. Senator Risch, you're next.
Senator Risch. I'm going to pass, Senator.
Senator Dodd. You're going to pass?
I should know the order of arrival, but I'll go to Ted
Kaufman. Ted, are you--are you ready? OK.
And the gavel's yours, Senator Casey. I've got to----
Senator Kaufman. You mentioned that the United States
should----
Senator Dodd. Turn your mike----
Senator Kaufman [continuing]. United States should get back
in the diplomacy game. And I was just wondering, how would you
characterize--you said some nice things about Senator Mitchell
in your testimony--how would you characterize Senator
Mitchell's efforts?
Ambassador Kurtzer. Senator, I have great respect for
Senator Mitchell, not only on the basis of his time served here
in the Senate, but also his accomplishments diplomatically. I
think this past year, however, our diplomatic efforts have
fallen well short of the high expectations we all had.
I think the President and Senator Mitchell got it right, at
the outset of the administration, when the President said that
the solution of the Middle East conflict is a United States
national interest. That's exactly right. The President also
said that he was going to make this one of his foreign policy
priorities. None of us would expect that it would be at the top
of the agenda, but that it would be on his desk. And third, the
President decided on the appointment of a senior Presidential
envoy of the stature of Senator Mitchell.
But there were missteps this past year: miscalculations;
the failure to articulate a clear strategy, and then to pursue
it; the way in which we created situations in which we put
Palestinians out on a limb on the question of settlements; or
even on the question of convening a trilateral meeting in
September that had no content and had no results. All of this
suggests that we didn't do as well as we might have done.
I am not suggesting that we can't do well. And I think that
Senator Mitchell certainly has--and doesn't need me to say it--
certainly has all the capabilities and diplomatic strengths to
accomplish this. But, I think we need to have a strong policy
with which he will operate, and an integrated strategy, so that
we're not pursuing this or that whim, and then deciding, at the
last moment, that we don't see it through to a conclusion.
Senator Kaufman. I would assume that Senator Mitchell will
be doing exactly what you said. One of the questions that comes
up is another issue you raise, which is the public statement of
our views on how this peace process should end. I think there's
a good reason why we haven't done that for 30 years, because I
think--and I'd like your comment on it--you say, in a comment,
you don't want this to become a U.S. plan imposed on the
region. But, I'll tell you what, as soon as the United States
announces where they want to go, folks on either end of the
spectrum will usually take that and say, ``That's where the
U.S. is going, when the U.S. is engaged in this, the United
States is forcing this.'' And so, I think that's why we haven't
done it for 30 years.
It would seem to me that Senator Mitchell would be talking
to the--he's talking to the parties all the time--that he can
surely, I would assume, express to the parties what our
position is.
What's the advantage of going public with this, as opposed
to just letting it be a back--in a diplomatic area, without
making it public?
Ambassador Kurtzer. Senator, let me first deal with the
disadvantages of not going public. And we've seen them for the
last 20 years. We've had opportunities to move this peace
process forward, and in the Clinton administration, in the Bush
administration, and now in the Obama administration, we've not
been able to exploit those opportunities diplomatically.
The interesting thing in this conflict is that most
everyone knows approximately how this is going to end.
Senator Kaufman. Right.
Ambassador Kurtzer. Public opinion polls in both
communities reveal no surprises.
Senator Kaufman. Right.
Ambassador Kurtzer. So, it will not be a surprise if the
United States articulates our own views on how this will end,
and uses that as a kind of galvanizing, or magnet force----
Senator Kaufman. Right.
Ambassador Kurtzer [continuing]. To bring the parties
closer together.
Senator Kaufman. Oh, I think it will galvanize--it'll
galvanize the parties. I'm just afraid it's going to--everybody
knows where we're going. I think publicly saying what we think
we ought to do about Jerusalem would be a massive mistake. And
I just really--I thought your comments--I agree with so much of
what you're saying. I'm just trying to get that out.
I mean, just going into the final process and saying where
we think it ought to go--I mean, even--I don't even want
anybody, kind of, saying that. We want to go through the
proximity, kind of work it out, and then we get to the very
end, and we all know what the issues are. I'm just trying to--
because I respect you so much--what is the advantage of saying
to everybody how we would resolve this, at this particular
point in the process?
I guess I'm going back to Senator Kerry's comment, too,
about timing.
Ambassador Kurtzer. Senator, the advantage is based on the
disadvantages of not doing it.
Take, for example, the situation that Rob Malley mentioned,
Camp David 2, where the United States did not articulate its
views----
Senator Kaufman. Yes.
Ambassador Kurtzer [continuing]. Where we tried to bring
the parties together.
Senator Kaufman. Right.
Ambassador Kurtzer. And only very late in the Clinton
administration did the President put out the so-called
parameters, which he then took off the table when the parties
would not agree to negotiate on their basis.
What would have happened, had the United States put those
views out 6 months earlier?
Senator Kaufman. Well----
Ambassador Kurtzer. Might it have acted as this magnet to
bring the parties together? And might it have had an impact,
also, on public opinion in the two constituencies?
Senator Kaufman. OK. We--and I think those are very, very
good points. What I'd like you to focus on a second--what the
impact would be on the region, on the parties, except extreme
elements, in both Israel and the Palestinian movement, of us
putting together what we think the final process should be--the
final position should be? Just, if you could focus on that for
a few minutes.
Ambassador Kurtzer. Well, first of all, I think it would
stimulate extraordinary public debate in every society in that
region, particularly in Israel, where public debate is a
national sport.
Senator Kaufman. Absolutely.
Ambassador Kurtzer. But also in Palestine, and in other
places, as well. That will be a healthy public debate, because
it will give public opinion, and those who articulate the views
about public opinion--the editorial writers, and the think-
tankers, and the commentators--additional grist with which to
fuel a very healthy discussion of how their respective
societies should move.
So, No. 1, it's to fuel a public debate. No. 2, it provides
our diplomats with a significant, constructive grounding with
which to argue our case.
I don't doubt at all that Senator Mitchell, and anyone else
who has been a special envoy in this conflict, has talked about
final-status issues. But, not being able to talk about them as
a ``United States position'' is a sign of weakness and it's a
handicap to our negotiators, because the United States should
stand for something. We carry weight. We are a major power, and
yet our diplomacy sometimes doesn't conduct itself as a major
power.
Senator Kaufman. Just one final piece, then. I mean you
have--and Dr. Malley--both have been critical of what the
administration has done with the settlement policy. That seems
to me to be Exhibit 1 of the problems of America stating where
it is we're going to go. I mean, stating a settlements policy
that doesn't declare--doesn't cause a problem--I mean, and I
think you'd say, public debate in Israel doesn't need fueling.
I mean, public debate in Israel right now is vigorous and
ongoing. I think what this would do would cut down the debate,
because it wouldn't be debating the issues; they'd be debating
the fact that the United States is now getting involved in this
process. And we would become the polarizing agent in the entire
discussion. Instead of discussing what's right and what's
wrong, the discussion would be, ``The United States says this.
They should stay out of here. They shouldn't be doing this.
This is not the way to go.''
But, we can kind of agree to disagree.
Dr. Malley.
Dr. Malley. I always hesitate to take issue with what
Ambassador Kurtzer says, but I do think I want to, sort of, go
in--somewhat in the direction you're saying.
The peace process is littered, literally littered, with
the--with cases of projects and plans and--you know, from the
Rogers plan to the Reagan plan to the roadmap, and on and on
and on--that didn't have a positive effect; in fact, just
stayed there. And the real--you know, it doesn't make any sense
to put something on the table if nothing will happen the day
after. The only thing that will happen at that point will--all
those who disagree will come out, because they'll have a
target, whereas those who agree won't have anything positive to
show about it.
And one example, although it's not--it's not exactly on
point--the Geneva Accords, which I think really--done by civil
society, Israel and Palestinian--I think everyone in this room
would say this is more or less where it's going to end up--was
put on the table, but it served as a magnet for all the
opponents.
Now, as I said earlier, I think this is not a matter of the
content, it's a matter of the context. And I think there is a
time where the United States can and should do--and there I
agree entirely with Ambassador Kurtzer--but it has to be at a
time when our credibility is restored in the region, where
we've done all the groundwork we need to do with Arab and
international partners so that when we put it on the table, the
odds of the parties saying yes increase, and the cost for them
of saying no decrease.
On the settlements issue, you're right. There was no cost
for Prime Minister Netanyahu, or very little, for him to say
no. He got away with it. Our credibility was hurt.
Senator Kaufman. Yes, Mr. Asali--Dr. Asali.
Dr. Asali. The chances of arriving at an agreement--a final
agreement--without the United States being in the mix, to the
point of having its own views--are nil.
Senator Kaufman. Right. I agree.
Dr. Asali. The question is the timing. I agree with
everybody else. Several things need to be done on timing. One,
I think the two variables, one for the Palestinians on violence
and for the Israelis on settlement, are all true.
A third variable, which has just been introduced and should
really deserve more attention, is what is happening on the
ground, relevant to the subject here, Truth on the Ground.
There is a state-building project that is happening on the
ground, where the Palestinians and the Israelis have a chance
to cooperate, and have to be held accountable to the United
States in the meantime. This is one way of not testing the
final understanding on the comprehensive agreement, but on
changing enough facts on the ground, where parties can either
help or thwart this effort. And I think this would be a measure
to guide us to the timing as to where the parties could be more
ready. And perhaps they would have more trust in each other by
the end of that successful venture.
Mr. Makovsky. I'll just say, Senator, I one hundred percent
agree with you. As I tried to say before, I think there are
real-world consequences. We saw, in 2009, what happens when we
raise expectations of putting forward an American policy
without thinking through the implications. And we lost on both
sides in 2009, and I hope that's a cautionary tale for the
future.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Casey [presiding]. Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It's been almost a year since our last hearing on this
issue, and while there have been positive developments in that
time, there has also been, obviously, frustration about the
pace of progress.
I do know that Special Envoy Mitchell has been working
tirelessly over the past months, meeting with leaders in the
region, and I want to commend him and the administration for
these efforts. I believe we need to reflect on the lessons
learned over the past year, and redouble our efforts to bring
the parties back to the table. And, obviously, challenges and
obstacles remain, difficult compromises will have to be made,
but achieving a lasting peace in the Middle East is essential,
not only to the security of Israelis and Palestinians, but for
others in the region, and, of course, for the national security
of the United States.
That's why it's imperative that we persevere in our efforts
to work with the parties toward a resolution of this conflict.
Ambassador Kurtzer, in your testimony you noted the
importance that people-to-people exchanges can have in breaking
down differences and building understandings between peoples,
even when the governments of their countries may not get along.
And so, while we continue to push for peace negotiations, what
more should be done to build better relationships between the
Israeli and Palestinian peoples? And how can the United States
and other nations help support that?
Ambassador Kurtzer. Thank you, Senator. There are at least
two, if not more, very specific activities which the United
States can foster to help stimulate and encourage people-to-
people activities. One is to revitalize the multilateral
negotiations that began after the Madrid Conference in 1991, to
bring people together on issues related to water, environment,
economic development, security, and so forth, and then, after a
few years, simply faded away.
They didn't accomplish a great deal, but they left a
lasting legacy of introducing Israelis and Arabs that goes on
today. I travel around the region and still meet with people
who remember having participated in such-and-such a meeting in
such-and-such a location, back in 1994. So, first of all, we
can simulate the renewal of even more action-oriented
multilateral negotiations.
I think, second, we and other external actors can provide
seed money. And we're not talking about large amounts of money,
but seed money for track-two people-to-people activities. There
are health initiatives that are wanting for money, in which
Palestinians, Israelis, and Arabs are trying to find ways to
get together and share ideas about health.
Water and the environment are always issues in which you
can find professional audiences on both sides that want to get
together.
We had in the late 1990s, or early 2000 period, about $10
million of American money to use for Israeli-Palestinian
cooperative activities in the NGO sector. And that money was
sucked up immediately by very good projects that brought
Israelis and Palestinians together outside of government
auspices.
So, there's just a number of things, that are not high-cost
items, that help translate peace into something meaningful on
the ground, even while the diplomats argue about things at a
different level.
Senator Feingold. You may not know the answer to this, but
with regard to those two examples you gave, do you know if--
even if the processes may not have continued--if the
interpersonal contacts continued from those kind of talks?
Ambassador Kurtzer. In some cases they did. In respect to
the late-1990s funding, one of our conditions for giving out
the funding, in fact, was sustainability. So, we were looking
for projects that would live beyond the $10 million. And in
some cases, they did.
In the case of the multilaterals, there are some unintended
positive consequences. There was not a multilateral
negotiation, for example, on health, but a lot of people who
watched the multilaterals thought it was a good enough idea
that they came together and created, for example, a Middle East
Cancer Consortium. There's also a Peace Through Health
Initiative that's run out of Boston.
So, this was something that, in fact, was not directly
stimulated by us, but was an unintended and positive
consequence.
Senator Feingold. Offshoot of the other things that were
done.
Ambassador Kurtzer. I'm sorry?
Senator Feingold. It was an offshoot of the other----
Ambassador Kurtzer. Exactly.
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Things that were done.
Ambassador, you've suggested that President Obama should
make the case directly to the Israeli public for United States
efforts to restart the peace talks, akin to how he reached out
to the Muslim publics in his Cairo address. So, I'd like to ask
you to say a bit more on what steps should be taken to bolster
our public diplomacy in the region, starting with Vice
President Biden's trip to Israel next week. What do you think
his key audience there should be? What are the most important
points he needs to make? And will the Israeli public be
receptive to it?
Ambassador Kurtzer. Well, Senator, as I've said in the
context of the earlier discussion about the substantive U.S.
policy, one of the goals that we have to have in our diplomacy
is also to affect public opinion. And I think the United States
has not done an adequate enough job with Israeli public
opinion. They have felt ignored, in very concrete terms. And
not just because the President went to Cairo and went to
Turkey, and didn't go to Israel, but also because there has
been a relative lack of interviews, of appearances on Israeli
television, a lack of opportunities for Israelis to kind of
touch and feel our leaders.
We know, from before the last election, that there were
some doubts in Israel about President Obama's views on Israel.
I'm being very blunt, but we know that to be the case. And I
think one of the assets that we need to build for our diplomacy
is to show the Israeli people that our leaders, both Democrat
and Republican, form a consensus with respect to support for
Israel, support for its security and well-being, and that this
can only be done by, as I say, touching and feeling.
In this respect, Vice President Biden's trip, and the
likelihood of his both appearing on television but also
delivering a major speech, will be such an opportunity to lay
out, very clearly, for the Israeli people--including from a
friend of Israel for 37 more years in his time in the Senate--
what it is that this administration stands for, and why the
people of Israel can trust this administration, even if we
articulate views, sometimes, with which they disagree.
Senator Feingold. Ambassador, you said that the Syrian-
Israeli issues should play a prominent role in our peace
process strategy. So, in that context, how do you view
President Obama's decision to nominate a U.S. Ambassador to
Damascus? And is there a role for the United States to play in
the Syrian-Israeli negotiation?
Ambassador Kurtzer. Well, I have believed, for a long time,
Senator, that sending an ambassador to a country is not a favor
we do for the country, but it's a national asset for ourselves.
It gives us the eyes and ears that we need on the ground. When
I served for a short while in our intelligence community, we
did a study, whose results have been publicized, that indicate
that a great deal of our intelligence analysis is based on
embassy reporting and the embassy contacts that are then
reported through diplomatic channels. In other words, our
embassies, our ambassadors, serve our purposes. They allow us
to argue our case before both the Syrian Government, in this
instance, and the Syrian public.
So, I think it's overdue that we're sending an ambassador
back, but quite good that we're doing it now. And the
designated choice, Robert Ford, is a very good man, and I think
he'll do a good job.
With respect to the peace process between Israel and Syria,
one needs to distinguish between the four substantive issues on
the agenda--security, the nature of peace, water, and
territory--all of which are resolvable--and what I would call
the contextual issues--Syria's relationship with Iran, which
should be of great concern to us; its relationship with
Hezbollah, which should be of great concern to us. And so, it's
a far more complicated set of issues than simply resolving the
proximate causes of the Israeli-Syrian conflict.
But, nonetheless, these two sides have also talked to each
other on and off, for about 20 years, and we certainly should
make an effort to see whether we can narrow the substantive
differences, and perhaps use progress on that to see whether
Syria can be weaned--not totally away from its relationship
with Iran, which I think is unrealistic, but certainly toward a
more balanced position with respect to who it chooses as its
friends.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Ambassador.
Dr. Asali, we've heard a lot of positive comments from you
and your fellow witnesses about the work of Prime Minister
Fayyad and building up Palestinian institutions,
infrastructure, and the economy. What can the United States do
to best support these kinds of efforts? And do you have any
concerns that the building of a de facto Palestinian state
could be used by either side as a reason to delay direct
negotiations?
Dr. Asali. First off, this is--as Prime Minister Fayyad
himself said, this has to be a unilateral effort, because the
Palestinians are the only ones who can build their state.
The other thing, the state of Palestine cannot be born
without an agreement with Israel. So, that has to be clear.
In the meantime, we're talking about the process of
building institutions and state--many different levels of
state-building exercises. For this--and this is the point where
I think it is relevant--Israel is the occupying power. Israel
has within its power all kinds of tools to make this exercise
either go along and happen, and mature, or frustrate it and
thwart it. This is one situation where the United States can be
very effective in having a meaningful conversation with Israel
as we encourage another conversation between the Palestinians
and Israel to make this exercise work.
There has been an unbelievable amount of cooperation on
security. Most of it has gone unnoticed, but it has been real,
and to the point where, I think, the Israeli security
establishment acknowledges this openly.
Now, this has been at a political price for the people who
are involved on the Palestinian side. I think the economic
progress that has been achieved, and the projects that have
been done, and the initial improvements in the legal and
government controls, are all things that need to be nurtured
and helped by the United States, and at least not obstructed by
Israel. I think this is where the Congress can continue its
generous support for the Palestinian authority.
And I want to mention, here, the issue of corruption that
keeps coming up. The Palestinian Authority has, in fact,
gotten, you know, high grades by PriceWaterhouse for its
accountability. All the money that's under the Palestinian
Authority is accountable for.
So, we need to continue the political support, we need to
continue the financial support, and we need to continue the
policy coordination between the Israelis and the Palestinians
on this one.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator.
I'm going to recognize Senator Casey, but can you clarify
that there were four--you had water, security----
Ambassador Kurtzer. We had--there were five multilateral
working----
The Chairman. No, no, no. No. What you said with respect--
--
Ambassador Kurtzer. Oh, with Syria, I'm sorry.
The Chairman. I thought you were talking about peace with
Syria.
Ambassador Kurtzer. Yes. Yes, with Syria there are four
core issues. One is territory----
The Chairman. Right.
Ambassador Kurtzer [continuing]. The withdrawal----
The Chairman. Obviously the territory. And then the water
and security----
Ambassador Kurtzer. The second is security----
The Chairman. I missed the fourth. I didn't hear what----
Ambassador Kurtzer. Political relations.
The Chairman. Political relations.
Ambassador Kurtzer. Normalization.
The Chairman. All right. Thank you.
Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I wanted to, in the time that I have, raise
maybe three or four issues. One that I'll start with is the
question of talks. What kind of talks can occur in the next
couple of months? But, I think, just by way of a statement of--
I guess, statement of an opinion that I have is--I think the
Israelis have shown, certainly in the last year, that they've
been willing to make real concessions. I can't say the same, in
my judgment, about the Palestinians. I think there's been a
real reluctance, or even refusal, to really engage in real
negotiations. I'll invite people to comment on that.
But, the two-part question I have is--in light of the fact
that there has been face-to-face engagement recently--in the
last year or so, if not prior to that--evaluate, if you can--
and I'll leave it for the whole panel--the question that some
would raise is that--some may assert, I should say--that any
kind of proximity talks would be a step backward. So, that's
one basic question for the panel to evaluate. Maybe I'll go
left to right.
And then, the second related question is, What can the
Obama administration or--and/or, I should say--the Congress do
to move that forward or to--in particular, to put some--what I
would argue would be appropriate pressure on the Palestinians
to come to the negotiation table?
Maybe start with Mr. Makovsky.
Mr. Makovsky. Thank you, Senator Casey.
Look, I think you're correct in pointing out--in 2009,
you've seen some key moves on the Israeli side. You've seen
Prime Minister Netanyahu, who, for much of his professional
life has been opposed to a Palestinian state, give a speech at
Bar-Ilan University, where he traversed, I think, a real
ideological distance in supporting a Palestinian state. I think
that was an important key move for him. He has also lifted many
checkpoints in the West Bank--I think the number went from 42
down to 14.
You've seen, on the settlement moratorium, while it was
qualified, more than any of his predecessors have been willing
to do. I think Jimmy Carter got 3 months from Begin. There have
been some steps.
I don't want to minimize what my friend and colleague Dr.
Asali says, which is that, on security issues, the Palestinians
have been forthcoming. And that's part of the good news that's
out there is the close coordination between Israeli and
Palestinian security forces, which is not covered in the
headlines. I even asked Israeli Defense Minister Barak, who
appeared at my institute, the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, on Friday. I said, ``Do you think the tranquility
could have happened without close security cooperation?'' He
said no. It was crucial.
So, I think that there is--that's where there've been
hopeful moves. And the change of a paradigm, which is not just
a favor to Israel, but a favor to the Palestinians themselves,
is one of accountability and not one of entitlement.
Are proximity talks a step backward? I mean, technically,
yes, they are. They bring us back, as Senator Kerry said, to
the pre-Madrid period. But, if it's a transition to direct
talks, or a political cover for a back channel, it's a good
thing. If it's an alternative to direct talks, it's going to
fail. The parties have to sit directly and deal with their
differences.
And did you have--was there a final point with----
Senator Casey. About pressure that can be applied by the
administration or by Congress.
Mr. Makovsky. Well, look, I endorse what my colleague Dr.
Asali said about support for Salam Fayyad's government. You
know, it's a real change. There was a time where the United
States Congress could not give any aid to the Palestinian
authority because of corruption. I am concerned, as I've tried
to point out in my testimony, by a little rockiness--that we're
entering a certain period between Fayyad and Israel that is
new. And I think Members of the Senate need to be aware of that
rockiness, because, on one hand, Fayyad is calling for
nonviolent resistance, which is a real change, and, I think, a
positive change, without question. But, there have been times
where that spilled over into violence, even though that was not
intended.
So, I think anything that Congress could do to encourage
Prime Minister Fayyad to work with Israel--not unilaterally,
but together--I think that's crucial. But, I think we have to--
it's a tribute to the Congress and to its support for Prime
Minister Fayyad and to General Dayton that there's been a real
change in Congress's approach, and there's a greater sense of
confidence, which has translated into a better situation on the
ground. So, I would applaud the Congress, but just keep your
eye on the situation.
Senator Casey. Doctor.
Dr. Asali. On the issue of the proximity talks, it's a good
start. It's a good start. And I think that there will be a
dynamic that will unfold in due time.
On the issue of what is happening on the Palestinian side,
I think it's important to know there are basically two things:
the political management of the issue and then what you might
call the state-building effort.
What is of great concern to us is that the state-building
effort has been a major success. It's been a cooperative effort
between the Israelis and the Palestinians, it's been adopted by
the United States, and the Congress has been very generous to
support it. And it is very important for this effort not to be
penalized, by the slowness, by the lack of development, the
lack of any meaningful progress that has been taking place on
the political front, and that might last for some time.
Now, on the issue of the security that my friend David has
raised, on the security questions about what Salam Fayyad is
doing; he is laboring under an exceptionally difficult set of
circumstances, where he gets a state security system that he
has put together, on one doctrine, basically, ``We are building
a state.'' So, if this security system, the security forces,
are challenged by Israel, by incursions, by events that take
place, that puts him in the most incredible position, vis-a-vis
his own security forces, as to, you know, ``Are we
collaborating with Israel against ourselves?''
So, that puts him, personally, in situations, where I have
personally known about, where he had to go to these places--
Nablus, Hebron, et cetera--after incidents where Palestinians
were killed, and then perhaps contain the anger of the people
and guide it into a peaceful kind of resistance building.
I think, frankly, he needs to have some slack cut for him.
And this is a conversation that we had with the Israelis too,
about this. This is the only real program that's taking place
on the ground now. Let us not jeopardize it by just going to
our old think. There is a perestroika that's taking place now
in Palestine. And, we hope, in Israel, too.
Senator Casey. I just have about 2 minutes left. I want to
make sure that I have an opportunity for the--our other two
witnesses to either comment on this question--I also want to
move to--and you can certainly jump to this question--about the
elections in July--July 17--the--in terms if--in light of what
Hamas will be doing, will you have a--or, it appears that we're
going to have a--you know, voters in the--in Gaza
disenfranchised. What does that all mean? Can you comment on
the elections? And, if you have a moment, to respond to the
first question.
Dr. Malley. Thank you, Senator.
I think it's important--what you said about Prime Minister
Netanyahu's moves is important, and we need to take it into
account. But, I think, to be effective diplomats, we have to
see how it's viewed from the other side.
The fact that Prime Minister Netanyahu has now endorsed a
two-state solution, as Palestinians see it, is not an Israeli
concession, it's the Prime Minister's conversion. Israelis have
accepted a two-state solution beforehand. This is nothing new.
And, in fact, Palestinians have accepted the two-state
solution. So, they don't see what there is to cheer about. And
the fact that Israelis are prepared to reduce the pace of
settlement growth, they would view it as Israelis doing less of
what they shouldn't be doing in the first place, under
international law. So, it's--I don't think that a Palestinian
would view the gestures that Prime Minister Netanyahu has taken
as significant.
I also think--and I said this in my testimony--that
President Abbas is the most moderate expression of deep
Palestinian disillusionment. In other words, most Palestinians
would not want--you know, they think that this whole
negotiation enterprise is a charade. He has been, from the
first, among the Palestinian leadership to believe in
negotiations. I believe he'll be the last to continue believing
in them, if everyone else loses faith. But, he can't be--just
as we have to be mindful of Israeli politics--and I emphasized
that in my statement--we have to be mindful of Palestinian
politics. There's deep disillusionment. If we don't want to
lose Abu Mazen--President Abbas--and people always say, ``Let's
not lose him''--we can't force him to do things that would cost
him the credibility that he has with his people.
I'm in favor of direct talks, but I think, right now, to
have proximity talks is not the worst we can do.
On elections, I don't think there will be elections,
because, in order to have elections, you need some form of--
some form of agreement between Fatah and Hamas, which seems
quite a ways off. And that's, maybe, unfortunate, but I think
we're not--we're not going to see elections this July, and
probably not this year.
Senator Casey. Mr. Ambassador.
Ambassador Kurtzer. Senator, on the second question, I
would point out that, for more than 20 years, we've asked
Palestinians to do three things: build institutions for
statehood; build up an economy that assures that it's not a
failed state, if it ever comes into being; and take
responsibility for security. And, for the first time, this past
year, they are doing it rather intensively. The Fayyad plan is
indicative of an intention to build up credible institutions.
The economy in the West Bank is moving along. I'm sure Senator
Kerry saw it on his trip. I saw it a couple of months ago when
I was there. And, with the assistance of General Dayton, there
is now a growing Palestinian security force that is not
beholden to a particular political party. Its mission is out to
carry out the law-and-order functions of the Palestinian
Authority.
So, I would probably advise not using the word
``pressure,'' with respect to Palestinians, but encouragement
to keep moving in the direction that they are. I think support
that we can provide to Prime Minister Fayyad and to General
Dayton to continue building up this capability for statehood is
going to be critical, even as we do the negotiations that try
to create the state.
I agree with Rob Malley, I doubt that elections will take
place. They certainly will not take place, in my view, before
there is reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, and that seems
to be experiencing the usual rocky road.
And on the question of proximity talks--I've kind of beaten
this horse pretty hard today--it all depends, in my view, if
there's substance that's going on in the proximity talks. If
there is strong substance, then this may be a way to get them
back to the table. If not, then it really is a setback of great
magnitude.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Casey.
I might just comment that the Fayyad plan is a really
detailed, well-articulated, thoughtful document. And to a
greater degree we can get that process accelerated--and there
are some issues. Area C transformations into Area A's, and so
forth, which really ought to be accelerated, in a good faith
effort to build those Palestinian institutions.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for your patience this morning. You're
almost through.
We've talked a lot about the details of what's happening in
the Middle East right now, and I'd like you to back up and take
sort of a broader view.
Earlier this year, General Jones--Jim Jones--said something
like, ``If there's any one problem that I tell the President he
should solve, peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians
would be it.''
So, you all are experts, not only on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, but also on the Greater Middle East. So,
can you talk a little bit about what General Jones was trying
to say with that comment, and what the impact of progress on
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might have on the anti-
Americanism that we see in some parts of the Middle East, and
also the anti-Israeli sentiment around the world? And--yes.
Mr. Makovsky. Thank you, Senator.
I just wrote a book, with my colleague Dennis Ross, who's
now in the Obama White House. And we did a few long chapters on
that one question. Sometimes it's called ``linkage.'' And I
think we feel you have to be very careful in how you look at
that issue.
We have no doubt--the book is called ``Myths, Solutions,
and Peace.'' I'd be happy to send you one.
Senator Shaheen. OK.
Mr. Makovsky. Just to get in a plug.
Senator Shaheen. This was not a planted question, just for
the----
Mr. Makovsky. OK. But, thanks for asking. [Laughter.]
Look, we know that this issue is evocative in the region.
And we know that it's exploited by extremists in the region,
too. And we see value of taking a card out of the hands of the
extremists. But, I think we're more humble in believing that
somehow if you solve this conflict--and we all want to end this
tragedy----
Senator Shaheen. Right.
Mr. Makovsky [continuing]. That's gone on for too long--
but, I think we also have to be humble in believing that
somehow--that this is the ``open sesame'' move--that somehow if
we solve this conflict, as some Arab leaders who have come to
Washington say, then you solve the Middle East.
I think all Americans have had a--like, a graduate seminar
on the Middle East since 9/11, and the Iraq war, and how
complicated it is, and all the ethnic differences of Sunni and
Shia, and the difference between the Arabs and Persians, and--
so many different dimensions. And I think, once you know all
that, you say, ``Well, good. Solve this conflict.'' It could be
helpful for the American position in the region. And, in a
sense, there's an American national security hope that if you
do this, it will have some marginal impact.
But, I think we have to be very humble, and not believe
it's going to be transformative. Iran will still want a nuclear
weapon. Shia and Sunni in Iraq will still have their
differences. They're not going to look at television and say,
``Oh, look, the Arabs and Israelis have made peace. We can
solve all our differences.'' There are so many conflicts in the
Middle East that have emerged that have nothing to do with the
Arab-Israeli conflict.
Will it have a marginal--yes, it could have a marginal
focus. But, I don't think it'll be transformative. And I
realize I'm saying something that's controversial, that will be
disputed by a lot of my colleagues. But, I don't believe that,
if we solve this conflict, it'll change the Arab dynamic toward
Iran.
I was sitting with the head of an Arab intelligence agency
the day of Annapolis, the day of great hope. And this person
ticked off for me all the reasons why the Arabs will not be
decisive on the Iranian issue. It has nothing to do with the
Arab-Israeli conflict.
So, should we pursue it? Of course we should pursue it.
Will it have marginal impact in taking a card away? Maybe. But,
it won't end terrorism; it won't unlock all these other
conflicts. But, even if it has a marginal role, we know it is
evocative, and we should pursue it. And, of course, we should
pursue it because--for the peoples themselves that have
suffered so long.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Dr. Asali. Thank you, David. I haven't written a book----
Senator Shaheen. Would you like to disagree, Doctor?
Dr. Asali. I haven't written a book about it, that's all I
can say. [Laughter.]
But, take what I say seriously. I think the problem between
Palestine and Israel is essentially the ultimate symbol in
world conflicts. Its impact goes way beyond--like Senator Kerry
mentioned before, whenever he goes to Pakistan or to Morocco,
you know, people tell him about this issue--it's precisely
because of the many layers of symbolism involved. The North-
South, the haves and have-nots, the Christians and Jews, the
Muslims. It is so many things, I don't want to take your time
counting.
The reason it is crucial to solve this is not it--that it
will take all the problems away. It won't, of course. None of
the other problems will go away. But, it will make them subject
to a rational conversation. Right now, you cannot really
discuss all of these issues, you know, reasonably, because of
the passion that's surrounded because of this issue. And it is
used. And of course it's used. It's used by the worst kinds,
and it's used by the best kinds, in order to move it to
resolution.
I have a certain antenna that goes up whenever anyone says,
``It's not a big deal.'' Well, ``it's not a big deal'' means
continuation of the status quo. The status quo happens to be a
descending curve. It is not a plateau. And that means across
the Middle East, not just between the Palestinians and the
Israelis.
So, we need to change the status quo, and the status quo
also means people living under occupation, whose pictures and
lifestyles are shown on Al Jazeera and so many TV stations,
daily, to keep all issues agitated. If anybody does not
understand the value of symbolism in politics, then you take
away the essence of politics.
The other thing is that this is not nuclear physics,
honestly. I mean, like, you--what is it? It's how, how to do
it. It can be done, and it can be done in many ways. And I
think we do have, now, the beginnings of a situation where the
Palestinians are taken seriously, by Israel and by the United
States, as having some people who really can--you can deal
with. If we fail to take advantage of that, then we would have
ourselves to blame.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Dr. Malley or Ambassador Kurtzer, do either of you want to
comment?
Dr. Malley. I don't have much to add to what Dr. Asali
said. I--you know, I recommend that people read David
Makovsky's and Dennis Ross's book.
But, that said, I think the argument, that solving the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict would resolve all the issues in
the Middle East, is a little bit of a strawman, or strawperson.
Even if you resolved all the problems in the Middle East, you
wouldn't have resolved all the problems in the Middle East. The
question is whether it would be helpful, in a critical way, to
U.S. interests, given, in particular, the way in which so many
people have used our policy and our efforts, and our failed
efforts and sometimes our nonefforts. Diplomatically, of course
we're going to have to do many other things. The issues have
become far more interrelated over the last decade or so,
whether it's Syria, whether it's Iran, whether it's Lebanon,
whether it's Iraq. And we're going to have to play on several
fronts at once.
But, I don't think that takes away from the fact that this
is an issue that resonates probably more widely, not just in
the Arab, but in the Muslim world, than any other one. And for
that reason alone, it's reason to work on it.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Ambassador Kurtzer. Senator, since we're shilling our
books, I also wrote one----
[Laughter.]
Ambassador Kurtzer [continuing]. Which we talked about----
Senator Shaheen. Are you going to send me one too?
Ambassador Kurtzer. Yes, of course.
Senator Shaheen. OK. [Laughter.]
Ambassador Kurtzer. But I actually want to quote an Israeli
Prime Minister and a Saudi king on this issue.
Prime Minister Rabin came to Washington in the summer of
1992, and told President George H.W. Bush that he felt it was
imperative to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, not because he
was a member of Peace Now, but because he saw the impending
threat of Iran. And he understood that the peace process was a
heavy weight around the neck of Israel in dealing with this
imminent over-the-horizon threat.
About 10 years later, the Saudi Peace Initiative--or the
Arab Peace Initiative was put forward, and the same reasoning
obtained in the thinking of King Abdullah, not that there's a
linkage between the resolution of one and the resolution of the
Iranian issue, but that the lack of resolution of the Arab-
Israeli conflict represented a dead weight on Arab policy and
Arab politics, which was inhibiting their ability to join
forces with the United States and others in dealing with a real
threat to their security.
Now, I agree fully with what my colleagues have said.
``Linkage'' is a bad word, and it's been used very loosely in
the past, in both directions. We had an argument a few years
ago that said, ``Don't resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict at
all. You fix the problem in Baghdad, that's where the road to
Jerusalem runs through.'' And you had the other argument made,
that, ``The road to Baghdad, or wherever, runs through
Jerusalem.'' It's silly, because the linkage argument is the
wrong way to phrase this. The Arab-Israeli conflict needs to be
resolved because it's a critical issue for the United States
and for the region, and the absence of a resolution hurts our
ability to deal with other pressing issues.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
In the minute that I have left, since you're ending on the
Arab perspective, we've talked about--you've talked about
Syria, but--and I think the chairman mentioned the Arab Peace
Initiative--are there other players in the region who are
prepared to be constructive, who we could--who could be further
engaged in what's going on in a way that would be helpful?
Dr. Asali.
Dr. Asali. Yes. I think the newcomer, the last decade at
least, on the scene, an actively engaged new player, is the
Turks--Turkey. And it has, in fact, made serious attempts to
mediate, certainly between the Syrians and the Israelis, and it
has been actively coordinating with the region.
Senator Shaheen. Can--excuse me for interrupting, but I
just want to pursue that a little bit, because I think there's
really been a deterioration of that relationship, and I wonder
if you could comment on that, in----
Dr. Asali. Yes.
Senator Shaheen [continuing]. Just the few seconds that I
have left.
Dr. Asali. Turkey has been actively engaged, is what I
said. And I think that is exactly how it is. As far as whether
people consider this a positive and--contribution that we would
welcome, or whether it has been an erosion of Turkey's standing
with its relation with the West, is an open question, in my
mind. OK? I really do think I have, personally, some
trepidations about an engagement of Turkey and--on the Middle
East--that could take away the possibilities of further
coordination. And I just want to mention that it has been more
protective of Hamas's interest than I would like to see. I
think we have enough problems without having Hamas being
endorsed by Turkey.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Can we take a final comment?
Go ahead.
Mr. Makovsky. I would just like to say, Senator, that I
think there are actually interesting players in Western Europe.
You have Gordon Brown in England, you've got Sarkozy in France,
you've got Merkel in Germany. And I think, taken together, the
three of them have shown more balance in the European position
than we've seen in the past toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.
And, as such, I think they've dealt themselves in, and there
might be creative ways to really bring about a greater role for
them, in the Quartet or elsewhere.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
Yes, Dr. Malley.
Dr. Malley. Just one word to--maybe, to stand up a little
bit more for Turkey's role. I think we would be making a
mistake to write them off. They have--I think they're going to
have to repair their relations with Israel. That's a critical
step they have to take, and Israel--and we could help in that.
But, they are a country that is Muslim, that is in Europe,
that has reached out to virtually all parties in the region--
the Israelis, the Syrians, the Iranians--and that's the kind of
player I think that we should be working with more closely at a
time when the region is as polarized as it is and at a time
when our relations with some of those entities are either very
poor or nonexistent.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you all very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lugar [presiding]. I'd like to just discuss one
area that has not been explored. At some point, one of you--and
forgive me for forgetting which one--indicated that one
impelling reason for Israel to consider the two-state solution
is that, over the course of time, Israel might be a state which
is no longer a Jewish state because of current trends lending
themselves toward substantial demographic changes in the
country. Would any one of you describe the timetable in which
these changes may take place? Additionally, what sort of trends
are occurring with regard to current immigration into Israel?
Are these changes being reflected now in elections, voting, or
registration, and if they are, how so?
Yes, Mr. Makovsky.
Mr. Makovsky. Yes. I was the one, Senator Lugar, who
mentioned demographics as a driver toward resolution. My point
was that, if you have a situation that Palestinians--the West
Bank, and Gaza added on to Israeli Arabs--and here you'll get
into a demographic debate over what is the point that group
becomes a majority. And it has something to do with projecting
birthrates, and something to do with looking at the statistics
of the Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics. I don't want to
get into the weeds on all this. But, whether it's 10 years or
more, then you may have more Arabs on the ground than you will
have Israelis.
Now, right now, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza
don't vote, because the whole idea is to set up a two-state
solution. Israeli Arabs do vote, they have full rights, they
have representation in the Knesset. They often rail against the
Israeli Government, more than they can probably do in any
Parliament in the entire Middle East.
But, the point is that the demographics is a driver. It
isn't yet having an impact on coalition politics, because, for
the most part, like I said, the Palestinians in West Bank and
Gaza are not citizens. That's why we want to solve this
conflict. That's why, I think, there's an urgency on the
border/security issue, of at least nailing that down, and
creating--setting up that two-state solution. Because I think
demographics are looming on the horizon. And for the same
point, Abbas, if he isn't successful, has got Hamas waiting in
the wings, willing to pounce, and saying, ``You haven't
produced results.''
So, I think for both of these players, Israelis and
Palestinians, there are internal drivers that mean it's
critical that these peace talks happen, that they make
progress, and that we have success.
Senator Lugar. But, just to be a contrarian about this,
let's say Hamas said, ``By and large, it is really not in our
interests or those with whom we are allied, whether it be
Iranians or elsewhere, for a solution to emerge.'' To express
this in a different way, it's difficult enough getting Hamas
together with other Palestinian actors. And we all hope that
they will come together, because that's part of the eventual
solution for the creation of a Palestinian state. But, let's
say they're contrarians and their objective is really not
unification, rather it is to maintain the antagonism that's
involved. I'm still struck with the difficulties, given the
players, as to how you finally get two parties that see some
reason to move, particularly on the Palestinian side.
Mr. Makovsky. I would just--if the question's for me, and
I'm sure my colleagues have their own views--I just think that
you could say, Hamas could spoil from the outside; but I think
they could spoil from the inside in any, ``unity government''--
that they won't allow Abbas to make peace. And so, I think
where Abbas is strongest is if he could demonstrate that
diplomacy is vindicated, that there is something that he can
tell his people. Because if you look at those Shikaki polls
that we were talking about before, of where's the public, 70
percent, perhaps, in each camp, say they want peace, but
they're not convinced the other side wants it.
So, the Palestinians are saying, ``We're for a two-state
solution, but the Israelis don't want it.'' And the Israelis
are saying, ``We're for a two-state solution, but the
Palestinians don't want it.'' If there was actually something
in his hand that he could say, ``I got it, diplomacy works. I'm
a success,'' Hamas might try to spoil, but at least, I think
with that middle opinion that could swing both ways, he'll be
able to solidify that group and break through that paradigm,
which is, ``Oh, we want peace, but you're going to fail because
the other side doesn't want it.''
So, I think there's nothing that succeeds like success. It
doesn't mean that Hamas won't try to spoil, but Abbas will be
in a much stronger position if he has something to point to in
his hand.
Senator Lugar. Yes, Dr. Asali.
Dr. Asali. I agree with David, actually. I think the
success of the moderates, in general, will determine the future
of Hamas and the rejectionist, fundamentalist approach, across
the Middle East. So, we have here more than one variable. It's
what the Palestinian leadership wants to do, and what it can
do. Here, again, we call on people to think strategically, in
the region. Specifically on Israel, which, as far as we can
watch, as closely as we can, it does not take long-term
strategic considerations in decisions that it makes today and
tomorrow.
It is unfortunate that Hamas is the beneficiary of many
policies in the region--including outcome of Israeli decisions,
and, in fact, Palestinian decisions and American decisions--all
built on the basis of the failure of the moderates to deliver.
We need to have the moderates to deliver. And for this, there
is a test, now, actually, that I want to come back, for the
fourth time, perhaps during this hearing, which is, let us make
the Fayyad plan in the West Bank a success, a cooperative
success between the three main parties--the Israelis, the
Palestinians, and the United States--and all the allies. And
that would determine the future of Hamas, I think, more than
anything else.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Well, let me just say, on behalf of the chairman and all of
the members of the committee, how much we appreciate your
coming today, in addition to how forthcoming you have been, as
well as obviously well-informed by the years. And we thank both
of you who are authors----
[Laughter.]
Senator Lugar [continuing]. So that we can read more of
your views. And those of you who have not published books
recently, you've published articles frequently, so we'll also
be beneficiary of your wisdom beyond the hearing.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]