JAMMING THE IED ASSEMBLY LINE: IMPEDING THE FLOW OF AMMONIUM NITRATE IN SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA

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JAMMING THE IED ASSEMBLY LINE: IMPEDING THE FLOW OF AMMONIUM NITRATE IN SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 2010

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:31 p.m., in room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert P. Casey, Jr. (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Casey, Coons, and Risch.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR.,
U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania

Senator Casey. This hearing will come to order. Thank you for being here today, and I’m grateful that both our witnesses and others were able to adjust their schedules to accommodate my schedule today. We had to move the hearing from 2:15 to this hour, and we’re grateful for that.

I will have a brief opening statement and Senator Risch, our ranking member, will have an opening statement, and then we’ll get as fast as we can to the testimony of our witnesses.

Last week Army SPC Anthony Vargas, 27 years old, of Reading, PA, lost his life in Nangarhar province, Afghanistan. He had wounds suffered when insurgents attacked his unit using an improvised explosive device. He was assigned to the 1st Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, based at Fort Campbell, KY. Specialist Vargas is survived by his wife Luisa and three children who live in Clarksville, TN. His father, Julio Vargas, and mother, Maria, live in Reading, PA.

Marine LCpl Larry Johnson, from my home town of Scranton, PA, was killed in Afghanistan last February. Lance Corporal Johnson was trained as a combat engineer whose job it is to seek and destroy improvised explosive devices. He was 19 years old. I for a couple months had his funeral or prayer card on my desk, and I hadn’t looked at it in a long time, and it’s hard to believe that it was February 18 that he died. Of course, on the back of the prayer card from the funeral home was the Marine’s Prayer, a lot of inspiration for all of us when we consider the topic of this hearing and also the destructive impact of IEDs and what we must do to take every step possible to combat it.

(1)
In March of this year, Pakistani police seized 6,600 pounds of ammonium nitrate stashed in a fruit market in Lahore, Pakistan. Investigators believe that the three men arrested in the seizure were connected to a series of suicide bomb blasts that killed more than 50 people.

The main explosive ingredient used in most IED attacks against our troops, coalition forces, Afghan and Pakistani civilians is ammonium nitrate. Today, this committee and this subcommittee, the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs, meets to examine the grave implications of the threat posed by ammonium nitrate and other precursor chemicals in IEDs. Ammonium nitrate is a common threat faced by Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the United States and we need to collectively do more to restrict the flow of ammonium nitrate into the region.

The statistics in IEDs in Afghanistan are sobering. In 2009 alone, more than 6,000 IEDs were discovered, the vast majority of which used ammonium nitrate as their main explosive ingredient. A recent Pentagon report said that fully 80 percent of IEDs in Afghanistan are made using ammonium nitrate. According to CSIS, IEDs are the No. 1 killer of U.S. and coalition forces, and through the first 9 months of this year 190 U.S. forces have perished and an astounding 2,459 have been wounded by IEDs. Since January 1 of this year, more than Afghan civilians have been killed by IEDs. So 190 of our U.S. forces, more than 2,400 individuals wounded, and 1,200 Afghans.

In response, the Afghan Government banned the use of ammonium nitrate as a fertilizer earlier this year, and despite this effort and despite vigilance by the Afghan security forces, IED incidents and casualties have steadily increased. The Afghan Government appeared committed to this fight and has enacted the appropriate legal measures and enforcement efforts. But ammonium nitrate is still ubiquitous in Afghanistan due to smuggling along supply routes from its neighbors, and particularly from Pakistan.

The amounts of ammonium nitrate reportedly ferried into Afghanistan from Pakistan are staggering. The Los Angeles Times reported in May that as much as 85 tons of ammonium nitrate was smuggled into Afghanistan and Pakistan in a single night, a shipment that could yield more than 2,500 IEDs.

Now, what can Pakistan do to address this common threat? A couple of things: First of all, the Pakistani Parliament should pass legislation that better restricts ammonium nitrate and other explosive precursor chemicals like potassium chlorate. While I understand that farmers in Pakistan rely on fertilizers, especially for cotton, Pakistani officials may want to consider a temporary ban during this precarious period. A local ban was instituted in the Multan district earlier this year as militant attacks were on the rise. At a minimum, Pakistani authorities need a coherent legislative framework in order to better regulate this dangerous chemical.

The second thing they could do is that more needs to be done to track the flow of ammonium nitrate inside of Pakistan itself. I referenced the seizure last March in Lahore. A senior Lahore police official in charge of that investigation said that his officers could have tracked down the middlemen who supplied the ammonium nitrate to the militants of Pakistan if Pakistan required manufac-
turers to put tracking numbers on each fertilizer bag. He said at the time, “It’s a totally undocumented market. There’s no reliable way of finding out who bought the bags. That is a huge problem,” he said.

Finally, the United States needs to work more closely with Pakistan to ensure that ammonium nitrate does not flow across the border to Afghanistan. The British have been very helpful in working with Pakistani border guards to provide training and equipment that better detect and interdict ammonium nitrate and other illicit materials as they cross the border.

This focus on border security could have a positive spillover effect on restricting the flow of other illicit material across the border. The Afghan-Pakistani border is famously porous and there’s little expectation that it can be completely sealed. However, the major crossings should receive special priority for our efforts. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on their recommendations as to how we can improve on the borders.

I’ve reached out to numerous senior officials both here and in Pakistan to implore them to focus on the fundamental threat posed against our troops. I’ve spoken to General Petraeus on the day he was confirmed. Of course, many of us are grateful for his leadership and service. Former Ambassador Anne Patterson has been a stalwart leader on this issue in Islamabad, working to ensure that ammonium nitrate was part of bilateral discussions with the Pakistanis. I look forward to continuing this dialogue with her and with her distinguished successor Ambassador Cameron Munter.

In the Senate, I led a bipartisan resolution in June calling for governments in the region to effectively monitor and regulate the manufacture, sale, transport, and use of ammonium nitrate.

We’ve witnessed some positive developments. Ambassador Holbrooke’s team has focused in on this problem and has intensified its engagement. Homeland Security has also played a lead role in Project Global Shield. Later this month, the Pakistani Government will host a national counter-IED forum, taking essential steps on this issue.

Pakistan has also suffered horrific losses of security personnel and civilians over the past few years. This fact should be acknowledged as we deliberate on the war in Afghanistan. But we must do all we can to address the supply lines that lead to these attacks.

So we have much to do and I want to move right to our panels, but I just will provide a brief introduction and then ask our ranking member, Senator Risch, for his opening comments. We are honored by two distinguished panels to help us assess these issues. First, we will hear from Mary Beth Goodman, Senior Economic Adviser to Ambassador Holbrooke, the Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Second, we will hear from John Woods, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security—Homeland Security Investigations, I should say, National Security division, within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Next we’ll hear from David Sedney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, who will share the perspective of the Pentagon and, obviously, the U.S. Department of Defense.
Finally, we’ll also hear from BG Michael Shields, the Deputy Director for Operations and Requirements, the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, known as “JIEDDO.”

We have much to do today and we’re grateful for the time that our witnesses are providing, and we’re grateful for those who are in attendance today; and I want to turn the microphone over to our ranking member, Senator Risch.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

Senator Risch. Thank you, Chairman Casey. Thank you very much for holding this important hearing. Those of us—many of us serving here in Congress are well aware of the problem with ammonium nitrate. We don’t know as much of the details as we should. Many of us come from parts of the country where ammonium nitrate is a very common commodity, anyone can buy it, and anyone with a pickup truck can haul enough away to cause serious damage. Yet, by and large, we’ve gotten along relatively well in the United States with some notable exceptions, of course.

The widespread use of ammonium nitrate, not only in the United States but around the world, as a legitimate fertilizer is widespread and as a result of that there are unique challenges, ones that those working with this particular problem I’m sure have a very difficult time with. One of the reasons I’m very interested in this hearing is to get the details of how you dovetail the two issues, that it’s so widespread, the use is so widespread, and second that in certain parts of the world it has to be very closely monitored.

So with that, I’m anxious to hear from the witnesses. I do have another commitment. We had scheduling issues with this. I have the written testimony from the witnesses, which I’ll study carefully, and I’d respectfully request that you hold the record open, Chairman Casey, so that I can submit questions for the record, if you would be so kind.

Senator Casey. So ordered.

Senator Risch. Thank you very much, and with that I’m going to excuse myself. Thank you so much.

Senator Casey. Senator Risch, thank you, and thank you for taking the time to be here with us today, especially in light of the scheduling change.

Senator Risch. Thank you.

Senator Casey. Thank you.

Ms. Goodman, thank you very much for being here. Why don’t we start with you. We’ll just go right to left. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF MARY BETH GOODMAN, SENIOR ECONOMIC ADVISER TO THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ms. Goodman. Thank you, Senator Casey, and thanks for the invitation to be here today. This is the first time that I’ve appeared before the subcommittee and I am truly honored to be here, particularly for such a critical issue.

On behalf of Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Holbrooke, the Department is appreciative of the helpful role that the subcommittee has played in drawing attention to the important issues
in South and Central Asia, and particularly your leadership in helping to try and find a solution to the lethal problem of improvised explosive devices. The bipartisan Senate Resolution 570 that passed here in June and called for an increased effort by the governments in the region to monitor and regulate the ammonium nitrate was an important step in bringing awareness to this endeavor.

Given the interagency nature of our efforts to combat the IED assembly line out in the field, I'm pleased to be here today with my colleagues from Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security.

As you know, the IEDs are responsible for a vast majority of coalition fatalities and injuries and are also the cause of significant civilian deaths among Pakistani and Afghan citizens. These deaths are the results of a complex and global network of both legal and illegal activities that facilitate the flow of lethal aid into Afghanistan from neighboring countries, including Pakistan.

The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan coordinates the Department of State's counter-IED response. Our three-pronged strategy is to: one, work cooperatively with both the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan to develop their domestic regulatory regimes; two, to address the issues of transshipment; and three, to address the smuggling issues.

A majority of the IEDs are constructed from the fertilizer calcium ammonium nitrate, which is legally and legitimately a dual-use traded product. However, CAN, as it is commonly known, is not widely used to support agricultural production in either Afghanistan or Pakistan.

On January 21, 2010, President Karzai signed a Presidential decree banning the import, production, transportation, use, sale, and storage of ammonium nitrate fertilizer. This decree also authorized the Afghan National Security Forces and ISAF to seize any existing supplies in Afghanistan after a 1-month grace period for farmers to turn in their caches. However, the importation and distribution of ammonium nitrate for use in mining and construction is still legal throughout Afghanistan. While there are regulations in place to monitor and control the use of CAN for mining and construction, to date no permits have been issued by the government for these purposes. In the absence of these permits, search and seizure authority exists only for—currently exists for ammonium nitrate in any form.

During the recent United States-Pakistan strategic dialogue, Pakistan announced that it has recently established a national counter-IED forum that is going to host a seminar on November 25 to address the first steps in developing a national strategy. This seminar will bring together Pakistani stakeholders as well as members of the international community to discuss legislative and law enforcement strategies to combat the proliferation of IEDs and to halt the flow of their deadly input. This seminar will establish the foundation on which Pakistan will build its counter-IED strategy.

While urea and di-ammonium phosphate are the predominant fertilizers in Pakistan, we know that there are two plants, the Pak-Arab Fertilizer Coalition Co. in Multan and the National Fertilizer Corp. in Lahore, which legally produce ammonium nitrate fertilizer.
in quantities sufficient to meet Pakistani demands. Pakistan customs data reports that in 2009 Pakistan imported ammonium nitrate fertilizer from Sweden, Germany, Russia, China, and Iran. Given the low level of usage for ammonium nitrate fertilizer in Pakistan's domestic agricultural use, this customs data indicates that the import levels far exceed domestic usage and thus may have been legally transshipped onward to Afghanistan.

Ambassador Holbrooke and our team at the State Department are working to raise awareness of the IED issue beyond the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The State Department has worked cooperatively with the Department of Homeland Security to launch Operation Global Shield and we were pleased to fund the initial session to train and launch this effort in October at the World Customs Organization in Brussels.

This program brings together the expertise of the World Customs Organization, Interpol, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to monitor the trade flows of 14 precursor chemicals, including ammonium nitrate. This is in an effort to raise global awareness of the harmful effects of these trade flows on our troops in Afghanistan and to improve the ability of customs and border officials in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Central Asian states to identify and seize the precursor chemicals smuggled across the borders and used in the manufacture of IEDs.

The State Department will continue to work with our inter-agency partners to encourage the Government of Pakistan to take swift and concrete action against IEDs and to actively promote implementation of initiatives to support this goal. We have already seen an increased engagement from Pakistan on the counter-IED issue and, although their efforts are nascent, Pakistan is working constructively to develop a coherent strategy to stop the proliferation of IEDs into Afghanistan.

Embassy Islamabad will support follow-on training in early December in Karachi to train front-line Pakistani customs officers on interdiction techniques for IED precursors. Embassy Kabul is also going to sponsor similar training this month as well.

We will also continue to help the Government of Afghanistan work to enforce their ban on ammonium nitrate and to aid in the detection and seizure of the substances at the border. Most importantly, we’re going to encourage direct engagement between Afghan and Pakistan, Afghan and Pakistani colleagues, to ensure that cooperation between civilian and military agencies on both sides of the border is at the center of the efforts to stop the flow of IED components.

Mr. Chairman, we look forward to working with you and your office on the important issues in the months ahead and I look forward to taking your questions today.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Goodman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARY BETH GOODMAN, SENIOR ECONOMIC ADVISER TO THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Senator Casey, Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee, thank you for your invitation to testify today on the critical issue of impeding the flow of ammonium nitrate in South Asia. On behalf of Secretary Clinton and Ambassador
Holbrooke, the Department is appreciative of the helpful role this subcommittee has played in drawing attention to important issues in South and Central Asia and your leadership, Mr. Chairman, in trying to find a solution to the lethal problem of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The bipartisan Senate Resolution 570 that passed this Chamber in June and called for an increased effort by the governments in the region to monitor and regulate ammonium nitrate was an important step forward in bringing awareness to this endeavor.

Given the interagency nature of our efforts to combat the IED assembly line out in the field, I am pleased to be joined today by my colleagues from the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security.

As you know, IEDs are responsible for the vast majority of coalition fatalities and injuries and are the cause of significant civilian deaths among Pakistani and Afghan citizens. These deaths are the result of a complex and global network of both legal and illegal activities that facilitate the flow of lethal aid into Afghanistan from neighboring countries, including Pakistan.

A majority of these IEDs are constructed from the fertilizer calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN), which is a legally and legitimately traded dual use product. CAN, as it is commonly known, is not widely used to support agriculture production in either Afghanistan or Pakistan.

On January 21, 2010, President Karzai signed a Presidential decree banning the import, production, transportation, use, sale, and storage of ammonium nitrate fertilizer. The decree also authorized the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to seize existing supplies in Afghanistan after a 1-month grace period for farmers, who could hand over their supplies in return for compensation for a more effective urea-based fertilizer. However the importation, production, and distribution of ammonium nitrate for use in the mining and construction sectors is still legal throughout Afghanistan. While there are regulations in place to monitor and control the use of CAN for mining and construction, to date, no permits have been issued by the government for these purposes. In the absence of these permits, search and seizure authority exists for ammonium nitrate in any form.

The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan coordinates the Department of State’s counter-IED response. Our three-pronged strategy is to: (1) work cooperatively with both the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan to develop their domestic regulatory regimes; (2) address issues of transshipment, and, (3) address the smuggling issues.

Our Embassies in Kabul and Islamabad are actively engaged with the governments in both Afghanistan and Pakistan to raise the profile of this critical issue and encourage our partners to take concrete action to combat IEDs.

I returned from Pakistan yesterday, where we discussed this issue with the Government of Pakistan and our international partners. The Government of Pakistan has recently established a National Counter-IED Forum that seeks to develop a national strategy to combat IEDs and coordinate the Government’s response. During the recent U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, Pakistan announced that its National Counter-IED Forum will host a seminar on November 25 as a first step in developing a national strategy. This seminar will bring together Pakistani stakeholders as well as members of the international community to discuss legislative and law enforcement strategies to combat the proliferation of IEDs and halt the flow of their deadly inputs. This seminar will establish the foundation on which Pakistan will build its counter-IED strategy. In addition, Pakistan is engaged in law enforcement activities directed at stemming the flow of illegal shipments of CAN and precursor explosive materials into Afghanistan.

While urea and di-ammonium phosphate are the prominent fertilizers in Pakistan, we know that two plants—the Pak-Arab Fertilizer in Multan and the National Fertilizer Corporation in Lahore—legally produce ammonium nitrate fertilizer. The Web site for the Pak-Arab plant in Multan states that ammonium nitrate fertilizer is produced on demand only and not for general export. Pakistan customs data reports that in 2009, Pakistan imported ammonium nitrate fertilizer from Sweden, Germany, Russia, China, and Iran. Given the low level of usage for ammonium nitrate fertilizer in Pakistan’s domestic agricultural use, the customs data indicates that import levels far exceed domestic usage and thus may have been legally transshipped onward to Afghanistan.

To raise global awareness of the transshipment of fertilizer into the region, the State Department worked cooperatively with the Department of Homeland Security to launch Operation Global Shield. This program brings together the expertise of the World Customs Organization, Interpol, and the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime to monitor the trade flows of 12 precursor chemicals, including ammonium nitrate, in an effort to raise global awareness of the harmful effects of the flow of
these products on our troops in Afghanistan and improve the ability of customs and border officials in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Central Asian states, to identify and seize precursor materials smuggled across the Afghan border to be used in the manufacture of IEDs.

Ambassador Holbrooke and our team at the State Department are working to raise awareness of the IED issue beyond Afghanistan and Pakistan. On August 16, the Department demarched 62 countries to urge participation in Operation Global Shield. The State Department was pleased to fund the initial training session to launch Operation Global Shield in Brussels in October at the World Customs Organization. The Department is also working with private industry to develop alternative, less explosive variants of CAN with the goal of encouraging fertilizer producers in the United States, Pakistan, and elsewhere to adopt technologies to make their products less useful in IEDs.

Pakistan is engaged on the counter-IED issue, and although its efforts are nascent, it is working constructively to develop a coherent strategy to stop the proliferation of IEDs into Afghanistan. Embassy Islamabad will support follow-on training in early December in Karachi to train front line Pakistani customs officers on interdiction techniques for IED precursors. We are pleased that senior Pakistani military officers from Pakistan’s Explosives Ordnance Disposal Company will also attend this training. This is among the first times that the Pakistani military provided training to Customs officials and marks an important step both for capacity building and for interagency cooperation.

We will continue to work with our interagency partners to encourage the Government of Pakistan to take swift and concrete action against IEDs and actively promote implementation of initiatives in support of this goal. We will also continue to help the Government of Afghanistan work to enforce their ban on ammonium nitrate and to aid in the detection and seizure of the substance. Most importantly, we encourage direct engagement between Afghanistan and Pakistan to ensure that cooperation between civilian and military agencies on both sides of the border is at the center of efforts to limit the flow of IED components in the region.

Mr. Chairman, we look forward to continuing to work with your office on this important issue in the months ahead. I look forward to taking your questions.

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much.

Mr. Woods.

STATEMENT OF JOHN P. WOODS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. WOODS. Thank you, Chairman Casey. On behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Assistant Secretary Morton, I thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

Many agencies play a critical role in this important issue and I am proud to be here alongside my counterparts from the Department of Defense and the Department of State. The October 28 attempt to ship explosive devices through air cargo and the attempted bombing of Northwest Flight 253 on December 25 of last year underscore the threat that improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, pose to our national security. As I will discuss today, ICE is at the forefront of our Nation’s civilian efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and investigate the international movement of IED components and explosive precursors.

ICE is well positioned to accomplish this mission by using its statutory authority to investigate and enforce criminal violations of all U.S. export laws as it relates to military items, controlled dual-use commodities, and sanctioned or embargoed countries. Further, we have the capability to expand the scope of our investigations beyond our domestic offices to our 67 attaché offices situated throughout the world.
To combat the illicit use of precursor chemicals by terrorists or other criminal organizations who manufacture IEDs, ICE initiated Project Global Shield, an unprecedented, multilateral law enforcement effort aimed at combating the illicit diversion and trafficking of precursor chemicals by monitoring their cross-border movements. This is a joint ICE–CBP global project, which ICE proposed at the World Customs Organization Enforcement meeting last spring in Brussels. It is based on a collaboration among the World Customs Organization, Interpol, and the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. This mutual undertaking represents the first time that the threat posed by explosive precursors has been collectively addressed by the international community.

The ultimate goal of Global Shield is to identify and interdict falsely declared precursor chemicals, initiate investigations, and uncover smuggling networks. In doing so, ICE and CBP aim to build capacity among our strategic partners and to detect illicit shipments of explosive precursors and promote cooperation among customs and police administrations in combating the illicit diversion of ammonium nitrate and other precursors along the global supply chain.

Global Shield seeks to facilitate legitimate trade while making it more difficult for those with nefarious purposes to get their hands on components necessary for IEDs. By working together and sharing real-time information and intelligence, countries will be able to verify the legitimacy of individual shipments while identifying, disrupting, and dismantling the terrorist networks involved in the illicit procurement of these chemicals via front companies and complicit middlemen.

We believe that Global Shield will provide invaluable data for trend analysis to increase the global understanding of the risks posed by precursor chemicals and their illicit movement. The program will identify best practices to combat illicit diversion and trafficking of precursor chemicals used to manufacture explosives, as well as monitor and track legitimate shipments of precursor chemicals to assist in identifying high-risk routes for future enforcement activity. Global Shield will set the foundation for future multilateral initiatives to deny terrorists access to other explosive components.

As an enhancement to our mission in thwarting this illegal trade activity and as a key part of the President’s export control reform initiative, President Obama signed Executive Order 13558 this past Tuesday, which created the Export Enforcement Coordination Center, a multiagency center that will be housed within ICE and serve as the primary government forum for the exchange of information and intelligence related to export enforcement.

One of ICE’s highest priorities is to prevent terrorist groups and others who might wish to inflict harm by illegally obtaining U.S. military products and sensitive technology, including weapons of mass destruction or WMD components.

All of these efforts, along with the efforts described in full detail within my written remarks, are part of our comprehensive strategy that focuses on assuring IED components and precursors do not reach the hands of terrorists or others who may wish to inflict
harm and prosecute those who subvert the rule of law and threaten our national security.

ICE remains dedicated and committed to this mission and we look forward to working with the subcommittee on its efforts.

Thank you once again for the opportunity to appear before you today and I would be pleased to take any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Woods follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN P. WOODS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, on behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Assistant Secretary Morton, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify today. The October 28, 2010, attempt to ship explosive devices through air cargo, and the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on December 25, 2009, underscore the threat that improvised explosive devices (IEDs) pose to our national security. IEDs are the most prevalent form of explosive employed by terrorists around the world and the single greatest threat to coalition forces in Afghanistan. According to military officials in Kabul, more than 4,100 bombs were either intentionally exploded or discovered by coalition forces in 2008, and more than 6,000 IEDs were discovered in 2009. The vast majority of these IEDs were produced from ammonium nitrate. As I will discuss today, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is at the forefront of the nation’s civilian efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and investigate the international movement of IED components and explosives precursors.

ICE is well-positioned to accomplish this mission. We have the largest force of investigators within the Department of Homeland Security, and we protect the nation by investigating criminal organizations that seek to exploit weaknesses in legitimate trade, travel, and financial systems to further their illicit enterprises. More than 6,500 ICE special agents detect, disrupt, and dismantle cross-border criminal networks engaged in the smuggling of people, narcotics, bulk cash, weaponry and weaponry-related components across our borders. ICE also has full statutory authority to investigate and enforce criminal violations of all U.S. export laws related to military items, controlled ‘‘dual-use’’ commodities, and sanctioned or embargoed countries. Further, we have the capability to expand the scope of our investigations beyond our domestic offices to 67 attaché offices situated throughout the world.

PROJECT GLOBAL SHIELD

To combat the illicit use of precursor chemicals by terrorist and other criminal organizations to manufacture IEDs, ICE initiated Global Shield—an unprecedented, multilateral law enforcement effort aimed at combating the illicit diversion and trafficking of precursor chemicals for making explosives by monitoring their cross-border movements. This joint ICE/U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) global project—proposed by ICE at the World Customs Organization (WCO) Enforcement Committee Meeting in Brussels, Belgium, during the spring of 2010—is based on collaboration among the WCO, INTERPOL, and the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC). This collaborative undertaking represents the first time that the threat posed by explosives precursors has been collectively addressed by the international community.

The ultimate goal of Global Shield is to identify and interdict falsely declared precursor chemicals, initiate investigations, and uncover smuggling networks. In doing so, ICE and CBP aim to build capacity among strategic partners to detect illicit shipments of explosive precursors and promote cooperation among customs and police administrations in combating the illicit diversion of ammonium nitrate and other explosives precursors along the global supply chain.

Customs and police administrations currently participate in several successful operational initiatives designed to combat the illicit diversion and trafficking of precursor chemicals used by criminal organizations to manufacture narcotics. Prior to Global Shield, no similar initiative existed to combat the trafficking of precursor chemicals used to manufacture explosives. The methodology of Global Shield draws on lessons learned and best practices from similar antinarcotic precursor projects and operations.
Global Shield seeks to facilitate legitimate trade while making it more difficult for those with nefarious purposes to get their hands on components for IEDs. By working together and sharing real-time information and intelligence, countries will be able to verify the legitimacy of individual shipments while identifying, disrupting, and dismantling the terrorist networks involved in the illicit procurement of these chemicals via front companies and complicit middlemen. ICE and CBP are working closely with stakeholders from across the federal government, including the Departments of State and Defense, to accomplish the goals of Global Shield.

The mass production of ammonium nitrate and other precursor chemicals largely occurs beyond the borders of countries most afflicted by IEDs. A global effort is therefore essential to effectively combat their illicit smuggling and diversion. The Government of Afghanistan has taken a crucial first step. On September 23, 2009, Afghanistan banned the importation of ammonium nitrate fertilizer and issued a decree permitting its confiscation either stored in or transported through Afghanistan. This ban quickly achieved significant results. In November 2009, Afghanistan seized 500,000 pounds of ammonium nitrate in Kandahar—one of the largest seizures of its kind in Afghanistan.

The implementation of Global Shield is underway. In October, police and customs representatives from 86 countries participated in a preoperational training seminar hosted by the WCO in Brussels, Belgium. The seminar focused on the detection of precursor chemicals used to manufacture explosives. Assistant Secretary Morton attended and provided opening remarks. As of November 1, 2010, Global Shield became operational, and intelligence production and information sharing among international partners has begun.

We believe that Global Shield will provide invaluable data for trend analysis to increase the global understanding of the risk posed by precursor chemicals and their illicit movement. The program will identify best practices to combat the illicit diversion and trafficking of precursor chemicals used to manufacture explosives, as well as identify routes for future enforcement activity. Global Shield will set the foundation for future multilateral initiatives to deny terrorists access to explosives.

ICE'S COUNTER-PROLIFERATION INVESTIGATION PROGRAM

One of ICE's highest priorities is to prevent terrorist groups and others who might wish to inflict harm from illegally obtaining U.S. military products and sensitive technology, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD) components. ICE agents in the counterproliferation investigations (CPI) focus on the illegal procurement and export of specific commodities and services, including explosives precursors. CPI priority programs address trafficking in WMD components and materials, sensitive dual-use commodities, and technologies sought by terrorist groups and others who might wish to inflict harm. Other programs address illegal exports of military equipment and spare parts to embargoed countries, significant financial and business transactions with proscribed countries and groups, export enforcement training for foreign law enforcement agencies, and outreach with domestic private industry.

ICE's export enforcement program uses a three-pronged approach: detecting illegal exports, investigating potential violations, and obtaining international cooperation to investigate leads abroad. The guiding principle behind ICE CPI investigations is the detection and disruption of illegal exports before they cause damage to the national security interests of the United States. ICE relies on specially trained CBP officers stationed at ports of entry to inspect suspect export shipments. Following detection of a violation, ICE agents deployed throughout the country initiate and pursue investigations to identify, arrest, and seek prosecution of offenders of the Arms Export Control Act, International Emergency Economics Powers Act and other related statutes.

The international nature of counterproliferation networks and schemes requires a global investigative response. Our attaché offices located overseas work to enlist the support of their host governments to initiate new investigative leads and develop information in support of ongoing domestic investigations. The collaboration between ICE and foreign governments in the area of CPI is the foundation for Project Global Shield.

In fiscal year 2010, ICE agents initiated a total of 1,149 criminal investigations into possible export violations and made 248 arrests for export-related criminal violations, more than any other U.S. federal law enforcement agency (reported by the U.S. Department of Justice). In fiscal year 2010, ICE agents conducted thousands of seizures of arms, military weaponry, and other sensitive commodities related to
illegal export schemes, valued at over $87.8 million. These efforts significantly contributed to preventing sensitive U.S. technologies and weapons from reaching the hands of terrorists, hostile countries and violent criminal organizations.

PROJECT SHIELD AMERICA (PSA)

One of the most effective tools ICE agents use is our industry outreach program, Project Shield America (PSA). Through this program, ICE agents conduct outreach to manufacturers and exporters of strategic commodities to educate them on U.S. export control laws, discuss export licensing issues and requirements, identify “red flag” indicators used in illegal procurement, and identify the government agencies responsible for the licensing of export-controlled commodities and technology. Since 2002, ICE agents have delivered approximately 19,000 outreach presentations to private industry and other entities as part of the PSA program.

EXPORT ENFORCEMENT COORDINATION CENTER (EECC)

A key part of the President’s Export Control Reform initiative is to improve our law enforcement capabilities to investigate violations of U.S. export control laws. On November 9, 2010, President Obama signed an Executive order creating the Export Enforcement Coordination Center (EECC)—a multiagency center that will be housed within ICE and will serve as the primary government forum for the exchange of information and intelligence related to export enforcement. The creation of the EECC is a key component of the administration’s three-phase reform plan for export control enforcement, with the ultimate goal of creating a single primary enforcement coordination agency. Such an agency would be more efficient, and would limit duplicative or conflicting enforcement activity.

The EECC will be staffed with full-time personnel from ICE, as well as individuals detailed from among the following departments and agencies: State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, Commerce, Energy, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and other executive branch departments, agencies, or offices as designated by the President. Specifically, the functions of the EECC will include:

• Coordinating the deconfliction of criminal and administrative enforcement operations and coordination of industry enforcement outreach activity;
• Serving as a conduit between federal law enforcement agencies and the U.S. Intelligence Community;
• Acting as the primary point of contact between enforcement agencies and export licensing agencies for enforcement and licensing matters;
• Resolving interagency conflicts not settled in the field; and
• Establishing governmentwide statistical tracking capabilities for U.S. export enforcement activities.

The EECC will replace ICE’s National Export Enforcement Coordination Network (NEECN), which has led coordination among DHS components to address challenges inherent with dismantling transnational procurement networks. Unlike the NEECN, in which agency participation has been on a voluntary basis, the new EECC will require participation by law enforcement and the intelligence community agencies. Staffing will be dedicated on a mandatory basis, but at various levels of participation consistent with the mission of each agency’s role in export enforcement.

CPI CENTERS

Faced with increasingly sophisticated global procurement networks, ICE has established and implemented the concept of operation for “CPI Centers” throughout the United States to more strategically utilize CPI resources in the field. The new CPI Center concept will allow for dedicated and experienced agents to be strategically placed in high-risk domestic areas to improve ICE’s ability to combat illegal exports and illicit procurement networks that pose a threat to the United States. All CPI Centers will be staffed with seasoned criminal investigators with years of CPI experience, will maintain an ICE certified undercover operation unit specifically focused on counterproliferation investigations, and will be required to house a sensitive compartmented information facility to ensure the capability to receive and share classified information. The first CPI Center has been established at the ICE Special Agent in Charge office in Washington, DC. ICE is in the process of identifying and acquiring funding for additional CPI Centers.

CASE EXAMPLE

In January 2007, ICE received information regarding the illegal export of U.S. technology to entities representing Iran, a violation of the U.S. trade embargo. A
joint ICE, Defense Criminal Investigative Service, and Department of Commerce Office of Export Enforcement investigation conducted from January 2007 to March 2008 uncovered a vast network of companies and entities based in Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, Canada, and Germany that were aggressively procuring sensitive U.S. technology and U.S. military commodities. Further investigation revealed that some of this technology was found in IEDs deployed against coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The subjects identified during the course of the investigation purchased, and then illegally exported to buyers in Iran, numerous “dual use” commodities (goods and technologies that have a commercial application, but also could be used to further military or nuclear potential, and could be detrimental to the foreign policy or national security of the United States). The investigation revealed that as many as eight individuals and eight corporations caused the export of 120 field-programmable gate arrays, more than 5,000 integrated circuits of varying types, approximately 945 Global Positioning Systems, 12,000 Microchip brand microcontrollers, and other electronic components. All of these items have potential military applications, including components in IEDs. As a result of the investigation, 35 individuals and entities involved in procurement and movement of sensitive military and dual use goods to Iran were arrested, indicted or convicted.

CONCLUSION

ICE agents are working tirelessly to ensure that IED components and precursors do not reach the hands of terrorists and others who might wish to inflict harm, and to prosecute those that subvert the rule of law and threaten our national security. We look forward to continuing to work with this subcommittee on this critical national security issue. Thank you once again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have at this time.

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much.
Deputy Assistant Secretary Sedney, thank you.

STATEMENT OF DAVID SEDNEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. SEDNEY. Mr. Chairman, it’s a pleasure to testify before you again. General Shields and I have submitted to the committee a joint statement that we ask that you enter into the record and each of us have a few short remarks.

Senator CASEY. It’ll be entered in the record. Thank you.

Mr. SEDNEY. Thank you, sir.

Thank you again for inviting us to speak before you along with our counterparts from the State Department, Department of Homeland Security, and JIEDDO.

The ongoing threat that IEDs pose to the United States, to NATO, to Afghanistan, and to our partner nations is of great concern. Secretary Gates has made this, combating the IED threat, a paramount—has made it clear that that is of paramount importance to the Department of Defense.

As Brigadier General Shields will highlight, defeating IED networks is a tough and complex fight. Successfully disrupting these networks requires close cooperation both here in Washington in the interagency, with our allies and partners overseas, and particularly with Afghanistan and Pakistan. As my colleagues have already described some of those efforts, I want to focus on one other area.

As part of the President’s Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, we are working to build a long-term strategic partnership with the government and people of Pakistan. This partnership is based on building mutual trust, identifying mutual interests, and building a partnership that is designed to accomplish the President’s core goal of disrupting, dismantling, and destroying al-Qaeda and its affiliates.
The importance of eliminating the IED threat within the region is clear to both United States and Pakistan. It's important to remember, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, that Pakistan and its civilians and military are tragic victims of IED attacks, with more than 10,000 civilians and more than 2,000 military personnel either killed or wounded by IEDs since January 2008, a trend that has worsened as Pakistan has expanded its efforts against the violent extremists that are on its soil.

Both Pakistani civilian and military leadership realize that IED networks are the most lethal security threat within their own country, and that's been proven again within the past week. This realization has led to increased cooperation from Pakistan, particularly with the Pakistani military, on counter-IED efforts. A number of—we have made progress on a number of fronts, which I would be happy to brief you on more fully in a classified setting.

As partnership and counter-IED efforts have improved, our senior defense leaders will continue to engage with and work with Pakistan on precursor supply chains. Our bilateral engagements on ammonium nitrate and other precursor topics will be key to these discussions. I have made this a priority in my discussions with Pakistani colleagues and will continue to do so.

There are many areas that need to be improved, as you highlighted, Mr. Chairman. Among those are intelligence-sharing as well as the issues of Pakistani regulatory capacity and law enforcement capacity that you highlighted. Our Office of Defense Representative in Pakistan has and will continue to make this effort against ammonium nitrate and other precursors a priority of their interactions with the Pakistani military.

IEDs have been a major cause and continue to be a major cause of United States military deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan and play a significant role in shaping today's combat environment. The Department of Defense is committed and is focused on addressing this critical issue, which is essential to the success of the United States strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Thank you again for calling this important hearing and I look forward to your questions.

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Sedney and Brigadier General Shields follows:]

Chairman Casey, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting us to appear before you today on behalf of the men and women of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) and the Department of Defense (DOD).

As part of the President's Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, we are in the midst of building a strategic partnership with Pakistan based on mutual interest, mutual trust, and mutual respect. President Obama has said that “America will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan's security and prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent, so that the great potential of its people can be unleashed.” Our partnership with Pakistan is designed, in part, to accomplish our core regional goal of disrupting, dismantling, and destroying al-Qaeda and its extremist affiliates. The U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, led by Secretary of State Clinton and her Pakistani counterpart, Foreign Minister Qureshi, has helped widen the scope of our partnership to include all spheres of bilateral cooperation. The Strategic Dialogue has helped elevate bilateral dialogue to advance this partnership, and has also pro-
vided a forum to discuss the tough issues that we must face as partners, from the transnational threat posed by extremist safe havens in Pakistan to the threat posed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Separate engagements at all levels of the Department of Defense—from Secretary Gates and Chairman Mullen, to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and at working levels throughout the Department—have begun to advance the dialogue with our Pakistani partners in combating this threat. Because of the sensitivity of much of our cooperation, as we are sure you understand, there are some aspects of our discussions with Pakistan on which DOD would need to brief members in a classified setting. We would welcome that opportunity.

The importance of countering the threat posed by IEDs cannot be overstated. IEDs have been a major cause of U.S. military deaths in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and play a significant role in shaping today's combat environment. DOD has prioritized countering the IED threat, and it is a focus area for Secretary Gates. From the establishment of JIEDDO as the nexus of DOD counter-IED efforts, to the urgent prioritization of the development and acquisition of Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles and the establishment of a standing Senior Initiatives Group chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Joint Staff Director of Operations, DOD has brought significant resources to bear in trying to counter the IED threat.

DOD responds to the IED problem from the military perspective, but we have increasingly recognized that interagency cooperation and cooperation with foreign governments are essential in addressing this complex issue. Active coordination with U.S. Government diplomatic, economic, intelligence, and military resources, as well as cooperation from foreign governments, is the key to a successful effort to defeat IED networks. We rely heavily on the Department of State to assist in this area.

IEDs continue to represent the most lethal threat to U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan and to the success of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Homemade explosives (HME) and other bulk explosives are the enabling factors in 9 of every 10 IEDs in Afghanistan. IEDs have resulted in the deaths of 1,046 coalition soldiers since January 2008, causing 2 of every 3 coalition fatalities in Afghanistan. The challenge of interdicting this HME threat is considerable and must be addressed using a comprehensive approach, applying a range of assets in close partnership with our allies and other countries in the region. Combating this threat is crucial to the success of the U.S. strategy. The best way to obtain results is through engagement with the international community, including the Government of Pakistan, collaboration within the U.S. Government and with multinational partners, and through the use of technology, training tools, and methods, along with a robust and enforceable regulatory or legal regime.

JIEDDO assesses that the vast majority of significant precursors for HME in Afghanistan—ammonium nitrate fertilizers and potassium chlorate industrial chemicals—originate in, or transit through, Pakistan. Additionally, it is assessed that a significant portion of the weaponization process for HME precursors occurs in areas outside Afghanistan. Complicating this picture is the dual-use nature of many of these precursors; they are the product of legitimate industries that produce items such as agricultural fertilizer and matches. Although there is a limited manufacturing base in both fields, there is a larger chemical broker and transportation industry that, often unwittingly, makes up the IED supply chain. An additional challenge is the absence or infancy of Pakistani regulatory and law enforcement regimes to control the sale, transportation, or weaponization of these materials. Should Pakistan institute an effective regulatory regime, it still would require a much more robust enforcement capability than the one that is currently in place. Once precursor materials have entered the retail chain, efforts to restrict the movement of ammonium nitrate-based fertilizer and other HME precursors into Afghanistan are hindered by the high profit margins these products can bring to those who deal in them. The economic incentive to smuggle becomes too high. It is important to remember that Pakistan and its civilians and military are tragic victims of IED attacks, with over 10,000 civilians and over 2,000 military personnel either killed or wounded by IEDs since January 2008. In our efforts with Pakistani military counterparts, they have recognized the common threat of IEDs and have cooperated in ways that have exceeded the expectations of some.

Our efforts to counter IEDs require what JIEDDO’s Director, Lieutenant General Michael Oates, calls a “combined arms approach.” This includes applying multiple material and nonmaterial solutions along the long line of IED production and using them to detect and disrupt IEDs in place or while being emplaced; IEDs constructed, acquired, or transported; and the diversion of precursors for IED manufacture both before and after weaponization.
Just as the IED supply chain is not limited by national borders, the counter-IED response cannot be limited to the interdiction of HME precursor materials in Afghanistan. Success against the supply of HME precursor materials is essential to reduce the effect of IEDs on our forces, as well as on government personnel and civilians in Afghanistan and Pakistan. To achieve this success, JIEDDO will continue to employ its three core functions and to integrate these functions: (1) rapid response, (2) training, (3) and operations and intelligence fusion, to achieve an effect greater than the sum of each individual effort separately. Broader DOD efforts to focus intelligence, operational, and acquisition efforts will also be key over the long term.

Although there is still much to be done, we will need to focus on interrupting the IED supply chain, including through border interdiction efforts. As much of the licit and illicit material transport in Afghanistan is through smuggling and the black market, the more success that we have at border interdictions, the greater the reward for smugglers as the black market price goes up. Our success means that we may soon reach a point of diminishing returns.

Although there is much to do, Pakistan’s recognition of the challenge has driven some progress. Through the Office of Defense Representative–Pakistan, and with coalition partners, DOD continues to work on collaborative efforts with Pakistan to enhance our collective ability to defeat IED networks. If requested, DOD can provide additional information in classified settings on our cooperative efforts. Although DOD’s efforts, along with other U.S. departments and agencies, to work with the Government and Security Forces of Pakistan on the IED-related challenges have only just begun, Pakistan recognizes the threat IEDs pose to their own security, but faces significant capability and capacity challenges. As with Coalition Forces in Afghanistan, IEDs are the single-highest casualty-producing threat against Pakistani military and security elements. The Pakistanis do appear to recognize the importance of a multilateral, comprehensive governmental solution to tackling the IED problem in order to protect Afghan and Pakistani civilians, as well as the security units trying to protect them.

There are additional efforts underway to develop needed capabilities and partnerships with the Government of Pakistan. The Department of Defense stands ready to bring its significant experience and expertise to bear to optimize the responses to this problem, which is essential to the success of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Sedney.

General.

STATEMENT OF BG MICHAEL H. SHIELDS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS, JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT ORGANIZATION (JIEDDO)

General SHIELDS. Chairman Casey, thank you for the invitation to appear before you today on behalf of the men and women of the Joint IED Defeat Organization. On behalf of Lieutenant General Oates, I’m honored to be here representing JIEDDO.

To call our mission a challenging one would be a considerable understatement. Improvised explosive devices continue to represent the most lethal threat to United States, coalition, and Afghan forces, as well as Pakistan security forces and civilians. It’s a weapon of tactical, operational, and strategic influence. Homemade explosives and other bulk explosives constitute approximately 80 to 90 percent of every IED in Afghanistan. The topic of this hearing couldn’t be more relevant to the fight we now face.

We face an adaptive and agile enemy, determined to inflict the most casualties, often in ways that expose them to the least amount of risk, but always in a manner that’s difficult to predict due to range of options available to insurgents. The enemy shifts its tactics, techniques, and procedures to adjust to our behavior on the battlefield. These options include how the device is detonated, ranging from remote-controlled and victim-operated to command wire IEDs.
JIEDDO assists U.S. Central Command in multiple ways, to include providing analysts and analytical tools for the warfighter. This near real-time reachback analytical support gives tactical commanders multiple layers of situational awareness. Additionally, JIEDDO's rapid acquisition of material and nonmaterial solutions supports efforts to attack networks, defeat IEDs, and train forces.

JIEDDO also supports information-sharing through our Joint Knowledge Information Fusion Exchange, referred to as JKnIFE, and it's also accessible to the coalition, as well as IED and HME recognition guides, handbooks, and test kits.

I've brought a couple of examples of some of our handbook products that we provide both to U.S. forces and coalition forces. We've got enough for the subcommittee. I've also brought an example of calcium ammonium nitrate in its fertilizer form, ammonium nitrate in its processed form, and the commercial ammonium nitrate. Sir, if you'd like we can move this forward, if you'd like to see this, and we can provide copies of this at the conclusion as well.

Senator CASEY. Sure. Thank you very much.

General SHIELDS. The IED assembly line is not limited by national borders, nor can the response be limited to the interdiction of HME precursor materials in Afghanistan. The HME threat is considerable and must be addressed using a comprehensive approach by applying a range of assets in close coordination with our allies and partners. The application of economic, political, and military solutions to the HME-based IED problem is the right approach. Success against the supply of HME precursor materials wherever they exist is essential to reducing the effect of IEDs on our troops and on those government personnel and civilians who are critical to the success foreign our counterinsurgency strategy.

Pakistan acknowledges the threat IEDs pose to their own security. It suffered over 10,000 casualties since 2008 and, as with coalition forces in Afghanistan, IEDs are the single highest casualty-producing threat against Pakistani military and security organizations, with over 2,000 military either killed or wounded. The Pakistanis recognize the importance of the multilateral comprehensive governmental solution to tackling the IED problem in order to protect Afghan and Pakistani civilians, as well as the security units trying to protect them.

There are additional efforts under way, as mentioned previously, to develop needed capabilities and partnerships with the Government of Pakistan. The JIEDDO Deputy Director for Operations Integration will travel to Pakistan in support of CENTCOM over Thanksgiving, to participate in the Pakistan-hosted counter-IED seminar with senior personnel of the Pakistani military, Ministry of Interior, as well as our Office of Defense Representative, Pakistan. The goal is to enhance cooperation between the United States and Pakistan on counter-IED efforts and assist Pakistan in developing a comprehensive counter-IED strategy.

JIEDDO stands ready to respond to counter-IED requirements generated from the combatant commanders and will continue to support efforts with other U.S. agencies to work with the government and security forces of Pakistan on this challenge.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to stand before the subcommittee and I'm prepared to answer your questions.
Senator CASEY. Thank you very much.
I’ve grateful for the testimony of all of our witnesses, and also wanted to welcome Senator Coons from Delaware, who for me becomes the third Senator from Delaware to serve on the Foreign Relations Committee in the short time that I’ve been in the Senate. When I got here Senator Biden was the chairman of the committee, and then Senator Kaufman used to sit right over there, and we welcome Senator Coons, unless you have anything you wanted to say before we start questions.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. COONS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate the welcome and the opportunity to join you in this important hearing. I apologize for my late arrival. I had a previously scheduled meeting. This is my first week.

I think this is a very important topic, and in reading the briefing materials beforehand was reminded of just the challenges that both our troops in the field face and that civilians face in theater. A young man who grew up next door to me in Delaware was killed by an IED December 11, 2005, and I never forget every day that there are American service men and women who are suffering either debilitating injuries or losing their lives due to these weapons.

So I just wanted to command you and thank you for organizing and pursuing this hearing and the conversation, the multiagency and multilateral conversation, on stopping the IED supply chain.

So thank you for the chance to speak, Senator.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator.

We’ll go to a round of questions. We have some flexibility today, so we don’t have to be too restrictive on time. But I’ll try to keep within a reasonable amount of time, maybe 7 minutes? I’ll try to keep within the committee rules and traditions.

But Ms. Goodman, I wanted to start with you, with regard to the State Department. You just returned from a visit to Pakistan. You spoke in your testimony about the Counter-IED Task Force. It’s critically important that the American people know that’s happening. I wanted to get your sense of how that’s going so far in Pakistan, who will actively participate, and what’s your sense of how far along that task force is in Pakistan.

Ms. Goodman. Thank you for your question, Senator. Our Embassy in Islamabad, as well as the British High Commission, have been working cooperatively with the Pakistani Government for several months now, trying to talk to them about regulatory best practices and trying to help them develop some overview of how a domestic regulation might look. The Pakistanis have been engaged, but, as you’re well aware, we have not yet seen them develop a comprehensive regulation that they’ve taken before their national assembly. We’re continuing to work with them on that.

During our recent United States-Pakistan strategic dialogue, we were able to have the issue of the ammonium nitrate on our agenda, which was a step forward for Pakistan in their public acknowledgment of addressing this issue with their Pakistani interlocutors and the Pakistani public. So we took that as a very
positive sign that they are going to be more forthcoming and more willing to have these negotiations on a regular basis.

The national counter-IED forum that they’re going to have on the 25th of November will not be publicly open as far as we understand it, but it will have broad participation from many of the ministries within the Pakistani Government, notably led by the Ministry of Interior, but it will also have participation from provincial governments as well as from several other ministries that have some level of involvement in this, including the customs authorities. So for the Pakistanis to convene all the stakeholders is really a significant step forward. It will also have participation from the Pakistani military, so this is a positive step in having the interagency cooperation there.

Senator CASEY. The one concern that we all have is that there must be a sense of urgency, and it has to be a sense of urgency within and throughout several countries, including our own. What’s your sense from having just returned from Pakistan? Is there an urgency that is at the highest levels, or do you still think it’s not yet at that point?

Ms. GOODMAN. Senator, I can’t promise you that this is the top priority in Pakistan. But I can tell you that Ambassador Holbrooke did raise this with the top levels of the Pakistani Government. We’ve had discussions with President Zidari, Prime Minister Gilani, the military leadership, and numerous ministers involved in the process in the Pakistani Government.

So it is something that they are keenly aware of as a strategic and important interest that we are following closely, and they have promised to follow through and to move in their system to develop a more comprehensive approach.

Senator CASEY. In terms of the legislative mechanics, we have our own challenges here with the movement of our legislation, but what’s your sense of the framework or the timeline for that? Do you have any sense of that yet, or is it too——

Ms. GOODMAN. I think it’s a bit too early to have any predictions on that, unfortunately, Senator.

Senator CASEY. Well, I hope we can continue to both monitor and push hard on that as best we can. I know that the State Department has that concern.

I know that the strategic dialogue here in the United States, I think even beyond this issue, more broadly, is critically important to continue that dialogue. The last one that took place here in the United States, was a few weeks ago now—Secretary Clinton raised this issue with the Pakistani leaders at that dialogue.

Ms. GOODMAN. It was on the agenda. We have 13 working groups under the strategic dialogue and it was on the agenda for more detailed and comprehensive discussion in our counterterrorism and security working group. So that’s where it was discussed, with the expert leaders and the ministers who participated in that session.

Senator CASEY. I only have a few more minutes in this round. But in terms of the Department of Defense, Mr. Sedney, I wanted to ask you about what’s your sense—to the extent that you can comment, because I know some of this you can’t get into certain details—in a broad way as to the degree of intensity or the priority that the Pakistani military places on this?
I ask you that with some knowledge of the strength of their military and the strong leadership they have. The two visits I've had in the last couple years to Pakistan I have on both occasions been able to meet with General Qiyani, who's a very capable military man. But I don't yet have a sense as to the—I'm sure the awareness is there—whether or not this is a top priority for his military or at some level close to his level as the leader of their military.

Mr. Sedney. Mr. Senator—Mr. Chairman, rather, we found that—and I think this is similar to our own experience with IEDs over the course of our encountering them—that the Pakistani military is to an increasingly and very serious degree understanding the threat that they pose to their own military and their own civilian population. We have raised this issue at the highest levels, including with General Qiyani. As I mentioned, I've raised it in my discussions. My boss, Under Secretary Michelle Flournoy, has raised it in her discussions with her Pakistani counterparts, and we have done that up and down, up and down the chain.

What we found over the last year particularly is a very responsive Pakistani military. There are a number of areas of the Pakistani military where our cooperation sometimes encounters roadblocks. This has not been one of them. The calls get returned right away. The sense of urgency is increasing. Is it as high as it might be? I think I'll leave that to the Pakistanis to decide, but I can certainly say that it is increasing very rapidly. The level of cooperation, the spirit of cooperation, as the Pakistanis have been exposed to some of the work that JIEDDO and the U.S. military has been doing into counter-IEDs, they've found that work bringing them the possibility of capabilities that they know they need.

I want to thank General Shields and his team for sending people to the seminar next week during Thanksgiving to participate in that. I expect that the interest of the Pakistani military will only continue to grow, so it's on a positive trend, getting close to where you're looking for, if not there yet.

Senator Casey. Thank you very much.

Senator Coons.

Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Casey, and thank you to the panel for those informative answers.

If I might, to Ms. Goodman. What else can we be doing to leverage support with regional allies to further strengthen the regime that's evolving in Pakistan and to further strengthen the domestic ban on ammonium nitrate importation in Afghanistan? What else could we be doing with regional allies or with partners in the field?

Ms. Goodman. Thank you, Senator. It's an excellent question. The ammonium nitrate is certainly flowing from all of Afghanistan's neighbors. The State Department has done some demarches to the Central Asian states to try and assess what their current regulatory regime is. Unfortunately, we did not get a very comprehensive response back, simply because this is the first time we've ever raised this issue with some of these countries, so they had to do some homework themselves to determine what their laws were on the books.

So we continue to work with the Central Asian states as well to help them in trying to find a regulatory solution there. The real winner in terms of making a difference is going to be having more
border coordination and more training of their border and customs officials, so that they know how to detect these types of materials going into Afghanistan. That’s what we’re seeking to do, is to enhance that engagement.

Senator Coons. Is my perception that these borders, broadly, are highly porous and poorly policed correct?

Ms. Goodman. That’s 100 percent correct. They’re incredibly porous.

Senator Coons. And to Mr. Woods, if I might: I was very interested to hear about Global Shield and the partnership through the World Customs Organization. Is there some broader multilateral partnership possible here with our more advanced industrialized allies in precursor exports and materials that are dual use? Does this set the stage for a broader conversation about things that are precursors for other production, whether narcotics, AN, in other contexts? What else could we be doing through multilateral organizations that would strengthen the regional efforts around Afghanistan?

Mr. Woods. That is correct, Senator. Through the World Customs Organization, we did hold this training seminar last month, where 86 countries did participate. It wasn’t totally focused on Southeast Asia. In her opening statement, Ms. Goodman stated how as far away as Sweden was shipping and transshipping ammonium nitrate into Pakistan. So this is a worldwide effort that we are looking at and looking at taking this into the next step, and not just with the 14 precursor chemicals, but down the road looking at other components and other strategies to stop—for counterproliferation efforts.

Senator Coons. If I might, just a closing question to the whole panel. How engaged and how helpful has the Karzai administration been on the ground in Afghanistan in embracing, adopting, and then actually enforcing the new regulatory regime we’re trying to press them toward, if I might?

Ms. Goodman. President Karzai was very helpful in issuing a Presidential decree in January of this year to completely ban the import of the fertilizer. As with everything that we do in Afghanistan, it’s a question of the capacity to implement. We’re continually working with the ministries involved and with the border officials there to train them and to equip them in how better to detect the ammonium nitrate and other precursors as well.

But it’s a slow process. I mean, it’s going to have to be an ongoing effort, with additional funding provided, so that we can ensure that they’re able to use the best technology and the best resources available to ensure that they are living up to their full capability in detecting this.

It’s an ongoing effort with them. The cooperation that we’ve received from the Ministry of Interior and from the Presidency’s Office once we made them aware of this issue was quite good; the Department of Agriculture; they’ve all been very cooperative.

To date, there has not been any regulation issued by the Ministry of Interior there to create the permit system that is needed for the importation of ammonium nitrate for either mining or for road construction. So that is something that our Embassy in Kabul
is actively engaging on, to ensure that that permit system is put in place and we’re able to effectively monitor it.

Senator COONS. Thank you.

Mr. WOODS. If I might add, Senator, additionally, this week in Brussels there are Afghanistan customs officials and police officials that are receiving Global Shield training and learning the methodologies that we plan to deploy around the globe in this endeavor. They have shown full commitment to this, and right after President Karzai’s decree there was a 500,000-pound seizure in Kandahar province that was the initial success, and there have been other seizures to the like.

Senator COONS. Thank you.

Mr. Sedney.

Mr. SEDNEY. Broadly, since the issuance of the decree, which made possible the seizure of a lot of the ammonium nitrate that was already in Afghanistan, we have had a series of quite successful operations, as Deputy Assistant Secretary Woods just mentioned one example. So the cooperation of the Afghan security forces in going after these existing caches or other caches of ammonium nitrates that have been brought in since has resulted in a real dent in the amount that’s there.

But, as, Mr. Chairman, you mentioned at the beginning, IEDs continue—IEDs and ammonium nitrate continue to be a serious problem. I think we’ve seen some change over the last several months in the kinds of IEDs that are being used, but that’s a discussion that I’ve have to have at a classified level.

General SHIELDS. Senator, JIEDDO is an enabler for the combatant command. I wouldn’t be able to comment on the administration and would have to defer to State.

Senator COONS. Thank you. I appreciate the answer.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator Coons.

I wanted to ask both General Shields and Mr. Woods. It’s a tough question to answer because you’re predicting or making judgments about what the implication of some action would be. But if you had a full ban in Afghanistan, what’s your sense of the implications of that?

Mr. WOODS. Well, I think the ban would have to go beyond the borders of Afghanistan. The issue here is the smuggling into Afghanistan, identifying those transshipment points and the actual countries that are being utilized to smuggle into Afghanistan the ammonium nitrate and other precursors.

Senator CASEY. And in the absence of any legislative change in Pakistan, are there ways right now that the border security, border interdiction, could be beefed up on the Afghan side? I’m just trying to think of ways that, instead of waiting for legislative changes, is there more we could be doing on the borders? And I’d ask that to the whole panel.

Mr. WOODS. Well, that’s part of our training technique, capacity-building within these countries, is to look at the trade data and look at diversion techniques that these middlemen will utilize. The fact that they would, maybe not market it as ammonium nitrate, but market it as something else, and train them in the methodolo-
gies that we use in interdiction here in the United States, to use at their own borders.

Senator CASEY. Going back to Ms. Goodman, I think probably a number of people were struck by one of the lines from your testimony, looking at page 3, where you say, and I quote, “Given the low level of usage for ammonium nitrate fertilizer in Pakistan's domestic agricultural use, the customs data indicates that import levels far exceed domestic usage and thus may have been legally transshipped onward to Afghanistan.”

That alone I think indicates just numerically or quantitatively that this is not a product that is essential for farming or other use in Pakistan. When you present that data as part of an argument or an assertion to the Pakistani civilian leadership, what do they say? What’s their response?

Ms. GOODMAN. Senators, in the conversations I've had regarding this subject, they acknowledge that the calcium ammonium nitrate is not the fertilizer of choice in Pakistan. With very limited exception, I have found no one there that even professes to use this among the farmers that we've talked to.

Urea is the most common available fertilizer there. It is certainly the cheapest and it is the most widely available. Pakistan also uses a bit of DAP, but it is also a bit more limited and more for some crops of export, to make them a bit greener, if you will, before they're exported. So the calcium ammonium nitrate is not something that is widely used.

These two plants that I mentioned do produce enough to meet the domestic needs of Pakistan. We have every reason to believe that the imports coming in are in excess of the domestic usage. It's very hard to get specific trade data on this, particularly in a place like Pakistan. The most recent data is from the United Nations, the Food and Drug Organization, and so all the trade data does support that by no means is CAN a fertilizer of choice in Pakistan.

Senator CASEY. I was going to ask, General Shields, I don’t know if you're able to walk through all of this, but just from the point of view of transport and movement, can you describe for us how—and I know in my opening I talked about that L.A. Times story about the 80 tons transported in 1 day, a quantity that can produce 2,500 IEDs.

To the extent that you can say, tell us how that happens? How does that sizable—that kind of tonnage, how does that get moved from one plant in Pakistan into Afghanistan on a single day? Even if it were half, if it were 40 tons, just describe for us, if you can, the movement of that, how it happens? There’s obviously—I’ll say it; you don’t have to—there’s definitively corruption and payoffs and all kinds of other. I don’t think there’s any question about that. But tell us as much as you can in this setting about how that happens?

General SHIELDS. Sir, it was mentioned earlier, the challenge with the porous borders. Of course, there’s two main POEs as well. There’s a lot of effort going on to improve the detect piece.

What I was going to mention on a previous question is the training aspect for attacking the network in Afghanistan. It’s a capability that JIEDDO is capable of providing. We provide analysts from regional command all the way down to battalion and we pro-
vide analytical counter-IED support all the way down to the battalion in support of the current intel uplift that’s ongoing.

But the ability to understand what we refer to as the taxonomy of the network and the logistics piece and how they move, that’s a challenge. The piece that was brought up earlier about the porous border, border security standards, how they’re disguising shipments, that is also challenging.

So I can’t address the piece how it gets from plant to border, but I can tell you that JIEDDO is focusing in on the network piece and the different functional nodes and components of the network and how they move within the country of Afghanistan. Sir, the rest of the answer I’d request to submit in a more classified forum.

Senator CASEY. OK. Thank you.

I don’t know if Senator Coons has another round, but I wanted to pose one more in the couple seconds I have here. Can you describe the degree to which Pakistani and Afghan senior officials have interacted or cooperated? Do you have any sense of that? Anyone, but I think Ms. Goodman maybe.

Ms. GOODMAN. As Mr. Woods has said, both countries participated in the Global Shield training that we did in Brussels. So there was some interaction there, and they both received the same training. Then we know that there has been some followup training with both governments as well separately.

At the next session of our trilateral strategic dialogue that we have—Pakistan, Afghanistan, the United States—we’ve already had some internal discussions saying that this would be an issue which we hope to put on the agenda so that we can have a more tripartite discussion on it. We don’t yet have a date set for that, that trilateral meeting, but we’re anticipating that it will happen early in the new year. So we will use that opportunity to bring them together in a more cooperative setting and have those discussions.

Senator CASEY. Senator Coons.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator. I’ll just ask, if I might, one or two more questions.

What do the Pakistanis offer as sort of the major impediments or the major reasons they can’t move more swiftly, given the evidence you’ve suggested, to bar the export into Afghanistan? We’ve talked about porous border. We’ve talked about a lack of clarity about the ways that they’re moving it. What’s their major reason?

If I hear you correctly, it’s really not broadly used domestically. There would be, in response to Senator Casey’s question, no dramatic impact on their domestic construction or farming industries. What’s their major reason for not being more active, more aggressive, more cooperative on this issue with us?

Ms. Goodman.

Ms. GOODMAN. Senator, I think they are being cooperative in working on this issue. I would note that, even in the United States, we’ve not yet developed a pure regulatory force to track this and to monitor the shipments. So it is quite difficult. They are working to try and develop some mechanisms to trace the imports with the freight forwarders and the movements internal in the country, but there really isn’t the sophisticated use of technology in a lot of this trading. It’s a very undocumented economy. A lot of this is just
simple barter in the markets, with cash changing hands. So the paperwork that exists here certainly would not be available there. It’s just a very difficult process to try to put the paperwork in place and the monitoring in place.

But it is something that they’re working on.

Senator Coons. I may have missed this in the previous testimony, but urea and DAP do not have the same lethal potential when mixed with fuel oil, or are they equally effective? My sense was that they are effective fertilizers, not effective components to explosives.

Ms. Goodman. That’s correct, sir. It’s the nitrogen that causes the problem. So it’s the calcium ammonium nitrate that is by far the most lethal in these attacks, and the urea is a more natural form that’s easily used for the fertilizer, but doesn’t have—it can be used, but it’s much more difficult to do so, is my understanding.

Senator Coons. To Mr. Woods: Are there efforts globally to put tracers or tagging molecules or identifying elements within these when produced in more reliable or advanced ally nations, like Sweden for example, that would help us trace the flow of ammonium nitrate through the global security?

Mr. Woods. This is part of our project, is to have countries be educated to what their ammonium nitrate exports are doing and who they are selling them to, at the same time tracing that trade data and making sure that it’s complete and correct. We’re in the process of doing an analytical product to look at the trade data of who is actually shipping, making shipments out, and who is bringing shipments in of this ammonium nitrate.

Senator Coons. Thank you.

Ms. Goodman.

Ms. Goodman. I’ll just add, Senator, that the State Department does have a subgroup that we’re working on to work with the private sector, to work with industry and the fertilizer institutes, to do just as you’re saying, to find ways to make the product itself less explosive and also to find ways that we might be able to use some taggants and some traceants to have a more effective marketing trace here and in Pakistan.

Senator Coons. Thank you all very much.

Senator Casey. Thanks very much.

We’ve heard a good bit about the plant at Multan. Before I ask the question about the owners of the plant, I wanted to ask you a question about that. What, if anything, can you tell us about the impact of the floods on that plant or on the flow itself? I’m assuming it’s—published reports say it’s slowed down. Do you have any current kind of status report on that?

Ms. Goodman. The plant owner in Multan is someone that is very well known to the U.S. Embassy and, more specifically, to the consulate in Lahore. It’s a family that has been very cooperative with any request that we’ve made to them. They’ve allowed us to come to numerous site visits. They’ve really extended all courtesies and all efforts to assist us in anything that we have engaged with them on. We have no reason to anticipate that that will change in the future in any way, shape, or form.

In regards to the floods, this is actually an incredibly appropriate question, Senator, because we’ve seen that one-fifth of Pakistan
was under water. Significant loss of agricultural production. We know that in order to meet some basic food security needs in Pakistan they will have to do some very quick, rapid planting. Currently they're working on what they call the rabi season for wheat, just to get it in the ground as quickly as possible, to do an early harvest.

So there will have to be a significant amount of fertilizer used in order to basically stave off the food insecurity issues. Right now, there are many countries that are working to provide some assistance so that Pakistan can get the seeds and the fertilizer that they need. Most of the imports of fertilizer so far that have been announced by other governments are in the form of urea, just because that is the preferred fertilizer in the region. But this is something that we're going to be monitoring very closely, because it will be essential for Pakistan to have the fertilizer in order to do the early harvest and replanting that they need to do because of the floods.

Senator CASEY. In light of the floods or because of the floods, was there any diminution in the productive capacity of that plant?

Ms. GOODMAN. I think because of it there hasn't been as much demand, so we've seen some of——

Senator CASEY. It wasn't that the plant was adversely impacted?

Ms. GOODMAN. Not in the least, no.

Senator CASEY. I was going to ask you about the owners and you spoke, you spoke to that. You're asserting that they have been cooperative and they share this concern. Is there anything that we have attempted to do or we can do in terms of engagement with those owners, short of—prior to any kind of legislative or any other kind of change? Is there any way that they've helped us to provide the kind of support you'd want, whether it's tagging of bags or some other way to track the flow of ammonium nitrate right from the plant? Or maybe there's not much that the owner can do.

Ms. GOODMAN. In my conversations with the owners of the plant, they've been receptive to anything that we want to suggest, because they are very concerned about this. This obviously has an impact on Pakistani citizens as well. So they are actually seeking advice and seeking input from us on things that we would advise that they can do to either put taggants or traceants or things that could help in determining the impact of this.

So we're in constant engagement with them about some technologies that could be used. Again, they're very receptive and very open to any input that we want to give them.

Senator CASEY. You list the number of initiatives or strategies that are in place, some just getting under way. You list Project Global Shield, the counter-IED forum, the beginnings of that in Pakistan, what JIEDDO is doing, what Defense is doing, what State is doing, what Homeland Security is doing. And you go down that list. I guess I have a couple of questions. One is, how do we measure results of all of those efforts? Because for the American people, I think this issue becomes just pretty fundamental. They hear day after day people being killed, or soldiers being killed, mostly soldiers, but civilians as well, so they hear a lot about that. They hear a good bit about IEDs and they I think are increasingly hearing about the topic of ammonium nitrate.
But it’s difficult for us to be able to say, well, we have Project Global Shield in place, they’re working on legislation, this U.S. agency is doing this, you go down that list. But they’re probably going to look at someone like me and say, but where are the results and how do we measure that? I know in some ways it’s premature to measure some results, because you’re just—some of these efforts are just getting under way.

So it’s a tough question, but I want to open it up for the whole panel, about how do we measure and when should we measure, in terms of the slowing down or substantially impacting the flow of ammonium nitrate from Pakistan or other places into Afghanistan that threatens our troops? Any thoughts on that?

Mr. SEDNEY. Mr. Chairman, you’re absolutely right that the only thing that matters is results. So far we’ve had the beginnings—in Pakistan, we’ve had the beginnings of results. We’ve had more results in Afghanistan, as Mary Beth Goodman laid out. We are pushing this urgently.

But in terms of measuring what we’re doing—and the measurement, of course, is the safety of our troops, the safety of Afghan military and civilians and Pakistani military and civilians—the responsiveness that I described earlier that we’ve been getting from the Pakistan military, and I think Mary Beth has been saying on the same side from the Pakistani civilian side, is encouraging, but there is a long, long way to go.

Maintaining the focus on this that you’re bringing, that this hearing brings to the issue, I think is quite important, because changing behavior, adding capacity—and Pakistan, as Mary Beth Goodman has laid out, lacks a lot of capacities. So it’s both a matter of them taking regulatory steps, but, as in the case of Afghanistan as well, the implementation is going to require the training and support that JIEDDO’s going to be able to provide. It’s going to require the training and support that DHS and others can provide.

At the same time, I want to caution—and I may ask General Shields to say as well—as we move on ammonium nitrate, the enemy is adaptive. There will be other ways of coming after us with IEDs. This is a struggle which as we’ve gone through the past year’s in Iraq and Afghanistan we’ve found that we have to keep looking ahead as well. I know that General Shields and his colleagues at JIEDDO are doing that as well.

I look forward to coming back, and I’m sure my colleagues do as well, in really a matter of months, because I think we are on the prospect of progress. But I welcome your holding us accountable to that and having us come back and do this hearing again within, as I said, in a matter of months, to see if those prospects that we’re describing have turned into the reality you’re seeking.

Senator CASEY. Thank you.

General Shields. Sir, just to echo the comments that have been made. JIEDDO continues to focus on gaps and vulnerabilities. We’ll continue to focus on increasing the capacity and the capability of U.S. and coalition forces. As you know, we’re providing support in Hornfels as well, and I think we need to continue to increase the capability of the Afghan security forces as well.
We’ve talked comprehensive approach. How do you make it so expensive that it compels the threat to make a choice between that and making payroll? Those are some other things that we need to be looking at as well. But JIEDDO is focused on those gaps and vulnerabilities and we’ll continue to maintain that focus and are training and assisting in support of CENTCOM both in theater with the RSOY piece as well as back in the States at our combat training centers. We’ve got a mobile training team capacity. We can bring the training to the forces in theater. We can bring it to them at host station. We support all of the COCOMs with that capacity as well.

Senator CASEY. Senator Coons.

Senator COONS. Thank you.

If I might, just a final question to Ms. Goodman. Given the dramatic amount of relief from the flooding that’s going to be needed and that hopefully the United States is involved in delivering, both through relief agencies privately and through our government, I just want to make sure I understood. I was pleased to hear there was a conversation between Ambassador Holbrooke and President Zidari. Did Secretary Clinton also have the opportunity to press this issue, and what was the response of the Pakistani leadership and administration to this issue? And is there more that this body can or should be doing to help press the issue with the Pakistani government?

Ms. GOODMAN. Senator, I was referring to the trip that we’ve just returned from. Actually, on Tuesday night Ambassador Holbrooke and I returned from Pakistan. So we were able to have some of these discussions as recently as this week with President Zidari and Prime Minister Gilani and other senior leaders in Pakistan. So they are aware of this issue now. It’s not something that necessarily had been brought to their attention until several months, maybe a year ago. So now we’re raising the awareness beyond just the military channels, but also the civilian channels in Pakistan, so that there is a more coordinated interagency response there and we can move forward on some of these regulatory issues with them through their national assembly.

The followup will continue. I mean, this is something that we’ll be raising on all of our trips out there. Secretary Clinton is certainly aware of the issue and has had conversations herself regarding this issue. But it is something that we continue to raise with the highest level of interlocutors there.

Senator COONS. And you found them to be generally receptive, or——

Ms. GOODMAN. Absolutely, sir. We’ve been working with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and others to try and again do some education so that they see the implications of this, and also to make them aware of how concerned we are, but also of the internal dynamics that they face with their private sector on this issue. This is a legally traded good, so having to develop this regulatory process is something that they’re looking at and will continue to follow up with us on.

But they so far have been incredibly receptive to doing this. It’s just a question of how do you do it, what’s the best method of doing it. Again, we continue to have these conversations and we’re going
to continue to have them until we see some resolution on the ground.

Senator COONS. Thank you.

Senator CASEY. I know we have to wrap up. Thank you, Senator Coons. I appreciate your questions and being here at kind of a late hour for a hearing. In the Senate we don’t often have hearings at this hour.

Just by way of two or three things on summation, and I want to allow each of our witnesses a final comment if you would like. But on this question of engagement at the highest levels, I think it’s critically important that Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, Secretary Napolitano at every possible level, that this gets raised and repeated. It’s like everything else that we see every day of our lives. Unless we repeat ourselves and be that squeaky wheel and keep after this, it will drift.

There’s nothing that substitutes for the leader of a major U.S. Government agency, leaders of our government, raising it over and over again with the Pakistanis, just as we have to, members of the Senate as well, have to do that. And I’ll continue to do that.

I want to thank you for this testimony today. I don’t know if any of our witnesses—do you have anything you want to add to your testimony? Of course, your full testimony will be made part of the record and we’ll leave the record open for a number of days for other members to submit questions, and I’ll certainly have written questions as well. But anything else that anyone wants to add?

[No response.]

Thank you very much. We’re adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:46 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]