[Senate Hearing 111-821]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-821
THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INDEPENDENT REVIEW RELATING TO FORT HOOD
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 21, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
BILL NELSON, Florida LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JIM WEBB, Virginia GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The Findings and Recommendations of the Department of Defense
Independent Review Relating to Fort Hood
January 21, 2010
Page
West, Hon. Togo D., Jr., Co-Chair, Department of Defense
Independent Review Relating to Fort Hood....................... 5
Clark, ADM Vernon E., USN [Ret.], Co-Chair, Department of Defense
Independent Review Relating to Fort Hood....................... 8
[Annex: The Report of the DOD Independent Review ``Protecting the
Force: Lessons from Fort Hood'' follows:]...................... 46
(iii)
THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INDEPENDENT REVIEW RELATING TO FORT HOOD
----------
THURSDAY, JANUARY 21, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to the notice, at 9:30 a.m. in
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, E. Benjamin Nelson, Hagan, Burris, Kirk, McCain, Inhofe,
Chambliss, Thune, LeMieux, Burr, and Collins.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Gabriella Eisen, counsel;
Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Gerald J. Leeling,
counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney,
counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Diana G. Tabler,
professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority
counsel.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Paul J. Hubbard,
and Jennifer R. Knowles.
Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Vance Serchuk, assistant to Senator
Lieberman; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Nick
Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Ann Premer, assistant to
Senator Ben Nelson; Juliet M. Beyler and Gordon I. Peterson,
assistants to Senator Webb; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to
Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan;
Roosevelt Barfield, assistant to Senator Begich; Nathan Davern,
assistant to Senator Burris; Ron Carlton, assistant to Senator
Kirk; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood
Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator Sessions; Clyde
A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Adam G. Brake,
assistant to Senator Graham; Jason Van Beek, assistant to
Senator Thune; and Molly Wilkinson, assistant to Senator
Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
meets this morning to consider the findings and recommendations
of the independent panel appointed by the Secretary of Defense
following the tragedy at Fort Hood. The primary objective of
the panel was to ``determine whether there are programs,
policies, or procedural weaknesses within the Department of
Defense (DOD) that create vulnerabilities to the health and
safety of defense employees and their families.''
Today's open hearing is on the panel's unrestricted report.
A restricted annex to their report titled ``Oversight of the
Alleged Perpetrator,'' focuses on information which in the
judgment of DOD could prejudice a criminal prosecution if it
were discussed in public. We'll have a closed session after
this open hearing has concluded.
Our witnesses this morning are Togo West, former Secretary
of the Army, and Admiral Vernon Clark, U.S. Navy-Retired,
former Chief of Naval Operations, who together co-chaired this
independent review. We have reviewed their unrestricted report.
Members have had an opportunity to review the restricted annex.
We welcome you both. We thank you for returning to government
service for this very important task. It's a continuation of
your great patriotism and loyalty.
On the afternoon of November 5, 2009, an Army field-grade
officer, Major Nidal Hassan, opened fire on fellow soldiers in
the Soldier Readiness Center at Fort Hood, TX, killing 12
soldiers, 1 civilian, and wounding or injuring 43 others. There
is information in the public domain indicating that this tragic
and violent incident was preceded by a number of indicators
that would seemingly raise questions about Major Hassan's
fitness to serve as an officer and Army psychiatrist. Some of
those indicators were email contact with a radical Muslim
cleric in Yemen, concerns about his expressed belief that
sharia religious law took precedence over the U.S.
Constitution, presentations that he made that for some of the
witnesses indicated sympathy for violence, and concerns
expressed by superiors and peers about his duty performance and
his ratings.
So there's a connect-the-dots issue here. There are a
number of other investigations that will examine the failure to
connect those dots. That is not part of today's open hearing.
DOD's inquiry is one of several inquiries that are or will be
examining the incident. The President has directed a review of
intelligence matters related to the shooting, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is conducting a review of its
procedures, and a military justice investigation is ongoing.
The review that we will consider today was a first
assessment of the Department's policies and procedures to
identify gaps that warrant further investigation and action.
Clearly there is much more that needs to be done. The Secretary
of Defense has committed to tasking each Service and pertinent
DOD agencies to conduct an in-depth follow-on review based on
the findings of this report.
The Secretary of Defense gave this independent panel less
than 60 days to conduct a quick-look review ``to identify and
address possible gaps and/or deficiencies in DOD's programs,
processes, and procedures related to identifying DOD employees
who could potentially pose credible threats to themselves or
others, the sufficiency of DOD's force protection programs, the
sufficiency of DOD's emergency response to mass casualty
situations at DOD's facilities, and the response to care for
victims and families in the aftermath of a mass casualty
situation, and, finally, the execution and adequacy of Army
programs, policies, and procedures as applied to the alleged
perpetrator.''
The panel completed its work and delivered its report to
the Secretary of Defense on time, and that is remarkable, given
the short period of time over the holidays that the panel was
given for this task. This could only be done under the strong
leadership of our witnesses, who co-chaired the independent
panel.
A copy of the report of the DOD Independent Review titled:
``Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood,'' will be
included in the record of this hearing.
[The information referred to follows:]
[See Annex.]
Chairman Levin. The independent panel made a total of 42
findings with associated recommendations in the basic report,
with an additional 12 findings in the restricted annex. The
panel gives Fort Hood high marks for a quick and effective
response to this incident, while recognizing that DOD can and
should do more to prepare for multiple simultaneous incidents
in the future.
The panel found that some programs, policies, processes,
and procedures were adequate, but were not complied with, and
other policies are in need of revision to give commanders the
tools that they need to counter internal threats as well as new
threats that may manifest themselves in the future.
The report produced by this independent panel gives DOD a
blueprint for additional reviews and resulting policy changes.
For instance, the Department will need to evaluate and update
policies and procedures for identification of indicators of
violence, clarify policy regarding religious accommodation,
review and improve military personnel records, and refocus
defense force protection programs on internal threats.
This committee has a continuing interest in the findings,
recommendations, and changes made based on these reviews. It
will continue its oversight of DOD actions, and I assume this
will be the first of a number of hearings into this incident,
how it could have been avoided and how we can deter similar
tragedies in the future.
Before I close, I want to commend the soldiers, the first
responders, the law enforcement personnel, and the health care
providers for their prompt, professional, courageous acts that
prevented an even greater loss of life as a result of this
horrendous act.
I would also like to insert for the record Senator Burris'
statement.
[The prepared statement of Senator Burris follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Roland W. Burris
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome Secretary West and Admiral
Clark. I am again pleased with both of your taking on this most
important effort to look at the lessons learned as a result of the
tragedy at Fort Hood. The Nation, and more importantly, the families,
are looking to all of us to make sense of this situation and provide
them with answers and solutions to ensure that this type of incident
does not occur in the future. The members of our military have
performed, and will continue to perform, their duties with honor and
integrity, and it is incumbent upon us to provide them the guidance and
oversight that they deserve.
I thank you for your testimony and your service to the Nation.
Chairman Levin. Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I join you
in welcoming Secretary West and Admiral Clark, and I thank them
for their continued service to their country, and I thank them
and their staff for their work in conducting this independent
examination of the tragic events last year at Fort Hood.
I agree with the statement in your report that ``the events
of November 5, 2009, are first and foremost a tragedy for all
involved; families, colleagues, and the Nation.'' My thoughts
and prayers continue for the families and friends of the
victims of this terrible tragedy.
I appreciate that DOD initiated this review to scrutinize
itself with regards to organizational shortcomings that led to
the horrific killings of 12 servicemembers, 1 Army civilian,
and the wounding of 43 others. However, most of your report is
devoted to personnel policies and emergency shooting response
procedures. The report concentrates on actions and effects,
rather than the motivations. But it was motives that led to the
Fort Hood killings that should have been examined, whatever the
political correctness implications. The panel's effort to
assist DOD and the American people to understand the threat to
national security and to our military personnel was undermined
as a result.
We have a profound responsibility to try to prevent harm to
all Americans, especially those who volunteer for service in
the Armed Forces and have, as a result, become high-value
targets for our enemies. I find insufficient information in
this report to advance the identification and elimination of
this threat.
The omission in your report of adequately recognizing and
addressing the specific threats posed by violent extremism to
our military servicemembers is troubling. We owe it to our
servicemembers and their families to be very candid in
addressing the threat of violence driven by violent Islamic
extremism.
I believe General Jack Keane, the former Vice Chief of
Staff of the Army, made the point clearly in his testimony on
November 19, 2009, when he said that: ``We need to provide a
service to all Muslims serving in the Armed Forces by clearly
describing the threat, explaining the indicators of potential
problems, and obliging all military personnel to report
individuals who display these beliefs and actions.''
I believe the information you have compiled in the
restricted annex to this report regarding failures in the
performance of officers who supervised Major Hassan during his
medical education will help to ensure accountability and
corrective measures. Much of this information, not
surprisingly, has been leaked to the media and it portrays a
system badly in need of reevaluation and reform.
I expect the Secretary of the Army to move quickly to
ensure accountability for the shortcomings you identified and
to demand more from our officers and organizations. They should
have the courage and integrity to identify substandard officers
who represent potential threats to those around them. I hope
you can comment today on what we can expect in this regard.
I also believe that your findings and recommendations will
have value in prodding DOD and the Services to take on the
challenge of identifying the legal and regulatory barriers to
information-sharing called for in the report. There is an array
of concerns that must be addressed in this regard. Concerns
about individual privacy, threat of litigation, equal
opportunity violations, First Amendment rights, medical
privacy, including stigma from seeking treatment, and abuse of
authority are just a few. They represent a Gordian Knot that
has to be cut.
What happened at Fort Hood was something more than an
isolated incident, more than a random act of violence by an
alleged perpetrator. It was a terrorist act, struck against us
as part of the broader war in which we are now engaged. Without
focusing on the threat posed today by violent Islamic extremism
to our military and their families, we can't address those
vulnerabilities and correct them.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Now let me call on you, Secretary West.
STATEMENT OF HON. TOGO D. WEST, JR., CO-CHAIR, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE INDEPENDENT REVIEW RELATING TO FORT HOOD
Mr. West. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and
distinguished members of the committee, for the opportunity to
testify before you on this important matter. I wonder if I
might do one or two quick housekeeping things. You have from us
our written opening statement. It is a joint statement by both
Admiral Clark and by me, and we would ask you to include that
in the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be.
Mr. West. With that, we will give a few comments, a bit of
a roadmap to what's in our report, although we're aware that
you have had a chance to look through it. I will do the first
group and then, if you will permit, Admiral Clark will take up
from there.
Chairman Levin. That would be fine. Thank you.
Mr. West. As you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, and you also,
Senator McCain, that day--November 5, 2009--was a day of
tragedy, and we will all remember it as such. Out of that
tragedy, there are some instructive lessons for us, and those
are what we address in our report.
As you pointed out, Secretary Gates was specific in what he
asked us to do, contained both in a memorandum to us in his
terms of reference and in his statement at his press
conference. That is important to us because it bounds our
undertaking, as did the time within which we were asked to
complete our work, and also as did the fact that he had already
indicated his intention to have a lengthier, more in-depth
follow-on review of both our report and the issues that we
raise by the Services. He has already begun the process of
referring the report out for their follow-on activities.
As you pointed out, we were asked to look at personnel
policies, specifically those that pertain to our ability to
make identifications of those who are a risk, a danger to their
fellows in the Service, to look at how those policies,
practices, and procedures allow us to deal with, after we have
identified those threats, and look at the ways in which there
are gaps or deficiencies--his language--that we need to improve
upon going forward.
He also asked us to look at force protection measures with
the same idea, not just in the Army, but across the board in
DOD, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
procedures and regulations at the level of every Service.
Third, to look at our preparations and our policies
concerning preparations for mass casualty events and for
responding to them.
Finally in that group of four, to look at how we provide
for the support of those who provide needed medical care to
those who serve.
The fifth assignment that he gave us was a very
specifically stated one and it's in one of the annexes to our
report, and that is this: to examine the Army's application of
its procedures and policies to the alleged perpetrator. I make
that distinction because he did not ask us to go and explain
what happened, although it certainly, I think, would appear to
all of us, you and we as well, that without an understanding of
what happened we certainly couldn't understand how the Army
applied its policy. But our purpose, our direction, was to
understand the Army's application of its policies and
procedures to the perpetrator. That is what is contained in our
annex 5.
I should say to you as part of an understanding of how we
organized and prepared for this that that was, in our view,
going to be simply chapter 5 of a report that we would submit
to you today for review. After review, departmental lawyers
concluded, and I think they concluded properly, that there was
a great risk of interfering with the military justice, the
criminal proceeding, and that is why it is submitted to you as
a restricted annex.
With that in mind, we were told not to interfere with the
intelligence investigation that had proceeded, nor with the
military justice, nor with the ongoing parallel FBI review, and
we've made an attempt not to do so. What we did do was to
organize ourselves into five teams, supported by personnel whom
we requested and were assigned to us from the military
departments and from OSD. Each of these teams looked into the
specific areas that we have described in the report, submitted
their report of their activities to us, and Admiral Clark and I
and those who worked directly with us, took responsibility for
reviewing and stating our conclusions and our views with
respect to that.
Our personal views are found throughout the report, but
they are specifically called out in the executive summary,
which you note we took the step of signing ourselves so that
you would know that the words of the executive summary come
from us, including those five or six recommendations that are
for specific early action by the Secretary of Defense. Let me
report that he has already taken some of those actions as we
speak.
We also had a board of advisers drawn from the senior ranks
of the Department, the military ranks, whose purpose was not to
lead a team, although two of them were team leaders, but merely
to review as we went and provide an overall perspective of what
we were looking at and how we were stating it and how it would
affect real progress for the Department in terms of responding
to what had happened. Their help to us was invaluable, because
when you think about it, otherwise the Admiral had himself and
me to bounce these things bounce and forth, to discuss. The
board of advisers gave us an additional group with the same
broad range.
A word or two at this point from both Admiral Clark and me
about the actual landscape of the report. What you have before
you has five chapters with an executive summary at the front
and with some annexes. The first chapter is a very brief, one-
page synopsis that we thought we could state in a public
report, that is much more dealt with in detail in the annex,
and that is about the alleged perpetrator.
Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 are the bulk of what the Secretary
asked us to look at. I call your attention to chapter 2, which
is about the personnel policies, which is divided into three
sections, one having to do with how we identify the kinds of
things that can lead a person to become a danger to his or her
colleagues. A second part of it has to do with sharing that
information, getting it to the right place. I point out to you
that in our finding 2.2 in that report we acknowledge a
specific difficulty and that is the fact that information that
is obtained in one place does not always go forward with a
servicemember to successive assignments, thus making it
difficult for commanders to know exactly what they're dealing
with. The third section in chapter 2 has to do with barriers to
action.
Three observations before I ask your permission to have
Admiral Clark take on the description to you of other parts of
the report. The first is this: There can never be too much
preparation. In some ways, we could say that no matter how much
preparation you've done there is more that could be done. At
Fort Hood, the leaders had anticipated mass casualty events in
their emergency response plans, and it showed in their
responses. As you have acknowledged, Mr. Chairman, and as also
did Senator McCain, the response was prompt. Within 2 minutes
and 40 seconds of the first 9-1-1 call, first responders were
on the scene of the shooting, and by first responders I mean
elements of the Fort Hood security forces. Within a minute and
a half after that, the assailant had been taken down, and
within 2 minutes and 50 seconds after that two ambulances and
an incident command vehicle from the post hospital had arrived
to begin to dispense needed medical care.
Lives were saved. Yet, as you have pointed out, 13 people
died and scores others, 43, were wounded. We must prepare
better, plan more intensively, and take the hard effort to look
around the corners of our future to try and anticipate the next
potential incident.
Second, we must be attentive to today's hazards. Today the
requirement that is imposed upon us in DOD is to understand the
forces that cause an individual to radicalize, to commit
violent acts, and thereby to make us vulnerable from within.
Finally, the thread through all of this is violence, how do
we detect the indicators of violence, how do we share the
information about those indicators, and then whether we have
the foresight to act.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and with your permission Admiral
Clark will take it from here.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. West.
Admiral.
STATEMENT OF ADM VERNON E. CLARK, USN [RET.], CO-CHAIR,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INDEPENDENT REVIEW RELATING TO FORT HOOD
Admiral Clark. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to be with you today to talk about the work of
Secretary West and myself and the group of people who worked
with us in this effort.
Let me make a few comments and get right to the questions.
I know that you have questions for us, so first let me talk
about force protection for a moment. The principal message of
our review with regard to force protection is simply this:
There are lots of policies on force protection inside DOD.
Since September 11, we have built many barriers. However,
existing policies simply are not optimized to deal with the
insider threat, the evolving threat that we see today--and when
people talk about the new threat, we're talking about the
insider threat.
Now, complicating the entire force protection challenge is
the diverse nature of the way DOD has evolved since September
11, 2001. So one of our recommendations to the Secretary was
that you have to look at the organization itself. On page 25 of
the base report, you find a description of the various Under
Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of Defense that are
charged with responsibilities for working the force protection
challenge. Synchronization is difficult and, simply stated, no
senior DOD official is assigned overall responsibility for
synchronizing this policy.
Notice, I'm not saying that one person should have all that
responsibility. Neither is Secretary West. We were careful not
to define the specific organization for the Secretary of
Defense. Our observation is synchronization is pretty difficult
the way it's set up, the way it is today, and we recommend that
it be looked at. The key point, too, is that there has to be a
mechanism in place to do this integration, and that's our
recommendation.
Second, the task of identifying employees who potentially
could threaten the workforce--and I ask us to remember that the
Secretary asked us to look at violence. So the question is, how
do we identify individuals who have the potential for violent
behavior. Certainly in our research we found that detecting a
trusted insider's intention to commit a violent act requires
observation skills that may not be in place. This is the
evolving threat.
So there's a requirement to understand behavioral cues and
anomalies that would alert commanders and supervisors to know
that such a threat exists. While DOD focuses very effectively
on many things, there is insufficient knowledge and guidance
concerning who this insider threat is: Who are these people?
There is insufficient guidance on workplace violence and, most
importantly, how to identify the person who has the potential
to self-radicalize. In our view it is simply insufficient.
The key word here is ``violence.'' Now, since our report
has come out some have criticized us for not suggesting and
talking enough about violent Islamic extremism. When we talk
about self-radicalization, and the term appears numerous times
in our report, we're talking about the behaviors that create
and lead to violence. That's what we're talking about. The lack
of clarity for comprehensive indicators limits the commanders'
and supervisors' ability to recognize the potential threats.
Fixing this issue will be critical to solving this problem in
the future.
DOD policy on prohibited activities--and I have the
instruction here with me that talks specifically about what
prohibited activities are inside the Department--this
instruction in our view is too limited and it only addresses
active and very visible participation in groups that may pose
threats to good order and discipline inside the ranks.
So we found that this lack of clarity for comprehensive
indicators which limit commanders' and supervisors' ability to
recognize the potential threats--we're talking about people who
could hurt themselves. The Secretary of Defense cited
specifically, people could hurt themselves, for example the
issue of suicide, criminal and gang behavior, people that are
advocating supremist doctrine, family violence, evolving
threats like self-radicalization--identifying these key
indicators is critical to focusing the force on the threat.
Let's talk about information sharing. Secretary West
addressed it also and let me just make a couple of points. The
policies governing information exchange inside the Department
and in the intergovernment system, in our view the policies are
deficient. They do not support detection and mitigation of the
internal threat.
DOD and Service guidance does not provide for maintaining
and transferring relevant information from one duty station to
the other. Now, remember we're doing phase one of this. As you
talked about, Mr. Chairman, we did this review in a hurry.
That's what the Secretary of Defense wanted us to do. Thousands
of pages of review, but put the spotlight on the things that
the Services can fix in a hurry. It is our view that this
internal information exchange has to be examined.
In other words, how can commanders connect the dots if they
don't have some information that's maintained at a local level
and hasn't transferred from one command to another. I will tell
you that automated systems inside the Services do not allow
them to share information on, for example, registered users and
persons who routinely come and go from a base and may become a
threat.
So the issue of maintaining and transferring all of the
relevant information, information that could lead to the
identification of contributing factors, that's the issue.
Last Friday, the Secretary of Defense, in his press
conference, stood and addressed his observations about our
report. One of the things that I was happy to see him address
was his comment that Secretary West and I are of the view that
we have to become more adaptable and certainly we have to be
proactive, but we have to be able to adapt rapidly to this
changing security environment, bringing a wide and continuously
evolving range of tools, techniques, and programs into play.
I just want to emphasize that there's no single-point
solution for this evolving threat. We have to keep working at
it. We need architectures and structures in place that will
make that possible.
One other point about information sharing. Certainly robust
information sharing is essential. Hand in glove with that
information sharing is the required command and control
apparatus, be it systems, policy, doctrine, tactics,
techniques, and procedures, to convert this information into
timely decisions and actions.
The bottom line, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: We
have to remove the barriers, all of the barriers. We have to
equip and enable the commanders, people in decisionmaking
positions, their ability--Mr. Chairman, you used the phrase--to
connect the dots. We have to get the information and thus the
indicators to the appropriate level of people in command.
Just a couple of comments about emergency response.
Secretary West addressed this. Mr. Chairman, you also certainly
did justice to the brilliance of the people at Fort Hood and
their actions. Lots of good news related to the emergency
response.
Mr. Chairman and members, I just wanted to try to put this
in perspective. I committed my life in service for 37 years. I
created in those 37 years a number of lessons learned myself,
and I heard dozens of lessons-learned reports. On the second
day that our team was in existence, Secretary West and I got on
a plane with a few members of our team and we went to Fort
Hood. We walked the ground and they showed us the space where
all of this happened and looked at the terrain. Then we sat
down with General Kohn and his command team and they gave us
this presentation that had been turned in a matter of a few
days, their lessons learned. I want to tell you that I was
really impressed.
So I heard a lot of them in my 37 years and I want you to
know that I never ever heard a better one than I heard at Fort
Hood that day. The base personnel were ready to respond. They
had trained at this, they had worked at it. Secretary West
talked about the timeline response to the active shooter. It
was brilliant.
All of that said, it still could have been better, and in
our review we found areas where it could be better. In their
own lessons learned they identified areas where it could be
better. I spoke in the last subject about the command and
control system. They need a better system. General Kohn had to
deal with misinformation, and should anybody be surprised? I
don't think so. There's never been a crisis ever that there
wasn't misinformation. Being able to deal with it in a rapid
way and being able to deal with a potential multiple event, Mr.
Chairman, as you indicated, is critical.
Fundamentally we believe that we can improve by providing a
well-integrated means to gather and evaluate and disseminate
the wide range of information that will make it possible for
commanders to perform to the maximum.
This report is about focusing on better tools for
commanders. This report is about focusing on violence
prevention, in whatever form that violence manifests itself.
This report is about adapting and evolving to rapid change,
sharing information, connecting the dots, and exercising
against the most stressing and pressing scenarios that we know
how to present, so that we satisfy ourselves that we are able
to perform to the standards that we have identified ourselves.
I want to close by just acknowledging my alignment with all
the comments that have been made about the people at Fort Hood,
the families that have suffered loss, and just say that the
thrust of our work has been to do everything that we know how
to do to identify policies, procedures, practices, and programs
that can be made better, so that the U.S. Armed Forces continue
to be the outstanding force that it is today.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. West and Admiral Clark
follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. Togo D. West, Jr. and ADM Vernon E.
Clark, USN (Ret.)
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the
committee: We appreciate the opportunity to appear before you and
discuss the findings and recommendations of the Department of Defense
Independent Review Relating to Fort Hood.
Two months ago, a gunman opened fire at the Soldier Readiness
Center at Fort Hood, TX. Thirteen people were killed and 43 others were
wounded. November 5, 2009 will be remembered as a day of great tragedy.
We extend our deepest sympathy to the families of the fallen, to the
wounded, to their families, and indeed all touched by this tragic
event.
Following the shooting, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates
established the Department of Defense Independent Review Related to
Fort Hood, and asked that Admiral Clark and I lead it. We have done so
and report on it today. Events such as the Fort Hood shooting raise
questions about how best to defend against threats posed by external
influences operating on members of our military community. The
challenge for the Department of Defense (DOD) is to prepare more
effectively for a constantly changing security environment. It is with
that backdrop in mind that Secretary Gates asked us to conduct our
review.
Secretary Gates charged us to provide an independent review and
assess whether there are programs, policies or procedural weaknesses
within DOD that create vulnerabilities to the health and safety of our
service men and women, DOD civilians, and their families. Dr. Gates
asked that we take a careful look at personnel policies, force
protection measures, emergency response procedures and support to our
military health care providers. He asked us to evaluate the Army's
application of its policies, programs, processes, and procedures to the
alleged perpetrator.
We established a board of advisors with senior officers from the
four Services. We constituted five review teams, consisting of a range
of experts, who investigated the key tasks outlined in our terms of
reference. The teams had unrestricted access to personnel and
facilities. The teams traveled to Fort Hood as part of their review.
Our charter directed us to focus on the noncriminal aspects of the
shooting. Although Fort Hood was central to our review, our scope
extended across the entire Department in order to gather the most
significant and meaningful findings and recommendations. As recognized
by the Secretary of Defense in stating that he intends to call upon the
military departments to conduct in-depth follow-on reviews based on our
results, areas in our report will require further study. By design, we
limited the depth of our report in areas that will be covered in
follow-on reviews.
We recently submitted our report to the Secretary of Defense.
Before discussing the overall report, we note that we cannot address
specifics with respect to the alleged perpetrator in open session, in
order to preserve the integrity of the ongoing military justice
process. We can tell you, however, that several individuals failed to
apply professional standards of officership regarding the alleged
perpetrator. We recommended the Secretary of Defense forward these
issues of accountability to the Secretary of the Army. The detailed
results and findings associated with the alleged perpetrator are found
in a restricted annex that will not be publically released at the
present time.
The review was much broader than the assessment of the alleged
perpetrator. With that in mind, our report includes recommendations to
strengthen DOD's ability to prepare for and respond to potential
threats. It is based upon research by our teams of more than 35,000
pages from over 700 documents related to departmental policies,
programs, processes, and procedures.
Before discussing the details of our findings, we would like to
highlight some observations from the tragic events on November 5.
First, no amount of preparation is ever too much. Leaders at Fort
Hood had anticipated mass casualty events in their emergency response
plans and exercises. The initial response to the incident demonstrated
this. It was prompt and effective. Two minutes and 40 seconds after the
initial 9-1-1 call, Fort Hood first responders arrived on the scene.
One-and-a-half minutes later, the assailant was incapacitated, taken
into custody, and remained in custody handcuffed to a law enforcement
representative for the next several chaotic hours. Two ambulances and
an incident command vehicle from the post hospital arrived on the scene
2 minutes and 50 seconds later to begin providing lifesaving emergency
care. Yet 13 people died; scores were wounded. We will prepare harder;
plan more diligently; seek to envision the next incident.
Second, we must be attentive to today's hazard. Even as the role of
our nation's military is to confront the external threat to our
country, one of the most significant emerging concerns in the
protection of our force is the internal threat. We need to develop a
better understanding of the forces that cause a person to become
radicalized; commit violent acts; and make us vulnerable from within.
Third, courage and presence of mind in the face of crisis can carry
the day. It happened at Fort Hood. Courageous acts were the key to
preventing greater losses that day.
As our report reveals, however, these attributes alone are not
enough to protect our force. We must exercise the foresight necessary
to identify the looming menace--self radicalization and its often
resultant violence--and act preemptively.
Our review of DOD policies, procedures, and processes revealed
shortcomings in the way DOD is prepared to deal with internal threats,
and in particular, the threat posed by troubled and potentially
dangerous individuals and groups.
Commanders are our key assets to identify and monitor internal
threats. Existing policies, however, are not optimized for countering
these threats. The policies reflect insufficient knowledge and
awareness required to help identify and address individuals likely to
commit violence.
While the department focuses very effectively on many things,
guidance concerning workplace violence and the potential for self-
radicalization is insufficient. DOD policy on prohibited activities is
limited and only addresses active and visible participation in groups
that may pose threats to good order and discipline. This lack of
clarity for comprehensive indicators limits commanders' and
supervisors' ability to recognize potential threats and detecting a
trusted insider's intention to commit a violent act requires
observation of behavioral cues/anomalies.
Complicating the force protection challenge is the diverse nature
of responsibilities as they have evolved within DOD since September 11.
Because no senior DOD official is assigned overall responsibility for
force protection policy, synchronization is difficult. Moreover, there
is a lack of DOD policy integration. This has resulted in a lack of a
well-integrated means to gather, evaluate, and disseminate the wide
range of behavioral indicators that could signal an insider threat.
Some policies governing information exchange, both within DOD and
between outside agencies, are deficient and do not support detection
and mitigation of internal threats. The time has passed when concerns
by specific entities over protecting ``their'' information can be
allowed to prevent relevant threat information and indicators from
reaching those who need it--the commanders.
As the Secretary indicated, we see a requirement to create the
ability to adapt rapidly to the changing security environment, which
requires anticipating new threats and bringing a wide and continuously
evolving range of tools, techniques, and programs into play. Robust
information sharing, therefore, is essential, along with the
accompanying command and control structure to convert active
information gathered on potential threats into decisions and actions,
including dissemination of the analysis and assessments to the
appropriate levels of command. While leaders at Fort Hood responded
well under the stress of a rapidly evolving crisis, we are fortunate
that we faced only one incident at one location. Real-time information
sharing will be critical should we face a situation of multiple events.
While all 50 States have complied with the Federal requirements for
the National Incident Management System, designed for a synchronized
response in crises, there are no established milestones to define
initial and full capability within DOD. The timelines should be
evaluated; doing so could lead to an umbrella plan for emergency
response and recovery and ensure interoperability with all the States.
Synchronizing the DOD emergency management program with this national
guidance will ensure the Department can integrate effectively with all
partners in response to any and all emergencies. Using common emergency
management principles, we can prepare our military communities to
respond to emergency from the smallest incident to the largest
catastrophe.
The response by the Fort Hood community in the aftermath of this
tragedy serves as a reminder of the strength, resiliency and character
of our people. We were very impressed with them, both military and
civilian. In a community where we might have expected the fabric of
trust to fray, it remained intact and grew stronger through mutual
support. The thrust of our effort has been to do all that we can to
prevent similar tragedies in the future.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you both very
much.
Let's try an 8-minute first round. The panel found that
``DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the
clarity necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate
religious practices from those that might indicate a potential
for violence or self-radicalization.'' I think what you're
saying is that, obviously, this country believes in tolerance
of others' religions, but it can never be tolerant of violent
radical views that are dressed up in religious garb. I think
that's that point reworded.
I couldn't agree with you more. Sometimes views that are
clearly either inherently violent or promote violence are
dressed up in religious clothing, and that automatically means
that people who are sensitive to others' religious views then
are put on the defensive right away, or reluctant right away to
point out what is underneath the claim of religion.
So the line has to be there. Obviously, we want to continue
our tolerance, but we have to be much harder and much more
intolerant of views that are radical, promote violence, or
encourage violence.
So my first question to you is about the policy of the
Department, which is limited to and addresses only active
participation in groups that pose threats to good order and
discipline, is far too narrow a policy because of the self-
radicalization point--you don't have to participate in a group
that poses that kind of a threat to be a threat yourself. My
first question is how would you--and I know you're not here to
provide remedies and that wasn't your job, but I assume that
you agree that it's not just that that policy should be
examined, but that in your judgment at least it's just simply
too limited a policy. I'm wondering whether or not, for
instance, you would agree that communication with a radical
cleric who promotes violence is the kind of conduct that should
raise real questions. Would you agree with that, even though
it's not active participation at that point? It's just simply
communication, asking someone for their recommendations and
views. Would you agree that that ought to be raising great
suspicion, without getting into this particular case?
Mr. West. Mr. Chairman, I would certainly agree. I think we
both would. I think your larger point that this is an example
of, we would agree with as well, and that is that, yes, in the
past perhaps membership alone in a group may have been less
looked upon than the actual act of doing things, but in this
environment we have to look at the group. We have to understand
its purposes.
It is already considered by some that there is a tool that
enables a commander to declare certain kinds of action,
including that, a threat to his immediate area's good order and
discipline. But we think DOD can just simply strengthen the
ability of commanders to look at and example exactly what kind
of activity they are permitting and whether or not we can
better define it.
Membership in a group that has a record of active
advocation of violence, as well as your point, communication,
especially repeated communication--again, not referring to any
particular case--with those who advocate violence, those are
all signals that we need to be able to indicate in our
publications and in our regulations commanders are authorized
to look at and react to.
Chairman Levin. Even if there weren't active participation
or communication with radical persons who are promoting
violence, even if there's simply the expression of views which
promote violence without any information about participation in
a group or communication with radical extremists--if somebody
gets up and says, ``I believe that the Constitution comes in
second and that my religious views come in first,'' would that
not be that kind of a signal which ought to indicate some real
genuine concern? Would you agree with that?
Admiral Clark. I certainly do agree with it. It goes
without saying that where we draw our red lines is a very, very
important point. But you know, if you look at our history, we
as a people as Americans have always been very careful about
where we draw those lines.
I so appreciate your introduction to this question by your
comments about that we are a tolerant people. When I look at
the DOD instruction here, it talks about what people can do
when they're at work and things that they can't do at work, but
they can do on their private time. What we're suggesting is
that we have to better understand how people go through this
process from being a non-radicalized person to radicalization
and what does it mean.
So I align with your comments completely. I want to make
one other observation, Mr. Chairman. In our report, we talk
about Active Duty members of the military, but DOD is much
broader than just the Active Duty people in uniform. We
understand that when Americans raise their right hand and take
a pledge to serve in the Armed Forces that there are some
freedoms that they set on the shelf. The challenge that we're
facing here in security applies to everybody in DOD, and that
includes civilians, contractors, and a whole other body of
people.
Then you could look at this and say, ``this is not just
DOD; this is the whole of our Nation; and the whole of
government.'' This is a real challenge that we face.
Sir, you made the comment, when a shipmate hears a comment
that's being made that is approaching a defined red line or
crossing a defined red line, that we must make sure our people
understand where those red lines are. That means we must have a
very effective education program and outreach program, that
people understand this is about our own security and the right
to self-defense is absolutely not in question. We have the
right to do that.
Chairman Levin. People should not be afraid of reporting
information that they believe in their good judgment represents
a potential threat to good order and discipline and to the
safety of the country or of their own group out of fear that
that might be viewed by some as being intolerant of religious
views. We have to simply allow people the freedom to report
something which they believe is a threat to their group, their
country, or to the individual himself or herself, and not be
dissuaded by the fact that the views are dressed in some
religious garb.
Admiral Clark. Good order and discipline is the fabric upon
which the greatness of the U.S. military is built, and we have
to ensure that we do everything we know how to do to protect
it.
Chairman Levin. Secretary West, did you want to add
anything to that?
Mr. West. No. I think the Admiral caught the point I would
have made, which is that we are sensitive to the fact that we
are talking about expressions and expressions in many cases
that pertain to religion--two different hits on the First
Amendment. But as he pointed out, when a member takes an oath
of office there are some things as to which he or she agrees to
be regulated. We believe that where there is a clear connection
with a potential for violence that would cause damage to one's
fellows in the Service, this is a basis on which we can
encourage the Department to act more clearly and more
aggressively.
Chairman Levin. My final question is this. You have not
been given the charge of recommending remedies for where there
are gaps. That's not part of your charge, although you freely
responded to my questions this morning and I appreciate that.
Who is in charge of responding with remedies to your
recommendations? What is the timetable? Does this go right up
to the Secretary of Defense and has he assured you that he will
consider appropriate remedies within a certain timetable, or is
there somebody else in the Department that's on the remedies
side of what you've outlined here?
Mr. West. The answer to your question is twofold. I'll take
the second first, which is: Yes, in his follow-on review he is
ordering two sets of things. He's in that process. I think some
orders have gone out, but not others. One, he is going to ask a
single member of his staff--we believe, but we don't want to
commit him--it is his prerogative, not ours--perhaps the
Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense or Security--I'm not
authorized to make that statement, don't know, but that's our
belief--to conduct a follow-on review, but each of the Services
also.
Part of their job is to take this report--he will refer it
to them--and to provide their recommendations as to how to
implement. That's the answer to your second question.
The first answer is in some ways you give Admiral Clark and
me too much of a bye. The fact is his direction to us was to
come up with action memo recommendations as well.
Chairman Levin. All right. In that case, I withdraw that
comment. Are your recommendations then to be acted upon in a
certain length, period of time?
Mr. West. I'm not clear.
Chairman Levin. What I'm referring to is this. You say that
there's inadequate clarity on the issue we've been discussing.
The recommendation is a general one: Provide clarity. But it's
not the specific clarity. It's just: You should provide
clarity, Mr. Secretary. I couldn't agree with you more, but
it's not what the new regulation should be. That's going to be
left up to the Secretary. That's what I meant when I said you
have not provided the specific new language that should be in
place replacing the unclear language. That's what I meant by
that.
Now, is there a timetable?
Admiral Clark. Yes, there is. There is a timetable, he
announced it Friday.
Chairman Levin. What is it?
Admiral Clark. He wants first impressions back in March and
he wants to wrap this up by June.
If you read the language, we were very careful with our
recommendations. First of all, you confirm the Secretary of
Defense and that allows him to be the person who makes policy.
We were very aware of the fact that at one point in our lives
we were those people, but we're not those people today.
So we suggested on numerous occasions he review policy
because we thought there were holes or weaknesses or gaps.
There were some places that the language is slightly stronger:
It's absolutely clear to us that the policy is--and we say
sometimes it's inadequate. But we teed it up in a way so that
they could now put that spotlight on it, and he's given them
the timetable.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm going to pick up on two things you mentioned, and the
first one I'll be criticized for as not politically correct.
But I'll make this statement. If you're around Washington and
you're in these hearings, it's one thing. But when you go back
to Oklahoma, as I do every week, it's another thing. I'm always
hit up with this idea, because not only--we're talking about
the Fort Hood thing now, but I could talk to you about Abdul
Mutallab, the Christmas bomber. The extremist views were
evident from the University College through London, and it goes
on and on. The November 19, 2009, the father reports and we all
know about that report. Late November, he was added to the U.S.
550-name Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) and
all this stuff.
All this stuff is stuff that we knew. That's not in your
purview, I understand that. But nonetheless, it's the same. A
terrorist is a terrorist. That's what they do for a living:
They kill people.
I for one--I know it's not politically correct to say--I
believe in racial and ethnic profiling. I think if you're
looking at people getting on an airplane and you have X amount
of resources to get into it, you need to get at the targets,
not my wife. I just think it's something that should be looked
into.
The statement that's been made is probably 90 percent true,
with some exceptions like the Murrah Federal Office Building in
my State of Oklahoma. Those people, they were not Muslims, they
were not Middle Easterners. But when you hear that not all
Middle Easterners or Muslims between the ages of 20 and 35 are
terrorists, but all terrorists are Muslims or Middle Easterners
between the ages of 20 and 35, that's by and large true.
I think that some time we're going to have to really--at
least I'm going to have to have a better answer than I give the
people back home, when people board planes or get into
environments such as the environment that we're dealing with
with this report.
I guess nothing more needs to be said from you guys on
this. Let me first of all say, which I should have said first,
there are no two people I think are more qualified to do the
job that you have had to do than the two of you. You've been
good friends of mine for a long period of time.
Now, something we can talk about, I think, a little more, a
little easier. Your purview was really domestic, wasn't it? The
continental United States (CONUS) was most of what you were
talking about, was making the recommendations coming from what
happened in the incident at Fort Hood. Did you look into
outside the United States (OCONUS)? We have thousands and
thousands of troops all over the world, and to me the threat is
probably a little bit greater there than it would be here.
What thoughts do you have on that, or maybe recommendations
you could have on that, to expand what you're doing to include
that?
Admiral Clark. We certainly did, Senator. The first thing
that comes to mind is, every base where we exist overseas, we
have non-Americans working with us on the base. What are the
processes and the procedures for vetting these people? So we
challenge it. We have a section in the report that talks about
security clearances and how people gain access.
The second thing I talked about--identifying people who
could become a threat, one of the things we have to look at is
how we vet people in the OCONUS environment. I would suggest to
you--and frankly, this would probably be better, the details of
this we might talk about in closed session. But I would suggest
to you that it was our conviction, and we would not have put it
in the report if we didn't think that this was certainly a
potential weakness.
Mr. West. Might I add this, Senator. If we take the lesson
of Fort Hood--and admittedly, we will talk more specifically
when you have your closed session--we have to be reminded that
the thesis on which we're dealing here is essentially, for this
whole report, the threat from within: the member of the
military family who then turns against his or her fellow
soldier, airman, sailor, marine, or coastguardsman.
The difficulty there, whether it is OCONUS or CONUS, is
that with the universal access card, the ID, they can enter
what should be the safest place either here or there, the base,
the post, freely. With our automated systems now, we don't stop
them for routine checks. So we can't--or we can. Certainly one
of the lessons learned at Fort Hood was that they have now
instituted some roving checks even of those who have the
credentials.
But the place to stop them, the insider who's the threat,
is not at the gate. It is to identify him or her before they
can get onto the post and do that act. That's why all those
signs that we talk about, all the cues and behavioral
indications, even the ones that the chairman mentioned, are
important for us to reemphasize, to expand and to focus on, to
make sure commanders have that information. That applies both
here and overseas.
Senator Inhofe. One of the things that was discussed here
by the chairman was when can we move this along faster. I think
you want to do that. We want to do that. We still have some of
the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission that are not fully
implemented and understood. So I would assume that you share
those feelings.
I was down at Fort Hood about 3 weeks before this incident.
That was when we had two of our Oklahoma units that were
deploying overseas and I was down there for that event. Then I
went down afterwards for the event that took place after the
tragedy.
You had said--and I asked my staff to hand it to me so I
could read it again. This is pretty remarkable, Mr. Secretary,
when you said 2 minutes and 40 seconds after the initial 9-1-1
call, installation first responders arrived on the scene. One
and a half minutes later, the assailant was incapacitated. Two
ambulances and incident command vehicles from the base were
there 2 minutes and 50 seconds later. I mean, that's really
moving.
I would recommend, and maybe you've already done this, that
you find out--not always looking at what is wrong, but learn
from what was done right. In this case, I think it would
probably serve us well to see how they did that remarkable job.
I wanted to see it in writing after you'd said it, because I
think that's remarkable. So I'd recommend you do that.
Mr. West. It was remarkable, and we did think that one of
our jobs was to find out if that was the result of good
planning, courageous and fast action, was there an element of
luck, and, if it was what we believed and what we've said,
excellent planning and well executed, is there a lesson to pass
across the force.
One other thing I would add. I don't want to overdo--let me
add it anyway. We tried as best we could to figure out what
that meant, the passage of time from the first shot by the
assailant to his last. That is, the whole event, because the
uncertain part was how quickly the 9-1-1 call got in after the
first shot was fired. The best we can make is that the whole
shooting incident was ended by security forces between 7 and 8
minutes after it started.
Senator Inhofe. Were you surprised at that too, Admiral?
Admiral Clark. I certainly was. This kind of a panel is
supposed to find the things that are wrong. That's what we're
supposed to do. But if you notice, we lead with some very
strong statements about what we thought was right, because we
wanted it up front that the people at Fort Hood did a fabulous
job.
I testified yesterday and the staff reminded me that I said
``fabulous'' or ``excellent'' or ``outstanding'' 19 times
yesterday. But I want to drive the point home. I said this was
the best lessons-learned I've ever seen, and the performance of
the people was brilliant. Were there things that could have
been better? Yes. One of the reasons that it was brilliant was
because of the brilliance of our people. They are so good.
Of course, nobody had the stopwatch going on inside the
room where he was shooting, so that's why we don't know the
exact time, as the Secretary indicated, between the first shot
and the 9-1-1 call. But here's what we do know: There were a
lot more rounds available, and they took that shooter down and
the CID agent was handcuffed to him in a matter of moments and
was with him from that point on.
Senator Inhofe. Let me commend all of them for the fine
work they did.
Admiral Clark. It was incredible.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
I would take 2 seconds just to say that I disagree with
your comments about Middle Easterners and Muslims and the
implications of those comments. I wouldn't want to say that
except while you're here.
Senator Inhofe. Sure. I understand that. I expected that.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Clark, you mentioned in terms of the threat a
generic self-radicalization that would lead to violence. There
are several different, as you suggest, categories of this, not
simply Islamic radicals, but a host of others. Is there a
strategy in DOD to identify these potential categories and to
essentially work explicitly against them or to at least be
aware of them?
Admiral Clark. The first point, there are people in the
public domain that have said we didn't use the magic term,
``radical Islamics.'' We didn't do it on purpose. It wasn't
because we were trying to be politically correct. It was
because our task was to deal with violence and this was one of
them. But I don't know how people could read our comments about
self-radicalization and not understand that this kind of
radical Islamic behavior is part of that group.
We said specifically though, the indicators are inadequate.
Now, having said that, on Friday the Army published the list of
10, and having something out there is better than nothing. In
the closed session, I would like to get into this in some
detail.
But to say we believe that all of the indicators related to
violence are not static indicators. We're living in such a
rapidly changing world, potentially we should be considering
the establishment of a group that focuses on this full-time. I
have this whole series of kinds of behaviors that we are
talking about--criminal, drug, domestic abuse, gang activity,
supremist ideology, terrorism, school violence, sex crimes,
sabotage, arson, cyber. We're talking about all of these.
So I trust that's responsive to your question.
Senator Reed. It is.
Mr. Secretary, do you have any comments?
Mr. West. There is an annex to our report that discusses
the sources of violence in some detail. It's an example of the
pieces that our researchers consulted. I think it's very
informative and I commend it for reading.
I think that I agree with the Admiral's response. Also, in
our executive summary, five or six key things that we recommend
to the Secretary that we pull out from this report is the
suggestion of a body that will collect the indicators of
violence, update them in light of current circumstances, events
in our world, occurrences in our world, and then make them
available on an updated basis to the commanders and the
supervisors who need to use them to make their judgments.
Senator Reed. Let me again turn to the Admiral. Did you
believe or conclude that there was adequate information coming
from Walter Reed to Fort Hood with respect to the Major? Was
there a problem there in terms of letters of reprimand that
might have been issued or informal reprimands that were never
fully communicated, so that the commanders at Fort Hood clearly
weren't able to gauge the seriousness of this individual?
Mr. West. Senator, I wonder if you would let us discuss
that with you in the restricted session. It's in the annex.
Senator Reed. I appreciate that.
There's another issue and this, I think, can be--I'll let
you decide--discussed in public, is that, there are many
indicators about Major Hassan's professional skills, far
removed from his religious beliefs and his discussions, just
simple competence, his ability to work with others, those
things that are fundamental to being an officer in the
military. Yet he was moved along. I know this question has come
up. In these critical areas where there are not a surplus of
individuals, such as mental health professionals,
psychiatrists, et cetera, is there a double standard in terms
of, had he been a line officer, an infantry officer, artillery
officer--forget his radicalization, but just his simple
performance, would that have gotten him kicked out?
Mr. West. I think again, Senator, we are prepared to
discuss that with you, but we would ask you to let us do it in
the restricted session.
Senator Reed. I appreciate that.
Admiral Clark. I would say certainly the heart of what we
have to say is in the annex. Let me make a comment. We use the
term ``officership'' in the open report. ``Officership'' was
intended to mean more than just leadership, and it was our view
that there were officership deficiencies. In the closed session
we can talk in great detail about the specifics of that.
Senator Reed. Just one final question----
Mr. West. If I might, Senator, I would just add also that
in our one-page summary discussion, in chapter 1, in the open
report, we do mention the findings and recommendations, which
had to do with the Army's application of its policies to the
perpetrator, but also the fact that there were signs that were
missed and some that as far as we can tell were ignored. That's
in the open part of the discussion.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Again, part of this response is going to be training, not
just commanders, but individual soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines. We have something like that when it comes to a
traditional threat, which is subversion and espionage, the old
posters, World War II, ``Loose Lips Sink Ships.'' That emphasis
is persistent. Do you envision something like that in terms of
the training elements going forward?
Admiral Clark. I mentioned just briefly, but I probably
didn't emphasize it well enough: There clearly has to be an
outreach program here. I'm not talking about an outreach
program outside the Department. I'm talking about inside the
Department. Notice, the Secretary of Defense said on Friday--
and we suggested that effective communication is the order of
the day here. The Secretary started that process on Friday when
he said to commanders: This isn't just ho-hum--I'm paraphrasing
now--ho-hum, regular day-to-day stuff. Commanders should have
to look past the day-to-day.
There is no doubt that a very effective training and
outreach program is part of an effective solution.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, you have previously served our country well in
your respective capacities and we appreciate your coming back
once again to help us deal with an issue that obviously is
extremely important, at the same time extremely sensitive. So
thank you for your continuing service.
In your report, you suggest that the Pentagon ``coordinate
with the FBI Behavioral Science Unit and the Military Violence
Unit to identify the indicators specific to DOD personnel, and
that DOD should use these indicators to develop an assessment
tool for commanders, supervisors, and professional support
service personnel to determine when individuals present risks
for violent behavior.''
Now, my question is, don't those tools already exist in the
form of the Army Form 4856, which is the Army Developmental
Counseling Form, and the Army Form 67-9, which is the Army
officer evaluation report (OER)? Assuming these documents are
used and filled out appropriately, shouldn't we be able to
identify a soldier who may be becoming self-radicalized as we
think happened here and appropriately address the threat that
they represent?
Mr. West. I'm going to let Admiral Clark have a good long
swing at that because of his extensive experience with OERs and
the like. But let me say what we were trying to do here,
Senator. The fact is that there is a very good argument that
there are tools out there that commanders can use to make the
assessments they need to make. The question for us, though is,
are there ways to strengthen what they can do and have we
learned anything by the incident we faced and will discuss with
you in closed session, from this incident, about how we can
shore that up?
Frankly, things like OERs, there is a culture in the
Services, all of them, which I think Admiral Clark can speak to
better than I can, that doesn't always find and report the
kinds of things that would be better to report. For one reason,
it may be because the information of some offense, of previous
drug usage, but there has been a rehabilitation effort, or of
some other contacts or signs, may have been left to the
discretion of the commander as to whether to even keep that in
the record so that it would be recorded in the OER. It never
gets to the next commander, the next supervisor, and suddenly
earlier signs are lost in the midst of the pass as they move
forward.
We need to shore that up. We said to the Secretary in our
executive summary, in our five or six big recommendations: You
need to say to the officer corps of the Nation and all the
Services that, what you report on these OERs and on things like
the Service School Academic Evaluation Report (SAER), which
takes the place of the OER when they're in Service school, you
need to say that that matters and that it has to be accurate
and, most of all, complete, so that we can make the judgments
we need to make.
Now, that's the thrust of what we're doing here. So, yes,
reports exist, but they're not being made use of in a way that
fits what we need in these new and trying times.
Senator Chambliss. So do you think it's a matter of further
education of those supervisors that are asking the questions
and making that report?
Mr. West. I have an answer to that. It's a question to me,
but I want to get Admiral Clark involved. My answer is
education, yes, but also making sure that the standards--and
maybe that is education--are applied. But there are also some
recommendations for some further adjustments.
Senator Chambliss. Admiral Clark?
Admiral Clark. I don't know the first form that you
referenced. I have the second forms here in front of me, so I
can talk specifically to those.
Senator Chambliss. The 4856 is the Army Developmental
Counseling Form, which I understand is completed once a
quarter. The 67-9 is an annual report for enlisted and officer
personnel.
Admiral Clark. I don't have that in front of me. But I
would say that that form and the tools that go with that would
be great if the person knows what the indicators are. Our
review suggests that in the area of self-radicalization that
can be very fuzzy.
The reason we suggested the FBI is they've already started
doing some work here. So we're saying to the Secretary, don't
start from scratch. But also the recommendation to use every
expert that we know how to get, because we're looking for
behavioral cues and their subtleties. Once those are known, I
have every confidence that our leadership, our supervisors,
will know how to deal with that.
But my interpretation of that was, we were talking about an
education and that's why you have to have an outreach program
that gets the training to the right people, so they have
understanding of these issues.
Senator Chambliss. If I'm hearing you right with regard to
what both of you've said in your statement and your answers to
the questions thus far, we did a great job responding at Fort
Hood. Our men and women were courageous, heroic, and did a good
job. But with the events leading up to the incident, we have
some major deficiencies.
In fact, Admiral, you alluded to this, I think you called
it ``an evolving threat,'' were your exact words that you said
earlier. Are there any protections or punitive measures that
are in place to detect, for example, an individual who is one
of those folks that I would categorize as an evolving threat,
who might simply join a branch of the military with the
intention of duplicating what happened at Fort Hood? What have
we got in place now or what do we need to do to ensure that we
don't have somebody who has spent the last 6 months in Yemen or
4 years ago spent 6 months in Yemen with the idea of ultimately
coming back and having been trained to go in and duplicate this
event?
Mr. West. Or who even spent a bunch of years or a month out
in the wilds of our country becoming radicalized in a different
way and under different pressures. The question is the same.
You're right, Senator, there was no failing by those at
Fort Hood in their response. If there were gaps, it was in us
as we tried to prepare ourselves to identify those factors that
would say this person is going to be a problem, we need to act.
But I think your question was to the Admiral.
Admiral Clark. I agree completely with what Secretary West
has said. The thrust of your question gets us to this issue of
the identification question that I raised this point to. That
identification question raises things about the manner in which
we do checks and what's involved there. I think it would be
smart not to inform an enemy in a public way about my
particular impressions, and if it's all right with you that we
talk about that in a closed session. But affirming your
comment, this is part of the challenge. By the way, should we
not expect that they're going to use every technique and scheme
or maneuver that they can figure out?
Senator Chambliss. Absolutely. That's why we have to,
number one, get the information. But further, to your point you
stated earlier, Admiral, is we have to share that information.
It has to get in the hands of the people who are filling out
those forms or who are making recommendations relative to an
individual.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Clark. Mr. Chairman, can I say, since you made that
last point, I say one more time: Get rid of the barriers,
inside and outside of the Department, the barriers to
information flow. Thank you.
Mr. West. Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry to keep this going, but
could I add one more thought to that?
Chairman Levin. Sure.
Mr. West. Here's another problem that your questions and
Admiral Clark's response raise, Senator. That is this. Let's
take religion. The reason we have numbers and records on the
representation of people of various religions in our forces is
because they self-identify. They say: This is my religion, I'm
an Episcopalian, or what have you. What about those who,
formulating a reason to hide their purposes, don't disclose
their religion, don't disclose anything that will cause us to
try to--this is not your term--to try to profile?
It's the indicators, the behavioral cues, that we have to
rely on. They are our only way of getting at this in any
organized and aggressive and effective way.
Admiral Clark. One more comment, then. So that you know,
the alleged perpetrator was initially in the Army as an
enlisted person and he went off and went to school. When he
came into the Army the first time, he professed to be a member
of the Islamic faith. When he came in as an officer, he did not
declare. So all of the indicators aren't right in front of our
nose. But I have all the statistics here to talk about every
brand of religion that we know about.
The reality is that way over half of our people never ever
declare what--they choose not to declare. So it's not always
immediately apparent. That's why this is a challenge. But then
really focusing on the behaviors, and that's what we wanted to
put the spotlight on. The Department in its guidance and
instruction to the commanders and all the people in the field
are going to go by this document, and this document doesn't
have sufficient guidance about self-radicalization.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank both
of you for your dedication and time in putting together a very
well-organized and, I think, insightful report. We appreciate
it very much.
So far we haven't really talked about, let's say, patient--
or the evaluation process. Of course, connecting the dots
requires that kind of an evaluation capability for it to be
able to tell us anything. In determining behavior, if you don't
have all the background perhaps you can't establish that.
Violence in the workplace is not unique now to the
military. It's part of everyday life, unfortunately, and that
kind of violence isn't necessarily the result of self-
radicalization in the workforce. So I'm wondering, in
connecting the dots, as you look for not only self-
radicalization, do you look for other indicators in your
report? Shouldn't the military look for others, such as marital
difficulties and other areas that, Admiral Clark, you
identified in addition? Because self-radicalization is a subset
of an overall problem when we talk about workforce violence, it
may be that the military is unique in that respect because it's
not just about domestic; we also have to face it on our
military posts around the world.
So in connecting the dots, I think we understand that not
all radicals will be engaging in violence and not everyone with
a different idea will engage in violence. So what are other
things that can be looked at in performance evaluations that
would help us detect potential violence coming, not just from
self-radicalization, but from others as well?
Admiral Clark. It's a really great question and it drives
us back to the guidance that's there today. We find that there
are good indicators in a lot of areas. I mentioned a number of
these. It includes the two that you talked about, although our
view is that the whole workplace side is--we tend to focus on
the kind of violence that takes place away from the workplace,
not in the workplace, and that's a criticism.
But let's just talk about the domestic piece, for example.
Earlier we talked about the requirement for balance. We have
been dealing with this now for years. So we learned a long time
ago that if the balance is incorrect we were going to have
difficulty, because a domestic violence situation always has a
``she says, he says'' scenario ongoing. So we know how to do
these things when we identify the behaviors.
So you're correct, we have them. We have the tools----
Senator Ben Nelson. We have the tools, right.
Admiral Clark. This is why we're suggesting that perhaps we
want to consider the establishment of an organization, a piece
of the structure, that does this for a living, because you or I
cannot define a solution set today and everything be perfect
for the next 3 years. It's going to change.
Our suggestion is we need to understand the evolving world
that we're facing. Let us not get sidetracked on just one
little piece of this. The Secretary's goal was to make the
workplace a safe environment. Imagine--and Secretary West
really alluded to this, when the alleged perpetrator--he was an
officer in the military, he was a field-grade officer. This
implies trust. He's a medical doctor, implies more trust. He's
somebody that a person would confide in. We can't have these
kinds of people turning from the inside on our people and
destroying the fabric of the institution and what we're all
about.
So we are convinced that this then calls for the kind of
investment that will ensure that we're staying up with the
adaption problem. This is a challenge, to be adaptive. I'm so
pleased that the Secretary of Defense addressed it straight-up
on Friday and said we have to create a more adaptive force.
Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary West?
Mr. West. Just as an add-on, in terms of your question,
what are some of the things that should be indicators, we have
a whole list of recommendations. Incidentally, in our appendix
C for purposes of being helpful to you we list all the
recommendations, the findings and recommendations, and
something about them, so that it's easier for you to find them
without having to go all through.
At about 2.6 or so and all the way through that to 2.10 or
so, there's a list of things that addresses what you said. For
example, you said what about medical? Well, so did we. We know
that the medical indications and medical records are protected,
and they should be. But we raise the question of whether we
shouldn't review whether there are ways to make some of that
history, especially when it pertains to some things I've said
before--drug abuse and the like--available on a more regular
basis to those who need to have these indicators.
Senator Ben Nelson. If you don't have all the dots, you
can't connect them.
Mr. West. Exactly.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I do want to
express my appreciation to you, Mr. Secretary and Admiral, for
all your service to this country, and obviously being called
back into service for your extraordinary work in regard to this
tragic incident.
I also want to take this opportunity to express my
condolences to those who lost family members and loved ones
during this terrible event. It was a horrific event in our
Nation's history and the fact that it happened at Fort Hood, a
place where more people have deployed to fight against
terrorism than any other place, is really heartbreaking. Our
heartfelt appreciation goes to those first responders who, once
informed of the situation, as you have noted, not only arrived
quickly, but showed tremendous professionalism and dedication
to duty and in doing so saved a lot of lives.
I want to ask you about a couple of findings in your
report. One is finding 3.8 of your review, which states: ``DOD
does not have a policy governing privately-owned weapons.''
Your recommendation states that: ``DOD needs to review the need
for such a policy.'' I guess my question is, can you explain
what you mean by a privately owned weapons policy?
Mr. West. There exists, for example at Fort Hood, which
among other things is a popular place for hunting, so a lot of
folks come on to hunt--so the effort to have some sort of
control over guns has to be carefully balanced, the need to
come on and use it, but also the security of the post. The way
that works and often works at a number of installations is
this. First of all, all weapons issued by the U.S. military to
its personnel are locked in the armory if you're enlisted or
officer or what have you. They're secured. So on the day of the
event, the only armed person on the scene until those who were
part of the security force arrived was the perpetrator.
The policy works this way there. If you live in the
barracks, then your privately owned weapon must of course be
owned--properly registered in accordance with State and Federal
law and the like, but also need to be registered with the
commander so that they know what's there. If you live in the
barracks, it is also secured in the armory. If you live in
personal quarters on the base, properly registered with the
commander, you keep them in your home. If you live off the
base, the only requirement is that they be registered in
accordance with State and Federal law, because you don't have
them on the base. If you bring them onto the base, previously
there was no way to know when that happened if you were a card-
carrying member of the Armed Forces, if you had your
credentials.
Now there's going to be a requirement, and I guess there
always was--to the same rules as anyone bringing privately-
owned weapons onto base: Let us know that you're bringing them
on, right there at the gate.
What doesn't exist is any way in which bringing them on and
concealing them, if you were a credentialed member of the Armed
Forces, could have been detected. We really don't have the
answer on how to deal with that, but we do know that it is a
gap in the protection that was accorded to those that day.
We know one other thing. The policies vary from post to
post. So the question we raised is simply this: Give some
thought, DOD, as to whether you wish to have a DOD-wide policy
with respect to the bringing and the use of private weapons on
the post by those who are members of the U.S. military. Fairly
straightforward.
Senator Thune. You don't prescribe that. What you've just
described is the policy at Fort Hood.
Mr. West. Right. It varies from post to post.
Senator Thune. It varies from installation to installation,
and the suggestion is simply that DOD adopt some uniform----
Mr. West. Consider, consider.
Senator Thune. Okay. All right, without getting into the
details of that.
That brings me to another question, because you have
described the timing of the incident. News reports have
indicated that it lasted about 10 minutes. Your report said 2
minutes and 40 seconds after the initial 9-1-1 call
installation first responders arrived, 1\1/2\ minutes later the
assailant was incapacitated, which accounts for about 4 minutes
and 10 seconds of the timeline, which as you said, is almost
superhuman in terms of response time. It really is remarkable
and a great credit to those who responded.
But could we assume then that there was a time period
before they got there, if in fact--I think you said 7 or 8
minutes.
Mr. West. That was our best estimate, but for the very
reasons you pointed out, we're not so sure. We just stated the
best estimate.
Senator Thune. Okay. Which is still a significant amount of
time; I guess the question is a follow-up to the previous
question. But if the soldiers would have been armed at the
time, in other words allowed to carry small firearms, in your
opinion could more lives have been saved?
Mr. West. Might as well give an answer----
Admiral Clark. Well, they're soldiers. If they had been
carrying their weapons around on them, it would have been
different. How different? How can I tell you? What would the
timeline have been? But of course it would have been different.
Mr. West. What I was hesitating about is that I thought
this was a natural lead-in to the active shooter program as
well, which Admiral Clark spent some time talking about. Maybe
we didn't go into it in detail, but the answer to your question
is armed servicemembers could probably have done so. The
difference, of course, is security personnel trained to take
down someone in those circumstances differently, and in two
ways.
In the past the practice has been clear out all the
innocents, those who are unarmed, those who are being assailed,
and then you take down the shooter. That has been the practice
for law enforcement agencies throughout the United States as
well. But there has been the advocacy of the response to active
shooter program, which is more and more becoming the response,
which is: Train your security people with firearms and then go
in, and as your first priority, take down the shooter before he
or she can do more damage to those who are there.
But the risks are obvious and that's why the emphasis is on
training. The FBI, who are the experts on this, have cautioned
that you really need a carefully selected and well-trained
force to do that. It was done at Fort Hood.
Senator Thune. They performed extremely well.
Admiral Clark. May I add one other point? My response was
brief, almost to the point of being brusque, let me just add.
It would have made a difference, but if I were a commander
would that be the first thing that I did, arm all the people on
the base? That's not what I would do. Would it make a
difference if some portion of them were armed? Of course it
would. But the reason I wouldn't just summarily arm everybody
is because of the fact that it would so change the environment
that we live in. I don't think that's the immediate solution to
good order and discipline.
Senator Thune. I guess in response to that, if, in fact,
there is going to be some consideration given to a policy, a
Department-wide policy with regard to firearms, I would hope it
would not be more restrictive, because I do think these are
soldiers. These are people who are trained. Clearly, if anybody
would be prepared, probably not trained exactly in emergency
response, but people who would be trained and prepared and
equipped to effectively use a firearm to save other lives, it
would be someone in the U.S. military. That's my observation.
So I have some other questions, but I'm out of time. So
thank you all very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Burris.
Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, may
I go on record as also objecting to the comment that was made
by the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma in reference to
profiling.
I also want to commend the two distinguished public
servants here, one of whom I've known since he was a freshman
at Howard University, and to see him move through the ranks and
commit all of this service to America is what I anticipated
when I saw him as a freshman when I was in law school at
Howard, and then of course seeing him graduate also from Howard
Law School. So, Secretary West, you have done a tremendous job
for the people of America and we are very, very grateful to you
for that.
Mr. West. Thank you, Senator. Your own lifelong record of
public service is quite distinguished and I consider your
compliment that much more valuable. Thank you.
Senator Burris. Admiral, I appreciate your service as well.
I just didn't attend school with you.
I am really seeking to see how we get at the major problem
that you were tasked to do. I had other questions, but the
hearing has just provoked some other thoughts. Mr. Secretary,
you mentioned the fact that when you take an oath of office in
the military--and I'm just wondering whether or not there's a
different standard under the constitutional rights that you
have after you've taken the oath of office. It's something I
may have been missing because I've never been in the military,
and I just want to know whether or not a person who has taken
an oath, there are different standards that they are held to,
for example, the free speech article or the right to bear arms
article, which was brought up by Senator Thune. Could you
comment on that, please?
Mr. West. I will, and then I think you'll be interested to
hear the views of someone who has commanded at every level and
has had to give these instructions to his officers and those
serving under him.
Years ago I was the DOD General Counsel, so we tried to
remain conversant with this for obvious reasons. I was a Judge
Advocate General officer as well. The basic rule is stated:
Servicemembers, whether they are officers or enlisted, who come
into the Services are still citizens of the United States. They
do not give up their basic constitutional rights and
protections. They get to speak, especially when they're on
their own time and not in uniform, freely. They get to
associate under the same circumstances. They are entitled, if
they are accused of criminal activity while on Active Duty, to
a trial with a number of the constitutional protections, not
all, because, as I think Admiral Clark observed, they do agree
when they take the oath of office to put some things, as he
said, on the shelf. For example, when they're in uniform they
can't just say anything they darn well please.
I may have said it too broadly. There are lots of things
you can add in, qualifications. But it's just a fact of life
and, frankly, when they're on Active Duty in uniform they can't
just go anywhere at any time to do whatever they please. They
are under orders. They are under obligations, either as
officers or as noncommissioned officers, to respond as they are
directed, to carry out their orders fully. They represent this
country as well as serving it.
Now, I've said that way too broadly, I'm sure. But I think
it gives an overlay. It says yes, they don't ever stop being
citizens, they don't lose their constitutional protections, but
there are some limits that can be imposed on them under lawful
military authority.
Admiral Clark. Secretary West said all of that like the
true veteran that he is. It was absolutely perfect. I would
just add that, so let's say we're having a time--it's the
political season and people are running for office. A member of
the Armed Forces is not allowed to show up there in uniform.
Now, if they choose to do so--and I'll use my words very
carefully--they will be counseled, to be sure. I would say
they'll probably be part of a short but exciting conversation,
is the way I might put it.
There are other areas. When we're overseas, the first thing
we tell our sailors is: Remember, you are ambassadors of the
United States of America. We put limits on the kind of things
that we expected them to do and things that we clearly expected
them not to do. So those are the things that we are speaking
to, and certainly, as Secretary West said so correctly, basic
constitutional rights are never in question.
Senator Burris. Thank you, Admiral.
Another general question that's running through my mind.
Now, in your work in this short period of time did you seek to
assess other violent acts that may have taken place on military
bases, on American soil or military bases, say the incident in
Iraq where one of the soldiers supposedly snapped and killed
fellow service persons? Did you look into any of that?
Admiral Clark. Absolutely. Team one went into great detail
of policies across the board. They're the group that reviewed
over 30,000 pages of instructions and policies. It was
incredible. We called this the omnibus team. It was an
unbelievable task that they had. They used as a frame of
reference to look into these special cases and say, now are
there weaknesses here? Because the Secretary of Defense asked
us to look for weaknesses in policies, programs, procedures,
and gaps. So we looked at those, and basically we found that--
this instruction, by the way, that I hold in front of me has
extensive detail about the questions you raise about the things
that you can and cannot do. In other words, the prohibited
activities are outlined here.
But our team used those particular cases like you cited as
a springboard and said, are the policies adequate?
Fundamentally, what we're reporting is that--and let me inject
this thought. We know that you can't legislate perfect
behavior. That's not possible. So the question is, are the
policies fundamentally sound? The areas that we have put a
focus on in the report, specifically this internal threat is
the area where we see the greatest need.
Senator Burris. I just wonder, gentlemen, whether or not in
your assessment and in your report we're trying to get at
something through procedures that is almost impossible to
prevent. It's similar to a suicide bomber, as I would see it, a
person who is willing to commit his own death. All the policies
and procedures that we would put in place, all the
corrections--for example, Mr. Secretary, if you were to have
some type of procedure to go on base, whether or not you bring
your private arms on base or not, what happens if the
commanding officer was to have a problem? Do you think that the
military police is going to stop a commanding officer at the
gate and search him for his own private weapon and determine
whether or not, if he's bringing that weapon on base, if he is
determined to make some type of violent act or statement?
I just bring that up as a result of our attempt to try to
get procedures that are going to be in the place that would
seek to prevent someone from doing such a violent act.
Mr. West. That's a very pertinent observation, Senator
Burris, and it is exactly on point. It is why we have
emphasized in our report that we can't rely solely on stopping
someone at the boundary. We have to have looked for the signs,
for the 100-yard stare, for the examples of tensions or
difficulties even in a personal life, and we can do this if
they use government facilities--for the communications with
extremist persons or organizations on a repeated basis.
We can look for all those signs. We can look for the signs
of drug abuse because--and I mention that so often because
there is some literature that our team one found, incidentally,
has its report in chapter 2. We looked for those signs--that
say that past drug abuse, even when corrected, is often linked
to later outbreaks of violence. So we have to look for what
Admiral Clark discussed in his opening statement as the
behavioral cues and indicators, and we must do that over the
course, say, of the colonel's service, to find them early
enough so that it doesn't get to the point that he brings his
weapon onto their base in some crazed effort.
Now that is the thrust, frankly, of the entire report, and
thank you for getting right to the heart of it.
Senator Burris. Mr. Secretary, the question is, can this
and will this happen again? God knows we don't want it to. But
think about it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Burris.
Senator LeMieux.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary and Admiral, again to add to my colleagues, thank
you for the work that you've done. Thank you for your past
service. Thank you for this service.
I also want to extend my condolences to the families of the
Fort Hood soldiers who were killed. We're keeping them in our
thoughts and our prayers.
I want to, first of all, just state that I think we all
agree, and your report certainly says, that this was a failure
on the front end. We commend the first responders for their
fantastic work, but this was a failure. I don't want to belabor
that, because I think it's been talked about, Mr. Chairman.
But there's a Houston Chronicle article of yesterday,
Richard Lardner and Calvin Woodward, that I'd ask be submitted
for the record, which I think details a lot of the failures in
monitoring Major Hassan along the way, and that something
should have been done to prevent this.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, sir.
What I want to talk about is three things, and there are
questions for you. The first one is to follow up on what
Senator Thune was talking about concerning soldiers on the base
carrying weapons. This struck me as well because I recently
this past week went to four military bases in Florida, from
Naval Air Station Pensacola, to Tindall, to Eglin, to Hurlbert
Air Force Base. The thing that you notice different than going
to a military base in a theater of war, like going to Bagram
Air Force Base, is that the soldiers and the airmen and the
sailors aren't carrying weapons. But when you're at Bagram you
see half of the service men and women carrying their weapons.
I don't think that this would have happened potentially at
Bagram Air Force Base for two reasons. One is there would have
been a huge deterrent to Major Hassan if he knew that the other
soldiers were carrying weapons. The second thing is, if it
would have happened, to follow up on Senator Thune's point,
that 4 minutes of time or whatever the period was where there
was no first responder there, one of our servicemembers I am
sure would have picked up their weapon and fired back.
I hope that you will in your continuing work stress this to
the Secretary of Defense, because, while I understand the
Admiral's point about order on the base, there is probably a
sweet spot here where some of the folks on a base, even in the
United States of America, should be carrying weapons, maybe
where there's going to be large groups gathered, I guess like
where this processing center was happening.
So I don't know if you have any further comments on that.
You've already answered Senator Thune's question, but I want to
make that point. Mr. Secretary?
Mr. West. I have a comment, and that is this. It has
happened overseas where people have been carrying weapons.
We've had incidents in which a soldier has gone berserk and
started shooting and there were weapons around him; it didn't
stop it.
Second, let's assume that everyone's able to carry weapons,
say at Fort Hood. Well then, for a committed person it wouldn't
have been necessary to smuggle them in to use them.
Then third, I guess--well, no. I think first and second is
enough. If the Admiral wants to add a third, I will let him.
Admiral Clark. I don't argue with your fundamental point. I
would just say that as a commander I realized that I was
responsible for the creation of the environment. So the
deployed environment is always different than the environment
at home. So I think there are a lot of things that I could
figure out how to do before I decided to arm every single human
being on the base.
I don't discount at all your point about the degree of
difficulty for a shooter. But I believe Secretary West has
accurately responded. We have cases, to be sure, and we have
been very careful not to define specific single-point dot
solutions for these cases because, for starters, we did this in
an extraordinarily short period of time. If we were going to
then look at all the possible courses of alternative solutions
for every one of the recommendations we made, we would have
needed at least 6 months and not the short time we had.
Senator LeMieux. I understand that. I'm just saying that
there's a general point. I used the term ``sweet spot'' for a
reason, not that you would put a gun on every service man or
woman's side, but that there be some thought about this point,
because I do think that knowing that someone is bearing arms is
a deterrent. Maybe it hasn't always been a deterrent, but it
can be a deterrent. It certainly might have saved 13 people. We
don't know, but it might have saved some of them.
The second thing is, in terms of--Senator Collins is going
to speak in a minute and her Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee, along with Senator Lieberman, has talked
about the need for training for all servicemembers in
identifying signs of Islamic extremism. I wonder if we don't
only need to encourage our servicemembers to look for these
signs and report them, but that we need to do more than that
and require it.
I think about something that universities do. I didn't
attend the University of Virginia, but I understand they have a
very stringent honor code. The honor code can be broken in two
ways: one, by violating it; and the second is failing to report
that someone else violated it. I wonder for your consideration,
whether or not we should make a suggestion like that, that you
have an obligation as a member of the U.S. military that if you
see something that is out of line, to report it. There, if I
feel like in my service record I'm going to be reprimanded for
not reporting something--none of us like to tell on our
colleagues. It's human nature. But I also commend that to you
as something you could consider, and if you want to comment on
that I'd appreciate that as well.
Admiral Clark. I think these are the kind of questions, all
in pursuit of potential solutions, that the Secretary would
think is going on, without suggesting whether one is the right
solution or not. Phase two is to do the drill-down, and they
couldn't do the drill-down on the whole breadth of things that
we looked at 30,000-plus pages of directions and policies and
all of that. Our job was to put the spotlight on the key things
that they could go do in a hurry. It's my understanding that's
his expectation for phase two.
Senator LeMieux. The third and final point I have is, we've
heard this phrase, ``connect-the-dots.'' I heard it yesterday
when we had a Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee
hearing with Secretary Napolitano and Director Leitner about
the Christmas Day bombing attempt. That's, obviously, the great
struggle, is connecting the dots. You mentioned, Admiral,
perhaps having some other special unit or division of people
who would try to do that.
That seems to be smart to me, that you have someone who's
going to look through all of the information, not be tasked
with maybe other jobs, but be tasked with trying to--I don't
know if it's an internal affairs function or if it's just a
function to make sure that someone is out there looking at
these reports that are filled out on different service men and
women. I know there's a lot of people in the U.S. military.
But we have really good technology in this country,
technology that's being used by the private sector. I don't
know if these reports are scanned. I don't know if they're
entered on a computer. I don't know if someone can use cloud
computing and some of these new techniques to do searches.
We've failed again on the almost terrible tragedy on
Christmas Day because of a misspelling of a name and other
things that failed in our intelligence and the way that we
process, gather, and evaluate intelligence. One thing I just
might commend to you in your further discussions with the
Secretary is, if you do establish one of these units, talking
to people in the private sector who develop this wonderful
technology and see if it might be an aid for helping keep our
service men and women safe.
Admiral Clark. May I comment? We say in the report that
we've been having arguments about who owns what pieces of
information. We've been having those discussions long enough.
It's time to move on. So without defining what that solution
is, I don't know how a commander can possibly connect the dots
if he doesn't have all the dots in his dot kit. ``Dot kit'' may
be the right term.
But also, I bring attention to this point. We told the
Secretary this isn't just interagency. This is inside the
Department as well. Challenge the assumptions on who has all of
the pieces of information. The commanders will be better
equipped and we know how brilliant they are when they're given
the tools.
Mr. West. Actually, I think the organization that you're
thinking about that we recommended was one that's designed to
collect all the indicators, keep them catalogued, update them
regularly, and make them available to commanders and those who
have to make decisions. Your idea has, I think, to do with
connecting dots on specific individuals, where those things
come up. That's an interesting concept and it's not one that we
necessarily focused on. Thank you for that.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks very much
to Secretary West and Admiral Clark for the service that you've
given in doing this report, and of course throughout your
lives. The attack of November 5, 2009, was a tragedy and we're
very grateful for the efforts that you've made along with DOD
personnel working with you in this review to ensure that such a
tragedy doesn't happen again.
The Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee--
and Senator Collins and I are here--has been investigating the
Fort Hood shootings to assess the information the government
had prior to the shootings and the actions it took in response
to that information. I can tell you that, even at this early
stage of our investigation, it's become apparent to us that
DOD's approach to the threat of servicemembers who adopt a
violent Islamist extremist ideology needs to be revised.
Senator Collins and I sent a letter last week along those
lines to Secretary Gates. I know there's sensitivity on this
about the other Muslim Americans who are serving honorably in
our military, but I honestly think that a more focused
approach, an open approach on Islamist extremism, will protect
the overwhelming majority of Muslim Americans serving in the
military, who are serving honorably, and will maintain the
bonds of trust that are so necessary in a military context
among servicemembers of all religions.
It seems to me in the Fort Hood case that there were many
indicators that Nidal Hassan was motivated to commit these
murders in furtherance of his own violent Islamist extremist
ideology. But I must say respectfully that your report only
tangentially mentions that particular threat. In contrast, your
review recommends generally that the Department ``identify
common indicators leading up to a wide range of destructive
events, regardless of the individual's identity.''
I understand again DOD's need to be sensitive to the
religious beliefs of all its servicemembers and employees. But
I think it's also critically important, and I don't see it in
your report, as much as I admire so many of the recommendations
you've made, that we recognize the specific threats posed by
violent Islamist extremism to our military.
So I wanted to ask you first, how do you think the
Department and the Services should address the specific threat
of violent Islamist extremism and if you want to respond to my
concern generally about this? I will add that I remember being
disappointed, troubled, after the Fort Hood murders when
General Casey's first response described the incident as a
force protection failure, which I suppose in one sense it was.
But it was also a terrorist attack in my opinion. To a certain
extent, the title of your report, ``Protecting the Force,''
continues that emphasis, as opposed to a focused emphasis on
the problem we're facing now, just as we focused earlier, after
Fort Bragg, on the very real problem explicitly of white
supremist extremism.
So I welcome your response generally and particularly.
Mr. West. I was the Secretary of the Army at the time of
the Fort Bragg, Senator, and because I was given a little more
leeway I was the one who ordered the review that occurred. We
operated under the same constraints then that--the folks we
appointed operated under the same constraints then that we
operate under now. That is, they had an ongoing military
justice investigation and in fact, because the victims were
civilians and the acts occurred off post in Fayetteville, still
to this day one is struck. I mean, the servicemembers required
two civilians to kneel and shot them execution-style.
So there were several, multiple criminal investigations,
and so that task force that we appointed could not get into
what might have been criminal aspects or anything that would
have imperiled the trials. We operated under that same
constraint.
Senator Lieberman. Okay, so that's the reason you thought
you couldn't be more explicit about Islamist extremism?
Mr. West. What we had to say, a lot of it is in the
restricted annex. But no, I think to your second point we had
is, respectfully, yes, it was and yes, it is a force protection
issue. That is the way in which it was handed to us and that is
the way in which we had to approach it.
In that case, it is every kind of extremism, every kind of
opportunity for violence, that we, if we're going to have this
one shot, Admiral Clark and I, to make recommendations to DOD,
have to be sure to cover. So yes, we went for indicators, for
cues and the like, but we did not exclude any source of
violence and we specifically did not exclude the source that
comes from radical Islamic belief associated with the actions
that go with it.
Admiral Clark has some thoughts I know he wants to add. We
talked about it more than once. So I'm going to stop here, but
that's my brief oversight of how we approached it.
Senator Lieberman. Let me just, before we go to Admiral
Clark, just follow up while I'm thinking about it, because
after those heinous murders at Fort Bragg in 1995 the Army, as
General Keane testified to us, issued a pamphlet, training
materials, that are quite directly oriented towards supremist
activities and other racial extremism, and specifically
detailed some of the key indicators to look for in white
supremists, which I thought was exactly the right thing to do,
of course.
I guess the question now is do you think the Services
should issue a similar type of pamphlet with the same kinds of
recommendations to address the threat of violent Islamist
extremism, because that is the reality. Of course--do you want
to respond to that?
Mr. West. Only that I think you make a good point.
Senator Lieberman. Okay, thank you.
Admiral, please.
Admiral Clark. Good to see you again, Senator.
Senator Lieberman. You too, Admiral.
Admiral Clark. In my opening statement I talked about
violence and I made the point that some have indicated that we
did not address the kind of violence that you're speaking to,
radical Islamic fundamentalism and the behavior that goes with
that. The point that I made is, yes, we did. Because Secretary
Gates wrote us a set of terms of reference that talked about
violence in the workplace and the people, including people
hurting themselves, we decided to go after it in that way.
But we used the term ``radicalization'' and ``self-
radicalization'' dozens of times in the report, which we
intended to make clear we're talking about every kind of
violent behavior, including this. Then we go on to then specify
in our recommendations--and I made the point about, here's the
DOD directive that talks about prohibited activities. Our point
is this document is inadequate to the task when dealing with
self-radicalized individuals.
So that's what we're talking about. I could not agree with
you more completely that we need the outreach program.
``Outreach,'' I mean we have to reach out and let people know
what the positions are and where the red lines are in
behaviors, and then with that goes all of the training that you
talked to. So I made that a matter of my prior testimony and
I'm in complete alignment with that view.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that clarification. In my
opinion, because--of course there's a concern about force
protection generally. But because this is a unique new threat
we're facing, I think the more explicit we are about it the
clearer it's going to be and the better off we're going to be,
because, as somebody said, some of the regulations earlier had
to do with almost Cold War scenarios, and then the obvious
response to the white supremist killings. Now, unfortunately,
we've had now two cases, Akbar in Kuwait and Hassan.
Unfortunately, the way things are going, we'll probably have
some more. So for the protection of the force, I think we have
to be really explicit about what this threat is.
My time is up. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, it's good to see you both. Thank you for your
continued public service.
Senator Lieberman, the chairman of our Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs Committee, has asked exactly the
questions that I planned to ask, which is not a surprise
because we've been working together on the whole issue of
homegrown terrorism and the threat of Islamist extremism.
I do want to follow up a bit on the point that Senator
Lieberman just made, because I was struck when I read the
public part of your report by the decision to omit the term
``Islamist extremism'' from the public report, and it troubled
me. It troubled me because it appeared to contrast sharply with
the approach that DOD has taken in the past. Your report
recommends that the Army focus on a broad range of motivations
for violence rather than focusing on specific causes. But
that's not what the Department and the Army did after the
racially motivated murders associated with Fort Bragg back in
1995. The 1995 guidance is striking because it squarely faces
the problem, and I believe that's why it was so effective. It
sent a clear message that white supremists had no place among
our troops.
I believe we need to send a similarly clear message.
Indeed, in 1996, in response to the Fort Bragg incident--and
obviously, Mr. Secretary, you're more familiar with it than I
since you were involved in correcting the problem at the time--
but in response, commanders were specifically advised to be
aware of ``indicators of possible extremist views, behaviors,
or affiliations.'' They were told to look for specific signs,
such as reading materials or the use of a personal computer to
visit extremist sites. These signs were geared toward
identifying white supremists within the ranks.
What Senator Lieberman and I have suggested in our letter
to Secretary Gates is that same kind of focus, squarely
admitting what the problem is. So my worry is that the
perception of your report for those who only get to read the
public part will be that we're not facing the problem squarely
the way we did in the mid-1990s, and it worked. The guidance
was excellent. It involved training our commanders or enlisted
troops, and it appears to have been very successful.
So, without presuming to speak for my chairman, Senator
Lieberman, that's what we're suggesting, that we squarely face
this threat to our troops.
So I would end what I realize has been more of a comment
than a question by urging you to more explicitly address this
specific threat. It doesn't ignore the fact that there are
other sources of violence. But in fact, family violence,
suicide prevention, sexual assault, all extremely important
priorities for us, but they are different in their nature than
the threat from Islamic extremists.
So I'd ask you to comment particularly on whether we should
have specific training to recognize the signs of radicalization
in this area. Mr. Secretary and then Admiral Clark.
Mr. West. It's almost impossible to have a comment,
Senator. That was a very powerful statement, along with Senator
Lieberman's statement. You of course put me a little bit under
the gun by pointing out that that's what we did in the Army
when that occurred.
I won't even spend time on the distinctions. I think there
are some clearly. Being a white supremist carries no overtones
of constitutional protections of any sort, whereas a religion
is always--I know I'm going to be accused of being politically
correct here, but so what--is always an area where we have to
go carefully.
For example, religious extremism, violent, aggressive
religious extremism, is a source of threat to our soldiers,
sailors, marines, airmen, and coastguardsmen, whatever the
religious source. We need to be careful, and we tried to be
careful when we did this, to make sure that we turn the
military's attention inward, since the person that was quoted
earlier as having talked about the Cold War, that was Secretary
Gates. What he was pointing out was something we said, which is
we have been focused on the external threat. Now we have to
look at the internal threat, from within, from one of our own.
As I said before, this is our one shot at it, Admiral Clark
and I, and we want to make sure that we look at the indicators,
and religious extremism, whatever its source, is an indicator,
and there are a whole bunch of things to look at. I think that
description is right. The fact, as you both make it, that it is
Islamic religious extremism, I think it is a point worth
making. I think the Secretary and everyone will hear it and
they will react accordingly. But that becomes part of the
history of this discussion.
Senator Collins. Admiral Clark.
Admiral Clark. It's so nice to see you again, Senator. It's
been a privilege for me to be engaged working on this task.
When the Secretary of Defense asked me to do this, I did so
because I believed it was so important.
Let me say that within 5 minutes of it going public that I
was going to co-chair this task force with Secretary West, my
very good friend General Jack Keane was calling on the phone
and telling me in great detail--I was driving down the road on
my cell phone, and he was explaining to me how they did it. He
happened to have been in command down there at Fort Bragg and I
was commander of the Second Fleet and we were friends and
worked together down there then.
So I've been mindful of his point of view on this since the
very, very beginning and was in complete alignment with it.
To build upon my response to Senator Lieberman, I'm just
going to give you Vern's view here. We talked about this a lot,
how do we shape this. If we shape this as--if the report was
full of reference to radical Islamic fundamentalist activity
and behavior, some people would have read it that it was going
to be all about that. The Secretary of Defense clearly gave us
another task. He gave us the task to deal with violence in the
workplace across the board, and because he did we made the
decision that we were going to handle it the way we have
presented it, but when questioned about--we frankly, Senator,
didn't know how people were going to be able to misread the
references to self-radicalization. We thought that that was
going to be pretty clear, but maybe it wasn't clear enough.
Our focus then, and one of our primary recommendations is
the guidance on these behaviors is inadequate, and the way you
make it adequate is you decide what the red lines are going to
be, you inform your people, you do everything that you know how
to do--and that's called training--to ensure that our people
know how to respond. That's what those of us who've had the
privilege to command are charged to do. We talk about
officership in the report and so forth. That's what leaders do
and that is what is required.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Collins.
I was listening to Senator Lieberman and Senator Collins
with the suggestion that we address a specific threat, since it
obviously is a specific threat. It is appropriate that our
leaders be directed as to how to address that threat, just the
way they were, I guess, in the 1990s with the white
supremacists, but to make it clear and to make it certain that
it's not viewed as an anti-Muslim effort, but rather an effort
to address violent extremism, radical Islamic extremism, it
would be very essential, it seems to me, wise that people who
were involved in preparing that kind of instruction include
Muslims, because obviously that would be important in terms of
knowledge of the threat, but also important in terms of making
it clear that is not anti-Muslim. 99 percent of Muslims are not
people who are engaged in these kind of activities, and to make
it clear it's not this kind of an effort, which I think is a
legitimate effort, that Senator Lieberman and Senator Collins
talk about. That is a legitimate effort to make it clear that
it is not aimed at Muslims, but aimed at violent Islamic
radical extremism, and it's important that Muslims be
significantly involved in that direction.
I was wondering if Senator Lieberman or Senator Collins
might want to comment on that suggestion.
Senator Lieberman. Mr. Chairman, I think that's an
excellent suggestion. In some ways you've given voice to it.
But it would be a real omission, as I hear you talk, if it
wasn't done, in other words if Muslims weren't involved.
One of the things in this fact situation that troubles me,
and I suppose why I feel like we have to talk explicitly to one
another about this threat, including most of all to have in the
conversation Muslim Americans. Obviously, as Senator Levin
said, 99 percent plus are not extremists or terrorists.
I worry as I look at this fact situation in Hassan's case
that part of the reason that commanders and others who after
the attacks at Fort Hood were spewing out to the media these
signs that looked back and said he showed he was really turning
in a very extremist, anti-American direction, that people
didn't voice them or record them because of political
correctness and, even more than political correctness, the
sensitivity that we all have about religious discussions.
But the truth is, the best thing that could happen here,
it's a great place for it to begin, in the military, is to have
a real open discussion about this. Of course, for it to be a
real discussion it has to include Muslim Americans. So I think
your suggestion--in other words, I think that if Muslim
Americans had been seeing--I don't know what the facts were
about this--some of the things that Hassan was saying at Walter
Reed, for instance, I think they would have been alarmed,
because this doesn't reflect what they think.
Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I think your suggestion is really
an excellent one. Thank you.
Senator Collins. Mr. Chairman, if I could just respond as
well. I too think that your suggestion is an excellent one and
it's very consistent with the approach that Senator Lieberman
and I have advocated on the Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee. In fact, in our letter to Secretary Gates
where we suggest more training, we point out that updating the
approach would help to protect from suspicion the thousands of
Muslim Americans who are serving honorably in the U.S. military
and help to maintain the bonds of trust among servicemembers of
all religions and enhance understanding.
So the steps that we have recommended would clearly benefit
from the inclusion and active involvement of Muslim Americans,
and that's what we intended. But I also think it has benefits
for Muslim Americans serving, so that other servicemembers have
a better understanding of Islam. So I'm in complete accord with
what you suggest. I think that is along the lines of what we
were proposing as well.
I would ask that we share with our two distinguished
witnesses today the recommendations that Senator Lieberman and
I have made in our January 13 letter to Secretary Gates,
because as you go forward with your work it may be of value to
you as well, we hope.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. One other thing that seems to me
would be appropriate, and I don't know if you've addressed
this, but it's sort of along this line: that our policies also
should be very clear about why it is unacceptable, why it's not
allowed, prohibited, to have taunting or harassment of people
because of their religious views, as, according to the public
record, occurred in the Hassan case.
I don't know if that's true and I can't comment on your
annex, but it seems to me this is part and parcel. Religious
tolerance does not mean tolerance for violence and extremism.
It doesn't mean that, as I pointed out maybe an hour ago.
That's not what we're tolerant of. But what we are tolerant of,
and proud of it, is other people's religious views. As part of
that, it has to be importantly pointed out in the military that
that means we do not accept taunts, graffiti about ``ragheads''
or what have you, about anyone's religious views. I don't know
if that is part of your recommendations here, that that be
clear as well in terms of guidance, but it seems to me it's an
important part of it.
Admiral Clark. Let me address it. It's very well covered in
the prohibited behaviors and activities.
Chairman Levin. You mean currently?
Admiral Clark. Currently. It's very well spelled out. So
I've spoken only to what's not in this document. What's in this
document is 100 percent right, and what we have said is this
document does not have the piece in it regarding self-
radicalized behavior.
Mr. Chairman, I so want to appreciate the fact that you
have collectively recognized the very effective and loyal
service of thousands of Muslims. Somebody accused me of being
politically correct. I don't care. The way you said it is
exactly right and I appreciate it.
Chairman Levin. One thing to make this even more complex.
When we talk about connecting the dots, and we have to do a far
better job of connecting the dots--I believe that's the
greatest failure in this and the other incidents that we've
been discussing in various committees--there are counter-
indicating dots that complicate the work, including with Major
Hassan. It's not just those dots which in my view would have
made folks suspicious, had they known about it, of what his
potential was, but there are some dots that go in the other
direction in terms of--and these are in the public record--what
his patients thought of him, which was very high. You have to
throw those dots into the mix, too, for people who are going to
be judging him.
You have a record here of a number of his assessments were
not just negative--that should have been included in the
record, by the way; I happen to agree with you totally--but
there's also some highly positive, not politically correct for
that reason, but positive, assessments of his capability.
I just think it's important that, since we're trying to
take a general view of this, that while it's critically
important to do a far better job of collecting dots, that we
also recognize in terms of the task in front of us that there
are some dots that are going to be in that mix which make it
very unclear what you do with the dots which seem to point in
one direction, because there are some dots that point in the
other direction, even with him. They've not been focused on,
obviously, but there are some counter-indicators here which are
fairly clear as well.
Finally, Admiral, you talk about reducing--``eliminating''
I think is your word--the barriers, get rid of the barriers to
information flow. I think generally you're right, and there's
barriers here which clearly should not be there. So I agree
with your premise. Are there any barriers that you'd want to
maintain, either privacy barriers or barriers--for instance,
you talked about I think prior drug problem or an addiction
problem which has been overcome. Some of that's not passed
along now. If it's been overcome, I think there's some instinct
in commanders that maybe we should just let certain things not
be passed along which would unfairly perhaps hurt somebody's
career path if they've overcome a problem.
Are there any barriers that you might want to keep?
Admiral Clark. There may be, and if I were responsible for
the policy review I would then look at all of the potential
courses of action and make that kind of determination. But let
me give you an example of the manner in which I might decide to
handle the case you just suggested, because, as you correctly
pointed out, by regulation there is some documentation that is
not allowed to proceed from command to command.
We could figure out how to compartmentalize information. We
do it in the intelligence world all the time. The briefer comes
into the room with the material that's in the pouch, that only
certain people get to see that information. It would be very
possible to have information that might be vital to connecting
the dots that is currently not passed, passed in a way that's
compartmented so that a select group of people had access to
the information.
I believe that that's inherent in achieving the correct
balance, Secretary West and I would not want anything that was
said here to imply in any way that the balance between these
issues isn't--it's very, very important. You have addressed it
correctly. This is a challenge.
One of the hallmarks of the U.S. military is we grow and
develop people. I've had dozens of these interviews with
people: Okay, you're getting a new job, this is turning over a
new leaf, this is the time to go get it. We've seen people turn
their lives around. This is one of the great things about our
institution.
So clearly these are issues that the policymakers have to
come to grips with. Our task was put the spotlight on policies,
weaknesses, gaps, and that's what we have tried to do. I do
believe that there may be places where barriers should be
retained in some way.
Chairman Levin. Maybe for some purpose.
Admiral Clark. For some purpose.
Chairman Levin. Maybe in a promotion.
Admiral Clark. Exactly.
Chairman Levin. It's different from whether it's a
strategic issue.
Admiral Clark. Exactly. But what I'm suggesting is that
people who are responsible for these policy decisions know what
the vital dots look like, know where they come from. As the
report says and I said in my earlier testimony, the time is
passed for us to be having these turf wars on who owns the
information.
Chairman Levin. I think we couldn't agree with you more,
and this is a major challenge for all of us in the Senate and
the House and our committees and, even more importantly
probably, for the executive branch.
Senator Lieberman, do you want to add anything?
Senator Lieberman. No, thanks.
Chairman Levin. We thank you for all the work you're doing,
not just here but on the Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committtee. That committee is doing critically
important work.
We're now going to move to a closed session of the
committee. We'll meet in room 222 in Russell, our committee
room. In accordance with restrictions placed on access to the
restricted annex, attendance will be limited to Senators and
committee professional staff.
We again thank our witnesses, not just for their work in
this regard, but for their lifelong work on behalf of our
Nation.
The committee will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
indicators for violence
1. Senator Akaka. Mr. West, research into the various predictors
and causes of violence span many disciplines and offer varying
perspectives regarding why some people resort to violence. These range
from biological, to religious, social, and political factors. The four
recommendations contained in 2.1 ``Protecting the Force: Lessons from
Fort Hood, Report of the Department of Defense (DOD) Independent
Review, January 2010'' (Independent Review) coalesce around the
identification of contributing factors of violent actions and the
reporting of behavioral indicators of violent actors. How must the DOD
adequately update and strengthen programs, policies, processes, and
procedures that address the identification of indicators for violence
without violating the civil liberties that are enjoyed by the military
members of the Armed Forces as well as DOD civilians?
Mr. West. The Department should thoughtfully consider a wide range
of options and exercise due caution to avoid infringing on civil
liberties. There are risk-assessment tools available for the
Department's consideration that would enhance DOD's ability to deal
with potential internal threats without compromising fundamental civil
liberties. In particular, DOD should draw on the expertise of the law
enforcement community, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), which has developed methodologies to help understand the
motivations and behaviors of violent offenders. My understanding is
that the FBI has already been assisting DOD in understanding these
issues.
We recommend that DOD continue to coordinate with the FBI
Behavioral Science Unit, under their comprehensive analysis of military
offenders project to identify behavioral indicators that are specific
to DOD personnel that would be used to help protect against internal
threats.
We also recommend that the Department develop tools and programs
that would educate DOD personnel about indicators of possible violent
behavior and help them determine the risk that such behavior might
occur.
religious accommodations
2. Senator Akaka. Mr. West, recommendation 2.7 of the Independent
Review states that the DOD should promptly establish standards and
reporting procedures that clarify guidelines for religious
accommodations. How must the DOD adequately clarify policy regarding
religious accommodations to help commanders distinguish appropriate
religious practices from those that might indicate a potential for
violence or self-radicalization while balancing the civil liberties
that are enjoyed by the military members of the Armed Forces as well as
DOD civilians?
Mr. West. The Department should issue clear guidance to provide a
common source for commanders, supervisors, and chaplains to distinguish
appropriate religious practices. The Department should exercise due
caution to avoid infringing on civil liberties. Clear standards would
ensure consistent mechanisms across the military departments, assisting
commanders and supervisors in assessing behavior and initiating action,
if appropriate.
health care providers
3. Senator Akaka. Admiral Clark, healthcare providers experience
traumatic stress and provider burnout and are stigmatized when seeking
treatment for stress and burnout. Other career fields, such as the
Chaplaincy and their support personnel, have programs that assess
stress and burnout. Recommendation 5.3 of the Independent Review states
that the DOD should review its requirement to de-stigmatize healthcare
providers who seek treatment. What steps should the DOD undertake to
ensure the resiliency and recovery of healthcare providers so that they
can continue to provide members of the Armed Forces and their families
with the best healthcare?
Admiral Clark. In order to ensure that healthcare providers can
continue to provide outstanding care for warriors and their families as
well as receive outstanding care themselves, DOD can take several steps
to make certain that a good balance is being struck between health care
for the warrior and health care for the provider. DOD's current
deployment model, for example, should be reviewed to assess whether it
provides sufficient continuity of care for redeploying servicemembers
while not delaying recovery for health care providers who have been
assigned to deploying combat units. DOD has a number of policies in
place designed to guarantee that U.S. military forces receive top
quality care and we are looking for further ways to integrate these
policies and properly resource them to positively affect the
Department's ability to continue delivering the best care available to
all military members and their families.
officership
4. Senator Akaka. Admiral Clark, the joint opening statement refers
to the fact that several individuals failed to apply professional
standards of officership regarding the alleged perpetrator and that you
recommended the Secretary of Defense forward these issues of
accountability to the Secretary of the Army. How should the DOD address
what the Independent Review characterizes as the failure to apply
professional standards of officership and to make the reflection of an
individual's total performance an accepted and standard practice
throughout the Services?
Admiral Clark. The conduct of Major Hasan's colleagues and former
supervisors remains under review, and it would be inappropriate to
comment at this time. Consistent with the recommendations of the
Independent Review Panel, the Secretary of Defense referred issues of
individual accountability to the Secretary of the Army for review and
action as appropriate. Secretary McHugh assigned senior military
leaders to investigate further, to assess accountability, and, as
appropriate, to take final action. This process remains ongoing.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Kay R. Hagan
actions not taken by army officers
5. Senator Hagan. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, several officers
failed to comply with existing Army policies when taking actions
regarding the perpetrator, Major Hassan. There were also significant
discrepancies between Major Hassan's performance in official records
and his actual performance during training, residency, and fellowship.
It seems that medical officers failed to include his overall
performance as an officer, and instead, focused on his academic
performance.
We have to ensure that performance appraisals accurately provide a
holistic overview of professional, ethical, and personal career
development of all personnel. Incomplete performance appraisals prevent
us from recognizing vital warning signs in dealing with internal
threats. They also prevent leaders from being alert to psychological
and emotional risk factors of servicemembers and civilians. How should
Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of the Army McHugh ensure
accountability for those failures by some medical officers that did not
apply appropriate judgment?
Mr. West and Admiral Clark. Consistent with the recommendations of
the Independent Review Panel, the Secretary of Defense referred issues
of individual accountability to the Secretary of the Army for review
and action as appropriate. Secretary McHugh assigned senior military
leaders to investigate further, to assess accountability, and, as
appropriate, to take final action. This process remains ongoing.
6. Senator Hagan. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, why did Major
Hassan's colleagues and former supervisors wait until after the Fort
Hood incident to speak about the content of his extremist religious
views?
Mr. West and Admiral Clark. The conduct of Major Hasan's colleagues
and former supervisors remains under review, and it would be
inappropriate to comment at this time. Consistent with the
recommendations of the Independent Review Panel, the Secretary of
Defense referred issues of individual accountability to the Secretary
of the Army for review and action as appropriate. Secretary McHugh
assigned senior military leaders to investigate further, to assess
accountability, and, as appropriate, to take final action. This process
remains ongoing.
7. Senator Hagan. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, what did the Army's
higher authorities do when complaints were sent up the chain?
Mr. West and Admiral Clark. The conduct of Major Hasan's colleagues
and former supervisors remains under review, and it would be
inappropriate to comment at this time. Consistent with the
recommendations of the Independent Review Panel, the Secretary of
Defense referred issues of individual accountability to the Secretary
of the Army for review and action as appropriate. Secretary McHugh
assigned senior military leaders to investigate further, to assess
accountability, and, as appropriate, to take final action. This process
remains ongoing.
interagency information sharing
8. Senator Hagan. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, I agree that in order
to protect the force, our civilian leaders and commanders in the field
need immediate access to sensitive information regarding
servicemembers' personal contacts, connections, or relationships with
organizations promoting radicalization and violence. I encourage the
Army and the DOD at-large to adopt the recommendation of the
Independent Review to increase service representation on Joint
Terrorism Task Forces and coordination with the FBI. What suggestions
and recommendations can you offer to facilitate enhanced cooperation
and information sharing between executive department agencies like the
FBI, National Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, and the Army Secretariat?
Mr. West and Admiral Clark. Liaison and information sharing
agreements already exist among the executive department agencies you
mention, but they can be strengthened. Many of these liaison and
information sharing agreements currently focus on antiterrorism
cooperation, potentially precluding the agencies from sharing sensitive
information pertaining to a servicemember's propensity to commit
violent acts. DOD should review the scope of these agreements to
determine where they can appropriately be expanded and strengthened to
enhance a commander's ability to assess his or her personnel.
We were pleased to learn that Secretary Gates approved our
recommendation to establish a single organization within DOD to manage
its participation in the Joint Terrorism Task Forces. We also are
pleased the Secretary approved our recommendation to revise
significantly DOD's Memorandum of Understanding with the FBI.
9. Senator Hagan. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, what challenges do
you foresee?
Mr. West and Admiral Clark. First, revising interagency agreements
is often a time-consuming process, particularly in the case of
agreements that involve multiple interagency partners. Second,
comprehensively accounting for all existing agreements will likely also
be a time-consuming process. For example, in some cases, each Service
has a separate agreement with a particular Federal agency on
information sharing. Determining where these agreements differ, what
the gaps are between them, and whether it is necessary or desirable to
bring them under a single umbrella will be time consuming.
ensuring that force protection policies counter internal threats
10. Senator Hagan. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, one of the most
significant takeaways I got out of the Independent Review was that DOD
force protection policies are not optimized for countering internal
threats, and reflect a lack of awareness of the factors and indicators
we have to be focused on in addressing internal threats.
I agree that we need to provide commanders with comprehensive
guidance and a full range of indicators designed to effectively
identify and address internal threats within the U.S. military
establishment. Do you anticipate challenges in the military departments
developing such guidance and indicators?
Mr. West and Admiral Clark. We do not doubt that the military
departments are committed to working to develop such guidance and
indicators. That said, this is a complex undertaking, and we anticipate
that it will be difficult to develop comprehensive guidance and a full
range of indicators to address internal threats. The Department should
thoughtfully consider a wide range of options and exercise due caution
to avoid infringing on civil liberties. There are a number of
recommendations that specifically address internal threats, including
2.1 (developing a risk assessment tool for commanders, supervisors, and
professional support service providers to determine whether and when
DOD personnel present risks for various types of violent behavior),
2.15 (review prohibited activities and recommend necessary policy
changes), and 3.2 (commission a multidisciplinary group to examine and
evaluate predictive indicators relating to pending violence and provide
commanders with a multidisciplinary capability). It is our
understanding that the Fort Hood Follow-On Review is addressing these
recommendations to improve the Department's capacity to protect against
internal threats.
11. Senator Hagan. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, how will those
indicators be coordinated with combatant commanders?
Mr. West and Admiral Clark. Our understanding is that the Follow-On
Review program includes representatives from all the military
departments and the Joint Staff, which coordinates input from the
combatant commands. As such, the combatant commands have a voice in
determining how potential indicators will be coordinated with them. One
of our recommendations was that the Department needs to develop
standardized guidance regarding how military criminal investigative
organizations and counter-intelligence organizations will inform the
operational chain of command, e.g. the combatant commander. We
understand the final report for the Follow-On Review will address this
specific issue.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
potential threats
12. Senator Burris. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, are there other
potential internal threats that our current system has failed to
identify?
Mr. West and Admiral Clark. We are not aware of other potential
internal threats that the current system has failed to identify.
However, our findings clearly show that DOD and Service programs that
provide guidance concerning observation of personal behavior do not
focus on internal threats. As such, one of our recommendations is to
develop a list of behaviors that may be indicative of an insider threat
and to integrate the disparate programs designed to defend against
these threats.
13. Senator Burris. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, how can we identify
potential sympathies which are counter to our national interests?
Mr. West and Admiral Clark. In the Independent Review report, we
recommended DOD promptly establish standards and reporting procedures
that clarify guidelines for religious accommodation. If requests for
religious accommodation that compete with mission requirements were
recorded and shared among commanders, supervisors, and chaplains, it
would help establish a baseline from which to identify deviations
within the Services and DOD.
failures to act
14. Senator Burris. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, in your
investigation, were there other examples of a failure to act on
performance reports and passing on the problem?
Mr. West and Admiral Clark. The conduct of Major Hasan's colleagues
and former supervisors remains under review, and it would be
inappropriate to comment at this time. Consistent with the
recommendations of the Independent Review Panel, the Secretary of
Defense referred issues of individual accountability to the Secretary
of the Army for review and action as appropriate. Secretary McHugh
assigned senior military leaders to investigate further, to assess
accountability, and, as appropriate, to take final action. This process
remains ongoing.
______
Question Submitted by Senator David Vitter
recommendations
15. Senator Vitter. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, in Chapter 2 of the
Independent Review, when reviewing barriers and constraints on taking
action, you state that the existing authority to address potentially
violent behaviors ``is likely insufficient if an employee represents an
imminent threat.'' However, your recommendations do not state specific
changes to regulations that would enable the DOD and the Services to
quickly adapt and address potential threats. Certainly identifying
threats is important and critical to saving lives and preventing
terrorist acts, but we must also prevent those threats after
identifying them and cannot let bureaucratic polices stop us from
averting terrorism. What specific policy changes at the company and
battalion command level would you recommend to shorten commanders'
response time in dealing with an immediate threat?
Mr. West and Admiral Clark. In Chapter 4 of the Independent Review
report, we identified several ways that the Department can better
prepare its military communities to respond to emergencies, including
developing a case study based on the Fort Hood incident to be used in
installation commander development and on-scene commander response
programs. But we also cannot discount the importance of responding to a
potential threat immediately, before it becomes a violent action.
Recommendation 2.1 specifically addresses updating policies and
programs that would enable the DOD and Services to assess potentially
violent behaviors. This includes developing a risk assessment tool for
commanders, supervisors, and professional support service providers to
determine whether and when DOD personnel present risks for various
types of violent behavior. Recommendation 2.15 deals with reviewing
prohibited activities and recommending necessary policy changes. For
example, DOD can update DOD Instruction 1325.06, Handling Dissident and
Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces, by providing
commanders and supervisors the guidance and authority to act on
potential threats to good order and discipline. We defer to the
Department on other policy changes it might identify and implement to
improve commanders' response times in dealing with an immediate threat.
[Annex: The Report of the DOD Independent Review
``Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood'' follows:]
[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the committee adjourned.]