[Senate Hearing 111-1105]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-1105
CLOSING THE GAPS IN AIR CARGO SECURITY
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 16, 2010
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JON TESTER, Montana LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
CHRISTOPHER A. COIONS, Delaware
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Jason M. Yanussi, Professional Staff Member
Elyse F. Greenwald, Professional Staff Member
Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Robert L. Strayer, Minority Director for Homeland Security Affairs
Luke P. Bellocchi, Minority Counsel
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
Patricia R. Hogan, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee
Laura W. Kilbride, Hearing Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Lieberman............................................ 1
Senator Collins.............................................. 3
Senator Levin................................................ 13
Senator Brown................................................ 16
Senator Burris............................................... 18
Senator Carper............................................... 21
Senator Ensign............................................... 23
Prepared statements:
Senator Lieberman............................................ 31
Senator Collins.............................................. 33
WITNESSES
Tuesday, November 16, 2010
Hon. John S. Pistole, Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security........... 5
Hon. Alan D. Bersin, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security............... 7
Alphabetical Order of Witnesses
Bersin, Hon. Alan D.:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Joint prepared statement with Mr. Pistole.................... 36
Pistole, Hon. John S.:
Testimony.................................................... 5
Joint prepared statement with Mr. Bersin..................... 36
APPENDIX
Responses to post-hearing questions submitted for the Record from
Mr. Pistole and Mr. Bersin..................................... 48
CLOSING THE GAPS IN AIR CARGO SECURITY
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TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:20 p.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Levin, Carper, Burris,
Collins, Brown, and Ensign.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. Good afternoon. The hearing will come
to order. Our subject today is air cargo security.
Beginning with the attacks against America on September 11,
2001, our terrorist enemies have consistently sought to use
airplanes as weapons of mass destruction, and more generally,
they have seen in our aviation system a strategic choke point
of international transit and commerce that could be brought to
a halt, or at least stopped, through terrorist attacks. We have
seen shoe bombers, liquid bombers, and underwear bombers. Again
and again, terrorists have sought different ways to blow up an
airplane.
In the most recent attempt, of course, terrorists hid bombs
inside the toner cartridges of printers and sent them to the
United States as air cargo. This plot, as the others before it,
was thwarted, in this case largely because of extraordinary
intelligence, and here we give thanks and credit to our friends
and allies in Saudi Arabia. But there was in this an element of
good fortune or luck, and luck, of course, is not a strategy to
defend our Nation from a threat of terrorists.
As this most recent plot demonstrates, good intelligence
and strong foreign partnerships are critically important. But I
think the point that remains with us, and it is that phrase
that echoes from the 9/11 Commission Report, the Kean-Hamilton
Report, in which they said September 11, 2001, occurred because
of a failure of imagination, our failure to imagine that people
could possibly try to do what the terrorists did to us on
September 11, 2001. Every time one of these events happens, it
compels us to figure out how we can better anticipate
terrorists' next move, not just react to the last one.
Former Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
Administrator and Deputy Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) Admiral James Loy recently said in an
op-ed in the Washington Post that after the September 11, 2001
hijackings, we hardened cockpit doors. Then the terrorists
tried a shoe bomb, and now we remove our shoes for inspection
at airports. Then the terrorists tried liquid explosives hidden
in sports drinks, targeting seven planes flying over the
Atlantic Ocean, and we cracked down on liquids that could be
brought on board. Then the underwear bomber came close to
bringing down a plane over Detroit, and now we have gone to
full body imaging. And, of course, I support every one of those
steps we have taken. Now terrorists are going after a weak spot
in cargo inspections, and we will respond to that, as well we
should, but they, our enemies, will keep looking for new
vulnerabilities, and we have to continue to try to think as
they would and raise our defenses before they strike.
We were lucky, as I have said, that none of these attempts
succeeded, but they will continue to probe our weaknesses,
attempting to detect our flaws and then defending against them,
and we have to make sure that not only does our luck not run
out, but that we are prepared to stop whatever they try.
Here are some of the questions that I would like to ask our
witnesses today. Clearly, both the gathering of intelligence
and acting on it is crucial, and I want to ask how we can
improve our intelligence beyond even where it is now.
Intelligence is always important in a war, never more important
than in the particular war with Islamist extremist terrorists
that we are fighting today for all the reasons that I have just
talked about.
Threats of terrorism come from within the United States or
from abroad. Our ability to deter, detect, or intercept that
foreign threat here is limited by our own sovereignty. We have
to depend on our foreign partners to implement strong security
programs, and I want to ask both of you what we are doing to
strengthen those relationships and implement international
security programs. Obviously, we have limited direct control
over incoming passenger flights and cargo flights.
While our government has achieved 100 percent screening of
air cargo on domestic passenger flights, which is a significant
accomplishment consistent with the 9/11 legislation we adopted,
only about 60 percent of cargo on passenger flights coming into
the United States from abroad is screened, and there is a kind
of patchwork system of cargo shipments on all-cargo aircraft.
So naturally, I want to ask how we can improve that and
convince our foreign countries to expand and accelerate their
screening of cargo coming either on passenger flights or all-
cargo flights to the United States.
Right now, we require air carriers coming from Europe,
Asia, Africa, and South America to provide cargo manifest
information after the plane has taken off, 4 hours before it is
due to arrive. Can we move that time line up? Is there
additional or different information that may be helpful in
identifying high-risk cargo?
And finally, how are we preparing to identify the next gap
terrorists will likely try to exploit? Do we have an
institutional way, as difficult and unprecedented as this enemy
is in threatening our homeland security, to try to think ahead
of them?
Our witnesses today are, of course, ideally positioned by
the offices they hold now and by their experience to help us
answer these questions--TSA Administrator John Pistole and
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Commissioner Alan Bersin. I
thank both of you for being here and look forward to your
testimony.
Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
your testimony, particularly when you were quoting Admiral Loy,
shows us that the terrorists remain unflagging in their
determination to exploit vulnerabilities in the security
systems developed since September 11, 2001.
In the past 12 months, the United States has narrowly
avoided two terrorist plots directed against aviation. The
first was averted by sheer luck and the quick action of the
passengers and crew in the skies above Detroit on Christmas
Day. The second, which we just discussed, was disrupted due to
intelligence shared by our allies and the hard work of Federal
law enforcement, intelligence, and homeland security officials
and several international partners, and I want to commend the
two leaders who are before us today, who I know worked around
the clock once they were informed of this threat.
In these two failed attacks, we see the fanaticism and
patience of our enemies. Though thwarted, these plots should
prompt us to reexamine whether our priorities are correct and
our resources properly deployed.
Today, the Committee examines the most recent attempted
attack. We all are aware that last month, terrorists exploited
weaknesses in the air cargo security system and succeeded in
putting explosives inside printer cartridges bound for this
country. The bombs ultimately found their way into the cargo
bays of airplanes, including at least one passenger plane. If
detonated, the results could have been catastrophic.
This is the nature of the terrorist threat that we face. It
is dynamic. It is ever changing. The Chairman reminds us of the
caution of the 9/11 Commission that we cannot suffer again from
a failure of imagination. As we strengthen our security
systems, the terrorists counter with a different kind of threat
aimed at a different target using different means.
The potential to plant an explosive somewhere in the
millions of pieces of air cargo shipped around the world daily
is clearly a vulnerability. The Department of Homeland Security
must use this near miss to redouble its work with other
countries, airline carriers, and shippers to tighten the
security network. We must move quickly to shore up our defenses
without interfering with the legitimate flow of commerce, and,
of course, that is always the challenge that we face. Al-Qaeda
is, after all, seeking to destroy our economy and way of life,
as well as to kill our people. We must not allow either goal to
be accomplished. DHS should analyze how government can best
focus its limited screening resources on the highest risk
cargo.
The successes in the risk-based screening of maritime cargo
could provide a road map for risk-based screening of air cargo.
Currently, maritime cargo manifest information must be
submitted to DHS at least 24 hours before a cargo container
headed to the United States is even loaded on a ship overseas.
Using this information and other intelligence, the DHS targets
high-risk cargo for inspection prior to the ship's departure to
this country.
In sharp contrast, air cargo manifest information is
required to be submitted only 4 hours before the cargo arrives
in the United States. That is a major difference, and it means
that the information is often transmitted to DHS while the
aircraft is in the air, providing no opportunity to conduct
further inspections of flagged cargo before departure. In some
ways, that reminds me of the problem with Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab, where he was flagged and was going to be
stopped, but only after he arrived in the United States. It
seems to me we have a similar problem in the case of our air
cargo.
Indeed, Customs and Border Protection has acknowledged that
based on the shipping information about the two packages from
Yemen, the agency would have flagged them as high risk upon
arrival in the United States. But our whole concept is to push
out our borders so that screening, that flagging of dangerous
cargo occurs not when the cargo arrives in our country, but
before it is even put on board a vessel or an aircraft bound
for this country.
Now, I recognize that the tempo of the air cargo supply
chain is different from maritime cargo, but regardless of the
mode, we have an obligation to examine vulnerabilities in our
supply chains and to manage risk to those systems.
There are also opportunities to make better use of the
private sector in securing air cargo overseas where screening
efforts are now more limited. Instead of attempting to screen
almost all cargo at the airport, it could be screened at a
warehouse where the package is sealed, long before it arrives
at an airport, and kept secure until it is delivered to the air
carrier. That is just one idea that would avoid the potential
delays of trying to do everything immediately prior to loading
packages on aircraft.
I mentioned that DHS must constantly reevaluate the
allocation of its security resources and priorities. In that
vein, I still remain concerned about the intrusiveness and
effectiveness of the Advanced Imaging Technology and the
potential negative health effects. As Mr. Pistole knows, this
is an issue that I have mentioned to him many times as well as
to Secretary Napolitano in multiple letters to the
Administration.
I believe the Department should independently evaluate the
health effects of that technology and should consider software
that is in use at Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam that respects
travelers' privacy by automatically identifying objects that
may be threats, but by using featureless images of travelers.
And to date, the Department's responses to my inquiries have
been inadequate. Now, I know that Mr. Pistole was on his way to
view this technology when the plot from Yemen was uncovered,
and I want to acknowledge that.
Obviously, our government's first priority is to protect
our people against terrorism, and the public will accept a
certain level of intrusion and inconvenience. But DHS should be
using technology and techniques that are as safe and as
effective as possible that minimize privacy concerns whenever
possible.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Collins.
Administrator Pistole, it is an honor to have you back with
us, and we welcome your statement now.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE,\1\ ADMINISTRATOR,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member
Collins, Senator Levin, and Senator Brown. It is good to be
here today along with Commissioner Alan Bersin of Customs and
Border Protection to address the Committee on the role of TSA
and CBP in the area of air cargo security. I appreciate the
Committee's leadership and ongoing efforts to ensure the
security of air cargo and passenger aviation for the American
people.
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\1\ The joint prepared statement of Mr. Pistole and Mr. Bersin
appears in the Appendix on page 36.
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Three weeks ago, as we have noted, we, and I use the
collective ``we'' in the broadest sense--Senator Collins
mentioned the intelligence, law enforcement, aviation security,
and private sector communities along with homeland security
communities--disrupted this attack when the individuals we
believe to be al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
concealed and shipped explosive devices hidden in toner
cartridges.
The two packages were shipped from Yemen destined for the
United States, and the episode for us began on the night of
October 28, Thursday night, around 10:30 when I received a call
from John Brennan, the White House Coordinator for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism, regarding specific credible
intelligence that we know is so rare in this business as to
exact packages that should be identified and assessed. So, of
course, we worked through the night and over the next few days,
staying in close contact with our colleagues throughout the
U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities and our
international counterparts and, of course, the private sector,
including cargo shippers such as FedEx and UPS.
As a first step, I immediately grounded all air cargo
packages coming from Yemen. After the initial response, we took
additional steps in conjunction with CBP. For example, we--CBP,
TSA, and our private sector partners--quickly identified and
located all other U.S.-bound packages from Yemen that were in
transit, and CBP, working with the Joint Terrorism Task Forces
(JTTFs) located and identified those packages and ensured they
were not a risk, such as the other two toner packages. And then
with the community, we refined the targeting tools we used to
provide additional focus on current threats.
I sent out a team of TSA security inspectors to Sana'a to
work with the Yemeni authorities to provide cargo screening
guidance, expertise, and actual explosive trace detection
equipment to the Yemeni government. I leveraged a previously
planned speech that I had to the Aviation Security World
Conference in Frankfurt, Germany, from where I was supposed to
go from Amsterdam, but I took that part out, and I gave that
speech and met with counterparts from Europe and elsewhere
around the world. While there, I met with the International Air
Transport Association (IATA) Director General, Giovanni
Bisignani, a world recognized expert in the area, along with
the head of aviation security for the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO).
From there, I went to Yemen 5 days after we became aware of
the plot to meet with the TSA team, the U.S. country team,
including Ambassador Gerald Feierstein, and Yemeni authorities,
including the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Transport,
and other Yemeni government officials.
Several days later, on November 2, Secretary Napolitano
spoke with leaders of the international shipping industry,
including UPS, DHL, FedEx, and TNT, as well as IATA and
Director General Bisignani about enhancing air cargo security
without unduly disrupting the critical air cargo supply chain.
And then on November 8, we announced that air cargo from
Yemen and Somalia would be banned from flights to the United
States for the immediate future. We also indicated that no
high-risk cargo would be allowed on passenger aircraft inbound
to the United States, and, of course, toner and ink cartridges
weighing 16 ounces or more, around 500 milligrams, would be
prohibited on domestic passenger flights and international
passenger flights inbound to the United States. Also, all high-
risk cargo would receive additional and enhanced screening,
including inbound international mail packages--we worked with
the Postmaster General on some of the issues to implement
that--which must be screened individually and certified to have
come from an established postal shipper. So these are just some
of the steps we have taken, and those steps will continue.
I would note that since August 2010, we have required, as
was noted, 100 percent screening of all air cargo transported
on domestic air carriers departing from U.S. airports. We have
worked, as Senator Collins outlined, in large part through the
Certified Cargo Screening Program, where we have over 1,100
private companies here in the United States to do screening
away from the airport. Actually, just over 51 percent now of
all air cargo flying out of the United States or leaving
domestically is done through these private screening facilities
that we certify, we inspect, and ensure that they are----
Chairman Lieberman. Excuse me for interrupting. Is that for
passenger planes and cargo planes?
Mr. Pistole. It is right now for passenger planes, and we
are looking at the possibilities with cargo, recognizing that
FedEx and UPS, of course, the two large ones here, have their
own screening regimen and do a very good job independent of
what we would do, which is obviously in their best interest,
also.
This very practical security program keeps commerce moving
without creating screening bottlenecks at the airports, and we
are looking at that as a worldwide model for implementation. It
is just an issue of capacity development.
There are a number of different issues that we are
addressing, which I can get into in more detail in response to
questions, perhaps. I would just note that since June 2009, CBP
and TSA have met extensively on leveraging CBP's Automated
Targeting System (ATS) to better target high-risk cargo on
international inbound passenger flights, and these efforts
complement our continued diplomatic work with our international
counterparts to improve screening on these flights.
Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today. I
look forward to working with the Committee as we pursue these
collective efforts. I would be glad to take your questions
afterward.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Administrator Pistole.
Commissioner Bersin, thanks for being here, and we welcome
your testimony now.
TESTIMONY OF HON. ALAN D. BERSIN,\1\ COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS
AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Bersin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Collins, Senators Levin, and Brown. I join Administrator
Pistole in acknowledging and appreciating this Committee's
leadership and support in exploring the gaps and the deficits
that we have so that we can more effectively confront
terrorism.
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\1\ The joint prepared statement of Mr. Pistole and Mr. Bersin
appears in the Appendix on page 36.
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I would like to address in this statement three dimensions
of CBP's work. First is the air cargo processing that we
currently engage in. The second is, building on Administrator
Pistole's testimony, CBP's response to the October 29, 2010,
event. And then last, the partnership with TSA and the way
ahead and the steps that we are contemplating taking together.
First, with regard to air cargo, it arrives in this country
in two ways, on commercial passenger flights in the hold, in
the belly of our cargo jets, or within specifically designated
cargo-only aircraft. In fiscal year 2010, CBP processed nearly
334,000 such flights and inspected and screened over 57 million
regular and express air waybill records. This is a massive part
of our international trade policy and economy.
Currently, as pointed out by Senator Collins, our systems
and processes are designed to identify high-risk cargo for
inspection after their arrival in the United States. They are
not designed to identify dangerous cargo prior to takeoff, as
is our regime in the maritime context.
Under the Trade Act of 2002, carriers currently must
provide cargo manifest data 4 hours prior to arrival of the
aircraft or at wheels up for flights arriving from embarkation
points less than 4 hours from the continental United States.
Upon receipt of the advance manifest data, CBP processes the
information through its Automated Targeting System. The system,
as you know, identifies potential threats related to terrorism,
narcotics, hazardous materials, and other areas of concern to
the agency and to the Nation.
ATS is the primary platform used by the Department of
Homeland Security to match travelers and goods against
screening information and specific intelligence that may be
received. It is used by our air cargo advance targeting units
at local airports to conduct risk assessments. It is also used
by our National Targeting Center-Cargo located in Virginia,
which conducts high-level sweeps for shipments of concern based
on intelligence and specific targeting rules that are written
to reflect present and prospective threats that we perceive
through intelligence or otherwise. These rules identify risk
factors that are present in the manifest data that we receive
from the carriers. Each of these risk factors receives a
quantitative value, or a score, and if the shipment exceeds a
predetermined score or threshold for national security concern,
we place the shipment on hold. We conduct an examination upon
arrival.
Once the cargo arrives in the United States, CBP conducts
examinations of all such identified high-risk air cargo or
other cargo identified as high-risk by the local advance
targeting units. These examinations must include a non-
intrusive inspection if equipment is available, or a physical
inspection of the shipment, as well as a mandatory radiation
scan.
We also partner at CBP with the trade community to enhance
supply chain security through the Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program. Under C-TPAT, importers and
shippers adopt minimum security standards, which they must
adhere to throughout their security chain. In exchange, CBP
treats these shipments as lower risk and provides fewer
inspections.
As Administrator Pistole indicated, when we became aware of
the threat on October 29, we responded immediately by
identifying all air cargo shipments from Yemen destined for the
United States, aside from the two that were the subject of the
inquiries in the United Arab Emirates and in the United
Kingdom. In effect, what we asked right away was, what more
could be coming toward us? Who could have been sending it to
us? And how quickly can we mitigate or neutralize that risk? We
ascertained the location of each shipment, and we held them for
inspection. We then completed inspections using X-ray systems,
explosive detection canines, and explosive trace detection
equipment.
As we can go into further in questions and answers, there
were 38 shipments in total, and we discovered and identified
those shipments within hours of receiving the threat
information. Within days, we had located all of those 38
shipments among the millions of packages that arrived in the
country, and within a week, we had actually satisfied ourselves
and cleared those cargoes as a result of techniques of scanning
that were applied to them.
So where do we go in the days and the months ahead with the
help and guidance of experts, including those on this
Committee? We have, ever since the December 25, 2009, incident
involving Abdulmutallab, seen a partnership between CBP and TSA
that has produced valuable results for our Nation and for the
homeland security. We need to do the same now with regard to
air cargo. What we believe is that this cooperation is the best
source of the progress we can make quickly.
Currently, CBP is providing assistance to TSA to fulfill
the mandates set forth in the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on
passenger aircraft. We are also collaborating to explore the
potential of utilizing CBP's Automated Targeting System as a
risk targeting tool in the air cargo context that can be shared
between CBP and TSA. This will allow us to leverage data and
information already collected to meet TSA's mission to secure
international inbound air cargo.
We also acknowledge the importance of partnering with the
private sector so that they can lend us considerable assistance
in securing the supply chain. We also recognize that we must
receive information in advance of what we are currently
receiving, and we are working with TSA in determining the
parameters and, importantly, consulting with our private sector
partners to get their views as to how they can most
expeditiously provide that information. It is clear that our
receipt of manifest data 4 hours prior to arrival does little
to help prevent dangerous cargo from being loaded aboard.
Let me abbreviate the statement so we can get on to the
dialogue of questions and answers. We believe that we have the
foundation in place to implement a more effective system, and
we believe that working with TSA and with other agencies in the
U.S. Government, we can strengthen this system and do it
relatively quickly. But we should do it cautiously and
deliberately, and I look forward to working, as I am sure
Secretary Napolitano and Administrator Pistole do, with this
Committee and its staff in reaching a satisfactory outcome and
building the next level of security into our air cargo system.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Commissioner.
We will go to the questioning now. We will have 7-minute
rounds for each of the Senators.
Administrator Pistole, we are focused here on air cargo
security, but obviously more broadly on the question of
aviation security, and I want to ask you a question related to
TSA that is very much in the news, which is the so-called pat-
down procedures that follow and are associated with the use of
the whole body imaging scanners, which I recall because we held
hearings on this subject after the Christmas Day bombing
attempt and most of us were calling for you to go to the whole
body scanners, either the Amsterdam variety or what you have
done.
I wanted to give you an opportunity before the Committee to
explain the pat-down procedures that have troubled people and
why you think that they are justified.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There is an ever-
evolving nature of the terrorist plot that has been well
described here this afternoon. The challenge for TSA and the
whole U.S. Government and our allies around the world is to
develop the best techniques and tactics enabled by the best
technology to detect those plots. As we have heard the various
plots outlined here this afternoon, it is clear that we have to
be one step ahead of the terrorists, and obviously, we are not
always in that situation, as evidenced by the last three plots
that could have been successful.
So it really comes down to a balance of partnership on the
one hand, working with the traveling public, and the security
and safety issues on the other hand, and what is a proper mix.
So what we try to do is be sensitive to people's concerns about
privacy, while ensuring that everybody on every flight has been
properly screened. We recognize--I particularly recognize--that
reasonable people can disagree as to what that proper balance
or blend is between privacy and security and safety.
That being the case, I think everybody who gets on a flight
wants to ensure and be assured that everybody else around them
has been properly screened, and by the way, everybody else on
that flight wants to make sure that I have been properly
screened or you have been properly screened. So how do we reach
that balance? That is the challenge that we go through.
I believe the advanced imaging technology is the best
technology we have today to detect the non-metallic device that
is well designed, well concealed, such as we saw on Christmas
Day. What I am concerned about, and I know many share this
concern, is an individual who opts out of the advanced imaging
technology. Let us say Abdulmutallab had done that, if that had
been the case in Schiphol, if he had opted out thinking, well,
I am not going to receive a thorough pat-down so I can get on
that flight. If that had been successful on Christmas Day, I
think we might be having a different dialogue here this
afternoon and in the public.
What I want to assure and reassure the public is that we
are concerned about your safety, your security, and your
privacy. Let us work together in partnership to ensure that we
can have the best way forward.
Chairman Lieberman. Let me just take this a moment or two
more. Just make clear, if you will, to the Committee and public
who may be listening or watching, how does someone get
subjected to a pat-down procedure?
Mr. Pistole. There is a very small number or percentage
that would actually have the pat-down, and it would really
occur almost exclusively in situations where somebody has opted
out of the advanced imaging technology or they have alerted on
that because there is something still in their pockets, or they
may be trying to carry some contraband on the plane.
Chairman Lieberman. In other words, either they have chosen
not to go through the scanner or they have gone through and
there is some alert?
Mr. Pistole. There is an alert, or through the walk-through
metal detector there is an alert, and so there is some basis
for doing it. And even with that, it is a very small percentage
of all the passengers. So very few people, even though the
public out there may not know because it is a new technique.
The other thing is I have been in Europe several times in
the last few months and have observed the pat-downs being done
in many airports, and it is very similar. Our pat-down approach
is very similar to what is being utilized in Europe, and as we
know, it is even much more thorough in other parts of the
world.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. And, of course, you have a same-
gender TSA employee doing the pat-down. This is a difficult
balance because obviously this has to be a more intimate and
intrusive investigation because of the choice that has been
made earlier or what the machine has shown, but I presume they
are instructed in a way that will determine whether somebody is
potentially dangerous, but also in doing so try to do minimal
harm to their privacy.
Mr. Pistole. Correct. They go through training, and the
clearest outcome of that training is to be professional and to
give clear guidance and a lot of clarity as to what they are
going to do in terms of the actual pat-down and to make sure
that the passenger understands that and responds to that. There
has been a lot of publicity out there about a certain
individual who recently tried to travel but did not want to
have that pat-down. I think if people get away from just the
passenger, they would hear that what the security officer was
saying was very cool, calm, professional, and that is what we
expect out of our security officers, to do this in a way that
is professional.
Again, the bottom line is if you have two planes that are
getting ready to depart and on one, you say everybody has been
thoroughly screened on this plane, and you can either go on
that plane or we have another plane where we have not done a
thorough screening because people did not feel comfortable with
that, I think most of, if not all of, the traveling public
would say, I want to go on that plane that has been thoroughly
screened.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes, I agree with you. I think you are
doing the right thing. I think perhaps the reaction to the pat-
down procedures got ahead of TSA's or the Department's
description of what you were doing and why you were doing it.
But if, God forbid, that bomb on Abdulmutallab's body had gone
off on the plane over Detroit, Congress and, I dare say, the
public would have been demanding not just the body imaging
equipment, but pat-downs, and I understand the privacy
sensitivities, of course.
It is awkward. It is unusual. On the other hand, we get on
those planes, and we want to have the confidence that nobody on
the plane has evaded security in a way that will allow them to
blow up the plane and kill everybody else on it.
So this is, unfortunately, the world in which we live. It
was not our choice, but we have to do everything we can to
protect the traveling public. I think that what you are doing
here with the pat-down procedures is difficult, it is
sensitive, but it is necessary for the homeland security of the
American people.
My time is up. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pistole, let me start with a fundamental question. But
for the intelligence tip that was provided by our ally, would
our current security systems have detected these package bombs?
Mr. Pistole. My professional opinion, no.
Senator Collins. And so that raises the issue of what can
we do to make sure that in the future, if there is another
attempt to exploit the gaps in air cargo security, we have
closed those gaps because in many ways, we were lucky that we
had an ally with extremely specific intelligence information
that allowed us to target these packages before harm was done.
What is the single biggest change that you think we should be
making?
Mr. Pistole. We have high confidence in the known shippers
and that supply chain, those who do business in the shipping
industry. There are over 8 billion, almost 9 billion pounds of
cargo that come into the United States every year, about two-
thirds on cargo planes, such as UPS and FedEx, and the other
third, over 2.6 billion, on passenger planes. We have high
confidence, again, in those international shippers with
established records.
The challenge becomes those locations, such as these
individual packages out of Yemen or other hot spots around the
world where there is not a known relationship with the carrier
or the shipper, and screening those packages in the same way
that we would require here in the United States. There are
several challenges there. One is just the capacity of some
countries. For example, Yemen, when I visited there a couple
weeks ago, had an X-ray machine that they use for cargo. But
they were not using explosive trace detection or a 100 percent
physical inspection of packages, which we are requiring now. So
there are a number of issues and challenges there.
Senator Collins. And with Yemen, I would be worried about
the people doing the screening and whether they share our
goals.
Mr. Pistole. You raise a very good point. So what I was
describing was the physical screening, but the insider threat--
--
Senator Collins. Exactly.
Mr. Pistole [continuing]. What type of vetting and
validating of those individuals is being done, and that is
obviously uneven around the globe.
Senator Collins. Mr. Bersin, I mentioned in my statement,
and you talked about it, as well, that we have a pretty well
defined system for the screening of cargo that comes by the
maritime system. And in that case, 24 hours before the cargo is
even loaded on the ship overseas, we have a manifest that is
combined with other information to allow us to identify the
cargo and target that which may be of high risk.
Why can we not do that with the air cargo? What are the
obstacles? I mean, frankly, a system that says we want to know
4 hours before it arrives at our shores provides very little
protection. The flight may be already en route.
Mr. Bersin. Senator Collins, as Mr. Pistole said, one
method of dealing with this is to segment the traffic between
cargo and shippers we know from shippers and cargo about which
we do not know enough or we have adverse information.
The other method of doing this is the risk management that
we have applied, and I think effectively so, in the maritime
context, and the three elements are, as you suggest, first,
receiving information sufficiently in advance so that we can
apply our targeting rules and actually attempt to identify the
high-risk cargo. And then, of course, the third issue is then
scan or screen using appropriate technology.
But, in effect, we should be looking at those same
techniques in the aviation cargo context, and in fact, we have
begun that process. We will want to customize it, given the
nature of the trade, the differences between the maritime and
aviation context. But the broad categories, Senator, are ones
that give us good guidance.
Senator Collins. Are you looking at increasing the amount
of time before cargo is shipped to our country where you
receive a listing of the cargo? The 4 hours strikes me as
something that you could change immediately. For example, in
response to the Times Square bomber attempt, TSA acted
immediately to change the update rule on the targeted
individuals. Are you looking at the 4-hour rule?
Mr. Bersin. Yes, Senator, we are, and we are working not
only with TSA and other government partners, but with the
private sector shippers, the airlines and the cargo carriers,
to reach a determination about how we can advance that deadline
for providing information to CBP, and we expect that we will be
coming up with a revised recommendation in the near future.
Senator Collins. Mr. Pistole.
Mr. Pistole. I would just add that it is a pragmatic issue.
I could issue a security directive today and say 8 hours or 24
hours or whatever it would be. The question is, are the
carriers capable of implementing that directive today? That is
what Commissioner Bersin is referring to in terms of working
with them. What can they do electronically? A number of the
smaller carriers around the world are not fully electronic in
terms of their communications, so how do we actually implement
that? So clearly, the intent is there. It is how do we make it
happen.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins.
We will call on, in order of appearance, Senator Levin,
Senator Brown, and Senator Burris. Senator Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to just pursue Senator Collins' question again.
Right now, the rule is you have to have your manifest 4 hours
before the arrival of an airplane, is that correct?
Mr. Bersin. Yes, for those destinations that are less than
4 hours from our shores, it is upon wheels up.
Senator Levin. Now, what are the practical problems with
increasing that?
Mr. Bersin. The first is the electronic systems in place to
get the information to us, but we can work on that over time as
we have in the passenger context.
Senator Levin. Well, that is the same whether it is 4
hours, 6 hours, or 8 hours, is it not? It has to be an
electronic system to get you the information----
Mr. Bersin. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Levin. So you could do 8 hours with the same
problem, same challenge.
Mr. Bersin. We could, and we are trying to work out with
the carriers the best system that would actually provide us
with the information in an effective advance period. But also--
--
Senator Levin. Well, that is not a practical problem. What
is the next problem which is not practical, allegedly?
Mr. Bersin. Well, the problem of making sure that we are
getting it as quickly as we can and then getting information
back to the carrier, putting a hold on certain high-risk cargo
that would be identified by our targeting rules.
Senator Levin. Why would 8 hours or 12 hours not help you
do that?
Mr. Bersin. It would help us.
Senator Levin. So that is not a practical reason not to
increase----
Mr. Bersin. No.
Senator Levin [continuing]. Four hours to 8 hours or 12
hours. I mean, we were told a minute ago there are practical
problems. I have not heard one yet.
Mr. Bersin. The practical problems, I think, that Mr.
Pistole alluded to, and they are, indeed, obstacles, not ones
that we will not be able to work with the private sector to
overcome, but there are airlines, as we have seen in the
passenger data area, that simply do not have the capacity to
electronically transmit that data to us.
Senator Levin. Well, that is true whether it is 6 hours, 8
hours, or 12 hours.
Mr. Pistole. So, if I could jump in, part of it, Senator,
is that the carriers themselves do not have that manifest data.
Sometimes it is only 2 to 3 hours before wheels up.
Senator Levin. I am saying, if it is required that it be 8
hours or 12 hours, then they will have the manifest data----
Mr. Pistole. So that is true----
Senator Levin. That is not a practical problem. That is
just saying you have to have the manifest data 8 hours, 12
hours, or whatever it is prior to wheels up.
Mr. Pistole. So if there is a last-minute shipment or
something, that means----
Senator Levin. Tough luck.
Mr. Pistole. Yes. Basically, they are out of luck then,
so----
Senator Levin. That is true now, too, is it not?
Mr. Pistole. No, not necessarily.
Senator Levin. One hour before arrival?
Mr. Pistole. Well, but if it is 4 hours----
Senator Levin. Well, last minute shipments, that is tough.
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Senator Levin. What are the other problems, practical
problems with 8 hours or 12 hours?
Mr. Pistole. The small carriers around the world. We are
not talking about UPS, FedEx--in fact, we are working with them
to provide immediate notification when they receive the
manifest, whatever the time line. It may be a couple of days.
Senator Levin. That is not a practical problem, either.
Mr. Pistole. No, I am saying that is a solution.
Senator Levin. I have not heard a practical problem yet. I
am struggling to hear a practical problem for not just saying,
directive, it is 8 hours, it is 12 hours, whatever. Why can you
not do that right now?
Mr. Pistole. For much of the world, we could do that. For
small carriers that would be dealing with a number of the high-
risk packages, let us say, from Central Asia someplace, their
system, as I understand, and we could get subsequent experts in
here to talk about that in a little more detail, would not have
the capacity to provide that information to CBP more than 4
hours in advance at this time.
Senator Levin. Why?
Mr. Pistole. I would have to defer to experts.
Senator Levin. The greater the number of hours prior to
arrival, it seems to me, the easier it is to get the
information if you are not electronically hooked up, not the
harder. You have more time. I do not get it, folks. I mean, I
do not see the urgency in your testimony here. It is such an
obvious question that I am a little bit dumfounded that we do
not have a direct answer.
You say there are practical problems, but we have not heard
one yet.
Mr. Bersin. I think the practical problem is going from the
status quo to where we want to be. I do not think anyone is
saying that we should not move there.
Senator Levin. That is not a practical problem. That is a
matter of issuing a directive saying it is now 8 hours or it is
now 12 hours.
Mr. Bersin. Well, the practical problem is that the trade
will tell you that it has not been done because it has been
perceived that it would unduly interfere with the commerce in
the world. When we come to a situation like this, there is an
urgency, and in fact, we overcome a lot of the practical
problems that were keeping the situation from being handled
that way in the past.
Senator Levin. Well, I have to tell you, I read your
comment, Mr. Pistole, about the length of time--you say that
security cannot bring business to a standstill. I do not think
anyone is suggesting that business be brought to a standstill.
The question is, is it reasonable to tell people, you have to
have your package and your documents in 12 hours before a plane
lands. That does not bring it to a standstill. That just slows
it down by 8 hours.
The question is, will the public or the world accept a
delay of 8 hours in getting something to where it has to go in
order to have greater security? My answer is, I think, kind of
like Senator Lieberman's points on the pat-down. Yes. This is
easier than pat-downs. This is just slowing it down. It does
not bring it to a standstill.
I was a little worried about your comment, Mr. Pistole,
about a delicate balance. The flow of global commerce is key to
economic recovery. I agree with that. But security cannot bring
business to a standstill. I do not think anyone is suggesting
that. It is a straw man, it seems to me, that you are raising,
and rather than telling us, yes, you do not see any practical
reason, either, and we are going to get it done, it is sort of
that, well, we are trying to overcome practical problems, which
you have not been able to identify, at least to me.
Mr. Pistole. Well, I agree, Senator, at least in terms of
your risk management and assessment construct. The issue comes
down to, if we would impose, for example, on all cargo
worldwide the same mandates we have here, the estimates I have
seen are that the cost of doing that would actually exceed the
revenue from that cargo.
Senator Levin. Are you saying that increasing 4 hours to 8
hours----
Mr. Pistole. No, different issue.
Senator Levin. Well, I think you ought to get your experts
to provide for the record what those practical problems are. My
time is up, but if you do not mind, Mr. Chairman, my suggestion
is that he provide the Committee for the record what those
problems are. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. I accept your suggestion and I make
that formal request of our two witnesses, as soon as you can.
Thank you. Senator Brown.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BROWN
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to be
back. Thank you for putting this together, and thank you to the
witnesses for appearing.
My concerns are pretty simple. I want to know what tools
and resources you need to better do your job so we can ensure,
God forbid, that this does not happen again in terms of the
extreme possibility of what could have happened. Also, as
someone who flies and has family members who fly, I want to
make sure that when I or my family or friends or anyone in this
country gets on a plane, that the cargo underneath is screened.
So how common is it to have a full flight of passengers and
have some extra room on a passenger plane and have that cargo
then fill that free available space? How common is that?
Mr. Pistole. Well, if the issue is whether it is screened
or not, 100 percent of that cargo on passenger flights
originating in the United States is screened regardless of when
it is put on.
Senator Brown. Originating in the United States.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Brown. But what if it is a tail-to-tail transfer
and it is coming in from Yemen or another country? Where are we
with that?
Mr. Pistole. The 9/11 Commission Act required 100 percent
screening of international inbound cargo on passenger flights.
The bottom line is we are not there yet because either the host
countries or civil aviation authorities have not put in the
same procedures that we have, and there are estimates anywhere
from two-thirds or perhaps 80 percent of all of that cargo is
presently being screened. The one take-away, though, is we say
100 percent of the high-risk cargo is screened, and we do not
define that publicly because we do not want to provide a
blueprint, obviously, to how to get out of that. But we look at
the known shipper issue; how does that work? So it is a good
point.
Senator Brown. So for toner cartridges from Yemen, does an
alarm go off? I mean, we have plenty of toner cartridges here
and why would we be importing them? Did that not raise a red
flag?
Mr. Pistole. It absolutely did, both by the shipper, who
had identified it as a suspect package--part of the challenge--
--
Senator Brown. How did it even get on the plane, then?
Mr. Pistole. Because of different protocols, for example,
in Sana'a, Yemen, even though the shipper had been identified--
that is why it was segregated in Dubai. So in addition to the
specific credible intelligence, they had identified it as a
suspect package. You are absolutely right.
Senator Brown. And when you asked for the cooperation of
the various cargo carriers, did you get the cooperation of all
of them?
Mr. Pistole. Absolutely.
Senator Brown. There were no questions asked?
Mr. Pistole. No. They have been very capable partners and
looking for solutions that make sense as opposed to us just
issuing an edict or rule, security directive, that says you
will do this now. We work very closely with them to do this.
Senator Brown. So is there going to be an updated or
improved screening and inspection plan when it comes to those
tail-to-tail transfers? Is there something you are proposing or
working on to deal with that gap?
Mr. Pistole. Yes. So the key is how do we work with our
international partners, and we do that in several ways. One is
through the International Civil Aviation Organization, which is
part of the United Nations. A hundred and ninety countries
signed off on an aviation security declaration last month in
Montreal. And then working through the International Air
Transit Association, and what they are doing is trying to
leverage their resources in a way that, frankly, builds
capacity in some of these areas of the world that need
additional screening protocols or actual explosive trace
detection equipment, canines, or whatever it may be.
Senator Brown. I have been to other countries, and you see
the cargo, and it is just there. It is laying around and anyone
can get access to it. I think it is going to take a real
commitment to ensure that our aviation partners--when I say
partners, I mean people who fly to the United States and
deliver goods to the United States--take their jobs seriously.
And I recognize the comments of the two previous
questioners regarding the timing. Is there a way to ensure
speed and accuracy when it comes to X-raying and inspecting? Do
we have the technology to make sure that we do not slow things
down to a crawl and we can continue on with our superior
delivery of product throughout the world?
Mr. Pistole. I say, generally, yes, and that is when it
comes down to the known shippers, the trusted partners
throughout the global supply chain. The problematic ones are
those individual shippers that we do not have any history on--
we do not have any intelligence about who this person is or
what they are shipping. But as you indicated, when somebody
ships toner or a computer printer from Yemen to Chicago, that
is a red flag. So that is exactly the type of information CBP
is getting through that 4-hour window and what we are seeking
to get additional time on.
Senator Brown. And how much air cargo is actually being
screened today?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, so 100 percent in the United States on
U.S. passenger flights----
Senator Brown. How is it done? Is it through X-rays or
through dogs, the whole gamut?
Mr. Pistole. We do it through a series of over 1,100
certified cargo security screeners, facilities around the
country away from airports. They use a variety of those, but
clearly X-ray, perhaps advanced technology X-ray, explosive
trace detection or physical inspection if necessary. They
screen it and then transport it, usually just a few miles, in a
secure fashion to the airport to put on the cargo flights and
passenger flights.
Senator Brown. So in conclusion, I just want to try to
solve the problem. I want to try to figure out what you need to
get that job done, and whether you come over to the office
again, either one of you, and deliver that or we have a private
meeting or however it works, I would like to, Mr. Chairman,
just know what they need. I mean, we have identified, by the
grace of God, that we have been very lucky. But at some point,
we are not going to be that lucky, and I want to be able to say
to my friends, family, and anyone I meet in Massachusetts that
I gave you the tools so they are not looking at any one of us
because this is not about party politics. This is about the
safety of our citizenry and also the ability to keep commerce
moving. So if you could maybe post testimony at some point or
reach out, that would be a big help.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Good idea, Senator Brown, and we will
arrange for that.
Senator Burris, from the beginning of your service in the
Senate to this, apparently your last week with us, you have
been a most faithful Member of this Committee, probably
attending more hearings than anybody else, except Senator
Collins and me, so thank you.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BURRIS
Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is because of
the interest in this Committee, and even this topic here has
really caught my interest because I might not be on point on
all my quick questions, but I have several concerns about TSA
as I travel across this country.
Maybe, Administrator Pistole, you can answer this. How do
you tell what a high-risk package is? What is the criteria for
a high-risk package?
Mr. Pistole. We do not define it publicly because we do not
want to provide the blueprint for----
Senator Burris. Thank you. We tell everything else. I mean,
we let it be known that the Saudis gave us the secret to this.
We have to stop putting everything out in the--I am sorry. Go
ahead.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator. Yes. So it is generally
outside the known shipper, trusted shipper arena, and just
generally, individuals who are shipping packages with no
history, perhaps from some hot area such as Yemen, the Horn of
Africa, and places like that. But it is all intelligence
driven. What intelligence do we know about the shipper? Did the
person positively identify himself when he came in to drop off
the package? Was the package physically inspected? What do we
know about the cargo carrier where the package was dropped off?
How thorough are they? How thorough is the airport at the cargo
facility? So a lot of criteria and indicia go into figuring out
what is a high-risk package.
Senator Burris. Because those packages were headed to
synagogues allegedly in Chicago.
Mr. Pistole. Correct.
Senator Burris. That is another major concern.
Let me shift gears just a little bit. On the pat-downs, we
have some airports that are staffed by contract screeners, is
that correct? They are not all TSA employees?
Mr. Pistole. That is correct. There are 17 airports out of
the 453 that are staffed by contractors, not TSA employees.
Senator Burris. Now, how do you deal with those pat-downs
in these airports? Do we have jurisdiction over those
individuals?
Mr. Pistole. Absolutely, Senator. They have to follow the
same protocols and standard operating procedures that we put
out for all TSA employees.
Senator Burris. Have they gone through the same training?
Mr. Pistole. They go through the same training. They are
identical to the Transportation Security Administration
officers and behavior detection officers and all the TSA
employees other than they are working for contractors.
Senator Burris. Why are there contract employees in Kansas
City? You all could not find enough TSA people to hire?
Mr. Pistole. Congress decided that there should be the
option either to have federalized airports or to have private
security done, and so there are some Members of Congress who
feel very strongly about that and want to have additional
airports that have private security as opposed to TSA.
Senator Burris. So you said that is written into TSA law--
--
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Senator Burris [continuing]. That they can be private
contractors?
Mr. Pistole. It is called the Screening Partnership Program
(SPP).
Senator Burris. Mr. Chairman, I do not have much longer in
the Senate, but we ought to look at these private contractors.
I am concerned about the number of private contractors, not
only at TSA, but at the other government agencies, and then I
am wondering if one of the passengers feels that they have been
over-screened, just what the liability there would be.
Would patting down have caught the underwear bomber, in
your estimation?
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Senator Burris. Not the machine, but the patting down?
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Senator Burris. Because allegedly, it was in a diaper type
of arrangement.
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Senator Burris. So they are going that deep in terms of
patting down individuals?
Mr. Pistole. The pat-downs are based on the latest
intelligence and the information that we have, and----
Senator Burris. But there was no intelligence on that
gentleman that was on the flight to Detroit. He was on the
plane.
Mr. Pistole. That is right. That is why we changed the
policy.
Senator Burris. Have our personnel received adequate
training? Mr. Chairman, do we know what will happen with the
litigation coming out of this? The Pilots Association and the
Flight Attendants Association are getting ready to bring some
type of action, as I understand, because of the excessive
patting down of flight attendants and of pilots. Is that the
case?
Mr. Pistole. That has been the case. Pilots have, of
course, not generally gone through the advanced imaging
technology because they are allowed to keep their shoes on, and
that is a different issue. But I have had a number of
conversations with representatives of pilots' associations, and
we are actively exploring options as it involves pilots because
we are using a risk-based approach. It just begs the question,
if you have somebody who is in charge of the aircraft that can
put the aircraft down, as could be the case, then why do we
have the screening for them? So actually, in the near future, I
will be announcing some new policies on that.
Senator Burris. That would help. There is also a question,
Mr. Pistole, about the degree of X-rays that these individuals
have to go through in the course of their day-to-day work and
what that will do to their physical health, if they go through
the X-ray machine rather than the excessive pat-down.
Mr. Pistole. That is one of the concerns that I think has
been raised. What I rely on is the scientific literature and
the studies that have been done using these specific machines,
including the Food and Drug Administration, National Institute
of Science and Technology, and Johns Hopkins University. They
have all done independent assessments of the advanced imaging
technology machines, the amount of radiation, and I have seen
several analogies, but one that sticks in my mind is going
through one of these machines is similar to receiving about 2
minutes of radiation that you would receive at 35,000 feet on a
normal flight. So it is very minimal, well within the
established scientific standards for safety, and we are always
trying to update that through independent validators and others
who have opinions about that.
Senator Burris. And how about the protection of the TSA
personnel? I mean, if the male officer is accused of grabbing a
lady's breast or the female officer is getting too close to a
male's genitals, how are they protected now?
Mr. Pistole. It's always same gender security officers who
would do that pat-down, and then people can request a private
area.
Senator Burris. Will there be a witness there with that
pat-down?
Mr. Pistole. They are welcome to have a witness there
present.
Senator Burris. So can the TSA employee request a witness
employee to be there with her or him when he is patting him
down or she is patting her down? Can they have personnel with
them there to protect them?
Mr. Pistole. It is not our current policy, but unless it
goes into a private screening area, the closed circuit
television (CCTV) would capture virtually all of that because
every checkpoint has CCTV enabled.
Senator Burris. I see my time is up, but I am also
concerned about our TSA personnel, and I listen to these
people. Please take care of the TSA personnel. Some of them do
not have health insurance. Some of them are working part-time.
I am listening to these complaints, and as a new Administrator,
I am counting on you to take care of those people who are going
to take care of us getting on these airplanes because we cannot
have disgruntled----
Mr. Pistole. Absolutely.
Senator Burris [continuing]. TSA personnel trying to
protect us on these flights.
Mr. Pistole. I could not agree with you more, Senator. I
appreciate your support. Thank you, sir.
Senator Burris. God bless you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you. Thanks very much, Senator
Burris.
Senator Carper has been the senior Senator from Delaware
since Senator Biden became Vice President. With the seating of
Senator Coons yesterday, he becomes not only senior in service,
but the oldest member of the Delaware delegation----
[Laughter.]
And we are going to treat you with a lot more respect.
[Laughter.]
Senator Carper.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Senator Carper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I think.
While Senator Burris is still here, I just want to second
the emotion that was expressed by our Chairman about his
service here in the U.S. Senate. He is not only a faithful
attendant and participant in full Committee hearings, but he is
a terrific Subcommittee Member, and I have been privileged to
welcome him to our Subcommittee hearings for the last 2 years.
He is almost always present, at least for part of the hearings,
asks thoughtful questions, and he is just a joy to serve with,
so we are going to miss you, my friend. I just want to put that
on the record.
Mr. Pistole, how are you doing in your new job? How long
have you been in your new job?
Mr. Pistole. Since July 1, Senator, and I am doing very
well, thank you.
Senator Carper. Any surprises?
Mr. Pistole. A lot of challenges, a lot of moving parts,
but I have been impressed with the quality of the workforce.
The Senior Leadership Team is outstanding. The interagency work
is outstanding. And it is a vital mission that people are very
focused on. Thank you.
Senator Carper. So is there anything that we in the
Legislative Branch ought to be doing more of or less of to help
you and the folks who are serving under you?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator. I know there have been
several issues that have been teed up. I would defer to the
legislative affairs folks in terms of getting that to staff and
working on that, but thank you.
Senator Carper. All right. Uncovering this most recent air
cargo plot and the failure of other attempted attacks over the
years tells me that it has become increasingly difficult since
September 11, 2001, for terrorists to exploit the
vulnerabilities to our aviation system. At the same time,
however, some aspects of our response to the foiled attacks are
at least a little bit worrisome.
The ban on cargo from Yemen and Somalia and the limits on,
for example, printer cartridges may be necessary, but they are
a specific response to a specific failed attack, as you know.
They follow similar rules put in place over the years related
to liquids, electronics, and other matters.
Recognizing that terrorists are still targeting aviation
and are constantly adapting and changing their methods, what
are we doing to make sure that we are just as nimble as they
are and are not spending too much time responding to the last
disaster? In my old days as a Naval flight officer, we always
talked about fighting the last war, and we have tried to learn
to fight the current war or the next war as time goes by. What
are we doing about making sure we are not spending too much
time responding to the last disaster?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator. My whole approach since I
took over as TSA Administrator in July is to use a risk-based,
intelligence-driven approach to make sure that we are informed
by prior actions and attempted attacks but not dwelling on
those. We want to make sure there are no other printer
cartridges out there because if they made two, maybe they made
more, and maybe they are already in the United States getting
ready to be sent someplace. So we have to be informed by that
just as we have to be informed about box cutters on flights or
liquids that could be explosives or shoe bombs or underwear
bombs.
So we have to be informed by all those, but we do not want
to be limited, and we have to be forward-looking to make sure
we are not acquiring, for example, the technology today that
deals with yesterday's threats, but we are trying to
anticipate, informed by the intelligence from not only the U.S.
community, but around the world, where we should be going, and
I think we are doing that.
Senator Carper. Good. Mr. Bersin, do you want to share a
thought or two with us?
Mr. Bersin. Just to add to the Administrator's comments, it
seems to me that we need to develop a deeper partnership with
the private sector, that, in fact, given the number of parcels
that we deal with--last year, as I indicated in the opening
statement, we dealt with 334,000 flights and 57 million
packages--we have to recognize that we cannot do this without
the help of the commercial airlines that carry the cargo, as we
have enlisted their support in the passenger context, and with
the express carriers, that we need to make the grand bargain
with them that would give them earlier release on cargo that is
assured and help us deal with that smaller percentage that we
do not have sufficient information on to make a good judgment.
Senator Carper. Thanks. Administrator Pistole, TSA has been
receiving a fair amount of negative attention in recent days
due to the discomfort, as we have heard, of some airline
passengers with the screening methods that are used at
airports, specifically the full body scanners and the pat-
downs. You had some considerable discussion on this already,
and I missed part of that. I do not want to get into a specific
discussion on how the two procedures are right now, but I do
want to talk about a program with TSA that could possibly limit
the number of passengers submitted to more intensive screening.
My staff and I have learned a lot in recent months about
TSA's Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT)
program, which uses, as you know, agency personnel trained in
behavior detection methods to identify passengers who might
pose a high risk. I think before your confirmation hearing, we
actually talked about this a little bit, several months ago.
But legislation that Senator Brown and I have introduced aims
to build on and expand this program.
Can you just take a couple of minutes and discuss with us
behavior detection training and perhaps the increased use of
intelligence about transportation security threats, how they
might be better used to target our efforts at airports.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator. I think the use of
behavior detection officers is a key component in our overall
layers of security, not a fail-safe or single point of failure
in any respect, but it is one of those multiple layers that we
use to help to identify somebody who may be acting suspiciously
or something that is not quite right. I am a big proponent,
given my almost 27 years in the FBI, especially having seen
behavior detection work in terms of interviews and somebody who
is lying and things like that. I think it is a valuable
resource.
The question is, how do we show outcomes if we have not
identified a putative terrorist, an Abdulmutallab-type? We
identified him because he was sweating or he was acting
nervously in response to questions or he saw a canine over here
and so he decided to go this way, or when he saw somebody
standing in line being swabbed for explosives, using trace
detection on his hands, then he backed out of the line. So
there are any number of indicators that can be helpful.
As we know, the Israelis do quite a bit in terms of how
they screen passengers, and behavior detection is one of those
keys. I am a strong proponent of it, and I am looking to expand
the program. Thank you for your support.
Senator Carper. Thanks so much. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Carper.
Senator Ensign, welcome. We invite your questions now.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ENSIGN
Senator Ensign. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I know this hearing is basically on air cargo
but folks have been getting into a few other areas, so let me
ask about the enhanced imaging. There have been reports in the
media that have said certain religious groups want to be
exempted because of religious, obviously, reasons. Can you
address that? Are you going to allow certain groups to be
exempted from that because of religious beliefs?
Mr. Pistole. Well, Senator, we try to be sensitive to each
individual and groups that have particular sensitivities, as to
whether it is headwear or certain garb or sensitivities about
being viewed or touched and everything. So we try to be
sensitive to those issues. At the same time, the bottom line is
we have to ensure that each person getting on each flight has
been properly screened, and so we have options, such as if
somebody does not want to go through the advanced imaging
technology, it is optional. They would just do the walk-through
metal detector and have a pat-down that would identify any
possible items. They can request private screening, so if they
do not want to be screened in public, they can go to a private
area, have a witness with them.
And so we try to address those concerns in every way
possible, recognizing, again, in the final analysis, everybody
on that flight wants to be assured with the highest level of
confidence that everybody else on that flight has been properly
screened, including me, you, and everybody.
Senator Ensign. I realize this is a difficult question for
you, but are you going to make no exceptions? I know you are
trying to reasonably accommodate, but----
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Senator Ensign [continuing]. Within those reasonable
accommodations, let us just say that my religion does not allow
me to be touched by somebody else, does not allow me to go
through that screening. So what happens in those cases?
Mr. Pistole. A very small percentage of people will
continue to receive pat-downs. So if somebody comes to the
airport----
Senator Ensign. They have to at least go through the pat-
down, if not the screening?
Mr. Pistole. No. Unless there is an alarm in the walk-
through metal detector or they opt out of the advanced imaging
technology, they in all likelihood would never receive a pat-
down. The pat-down is only for a very small percentage of
people.
Senator Ensign. No. Maybe I am not particularly clear in my
question.
Mr. Pistole. OK.
Senator Ensign. What if somebody is getting a random
screening. I just got randomly screened at the airport. For
whatever reason, my number seems to come up quite often. But if
that happens and the option is either the imaging or the pat-
down, and I do not want either of them because of religious
reasons, what happens to me?
Mr. Pistole. While we respect that person's beliefs, that
person is not going to get on an airplane.
Senator Ensign. And there will be no exceptions----
Mr. Pistole. No.
Senator Ensign [continuing]. Just because of religion. That
was the answer that I was looking for.
I want to go back a little bit to cargo, and I know this
was addressed just a little earlier. When it comes to when you
have cargo planes then going to passenger planes, that seems to
me the biggest potential concern because it is not as big of a
target to take down a FedEx plane or a UPS plane as it would be
a passenger plane. I think, in all reality, we all recognize
that, and from what I understand, you are working on all cargo
being eventually screened. Since we screen going out but we are
not screening all cargo coming in, when will we get to that
point?
What is the schedule?
Mr. Pistole. There are two aspects, Senator. One is all
cargo going on passenger planes, and there are various
estimates between two-thirds and 80 percent that is coming
internationally into the United States that is screened. I do
not have a way of validating that or verifying that, so that is
really self-reporting from airlines and cargo companies.
The all-cargo is largely unregulated. Now, what we have
done since the most recent events in Yemen with the printer
cartridges is issue rules that limit cargo with a final
destination in the United States as to what that may be, so we
differentiate between known shippers and high-risk shippers,
those individuals and things coming from certain areas and
things like that. So those are the two areas.
In terms of the time frame, we are----
Senator Ensign. I know you are going as fast as you can.
Mr. Pistole. That is the bottom line, and it really comes
down to building capacity in certain parts of the world that
currently do not have that 100 percent capacity like we have
here.
Senator Ensign. I see. And I understand that you are
dealing with some of the most difficult issues on security that
you could possibly have because the terrorists are always
looking for ways to--as soon as we come up with one security
system, they come up with another. Could you address the use of
dogs and the bomb-sniffing capabilities? Dogs have very
sensitive noses, but at the same time, there are ways to get
around those, depending on how you wrap the packages and
various things like that. Just kind of explain a little bit,
without letting terrorists know exactly what we are doing----
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Ensign [continuing]. About the role that canines
versus other types of detection techniques are being used.
Mr. Pistole. The bomb-sniffing dogs, the canines, do play
an important role in the overall screening here in the United
States. It is uneven around the world, of course. We are the
leaders here. There are really two types. One can detect the
actual explosives in this box. Then there is vapor wake. If
somebody has been carrying a bomb like the July 7 bombers in
2005 in London, in their backpacks before they got on the
London Tube, dogs trained in vapor wake would actually be able
to pick up that scent after they have walked by, as long as the
air has not been too disturbed and things like that. Those are
the two main approaches.
The challenge is to have enough dogs in enough locations
worldwide to make a meaningful difference, especially in those
high-risk areas. We need not only a trained dog, but a trained
handler. It is a terrific technology enhancer for us. It is
really the question of scalability.
Senator Ensign. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Ensign.
Last week, I was in Afghanistan to visit our troops, and I
saw a remarkable demonstration of a bomb-sniffing dog there.
These dogs are really extraordinary and saving lives every day.
Senator Ensign. Well, it is only because of the outstanding
veterinary care that they get from my profession.
Chairman Lieberman. Without question. [Laughter.]
I had no idea I was being set up to set you up. [Laughter.]
Gentlemen, I have a few more questions, if I might. Going
on the basis of public reports at this public hearing, it
appears that the two bombs shipped from Yemen last month were
screened and cleared perhaps more than once. And I wanted to
ask you, as a result, is TSA or CBP, but I will focus on TSA,
reviewing and reevaluating what types of screening it uses or
certifies in light of that tough reality?
Mr. Pistole. Mr. Chairman, you have hit on a key point in
terms of the specific screening that was done in those two
instances in Dubai and the United Kingdom and then how that
informs our actions and our judgments. We have reviewed the
forensics and the screening that has been described to us, so
we are doing that. And as you note, because of the
sensitivities of that, I would defer to a closed hearing in
terms of discussing those details. But yes, we are informed by
and taking actions that are consistent with what we found.
Chairman Lieberman. Understood. This is consistent with
what Senator Brown asked before. In this coming budgetary
round, if you feel you need more funding support for research
and development or grant programs to develop better technology
for screening, please do not hesitate to ask us.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And in response to
what Senator Collins mentioned earlier in terms of the
automated target recognition, if I could just use that----
Chairman Lieberman. Yes, please do.
Mr. Pistole. We are aggressively testing that currently
here at our Transportation Security Integration Facility at
Reagan National Airport, just south of the airport. We are
cautiously optimistic as far as that being the next generation
of advanced imaging technology, and the nice thing is that it
is basically a software modification to our existing hardware.
The issue is the high rate of false-positives that we have
seen. So we are trying to work through that, and I am not ready
to request funding for that until we ensure that those false-
positives are lowered and it is an effective tool because if
there are high false-positives, the result is pat-downs.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Pistole. So we are trying to get away from that
construct to say, yes, this is the best technology. It clearly
addresses the privacy issue. It actually creates efficiencies
for us. We do not need a separate screener in a separate room
for privacy issues.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Pistole. So, yes, thank you. We are exploring that.
I would say the biggest issue is on security inspectors
worldwide, and that is where we are working with, obviously,
the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of Management
and Budget, and the Administration, to move forward in that
area.
Chairman Lieberman. Which means to try to convince and
influence other countries to do a better job at screening cargo
coming into the United States.
Mr. Pistole. Exactly.
Chairman Lieberman. So I just want to get on record, and I
think it probably is clear, that this next generation of
imaging systems, in the original imaging portion of its
process, is more protective of privacy.
Mr. Pistole. It is basically a stick figure.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Pistole. It is either a stick figure or a blob, so yes.
Chairman Lieberman. But if an alarm goes off there----
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Chairman Lieberman [continuing]. It still requires a pat-
down.
Mr. Pistole. Yes, although specific. So with the Automated
Target Recognition, it will show a box, for example, in the
area of the body where there is an anomaly.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Pistole. And so it can be targeted for that area. So it
may be someplace else.
Chairman Lieberman. So it may limit the area of the pat-
down.
Mr. Pistole. It might.
Chairman Lieberman. But, as you said, your concern now is
that there may be a higher rate of false-positives so that in
the end, there would actually be more pat-downs.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Chairman Lieberman. I hope you will keep us posted on that.
I know that on November 8, the TSA issued the Security
Directives and Emergency Amendments, and they were designed to
reduce the risk to the aviation network by limiting the ability
to transport ink or toner and also preventing all shipments
from Yemen and Somalia for at least the next month. And I know
that one way--trying to balance what we talked about before
about the time by which you get the manifests to balance the
interest in security against the interruption of commerce is,
of course, to have higher standards, as we do in the movement
of cargo coming from certain countries.
But the question obviously arises, and we have watched this
with people, too, what do we do if the terrorists understand
that and then start to move their cargo through interim points
in Europe or Asia? Mr. Bersin, that is for you.
Mr. Bersin. Yes. I think in terms of the risk management
there, you pointed out that, unlike the passenger context,
packages do not carry those characteristics except insofar as
we get advance information. What we need to do is actually get
more specific information earlier so that our targeting rules
can adapt. But you are exactly right. The high-risk packages
could as easily come from Europe as they could from the Persian
Gulf, as they did in this particular case. We need to adjust
the targeting rules to be able to pick up high-risk cargo from
wherever it comes toward the homeland.
Chairman Lieberman. And are we intending to do that?
Mr. Bersin. Yes, sir.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. And, of course, that, too, puts an
emphasis on good intelligence. There is obviously nothing
better than having the kind of information that we had in this
case to target and move those packages out.
Is there anything being done on that? I will go back to a
question I asked at the beginning of the hearing. I know we
have worked very hard in the post-September 11, 2001, reform of
our intelligence apparatus, and we are doing much better than
we have before, both in gathering information and in sharing
it. Is there anything from the perspective of your two agencies
that you have asked of the intelligence community--obviously,
be more general than specific here--that relates to cargo, for
instance, information related to cargo? Is there something
different about intelligence gathering that you are looking
for?
Mr. Bersin. Without being specific, Senator, the answer is
yes with regard to informing the targeting rules that we use
out of the National Targeting Center.
Chairman Lieberman. Let me ask this. If I understand this
intricate world, CBP actually gets more information generally
about inbound air cargo than TSA does.
Mr. Bersin. Under the 2002 Act and the regulations CBP has
imposed on the 4-hour requirement----
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Bersin [continuing]. The information comes to the
Targeting Center. But I think it is fair to say, and it is one
of the great developments, that, in fact, we have been fairly
seamless and will become even more seamless in terms of that
information being able to inform TSA activities.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes, that was my question. Are you
cooperating and sharing information between CBP and TSA.
Mr. Bersin. Absolutely, Senator.
Chairman Lieberman. You are getting what you need?
Mr. Pistole. Absolutely right. Great relationship.
Chairman Lieberman. Good. A final question, just broader.
It goes back to something else I asked at the beginning, which
is how do we--this is the imagination, the evil imagination.
Institutionally, is there somewhere now within your two
agencies, within DHS or the intelligence community, and if not,
should there be, where we are trying to think like the
terrorists?
Obviously, this is very difficult in an open society like
ours, in a globally connected world both in terms of ease of
movement of people and cargo, but still, the record is as I
stated. We do seem to respond to the last attack,
understandably. Of course, I am grateful that we do. But is
there some way we can gear the system so that we get ahead of
what they are going to try to do to us next?
Mr. Bersin. Just the nature of the targeting enterprise
requires that you attempt to do that. It typically is better
informed when there is intelligence. But, in thinking about the
risks and the gaps that exist now, something we have not talked
about at great length here but that we need to explore
downstream, would be international mail, for example.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Bersin. It is not subject to much of the kinds of
safeguards and risk management techniques that we have. So to
that extent, yes, we try to keep ahead, recognizing the
difficulty of that challenge.
Chairman Lieberman. Are there people in CBP or TSA who are
charged specifically with doing that?
Mr. Bersin. As I say, in the targeting exercise----
Chairman Lieberman. In the targeting area, OK.
Mr. Bersin [continuing]. We have people doing that all the
time.
Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Pistole.
Mr. Pistole. And I would simply add, Mr. Chairman, that
there are people within the TSA Office of Intelligence and our
explosives group, and I would share a paper with you in a
closed setting, who are basically red celling the whole issue
of what is the next target, and this is done by our explosive
experts informed by intelligence and working within the entire
community. So the National Counterterrorism Center, the Office,
the Bureau, the Agency, and the National Security Agency,
everybody is saying, what is the next possibility and then what
do we do with that to inform the judgments and actions of our
folks. I think you would find that paper interesting. It is
just several pages. It says, what if and how can they do that,
given what we know, how they are using pentaerythritol
tetranitrate (PETN), how they used acetone peroxide (TATP) on
December 25, lead azide most recently, so all those things,
taking that, what is the next type of device we are looking
for?
Chairman Lieberman. That is very reassuring to me, and I
hope it is reassuring to anybody who is hearing it. That is
exactly the kind of thing I was hoping to hear, that we are
doing the kind of, the military says red teaming,
appropriately, you are saying red celling, but it is the same
basic idea.
I thank both of you for your testimony. I thank you for
what you are doing. Well, first, I would ask you to respond as
soon as you can to the few questions that we asked for more
information. Perhaps when we come back after Thanksgiving--we
do not know exactly how long we will be here--it would be
helpful to do a closed meeting with the two of you.
Do either of you want to say anything before we adjourn the
hearing?
Mr. Pistole. I would just like to take the opportunity, Mr.
Chairman, to appeal to the American people traveling next week
for Thanksgiving, with all the people going home to see family
and friends, to really look at this as a partnership----
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Pistole [continuing]. Between you and the U.S.
Government, particularly TSA. Those security officers are there
to work with you to ensure that everybody on that flight has
been properly screened. Everybody wants that assurance. So just
try to be patient and work with our folks. They are there to
protect you and your loved ones, and let us make it a
partnership. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Well said. Thank you for saying that.
We will keep the record of the hearing open for 15 days for
additional questions and answers and statements.
Without anything else to say, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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