[Senate Hearing 111-1015]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-1015
SAFE PORT ACT REAUTHORIZATION: SECURING OUR NATION'S CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 21, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts Ranking
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BILL NELSON, Florida JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
TOM UDALL, New Mexico SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MARK WARNER, Virginia MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
Bruce H. Andrews, General Counsel
Ann Begeman, Republican Staff Director
Brian M. Hendricks, Republican General Counsel
Nick Rossi, Republican Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on July 21, 2010.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Rockefeller................................. 1
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 5
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 38
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 40
Statement of Senator LeMieux..................................... 42
Witnesses
Admiral Robert J. Papp, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, Department
of Homeland Security........................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Hon. Alan Bersin, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, Department of Homeland Security.................... 15
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Stephen L. Caldwell, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office.................. 21
Prepared statement........................................... 23
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted to Admiral Robert J. Papp
by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 53
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 60
Hon. Barbara Boxer........................................... 61
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 62
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison.................................... 64
Hon. David Vitter............................................ 69
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Alan Bersin by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 70
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 76
Hon. Barbara Boxer........................................... 76
Hon. Bill Nelson............................................. 78
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 79
Hon. Mark Pryor.............................................. 81
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison.................................... 82
Response to written questions submitted to Stephen L. Caldwell
by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 83
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison.................................... 83
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 85
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison.................................... 94
Hon. Bill Nelson............................................. 95
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 95
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 97
SAFE PORT ACT REAUTHORIZATION:
SECURING OUR NATION'S
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
----------
WEDNESDAY, JULY 21, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m. in room
SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John D.
Rockefeller IV, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
The Chairman. All right, this hearing will come to order.
You have the brains of the Committee before you.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Actually, the brains of the Committee is
sitting behind us.
[Laughter.]
Senator Hutchison. Right, exactly.
The Chairman. Every day, terrorists are hard at work at
hatching new plans to do America harm. As the former Chairman
and current member of the Intelligence Committee, I have a very
special way of knowing that, and I can tell you, the threats
are very real--and, of course, you all know that--and that they
continue and they expand and become more malicious.
In the last year alone, we have seen one terrorist try to
blow up an airplane on Christmas Day, and we've seen another
try to turn his SUV into a bomb near Times Square. No matter
how many plots we disrupt, more will replace them, and history
has shown us that one of the greatest security challenges we
face is securing our free and open transportation system.
Although our aviation security system is the most visible
part of our Nation's homeland security system, DHS is working
to secure all aspects of our transportation infrastructure.
Today, we're going to talk about a huge challenge we have in
making our ports more secure. The very size, location, and
constant movement at ports makes them vulnerable to a potential
terrorist attack. In fact, a fairly easy terrorist attack.
If terrorists were to shut down a major port, the economic
disruption to our economy would be incalculable, as it would be
to the psyche of Americans. Maritime security is more than just
protecting our ports from attack; it's protecting our ships,
both military and commercial, preventing attacks on our
communities, and keeping extremely hazardous materials from
being used as weapons.
Welcome, Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you.
The Chairman. For example, small vessels can carry
explosives, as they did in the 2000 USS Cole attack, or smuggle
terrorists, as they did in Mumbai, India, in 2008. Preventing
terrorists from using our maritime transportation system to
smuggle weapons or people into this country is very important
to our economic security, and our national psyche.
I think, as a West Virginian--of chemical plants on the
Ohio River, right between West Virginia and Ohio--it's called
the Ohio River, but we own it, which means we have to pay to
build the bridges. That's just a small thing, which is not
really a part of this hearing. Anyway, it's lined with chemical
plants, and it's lined with powerplants, all the way from
Pittsburgh all the way down to Cincinnati. And I think the
Coast Guard is only able, at this point, because of funding
problems, et cetera, to supply, at the most, three, but, up
until recently, only two armed speedboats to patrol that 200
miles. It's like an open, free chance for anybody.
Many people may not know this, but West Virginia is
actually home to the seventh-largest port--and that includes
San Diego, San Francisco, New York, et cetera--in the country,
and it's called Huntington, West Virginia. It connects all the
way from the Atlantic to the Gulf, and it's just an
unbelievable sight of transference of cargo. Over 77 million
tons move through that port annually, 30 of which is petroleum
and chemical products. If terrorists attacked a chemical plant
adjacent to the Port of Huntington, the resulting toxic plume
would be devastating. It can happen any day. It has not, but it
could.
Make no mistake, the challenges before us are very great.
Two of our witnesses today will discuss the enormously
difficult task of balancing the need to protect our maritime
transportation system with the efficient flow of commerce.
For example, in 2007, Congress required 100-percent
scanning of all oceanborne cargo containers entering the United
States. Last year, the Secretary of Homeland Security told this
committee that she doubted that DHS could meet that challenge.
It will be expensive. Very expensive.
If we cannot meet this mandate, then I believe we need to
find a different way to address this threat. I look forward to
hearing from you and having a discussion about that. What is
possible, what is not; If we stretched, did something
different, what difference could we make? As I have discussed
already with Admiral Papp, the Coast Guard has too few
resources to meet all of its missions, and that is
unacceptable. I believe the Coast Guard needs more resources
and more support to do its job, period. One can argue about
debt, deficits, and all the rest of it, but protecting the
American people ought to be, pretty much, preemptive, I would
think.
So, just as the Committee has jurisdiction over maritime
issues, we also have a primary role of making sure our maritime
sector is, itself, secure. So, in the coming days, we're going
to introduce legislation that builds on provisions in the
Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006, or the
SAFE Port Act, and the Maritime Transportation Security Act of
2002, bills this committee passed to strengthen maritime
security.
The SAFE Port Act of 2006 furthered the preparedness of our
ports by requiring national and regional security plans and
mandating Coast Guard-approved incident response plans for all
vessels, ports, and facilities on and adjacent to waterways
that are engaged in maritime transportation.
This bill that I introduced will do the following: focus
resources on critical needs, critical small vessel security--we
need to talk about that--especially hazardous cargo, and the
security of the global supply chain; reauthorize the Port
Security Grant Program to ensure that adequate resources exist
to secure our airport facilities; and, most importantly, seek
to address key security gaps and lessons learned from the past
4 years.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and as
we go to several things: evaluate the current state of port
security, reflect on the implementation of previous port
security bills, and discuss how we can improve going ahead.
I thank everybody for being here, and I turn now to my
extremely distinguished Co-Chair, Kay Bailey Hutchison.
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And it is such an important part of our responsibility--
port security. It has been 4 years since this committee passed
the port security legislation, which became the SAFE Port Act
of 2006. And, as many of these provisions in the bill begin to
expire, we look forward to working together, the Chairman and I
and other members, to reauthorize this important legislation.
The maritime transportation system in the United States is
a vital asset to our Nation's economy, employing more than 13
million workers. The cargo that passes through our ports and
waterways contributes approximately three-quarters of a
trillion dollars to the U.S. gross domestic product.
In my home State of Texas--I'm going to brag on my port--
the Port of Houston continues to rank first in the country in
U.S. imports, first in foreign waterborne tonnage, and is home
to one of the largest petrochemical complexes in the world, as
well as part of the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve.
The Houston ship-channel businesses account for almost
800,000 jobs and have an economic impact of close to $120
billion. The Port of Houston is just one of the ports in our
Gulf Coast, in Texas. We go from Brownsville all the way up the
coast, through Port Arthur, in Beaumont. So, we do have a huge
amount of waterborne commerce in my State, and there is no
question that this is a security issue, just as any part of our
transportation and commerce system is.
The Brookings Institution estimated that a detonated weapon
of mass destruction at an American port could cost $1 trillion
to the national economy. So, it is the job of the Department of
Homeland Security, with assistance from other entities in the
Administration--certainly the Coast Guard, as well--Congress,
State and local governments, and industry stakeholders, to be
able to work seamlessly together. It's going to take the
contribution of all of these entities to prevent any kind of
devastating terrorist activity in our ports.
I am interested to hear what the three of you are going to
say, and I hope that you will elaborate on any ideas that you
have, going forward, for us to be able to pass a bill that will
make a difference in our ports' security. I'm interested in
ways that the government agencies, both State, local, as well
as the different Federal agencies, can work seamlessly with
each other, and cooperatively with the private sector, and
efficiently, to make sure that risk management is the best that
we can do to secure our Nation's transportation systems.
So, thank you for being here, and thank you, Mr. Chairman,
for continuing to focus on this important issue.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hutchison follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison, U.S. Senator from
Texas
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today's hearing on port
security, a critical element of our Nation's national security efforts.
It has been almost 4 years since this committee passed port
security legislation, which became the SAFE Port Act of 2006. As many
of the provisions in that bill begin to expire, I look forward to
working with the Chairman and the other members to reauthorize this
important legislation.
The maritime transportation system in the United States is a vital
asset to the Nation's economy, employing more than 13 million workers.
The cargo that passes through this country's ports and waterways
contributes approximately three-quarters of a trillion dollars to the
U.S. gross domestic product.
In my home state of Texas, the Port of Houston continues to rank
first in the country in U.S. imports, first in foreign waterborne
tonnage, and is home to one of the world's largest petrochemical
complexes, as well as the U.S. Strategic Petroleum reserve.
The Houston shipping channel businesses account for almost 800,000
jobs and have an economic impact of close to $120 billion.
Clearly, our Nation's economy and the flow of commerce can be
affected significantly by an unforeseen event, which I am concerned we
are not adequately prepared. A terrorist incident at a major U.S. port
could cause a devastating loss of life and deliver a huge blow to our
economy.
For example, the Brookings Institution estimated that a detonated
weapon of mass destruction (WMD) at an American port could cost $1
trillion to the national economy.
And so, it is the job of the Department of Homeland Security, with
assistance from other entities within the Administration, as well as
Congress, State and Local governments and industry stakeholders, to
help put systems in place to prevent these devastating types of events
from occurring and disrupting the delicate equilibrium of the flow of
commerce and the sanctity of our way of life.
Therefore, I am particularly interested to hear what assessment our
witnesses will provide of the state of our Nation's maritime security.
In addition, I hope that our witnesses will elaborate on innovative
ideas to help better secure our Nation's ports. I am especially
interested in ways in which government agencies can work seamlessly
with each other, work cooperatively with the private sector, and most
importantly, work efficiently, so as not to expend precious financial
resources on ineffective projects. Risk management is fundamental to
securing our Nation's transportation systems.
Thank you and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on these
very important issues.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hutchison.
And now to the distinguished Senator Frank Lautenberg.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
And your reminder that your landlocked State has such an
important port is an important focus on what our ports mean to
us, and certainly to your State, as you mentioned. My home
State of New Jersey is, unfortunately, a prime terrorist
target. In fact, the most at-risk area in the entire country
for a terrorist attack is the 2-mile stretch from Newark
Liberty International Airport to the Port of Newark.
And yesterday, I stood in that port with leaders of the
Port Authority and those who labor there to provide for
themselves and their family, and I was reminded again why the
port is so critical. I'm very familiar with the port there. I
was a commissioner of the Port Authority, and I ran a good-
sized company in New Jersey, and was aware of the revenue and
the energy provided by the port. And that port is so critical
and attractive to those who want to hurt us. They know that the
lifeblood of not just our region's economy, but our Nation's
economy exists there.
The Port of Newark is the largest port on the East Coast,
generating $20 billion a year in economic activity. An attack
on this port, or any of the Nation's ports, would be
devastating. Billions of tons of domestic, important import and
export cargo pass through American ports and waterways each
year. And for example, when the Port of Long Beach in
California shut down because of a labor dispute in 2001, it
cost the economy a billion dollars a day. The Brookings
Institution estimated that a detonated weapon of mass
destruction at any one of our ports could cost the American
economy a trillion dollars. It's a major responsibility of
ours--Mr. Chairman, and you wear that mantle well--of ours to
make sure our ports remain secure.
The 9/11 Commission underscored that obligation when it
noted that opportunities to do harm are as great or greater in
maritime and surface transportation than in aviation. When it
comes to preventing future terrorist attacks, we dare not leave
anything to chance. And that's why we passed the SAFE Port Act
in 2006. That law set out a clear roadmap for the Department of
Homeland Security to make sure our ports were protected.
Unfortunately, we're not yet at our destination. We've got
more work to do. And I'm looking forward to hearing from our
witnesses about the progress that has been made to meet the
benchmarks set by that law, and the challenges that remain.
I'm delighted to have these witnesses here, Mr. Chairman. I
congratulate you for having this hearing.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
And now I think we should move in the direction of
admirals. Admiral Papp, we look forward to hearing from you.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ROBERT J. PAPP, COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST
GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Admiral Papp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, good afternoon. And,
to Ranking Member Senator Hutchison, good afternoon to you,
ma'am, and Senator Lautenberg, our long-time supporter. It's
good to see you again, sir.
I'm pleased to appear before you today to discuss this very
important topic of maritime, homeland, and port security. I
have an extensive written statement that I've submitted for the
record, and I would just ask to do a short oral statement to
open up.
The Chairman. All statements are in the record.
Admiral Papp. Thank you.
I have three issues--three brief issues to address, here.
First and foremost, the topic of this hearing, which is port
security, of course. And while we've worked successfully with
our Federal, State, local, foreign, and international partners
to construct a robust maritime homeland and port security
architecture, one of the things that concerns me the most, and
one of the reasons I'm most grateful for this hearing today, is
my concerns about complacency.
One of the things, as the Atlantic Area Commander, that I
put up on our operations brief every morning, is the number
3,119. That's the number of days that transpired between the
first attack on the World Trade Center, in February 1993, and
then the events of September 11, 2001. And each day, we counted
the increasing numbers of days that have passed since 9/11.
Fortunately, we're up, now, to 3,235, so we've surpassed the
period between the first attack and second attack on the Trade
Center. But, what that tells me is, as we go longer and longer
away from that event, we run the risk of our public becoming
complacent.
So, Mr. Chairman, you drawing attention to this very
important topic is good for us, and good for the Nation, and I
thank you for that.
As I stated, 3,235 days have passed since 9/11. And while
we've worked tirelessly to enhance our maritime, homeland, and
port security, we must not let our guard down. We need to be
looking to undertake initiatives that will tighten the security
net in our ports, particularly with respect to the threat posed
by small vessels. These initiatives include, amongst others,
continuing to strengthen an already robust Federal, State, and
local partnerships, working to formalize programs like
America's Waterways Watch to incorporate the presence of
professional mariners and recreational boaters into a
coordinated effort. More vessels on the water can only mean
greater security.
Since 9/11, the Coast Guard has exercised its versatile,
adaptable ships, boats, and aircraft--and, I would say,
versatile and adaptable people, as well--along with our
authorities, partnerships, and capabilities, to create a
layered security triad consisting of maritime security regimes,
maritime domain awareness, and maritime security operations.
This maritime triad, as I refer to it, is like a three-legged
stool; if you forget one of those legs, you're going to subject
yourself to a lack of success. So, we have to concentrate on
all three.
The first leg of the ``stool,'' as I refer to it, is the
maritime security regimes. Maritime security regimes include
domestic and international statutes, regulations, and
agreements. Maritime security regimes constitute the framework
for coordinating partnerships and establishing enforceable
maritime security standards. Examples of that, of course,
include the Maritime Transportation Security Act, the
international maritime organizations, international ship and
port facility code, and, of course, the SAFE Port Act.
The second leg of the ``stool,'' as I refer to it, is
maritime domain awareness. Interagency operation centers, the
nationwide automatic identification system, and long-range
identification and tracking systems, Blue Force Tracking, and
the America's Waterways Watch Initiative, are also important to
maritime domain awareness efforts. These initiatives are the
means to collect, fuse, analyze, and disseminate a common
operating picture and information, not just to the Coast Guard,
but to our partners, as well, and to make us all stronger.
The third leg of this ``stool'' is the Maritime Security
and Response Operations, or MSRO. These elements include
coastal and waterway deterrence patrols, high-risk vessel
escorts, response to threats, and recovery from attacks that
may occur. The MSRO encompasses military outload security,
enforcement of fixed security zones, control of port access
activity and movement, and also includes waterborne security
boardings, airborne use of force, underwater port security, and
deliberate contingency and recovery plans and exercises focused
on regional surge operations.
Ensuring the availability of the--of our Coast Guard
cutters, aircraft, boats, and supporting systems and
infrastructure to conduct these activities has become
increasingly challenging. As Commandant, I'm committed to
aggressively recapitalizing our assets to sustain fleet
readiness and ensure future mission success. This is a top
priority for me, moving forward.
Of the three concerns I listed, my second concern is my
goal of steadying the service. Among other things, consummating
our modernization effort and consolidating our command-and-
control and mission-support structure within the Coast Guard.
To complete this modernization effort, which was started under
my predecessor, we, of course, need the authorization act. You
giving focus to this and working with the Coast Guard to
continue the authorization act, moving forward, is deeply
appreciated, and I look forward to working with you and the
Committee to complete this very important initiative so that we
can continue and finalize the structure of our Coast Guard.
And my last concern is actually a statement of pride. I
want to tell you how absolutely proud I am of the men and women
of the Coast Guard. We're now 3 months into the Deepwater
Horizon response, and a tremendous number of our Reserve and
active-duty personnel, ships, and aircraft, those same
versatile and adaptable assets and people I spoke of earlier,
are deployed to the Gulf in support of the National Incident
Commander. Our most important mission is to continue our all-
hands-on-deck effort to protect the Gulf, its people, and their
way of life.
As a force provider to the National Incident Commander,
it's my duty, however, to closely monitor the impact of this
response on our people and our assets. Our Coast Guard men and
women are focused and committed to accomplishing this all-
important mission. Coastguardsmen were first on scene,
performing search-and-rescue operations when the Deepwater
Horizon rig exploded, resulting in the tragic loss of life of
11 people. And our versatile and adaptable people and assets
transitioned as this incident evolved into the largest and most
extensive environmental disaster that our Nation has faced, and
we are proud that we are leading, along with the Department of
Homeland Security and across the entire interagency, the
largest and most comprehensive response. We will be in the Gulf
until our mission is completed.
In conclusion, while much has been accomplished, much
remains to be done. Opportunities remain to strengthen
relationships, improve maritime domain awareness, recapitalize
our fleet, enhance public vigilance, and refine collaborative
security regimes. The Coast Guard, as a component of the
Department of Homeland Security, is committed to working hand-
in-hand with our many partners to ensure the safety of American
citizens and our ports and waterways.
Again, I look forward to working with this committee to
understand the challenges and to earn your support. I thank you
for the opportunity to testify today, and I look forward to
your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Papp follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral Robert J. Papp, Commandant,
U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security
Good afternoon, Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison and
distinguished members of the Committee. I am Robert Papp, Commandant of
the Coast Guard and I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Coast
Guard's critical role in protecting one of our Nation's most important
economic and strategic lifelines, our Marine Transportation System
(MTS). As the lead Federal agency for U.S. maritime security, the Coast
Guard works with its port partners to build resiliency into the U.S.
MTS. We have come a long way in protecting this system and its users;
however, security challenges remain, and they demand an agile and
technologically advanced Coast Guard.
Port Security: Mission and Scope
The Coast Guard's enduring value to the Nation resides in our
multi-mission authorities, resources and capabilities. The ability to
field versatile assets and personnel with broad authority is perhaps
the Federal Government's most important strength in the maritime
security environment. While each of the Coast Guard's eleven mission
programs primarily supports safety, security or stewardship, all of our
missions can serve additional roles. For example, when Coast Guard
personnel conduct vessel safety inspections, their activities include
verification of immigration documents and validation of crew manifests.
The Coast Guard's safety and security authorities are fully integrated,
providing a suite of unrivaled capabilities to address security in the
maritime and port environment.
The Coast Guard primarily addresses MTS security through its Port,
Waterways and Coastal Security (PWCS) mission, which is carried out
using the Coast Guard's broad authorities and multi-mission assets.
PWCS also benefits from other Coast Guard missions, including: Marine
Safety, Illegal Drug and Migrant Interdiction, Defense Readiness, and
Aids to Navigation missions.
The Coast Guard's holistic approach to port security protects
against internal and cross-border threats, builds versatility, and
supports the safe flow of lawful travel and commerce. Our efforts are
focused on preventing and disrupting terrorist attacks and subversive
acts in the maritime domain and the MTS. Should an attack occur, Coast
Guard resources and competencies are prepared to contribute to a swift
response and recovery.
Critical infrastructure, key resources and large population centers
within or near America's ports represent vulnerabilities that
terrorists may seek to exploit. As such, our port security efforts
leverage the capabilities of the private sector, other Government
agencies, including the Maritime Administration, and the public to
multiply our defenses.
The Coast Guard helps secure over 95,000 miles of coastline, over
300 ports and over 10,000 miles of navigable waterways. Coast Guard and
its port partners provide security for myriad landside connections that
allow the various transportation modes to move people and goods to,
from, and on the water. More than $958 billion of international
commerce, including 1.4 billion tons of cargo, is carried within the
MTS. The Coast Guard regulates protection of more than 8 million cruise
ship and ferry passengers, accounting for more than 65 million
passenger-miles a year. The Coast Guard also regulates waterway
security for numerous boaters operating almost 13 million registered
recreational vessels. Finally, the Coast Guard protects the movement of
numerous high-value military vessels and maritime cargo in support of
ongoing overseas contingency operations.
The demand for maritime escort and security services continues to
grow. Over the last few years, for example, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)
imports have doubled, from 1.5 percent to 3 percent of gas used, and
are estimated to rise to more than 15 percent by 2025. This demand has
triggered increased applications for facilities and development of new
facilities, which, in turn, will likely result in an increased number
of LNG vessel transits. Our challenge is to manage risk and deploy our
limited assets where they achieve the greatest effect, and to both
implement effective security measures while supporting the smooth flow
of legitimate commerce. Under the current policies for Coast Guard
asset utilization, growth in the maritime industry will increase the
demand for Coast Guard capabilities, capacity and partnerships.
Mission Elements
The Coast Guard's role as Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for maritime
security is embedded within the overarching system of maritime
governance. The Coast Guard's systematic, maritime governance model for
port security consists of maritime security regimes, domain awareness,
and maritime security and response operations, which are carried out in
a unified effort by international, governmental, and private
stakeholders. The Coast Guard exercises unique competencies,
capabilities, authorities, and partnerships in an attempt to help
reduce the risk of terrorism and related nefarious acts. It also
engages the private sector through Area Maritime Security Committees,
implementation of the DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS),
America's Waterway Watch (AWW), and local and regional exercises. The
SVSS proactively recognizes that small vessels are a potential means
for exploitation by terrorists, smugglers of weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs), narcotics, aliens, and other contraband, and other
criminals and addresses near-shore security concerns and provides a
coherent framework to improve maritime security and safety.
A System of Maritime Governance
The Coast Guard has extensive statutory authority, presence,
command and control capability, and experience in maritime safety and
security. The Coast Guard employs a holistic layered approach to
maritime security that is designed to detect, deter, and prevent the
methods of terror and terrorists as early as possible in the event
chain. This approach requires rigorous analysis of the terrorist threat
and corresponding risk-reduction strategies and tactics. It facilitates
early warning of maritime-related threats originating in other nations
by way of offshore regions routing into the U.S. For example, through
the 96-hour advanced notice of arrival process, the Coast Guard is able
to screen vessels for potential threats far from the Nation's ports.
Another example of a ``far-from-the-homeland'' element of this layered
security system is the International Port Security (IPS) Program, which
verifies that effective antiterrorism measures have been instituted in
foreign ports to help reduce the risk to U.S. ports.
Port Security--A layered system
The three major elements of the Coast Guard's maritime security
strategy are Maritime Security Regimes, Maritime Domain Awareness, and
Maritime Security and Response Operations.
Maritime Security Regimes
The Maritime Security Regimes element of the Coast Guard's maritime
security strategy includes domestic statutes and regulations, and
international agreements and codes. It is comprised of the ``rules'' to
coordinate partnerships and establish maritime security standards.
Regimes represent the framework that complements efforts to conduct
effective MDA activities and maritime operations. All of the regimes
associated with all Coast Guard missions also support port security
effectiveness.
The 2002 Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) requires that
ships and port facilities assess their vulnerabilities and develop
measures to reduce them. The MTSA also requires that the Coast Guard
periodically assess the effectiveness of antiterrorism measures in both
U.S. and foreign ports and take action in cases in which effective
anti-terrorism measures are not in place. In accordance with the
provisions of the MTSA, the U.S. helped lead the International Maritime
Organization in the development of an international code, designated
the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS). The ISPS
Code contains security-related requirements for governments, port
authorities and shipping companies, together with a series of
guidelines and recommendations for meeting those requirements. The
Coast Guard's IPS Program engages with foreign governments and visits
foreign ports to assess their compliance with the ISPS Code and to
improve security through dialogue.
Additionally, MTSA required the development and implementation of
strategic, regional, vessel and facility security plans to enhance
maritime transportation security. Area Maritime Security Plans are
created by committees established by the Coast Guard and comprised of
Federal, state, tribal, and local agencies and industry
representatives. The Transportation Workers Identification Credential
(TWIC) program, a Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
initiative primarily enforced by the Coast Guard that helps to ensure
that only properly vetted individuals have access to secure areas at
ports, furthers the multilayered approach to the safeguarding of U.S.
ports and maritime critical infrastructure and key resources.
Various programs and strategies have been developed to address
specific threats and risks. The SVSS helps to reduce the small vessel
security threat, and our strategy establishes the rules by which other
vessels are identified as having a potential terrorism threat.
Maritime Domain Awareness
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), the second major element of the
Coast Guard's maritime security strategy, supports the development of
maritime regimes and effective Maritime Security and Response
Operations. MDA requires that all-source intelligence and broad
situational awareness be collected, fused, analyzed, and disseminated,
enabling the United States and other nations to understand activities,
events, and trends that could threaten their security in the maritime
and port environment. MDA consists of what is observable and known as
well as what is anticipated or suspected. Improving MDA requires
continued development of intelligence capabilities and broader maritime
situational awareness that leverages Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR)
capabilities. MDA provides the key Common Operating Picture (COP) of
conditions and activity across the maritime domain. The COP includes
information about vessels, cargo, passengers and crew, and shore-side
infrastructure. As an example of the need for awareness, the Coast
Guard is keenly interested in the real-time location and movements of
certain vessels. These include all High Interest Vessels (which may
pose a threat), High Value Units (certain military vessels), Certain
Dangerous Cargo Vessels, and High Capacity Passenger Vessels. The
Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) is used to analyze and
calculate risk to maritime critical infrastructure and key resources
using threat factors provided by the intelligence community. MSRAM
evaluates the consequence and vulnerability judgments in the field at
the local, regional and national levels to enhance security risk
analysis by informing the Common Operating Picture (COP) at the
tactical, operational and strategic levels.
Interagency Operations Centers, the Nationwide Automatic
Identification System, the Long Range Identification and Tracking
(LRIT) system, and Blue Force Tracking support the MDA effort. These
initiatives provide high-tech means to collect, fuse, analyze, and
disseminate COP information and intelligence. Every Coast Guard unit
has MDA responsibilities and serves as a sensor to increase awareness
and knowledge of the maritime domain. The AWW initiative enlists public
support to report suspicious activity on or near ports, docks, marinas,
riversides, beaches, waterfront communities, or maritime
infrastructure.
Maritime Security and Response Operations (MSRO)
The third major element of the Coast Guard's maritime security
strategy is Maritime Security and Response Operations (MSRO). Ground,
waterborne, and airborne prevention and response operations are
conducted to prevent, disrupt and recover from attacks.
Recognizing that the Coast Guard and its partners cannot be
everywhere all of the time, the Coast Guard conducts Maritime Security
and Response Operations based on risk-informed decision-making models.
Coast Guard forces are trained and equipped to perform MSRO
activities to enhance the Nation's ability to prevent and respond to
maritime terrorism events. Specifically, Deployable Operations Group
(DOG) forces were created to support operational and tactical
commanders, including DOD and other Federal agencies. DOG forces
include Maritime Safety and Security Teams, the Maritime Security
Response Team, Tactical Law Enforcement Teams, Canine Explosive
Detection Teams, and the National Strike Force.
MSRO elements include coastal and waterway deterrence patrols,
high-risk vessel escorts, response to threats, and recovery from
attacks. MSRO encompasses Military Out-Load security support,
enforcement of fixed security zones, and control of port access,
activity, and movement. MSRO also includes waterborne security
boardings, Airborne Use of Force, underwater port security, deliberate,
contingency, and recovery planning and exercises, and focused regional
surge operations. A key element of the offshore portion of the MSRO is
persistent presence of Coast Guard cutters and aircraft that are
regularly engaged in multi-mission operations, such as at-sea
interdiction and enforcement. As appropriate, MSRO forces are being
equipped to respond to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
high-yield explosive threats. The Area Maritime Security Training and
Exercise Program is also an element of MSRO.
FY 2009 Mission Accomplishments
The Coast Guard conducted 49,276 armed waterborne patrols
projecting presence near maritime critical infrastructure or
key resources, 18,690 security boardings of small vessels in
and around U.S. ports, waterways, and coastal regions, 4,000
escorts of high-capacity passenger vessels, such as ferries and
cruise ships, 1,855 security boardings of High Interest Vessels
(designated as posing a greater-than-normal risk to the U.S.),
1,429 escorts of high-value U.S. naval vessels transiting U.S.
waterways, and 660 escorts of vessels carrying Certain
Dangerous Cargoes (CDCs).
In support of Overseas Contingency Operations, the Coast
Guard provided waterside security and escorts for 192 military
outloads throughout the system of 20 predesignated commercial
and military strategic U.S. seaports.
The Coast Guard's MSRAM continued to support risk management
decisions in the execution of the PWCS mission. MSRAM helps
prioritize security risk from terrorist attacks by assessing
the risk between vastly different critical infrastructure
facilities and key resources. MSRAM supported port security
grant funding decisions by enabling DHS to compare various
ports and determine which ports have the highest risk.
The Coast Guard expanded its global vessel track picture
through Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) for
vessels greater than 300 gross tons and improved Automatic
Identification System (AIS) data. LRIT began operation in 2008
and to date over 750 U.S.-flagged vessels have been certified
for carriage. The Coast Guard operates an International Data
Exchange (IDE) that routes vessel positioning data among all
participating LRIT national and regional data centers, as well
as the U.S. national data center. At any given time, the Coast
Guard tracks approximately 2,500 foreign flagged LRIT-equipped
vessels en route to the U.S. or sailing within 1,000 nautical
miles of U.S. territory, as well as U.S. ships around the
globe.
The Coast Guard conducted over 60 international port
security visits/evaluations. These visits ensure foreign nation
compliance with port and facility protocols to increase the
security of commerce bound for the U.S. The Coast Guard also
published eight Port Security Advisories (PSAs) to provide
guidance to the maritime community on security issues related
to piracy.
The Coast Guard equipped and trained additional air stations
around the country to increase its Airborne Use of Force (AUF)
capability. AUF-capable helicopters offer a rapid and potent
deterrence and response to terrorist threats.
As of July 15, 2010, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) has issued nearly 1.5 million
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC). The
Coast Guard began full-time enforcement of TWIC regulations
nation-wide on April 15, 2009. Since then, the Coast Guard
inspected TWICs in port facilities throughout the U.S.
The Coast Guard updated the Nation's 43 Area Maritime
Security Plans in coordination with respective Area Maritime
Security Committees. The revisions incorporate lessons learned
from recent hurricanes to enhance the recovery of the MTS. Per
SAFE Port Act requirements, the plans now integrate the DHS
Strategy to Enhance International Supply Chain Security and
Salvage Response Plans. The new plans align Coast Guard
exercises with the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation
Program.
Coast Guard FORCECOM training teams conducted PWCS Weapons
of Mass Destruction (WMD) equipment training. 3,826 Coast Guard
personnel assigned to boarding teams learned how to use
detection gear and properly wear and maintain protective
clothing.
At 12 designated, key seaports, the Coast Guard developed
Underwater Terrorism Preparedness Plans. The preparation,
maintenance and exercising of these plans increases the Coast
Guard's ability to deter and respond to the threat of
underwater attack.
Coast Guard Maritime Force Protection Units (MFPUs) Bangor,
WA, and Kings Bay, GA, each received a new 87-foot cutter and
64-foot escort boat and crews. MFPUs protect Navy ballistic
missile submarines from terrorist and other threats.
Coast Guard conducted over 14,000 inspections on U.S.-
flagged vessels.
Coast Guard conducted 6,900 dockside safety exams on
commercial fishing vessels.
Coast Guard screened over 75,000 foreign vessel arrivals and
conducted over 9,500 Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) safety
compliance exams and over 8,700 ISPS security compliance exams.
Coast Guard issued 73,168 credentials to qualified merchant
mariners, ensuring the safe, secure, and efficient navigation
of ships.
Conclusion
Port security and the resiliency of the MTS rely on an integrated
approach to safety and security in order to prevent, disrupt or respond
to terrorist attacks or major marine incidents. The Coast Guard's
operational model is flexible, adaptive, efficient and capable of
succeeding in various maritime scenarios to achieve these goals.
While much has been accomplished to protect the MTS, there is also
much more to be done. Opportunity remains to strengthen partnerships,
improve maritime domain awareness through existing sensor integration
and interagency cooperation, enhance public vigilance, and refine
collaborative security regimes. The Coast Guard is committed to working
hand-in-hand with international partners and domestic stakeholders,
including recreational waterway users, commercial maritime interests
and law enforcement partners, to ensure a resilient MTS and the safety
of American citizens. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I
welcome your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, Admiral, very much.
And now Alan Bersin, who is Commissioner of U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, Homeland Security.
STATEMENT OF HON. ALAN BERSIN, COMMISSIONER,
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Bersin. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Madam Ranking
Member, Senator Lautenberg.
As the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection, it's
a privilege to appear before you as you take on the important--
indeed, critical--task of taking a look at the SAFE Port Act of
2006 and preparing for its reauthorization.
We know that the central challenge here is to secure the
flow of goods in and out of the United States, and to do so in
ports that are safe and secure. It seems to us that there is a
central challenge we must confront, and that will take up much
of the dialogue we have here this afternoon; which is that we
must find a way to both enhance the security of our ports and
the flow of our goods at the same time that we provide for an
economically prosperous America and an economically competitive
America.
From the perspective of Customs and Border Protection, we
understand the task to consist of two major dimensions: first,
risk management, and understanding and taking risk management
and its associated concepts to the next level; and second,
building on the partnerships that will be essential between the
private sector and the government to ensure the kind of
security and facilitation we seek.
Preventing and disrupting terrorist threats, including
chemical, radiological, biological, and nuclear attacks, are at
the core of the CBP mission. We pursue a comprehensive and
global strategy, as part of the DHS family of agencies, to
secure containerized cargo. While inspections and operations at
our ports are a key component of our strategy, to fully meet
our responsibilities, we must identify and stop threats before
they arrive at American ports. This requires that we secure the
flow of cargo at each stage of the supply chain--at the port of
origin, while in transit, and when it arrives in the United
States. To accomplish this, CBP pursues a multilayered approach
to security, using a risk management approach that allows us to
apply resources to prioritize enforcement objectives.
At the core of our approach to risk management is the
notion that our borders are not merely juridical lines on a
map--they're not simply the physical barriers that separate us
from foreign nations--but, rather, borders need to be
conceptualized as the flow of goods and people, and it is the
job of CBP, in the concert with other agencies in the
government, to stop dangerous people and dangerous things from
approaching the homeland and entering our country, doing harm
to our people.
At the same time, we have an important role to play in
trade facilitation, in building an economically prosperous
America. Although often presented as being in tension or
conflict, our security and trade facilitation missions, indeed,
are mutually supportive. By utilizing risk-based strategies and
applying a multilayered approach, we can focus our time and
resources on the small percentage of goods that are high-risk
or about which we know the least, which, in turn, allows us to
expedite trade that is low-risk or about which we already know
a great deal.
Our multilayered approach is based on the following core
elements: obtaining information about the cargo, and those
involved in moving it, early in the process; using advanced
targeting techniques and sophisticated logarithms to assess
risk in building a knowledge base about the people and the
companies involved in the supply chain; partnering with the
private sector to secure that supply chain; collaborating with
other Federal agencies and departments, such as the U.S. Coast
Guard, the Food and Drug Administration, the Consumer Product
Safety Commission, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the
Department of Agriculture, among 40 other agencies for which
CBP serves as the executive agent at our ports of entry--
seaports, landports, and airports; working with foreign
governments to foster an effective working relationship between
and among customs regimes; and maintaining robust inspection
regimes, including non-intrusive inspection equipment and
radiation detection technologies, at our ports of entry.
As detailed in my written statement, which the Chairman has
deemed accepted, we're pursuing a number of different
initiatives as part of our approach to secure containerized
cargo. Some of the more notable are trusted-shipper programs,
the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, C-TPAT, and
the prescreening programs, Container Security Initiative, and
the Secure Freight Initiative.
Frankly, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Hutchison, it's time
that we look at these programs, brilliantly conceived and
supported by the Congress, that need to get to the next
generation. We need to get to the next level of Secure Freight
Initiative, CSI, and C-TPAT.
We must also leverage the unique capabilities of the
National Targeting Center Cargo to proactively analyze advance
cargo information using the Automated Targeting System before
shipments reach the United States.
As you know, CBP requires advance electronic cargo
information for all inbound shipments in all modes of
transportation, and then uses advance targeting to identify
potential threats. This is the essence of the risk management
process.
We require the electronic transmission of data, as mandated
by the SAFE Port Act, through the Importer Security Filing and
Additional Carrier Requirements rule, the so-called ``10 plus
2,'' which went into full effect in January of this year. With
10 additional data elements from the importer and 2 from the
carrier regarding the stowage plan, ``10 plus 2'' allows CBP
targeting specialists to identify risk factors earlier in the
supply chain and further in time and space from the U.S.
homeland.
And finally, I know that the 100-percent scanning
requirement, as a matter of law, remains of interest to this
Congress and to our Department. We have been advancing the
screening requirement through pilot projects at five foreign
seaports. We've learned much from these pilots, but they have
also demonstrated a number of significant challenges to the
100-percent requirement. These include limitations with
currently available technology, logistical challenges with the
design and layout of foreign ports, and the high cost of
implementation. As Secretary Napolitano has informed the
Congress, the Department will need to seek the time extensions
authorized by law as we work with the Congress to a more
permanent solution to the issues of security at our ports. The
Secretary, as you know, is committed to working with the
Congress on this issue.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you again for
this opportunity. I look forward to our dialogue and to
responding to your questions regarding the terms and conditions
of the reauthorization of the SAFE Port Act.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bersin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Alan Bersin, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security
Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, esteemed members of
the Committee, it is a privilege and an honor to appear before you
today to discuss U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) work to
secure the flow of goods into and out of the United States--preventing
smuggling and protecting the country from dangerous shipments while
expediting legitimate commerce. CBP pursues a multilayered approach to
security, using a risk management approach that allows us to
strategically apply resources to prioritized enforcement objectives and
threats.
CBP is at the frontline of protecting the Nation from threats,
including those posed by containerized cargo. At the core of that
mission is preventing chemical, radiological, biological, and nuclear
threats, and preventing and disrupting terrorist attacks arising from
border crossings. We also stem the illegal flow of drugs, contraband
and people, protect our agricultural and economic interests from
harmful pests and diseases, protect American businesses from theft of
their intellectual property, enforce textile agreements, determine and
track import safety violations, regulate and facilitate international
trade, collect import duties, facilitate legitimate travel, and enforce
U.S. trade laws. In Fiscal Year 2009, CBP screened 100 percent of the
maritime containers arrived at our seaports through our multilayered
approach--9.8 million in all.
While security is our core mission, CBP also has important trade
responsibilities. Our security and trade facilitation missions are
mutually supportive: by utilizing risk-based strategies, and applying a
multilayered approach, we can focus our time and resources on the small
percentage of goods that are high-risk or about which we know the
least, which in turn allows us to expedite trade that is low-risk or
about which we already know a great deal.
Overview of CBP Approach
We are operating in the age of integrated global supply chains, and
our approach to this environment must be equally comprehensive and
global. While inspections and operations at our ports are a key
component of our strategy, to fully meet our responsibilities, we must
identify and stop threats before they arrive at American ports. This
requires that we secure the flow of cargo at each stage of the supply
chain--at the point of origin, while in transit, and when it arrives in
the United States.
Our multilayered security approach involves:
Obtaining information about cargo and those involved in
moving it early in the process;
Using advanced targeting techniques to assess risk and
building a knowledge base about the people and companies
involved in the supply chain;
Fostering partnerships with the private sector and
collaborating with other Federal agencies and departments, such
as the U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Health and Human
Services, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, and the Department of Agriculture, and
with foreign governments, including through information
sharing;
Expanding enforcement efforts to points earlier in the
supply chain than simply our borders; and
Maintaining robust inspection regimes, including non-
intrusive inspection equipment and radiation detection
technologies, at our ports of entry.
We have asked the trade community to assume its fair share of the
burden as well, to exercise reasonable care in customs matters, to
provide information to better understand the parties to a transaction,
and to invest in the resources necessary to keep up with current
requirements. CBP strives to provide an environment built upon
predictability, transparency, and uniformity in the importing process.
We weigh the cumulative costs of our decisions on business and, when
possible, provide for simplified commercial processing. CBP and the
trade community must be partners, leveraging both parties' expertise.
In addition to addressing security concerns, CBP has also been
aggressive in addressing other public safety concerns, such as product
safety. CBP has established the Commercial Targeting and Analysis
Center (CTAC), which is solely dedicated to import safety concerns. The
Import Safety CTAC serves as a fusion center for CBP and other
government agencies--including the Consumer Product Safety Commission,
the Food and Drug Administration and the Food Safety Inspection
Service--to combine resources and manpower to protect the American
public from harm that could be caused by unsafe imported products. CBP
looks forward to the expansion of this targeting center to include the
participation of additional agencies.
With that background, I would like to discuss the operational
initiatives that help us fulfill the security, trade and public safety
missions I have outlined.
Advance Information
CBP requires advanced electronic cargo information, as mandated in
the Trade Act of 2002 (24-Hour Rule, through regulations), for all
inbound shipments in all modes of transportation. CBP requires the
electronic transmission of additional data, as mandated by the SAFE
Port Act, through the Importer Security Filing and Additional Carrier
Requirements rule (Security Filing ``10+2''), which became effective as
an Interim Final Rule on January 26, 2009, and went into full effect on
January 26, 2010. Under the Security Filing ``10+2'' rule, importers
are responsible for supplying CBP with ten trade data elements 24 hours
prior to vessel lading, and ocean carriers are required to provide
their vessel stow plans no later than 48 hours after departure and
their container status messages no later than 24 hours after creation
or receipt. This advance data allows CBP targeting specialists to
identify risk factors earlier in the supply chain. Security Filing
``10+2'' joins the 24 hour rule, and the C-TPAT program and CSI
discussed below, in collecting advanced information to improve CBP's
targeting efforts.
As part of CBP's layered targeting strategy, the National Targeting
Center--Cargo (NTC-C) proactively analyzes advance cargo tactical and
strategic information using the Automated Targeting System (ATS) before
shipments reach the United States. ATS provides uniform review of cargo
shipments for identification of the highest threat shipments, and
presents data in a comprehensive, flexible format to address specific
intelligence threats and trends. Through targeting rules, the ATS
alerts the user to data that meets or exceeds certain predefined
criteria. National targeting rule sets have been implemented in ATS to
provide threshold targeting for national security risks for all modes
of transportation--sea, truck, rail, and air. ATS is a decision support
tool for CBP officers working in the NTC-C and in Advanced Targeting
Units at our ports of entry and CSI ports abroad.
Once NTC-C has analyzed the advanced information using ATS and
other tools, intelligence briefs are created and disseminated to
officers in the field. This information is used by CBP and other
agencies to support enforcement actions, such as seizures and arrests.
NTC-C has established partnerships and liaisons with other
agencies, both domestically and abroad. Partnerships with Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, the Department of Commerce, and
the Department of Health and Human Services promote information sharing
and the exchange of best practices, while collaboration with foreign
governments results in seizures and detection of threats at our borders
and in foreign ports.
Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)
CBP works with the trade community through the Customs Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), a voluntary public-private
partnership program wherein some members of the trade community adopt
tighter security measures throughout their international supply chain
and in return are afforded benefits such as reduced exams, front of
line examination privileges to the extent possible and practical, and
an assigned Supply Chain Security Specialist who helps them maintain
compliance. C-TPAT has enabled CBP to leverage private sector resources
to enhance supply chain security.
Prospective C-TPAT members submit basic company information and a
security profile through an Internet-based portal system. CBP conducts
records checks on the company in its law enforcement and trade
databases and ensures the company meets the security criteria for its
particular business sector. Members who pass extensive vetting are
certified into the program. Using a risk-based approach, CBP Supply
Chain Security Specialists conduct on-site visits of foreign and
domestic facilities to confirm that the security practices are in place
and operational.
C-TPAT has been a success--membership in the program has grown from
7 companies in its first year to 9,897 as of July 8, 2010. C-TPAT's
certified partners include 4,416 importers, 2,739 carriers, 843
brokers, 809 consolidators/third-party logistic providers, 59 Marine
Port Authority and Terminal Operators, and 1,031 foreign manufacturers.
C-TPAT has conducted 15,207 onsite validations of manufacturing and
logistics facilities in 90 countries. Of those in the program, 313 C-
TPAT importer partners have been granted the highest level of program
benefits having qualified for Tier 3 status, which means that these
companies have exceeded C-TPAT's security requirements.
Additionally, CBP is working with foreign partners to establish bi-
national recognition and enforcement of C-TPAT. CBP currently has
signed mutual recognition agreements with New Zealand (2007), Canada
(2008), Jordan (2008), Japan (2009), and Korea (2010). We are
continuing to work toward similar recognition with the European Union
and other countries.
Container Security Initiative
CBP partners with foreign governments through the Container
Security Initiative (CSI) to prevent and deter terrorist threats before
they reach American ports. CSI enables CBP to identify and inspect
high-risk U.S.-bound cargo containers at foreign ports prior to
departure. Through CSI, CBP stations multidisciplinary teams of
officers to work with host country counterparts to identify and examine
containers that are determined to pose a high risk for terrorist
activity. CSI, the first program of its kind, was announced in January
2002 and is currently operational in 58 foreign seaports--covering more
than 80 percent of the maritime containerized cargo shipped to the
United States.
CBP officers stationed at CSI ports, with assistance from CSI
targeters at the National Targeting Center-Cargo (NTC-C), review 100
percent of the manifests originating and/or transiting those foreign
ports for containers that are destined for the United States. In this
way, CBP identifies and examines high risk containerized maritime cargo
prior to lading at a foreign port and before shipment to the United
States. In FY 2009, CBP officers stationed at CSI ports reviewed over 9
million bills of lading and conducted over 56,000 exams in conjunction
with their host country counterparts.
As the CSI program has matured, CBP looked for opportunities to
increase efficiencies and reduce costs by shifting functions to the
NTC-C. CBP's ability to target high risk containers has progressed to
the point that much of the work can be done from CBP's U.S. location
rather than through a physical presence overseas. CBP is exploring
opportunities to utilize emerging technology in some locations, which
will allow the program to become more efficient and less costly. In
January 2009, CBP began to reduce the number of personnel stationed
overseas who perform targeting functions, increasingly shifting the
targeting of high risk containers to personnel stationed at the NTC-C.
This shift in operations reduces costs without diminishing the
effectiveness of the CSI program. CBP will remain operational in all 58
locations in Fiscal Year 2011 with sufficient personnel in country to
conduct the examinations of high risk shipments with the host
government and to maintain relationships with their host-country
counterparts.
Secure Freight Initiative
The Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) is an effort to enhance the
U.S. government's ability to scan containers for nuclear and
radiological materials at seaports worldwide and better assess the risk
of inbound containers. This initiative is the culmination of our work
with other Federal agencies, foreign governments, the trade community,
and vendors of cutting-edge technology. SFI provides carriers of
maritime containerized cargo greater confidence in the security of the
shipment they are transporting, and increases the likelihood of an
uninterrupted and secure flow of commerce.
In advancing the goal of 100 percent scanning, the Secure Freight
Initiative (SFI) deploys networks of radiation detection, provided by
the Department of Energy, our partner in SFI, and imaging equipment at
five overseas pilot ports. This advanced pilot has encountered a number
of serious challenges to implementing the 100 percent scanning mandate.
Certain challenges are logistical. Many ports simply do not have
one area through which all the cargo passes; there are multiple points
of entry, and cargo is ``transshipped,'' meaning it is moved
immediately from vessel to vessel within the port. These ports are not
configured to put in place detection equipment or to provide space for
secondary inspections. At these ports, scanning 100 percent of cargo
with current systems is currently unworkable without seriously
hindering the flow of shipments or redesigning the ports themselves,
which would require huge capital investment.
Other challenges are the limitations that are inherent in available
technology. DHS currently uses both passive radiation detection and
active x-ray scanning to look for radioactive material in cargo. An
important obstacle is the absence of x-ray scanning technology which
can effectively and automatically detect suspicious anomalies within
cargo containers that should trigger additional inspection. Currently,
DHS personnel visually inspect screens for possible anomalies, but the
scale and the variety of container cargo make this process challenging
and time-consuming. In addition, current x-ray systems have limited
penetration capability; this can limit their ability to find a device
in very dense cargo.
While DHS is pursuing technological solutions to these problems,
expanding screening with available technology would slow the flow of
commerce and drive up costs to consumers without bringing significant
security benefits.
Finally, and on that note, the costs of 100 percent scanning pose a
great challenge, particularly in a struggling economy. Deploying SFI-
type scanning equipment would cost about $8 million per lane for the
more than 2,100 shipping lanes at more than 700 ports around the world
that ship to the United States. On top of these initial costs,
operating costs would be very high. These include only DHS expenses,
not the huge costs that would have to be borne by foreign governments
or industry. It is also important to keep in mind that about 86 percent
of the cargo shipped to the United States is sent from only 58 of those
more than 700 ports. Installing equipment and placing personnel at all
of these ports--even the tiny ones--would strain government resources
without a guarantee of results.
Thus, in order to implement the 100 percent scanning requirement by
the 2012 deadline, DHS would need significant resources for greater
manpower and technology, technologies that do not currently exist, and
the redesign of many ports. As Secretary Napolitano has indicated,
these are all prohibitive challenges that will require the Department
to seek the time extensions authorized by law.
Non Intrusive Inspection/Radiation Detection Technology
The deployment of imaging systems and radiation detection equipment
has made a tremendous contribution to CBP's progress in securing the
supply chains that bring goods into the United States from around the
world against exploitation by terrorist groups. Non-Intrusive
Inspection (NII) technology serves as a force multiplier that allows
officers to detect possible anomalies between the contents of a
container and the manifest. CBP's use of NII allows us to work smarter
and more efficiently in recognizing potential threats.
CBP has aggressively deployed NII and RPM technology. Prior to 9/
11, not a single Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM), and only 64 large-
scale NII systems, were deployed to our country's borders. Today, CBP
uses RPMs to scan 99 percent of all cargo arriving in the U.S. by land
and sea. CBP, in partnership with the DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office (DNDO) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), has
deployed 493 RPMs at northern border land ports of entry; 392 RPMs at
southern border land ports of entry; 451 RPMs at seaports; and 52 RPMs
at mail facilities. Currently, CBP has 267 large-scale NII systems
deployed. Additionally, CBP has deployed over 1,700 Radiation Isotope
Identifier Devices (RIIDs) and over 20,000 Personal Radiation Detectors
(PRDs). These devices allow CBP to examine 100 percent of all
identified high-risk cargo. To date, CBP has used the deployed NII
systems to conduct over 42 million examinations, resulting in over
8,300 narcotic seizures, with a total weight of over 2.6 million
pounds, and over $28.6 million in undeclared currency seizures. Since
RPM program inception in 2002, CBP has scanned over 438 million
conveyances for radiological contraband, resulting in over 2.7 million
alarms. CBP's Laboratories and Scientific Services 24/7 Teleforensic
Center spectroscopy group at the National Targeting Center has
responded to over 23,000 requests from the field for technical
assistance in resolving alarms. To date, 100 percent of alarms have
been successfully adjudicated as innocent, legitimate trade, legitimate
transportation, or non-terrorism related.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you again for this
opportunity to testify about CBP's commitment to enhancing cargo
security. We look forward to continuing to work with the Committee on
this issue. I will be happy to answer any of your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
And then, finally, we hear from Stephen Caldwell, who is
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, working in the
U.S. Government Accountability Office, known as the GAO.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN L. CALDWELL, DIRECTOR,
HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES,
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Caldwell. Thank you very much, Chairman Rockefeller.
And nice to be here, Senator Hutchison and Senator Lautenberg.
Let me summarize my written statement, which has four main
topics: risk management, the small vessel threat, foreign port
security, and container security.
Risk management, as required by the Homeland Security Act,
should continue to be the guiding principle, in terms of
protecting our ports and the seas beyond. Since GAO's original
work looking at risk management used in ports and for other
infrastructure, the Coast Guard has made a great deal of
progress in developing models and methodologies that can be
used, not only to assess risk, but to adjust operations and
make resource decisions.
I think the important thing for all of us to remember about
risk management is it's about managing risks, not eliminating
them. Risk management will still require some level of judgment
by our government officials and other maritime stakeholders. We
won't be able to prevent all threats at all times. At the
Committee's request, we plan to conduct additional work at
ports, which, among other things, will look at how the Coast
Guard is using MSRAM to adjust risks, and even reduce them.
In terms of the small vessel threat, this continues to be
one of the most vexing problems in security in our ports and
coastal areas. Our small boats are large in number, anonymous
in their movement, and ominous in their capabilities.
Current systems for tracking vessels, in some ways, are
geared more for tracking the vessels as targets than they are
for tracking the small vessels that might be attacking them.
While the Coast Guard has activities in place to provide
waterborne escorts to protect cruise ships and hazardous
tankers, the Coast Guard does not have the resources to escort
all of them. Even in places with robust State and local law
enforcement assistance, it would be very difficult to prevent
an unexpected attack by a determined terrorist group using
small vessels. Some steps to mitigate the risks have already
been mentioned, such as expanding America's Waterway Watch
Program, and another one would be to expand District 11's
``Operation Focused Lens'' Program. It has now been 2 years
since DHS issued its Small Vessel Security Strategy, so we look
forward for the Department to issue the implementation plan to
go with it.
Security in our home ports begins at the foreign ports,
where crews and cargoes and passengers are loaded on vessels
that are bound for the United States. The Coast Guard's program
for assessing the security at foreign ports has matured
considerably, as they are now in their third round of visits.
Despite the progress, there will always be some inherent
challenges in this program, related to foreign nation
sovereignty as well as their own resource limitations. Coast
Guard visits to these nations are always going to be somewhat
limited in scope and duration, so they will remain a snapshot
of security in place at the ports we visit and when we visit.
As we indicated in our earlier report, this is an area
where the Coast Guard could benefit from risk management,
concentrating its efforts on nations where perhaps risks are
the greatest.
Regarding container security, the statutory requirement to
double-scan 100 percent of all inbound containers continues to
be a difficult issue, as Mr. Bersin has already noted. While
two of the Secure Freight Initiative pilot ports achieved
relatively high levels of scanning, the other pilot ports ran
into a number of implementation problems.
In its most recent budget, CBP proposed to downgrade three
of the SFI ports to the CSI level, and the budget did not have
any new funds for the Strategic Trade Corridor, which the
Secretary had previously approved as one potential way to
advance toward 100-percent scanning.
Our most recent report on SFI made recommendations to CBP
to conduct feasibility analysis, improve some of their cost
estimates, conduct certain economic analysis, and provide
different alternatives to Congress. And this hearing may, in
some ways, help advance that last recommendation.
Some of the alternative solutions suggested by CBP to the
100-percent scanning, such as ``10 plus 2'' and improved
technologies, for both containers themselves and for the
scanning equipment, are being pursued. We have work underway on
all of these efforts, and will complete those reports later
this year.
In closing, thank you very much for letting me appear here,
and I'm happy to answer any questions about GAO's work on
maritime security.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Caldwell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen L. Caldwell, Director, Homeland Security
and Justice Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss port security issues and
their related challenges. Ports, waterways, and vessels are part of an
economic engine handling more than $700 billion in merchandise
annually, according to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and
an attack on this system could have a widespread impact on global
shipping, international trade, and the global economy. Balancing
security concerns with the need to facilitate the free flow of people
and commerce remains an ongoing challenge for the public and private
sectors alike. Within DHS, component agencies have responsibility for
securing the maritime environment. The U.S. Coast Guard is responsible
for protecting the public, the environment, and U.S. economic and
security interests in any maritime region in which those interests may
be at risk, including America's coasts, ports, and inland waterways.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for keeping
terrorists and their weapons out of the United States, securing and
facilitating trade, and cargo container security.
Various laws have been enacted since the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks to strengthen port security. The Homeland Security
Act of 2002 \1\ charges DHS with establishing a risk management
framework across the Federal Government to protect the Nation's
critical infrastructure and key resources. In addition, much of a new
port security framework was set in place by the Maritime Transportation
Security Act of 2002 (MTSA).\2\ Enacted in November 2002, MTSA was
designed, in part, to help protect the Nation's ports and waterways
from terrorist attacks by requiring a wide range of security
improvements. Among the requirements included in MTSA were: (1)
conducting vulnerability assessments for port facilities and vessels;
(2) developing security plans to mitigate identified risks for the
national maritime system, ports, port facilities, and vessels; and (3)
establishing a process to assess foreign ports from which vessels
depart on voyages to the United States. The Security and Accountability
For Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006 later directed the Secretary of
Homeland Security to, among other things, increase the security of
container cargo bound for the United States by requiring CBP to
establish a pilot program to test the feasibility of scanning 100
percent of U.S.-bound containers at foreign ports.\3\ Further, in
August 2007, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act were enacted and provide, among other things, that by July 2012, a
container loaded on a vessel in a foreign port shall not enter the
United States unless that container is scanned before it is loaded onto
the vessel.\4\
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\1\ Pub. L. No. 107-296, 201, 116 Stat. 2135, 2144 (2002).
\2\ Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002).
\3\ Pub. L. No. 109-347, 231, 120 Stat. 1884, 1915-16 (2006).
\4\ Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1701(a), 121 Stat. 266, 489-90 (2007).
The law defines scanning to be an examination with both nonintrusive
imaging equipment and radiation detection equipment. In addition, while
the law states that cargo containers are not to enter the United States
unless they were scanned at a foreign port, actual participation in the
program by sovereign foreign governments and ports is voluntary.
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My statement today is based on related GAO reports and testimonies
issued from December 2005 through June 2010 addressing risk management
and port security, and also includes selected updates--conducted in
July 2010--to the information provided in these products and on the
actions agencies have taken to address recommendations made in these
products that are also discussed in this statement. These products
include our assessment of the progress that DHS and its component
agencies have made to strengthen port security, the challenges that
remain, and recommendations for improvement.\5\ The details on the
scope and methodology for those reviews are available in our published
products. The selected updates include a review of: (a) the Coast
Guard's and CBP's Fiscal Year 2011 Congressional budget justification
and (b) CBP's Fiscal Year 2010 Report to Congress on supply chain
security. In particular, my statement addresses the extent to which DHS
and its component agencies have made progress and face challenges
regarding: (1) strengthening risk management, (2) reducing the risk of
small-vessel threats,\6\ (3) implementing foreign port assessments, and
(4) enhancing supply chain security. We conducted this work in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
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\5\ See the list of related GAO products at the end of this
statement.
\6\ According to DHS's Small Vessel Security Strategy, ``small
vessels'' are characterized as any watercraft--regardless of method of
propulsion--less than 300 gross tons, and used for recreational or
commercial purposes.
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In summary, DHS and its components agencies--the Coast Guard and
CBP--have taken various actions to implement port security legislation
and enhance port security. These efforts include: (1) the Coast Guard's
development of a risk assessment model to help prioritize limited
resources; (2) DHS and the Coast Guard's development of a strategy and
programs to reduce the risks associated with small vessels, such as a
community outreach program, vessel tracking systems, and security
operations; (3) the Coast Guard's implementation of the International
Port Security Program to assess security measures in foreign ports; and
(4) CBP's efforts to scan U.S.-bound cargo containers. Although these
initiatives have helped to improve port security, challenges remain,
including resource constraints; the lack of technology to track and
identify small vessels; sovereignty concerns over the Coast's Guard's
visits to foreign ports; and a variety of political, logistical, and
technological barriers to scanning all cargo containers. We have made
recommendations to DHS in prior reports to help address these
challenges, and DHS generally concurred with our recommendations in
these reports.
The Coast Guard Has Made Progress in Improving Its Risk Management
In December 2005, we reported that risk management, a strategy for
helping policymakers make decisions about assessing risks, allocating
resources, and taking actions under conditions of uncertainty, had been
endorsed by Congress and the President as a way to strengthen the
Nation against possible terrorist attacks against ports and other
infrastructure.\7\ Risk management has long been used in such areas as
insurance and finance, but at the time its application to domestic
terrorism had no precedent. We noted that unlike storms and accidents,
terrorism involves an adversary with deliberate intent to destroy, and
the probabilities and consequences of a terrorist act are poorly
understood and difficult to predict. The size and complexity of
homeland security activities and the number of organizations involved--
both public and private--add another degree of difficulty to the task.
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\7\ GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess
Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical
Infrastructure, GAO-06-91 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005).
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We have examined Coast Guard efforts to implement risk management
for a number of years, noting how the Coast Guard's risk management
framework developed and evolved. In 2005, we reported that of the three
components GAO reviewed--the Coast Guard, the Office for Domestic
Preparedness (this office's function is now within the Federal
Emergency Management Agency), and the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate (now the National Protection and
Preparedness Directorate)--the Coast Guard had made the most progress
in establishing a foundation for using a risk management approach.
While the Coast Guard had made progress in all five risk management
phases,\8\ its greatest progress had been made in conducting risk
assessments--that is, evaluating individual threats, the degree of
vulnerability in maritime facilities, and the consequences of a
successful attack.\9\ However, we reported that those assessments were
limited because they could not compare and prioritize relative risks of
various infrastructures across ports. At the time the Coast Guard had
actions under way to address the challenges it faced in each risk
management phase and we did not make recommendations in those areas
where the Coast Guard had actions well under way. Several of these
actions were based, in part, on briefings GAO held with agency
officials. Our recommendations were designed to spotlight those areas
in which additional steps were most needed to implement a risk
management approach to Coast Guard port security activities. We
recommended that the Coast Guard take action to:
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\8\ The five phases of the risk management framework developed by
GAO are: (1) setting strategic goals and objectives, and determining
constraints; (2) assessing the risks; (3) evaluating alternatives for
addressing these risks; (4) selecting the appropriate alternatives; and
(5) implementing the alternatives and monitoring the progress made and
results achieved.
\9\ Risk assessment is a function of: (1) threat--the likelihood
that a particular asset, system, or network will suffer an attack or an
incident; (2) vulnerability--the likelihood that a characteristic of,
or flaw in, an asset's, system's, or network's design, location,
security posture, process, or operation renders it susceptible to
destruction, incapacitation, or exploitation by terrorist or other
intentional acts, mechanical failures, and natural hazards; and (3)
consequence--the negative effects on public health and safety, the
economy, public confidence in institutions, and the functioning of
government, both direct and indirect, that can be expected if an asset,
system, or network is damaged, destroyed, or disrupted by a terrorist
attack, natural disaster, or other incident.
establish a stronger linkage between local and national risk
assessment efforts--an action that could involve, for example,
strengthening the ties between local assessment efforts, such
as area maritime security plans, and national risk assessment
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activities; and
ensure that procedures for evaluating alternatives and
making management decisions consider the most efficient use of
resources--actions that could entail, for example, refining the
degree to which risk management information is integrated into
the annual cycle of program and budget review.
Since we made those recommendations, both DHS and the Coast Guard
have made progress implementing a risk management approach toward
critical infrastructure protection. In 2006, DHS issued the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), which is DHS's base plan that
guides how DHS and other relevant stakeholders should use risk
management principles to prioritize protection activities within and
across each critical infrastructure sector in an integrated and
coordinated fashion.\10\ In 2009, DHS updated the NIPP to, among other
things, increase its emphasis on risk management, including an expanded
discussion of risk management methodologies and discussion of a common
risk assessment approach that provided core criteria for these
analyses.\11\ For its part, the Coast Guard has made progress assessing
risks and integrating the results of its risk management efforts into
resource allocation decisions. Regarding risk assessments, the Coast
Guard transitioned its risk assessment model from the Port Security
Risk Assessment Tool (PS-RAT) to the Maritime Security Risk Assessment
Model (MSRAM). In 2005 we reported that the PS-RAT was designed to
allow ports to prioritize resource allocations within, not between,
ports to address risk most efficiently. However, the new MSRAM can
assess risk across ports and is used by every Coast Guard unit and
assesses the risk--threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences--of a
terrorist attack based on different scenarios; that is, it combines
potential targets with different means of attack, as recommended by the
NIPP. The Coast Guard uses the model to help implement its strategy and
concentrate maritime security activities when and where relative risk
is believed to be the greatest. According to the Coast Guard, the
model's underlying methodology is designed to capture the security risk
facing different types of targets, allowing comparison between
different targets and geographic areas at the local, regional, and
national levels. We have also reported that the Federal Emergency
Management Agency has included MSRAM results in its Port Security Grant
Program guidelines as one of the data elements included in determining
grant awards to assist in directing grants to the ports of greatest
concern or at highest risk.
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\10\ Critical infrastructure are systems and assets, whether
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that their
incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on national
security, national economic security, national public health or safety,
or any combination of those matters. Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 7 divided up the critical infrastructure in the United States
into 17 industry sectors, such as transportation, energy, and
communications, among others. In 2008, DHS established an 18th sector--
Critical Manufacturing.
\11\ The framework for the updated NIPP includes six components:
(1) set goals and objectives; (2) identify assets, systems, and
networks; (3) assess risks; (4) prioritize; (5) implement programs; and
(6) measure effectiveness. See GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Update to National Infrastructure Protection Plan Includes Increased
Emphasis on Risk Management and Resilience, GAO-10-296 (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 5, 2010).
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With regard to the integration of risk management results into the
consideration of risk mitigation alternatives and the management
selection process, Coast Guard officials stated that the Coast Guard
uses MSRAM to inform allocation decisions, such as the deployment of
local resources and grants. We have also reported that at the national
level, the Coast Guard uses MSRAM results for: (1) long-term strategic
resource planning, (2) identifying capabilities needed to combat future
terrorist threats, and (3) identifying the highest-risk scenarios and
targets in the maritime domain. For example, Coast Guard officials
reported that results are used to refine the Coast Guard's requirements
for the number of required vessel escorts and patrols of port
facilities. At the local level, the Captain of the Port \12\ can use
MSRAM as a tactical planning tool. The model can help identify the
highest risk scenarios, allowing the Captain of the Port to prioritize
needs and better deploy security assets.\13\ The 2011 Congressional
Budget Justification showed that the Coast Guard uses risk or relative
risk to direct resources to the mitigation of the highest risk. For
example, the use of risk management in the allocation of resources that
is specific to port security concerns the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal
Security program. This program has a performance goal to manage terror-
related risk in the U.S. Maritime Domain to an acceptable level. The
Coast Guard uses a program measure to direct resources to the programs
that reduce risk the most based on the amount invested. Based on the
development of the MSRAM assessment process and the use of risk
management analysis results in its allocation of resources, we believe
that the Coast Guard has addressed the recommendations discussed
earlier concerning risk management.\14\
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\12\ The Captain of the Port is the Coast Guard officer designated
by the Commandant of the Coast Guard to enforce within his or her
respective areas port safety and security and marine environmental
protection regulations, including, without limitation, regulations for
the protection and security of vessels, harbors, and waterfront
facilities.
\13\ For more information on the use of MSRAM see GAO, Maritime
Security: Varied Actions Taken to Enhance Cruise Ship Security, but
Some Concerns Remain, GAO-10-400 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 9, 2010).
\14\ We have work planned for this committee to address a request
concerning port security planning that will include a more detailed
examination of MSRAM.
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DHS and the Coast Guard Have Taken Several Actions to Address the
Small-Vessel Threat but Challenges Remain in Mitigating the
Risk
In recent years, we reported that concerns had arisen about the
security risks posed by small vessels. In its April 2008 Small Vessel
Security Strategy, DHS identified the four gravest risk scenarios
involving the use of small vessels for terrorist attacks, which include
the use of a small vessel as: (1) a waterborne improvised explosive
device, (2) a means of smuggling weapons into the United States, (3) a
means of smuggling humans into the United States, and (4) a platform
for conducting a standoff attack--an attack that uses a rocket or other
weapon launched at a sufficient distance to allow the attackers to
evade defensive fire.\15\ According to the Commandant of the Coast
Guard, small vessels pose a greater threat than shipping containers for
nuclear smuggling.\16\ Some of these risks have been shown to be real
through attacks conducted outside U.S. waters, but--as we reported in
December 2009--no small-vessel attacks have taken place in the United
States. Many vessels frequently travel among small vessels that operate
with little scrutiny or notice, and some have suffered waterborne
attacks overseas by terrorist or pirates who operated from small
vessels. For example, at least three cruise ships have been attacked by
pirates on small boats while armed with automatic weapons and rocket
propelled grenades, although the three vessels were able to evade the
pirates by either maneuvering or fighting back.\17\ Oil tankers have
also been attacked. For example, in October 2002, a small vessel filled
with explosives rammed the side of an oil tanker off the coast of
Yemen.\18\ The concern about small-vessel attacks is exacerbated by the
fact that some vessels, such as cruise ships, sail according to precise
schedules and preplanned itineraries that could provide valuable
information to terrorists in preparing for and carrying out an attack
against a vessel.
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\15\ Department of Homeland Security, Small Vessel Security
Strategy (Washington, D.C., April 2008).
\16\ From testimony delivered by Vice Admiral Thad Allen, Chief of
Staff, United States Coast Guard, during a hearing on the Coast Guard
role in border and maritime security, before the Committee on
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, U.S. Senate (Apr. 6,
2006).
\17\ For more information on cruise ship security, see GAO-10-400.
\18\ GAO, Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address
Challenges in Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy
Commodity Tankers, GAO-08-141 (Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2007).
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DHS and the Coast Guard have developed a strategy and programs to
reduce the risks associated with small vessels; however, they face
ongoing challenges related to some of these efforts. The following
discusses some of our key findings with regard to reducing the risks
associated with small vessels:
Small Vessel Security Strategy. DHS released its Small
Vessel Security Strategy in April 2008, as part of its effort
to mitigate the vulnerability of vessels to waterside attacks
from small vessels, and the implementation plan for the
strategy is under review. According to the strategy, its intent
is to reduce potential security and safety risks posed by small
vessels through operations that balance fundamental freedoms,
adequate security, and continued economic stability.\19\ After
review by DHS, the Coast Guard, and CBP, the draft
implementation plan was forwarded to the Office of Management
and Budget in April 2010, but the release of the plan has not
been approved by the Office of Management and Budget.
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\19\ The goals of the Small Vessel Security Strategy are to: (1)
develop and leverage a strong partnership with the small-vessel
community and public and private sectors; (2) enhance maritime security
and safety; (3) leverage technology to enhance the ability to detect,
determine intent, and when necessary, interdict small vessels; and (4)
enhance coordination, cooperation, and communications between Federal,
state, local, and tribal stakeholders, the private sector, and
international partners.
Community Outreach. Consistent with the Small Vessel
Security Strategy's goal to develop and leverage strong
partnerships with the small-vessel community, the Coast Guard,
as well as other agencies--such as the New Jersey State Police,
have several outreach efforts to encourage the boating
community to share threat information; however, the Coast Guard
program faces resource limitations. For example, the Coast
Guard's program to conduct outreach to the boating community
for their help in detecting suspicious activity, America's
Waterway Watch, lost the funding it received through a
Department of Defense readiness training program for military
reservists in Fiscal Year 2008. Now it must depend on the
activities of the Coast Guard Auxiliary, a voluntary
organization, for most of its outreach efforts. In addition to
America's Waterway Watch, the Coast Guard piloted a regional
initiative--Operation Focused Lens--to increase public
awareness of suspicious activity in and around U.S. ports, and
direct additional resources toward gathering information about
the most likely points of origin for an attack, such as
marinas, landings, and boat ramps. According to Coast Guard
officials, the agency views Operation Focused Lens to be a best
practice, and the agency is considering plans to expand the
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program or integrate it into other existing programs.
Vessel Tracking. In December 2009, we reported that the
Coast Guard was implementing two major unclassified systems to
track a broad spectrum of vessels; however, these systems
generally could not track small vessels.\20\ The Coast Guard
and other agencies have other technology systems, though--
including cameras and radars--that can track small vessels
within ports, but these systems were not installed at all ports
or did not always work in bad weather or at night. Even with
systems in place to track small vessels, there was widespread
agreement among maritime stakeholders that it is very difficult
to detect threatening activity by small vessels without prior
knowledge of a planned attack.
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\20\ For more information on vessel tracking systems, see GAO,
Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but
the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed, GAO-09-337 (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 17, 2009).
Nuclear Material Detection Efforts. DHS has developed and
tested equipment for detecting nuclear material on small
vessels; however, efforts to use this equipment in a port area
have been limited to pilot programs. DHS is currently
conducting 3-year pilot programs to design, field test, and
evaluate equipment and is working with CBP, the Coast Guard,
state, local, tribal officials, and others as they develop
procedures for screening. These pilot programs are scheduled to
end in 2010, when DHS intends to decide the future path of
screening of small vessels for nuclear and radiological
materials. According to DHS officials, initial feedback from
Federal, state, and local officials involved in the pilot
programs has been positive. DHS hopes to sustain the
capabilities created through the pilot programs through Federal
grants to state and local authorities through the port security
grant program.\21\
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\21\ For more information, see GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling:
DHS Has Made Some Progress but Not Yet Completed a Strategic Plan for
Its Global Nuclear Detection Efforts or Closed Identified Gaps, GAO-10-
883T (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010).
Security Activities. The Coast Guard also conducts various
activities to provide waterside security including boarding
vessels, escorting vessels into ports, and enforcing fixed
security zones, although they are not always able to meet
standards related to these activities. Through its Operation
Neptune Shield, the Coast Guard sets the standards for local
Coast Guard units to meet for some of these security
activities. Although the Coast Guard units may receive some
assistance from other law enforcement agencies in carrying out
these security activities, Coast Guard data indicates that some
units are not able to meet these standards due to resource
constraints. However, the Coast Guard's guidance allows the
Captain of the Port the latitude to shift resources to other
priorities when deemed necessary, for example when resources
are not available to fulfill all missions simultaneously. The
planned decommissioning of five Maritime Safety and Security
Teams--a domestic force for mitigating and responding to
terrorist threats or incidents--may continue to strain Coast
Guard resources in meeting security requirements. Although
remaining teams are to maintain readiness to respond to
emerging events and are to continue performing routine security
activities, such as vessel escorts, their ability to support
local units in meeting operational activity goals may be
diminished.
The Coast Guard Has a Program in Place to Assess the Security of
Foreign Ports, but Challenges Remain in Implementing the
Program
The security of domestic ports also depends upon security at
foreign ports where cargoes bound for the United States originate. To
help secure the overseas supply chain, MTSA required the Coast Guard to
assess security measures in foreign ports from which vessels depart on
voyages to the United States and, among other things, recommend steps
necessary to improve security measures in those ports. In response, the
Coast Guard established a program, called the International Port
Security Program, in April 2004. Under this program, the Coast Guard
and host nations review the implementation of security measures in the
host nations' ports against established security standards, such as the
International Maritime Organization's International Ship and Port
Facility Security (ISPS) Code.\22\ Coast Guard teams have been
established to conduct country visits, discuss security measures
implemented, and collect and share best practices to help ensure a
comprehensive and consistent approach to maritime security in ports
worldwide. Subsequently, in October 2006, the SAFE Port Act required
the Coast Guard to reassess security measures at such foreign ports at
least once every 3 years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ The International Port Security Program uses the ISPS Code as
the benchmark by which it measures the effectiveness of a country's
antiterrorism measures in a port. The code was developed after the
September 11 attacks and established measures to enhance the security
of ships and port facilities with a standardized and consistent
security framework. The ISPS Code requires facilities to conduct an
assessment to identify threats and vulnerabilities and then develop
security plans based on the assessment. The requirements of this code
are performance-based; therefore compliance can be achieved through a
variety of security measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As we reported in October 2007, Coast Guard officials told us that
challenges exist in implementing the International Port Security
Program.\23\ Reluctance by some countries to allow the Coast Guard to
visit their ports due to concerns over sovereignty was a challenge
cited by program officials in completing their first round of port
visits. According to these officials, before permitting Coast Guard
officials to visit their ports, some countries insisted on visiting and
assessing a sample of U.S. ports. The Coast Guard was able to
accommodate their request through the program's reciprocal visit
feature in which the Coast Guard hosts foreign delegations to visit
U.S. ports and observe ISPS Code implementation in the United States.
This subsequently helped gain the cooperation of the countries in
hosting a Coast Guard visit to their own ports. However, as Coast Guard
program officials stated, sovereignty concerns may still be an issue,
as some countries may be reluctant to host a comprehensive country
visit on a recurring basis because they believe the frequency is too
high.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ GAO, Maritime Security. The SAFE Port Act. Status and
Implementation One Year Later, GAO-08-126T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30,
2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another challenge program officials cited is having limited ability
to help countries build on or enhance their capacity to implement the
ISPS Code requirements. Program officials stated that while their
visits provide opportunities for them to identify potential areas to
improve or help sustain the security measures put in place, other than
sharing best practices or providing presentations on security
practices, the program does not currently have the resources to
directly assist countries, particularly those that are poor, with more
in-depth training or technical assistance. To overcome this, program
officials have worked with other agencies (e.g., the Departments of
Defense and State) and international organizations (e.g., the
Organization of American States) to secure funding for training and
assistance to countries where port security conferences have been held
(e.g., the Dominican Republic and the Bahamas).
CBP Has Established a Program to Scan U.S.-Bound Cargo Containers, but
Challenges to Expanding the Program Remain
Another key concern in maritime security is the effort to secure
the supply chain to prevent terrorists from shipping weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) in one of the millions of cargo containers that
arrive at U.S. ports each year. CBP has developed a layered security
strategy to mitigate the risk of an attack using cargo containers.
CBP's strategy is based on a layered approach of related programs that
attempt to focus resources on potentially risky cargo shipped in
containers while allowing other cargo containers to proceed without
unduly disrupting commerce into the United States. The strategy is
based on obtaining advanced cargo information to identify high-risk
containers, utilizing technology to examine the content of containers,
and partnerships with foreign governments and the trade industry. One
of the programs in this layered security strategy is the Secure Freight
Initiative (SFI). In December 2006, in response to SAFE Port Act
requirements, DHS, and the Department of Energy (DOE) jointly announced
the formation of the SFI pilot program to test the feasibility of
scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound container cargo at three foreign
ports (Puerto Cortes, Honduras; Qasim, Pakistan; and Southampton,
United Kingdom). According to CBP officials, while initiating the SFI
program at these ports satisfied the SAFE Port Act requirement, CBP
also selected the ports of Busan, South Korea; Hong Kong; Salalah,
Oman; and Singapore to more fully demonstrate the capability of the
integrated scanning system at larger, more complex ports. As of April
2010, SFI has been operational at five of these seven seaports.
In October 2009, we reported that CBP has made some progress in
working with the SFI ports to scan U.S.-bound cargo containers; but
because of challenges to expanding scanning operations, the feasibility
of scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers at over 600
foreign seaports remains largely unproven.\24\ CBP and DOE have been
successful in integrating images of scanned containers onto a single
computer screen that can be reviewed remotely from the United States.
They have also been able to use these initial ports as a test bed for
new applications of existing technology, such as mobile radiation
scanners. However, the SFI ports' level of participation, in some
cases, has been limited in terms of duration (e.g., the Port of Hong
Kong participated in the program for approximately 16 months) or scope
(e.g., the Port of Busan, Korea, allowed scanning in one of its eight
terminals). In addition, the Port of Singapore withdrew its agreement
to participate in the SFI program and, as of April 2010, the Port of
Oman had not begun scanning operations. Furthermore, since the
inception of the SFI program in October 2007, no participating port has
been able to achieve 100 percent scanning. While 54 to 86 percent of
the U.S.-bound cargo containers were scanned at three comparatively
low-volume ports that are responsible for less than 3 percent of
container shipments to the United States, sustained scanning rates
above 5 percent have not been achieved at two comparatively larger
ports--the type of ports that ship most containers to the United
States. Scanning operations at the SFI ports have encountered a number
of challenges--including safety concerns, logistical problems with
containers transferred from rail or other vessels, scanning equipment
breakdowns, and poor-quality scan images. Both we and CBP had
previously identified many of these challenges, and CBP officials are
concerned that they and the participating ports cannot overcome
them.\25\ In October 2009, we recommended that DHS conduct a
feasibility analysis of implementing the 100 percent scanning
requirement in light of the challenges faced.\26\ DHS concurred with
our recommendation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ GAO, Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit
Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing
the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers, GAO-10-12
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2009).
\25\ GAO, Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent
of U.S.-Bound Cargo Containers, GAO-08-533T (Washington, D.C.: June 12,
2008).
\26\ GAO-10-12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP and DOE spent approximately $100 million through June 2009 on
implementing and operating the SFI program, but CBP has not developed a
comprehensive estimate for future U.S. program costs, or conducted a
cost-benefit analysis that compares the costs and benefits of the 100
percent scanning requirement with other alternatives. The SAFE Port Act
requires CBP to report on costs for implementing the SFI program at
foreign ports, but CBP has not yet estimated total U.S. program costs
because of both the lack of a decision by DHS on a clear path forward
and the unique set of challenges that each foreign port presents. While
uncertainties exist regarding a path forward for the program, a
credible cost estimate consistent with cost estimating best practices
could better aid DHS and CBP in determining the most effective way
forward for SFI and communicating the magnitude of the costs to
Congress for use in annual appropriations. To address this, in October
2009, we recommended that CBP develop comprehensive and credible
estimates of total U.S. program costs.\27\ DHS concurred with our
recommendation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ GAO-10-12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP and DOE have paid the majority of SFI costs for operating the
SFI program. The SAFE Port and 9/11 Commission Acts do not address the
issue of who is expected to pay the cost of developing, maintaining,
and using the infrastructure, equipment, and people needed for the 100
percent scanning requirement, but implementing the requirement would
entail costs beyond U.S. Government program costs, including those
incurred by foreign governments and private terminal operators, and
could result in higher prices for American consumers. CBP has not
estimated these additional economic costs, though they are relevant in
assessing the balance between improving security and maintaining trade
capacity and the flow of cargo. To address this, in October 2009, we
recommended that DHS conduct a cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the
costs and benefits of achieving 100 percent scanning as well as other
alternatives for enhancing container security.\28\ Such an analysis
could provide important information to CBP and to Congress to determine
the most effective way forward to enhance container security. DHS
agreed in part with our recommendation that it develop a cost-benefit
analysis of 100 percent scanning, acknowledging that the recommended
analyses would better inform Congress, but stated the recommendations
should be directed to the Congressional Budget Office. While the
Congressional Budget Office does prepare cost estimates for pending
legislation, we think the recommendation is appropriately directed to
CBP. Given its daily interaction with foreign customs services and its
direct knowledge of port operations, CBP is in a better position to
conduct any cost-benefit analysis and bring results to Congress for
consideration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ GAO-10-12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senior DHS and CBP officials acknowledge that most, if not all
foreign ports, will not be able to meet the July 2012 target date for
scanning all U.S.-bound cargo. Recognizing the challenges to meeting
the legislative requirement, DHS expects to grant a blanket extension
to all foreign ports pursuant to the statue, thus extending the target
date for compliance with this requirement by 2 years, to July 2014. In
addition, the Secretary of Homeland Security approved the ``strategic
trade corridor strategy,'' an initiative to scan 100 percent of U.S.-
bound containers at selected foreign ports where CBP believes it will
mitigate the greatest risk of WMD entering the United States. According
to CBP, the data gathered from SFI operations will help to inform
future deployments to strategic locations. CBP plans to evaluate the
usefulness of these deployments and consider whether the continuation
of scanning operations adds value in each of these locations, and
potential additional locations that would strategically enhance CBP
efforts. While the strategic trade corridor strategy may improve
container security, it does not achieve the legislative requirement to
scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound containers. According to CBP, it does
not have a plan for full-scale implementation of the statutory
requirement by July 2012 because challenges encountered thus far in
implementing the SFI program indicate that implementation of 100
percent scanning worldwide by the 2012 deadline will be difficult to
achieve. However, CBP has not performed a feasibility analysis of
expanding 100 percent scanning, as required by the SAFE Port Act. To
address this, in October 2009, we recommended that CBP conduct a
feasibility analysis of implementing 100 percent scanning and provide
the results, as well as alternatives to Congress, in order to determine
the best path forward to strengthen container security.\29\ DHS
concurred with our recommendation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ GAO-10-12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In DHS's Congressional Budget Justification FY 2011, CBP requested
to decrease the SFI program's $19.9 million budget by $16.6 million.
According to the budget justification, in Fiscal Year 2011, SFI
operations will be discontinued at three SFI ports--Puerto Cortes,
Honduras; Southampton, United Kingdom; Busan, South Korea--and the SFI
program will be established at the Port of Karachi, Pakistan.
Furthermore, CBP's budget justification did not request any funds to
implement the strategic trade corridor strategy.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be
happy to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Committee
may have at this time.
Related GAO Products
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Some Progress but Not Yet
Completed a Strategic Plan for Its Global Nuclear Detection Efforts or
Closed Identified Gaps. GAO-10-883T. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010.
Maritime Security: Varied Actions Taken to Enhance Cruise Ship
Security, but Some Concerns Remain. GAO-10-400. Washington, D.C.: April
9, 2010.
Coast Guard: Deployable Operations Group Achieving Organizational
Benefits, but Challenges Remain. GAO-10-433R. Washington, D.C.: April
7, 2010.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Update to National
Infrastructure Protection Plan Includes Increased Emphasis on Risk
Management and Resilience. GAO-10-296. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2010.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Requested Fiscal Year 2011 Budget,
Past Performance, and Current Challenges. GAO-10-411T. Washington,
D.C.: February 25, 2010.
Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would
Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement
to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12. Washington,
D.C.: October 30, 2009.
Transportation Security: Comprehensive Risk Assessments and
Stronger Internal Controls Needed to Help Inform TSA Resource
Allocation. GAO-09-492. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2009.
Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information,
but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed. GAO-09-337.
Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2009.
Risk Management: Strengthening the Use of Risk Management
Principles in Homeland Security. GAO-08-904T. Washington, D.C.: June
25, 2008.
Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.-
Bound Cargo Containers. GAO-08-533T. Washington, D.C., June 12, 2008.
Highlights of a Forum: Strengthening the Use of Risk Management
Principles in Homeland Security. GAO-08-627SP. Washington, D.C.: April
15, 2008.
Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in
Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity
Tankers. GAO-08-141. Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2007.
Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One
Year Later. GAO-08-126T.T Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act and Efforts to Secure Our
Nation's Ports. GAO-08-86T. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2007.
Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin. GAO-07-804R.
Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007.
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and
Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical
Infrastructure. GAO-06-91. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Caldwell.
I'll start the questioning with, actually, one of the last
questions I was going to ask. Admiral, I'm going to ask this to
you.
It's interesting, in aviation--and Kay Bailey Hutchison and
I have been working on an aviation bill for a long time, and we
hope to get it done--and one of the interesting things there
are, there are so many more general aviation--I'm making a
small-boat comparison, okay?--general aviation planes that are
in the air at any given moment than there are commercial
flights, but they only pay a very small percentage of keeping
up the air traffic control system. In fact, it used to be as
little as 8 percent. I think it's now something like 14
percent.
What is my point? I'm talking, basically, about larger
jets. But, you have a real problem in small vessels. There are
more than 17 million small watercraft operating in U.S. waters,
and that is one extraordinary security threat. It wasn't that
long ago that a one-engine airplane flew into a building in New
York, and it didn't get a whole lot of attention. New York
City. And it was just a pilot who fell asleep, or something.
But, I happen to care about that one, because it happened, and
second, my son was living in that building. And he is okay, and
the building's okay, because it was a small, one-engine plane.
But, it says what the possibility of small numbers of ships or
craft on the water can mean.
So, my question to you is, To what extent is this a
problem, from a monitoring point of view, from a national
security point of view? I mean, it's my understanding that you
can have a small aircraft or a small boat carry a very heavily
loaded series of briefcases into port, and nobody's going to
notice. So, how do you monitor? How do you do that? Or is it,
in fact, financially entirely out of your scope?
Admiral Papp. Mr. Chairman, it's certainly a problem that
has concerned me----
The Chairman. I don't mean your scope, but your ability to
do something about it, because of resources.
Admiral Papp. Well, I think there's something we can do
about it. And what I would do is go back through my own
experience. Shortly after 9/11, I was the 9th District
Commander, up in the Great Lakes. And I have to think that,
when I looked out my window across Lake Erie and saw all those
small boats out there, that half of those 17 million might be
just on Lake Erie. The fact of the matter was, there are about
7 million boats up in the Great Lakes, and then you throw in
another, maybe, 3 million from the Canadian side and
international waters, it's quite a challenge.
And I think, as I went up there and started confronting the
problem after 9/11, I looked at those small boats as the enemy.
In other words, every one of them's a threat. The truth of the
matter is, the vast majority of them are our friends, and can
be used as sensors, and can enable us to provide us better
maritime domain awareness.
So, a great example of making effective use of this, at
very small cost, is the America's Waterways Watch Program,
where we go out, we engage the boating community. We make them
part of the system, instead of having them the enemy, and they
will help us, they will inform us and become a part of our
system of maritime domain awareness.
So, I think continuing those sorts of efforts--outreach,
making sure that the boating community doesn't get--share the
same complacency that I was talking about, informing them that
there is the potential for threats out there and we need them
to help us in doing our job, I think goes a long ways toward
doing that.
I visited, up the Gulf of Maine, with Senator Snowe, back a
few months ago, and just from my own personal experience
sailing in the waters off New England, most of those lobstermen
up there, or the fishermen on Georges Banks, they know who are
supposed to be out there, they know each other, they sometimes
even fight each other out--trying to protect their own special
areas. They know strangers when they come in there, they know
behavior that is not normal, and if they have an avenue to be
able to report this to the Coast Guard, it helps us in our
situational awareness. We can share that, and investigate it.
So, I think there are ways of using that large group of
small vessels, that were, in the past, perceived as a threat,
to help enable us to take care of what might be a threat out
there.
The Chairman. Two very quick questions. When you say you're
making outreach to those people so that we look upon them as
the enemy, but you're looking to make outreach and to get them
to be alert and not be complacent, and the rest of it, which,
by definition, means that you are talking to, or being
responded to, by those who want to cooperate with you. That
doesn't talk about those who actually might have, or
circumstantially might have, explosive devices put upon their
small craft, and not even know it. So, I'm comforted by the
lobstermen knowing, you know, who the friendlies and the
unfriendlies are, the strangers are, but, outside of the
fishing community--17 million--that's a very large number.
Admiral Papp. Sure.
The Chairman. And my understanding is that you and Homeland
Security--that the Coast Guard and Homeland Security are
preparing a new strategy as to how to approach small vessels,
in terms of security. And I'm interested to know, how is that
coming along? Are we going to be able to get that, and see it?
Admiral Papp. Yes, Mr. Chairman. That's in the final stages
of review by the Secretary right now. And I don't know what
their timeline is, in terms of approval by the Secretary, but,
across components, we've been working on that. It has to be a
layered response. There is outreach to the boating community.
And in that regard, the adaptability, the multimission
structure of the Coast Guard, our continuing involvement in
boating safety over the years, our Coast Guard auxiliarists
that number over 30,000 people across the country, help enable
us to reach out to those people, to inform them of the program,
and to get them to help us out.
But, it really boils down to the--its other aspects, as
well. Good intelligence is clearly essential to the small-boat
problem. And the Coast Guard, as a member of the intelligence
community, is constantly looking out for trends, for
activities, for other things that might indicate a challenge or
a potential threat within the country. When we know that, or
when we have events, that's when we don't rely just upon other
people in the area; we have Captain of the Port authorities
that can set up security zones. We can do escorts. We can put
resources out there, and not just Coast Guard resources, but
CBP resources or local, State, and--or other Federal agencies,
to help us, in the event of a----
The Chairman. Admiral, I thank you. I just, in turning to
Senator Hutchison, would need to comment that it seems to me
you're talking about the reach out being kind of like driver
education, ``You've got to be safe, you've got to do this,
you've got to do that.'' People who don't want to be safe, who
want to do this, can be incredibly safe, but very destructive.
And that's kind of the problem that I'm getting at. How do you
reach those people? And, I guess, in this document, I'm going
to learn something about that.
In any event, thank you.
And I turn now to Senator Hutchison.
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you very much.
I would just like to ask the three of you--in the issue of
port security, obviously we have foreign ships coming in,
containers coming in, and we've increased our capabilities with
containers, and put seals on them after they've been inspected
in a foreign port. But, my question is, What have you found
that we can do that would be more and better coordinated with
all of the different entities that can contribute to security
to make our ports as secure as possible, with all of the
foreign tonnage coming in?
I'll just start with you and just go down the way.
Admiral Papp. Senator, I think, first and foremost, it's
pushing it as far offshore as possible. And, in that regard,
our International Port Security Program--I've been really
pleased, over the last couple of years, in the advances that
we've made. As the Atlantic Area Commander for the Coast Guard,
all the international port--or, all the international port
security liaison officers were working under the Atlantic Area
staff. We programmed them, we scheduled them. We've made visits
to 150 of 154 countries to validate their security regimes
within their ports. That's really the first step, is making
sure that they are complying with the same security standards
that are required throughout the world, and trying to normalize
that so that we can trust the ports in which the cargo is
loaded.
With that, the experts on cargo security--or ``the''
expert--is sitting right next to me.
But, the Coast Guard will assure the standards of security
within the port. The handling of cargo is taken care of by my
partner's organization.
Mr. Bersin. Precisely so. In addition to the security
dimensions of the port, Senator, we see it as an issue of risk
management. And the segmentation of traffic between those
cargoes and containers about which we know something adverse,
and distinguish those from which we know may present a lower
risk. Unless we can actually separate out those containers as
far away in time and space from the American homeland, we have
a difficult time to move lawful traffic in the way in which we
need for an economically competitive America.
Senator Hutchison. Are you talking about specific types of
cargo, or the ports from which they came being a different risk
assessment, or the companies that are transporting being a
different risk assessment? Is that a----
Mr. Bersin. All of----
Senator Hutchison.--part of your----
Mr. Bersin.--the above. I mean, in terms of being able to
distinguish containers that we need to look at more carefully
from those in which we can expedite--in effect, looking for
that needle in a haystack, both by having intelligence about
the ones we need--where we might pluck out the needle that
would cause us harm, but also reducing the size of the
haystack. So, this is about increasing the information about
the container, the importer, the shipper, the freight
consolidator, every part of the supply chain, so that we can
actually do this segmentation of traffic----
Senator Hutchison. And do you think we effectively do that?
Mr. Bersin. We are in a position, compared to 2006, with
much more information, a more effective way of managing that
information. I believe a more----
Senator Hutchison. With the capability to do the transfers
away from the ports?
Mr. Bersin. In terms of, for example, having more
information before a container arrives at the American port,
yes. The ``10 plus 2,'' the importer filing--safety filing,
security filing--has permitted us to gather much more
information than we did before that, so that we can do the risk
management and the assessment while the containerized cargo is
coming toward the American port.
So, the answer to that is yes. And we also have more
sophisticated targeting rules, which incorporate threat streams
so that we can actually both separate out that cargo that
presents low risk from that cargo that is either high risk or
about which we know very little.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you.
From the GAO?
Mr. Caldwell. Thank you, Senator Hutchison.
While GAO is probably not in the position to be able to
come up with the path forward and ``Where do we go from here?''
Our work has found that there is a fairly robust and layered
regime of programs for port security out there. And the details
of these programs are already in the statements of the two
gentlemen here.
I think where we come in, our contribution, is to look at
the execution and the implementation of those programs, and a
lot of times we have found weaknesses in those areas. But, I
have to say that both Coast Guard and CBP have generally been
very responsive to our recommendations. It's not always an easy
fix, the things that we're asking them to improve, but they
have generally been responsive to the recommendations that
we've made.
So, while I agree with the Commandant that complacency is
one of the issues, I think these programs need to continue to
mature--the programs in place while the programs that we're
discussing--or even ``10 plus 2'' is relative new, in terms of
that program being fully implemented. One of the bigger issues
we see right now is, obviously, the 100-percent scanning
requirement. We're at a little bit of an impasse here between
what the statute actually says and, I think, what can actually
be accomplished by the Department. Our Department's pretty much
made that clear, and I think that foreign governments and
companies have as well. It's something that would be very
difficult to implement because the technology is just not there
right now.
Another question has arisen from that is, How does that fit
into the layered strategy? Aspects of that requirement may
detract from some of the existing programs out there. Countries
may be less willing to participate in CSI if everything's going
to be scanned, anyway. Companies may be less willing to
participate in C-TPAT, and foreign governments that have AEO
programs, may be less willing to have them if their containers
are going to get scanned anyway.
It is a question of trying to balance across these
different programs. And, hopefully, these programs will
continue to mature and improve.
Senator Hutchison. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And my time is
up, but I do have another couple of questions for a second----
The Chairman. Well, go ahead.
Senator Hutchison.--round.
The Chairman. Look, we can----
Senator Hutchison. No----
The Chairman.--be a little informal here----
Senator Hutchison. No, no, there are other members here.
I'd----
The Chairman.--right? You want more time?
Senator Hutchison.--prefer----
The Chairman. Seven minutes?
Senator Hutchison. No. I'd prefer----
The Chairman. No?
Senator Hutchison.--to let----
The Chairman. OK.
Senator Hutchison.--them go, but I would like a second
round.
Senator Lautenberg. We have great respect and admiration
for Senator Hutchison, and part of the admiration is her grace
and her willingness----
The Chairman. To yield to the Senator----
Senator Hutchison. To let Mr. Lautenberg----
The Chairman.--from New Jersey.
Senator Hutchison.--speak.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And when we look at the witness table here, and we see the
responsibilities that are covered by these three people,
they're enormous. And Admiral Papp just mentioned in his
remarks--that I'm a strong supporter, as I know both of you
are--each of you is, as well--with the Coast Guard. And when we
look at the assignments they have, it needs a constant reminder
about the fact that they cover so many bases, and that they
continue to respond positively, bravely, and courageously to
new assignments without always getting--without almost ever
getting the resources that accompany the additional
responsibilities.
And right now, with the attention that's given to the Coast
Guard--and I congratulate you, Admiral Papp, for your ascending
to the leadership of the Coast Guard; you've earned it. It's a
wonderful organization and they're lucky to have you as their
leader. We all feel that way. But, I want to just take a moment
to say that, in the bill that I now have in my chairmanship on
the Appropriations Committee--and that is the DHS bill--we
increased the Coast Guard budget by $221 million from last
year. We were happy to do it, and know how vital it was that
you get the additional support that you need as your
responsibilities in your organization contains.
Mr. Bersin, also, you know, people often forget how broad
the responsibility of your organization is. And when we look at
Customs, we think about people that we see more often at the
airport and the most visible places. But, you've got an array
of things, going from agriculture interests and have a--
intellectual property theft, preventing and disrupting
terrorist attacks, a lot going on there.
One of the things that you mentioned, and has been on our
mind and our screen, was that--you mentioned this--the
screening that's supposed to have taken place. Three years ago,
Congress acted to require 100-percent scanning of all
containers coming to the country. However, last year the GAO
found out that we were only scanning less than 5 percent of all
U.S.-bound containers, and that 100-percent screening has not
been achieved at even a single port.
Now, what has the Department done to improve this leap
ahead from the 5-percent scanning rate? Where is it?
Mr. Bersin. Senator, first, to distinguish between the
scanning for the RPMs, the radiological scanning is taking
place with regard to maritime cargo. With regard to the gamma-
ray or X-ray scanning, you're correct that we have not
instituted a 100-percent scanning. As I indicated in my
statement, and as the Secretary has indicated to the Congress,
while we have completed the pilot project at the five ports
designated in the SAFE Port Act of several years ago, the
lessons we've learned there suggest that we need to continue to
do work with regard to developing a security regime that takes
into account the problems that I indicated in the statement.
Senator Lautenberg. How many ports--or, how many
containers--percentage of containers do we cover, in terms of
your responsibility?
Mr. Bersin. The--there are approximately, last year, just
under 10 million containers, and we are----
Senator Lautenberg. That's out of how many?
Mr. Bersin. Ten million containers that are coming to the
United States, and we are scanning 4 to 5 percent of those,
sir.
Senator Lautenberg. Four to 5 percent, OK. I got the
number--I jumped ahead of you on the numbers.
Mr. Bersin. And----
Senator Lautenberg. So, we're still far behind the
objectives that we set for ourself at this point in time.
Mr. Bersin. Measured by the 100-percent standard, yes, sir.
Senator Lautenberg. Yes. We have a deadline, 2012, for 100-
percent scanning of all incoming shipping containers. But,
we're a long way from that point. And when I look ahead to a
year and a half, or two, at the most--do you think we can
possibly meet that standard?
Mr. Bersin. As you know, and as the Secretary has advised
Congress, Senator Lautenberg, the Department is working on a
proposal that, first, would actually provide the documentation,
as the GAO has requested, that would indicate what it would
take to do the scanning, in terms of cost and logistical
outlay.
Senator Lautenberg. What's your estimate Mr. Bersin? What
do you think? When do you think, if we can possibly, at all,
reach that goal that we set for 2012?
Mr. Bersin. Frankly, Senator, I think that we're going to
need to develop an alternative approach that provides us with
the security that is sought by the 100-percent scanning, but to
do so in a way that incorporates risk management and recognizes
the difficulties----
Senator Lautenberg. Right.
Mr. Bersin.--of trying to do it all----
Senator Lautenberg. But----
Mr. Bersin.--at once.
Senator Lautenberg.--we're a long way away, and--I don't
want to cut you off, but--I come from a position that says,
okay, here's A, there's B; What's the difference between A and
B? And the difference here is that we're significantly behind
the goal that we'd like to have. And I think it's important
that we recognize this, Mr. Chairman, in this committee.
Admiral Papp, the SAFE Port Act required that the Coast
Guard establish an Interagency Operation Command Center at all
the high-priority ports, and that was to be done by last
October. Unfortunately, the Coast Guard has not yet begun to
construct a center for the Port of New York/New Jersey, the
largest port on the East Coast. Why hasn't an IOCC been
established for the New York/New Jersey region? And when might
the Coast Guard move forward on this project?
Admiral Papp. Well, you're absolutely right, Senator, there
is nothing that is called the IOC, or Interagency Operations
Center, in the Port of New York, but we have been working,
across the country, in 35 critical ports to develop IOCs. There
are probably three components of that. First of all, is getting
the software to be able to consolidate the sensors, and then to
set up the structure within which to work, which we think we
can do, based upon the work we do in our Area Maritime Security
Committees. And then, third, and probably the thing that has
probably confounded us the most is having a facility where you
gather.
But, we've been focused on things like the buildings we've
put up in Seattle or the buildings that we've--that we're now
building in New Orleans, and focusing on them as Interagency
Operations Centers. It's tough to come up with the resources to
be able to construct buildings.
So, what we've been working on is virtual--virtually
bringing people together. We have implemented a piece of
software called Watchkeeper, which brings various sensors and
other databases together, which we can share with the
interagency in each one of those ports. We've fielded that in
Charleston, and we expect to have all 35 of the ports,
basically our sector command centers, using Watchkeeper within
the next year.
The next step is to share that with the other interagency
partners across the port. And then, the third step would be to
provide the facilities, either virtual or physical facilities,
to bring all the interagency together within those command
centers.
I will tell you, though, in our Area Maritime Security
Committees, in terms of developing plans, the Coast Guard has
constantly been involved in outreach across the interagency. In
the Port of New York, at Sector New York, they have room within
their command center, where, in times of operations, we bring
in Commissioner Kelly's people or Ports Authority people or the
interagency, and we work together.
So, while we may not be able to reach out and identify a
building as an Interagency Operations Center, we've certainly
been working within the spirit to bring the interagency
together so that we can have greater synergies in providing
security in the ports.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Chairman, I wind up with an
observation, if I might, to you, sir, and that is that we have
these responsibilities, and there are serious people here, with
strong staff and strong commitment, but yet have not come close
to the goals that we've set out. And some of this is a division
of resources. And we have to recognize that defending ourselves
at home from terrorism is not really less important than
defending ourselves in far distant places for our security,
that security at home, here, whether it's in the ports or in
the airports, that we have to have resources to do it with. And
we spend $650 billion each and every year on defense, and it's
appropriate that we have to have something at least comparable
to honestly present our people with the resources they need.
I thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lautenberg.
And now Senator Klobuchar.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, to all of you.
Admiral Papp, the SAFE Port Act strengthened the Maritime
Transportation Security Act by adding a requirement that the
Coast Guard conduct two inspections annually and one being
unannounced. Have those unannounced inspections helped? Have
they been effective in improving compliance?
Admiral Papp. Yes, ma'am, I believe they have. And I'm--in
the interest of transparency, I'm trying to search my mind for
our success rate in terms of those. We've devoted an awful lot
of resources and inspectors toward completing those inspections
and unannounced visits, and conducting exercises. And as we
have reviewed all the plans--and we go through 3,200 security
plans across the country--and I'm sure you're talking about the
domestic security plans----
Senator Klobuchar. Yes.
Admiral Papp.--that's a large task to take on, but we're
very proud of the fact that we have completed those, and we
have updated them, in accordance with the Act. And I think that
it is a success story for us.
Senator Klobuchar. Very good. And maybe you can follow up
when you can get some of the data and things in writing, but I
appreciate that.
Commissioner Bersin, as part of CBP's layering targeting
strategy, you discussed the role of a National Targeting Center
in sharing local officers, the information and intelligence
that you gather on incoming cargo. And I'm a former prosecutor,
so I'm always concerned that local law enforcement be properly
looped in on issues. And I know this has sometimes been an
issue in the past. Could you talk about your efforts in that
regard?
Mr. Bersin. As a former prosecutor myself, I appreciate the
value added by State and local authorities. And I know, with
regard to CBP, there are numerous instances in which CBP field
officers in our seaports and airports, and our Border Patrol
Agents on the northern and southern borders, are in constant
communication with the State, local, and tribal law enforcement
authorities.
With regard to the cargo, containerized cargo security,
that information ordinarily would not be directed to local law
enforcement. That is to say, we don't have, usually, the local
or county interest in inspecting containerized cargo that would
come to the ports. But, there are numerous instances in which
incidents take place at our ports, in which CBP relies upon the
partnerships that exist, whether they're the JTTF, the Joint
Terrorism Task Forces, or more conventional law enforcement
alliances.
Senator Klobuchar. Speaking of cargo, you also mentioned in
your testimony about the work you've done with the Consumer
Product Safety Commission and the FDA and the Food Safety
Inspection Service to prevent unsafe products from entering our
country. I've been active on a lot of those product issues, as
have other people on this committee. Could you talk about how
you're working with other agencies at the border to weed out
dangerous products?
Mr. Bersin. Yes. Earlier this spring, Senator, CBP, Customs
and Border Protection, entered into a memorandum agreement, a
working agreement, with the Consumer Product Safety Commission,
in which we opened up, formally, the Commercial Targeting and
Analysis Center, which is a trade version of our national
security targeting system. The database of the--uses the same
database information as our national security targeting, but
it's focused on issues such as import safety, food and drug
safety, intellectual property rights protection, and other
trade enforcement issues. FDA is a member of that group, and we
expect to hold a conference, in the fall, in which we will be
inviting our major other government agency partners to
participate as full members of the CTAC and also of the--to
build on the so-called International Trade Data System group,
which are the government agencies involved at the ports of
entry.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you. I think that's going to be
very important as we see some of these products coming in.
I'm also interested--my last question--in your discussion
of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, the public-
private partnership program that allows participating trade
groups to receive expedited service at ports, in exchange for
maintaining a higher level of personal security. So, you're
working in partnership, acknowledging that some businesses and
trade groups are going to do a better job of having higher
security. And you mentioned that CBP is working with foreign
partners to establish binational recognition and enforcement.
Could you elaborate on that?
Mr. Bersin. We cannot do our job, Senator, without
segmenting the traffic between, as I indicated in my statement,
traffic we know something about from traffic we know nothing
about or about which we have derogatory information. The C-TPAT
Program, the Trusted Shipper Program, the Trusted Broker
Program, the Trusted Freight Consolidator Program, is
essential--an essential public-public partnership that actually
offers some assurance of supply chain security so that we can
offer benefits of expediting trade to the members of that
partnership.
In the same way as you suggest, our partnerships with
foreign governments in which they have the so-called AEO or
trust--AEO programs, or trusted programs--when we can do a
mutual recognition with those countries, we actually multiply
our presence. So far, we have five agreements of mutual
recognition, with Japan, Korea, Canada, Jordan, and--I always
forget the fifth one----
Senator Klobuchar. You can supplement the record.
Mr. Bersin.--and I always forget the----
Senator Klobuchar. Oh, they're so quietly advising you back
there, I didn't notice.
Mr. Bersin. And I always forget New Zealand, the first one,
as I'm reminded, and the one on which we rely for so much of
our commodity import. But, of those five countries, we actually
have a mutual-recognition regime.
Just recently at the World Customs Organization, we
negotiated, with the European Union, a process by which we
trust, over the course of a year, we will have mutual
recognition between the United States and the 27 nations of the
European Union.
Senator Klobuchar. Very good. And I can put my question in
writing for you, Director Caldwell, about some of the issues
with some of the foreign ports and the recent Coast Guard
estimate about 15 countries not maintaining their effective
antiterrorism measures. But, I think I'm out of time, and I'll
just put that in writing. All right? Thank you.
Thank you, to all of you.
The Chairman. Senator Cantwell.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for
holding this important hearing.
Admiral Papp, good to see you. I'm looking at the FY-2011
budget for the Coast Guard, and I see that there's a 3.3
proposed decrease, about $75 million. And do you have any idea
what that means, as far as how you're going to realize those
budget cuts? And I know, also, that there's a GAO report that
the FY-2011 budget cites decreases in port funding in waterways
and coastal security, and has a cut of about 6 percent. So, I'm
just trying to understand how we're going to make these cuts
and how we're going to keep our ports safe in the process.
Admiral Papp. Yes, ma'am. Obviously, some very difficult
decisions were made when putting together the 2011 budget.
There were tradeoffs made to continue the recapitalization of
our infrastructure, the--those versatile and adaptable
aircraft, boats, and ships that I talked about earlier, and to
sustain some short-term reductions in other activities in order
to pay for that.
Where it manifests itself, probably most visibly for this
particular hearing, are the five Maritime Safety and Security
Teams that were reduced in that budget. I've done a lot of
talking about the versatile and adaptable resources that we
have. For instance, one of the MSSTs that was to be reduced is
in the Port of New York. We have increased Station New York and
Sector New York general-purpose forces, almost double over the
last 8 years or so. For--as an example, Station New York used
to have 45 people, they have 90 people there right now that can
do daily missions within the Port of New York; whereas, the
MSST, as a single-focus security force--I love having them, but
their utility, in terms of providing day-to-day security was
not as much as the stations that were there. So, when
confronted with the choices of, ``How do we balance our forces
to provide the services to our country?'' we stuck with the
versatile, adaptable general forces, to sustain them as much as
we could, while recapitalizing some of those ships, boats, and
planes that we so desperately need, as well.
Senator Cantwell. I'm not sure I followed all of that, but
I also want to ask you, because in this line of making ends
meet, obviously ports are a key part of our security regime. I
had asked Secretary Napolitano about the semisubmersible
vessels and what we were doing to repair--and I know that there
has been, recently--a submersible vessel that was recently
discovered in Ecuador, so this whole issue of their involvement
in drug trafficking--so, what are the plans to fully combat
these submersibles?
Admiral Papp. Well, ma'am, the first thing is good
intelligence. We need to cooperate with the countries of South
and Central America, particularly our friends in Colombia, who
have really done a complete turnaround down there and have
assisted us and really been strong partners in this drug war.
We work the intelligence side very hard, through many
methods, so that we can detect these semisubmersibles as
they're leaving. If we don't know when they're leaving, then it
makes the equation even much more difficult, because of their
profile. With the vast expanses in both the eastern Pacific and
in the Caribbean, they're very difficult to detect. We have
marine aviation patrols out there. We work with the Navy, and
we work with other Central and South American countries, as
well, to try and detect them. And then, of course, we have our
own patrol vessels down there.
Senator Cantwell. And what about small-vessel threats
that--I know there was a pilot program that both Seattle and
San Diego participated in, as it related to nuclear detection
for small vessels--is that--I think the Coast Guard was
involved in that--and do you think that we need to expand that
program? Are we going to expand that program----
Admiral Papp. The----
Senator Cantwell.--into--you know, into major port areas?
Admiral Papp. We--as mentioned earlier, the small-vessel
threat is one that deeply concerns me, just based upon the
magnitude, the sheer numbers, of recreational boaters and
fishing boats that are out there. As I talked about before, we
perceived all of them as a threat, at one time, and what we've
done now is actually saw them as a--see them as a force
multiplier. So, outreach through education, some of the
programs that we've had out in the 13th Coast Guard District,
and our America Waterways Watch Program, have been very
beneficial to us, in terms of bringing that recreational and
fishing-boat public in to act as additional sensors for us on
the water to provide us maritime domain awareness.
Senator Cantwell. So, do you think the program's going to
expand?
Admiral Papp. Well, it's certainly one that I want to
sustain. Right now, it's a very low-cost project for us, the
America's Waterways Watch Program. It's slightly in excess of a
million dollars, which is basically to provide and conduct
outreach, both through Active Duty Coast Guard people and our
Coast Guard Auxiliary. That's certainly a program that we could
expand upon. And then, we're also--we have our small vessel
security----
Senator Cantwell. That's more what----
Admiral Papp.--strategy that is on its way, that's----
Senator Cantwell. That----
Admiral Papp.--currently under review by the Secretary.
Senator Cantwell. OK, that's more what I was referring to,
so I'll----
Admiral Papp. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell.--look forward to seeing that plan and
what you're going to do about small vessel detection.
Admiral Papp. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell.
Senator LeMieux.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE S. LeMIEUX,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks all of you, for your service.
Commandant, it's great to have you here, and
congratulations on your new position. I had a chance to visit
before you officially came on, and very pleased that you're
leading the Coast Guard. And we had a great discussion about
what the Coast Guard means to Florida. So, I am proud of you,
proud of the work that all the Coast Guard folks have done in
the Gulf. This has been an extremely difficult and trying time,
and I know your folks are working very long hours. And I just
wanted to let you know, and please pass along, how much we
appreciate the good work they've done.
Admiral Papp. Oh, thank you, sir, they'll appreciate that.
Senator LeMieux. I want to talk about port security, and I
want to talk about two areas. I want to follow on what Senator
Lautenberg said about this container issue. Five percent's not
acceptable. And if the law says 100 percent, then we have to
get toward 100 percent. And although that may be a very
difficult task, frankly and respectfully, it's your job to get
there. If you can't get there and that is an unreasonable
requirement, then we need to change the law. But, if the law is
that you're at 100 percent, we need to try to get to 100
percent, and 5 percent is very far from 100 percent.
We've got, as you know, 14 deepwater ports in Florida. The
ports are our lifeblood. They are where the cruise ships come
in, and they are where we do our trade. So, I have been
concerned for a long time, even prior to my time here in the
Senate, when I worked in the attorney general's office in
Florida, about port security. I'm concerned about it because of
what may come in on a ship, but I'm also concerned about it
because, like many cities, our port--most of our ports are
embedded in our downtown areas, and they are--you know, as a
place of entry, they are so close to our civilian populations
and our city centers. So, I worry, as I know you do, about
worst-case scenarios and what could come in on a ship. And I'm
very pleased to see that you're doing, what, nearly 100 percent
on the screening for radioactive materials, and I commend you
for that. But, the screening that has to happen on the rest of
these containers--there are a lot of things that could come in
on them, and it's not just the dangers everyone thinks about
it. In Florida, it can be exotic plants and animals that come
in and get in our waterways and cause tremendous environmental
damage. So, there are a lot of things that can come in on a
container, and a lot of containers come through Florida, as you
know, not just for Florida's use, but for the entire eastern
part of our country.
But, specifically on ports, I wanted to ask you if--what
focus you're having on trying to secure the ports, not on the
container side, but just on the physical property of the ports.
And I'll tell you what worries me. I'm from Fort Lauderdale,
and we have Port Everglades there. And Port Everglades is our
fuel port. They do cruise ships and other things, too. But, we
have these huge fuel containers, that store gasoline and oil,
that are basically right in our downtown. And you can see them,
and you can drive by them on Federal Highway. And I've always
been worried about what someone with bad intentions could do to
something like that. And there are other places in Florida, as
well--in Tampa, in other places, where the port is right near
the city center.
So, if you could address that for me a little, sir, and
then we can talk a little bit more about containers.
Mr. Bersin. Let me start with the containers, because----
Senator LeMieux. Whatever your preference.
Mr. Bersin.--if I might. The--because I don't like being in
the position, because I do appreciate, and I know the Secretary
appreciates, the threat, and also the fact that 100-percent
scanning is the law, and that, in fact, being at 5 percent,
there is a huge gap there, and it has been, actually, an issue
that has been delayed and deferred each year, as the
legislation permits. So, I think, in fact, we need to come to
grips with that, and I suggest to you, Senator, and commit to
you, that that process is underway, which is to take the very
significant challenges that we face, in terms of cost and
logistics of a 100-percent scanning regime.
And it's our obligation, I think, to do two things. One is
to provide a complete statement of what it would take, in cost,
to meet the law, and in terms of the arrangements, and whether
or not we could do that, all things being equal, which
oftentimes they're not. And if we cannot do that, then we come
up with a regime, in consultation and concert with Congress,
that gets us a level of security that is satisfactory to the
American people.
So, I understand the Senator's concern. I share it. And I
know that the Secretary is committed to the Congress to work
through a series of proposals if, in fact, the 100-percent
cannot be met.
Senator LeMieux. OK.
Mr. Bersin. With regard to port security, let me lay the
scenario up, because this is something that would be in a
partnership with the Coast Guard--in some cases, the Navy--and
mostly, actually, with the Port Authorities that control the
ports, such as the one, Fort Lauderdale, that you refer to.
These are county or State authorities that actually have the
bonding authority and do the construction. Usually, with regard
to CBP, CBP would be consulted as to the specifications for the
necessary customs inspection facilities, but the port security
layout is ordinarily an issue, frankly, that we would not have
control over. We would be consulted, as I believe the Coast
Guard would, but ultimately it's a local decision as to how, in
fact, to construct the facility.
I will say, in the wake of 2001, and certainly even the
Port--the SAFE Port Act, there are much more--there's much more
consultation. Before coming into this job, I was the Chairman
of a Regional Airport Authority, which is comparable to the
authority you suggest that runs the ports at Fort Lauderdale
and elsewhere in Florida. And we certainly consulted with our
Federal partners. But, at the end of the day, it was a decision
of the Airport Authority as to what steps would we take and
where the construction would take place. So, I'm not avoiding
the responsibility; it's just not within our authority,
although we are always willing to consult, as I know the Coast
Guard is.
Senator LeMieux. I mean, I know there's a shared governance
issue. But, as you know, these ports were built a long time
ago, most of them, and they were built in a pre-9/11
environment. And I've been appreciative of the heightened
security requirements. When you go into these ports now,
there's usually a checkpoint and there are other things that
you have to do so that there's some monitoring of people who
are going in and out. But, I worry about their proximity to
city centers. I worry most about the ones that have fuel. And I
don't know what the answer is, but I wanted to raise the topic,
because I wanted you all to be focused on it.
Mr. Bersin. I appreciate that, sir.
Senator LeMieux. Admiral, you want to speak to that point?
Admiral Papp. Oh, yes, Senator, surely.
This is where the versatility and the authorities the Coast
Guard has really comes into play, in earnest. We have Area
Maritime Security Committees, which brings together the
Federal, State, and municipal authorities, the interagency, all
under the authority of the Captain of the Port. And our Captain
of the Ports are now the area maritime security coordinators
under MTSA. Every one of those facilities has to have a
facility security plan reviewed, approved, drilled, and
exercised, and inspected by the Coast Guard. So, none of these
things are done in isolation or unilaterally, they're all done
under cooperation and with a multilayered review when they are
put in.
And I know, down in Fort Lauderdale, we have extensive
Coast Guard oversight down there, we work in partnership with
the local communities, and are continually reviewing it.
Senator LeMieux. Appreciate that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.
I guess I'm a little bit frustrated, because there's a lot
of, kind of, intelligence-speak, security-speak, government-
speak going on here. And the basic--the base--I sort of come
back to the boats, the little boats. And Senator LeMieux was
referring to that, and others were.
The 100-percent--you've got to get to 100 percent. That's
very much in the minds of people, very much in the minds of
Congress. If that's not doable, we need to know about that, and
we need to change the law, as just has been suggested. But, to
hold out a promise--see, in the world of coal mining, where you
have disasters on a fairly regular basis, we have--and that's
very complex in--it's a sort of hidden secret world, et cetera,
deep in--you know, a mile underground, all this kind of thing--
we have a mantra, that all accidents are preventable. A little
bit, I get the feeling that ``We're doing the best we can''
from you. That totally makes sense, just as you could say ``All
accidents are preventable'' can't be true, since accidents can
occur in various ways and--but, you know, I think that the
mantra of ``All accidents are preventable'' is the one that we
have to have, because that's what drives us toward speaking
rationally and realistically to each other.
I mean, the Washington Post is carrying, I think, a
fascinating article--and I'm, you know, on the Intelligence
Committee--about the world of intelligence, how it has gone up
by enormous numbers, and enormous numbers of dollars, and it's
sort of horrifying as you look at all the charts and the way
everything is spread, and DHS has, you know, tons and tons of
things, and--Is DHS really working properly? And can it work?
Was it put together properly?
I think we're going into an era where we have to deal with
a new toughness about budget. I know that the Republicans are
talking very much about a very severe attitude toward budget
deficits, reducing it dramatically, reducing resources
available in very, very important programs. The whole concept
of the military getting the amount of money that it gets, I
think, is beginning to wear on the American people just a bit,
because it's--in the President's budget cut, it was exempted--
it was exempted--as, in fact, was intelligence. Well, that's
good, because we're still in a post-9/11 way of thinking--and
we are, very much so--that we've got to stop everything. And
therefore, you have to grow, grow, grow.
But, at some point, you also have to make what you are
doing work. And so, I come back to the little boats. Secretary
Napolitano was here some time ago, and she's got this--you all
have this test-radiation-detection-equipment thing going on to
find out radiation devices, containers, whatever, that are
found in relatively small pleasure boats or commercial boats.
Now, you can't, sort of, board each one of these things,
because they'd tip over. So, you have, sort of, drive-by or
motor-by detection devices, trying to figure out, Are these
enemies, or not? You don't really care whether they like
America or not, but you care very much about whether they have
onboard something which is--could go off in a port, anywhere.
And Senator Lautenberg was describing, and Senator LeMieux, how
close these ports are to hundreds of thousands, millions of
people.
So, I just want to press you on this question, Admiral
Papp, of the--you know, what do you know about these little
boats? That's something that can be done. I'm not interested
in, Do they like us? I'm not interested in outreach, sort of
driver education, ``Drive--do it safely,'' all that. I'm
interested in your response to matters relating to terrorism
and destruction in America.
And to you, Mr. Bersin, these are paramount.
So, now, your world is going to be one--and you have a lot
of helicopter problems, you have a lot of helicopter crashes.
You didn't used to, but you've got old equipment. Your ice
cutters are 45 years old now, right? No money to fix them up.
Your Merchant Marine Academy needs a lot of repair. It takes
money. I'm not sure the money is going to be there in the
future. I'm not sure of that.
So, what--how do you take all of these things that you have
to keep your mind on, in terms of being secure--you each have
intelligence agencies--I don't think the GAO does, but I may be
wrong--but you have intelligence agencies. I don't know how
much you share with other intelligence agencies, or whether
they share it with you, or whether there's any attempt to make
all of that going on. But, we've got to find efficient ways of
protecting people. And, in the case--I'm just using small boats
sort of symbolically--but that's something we ought to be able
to do. It's like----
Why am I offended that I can get on a general aviation
aircraft without going through one inch of security, and the
pilots can do exactly the same? And I can carry anything I want
onto a general aviation plane, and nobody pays any attention. I
just go out to Dulles, get on a general aviation plane--don't
do it very often, but I can do it and nobody pays any
attention. That is not acceptable, in terms of national
security. That is unacceptable. There are agencies that allow
that, agencies that could stop that.
We could do the same with small boats. I'm not saying small
boats are the whole issue, but it is an issue, and it's the one
that I'm picking on.
So, what about these motor-by radiation detector things? I
don't think they're working very well. I could be wrong. And if
you've got 17 million, where do you start? Do you start in
Houston? Do you start in Newark? Do you start in Fort
Lauderdale? You know, it isn't just a question of--you know,
coming to hearings must be awful for you. You must hate doing
it. But, we have to get a sense of how money is being spent,
and what the results we are getting from that money are.
I'm a huge fan of the Coast Guard--you ask Admiral Allen--
huge fan of the Coast Guard. But, the Coast Guard has to
perform. It doesn't matter whether I like them or don't like
them; they have to perform. And you can't come up here and say,
``Well, we're doing the best we can. And yes, there's a long
distance between 5 percent and 100 percent.'' And if we can't
do 100 percent, or you don't--we could, but--if you had the
money, but you don't have the money, then you do need to tell
us that so we do change the law, which is at least being square
with the American people.
Now, you understand what I'm saying, and I don't have to
ramble on, here. But, I feel very strongly about this, that
we--we talk to each other in acronyms, we talk to each other
in, sort of, statements of certainty, of effort, of
aspirations, and yet, when it gets down to, what are the
results, really, and what are the reasons those results can't
be better? Is it a matter of money? Is it a matter of
personnel?
And then again, you run into budget problems in the future.
I think we're going to have substantial budget problems in the
future. In fact, I guarantee you we're going to have
substantial budget problems in the future.
So, just taking what I've said, and picking out whatever
little morsel you want, please respond.
Admiral Papp. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, you're absolutely right. It is a tremendously
vexing and challenging problem. Seventeen million boaters. But,
you know, it's analogous to--I don't know how many cars are in
this country. I would venture to say--well, I won't even
venture to say. There are many, many more, by magnitudes--cars,
trucks. And we know that people have used car bombs and/or
truck bombs. You only have to look back as far as Oklahoma City
to see that that method has been used. Can we keep people off
the streets? Can we prevent another car bomb from happening? I
think that's quite a challenge. And I think it's an--analogous
to what we're trying to do.
Now, we have authorities. We can shut down--our Captain of
the Ports have authorities to shut down waterways, take all the
boats off. Now, we do that from time to time. If there's a
major security event, whether it's an inauguration, whether
it's a Super Bowl game that's alongside the Detroit River, we
will shut down waterways because of the increased threat and
potential for something to happen.
The Chairman. But, you know what? I don't count that. I'm
not going to let you get away with that, because----
Admiral Papp. OK.
The Chairman.--those are predictably dangerous situations;
and so, of course everybody, you know, goes around with Uzis
and AK-47s and although--I mean, sure, we load up, we have
absolute protection, and we shut the waterways down. But, there
are the under--the other 364 days a year, where there aren't
large events, and there are small ports or large ports and
millions of people, and 17 million boats. Didn't mean to
interrupt you, but I did.
Admiral Papp. No, sir. And you're absolutely right. We put
in an awful lot of effort on those events. And what I call them
is low-probability/high-consequence events, with the amount of
structure we put around them, it's unlikely that an event is
going to occur, because we have strengthened and fortified that
particular event.
The Chairman. But, don't you understand----
Admiral Papp. What concerns me is----
The Chairman. That's why I don't like your----
Admiral Papp. Yes, sir.
The Chairman.--answer, because that's a special situation.
Admiral Papp. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I'm talking about the other 364 days, because
that's when something's going to happen.
Admiral Papp. Well, the vast majority of those 17 million
boaters are law-abiding citizens of the United States who, by
our nature, are resistant to discipline, structure, and regimes
that prevent them from enjoying what they perceive as their
right to enjoy the waterway. And therein lies the problem. What
sort of strictures, what structure, what discipline, what laws
do we put into place that might penalize those--the vast
majority of that 17 million while we're trying to find someone
who, we don't know for sure is out there?
And that's why I keep on going back to strengthening our
intelligence regimes. We have discovered much more through
intelligence, where we can track people, where we look at
what's being purchased, whether it has the makings for a bomb,
whether it's somebody that perhaps has not used the water
before, someone becomes suspicious because they buy a large
boat, with capacity for carrying things, and they may exhibit
behaviors that would indicate that they're not mariners, but
might have some nefarious purpose. That's where I see us.
Unless we want to have a Coast Guard that is, I don't know,
100,000 people, so that we can have every waterway picketed
with our boats out there, I don't know that the country can
afford that.
So, given what I have, in terms of resources, I employ them
to the best effect that I can, which is leveraging
intelligence, strengthening partnerships with--through our Area
Maritime Security Committees, and doing the best we can with
the resources that we have. And sometimes, yes, sir, knocking
on wood, keeping my fingers crossed that there's nothing out
there that we haven't detected or that we're not going to be
able to get to.
So, I understand, and I fully comprehend--you know,
sometimes when I speak to groups, they say, ``You're just
being--that's just paranoia.'' For me, is it paranoia or is it
possible? And if you come down on the side it's possible, then
who is responsible for it, and who is doing something about it?
The Chairman. OK. I----
Admiral Papp. It's my responsibility----
The Chairman.--hear you, and my time is----
Admiral Papp. Yes, sir.
The Chairman.--like 3 days over.
Admiral Papp. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. But, my approach would be--if I were you, I
would take some of those--in Fort Lauderdale or Houston, I
would take some of those ships, and those commercial pleasure
craft, and I'd stop them, and they'd be furious at you, and you
wouldn't care, because you have a job to do, which is far
greater than the pleasure which they're experiencing. You're
worried about destruction. I'd stop them, and I'd go through
them, and you don't have to do it everywhere, you don't have
the personnel to do it everywhere, but the word gets around.
The word gets around. And that helps. Rather than saying, ``The
vast majority of Americans are good, law-abiding citizens.''
That doesn't do much for my conscience.
Admiral Papp. Yes, sir. Well, I'm sorry, if I haven't been
informative enough. When I talk about maritime security
operations, that's where these versatile adaptable forces come
in. We are doing boardings constantly. We do random boardings.
The Chairman. You just said, ``But, we don't want to
interrupt people in their pleasure.''
Admiral Papp. Well, not the vast majority, but we do
random. And that is part of our Operation Neptune Shield
philosophy, is to do random and scheduled patrols and boardings
throughout our areas of responsibility. That's ongoing, every
day. We have thousands of boardings that go on, to inspect
vessels for safety, but, once we have people onboard, and we're
inspecting for safety, if there is some indication of other
activity, whether it's drinking or use of drugs, we carry that
inspection further.
The truth of the matter is, in the years since 9/11, we
have not lost one single person due to terrorism out on the
waters of the United States, but every year we lose about 1,000
people for not wearing life jackets and drunk boating.
The Chairman. That is right.
Admiral Papp. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. But, that's also a way that you avoid
answering a question, in Washington-speak. ``Nothing has
happened.'' Well, the fact of the matter, a great deal has been
attempted, and has been interdicted, which you can't talk
about. But, you know, if somebody hadn't been there--I'm just--
I'm going to stop talking. OK? Because I want to let these
others, if they have other questions, to ask them. But, I just
want you to read me.
Admiral Papp. Yes, sir, absolutely.
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to ask you something, because I have been concerned,
as I think many people know, because I introduced a bill in
response to the administration not waiving the Jones Act
immediately after the oil spill. And my question is, Do you
believe that it would have been more expeditious if we could
have gotten the help from the foreign skimmers into the 3-mile
limit more quickly? And, if no, why not? And maybe you'll say
``no,'' but why wasn't it done immediately, on an expedited
basis, rather than the processes that you have to go through,
that the Coast Guard has the control over, to waive the Jones
Act on a piecemeal basis?
Admiral Papp. Well, thanks, Senator, for that question,
because, quite frankly, I've just not understood why people
have been concerned about this, because it hasn't delayed
anything from getting there. The Jones Act did not even come
into play--the spill location being that far offshore, there
was no implications to the Jones Act. We had foreign skimmers
and ships that came in. They weren't involved in trade between
ports in the United States, so as long as they stayed that
distance offshore, there was no need to provide a waiver,
because the Jones Act just did not apply.
Senator Hutchison. But, why----
Admiral Papp. Now, there was the potential----
Senator Hutchison.--once the oil was going into the 3-mile
limit, then it was going to be going on the shore. So, why
wouldn't you want the full capability that those well-equipped
foreign skimmers could have given and were offered?
Admiral Papp. Well, most of the skimmers that were ordered
were ocean skimmer--or, offered--were ocean skimmers. That's
where we needed them, out close to the source. We needed to
collect as much oil as we could out at the source, at the well.
And we've been very successful at doing that. And there was
never any delay in getting any of those foreign skimmers
because of any Jones Act considerations. And, in fact, they've
been helping us out greatly.
Now, to bring in smaller in-shore skimmers, we've just--we
have had, between the skimmers we have, organically, in the
United States, the thousands of vessels of opportunity that we
had step forward in the Gulf, that were employed in the
skimming operations, there was just no need for any
additional--to my knowledge; now, this is one of the details
the National Incident Commander could get into--but, to my
recollection, there was no need for smaller, in-shore foreign
skimmers to come in, which would not--if they did, it would
require a waiver. I know Secretary Napolitano was ready and
willing to provide a waiver, if needed, but there just was no
need for it.
Senator Hutchison. And you feel that there were sufficient
numbers--it's sort of a disconnect, from what was being
reported and what you're saying, about the numbers of skimmers
within the 3-mile limit being sufficient. Do you feel that you
had the sufficient number within the 3-mile limit?
Admiral Papp. In terms of the breakdown in
responsibilities--and I have to go back to Senator Rockefeller,
because I feel badly, because this is the first time I've ever
been accused of Washington-speak in my career, so I'm trying to
be as clear and frank as possible--I--the--Admiral Allen is the
National Incident Commander. It's my role, as the Commandant of
the Coast Guard, to support him with Coast Guard people and
forces. So, to that extent, we have given 100-percent support
to Admiral Allen in that effort, using Coast Guard forces,
Coast Guard people. I've been involved, peripherally, because
I've sent some of my admirals, my flag officers, down there to
work within the National Incident Command process, so I get
some feedback, and my feedback is that we've had sufficient
resources down there, that the National Incident Commander,
Admiral Allen, has received everything that he has asked for.
And so, I have not seen the problem.
Senator Hutchison. Well, you are getting into Washington-
speak, because I understand what Admiral Allen's role is. There
is a disconnect between what we read and see, versus seeming
like we're not making the maximum use, in the most efficient
way, of the offers that were given.
Let me ask a final question, and that is, the Houston Ship
Channel Security District has put in place a fee structure that
would allow port tenants and also the Federal dollars to be
able to be pooled for port security to be done on a portwide
basis. Is this unique among the other ports, this model? And
are others doing it? What's good about it? And is it being
implemented in a positive way, which we think is the case,
but--is it unique?
Admiral Papp. I think my friend, the Commissioner, is
itching to answer, here, but I have learned about it recently,
and I'm encouraged by it. I think it's a great way--and
actually, it works within our Area Maritime Secure Committee,
that effort--the Coast Guard Captain of the Port in Houston
works with the district. And I've received some very
encouraging reports. It's exactly what we're looking for, in
terms of not just Federal forces providing for security, but
the community, the port, and the State all coming together so
that--none of us can do it fully on our own; all together, we
can do a much better job.
Senator Hutchison. Is it a value added, Mr. Bersin?
Mr. Bersin. If I might--absolutely. In the--it's not
unique. What makes the Houston Ship Channel so--makes it one-
of-a-kind are the number of jurisdictions that are around the
particular area. But, in fact, multi-jurisdictional
participation in joint harbor commands or the kinds of
interagency and intergovernmental bodies that the Admiral spoke
about before, I think, is the way in which we get the greatest
leverage out of every--all the governmental authorities. So,
that particular model is not unique, but it's very effective.
And I know, on the CBP side, all of the Federal agencies
are gathering together to work with the many jurisdictions on
the channel to build a common security plan, and then to have
the financing to see that it's implemented effectively.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hutchison.
I thank all three of you very much. This has been a very
informative hearing. And I'm sorry more members didn't come
out, but these are strange days in the Senate.
And this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Admiral Robert J. Papp
Question 1. In spite of the recent economic downturn, the rate of
global commerce is forecasted to increase over the next few years. As
trade and the economy improve, a significant portion--more than 80
percent by some accounts--of goods entering the United States will come
through our domestic ports. Given the economic importance of ports,
vessels, and waterways, their security is absolutely critical. Where do
you see the greatest port security risks? What are you doing to
mitigate those risks? How do you believe S. 3639 addresses these
concerns?
Answer. The tremendous amount of CIKR and population within or near
America's waterways provides terrorists potential opportunities to
conduct physical and psychological damage. The Coast Guard makes a
determined effort to provide security for about 95,000 miles of
coastline. It is responsible for protecting over 300 ports and over
10,000 miles of navigable waterways. It provides security for a myriad
of landside connections which allow the various transportation modes to
move people and goods to, from, under, and on the water. More than $958
billion of international commerce, including 1.4 billion tons of cargo,
is transported within the MTS. Most cargo is carried by foreign vessels
and crews that the Coast Guard cannot as easily scrutinize for security
threats as it can U.S. flag vessels. The Coast Guard is challenged to
protect more than 8 million cruise ship and ferry passengers as part of
a transportation segment that logs more than 65 million passenger-miles
a year (a 21 percent increase above the average just 6 years earlier).
The Coast Guard secures waterways for numerous boaters operating almost
13 million registered recreational vessels. Additionally, the Coast
Guard protects the domestic movement of numerous high value military
vessels and maritime cargo for national defense and national security.
The vast and complex CIKR and MTS of this Nation and its citizenry is
exposed to an extremely unpredictable and diverse set of terrorist and
other security threats.
U.S. Marine Transportation System components (i.e., ports,
waterways, maritime critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR),
and vessels) are potentially vulnerable to a myriad of maritime and
shore-based attack methods (e.g., underwater swimmers, mines, stand-off
weapons, small vessel \1\ attacks, vehicle and waterborne improvised
explosive devices (VBIED/WBIED), etc.).
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\1\ Small vessels are characterized as any watercraft, regardless
of method of propulsion, less than 300 gross tons. Small vessels can
include commercial fishing vessels, recreational boats and yachts,
towing vessels, uninspected passenger vessels, or any other commercial
vessels involved in foreign or U.S. voyages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Intelligence Community reports no credible indications exist
that terrorists are planning to use small vessels in an attack on the
United States. However, among the viable maritime attack methods, the
direct and indirect use of small vessels generates the greatest
concern.
The Coast Guard and other law enforcement agencies face the
challenge of distinguishing between the vast number of legitimate
vessel operators and the relatively few individuals engaged in illicit
and potential terrorist activities. The challenge is immense, as it
involves nearly 13 million registered U.S. recreational vessels, 82,000
fishing vessels, and 100,000 other small commercial vessels. On any
given day, a considerable number of these boats share waterways with
commercial deep draft and military vessel traffic, operating in
hundreds of U.S. ports and in the immediate vicinity of maritime
critical infrastructure and key resources.
Overall, S. 3639, if enacted, could facilitate or assist the
fulfillment of some of maritime security by increasing the transparency
associated with owners and operators of recreational vessels, enhancing
maritime domain awareness, mitigating small vessel security risk and
increasing cooperation and coordination amongst stakeholders.
Question 2. As the U.S. Coast Guard's responsibilities and role in
safety and security issues continues to broaden, questions have
surfaced about whether the Coast Guard has sufficient resources to
adequately execute its missions. Do you believe that we should look to
assessing a port security user fee to help manage the growing cost
associated with port security? Should the cargo and shipping industries
along with other users be required to pay a similar fee?
Answer. A fee-based structure could be appropriate to fund security
services that benefit specific users of port facilities. A review of
existing fees would be an important first step in making that
determination.
Question 3. The Coast Guard is currently examining technologies to
test radiation detection equipment, but thus far it appears the results
indicate that the technology has operational issues (i.e., is not
operating at high speed or far distances). Is this the case and are you
confident that the technology works? What alternative technologies are
you considering? Will the U.S. Coast Guard commit to coordinating with
DOE going forward? Please provide a summary of findings to-date on the
tests, the determination of the viability of the technology, and what
plans Coast Guard has formulated to address the deficiencies.
Answer. The Coast Guard is not leading any efforts to examine
technologies to test radiation detection equipment. The current
radiation detection/identification equipment deployed by the Coast
Guard is adequate and meets or exceeds Coast Guard Maritime Radiation
Detection Program mission requirements. The Coast Guard currently uses
human portable systems which typically require boarding team and
inspectors to physically board a vessel. Future goals of the Coast
Guard Maritime Radiation and Nuclear Detection Program are to minimize
the need to board each vessel through the use of stand-off detection
and identification technologies. However, based on a review of the
results from recently completed testing by the DHS Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO), stand-off detection/identification is in the
embryonic stage of development and the technology does not currently
exist to resolve this problem in the short-term.
DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) has the lead for the
research, development, testing, evaluation, and acquisition of
radiological/nuclear detection and identification equipment to ensure
that it is fully aligned with their Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture (GNDA). USCG has worked with DNDO on the development of
requirements for next-generation detectors to ensure that they meet
USCG maritime domain requirements. As the lead in detection
architecture development, DNDO would be in a much better position to
provide a summary of findings to-date concerning tests and technology
viability.
The Coast Guard has a long-standing relationship with the
Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Agency
(NNSA) and will continue to coordinate our maritime radiation detection
program efforts with DOE for technical support. In the event that Coast
Guard detects and/or identifies a potential or actual radiological
material threat, Coast Guard operational protocol provides mechanisms
for requesting the technical services of the DOE/NNSA Radiological
Assistance Program (RAP) Teams or the Nuclear/Radiological Advisory
Team (NRAT).
Question 4. The Coast Guard is required to perform 2 inspections at
MTSA-regulated facilities each year, with one of these being an
unannounced inspection. Is an unannounced spot check a sufficient gauge
of facility compliance with MTSA? How does it differ from an announced
inspection? Is the Coast Guard finding greater non-compliance during
unannounced inspections? Coast Guard staff who conduct facility
inspectors are often assigned multiple duties while they are
responsible for facilities that are growing in size and number.
Answer. Yes, unannounced spot checks, as part of a compliance
program, are an effective port security tool. During the spot check,
Coast Guard personnel are able to carry out inspections until they are
satisfied that the facility has met the Maritime Transportation Safety
Act (MTSA) requirements.
Typically, announced inspections are MTSA Annual Compliance Exams.
These exams may take days to complete, will involve the Facility
Security Officer (FSO) as well as other facility personnel, and cover
the entire Facility Security Plan in detail. The Coast Guard
traditionally schedules MTSA Annual Compliance Exams with the FSO to
ensure that the necessary facility personnel are present for the
examination and have set aside the requisite amount of time from their
daily responsibilities. If a facility has not met the level of security
required by MTSA the Captain of the Port (COTP) may conduct additional
unannounced MTSA annual compliance examinations.
Between January 1, 2010 and August 4, 2010, there have been 1,358
announced MTSA Annual Compliance Exams conducted. Out of those exams,
18 facilities, or approximately 1.3 percent, did not meet inspection
compliance, of the 1,789 unannounced security spot checks there were 6
facilities, or approximately 0.3 percent, which did not meet
compliance.
Question 5. Has the Coast Guard conducted any analysis of their
inspection requirements to ensure that staffing needs are met and
inspections meet their stated goals?
Answer. The Coast Guard has developed and continues to refine a
Sector Staffing Model (SSM) to examine several critical factors such as
mission hours and activity levels as well as personnel, skill sets,
qualifications, experience level, etc., in determining the appropriate
number of personnel in key facility inspection positions for various
mission areas. The Coast Guard's Marine Safety Improvement Plan is the
Service's multi-year plan to enhance performance of the Marine Safety
mission through various initiatives including increasing the number of
marine inspectors.
Question 6. Coast Guard port security procedures establish specific
activity goals, known as Operation Neptune Shield (ONS)--in support of
the agency's strategic plan for ports, waterways and coastal security.
There are well documented shortages of resources, including GAO reports
noting that Coast Guard's inability to meet its own standards. Does the
Coast Guard have sufficient resources to handle elevated threat levels?
Answer. The Coast Guard employs risk-based decisionmaking to
allocate resources. Using the Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model
(MSRAM), the Coast Guard identifies the highest risk vessels, maritime
critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) within the threatened
region, port(s), or National Infrastructure Protection Plan Sector(s).
These risk-based results help guide the Coast Guard operational
commanders' application of their resources to mitigate the highest
maritime risk.
In response to elevated maritime threat levels, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) may elevate the Homeland Security Advisory
System (HSAS) Threat Condition. The Coast Guard Commandant in
coordination with the Secretary of DHS, may set elevated MARSEC Levels
2 or 3 nationwide, regionally, by port(s), or by National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) Sector(s), (e.g., Transportation
Systems, Energy, Chemical, etc.). DHS and the Coast Guard endeavor to
apply the HSAS Threat Condition and MARSEC Levels in a targeted manner
to balance the need for additional security measures against the
impacts of those security measures upon the U.S. Marine Transportation
System, maritime commerce, and recreational activities in ports and on
waterways.
To meet the MARSEC Level 2 and MARSEC Level 3 performance
standards, Area Commanders may relocate existing resources from outside
of the affected areas and may surge resources from other missions. The
ONS OPORD contains provisions to mitigate the impact of surging
resources on the Coast Guard's other missions. The ONS OPORD authorizes
Area Commanders to adjust the other mission's performance standards.
Sustained MARSEC Level 2 or MARSEC Level 3 operations may justify
the recall of Coast Guard Reserve forces under the Secretary of DHS's
authority found in 14 U.S.C. 712. Reservists recalled under Title 14
may be issued orders for up to 60 days. Since 2008, the Coast Guard has
annually obtained pre-approval from the Secretary of DHS for the
Commandant to involuntarily recall up to a pre-designated number of
Coast Guard Reservists under Title 14 to ``. . . aid in prevention or
response to an imminent catastrophe, act of terrorism, or
transportation security incident. . . .'', thus enhancing our
mobilization readiness and the Coast Guard's ability to respond with
minimum delay. The use of Coast Guard Reserve forces is subject to
certain limitations, particularly the ``dwell time'' required between
periods of active duty.
Question 7. The number of vessel arriving into U.S. ports has
generally increased over the past few years and this trend is expected
to continue in the near future. What challenges does this increased
workload pose to the Coast Guard in terms of its ability to carry out
it mission to board and inspect foreign vessels, especially those
deemed high-risk?
Answer. The Coast Guard uses a risk-based approach to mitigate
resource gaps, and identify and inspect high risk vessels. As a result
of a 2007 comprehensive Marine Safety program review, the Coast Guard
identified opportunities to improve capacity and competency through
development of the Marine Safety and Improvement Plan. Through
development of this Plan, the Coast Guard established a roadmap to
improve the effectiveness, consistency, and responsiveness of the
program to promote safe, secure, and environmentally sound marine
transportation. This roadmap includes reinvigorating industry
partnerships, improving technical competencies, increasing the number
of inspectors, engineers and investigators, and expanding rulemaking
capability to ensure the Coast Guard meets current and future program
needs.
Question 8. What steps has the Coast Guard taken to ensure it has
the capability and resources to fully carry out its port state control
and security boarding responsibilities even as the potential number of
vessels needing to be examined or boarded continues to increase?
Answer. The Coast Guard has taken several steps to effectively
manage capability and resources to carry out Port State Control (PSC)
and security boarding responsibilities. Examples include:
2006--New PSC targeting matrix for better targeting of high
risk vessels and reduced targeting of low risk vessels;
2007--New PSC Training Regime with new courses and improved
qualification standards;
2008--New High Interest Vessel (security) targeting matrix
refined targeting of high risk vessels, reduced targeting of
low or no risk vessels; and
2010--Maritime Enforcement Specialist (ME) Rating
established, and the ME school and qualification procedures
established.
Additionally, through the development of the Marine Safety
Improvement Plan (MSIP), provided to Congress in October 2007, the
Coast Guard developed a multi-year plan to increase the core
capabilities of the marine safety program to support and infuse the
needed resources to address the growth of responsibilities for the
boarding and examination of foreign vessels arriving and operating in
U.S. waters.
The Coast Guard is in the process of implementing this multi-year
plan. The MSIP provides a roadmap to improve the effectiveness,
consistency, and responsiveness of the program to promote safe, secure,
and environmentally sound marine transportation. This roadmap includes
reinvigorating industry partnerships, improving technical competencies,
increasing the number of inspectors, engineers and investigators, and
expanding rulemaking capability to ensure the Coast Guard meets current
and future program needs.
Question 9. The Coast Guard has formal MOUs or other agreements
with state and local law enforcement authorities in some ports for
sharing security resources in an elevated MARSEC situation. To what
extent have these agreements been formalized to leverage other
stakeholder's resources for ensuring port security?
Answer. The legal framework for providing maritime security
consists of the overarching Security and Accountability for Every
(SAFE) Port and Maritime Transportation Security (MTSA) Acts supported
by three statutory pillars: The Magnuson Act (50 U.S.C. 191 et seq.),
the Ports and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA) of 1972 (33 USC 1221 et
seq.), and Coast Guard operating authorities contained in Title 14,
U.S. Code. Collectively and through the implementation of scalable
requirements driven by Maritime Security (MARSEC) Levels, this
architecture establishes risk-based maritime security burden sharing
for federally-regulated waterfront facilities and vessels among
Federal, State, and local government entities and industry. Layered
security is a manifestation of this shared maritime security
responsibility. The initial responsibility for State and local
government entities is to resource the activities that they are
executing for their portion of the layered security. State and local
government may share resources with and provide assistance to the Coast
Guard.
Pursuant to requirements within the MTSA as amended by the Security
and Accountability for Every Port (SAFE Port) Act of 2006, Coast Guard
Captains of the Port (COTP) serving as Federal Maritime Security
Coordinators (FMSC) worked in conjunction with their port partners to
establish and convene Area Maritime Security (AMS) Committees, conduct
AMS Assessments, and to develop required formal AMS Plans. These very
comprehensive AMS Plans serve as Coast Guard-coordinated, port
community-oriented maritime antiterrorism preplanning of joint
deterrence efforts for transportation security incidents (TSI). The AMS
Plans provide a strategy for coordinated and scalable actions to
detect, deter, and prevent threats at varying threat levels throughout
the respective COTP zones.
In August 2009, the Coast Guard completed the first formal five-
year update of the Nation's 43 AMS Plans in coordination with
respective AMS Committees, as required by MTSA. The FMSCs and AMS
Committees use the Coast Guard's Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model
to conduct AMS Assessments as required by MTSA implementing regulations
in 33 CFR 103.400 to 103.410. The FMSCs/AMS Committees use the results
of the AMS Assessments to identify the top three types of
Transportation Security Incidents (TSI) most likely to occur in their
port areas. All the AMS Plans include procedures and steps to be taken
for prevention, protection, security response, and recovery from the
identified TSI planning scenarios should such an attack be threatened
or actually occur (elevated threat levels). As stated in the Navigation
and Vessel Inspection Circular No. 09-02, Change 3 (Guidelines for
Development of Area Maritime Security Committees and Area Maritime
Security Plans Required for U.S. Ports), ``. . . these Plans may be
viewed as unofficial Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs) within the port to
ensure key players understand what activities each agency will take,
and what resources each will bring for the given scenario.''
The AMS Plans are required to be exercised annually, as part of the
Coast Guard's Area Maritime Security Training Exercise Program
(AMSTEP). The AMS Plans and the required AMSTEP exercises are critical
elements of the Nation's maritime security preparedness and enable, at
minimum, an annual opportunity for Coast Guard, Federal, state and
local law enforcement, tribal and industry representatives, and other
governmental agencies to validate the AMS Plans and resource
sufficiency and stakeholder responsibilities in light of on-going risk
analysis.
In addition numerous Coast Guard operational commanders and State
and local government entities have found it beneficial to enter into
memoranda of agreement (MOAs) or memoranda of understanding (MOUs).
MOAs and MOUs are detailed and have a narrower focus than AMS Plans.
They vary in content, based on local resources and needs. They often
address tactical specifics such as use of force policy, communications,
training, reporting, etc. Several of the existing MOAs and MOUs
specifically address elevated Maritime Security (MARSEC) Levels. With
respect to the actual sharing of resources, these MOAs and MOUs are
considered non-binding on the signatory parties. The State and local
government entities may decline requests for resource support from the
Coast Guard on the basis of risk-based decisions made to mitigate their
share of the maritime security risk or to mitigate higher priority,
non-maritime security risks. When elevated Homeland Security Advisory
System Threat Conditions or MARSEC Levels are set, it is highly likely
that State and local government entity resources may already be fully
engaged and therefore unavailable to the Coast Guard. Within an
Incident Commander or Area Commander command structure established to
manage the incident or event prompting the elevated MARSEC Level,
particularly MARSEC Level 3, State and local resources will likely be
applied per the approved Incident Action Plan.
Question 10. The Coast Guard--through its International Port
Security Program--has completed several rounds of visits to foreign
countries to make sure that they meet established port security
standards. What standards does the Coast Guard use to make these
assessments? How do these standards compare to those used in
assessments of domestic U.S. ports?
Answer. The Coast Guard uses a country's implementation of the
mandatory provisions of an international security standard, the
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, as the
primary indicator of whether effective anti-terrorism measures are in
place. We also consider intelligence information to validate our
observations and to ascertain the terrorist threat posed by the
country. Regulations issued pursuant to the Maritime Transportation and
Security Act (MTSA), 33 CFR Parts 101 through 106, are the standard
used to inspect domestic ports. These regulations were developed in
conjunction with and are representative of the standards set forth in
the ISPS Code. MTSA regulations, however, are more comprehensive,
specific, and detailed than the minimum requirements established in the
ISPS Code.
Question 11. Every 2-3 years the Coast Guard must inspect
facilities in approximately 150 countries participating in the
International Port Security Program. How does the Coast Guard determine
which ports and facilities it should assess in each country? Does the
Coast Guard have the necessary resources to carry out these
inspections?
Answer. The Coast Guard uses a risk based approach to determine the
port facilities it will visit. The greater the risk the country poses,
the more facilities in that country the Coast Guard visits. In general,
the Coast Guard seeks to visit a representative sample of large,
medium, and small International Ship and Port Facility Security Code
regulated facilities that reflect the trading patterns of the country
with the U.S. Emphasis is placed on visiting those facilities that have
direct trade with the U.S., port facilities that have not yet been
visited, and facilities previously visited at which the Coast Guard
identified security deficiencies.
The Coast Guard has sufficient resources to visit an adequate
sampling of facilities in all countries that conduct maritime trade
with the U.S.
Question 12. What has Coast Guard determined will be the impact of
rotation length for International Port Security Program personnel,
given the training and experience needed for effective observations of
facility security during country visits?
Answer. The Coast Guard has determined that its rotation policy has
no significant impact on the ability of the International Port Security
Program (IPS) to conduct its mission. IPS Program personnel receive
specific training upon being assigned to the program and continue to
advance their skills through on-the-job training with more experienced
program personnel. In addition, the program has a cadre of civilian
personnel that provide continuity.
Question 13. The Coast Guard continues its visits to the ports of
foreign maritime trading partners to assess the effectiveness of
antiterrorism measures in those countries' ports. Recognizing that some
countries may not be receptive to an expectation that they provide the
Coast Guard with periodic access to their ports every few years for a
visit, what steps is the Coast Guard taking to address the concerns of
those countries and gain their cooperation? Does S. 3639 provide
sufficient authority to assist countries in meeting this requirement?
Answer. Due to sovereignty concerns, it is becoming increasingly
difficult to gain access to countries for re-assessments. The Coast
Guard offers what it calls ``reciprocal visits'' in which the Coast
Guard hosts representatives from the Designated Authority of foreign
countries to observe how the Coast Guard implements the international
security standard, the International Ship and Port Facility Security
Code.
While there is a requirement for the Coast Guard to assess
countries, there is no requirement for those countries to be assessed.
The Coast Guard is dependent on the country granting access to allow
the observation of the security conditions. As noted above, this is
becoming increasingly difficult. S. 3639 would clarify and strengthen
the Coast Guard's ability to make a finding that effective anti-
terrorism measures are not in place in such cases where countries
refuse to grant us access. Where possible, the Coast Guard works with
other agencies, such as the State Department, to provide capacity
building assistance in order to overcome security deficits when a
country is having difficulty implementing the international security
standard.
Question 14. To carry out the security boardings of high interest
vessels, some field units rely on the Maritime Safety and Security
Teams (MSSTs) and their related assets. However, these teams and their
assets may become unavailable to carry out these boardings if they are
deployed to respond to a natural disaster or national security threat
that may require them to conduct security activities other than
security boardings. Under such circumstances, to what extent will these
Coast Guard units be able to conduct security boardings? What actions
does the Coast Guard plan to take to ensure that those field units can
carry out their required boardings or otherwise mitigate the potential
risks?
Answer. The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 directed
the creation of Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs) to enhance
the domestic maritime security capability of the United States. MSSTs
are deployable specialized forces that are not dedicated to a specific
port, and routinely deploy in support of a designated national security
event or in response to a natural disaster. When not deployed, MSSTs do
augment local forces by conducting some operational activities under
Operation Neptune Shield (ONS), such as escorts of high capacity
passenger vessels. However, MSSTs perform a relatively small percentage
of the high interest vessel security boardings in their respective
homeports. Coast Guard Sectors will continue to be the backbone of
Coast Guard security efforts in a port, including security boardings of
high interest vessels. Therefore, deployment of MSSTs will not have a
significant impact on a Sector Commander's ability to conduct security
boardings.
Question 15. In November 2009, a group of terrorists in small
vessels arrived in Mumbai, India and attacked multiple targets, killing
more than 100 people. With regards to the United States, are we just as
vulnerable to foreign terrorists in small vessels, perhaps arriving
from the Caribbean, attacking our cities or maritime infrastructure?
Does DHS have any programs that would be able to track and prevent such
small vessels from carrying out such an attack?
Answer. While the Intelligence Community reports no credible
indications exist that terrorists are planning to use small vessels in
an attack on the United States, their use overseas (such as in Mumbai,
India in November 2009) is a clear indicator of a capability.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is concerned about
security risks associated with small vessels and has taken steps to
mitigate such risk.
The DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) was developed in an
effort to mitigate potential risks associated with small vessels.
Numerous activities supporting the Strategy are already being
implemented or have been completed. For example:
Maritime Domain Awareness initiatives:
The Citizen Action Network (CAN), which has long
served the Puget Sound area, and Focused Lens (FL),
developed in California ports to systematically increase
maritime patrol presence and effectiveness, have begun
working with the America's Waterway Watch (AWW) program to
develop a model for upgraded suspicious activity
information collection. This coordinated set of programs
was tested with Canadian partners during the 2010 Winter
Olympics and plans are being formulated to roll it out
nationally.
Under the combined leadership of the United States,
the United Kingdom, and Japan, the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) developed and issued Non-Mandatory
Guidelines on Security Aspects of the Operation of Vessels
Which Do Not Fall within the Scope of SOLAS Chapter XI-2
and the International Ship and Port Facility Security
(ISPS) Code. These guidelines are being included in the
National Association of State Boating Law Administrators'
standards of training for boat operators, and in the U.S.
Power Squadrons' training materials.
Our primary system to track vessels today is the
Nationwide Automatic Identification System (NAIS).
Currently, as per national and international regulations,
AIS is required to be carried on commercial vessels greater
than 300 gross tons. However, a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (December 2008) proposed to mandate AIS carriage
on smaller commercial vessels, fulfilling the requirements
of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA)
and addressing a considerable number of small craft.
Our Vessel Traffic Services track vessels by radar,
AIS, and in some cases by camera, in several major
commercial ports, and by various sensors employed by U.S.
Coast Guard (USCG) Sector or Interagency Operations
Centers.
We have expanded upon the requirements of the MTSA directed
Area Maritime Security Plans (AMSP), Vessel Security Plans, and
Facility Security Plans to require planners specifically
address potential small vessel risks, with plan revisions
completed at the appropriate 5 year revision cycle (in most
cases, in 2009).
A key function of our tactical methods to address small vessel
threats are addressed through Maritime Security and Response Operations
programs, under the Coast Guard's Operation Neptune Shield. This is a
tiered system, which aligns with and supports DHS' Homeland Security
Advisory System (HSAS) and represents a diverse set of operational
activities, many of which directly relate to small vessel security
risks:
Waterborne, airborne, and shoreside patrols and visits to
critical infrastructure.
Security boardings of small vessels--Operation Neptune
Shield has a specific requirement for each Sector Commander to
conduct a minimum number of security boardings of small vessels
(<300 GT) each month.
Vessel escorts of:
High Value military ships;
Vessels carrying high consequence cargoes; and
A percentage of high capacity passenger vessels (e.g.,
cruise ships, ferries)
Taken as a whole, these awareness programs, regimes, and
operational measures are intended to provide layered security against
small vessel and other security risks in the maritime domain.
Question 16. In April 2008 DHS issued its Small Vessel Security
Strategy and is now developing a more detailed implementation plan.
When will that detailed implementation plan be completed and approved?
Will DHS be seeking more authorities or resources to implement the
plan? If not, how will the strategy and plan have any impact on the
potential threat of small vessel attacks?
Answer. As described in the response to Question 12, numerous
activities supporting the Strategy are already being implemented or
have been completed. While there is no formal implementation plan, DHS
has prepared a security-sensitive internal document (referred to as an
implementation plan) to help guide small vessel security investments by
Department and its components. Additionally, DHS will soon finalize a
document for release to the public that provides examples of planned
and ongoing activities, especially those that depend on cooperative
efforts and public engagement.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Admiral Robert J. Papp
Question 1. The SAFE Port Act required that the Coast Guard
establish Interagency Operation Command Centers at all high priority
ports by October 2009. Why hasn't an IOCC been established in the New
York/New Jersey region and when will the Coast Guard move forward?
Answer. The WatchKeeper information management software will be
deployed to Sector New York in Fiscal Year 2011. Interagency Operations
Centers (IOCs) are being established in 35 high priority ports
nationwide with one IOC centrally located within the geographic area of
responsibility in each of the Coast Guard's 35 Sectors. For each
location to officially achieve designation as an IOC, at a minimum, the
following must be in place:
1. A regular schedule of coordination meetings with Federal,
state, and local port partners, as appropriate.
2. Shared awareness of the operational schedules of maritime
assets between IOC member agencies.
3. IOC member agencies have direct access to WatchKeeper
information sharing capabilities.
4. Joint awareness and coordination between Coast Guard and
U.S. Customs and Border Protection of planned vessel inspection
activities.
5. The IOC operates under a Unified Command structure and
members adhere to best practices.
To support these IOCs, the Coast Guard established the IOC
Acquisition Project to provide the means for collaboration and
consensus-building needed to enhance unity of effort among maritime
stakeholders.
Question 2. Last September, the DHS Inspector General issued a
highly critical report on the Department's efforts to address small
vessel security. The IG stated that the Department has not provided a
comprehensive strategy for addressing threats from small vessels, such
as those used in the USS Cole and Mumbai attacks. Since this report was
issued, what additional steps has the Coast Guard taken to address
small vessel security?
Answer. The Coast Guard played a critical role in the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS's) development of the Small Vessel Security
Strategy (SVSS). The Coast Guard has already implemented and expanded a
number of measures to address security threats posed by small vessels.
For example:
Maritime Domain Awareness initiatives:
America's Waterways Watch;
Citizens' Action Network
Automatic Identification System (AIS) carriage
requirements; and
Robust intelligence gathering and analysis, including
Field Intelligence Support Teams at each Coast Guard
Sector.
Security Regimes:
Area Maritime Security Plans (AMSP), which conform to
the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), include
actions to mitigate small vessel attacks;
Coast Guard approved security plans are required for
MTSA regulated vessels and facilities; and
Coast Guard Captains of the Port (COTPs) possess broad
authorities to control port access, movement, and activity.
Maritime Security and Response Operations:
The Coast Guard utilizes a tiered risk-based system,
which aligns with and supports DHS' Homeland Security
Advisory System;
A diverse set of operational activities, including;
Waterborne, airborne, and shoreside patrols and visits to
critical infrastructure; and
Security boardings of small vessels.
Vessel escorts of:
High Value military ships;
Vessels carrying high consequence cargoes; and
High capacity passenger vessels (e.g., cruise ships,
ferries).
Question 3. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey is unable
to move forward on a number of projects to improve the security of the
port because of the twenty-five percent cost share requirement for port
security grants. It is my understanding that waiving this requirement
is a long, arduous process that is rarely successful. What should be
done about this cost-share requirement so that it does not impede the
security of our ports?
Answer. The cost-share requirement is a statutory requirement
mandated under 46 U.S.C. 70107 (c). The Secretary of Homeland
Security does have the authority (again, pursuant to statute) to reduce
the cost-share requirement for Port Security Grant Program (PSGP)
projects.
FEMA issued Information Bulletin No. 322 on July 15, 2009 to define
the process grantees should follow to submit requests for cost-share
waivers for FY 2007, 2008, and 2009 PSGP grants. Cost-share waiver
requests are evaluated on a project-by-project basis and generally not
granted for an entire award. Each waiver request must contain a strong
justification from the prime recipient, proof of written notice to the
local Captain of the Port and Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC),
assurance that granting the waiver will not change the security
compliance requirements the grantee is required to operate under within
their approved security plan, and a revised budget.
All cost-share waiver requests are considered by FEMA, USCG, and
DHS leadership. All requests for waivers under this process that have
been presented to the Secretary for consideration have been approved
thus far.
Question 4. Over a million maritime workers have gone through
background checks and obtained TWIC cards, to gain access to secure
areas of our ports. The Port Authority of New York/New Jersey is one of
the sites testing these TWIC cards. However, this technology has been
fraught with challenges and has not been working as intended. How do
the challenges with the TWIC program affect the security of our ports?
Answer. The Transportation Worker Identification Credentials (TWIC)
program is an additional layer of security that builds upon the sound
security regime currently in place under the Maritime Transportation
Security Act (MTSA). The Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE)
Port Act of 2006 requires the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to
conduct a TWIC pilot program in at least five distinct geographic
locations to test the business processes, technology, and operational
impacts required to deploy transportation security card readers.
Currently, there are 24 TWIC pilot program participants in 10 different
geographic locations representing a broad sampling of MTSA regulated
facility and vessel operations. The Port Authority of New York/New
Jersey is one of the pilot participants.
As of September 27, 2010, TWICs have been successfully issued to
over 1.5 million individuals who have gone through an extensive
Security Threat Assessment (STA). All personnel requiring unescorted
access to secure areas of MTSA regulated facilities and vessels, and
all mariners holding Coast Guard issued credentials have been vetted
and determined not to pose a security risk to the maritime
transportation system. Although the use of readers for checking TWICs
has not yet been instituted by regulation, TWICs are required to be
used as a visual identification card. Based on the STA and visual
inspection of the TWIC, the TWIC program has strengthened DHS'
multilayered approach to the safeguarding of our Nation's ports and
critical maritime infrastructure.
TSA is working closely with TWIC pilot program participants, the
Coast Guard, NIST and industry on technological challenges related to
the TWIC reader pilot. Specifically with the Port Authority of New
York/New Jersey, there are site visits and weekly calls to assist them
troubleshoot issues, some of which are related to requirements they
have for their specific implementation of the TWIC.
Verification of the TWIC through the use of readers is the ultimate
end state for the TWIC program; it is an additional layer which will
build upon a very sound security regime currently in place under MTSA.
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Admiral Robert J. Papp
Question 1. The security of our Nation's ports is a major priority
for me. Forty percent of our Nation's goods go through the Ports of Los
Angeles and Long Beach. California ports from West Sacramento to
Oakland and San Diego are economic engines in my state, generating
billions of dollars of revenue for our localities. With difficulties
and delays in implementing the 100 percent cargo scanning requirement
required by law (The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007), what other steps are being taken to ensure
that maritime cargo does not pose a security or safety threat?
Answer. In order to ensure the security and integrity of maritime
cargo entering the U.S., CBP employs a layered, risk based approach to
security. This includes the use of targeting tools such as the
Automated Targeting System (ATS) to review in bound cargo and identify
potentially high risk shipments. ATS is utilized by CBP officers at
U.S. ports of entry as well as the National Targeting Center--Cargo and
at various ports around the world under the auspices of the Container
Security Initiative (CSI). Under CSI, bills of lading are reviewed at
overseas ports and any potential high risk shipments are examined
overseas prior to lading aboard U.S. bound vessels. In FY 2009, CSI
officers reviewed over nine million bills of lading and conducted
approximately 57,000 examinations of high risk cargo while over 80
percent of all U.S. bound cargo is currently screened at a CSI port
prior to lading aboard U.S. bound vessels.
Additionally, CBP is engaged with the trade community through the
Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), another key
component in the layered approach to security. Through C-TPAT, CBP
works with the various components of the trade (carriers, importers,
manufacturers, etc.) to ensure the safety and security of their cargo
as well as to ensure a robust security process is in place as goods
move through the supply chain. This allows CBP to facilitate legitimate
trade while focusing resources on those components and entities which
may pose a threat to maritime cargo.
In addition to targeting tools and methodologies and working with
the trade community, CBP has deployed or installed an array of Non-
Intrusive Inspection (NII) technology such as x-ray or gamma ray
equipment (both mobile and fixed site) and radiation detection
equipment. Such NII is deployed or installed at U.S. ports of entry as
well as the 58 ports around the world which are designated as CSI
ports. The use of such equipment allows CBP to quickly and effectively
examine potentially high risk cargo at various points along the supply
chain, either prior to lading in a foreign location or upon arrival at
U.S. ports of entry.
CBP is also working with foreign governments and through
organizations such as the World Customs Organization to promote
enhanced standards for supply chain security globally. Our capacity
building efforts include partnerships with other nations to improve the
effectiveness and professionalism of customs administrations world-
wide. Such activities allow CBP to foster relationships that increase
the likelihood that threats to the global supply chain in general and
the U.S. in particular will be discovered and addressed.
Question 2. I was concerned to see the FY11 President's Budget
decreased funding for Coast Guard's overall budget and eliminated five
Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs), including the San Francisco
based team. The San Francisco Bay Area has many critical infrastructure
and tourist assets, including several bridges such as the Golden Gate
Bridge and Bay Bridge, and two ports--the Port of Oakland and the Port
of San Francisco. Can you assure the people of the Bay Area that the
elimination of the MSST will not place the Bay Area at risk?
Answer. Yes. Coast Guard Sectors continue to be the backbone of
Coast Guard security efforts in a port, including the Port of Oakland
and the Port of San Francisco. Marine Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs)
are deployable specialized forces that are not dedicated to a specific
port, and routinely deploy in support of a designated national security
event or in response to a natural disaster. When not deployed, MSSTs do
augment local forces by conducting some operational activities under
Operation Neptune Shield (ONS), such as escorts of high capacity
passenger vessels. However, MSSTs perform a relatively small percentage
of the high interest vessel security boardings in their respective
homeports.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Admiral Robert J. Papp
Question 1. Thank you for your response to my question regarding
the detection of semi-submersibles and submersibles vessels used in
drug smuggling. As a follow-up question, are the challenges of
detecting and interdicting semi-submersible and submersible vessels of
the type used in drug smuggling being addressed in the Department's
Small Vessel Security Strategy with respect to port security?
Answer. Yes. Objective 1 of Goal B of the Department of Homeland
Security's Small Vessel Security Strategy is to ``Improve detection and
tracking capabilities to better identify small vessels operating in or
near U.S. waters.''
Question 2. The Port Security Grant Program has played a vital role
in funding key security projects to help detect and prevent terrorist
attacks. It is my understanding that FEMA has indicated that it is
interested in funding projects under the program that address maritime
resiliency and business continuity but is seeking Coast Guard
endorsement before adding the relevant language to the grant guidance
material. What are your thoughts about making maritime resiliency and
business continuity projects eligible under the Port Security Grant
Program?
Answer. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the grant
administrator of the Port Security Grant Program. The Coast Guard
assists FEMA by providing subject matter expertise on maritime security
issues. Since 2007, FEMA policy has required Port Wide Risk Management/
Mitigation and Business Continuity/Resumption of Trade Plans for Group
I and Group II port areas. These documents represent a five-year plan
that supports each port's Area Maritime Security Plan and lays out a
strategy and series of actions that must be undertaken to address the
prevention of, protection against, response to, and recovery from major
security incidents. The Coast Guard, in close collaboration with
maritime industry through Area Maritime Security Committees, has
assisted FEMA in developing these plans with the goal of closing
maritime security risk vulnerability gaps.
Question 3. It is my understanding that current law and regulation
allow an individual to be escorted to their job while they are waiting
to receive their TWIC card. However, longshoremen tell me that
``escorting'' is not occurring in the state of Washington. Workers who
file waivers or appeals wait months for their cases to be adjudicated.
As a result, some workers are unable to financially support themselves
through the process.
a. Are there actions the Coast Guard can take today to improve the
TWIC escort process?
b. Going forward, do you believe the Coast Guard should take a more
pro-active role in formulating escort policies and procedures with
waterfront employers so that workers and their families will be able to
support themselves while waiting on their TWIC card?
Answer. Throughout the implementation of the Transportation Worker
Identity Credential (TWIC) program, the Coast Guard has been pro-active
in formulating TWIC escort policies and procedures. Specifically, the
Coast Guard provided the following TWIC escort related documents to
industry (available at: https://homeport.uscg.mil/TWIC):
Navigation and Inspection Circular 03-07 ``Guidance for the
Implementation of the TWIC Program in the Maritime Sector;''
TWIC Program: Small Entity Guide of Applicants;
TWIC Program: Small Entity Guide for Owners and Operators;
and
Five TWIC/Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) Policy
Advisory Council (PAC) Decisions related to escorting (PAC 02-
07, 02-08, 03-08, 02-09, 03-09)
The TWIC Program aims to enhance security by requiring that all
personnel needing unescorted access to secure areas of MTSA regulated
facilities and vessels and all mariners holding Coast Guard issued
credentials have passed a Security Threat Assessment.
A facility owner/operator is responsible for informing workers,
including longshoremen, whether they will need a TWIC to perform their
job (i.e., whether they will need unescorted access to secure areas at
that facility). If a longshoreman needs access to a secure area of a
facility, but does not have a TWIC, the facility owner/operator has the
authority to provide an escort. The Coast Guard guidance to the
maritime industry provides facility operators with options to meet
escort requirements; however, the TWIC escort provisions are not
intended to be used in lieu of the TWIC for workers requiring frequent
access to MTSA regulated facilities and vessels. Therefore, the
facility operator may choose to not provide escorting procedures for
these workers and thereby limit their access.
Question 4. Both the Puget Sound Area and the San Diego Harbor Area
were chosen for the Department of Energy Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office (DNDO) pilots focused on Small Vessel threats. The pilots, which
included participation by the Coast Guard and Pacific Northwest
National Laboratories, have provided an opportunity for state and local
authorities in Puget Sound to better understand its current prevention
and detection capabilities and limitations.
a. From the Coast Guard's perspective what are the most important
lessons learned from the two pilot projects?
b. Based on the results of the pilots, would you recommend that
DNDO conduct additional pilots or turn the pilot into a program?
Answer. The West Coast Maritime Preventive Radiological/Nuclear
Detection (PRND) Pilot Project was a Department of Homeland Security/
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)-sponsored effort in full
partnership with the Coast Guard. Department of Energy's (DOE) Pacific
Northwest Laboratory (PNNL) supported the Puget Sound Pilot while DOE's
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) supported the San Diego
Pilot. In addition to the Coast Guard and DNDO, other Federal, State,
Local and Tribal Law Enforcement agencies were full participants.
Lessons Learned--The most important lessons learned from the two
pilots include:
A radiological/nuclear Subject Matter Expert serving as an
advisor to the Command Staff is a critical factor in overall
program success.
The pilots and the resultant Full-Scale Exercises reaffirmed
the necessity for comprehensive planning and coordination.
Standardized Equipment and training are essential and are
critical factors for implementing a successful program. The
need for standardized communications systems and their
effective use are critical factors in overall program success.
In response to question b., the capability demonstrated in the West
Coast Maritime Pilot should be implemented in other port regions.
However, the mechanisms for implementation will require continuing
consideration.
Question 5. There are still identified security issues at foreign
ports that, at worst, threaten our national security, and at best, slow
our ability to receive cargo. When Senator Snowe and I introduced our
amendment to the SAFE PORTS Act, the Coast Guard was then inspecting
select foreign ports at a rate of once every 4 to 5 years.
a. What inspection rate does the current level of Coast Guard
resources afford with respect to number of foreign ports covered and
frequency of inspections? Are these resource allocation decisions risk-
based?
b. Does the proposed FY 2011 budget allow for increasing inspection
rates to once every 2 years, as originally designed in my amendment?
c. I believe the security of our homeland is improved when we are
able to extend our security borders as far out as possible. I view the
inspection of foreign posts as part of a layered approach to homeland
security. Do you believe the Coast Guard requires additional resources
in order to carry out its foreign port inspection mission?
Answer.
The Coast Guard generally conducts assessments on a 2-year
cycle attempting to visit approximately 70+ countries each
year. A small number of country assessments go beyond the 2-
year cycle mostly because the country's Designated Authority
requested to reschedule or delay the visit.
Resource allocation for foreign port inspections are based
on a risk methodology that considers threat, a country's
internal stability, and volume of trade.
The Proposed FY 2011 budget does allow for an inspection
rate of once every 2 years.
The Coast Guard is currently able to perform our foreign
port inspections.
Those inspections depend on the consent of foreign
governments and in some cases, there has been increasing
difficulty in gaining access, despite reciprocal visits being
offered.
Coast Guard capacity building assistance, while limited, is
often requested by countries to assist in enhancing their port
security.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison to
Admiral Robert J. Papp
Question 1. Various ports across the Nation have indicated that the
port security grant process is confusing, and that the distribution of
funds is very slow, with FEMA and the USCG still working on delivering
funds from 2007. What percentage of the Port Security Grant funds has
not been distributed, and why?
Answer. Please see Table 1. 39 percent of total PSGP funding is
currently available for grantees to draw down. This percentage has
increased significantly from only 5 months ago when it was 21 percent.
The expedited release of PSGP funds is a priority and the rate at which
these funds become available is expected to increase significantly. Of
note, although FEMA has released 39 percent of funding, grantees have
only drawn down 7.4 percent of available funds. FEMA does not have the
authority to mandate when grantees draw down funds.
Table 1.--Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) FY 2007 through FY 2009 Funding, Obligation, and Availability Summary, Including ARRA Funding for FY 2009
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amount
Fiscal Year Appropriated Amount Allocated Obligation Current Holds Available Funds Award Balance Draw Downs
(Source: GD&A) (Source: GD&A) (Source: IFMIS) (Source: PARS) (Source: PARS) (Source: IFMIS) (Source: IFMIS)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 $320,000,000 $311,170,000 $310,429,718 $51,793,028 $258,636,690 $239,476,664 $70,953,054
2008 $400,000,000 $388,600,000 $387,999,310 $301,769,730 $86,229,580 $377,910,595 $10,088,715
2009 $400,000,000 $388,600,000 $388,353,557 $347,167,061 $41,186,496 $386,745,388 $1,608,169
ARRA $150,000,000 $150,000,000 $150,000,000 $57,943,799 $92,056,201 $141,525,804 $8,474,196
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total $1,238,370,000 $1,236,782,585 $758,673,618 $478,108,967 $1,145,658,451 $91,124,134
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Available Funds as a Percentage of Obligation Amount: 39 percent
Total Draw Downs as a Percentage of Obligation Amount: 7.37 percent
Additionally, some grantees have expressed concern about the
grantees' ability to meet the legislated cost share requirement for FY
2007 through FY 2009 (FY 2009 ARRA and FY 2010 PSGP cost share
requirements were congressionally waived). Uncertainty about the cost
share requirement resulted in a degree of hesitancy by grantees to
expend funds and has led to some significant delays in commencing
approved projects. To help alleviate this concern, FEMA issued
Information Bulletin (IB) No. 322 to provide grantees with an
understanding of what a cost share waiver is and how to request one. If
a grantee requests a cost share waiver, the FEMA Program Analyst
assigned to that award works closely with the authorized representative
of the award to ensure that the request meets all criteria outlined in
the IB and that all appropriate information is provided to allow the
Secretary of Homeland Security to make an informed decision to approve
or deny the request.
The reasons for delays in releasing funding are provided in the
response to the following question.
Question 2. How can the distribution of grant funds be accelerated?
Answer. Since Fiscal Year (FY) 2007, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) has awarded over $1.2 billion in Port Security Grant
Program (PSGP) funding. Of this amount, approximately $91 million has
been drawn down by recipients through FEMA's electronic Payment and
Reporting System (PARS). This equates to approximately 7.4 percent of
the total awarded funds drawn down by recipients. Although this is a
relatively low percentage, drawdown figures should not be the sole
gauge of a programs progress.
The release of PSGP grant funds can take several months or even
years to complete due to numerous mandatory grant administration
processes that must be met prior to a grantee spending grant funds.
Many of these requirements are statutorily required. Often, due to the
nature of their projects, these requirements have the greatest impact
on the larger, higher risk port areas. These are also the port areas
which receive the majority of PSGP funds. These processes include:
development of a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and a Port-Wide Risk
Management Plan (PWRMP) for each port area; local and national review
of proposed projects; creation, review and approval of award documents;
review of project budget submissions, and compliance with a number of
environmental and historic preservation laws which requires reviews of
Environmental and Historic Preservation (EHP) impacts of approved
projects.
Further, in FY 2007 and FY 2009 the PSGP received additional
appropriations, essentially creating two rounds of grants for these
years. The double appropriations doubled FEMA's workload.
Over the past several years, the combination of time consuming
procedural and process requirements, increased workload, and other
factors have contributed to delays in the release of PSGP funds.
The requirement for Group 1 and 2 port areas (i.e., largest ports
with significant grant awards) to develop a CONOPS and PWRMP was issued
by FEMA with the FY 2007 Supplemental PSGP grants guidance. These
deliverables can take 12--18 months to complete and grant funds may be
used in their development (without any cost-share requirement).
Development and approval of a typical PWRMP requires completion of a
comprehensive vulnerability assessment for the port and identification
of port area priorities by the Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC)
and the USCG Captain of the Port (COTP). The PWRMP takes into
consideration the port priorities and vulnerabilities, existing
resources and capabilities, and available funding options to produce a
5-year spend plan outlining how the anticipated port area funds will be
expended. The PWRMP is then approved by the COTP, and submitted and
approved by FEMA. Plans that do not meet the established criteria are
returned for modifications as needed. Now that the majority of ports
have completed these deliverables the process of identifying,
prioritizing, and approving PSGP projects is significantly more
objective and efficient--the time saved has been clearly evident.
Once these deliverables are approved by FEMA, the port Fiduciary
Agent (FA), FEMA's grantee, submits projects for review and approval.
Even before FEMA receives the projects, they are reviewed and
prioritized at the field level by the local COTP and AMSC. This process
has evolved since the FY 2007 Supplemental appropriation, resulting in
many process improvements and additional time savings. Soon after the
congressional appropriations are finalized, FEMA provides guidance and
outreach in person and via national conference calls. FEMA staff
explains PSGP funding constraints, programmatic requirements, and
various other aspects of the program in an effort to facilitate the
submission of investment justifications, budgetary documents, EHP
information, as well as required reports. Based on stakeholder
feedback, the guidance is updated each year. The improved guidance has
made it easier for the grant applicants/awardees to meet program
requirements in terms of both quality and timeliness of their
submissions, which has in turn reduced the need for time consuming
resubmissions. Additionally, FEMA now places greater emphasis on the
input and prioritizations provided by the AMSC and COTP. Rather than
second guess the expertise of the port-level reviewers, the national
level review focuses primarily on verifying that proposed projects fall
within program constraints. This improvement to the review process
saves time by minimizing redundant project scrutiny. It also improves
the objectivity of the overall review process.
FEMA continues to find ways to improve its grant administration
processes to accelerate the distribution of funds. Some delays however,
are beyond our control. Once FEMA releases funds (either partial by
project or the entire award), the recipient is notified and may draw
down against the grant through the Payment and Reporting System (PARS).
Of the $1.2 billion in PSGP funding awarded from FY 2007 to present,
$478 million or 39 percent of total funding has been released to
grantees. FEMA does not control or dictate when recipients must
drawdown funds. Each recipient follows their local protocols, some of
which can be quite burdensome and time consuming; for example, when the
project and/or allocation of funds must be reviewed and approved by
state or local government officials. Funds may be drawn down anytime
during the award period and up to 90 days following the end of the
award period. Because each FA is on a different timetable, FEMA
continually receives project submissions and must reconvene panels of
subject matter experts from across DHS for their review. These panel
sessions are necessary to the approval and distribution of PSGP funds.
Among the more significant changes, beginning with the FY 2010
PSGP, all FA projects submissions were due to FEMA 45 days after the
application period closed. In July, FEMA reviewed all projects during a
single session by a panel of subject matter experts. This approach puts
all FAs on the same timetable going forward and eliminates the
inefficient practice of reviewing projects on a rolling basis. Although
FEMA clearly set a deadline for FY 2010 project submissions, there were
still some ports that did not adhere to this deadline. Nevertheless,
FEMA realized significant efficiency gains through this process
improvement. For FY 2011, FEMA will require all applicants to submit
projects at time of application to further reduce delays.
As mentioned with the PSGP guidance development process, FEMA
routinely engages with port stakeholders to listen to concerns and
suggestions for improving the program. This past fall, FEMA invited all
of the PSGP FAs to Washington, DC for a two-day workshop on how to
improve the efficiency of the program.
A significant concern among grantees includes the multiple
disparate systems a grantee and FEMA staff must use in managing a
single grant. FEMA plans to deploy a new grants management system, ND-
Grants in FY 2011, with the end goal of having a single grants
management system for the entire grants lifecycle. This system, in
conjunction with a newly developed programmatic grant monitoring tool
will provide a greater ability to document, justify, and report
progress toward achieving the priorities of the PSGP.
The budget review process has also been improved. A budget detailed
worksheet and instructions for its use is provided with the PSGP
guidance and submitted by the grantee, either with their application or
when projects are submitted. If the project(s) are approved for
funding, the Grants Management Division (GMD) commences the budget
review. GMD checks the budget for allowable expenditures and
appropriate cost categories for funding, as well as to ensure that the
submitted budget accurately reflects the awarded amount. If the award
was adjusted, or if discrepancies exist within the budget, GMD contacts
the grantee to request clarifications and/or revisions. There are
frequent delays in grantee responsiveness, which can further slow the
budget review process. If a grantee is un-responsive to numerous
inquiries from GMD, GMD refers the matter to the PSGP Program Analyst
for assistance in coordinating with the grantee and gathering the
required information. This process helps ensure that outstanding budget
issues are resolved in a timely manner.
A similar, streamlined approach is employed for the Environmental
and Historic Preservation Compliance Review (EHP). Federal EHP laws and
Executive Orders (EOs) provide the basis and direction for the
implementation of Federal EHP review requirements for FEMA-funded
projects. These laws and EOs are aimed at protecting our Nation's
water, air, coastal, wildlife, land, agricultural, historic, and
cultural resources, as well as minimizing potential adverse effects to
children, and low-income and minority populations. FEMA, through its
EHP program, engages in a review process to ensure that FEMA-funded
activities comply with those laws. The current EHP compliance review
process includes a preliminary screening of all projects to identify
further information that may be required to complete an EHP compliance
review and determination, if any. Those projects that do not require
further information to complete a review may be approved for EHP
compliance at that time. If additional information is needed, grantees
are notified of further data requirements. This information is
necessary to support a determination of compliance with EHP laws and
regulations. An EHP Screening Form and a formal submission process have
been developed, and technical assistance made available, in order to
assist grantees in identifying and providing the necessary information
with their applications. Furthermore, FEMA has developed and finalized
a Programmatic Environmental Assessment (PEA) that analyzed the EHP
impacts of all projects funded by GPD. This PEA defined those project
types that would not have any impact to the environment, as well as
those that would require further study. For those project types defined
as having no impacts, no further EHP information would be required. To
date, this process has been very successful, and FEMA has received
positive feedback from its stakeholders.
In summary, FEMA has made significant strides in releasing PSGP
funding in a timely manner. Thanks to dedicated contract support
personnel, the EHP backlog has been cleared. Additionally, it has been
a priority of PSGP staff to review projects in a timely manner, release
partial funds as projects are approved, and provide feedback to FAs as
to status, particularly if projects are sent back requiring additional
work. Finally, the majority of CONOPS and PRWMPs have been submitted
and approved by FEMA, which now allows FEMA to concentrate on reviewing
and approving projects.
Question 3. Is FEMA's role in financial oversight of the grants
sufficient?
Answer. The financial grants management of PSGP awards is performed
by FEMA's Grants Management Division (GMD), which acts as a centralized
financial management and business support for all FEMA grant programs,
which is comprised of several branches. The Operations Branch,
comprised of trained Grants Management Specialists, performs all pre-
award and award grant administration functions, and provides procedural
and technical business support to award recipients. The Systems and
Business Support Branch oversees development, implementation,
maintenance, user support and training for the Agency's suite of grants
management information systems. The Accountability, Management, and
Oversight Branch develops and manages Agency-wide grant policies and
operating procedures to assist Headquarters program offices and the
Regions in the implementation, award, and management of FEMA grant
programs. Together the GMD branches work with internal and external
stakeholders to coordinate and manage the full financial grant
lifecycle.
Each Grants Management Specialist (GMS) is trained to provide
expert guidance and instruction for pre and post award financial grants
management which includes: planning, awarding, and administration of
FEMA grants and cooperative agreements. The Specialists work closely
with grantees and the Program Office to provide financial grants
management technical assistance and financial support with a strong
concentration on providing high quality customer service to internal
and external stakeholders. In order to provide continued guidance, the
GMS's stay current on new grant policies, legal authority, and
regulations to determine how changes will impact internal policies,
procedures, and systems.
Both the Federal staff and contract support staff continually
review and improve processes to ensure timely processing of pre and
post award activity, while maintaining compliance with Federal laws
governing financial grants management. One improvement that has largely
impacted the grantees' ability to access award funds was the
implementation of the Special Conditions-Release of Funds (SC-ROF)
process in early FY 2009. This process was designed to accelerate the
removal of Special Conditions stipulated in the award and allow
grantees quicker access to draw down on grant funds. The SC-ROF process
involves the expertise of the GMS's who review and approve the grantee
pre-award financial budget documents for compliance with FEMA financial
reporting and fiscal integrity, while ensuring that all documents
adhere to the Program Guidance, OMB Circulars, and Administrative
Requirements. The success of this process is augmented by a well
established coordination effort between GMD Operations staff and the
Program Office to ensure full compliance with the terms and conditions
of the award and financial reporting.
The extensive knowledge of financial grants management and combined
experience of Federal staff, rooted in a dynamic environment that
promotes openness for collaboration, pushes GMD forward to continue
providing quality cradle-to-grave grant management service to internal
and external stakeholders.
Question 4. Would the ports be better served if the Coast Guard
handled distribution of grant funding?
Answer. FEMA is the grant administrator of the Port Security Grant
Program (PSGP), and the Coast Guard assists FEMA by providing subject
matter expertise on maritime security risk mitigation issues. The ports
are best served by this collaborative relationship, whereby FEMA
leverages its expertise in grant administration and financial
management, and the Coast Guard leverages its expertise in maritime
security. Further, the Coast Guard does not have the experience to
function as the grant administrator of the PSGP. As a regulator of the
maritime industry, it may also be considered a conflict of interest for
the Coast Guard to serve as the grant administrator and would further
complicate its coordination and facilitation role with maritime
stakeholders.
Additionally, FEMA is now better staffed to manage the increased
PSGP workload. In FY07, PSGP comprised of a staff of one Acting Section
Chief and three program analysts, which was a significant strain at
that time. Over the past year the staff has been expanded to include
two full time Section Chiefs and eight program analysts. A contract
support team is also available to provide surge support under direct
Federal supervision as needed.
Question 5. The Coast Guard is responsible for securing 361 ports
and 95,000 miles of coastline and navigable waterways. It also has 10
other missions, including maritime drug interdiction, search and
rescue, immigration law enforcement at sea, and serving as the lead
Federal agency responding to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and all
of this with only 42,000 Active Duty personnel. Is the Coast Guard
adequately staffed to secure our ports and fulfill all of its other
responsibilities?
Answer. The Coast Guard's systematic, maritime governance model for
port security consists of maritime security regimes, domain awareness,
and maritime security and response operations and is a layered security
approach that shares responsibilities with partners to provide a
credible deterrence (while employing risk-informed decisionmaking).
Regarding general maritime security activities (escorts, patrols,
and boardings), the Coast Guard's guidance to field commanders,
Operation NEPTUNE SHIELD, prioritizes these activities based on risk
and the availability of resources. Higher risk, higher consequence
activities are provided with more attention and consideration than
lower risk and consequence activities.
In responding to a maritime security threat, the Coast Guard
employs threat-based, risk-managed principles, matching protective/
preventative efforts to the threat's nature, i.e., attack method,
target, etc. By using these principles, the Coast Guard implements
Maritime Security (MARSEC) level increases that are focused on a single
or few Sectors or, if nationwide, only on the targeted type of maritime
critical infrastructure and key resources (e.g., maritime mass
transit--ferries or vessels carrying Certain Dangerous Cargoes). The
Coast Guard approaches its risk-informed decision-making methodology
through the use of the Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model and has
been used to prioritize security activities as well as validate
applications for the Port Security Grant Program. The Coast Guard
leverages the support of other government agencies and ensures that
maritime industry stakeholders have increased their security efforts in
accordance with their Coast Guard-approved facility and vessel security
plans. Coast Guard Sector Commanders carrying out the operational
security measures dictated by increased MARSEC levels may request
additional resources, i.e., deployable specialized forces, from the
Deployable Operations Group via their Area Commander.
Maritime security and response operations as well as Maritime
Transportation Security Act and the implementing regulations are not
static efforts and should and will be modified to meet emerging threats
and/or further reduce vulnerabilities as we refine risk mitigation
strategies.
Question 6. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
maritime security efforts have focused primarily on large commercial
vessels, cargoes, and crew. Efforts to address the small vessel
environment have largely been limited to traditional safety and basic
law enforcement concerns. Small vessels are, however, readily available
for potential exploitation by terrorists, smugglers of weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs), narcotics, aliens, and other contraband, and other
criminals. Small vessels have also been successfully employed overseas
by terrorists to deliver Waterborne Improvised Explosive Devices
(WBIEDs).
What efforts is the Coast Guard making to address security threats
posed by small vessels?
What is the Coast Guard doing to develop and leverage partnerships
with recreational boaters and professional mariners who operate small
vessels to increase awareness about security threats posed by smaller
vessels?
Answer. Small vessels generally operate with great autonomy. The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Coast Guard have taken
numerous steps to address possible risks associated with small vessels
while also recognizing the importance of preserving the traditional
freedoms enjoyed by the boating public.
As described in our response to Question 12, numerous programs and
activities supporting the SVS Strategy are already being implemented or
have been completed. including:
Maritime Domain Awareness initiatives:
America's Waterways Watch;
Citizens' Action Network;
Automatic Identification System (AIS) carriage
requirements; and
Robust intelligence gathering and analysis, including
Field Intelligence Support Teams at each Coast Guard
Sector.
Security Regimes:
Area Maritime Security Plans (AMSP), which conform to the
Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), include
actions to mitigate small vessel attacks;
Coast Guard approved security plans are required for MTSA
regulated vessels and facilities; and
Coast Guard Captains of the Port (COTPs) possess broad
authorities to control port access, movement, and activity.
Maritime Security and Response Operations:
The Coast Guard utilizes a tiered risk-based system, which
aligns with and supports DHS' Homeland Security Advisory
System.
A diverse set of operational activities, including:
Waterborne, airborne, and shoreside patrols and visits to
critical infrastructure; and
Security boardings of small vessels.
Vessel escorts of:
High Value military ships;
Vessels carrying high consequence cargoes; and
High capacity passenger vessels (e.g., cruise ships,
ferries).
The Coast Guard's numerous measures, together with port partner
efforts, provide layered security against small vessel and other
security risks in the maritime domain. Where appropriate, many of these
measures include partnerships with recreational boaters and
professional mariners who operate small vessels, such as America's
Waterways Watch and Citizens' Action Network. DHS and the Coast Guard
will continue to work hand in hand with industry and the public to
ensure they are part of the solution.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. David Vitter to
Admiral Robert J. Papp
Question. The SAFE Port Act required the Coast Guard, within 180
days, to ``update and finalize the rulemaking on notice of arrival for
foreign vessels on the Outer Continental Shelf '' (sec. 109 of P.L.
109-347). As I understand it, nothing has happened regarding this
matter since the notice of proposed rulemaking was issued on June 22,
2009. Please explain how you will ensure that this requirement from the
bill is completed.
Answer. The SAFE Port Act (Section 109) requires the promulgation
of regulations detailing notice of arrival (NOA) procedures for foreign
vessels planning to engage in Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) activities.
The Coast Guard published the NOA on the OCS notice of proposed
rulemaking on June 22, 2009. The Coast Guard proposes to enhance
maritime domain safety and security awareness on units and personnel
engaging in activities on the Outer Continental Shelf by regulations
which will require notice of arrival for units planning to engage in
Outer Continental Shelf activities. The proposed rules would implement
provisions of the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of
2006 and increase overall maritime domain awareness by requiring owners
or operators of United States and foreign flag floating facilities,
mobile offshore drilling units, and vessels to submit notice of arrival
information to the National Vessel Movement Center prior to engaging in
Outer Continental Shelf activities.
The Coast Guard received and reviewed two detailed sets of comments
and recommendations from trade associations (the International
Association of Drilling Contractors and the Offshore Marine Service
Association) in response to the NPRM. These comments are part of the
public record and are being considered in the process of drafting a
final rule.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Hon. Alan Bersin
Question 1. Will the 100 percent scanning requirement apply to
cargo containers destined for Canada and Mexico ports which are
subsequently transshipped by truck and rail to the United States?
Answer. Section 232 of the SAFE Port Act, as amended, requires 100
percent scanning of containers at all foreign ports that ultimately
ship containers to the U.S. A container is considered U.S-bound if it
is destined to a U.S. port. If the destination is Canada or Mexico,
then it is not considered U.S.-bound, therefore not subjected to the
100 percent scanning mandate. Those containers that are unladed in
Canada and Mexico and subsequently shipped to the U.S. via rail or
truck are screened, targeted and if necessary examined at the U.S.
ports of entry.
Question 2. Do you believe that we should look to assessing a port
security user fee to help manage the growing cost associated with port
security? We have seen a similar fee in the aviation context to defray
the enormous costs associated with security. Should the cargo and
shipping industries along with other users be required to pay a similar
fee?
Answer. The significant cost and scope of work that benefits the
facilitation of legitimate trade would certainly warrant additional
research to determine if a fee structure could be created to defray
some or all of the costs associated with port security. Determining
which port security-related activities should give rise to fees is a
prerequisite to the development of a fee structure. Currently, there
are user fees that exist to support some of these activities. To move
forward, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) would need to
identify which port security-related activities do not currently
receive fee funding and which activities CBP should seek to receive
reimbursement, and determine whether the complete fee structure should
be reworked or if it is sufficient to impose additional fees for
services that are not covered by the existing fee structure.
Question 3. On December 2 of last year, Secretary Napolitano said
that prohibitive challenges would require DHS to seek more time in the
implementation of the 100 percent scanning mandate. S. 3639 extends the
deadline to 2015 and clarifies the requirement to include either RPM or
NII scanning. Do you support this approach?
Answer. CBP recognizes that 100 percent scanning may play a role in
certain trade corridors where the scan data can provide additional
information to improve the security of that particular supply chain but
believes a risk-based approach should also be considered. CBP
understands the need to proceed with future deployments in a
responsible, fiscally sound manner that best achieves the goal of
maximizing the security of U.S. bound maritime cargo while maintaining
an effective risk-based strategy. CBP is currently identifying multiple
options, including the resources needed to implement these options,
that would scan 100 percent of all cargo prior to departure from a
foreign port.
CBP notes however that the requirement to scan all cargo at foreign
ports presents challenges in that some foreign governments view the
requirement as extraterritorial and an affront to their sovereignty.
They have indicated the likelihood of instituting reciprocal
requirements for U.S. exports to their countries. Even countries that
are cooperative are concerned about the feasibility on the basis of
port efficiency, logistical limitations, and associated costs of
implementation and operation.
Question 4. What is causing the delay for issuing technical
standards for foreign-inspection equipment?
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) does not ``issue''
technical standards to foreign governments, so there is no delay. All
equipment currently utilized in foreign environments under the Secure
Freight Initiative (SFI) is CBP owned and thus meets current CBP
minimum standards when initially deployed.
Should foreign governments pursue the purchase of their own
equipment for a port under the Container Security Initiative (CSI), and
information is requested during negotiations, CBP may provide the
foreign government or equipment companies with current technical
specifications that meet CBP minimum standards, ensuring compliance
with CBP standards for participation in a CBP program. These standards
are normally open source and accepted by the World Customs Organization
and the international community. CSI keeps an inventory and matrix of
all NII equipment that is utilized in CSI ports. Some of the NII
equipment is owned by CBP or was previously owned by CBP and thus meets
CBP standards. CBP cannot dictate to foreign governments from which
vendors they must purchase equipment, but much of the foreign owned
equipment is from the same vendors CBP purchases equipment and
therefore meets CBP standards. Other foreign owned equipment meets or
exceeds the penetration levels of CBP equipment. Also, CBP Officers are
present during the examination of containers selected by CSI Officers
and review the NII image for anomalies.
CBP's mission to combat terrorism and facilitate legitimate trade
relies on many types of technology, used in combination, to promote a
layered enforcement strategy. An example of CBPs layered enforcement
strategy includes the scanning of sea-cargo containers at foreign
seaports under SFI. Section 232(b)(1) of the SAFE Port Act, as amended
by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, states,
``A container that was loaded on a vessel in a foreign port shall not
enter the United States (either directly or via a foreign port) unless
the container was scanned by non intrusive equipment and radiation
detection equipment at a foreign port before it was loaded on a
vessel.''
Through the Office of Information and Technology, CBP has developed
standards for both non-intrusive inspection (NII) equipment and
radiation portal monitors (RPM) used for scanning containers in the
sea-cargo environment. Although there is a varying degree of industry
sophistication in commercial-off-the-shelf NII equipment and RPM
technology, the technical requirements listed in this document provide
a guideline for a complete scanning system that combines NII equipment,
RPMs and optical character recognition (OCR) technology into one
integrated system. This integrated system would have a very small
footprint and would be easily deployed, in a ``turn-key'' delivery, to
any seaport environment in the world. The specifications listed should
be used as minimum standards and are not all inclusive.
NII equipment technical specifications:
System should have a minimum footprint and easily integrate
with RPMs and OCR technology.
Penetration of a minimum of 300 mm of steel.
Minimum source strength not less then 6 MeV.
Have low dose rate emissions per inspection.
Capability to scan 20-53 foot chassis-mounted sea containers
in a drive through capacity.
System should scan a minimum 85 containers per hour and
preferably up to 150 containers per hour.
System should be able to transmit images to a designated
location in the United States via the N-25 format (N-25
baseline version 1.4) and be N-25 complaint.
Operate as an automated drive-through system.
Must be integrated with redundant safety features.
Must provide for radiation safety of operators, workers,
stevedores and by-standers while maintaining a minimum
footprint.
Ability to operate effectively in extreme temperatures and
accommodate worldwide deployment conditions.
Ability to operate on universally accepted power standards.
Must be compliant with all country deployed safety and
certification requirements.
Resolution requirements shall be .125 inches, preferred, but
not less than .5 inches.
Workstation and Interface System to include an Operator
Console and all operating systems, software, cameras, controls
and displays to depict a video and radiographic image of the
target.
Capable of capturing and displaying the radiographic and
visible spectrum (video) images of the target to the Operator
simultaneously.
RPM equipment technical specifications:
System should have a minimum footprint and easily integrate
with NII and OCR technology.
RPMs should be able to detect gamma and neutron radiation
using plastic scintillator (gross gamma counting) and helium
three tube neutron detectors.
Scintillator panels and neutron detectors should be mounted
vertically.
RPMs should at a minimum meet American National Standards
Institute (ANSI), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
U.S. Department of Energy standards on detecting radiological
material and shielded and un-shielded special nuclear material
(SNM).
RPMs should be able to detect heavily shielded SNM with a
very low false alarm rate.
RPM installations should be sensitive and capable of
detecting radioactive material at a range of heights to
intercept illicit material hidden in a multitude of cargo
types, with detectors deployed on both sides of a monitored
lane.
System should be able to transmit RPM data to a designated
location in the United States via the N-25 format (N-25
baseline version 1.4) and be N-25 complaint.
RPM systems should consist of radiation sensor panels with
presence sensors, stands, control units, annunciators (as
needed), cameras/license plate readers (as needed) and alarm
station displays.
Ability to operate effectively in extreme temperatures and
accommodate worldwide deployment conditions.
Ability to operate on universally accepted power standards.
Must be compliant with all country deployed safety and
certifications requirements.
Workstation and Interface System to include an Operator
Console and all operating systems, software, cameras, controls
and displays to depict a video and radiographic image of the
target.
OCR equipment technical specifications:
System should have a minimum footprint and easily integrate
with NII and RPM technology.
OCR component must automatically identify a sea-cargo
container number (to include two TEU units on one chassis) as
they are scanned.
OCR technology must have a very low false alarm rate.
RPM, NII and OCR data should be integrated in near ``real-time'' so
that personnel can quickly view images and adjudicate any radiological
alarms. All technology should also integrate easily, via the N-25
format, with CBP systems. The Operator Console System should be
deployed in a central alarm station that includes all operator work
stations, servers, etc., and must have the capability to send data to a
multitude of locations, to include transmission of scanning images/
radiation spectra, from a foreign location to the United States.
Additionally, all equipment must be installed so that it is easily
accessible for maintenance and calibration.
System acquisition should provide operator training, on all
equipment, in the English language with the potential for foreign
language training. System acquisition should provide on-site
maintenance, to include the potential for 24/7 on-site maintenance
technicians. All proposals should also include ``over height sensors,''
signage, drop bars and any other safety equipment as deemed necessary
by CBP.
As CBP moves forward with the deployment of technology and as the
number of manufactures, models and designs continue to increase, CBP
will work in a steadfast manner to ensure equipment performs to needed
specifications. Additionally, as new technology develops and improves,
CBP will work with both vendors and the scientific community to ensure
that the most efficient, effective and state-of-art equipment is
utilized, acquired and deployed.
Question 5. With the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) and
requirement for 100 percent scanning of U.S.-bound cargo containers,
the U.S. security strategy may become more dependent upon foreign
governments to scan cargo containers. Containers scanned by foreign
governments are not generally scanned again when they arrive in the
United States. Does CBP systematically review or examine the
inspections practices or training of host government customs services
that conduct inspections of high risk U.S. bound containers?
Answer. No. However, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has
conducted targeting and interdiction training for a number of foreign
Customs administrations. Further, in Container Security Initiative
(CSI) ports where CBP staff is present, CBP officers participate in and
witness the inspections of high-risk U.S. bound containers that are
conducted by host government personnel and may request further
inspection.
Question 6. What strategies does CBP employ to ensure foreign
customs officials are sufficiently trained and that the cargo
inspections are performed in accordance with U.S. standards?
Answer. CBP does not systematically review training of host
government customs services that conduct inspection of high-risk U.S.-
bound containers. However, CBP has conducted targeting and interdiction
training for a number of foreign Customs administrations. In CSI ports
where CBP staff are present, CBP officers participate in and witness
the inspections of high-risk U.S. bound containers that are conducted
by host government personnel and may request further inspection (i.e.,
a physical exam of the container's contents) if necessary. In the port
of Qasim, Pakistan, no CBP personnel are on the ground. However, Vetted
Foreign Service Nationals perform the inspections and transmit the data
to the National Targeting Center-Cargo (NTC-C) for further review and
scrutiny in real time. In this situation, the CBP officers at the NTC-C
make the final decision to release the container or request further
examination.
Question 7. CBP officials responsible for managing the CSI program
have reported that overall there has been a high level of cooperation
at CSI seaports, though they acknowledged that the degree of
involvement and participation that CBP officers have with foreign
customs officials during the examination of high-risk cargo varies by
country. How often do CBP personnel participate in or witness
inspections of high-risk cargo bound for the United States at these
foreign seaports?
Answer. CBP personnel regularly participate in and witness
inspections of high-risk cargo at all CSI foreign ports with the
exception of the two Container Security Initiative (CSI) ports in
Mainland China.
Question 8. Are there any countries that restrict CSI teams from
participating or viewing examinations of high-risk cargo?
Answer. Yes, the two CSI ports in Mainland China.
Question 9. CBP officials at the National Targeting Center: (1)
assist the CSI teams at high-volume seaports to ensure all containers
that pass through CSI seaports are targeted to identify high-risk
container cargo; (2) carry out targeting responsibilities for CSI
seaports that do not have CBP officials stationed there; and (3)
conduct targeting for U.S.-bound container cargo that does not pass
through CSI seaports using advance information (24-hour rule and 10+2)
to identify high-risk container cargo. What are the advantages and
disadvantages of conducting targeting from the United States versus
targeting at CSI seaports?
Answer. The advantages of targeting at overseas Container Security
Initiative (CSI) seaports are control, immediate access to the
containers before they are laden on the vessels, and access to local
host country intelligence in regards to trade entities. The primary
disadvantage of targeting at overseas CSI seaports is the significant
cost of staffing, data transmission and equipment. Conversely,
targeting from the U.S. would allow for a lower cost of staffing, data
transmission, and equipment. Targeting from the National Targeting
Center-Cargo (NTC-C) also brings with it capabilities to receive highly
classified intelligence, and close interaction with a multitude of
other Federal agencies.
When CSI was first launched in 2002, the most practical and
advantageous method of execution was to provide staffing to physically
target cargo at the foreign CSI seaport locations. During that time,
the relationships and reciprocal agreements with the host countries
were in the development stage. Over the past 8 years, the program has
evolved and matured to include global cooperation and the development
of measures which improve shipping security for the U.S. and its
partners. The nurturing of host government relationships along with the
combined assets of CSI NTC-C and its hosts provides CSI a comprehensive
network of intelligence to draw upon to in order evaluate manifest
data. These factors may now tip the balance in favor of performing more
of the targeting functions from the U.S. while maintaining a minimum
staffing of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Officers at the
CSI ports to witness exams and collaborate with host nation officials.
Question 10. In DHS's Congressional Budget Justification FY 2011,
CBP requested a $50 million decrease for the CSI program shift CSI
personnel currently stationed overseas, at the CSI ports, back to the
U.S. at the National Targeting Center. What security impacts do you
anticipate from transitioning personnel back to the United States?
Answer. While shifting some of the officers overseas to the
National Targeting Center (NTC), U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) would look to station a minimum number of officers in Container
Security Initiative (CSI) ports overseas to continue to foster
relationships and information sharing with host counterparts and to
witness inspections. With this proposal, there would not be a
significant impact on security.
When CSI was first launched in 2002, the most practical and
advantageous method of execution was to provide staffing to physically
target cargo at the foreign CSI seaport locations. During that time,
the relationships and reciprocal agreements with the host countries
were in the development stage. Over the past 8 years, the program has
evolved and matured to include global cooperation and the development
of measures which improve shipping security for the U.S. and its
partners. The nurturing of host government relationships along with the
combined assets of CSI, National Targeting Center-Cargo (NTC-C) and its
hosts provides CSI a comprehensive network of intelligence to draw on
in order evaluate manifest data. These factors may now tip the balance
in favor of performing more of the targeting functions from the U.S.
while maintaining a minimum staffing of CBP Officers at the CSI ports
to witness exams and collaborate with host nation officials.
Question 11. Many of our imports come from China--which in the past
did not allow CBP officials into the country to validate C-TPAT
members' supply chains. During 2007, CBP undertook a pilot project to
use third party contractors to validate the supply chain security of
U.S. importers in China. In that pilot, only 14 of 307 eligible C-TPAT
members had indicated an interest in using a third party to validate
their security practices and only 1 had actually been validated. Why
were C-TPAT members importing from China willing to forego the added
benefits of validation as a Tier 2 or Tier 3 participant rather than
submit to validation by a third party? Why did so few of the eligible
C-TPAT members agree to cooperate in the pilot and what would be
necessary to gain their support?
Answer. There are several possible explanations for the low number
of volunteers participating in the project. First, in accordance with
the SAFE Port Act the member was required to incur the cost associated
with the third party validator. Second, members were concerned about
sharing proprietary information with the third party entities. Finally,
invited companies may have decided to see how the CBP--China Customs
joint validation initiative progresses before incurring the cost
associated with a third party validation. Engaging the services of a
third party is an individual company decision which is based upon a
cost/benefit comparison.
Question 12. CBP does not directly test C-TPAT members' security
practices, but generally discusses security with officials, observes
physical security, and reviews policies and procedures to validate
members' security practices. Additionally, CBP has yet to identify
outcome based performance measures to indicate C-TPAT's effectiveness
at enhancing supply chain security. Absent direct testing and outcome
based performance measures, what information is available to support
that the C-TPAT program has enhanced the security of the international
supply chain?
Answer. Custom-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) has
positively impacted the security of the international supply chain
through adherence to the program's security criteria and this impact is
reflected in a series of performance measures. C-TPAT has developed a
comprehensive validation strategy to ensure that strong security
measures have been adopted by members throughout their supply chain.
The member's security profile is closely reviewed by highly trained
Supply Chain Security Specialist (SCSS) and subsequently subjected to
rigorous on-site reviews. SCSS closely examine records such as
container inspection and seal logs, personnel files, and business
partner screening records. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
documents the records reviewed and all vulnerabilities including
physical security deficiencies. CBP grants members 90 days to implement
needed corrective actions which SCSS confirm through a variety of
methods such as digital photos, invoices and physical onsite
confirmation. Members which fail to implement the required enhancements
are suspended from the program. C-TPAT data shows that members are on
average 95 percent compliant in meeting the program's security
criteria. In addition members must conduct an annual self-assessment
where they are required to review, correct and/or update their
previously submitted security profile. Failure to do so also results in
suspension or removal from the program.
To further enhance the program's performance measures C-TPAT
recently created a validation scorecard to measure how well companies
are implementing supply chain security procedures. The scorecard
measures how a company performed during the validation; it may also be
used as a tool to show improvements or patterns of predictability over
time such as potential supply chain security risks.
C-TPAT's security criteria and strong on-site validation procedures
have been replicated around the world to the point that they have
become the global standards for supply chain security. The governments
of Canada, Jordan, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand developed or
improved their own business partnership programs to align with and be
at the same level as C-TPAT. By setting and maintaining high standards,
C-TPAT has in essence become the security program that foreign Customs
Administrations want and need to replicate, particularly if they
envision signing a Mutual Recognition arrangement with CBP.
Question 13. The 10+2 program was developed, in large part, to
improve the quality of shipping information used by the ATS system to
identify high risks containers. What are CBP's plans for collecting and
analyzing information on how the 10+2 data are being used for targeting
purposes and determining whether the data have a clear impact on CBP's
ability to target high-risk containers?
Answer. The advanced data provided by the Importer Security Filing
(``10+2'') significantly increases the scope and accuracy of
information gathered on the goods, conveyances and entities involved in
the shipment of cargo to the U.S. via vessel. This additional advance
data allows U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to make earlier
and much better informed targeting decisions prior to cargo arrival in
the U.S.
CBP continuously collects information about the frequency of the
risk indicators identified in the importer security filing data set;
risk indicators that may or may not have been previously identified by
the manifest (bill of lading) and/or entry data sets. CBP periodically
conducts structured analyses of its targeting methodology to measure
its effectiveness. One aspect of that analysis is a measurement that a
given data attribute predicts an outcome. Each of the targeting
concepts developed from the ``10+2'' data will be measured using this
analysis. While the ``10+2'' program is still in the early stages,
there have been several instances which highlight the effectiveness and
necessity of this new data.
For instance, real time analysis of the Imposter Security Filing
(ISF) data enables CBP to identify potentially mis-manifested
containers scheduled to arrive into U.S. waters by comparing the
container numbers that are declared in the carriers' vessel stow plans
against the containers derived from the 24 hour manifest data for the
same shipments.
Based upon the ``10+2'' data alone, CBP Officers are now able to
identify and timely mitigate any risk from potentially mis-manifested
containers, while avoiding needless delays to the movement of all other
cargo.
A second preliminary measure of the effectiveness of the ``10+2''
data is the earlier and much more precise identification of lower-risk
parties involved in the supply chain. Prior to the collection of the
``10+2'' importer security filing data, CBP was unable to identify,
with any high degree of confidence, that a party was indeed a trusted
C-TPAT participant solely from the manifest data. Today, C-TPAT
participants are identified immediately through their importer security
filings and given their respective targeting ``credit'', which
significantly reduces the chances of a shipment being targeted for an
enforcement examination. Prior to ``10+2'', it was not uncommon for C-
TPAT companies to undergo numerous domestic non-intrusive inspection
(NII) exams due to questionable manifest data.
Lastly, CBP is able to identify and mitigate the presence of
higher-risk entities earlier in the supply chain due to more precise
information that is supplied as part of the ``10+2'' data. Over the
course of the past 2 years, the Automated Targeting System (ATS) has
identified hundreds of potential high-risk entities from the ``10+2''
data; matches that CBP would not have known about based on the manifest
data alone. While an inconclusive or conclusive match is not
necessarily indicative of the presence of dangerous cargo, it does
allow CBP to gain valuable intelligence on the nature of the shipments
being shipped or imported by these potentially terrorist-related
subject matches.
Question 14. Are any of the 10+2 requirements to be used for
purposes other than assessment of terrorist threat, such as detecting
other illegal contraband?
Answer. The usage of the ``10+2'' data is not strictly limited to
anti-terrorism efforts. In fact, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) targeters and analysts routinely use the ``10+2'' data to help
identify the presence of shipments containing illegal contraband such
as narcotics and other illegally smuggled goods--the same techniques
used to introduce contraband into the U.S. may also be used by
terrorists to smuggle in weapons of mass effects. However, at this
time, the Trade Act of 2002 and the SAFE Port Act of 2006 expressly
forbid CBP from using the ``10+2'' data for pure trade compliance or
trade enforcement purposes.
Question 15. Has CBP officially adopted a position that 10+2 will
alleviate the need for 100 percent scanning?
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has not adopted
the position that 10+2 alleviates the need for 100 percent scanning.
Question 16. If so, what type of analysis was done to support this
position and what reductions in what types of risk are expected as a
result 10+2?
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has not adopted
the position that 10+2 alleviates the need for 100 percent scanning.
However, CBP's Importer Security Filing (ISF) initiative, also known as
``10+2", forms a critical enhancement to the advanced data component of
CBP's layered security strategy in the ocean cargo environment. The
application of the advanced data from the ISF to CBP's targeting
process enhances the utility of the agency's risk analysis
exponentially. The level of detail provides greater transparency into
individual transactions and the parties involved, enabling CBP's
targeters to more accurately identify high-risk and potentially
problematic shipments while facilitating truly low-risk cargo. When
combined with CBP's currently deployed imaging and radiation detection
technology and the expertise of our National Targeting Center and port
targeters, ISF forms a cornerstone of an effective risk-based, layered
security strategy.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Hon. Alan Bersin
Question 1. Three years ago, Congress acted to require one hundred
percent scanning of all containers coming to the U.S. However, last
year the GAO found we are only scanning less than 5 percent of all
U.S.-bound containers and that one hundred percent screening has not
been achieved at even one port. Is the Department scanning more than 5
percent of the containers prior to arriving in the United States? If
so, what is the percentage of containers that are now being scanned?
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) continues to scan
less than 5 percent (collectively in Container Security Initiative
(CSI) and Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) ports) of containerized
maritime cargo before it is laden on a vessel bound for the U.S. CBP
continues to screen 100 percent of all cargo manifests utilizing the
Automated Targeting System and intelligence databases. One hundred
percent of those shipments that are deemed high risk are scanned
utilizing NII and radiation technology.
CBP defines scanning as examining cargo to both an x-ray image for
anomalies and radiation screening for the presence of radiation. CBP
defines screening as analyzing all cargo manifests utilizing the
Automated Targeting System to identify high risk cargo.
Question 2. Although it was recommended the by Government
Accountability Office (GAO), the Department of Homeland Security has
not yet completed a feasibility or cost benefit analysis of the one
hundred percent scanning requirement or any other alternative program.
When will the Department conduct such an analysis so that we can
determine the most effective way to move forward on container security?
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has conducted
initial research into the feasibility and cost benefit analysis of one
hundred percent scanning. A complete cost of the SFI pilot ports has
been documented in the bi-annual reports to Congress. CBP is currently
identifying multiple options, including the resources needed to
implement these options, for scanning 100 percent of all maritime cargo
prior to departure from foreign ports. Once the analysis is completed,
we will be pleased to provide a briefing on the results.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Hon. Alan Bersin
Question 1. Several ports in my state have expressed concern about
the 25 percent cost share for ports to participate in the Port Security
Grant program because they believe it has been difficult to come up
with the local match in this tough economy. Why does DHS continue to
maintain a need for a cost share for the port security grant program
when other Homeland Security grant programs such as the Transit
Security Grant Program and the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI)
grant program do not have a required local cost share? Are you aware of
ports that have had to scale back or abandon port security projects
because of the inability to come up with the local cost share due to
decreased revenues in this tough economy? Do you believe this could be
putting our ports at risk?
Answer. Cost-sharing is an effective way to ensure buy-in by a
grant recipient, while incentivizing the recipient to leverage its own
ongoing and planned investments in homeland security. The cost-share
requirement is Congressionally-mandated under 46 U.S.C. 70107(c).
Although the cost-share is statutorily required, the Secretary of
Homeland Security does have the statutory authority to reduce the cost-
share for Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) projects in certain
circumstances. The cost share requirement for FY 2009 ARRA and FY 2010
PSGP awards were congressionally waived, but the FY 2010 Homeland
Security Appropriations Act conference report language (P.L. 111-83)
specifically indicated that the cost share requirement for the PSGP is
not expected to be waived in the future, except at the discretion of
the Secretary. Some port representatives have expressed concern about
the cost share requirement for FY 2007 through FY 2009 grants. Several
fiduciary agents have informed us of difficulties in soliciting project
proposals because sub-recipients are unable to cover the cost match in
this current economic climate. However, we have no evidence to suggest
that previously approved port security projects are being abandoned due
to this concern.
Additionally, FEMA issued Information Bulletin (IB) No. 322 on July
15, 2009 to define the process grantees should follow to submit cost-
share waiver requests for FY 2007, 2008, and 2009 PSGP grants. Such
requests are evaluated on a project-by-project basis and generally not
granted for an entire award. FEMA Program Analysts work closely with
the authorized award representatives to ensure the request meets all
criteria outlined in the IB. Each waiver request must contain a strong
justification from the prime recipient, proof of written notice to the
local Captain of the Port and Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC),
assurance that granting the waiver will not change the security
compliance requirements the grantee is required to operate under within
their approved security plan, and a revised budget. All cost-share
waiver requests are considered by FEMA, USCG, and DHS leadership.
While cost-sharing is valuable in ensuring efficient and effective
recipient use of Federal funding, we recognize that extenuating
circumstances may arise. The cost-share waiver provision helps ensure
that worthy PSGP projects continue to move forward. Thus far, all
requests for waivers under this process that have been presented to the
Secretary for consideration have been approved.
Question 2. I included language in the FY 2008 Omnibus
Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161) Conference Report to require the
Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to report to
Congress on the training of CBP officers assisting the FDA in
monitoring the safety of our Nation's food supply. Does CBP have enough
officers at our ports to ensure the safety of our Nation's food
imports?
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) believes there are
enough officers at our ports of entry to ensure the safety of our
Nation's food imports. CBP works closely with the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to address the issue of food safety. FDA personnel
are co-located at CBP's National Targeting Center and the Commercial
Targeting and Analysis Center. The FDA and CBP automated systems for
prior notice and entry release are integrated, which allows both
agencies to have advanced targeting in place to select potential
shipments that warrant review and/or examination. At some ports of
entry, but not all, FDA has personnel along side CBP to address these
concerns. The partnership between CBP and FDA has streamlined and
enhanced our efforts to address food safety concerns.
Question 3. What changes has CBP made since 2008 to improve the
safety of our Nation's imported food supply?
Answer. Since 2008, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has
designated ``Import Safety'' as a priority trade issue; an identified
high risk trade area where CBP can focus our resources as part of a
layered approach to risk management. These priority trade issues are
commodities that can cause a significant revenue loss, economic risk to
U.S. industry and/or represent health and safety concerns to citizens.
CBP has created two divisions, the Import Safety and Interagency
Requirements Division and the Commercial Targeting Analysis Center both
dedicated in identifying and addressing import safety concerns.
CBP has been an active participant in interagency workgroups such
as the Import Safety Interagency Workgroup and President Obama's
recently announced, Food Safety Working Group. CBP is dedicated to
working with the other government agencies on creating policy for CBP
field resources to address import safety nationwide in a uniform
manner. These work groups have been successful in multiple initiatives,
including but not limited to incorporating product safety in our
trusted partnership programs, the establishment of other government
officials at the ports of entry to interdict import safety concerns,
and the possible cross laboratory training among participating
agencies.
To enhance collaboration between CBP and other government agencies
including FDA, the Import Safety Commercial Targeting and Analysis
Center (CTAC) was established in 2009. The facility is located within
CBP's Office of International Trade. The CTAC serves as a fusion center
where CBP, FDA and other participating personnel are co-located at a
single site, sharing targeting resources and expertise to achieve the
common mission of protecting the American public. The CTAC enhances CBP
and FDA's ability to streamline national trade targeting efforts and
coordinate among the participating agencies; this includes the sharing
of critical import safety information, sharing of best practices,
reduction in duplicated targeting/examinations across agencies, and
also serves as a central point of response for import safety events of
interest to FDA, CBP, and other agencies present. The mission of the
CTAC is in line with the President's Food Safety Working Group, which
calls for agencies with an interest/authority in import safety to
coordinate efforts and resources, and focuses on the core principles of
prevention, surveillance, and response. Through a unique Memorandum of
Understanding, agencies at CTAC are able to share information and
systems access in order to conduct joint import safety targeting at a
national level. Through this channel, the CTAC is an effective tool for
CBP and FDA to enhance the safety of our Nation's food imports. At the
center, personnel from both agencies respond collectively to
allegations, develop food safety operations, coordinate with
laboratories on food safety testing requirements, and pursue
enforcement actions against shipments found to pose a threat to U.S.
consumers.
CBP will continue to work with our Federal partners to prevent
dangerous products from getting into the hands of the American
consumers.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to
Hon. Alan Bersin
Question 1. Commissioner Bersin, how does transparency in trade
data increase maritime security?
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implements a risk-
based, layered enforcement strategy toward securing maritime cargo.
This multi-layered enforcement strategy includes the collection of
advanced trade information (manifest and entry) from programs such as
the 24-hour Rule, the Importer Security Filing (``10+2'') and Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). Prior to the collection
of trade data provide to CBP as part of the ``10+2'' program, CBP
primarily relied on the carrier's manifest data to perform security
risk analysis prior to the lading of merchandise arriving by vessel.
While manifest data by nature is timely, internal and external reviews
have shown that alone, manifest data is not very detailed. As a result,
CBP had found that in many instances, low-risk companies were being
unduly targeted and examined. Conversely, and much more troubling from
a security standpoint, is the fact that certain high-risk entities,
questionable trade patterns and commodities of interest were not being
identified and targeted 24 hours prior to vessel lading due to lack of
quality trade data at that point in time.
The advanced entry data provided by the Importer Security Filing
(``10+2'') in conjunction with manifest data transmitted 24 hours prior
to vessel lading has significantly increased the scope and accuracy of
information gathered on the goods, conveyances and entities involved in
the shipment of cargo, which vastly improves CBP's ability to identify
high-risk shipments so as to prevent smuggling and ensure cargo safety
and security. This advance knowledge allows CBP to make earlier and
much better informed targeting decisions prior to cargo arrival which
helps to foster and facilitate the movement of lawful international
trade.
Question 2. The law requires CBP to make import and export data
available for dissemination. Is complete data currently being made
available to all of the appropriate entities who request it?
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) provides, daily in
accordance with 19 CFR 103.31 (e) all available inward manifest
information from its Automated Manifest System (AMS), within the
Automated Commercial System, to those parties who subscribe to the CD-
ROM service. Under CBP regulations at 19 CFR 103.31(e) interested
members of the public may purchase a single day or subscribe to AMS to
receive the subject manifest data. Those companies or individuals who
subscribe receive a CD-ROM daily with all CBP AMS manifest data wherein
manifest confidentiality has not been requested pursuant to 19 USC
1431(c)(2) and 19 CFR 103.31(d). The AMS data elements that may be
released are enumerated in 19 CFR 103.31(e)(3).
With regard to vessel outward manifest (export) data filed
electronically, CBP provides a data push through a Virtual Private
Network connection to those parties who have signed an Interconnect
Security Agreement and met the technical specifications for the
Information Technology interface. This data push currently encompasses
15 percent of outward manifests.
Access to outward manifests filed in paper or other than
electronically, CBP currently permits access within its ports of entry
to one requestor, and has been exploring means to accommodate
additional requestors without interfering with port operations or over
burdening port personnel with requests for review of copied information
pursuant to section 19 CFR 103.31 (b).
Question 3. If not, why?
Answer. Physical access to manifest documents at U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) Ports of Entry by more than one entity has been
identified as a logistical burden for the respective ports to manage,
and raises concerns about safeguarding and securing those portions of
the vessel manifest that are not available for public or press access.
CBP continues to explore alternative methods to provide access to
outward manifest data in an electronic format for interested parties.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Hon. Alan Bersin
Question 1. In 2002, Customs and Border Protection established the
rule requiring an electronic manifest be submitted 24-hours prior to
loading onto any commercial ship destined for the U.S. This process
identified cargo containers that required inspection at the foreign
port of origin and also determined which cargo containers would be
examined upon arrival in the United States. In addition, agreements
were negotiated with foreign countries to allow U.S. Customs agents
with overseas billets to work with their foreign Customs counterparts
and effectively ``push our borders out'' to more thoroughly examine
U.S. bound maritime cargo. However, today, I understand that CPB is
withdrawing overseas billets and bringing a number of CBP Officers back
to the U.S. Could you provide some additional details on this
adjustment of overseas billets and what impact it will have on the
Container Security Initiative?
Answer. The Container Security Initiative (CSI) program has
developed significantly since its inception in 2002. The CSI program of
tomorrow will be a hybrid of different (less personnel intensive, more
technology driven) and more efficient and less costly concepts of
operations to include remote targeting and remote examinations in a
selected number of CSI ports, reciprocal relationships and the
continued need for a minimal number of U.S. Customs and Protection
(CBP) personnel stationed in foreign locations. CSI will maintain a
foreign presence to witness exams, collaborate with host-country
counterparts and maintain relationships with foreign customs
administrations.
Question 2. Last month the GAO released a report on combating
nuclear smuggling. What the GAO found quote ``While DHS reports it
scans nearly 100 percent of the cargo and conveyances entering the U.S.
through land borders and major seaports, it has made less progress
scanning for radiation: (1) in railcars entering the U.S. from Canada
and Mexico; (2) in international air cargo; and (3) for international
commercial aviation aircraft, passengers, or baggage.'' For example,
containers offloaded from foreign ships arriving in western Canadian
ports, are placed on freight rail, and cross into our country over a
land border. Are there differences between how U.S. and Canadian ports
deploy radiation detection equipment and the procedures used to scan
cargo entering each respective country?
Answer. There is no difference in the level of security scrutiny
that cargo containers coming into the U.S. from Canada would receive
versus containers entering directly from other foreign countries
through U.S. ports. Conveyances arriving in the U.S. from Canada
through land border ports of entry by truck or rail are considered to
be arriving from a foreign country and are therefore subject to the
same level of security scrutiny as containers being imported directly
into U.S. ports.
Regardless of the mode of transportation, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) concentrates its efforts on its primary mission of
preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the U.S.,
while at the same time facilitating legitimate trade and travel.
We are accomplishing these twin goals through the use of advance
information, risk-management targeting systems, detection technologies,
extended border strategies and international partnerships. CBP employs
a layered enforcement approach to safeguarding the U.S. from threats by
land, air, and sea.
CBP recognizes that no single strategy or risk assessment is 100
percent effective and accurate, so CBP focuses on layering multiple
initiatives together to accomplish its mission. CBP works aggressively
with trade and government partners to legislate improvements regarding
data timeliness and quality. This data enhances the ability of CBP's
highly trained personnel, together with their use of cutting edge
technology, to target, detect and interdict terrorists, or implements
of terrorism, destined to the U.S.
Question 3. Do you believe this presents a potential vulnerability?
Answer. There is no difference in the level of security scrutiny
that cargo containers coming into the U.S. from Canada would receive
versus containers entering directly from other foreign countries
through U.S. ports. Conveyances arriving in the U.S. from Canada
through land border ports of entry by truck or rail are considered to
be arriving from a foreign country and are therefore subject to the
same level of security scrutiny as containers being imported directly
into U.S. ports.
Regardless of the mode of transportation, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) concentrates its efforts on its primary mission of
preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the U.S.,
while at the same time facilitating legitimate trade and travel.
We are accomplishing these twin goals through the use of advance
information, risk-management targeting systems, detection technologies,
extended border strategies and international partnerships. CBP employs
a layered enforcement approach to safeguarding the U.S. from threats by
land, air, and sea.
CBP recognizes that no single strategy or risk assessment is 100
percent effective and accurate, so CBP focuses on layering multiple
initiatives together to accomplish its mission. CBP works aggressively
with trade and government partners to legislate improvements regarding
data timeliness and quality. This data enhances the ability of CBP's
highly trained personnel, together with their use of cutting edge
technology, to target, detect and interdict terrorists, or implements
of terrorism, destined to the U.S.
Air Cargo Interagency Collaborations--Efforts between U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) and other agencies have been established to
address the strengthening of air cargo security; For example, Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is exploring opportunities
with TSA's Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) to increase
information sharing between both programs through strategies such as
collecting additional information during foreign validation visits and
leveraging existing mutual recognition arrangements with foreign
customs administrations.
And, the implementation of ``Smart Border'' agreements that involve
a number of actions to improve information exchange and adopt
benchmarked security measures that will reduce the terrorist threat at
our borders, such as the sharing of significant seizure information
that would enhance future targeting efforts.
These layers are interdependent and deployed simultaneously, to
substantially increase the likelihood that contraband, including
terrorists and weapons of terror will be detected. No single strategy
could provide the level of security that CBP has worked to achieve and
maintain since the tragic events of September 11, 2001.
The rail vector presents unique challenges to CBP in deploying
effective radiation detection technology. In its ongoing efforts to
address the nuclear threat, CBP has procured a new prototype dual-
energy rail radiography system that incorporates a passive radiation
detection capability. This new prototype was procured as a possible
replacement for the large-scale NII rail imaging systems currently
deployed to rail border crossings. CBP intends to replace its inventory
of older rail radiography systems with new and enhanced technology as
the older systems reach their end-of-life-cycle. Acceptance of this
prototype is contingent upon ongoing testing and evaluation efforts by
both the vendor and CBP. Additional characterization efforts of the
active radiography and passive radiation detection technologies'
capability to function in a synchronized mode are currently in the
planning stages.
Question 4. Section 122 of SAFE Ports Act of 2006 required CPB to
seek to develop a plan for the inspection, prior to the loading of
passengers and vehicles, for U.S. inbound ferries. There are 28 ferries
operating from Ports in Canada, Mexico, the British Virgin Islands, and
the Dominican Republic, to ports in the U.S.
Washington State operates the largest passenger ferry system in the
country. There are a handful of ferry routes between cities in
Washington State and British Columbia. As you may recall, the so-called
``millennium bomber'' entered the country on a ferry from Canada. For
these reasons, ferry security is ever present in the mind of my
constituents.
To paraphrase the report delivered to Congress on January 9, 2009--
we (CPB) took a look at it, looks like too hard a problem to solve
because of the challenges that have arisen during current discussions
with the Canadians for pre-inspection at land border points of entry,
so we consider that we fulfilled the obligation.
I intend to raise the issue of ferry security when the Senate takes
up reauthorization of the SAFE Ports Act. Are you willing to work with
me between now and then in trying to figure out how to clear some of
the hurdles to enable the development of a plan as envisioned in
Section 122?
Answer. Yes. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is aware that
inbound ferries are a potential vulnerability. CBP currently receives
some ferry Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) data voluntarily
that allows for some advance screening. CBP would appreciate the
opportunity to work with you to address these issues.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to
Hon. Alan Bersin
Question 1. It is CBP's duty to ``steadfastly enforce the laws of
the United States while fostering our Nation's economic security
through lawful international trade and travel.'' Customs has the sole
responsibility of ensuring that duties assessed on unfairly traded
imports are collected. The duties are often put in place on certain
imports to serve as a deterrent against unfairly traded imports which
were found to have injured U.S. companies and workers. It has come to
my attention in recent months that there is a growing problem with
import fraud by countries and companies seeking to evade certain
duties. What steps are being taken by CBP to end this practice?
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) takes all matters
of antidumping and countervailing duty (ADCVD) evasion very seriously,
and in coordination with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
employs every available method in accordance with law to address these
matters. Such actions may include entry summary reviews and/or cargo
examinations by the ports; domestic importer premises visits; domestic
broker/filer visits; sampling by the ports for CBP laboratory testing;
and when available, foreign manufacture visits by the ICE attache's
office to review production capability and/or existence of operations.
However, the volume of ADCVD cases and the complexity of regulating
them pose a significant challenge.
ADCVD is a Priority Trade Issue (PTI) for CBP and as such, CBP
conducts an assessment of our implementation and enforcement efforts on
an on-going basis.
Question 2. Are you aware of such fraud issues as they relate to
steel pipe and tube products from China?
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has received
multiple allegations of circumvention of antidumping cases on Chinese
steel pipe and tube. CBP continues to work with U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) as well as the domestic manufacturers of
steel pipe and tube to address these matters.
Question 3. Does CBP have the resources to ensure the proper
collection of all duties and prevent import fraud?
Answer. CBP is currently monitoring approximately 300 AD/CVD cases
for which the Department of Commerce (DOC) has ordered the imposition
of AD/CVD duties and dozens of AD/CVD cases that are in preliminary
status. As you may know, DOC assigns various different duty rates for
specific manufacturers within AD/CVD cases, providing incentive and
opportunity for circumvention. For example, DOC assigned 195 different
manufacturer deposit rates for the Chinese wooden bedroom furniture
case. In addition, DOC issued 155 messages on that case, which includes
scope rulings and injunctions. These points illustrate the challenges
CBP has with administering and enforcing only one AD/CVD case.
CBP recently issued a vacancy announcement to add personnel to our
National Targeting and Analysis Groups (NTAG), including the AD/CVD
NTAG.
Question 4. With the ongoing focus of putting CBP resources on the
border, what impact is that having on inspecting imports at ports of
entry including U.S. ports?
Answer. While CBP has increased enforcement personnel along the
southwest border with Mexico, particularly Border Patrol agents, we
have not diminished our trade enforcement activities at seaports or
airports.
CBP understands that there is a monetary gain in not paying the
ADCVD duty on the subject products, and that certain foreign
manufactures and U.S. importers will attempt to circumvent ADCVD cases.
As such, CBP will continue to target importers and manufactures for
potential evasion of ADCVD cases and will use all available means to
enforce the cases.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison to
Hon. Alan Bersin
Question 1. The Coast Guard is responsible for securing 361 ports
and 95,000 miles of coastline and navigable waterways. It also has 10
other missions, including maritime drug interdiction, search and
rescue, immigration law enforcement at sea, and serving as the lead
Federal agency responding to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill . . . and
all of this with only 42,000 Active Duty personnel.
CBP also has an enormous number of tasks to accomplish with limited
resources. Although you have only been on the job since the spring, in
your estimation, is CBP adequately staffed to handle all the port
security tasks?
Answer. The FY 2011 budget request includes the appropriate funding
level to support U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel
assigned to carry out their responsibilities. CBP has conducted staff
modeling to assess where best to position its resources, and our major
and minor ports all receive a share of resources based on operational
need.
Question 2. The level of transportation security abroad has an
important impact on our domestic homeland security efforts. The weaker
cargo security standards are at foreign ports, the greater the risk to
U.S. bound cargo. To that end, both the Coast Guard and CBP have
developed international programs to improve and build a layered
approach to port security.
CBP has developed a number of programs aimed at international port
security including the ``Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism''
(C-TPAT), the Container Security Initiative (CSI), and the ``10+2''
security filing. Given all the cooperative arrangements that are
inherent in these programs, especially those with the private sector,
is CBP able to quantify how these programs have contributed to cargo
security?
Answer. During FY2009, Container Security Initiative (CSI)
conducted 56,781 cargo exams of high-risk shipments in overseas ports.
Since they were examined overseas, there was no reason to inspect them
for security purposes once they were unladed in domestic ports and were
more than likely released into the economy unless they were targeted
for a non-security related inspection (i.e., trade, narcotics,
agriculture, etc.). To date, no instruments of terrorism have been
detected in maritime containerized cargo destined for the U.S. CSI is
currently operational in 58 ports worldwide. With these 58 ports, CSI
processes approximately 86 percent of all maritime containerized cargo
imported into the U.S., and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
continues to screen 100 percent of cargo manifests and related
information.
For several years CBP has successfully utilized a layered
enforcement strategy, involving different programs such as those
described in the question and other security programs. The programs are
inter-related and secure different parts of the supply chain. Each
program has its own set of productivity measures all of which continue
to increase each year and as a whole they combine to form a strong
security posture which also serves to facilitate legitimate trade. The
private sector continues to support a risk based cargo enforcement
strategy. CBP recently concluded the 2010 Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) member survey and the results will be made
public later this year. More than 3,900 member companies, nearly half
of all membership, chose to participate. This study demonstrates the
effectiveness of C-TPAT in causing thousands of companies to give
closer scrutiny to the security of the goods they handle and ensuring
that their overseas suppliers have implemented sound security
practices.
The 2010 study identified several collateral benefits for C-TPAT
members that support the argument that the C-TPAT program has enhanced
the security of the international supply chain:
Decrease in supply chain disruptions.
Establishment of supply chain security procedures where none
existed before.
More frequent review of service providers security
standards.
Reduce cargo theft and pilferage.
Improved security for workforce.
Access to security training sessions, tips, and techniques.
Question 3. How can these programs be further improved?
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) continues to
pursue means of operating more effectively and efficiently as new
technology becomes available. Container Security Initiative (CSI)
targeters have implemented the Importer Security Filing data into
targeting methodologies and continue to work closely with host country
nations on information sharing.
CBP's security programs are relatively mature and stable at this
point and we continually making process improvement so that CBP can
effectively segment risk and ensure legitimate trade moves quickly
through the supply chain. For example, in 2010 Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) established an internal
Evaluation and Assessment Branch to ensure validations are conducted
consistently and in accordance with established standard operating
procedures.
Question 4. One CBP program that has encountered numerous
challenges is the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI), which Congress
mandated to test the feasibility of 100 percent scanning of U.S. bound
cargo at foreign ports.
The GAO recommended that CBP conduct a feasibility study of the SFI
program before moving forward with any future implementation, but to
date, CBP has not completed such a study. Why has the study not been
completed?
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has conducted
initial research in the feasibility and cost benefit analysis of one
hundred percent scanning. A complete cost of the Secure Freight
Initiative (SFI) pilot ports has been documented in the bi-annual
reports to Congress.
Question 5. Do you believe the costs of 100 percent scanning
outweigh the benefits to securing U.S. bound cargo?
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) recognizes that
100 percent scanning may play a role in certain trade corridors where
the scan data can provide additional information to improve the
security of that particular supply chain but believes a risk-based
approach should also be considered.
Some governments, as a result of concerns over sovereignty,
feasibility, logistics, their own regulatory authority, and cost may
decide to forego 100 percent scanning in their ports. Such concerns
affected the participation of at least one major trading partner in the
SFI study. CBP will continue to work with foreign governments,
carriers, and shippers globally to improve risk-based targeting and
enhance supply chain security.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Stephen L. Caldwell
Question 1. Pending the release of the implementation plan for the
DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy, what are the potential options for
mitigating threats from small vessels? To what extent would a new
requirement that small vessels carry transponders--so they could be
tracked--be a viable solution? How does this option compare to
increased ``neighborhood watch'' type programs to encourage watermen
and pleasure boaters to report suspicious activity?
Answer. Please see the question below for a joint response.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison to
Stephen L. Caldwell
Question. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
maritime security efforts have focused primarily on large commercial
vessels, cargoes, and crew. Efforts to address the small vessel
environment have largely been limited to traditional safety and basic
law enforcement concerns. Small vessels are, however, readily available
for potential exploitation by terrorists, smugglers of weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs), narcotics, aliens, other contraband, and other
criminals. Small vessels have also been successfully employed overseas
by terrorists to deliver Waterborne Improvised Explosive Devices
(WBIEDs). GAO previously noted that technology systems used by the
Coast Guard to track small vessels have not worked properly at night or
during inclement weather. In your view, is it cost-effective to track
small vessels?
Answer. Governmental agencies, both in the United States and
abroad, have exercised several options to address the risks presented
by small vessels. As we previously reported in April 2010,\1\ the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--including the U.S. Coast Guard
and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)--and other entities are
taking actions to reduce the risk from small vessels. These actions
include the development of the Small Vessel Security Strategy,\2\
community outreach efforts through the America's Waterway Watch (AWW)
program and Operation Focused Lens, port-level vessel tracking efforts
with radars and cameras, port-scale nuclear detection pilot projects,
establishment of security zones in U.S. ports and waterways, and
escorts of possible targets of waterborne improvised explosive devices.
CBP and the Coast Guard also have other efforts under way to prevent
small vessels from transporting weapons of mass destruction,
terrorists, or narcotics from foreign countries into the United States.
CBP's Office of Air and Marine reports that it is using airborne assets
such as four engine P3 Airborne Early Warning and Long Range Tracker
aircraft and soon maritime reconnaissance versions of unmanned Predator
drones, to detect smugglers' vessels, including semisubmersibles,
sailing to the United States. The Coast Guard and CBP's Office of Air
and Marine also report that they station patrol vessels along smuggling
routes to intercept smugglers' vessels before they reach U.S. shores.
At the request of Chairman Bennie Thompson and Ranking Member Peter
King of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives,
we are currently reviewing CBP's Office of Air and Marine program and
examining the agency's use of its resources and expect to issue the
results of this review next year. Outside of the United States, the
government of Singapore began a program in 2007 called Harbour Craft
Transponder System where all vessels not covered by the International
Maritime Organization's (IMO) International Convention for the Safety
of Life at Sea (generally, this convention covers vessels 300 gross
tons or more on an international voyage and cargo ships of 500 gross
tons or more) were required to install and operate transponders that
broadcast their position. The program was implemented jointly by the
Maritime and Port Authority, the Police Coast Guard and the Republic of
Singapore Navy, and an estimated 2,800 small vessels were equipped when
its operation commenced in 2007. User costs include the transponder
device, which ranges in cost from approximately $700 to $730 plus
applicable taxes, depending on whether the model is portable or fixed,
and an annual operating cost of approximately $90.
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\1\ GAO, Maritime Security: Varied Actions Taken to Enhance Cruise
Ship Security, but Some Concerns Remain, GAO-10-400, (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 9, 2010).
\2\ The goals of DHS's Small Vessel Security Strategy are
consistent with the critical infrastructure protection maritime sub-
sector goal to enhance the resiliency of the maritime transportation
system. According to the strategy, reducing the risk from small vessels
will contribute to the security of our ports and help prevent the
disruption of commerce and the negative impact of a vessel security
incident by reducing the potential consequences of such an incident.
The primary consequence of a terrorist incident (as well as other
transportation security incidents) arising from the use of a small
vessel could be devastating for the U.S. economy if it damaged critical
infrastructure or resulted in closure of a port. By reducing the risk
and the associated consequences from small-vessel risks, the strategy
contributes to the resilience of the maritime sector and associated
critical infrastructure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As we reported in March 2009, the expansion of vessel tracking to
all small vessels--through transponders or other methods--may be of
limited utility because of the large number of small vessels, the
difficulty identifying threatening actions, the challenges associated
with getting resources on scene in time to prevent an attack once it
has been identified, and the limitations of certain equipment.\3\ For
vessels not required to carry automatic identification system (AIS) \4\
equipment, cameras may be utilized, though not all ports have cameras
suited to overcome challenges posed by low lighting during operation at
night or in bad weather. Even when vessels carrying transponders are
tracked in ports, recognizing hostile intent is very difficult. During
our reviews of maritime security efforts, we were provided evidence of
vessels intruding into security zones where unauthorized access was
prohibited. While no attacks occurred, such vessels were able to travel
freely near potential targets. Coast Guard officials have told us that
their ability to enforce security zones is constrained by their limited
resources. Moreover, the Coast Guard has not been able to meet its own
internal standards for the frequency of escorts of potential target
vessels. The difficulty in recognizing potentially threatening activity
and the limited response capability indicates that expanding tracking
to all small vessels would not necessarily diminish the risk posed by
small vessels. While such tracking would likely lead to increased
observation of prohibited activities, such as intrusion into security
zones, it would not necessarily help to differentiate between vessels
that entered security zones with hostile intent and vessels that
entered for other reasons, such as better fishing. In addition, with
the increased number of vessels to observe, watch standers could be
overwhelmed by the amount of information they must track or monitor.
While the Coast Guard has research underway to automate its ability to
detect threatening behavior by vessels, even if these efforts are
successful they would not improve the agency's ability to respond
quickly. DHS's Small Vessel Security Strategy also states that small-
vessel risk reduction efforts should not impede the lawful use of the
maritime domain or the free flow of legitimate commerce--making the
need to decipher vessel behavior essential. As the strategy states,
given the size and complexity of the maritime domain, risk-based
decisionmaking is the only feasible approach to prevention, protection,
response and recovery related to small-vessel threats.
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\3\ As we reported in March of 2009, some cameras have the ability
to operate in low light or use infrared images that distinguish objects
by the heat they emanate. These capabilities allow them to be effective
when cameras using visible light prove ineffective, such as at night or
in bad weather. However, these cameras can still be affected by high
surf conditions, which can hide vessels smaller than the height of the
waves. For additional information, see GAO, Maritime Security: Vessel
Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but the Need for Duplicate
Data Should Be Reviewed, GAO-09-337 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2009).
\4\ AIS is a technology that uses global navigation satellite data
and radios to transmit and receive information about a vessel's voyage,
including its name, position, course, and speed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Much of the seaborne smuggling of narcotics and undocumented
migrants into the United States currently makes use of small vessels,
such as high-speed ``go fast'' boats and semisubmersibles. While CBP
and the Coast Guard are also taking actions to intercept smugglers at
sea, their ability to prevent this smuggling is mixed. In its Fiscal
Year 2009 performance report, the Coast Guard reported removing 15
percent of the cocaine being transported on noncommercial vessels bound
for the United States in Fiscal Year 2009. Conversely, the Coast Guard
reported that it interdicted approximately 84 percent of undocumented
migrants who attempted to enter the United States via maritime routes
in Fiscal Year 2009. CBP's performance report did not include similar
measures for maritime narcotic or migrant interdiction.
With the critical task of mitigating the risk posed by small
vessels before the Coast Guard and CBP, we believe a risk management
approach coupled with strong intelligence-gathering efforts would lead
to the greatest benefit. Intelligence-gathering efforts at the port
level, such as AWW, should help uncover potential threats before they
develop into full-fledged attacks. The program's outreach to over 400
local watch group members in and around the Puget Sound region for the
Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympics demonstrated its potential as means of
increasing vigilance and communication. Moreover, targeted efforts
aimed at protecting critical infrastructure and valuable vessels, along
with random escorts and patrols, should help provide deterrence against
a small vessel attack inside U.S. port areas. Offshore, intelligence
efforts aimed at uncovering smuggling operations should also help to
target patrols and interceptions. These efforts would include random
patrols, which add uncertainty to where these assets will be at any one
time. A risk management approach that focuses limited resources on the
greatest risks is even more critical given the Federal Government's
current budget climate.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Stephen L. Caldwell
Question 2. Regarding security in foreign ports, your statement
emphasized the importance of risk management and indicated that your
work had shown potential to apply more risk management to the Coast
Guard inspection of foreign ports. What did your work specifically show
and how could the Coast Guard use risk management more effectively? Can
the Coast Guard do this on its own, or would legislative changes be
needed to implement changes in the frequency or intensity of visits to
foreign ports?
Answer. Since we issued our report on the Coast Guard's
International Port Security Program in April 2008, the Coast Guard has
adopted a new risk management program.\5\ In April 2008, the Coast
Guard was just beginning the next phase of the program, revisiting
countries to reassess the security measures of 138 trading partners. As
part of this next phase, the Coast Guard planned to place greater
emphasis on countries that were not in compliance or that were
struggling to comply with International Ship and Port Facility Security
(ISPS) Code requirements. To accomplish this with available resources,
the Coast Guard planned to prioritize its country visits and capacity-
building efforts using a risk-based approach that would allow Coast
Guard officials to spend more time in countries not in compliance and
whose lack of compliance poses a higher risk to the United States. At
the time of our report, the Coast Guard was in the process of
developing this risk-management approach and had created working groups
to consider how to implement this approach. Since the issuance of our
report, the Coast Guard reported that the program finalized its
methodology which analyzes the risk a country potentially poses to the
United States, how well a country is implementing the ISPS Code, and
the likelihood that capacity-building efforts in the country would be
effective considering a variety of political, economic, and social
preconditions. According to the Coast Guard, the results of the
methodology are used to manage risk and limited resources by helping
establish assessment team size, determining countries and ports where
capacity-building resources would be most effective, and finally
identifying high-risk countries that need additional oversight. We have
not conducted a detailed review of this methodology or the Coast
Guard's implementation of it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Our April 2008 report is restricted and not available to the
public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although we have not analyzed or directly reported on this issue as
it relates to the Coast Guard, another approach the Coast Guard could
consider to incorporate risk management into the program is to use
mutual recognition arrangements with other countries, similar to that
developed by CBP for international customs. We reported in August 2008
that CBP worked with the international customs community to achieve a
system of mutual recognition--an arrangement whereby the actions or
decisions taken by one customs administration are recognized and
accepted by another administration.\6\ For a system of mutual
recognition to work, however, there must be an agreed-upon common set
of standards that are applied uniformly so that a level of confidence
exists between countries. As international standards exist for maritime
security through the ISPS Code, the Coast Guard could consider
developing a similar system of mutual recognition for international
maritime security. For example, the European Union has developed
detailed regulations for the consistent implementation of the ISPS Code
by its member states and established a process for verifying the
effectiveness of its member states' maritime security measures. This
process includes an inspection of member states' ports that results in
a report identifying any nonconformities with the regulations and
making recommendations to address the nonconformities. Should the Coast
Guard develop confidence in the European Union's regulatory and
inspection approach to determine whether its members have fully
implemented and maintain international maritime security standards,
under a mutual recognition arrangement with the European Union the
Coast Guard could agree to recognize and accept one another's security
practices. The Coast Guard could then give countries with which it has
such agreements lower priority for a country visit. During a meeting in
September 2010 to follow-up on our report, Coast Guard officials told
us that more flexibility to determine whether an assessment is
necessary for countries with which there is confidence in the
implementation of international maritime security standards would be
helpful to the program in allocating program resources toward the
highest-risk countries. Changes to increase the frequency of visits to
foreign ports would not require a legislative change, whereas a
decrease in frequency may require a legislative change.
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\6\ GAO, Supply Chain Security: CBP Works with International
Entities to Promote Global Customs Security Standard and Initiatives,
but Challenges Remain, GAO-08-538 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 15, 2008).
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In regard to the Coast Guard's ability to spend more time in
countries not in compliance to assist with capacity building, we
reported in April 2008 that the International Port Security Program was
subject to limitations on its ability to offer capacity-building
assistance outside of assessment activities or to other countries that
may comply with the ISPS Code standard, but struggle to maintain their
compliance. Coast Guard officials stated that while authorities allowed
for certain types of capacity-building activities, several of the
authorities limited those activities to ports in foreign countries that
have been found to lack effective antiterrorism measures. However, with
the enactment of the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010,\7\ the
Coast Guard has new authorities to provide assistance to what the Coast
Guard describes as a broader range of countries. For example, the act
authorizes the Coast Guard to provide specified types of assistance to
foreign ports based on risk assessments and comprehensive port security
assessments rather than a finding of the lack of effective
antiterrorism measures before providing assistance. In terms of changes
to the frequency of visits to foreign ports, although the Security and
Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act) currently
requires that a minimum number of reassessments of the effectiveness of
antiterrorism measures in foreign ports be conducted at a rate of not
less than once every 3 years,\8\ the International Port Security
Program strives to conduct reassessments every 2 years to follow the
direction contained in the conference report accompanying the Fiscal
Year 2007 DHS Appropriations Act.\9\ The Coast Guard states that in
addition to the reassessments, it visits all countries at least
annually, with countries that have ports with nonconformance issues it
has identified more frequently. Consequently, to decrease the frequency
of visits to an amount less than the established frequencies in the
SAFE Port Act would require legislative changes whereas an increase in
frequency would not require legislative changes.
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\7\ Pub. L. No. 111-281, ___ Stat. ___ (2010).
\8\ Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884, 1918 (2006).
\9\ H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-699, at 142 (2006).
Question 3. S. 3639 authorizes the Coast Guard to provide
assistance to foreign governments or ports to enhance their maritime
security. Does GAO support this provision?
Answer. Provisions in S. 3639 to authorize the Coast Guard to
provide assistance to foreign governments or ports to enhance their
maritime security are similar to provisions recently enacted in the
Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010. While we have not directly
looked at this issue, based on our work, Coast Guard technical
assistance to other countries could be another way to improve port
security in certain circumstances with available Coast Guard resources.
During our review of the International Port Security Program, Coast
Guard officials told us that funding is a major challenge for most
countries struggling to meet and sustain ISPS Code requirements.\10\
For example, Coast Guard officials stated that in several African
countries, the designated authority within the government does not have
the resources to provide security for ports or funds to provide grants
for ports in need of improvements. However, according to Coast Guard
officials, the Coast Guard also does not have resources to supply
physical security assets, such as fences and guards, to those countries
that cannot afford them. Program officials have sought to raise
awareness about low-cost methods that can be used to meet certain
international security requirements, such as the use of ``tabletop''
exercises rather than conducting full-scale drills and exercises.
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\10\ Our April 2008 report is restricted and not available to the
public.
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In addition to the budgetary limitations, Coast Guard officials
stated that the program faced legal limitations in the capacity-
building efforts they could provide under their previous legislative
authorities. As discussed above, while previous authorities allowed for
certain types of capacity-building activities, several of those
authorities limited those activities to ports in foreign countries that
had been found to lack effective antiterrorism measures. However, with
the enactment of the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010, the Coast
Guard has new authorities to provide assistance. For example, the Act
authorizes the Coast Guard to provide assistance based on risk
assessments and comprehensive port security assessments rather than a
finding of a lack of effective antiterrorism measures. Another
capacity-building authority authorizes the provision of technical
assistance when it is provided in conjunction with regular Coast Guard
operations. The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010 amended this
authority to expressly authorize the use of funds for certain purposes
such as the activities of traveling contact teams, including any
transportation expense, translation services, seminars, and conferences
involving members of maritime authorities of foreign governments, and
the distribution of publications pertinent to engagement with maritime
authorities of foreign governments.
Question 4. Does the Coast Guard have an adequate workforce of
inspectors who can operate in foreign environments to inspect foreign
ports? To what extent would that workforce be affected by proposals to
change the frequency or intensity of visits to foreign ports? How would
it be affected by proposals to increase technical assistance to foreign
governments and ports outside of the normal visit/inspection cycle?
Answer. We reported in January 2010 that during this decade, the
Coast Guard has been challenged with expanded mission responsibilities,
and concerns have been raised about whether the Coast Guard has a
sufficient workforce to fulfill these mission responsibilities.\11\ The
impact of expanding missions underscored shortcomings in the Coast
Guard's ability to effectively allocate resources, such as personnel;
ensure readiness levels; and maintain mission competency. Similarly,
when we concluded our review of the International Port Security Program
in April 2008, we reported that the Coast Guard also faced challenges
in ensuring that it had trained staff available to meet assessment and
assistance needs. According to Coast Guard officials, personnel working
in the program have unique demands placed on their skills since they
must be proficient security inspectors and must also be culturally and
diplomatically sensitive liaisons to foreign countries. The challenge
was made more difficult by Coast Guard plans to compress its schedule
for completing follow-up visits so that all were to be completed within
a 2-year time-frame and by the Coast Guard personnel rotation policy
that moves personnel between different positions every 3 to 4 years.
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\11\ GAO, Coast Guard: Service Has Taken Steps to Address Historic
Personnel Problems, but It Is too Soon to Assess the Impact of These
Efforts, GAO-10-268R, (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 29, 2010).
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We also reported that the Coast Guard did not have a fully
developed strategic workforce plan for the program. Coast Guard
officials noted that the calculations for the number of program
personnel required were straightforward as the number of countries to
assess was limited to approximately 138 and the amount of time required
to conduct assessments was known. When we asked Coast Guard officials
about ensuring the availability of sufficient resources for the next
phase of the program, Coast Guard officials stated that they believed
they had sufficient resources to conduct assessments and provide
capacity building within the current authorities provided to the
program. However, we reported that they had not completed aspects of
workforce planning, such as processes to regularly analyze staffing
data and workforce demographics and develop strategies for identifying
and filling gaps, as human capital management guidance provided by the
Office of Personnel Management suggests. Without such planning, we
reported that it may be difficult for the Coast Guard to meet its
program goals. As a result, we recommended that the Coast Guard develop
and incorporate a workforce plan as part of the risk management
approach it was developing to prioritize the performance of program
activities. DHS and the Coast Guard concurred in part with our
recommendation. Specifically, they noted that the Coast Guard has
analyzed its workforce needs to carry out the functions currently
mandated and had begun to develop a methodology to determine where best
to conduct capacity-building efforts. They stated that more analysis
would be done when and if authorities are provided to expand the
capacity-building activities of the program. While we agreed that the
Coast Guard would need additional authorities to carry out certain
capacity-building activities beyond countries not in compliance, the
Coast Guard's workforce planning efforts were not consistent with those
called for by human capital management guidance, even for the program's
current authorities.
While we do not have the data or information to determine how the
Coast Guard's workforce would be affected by potential changes to the
frequency or intensity of visits, or changes to increase the technical
assistance to foreign governments and ports, since the issuance of our
report the Coast Guard has reported taking additional actions to more
fully develop a workforce plan for the program. Although the program
does not envision a separate ``stand-alone'' plan, the Coast Guard
reported reviewing human capital management guidance and is
incorporating some of the principles in its program management. Among
other things, the Coast Guard reported that the program continues to
refine its human capital management including using an analysis to
identify training needs for new personnel entering the program and
promulgation of guidance on resources that should be devoted to
conducting assessment visits for various categories of countries. The
program also reported finalizing its methodology which looks at the
risk a country potentially poses; how well it is implementing the
international security standard, the ISPS Code; and the likelihood that
the capacity-building efforts in the country would be effective. While
we have not assessed these actions, we believe they contribute toward
the implementation of our recommendation and thereby better position
the Coast Guard to ensure that it has an adequate work force. Should
the program be given additional capacity-building authority, the Coast
Guard stated that the program will use its methodology to identify
additional personnel needs and where they should best be stationed.
Question 5. Has GAO's work made a formal determination of whether
the 100 percent scanning requirement is consistent with risk
management?
Answer. The application of risk management for container security
can be considered at the strategic level (e.g., assessing risks to the
entire supply chain and designing appropriate security programs) or the
tactical level (e.g., assessing risks to individual containers and
applying extra scrutiny through existing layered security programs). At
the strategic level, Federal law and Presidential directives call for
the use of risk management in homeland security as a way to protect the
Nation against possible terrorist attacks, and CBP uses risk management
in its processes for mitigating potential threats posed by U.S.-bound
cargo containers. Risk management generally calls for establishing risk
management priorities and allocating limited resources to those assets
that face the highest risk. Risk management is necessary in the context
of container security because CBP, like other DHS components, cannot
afford to protect all commerce against all possible threats. According
to risk management frameworks developed by GAO and DHS, key phases of
risk management should include: (1) assessing the risk posed by
terrorists' use of cargo containers; and (2) evaluating alternative
measures to counter that risk based on factors such as the degree of
risk reduction they afford and the cost and difficulty to implement
them.\12\ This process includes a cost-benefit analysis of
countermeasure options, which is useful in evaluating alternatives
because it links the benefits from risk-reducing countermeasures to the
costs associated with them. While we have not conducted an assessment
of whether the 100 percent scanning requirement is consistent with risk
management, our prior work indicates that 100 percent scanning is not
consistent because this strategic analytic process did not occur.
Specifically, our work has shown that DHS has not evaluated the cost-
effectiveness of 100 percent scanning as a countermeasure as part of a
risk management framework for cargo container security.\13\
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\12\ GAO-06-91 and DHS, National Infrastructure Protection Plan,
Partnering to Enhance Protection and Resiliency (Washington, D.C.:
January 2009).
\13\ GAO, Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit
Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing
the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers, GAO-10-12
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2009).
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At the tactical level, opponents of 100 percent scanning have taken
the position that it is better to assess the risk posed by each
container and apply a countermeasure that is tailored to that
container--as opposed to assessing the risk posed to supply chain
security by cargo containers in general and then determining the most
cost-effective countermeasure to reduce that risk (e.g., 100 percent
scanning, CBP's layered security approach, or another alternative).
From this perspective, the 100 percent scanning requirement is a
departure from existing CBP container security programs because it
requires CBP to scan all containers before performing analysis to
determine their potential risk level. This position applies risk
management principles--establishing strategic goals and priorities and
allocating limited resources to those assets that face the highest
risk--at the individual container level. According to this view, the
100 percent scanning requirement is inconsistent with risk management
principles because it does not distinguish among containers based on
risk; rather, it assumes that all containers have an equal risk of
carrying terrorist weapons and are to be subjected to the same level of
scrutiny with the same amount of resources. Thus, resources are applied
uniformly across all cargo containers rather than being allocated based
on the potential risk they pose. Opponents of 100 percent scanning who
have generally taken this position include CBP, foreign governments,
and industry. For example, the former Acting Commissioner and current
Commissioner of CBP have said that the 100 percent scanning requirement
is not a risk-based approach. Similarly, foreign governments have
expressed the view that 100 percent scanning is not consistent with
risk management principles as contained in the World Customs
Organization (WCO) Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate
Global Trade (commonly referred to as the SAFE Framework). For example,
European and Asian customs officials told us that the 100 percent
scanning requirement is in contrast to the risk-based strategy, that
serves as the basis for other U.S. programs, such as the Container
Security Initiative (CSI) \14\ and the Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT).\15\ The WCO, representing customs agencies
around the world, stated that the implementation of 100 percent
scanning would be ``tantamount to abandonment of risk management.'' In
terms of industry, in 2008 the Association of German Seaport Operators
released a position paper that stated that implementing the 100 percent
scanning requirement would undermine mutual, already achieved security
successes and deprive resources from areas that present a more
significant threat and warrant closer scrutiny. Closer to home, the
Commercial Operations Advisory Committee--an official industry group to
CBP--has recently called for the repeal of the 100 percent scanning
requirement and a move toward a more risk-based approach.\16\
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\14\ CBP places staff at participating foreign ports to work with
host country customs officials to target and examine high-risk
container cargo for weapons of mass destruction before they are shipped
to the United States.
\15\ Through the C-TPAT program, CBP develops voluntary
partnerships with members of the international trade community
comprised of importers; manufacturers; customs brokers; forwarders;
air, sea, and land carriers; and contract logistics providers. Private
companies agree to improve the security of their supply chains in
return for various benefits, such as reduced examination of their
cargo.
\16\ The Commercial Operations Advisory Committee advises the
Secretaries of the Treasury and Homeland Security on the commercial
operations of CBP and related DHS and Department of the Treasury
functions.
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Still at the tactical level, supporters of 100 percent scanning
have expressed concerns about the effectiveness of existing CBP
programs that attempt to assess the risks of individual containers and
subject those deemed higher risk to closer scrutiny, including non-
intrusive inspection (NII) scanning. Members of Congress who spoke in
favor of the 100 percent scanning requirement noted that scanning all
containers overseas could help detect weapons of mass destruction
concealed in containers that are not identified as high risk because of
weaknesses in CBP's layered security strategy. That is, 100 percent
scanning would be a more effective way to counter the risks posed to
cargo containers than existing initiatives intended to identify high-
risk containers. In making these arguments, certain Members of Congress
also cited GAO work that had identified potential weaknesses in
programs that make up the layered security strategy. Our work
identified weaknesses including a lack of validation of CBP's targeting
practices through strategies like red-teaming; inadequate validation of
C-TPAT members' security practices prior to granting them program
benefits, such as a decreased likelihood of having their shipments
scanned or physically examined; and not ensuring that containers
identified as high risk but not scanned at CSI ports overseas are
scanned upon arrival in the United States.\17\ The concerns we raised
were open issues at the time Congress considered the 100 percent
scanning requirement; however, since that time, these CBP programs have
matured, and many of our recommendations have been implemented.\18\
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\17\ See for example, GAO, Cargo Security: Partnership Program
Grants Importers Reduced Scrutiny with Limited Assurance of Improved
Security, GAO-05-404 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2005), and Homeland
Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing Cargo
Containers for Inspection, GAO-04-557T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31,
2004).
\18\ We previously reported on the maturing of these programs and
the implementation of our recommendations in GAO, Maritime Security:
The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One Year Later, GAO-08-
126T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007).
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As mentioned above, risk management includes not just assessing
risks, but also evaluating alternative measures based on such factors
as the degree of risk reduction they afford and the cost and difficulty
to implement them. Our work has documented that there are operational
challenges--such as logistics, technology, and infrastructure--to
implementing 100 percent scanning.\19\ However, CBP has not done a
detailed analysis to determine the feasibility of 100 percent scanning
within the context of its risk-based layered security strategy. In this
case, part of evaluating alternative measures is determining a concept
of operations--a description of the operations that must be performed,
who must perform them, and where and how the operations will be carried
out--for how 100 percent scanning would work at foreign ports, which
would include conducting studies and analyses at each port to determine
locations where NII equipment would be able to scan 100 percent of
containers going to the United States with a minimum of disruption to
the flow of commerce at the port. For instance, transshipment--cargo
containers from one port that are taken off a vessel at another port to
be placed on another vessel bound for the United States--poses a
particular challenge to 100 percent scanning. According to European
customs officials, implementing the 100 percent scanning requirement at
large ports with complex operations would likely result in the need for
a fundamental redesign of several ports, entailing substantial costs to
terminal users. For other scanning options, the costs may not be as
great. For example, as we describe in more detail in the next section,
scanning with only radiation portal monitors (RPM) is less costly in
terms of both equipment and impact on the flow of commerce.
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\19\ GAO, Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent
of U.S.-Bound Cargo Containers, GAO-08-533T (Washington, D.C.: June 12,
2008).
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No homeland security program can guarantee complete success or
freedom from risk, and CBP officials have acknowledged that they will
likely not be able to achieve 100 percent scanning of U.S.-bound cargo
containers by the statutory deadline.\20\ However, we believe
additional analysis, done within a risk management framework, can help
improve container security. In our October 2009 report on the Secure
Freight Initiative (SFI) and 100 percent scanning, we recommended that
among other things, CBP perform feasibility and cost-benefit analyses
to: (1) better position itself to determine the most effective way
forward to enhance container security, (2) improve its container
security programs, and (3) better inform Congress. DHS agreed in part
with our recommendation that it develop a cost-benefit analysis of 100
percent scanning, acknowledging that the recommended analyses would
better inform Congress, but stated that the recommendation should be
directed to the Congressional Budget Office. While the Congressional
Budget Office does prepare cost estimates for pending legislation, we
think the recommendation is appropriately directed to CBP. Given its
daily interaction with foreign customs services and its direct
knowledge of port operations, CBP is in a better position to conduct
any cost-benefit analysis and bring results to Congress for
consideration. We believe that such analyses could help to guide DHS,
CBP, and Congress in their efforts to either implement the 100 percent
scanning requirement or assess other approaches to enhancing container
security.
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\20\ The statute provides that containers loaded at foreign ports
on or after July 1, 2012 shall not enter the United States unless they
were scanned by NII equipment and radiation detection equipment prior
to loading. It also provides for renewable, two-year extensions if DHS
certifies to Congress that certain conditions exist at a port or ports,
such as equipment not being available for purchase and installation,
physical constraints, or a significant impact on trade capacity and
flow of cargo. See 6 U.S.C. Sec. 982(b).
Question 6. S. 3639 makes a technical amendment so that all U.S.-
bound containers be scanned with either RPM or NII, but not both. It
also extends the deadline for the requirement by 3 years from 2012 to
2015. What are the advantages of this approach to 100 percent scanning?
Answer. Based on our review of the 100 percent scanning
requirement, scanning containers with RPMs instead of in combination
with NII equipment may be more achievable from a technology, logistics,
political, and cost standpoint.\21\ However, there are limitations to
relying solely on RPMs for scanning cargo containers that should be
taken into consideration.
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\21\ GAO-10-12.
Technology/logistics: Scanning containers with RPM equipment
is generally less time-consuming than scanning with NII
equipment. While the actual NII scanning time per container can
take as little as 20 seconds, depending on the system, the
entire inspection time can take longer than 6 minutes. As part
of the scanning process, customs officers need time to: (1)
stage the container to align it properly between the system's
radiation source and detector array, (2) verify the container
information with the manifest, (3) ensure that the system is
set to receive scanned images, (4) interpret the scanned images
and verify them using manifest information, (5) identify and
document any anomalies, (6) save the scanned images, (7) check
the integrity of the seal and verify the seal number, and (8)
prepare the system for the next container. While scanning cargo
containers with NII equipment involves several steps, in
contrast it takes the driver of a standard tractor trailer from
4 to 7 seconds to pass through a RPM.\22\
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\22\ Containers that trigger a radiation alarm at the RPM undergo a
second exam with a handheld radiation detection device to help ensure
that the source of the alarm is identified and resolved. The exam with
the handheld radiation detection device typically requires 5 to 10
minutes to perform.
Political: Although 173 members of the WCO expressed their
opposition to the 100 percent scanning requirement, in a letter
to Members of Congress in September 2008, the WCO noted that it
did not object to the requirement that all cargo containers be
subjected to radiation detection processes (i.e., RPM scanning)
prior to shipment to the United States. In addition, foreign
government officials we spoke with stated that they are
generally not opposed to the use of radiation detection
equipment--such as the RPMs that are used as part of the
Megaports Initiative \23\--but they are opposed to the use of
NII equipment because of the likelihood that it may hinder
trade and reduce security by consuming a large amount of scarce
resources (i.e., key dock space and increased time needed for
cargo container inspections) for comparatively little benefit.
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\23\ Through the Megaports Initiative, the Department of Energy
installs radiation detection equipment at key foreign ports, enabling
foreign government personnel to use radiation detection equipment to
scan shipping containers entering and leaving these ports, regardless
of the containers' destination, for nuclear and other radioactive
material that could be used against the United States and its allies.
Cost: RPM equipment is less expensive than NII equipment.
The price for polyvinyl toluene monitors--the type of RPMs most
commonly used at U.S. seaports--is $425,000 per unit (including
deployment costs). In contrast, the purchase price for large-
scale NII systems used by CBP at U.S. seaports is approximately
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$3 million per system (including deployment costs).
Limitations of RPMs: Scanning containers with RPMs alone
introduces the vulnerability of not detecting shielded nuclear
material. However, if customs officials believe based on
targeting data that further inspections are necessary, they can
have a container scanned by NII equipment.
In addition to the factors listed above, the Department of Energy's
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has a goal through the
Megaports Initiative of scanning as much global cargo container traffic
as possible with RPMs. Since the start of the Megaports Initiative in
Fiscal Year 2003, NNSA has completed installations of RPM equipment at
27 foreign ports, and implementation is under way at an additional 16
foreign ports. The Megaports Initiative seeks to equip 100 ports with
radiation detection systems by 2015, scanning approximately 50 percent
of global maritime containerized cargo.
Question 7. DHS and CBP have cited the Strategic Trade Corridor and
the Importer Security Filing (10+2) as alternative ways to enhance
supply chain security. They have also stated that new technology for
containers themselves, and the equipment used to scan them, is another
path forward to improve supply chain security. What work does GAO have
on these programs and what is the status of these DHS efforts?
Answer:
Strategic Trade Corridor Strategy
The Secretary of Homeland Security has endorsed the concept of a
strategic trade corridor strategy as the path forward for implementing
the SFI program, but DHS and CBP have not yet selected the ports or
funded the expansion of SFI. In particular, in April 2009, the
Secretary of Homeland Security was presented with three options for
implementing the SFI program, ranging from implementing SFI at 70 ports
that account for shipping over 90 percent of U.S.-bound containers to
seeking repeal of the 100 percent scanning requirement. The strategic
trade corridor strategy option selected by the Secretary focuses cargo
container scanning efforts on a limited number of ports where CBP has
determined that SFI will help mitigate the greatest risk of potential
weapons of mass destruction entering the United States. According to
CBP's report, Risk-Based, Layered Approach to Supply Chain Security,
sent to Congress in April 2010, the data gathered from SFI operations
will help to inform future deployments to strategic locations.\24\ The
report further added that CBP plans to evaluate the usefulness of these
deployments and consider whether the continuation of scanning
operations adds value in each of these locations and in potential
additional locations that would strategically enhance CBP efforts.
However, in DHS's Congressional Budget Justification for FY 2011, CBP
requested a decrease in the SFI program's $19.9 million budget by $16.6
million and did not request any funds to implement the strategic trade
corridor strategy. According to the budget justification, in Fiscal
Year 2011, SFI operations will be discontinued at three SFI ports--
Puerto Cortes, Honduras; Southampton, United Kingdom; and Busan, South
Korea--and the SFI program is to be established at the Port of Karachi,
Pakistan. We issued a report in October 2009 that provides further
details about the implementation of the SFI program.\25\
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\24\ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Risk-Based, Layered
Approach Supply Chain Security, Fiscal Year 2010 Report to Congress
(Washington D.C., Apr. 13, 2010).
\25\ GAO-1012.
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Importer Security Filing Program
While CBP has implemented the Importer Security Filing and
Additional Carrier Requirements,\26\ collectively known as the 10+2
rule, and is using the information to identify high-risk unmanifested
containers, CBP has not yet fully incorporated the collected data into
its targeting process. In January 2009, CBP implemented the 10+2 rule,
which mandates that importers and vessel carriers submit additional
cargo information, such as country of origin, to CBP before the cargo
is loaded onto a U.S.-bound vessel.\27\ Collection of the additional
cargo information (10 data elements for importers and 2 data elements
for vessel carriers) and their incorporation into CBP's Automated
Targeting System (ATS) \28\ are intended to enhance CBP's ability to
identify high-risk shipments and prevent the transportation of
potential terrorist weapons into the United States via cargo
containers. CBP has assessed the submitted 10+2 data elements for risk
factors, and according to CBP officials, access to information on stow
plans \29\ has enabled CBP to identify more than 1,000 unmanifested
containers--containers that are inherently high risk because their
contents are not listed on a ship's manifest. However, although CBP has
conducted a preliminary analysis that indicates that the collection of
the additional 10+2 data elements could help determine risk earlier in
the supply chain, CBP has not yet finalized its national security
targeting weight set for identifying high-risk cargo containers or
established project time frames and milestones--best practices in
project management--for doing so. We recommended that CBP establish
milestones and time frames for updating its national security weight
set to use 10+2 data in its identification of shipments that could pose
a threat to national security. DHS concurred with this recommendation
and said it plans to complete its updates to the national security
weight set by November 2010. More information on the results of our
review can be found in our September 2010 report.\30\
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\26\ Importer Security Filing and Additional Carrier Requirements,
73 Fed. Reg. 71,730 (Nov. 25, 2008) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pts.
4, 12, 18, 101, 103, 113, 122, 123, 141, 143, 149, 178, and 192).
\27\ Under other requirements that preceded the 10+2 rule,
importers are also required to provide customs entry information, and
carriers are required to provide cargo manifest information under the
24-hour rule.
\28\ ATS is a computer model that CBP uses to analyze shipment data
for risk factors and target potentially high-risk oceangoing cargo
containers for inspection. For more information on ATS, see GAO, Cargo
Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of
Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System, GAO-06-591T
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006), and GAO-04-557T.
\29\ Stow plans depict the position of each cargo container on a
vessel.
\30\ GAO, Supply Chain Security: CBP Has Made Progress in Assisting
the Trade Industry in Implementing the New Importer Security Filing
Requirements, but Some Challenges Remain, GAO-10-841 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 10, 2010).
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Container Security Technologies
DHS is testing and evaluating technologies for detecting and
reporting intrusions into and tracking the location of cargo containers
as they pass through the global supply chain, but it will take time
before the evaluations are complete and the technology and
implementation challenges are overcome for some of these technologies.
In particular, CBP has partnered with DHS's Science and Technology
Directorate (S&T) to develop performance standards--requirements that
must be met by products to ensure that they will function as intended--
for four container security technologies with the goal of having the
ability to detect and report intrusion into, and track the movement of
cargo containers through the global supply chain. If S&T is able to
demonstrate through testing and evaluation that container security
technologies exist that can meet CBP's requirements, then it plans to
provide performance standards to CBP and DHS's Office of Policy
Development to pursue for implementation. From 2004 through 2009, S&T
spent over $60 million and made varying levels of progress on its four
container security technology projects. Each of these projects has
undergone laboratory testing, but S&T has not yet conducted operational
environment testing to ensure that the prototypes will satisfy the
requirements so that S&T can provide performance standards to the
Office of Policy Development and CBP. Performance standards are
expected to be completed for two of the technologies by the end of
2010, but it could take time before they are complete for the other two
technologies. More information on the results of our review of
container security technologies may be found in our September 2010
report.\31\
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\31\ GAO, Supply Chain Security: DHS Should Test and Evaluate
Container Security Technologies Consistent with All Identified
Operational Scenarios to Ensure the Technologies Will Function as
Intended, GAO-10-877 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2010).
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Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System
We also reviewed DHS efforts to improve NII scanning through the
cargo advanced automated radiography system (CAARS) program. DHS
intended for CAARS to be used by CBP to automatically detect and
identify highly shielded nuclear material in vehicles and cargo
containers at U.S. ports of entry. However, DHS's Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO) pursued the acquisition and deployment of CAARS
machines without fully understanding that they would not fit within
existing primary inspection lanes at CBP ports of entry. This occurred
because during the first year or more of the program DNDO and CBP had
few discussions about operating requirements at ports of entry.
Further, the development of the CAARS algorithms (software)--a key part
of the machine needed to identify shielded nuclear materials
automatically--did not mature at a rapid enough pace to warrant
acquisition and deployment. These factors contributed to DNDO's
December 2007 decision to make a ``course correction'' in the program
resulting in cancellation of the acquisition and deployment plans for
CAARS. Through this action, DNDO significantly reduced the scope of
CAARS to a research and development effort designed to demonstrate the
potential capability of the technology. While the development of CAARS-
type or other advanced radiography equipment capable of automatic
detection of highly shielded nuclear material in cargo containers has
been ongoing since 2005, one senior CBP official acknowledged that it
is not known when the technology will be sufficiently mature for
agencies within DHS, such as CBP, to justify acquiring and deploying it
in large numbers. On September 30, 2010, the Director of DNDO announced
that DNDO is terminating the CAARS program. However, the technology
developed under the CAARS program may be utilized by other programs.
More information on the results of our review of CAARS may be found in
our September 2010 statement for the record for the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.\32\
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\32\ GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Inadequate Communication and
Oversight Hampered DHS Efforts to Develop an Advanced Radiography
System to Detect Nuclear Materials, GAO-10-1041T (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 15, 2010).
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______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison to
Stephen L. Caldwell
Question. Various ports across the Nation have indicated that the
port security grant process is confusing, and that the distribution of
funds is very slow, with FEMA and the USCG still working on delivering
funds from 2007. What insights can GAO offer for a better, and more
efficient, way to distribute port security grants, so that our Nation's
ports receive funds in a timely manner? GAO has made a number of
recommendations to TSA and FEMA to improve the grant process for rail
and transit security grants. Do any of those recommendations apply to
port security grants? Is the Fiduciary Agent process an effective way
to distribute port security grant funds?
While we have not reviewed issues related to the distribution of
funding under the PSGP since 2005, and thus cannot offer solutions to
current PSGP problems, we reported in our June 2009 report on the TSGP
that defining agency roles, tracking grant activity, and distributing
funds in a timely manner are important principles of grant
management.\33\ For example, given that the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) and Transportation Security Agency (TSA) share
responsibility for the TSGP, we recommended that the two agencies
define their respective roles and responsibilities for managing the
TSGP. Similarly, FEMA and the Coast Guard should define their
respective roles and responsibilities for managing the PSGP. We also
reported that the systematic collection and tracking of grant
activities under the TSGP is essential to effective grant management.
At FEMA, the Grants Program Directorate (GPD)--which also oversees the
PSGP--is responsible for this record keeping. However, GPD officials
reported in March 2010 that the development of an updated grant
management system--scheduled for completion in 2011--had been halted
because of budget cuts. Last, because of delays that transit agencies
experienced in receiving funding, we recommended that TSGP grant
management officials establish time frames for making funds available
to stakeholders that have had projects approved. Establishing such time
frames could help grantees implement projects within the designated
performance periods of the grants.
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\33\ GAO-09-491.
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In addition to negotiating, tracking, and distributing funds, the
process must also include key internal controls. In its Guide to
Opportunities for Improving Grant Accountability, the Domestic Working
Group reported that internal controls are needed to ensure that funds
are properly used and achieve intended results.\34\ It cites four areas
where internal controls are important: (1) preparing policies and
procedures before issuing grants, (2) consolidating information systems
to assist in managing grants, (3) providing grant management training
to staff and grantees, and (4) coordinating programs with similar goals
and purposes. Establishing effective internal controls may slow the
distribution of grants, as these systems should be in place prior to
the grant award. However, the Domestic Working Group reported that
inadequate internal controls make it difficult for grant managers to
determine whether funds are properly used.
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\34\ The Domestic Working Group, consisting of 19 Federal, state,
and local audit organizations, was formed to identify current and
emerging challenges and explore opportunities for greater collaboration
within the intergovernmental audit community. The group identified
grant accountability as a concern and created a project team to address
this concern. The results are presented in the following report:
Domestic Working Group Grant Accountability Project: Guide to
Opportunities for Improving Grant Accountability (Washington, D.C.,
October 2005).
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In terms of using a fiduciary agent, until Fiscal Year 2009, TSGP
grant funding was first processed through a state administrative agency
(SAA). However, the DHS appropriations acts for Fiscal Years 2009 and
2010 required funding to be provided directly to transit agencies.\35\
We expect to follow up with transit agencies to identify the impacts of
this change and determine whether the removal of the fiduciary agent
added any efficiencies to the grant process as part of our upcoming
review of grant management processes of selected DHS preparedness grant
programs, requested by Ranking Member Peter T. King of the House
Committee on Homeland Security, and Senator George V. Voinovich of the
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
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\35\ Pub. L No. 110-329, 122 Stat. 3574, 3671 (2008); Pub. L. No.
111-83, 123 Stat. 2142, 2159 (2009).
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______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to
Stephen L. Caldwell
Question. Mr. Caldwell, does TSA share the information it gathers
in its background investigations for Transportation Worker
Identification Cards with state law enforcement entities?
Answer. TSA reports that it does not share the information that it
gathers during the background investigations of TWIC applicants with
state and local law enforcement entities on a routine basis. Pursuant
to MTSA provisions restricting the use of applicant information and the
TWIC Privacy Impact Assessment, TSA and the Coast Guard limit their
sharing of information on applicants and card holders. MTSA also
provides, however, that such information may be shared with other
Federal law enforcement agencies. According to TSA officials, on a
case-by-case basis, TSA can decide to share information if TSA
determines that there is an imminent threat (terrorist or criminal) of
loss of life or property. According to TSA officials, in such a
situation, TSA would provide only basic information, such as the type
of threat, location, and individuals involved, but would likely not
provide other information from a person's TWIC application.
Additionally, state and local law enforcement entities may contact TSA
if they identify criminal use of a TWIC card (e.g., a TWIC card used in
commission of a crime, or presentation of a fraudulent TWIC card for
entry into the secure area of a MTSA-regulated facility) or to verify
the authenticity of a TWIC card.
Additionally, the Coast Guard and TSA have processes in place to
share threat information with other Federal law enforcement or
terrorism centers. In the event that a TWIC applicant or TWIC
cardholder is determined to pose a security threat, Coast Guard and TSA
have developed a protocol to ensure effective interagency coordination
and timely action to minimize the potential threat and risk to the
maritime community associated with these individuals.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Stephen L. Caldwell
Question 1. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey is unable
to move forward on a number of projects to improve the security of the
port because of the twenty-five percent cost share requirement for port
security grants. It is my understanding that waiving this requirement
is a long, arduous process that is rarely successful. What should be
done about this cost-share requirement so that it does not impede the
security of our ports?
Answer. Matching contributions--also known as cost-share
requirements--are a key factor for effective Federal grants for two
reasons. First, it is important that Federal dollars are leveraged to
ensure that Federal grants supplement stakeholder (whether public or
private) spending rather than serve as a substitute for stakeholder
spending on grant-funded projects. If a grant program is not designed
to encourage supplementation, other stakeholders may rely solely on
Federal funds and choose to use their own funds for other purposes,
meaning that Federal funds cannot be leveraged to the extent they
otherwise could be. We reported in September 2003 that the inclusion of
matching requirements is one method through which to encourage
supplementation of Federal grants.\36\ Second, matching requirements
are reasonable given that grant benefits can be highly localized. For
example, regarding port security grants, we reported in December 2005
that,
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\36\ GAO, Homeland Security: Reforming Federal Grants to Better
Meet Outstanding Needs, GAO-03-1146T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 3, 2003).
``Ports can produce benefits that are public in nature (such as
general economic well-being) and distinctly private in nature
(such as generating profits for a particular company). The
public benefits they produce can also be distinctly local in
nature, such as sustaining a high level of economic activity in
a particular state or metropolitan area. Thus, state and local
governments, like private companies, also have a vested
interest in ensuring that their ports can act as efficient
conduits of trade and economic activity. Given that homeland
security threats can imperil this activity, it can be argued
that all of these stakeholders should invest in the continued
stability of the port.'' \37\
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\37\ GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess
Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical
Infrastructure, GAO-06-91 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005).
However, in the December 2005 report, we also recognized the
differences of opinion among policymakers regarding the inclusion of
matching requirements in Federal grants. Some might see substitution of
Federal funds for local funds as reasonable given differences in fiscal
capacity, while others may view homeland security as a shared
responsibility. For policymakers who place greater value on reducing
the substitution of Federal funds for local funds, strengthening
matching requirements offers one option in administering grants. One
way to implement this requirement involves using a sliding scale for
matching Federal funds depending on the fiscal capacity of the grant
applicant. Additionally, the matching requirement under the Fiscal Year
2009 Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) stated that the match may be in
the form of cash or in-kind contributions, allowing grant recipients
flexibility in meeting this requirement. However, the cost-share
requirement was waived for Fiscal Year 2010 port security grants.
Aside from matching requirements, there are other key factors to
consider in ensuring an effective grant process, such as efficiency,
timeliness, and oversight. For example, the DHS Office of Inspector
General reported in March 2010 that DHS has a variety of preparedness
grant programs with similar purposes, redundant application processes,
and differing program requirements.\38\ In our June 2009 report on the
Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP), we identified problems with
grant management and made recommendations related to defining agency
roles when more than one agency is involved in the grant program,
developing a plan for measuring effectiveness, developing a process to
systematically collect data and track grant activities, and
communicating the availability of grant funding to transit
agencies.\39\ Lacking these grant management characteristics, the TSGP
experienced delays in approving projects and making funds available. As
a result, about $21 million of the $755 million in awarded funds for
Fiscal Years 2006 through 2008 had been expended by transit agencies.
At the request of Ranking Member Peter T. King of the House Committee
on Homeland Security, and Senator George V. Voinovich of the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, this month we
are initiating a review of grant management processes of selected DHS
preparedness grant programs.
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\38\ Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General,
Efficacy of DHS Grant Programs, OIG-10-69 (Washington, D.C., Mar. 22,
2010).
\39\ GAO, Transit Security Grant Program: DHS Allocates Grants
Based on Risk, but Its Risk Methodology, Management Controls, and Grant
Oversight Can Be Strengthened, GAO-09-491 (Washington, D.C.: June 8,
2009).
Question 2. Over a million maritime workers have gone through
background checks and obtained TWIC cards, to gain access to secure
areas of our ports. The Port Authority of New York/New Jersey is one of
the sites testing these TWIC cards. However, this technology has been
fraught with challenges and has not been working as intended. How do
the challenges with the TWIC program affect the security of our ports?
Answer. In November 2009, we identified several Transportation
Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program challenges.\40\ As
noted in the report, the TWIC pilot is currently under way to test the
use of TWIC cards with biometric card readers. Specifically, this pilot
is intended to test the technology, business processes, and operational
impacts of deploying TWIC readers at secure areas of the marine
transportation system. As such, the pilot is expected to test the
viability of selected biometric card readers for use in reading TWIC
cards within the maritime environment. It is also to test the technical
aspects of connecting TWIC readers to access control systems. After the
pilot has concluded, the results of the pilot are expected to inform
the development of the card reader rule requiring the deployment of
TWIC readers for use in controlling unescorted access to the secure
areas of Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA)--regulated
vessels and facilities.\41\ However, as noted in our November 2009
report, shortfalls in TWIC pilot planning have hindered the TSA and the
Coast Guard's efforts to ensure that the pilot is broadly
representative of deployment conditions and will yield the information
needed--such as information on the operational impacts of deploying
biometric card readers and their costs--to accurately inform Congress
and the card reader rule. For instance, because of schedule
constraints, TSA did not conduct its more rigorous laboratory testing
of readers to be used at pilot sites prior to testing them at pilot
sites as initially planned.
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\40\ GAO, Transportation Worker Identification Credential: Progress
Made in Enrolling Workers and Activating Credentials but Evaluation
Plan Needed to Help Inform the Implementation of Card Readers, GAO-10-
43 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 18, 2009).
\41\ Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064.
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Since we issued our report in November 2009, TSA has received the
results of the more rigorous laboratory-based reader durability
testing. However, TSA has not shared the information on reader results
with pilot participants. According to representatives of four of the
seven pilot participants we met with, not sharing the results of reader
testing has limited their ability to acquire the equipment that meets
the environmental and durability needs of their port facilities and
vessels and has resulted in their expending important port security
funds without any assurance that their investment will be fruitful.
Further, not all the approaches proposed in the Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rule Making for using TWIC cards with readers will utilize the
electronic security features on the TWIC card to confirm that the TWIC
card is valid and authentic.
We are currently conducting a review of the TWIC program's internal
controls related to enrollment, background checks, card production,
card activation and issuance, and use. The results of this work,
including related covert testing at port facilities, will be published
in February 2011.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Stephen L. Caldwell
Question. As recently as this month, the U.S. Coast Guard estimated
that as many as 15 countries are not maintaining effective
antiterrorism measures at their port facilities. If foreign ports or
facilities fail to maintain these measures, the Coast Guard has the
authority to deny entry to vessels arriving from such ports or impose
specific conditions on the vessels in order to be allowed entry to the
U.S. Can you tell us more about this assessment and what the conditions
on the ground are at these ports? How are we working with foreign
governments to increase protective measures at their ports? What steps
are we taking to address the national sovereignty concerns of nations
whose ports are being examined under the International Port Security
Program?
There are a variety of reasons and circumstances whereby the Coast
Guard deems a country and its ports as not in compliance with
international port security standards. In regards to the conditions in
countries currently considered not to be maintaining effective
antiterrorism measures at their port facilities, the Coast Guard
considers this information as sensitive and it therefore cannot be
publicly released. However, the Coast Guard told us that its concerns
about these countries generally center around the failure of the
contracting government to audit the ISPS Code compliance of its port
facilities and on the individual port facilities' failure to adequately
control access of personnel and cargo. During the assessment the Coast
Guard conducts of foreign ports \42\ through its International Port
Security Program, Coast Guard officials visit and review the
implementation of security measures in foreign ports, examining the
physical security measures and access controls at the ports as well as
the policies, procedures, and training related to the ISPS Code. Based
on its visit and the information provided by the foreign country, the
Coast Guard team determines the extent to which the country has
substantially implemented the ISPS Code. The Coast Guard team makes a
determination that a country has ``substantially implemented'' the ISPS
Code if the team concludes that effective security measures are in
place at the ports that meet the requirements of the ISPS Code and the
government exercises effective oversight. If the team does not observe
these items, the team makes a determination that the country ``has not
substantially implemented'' the ISPS Code. In addition to being an
outcome of a country visit, the Coast Guard may also find a country to
not have substantially implemented the ISPS Code if it denies access to
its ports, it fails to communicate information on its compliance to the
Coast Guard or the IMO, or a credible report by another U.S. Government
agency or other source finds that substantial security concerns exist.
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\42\ While the focus of the program is country based, the
implementation status of specific ports or port facilities is
considered on a case-by-case basis if the country has not substantially
implemented the ISPS Code. In certain cases, a port facility that has
implemented the ISPS Code in a country that has not may request that it
be considered separately from the country. Requests are handled on a
case-by-case basis and are generally limited to only those port
facilities critical to maritime trade with the United States based on
factors such as the volume and importance of the cargo imported from or
exported to that port or port facility.
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In cases where a country has been found not to have substantially
implemented the ISPS Code, the Coast Guard explains the identified
deficiencies and makes recommendations to the country for addressing
the deficiencies and provides possible points of contact for assistance
to help the country improve. In addition, Coast Guard officials work
with the appropriate American embassy to identify other capacity-
building resources that might assist the country. As part of the
program, the Coast Guard has been collecting and sharing best practices
it has observed during its visits with a special emphasis on low-cost
security practices or innovative applications that are easy to
implement and do not require a significant financial investment. The
Coast Guard shares these best practices with other countries and makes
them publicly available through the program's website to assist foreign
governments in making improvements in their port security. The Coast
Guard team then revisits the country to observe whether identified
deficiencies have been addressed. Depending on the progress observed
and the cooperation received from the country, the team may decide to
continue to work with the country and make a revisit or place
conditions on vessels that try to enter U.S. ports after visiting the
country's ports. During our review, Coast Guard officials cited their
efforts in one Caribbean Basin country as an example of how the Coast
Guard works with foreign governments to increase protective measures at
their ports. In that case, the Coast Guard initially found that ports
in the country were not substantially implementing the ISPS Code. After
several rounds of sharing information on security training, discussions
of best practices for security exercises, and suggestions for specific
physical security improvements, the Coast Guard found that the country
had made substantial progress toward implementing the ISPS Code.
In regards to national sovereignty concerns, the Coast Guard is
aware of such concerns and has considered ways to address them. The
Coast Guard has stated that because of sovereignty concerns and
``assessment fatigue,'' it is becoming increasingly difficult to gain
access to countries such as China, Egypt, India, Libya, Russia, and
Venezuela for reassessments. During our review, Coast Guard officials
stated that an effort was underway to conduct joint visits when
possible with other U.S. Government agencies as well as increase the
sharing of assessment data among various agencies to reduce the
``footprint'' of U.S. Government activities in the countries. As
another approach, Coast Guard officials stated that they have also
considered partnering with other foreign governments and international
organizations to complete assessments. However, the Coast Guard has not
partnered with any international governments to conduct reassessments
because the international community has not developed an approach or
methodology as the Coast Guard has for inspecting ports. The Coast
Guard has also reported that it works frequently with international
organizations such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and
the Organization of American States on capacity-building projects and
utilizes the information obtained when conducting such actions as part
of the assessment process. For example, as part of APEC's
Transportation Working Group's maritime expert group security
subcommittee, the Coast Guard assisted in creating the Port Security
Visit Program and has participated in several of the assessment visits
to member economies. In addition, the Coast Guard has conducted joint
visits with auditors from the Secretariat of the Pacific Community in
Pacific island nations. In the short-term, program officials stated
that the best way to mitigate a possible lack of cooperation from
sovereign nations is to continue to reach out and diplomatically work
with countries. The recently enacted Coast Guard Authorization Act of
2010 now mandates that unless the Coast Guard finds that a port in a
foreign country maintains effective antiterrorism measures, that the
Coast Guard notify appropriate governmental authorities of the foreign
country and allows the imposition of conditions of entry (requiring
vessels to take additional security measures) ``unless the Coast Guard
finds effective anti-terrorism measures in place in foreign ports.'' In
cases where countries still deny the Coast Guard access to their ports,
program officials will implement and utilize these provisions as
required and work with other Coast Guard programs in the domestic
arena--specifically, programs that examine foreign vessels to verify
their compliance with ISPS Code requirement--and conduct offshore
security boardings of vessels to help limit the access of high-risk
vessels to U.S. ports.