

**STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED
PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2011**

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2010

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Patrick J. Leahy (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Leahy, Mikulski, Landrieu, Specter, Gregg, Bennett, Bond, Brownback, and Voinovich.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRETARY OF STATE

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, SEC-
RETARY OF STATE

STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY

Senator LEAHY. Secretary Clinton, I commend you for your unbelievable energy, not only in the work you do at the State Department but around the world in representing the United States. I understand this is one of four times you're going to be testifying here on Capitol Hill and we appreciate it very much, Madam Secretary.

The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request for the Department of State and foreign operations totals \$56.6 billion. It's a 10.6 percent increase over last year. Most of the increase is for three countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.

For the remainder of the world, the increase is about the rate of inflation and, as the President has pointed out, the total request for foreign operations is about 1 percent of the entire Federal budget.

If we cut all these programs, it wouldn't make a dent in our deficit but it would cause many other problems around the world, especially as it would affect America's leadership position.

The funds are all we have, besides the U.S. military, to protect the security and other interests of the American people in an increasingly dangerous and divisive world.

That is not to say we can't do more to get full value for our tax dollars, that's always been mine and Senator Gregg's goal on this subcommittee. If there are programs that are not effective or no longer necessary, then we will eliminate them. As we listen to the

complaints about broken Government or paralysis in Washington, this is a bill that, over the past number of years, has had overwhelming bipartisan support.

If anybody wants to see whether bipartisanship still exists in Congress, they do not have to look any further than this subcommittee. Every member of this panel, Republican and Democrat alike, has a stake in what's in here. We work together. For example, our global health programs help to prevent outbreaks of deadly viruses and other infectious diseases that are only a plane ride away. If such viruses spread and become pandemics, they could kill millions of people, including Americans.

Funding provided in this bill also addresses the continuing need to stop terrorism, organized crime, and other transnational crime that are growing threats to Americans and the citizens and governments of other nations, especially governments whose institutions are prone to corruption. There are many other examples.

We know this budget is not going to solve every problem in the world but at least it ensures that the United States is equipped to play a leadership role.

The Secretary has done her part and, Madam Secretary, I must say I appreciate the fact that you have been the face of America around the world. I know that it is physically strenuous, both for you and your staff, but it is important that you are there.

Today, more than ever, we appreciate the need for fully staffed and secure embassies, effective diplomacy, and strong alliances. I want to commend the dedicated men and women of the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), who are serving America here at home and at posts around the world and, I should note, often at great personal risk.

After Senator Gregg makes his opening remarks and the Secretary testifies, we'll have 7-minute rounds for questions. The Senators will be recognized in order of arrival, alternating back and forth.

Senator Gregg.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JUDD GREGG

Senator GREGG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to second your opening comments. I especially want to pick up where you left off which is saying thank you to not only yourself, Madam Secretary, but the extraordinary staff that works for you at the State Department.

Those of us who've had a chance to travel to some more severe regions in this world, such as Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan, of course Iraq, recognize that the men and women who serve us in the State Department are on the frontlines and doing an extraordinary job of trying to carry out American policy and assist those nations in moving toward more democratic forms of government and to be constructive citizens in the world. They put their lives at risk as our military people do, and we very much appreciate their service.

I also want to thank you personally for what you're doing. Your presentation around the world has been extraordinary and it's been very positive for us, for our Nation, to have you out there as our spokesperson, along with the President, of course.

There are so many areas of concern that come to mind that rather than taking them all up in my opening statement, I'd rather hear your thoughts on them.

So I will turn to you, but I just want to highlight one that doesn't get a lot of attention and that is an issue I've had interest in for almost 15 years now which is to make sure that you have the best technology and the best capability so that the support is there for the people who do such wonderful things for us in the field. I'd be interested in your thoughts on where we stand in that area and also in the area of facilities.

I'd like to spend some time on that. I'm especially concerned about the cost of the Iraqi mission and the new building and the complex there and how that's going to drain away funds from other initiatives.

I'd rather hear from you than talk myself. So I'll turn it over to you, Madam Secretary.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you. Secretary Clinton, please go ahead.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you very much, Chairman Leahy, and Senator Gregg, and members of the subcommittee. It really is a pleasure to be back here in the Senate and to be with all of you today.

When I was last here to discuss our budget, I emphasized my commitment to elevating diplomacy and development as core pillars of American power. Since then, I have been heartened by the bipartisan support of this subcommittee and the rest of Congress and I want to take this opportunity to thank you on behalf of the men and women who work every day around the world at the State Department and USAID who put our foreign policy into action, and I will certainly convey the very kind words of both the chairman and the ranking member to them.

The budget we're presenting today is designed to protect America and Americans and to advance our interests and values. Our fiscal year 2011 request for the State Department and USAID totals \$52.8 billion. That's a \$4.9 billion increase over 2010. Of that increase, \$3.6 billion will go to supporting efforts in frontline states, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.

Other funding will grow by \$1.3 billion and that is a 2.7 percent increase and with that money, we will address global challenges, strengthen partnerships, and ensure that the State Department and USAID are equipped with the right people, the right technology, and the right resources.

Over the past 6 weeks in Haiti, I've been reminded again of the importance of American leadership. I'm very proud of what our country has done. We will continue to work with our Haitian and international partners to address ongoing suffering and transition from relief to recovery.

I'm also well aware that this is a time of great economic strain for many Americans here at home. As a former Senator, I know what this means for the people you represent. For every dollar we spend, we have to show results. That is why this budget must support programs vital to our national security, our national interests, and our leadership in the world, while guarding against and root-

ing out waste, redundancy, and irrelevancy. I believe this budget achieves those goals.

These figures are more than numbers on a page. They tell the story of the challenges we face and the resources we need to overcome them. We are fighting two wars that call on the skill and sacrifice of our civilians as well as our dedicated military troops.

We've pursued a dual-track approach to Iran that has exposed its refusal to live up to its responsibilities and helped us achieve a new unity with our international partners. Iran has left the international community little choice but to impose greater costs and pressure in the face of its provocative steps. We're not working actively with our partners to prepare and implement new measures to pressure Iran to change its course.

We have achieved unprecedented unity in our response to North Korea's provocative actions, even as we leave the door open for a restart of the Six Party Talks, and we're moving closer to a fresh nuclear agreement with Russia, one that advances our security while furthering President Obama's long-term vision of a world without nuclear weapons.

With China, we are seeking areas of common purpose while standing firm where we differ. We're making concrete our new beginning with the Muslim world. We're strengthening partnerships with allies in Europe and Asia, with our friends here in the hemisphere, with countries from those that are rising and emerging powers to those who have challenges, and we're working hard every day to end the impasse and the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.

At the same time, we're developing a new architecture of cooperation to meet transnational global challenges, like climate change, the use of our planet's oceans, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, health problems which, as the chairman said, are no respecter of boundaries.

In so many instances, our national interests and the common interests converge and so from our hemisphere across the world we are promoting human rights, the rule of law, democracy, Internet freedom. We're fighting poverty, hunger, disease, and we're working to ensure that economic growth is broadly and inclusively shared.

Now our agenda is ambitious, I admit that, but I think the times demand it. America is called to lead and we need the tools and resources to exercise our leadership wisely and effectively. We can bury our heads in the sand and pay the consequences later or we can make hard-nosed targeted investments now, addressing the security challenges of today while building a more lasting foundation for the future.

Let me just highlight three areas where we're making significant new investments. First, the security of frontline states. In Afghanistan this past year, we've tripled the number of civilians on the ground and this presence will grow by hundreds more with the \$5 billion in this budget. Our diplomats and development experts are helping institutions, expand economic opportunities and provide meaningful alternatives for insurgents ready to renounce violence and Al Qaeda and join their fellow Afghans in the pursuit of peace.

In Pakistan, our request includes \$3.2 billion to combat extremism, promote economic development, strengthen democratic institutions, and build a long-term relationship with the Pakistani people. This includes funding of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman initiative. Our request also includes a 59 percent increase in funding for Yemen to help counter the extremist threat and build institutions there, as well.

In Iraq, we're winding down our military presence and establishing a more normal civilian mission. Our civilian efforts will not and cannot mirror the scale of the military presence, but they, rather, should provide assistance consistent with the priorities of the Iraqi Government and the United States. So our request includes \$2.6 billion for Iraq.

These are resources that will allow us to support the democratic process, ensure a smooth transition to civilian-led security training, and operational support. These funds will allow civilians to take full responsibility for programs and the Defense budget for Iraq will be decreasing by about \$16 billion and that's a powerful illustration of the return on civilian investment.

We are blessed, as we all in this room know, with the best troops in the world and we've seen that time and time again in today's wars, but we also need to give our civilian experts the resources to do the jobs we're asking them to do and this budget takes a step in the right direction.

It includes \$100 million for a State Department Complex Crisis Fund, replacing the 1207 Fund which the Defense Department used to direct money toward crisis response. It also includes support for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund which previously fell under the Defense Department, as well.

The second major area is investing in development. So we're making targeted investments in fragile societies which, in our interconnected world, bear heavily on our own security and prosperity. These investments are a key part of our effort to get ahead of crises rather than just responding to them.

The first of these is in health. Building on our progress treating HIV, malaria, and tuberculosis, our Global Health Initiative will invest \$63 billion over 6 years, starting with \$8.5 billion in fiscal year 2011, to help our partners address specific diseases and build strong sustainable health systems.

The administration has also pledged to invest at least \$3.5 billion in food security over 3 years and this budget includes a request for \$1.6 billion, of which \$1.2 billion is funded through the State Department. This will focus on countries that have developed effective, comprehensive strategies where agriculture remains central to prosperity and hunger is widespread.

On climate change, we've requested \$646 million to promote the United States as a leader in green technology and to leverage other countries' cooperation, including through the Copenhagen Accord, which for the first time brings developed and developing countries together. This is part of the administration's total request of \$1.4 billion to support core climate change activities in developing nations.

Our request also includes \$4.2 billion for humanitarian assistance. Our efforts in Haiti have made clear that State and USAID

must be able to respond quickly and effectively, but we believe these initiatives will enhance American security and they will help people in need and they will give the American people a strong return on this investment.

Our aim is not to create dependency but, rather, to help countries learn to fish, as the old Proverb tells it, and what we want to do is focus on equality and opportunity for women and girls because we know that is the key driver of economic and social progress.

And then, finally, our third area of investment. None of what we intend to do can be accomplished if we don't recruit, train, and empower the right people for the job.

The State Department and USAID are full of talented and committed public servants, but we have too often neglected to give them the tools they need to carry out their missions on the ground and rather than building our own expertise, we have too often relied on contractors, sometimes with little oversight and often at greater cost.

This budget will allow us to expand the Foreign Service by over 600 positions, including an additional 410 for the State Department and 200 for USAID. It will also allow us to staff the standby element of the Civilian Reserve Corps which is a crucial tool in our efforts to respond to crises.

Now while deploying these personnel generates new expenses in some accounts, it will reduce costs by changing the way we do business. As we are ending our over-reliance on contractors, we're actually showing we can save money, plus bringing these functions inside and improving oversight and accountability.

So, Mr. Chairman and ranking member and members, one thing should be clear from this budget, the State Department and USAID are taking a lead in carrying out the United States' foreign policy and national security agenda.

As we finish the first-ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), we have a unique opportunity to define the capabilities we need and to match resources with priorities. This budget aligns our investments with the strategic imperatives of our time.

The QDDR will also help ensure we are more effective and accountable. As I have reported to you before, filling the first-ever Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources with Jack Lew, a former OMB Director, has given us an extra advantage in developing this budget and reviewing it to make sure that every item is economical and effective.

PREPARED STATEMENT

Now at this time of change and challenge around the world, we need to make these investments and I believe that this subcommittee understands why. I look forward to your questions, but even more so I look forward to working with you in partnership in the months and years ahead.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

Thank you very much, Chairman Leahy and Senator Gregg and members of the subcommittee. It really is a pleasure to be back here in the Senate and to be with all of you today. When I was last here to discuss our budget, I emphasized my commitment to elevating diplomacy and development as core pillars of American power. Since then, I have been heartened by the bipartisan support of this committee and the rest of Congress. And I want to take this opportunity to thank you, on behalf of the men and women who work every day around the world at the State Department and USAID who put our foreign policy into action. And I will certainly convey the very kind words of both the Chairman and the Ranking Member to them.

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But even more so, I look forward to working with you in partnership in the months and years ahead.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

IRAN

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Madam Secretary. Let me first ask you about a country that concerns all of us: Iran.

We know that the Iranian people have relied on the Internet and satellites to get news, often of the outside world, but sometimes even of what's going on in their own country.

The Iranian Government has spent millions of dollars to block Internet and social media connections inside of Iran. To me that's a sign of a regime that is afraid of its own people and that wants to hide its actions from the rest of the world.

In an earlier time, oppressive regimes trapped their people behind an Iron Curtain. The Iranian Government is trying to muzzle its people behind an electronic curtain, and I'm troubled by what they're doing, not just to their own people but also stopping the programs of other countries.

You made a recent speech, which I thought was superb, at the Newseum spelling out principles of global Internet freedom for the benefit of people everywhere and that was well received around the globe.

It appears that Iran has broken international agreements by doing this, is that correct?

Secretary CLINTON. Yes.

Senator LEAHY. We have worked with the State Department and others on this issue. Beginning in fiscal year 2008, we provided funds to facilitate Internet communication by people around the world in closed societies.

I noticed an article in the Washington Post on February 18 that mentioned the National Security Council discouraged the Broadcasting Board of Governors, the Board that oversees the Voice of America (VOA) and other U.S. international broadcasters, from signing a statement with the BBC and Deutsche Welle denouncing Iranian jamming of their broadcasts. In the end, VOA ended up signing that statement.

Is there disagreement in the administration of the need to strongly protest internationally this violation of international agreements by Iran?

Secretary CLINTON. Mr. Chairman, there is no disagreement. As I said in my Internet Freedom speech, the development of new tools that enables citizens to exercise their rights of free expression and virtual assembly, because I think it's rooted in both, needs to be protected and advanced, and we need these new tools, particularly in Iran but not only in Iran.

So the State Department is looking very closely at what more we can do to try to work with the private sector in partnership to unblock the Internet, to get information flowing, to speak out against the kinds of abuses that we see going on out of Internet.

We are providing funds to groups around the world to make sure that these new tools get to the people who need them. We are—we have been assisting in those areas for some time and thanks to this subcommittee, which has helped to pioneer the funding for these efforts, but there's so much more that we can and should do and inside the State Department, I've created a group of young tech-savvy diplomats.

We're doing what we call "21st Century Statecraft" and they are working, again as I say, with the private sector, this is not all just American government efforts, in order to be able to unjam and circumvent with our technologies the kind of blockades that the Iranians are using.

There's still a lot to be done and I think that the discussion inside the administration is what are the most effective ways of doing it. Some of the technology, for example, that we would very much like to see used to unblock Iran is very valuable technology. We have to be careful about how it is utilized so it doesn't get into the wrong hands.

Senator LEAHY. Sure.

Secretary CLINTON. We're focused on this, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LEAHY. But we also have to be working, I would assume, with other countries if there's a violation of a bilateral agreement.

I've heard that some of their blocking efforts not only block satellite transmission into neighboring countries but in one instance as far away as Italy.

Secretary CLINTON. Well, when they bring down the cellphone networks, that has broad ramifications.

Senator LEAHY. The satellite is not just Voice of America. I know we've tried to tighten bilateral sanctions against Iran, targeting the Revolutionary Guard. We're seeking the support of Russia, China, and other countries for U.N. sanctions.

Are there other things we should be doing? I know the House and Senate have passed legislation imposing sanctions on petroleum companies that do business with Iran. What about that?

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Mr. Chairman, we support the purpose and the principles of the bills, both the bill in the House and the sanctions bill that recently was passed by unanimous consent here in the Senate.

We want to have as strong a partnership with the Congress as possible. We need to enlist every possible tool that we can bring to bear on this, and we look forward to working with the Congress. What we're hoping for is that whatever sanctions emerge from the conference committee have some flexibility that will support our ongoing efforts because you rightly pointed out, we are working very hard with our partners in the Security Council.

We've already made it clear that we stand ready to do both unilateral and multilateral sanctions on top of whatever comes out of the Security Council, but while we're in the midst of these negotiations, it would be very useful for us to be in close consultation with

the Congress so that whatever is done here supplements and supports what we're trying to get done in the Security Council.

ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUNDS

Senator LEAHY. Let us follow up on that in another discussion. The administration has requested increases in Economic Support Fund assistance for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. I worry about the billions that were wasted in the years past because there seemed to be an emphasis on burn rates more than on results. I think you and I should discuss that more as we go forward with the bill.

TRAVEL TO CUBA

I will also be talking to you about a group of Vermont high school students who wanted to travel to Cuba to set up a sister school relationship with Cuban students. After doing their own research, and getting ready for the trip, they ran into U.S. travel restrictions.

It seems so beneath a nation as powerful as ours to tell kids they can't go back and forth and talk to students in Cuba. They can go to Russia, they can go to China, they can go everywhere else. Then there's Cuba. It makes no sense. You don't have to answer, but we'll talk further about that.

Senator Gregg.

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

JORDAN

Senator GREGG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, one of our closest allies in the Middle East is Jordan and they've really borne the brunt of a lot of our policies in the forms of cost of refugees and border security issues. They requested \$300 billion additional assistance in the supplemental.

I was wondering if the administration supports this request.

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator Gregg, as you know, Jordan is a stalwart ally and their work with us over the years has been extraordinarily helpful.

We, in this budget, hit the targets that were set in the memorandum of understanding that we—we certainly abide by which gives us about over \$600 million. The supplemental amount is something that we are considering and looking at.

Obviously in this time of real budget constraints, it's—it's a challenge, but we know how much Jordan has done. We just have to try to see whether it's—it's doable within the confines of the budget.

Senator GREGG. Well, considering what we're spending in Iraq and Afghanistan, Pakistan, it would seem to me to be dollars well spent and probably have a much better impact in the area of stabilization in the region.

Let me ask you two specific areas that I'd be interested in getting your thoughts on because they appear to be energizers of most of our problems.

The first is the issue of where you think the Palestinian issue is going and where you think Israel is going in relationship to Palestine, and, second, the issue of the India-Pakistan relationship

and what we're doing to try to create some comity there so that we can take advantage of our friendships or participate with the friendships in both countries.

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator Gregg, those are two issues that we spent a lot of time working on.

MIDDLE EAST

First, with respect to the Palestinians, there are really two aspects of our engagement with the Palestinian Authority. The first is our continuing effort under the leadership of former Senator Mitchell for the Israelis and the Palestinians to resume negotiations.

We hope that that will commence shortly. We think it's absolutely essential that they begin to talk about the final status issues that divide them, that have perpetuated the conflict over all of these years, but we're well aware of the difficulties that confront us on this.

At the same time, we continue to work with the Palestinian Authority to support their efforts to build their capacity, particularly in security. General Dayton has done a superb job working with Prime Minister Fayed in creating a Palestinian Security Force that is respected by the Israelis, that demonstrates a capacity to perform under difficult circumstances.

We have encouraged other countries to provide funding directly to the Palestinian Authority so that they can help build their judicial system, their prosecutorial system, their corrections system. It's not enough just to have a good security force, you've got to have the rest of the law enforcement, judicial apparatus functioning, and we're getting support to do that given directly to the Palestinian Authority.

So on both of those tracks, there are certainly challenges ahead, particularly on the first, the political negotiation track, but the progress that is being made on the second track actually increases the leverage and the credibility of the Palestinians in negotiations with the Israelis.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Second, with respect to India and Pakistan, we've encouraged the resumption of the direct talks which were suspended when President Musharraf left office. Those talks between President Musharraf and Prime Minister Singh had actually been quite productive, particularly in producing results on the ground in Kashmir, but they've been in abeyance now for I think slightly more than 2 years.

So we've encouraged both countries to begin a dialogue. They are going to be doing so. There will be a meeting within days, as I recall the date, and we are sensitive to the concerns that they each have that it's—it's their issues that they have to address, but we continue to raise it and make the case to each separately as to why it's in their mutual interests to proceed.

What's going on in Pakistan right now is very significant. The increasing efforts by the Pakistani Military and Intelligence Services to capture Taliban leaders, which they've done, to work with the United States, both on the civilian and the military side, better to

assist in what they're doing to reclaim territory from Swat to North Waziristan.

We're trying to create a new relationship with Pakistan that is of longer duration and—and making the Pakistanis know that we're in it for the long term.

With India, we've had a very successful start to this administration building on, frankly, the success and the investment of the prior two administrations in working with India, creating more opportunities for investment, more relationship-building between our two governments.

So I think that in these two areas, which are two of the most significant areas for America's long-term security, we are working very hard and, you know, trying to make even, you know, very small but significant progress in any way we can.

SYRIA

Senator GREGG. Thank you. I noticed we just appointed an Ambassador to Syria. There has been some slight opening, very slight opening of dialogue there.

Can you tell us where you see that going?

Secretary CLINTON. Senator, we have. We decided to return an Ambassador. We've been without one since 2005. We have a very experienced diplomat, Robert Ford, who has served in Iraq as the political director, is fluent in Arabic, lots of experience in the region.

I agree with your characterization that there's a slight, a slight opening for us to build on. We've had high-level visits, highly ranking Members of Congress have also gone to Syria in the last year, but there are a lot of issues between our Government and the Syrian Government, and we've been absolutely clear about those issues.

Just recently Under Secretary Bill Byrnes had very intense substantive talks in Damascus and we have laid out for the Syrians the need for greater cooperation with respect to Iraq, the end to interference in Lebanon, and the transport or provision of weapons to Hezbollah, a resumption of the Israeli-Syrian track on the peace process which had been proceeding through the auspices of the Turks the last years, and generally to begin to move away from the relationship with Iran which is so deeply troubling to the region as well as to the United States.

There are many specifics under each of those big ticket items that we have discussed with the Syrians and, you know, we are going to resume ambassadorial level representation, but these issues have to be addressed continually.

Senator GREGG. Thank you, Madam Secretary.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you. Senator Mikulski.

Senator MIKULSKI. Madam Secretary, it's so great to welcome you back to the Senate. We miss you, and we know today you've really presented an appropriations request representing your role as the CEO of the State Department as well as America's top diplomat.

Reading the budget, I see where the President, with your advice and to us, meets compelling human need around the world. It's in our strategic interest. It re-establishes relationships with treasured

allies, and I know I speak in a heartfelt way that the focus on women and girls in development.

Also, I note the—your desire to reinvigorate and re-establish the professionalism that once was the hallmark of AID. So we appreciate that.

IRAN

Let me get right to my questions. One—one, I want to associate myself with the remarks of Senator Leahy about Iran and we would hope to discuss after this hearing how we could follow up on that close alignment, but do you—I'm concerned that there is a lack of intensity in the international arena as we push or advocate for sanctions.

My concern is that Russia and China are slow walking us. You might or might not want to comment on that, but is it your view and the administration's view that we'll move with our own sanctions after the international community acts or are we not going to wait for them or is that yet to be determined?

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for your encouragement and support of our initiatives, particularly around women and girls. I—I appreciate that very much.

With respect to Iran, I feel the intensity of our efforts very personally because I have been out there engaged in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy with countries that we are moving toward an acceptance of the need for greater pressure on Iran.

You know, when President Obama came to office, he very clearly, and I think correctly, laid out what we needed to do. He said, look, we'll extend our hand, but you have to unclench your fist, and from the very beginning he said we will have a two-track process. We will engage, but it's a two-way street. There has to be something coming back and we will pursue pressure and sanctions in order to change behavior and to send as clear an international signal as possible that Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons will not be allowed.

Now, I believe that because of the President's policy of engagement, we are in a much stronger position today than we would have been in the absence of all of our efforts. We have kept the so-called P5+1, which is the United Kingdom, France, Germany, China, Russia, and us, united until now. We have issued very strong statements, with both Russia and China signing on, endorsing this dual track approach.

We have demonstrated to countries that are somewhat ambivalent, to say the least, about going against Iran what it is we are trying to achieve and pointing out the problems that Iran poses to them.

So just in the last, you know, month, I've attended a London conference on Afghanistan and Pakistan but spent an enormous amount of time in bilateral negotiations with all of the major parties about Iran. I went to Saudi Arabia and Qatar last week. I'm on my way to Latin America next week, and Iran is at the top of my agenda, and in the Security Council our negotiations are very intensely under way.

There's been an enormous amount of work done by the Treasury Department and the State Department to design sanctions that will be aimed at the Revolutionary Guard. I think we've made tre-

mendous progress with Russia and I believe it is due to the President's engagement with Medvedev and our very clear, consistent message over this past year about the way we see Iran which the Russians now are endorsing.

With China, because of their dependence on Iranian oil, our arguments to them are somewhat different, that because of their dependence, they, above all, should be supporting a sanctions pressure track because an arms race in the gulf that would further destabilize the major oil producers is not in China's interests and I think we've made a lot of progress.

Now we don't come out and do a press conference every time we have these meetings, but I have seen over the past year the attitudes about Iran evolve. So even countries that are still not sure they want to sign up to sanctions, they're not sure they want to oppose them, they now understand why the United States views Iran's behavior as a threat.

And, finally, Senator, I want us to work in tandem as a United States Government. The administration and the Congress together focused on what are the smartest, toughest sanctions that can be legislated that will assist our efforts because we want to make sure that we don't send wrong messages before we get everybody signed up to whatever we can achieve internationally.

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, thank you very much, Madam Secretary. It's very clear we appreciate your personal hands-on robust involvement in moving this agenda forward and we salute you for identifying the risk of a lackluster response to Iran that would not only endanger our security, treasured allies', but also the rest of the world. So we thank you for that.

We also want to thank you for your speech on China and the cyber world. Senator Bond and I are on the Intelligence Committee. I'm on a task force on the—on the cyber terrorism issue. We want to work—today, this is not the environment to have this conversation. A more classified one would be appropriate.

But I believe that cyber terrorism, cyber intrusion is really one of the biggest threats facing the United States and the free world. If the terrorists can attack and steal our ideas or place our critical assets into jeopardy, it is—has the potency that I believe is far more dangerous than even nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. So that's a topic for other discussion.

HAITI

But I'd like to just shift in my time left to a compassion issue which is Haiti. We really want to salute the administration and work with the Congress on our response to Haiti as well as President Bill Clinton's Global Initiative.

I worry about compassion fatigue, not of our country but of allies, and I wonder how you see that and, number 2, what do you see are the future sustained efforts?

I represent a substantial number of NGOs that are headquartered in Maryland, like Catholic Relief, and then there's another issue that I'd like you to consider and follow up with your staff. That is the issue of amputees.

Secretary CLINTON. Yes.

Senator MIKULSKI. In all of the terrible tragedy, so much of the population has suffered amputation. My colleague, Senator Leahy, has been one of the leaders. I had the great honor of being with him in Mozambique where he had created a low-tech but highly effective industry where people who had been victims of land mines, children, adults, the elderly, and I saw where they could make their own products that could help them sustain themselves in a very rugged environment.

I was so proud of what Senator Leahy did, and I really bring this to the attention that Senator Leahy, with his leadership as the Chair, your work in Haiti, that we take special attention to that.

I've reached out to the Bloomberg School of Public Health. I have a list of people who've done this around the world where there are models and lessons learned, but again it was the Leahy leadership in Africa and your work here because what I fear is, after the TV cameras leave and we want to go rebuild a country that's 80 percent agriculture, they won't be able to do the work and also could that also be another source of employment right there in country.

So you might not have the answer today, but I'd like to lay that out as a policy direction that perhaps we could pursue.

Secretary CLINTON. Could I take a little time, Mr. Chairman, to respond because this is—

Senator LEAHY. Sure.

Secretary CLINTON. I was smiling because I had a meeting—

Senator LEAHY. I should note that the Secretary, when she was in—

Senator MIKULSKI. Are you all aware of this?

Senator LEAHY [continuing]. The Senator supported me on every one of these efforts to help with amputees—

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, he's been the leader.

Senator LEAHY [continuing]. As has the Senator from Maryland.

Secretary CLINTON. Well, I was meeting with Dr. Roj Shah, our new USAID Administrator, telling him about this work that Senator Leahy has led and that so many of us supported for exactly the reasons that you're pointing out, Senator Mikulski.

The amputation issue is going to be one we have to address. We're trying to put together a plan now and I would like to come back to all of you who are concerned about this to make sure that you know what we're doing, that we have all the information you have at your fingertips, the experience that resides here on this subcommittee, and that we have adequate funding to address it because I think that is a wonderful compassion initiative for the United States.

But to your other point, Senator, I am very heartened by what I see happening in the international community. Every single country in the Western Hemisphere has contributed something to Haiti and they have made a collective commitment of money, plus individual countries, like Brazil and Mexico, that have more capacity, but even poor countries, like Guatemala. The Dominican Republic has been extraordinary in what it has done for its neighbor.

We're having a conference that is co-hosted by the United States, the United Nations, and major donor countries at the United Nations on March 31 to really nail down these commitments.

The United States is working very closely with the Haitian Government to stand up a development authority that will be supported to fulfill the reconstruction and recovery work now that the relief phase is ending.

But I think this is an opportunity for us. Our military performed admirably and just completely eliminated any of those old canards about the United States military in our hemisphere. We had a very robust public diplomacy effort.

Under Secretary Judith McHale, whom you know, drove this and we basically looked at every press coverage in the world about what we were doing in Haiti. If there was a story that was inaccurate or unfair, we immediately responded and the net result is that I think the United States is seen as the leader that we have been in doing this work.

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, that's fantastic. My time is up. I have—I have a constituent who's in a Burmese prison and I'd like to talk to you. Your staff has been great, but I'd like to talk with you about more, perhaps other avenues for his release.

Secretary CLINTON. Good.

Senator LEAHY. And the Secretary's been wonderful in being accessible to us. I want to make sure everybody gets a chance before she has to leave.

Senator Bond has been one of the hardest-working members of this subcommittee. I want to make sure he gets a chance to be heard.

Senator BOND. Mr. Chairman and I join with you and Senator Gregg in issuing a very warm welcome to the Secretary back to the Senate and I certainly join them in applauding your leadership at the State Department.

I personally am delighted with your active support of the concept of smart power, particularly in nations where we see the threat of extremist violent terrorism in Islamic lands threatening not only their people, our interests, their neighbors, but the United States, and smart power, through the use of diplomatic efforts, personal visits, economic cooperation, two-way trade, investment, and educational exchanges can work.

But one of the things that I have seen as I've traveled around the world is the great need for more of your personnel on the ground and I join with Senator Gregg in supporting—and the chairman—in supporting your budget to rebuild our civilian foreign assistance capacity. That's very important.

ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA

As you may know, as you know, I'm interested in Southeast Asia which the 10 nations comprise our fifth largest two-way trading partner, equal—exports equal almost what we send to China, and the keystone of that whole area is Indonesia.

I thank you for recognizing Indonesia's importance. One of your first official visits was ensuring that the President can go there. No better—no better example of our friendship, and I just visited with President Yudhoyono last month who was interested in far more United States investment and participation.

And I guess the first question is does the administration support any conditionality at all on the foreign military assistance, foreign aid and foreign assistance to Indonesia?

Secretary CLINTON. Senator, thank you for those—those comments, and as you know, President Obama will be going to Indonesia—

Senator BOND. Right.

Secretary CLINTON [continuing]. In March with his family, and we have been working hard with the Indonesian Government to be able to be in a position where we can resume support for vital security functions and we are looking at ensuring that the Indonesian democracy that has taken hold there will make sure that there's no resumption of any human rights abuses or other kinds of behaviors that we, you know, deplore.

This is an area where Chairman Leahy has been a real leader. We hope to be able to come before the President's trip and brief you on how we would like to be able to move into a new era of cooperation because the Indonesians have been very helpful to us on counterterrorism. I think a lot of what they've done in their own—in dealing with their own threats has really been first, you know, first-rate in the sense of the results that they've gotten, but we just have to make sure that we're complying with all the legislative criteria and we think we can do that.

Senator BOND. Well, Madam—Madam Secretary, I believe there's a new era. It's been totally changed.

Secretary CLINTON. I do.

Senator BOND. President Yudhoyono has reformed the military, a former general. He stepped out of the military. He's working to establish—and we need much stronger cooperation to make sure the military leaders understand that they are under civilian rule. We need to fight corruption and—and ensure continued support. They need our active support militarily but they need the support of private businesses and I—as I've visited those countries, I find that American business people abroad are penalized, facing double taxation.

I visited Thailand. The American Chamber of Commerce, there is probably one of the best public diplomacy outreaches we have. They have adopted school programs. They're constructing playgrounds, libraries, water tanks, water filtration, helping children with dental deformities, but the problem is that our system of taxation penalizes the CEOs, so all the American companies that could be leading for America have to be Australians, Brits, or Kiwis because of our extra-territorial taxation.

I just—I know that's a sensitive subject. I've been fighting it, but what's your view of the role that private American businesses' investment and participation in developing countries can do to strengthen our relationship?

Secretary CLINTON. Well, I believe very strongly that American business is critical to American interests and American security and prosperity.

I met this morning with two of our leading company CEOs, Indra Nooyi from Pepsico and Jeff Immelt from GE, talking about how the State Department and our commercial diplomacy efforts need

to be more in support of what American businesses are doing because the competition is so rough.

Senator BOND. Right. And we—if we—with the double taxation, the punitive taxation, we penalize them putting American CEOs in—in charge of it.

AFGHANISTAN

I have lots more questions, but on—I want to turn to Afghanistan. My staff met with Joann Herring, who's founded the Marshall Fund Charities and during Charlie Wilson's Days in the 1980s, she was working to help the people of Afghanistan. She has some views on a comprehensive approach to reconstruction and development bringing NGOs together, and I would ask, number 1, that you at least give a hearing to them. They would like USAID dollars. I hope you'll consider that.

AGRICULTURE

Also, I hope that you will—that the additional funds for USAID will help them take agricultural experts. For 2 years, this subcommittee supported me in putting \$5 million in the budget to send agriculture extension agents several years ago to Afghanistan. They never got one there. The Missouri National Guard has the Agricultural Development Team which is making a tremendous difference in Nangahar Province.

I hope that there can be continued cooperation and providing military—military-civilian support for improving agriculture, teaching them not only to fish but to grow crops.

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, again, I mean, you are singing my song here because we are absolutely committed to agricultural exports.

I don't know if this subcommittee has gotten a copy of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy. If not, we will get copies to you. But in the section on Rebuilding Afghanistan's Agricultural Sector, just a few highlights. Eight-ninety agricultural experts, 64 from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), 25 from USAID, on the ground in Afghanistan, working in the south and the east sectors with our PRTs, our district support teams.

We've got USAID issuing vouchers to farmers in 18 provinces, particularly in Helmand and Kandahar, for inputs offering, you know, better fruits, assistance with irrigation and the like, and, finally, we're doing a high-impact irrigation initiative because all of our agricultural experts have told us that's key.

But there's a lot more, Senator, that I would like you to know about because you have been right about this for years and I think finally we're getting around to implementing it and we are looking for assistance from land grant colleges and asking, as well, that as we embed our civilians in with our military, which is how we're getting into these combat or post-combat zones, that we have the support that is needed to be able to get out there and deliver these services to farmers and we're doing that.

Senator BOND. I look forward to talking with the appropriate staffers on your team about that because there's much that we can.

Thank you.

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you very much. Senator Landrieu.

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Madam Secretary. It's wonderful to see you back, and let me just begin by thanking you for the very admirable way that you have represented our country. Many of us are extremely proud. I know it's a very, very difficult job that you have and you do it very well on our behalf.

I also want to follow up with what Senator Bond said, that I specifically appreciate your partnership with Secretary Gates to marry the hard power of our military with the smart power of our diplomacy over the long run. I believe that is going to pay huge dividends and it's been missing in the last several years and you have really filled the bill there.

I also want to acknowledge, as Senator Mikulski said, thank you for always putting women in the forefront of this debate because, as you know, women can be the drivers of economic growth and social stability around the world. They're often left out at our peril because no plans really work without them being at the table and I think often they're left out, but with your leadership, they have not been.

ORPHANS

In one particular area, Madam Secretary, I wanted to ask you some questions about something you and I have worked on for many years together and that is the rights of the world's children, particularly orphans. This has been in the news from day one in Haiti, but it really should be news all over the world because conservative estimates have about the number pegged at somewhere about a 163 million orphans. We don't know the real number. We know that there are some issues with those definitions. UNICEF's definition is a little bit different than other definitions.

But my point is this or my question is this. Senator Inhofe and I and other members in a bipartisan way have introduced a bill called The Families for Orphans Act which is pending before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate now. This bill would establish in the State Department an opportunity to focus on the plight of orphans and to promote the simple but profound concept that children belong in families. They don't belong in institutions. They can't raise themselves on the streets. If we want to stop trafficking, if we want to stop exploitation of children, prostitution of children, the best thing to do would be to put them under the watchful eye and care of a family. So that's what our bill attempts to do.

Could you give us your views about our efforts there, if you're familiar with the specific aspects of this bill, please comment, but what are your general views about what we could do to focus our efforts and the world's efforts to really connect orphans to families that need them or children that need families?

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, let me start by acknowledging and thanking you for your passion about this. You and I have both worked together on this and talked over many years about it, but you've been the leader. You have really demonstrated a heartfelt commitment to the world's children in so many different aspects.

I share that commitment and I am looking for the best way forward, how we can realize the positive results that we both see, because I share your conviction that, you know, the best place for a child is in a family and it may not be a family with a mother and a father, it might be grandparents, it might be older siblings, it might be aunts or uncles or even in some societies extended families, and so there are three areas that I think we have to focus on.

One, there is in many parts of the world no capacity for absorbing orphans and no real sense of adoption or fostering in any organized institutional way. So I think we need to up our outreach to provide education, technical capacity, to help countries because in some countries adoption is really against the culture and so if they're not some blood connection, the child has nowhere to go, and I think there's a slow change in this but we have to do more in a public diplomacy outreach way and I'd like to work with you on that.

Second, in times of crisis, we have to have our systems in place, we certainly saw that in Haiti, because there's a lot of misunderstanding, there's confusion in any disaster. So we're working on kind of a lessons learned from—from disasters, from conflict situations about what more can be done, and we need high-level advocacy.

We have a Children's Office in the State Department. It would be, you know, my preference that we sort of build that up because I want it embedded. I don't want it to be—I don't want this to be an add-on. I want it to be permeate what I'm trying to do with women, is to permeate the Department so that women are part of the policy. If you're serving in Europe or Africa are part of the policy. If you're doing outreach in Angola, we are just going to try to permeate.

I want the same attitude about children. So we need—we need better education, more technical capacity, more direction and support, and I'd like to work with you to make sure that what we're doing will actually have the results that we both seek.

Senator LANDRIEU. And I appreciate that, and I thank you for pointing out that in many countries of the world there isn't the same urgency or appreciation for the strength of families that exists in America, but just because people can't appreciate that doesn't necessarily mean that it's not the right thing and I appreciate your commitment.

One figure that I want to throw out today because these figures are hard to come by and some people throw up their hands and say the problem is overwhelming, we can't address it, but I want to leave you with these numbers. If you just took 50 percent of the estimated orphans, Senator, Secretary Clinton, that would be roughly 70 million children.

There are 2.5 billion families in the world. So if only 2½ percent of families in the world, only 2½ percent opened up their homes and their hearts, there would be no orphans left in the world. So while these numbers seem overwhelming, when you put them in perspective to how many parents would adopt, how many families want to open up their homes, how many churches, synagogues and mosques are willing to step up, it's just the government enterprises have to get themselves better organized.

So I know you're a great leader in this area. I look forward to working with you, and I know that your position is generally against institutional care and for care in families.

So thank you very much and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership on this issue, as well.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you very much, Senator. We all know the amount of time and effort you have spent on this issue and I applaud you for it.

Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, I've got three areas that I'm going to mention and I'm hopeful that you'll be able to respond to at least one of them and if we don't get a second round, Mr. Chairman, I would hope that the people that are here would respond to them to me in writing.

First of all, I want to congratulate you on putting together a great team. I don't know of any Secretary of State that's had more on their plate than you have and I do understand that you can't do it alone.

I also applaud the fact that you have created two Deputy Secretaries, one for management and one for policy. As you know, I've been critical of the former administration because they didn't pay enough attention to management.

I want to tell you that the most important—one of the most important things you've done for your people is the issue of location pay—

Secretary CLINTON. Yes.

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. And I hope that that is reflected in this budget. The Foreign Relations Committee hasn't yet set out their vision, I guess, for the next 5 years, but that's important.

Second of all, I'd like to say that where the Visa Waiver Program has worked, they have less work than they had before because of that program.

And last but not least, the Embassies. I visited a couple of countries and they're really pleased with those Embassies and I think it's important to the countries because it indicates to them that the United States is really interested in them and their future.

ASSISTANCE FOR EUROPE, EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA

Last week I was in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Serbia with Senator Shaheen, and I know you're focused on Iraq and Iran and Afghanistan, but probably more than maybe some other Secretary of State, I know that you're interested in that region. We have spent a lot of time, a lot of money, and I'm concerned that if we don't pay attention to it, all of the progress that we have made may be—may be for naught.

The good news, when I visited these countries, they didn't mention the FMA or IMET, but what they did mention was the State partnership that they have with our states. This wasn't in this trip but when I was in Latvia the last time, the Latvian group going to Afghanistan had the Michigan National Guard serving under it and I know that the Ohio Guard is doing a fantastic job in Serbia today. Just to hear their Defense Minister talk about that partnership, it just gives me goose bumps.

Second of all, you know that their budgets are not very good. They've got the same problems we have, but they're helping us, many of them, in Afghanistan and Kosovo, and they care about the regions.

It's interesting. Each of these countries, you know, they're concerned about themselves, but they realize they have a symbiotic relationship with the other countries that—that are there and their vision is my vision, that they all get in the European Union (EU), they become part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and then become part of the EuroAtlantic Alliance, and a couple of things they're concerned about.

One is EU membership. They know that there's fatigue today in the European Union and many of them were using it as an incentive to get them to do some things they wanted to do but they're afraid that they'll never in the European Union.

Most of them were concerned about Bosnia. Put in a nutshell, the Butmir Process has not worked. No progress will be made on that, they think, and this is the consensus, till after the election, but what they're worried about is that in the election, they'll poison the well so that after the election, the issue of changing the Constitution to give it more flexibility is not going to occur and they argue strenuously for Bosnia getting into the European Visa Waiver Program and they also think it's very important that some indication of their getting IPMAP is—is—or MAP is going to—is going to happen.

And their concern is that Dodik right now and his president, one of the three presidents is in favor of—of NATO membership, but after the election, they think possibly this thing would just blow up and then we'll have a black hole there in that part of the world.

In addition to that, they're all concerned about Kosovo because you know the court's going to decide one way or the other on Kosovo and when I talked with Prime Minister Thaci, I said, "You ought to be thinking about what's going to happen here," and I talked to the Serbs. "You've got to think about what's going to happen on the ground," and I think it's real important that the State Department encourage them to do that.

AFGHANISTAN

The last part of this deals with—with Afghanistan. I had—I was honored that Holbrook spent a couple hours. I went over there and spent—I was absolutely impressed with what they're doing, but I don't think that we have been candid enough with the American people about the commitment that we're going to have to make in Afghanistan if we intend to be successful.

Now you've mentioned some of the things that you're doing, but this is not going to be next year or the year after. This is maybe 5 to 10 years. It could even be more than that if we're going to create an environment where the Taliban, who—you know, it's with them, you know, it's Alakbat, okay. That's what you're dealing with and so you're going to have to really do a lot of work there to counter that and get people to feel good about it and you're also going to have to make—and you should level with the American people. Okay?

The last time around, if you remember, we were there is that we did not level with the American people about the commitment that we're going to have to make. We're just kind of—and we need to put it out. This is a commitment we're going to have to make. The Europeans, by the way, also want to know about the commitment in terms of military and in terms of their—what do you call them—P—

Secretary CLINTON. PRTs.

Senator VOINOVICH. PRTs, and I congratulate you on getting them all together. They don't feel like we're just telling them what to do. There's a consensus and you've got to keep doing it, but I think it's really important that—that we level with the American people and the world about what kind of commitment we're going to have to make to be successful in Afghanistan.

And last but not least, I'm concerned about whether Karzai's going to do his thing and if you recall in terms of Iraq, we laid out a whole list of things they promised to do and then we used metrics to see whether or not they did them or not, and I would think that, rather than having it come from Congress, that you'd give some serious consideration to saying here's what they did, we're going to monitor their progress so that you can keep us informed and the American people that they're doing what they're supposed to do because if they don't do what they're supposed to do, we're in—we're in big trouble.

ASSISTANCE FOR EUROPE, EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, I don't think there's a thing you said that I disagree with and I thank you for your interest and focus on southern Europe.

We are very concerned, as well, about the direction we see Bosnia heading. We need to have more attention paid. We need to partner with the Europeans so that they are committed. We are obviously a strong supporter of the countries in southern Europe going into the EU. We think it has a lot of benefits for the countries but also the broader effort for integration in Europe and the TransAtlantic Alliance. But we also think, with respect to NATO, that we have to make clear what it would take to get MAP and then move Bosnia forward.

I think, you know, Senator, that your attention to these issues is something that I'd like to take more advantage of because you have been consistently concerned and involved. I share your wariness about what happens after the court decision in Kosovo and I think I'd like to follow up with you to make sure that we convey to our Serbian friends and our Kosovar friends that this has to be managed in the right way.

AFGHANISTAN

And, finally on Afghanistan, I agree that we have to be as candid as possible. We can't lay down a clear path forward and say this is the way it's exactly going to be, but we can certainly set the general direction and we have said consistently that our, you know, our goal is to transition military security to the Afghans and we've seen some real progress under General McChrystal and General Caldwell in improvements in Afghan security, both Army and po-

lice recruitment and retention and performance, but we are going to have a long-term civilian relationship and we think we need that. We think that's going to be in America's interests, and I agree with you that we need to make that as clear as we can, and we want also to use the metrics that we've developed that I would hope have been shared with you, but if not, we will, as to how we're going to try to hold the Karzai Government accountable.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you.

Senator LEAHY. Senator Specter.

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, thank you for taking on the job and the hard work and successful work you're doing. We miss you in the Senate but we like to see you where you are.

SYRIA

Thank you for the call from your Deputy Bill Burns about his trip to Syria.

The question on my mind that I alerted him to this yesterday as to whether the stalemate might be broken between Syria and Israel on negotiations if the President were to invite them to the Oval Office.

Back in 1995, Senator Hank Brown and I were in India and Prime Minister Rao brought up the subject of his interest in having the subcontinent nuclear-free and asked us to convey that message to Prime Minister Bhutto whom we saw the next day and we made a recommendation to President Clinton to consider calling them in.

I had recalled the tremendous success that President Clinton had with Yassir Arafat and Shimon Peres and Rabin that memorable day on the White House Lawn.

Would you give consideration to that process? I have gotten to know the Assads, both the father and the current president, and I think the right nudge could push them to the table. We came very close in 1995, came very close in 2000. The Turks have been in the process of mediating, but would you consider that?

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, I certainly will look at anything that might break the stalemate. I'm not sure that that would be acceptable or doable to all of the parties involved, but certainly our goal is to help facilitate a resumption of talks between Israel and Syria. We think it's absolutely necessary for Israel's security and future to try to move the whole region toward a more peaceful state. So we'll certainly take—take any idea you have under consideration because you have been—I don't know how many times you've been to Syria by now.

Senator SPECTER. Eighteen.

Secretary CLINTON. Eighteen. It's more than anybody else that I personally know. So we take what you say and that's why Under Secretary Burns called to report to you. We take what you say, you know, very seriously and we'll certainly consider it.

Senator SPECTER. I have been concerned about the gridlock in Congress for many reasons, but from what I have read and heard, it has had an impact on our stature internationally.

The President came on with a great promise and, I think, did materially change the world's view of the United States for a number of reasons and I think not only has President Obama been di-

minished but so has the presidency and for that matter so has the ability of governance by the Congress of the United States, very, very problem-some, and we ought to be backing up the President on matters that he has to deal with of such gigantic importance.

I read your statement across the board, Iran and North Korea and the Mid East and Afghanistan and everywhere.

May the record show an affirmative nod? We trial lawyers use that procedure sometimes not being sure what the answer will be.

What do you—what do you think?

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, I have great affection and admiration for the Senate. The 8 years I was privileged to serve here were extraordinarily meaningful to me, but unfortunately I have to agree with you.

SENATE CONFIRMATION PROCESS

The gridlock over nominations is particularly troubling. We're now, you know, what, more than 1 year into a new administration and whether you agree or disagree with a particular policy, a president deserves to have the people that he nominates serving him and I would earnestly request the attention of this committee to filling the USAID appointments. We finally got Dr. Shah nominated and confirmed. There was no delay on that, and I thank you for it, but he has no team and we've got to get that moving as quickly as possible.

But I—I have to confess that when it came to some Assistant Secretary positions, some ambassadorial positions, it became harder and harder to explain to countries, particularly countries of significance, why we had nobody in position for them to interact with.

So I—I think that, as we move forward, there are many things to argue about and I am the strongest advocate of people, you know, arguing out positions in a civil way that hopefully sheds more, you know, light than smoke, but on the question of nominations, I hope that we all can move more quickly and particularly on the AID front and the ambassadorial front.

Senator SPECTER. Well, I will help you with that, but, Madam Secretary, beyond the confirmations, is my perception right or wrong that what has happened on gridlock goes beyond that? The weakening of the President? Everybody reads the public opinion polls. He's not able to project the same kind of stature and power that he did a year ago because we're—because he's being hamstrung by—by the Congress and it has an impact on foreign policy which we really ought to do everything we can not to have partisanship influence.

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, I think there is certainly a perception that I encounter in representing our country around the world that supports your characterization. People don't understand the way our system operates. They just don't get it, and their view is—does color whether the United States is in a position, not just this President but our country is in a position going forward to demonstrate the kind of unity and strength and effectiveness that I think we have to in this very complex and dangerous world, and, you know, we're always going to have differences between the executive and the legislative branch.

Having served on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, that's par for the course. That's democracy. You know, we're not going to do anything that will undermine that, but I do think we have to be attuned to how the rest of the world sees the functioning of our Government because it's an asset. It may be an intangible asset but it's an asset of great importance and as we sell democracy and we're the lead democracy in the world, I want people to know that we have checks and balances, but we also have the capacity to move, too.

So it is—it is a concern of mine, and I—I hope that we can figure out a better way to address it.

Senator SPECTER. No more questions, Mr. Chairman, but a comment.

IRAN

On Iran, I hope you will figure out something that we can get the Chinese to go along with, which is tough enough, to get some sense out of Iran because that boiling pot is not going to simply boil forever.

And the final comment is I know you've done a great deal on the three hikers in Iran, one of whom lives in the Philadelphia suburbs, Joshua Fattal, but whatever in addition can be done, it would be greatly appreciated in many quarters.

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you, sir.

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Madam Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you. I'm going to yield back to Senator Bennett, but on Iran, I'm going to leave with you and your staff an op-ed in the New York Times by Roger Cohen about what we prevent from going to Iran. One of the things he suggests we shouldn't be preventing is the equipment they might need to get on the Internet. That's kind of a layman's description of it.

I would look at that especially as they're working so hard to block the Internet, anything we can do there which will get around the government's censorship would be helpful.

Secretary CLINTON. If I could, Mr. Chairman, I just want to respond to Mr. Cohen's column. It references a pending license that was held up in the Treasury Department. That has now been moved, perhaps there's a cause and effect there, and it is now in the State Department and we intend to act on it expeditiously.

Senator LEAHY. As the old serials on radio would say, my work here is done.

Senator Bennett.

Senator BENNETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I join, Madam Secretary, my colleagues in welcoming you back to your old stomping grounds. Seeing you on the other side of the table is a different kind of reaction, but we're always happy to see you, regardless of the circumstance.

Coming as late in the questioning as I do, I won't rehash many of the things that have been said by my colleagues, but I will not let the opportunity to mention Iran and the Iran Sanctions Act go unchosen. I won't have to add anything to the things that have been said, but I believe that's extremely important, whatever you can do to see to it that the Russians and the Chinese are helpful

to us here. I won't go into territory about what I think may be happening with both Russia and China because I don't want to say anything that makes any particular headlines.

But I understand from reading history that Ronald Reagan used to drive Mikhail Gorbachev crazy by quoting the old Russian aphorism "Trust but verify," and Gorbachev finally said to Reagan in an outburst, "You keep saying that," and I think he did keep saying that and we should keep saying that.

So with respect to Iran and what the Russians and the Chinese are doing, just remember the Russian proverb that an American president enjoyed so much.

So I will turn to two subjects that have not been raised, both of which are enthusiasms of mine that I've been involved with in the subcommittee while I've been on it. The first one is the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the second one is micro lending and micro enterprise.

MICROLENDING AND MICROENTERPRISE

If I can start with the second first, just I'm very proud of the fact that as long as I've been on this subcommittee, the pressure for micro lending has always been strong and the number has always gone up and I don't think there's anything we can do that makes more sense in the poor parts of the world than encourage micro lending.

I have some of the articles that have been produced by women who have received micro loans. They offered to make me a deal. I said no, I don't want a discount, I'll pay the full price for this because it's still very low and I want you to be as encouraged as you can.

Would you talk to Secretary Geithner to talk about increasing U.S. support at the World Bank? I've talked to the World Bank about this and I get lots of encouraging words back, but I'm not sure there's been as much movement at the World Bank as perhaps there should be and I hope that the State Department will continue to be as supportive and increase as much as they possibly can in these budgetary times support for micro lending.

Do you have a comment on that before we turn to the Millennium Challenge Corporation?

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, I share your enthusiasm. I've worked in micro enterprise since 1983 in Arkansas. I championed it when I was First Lady and I supported programs, along with you and others, when I was a Senator and we are very focused on micro enterprise and we're also looking at some new ways of accomplishing the goals of the Micro Enterprise Results and Accountability Act of 2004.

We are looking at how we can fund institutions more effectively, leverage the money, and the World Bank is a big—has a big role in this. So I will gladly pass on your comments to Secretary Geithner.

Senator BENNETT. Yeah. My own experience with the World Bank, as I say, is they talk a good fight but they get carried away with, well, we can do this, we can do that, and all these other things with respect to financial services, and—and that's wonderful, but in the meantime make the loans.

Secretary CLINTON. Right.

Senator BENNETT. Don't study this thing to death—

Secretary CLINTON. Right.

Senator BENNETT [continuing]. And look at possibilities. I want the possibilities to come true, but in the meantime let's make the loans.

MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION

All right. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), I met with the new CEO whom I find very impressive, and the concern that many of us have with respect to the Millennium Challenge Corporation is that the current administration might take steps to curb its independence and one of its values, I think, has been that it is an independent agency with strong guidance from a board of directors which you chair.

But can it maintain its independence or is there still conversation about folding it into something else that would make it more part of the State Department bureaucracy or the AID bureaucracy, and the budget is the lowest request that we've had since it began. I'd like you to address those two issues.

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, I do chair the board and I'm very, very proud and happy to do so and I have publicly applauded the Bush administration for both MCC and PEPFAR which I think were significant advances in how we think about and do development.

There have been no conversations that I have been part of or that I'm aware of about curbing the independence of the MCC. I think that there are, as you know, some legislative fixes that need to be done so that compacts can be extended, so that money can be rolled over, and that the mission of the MCC really focused on the kind of conditions-based aid that will change behaviors and increase capacity can be supported more effectively.

So I—I am a strong advocate of the MCC. I think actually some of the lessons that we have learned from the MCC are part of our QDDR process and will be influencing how we do aid elsewhere, but, you know, it won't surprise you, I'm not telling you anything you don't know, that there is a division of opinion within the Congress concerning the MCC. There are very strong supporters and there are very strong detractors.

But I think that on balance the MCC has proven itself. I think its—its independence has been beneficial, but I do want it to be seen as part of our overall efforts, not that it's going to be in any way undermined, but that it is part of how we deliver aid. It's not, you know, some add-on that is stuck out in left field. It is something that is integral to what the United States Government is doing and it's a model that I happen to hold in high regard.

Senator BENNETT. Well, I recognize there are some strong supporters and some strong opponents. Put me down as a strong supporter, and my—my goal is—is not to fund monuments overseas. We go overseas and we see U.S. money going to create something which then isn't maintained or doesn't provide any long term. I want to fund movement, movements toward the kinds of developments that are long term and become sustaining, and I think the MCC has that particular vision.

So I applaud your support and if you need any support on this side in this subcommittee, why, put me down as one who's available.

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, I just want to make sure that the record accurately reflects, thanks to the good information from my team here, we're actually increasing the MCC budget. We have a 15 percent increase over fiscal year 2010. We've asked for \$1.279 billion. That's a \$174 million over fiscal year 2010. So we're increasing the MCC budget by 15 percent.

Senator BENNETT. Oh, I'll get back into that then. Thank you. I appreciate that.

Secretary CLINTON. If you have any questions, please call us.

Senator BENNETT. I will.

Secretary CLINTON. We'll walk through them with you.

Senator BENNETT. Thank you.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Senator Bennett. Senator Brownback.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Madam Secretary. Appreciate you being here, appreciate the way you represent us around the world and your high energy levels. I'm sure it takes every bit of it.

Secretary CLINTON. Yes, it does, Senator.

Senator BROWNBACK. I've got a couple of items I want to run through with you, all of which you're familiar with, but a couple really need your action.

INTERNET FREEDOM

We've appropriated to the State Department I think it's \$20 million for Internet firewall, getting through the Internet firewall. I was at your speech that you gave on this recently over at the Newseum. Congressman Wolf and I wrote you about this in 2009. Senators Specter, Casey, Kauffman, Kyl, and I wrote you about this.

We've allocated the money to the State Department but State Department hasn't given any of it to the Global Internet Freedom Consortium. This is the group I found the most effective in doing this. They believe they could get a capacity in the anti-firewall area from 1.5 million now people that can get through these firewalls to 50 million users a day with the amount of money we put forward.

I got two letters here to you from basically Chinese dissident groups and Iranian dissident groups saying would you please allocate this money to the Global Internet Freedom Group?

There's a recent Washington Post report from an unnamed senior administration spokesman saying the reason they're not going to the Global Internet Freedom Consortium is because the Chinese Government would "go ballistic" if this were done. These are—a number of these are Chinese dissidents that are operating in these firewall items but they've been very successful on rudimentary, no help from the U.S. Government and with it, they can smash through the Iranian firewall and probably the Chinese firewall, as well, and I just would really urge you to look at it.

I'm going to give you these two letters—

Secretary CLINTON. Good. Thank you, sir.

Senator BROWNBACK [continuing]. From those groups because that's in your wheelhouse already. You've spoken about it. You've got the money. We need to get it to a good group.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Second, I know you've been to Congo a few months back. That's been a personal interest of mine and Senator Durbin's, as well. I think we have the chance here to defund the militias that are—that are really just wreaking havoc all over Eastern Congo but the key is the—the minerals, conflict commodities. It's the—it's—it's the blood diamonds issue, only got four commodities you're dealing with, and I think at the core of the issue is that—that we require companies that are going to sell products into the United States, they've got to have a license on the products, a license on the minerals coming out.

We want you to sell the minerals, Congo. We want you to be able to get the income, but on an item like coltan that's in cellphones that Congo has 80 percent of the African coltan and then it comes out and these militias, this is the way they fund themselves is they kind of operate the concessions or let people come and go, and then that funds the soldiers.

If we could just require licensing on minerals that come out of Congo, I really think—and this by the big companies, I really think it would defund the militias and much of this goes away, not all of it but a lot of it. In the blood diamonds case in West Africa, this thing mostly defunded the militias which is what we got to do. We got to get the money away from the militias and there's a bill in both the House and the Senate. We have companion bills in each House that would do this.

We've worked for several years to work with the companies, with the government, you know, that—that this is a way that could do this without hurting Congo and without hurting the businesses. So I think we've found how to do it, but we really need your backing and support and I don't know of anything that could—could help that war-weary place and it's—it's probably—it's hard to say, but this probably is the worst suffering in the world right now, is in—is in Eastern Congo and it's big, it's big. I mean, it's 60 million people in Congo.

SUDAN

The third item is Sudan. I was pleased to see this recent agreement signed on Darfur. I'm going to watch and see if it—if it actually holds, but Southern Sudan, as you know, is going to be voting fairly soon on whether to move out of the Union with Northern Sudan. They've been—you know they've had a conflict for a long period of time.

I would really hope that State Department and the White House could start working with Southern Sudan more like a country and helping them get established and visible. I've thrown out, you know, that if the President or if you could meet with the leadership of Southern Sudan, the President could meet in the White House with them as a statement of support for them.

They've got—I've been urging them, saying why don't you get a basketball team together and start traveling in America with the

Southern Sudanese. They've got—you know, the Dinka Tribe dominated and they're very tall. They've got 10 guys, Mr. Chairman, over seven feet tall playing basketball in Southern Sudan.

So I'm saying just show up. You may get beat up by 40 points but everybody's going to say where did these guys come from and I thought—I told them, I said, "I don't know of a better way to get on the view screen in America faster than showing up with four guys over seven feet tall playing basketball."

MIDDLE EAST

Anyway, just if you could work with them, I think it's really an important phase, and I want to finish my comments with you on this. This is—this is a really tough one, I know, but I think it's time for us to review our Embassies in Israel and review again with the depth of review moving it from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Long issue, old issue. I know all of the thorns that are around it, but it seems to me that now is a good time to do this, that we're starting to talk about a two-state solution, have for a couple years.

Another key issue is the final status of Jerusalem. This is a negotiation just between us and the Israeli Government. I think it would be a very strong statement. It's the only capital in the world where we don't put our Embassy in the capital city. It would be obviously well received by the Israelis. It might irritate the Iranians. I'm okay with irritating the Iranians right now with everything that they're doing. I realize it has broader impact, but I think, you know, these things have timings to them, as you know better than anybody, and I think this is ripe now for a discussion to begin, particularly when we've had now a couple years of discussion about a two-state solution.

I think we need to be clear that we believe Jerusalem's the capital of Israel and we're going to—we're going to act that way.

So I thank you for considering these comments and would love to work with you on any of them.

Secretary CLINTON. Well, we will get back to you on all of them, Senator, because each and every one of them is very important. I appreciate your concerns about them.

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

Senator LEAHY. The hearing record will remain open until Monday, March 1, for the submission of any written questions for the Secretary. I know we've gone beyond the time that was allocated for the hearing.

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the hearing:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY

Question. I was surprised that the budget recommends a cut of \$87 million from the fiscal year 2010 level for aid for refugees. Given what we know about the pressures on this account, aren't you essentially forcing us to rob funds from other accounts to be sure that the most vulnerable people are not disproportionately hurt?

Answer. Supporting humanitarian assistance to and the protection of refugees, internally displaced populations, other conflict victims, stateless people, and vulnerable migrants remains a top Administration priority. While the President's fiscal year 2011 MRA request of \$1.605 billion is lower than the fiscal year 2010 appro-

riated level of \$1.693 billion, it represents a 9 percent increase over the fiscal year 2010 MRA request of \$1.48 billion. To assist in meeting humanitarian requirements in fiscal year 2011, the Administration also requested \$45 million in the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) Fund to meet urgent and unexpected needs. The Administration will continue to monitor worldwide humanitarian needs closely.

Question. You have requested another \$25 million to support Jewish migrants to Israel, which is the only instance in which we carve out an amount of funds for a designated group of refugees. The Congress has consistently supported this. Would you support similar carve outs for other designated groups of migrants, for example, Somalis who seek refuge in Yemen, and if not why not?

Answer. The Humanitarian Migrants to Israel program provides a critical service to Jewish migrants to Israel. While the Administration appreciates congressional support for this program, we would not support similar carve outs for other populations that we assist. The Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account is a humanitarian contingency account that serves the needs of refugees and conflict victims worldwide. Given the fluid and ever-changing nature of humanitarian situations, the flexibility provided within the MRA account to respond to needs as they arise is critical to ensuring the effectiveness of this assistance.

Question. You are requesting a \$25 million cut in aid for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia. These include the former Soviet republics, where democracy is being threatened every day. Given the importance of strengthening our relationships with the people of these countries, why does cutting these programs make sense?

Answer. We agree with you that strengthening our relationships with the people of the countries of Eurasia and Central Asia is critically important to the people of the United States. We recognize the backsliding that has occurred in the establishment of democracy in these countries—from flawed elections to stifling of media outlets.

We believe that the Administration's request for AEECA funding is appropriate and reflects the needs of this region relative to critical priorities in other parts of the world. The fiscal year 2011 request of total assistance (all accounts) for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia reflects only a 2.5 percent reduction (compared to the fiscal year 2010 estimate). The proposed allocations for fiscal year 2011 programs in the democracy and governance area in the Assistance to Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA) account represent only a 2.3 percent reduction from the fiscal year 2010 estimate—slightly less than the overall 3.4 percent reduction in the account as a whole.

Though some needs in the region have increased, other areas require fewer resources. Some nations in the region are beginning to make real progress on economic and political reform. In addition, other nations have significant energy wealth which they are applying to support their own development, and which require our continued diplomatic efforts—but not much more money—in order to try to bring human rights and other important issues to the fore. Thanks to prior U.S. investment some non-governmental organizations and legacy institutions are now a sustained presence supporting democratic and economic reform in many countries.

Finally, past investments in building the capacity of local organizations have allowed us to utilize indigenous expertise for program implementation, thereby permitting some cost savings within the fiscal year 2011 level. Moreover, we are using our experience to be more strategic in selecting the most cost-effective interventions and are leveraging more sources of other USG and donor funding to complement our assistance. In short, we believe that the levels of funding in the fiscal year 2011 AEECA request will permit us to continue to promote the transformation of these countries into market-based democracies respectful of human rights and committed to the rule of law.

AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN CIVILIAN SURGE

Question. You are requesting an increase of \$1.4 billion for the Economic Support Fund. The bulk of it is for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, which is separate from the \$1.8 billion you have requested for Afghanistan, \$344 million for Pakistan, and \$517 million for Iraq in the supplemental.

I understand the motivation to increase aid to these countries given what is at stake, but we have seen how difficult it is to spend money effectively. The previous Administration wasted billions in top-down programs, and measured results by the so-called “burn rate”—how fast money was spent, often through big contractors and corrupt governments. You are asking for a lot more money, and that means spending bigger and faster. Shouldn't we spend less, go slower, work from the ground

up—in other words, fundamentally change the way we spend money in these countries?

How much are we spending through Afghanistan’s central government, and given press reports that top Afghan officials, including President Karzai’s family, are getting rich and buying mansions in Dubai, are these the people we should be working with?

Answer. We have provided over \$700 million to the Karzai government between fiscal year 2002–2009. We are using this assistance to build Afghan government capacity, which will help the Afghan government gain the trust of its people through the delivery services. This direct assistance is also transferring ownership and responsibility of our assistance to Afghanistan to the Afghan people.

The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) is our primary vehicle for channeling resources through the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s (GIROA) budget. This mechanism, which we monitor carefully, strengthens GIROA’s capacity to prioritize, direct and allocate resources. The ARTF also improves aid effectiveness by serving as a collective platform for donor funding, reducing the need to deal with all donors bilaterally. The governance and fiduciary framework for the ARTF has strict systems in place to increase accountability, transparency, and safeguards to ensure proper oversight of U.S. taxpayer (and donor) resources.

We review the financial management, procurement and expenditure systems of key ministries to help them increase their capacity to accept U.S. direct assistance. Assessments (financial and procurement) to determine Ministries’ ability to account for and manage funds and execute services are conducted at Ministries we intend to fund with direct assistance. Ministries are recertified every 3 years. The USAID controller leads this effort.

At the same time, we are taking a multi-pronged approach to tackling corruption in Afghanistan. The U.S. government, with the broader international community, is prepared to help the Afghan government implement its strategy with programs designed to: (1) improve the transparency and accountability of Afghan government institutions to reduce corrupt practices; (2) improve financial oversight; (3) build Afghan capacity to investigate, prosecute, sanction and/or remove corrupt officials from power; and, (4) help Afghans educate the public about efforts to reduce corruption and improve the resources available for the public to demand and participate in transparent and accountable governance. Initiatives already underway include the Major Crimes Task Force, the Anti-Corruption Unit at the Attorney General’s office, and new programmatic support for the High Office of Oversight. We are also working with the Afghan Parliament to ensure ethics training is part of orientation for new members of parliament, and oversight assistance training is provided for members working on the national budget.

Strengthening the Government accountability and service delivery is a key component of our larger strategy for stabilizing Afghanistan. Along with our diverse counter corruption initiatives, our programs to provide qualified civilian technical advisors and put in place sound auditing and payment transmission systems will be an important step toward stemming corruption and achieving our larger national security goals in Afghanistan.

Question. Talking about ground up approaches to development, you have probably read or at least heard of Greg Mortenson’s book “Three Cups of Tea” about building schools in Pakistan and Afghanistan. His schools, with the support of local villagers, cost a fraction of the schools we build and they are not destroyed by the Taliban. His approach may not be the answer for everything we are trying to do, but what have we learned from Mortenson’s experience and how are we applying those lessons?

Answer. Two key components of Greg Mortenson’s approach to building schools in Pakistan and Afghanistan are community buy-in and long term investment. Both concepts continue to ground USAID education programming in Afghanistan and Pakistan as we move forward implementing USG strategy in this politically strategic region. The involvement of the community is a critical aspect of sustainable development in the education sector; USAID provincial programs in education incorporate input of local leadership and provide support for school management committees and parent teacher councils. In addition to fostering community involvement, USAID/Afghanistan and USAID/Pakistan demonstrate a long-term commitment to education by building capacity of government agencies on the district, provincial, and Federal levels and of nongovernmental organizations. These combined efforts to improve access to, quality, and governance in education throughout both countries, particularly in underserved areas and those vulnerable to extremism.

I would also like to provide you with a bit of background on USAID’s construction of schools in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Since 2002, USAID, in conjunction

with the Ministry of Education (MoE), has built or refurbished over 680 schools throughout Afghanistan, at a total cost of \$58 million. The preferred school design of the MoE is an eight-classroom school. As a Government agency, USAID follows the direction of the host government's MoE.

The MoE estimates that an eight-classroom primary school costs approximately \$160,000, while the cost of high schools differs greatly based on their size and the equipment to be provided. Construction costs can vary significantly depending on a number of factors, including remoteness of location, difficulty of terrain, land availability and the security environment.

Without knowing the particulars—including size and location—of Greg Mortenson's schools, it is difficult to compare construction costs. One of the key factors could be that Moretson may be using local materials, such as mud or brick, and that the school may not be earthquake-resistant. Indeed, traditional Afghan construction is very inexpensive but does not produce the types of buildings that will last over time nor stand up to earthquakes. To the extent possible, USAID uses local materials if they meet International Building Code (IBC) standards, however, some traditional materials are often not long-lasting and not of a high quality.

As of 2008, all USAID-funded buildings must be constructed to IBC standards. We are not aware of any other donor in Afghanistan requires these higher standards, but we believe it is essential that U.S. Government funded buildings adhere to these international standards in areas that are prone to earthquakes, and so we accept the higher costs and longer timeframes necessary to construct high quality buildings for school children and their teachers.

The cost of construction for USAID-funded schools in Pakistan ranges from 2,100–5,600 Pakistani Rupees per Square foot (U.S. \$25–\$66). USAID-constructed schools are built to the Zone Four Earthquake Rating (the highest possible) and apply the internationally accepted Uniform Building Code.

Question. There have been articles in the New York Times and Washington Post about secret prisons in North Korea. It described horrific conditions, where prisoners—mostly critics of the regime or their relatives—are worked and tortured to death. That was disturbing enough, but the article also said that U.S. policy is focused on the nuclear issue, and that human rights and specifically the treatment of political prisoners is not a significant part of the discussion. Is that correct?

Answer. The United States remains deeply concerned about the human rights situation in North Korea, including its labor and political prison camps. Human rights are a top priority and addressing human rights issues will have a significant impact on the prospect for closer U.S.-DPRK ties.

The State Department's annual Human Rights Report reports that an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 persons, many of whom die from torture, starvation, disease, and exposure, are held in a type of political prisoner camp known as the kwan li so. As noted in both the Department's Human Rights Report and Trafficking in Persons Report, the North Korean regime reportedly continues to use forced labor as part of an established system of political repression.

The Department currently funds a number of programs which seek to increase the free flow of information into and out of North Korea, document human rights abuses, including those occurring in political prisoner camps, and build the capacity of defector-led organizations to protect the human rights of all North Koreans. Additionally, the Department of State will allocate approximately \$3.5 million in fiscal year 2010 for programming to promote democracy, rule of law, and human rights in North Korea.

We also continue to work through multilateral organizations, such as the U.N. Human Rights Council (HRC), and bilaterally with other governments, including our regional partners, to improve human rights in North Korea. We are currently cosponsoring a resolution at the U.N. HRC, which specifically censures the use of torture and political prisoner camps. We see human rights as an integral part of the United States' North Korea policy, and will raise our concerns at every appropriate opportunity in the Six-Party Talks framework.

Ambassador Robert King, the Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues, oversees North Korean human rights issues as a part of the Office of the Special Representative for North Korea Policy and participates in all relevant discussions in accordance with congressional intent.

Question. I think there is a lot of concern that despite Senator Mitchell's efforts, negotiations on a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians have not produced the results we had hoped for. A year has passed, and Israel continues to expand settlements in the West Bank and the Palestinians continue to fight among themselves.

Are those of us who believe a peace agreement is necessary to the success of our broader foreign policy goals in the region overstating its importance? If real progress is not made this year, do you think we should rethink our approach?

Answer. Comprehensive Middle East peace remains important to broader American foreign policy goals in the region. When Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Abbas met in Washington on September 2, 2010 to launch direct talks, they agreed to pursue a framework agreement within twelve months. That remains the goal.

Unfortunately, we have not made as much progress as we or the parties would have liked. We knew this effort would be difficult and that we would hit hurdles; and we are always assessing the merits of our approach and seeking ways to promote progress toward the two state solution in the most realistic way possible, knowing the risks and constraints of the environment in which we operate. Both parties have asked for continued U.S. engagement with the parties and that is what we intend. Moving forward we will engage both on the core issues of the conflict and with a deepened commitment to Palestinian state-building, and step up the American approach including by offering new ideas and bridging proposals as necessary.

Question. The Administration is putting together a supplemental request for relief and reconstruction in Haiti. A lot of people here will want to support that. The American people have shown tremendous generosity in helping the Haitian people during this disaster, and we want to help Haiti rebuild—hopefully to a better place than they were before the earthquake.

But money, without effective leadership, will not solve Haiti's problems. While the current government is an improvement over the past, it was barely functional before the earthquake and will be unable to play a leadership role for the foreseeable future. There is a need for effective leadership, whether by the United Nations, United States, or some coalition of international donors and agencies. Given the amount of foreign aid wasted or stolen in Haiti, any long term reconstruction strategy, for Congress to support it, needs to be credible. The Haitian Government obviously needs to be consulted and involved, but a strategy whose success depends on the performance of the government would not be credible.

Do you agree or disagree, who is in charge of rebuilding Haiti, is there a strategy, and how do we avoid the mistakes of the past?

Answer. A key guiding principle of the USG strategy in Haiti is that the ultimate responsibility for rebuilding the country rests in the hands of the sovereign nation of Haiti and the Haitian people. It is our responsibility to see that U.S. Government resources spent toward accomplishing the reconstruction of Haiti are effectively managed, and transparently administered with proper oversight while we are helping Haiti to rebuild. There are a number of proposed mechanisms being discussed among Government of Haiti officials, multilateral institutions and bilateral donors for the management of reconstruction resources that would entail Haitian leadership along with credible systems of transparency and accountability. The United States strongly supports the development of mechanisms for oversight and management of the reconstruction program that will promote the effective, transparent and accountable use of resources.

Question. There have been reports that funds have been cut from other disaster relief programs in order to support the Haiti relief operation. Is this correct, are funds for Sudan or other humanitarian crises being cut?

Answer. Since IDA is a contingency account used to respond to natural and complex disasters world-wide, its flexibility allows OFDA to program funds as necessary to meet emergencies. While a significant amount of IDA funding is being directed to respond to the devastation from Haiti earthquake, the impact to other OFDA programs can be minimized if a supplemental is approved in a timely fashion (no later than the third quarter of the fiscal year).

Humanitarian needs in Haiti can be met with current IDA resources, but funding availabilities for other programs world-wide may be temporarily reduced. USAID is hopeful that the IDA account will be replenished by a supplemental, which will allow OFDA to restore other programs to originally planned levels. In the mean time, OFDA will work with partners to meet critical needs with currently available funding and avoid programming gaps.

However it should be noted that if a supplemental does not materialize, or is not available until late in the fiscal year, there will unfortunately be major impacts to OFDA's programs world-wide.

Question. The \$1.4 billion Merida Initiative, which Congress funded, was to be for 3 years. But for fiscal year 2011 you are requesting another \$292 million for Mexico for the same purposes. Is this part of a longer term strategy with Mexico—sort of “Merida Plus”, and if so, where can we get a copy of the strategy, who was consulted

about it, how many years is it for, how much will it cost, and what results do you predict if the demand for illegal drugs in the United States, and the flow of guns from the United States, continues?

Answer. The Merida Initiative was announced in 2007 as a partnership among the governments of the United States, Mexico, and the countries of Central America to confront the violent national and transnational gangs and organized criminal and narcotics trafficking organizations that plague the entire region. To date, Congress has supported this Initiative with \$1.324 billion in funding for Mexico. The fiscal year 2011 budget request includes \$310 million for Mexico—\$292 million in INCLE, \$10 million for ESF, and \$8 million in FMF.

Following extensive Department discussions, including within the interagency community, and especially with Congress, we have now broadened our focus to include the Caribbean under the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, renamed our Central America efforts as “CARSI” (the Central America Regional Security Initiative), and are refocusing on ways to improve citizen safety—something consistently ranked high among societal concerns in all countries of the region.

Beginning with the Merida Initiative and moving “Beyond Merida” in Mexico, the United States is forging strong partnerships to enhance citizen safety in affected areas by fighting drug trafficking, organized crime, corruption, illicit arms trafficking, money-laundering, and demand for drugs on both sides of the border.

At bilateral working group meetings leading up to the March 23rd Merida U.S.-Mexico High Level Consultative Group, the governments of the United States and Mexico agreed on new goals to broaden and deepen our cooperation to effect lasting change. As a result of these new goals, we are accelerating our efforts to support and strengthen democratic institutions in Mexico (especially police and judicial institutions) and civil society organizations. We are also expanding our border focus beyond interdiction of contraband to include facilitation of legitimate trade and travel; and we are cooperating in building strong communities resistant to the corrupting influence of organized crime. As discussed in recent briefings with congressional staff, future programs to increase Mexican capacity and to institutionalize our partnership will focus on four goals:

- Disrupt Organized Criminal Groups.*—The United States and Mexico will continue to collaborate to disrupt and dismantle organized criminal groups. We will do so by focusing our efforts on intelligence collection and analysis, training and equipping special units, enhancing investigative capacity, conducting targeted work against money laundering, improving interdiction capability, building effective command and control centers across Mexico, and developing effective task forces.
- Institutionalize Reforms to Sustain Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights.*—The United States will partner with Mexico to help institutionalize justice-sector reforms to sustain the rule of law and respect for human rights. We will continue large-scale institution building projects with security and judicial institutions at the Federal level and expand these efforts to include additional Federal agencies and to State and local institutions. The goal of these efforts is to support sustainable changes in the judiciary to strengthen the rule of law, promote respect for human rights, and engage with civil society.
- Create a 21st Century Border.*—Our goal is to create efficient, economically competitive border crossings along the U.S./Mexican border that ensure “secure two-way flows” of travelers and trade. We will also work to improve enforcement cooperation between ports of entry. Our immediate law enforcement challenge is to greatly reduce the flow of drugs to the north, and guns and bulk cash to the south.
- Build Strong and Resilient Communities.*—Mexico will take the lead to enhance the rule of law, promote respect for human rights, and create a culture of lawfulness by targeting specific areas for building community organizations, reducing demand for drugs, encouraging civil society participation, creating sustainable economic opportunities, and promoting community cohesion and violence reduction strategies. The United States will support specific, geographically focused programs that advance these goals.

The United States and Mexican governments agree in principle to this framework for cooperation and are working together closely to determine the scope of action within each programmatic area. Broadly, and within this context, we are moving away from equipment purchases, such as aviation, and into an engagement that reinforces progress by institutionalizing Mexican capacity to sustain the rule of law and respect for human rights, build more responsive and transparent institutions, promote full civil society participation, transform the nature of our borders, and provide intensive technical assistance and training. We will also encourage enhanced cooperation with regional partners, including along Mexico’s southern border with

Guatemala and Belize. The \$310 million fiscal year 2011 request for Mexico, along with considerable GOM efforts in these areas, complements the comprehensive and balanced USG strategy on our side of the border to reduce drug demand by focusing on prevention, treatment, and enforcement, and expanded efforts stop illegal arms and bulk cash flowing south into Mexico.

We are hopeful that we can strengthen U.S. national security by helping the Calderon Administration break the power of the drug trafficking organizations and institute lasting institutional reforms that will continue into future Mexican Administrations. Assistance under the Merida Initiative, and other regional efforts throughout the Hemisphere, is strategically targeted to make an impact on the need for improved citizen safety and security. As we move forward, we will continue to assess progress and the impact of our assistance. We especially look forward to continued and regular dialogue with Congress as an integral part of this ongoing review.

Question. I and other Members of Congress, and the Administration, have urged the Mexican Government to conduct a credible, transparent, and thorough investigation of the murder of American citizen Bradley Will, and the 17 other Mexicans who were killed in Oaxaca in 2006. Instead, the Mexican Government arrested and accused an innocent man of killing Mr. Will, and he languished in prison until a court finally ordered his release. Can you assure me that you will insist that these cases be thoroughly and credibly investigated?

Answer. The Department of State has and will continue to raise the case of the death of American citizen Bradley Will with the Government of Mexico. We have made it clear to the Mexican Government that we expect a thorough and credible investigation of all evidence by Mexican authorities with a view to identifying and prosecuting the individual or individuals responsible for this heinous act.

On the issue of other Mexican citizens who were killed in Oaxaca in 2006, we have raised these as part of our regular dialogue regarding human rights issues with the Government of Mexico.

Question. For years, there has been talk about the need to reform the foreign aid budget. There has been any number of commissions, studies, reports and countless recommendations, all with little effect. This Administration has its own studies underway, at least one at the NSC and your Quadrennial Diplomatic and Development Review (QDDR). Given the strong views in Congress and the special interests with a stake in the status quo, what do you hope to accomplish this year to make foreign aid more efficient and effective?

Over the years, USAID has seen its autonomy decrease, as it lost control of its budget and no longer has a policy office. Whole pieces of foreign aid have been shifted to the State Department or the Millennium Challenge Corporation. In my opinion, USAID's effectiveness has been weakened as a result. I will also ask USAID Administrator Shah this question when he testifies next month, but what steps do you plan to rebuild USAID and restore some of its autonomy?

Answer. To make foreign aid more efficient and effective, State and USAID work closely with other agencies in the field, under the direction of the Chief of Mission, to coordinate our assistance activities. In Washington, we are taking specific steps to ensure close coordination. For example, under our Global Health Initiative, we are working collaboratively with USAID and Health and Human Services to review all of our associated health programs in a number of countries. We will enter into new long-term partnerships building on prior U.S. international health programs and work with our 80 partner countries to strengthen health systems and improve sustainable health outcomes, with a particular focus on women, children and newborns.

The fiscal year 2011 request is critical to helping USAID become the world's premier development agency. The request includes resources for hiring an additional 200 officers at USAID and—under the strong leadership of Administrator Shah—for building a robust policy, planning and evaluation capacity. USAID is playing a leading role in the management of priority development initiatives such as working to improve global health and food security around the world. In each of these areas USAID will show that it can have impact, make tough choices about how resources are used to get the most bang-for-buck, and serve as a whole-of-government platform that invites in other partners to maximize efforts against specific goals and outcomes.

CLIMATE CHANGE

Question. The Administration committed at Copenhagen to contributing a total of \$1 billion over 3 years in new funds to protect tropical forests, improve forest management, and increase carbon sequestration in tropical forests. I strongly support

this, and it builds on what this subcommittee has been doing for years to protect tropical forests. How do you plan to meet the \$1 billion commitment by fiscal year 2012?

Answer. In Copenhagen, the United States and five other developed countries collectively pledged \$3.5 billion over the 2010–2012 periods for REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) activities, with the United States pledging \$1 billion as its share of the total. We are on a path to meet that commitment.

The fiscal year 2010 appropriation included \$233 million in “Sustainable Landscapes” for forest-related climate change funding for State, USAID, and Treasury. This includes a “core” allocation of \$153 million, as well as \$80 million in USAID biodiversity funding that has direct climate benefits. The fiscal year 2011 request for State, USAID, and Treasury includes \$347 million for sustainable landscapes.

In addition to this fiscal year 2010 and 2011 “core” funding from State, USAID, and Treasury, additional USAID activities, as well as assistance activities by MCC and possibly other USG agencies, contribute to our climate change goals. We are currently reviewing those assistance portfolios to identify other existing or planned fiscal year 2010 and 2011 assistance activities that meet the REDD+ criteria and contribute toward our Copenhagen REDD+ pledge.

We are confident the Administration’s fiscal year 2012 budget request, still to be formulated, combined with the fiscal year 2010–11 assistance mentioned above, will allow us to meet the \$1 billion commitment.

Question. The budget request proposes adding American Centers, expanding English language programs, increasing public diplomacy programs to Muslim-majority countries, expanding the initiative specifically for Pakistan, and increasing the Department’s efforts with the Internet and other electronic media tools. This subcommittee has been very supportive of the Department’s public diplomacy programs, particularly the educational and cultural exchange programs. What are the Department’s priorities for public diplomacy programs, what gives you confidence that these programs are working and should be expanded, and how can we be sure that educational and cultural exchange programs will continue to grow?

Answer. First of all, thank you and the rest of the committee members for your continued support of public diplomacy.

The core mission of public diplomacy is to support the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives, advance national interests and enhance national security by informing and influencing foreign publics and by expanding and strengthening the relationship between the people and government of the United States and citizens of the rest of the world.

To that end the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Judith McHale, after an 8 month review of the current state of public diplomacy and public affairs, has just recently rolled out a strategic framework for public diplomacy. After consulting with members of the Hill, NGOs, representatives from academia, and Public Affairs Officers, Under Secretary McHale found that in significant ways our public diplomacy was working well to advance America’s interests. But the review also revealed a great degree of consensus about what needs to be changed to align it to current priorities and guide our efforts going forward.

As part of this review, we identified five strategic imperatives: to pro-actively shape global narratives; expand and strengthen people-to-people relationships; counter violent extremism; better inform policy-making; and, redeploy resources in strategic alignment with shifting priorities. Moving forward, we are taking steps to ensure that all our activities support these requirements.

Creating or maintaining American Centers, increasing English language training, appropriately using Internet technology and social media and increased engagement in Muslim majority countries are all means by which we can better achieve the strategic imperatives laid out above.

As noted in your question, a great deal of our public diplomacy efforts have been focused on Pakistan. Last summer, Under Secretary McHale, working closely with our Embassy in Islamabad, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, USAID and DOD, drafted the Pakistan Communications Plan, a copy of which will accompany this response.

The Pakistan Plan has four broad goals: expand media outreach, counter extremist propaganda, build communications capacity, and strengthen people-to-people ties. Our plan links elements of traditional public diplomacy with innovative new tools. For instance, recognizing that extremist voices dominate in some of Pakistan’s media markets, we instituted a rapid response unit and a 24-hour multilingual hotline for the Embassy to respond to attacks, threats, and propaganda from the Taliban, al Qaeda, and their sympathizers. This approach reversed a previous approach of not actively countering such propaganda. It has been an uphill battle but,

as our voice gets more frequent play, the impact on the discourse in Pakistan's media has been noticeable.

As we strengthen our people-to-people ties with Pakistanis, our aim has been to increase positive American presence on the ground in Pakistan. To do this we are focusing on more exchanges, more presence, more Lincoln Centers, more face-to-face meetings with engaged citizens in Pakistan, and more non-official contacts between Pakistanis and Americans in Pakistan.

A key component of face-to-face engagement is our educational and cultural exchange programs for which I have every confidence that these programs will continue to play an increased role in the success of our foreign policy objectives. Exchange levels have increased significantly in the last couple of years and we are looking to increase that trend while ensuring that resources are being placed strategically and appropriately and that proper oversight and evaluations are being carried out.

Under Secretary McHale and I agree that in this day and age it is critical that we engage with foreign publics like never before. It is the relationships built upon year after year that matter and that ultimately help us to better realize our foreign policy objectives.

EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT OF CONTRACTORS

Question. Over the past several years, the Department's Inspector General and the Special Inspectors General for Iraq and Afghanistan have identified systemic problems in the Department's contract management, including inadequate oversight of the contractor's work, overpayments to contractors, and delayed project completion.

What changes, within what timeframe, is the Department implementing to address these problems, which are responsible for the waste of millions of dollars?

Answer. The Department of State is committed to strengthening our contract management processes. In the last 2 years, the Office of Acquisitions Management (A/LM/AQM) created a strategy and established a business process for audits of A/LM/AQM contracts. We developed a close and professional working relationship with the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) which are the Department's audit agencies for major programs. We also issued an A/LM/AQM operational policy pertaining to audit services to ensure staff is aware of the policy. This strategy ensures that the Department meets contract administration responsibilities required by the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). During fiscal year 2009, the Department initiated 12 external audits of significant programs. In addition to financial audits, we initiated a series of business system audits to review contractor accounting and internal controls, billing systems, estimating systems, labor system controls, subcontractor systems, and property management systems in conjunction with audits of specific contracts on a pre-award and post-award basis. The Quality Assurance Branch works closely and successfully with contracting officers, the Office of Inspector General, and program offices to obtain documentation, provide answers to audit related questions, support negotiations, and reach settlement agreements.

Since 2008, A/LM/AQM has also significantly improved our contract close-out process. A/LM/AQM designed an effective business process and formed a team of close-out specialists, trained to identify contractual and budget issues, perform contract analysis, and to reconcile and document obligations and payments. This team is developing standard operating procedures for all of our contract managers to follow and is training their colleagues in A/LM/AQM on our new business process. In fiscal year 2010, as of February 24, 2010, nearly 500 contracts have been closed out, with \$16.5 million in deobligations of unliquidated funds.

The Department is continuing to examine other improvements to contract oversight through the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review with USAID acquisitions offices.

Question. The fiscal year 2011 budget request includes \$3.1 billion for Department of State operations in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. This includes a significant increase in civilian staff throughout these countries. Given the severe security constraints on State Department and other U.S. Government civilians in these countries, how are you going to use these people effectively and at the same time ensure their safety?

Answer. Achieving progress in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq will require continued dedication and sacrifice not only by our military personnel, but also by the more than 2,000 U.S. government civilians currently serving in those countries. While security remains a concern in many parts of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, the civilian increase can still be used effectively, without compromising civilian safe-

ty or our mission. For example, the increase in Afghanistan, coordinated by the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources, includes top experts from 10 different U.S. government departments and agencies. Many have previous experience in Afghanistan or Iraq. In Afghanistan, these experts contribute to the mission in the field, especially in the East and South where a majority of U.S. combat forces are operating and many of the additional 30,000 forces announced by President Obama are deploying. They work alongside our military forces in critical districts where ISAF is focusing its efforts in 2010, and partner with Afghans to enhance the capacity of national and sub-national government while helping to rehabilitate Afghanistan's key economic sectors.

In Afghanistan, U.S. civilians move into dangerous areas only after ISAF has completed clearing operations, which allows the Afghan government, U.S. civilian experts and ISAF to deliver an integrated package of basic services.

Question. I held a hearing in the Judiciary Committee recently about the roles of State Department, the Department of Homeland Security, and Federal Bureau of Investigation in the Christmas Day bombing attempt, and what changes are needed to prevent a similar incident from occurring again. At that time, the Department of State indicated that the visa process was under review to determine what improvements and changes are needed.

What is the status of the Department's efforts to improve the visa process, and what if any improvements are included in the fiscal year 2011 budget request?

Answer. We took immediate action to improve the procedures and content requirements for Visas Viper cable reporting that will call attention to the visa application and issuance information that is already part of the data that we share with our national security partners. All officers have been instructed to include complete information about all previous and current U.S. visa(s) when a Visas Viper cable is sent. This instruction includes guidance on specific methods to comprehensively and intensively search the database of visa records by conducting a wide-parameter, "fuzzy search," leveraging an existing search capability, when searching our comprehensive repository of visa records in the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD). Searches conducted in this manner will identify visa records despite variations in the spelling of names as well as in dates of birth, places of birth, and nationality information. Visas Viper cables sent after December 2009 contain this more complete information.

Since the Presidentially ordered Security Review, there have been exigent changes in the thresholds for adding individuals to the Terrorist Screening Database, No Fly, and Selectee lists. The number of revocations has increased substantially as a result. As soon as information is established to support a revocation, an entry showing the visa revocation is added electronically to the Department of State's Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) and shared in real time with the DHS lookout systems used for border screening.

The State Department has broad and flexible authority to revoke visas and we use that authority widely to protect our borders. Since 2001, we have revoked more than 57,000 visas for a variety of reasons, including over 2,800 for suspected links to terrorism. Currently, we are reviewing the procedures and criteria used in the field to revoke visas and will issue new instructions to our officers. Revocation recommendations will be added as an element of reporting through the Visas Viper channel. We have provided additional guidance to the field on use of the broad authority of visa officers to deny visas on security and other grounds. Instruction in appropriate use of this authority has already been a fundamental part of officer training for years.

We have been actively using this revocation authority as we perform internal reviews of our data against watchlist information provided by partner agencies. We are reviewing all previous Visas Viper submissions and cases that other agencies are bringing to our attention from the No Fly and Selectee lists, as well as other sources. In these reviews, we have identified cases for revocation and also confirmed that substantial numbers of individuals in these classes hold no visas and, of those few who did, a great many were revoked prior to the current review.

We are implementing a new generation of visa processing systems that will further integrate information gathered from domestic and overseas activities. We have enhanced our automatic check of CLASS entries against the CCD as part of our ongoing process of technology enhancements aimed at optimizing the use of our systems to detect and respond to derogatory information regarding visa applicants and visa bearers. We are accelerating distribution to posts of an upgraded version of the automated search algorithm that runs the names of new visa applicants against the CCD to check for any prior visa records. This enhanced capacity is available currently at 83 overseas posts, with the rest to follow soon.

We are deploying an enhanced and expanded electronic visa application form, which will provide more information to adjudicating officers and facilitate our ability to detect fraud. We are working with our interagency partners on the development and pilot-testing of a new, intelligence-based Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) system that will make full use of the additional application data.

The fiscal year 2011 budget for Consular Affairs includes significant resources to fund ongoing and new activities for the Visa Office. All activities will be funded with fee revenues included in the new schedule of fees. These activities include: Global Visa System creation, advanced biometric search capabilities, datasharing with relevant agencies and other advancements.

Question. Do you think that adding Department of Homeland Security Visa Security Units at overseas embassies would improve the security of the consular visa issuance process?

Answer. The Department of State has a close and productive partnership with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including the Visa Security Program (VSP) of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Over the past 7 years both agencies have increased resources significantly, improved procedures and upgraded systems devoted to supporting the visa function. We support the assignment of Visa Security Officers to selected overseas posts where they work together with Consular Officers and Assistant Regional Security Officer-Investigators (ARSO-I) to advance the nation's border security initiatives in the following areas: extending the border overseas; capitalizing on the visa process to identify national security threats; identifying unknown threats; sharing information and conducting liaison activities; providing training and advice; and investigating terrorism, human trafficking, alien smuggling, marriage fraud.

We work closely with the ICE Visa Security Units (VSUs) established abroad and with domestically based Visa Security Program supporting those units. VSUs currently operate at 14 visa adjudicating posts in 12 countries. Since January 19, 2010, we have received requests from ICE to open four additional VSUs and to augment staff at two existing VSUs. The Chiefs of Mission have approved the four new VSUs and one request for expansion with one request for expansion pending.

Question. An article in the February 23rd Washington Post describes problems in moving forward with the planned Security Training Facility in Maryland. The most troubling issues mentioned in the article include missteps by Federal officials, poor communication with the local communities affected by the Training Facility operations, and the State Department's acknowledgement that there hasn't been adequate analysis on whether building a single facility is more cost-effective than the current leasing of various different sites.

The article also questions the economic impact of the project for the local community and States that the Department acknowledges that there may be delays due to the public opposition and possible legal challenges.

What is the State Department doing to address these problems and have you determined whether building a single facility is the most cost-effective approach to providing security training to its employees? If not, shouldn't that have been done well before this point?

Answer. The Department of State (DoS) and General Services Administration (GSA) recognize and understand the concerns of Queen Anne's County residents regarding this proposed project. It is our goal to work in conjunction with the citizens of this community to ensure that the proposed facility benefits the surrounding area and any adverse impacts are minimal.

To that end, project overview and public scoping meetings were held in early January, marking the beginning of the public participation process. Additional public meetings were conducted on February 16 and February 23, and the public comment period was extended from January 15, 2010 until March 12, 2010. In those meetings, we shared the evaluation criteria guiding the selection of a preferred site, provided general background information about the purpose and need of the project, and requested feedback from local residents and community groups about what issues should be studied and what areas may need to receive a greater level of attention during the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process.

The NEPA process is the tool by which the public is invited to comment and identify impacts that they believe may result from the proposed development. The comments will be part of the NEPA analysis that will be published in the draft Environmental Assessment (EA). Upon publication of the EA, the public will have another opportunity to participate in a 30-day comment period. The findings will be used to modify the plans and operations for the facility to avoid or mitigate any impact. Development of the site cannot, and will not, begin until the NEPA process is completed.

Additionally, the DoS and GSA accepted numerous invitations from local organizations and community groups for open discussions, and are also working to establish community liaison positions that will strengthen the dialogue with the local community and continue it on a more regular basis. We also invited the public to submit feedback on the proposed training center at any time, by calling the dedicated phone line at (215) 446-4815 or emailing FASTC.info@gsa.gov.

According to a 2007 DoS Office of the Inspector General report, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's (DS) training facilities are not adequate to accommodate the Bureau's training. The dispersal of instructors and students among different facilities throughout the greater Washington, DC, metropolitan and surrounding areas is a barrier to effective team building, communication, and operational efficiency. The operating cost to conduct training at the current patchwork of 19 facilities exceeds \$19 million annually. Students and instructors shuttle between facilities that extend from West Virginia to the Maryland suburbs at a significant productivity cost to employees. Several off-site annexes used for training are sub-standard facilities.

The Department, over a 15-year period, has pursued possible locations for a consolidated training facility in Maryland, Virginia, and Washington, DC. DS collaborated extensively with other agencies (Drug Enforcement Agency, Customs and Border Protection, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Defense and others) to discuss facility sharing and opportunities for co-location. During this process, DS learned that these agencies were training at maximum capacity, and could not offer exclusive scheduling opportunities. Furthermore, they could not accommodate our highly specialized programs or our diverse and voluminous student population (Foreign Service Officers, Foreign Service Nationals, etc.) and unique curriculum (i.e., aggressive driving/ambush/kidnap scenarios, weapons of mass destruction and medical courses, explosives, heavy firearms, etc.).

DS also vigorously explored expanding existing facilities. DS concluded that existing facilities have been expanded to capacity and unable to meet the demands of an increase in Foreign Service and other personnel who will serve in high/critical threat environments based on an expected augmentation of U.S. foreign affairs reconstruction and stabilization efforts in failing or transitioning states/regions.

Question. Were existing sites, including local military facilities with excess space capacity, considered and evaluated as part of the decisionmaking process? If so, which sites were considered and what were the reasons for deciding to instead build a new site? If existing sites were not considered, why not?

Answer. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) has been pursuing space for a consolidated training facility for more than 15 years. This search has included seeking available land for purchase or exclusive use from other Federal agencies, operating military bases, and military bases scheduled to close as a result of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendations, as well as facility sharing and opportunities for co-location. Other agencies with whom DoS has approached over the years to share their facilities include the Drug Enforcement Administration, Customs and Border Protection, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Defense, and others.

In addition to seeking new land, DS also vigorously explored expansion of existing facilities, but concluded that those facilities are already at full capacity. Over the past several years, some of the following Federal/military/or commercial facilities have been investigated as potential sites for a consolidated DS hard skills training center:

- Camp Dawson, WV;
- National Conservation Training Center, WV;
- Summit Point Raceway Associates, WV (Privately owned land-lease with DoS-owned buildings);
- Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD;
- Agricultural Research Center, Beltsville, MD;
- Indian Head Naval Surface Weapons Center, MD;
- Fort AP Hill, VA;
- Quantico Marine Base, VA;
- Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Cheltenham, MD;
- Fort Pickett, VA; and
- U.S. Army Research Facility, Blossom Point, MD.

None of the agencies or locations listed above were able to accommodate the highly specialized programs (i.e., driving tracks, firing ranges and mock-urban environments), student populations (Foreign Service Officers, Locally Employed Staff, etc.), and relatively unique curriculum and mission needs of DS.

Therefore, during the summer of 2009, a search for other available land was initiated by the General Services Administration (GSA), Region 3/Philadelphia, on behalf of the Department. Following a search of declared excess Federal property and commercially listed private lands, both GSA and the Department concurred additional site options were needed. GSA posted an announcement seeking interested parties on the Federal Business Opportunities website (www.fbo.gov) on June 29, 2009.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUE

Question. Madame Secretary, as briefly mentioned, Hawaii will have the great honor of hosting the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 2011 Leader's Meeting. My constituents have expressed some concerns about anticipated security-related expenses that will be associated with this event. It is my understanding that last year's Group of Twenty Summit, which was hosted by Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, resulted in cost overruns incurred by the State and local governments. The APEC 2011 Leader's Meeting will be quite an undertaking, and it is my hope that the State of Hawaii can look forward to the full cooperation of the Department of State and all the other coordinating Federal agencies. Would you please speak to the interagency cooperation, coordination, and cost-sharing anticipated between the various Federal agencies and Hawaii's local government?

Answer. The Department of State is the lead coordinating agency for U.S. participation in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), and will work with a strong interagency team to arrange the hosting of APEC in 2011. Of the \$89 million anticipated spending by State in fiscal year 2011, we expect that over one-half will be spent in Hawaii. The majority of the APEC 2011 meetings will take place during fiscal year 2011, and much of the Hawaii costs will also be incurred in fiscal year 2011. However, Leaders Week security costs will fall in the fiscal year 2012 budget period. Diplomatic Security officers have briefed officials in Hawaii on obtaining National Security Special Event Status and have requested that Hawaii prepare a budget of anticipated costs. Governor Lingle has also discussed the matter with Secretary Napolitano, and the Departments of State and Homeland Security will coordinate closely in this matter. The State Department looks forward to working closely with Congress, the interagency team and officials in Hawaii to ensure successful meetings in 2011.

Question. The East-West Center was created by Congress 50 years ago to promote the relationship between the United States and its neighbors throughout and across the Pacific Ocean. I appreciate the support the Department has expressed for public diplomacy, and a commitment to promoting the concept of citizen diplomacy. These are key concepts promoted by the East-West Center and facilitated by its exchanges and educational programs. The Center is a key stakeholder and participant planning and preparing for the APEC 2011 Leader's Meeting. As the Center looks forward to its next 50 years, how do you see the Center's extensive alumni network throughout Asia and the Pacific region, exchange programs, capacities, and partnerships complementing efforts by the Department, and how might its tremendous resources be further utilized?

Answer. The Department of State greatly values the East-West Center's achievements in strengthening relationships between the United States and the Asia-Pacific region, and in addressing global issues. The Center is providing important support to our efforts to prepare for the United States' hosting of APEC in 2011, particularly preparations for the 2011 APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting.

For 50 years, the East-West Center has played a vital part in bridging cultural, educational, political, economic and social distances between the United States and the Asia-Pacific region. I appreciated the opportunity to speak at the Center as part of its anniversary celebrations, and to engage with students who will be among the next generation of leaders in promoting stronger U.S.-Asia-Pacific relations.

The East-West Center has served as an important forum for meetings between senior U.S. officials and leaders from the Asia-Pacific region, including the Heads of State of many Pacific islands nations. It also brings together journalists, security experts, educators and other professionals in many fields that are important to our relationship. Its 58,000 alumni, organized into 50 chapters, form a significant international network of influence, and our Embassies help to support the efforts of these alumni overseas.

As the United States further develops our partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region, the East-West Center offers a unique venue and expertise to foster cooperation and encourage the sharing of ideas. The Center's efforts to promote broader systemic and globalized thinking in the Asia-Pacific region helps build a common under-

standing of issues and values among publics and professionals, facilitating the State Department's work. We anticipate that the Center will become an even more valuable part of the overall U.S. public diplomacy effort in East, South, and Southeast Asia and the Pacific in the coming years, and we look forward to continued collaboration with this important institution.

Question. The Asia-Pacific region continues to gain more attention in the media, whether due to economic, trade, or security matters. With the benefit of having a year in your position as the Secretary, I am curious how you see the U.S. role in the region growing, adapting, and changing in the next few years?

Answer. The United States' revitalized relationship with the Asia-Pacific region will continue to grow in the next few years. We have a strong interest in continuing our economic and strategic leadership, and Asia has a strong interest in the United States remaining a dynamic economic partner and a stabilizing influence.

We will remain a resident power in the region contributing to the stability that makes economic progress possible. Our economies will remain inextricably linked. American companies export \$320 billion in goods and services to the Asia-Pacific region every year, creating millions of jobs. We will continue to work through APEC with other regional economies to foster free and open trade and investment and growth that is more inclusive, balanced, and secure.

We will enhance our partnerships with our friends in the Asia-Pacific region to meet global security and humanitarian needs. We will continue to work together to help prevent nuclear proliferation, support our common interests in Afghanistan, combat piracy off the Horn of Africa and more.

Our people-to-people links will continue to grow with more than 13 million Americans tracing their ancestry to that part of the world. Hundreds of thousands of students from the Asia-Pacific region study in the United States, and the number of American students is increasing at universities in Asia.

The next few years will present the possibility for greater regional cooperation. We are building the architecture to meet the challenges faced by the region. Our alliance relationships with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines are among the most successful bilateral partnerships in modern history and will remain the cornerstone of our regional involvement. We are building toward launching a Comprehensive Partnership with Indonesia and will continue to strengthen relationships with other key players, including China. We are also exploring strengthened multilateral cooperation across the region.

Question. Last April I shared with you my concerns regarding the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) and specifically, the importance of bigeye tuna (BET) to Hawaii's economy.

The Hawaii longline fleet has been under limited entry regulation for 15 years while other nations (including China and Taiwan) have increased their number of boats by 50 percent and increased their fishing exponentially by entering into multiple charter agreements with other nations—which are not closely tracked. The WCPFC established a BET quota of 4,200 metric tons for the U.S. longline fleet for 2006–2008. For 2009–2011 that quota was reduced to 3,750 metric tons. The purse seine industry in the United States also catches BET, often taking more as unwanted bycatch than the longline industry takes as a target species.

Our longline industry has informed us repeatedly about the challenges associated with operating within this quota, particularly in light of the fact that China and Taiwan do not appear to be honoring the quota limits. To that end, the fishermen in Hawaii have taken the initiative to map out potential charter agreements with Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in order to legally take additional catch and ensure a steady supply to the American market. However, the WCPFC has not adopted mutually agreed upon parameters for charter agreements, and there is currently no governing mechanism for how they are entered into or agreed upon, which is something we encourage the WCPFC to take up at future meetings.

Our challenges are twofold: How do we secure meaningful enforcement measures to ensure that all WCPFC signatories abide by their quota while supporting the efforts of our domestic industry to provide a high quality, reliable supply of fresh seafood to the American market? Even though the Regional Fishery Management Organizations such as the WCPFC focus on international issues, I urge State to work with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to take into account the effect of international negotiations on domestic industry. How can State assist with moving this forward?

Answer. The Department of State works closely with NOAA on issues related to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). Both agencies take seriously the responsibility of making decisions that affect U.S. economic interests, and our negotiators work diligently to balance those interests with the con-

servations imperatives and priorities in the most equitable manner possible. In particular, in recognition of the special circumstances surrounding the operation of the Hawaii-based U.S. longline fleet, our negotiators, on two separate occasions, fought for and secured special accommodations for that sector of the industry, which were described in detail in a May 4, 2009 letter to you from Assistant Secretary Verma. Together, these provisions ensure that reductions in the quota for the U.S. Hawaii-based fleet are significantly less than the cuts faced by the fleets of other developed States.

Even so, we fully recognize the challenge in working to ensure that all WCPFC participants abide by the quotas for bigeye tuna pursuant to WCPFC Conservation and Management Measure 2008–01. At this time, we have no evidence to indicate or to suggest that other WCPFC members, including those mentioned in your question, are exceeding their established quotas. At the same time, we recognize that the process for monitoring of catches and collection of information is still under development and the information available to us to assess the current situation is imperfect. A large part of our response to the challenges you have identified must be to continue to strengthen the programs within the WCPFC for monitoring, control and surveillance of fishing activities to ensure a greater level of transparency in fishing operations in the region.

The WCPFC took an important step in this direction at its December 2009 meeting with the adoption of a measure to monitor and regulate the transshipment of fish caught in the WCPFC Convention Area. Under this measure, all transshipments of fish by longline vessels will be observed and recorded by an observer on board either the fishing vessel or the carrier vessel receiving the fish. (Similar provisions apply to other fleets.) In our view, this measure closes a significant gap in our ability to monitor catches and ensure compliance with agreed measures. Unreported transshipment of fish is one way that vessels can avoid having catches counted against their national quotas. We will also continue to push for higher levels of observer coverage on foreign longline fleets, recognizing the U.S. fleet operates with the highest level of coverage of any fleet in the region.

The issue of charter operations is one that we are considering carefully. Under certain circumstances, charter operations can provide an effective and legitimate means for small island developing States and territories to develop their domestic fisheries without incurring large capital expenditures. At the same time, we are concerned that, without clear rules and guidance on the nature and extent of allowable charter operations, such operations could allow some fishing States to increase their catches without having that catch count against their national quota, but instead against the quota of a small island developing State or territory, with little direct link to the development of the domestic fishery in the State or territory in question. Under this latter scenario, the catch limits for some distant water fishing nations would have little meaning and the conservation benefits of CMM 2008–01 would be significantly diminished.

Finally, another way to address concerns about the status of bigeye tuna, is to explore ways to reduce catches of juvenile bigeye tuna in the tuna purse seine fishery, especially the fishery associated with fish aggregating devices or “FADs.” At present, different groups are exploring various options with respect to the development of different fishing gear and techniques to reduce catches of juvenile bigeye tuna. WCPFC members are looking to the United States for leadership in this endeavor. In our view, although this work is expensive and would require a multi-year funding commitment, the United States should seek to join these ongoing efforts and contribute to them in a material way.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU

Question. Madame Secretary, as you are aware, on April 1, 2008, the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption went into full force in the United States. Since that time, the number of intercountry adoptions has decreased dramatically from over 22,000 in 2004 to just over 13,000 last year. For the most part, this is because countries of origin have shut adoption processes down due to concerns of fraud and abuse. It has been my experience that governments in these countries are both willing and wanting to receive guidance from the United States in building a system of intercountry adoption that is both safe and effective. What is the State Department currently doing to meet this need?

Answer. The reasons for the decline in numbers of intercountry adoptions vary from country to country. The United States is only one of several receiving countries experiencing such a trend. However, since the United States adopts on a greater scale than all other countries, the decline in raw numbers is larger. The majority

of intercountry adoptions into the United States occur from a handful of countries of origin. When those few countries of origin alter their intercountry adoption practices and requirements, the impact on our overall numbers is disproportionately large.

Over 70 percent of the reduction in fiscal year 2009 was in the number of children adopted from Guatemala, where the Guatemalan National Council on Adoption announced in September 2008, that it would not accept any additional adoption cases, because, among other things, the Government of Guatemala has not yet met its obligations under the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption (the Convention) and has not yet put into place the required safeguards. This year, due to our strong interest in encouraging Guatemala's efforts to reform its adoption system, and pending a determination about whether the program is consistent with Convention standards, the United States has asked to participate in a limited 2 year Guatemalan pilot program to allow for the adoption of a number of special needs children.

Nearly 20 percent of the fiscal year 2009 reduction in intercountry adoptions was from China, which is making fewer children eligible for intercountry adoption, while the numbers of prospective adoptive parents from traditional receiving countries has been increasing. As a result the wait time for healthy young children is increasing. However, the wait time for older children and those with special needs remains low. Russia and Vietnam also registered notable declines. The Department remains in close contact with the governments of Russia and Vietnam on adoption matters.

The United States takes a multi-faceted approach in working with other countries on adoption issues. The Convention is an important tool in helping the United States promote intercountry adoption practices that focus on the best interests of each child. The accreditation process for adoption service providers who wish to operate in Convention countries establishes clear, strong, enforceable standards. Although the accreditation process is only a few years old, it is our judgment that U.S. efforts in accreditation have "raised the performance bar," and helped to improve the standard for services provided in non-Convention as well as Convention adoptions.

As the U.S. Central Authority for the Convention, the Department of State encourages and supports implementation of best practices in child protection and welfare in order to achieve Convention goals of incorporating intercountry adoption in an integrated child protection and child care system. As a matter of policy, we take every opportunity to encourage all countries to take the necessary steps toward joining and properly implementing the Convention. For example, the Kyrgyz Republic, which is not party to the Convention, halted intercountry adoptions in 2008 over concerns of corruption and fraud in the adoption process. The Department has engaged the Kyrgyz government at the highest levels on numerous occasions to encourage the strengthening of safeguards in the adoption process and accession to the Convention. In addition to these efforts, we have advanced the issue through outreach programs that included sending a U.S. adoption expert to the Kyrgyz Republic last year, and sponsoring an adoption-themed study tour to the United States for senior Kyrgyz officials.

Another country not party to the Convention is Vietnam. Adoptions from Vietnam were suspended in 2008. However, the United States remains in frequent contact with the government of Vietnam on adoption matters. Discussions have focused on the broad range of child welfare responsibilities encompassed by the Hague Adoption Convention, the principles underlying the Convention, and the practical requirements for implementing procedures that the Convention requires.

Cambodia is a member of the Hague Adoption Convention, but due to fraud, irregularities, and an insufficient legal framework to provide safeguards for the protection of children, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) suspended adoptions from Cambodia on December 21, 2001. Despite accession to the Convention in 2007, the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) has been unable to implement Hague-compliant procedures necessary to meet its treaty obligations. Working in cooperation with the Hague Permanent Bureau (HPB), as well as with several receiving countries, the United States has sought to provide assistance for Cambodia's establishment of implementing legislation necessary for an ethical and transparent adoption program that meets Convention standards. The United States has supported efforts by the HPB and joined a receiving country Working Group comprised of Convention states to provide coordinated input on Hague law and procedures to the RGC. The United States also supports UNICEF's continuing work with the RGC to implement law, as well as improve and strengthen the child welfare system in Cambodia. As part of a multi-country assistance grant to UNICEF, the USAID Displaced Orphan's and Children's Fund (DCOF) is providing approximately \$1 million for this purpose.

Finally, the United States supports the work of the Hague Permanent Bureau as it responds to inquiries from countries on intercountry adoption issues. The Department has an ongoing and active record of sponsoring and participating in the work of the Hague Conference on Private International Law's Inter-Country Adoption Training and Technical Assistance Program (ICATAP). Created in 2007, ICATAP provides assistance directly to governments that are planning to ratify or accede to the Convention, or have already done so but are experiencing difficulties with implementation. The United States contributed \$200,000 in 2008 to the Hague Permanent Bureau's Supplementary Budget, which funds ICATAP and other child welfare programs.

Question. As you know, one of the founding principles of the Hague is that children are best served in a family. Under what is called its principle of subsidiarity, convention countries agree to pursue family reunification and domestic adoption before allowing a child to be adopted by a family in another country. Convention countries also agree that institutionalization and long term foster care are not considered permanent and should therefore not be used as long term solutions. Madam Secretary, I am concerned that while it appears to be U.S. policy that intercountry adoption should take precedence over long term foster care and institutions, our practice appears to be quite the opposite.

Can you confirm that it is in fact the U.S. policy that long term foster care and institutionalization are not long term solutions and should therefore not be given preference over intercountry adoption?

Answer. Yes, that core Convention principle reflects our policy as well. In situations where children will not be reunited with their families, permanency planning should be undertaken as quickly as possible. Long-term foster care or institutionalization is not in the best interests of children. The principle of subsidiarity as expressed in the Convention stands for the principle that national adoption be given precedence over intercountry adoption. However, the practice of stopping intercountry adoptions pending the development of a viable national adoption system or enactment of long-term child care reform, in most cases runs contrary to the core "best interests of the child" principle of the Convention.

Question. As you know, one of the many challenges in addressing the needs of orphan children in Haiti is the lack of a universally accepted definition of what is an orphan. In fact, the often cited estimate that there were 380,000 orphans in Haiti prior to the earthquake include children who had one living parent and/or extended family. What can the United States do to assist the Government of Haiti in developing the data necessary to better understand what children's precise needs are?

Answer. The United States is actively assisting the development of the data necessary to better understand children's precise needs by providing expert technical assistance to the U.S. mission child protection team, technical assistance and transport for GOH/UNICEF assessments of the needs of children in hundreds of orphanages in the Port au Prince area, and by supporting nationally representative surveys such as periodic Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and a recent survey of child trafficking, restaveks, and child victims of violence.

The figure of 380,000 is the UNICEF estimate of the number of children under 18, before the earthquake, who had lost one or both parents. Of this number, 330,000 children had lost one parent and 50,000 had lost both parents. The great majority of these children were living with the surviving parent (if a single orphan) or with extended family members, usually a grandparent or aunt or uncle.

Prior to the earthquake, only 67 of an estimated 600 residential care centers (referred to as "orphanages," though many of the children have one or both parents living) had been registered with the Government of Haiti (GoH). Because a majority of these centers were unregistered, there is little official data or statistics on children living in these conditions. Approximately 300 of these centers were located in Port-au-Prince and the surrounding earthquake-affected area.

The USG is supporting the GoH and UNICEF to map and build a database of children's residential care centers to facilitate stronger oversight through registration and monitoring in the future. As of March 1st, the UNICEF-led Child Protection Sub-cluster (CPSC) had completed assessments in 280 residential care centers. More than 17,000 children were residing in 205 of the assessed centers. The remaining assessed centers were found to be no longer hosting children.

With USAID support, Haiti carried out Demographic and Health Surveys in 1994-1995, 2000, and 2005-2006. The 2005/6 survey included information for children under 18 about whether the parents are alive, whether the children live with their parents and the relationship to other members of the household. The United States can assist the Government of Haiti to conduct another such survey as soon as possible, preferably with additional questions about the changes in these rela-

tionships following the earthquake. If possible, the survey should be accompanied by special data collection on children who live in residential care centers.

Question. The UNHCR stipulates 2 years as a “reasonable period” for the tracing of and reunification with parents or other surviving family members. Understanding the detrimental effects of prolonged institutionalization, particularly for children ages 0 to 5, what is the United States plan for ensuring that children are not placed in institutions for significant portions of those 2 years?

Answer. The duration of the tracing process varies per child and is largely influenced by prospects for success, as well as the age and specific needs of the child and the circumstances of the child’s interim care placement. It is the USG’s view that it would be inappropriate to mandate 2 years of tracing before decisions about long-term placement and care are made, particularly for young children. With adequate resources, we believe that the GOH capacity could be developed so that, when a child is identified as currently not living with a family, a “best interests of the child” determination (BID) could be made for each child. Once a BID is completed, then placement decisions about short and long-term care could be made concurrently.

The following are priorities that USAID aims to address for child protection in Haiti:

- Assist reunited families to remain intact and viable through social and economic support;
- Reduce the number of children abandoned (as measured by new admissions to orphanages);
- Increase the number of children in family-based interim and long-term care in communities (e.g. family reunification, kinship care, foster care, small group homes, supervised independent living for older children, adoption);
- Reduce the number of children living in orphanages; and, improve the quality of care for children living in orphanages awaiting a family placement; and
- Strengthen the capacity of the Government of Haiti to build and lead a national child protection program based on international standards, robust monitoring and evaluation, an expanded cadre of professional social and child welfare workers.

Question. As you are well aware, U.S. Federal law requires that State and local officials who place children in foster care are to pursue the primary goal of family reunification, while at the same time, developing an alternative permanency plan for the child. If the family reunification efforts fail, then the alternate plan will already be in place and well on its way to completion. This practice, which is called concurrent planning, is intended to reduce the total period of time a child will remain in out of home care before being permanently placed with a family. Is this an approach that the United States might encourage its international partners to consider adopting so that children in Haiti are not spending unnecessary time in non-permanent situations?

Answer. Yes, we are aware of and support the concept of concurrent planning for children in care. We note that the main problem in Haiti before and after the earthquake is that the GOH does not have a functioning child welfare system, including the sophisticated social work capacity required to engage in case-by-case analysis of each child’s situation and needs so that, if needed, a concurrent plan could be written, approved, and executed. Now that so many children are in need of emergency care, such as food and shelter, the immediate priority has been to focus on those needs first.

Question. Long term solutions to the issues facing Haiti’s orphan children will undoubtedly require the mobilization and coordination of both traditional and non-traditional partners. Have you given any thought about how you might mobilize faith based, corporate and professional partners around the goal of providing families for orphan children?

Answer. Yes, a great deal of thought has been given to the mobilization of such partners. Faith-based partners in particular have long played a central and seminal role in assisting children and are well positioned to scale-up such services. USG agencies are currently working with a variety of faith-based partners in Haiti to address the needs of orphans and vulnerable children.

Question. This year will mark the third year of the 10-year memorandum of understanding between Israel and the United States on important military assistance to Israel. The President’s budget request for FMF to Israel—\$3 billion—is the amount noted in the MOU and we are appreciative of the President’s ongoing commitment to ensure Israel has the tools it needs to defend itself. What do you perceive to be the security threats Israel faces today? How will this assistance help to enhance security and stability in Israel and throughout the region?

Answer. Support for Israel's security is a cornerstone of our Middle East policy. Israel faces potential threats from a number of sources, including terrorist organizations such as Hizballah and Hamas, as well as states including Iran. Our Foreign Military Financing (FMF) memorandum of understanding is intended to contribute to Israel's ability to defend itself from these regional threats by committing the Administration to seek congressional approval to provide Israel \$30 billion in FMF over a 10-year period, beginning in fiscal year 2009. The United States provided Israel with \$2.55 billion for fiscal year 2009, and forward-funded \$555 million of Israel's \$2.775 billion fiscal year 2010 FMF allocation via the fiscal year 2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act.

Israel uses this assistance both to procure U.S.-origin defense articles, ranging from ammunition to advanced weapons systems and training, and to develop and support its own defense industry. U.S. assistance will help ensure that Israel maintains its qualitative military edge over potential threats, preventing a shift in the security balance of the region, and safeguarding U.S. interests. Our assistance is also aimed at building Israel's confidence to make historic concessions necessary for comprehensive regional peace.

Question. The President's request included \$400.4 million in economic assistance for the West Bank and Gaza "to strengthen the Palestinian Authority as a credible partner in Middle Eastern peace and continue to respond to humanitarian needs in Gaza." The request also states that this assistance "will provide significant resources to support the stability of the PA, economic development of the West Bank, and increase the capacity of the PA to meet the needs of its people." Can you tell us how these funds will be disbursed? What specific projects will be funded and through what specific mechanisms? What portion of these funds will be used for humanitarian assistance in Gaza? Are you confident that there are safeguards in place to ensure this assistance reaches its intended recipients and does not land in the hands of Hamas or benefit Hamas? If yes, can you please provide an explanation of the safeguards in place?

Answer. The Department's \$400.4 million request in fiscal year 2011 for the West Bank and Gaza Economic Support Funds (ESF) program supports the Palestinian Authority's (PA) development and institution-building priorities through the following bilateral economic support:

- Up to \$200 million in direct budget support to the PA.
- \$72.5 million for the delivery of basic education, health, and water services.
- \$81.4 million in programs to help develop the environment for growth in the Palestinian private sector.
- \$15.5 million in food, medical, and other humanitarian assistance for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.
- \$31 million to enhance democratic reform, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and increase civic engagement.

The more than \$400 million ESF requested in fiscal year 2011 will continue support for priority reform and institution-building priorities identified by the PA, and will be disbursed primarily through either new or existing USAID and MEPI contracts or grants with international organizations, U.S. non-governmental organizations, and local vetted organizations. As noted above, the Administration has requested \$15.5 million for humanitarian assistance in the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal year 2011. At this stage, USAID cannot predict the exact amount that will be spent on humanitarian assistance in Gaza versus the West Bank. The decision on funding for Gaza will be based on the changes in the situation and the evolving needs.

The United States has installed safeguards that will ensure that our funding is only used where, and for whom, it is intended, and does not end up in the wrong hands. USAID and MEPI provide all project assistance through International organizations, U.S. non-governmental organizations and local vetted organizations. Before making an award of either a contract or a grant to a local NGO, USAID or MEPI, as appropriate, checks the organization against information in U.S. government databases. USAID and MEPI also check these organizations and the organization's principal officer, directors, and other key individuals through law enforcement and other systems accessed by USAID's Office of Security. All NGOs applying for grants from USAID and MEPI are required to certify, before award of the grant will be made, that they do not provide material support to terrorists. These organizations also work with local organizations through sub-grants. All local sub-grantees are likewise vetted to ensure no terrorist connections.

Once an award has been made, USAID and MEPI have established procedures to safeguard U.S. investments and ensure the transparency and integrity of U.S. assistance. In order to ensure that funding through local and U.S. NGOs is used only for agreed upon purposes, all NGOs are required to submit quarterly financial re-

ports on how funds are spent. Also, all direct USAID grantees, contractors, and significant sub-grantees and subcontractors' local costs are audited by USAID's Inspector General on an annual basis. In addition, the Mission's vetting procedures are the subject of regular GAO audits.

Before transferring U.S. taxpayer dollars to the PA as budget support, the Secretary of State certifies that the PA maintains a Single Treasury Account; has eliminated all parallel financing mechanisms outside of the treasury account; and established a single comprehensive civil service roster and payroll. The PA is only authorized to use budget support funds for purposes approved by USAID. In 2008 and 2009, U.S. budget support was tied to specific PA expenditures, i.e., payment of debt to Israeli energy or utility companies and private sector financial institutions providing credit for purchases from these companies. Vetting of specific private sector creditors is a prerequisite to disbursements of funds. Funds are transferred into a separate local currency sub-account of the PA's Single Treasury Account, and USAID had access to all information pertaining to the separate sub-account in order to monitor funds. The PA must notify USAID in writing when disbursements are made from the separate sub-account, including the amount disbursed and the recipient. The Regional Inspector General also audits each cash transfer. We anticipate using the same process for fiscal year 2011 budget support.

In addition to tight USG procedures and controls, the PA, under Prime Minister Fayyad, has undertaken substantial economic and fiscal reforms that have increased transparency and accountability. The PA's budget, including revenue sources and actual expenses and commitments, is publicly available on the Ministry of Finance's website. In addition, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) has taken a number of additional steps to increase fiscal oversight and streamline budget execution, including by establishing a General Accounting Department and a Computerized Accounting System to link the MOF to line ministries and ensure that funds are used for their intended purpose.

Question. The President also requested \$150 million for security assistance for the Palestinian Authority, indicating these funds will support reform of the Palestinian security sector. This is an increase of \$50 million over last year's funds. Please explain the reason for this increase.

Answer. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) will use most of the \$50 million increase in funding over fiscal year 2010 levels to train, equip and garrison an additional Special Battalion of the Palestinian Authority's (PA) National Security Force (NSF). The total fiscal year 2011 request of \$150 million provides enough funds to train, equip, and garrison three Special Battalions. This level of funding will bring us to our goal of training and equipping a total of 10 battalions (including one in reserve) and garrisoning nine.

INL will direct a portion of this additional request to provide training, equipment, infrastructure, and technical assistance to prosecutors, investigative police, and prison officials in the Justice and Corrections Sectors to complement our security force programs.

Question. In December, you acknowledged that efforts to engage Iran in negotiations on its nuclear program had not had the desired results, saying, "I don't think anyone can doubt that our outreach has produced very little in terms of any kind of positive response from the Iranians." Iran continues to enrich uranium, test missiles and work on its heavy water reactor. The global community cannot sit idly by as Iran continues to build a nuclear weapons capability. Can you provide us with an overview of the Administration's strategy to prevent Iran from obtaining and using a nuclear weapon?

Answer. The Administration remains committed to its dual-track strategy to address Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, which ultimately presents Iran with two choices: It can fulfill its international obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the U.N. Security Council and International Atomic Energy Agency, or it can face increasing international pressure and condemnation for its activities.

At the moment, our focus is on getting the international community to consider new multilateral sanctions, while also implementing all existing U.N. Security Council resolutions through national measures. We believe that these kinds of multilateral pressures can most effectively underscore to the Iranian government the cost of defying the international community. They are also the most difficult for Iran to evade.

We also continue to work independently and with our allies to take measures to deny Iran access to the technology and know-how it needs to develop further its nuclear program, while underscoring our continued support for a peaceful nuclear energy program in Iran. We are also working with our partners to prevent Iran from abusing the international financial system to facilitate its proliferation activities.

Finally, we are working with our counterparts on the IAEA Board of Governors to support the IAEA's investigation into Iran's nuclear program and compliance with its obligations. Through the IAEA's investigation, we have learned much concerning Iran's activities and many questions have been raised that reinforce our concern regarding the nature of Iran's nuclear intentions. We support fully the IAEA's efforts to address those questions.

Question. As part of the administration's sanctions effort, will the State Department begin to implement the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) by making determinations about companies investing in the Iranian petroleum sector?

Answer. The Department of State takes its obligations under the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) very seriously and we have reviewed many reports of potentially sanctionable activity under the Act. In addition to this ongoing process, we recently conducted a preliminary review of a number of reported activities that were mentioned in a letter sent from 50 Members of the House to President Obama in October and a letter sent to me by Senator Kyl and 10 other Senators in November. During the course of this review, we found the activities of some companies to be problematic and therefore warranting more thorough consideration under the standards delineated in the ISA. We are continuing to collect and assess information on these cases.

We work aggressively on three fronts to ensure that our review of such reports is serious and thorough and that we have a rigorous process in place for implementation of the ISA. First, we raise in our bilateral engagement with numerous countries the need to strengthen our cooperation in promoting a united front for restricting investment in Iran's energy sector. Second, we supplement our efforts by working with our Embassies overseas to collect information on potentially sanctionable activity. Finally, we review with the intelligence community reports of activities of some companies that warrant further scrutiny under the ISA. Through these mechanisms we ensure that credible reports are examined fully while reports with no substance are put to rest. It is worth noting that the Iranian government, in its efforts to deny its increasing international isolation, promotes and publicizes all manner of transactions and purported investments that may or may not have any truth to them.

If the Secretary makes a final determination that sanctionable activity has occurred, Congress will be notified promptly.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR FRANK R. LAUTENBERG

Question. We saw with the *Sean Goldman* case that international parental abduction is a major problem. Although we were able to secure a positive outcome in that case with your help, many other parents are still struggling to bring their children home and it is clear that the current system falls short. What are you doing to improve the Department's ability to locate and help safely return American children who are victims of international parental abduction?

Answer. The Department has designated the Office of Children's Issues (CI) in the Bureau of Consular Affairs as the U.S. Central Authority for the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Hague Abduction Convention) and to work with parents and our posts abroad on cases of international parental abduction to countries that are not Hague partners. CI works to reunite parents with abducted children and has expanded in size as the number of international parental child abductions has grown. In the last year alone, the Department has hired 21 new employees in the Office of Children's Issues to work exclusively on abduction cases, bringing total staff for the issue of abduction to over 70 employees spread among five issue-specific and geographic branches. In addition, the management structure of CI has been expanded and a number of new higher-graded positions have been introduced. The CI Director is a member of the Senior Foreign Service. A Senior Advisor will also be added to provide senior management with analysis and policy recommendations. Additionally, in the fall of 2009, CI added a Diplomatic Security officer to its staff to strengthen its cooperation with law enforcement authorities. These additional resources will enable CI to continue to broaden its prevention-related activities, improve its ability to locate abducted children abroad, ensure consistently high levels of service among case workers, improve training, and carry out more vigorous bilateral and multilateral engagement with countries that are parties to the Hague Abduction Convention, and those that are not.

These bilateral and multilateral efforts are critical to resolving cases of international parental child abduction. As the *Goldman* case with Brazil demonstrated, complying with the Hague Abduction Convention and returning children remains an ongoing challenge for some countries. When countries fail to comply with the Hague

Abduction Convention, the Department, in coordination with other treaty party countries and the Hague Conference on Private International Law, offers technical assistance and guidance. The Department participates in and helps to sponsor judicial seminars on the Convention in party countries across the globe. In the last few years alone, the Department has participated in judicial conferences or training in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Israel, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Spain.

The Department has seen how its diplomatic efforts can produce positive results. As recently as 2007, for example, Germany was one of the most difficult countries from which to recover an abducted child. But active engagement with Germany through quarterly bilateral meetings has resulted in consistent and prompt action by German courts. Germany has returned 17 children to the United States over the past 2 years.

Intensive cooperation with other Convention countries has also been critical to enhancing our ability to stop abductions before they happen. When the Department becomes aware that a parent may be in the process of abducting a child from the United States to another country, it works with U.S. law enforcement to stop the departure from the United States. Once the abductor is on the way to another country, the Department works with officials in other Convention countries to intercept the taking parent, if possible. In 2009, these efforts resulted in the prevention of 147 abductions from the United States to 61 different countries.

The Department is engaged in multilateral efforts to obtain better cooperation from countries that are not parties to the Convention. In Japan, for instance, our ambassador has recently joined his counterparts from Australia, Canada, France, Italy, New Zealand, Spain, and the United Kingdom in a persistent effort both to encourage Japan to recognize foreign custody orders and to adjust its laws so that Japan can join the Hague Abduction Convention. The Department will continue and increase these efforts with Japan and around the world in the coming months.

The Department's abduction staff is expert in the field, speaks 21 different languages, and works closely with embassies and consulates around the world to do everything the Department legally can to assist parents in preventing abduction and recovering their children. CI has developed resources for left-behind parents that are easily accessible, regardless of a parent's immigration status, English-language capability, or financial situation. These include: information on our website at travel.state.gov; a 24-hour toll-free number for parents; lists of attorneys abroad and in the United States; a language line for parents who do not speak English; law enforcement liaison; and victim assistance resources. The CI Staff are available to assist 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, worldwide. An improved website focused on international child abduction and intensified outreach programs in domestic and international fora are contributing to public awareness of both the problem and of resources to combat it.

The Department assisted in the return of 422 children to the United States from other countries during fiscal year 2009. During the same period, 132 children were returned from the United States to their countries of habitual residence. More detailed information about international parental child abduction cases and the Department's work to resolve longstanding cases will appear in the Department's upcoming 2010 Report to Congress on Compliance with the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. Previous reports can be found online at www.travel.state.gov/childabduction.

Question. Eighty-five years ago, Haiti's tropical forest covered 60 percent of the country. Today, that number has fallen to less than 2 percent. As we work to fight global warming, this environmental degradation has serious implications for Haiti and the world. What role will environmental issues such as reforestation play in the long-term recovery plan for Haiti?

Answer. Root causes of environmental disaster in Haiti include acute poverty, rapid population growth and unplanned urbanization. In the short term, it is critical to convert hillsides to tree-based perennial agriculture to improve soil conservation. Lessons learned from decades of reforestation programs demonstrate that, if a tree has value, a farmer is likely to maintain and manage it; if not, it will likely disappear. Therefore, strengthening tree crop value chains is an approach with proven ability to restore degraded landscapes.

USAID/Haiti's Watershed Initiative for National Natural Environmental Resources (WINNER) Project, an agricultural and watershed management program, applies best practices such as this. WINNER is already active in the Cul-de-Sac watershed where Port-au-Prince is located, as well as the Cabaret, Mirebalais, Archaie and Gonaives regions of Haiti. Prior to the January 12, 2010 Haiti earthquake disaster, the United States planned to invest \$126 million in the project over the next 5 years. WINNER is strengthening the value chains for tree crops and focusing on

tree crops with high value (such as mango) as these are effective incentive to hillside farmers to plant and manage perennial crops.

In addition to tree crops, the USG strategy in Haiti also includes plans to promote cleaner and more efficient cooking technologies, such as liquid petroleum gas (LPG), to decrease charcoal consumption and reduce the rate of deforestation and environmental degradation. After completing a rigorous assessment of the potential market for improved cooking technologies, the USG will implement a program that will address market barriers such as high upfront costs or lack of awareness and achieve large-scale reduction of charcoal consumption over a 5-year period. Beneficiaries are likely to include households, food vendors and energy-intensive businesses such as laundries and bakeries.

Finally, a Programmatic Environmental Assessment will be conducted for proposed earthquake reconstruction activities, which will pay close attention to addressing these issues across the mission's portfolio of projects.

Question. I applaud President Obama's immediate rescission of the Mexico City Policy, also known as the Global Gag Rule, upon taking office. What impact did the previous 8 years of this policy have on women's health? What impact does uncertainty surrounding this policy have on organizations' ability to address these critical health challenges?

Answer. During the period in which the Mexico City Policy (MCP) was in place, all family planning funds were successfully programmed with an emphasis on the countries with the greatest need. This included funds that might have otherwise gone to international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that chose not to work with USAID while the policy was in place.

More than 450 foreign NGOs elected to accept assistance subject to the MCP and received USAID funding. USAID programs demonstrated continued success during this period—shown by an increase in modern family planning use among married women from 33 to 39 percent between 2001 and 2008 in 38 countries with USAID-assisted family planning programs which have data over this period. Since the rescission of the MCP, the USG has had the opportunity to reengage with additional experienced and qualified family planning providers working at the grassroots level, furthering our work to meet the growing demand for voluntary, safe family planning and other critical health services. We expect that should this situation change, these organizations would reassess their decision to work with USAID.

Question. Aid programs too frequently focus on one problem and fail to provide the integrated approach necessary for successful development. What is the Administration doing to better integrate U.S. development programs on food security, health, the environment, and family planning?

Answer. USAID has made great strides in establishing mechanisms to ensure that its development activities are undertaken within the framework of a comprehensive and integrated development approach, which employs strategic multi-sector synergies for improving performance and producing greater results. For example, the Agency's new USG Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative (GHFSI) is multi-disciplinary and being developed and undertaken with a cross-cutting sector approach that includes the direct participation of development experts from a wide variety of sectors—including agriculture, environment, nutrition, maternal and child health, education, infrastructure, gender, and family planning and reproductive health. Similarly, one of the principles of President Obama's new Global Health Initiative (GHI) is integration with other sectors to ensure a cross-cutting sector approach that will benefit from the development linkages within USAID and across the USG. In addition, USAID's Global Climate Change Agency Policy Coordinating Committee (APCC) is working closely with the GHFSI APCC, the GHI Interagency Team and the Agency's Extended Water Team to identify integrated approaches to the four programs. Designed to address the unique settings of each development and humanitarian challenge, this comprehensive integrated management structure strengthens USAID's development efforts, and particularly, the Agency's new initiatives both in Washington and the field.

Under the GHI and in the Agency approach generally, USAID is engaging in smart integration to maximize gains from development funds. Using an increasingly integrated and coordinated approach, several principles derived from experience serve as a guide. These principles focus on:

- Country-led coordination and strategic decisionmaking on integration of services is required for the sustainability of development;
- All partners—public and private—are important in maximizing achievement of outcomes in limited resource settings;
- Integration of U.S. programs must be based on specific country circumstances;

- Integration and coordination have a cost—they add a level of complexity and administrative burden to programs that must be weighed against the urgency of rapid results;
- Resources are required to research, monitor and evaluate the expected causal relationship between increased integration and outcomes;
- In order to build country capacity for integration, systems and structures (such as the health system) should be a deliberate focus of U.S. assistance with documentation on the impact on outcomes; and
- Critical assessment of other multilateral and bilateral investments and increased coordination will be essential to the achievement of ultimate success.

Question. I was pleased to see the increase in funding for the Clean Technology Fund and the Strategic Climate Fund. How will these two programs address the national security threats caused by global warming?

Answer. Climate change poses a significant threat to the national security of nations around the globe. Variations in weather patterns caused by rising temperatures threaten to create dangerous changes in the climate system, increasing floods and droughts, altering natural resource availability, and creating conditions likely to cause regional conflict and destabilize security situations throughout the world. Given the urgency of the climate challenge and the threats it poses to national security, it is essential to be able to mobilize and disburse climate assistance quickly and effectively. The CIFs, which were launched just 2 years ago as a partnership of developed and developing countries, are doing just that.

The Clean Technology Fund and the Strategic Climate Fund (together, the Climate Investment Funds or “CIFs”) have become an essential pillar of the international community’s effort to mobilize funding to help developing countries mitigate their greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the effects of climate change. With \$6.3 billion pledged so far, the CIFs constitute the largest multilateral fund dedicated to climate assistance. Funds mobilized under the CIFs are being utilized to help those countries which are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change increase their resilience and capacity to adapt to its effects which will in turn reduce national security concerns caused by effects like changes in natural resource availability. Those funds mobilized to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions are working to directly address climate change by limiting the increase in temperature rise and reducing the source of the problem which poses such extensive national security concerns throughout the world.

Question. As you have stated, the Middle East Peace process has effectively stalled. How do you plan to reestablish the trust of the parties and move the peace process forward?

Answer. We are pursuing a two-pronged approach toward comprehensive peace based on the two-state solution: first, to encourage the parties to enter direct negotiations to reach an agreement on all permanent status issues; and second, to help the Palestinians build their economy and the institutions that will be necessary when a Palestinian state is established. The two objectives are mutually reinforcing. Our goal is to re-launch direct, bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians as soon as possible with a 24-month timeline for their successful conclusion. We expect that all concerned will demonstrate the leadership to make bold commitments and take bold actions to make peace possible.

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Question. According to the Justice Department, Teodoro Nguema Obiang, the forest and agriculture minister of Equatorial Guinea and the son of its president, has accumulated most if not all of his wealth through corruption while the people of Equatorial Guinea live in severe poverty. Nonetheless, Mr. Obiang has been granted multiple visas to enter the United States in violation of U.S. law and reportedly purchased a \$35 million home in Malibu. Why has Mr. Obiang continued to receive visas despite U.S. anti-kleptocracy laws? What are you doing to enforce those laws and commitments?

Answer. The Department of State is committed to combating kleptocracy and corruption internationally and to use Presidential Proclamation 7750 and other provi-

sions to deny entry to corrupt foreign government officials. We are aware of the concerns you raise and of ongoing congressional interest in Mr. Obiang. Under Section 222(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act visa records are considered confidential, and therefore I cannot comment on any individual case. The Department would be happy to share such relevant information in a closed setting.

Combating corruption is a foreign policy priority for the Department. We coordinate and cooperate with other Departments to foster a comprehensive approach including by law enforcement and other agencies. In our overall international anticrime strategy we recognize the central role of corruption, as the “grease” that facilitates virtually all transnational illicit activities, from drug trafficking to terrorist financing. We take the role of Presidential Proclamation 7750, which allows for denial and revocation of corruption foreign government officials and their families, very seriously. However, it is only one part of our Anti-Corruption Policy Framework.

The United States has been a leader on anticorruption issues globally:

- With the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977, the United States was the first country to criminalize foreign bribery.
- In 1999 the USG developed and launched the premier government-to-government event, the Global Forum, the first-ever international conference on corruption and how to combat it.
- The first multilateral enunciation of the No Safe Haven policy for kleptocrats and their ill-gotten assets occurred at Evian in 2003. Each G–8 summit since then has sought to deepen political commitment and foster concrete action. The G–20 has also undertaken similar anticorruption commitments.
- The U.S. International Anti-Kleptocracy Strategy was promulgated in 2006, in part to spur greater interagency cooperation in taking concrete action against kleptocrats and their assets.
- Denial and revocation of the visas of kleptocrats continues to play an important role in both of the preceding initiatives.
- The United States supported the negotiation and implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), which entered into force in December 2005, and was ratified by the Senate in 2006. It now has 143 States Parties.
- The United States supported the UNCAC as the first truly global anticorruption treaty and the most comprehensive anticorruption instrument. It has chapters on criminalization and law enforcement, prevention, recovery of stolen assets, international legal cooperation, and technical assistance. In November 2009, the United States helped lead its Conference of Parties to establish a comprehensive review mechanism, a significant and rare accomplishment for a United Nations instrument.
- Another key treaty is the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. The United States was a leader in the OECD’s push to tackle foreign bribery. The OECD Convention has many similarities with the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and targets the supply side of the corruption equation. The United States is an active participant in the treaty’s peer review process and the Working Group on Bribery.
- The United States also supports and participates in regional treaties or initiatives in the Americas (Inter-American Convention), Western and Eastern Europe (Council of Europe/GRECO), Middle East/North Africa, and the Asia-Pacific region. These are useful to bring together countries to press each other on progress and to share good practices.
- The USG is one of the largest donors of technical assistance in anticorruption and good governance. In fiscal year 2009, the Department of State and USAID provided a total of over \$1 billion in anticorruption and related good governance assistance.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MITCH MCCONNELL

Question. Last September, Secretary Clinton announced the administration’s new strategy of engagement with the Burmese regime. We are now 6 months into the new strategy, what tangible benefits have come about as a result of the new approach? Has the denial of Aung San Suu Kyi’s appeal led to a reevaluation of the engagement policy?

Answer. Last year the Administration launched a review of Burma policy, acknowledging that neither sanctions nor engagement alone had succeeded in influencing Burma’s generals to adopt a course of reform. The conclusions of the policy review reaffirmed our fundamental goals in Burma. We want a democratic, pros-

perous Burma that respects the rights of its people. To achieve that end, the administration decided to engage Burmese authorities in a senior-level dialogue while maintaining the existing sanctions regime and expanding humanitarian assistance.

We understood at the outset that this process would be long and difficult, in particular given the regime's focus on this year's planned elections. We have not yet achieved concrete progress on our core concerns and with respect to the electoral process, the regime has taken a step backwards. However, our new approach has helped advance the interests of the United States, both in Burma and in the wider region. Through our senior-level dialogue, we have been able to get our message in directly to senior leaders in Nay Pyi Taw and we have had been able to meet with imprisoned democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi for the first time in years. The channels of communication we developed through our dialogue were instrumental in securing the release of Kyaw Zaw Lwin (aka Nyi Nyi Aung), a U.S. citizen imprisoned on politically motivated charges. More broadly, our outreach to Burma and our determination not to allow Burma to be an obstacle to a strong U.S.-ASEAN relationship has strengthened the position of the United States in Southeast Asia. We were able to hold the first ever meeting between the United States and ASEAN at the leaders' level and to sign on to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.

We continue to monitor and evaluate events in Burma carefully and have and will continue to adjust our strategy as necessary to advance our policy goals.

Question. What is the Department of State's understanding of Burmese nuclear capabilities and ambitions?

Answer. We closely follow Burma's pursuit of nuclear technology, ostensibly for peaceful scientific applications, as well as reports that Burma is pursuing a clandestine nuclear program.

Burma joined the IAEA in 1957, acceded to the NPT in 1992, and signed a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA in 1995. Burma is also a Party to the 1995 Treaty of Bangkok that established the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. In 1997, Burma established a Department of Atomic Energy and in 1998 passed an Atomic Energy Law. The IAEA provides training to Burmese nuclear researchers through a number of Technical Cooperation projects, most involving nuclear applications in medical research, food, and agriculture.

After several years of bilateral discussions between Burma and Russia, Moscow agreed in 2007 to provide a small pool-type research reactor to Burma, conditioned on the reactor being under IAEA safeguards. While there has been little or no movement on implementing this agreement, Burmese students have been studying nuclear science at several Russian universities and institutes for several years.

It is incumbent on Burma, as a signatory to the NPT and the Bangkok Treaty and as a member of the IAEA, to be transparent in all its nuclear undertakings and live up to its international obligations. In addition, we urge Burma to modify its Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) with the IAEA and implement the IAEA's Additional Protocol.

Question. Please characterize the relationship between North Korea and Burma.

Answer. Burma and North Korea have clearly both been subject to substantial international scrutiny for numerous aspects of their behavior, including disregard for human rights and for international standards on nonproliferation. We are concerned, in particular, about the military relationship between North Korea and Burma. U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874 requires all member states to prohibit the procurement by their nationals, or using their flagged vessels or aircraft, of conventional arms and related materiel, nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related, and other WMD-related items from North Korea. The UNSCRs also prohibit any associated technical, training, advice, services, or assistance. The Burmese government has publicly committed to enforcing UNSCR 1874 fully and transparently, and we have reminded the Burmese of their obligations under both UNSCRs 1718 and 1874. We have encouraged all states, including Burma, to be vigilant and transparent in their dealings with North Korea.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER S. BOND

Question. Does the Administration support any conditionality on FMF assistance for Indonesia?

Answer. Indonesia is the world's third-largest democracy. Over the last decade, it has undergone a democratic transformation to become a stable and peaceful nation. It is committed to democratic reform and has become an ally in promoting democracy and human rights in the region, including through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. As part of its transformation, the Indonesian government has taken significant steps to reform its military, emphasizing respect for human

rights, and generally maintained effective civilian control of the military. Indonesia is also an important partner of the USG on a broad range of issues, including combating terrorism and addressing maritime security threats in the region. The Department supports Indonesia's efforts to address these security-related areas that are of mutual concern to both our countries, including by providing FMF assistance.

Given Indonesia's progress in promoting and protecting human rights and our close collaboration on security issues, we believe FMF assistance to Indonesia is warranted without conditionality.

Question. Can you describe for us the role our International Affairs programs play in helping spur economic growth here at home and creating American jobs? How do these programs help U.S. businesses and entrepreneurs to remain competitive in the global market place?

Answer. The State Department supports the efforts of U.S. companies and farmers to expand their business through exports. As flourishing international trade requires at least two parties, our efforts support U.S. businesses wishing to export and also help our trading partners develop so that those countries will have a healthy demand for those exports. The Department promotes U.S. exports by providing advocacy on behalf of U.S. companies, urging enforcement of intellectual property rights, and helping to develop high-potential overseas markets. State Department officers manage the commercial function at 96 U.S. missions worldwide that have no U.S. Commercial Service presence. State Department officers also provide vital political and economic insight to U.S. companies about foreign countries. U.S. Embassies and Consulates are key advocates for U.S. business overseas. Embassies can offer U.S. exporters critical country-specific insight on markets, assist in commercial and investment disputes, and provide expertise on local judicial systems. Our advocacy efforts are to ensure that exporters of U.S. goods and services get fair and equitable treatment in foreign markets.

On the other side of the trade equation, State and USAID foreign assistance programs help developing country economies grow, resulting in increased demand for U.S. goods and services over time. More directly, some U.S. Trade Capacity Building (TCB) programs help countries streamline customs and other import administration procedures and improve trade-related infrastructure, thereby lowering the cost of U.S. products in those markets and opening up new export and job opportunities for U.S. suppliers. Other TCB programs help countries comply with their trade commitments under bilateral Free Trade Area agreements and the World Trade Organization, such as their commitments to ensure that agriculture and food safety standards are based on sound science.

Question. I note with concern that funding overall for Southeast Asia took a \$22 million cut below the fiscal year 2010 enacted level. Can you provide me with an overview of where some of these cuts were made and why a reduction in overall funding?

Answer. The United States must have strong relationships and a strong and productive presence in Southeast Asia. This region is vital to the future of not only the United States and each of the ASEAN countries, but to the world's common interests: a significant and trade-oriented regional economy; a critical strategic location; and a set of countries that will be key to any solutions we pursue on climate change, counterterrorism, global health, and so much else. Our fiscal year 2011 request for Southeast Asia increased by \$65 million (11.2 percent) over our fiscal year 2010 request. While there are always more assistance needs in the region than we are able to fund, given current budget realities, this increase strongly reflects the importance of Southeast Asia to the Administration. Not all regions in the Department experienced an increase, or even a straight-line; some were reduced from the fiscal year 2010 request level. The Department faces difficult choices in allocating limited foreign assistance funding, and the ability to fund Frontline States necessarily requires trade-offs in funding in other regions, including Southeast Asia.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAM BROWNBACK

Question. The French government has recently announced its plans to sell several Mistral-class helicopter carriers to Russia and a French company is reportedly negotiating to sell tanks as well. A Russian admiral, Vladimir Vysotsky, stated recently that if Russia had had a Mistral ship during the Georgia war in 2008 it could have won the conflict in 40 minutes. Baltic States such as Estonia are furious over the ship sale and it is a direct threat to Georgia and our national interests, as well as our billion dollars in rebuilding assistance. Do you share the concerns raised by our NATO allies? Most importantly, does the sale violate the Wassenaar Arrangement

on Export Controls as well as the European Union Code of Conduct for Arms Exports?

Answer. We understand that reports of this potential sale have raised concerns among some of Russia's neighbors. Inflammatory comments from a senior Russian military officer added to this anxiety. We would urge all parties to focus on efforts to promote stability in the region and avoid actions that could escalate tensions. I made these points when I met with President Sarkozy in January.

Export control decisions in the Wassenaar Arrangement are left to national discretion. The European Union Code of Conduct for Arms Exports, to which the United States is not a party, sets criteria under which EU countries are obligated to assess arms export licenses. Implementation is an internal matter for each EU party.

Question. As of today, Russia is continuing to build military bases and station elite troops in regions of Georgia not under the Georgian government's control. What concerns does the United States have toward the sale of advanced weapons to Russia that could be used in a future conflict against Georgia or a NATO ally?

Answer. The United States supports Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. We are concerned about recent Russian announcements to introduce additional military facilities and troops into the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. We would regard such actions to be in violation of the August and September 2008 ceasefire agreements and the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and host nation consent for the stationing of foreign forces. We support the ongoing Geneva talks, which established the Incident Response and Prevention Mechanisms (IPRMs) to increase communication and transparency among the parties to the conflict and decrease the escalation of tension along the ceasefire lines. We continue to emphasize the importance of restarting the South Ossetian IPRM.

Russia's possible procurement of a French Mistral-class helicopter carrier has raised concerns among some of Russia's neighbors. While we recognize that arms sales are a sovereign decision for individual countries to make in keeping with international law and treaty obligations, we continue to follow these developments closely, and we urge all parties to focus on efforts to promote stability in the region and avoid actions that could escalate tensions. These points have been raised at high-levels with the French government.

Question. A recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee report determined that the United States should move forward and rearm the Georgian government with the weapons it needs to defend its territory. Do you support this step? If not, why? If so, when will the United States begin the sale of arms to an ally that is deploying 1,000 troops to Afghanistan?

Answer. The Administration remains committed to supporting Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Our security assistance and military engagement with Georgia is focused on rebuilding Georgia's defense and security architecture. This approach is consistent with Georgia's objectives in its NATO Annual National Program. It also helps Georgia advance toward NATO membership by supporting Georgian defense modernization and reform and improving Georgia's ability to contribute to international security operations. Our focus in the near term is enhancing self-defense capabilities through an emphasis on doctrine, personnel management, education, and training.

Additionally, the United States is assisting the Georgian Armed Forces by training and equipping four infantry battalions for successive deployment to Afghanistan, around twice a year for 2 years. Georgian forces will sustain this rotation without caveats, and will fight alongside the U.S. Marines as part of NATO's International Security Assistance Force in Regional Command—South, Helmand Province, to conduct distributed operations in a counter-insurgency environment. The first Georgian battalion of approximately 750 troops began training September 1, 2009 and will deploy to Afghanistan in April for six months. Three follow-on battalions will be trained and deployed to Afghanistan in 7-month rotations.

Question. In a letter exchange between Secretary Clinton and Senators Feingold, Brownback, and Durbin, the State Department stated that it had begun mapping the mineral rich zones controlled by armed militias in the Congo. When will this map be made available to the public and/or Members of Congress? The letter also indicated that the State Department is considering additional efforts to address conflict minerals in the Congo. What are these "additional efforts" that the State Department is exploring to address conflict minerals in the Congo?

Answer. The map of mineral-rich zones and armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which was mandated in Public Law 111-84, will be made available to the appropriate congressional committees and the public shortly.

In terms of additional efforts, we plan to strengthen our public diplomacy to draw attention to the conflict minerals challenge; to enhance diplomatic outreach with the DRC, in the region and with countries in the supply chain; to intensify engagement with the private sector to discourage illegal minerals trade; to continue examining and further expand reporting on the link between illegal exploitation of natural resources, corruption, and human rights abuses in the State Department's annual human rights report on the DRC; and to contribute to the work of the United Nations Security Council's Democratic Republic of the Congo Sanctions Committee's Group of Experts (UNSC DRC Group of Experts) on due diligence guidelines for importers, processing industries and consumers of mineral products.

Question. What are the current programs within both the State Department and USAID to improve the livelihood prospects of communities affected by human rights abuses in eastern Congo, particularly victims of sexual and gender based violence?

Answer. USAID social protection programs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) include economic strengthening activities for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence and their families. Economic assistance is also provided to other highly vulnerable women. Current programs include:

- Program for Psychosocial Support and Reintegration of Survivors of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Eastern DRC.*—Implemented by Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI), operating in Ituri District, Orientale Province and Maniema Province, funded at \$4,945,045 (December 15, 2008, to December 14, 2011). COOPI and its local partners are providing medical, psychosocial, socio-economic, and legal support to 24,000 survivors of sexual and gender-based violence. Through this project, 4,000 survivors benefit from income generating activities each year through self-help groups and women's NGOs.

- ESPOIR: Ending Sexual Violence by Promoting Opportunities and Individual Rights.*—Implemented by International Rescue Committee, operating in North and South Kivu Provinces, funded at \$7,000,000 (September 17, 2009, to September 30, 2012). IRC and its local partners are providing medical, psychosocial, socio-economic, and legal support to 14,500 survivors of sexual and gender-based violence. IRC's sub-grant to Women-for-Women International is supporting more than 6,000 women in income-generating activities and vocational training.

- Program for Assistance and Reintegration of Abducted Girls and Boys and Other Gender-based Violence Survivors.*—In partnership with UNICEF (COOPI is the implementing partner), operating in Ituri District, Orientale Province, funded at \$1,511,644 (July 20, 2006, to December 31, 2009). This program assists girls and boys formerly associated with armed groups, many of whom are affected by sexual and gender-based violence, with social and economic reintegration. Community-based reintegration includes returning to school and engaging in income-generating cooperatives for vulnerable children (children who have been separated directly from armed groups, as well as children who encounter challenges in reintegrating with their families, particularly girls and girl mothers).

- USAID Food for Peace programs in the DRC provide livelihood assistance to displaced and other highly vulnerable people in North and South Kivu, areas most affected by insecurity, human rights abuses, and sexual and gender-based violence. Development food aid programs support individuals and small farmers' associations to increase agricultural productivity through training and food-for-work programs.

- USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance programs support livelihood activities for vulnerable individuals in eastern DRC. In fiscal year 2009, USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance provided \$33 million for agriculture and food security, economic recovery and market systems, humanitarian coordination and information management, health, logistics and relief commodities, nutrition, protection, shelter and settlements, and water and sanitation programs.

- The Department of State Office of Population, Refugees, and Migration provided more than \$45 million in fiscal year 2009 for humanitarian programs for refugees and internally displaced persons from and in DRC. Funding includes programs for agriculture and food security, education, emergency food assistance, health, protection for refugees and internally displaced persons, livelihoods, psychosocial services, refugee integration, sexual and gender-based violence protection and response, shelter, and water and sanitation programs.

Question. What resources, including personnel, are dedicated both within the State Department and USAID to the issue of conflict minerals in the Congo?

Answer. The United States dedicates significant financial and personnel resources to address illicit mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We have supported incorporation of the mining issue into the mandates of both the U.N. Mission

in the Congo (MONUC) and the U.N. Group of Experts on the DRC. Through USAID, we support livelihoods programs for Congolese artisanal miners who are the great majority of miners nationwide. Through the U.S. Department of Labor, we fund programs to remove child laborers from the mines and enroll them in school. Embassy Kinshasa is working with the DRC Ministry of Mines to support the implementation of the country's 2002 Mining Code, and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is training Congolese border and customs police in interdiction techniques.

Question. Please explain the decrease in the State Department's budget request for peacekeeping operations in Sudan, an account that among other things is used to professionalize the SPLM and provide communications and other equipment for the military.

Answer. The State Department's \$42 million budget request for non-assessed peacekeeping operations in Sudan is the same in fiscal year 2011 as it was in fiscal year 2010. Congress appropriated \$44 million, \$2 million more than the Administration's request, for voluntary peacekeeping operations in Sudan in fiscal year 2010. At this time, the request of \$42 million will be sufficient to advance the Department's fiscal year 2011 programs for supporting the Government of Southern Sudan's (GoSS) goals and objectives to transform its military, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), into a professional military body.

Question. Can the United States include radar for the SPLM capable of detecting aerial attack within its peacekeeping operations budget request or as part of another State Department funding vehicle?

Answer. Section 7070(f)(5) of the fiscal year 2010 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act authorizes the provision of "non-lethal military assistance, military education and training, and defense services controlled under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations" to the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), provided that the Secretary of State provides Congress 15-days advance notice of her determination that the provision of such items is in the U.S. national interest. Deputy Secretary Steinberg made this determination on February 3, 2010, with respect to fiscal year 2010 funds. As a general matter, a radar system would be considered non-lethal assistance, although the exact configuration of radar and its integration into a weapons system could change this conclusion.

Currently, the priority use of peacekeeping operations (PKO) funds supporting the development of the SPLA is as outlined in the fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 congressional budget justifications—namely the transformation of the SPLA into a professional military—and does not include providing a radar system to the SPLA.

Question. What resources, including personnel, is the State Department employing to monitor and report on human rights conditions throughout Sudan?

Answer. The human rights situation in Sudan is poor, and human rights abuses continue to be wide-ranging. The Obama Administration is committed to improving the situation.

The State Department monitors human rights abuses through a collaborative process that involves personnel both in the field, including at Embassy Khartoum and Consulate Juba, and in the United States. Our staff has regular contact with human rights activists, victims of abuse, and non-governmental organizations in Sudan. Special Envoy Gration also travels extensively in Sudan, and he regularly raises human rights issues with his high-level counterparts in Khartoum and in Southern Sudan. Finally, United States Government (USG) personnel based in Washington, DC, meet regularly with a variety of Sudanese diaspora, civil society, and advocacy groups to discuss human rights issues. We place a high value on these discussions, and we work to ensure that we follow-up on the information and concerns presented to us by these constituencies.

The USG, through the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, issues Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and the International Religious Freedom Report. The Department's Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons issues the annual Trafficking in Persons Report. Taken together, these reports provide detailed information on human rights issues in Sudan. The State Department also continuously collaborates with the United Nations on its efforts to monitor the human rights situation. We have successfully worked to ensure that the U.N. Human Rights Council maintains a reporting and monitoring mechanism focused on Sudan, through the establishment of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Sudan. We also continue to closely follow the work of the U.N. Panel of Experts on Sudan.

Question. As we've seen in Darfur, many non-Arab Sudanese Muslims have longstanding grievances against the central government in Khartoum that can lead to

conflict. What is the State Department doing to help prevent new crises among marginalized peoples and regions in Sudan?

Answer. The United States government (USG) has a long standing commitment to the people of Sudan. The central Sudanese government in Khartoum has marginalized many groups of non-Arab Muslims throughout various regions within Sudan, and we have long been greatly concerned about the marginalization of these populations. We continue to pursue policies and implement programs that will help to mitigate the effects of marginalization by the government and promote peacebuilding and conflict resolution within marginalized communities. Additionally, the USG continues to work tirelessly to achieve the goals of the Sudan Strategy, including full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the North-South civil war and a definitive end to violence, gross human rights abuses, and genocide in the Darfur region.

Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, the people of Sudan have made progress in developing a stable political environment where residents can work and live without the overt threat of violence. However, parts of Darfur, Southern Sudan, the Three Areas and Eastern Sudan remain volatile and are flashpoints for destabilization. The U.S. Government is working with international partners to support Sudanese communities to prevent or moderate conflict in these flashpoints so that problems do not escalate and interfere with Sudan's higher political processes. The State Department and USAID will implement complementary programs. USAID efforts focus primarily on supporting state and local governments, organizations, and communities to manage conflict, to provide economic alternatives to raiding and banditry, and to implement reconciliation processes important to a sustainable peace in Sudan. State Department activities focus primarily on building state and local capacity to stabilize the security and political situation.

Question. Revenue-sharing from the oil sector is a key element of the CPA. What is the State Department doing to ensure Khartoum lives up to its promises to share oil revenues with the South?

Answer. Over the course of 2009, the United States Government (USG) brought together the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) to address outstanding Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) implementation issues, including issues related to the sharing of oil revenues. Due to this U.S.-led Trilateral initiative, the two parties signed 10 Points of Agreement in August 2009, one of which was devoted to wealth-sharing and oil revenue. Following this agreement, the Government of National Unity (GoNU) returned approximately \$52 million to the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), a sum that was incorrectly deducted from monthly oil revenue transfers to finance election activities. While in the past, GoNU payments to the GoSS had been late or partial, as of December 2009, the parties broadly agreed that the GoNU shall transfer the full oil revenue amount allotted to the GoSS. As a result, all agreed-upon arrears have been paid to the GoSS by the GoNU.

During the Trilateral Process, the two parties also agreed to an independent audit of the oil sector, to determine whether the payments made to the GoSS represented the full amount due under the CPA. While progress has been slow in obtaining approval from relevant government bodies for the audit to move forward, it is hoped that the audit can proceed after the formation of new national and regional governments in the wake of April's elections.

Question. What is the State Department doing to persuade Khartoum's economic partners, particularly those with major investments in the oil sector such as China, India, and Malaysia, to use their influence to encourage Khartoum to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) fully and to avoid the resumption of a destructive, and economically disruptive, North-South civil war?

Answer. A key part of the U.S. Sudan strategy is reinvigorating and strengthening international attention to outstanding Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) implementation issues. The United States Government (USG) continues to work with all international stakeholders to bring attention to remaining CPA issues such as demarcation of the North/South border and appointment of commissions for the Southern Sudan and Abyei referenda. Central to this is the promotion of sustainable economic development and stability in both Northern and Southern Sudan. This is an area in which China, other major investors in Sudan, and the United States have the same objectives. We continue to urge all countries, especially those with key interests in the oil sector, to advocate for continued attention to this matter as a central part of CPA implementation. U.S. officials discuss these issues regularly with their foreign counterparts. Additionally, we are engaging with all international stakeholders to coordinate international support for negotiations on post-referendum

arrangements, an important component of which will be oil sector development and continued North/South oil revenue sharing.

Question. The State Department's Office of International Religious Freedom has been without an Ambassador for International Religious Freedom for over a year. Given both President Obama's remarks in Turkey and Egypt and Secretary Clinton's remarks in Qatar regarding the importance of addressing religious freedom, when can we expect someone to be nominated for this post?

Answer. A candidate for the position of Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom has been identified and is in the vetting process. We look forward to the announcement from the White House.

International Religious Freedom remains a top focus for both the President and the Secretary of State. The Office of International Religious Freedom continues to pursue a robust agenda of monitoring and promoting religious freedom under the leadership of a Senior Foreign Service Officer. Religious Freedom issues are regularly raised by the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Michael Posner, as well as other State Department principals.

Question. There continues to be severe and ongoing religious freedom violations in Vietnam, including the active suppression of independent religious activity and the detention and arrest of members of particular religious organizations for their religious freedom advocacy. As the State Department makes Country of Particular Concern (CPC) designations under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) this year, what criteria, specific to Vietnam, will be used to determine whether Vietnam will be re-designated a CPC?

Answer. The State Department applies the statutory standard found in IRFA Sec. (3)(11) to determine whether a country should be designated a CPC, and will consider CPC designations, as warranted, for all countries found to be, in the words of the Act, committing "systematic, ongoing, egregious violations" of religious freedom.

We are concerned about a number of religious freedom violations in Vietnam, including treatment during the past year of Buddhist monks and nuns of the Plum Village Order who were evicted from two pagodas, as well as the use of force against Roman Catholics in property restitution disputes. We are also watching closely whether the Government of Vietnam will fulfill its commitment to register more religious congregations.

After being designated a CPC in 2004, Vietnam addressed its most serious violations (religious prisoners, church closings, forced renunciations, and the lack of a transparent registration system) and instituted policies and practices to protect religious freedom. The State Department removed Vietnam from the list in 2006 because it no longer fit the criteria of a CPC under the IRFA. Each year, we carefully monitor the status of religious freedom in Vietnam and reevaluate whether it merits designation as a CPC. We will report on further developments in Vietnam in our next International Religious Freedom Report, due in September.

Question. Secretary of State Clinton has publicly spoken about the importance of freedom of worship. Is the Administration prioritizing the freedom of worship as a matter of diplomacy and if so, in what way? Does the Administration see any distinction between freedom of religion, as defined by international standards such as the ICCPR, and freedom to practice or worship?

Answer. International religious freedom remains a central component to our promotion of human rights around the world. Promoting all aspects of freedom of religious belief and expression remains a high priority in our diplomatic efforts, as reflected in President Obama's Cairo speech in June, where he emphasized that "freedom of religion is central to the ability of peoples to live together." In meetings with government leaders around the world, State Department officials consistently raise concerns regarding violations of religious freedom, and the annual International Religious Freedom Report is an important tool in that effort.

As a matter of international human rights law, there is a difference between the terms "freedom of religion" and "freedom of worship," and one encompasses the other. Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights describes the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion as including freedom to manifest one's religion or belief "in worship, observance, practice and teaching." Freedom of worship is a component of the broader freedom of religion. As an informal matter, the terms "freedom of religion" and "freedom of worship" have often been used interchangeably through U.S. history, including in this Administration.

Question. International NGOs continue to report on periodic violent attacks against Burmese Rohingya refugees in Thailand and Bangladesh. What resources are the State Department and USAID employing to offer assistance to the Rohingya refugees? How is the State Department engaging the governments of Thailand and Bangladesh regarding the protection of Rohingya refugees?

Answer. We are closely following the situation of Burmese Rohingya refugees and asylum seekers in Bangladesh, Thailand and elsewhere in the region. The State Department and USAID are very concerned by credible reports of a growing humanitarian crisis among the unregistered Rohingya population residing outside of Kutupalong refugee camp in Bangladesh and the increased numbers of arrests and push-backs to Burma at the border. We are urging the Royal Thai Government to provide assistance to Rohingya "boat people" distressed at sea who are encountered in international waters near Thailand or within Thai waters, in accordance with international maritime law and practice.

In fiscal year 2009, the State Department provided more than \$2 million in funding to several international humanitarian organizations to provide assistance and protection activities to both the registered and unregistered Rohingya populations in Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia and elsewhere in the region. These organizations include ActionAid, Handicap International, Action Contre La Faim and the International Organization for Migration. Humanitarian assistance includes the provision of healthcare, water and sanitation, education, vocational skills training, conflict resolution, community mobilization, mental health and psychosocial support, gender-based violence prevention and response, and access to essential services for Persons with Disabilities. USAID implements development programs in Southeast Bangladesh on sectors that include population, health, energy, natural resource management, and democracy and governance. PACOM is constructing seven multi-purpose cyclone shelters and schools. Given the sizeable Rohingya population in Southeast Bangladesh, these programs also indirectly benefit the unregistered Rohingya.

We are urging the Government of Bangladesh (GOB) to allow UNHCR to properly document the unregistered Rohingya population to ensure its protection. We also urge the GOB to respect the principle of non-refoulement, to investigate allegations of abuse, and take actions as necessary. UNHCR has also gained agreement with the Government of Burma to expand operational space in Northern Rakhine State. Third-country resettlement remains an important strategic durable solution for some Rohingya refugees in the region. The eventual voluntary repatriation of refugees from Burma in safety and dignity and when conditions allow is also another solution. Both the registered and unregistered Rohingya, recognized as Persons of Concern by UNHCR, need freedom of movement and access to opportunities for work, which would enable them to become self-reliant and improve their chances for voluntary repatriation.

The issue of the Rohingya is complex with a strong international dimension that requires a concerted effort by affected countries in the region. Thailand and Bangladesh have an important role to play in the Bali Process, where the Rohingya situation is being addressed regionally, to help combat people smuggling, trafficking in persons, and related transnational crimes in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. The State Department continues to urge UNHCR to work in close coordination with IOM through the Bali Process in developing a coordinated regional response and comprehensive plan of action with affected countries to address the plight of the Rohingya.

Question. How is the State Department engaging Japan in diplomatic discussions regarding International Child Parental Abduction (IPCA) issues? At what level are these discussions occurring? What has been the outcome of these discussions thus far?

Answer. For several years, IPCA has been a high priority as the number of children abducted to Japan has steadily increased. Japan has consistently opposed signing the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. This places United States left-behind parents of abducted children to Japan at a great disadvantage given Japan's family law system and traditions.

The Embassy and the Bureaus of Consular Affairs and East Asian and Pacific Affairs continue to raise this issue during meetings with Japanese officials at all levels. Japanese officials have consistently stated that:

—The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice are studying the Hague Convention.

—Japanese family law is not consistent with the Hague Convention.

—The Diet would have to pass the required legislation to change domestic law.

However, as Japanese officials have recently begun to take IPCA more seriously, we have been more actively engaged on a number of fronts. On October 16, 2009, U.S. Ambassador to Japan Roos, and the Ambassadors of Canada, France, Italy, New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the deputy head of mission of Australia, demarched the new Minister of Justice about IPCA. They urged Japan to accede to the Hague Convention and take measures to improve access for parents separated from their children. A joint press statement was issued by the eight embas-

sies following the meeting. On January 22, 2010, American Citizen Services Chief William Christopher and staff from the Office of Children's Issues met with officials from Ministry of Justice to discuss Japan's legal statutes as they relate to IPCA, in particular the legal definition of domestic violence, how courts determine custody in divorce cases, and mechanisms used to enforce court orders.

On January 30, 2010, Ambassador Roos, accompanied by the same six ambassadors and one deputy head of mission from other embassies in Japan, demarched Minister of Foreign Affairs Katsuya Okada about IPCA. The Ambassadors urged Japan to accede to the Hague Convention and to take measures to improve access for parents separated from their children. Minister Okada expressed appreciation for the meeting and stated that the new government must decide how to deal with IPCA. There was good media coverage of the meeting and the statement in both Japan and overseas.

The third annual symposium on IPCA was held from March 17–18 in Tokyo. The symposium brought together key stakeholders and professional counterparts from the co-hosting nations in an expert level forum. The event was in response to Japanese Justice Minister Keiko Chiba's October 2009 expression of interest in learning about the experiences of Hague signatory nations.

Our joint efforts have encouraged Japanese officials to more seriously consider the issue of child abduction and look for ways to address both accession to the Hague Convention and resolution of current cases. We are encouraged by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' decision to establish the Division for Issues Related to Child Custody, and we expect this to be an avenue for discussion of individual cases.

Question. The budget request to combat Trafficking in Persons seems inadequate. If the State Department and USAID were to have more resources devoted to combating trafficking, how would they be used?

Answer. The Department of State (DOS) uses foreign assistance funds to stimulate governments to take action to combat trafficking in persons (TIP) through criminal justice sector improvements, trafficking prevention programs, and support for protection and assistance services to victims. Funds for these anti-trafficking programs are critical to fulfilling the mandate of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000 and our bipartisan policy priorities.

Since 2006, the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (G/TIP) which manages a portion of the State Department's anti-TIP funds has funded a mere fraction of the requests received, which is approximately \$21 million of the over \$288 million requested. G/TIP has seen a 325 percent increase in requested funds for anti-trafficking projects in a 4 year period from \$45 million in fiscal year 2006 to over \$288 million in fiscal year 2010. G/TIP's most recent solicitation resulted in 531 Statements of Interest for fiscal year 2010 funding, which is a significant increase from the previous year's 372 proposals.

If an increase in funding to combat TIP were appropriated, DOS and USAID would look to:

- Fund a greater percentage of the proposals received for international anti-TIP projects;
- Increase the number of innovative TIP prevention programs, including TIP-specific development projects;
- Increase the number of TIP research projects to promote greater understanding of the scope of the problem and increase efficacy of USG anti-TIP resources;
- Create dedicated training and technical assistance program to include recruitment and deployment of experienced counter-trafficking professionals in areas of victim assistance and protection, rule of law, and investigation and prosecution.

Question. How is the Senior Policy Operating Group, which the State Department chairs, ensuring the coordination of anti-trafficking funding across the State Department and United States government per the mandate established in the TVPRA?

Answer. The Senior Policy Operating Group (SPOG) coordinates programs and policies at several levels:

- Quarterly SPOG meetings.*—G/TIP chairs quarterly, interagency meetings involving every USG agency involved in anti-trafficking programs—DOS, DOL, DOJ, DHS, and others. The quarterly meetings provide a forum for agencies to coordinate anti-trafficking policies and programs.
- SPOG Committee meetings.*—The SPOG created working-level committees to further its work, one of which is focused on grant-making.
- SPOG Programs Review Process.*—Before issuing anti-trafficking grants or contract funds, all USG agencies submit their proposed anti-trafficking actions for review by the other key SPOG members. Anti-trafficking program proposals are subject to a 7-day comment period, during which SPOG member agencies provide comments on whether the project will duplicate other USG activities,

whether the project presents opportunities for cooperation with other USG activities, and whether the project is consistent with USG anti-trafficking policy.—*Fiscal Year Chart on USG Spending.*—At the end of each fiscal year, SPOG staff gathers and organizes data on USG funds obligated in that fiscal year for TIP projects.

Question. India has arguably the world's largest Trafficking in Persons population, with its millions of bonded laborers. Given the importance of our bilateral relationship, is the State Department ensuring that combating trafficking in persons is conveyed as a strategic priority for the United States throughout all diplomatic discussions with the Government of India?

Answer. The Department places great importance on the need to build a stronger partnership with the Government of India on addressing shared human trafficking concerns. We encourage the Indian government to research the phenomena of sex trafficking and bonded labor within India. Over the last year, Secretary Clinton and other senior officials have raised the issue of human trafficking with the Indian government and the Department continues to convey the priority the Obama Administration places on this human rights issue. We believe the Government of India is committed to combating human trafficking and in achieving faster progress against this global problem.

Question. How is the State Department leveraging U.S. trade to further encourage other nations to actively combat trafficking in persons?

Answer. The State Department is committed to expanding trade and market opportunities in developing countries to help create an environment not conducive to trafficking. Economic pressures make more people susceptible to the false promises of traffickers. Embassy employees worldwide provide country-specific data for the annual Trafficking in Persons report, as well as the Department of Labor's Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) list of products made by forced labor and child labor in violation of international standards. Products on the TVPRA list are not permitted to be imported into the United States.

Question. As Haiti has shown us all too clearly, disasters in general (and Haiti in particular) often necessitate expertise and resources specific to combating trafficking in persons in our protection response. What can the State Department learn from Haiti and how can the U.S. government best ensure preplanning is done such that the United States is ready to meet that need when the next disaster strikes?

Answer. As past natural disasters have proved, commandeering the appropriate response on a wide-range of issues takes absolute coordination, communication, resources, and resolve.

Specifically to trafficking in persons, the Department was actively involved in anti-trafficking efforts prior to the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons funded efforts in fiscal year 2008 by its non-government partners to: increase public awareness; create a whole of community efforts with targeted interventions, economic opportunity, and psychological support; and address the "restavek" issue in country.

We were able to translate our pre-existing efforts into response in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. The Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons was involved with the Child Protection Subcluster and it participated in a host of task forces and working groups to ensure a whole of government response that was both coordinated and concerted against trafficking.

One of the challenges we face in combating human trafficking in post-natural disaster areas is the fact that many of these nations already are facing an uphill battle against modern slavery before the whole new set of post-disaster challenges emerge. We can learn from every experience in disaster response. Perhaps the greatest lesson in post-earthquake Haiti is recognizing that trafficking in persons must be interwoven in the disaster-response in the immediate, interim, and long-term plans. From the beginning, the United States Government must train itself to translate human trafficking and be mindful of the cultural contexts that increase vulnerability to TIP as a subset of the protection pillar of disaster response, whether it is child protection, protection against gender-based violence, or overall security issues. It cannot come days later, or after a news story breaks, but should be in pre-planning efforts across the board.

Fortunately, we were aware of the increased likelihood of human trafficking in the days following the Haiti earthquake and worked around the clock to make sure we could supplement and strengthen our efforts. However, it is vital to ensure that the first boots on the ground are fully aware of the warning signs and the trends of human trafficking and are readily equipped to properly address this issue.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GEORGE V. VOINOVICH

Question. I am concerned about—and would appreciate your thoughts on—the pace of constitutional reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I am particularly worried that the Presidential/Parliamentary campaign rhetoric in Bosnia this Fall will “poison the well” for the extension of NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Bosnia. I know you agree that we must continue to push Bosnia towards NATO and the EU, and not allow it to become an economic and political black-hole in Europe. I’m heartened that, in the Republik of Srpska, Prime Minister Dodik has stated his support for Bosnia’s membership in NATO despite great public opposition within his entity.

What is your view on the possible extension of MAP—or a declaration by NATO of an intention to grant MAP—to Bosnia before the Fall elections? Senator Shaheen and I met with the leaders and foreign ministers of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia during our visit to the region last week, who all believed that such a step would be a positive signal to Bosnia’s leaders that NATO is serious about Bosnia’s future.

Answer. The United States continues to support Bosnia and Herzegovina’s aspirations for NATO and EU membership and we are working in Sarajevo and Brussels to encourage Bosnia along its Euro-Atlantic integration path.

At the December 2009 NATO Foreign Ministerial, Allies noted that Bosnia and Herzegovina has made substantial progress in cooperation with NATO and urged its leaders to work together to pursue national integration and improve the efficiency and self-reliance of state-level institutions. Allies expressed support for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s participation in MAP once it achieves the necessary progress in its reform efforts, and pledged to keep its progress under active review.

In order to successfully participate in MAP, a country needs to have the institutional structures in place to make timely decisions and implement difficult reforms. We have made clear to the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina that they must demonstrate concrete evidence of a sufficient capacity for political decisionmaking and a level of government functionality to meet the commitments under MAP.

The next opportunity to assess Bosnia and Herzegovina’s preparedness for MAP will come at the meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Tallinn on April 22. We will continue to encourage Bosnia’s leaders to intensify their reform efforts and to demonstrate their commitment to advancing their aspirations.

Question. The Iranian regime remains the single greatest threat to the peace and security of the Middle East. The neighboring nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which include the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait, are valuable allies for the United States and have forged an important strategic partnership with us. The GCC represents an important bulwark against Iranian aggression.

What other forms of cooperation can the United States pursue with the GCC to further strengthen our partnership and to enhance the regional security?

Answer. The United States is actively working to strengthen our partnership with the GCC states via significant engagement on regional security, non-proliferation, alternative energy development (including nuclear energy and renewables), and support for economic diversification.

On the political front, we consult with our Gulf partners to coordinate efforts to manage regional political, diplomatic, and security challenges, including threats posed by Iran. With respect to Iran, these consultations have resulted in Gulf country support for five U.N. Security Resolutions on Iran, increased vigilance and action against Iranian efforts to evade sanctions, active participation in a GCC-plus-3 forum (with Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq), and increased U.S. security and military cooperation throughout the Gulf.

Our political dialogue is complemented by a robust security relationship among the U.S. and Gulf States. Using multilateral exercises, training, and Foreign Military and Direct Commercial Sales, the United States strengthens the GCC nations’ capacity to defend against regional threats, thereby limiting their vulnerability to Iranian pressure.

Similarly, we cooperate with Gulf States on counterproliferation issues. This growing cooperation is best exemplified by our cooperation with the UAE. In 2006, we initiated a senior-level bilateral counterproliferation dialogue (Counterproliferation Task Force or “CTF”). The CTF meets annually in addition to supporting working groups that meet throughout the year. Since 2006, we have seen the UAE make significant progress on counterproliferation issues by actively enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolutions related to Iran and North Korea, participating in the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, passing and implementing an export control law, and preventing trans-

shipments of sensitive items from going to countries of proliferation concern such as Iran.

Moreover, the United States is taking active steps, along with our Gulf allies, to provide a counterweight to Iran's energy strategy. We have encouraged our regional partners to help us reduce international reliance on Iranian natural resources as a way to sharpen the choice for Iran—opt to comply with nuclear obligations or face further isolation. On civil nuclear energy issues, we concluded a landmark 123 Agreement on civilian nuclear energy with the UAE in 2009 which includes the highest nonproliferation standards and a commitment by the UAE to forgo enrichment and reprocessing on its soil. This civil nuclear energy agreement represents a powerful countermodel to Iran in demonstrating how a country can pursue civil nuclear energy and still meet its international obligations.

We are also actively engaged in building commercial ties with the GCC nations. Using tools such as our Free Trade Agreements with Bahrain and Oman, proactive commercial advocacy and technical assistance on commercial law development, the United States is encouraging expanded American commercial ties in the region. Not only does this expand U.S. business opportunities, but it also supports Gulf States' efforts to diversify their economies.

Question. The Conference Agreement for the fiscal year 2010 Departments of Transportation and Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act includes specific language stating that "The Conferees support the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)'s initiatives to combat anti-Semitism in Europe and Eurasia and expect the Coordinator for United States Assistance for Europe and Eurasia to provide adequate funding to ensure continued leadership within the OSCE."

Madam Secretary, can you provide me in writing with specific details of your team's fiscal year 2010 work toward compliance with the expectations of the House and Senate conferees concerning U.S. financial support for OSCE efforts to combat anti-Semitism in Europe and Eurasia—including support for OSCE extra-budgetary programming efforts?

Answer. The OSCE is committed to combating all forms of racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and discrimination in the 56 participating States (pS). The United States supports efforts to ensure that OSCE commitments in the fields of tolerance and non-discrimination and freedom of religion or belief are implemented effectively. We believe the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) projects should focus on those countries where the gap between commitments and practices is the greatest. The United States has successfully insisted that ODIHR treat freedom of religion as a fundamental freedom as well as an issue of promoting mutual respect (as demonstrated during the Supplemental Human Dimension Meeting on Freedom of Religion in July 2009). We have successfully lobbied Chairs-in-Office to appoint or re-confirm the three special representatives on anti-Semitism, anti-Muslim discrimination, and discrimination against people of other religions including Christianity, who track government activity to promote respect for religious differences and ensure the rights of people of all faiths in the OSCE region.

The fiscal year 2010 appropriation levels approved by Congress will enable the State Department will meet all U.S. financial obligations to the OSCE and will also provide voluntary contributions for elections support, U.S. personnel on secondment to the OSCE, and extra-budgetary projects. OSCE funding comes from a combination of the Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA), and Diplomatic and Consular Affairs Program (D&CP) accounts. We expect to provide significant financial and extra-budgetary contributions to the OSCE in support of the efforts of ODIHR and the OSCE Personal Representatives on tolerance to combat anti-Semitism throughout Europe and Eurasia. We continue to encourage the OSCE and the ODIHR to attach a high priority to combating anti-Semitism and we will continue to support the organization's pioneering efforts in this area. We look forward to sending a delegation to a planned OSCE high-level conference on mutual respect and non-discrimination issues this summer and to engaging on a robust agenda there.

Question. I would also appreciate from your team during the next 30 days a written strategic plan outlining the Department of State's policy initiatives to combat anti-Semitism, including milestones, metrics, and expected future financial resource requirements from Congress.

Answer. To effectively combat anti-Semitism, we are building strong channels of communication and collaborating with nongovernmental organizations. This includes greater engagement in interfaith efforts, active outreach among Muslim leaders, as well as reaching out to other groups that experience discrimination.

The President has appointed Hannah Rosenthal as the new Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism. Special Envoy Rosenthal joined the Depart-

ment of State in late November. Since that time she has traveled extensively both overseas and in the United States to advance her mandate.

One of Special Envoy Rosenthal's goals is to work more closely with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Enclosed please find her strategic outline to elevate and increase the visibility of the work that the OSCE does to combat anti-Semitism.

On January 27, Special Envoy Rosenthal was part of the President's delegation to the 65th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz commemoration in Poland. Prior to the actual ceremony at Auschwitz-Birkenau, she met with the Education Ministers from 29 countries to learn more about their Holocaust and anti-discrimination education. All 29 countries reported that they are implementing curriculum and activities to educate about the Holocaust and to confront intolerance. However, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) was not present at this gathering and none of the countries in attendance mentioned use of the ODIHR curriculum or expertise. Immediately after the ceremony, Special Envoy Rosenthal stayed on in Poland for several more days to better understand this situation. She went to Warsaw and had an excellent meeting with the staff at ODIHR, where she learned that ODIHR representatives had tried unsuccessfully to get invited to that Education Ministers' meeting. She discussed how we can ensure that does not happen again, how to increase ODIHR's visibility, and how best to get ODIHR the credit that is its due.

ODIHR has virtually no funds for public relations and clearly needs people with higher visibility to talk about its mission, expertise, and accomplishments. To assist with this challenge, Special Envoy Rosenthal planned three major actions upon her return to Washington from Poland: a trip to Lithuania in April to discuss with the U.S. Embassy in Vilnius a proposal to develop a "training the trainers" approach to tolerance education; clearance for all her speeches in the United States and abroad to highlight the work of OSCE-ODIHR; and a new initiative to be rolled out at the OSCE high-level conference on tolerance and non-discrimination in Astana, Kazakhstan June 29-30. These are included in the attached outline.

The outline was created after Special Envoy Rosenthal consulted with Rabbi Andrew Baker; ODIHR; Human Rights First; the Interparliamentary Coalition to Combat Anti-Semitism; the Co-Existence Trust of England; and several human rights NGOs in Poland, the United Kingdom, and domestically.

Increasing the Visibility of the OSCE

Hannah Rosenthal Speech Highlights

Meetings with over 10 NGOs in Warsaw January 28-29, 2010.
 Jewish Council for Public Affairs annual conference February 22, 2010.
 Community Security Trust in London March 8, 2010.
 Yale Institute of Research on Anti-Semitism April 12, 2010.
 Testimony HFAC April 14, 2010.
 University, Kaunas, Lithuania April 27, 2010.
 ADL Leadership Conference May 3, 2010.
 Graduation speech Madison, Wisconsin May 15, 2010.
 Maryland Jewish Council May 27, 2010.
 Canadian Interparliamentary Council to Combat Anti-Semitism November 2010.

Partnerships—promote to their members and activities, cover on websites

Jewish Council for Public Affairs.
 American Jewish Committee.
 B'nai Brith.
 Anti-Defamation League.
 Human Rights First.
 Joint Distribution Committee.
 Simon Wiesenthal Center.

Reiterate recommendations to governments

Acknowledge and condemn anti-Semitism and hate crimes.
 Enact laws that address hate crimes.
 Strengthen enforcement and prosecute offenders.
 Train law enforcement.
 Undertake interagency, parliamentary and other special inquiries.
 Monitor and report on hate crimes, and ensure delineation for anti-Semitism.
 Strengthen anti-discrimination and human rights bodies.
 Reach out to NGOs.
 Speak out against official intolerance and bigotry.
 Encourage international cooperation and joint statements.

OSCE to publicize

Help countries to meet obligation to collect and report hate crimes data to ODIHR.

Make more visible three personal representatives.

Expand administrative resources to support three representatives and provide public affairs capacity.

Support ODIHR's Tolerance and Non-Discrimination unit

—Ensure law enforcement program participation;

—ODIHR convene national points of contact and NGOs to build trust and cooperation between law enforcement agencies, civil society groups, and victims;

—Distribute materials and reports widely; and

—build funding through regular OSCE budget and extrabudgetary contributions.

High-level conference on Tolerance and Non-Discrimination—June 2010.

Develop a “side event” at the OSCE high-level conference in Kazakhstan June 29–30 to roll-out the “ART Initiative: Acceptance, Respect and Tolerance.” SEAS and USOSCE will bring 8–10 NGOs that work with governments to move beyond tolerance and advance acceptance and respect. Highlight their “best practices” with easy-to-share demonstration models. The proceedings will be both videotaped and transcribed for official documents and websites for broad dissemination at conferences, country visits, State Department website, OSCE website, partners’ websites, etc.

US Government and leadership

ART promotion.

Bilateral discussions.

Funding and TA expertise.

Human Rights Report and International Religious Freedom Report annually.

Clearly state our freedom of expression issues.

Clearly state our definition of anti-Semitism (and where it is part of anti-Israel rhetoric and activities).

Award/Recognition program

Develop an annual nomination and selection process for high visibility recognition to individual and organizational work to advance ART (acceptance, respect and tolerance).

Question. Secretary Clinton, I understand that the Department of State recently entered into a contract with a new provider of crystal stemware to be used at all American embassies.

Could you please explain the circumstances surrounding this award and the process by which the new vendor was selected?

Answer. The Department of State had a new departmental requirement for lead-free crystal ware design, production, inventory management and fulfillment services for U.S. embassies. Department officials met with SDI, a company that had earlier been introduced to the Department of State by the Small Business Administration (SBA), to discuss the company's capabilities in fulfilling the contract requirements.

In accordance with complying with FAR 6.302–5, “Other Than Full and Open Competition, Authorized or Required by Statute,” the Contracting Officer sent an offer letter to SBA to negotiate and award a contract under the 8(a) program with SDI, an 8(a) program participant. SBA accepted the requirement into the 8(a) program and authorized DOS to negotiate a contract with SDI on May 18, 2008. A solicitation was released to the firm who then submitted a proposal.

SDI subsequently informed the Department that they could not find a U.S. manufacturer of lead-free crystal, and planned instead to subcontract manufacturing to Orrefors/Kosta Boda, USA located in New Jersey. Market research conducted by the Department indicated there was no company that manufactured lead-free table top crystal ware in the United States. The Department evaluated SDI's proposal, determined it to be technically acceptable and that the price was fair and reasonable. An award for a base year and four option years was made to SDI on September 24, 2009, for a total ceiling for the contract of \$5.4 million (total for 12-month base year, and four 12-month option years).

SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Madam Secretary. This hearing is recessed.

[Whereupon, at 12:21 p.m., Wednesday, February 24, the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]