A DAY WITHOUT SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
MEETING JOINTLY WITH THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

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NOVEMBER 3, 2011

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A DAY WITHOUT SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, Meeting
Jointly with Subcommittee on Readiness, Washington, DC,
Thursday, November 3, 2011.

The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 11:42 a.m. in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

Mr. FORBES. Good morning. We would like to call this joint hearing to order.

Mr. Akin, we understand, is on his way, and he will take over the gavel as soon as he gets here.

But I want to thank Chairman Akin for co-chairing this hearing and thank all of our members and the distinguished panel of experts and welcome them to today's hearing focused on what the future of seapower and projection capabilities may portend in an era of austere budgets.

I am sure that Chairman Akin will note his appreciation for all of our witnesses being here, and I want to just say how much we appreciate your service to our country and your taking time today to bring your expertise and experience to all the members of this subcommittee.

I believe it is vital that you are all here today to continue to inform the members of these subcommittees and the public in advance of the “super committee” [Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction] delivering its ultimate recommendations to the Congress.

I am going to keep my remarks short in order that we proceed to the heart of the discussion. The Readiness Subcommittee has convened numerous times in the past few months to hear from each of the services, and most recently the vice chiefs, regarding the current state of the force, the increased risk and the uncertainty of the future and potential impacts to military readiness if sequestration were enacted.

While there seems to be a prevailing consensus that sequestration, under the Budget Control Act, would be devastating to the military, I remain severely concerned that we have already gone too far.

Last year, when the DOD [Department of Defense] began closing Joint Forces Command without any predecisional analysis, I told members this would soon be coming to a theater near you.
Well, currently, we are dealing with the $465 billion DOD cuts that was arbitrarily made without analysis to underpin that number. Now another shoe has dropped with regard to civilian personnel. The Air Force announced just yesterday that they will eliminate 16,500 civilian positions in fiscal year 2012. That is just the Air Force and only one fiscal year.

What happens when the other shoe drops or if it drops under sequestration?

With all these individual decisions, the cumulative effect will be devastating. At this point, I would say get ready. The show is only just beginning.

This leads me to reiterate my concern regarding additional short-term decisions that could lead to the potential hollowing of the force under sequestration. That would be a situation that cannot be quickly reversed.

General Dunford articulated this very point before the Readiness Subcommittee last week regarding concerns that we will make these cuts without any adequate appreciation of the strategic implications.

The implications on our readiness are the implications of breaking faith; and also, that folks would think that, if we get it wrong, “Well, we can just simply fix it in a year or two.”

That is not possible, particularly in the latter category. And if we break the trust of our marines, sailors, soldiers and airmen today, it would be decades before we get it back.

The question I continue to ask is what is the risk to the national defense of our country if we continue to make some of the cuts to defense we are hearing being discussed in Washington?

There are never enough resources to eliminate all of our risk, but there must be a strategic assessment to underpin the decisions. Instead, I feel that, currently, the DOD is just responding to budgetary pressures the result of which could severely degrade the military’s ability to operate.

In Vice Admiral Clingan’s written testimony for this hearing today, he indicates, without question, the fleet is operating now at an unsustainable level.

To best meet the combatant commander’s need for deployed Navy forces since September 11, 2001, and to respond to emergent requirements, we have increased the frequency and average length of unit deployments.

This has resulted in reduced training time, reduced maintenance availabilities, a narrowing of predeployment training for certain units to mission-specific tasks, and an accelerated aging of our ships and aircraft.

Consistent with the testimony that Vice Admiral Burke provided before the Readiness Subcommittee, the Navy has been operating in a sustained surge, precluding the opportunity to do deep maintenance on fleet assets. How will that impact the future force? Looking forward, will our forces be ready for the mission they are called upon to do when the time comes?

While there are many contributing factors that brought us to this point today, we are currently at a crossroads where we have time yet to prepare for the many tough decisions that lie ahead.
In doing so, we must not forget our obligation to ensure our men and women in uniform are given all the tools necessary for the job we ask them to do.

I look forward to learning from each of our witnesses about how we cope with these challenging fiscal times while also maintaining a ready military.

At this time, I would like to recognize my good friend, the representative from North Carolina, Mr. McIntyre, for any opening remarks he might have and pass the gavel to Chairman Akin.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 36.]

STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE MCINTYRE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NORTH CAROLINA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

Mr. McIntyre. Thank you very much.

I thank the chairman. Thank you, Mr. Forbes and to Mr. Akin, and thank them for their leadership.

I also want to thank the witnesses for taking time out of your schedule to be with us today and to even come and meet with us yesterday and other days that you have met with us personally when we have had questions or had concerns and you have been proactive in raising the awareness of the concerns that our military has with regard to this budget.

It is becoming clear that, as we draw down from Iraq and Afghanistan, the demand for maritime presence and force projection will increase.

We must ensure that our troops are available to quickly respond to crises around the world. As we know also, there will be times that we are called upon to offer humanitarian assistance in disaster situations and to help protect and keep open economic trade lanes by maintaining peace operations.

I am concerned, very concerned about the impact that large defense cuts will have on U.S. national security. DOD has given more than their fair share in budget cuts already. And if further cuts were implemented beyond those in the Budget Control Act, our great Nation possibly could be jeopardized in terms of its status as the global power that is preeminent.

I look forward to hearing the witnesses discuss the current missions we are executing in our combat AORs [Areas of Responsibility] and elsewhere around the world. More importantly, I would like to hear which of these missions would be compromised if we faced the inevitable situation that we hope will not face by November 23rd or ultimately December 23rd.

Thank you. Thank you to the witnesses for your service.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

Mr. Akin. [Presiding.] Thank you very much. I appreciate it.

And thank you, Randy, also for sitting in for me here. I was caught on the telephone. I think we ought to get rid of those gadgets.
So, if we could, I would like to back up a little bit, start the meeting with a prayer, if I could. Father, we thank you for the people who serve us in uniform, and we just ask please now for your wisdom as we take a look at the decisions that we need to be making in this Nation. And I ask your blessing on everybody here and help us to make good and wise decisions. I pray in Jesus’ name. Amen.

Just to put things simply, and I want to try to get to the right altitude here, we have already taken $450 billion in cuts to military just in the last year or so. Now, $450 billion is more than normal paycheck that I know what to do with, so what does that amount to? I want to try and put that in perspective.

First of all, we have a Marine general. I think you are talking about $100 billion maybe for a year to run the United States Marines. Is that roughly right? So $450 billion cut that we have already taken would be the equivalent of 4 1/2 years for the entire Marine Corps budget, right?

Let us shift over now. Let us talk about aircraft carriers. We have, I believe, 11 aircraft carriers. We don’t lose them too often, they are considered important. How many would $450 billion buy; about what, maybe 45 aircraft carriers? That is a long string of aircraft carriers.

That is how big the cuts we have already taken are, and now there is discussion about cutting more.

And so the point of this hearing is to say, “When is enough already in terms of cuts?”

Now, just to put some things onto some graphs, we have a couple of graphs that I think are very important for people to be aware of. The first is this one here, and it is on the chart. Basically it shows, as a percent of GDP [Gross Domestic Product] how much we have spent on defense through the years, and also as a percent of GDP what we are spending on various things that politicians call entitlements.

The red line is the entitlements. The blue line is defense. What you see is we are spending a whole lot less of the American dollar on defense than we used to. That is the first one.

The second chart that I think is somewhat—no, I don’t want to do that chart. I want to do that other one about the number of planes and men in uniform. Okay.

If you make a comparison to where we were in 1990, the number of people in uniform, the number of aircraft and the number of ships, what you see is, is that we are running about 50 percent just in sheer numbers of where we were in 1990.

So we are already at half strength from 1990, and now we are talking—that is before the $450 billion budget cut. And if we take more budget cuts, what is that going to mean?

I am very uncomfortable with those numbers, but I am not the expert. We have the experts right here with us this morning.

I would hope each of you gentlemen would first of all at least follow somewhere in your presentation, one, this is the purpose of what my branch of service is about; and then second of all, if you take this money away, how is that going to degrade our ability to do the mission that you have been assigned to do?

With that, I am going to conclude my opening remarks and go to the wonderful lady from Guam, Madam Bordallo.
Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Chairman Forbes. Thank you for scheduling this hearing. And I am glad to join my colleague and my good friend Congressman McIntyre.

I also want to welcome each of our witnesses this afternoon.

And, General Hesterman, I congratulate you on your new appointment as the military deputy for readiness in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.

Today we continue our discussion on the implications of the defense spending reductions resulting from the passage of the Budget Control Act, as well as the possible implications if sequestering occurs.

As I have stated in previous hearings, I do not believe sequestration needs to occur. In fact, I believe former Senator Simpson, Erskine Bowles, and others got it right when they indicated that the so-called super committee cannot fail. Everything must be on the table to achieve a balanced result that helps put American finances back on track.

So that said, I believe our sea and air-power projection capabilities are vitally important as we understand the threats that we will be facing in future years.

This is particularly important for my constituents in Guam. Our naval and Air Force long-range strike capabilities are what to a greater extent provide stability in the Western Pacific. The tyranny of distance in the Pacific makes these capabilities invaluable.

Recently, Secretary Panetta visited our allies in Asia to discuss a range of issues, and I commend Secretary Panetta for his comments while he was in Asia. Time after time he reiterated the importance of Asia-Pacific to the U.S. military and our greater national security and economic interests.

He further stated how important it is that no matter what happens with regards to current or future budget reductions, that we at least maintain, if not grow, our military presence in Asia-Pacific.

Secretary Panetta stated, “Most importantly, we have the opportunity to strengthen our presence in the Pacific, and we will.”

I believe that is the right approach for our country to be best positioned to address current and emerging threats. I hope that each of our witnesses this afternoon will be able to comment on the importance of power projection or long-range strikes if we are to maintain a constant and significant presence in Asia-Pacific.

Specifically, how important is the development of a next-generation bomber to our presence in the Pacific? What additional capabilities could this asset provide us in the Asia-Pacific region? Further, what strategies are being employed to manage the program in a cost-effective manner?

For our friends in the Navy and the Marine Corps, I hope you can each comment on the impact that tyranny of distance has on power projection. What is needed to overcome the tyranny of distance? There has been some discussion, particularly by our friends
in the Senate, of pulling back most of our military forces from abroad to bases back home; or whether we even need a forward-deployed presence.

I hope our witnesses can discuss the strategic value of a forward-deployed presence, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region.

Finally, many of those in think tanks are suggesting that our next conflict will be a maritime and air battle concept. I remain concerned that budget cuts, because of the Budget Control Act, will unduly target the operation and maintenance accounts, and specifically the training accounts.

How are the Navy and the Marine Corps going to approach this matter? The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were primarily land based, so what will we need to do to achieve a certain level of readiness for our Naval and Marine Corps forces? How important is amphibious landing capability to an expeditionary Marine Corps?

I hope that each of these matters can be addressed at this hearing, and I thank each of our witness, and I look forward to your testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you very much for your opening statement as well.

Now we are going to go to our witnesses. And first off is Vice Admiral Bruce Clingan. He is the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Planning and Strategy.

And so, Bruce, fire away, sir.

STATEMENT OF VADM BRUCE W. CLINGAN, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR OPERATIONS, PLANNING AND STRATEGY (N3/5)

Admiral CLINGAN. Thank you, Chairman Akin, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member McIntyre and Ranking Member Bordallo and members of the subcommittee. We thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

I am proud to represent 625,000 sailors and civilians that are serving on Active Duty in the Navy today, a testament to your support today, and which makes the topic of today's hearing hypothetical, thankfully, as opposed to historical.

I look forward to assisting you to ensure that our Navy remains fully capable of providing America offshore options to protect and advance our national interests in an era of uncertainty and fiscal challenges that must be addressed.

As it has for more than 200 years, our Navy today delivers credible capability for deterrence, sea control, and power projection, to prevent crises, contain conflicts, and win our Nation's wars.

We remain forward at the maritime crossroads, protecting the interconnected systems of trade, information and security that underpin our Nation's economic prosperity.

This prosperity requires free access to the global commons, in particular the maritime air, space, and cyberspace commons where the Navy operates today, which are increasingly threatened by both state and non-state actors.

Significant concerns have been voiced regarding the impact of the Budget Control Act on the Navy's future ability to fulfill its fundamental responsibilities. There is no doubt that the evolving security
environment, characterized by systems designed to neutralize our advantages in both space and cyberspace; proliferation of sophisticated weapons intended to prevent freedom of action in those global commons; aggressive, coercive and assertive states, unfettered by international norms; and persistent attacks by violent extremists. All of these characteristics of the future security environment pose a growing challenge to our national interests.

And all of these characteristics demand a ready Navy that can rapidly and effectively respond to diverse crises with efficient off-shore options ranging from humanitarian assistance to high-end, high-intensity combat operations against a very capable adversary.

The risk to successfully accomplishing such missions today is significant and the impact of the Budget Control Act before sequestration would push this risk to the manageable limit. Tough choices will have to be made as we balance this risk and distribute it across the Navy’s portfolio and as we endeavor to ensure that we are manned, trained, and equipped to fulfill our obligations to the Nation.

While we anticipate being resourced at a level that will never result in a day without seapower, I am eager to answer your questions as we contemplate adjustments that move the Navy in this direction.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Clingan can be found in the Appendix on page 38.]

Mr. Akin. Thank you, Admiral.

Our next witness is going to be Lieutenant General Richard Mills, Deputy Commander for Combat Development and Integration at the Marine Corps, Combat Development Command.

General Mills.

STATEMENT OF LTGEN RICHARD P. MILLS, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION, MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND

General Mills. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Akin, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Members McIntyre and Bordallo, members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the importance of seapower and projection forces.

More importantly, thank you for the tremendous support you provide to your marines on a daily basis, both here at CONUS [Continental United States], while embarked aboard ship, and in combat overseas.

As we plan for the years ahead, we see a world of increasing instability and conflict. It will be characterized by poverty, competition for resources, urbanization, overpopulation, and extremism. Failed states may indeed become safe havens for terrorists, insurgents, and criminal groups that directly threaten the United States and our allies.

There is no doubt that these trends will exert a significant influence on future security environments. History tells us that we never know when crisis, conflict or security challenges will occur, but it also tells us we know they will occur. It also tells us the price
we will have to pay if we are unable to respond to them quickly, effectively, and reasonably.

While the character of the future security environment continues to evolve and change, our Nation’s requirement to maintain a forward-based force in readiness has not changed and in fact has never been stronger. Forward-deployed forces are important for a myriad of reasons.

First, physical presence matters. It demonstrates our economic and military commitment to a particular region. It deters our adversaries. It ensures our friends. Crisis response matters, and crisis response is frequently measured in hours, if not in minutes. Embassies are threatened. Americans are put in danger. Disasters occur. Time is critical. Flexible options are critical.

When the marines rescued a downed American pilot shot down in Libya earlier this year, the marines did so from amphibious shipping in the Mediterranean, with the rescue completed within 3 hours of notification. Without our forward presence, that situation would have turned out dramatically differently. Imagine how the situation might have changed had Gadhafi in fact captured a U.S. aircrew.

Earlier in the year, within 20 hours of notification of the tsunami, forward-deployed marines arrived in Japan to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions. Crisis response cannot be adequately accomplished in the United States. By its very nature, it requires a forward presence that our naval forces are uniquely positioned to provide. We are the Nation’s away-team ready to respond to any crisis.

The Nation must have forward-deployed marines ready to respond to crisis. Indeed, I believe that the phrase, “The marines have landed and the situation is well in hand,” means more than just kinetic success. It means that people struck by disaster quickly see the United States flag helping them. It means that a stable, capable force under the United States flag is on hand to assist in any number of crisis situations.

Ultimately, it means people overseas thankful to the United States for the help they receive.

The demand for amphibious forces has never been greater. Flexibility has been the key. This year alone, your Marines partnered with the Navy have fought an aggressive, full-spectrum counter-insurgency operation in Afghanistan and we continue to fight there today. Partnered with allied forces engaged in missions at every geographic combatant commander’s area of responsibility, we train with our allies.

We have conducted foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions in Pakistan, in Haiti, in the Philippines, and in Japan. We have executed maritime security operations to ensure freedom of navigation along sea lines of communication. That includes the recapture of the vessel Magellan Star and the rescue of its crew from Somali pirates.

The Marines have rapidly reinforced U.S. embassies overseas, in Haiti, in Guinea, in Kazakhstan, and in Cairo, Egypt. We have protected diplomatic personnel. And finally, we have conducted air strikes against loyalist forces in Libya and, as I mentioned, rescued an American aviator shot down during Operation Odyssey Dawn.
Demand for amphibious forces has never been greater, as I said. While we cannot know when the next conflict will occur, we know in fact that it will occur. When that happens, America’s forward-deployed Navy and Marine Corps team will be there, ready to plug the gaps during international crisis; ready to give our decision-makers back here in Washington time and space in which to make those decisions; and ultimately, to provide those decisionmakers with responsible options to respond when the Nation is ready.

The United States remains the world’s largest economy. We are critically dependent on the sea for exports and imports that ultimately sustain our livelihood. Disruptions in the sea have measurable economic impact on every family in the States. The Nation’s naval forces provide the ability to maneuver through the littorals, to deter, to defend, and to protect vital areas from any variety of threats without dependence on land bases.

I would urge the members to remember that the Nation’s economic health is directly tied to our ability to maintain stability on the seas. Your Navy and Marine Corps team is forward-deployed and ready to meet the needs of our Nation.

Over the past decade, our men and women in uniform have made extraordinary sacrifices. We must maintain faith with our marines. We must send them a clear message that their contributions are recognized and appreciated. For us the marines, keeping faith means that the institution, the people, the marines, the families that are out there in Twentynine Palms, Camp Pendleton, Camp Lejeune, Beaufort are ready.

We need to maintain their best interests at heart. Even though they understand there will be changes, we must have their best interests at heart at all times as you look at the three main areas of manning, training, and equipping our forces that go forward. We cannot break faith with them.

Cuts at the level anticipated with sequestration would in fact break faith with those marines. I would like to add that as the year continues, the challenge we face operating on a continuing resolution will only increase. We need a budget passed so that we have the predictability and flexibility to carry out our missions.

In the months and years ahead, we will face difficult resource decisions. I urge Congress to consider how best to mitigate the risk of a reduced defense capability; and I tell you, like an affordable insurance policy, the Marine Corps and Navy’s amphibious forces are, in fact, the hedge against the Nation’s most likely risks. It is imperative that our Nation retain a credible means of mitigating risk as we draw down other capabilities and capacities.

Thank you for the opportunity to be here. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Mills can be found in the Appendix on page 54.]

Mr. AKIN. Thank you very much, General.

Our last witness is Major General John Hesterman, United States Air Force, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements.

And I also wanted to offer my congratulations, General Hesterman, at your nomination for Lieutenant General, I guess was just yesterday, was it?
Thank you very much. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN JOHN W. HESTERMAN III, USAF, ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS, AND REQUIREMENTS (A3/5), U.S. AIR FORCE

General HESTERMAN. I thank the chairman. My senior joint brothers have told me I will immediately become more intelligent and more eloquent if that confirmation process goes forward.

Chairman Akin, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo and all the distinguished members of the committee, thanks for the opportunity to provide you an update on your power projection forces and your outstanding airmen around the world.

Today, the Air Force is fully engaged in operations across the globe supporting our Nation's and our combat commanders' requirements. Today, our capability and reach are unparalleled among the world's air forces, and the dedication of your airmen is truly exceptional, and they are busy.

Each day, 24 hours a day, a mobility aircraft takes off every 90 seconds. On an average day, your airmen and our airlift fleet transport 4,500 passengers and over 1,900 tons of cargo. Our tanker crews deliver 5 million pounds of fuel to U.S. and coalition aircraft and there has been no let-up in the pace.

Since September 11th, 2001, our tankers have delivered 15 billion pounds of fuel. Our airlift fleet has delivered over 6.5 million tons of cargo. During a 2-week period last March, affectionately known inside the Air Force as “March madness,” the Air Force conducted humanitarian relief efforts in Japan simultaneously with combat operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya.

In Japan, the Air Force opened Sendai Airfield in the heart of the disaster area within 5 days of the tsunami and started the flow of much-needed aid. Within 2 weeks, our airlift crews delivered 2.5 million gallons of water and 167 tons of food to those most affected.

Last year in Afghanistan, we air-dropped 60 million pounds of critical supplies in the most heavily contested areas to our soldiers and marines. Our air-drop for Operation Enduring Freedom has doubled each year since 2006, from 3.5 million pounds in 2006 to 60.4 million pounds in 2010. And this year we have exceeded the 2010 number already.

This important capability minimizes the predictable overland delivery requirement which puts truck convoys and U.S. personnel at risk of insurgent attacks and the prolific IED [Improvised Explosive Device] threats. It saves soldiers’ and marines’ lives. At the same time, in the early days of the Libya conflict, as part of Operation Odyssey Dawn, our B–2 stealth bombers launched from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri flew halfway around the world and destroyed precise targets in Libya before flying back home to Whiteman. En route, they were refueled several times by our tanker fleets and their crews. Yours is the only air force on the planet that can do that and right now, we can do it anywhere we need to.

Our Nation cannot afford to compromise this long-range strike capability, particularly as we look at a future with anti-access/area-denial environments our adversaries are now creating.
Chairmen, Ranking Members, all the distinguished sub-committee members, I join our Secretary of Defense and my Air Force Chief of Staff in stating that any further cuts in addition to the $450-plus billion already identified in the Budget Control Act will at least reduce our capability to conduct these operations concurrently. And if the sequester provision goes into effect, it may risk our ability to protect the Nation.

My sincere thanks to all of you for your continued support of your outstanding airmen and for all our Nation’s military, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Hesterman can be found in the Appendix on page 61.]

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, all three, for your testimonies.

We are going to now proceed to questions from both committees here. And as the chairman, I guess I get the first shot. So I am going to try and start with kind of simple things.

There are a lot of people that would prefer America to be a nation that is at peace and where things are peaceful and there is not war going on all the time.

So if you really want America to be a peaceful nation, would you think it would be better to have a strong military or a weak military?

Admiral CLINGAN. Chairman Akin, I will start the answer. Of course, you might imagine that you will find unanimity of opinion at this table that a strong military certainly contributes to the peace that the American population and, frankly, our allies and partners desire. And in many cases we are the guarantor of their peace as well as our own.

Mr. AKIN. Good, let us just stop right there. That is kind of what I was fishing for.

It seems like to me if we are strong, one, it doesn’t encourage adventurism in other nations that are less stable. And it provides not only peace for our own people but around the world nations can trade and more or less live at peace just because of, in a sense, the umbrella that we provide.

Is that a pretty safe assumption? And so if we allow our defense to degenerate, then we get into a situation where there is more wars and things, isn’t that right? The times that we have been at war, haven’t those times been many times when we are not as strong as we might have been? Anybody want to comment on that historically?

General MILLS. Sir, I would echo your words. I think any student of history realizes this country has been most at threat and gone to war when it has been its weakest. Certainly, World War II would be certainly an outstanding example of that.

But I concur with the admiral. The best way to ensure a just peace is to have a strong military that is out there to deter your enemy and to stand ready to defend your homeland if called upon.

Mr. AKIN. Right.

Now, sometimes people are critical and say, “Hey, we have got troops in Germany and we have got troops in Korea, all this stuff. Why do we need troops all the way over there? Why don’t we just bring them home, and save a lot of money—with having to resup-
ply all of those different people living in different corners of the world?"

And, yet, some of the missions that you have talked about today couldn’t happen if we didn’t have forward-deployed troops, isn’t that correct?

Admiral CLINGAN. That is correct, Chairman.

Mr. AKIN. So just kind of running through things, first of all, a navy, your mission in a way is to turn the oceans into areas where we can project force in order to keep the peace but also be prepared for different contingencies, is that correct?

Admiral CLINGAN. Chairman Akin, that is absolutely correct.

Mr. A KIN. And in order to do that you have to have a certain number of ships because the globe is a pretty big place to put ships on, isn’t it?

Admiral C LINGAN. Yes, it is.

Mr. AKIN. So you don’t have enough ships you are not going to be present and then people start to become adventurous and do risky things, is that right?

Admiral CLINGAN. That is certainly a risk as we look at the future security environment and the way it is evolving.

Mr. AKIN. Okay.

And then from the point of view of the Marine Corps, your job is to be the first ones in, but in a degree, doesn’t that also buy us time in terms of what our response needs to be when there is a problem, General?

General MILLS. Absolutely, sir. The presence of amphibious forces near a crisis site, I believe, buy critical time for decision-makers to sort out what needs to be done and come to a reasonable solution over that.

Those forces don’t necessarily have to be ashore. Simply their presence in the area indicates the strength and power of the United States is there ready to take action if so called upon; I believe has a huge deterrent effect anywhere in the world where we have our forward-deployed forces.

Mr. AKIN. Because essentially if you need to go into a particular location in the world in a fairly short period of time, you could hit with a pretty big hammer and land an awful lot of marines, is that correct?

General MILLS. Sir, we advertise ourself as a middle weight force but we are in fact strong enough to be able to stabilize any situation and then allow for the entry of the joint force as it begins to close on that situation.

But, yes, sir, we are there prepared to win once we get ashore, and then thoroughly ready to do so under our current capabilities.

Mr. AKIN. Right.

General MILLS. Should we suffer drastic cuts, those capabilities, in fact, could be reduced?

Mr. AKIN. And when that is reduced then you have got to make decisions, right? You got to decide, “Am I going to cut training? Am I going to have fewer troops?”—so that makes everything more risky. “Am I going to have cheaper, poorer quality equipment so people don’t have the type of protection they need?”

All those are given you some kind of impossible decisions to make in a way, aren’t they, when you get down to a certain point?
General Mills. Those are very difficult decisions to make, sir. I think the battlefield is a dynamic place. It is not stable. The enemy threat changes every day. I would point to Afghanistan where we look at an enemy who is adaptive, who is imaginative and who we have to adjust to. Those require changes in equipment, they require changes in training and adequate force structure to conduct the mission once ashore.

Mr. Akin. And then, John, from a Air Force point of view, in a way, you have a lot of service aspect to what you do because you are providing all that support essentially to all the other people, as well as that long-range punch to let people know that we have some teeth and those teeth can reach pretty far and bite pretty hard. And that is what you have to try to maintain that capability too, right?

General Hesterman. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, that is true. And let me add, to pile on just a little bit, I spent the last year of my life in the Middle East as the Deputy Air Component Commander for Central Command. And there is a reason the combatant commanders spend most of their time working on relationships with foreign militaries and foreign leaders: so that we are able to execute, or we are told to go execute the things we need to do that we have those relationships in order to give us the access and the lily pads and the things that we need to prosecute our campaigns.

Mr. Akin. So there is an ongoing working with other nation partners and things, which facilitate that ability to provide that overall umbrella of peace, really——

General Hesterman. I am convinced it is essential, sir.

Mr. Akin. Yes.

Well, if any of you want to jump on; I just want to talk at the highest level. What starts to degenerate if you don’t fund things enough?

Because we have seen the charts, and we have been cutting defense, as a percent of GDP heavily. We see that we have reduced our force almost by half of where we were in 1990. And now we are talking after $450 billion, which again I am trying to figure out what 45 aircraft carriers look like in a row. Imagine, Admiral, you might think it is a pretty sight as a matter of fact.

But, anyway, that is a lot of money we have already taken in cuts, and now we are talking about more cuts. And, really, I think what I am hearing you say is that if you really want a safe and well-defended America, you just can’t do this. I think that is what I am hearing you say.

Admiral Clingan. Chairman Akin, as we contemplate how to solve the budget puzzle posed with the current cuts that are on the table, the Department of Defense appreciates the fact that those type of major adjustments must be driven by strategy. And that strategy review is ongoing.

As the Navy looks to its maritime strategy as a supporting strategy for that defense strategy, we can see the persistence of some strategic imperatives that you have alluded to; for example, contain regional conflict, deter adversaries, win our Nation’s wars. And we do that with forward regionally postured forces.
We also see the imperative to contribute to the homeland defense in depth to foster and sustain the cooperative relationships that have been talked about and are of great value as we work together in an evolving security environment that is challenging and, of course, to prevent disruptions and crisis that disrupt the international system. That benefits all of us, as I mentioned earlier, not just America, but allies, partners and even adversaries.

To that end, we use globally distributed naval forces. And the benefit of those forward forces is a commitment, this declaration of commitment to our allies with which we have common defense agreements.

To our partners who look to us to protect their interests and their economic well-being in a world that relies on container ships moving 90 percent of the commerce, and we look at the rapid response that the General talked to where we can provide with the Navy offshore options that are very diverse in their capability and tailorable to achieve support of our national interests.

So we look, as these budget adjustments must be contemplated, at the prospect of finding the forward presence that we know we need in this evolving security environment to be at risk.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you very much.

I didn’t mean to take too much time, but I think the next person I am going to isn’t here; McIntyre.

So I will go ahead——

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My first question is for General Hesterman.

Last week, while Secretary Panetta was meeting with allies in the Pacific, he reaffirmed the U.S. intent to remain a Pacific power. We applaud the Secretary’s focus on this key region, and we will do everything we can to support this imperative.

However, in order to ensure that such words could be translated into actual military capability, we need to think about numbers. Given the tyranny of time and distance in the Pacific region, and I know I don’t have to remind you, but given that these areas are a part of the United States, and many thousands of U.S. citizens are living there, at what point do Air Force fleet numbers drop too low to sustain an extended air campaign in the region?

We must have enough long-range strike assets in the fleet to project force over enemy territory in a concentrated fashion. The Air Force has done nothing but shrink the force over the past decade. At a certain point, you simply can’t do more with less. So my question is where is the red line regarding the size of the fleet as we look at the operations in the Pacific theater?

General HESTERMAN. Ma’am, I don’t have a number for you, but what I will tell you is this is important to us. It is what we do. You know, my kid brother is a 46-year-old vice wing commander at a strategic bomber base in Louisiana. He spends a lot of time on Guam. Every airplane on the ramp is 4 years older than him, at least.

So what we have to do is be able to have a budget that allows the modernization of that fleet, because we expect those youngsters to fly that thing until 2030. And in order to equip it and equip the weapons base with the kinds of standoff weapons they all need to
fight in the Pacific theater, we have to fund those things, because they will go if we ask them, needless to say.

You know, we have to fund the long-range strike bombers, as you talked about because at some point, you know, we have to have a platform that will actually get and be able to operate inside of that fight.

So it is similarly important to us to have the right number to be able to prosecute our campaigns in the theater there.

Ms. BORDALLO [continuing]. But it must be the right number?

General HESTERMAN. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, General.

And I have another question, Mr. Chairman, for Admiral Clingan and General Mills.

Given China’s rapid development of an increasingly capable blue-water navy and their intent to be in broadened command of the Western Pacific operating area, how would a resource-constrained Navy and Marine Corps respond to calls for support from our allies in the region if contentious natural resource land or navigation issues arise?

How important is it to have our forces strategically forward-deployed in the Pacific to overcome the massive challenge of tyranny of distance?

And I will begin with you, Admiral.

Admiral CLINGAN. Ranking Member Bordallo, thank you for the question.

We respond to those types of crises which are unanticipated and at times come up in a fashion or a manner over a spark that wasn’t anticipated with having forward-deployed naval forces that are permanently stationed overseas, as well as having forward presence that we generate through the rotation of United States-based forces.

It is that combination that allows us to respond immediately with the presence that are there in theater.

And should the tension or crisis be of such a magnitude that those forces were insufficient, we would have the wherewithal to surge additional forces from the continental United States, should that be required.

But your point is that we need those forward forces to be sufficient to deter that type of behavior in the first place. And that is an area that takes the leadership of the United States, both diplomatic and military, to keep a constant sense of the trends and the assertiveness of nations; not just China, but others; so that we understand how that environment is evolving and we can make adjustments in terms of those standard levels of presence that would be there.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Admiral.

And General Mills.

General MILLS. I would just add to the Admiral’s comments on the value of the forward-deployed forces over there, that they assure our allies and our friends that the U.S. is interested and that we maintain a presence over there because of that vital interest and our vital interest in supporting them as they proceed to their day-to-day activities.
Secondly, it gives us the opportunity, forward-deployed, to interoperate with our allies, with the Australians, who are developing an amphibious capability because of some of the threat that they see on the horizon.

Forward-deployed forces enable us to operate on a day-to-day basis with them to gain familiarity with them, interoperability, and develop those relationships that become very critical during times of crisis and, ultimately, perhaps in times of war.

So the value of a constant presence out there, I think, cannot be overstated.

Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, General. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Akin. Congressman Forbes.

Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, gentlemen, thank you so much for your service to our country and for being here today. Admiral, we talk a lot about these numbers, and they, kind of, go over everybody’s head sometimes, especially the general public; I know not over the three of your heads.

But one thing that really just stuck out to me in your testimony was the fact that you said that, in fiscal year 2011, throughout 2011, the Navy was only able to meet 59 percent of the combatant commanders’ requirements.

And I am assuming I am reading that correctly.

And that was, as I understand it, before the $465 billion of cuts that are going to be coming our way that we are already taking, and, obviously, before any $600 billion in sequestration. Is that a fair statement, Admiral?

Admiral Clingan. Yes, sir, it is.

Mr. Forbes. General Mills, have you been able to look at a similar analysis for the ability that you had to meet our combatant commanders’ requirements before all of these $465 billion of cuts, or the $600 billion cuts?

And if you were, can you give us any ballpark of that percentage, like Admiral——

General Mills. I can, Mr. Chairman.

If you assume that the 20,000 marines deployed to Afghanistan will also meet a combatant commander’s requirement, then we are at about 60 percent of that requirement.

If you subtract those 20,000 forces out, we drop into the 20s because of that large commitment on the ground that we have in Afghanistan.

I think some of it reflects, for both of us, the rapid rise in those requirements over the past few years. Since 2007 we have seen somewhat of an 86 percent increase in the combatant commanders’ requests for amphibious forces.

So it is a rising demand and there is a large commitment already made, and we are doing the best the we can.

Mr. Forbes. And you are not seeing anything on the security front that suggest to you that that is going to reduce significantly over the next few years, have you?

General Mills. I do not. I do not. I would expect that demand only to increase.

Mr. Forbes. General Hesterman.
General HESTERMAN. Sir, I don't have a number to throw out at you. What I will tell you is the combatant commander requirement for several of our capabilities are at a 1–1 dwell. That means people are in combat for at least as much time as they are home.

You know, so, pararescue men, ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] operators, combat controllers, special operations, weather guys, civil engineers, our EOD [Explosive Ordnance Disposal] guys that find those IEDs, there aren't enough of them. And we send all that we can. And we have already cut well back in some of our training in order to meet combatant commander requirements. We will continue to do that.

Our service leadership is committed to giving them everything that we have.

Mr. FORBES. And, General, just for clarification, that is before——

General HESTERMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. The $465 billion of cuts that are coming down the pike we are already taking?

General HESTERMAN. Yes, sir, that is true.

Mr. FORBES. And obviously long before sequestration.

General HESTERMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, just one last question for you; and this is no fault of the Navy's. This is because we just haven't given you the resources. But today, as I understand it, you are facing—let us forget Afghanistan and Iraq—and let us look at China and what we face there.

The Chinese, for the first time in our lifetimes, have more ships in their Navy than we have in our Navy. And we can argue about capacity and those kind of things, but it is my understanding that, from just surface-to-surface missiles based on open-source documents, they can hit us from about 185 kilometers, and we are at about a 120-kilometer range to them.

And at the end of this decade, they are going to have 78 subs to our 32 subs in the South China Sea, if we don't do something different.

You have a $367 million shortfall in your maintenance accounts because we haven't given you the money to do them.

My concern is this. If I look at your projections for shipbuilding, and even, at a minimum, a 313-ship Navy, about 70 percent of those ships that will make up that 313-ship Navy by 2020, we already own today. But we are not able to do the maintenance; and, again, not through your fault, because we haven't given you the resources.

What can the Navy do? Are we going to continue to just allow our resources to wear out so that we take them off earlier, or are we going to try to invest resources to try to maintain them and get a greater service life? And if so, how in the world can you do it if we are already at $367 million shortfall in the dollars we have given you to maintain the ships we have, and we are cutting another $450 billion, and we are talking about sequestration?

How do you possibly get your arms around that?

Admiral CLINGAN. Well, that is one of the daunting challenges that we are working with, not just today but as we look to make the cuts required.
First of all, one of the contributing factors to the material condition of the ships, which we are working to invest in through increasing the dollars that we allocate to our maintenance accounts, to your point, to get those ships to their expected service life, one of the challenges has been that, for at least the last 3 years, we have been operating above a sustainable operational tempo, at a level that we call surge, as we endeavor to meet that combatant commander’s demand that you alluded to.

That is with our current force structure. It has come at a cost that represents missed maintenance opportunities or reduced maintenance opportunities. It has come at longer deployments that have caused that compression of the maintenance cycle. It has come at tailored mission training as opposed to fully robust major combat operations training, so that we can get those ships forward to do the missions that the combatant commanders need.

As we have looked at the cost of that surge, we have come to the conclusion that you mentioned, which says it is an unsustainable rate and we must build time into our force generation model that allows the appropriate maintenance to be conducted and we must fund that maintenance appropriately.

We have taken steps within our budget constraints, approximately 900 additional million dollars each year toward that end, but it will come at a cost of reduced forward presence as we keep those ships which have been operating at surge at home to get the maintenance required.

Mr. FORBES. So, Admiral, it would be fair to say that that 59 percent that you were able to meet under the previous budgets, we may not even be able to meet that if we are having to keep more of the ships back home. Is that a fair statement?

Admiral CLINGAN. That is a fair statement. It will depend on their demand signal, which, as the General alluded to, we expect, in the evolving security environment, will go up.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral.

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. AKIN. And Congresswoman Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the joint hearing and certainly appreciate the service of all of you gentlemen. Thank you very much for being here and for your leadership.

I wanted to just clarify for a minute, as I am looking at the declining force structure chart, and are these numbers that you all, if we go over to the final, if the super committee fails, my understanding is this is really a worst-case scenario if, totally, across the board, everything is cut.

Are these the Pentagon’s numbers?

Admiral CLINGAN. Congresswoman, I can’t attribute the numbers to anybody beyond what the footnote says. But I can comment on the impact of sequestration.

Backing up just a minute, as we look at how to work simply with the current bill that we have with the existing $450 million to $500 million requirement, we are looking to balance risk as we take those cuts by, number one, making sure that we are ready to fight and win today; number two, to build the future force that we can
fight and win with tomorrow; and, three, to take care of our people, as we work through those priorities to avoid a hollow force.

Mrs. DAVIS. I——

Admiral CLINGAN. I can't get any more——

Mrs. DAVIS. I appreciate that, sir.

I just wanted to understand for myself because I think that the attribution is for the quote and not for the numbers in the chart, if I am not mistaken. And I just wanted to, I hope that, you know, if you all can go back and take a look at those and see. Is that really what you would come up with, so the Department of Defense would provide those numbers.

I think the other thing that is really critical and it is important, I think, for our constituents and certainly for the country to understand is, you know, as you are talking about the 59 percent of requirement, and certainly 87 percent, you know, for Marines, what does that really mean in specifics?

I think you have tried to do that, but it would be helpful to even have that on paper as we were to draw down. Some of those requirements, we know, certainly in budgets there are things that, you know, under the best of circumstances it would be great to have, but, you know, it is not as critical as some other things.

I think I am looking at the criticality here. You know, what is it that really does make a difference? I happen to believe that humanitarian missions actually can do more for the country sometimes than other commitments that we have and other kinetic activity.

So I think that, you know, if we could look at that more, that would be very helpful because we are trying as hard as we can to communicate with the individuals that are serving on this super committee and that kind of specificity would be very, very important to have. I think that we talk about hollowing out of the force, but you know, getting down to the details is also important.

And certainly on the personnel issues, I welcome your comments about that. You don't have to make them now. But, you know, where is it? I mean, obviously none of us would like to touch any of that, but if we have to, and we want to make certain of the least harmful to our troops, that keep the faith, et cetera, what is it that you think, you know, in your many years of service, would actually be reasonable to look at; would be something worth, you know, worth doing.

And the other thing, just very quickly, I just have a moment, in terms of the overseas presence. Our constituents ask those questions all the time. And I don't know whether there are opportunities where if you drew down a sixth of the force that is overseas, what difference that would make. We are talking about more accompanied tours in South Korea, for example. You know, how critical is that? And is that worthwhile to put that effort into there? Or, you know, is that not as important in terms of how are troops are able to carry out their mission?

I happen to know something about accompanied or unaccompanied tours, but on the other hand I think, you know, that is, today with our budget constraints, we may be looking at some different realities. So I wanted to be sure that I had a chance to get out that message.
And then I think just finally, we know that our Marines have certainly not been as much a part of amphibious ready groups as in the past and there are challenges there, and within budget constraints where do those lie as well?

So I have given you very little time to respond. I am sorry. But I wanted to just lay out and understand; help us get to the specificity when you can.

Would you like to comment?

Admiral CLINGAN. Just quickly, Representative Davis. As we work through those priorities I outlined, these ship numbers are in the ballpark of what could result. So while I can’t credit the numbers exactly, this is the type of impact that you might expect.

General MILLS. I would offer up my, I am not sure where those figures came from. We did a very, very thorough and rigorous force structure review over the past year, arrived at what we felt was a Marine Corps proper size, 186,800 marines that met our commitments and kept our capabilities where they were. But more importantly, perhaps, reduced stress on the force to give marines adequate time at home between training deployments and between actual deployments, to be able to spend some time decompressing, if you will, from their activities.

That force is at great peril as we watch the budgets decline. Where the breaking point is, is probably difficult to say. We look at what our commitments are; what we are required to provide the Nation in the way of COM [Command] plans and things like that, but also what we need to be able to give our forces adequate time to train and adequate time at home in order, as I said, to recover.

I would offer up that, as you talked about South Korea, the presence of forces in the Pacific offer up quite a, present our possible opponents over there with whom they have to think about. They can’t act as freely knowing that there are American forces both in Korea, close by Korea, and within the Pacific region that could respond quickly, and I think raise the stakes considerably when they decide what their strategy will be against us in the years to come.

So I appreciate the opportunity to comment on that, but I think, again, the value of deterrence with forward-deployed forces cannot be overstated. It is absolutely critical to what we are trying to do all over the world.

General HESTERMAN. Ma’am, just very briefly. Our thoughts on the numbers are the same as my compatriots here. The thing that we worry the most about is the stress on our airmen, needless to say. One thing I will tell you, in a lifetime in the Air Force, the thing that is the biggest morale booster is having the appropriate training and the appropriate equipment and the appropriately sized force to win when we send them into conflict.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

Mr. AKIN. Yes, I think you had a question on the numbers that we had in that one set of graphs? Could we throw the chart up on the screen again? The screen with the different various cuts. How much we are going to be, what the cuts were going to be?

I guess we can’t put it on the screen. Anyway, my understanding was, let me get this right, the 1990 numbers are from where? Those are historical data. Oops, we are getting closer here. There we go.
So the 1990 number is historical data. The 2000 numbers are also historical data, right? And the today numbers are historical. The black and red columns were done by some of the staff on the Armed Services Committee, and my understanding is those are simply you take the size budget cut; it is a straight percentage, and take the percentage, and that is what you get.

Obviously, it is an estimate, but it is kind of a ballpark if you figure using straight percentages. Okay. Our next question comes from Congressman Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to recognize General Mills, too, first Marine Corps general to command NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] forces in combat; just left Afghanistan. So he is not just a Quantico guy. He just left theater. And I am just happy to have you back and thanks for the job there.

Think back 50 years ago to World War II, putting a Marine general in charge of anybody would have created an uproar; but we were able to do it, so hurrah for that.

When I look at the three of you, what I see is kind of like the heavy compound list; like let me just phrase it this way: dead lifts, squats and bench press. I mean, you are what makes the American superpower the American superpower. You can do curls and you can do other fancy stuff to get beach muscles, but when it comes to heavy lifting and how powerful you are, and the ability to reach out and touch somebody, it is you.

And when you think back to the Falklands in 1982 with the British as kind of the, Britain’s last gasp of trying to reach out and touch somebody, and succeeding, but also kind of that was their last gasp, and post-World War II Britain giving up all of their sea bases to us.

I don't even know where to start with what is happening. Chairman Akin and Chairman Forbes have laid this out. If we can't reach out and touch people anymore and we pull back our sphere of influence, you have things like the LCS [Littoral Combat Ship], which I would argue is just a fast frigate. It is not Stealth. The Navy has some carbon-fiber ships that could evade radar. We are not building them. We are building fast frigates that can't get next to Taiwan; that can't go through the strait there.

On one side, we are building ships that are going to be nice to have. They are nice modular ships, but they are not going to be able to get our men and women to where they need to go. And then on the Marine Corps side, I guess the big question is: Do we need to go anymore?

So I have seen the Air Force’s plans for the next-generation tanker and the bombers, and they are looking good. They are looking on track and it looks like you have overcome a lot of the acquisition problems we have had in the past. But when it comes to the Navy and Marine Corps being able to reach out and touch and gain access to that anti-access/area-denial thing that we like to say, it seems like we are well behind that still.

And there is not a chance in heck of getting there now with the way that the budget is. But even when we have to prioritize, we are still not buying the right stuff. We are buying stuff, but we are not buying the right stuff.
So if you can’t get next to Taiwan and you can’t get even close to North Korea, why do you need the ability to knock down doors and gain a beachhead, if you can’t get there in the first place?

So my question is for General Mills, do we need to get there in the first place? Does the Marine Corps need that anymore?

And to Admiral Clingan, how do we do it if we are not going to build the right ships for it, if we are going to build some modular fast frigates that are not stealthy and that are not as fast as some of the ships like the Stiletto in San Diego? It is a carbon fiber air entrapment whole ship that can go really fast and is undetectable by radar. If we aren’t going to do that, then how are we going to touch people anyway?

General MILLS. Thank you for those comments, Congressman. And thank you for the comment on my service.

Let me just start off, and I would just say that the Marine Corps and amphibious warfare go back, as you know, quite a while. The initial question we had to answer was: Was amphibious warfare even feasible, back in the 1930s, as we began to look at an expanding Japanese threat in the Pacific? There were many people back then who said no, it was not a feasible military strategy and was foolish for us to pursue and try to train and equip our forces to do so.

I think the success, obviously, in World War II as it evolved and as our tactics changed and our equipment changed, proved, in fact, that was a very feasible strategy.

In the years since World War II, time and time again, the feasibility of amphibious operations has been questioned, whether it be in 1949 when it was—General Bradley questioned the very idea that an amphibious attack would ever take place again, followed very shortly thereafter, of course, by the Inchon landing and then what many people would describe as the decisive stroke of the Korean War, and the other amphibious operations that have taken place since that time.

Each time, things have changed. The threat has been more. People have questioned whether or not that was still a feasible military operation. Each time, I think that the Navy and Marine Corps team, backed by the entire joint community, has proven in fact not only is it feasible, but it is extraordinarily valuable as you pursue operations whether across the entire spectrum of military operations, everything from humanitarian relief to full combat ashore with Task Force 58, as we struck some 450 miles inland to begin the Afghan war back in the early 2000s.

So I would say that those who question the ability of amphibious forces to conduct operations today just don’t understand the way that we constantly study, that we constantly adapt, that we constantly change. And we face a threat and we believe that we can overcome it.

I would argue vehemently that amphibious operations play a critical role in the United States military spectrum of capabilities. We fit in very nicely to the joint effort. I think over the years we have begun to operate more and more with them. We operate very closely with our SOC [Special Operations Command] community, which is emerging as a very powerful force.
We also operate now with our cyber community, which, again, is adding another facet to amphibious operations.

So I would argue, properly equipped, properly trained, properly manned, amphibious operations are indeed a valuable tool for the United States military to have in its toolbox in the years to come.

Admiral CLINGAN. Congressman Hunter, thank you for the question, and you have well articulated one of the challenges that faces the Navy and the joint force today.

Clearly, to bring the Marine Corps to bear in its amphibious assault role and in fact to flow the joint force to a theater of interest and to sustain it requires that we deal with the anti-access/area-denial environment that is not only evolving in the Asia-Pacific, but we expect proliferation of those weapons as well as its uniquely evolving in other parts of the world.

So it is a global challenge that we must be able to address, against a very capable adversary that can bring ballistic missile capability, cruise missiles, submarines and the entire spectrum of highly technical and sophisticated weapon systems together to oppose our access. We need to bring the entire portfolio of the Navy and the Air Force and other elements of the joint force to bear as well.

So when we look at what is required of the Navy to deal with this anti-access environment, it runs the gamut from aircraft carriers to cruisers with ballistic missile and integrated air missile defense capabilities, as well as our DDGs and the DDG–51. It takes P–8s to deal with the submarine threat, and even the Littoral Combat Ship, which is our future mine countermeasures platform, which is an aspect of area denial that we have got to deal with.

So it is a challenge, and the budget constraints that we face are going to require us to balance risk across that entire portfolio necessary to deal with it.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, gentlemen.

And I would just end, Mr. Chairman, by saying he who controls the ocean controls the world, and he who controls space controls the ocean. And if we lose that ability we are going to lose our superpower status and be a regional power. And it is going to be a sad day if we in this committee and in these committees allow that to happen.

Thank you.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Congressman Hunter.

And Mr. Larsen; Congressman Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Either one works, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for recognition. I think what we are hearing is that deficits matter here on Capitol Hill, and the global recession that begin in 2007 exacerbated structural deficits, structural problems in the Federal budget overall that this Congress and Congresses before us and administration before us and this administration have all ignored.

And now we are left with a period of having to make some serious choices, and serious choices sooner rather than later, because the tail on a lack of making decisions on this is pretty big. But the impact of making good decisions now is pretty big as well, in the future.

And so that is kind of what we are left with. And I know on this committee we talk about a core constitutional function being com-
mon defense, but there is also general welfare, ensuring the blessings of liberty. So it impacts the entire budget.

And I just think it is important to make those points as we are putting this in context. We tend to focus on one set of issues here on this committee, but there are a lot of committees and a lot of people around the country who are looking at a lot of other parts of the budget, too, and trying to make sure that we are addressing a lot of needs.

And so now we are faced with choices that, frankly, we are elected to make, but are trying to resist making sometimes. But, you know, we have to make them. That is a premise.

Admiral, just a couple questions. So I just want to understand some of the details on some of the points. On the maintenance and Navy ships that have been at a high operational tempo over the last 10 years, would this, a couple questions here, would this maintenance cycle, we have to bring these home; would these have occurred regardless of sequestration, first off? In other words, isn't the need for the maintenance of a lot of these ships going to occur anyway? So what does the impact of sequestration have on it, have on this maintenance, first?

Second, the 59 percent of the requests that are being fulfilled; is that request of any and all requests, or are these 59 percent of the requests that have been validated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that are being fulfilled? Or are 100 percent of the requests that have been validated being fulfilled? You know, what is that number?

And I guess for the record, if I could have the Air Force and Marine Corps get back to me.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 75.]

Mr. Larsen. Give me the difference there between the percentage of requests being fulfilled versus the one that actually, the requests that have been validated have been fulfilled. So how do those differ?

And I think those, if I had that kind of information it would help me understand a little bit better about this challenge. I know there are challenges, just trying to put some numbers on them that are from a similar standard so I can deal with some of these decisions and choices that we are going to have to make all over the budget, not just here in the defense budget, but all over the budget.

So, Admiral, if you could, just take a whack at those.

Then, for the other two, for the record, give me the Marine Corps and the Air Force numbers.

Admiral Clingan. Congressman Larsen, thank you for the question.

The impact of operating at surge levels over the last several years has resulted in challenges with regard to the material condition of our ships. And we have just recently finished work that has developed class maintenance plans for each type of ship. And that gives us a good baseline for us to understand what needs to be done to maintain these ships so they are ready to be operationally employed and will reach their expected service life.

So we are endeavoring within budget constraints to put the right money against those maintenance plans and provide the time, the
access for the ship yards and ship company to the ships when they are not operating to actually do the required maintenance.

Sequestration, as you well know, applies a level cut against all program and activity lines. And so very clearly that budget line would be cut and we would be forced to rescope some availabilities and cancel others.

So, if you will, this recovery effort that is required to get our ships to the expected service lives would be delayed, if not precluded to some significant extent.

With regard to the 59 percent of the COCOM [Combatant Command] demand, the COCOMs derive their requirements from their tasking, and they are pretty good at that. And so they will work hard at deciding what capabilities across the joint force they need to accomplish their requirements, their effects out in the real world, and they get validated. So we are talking about 59 percent of the validated requirements we are able to resource.

That said, we are working with them under the circumstances and have been to explore new and creative ways to meet the requirements. For example, while we prefer an offshore option in many cases, perhaps we can send the training team by aircraft and have them train in situ on the partnership. Not the way we prefer, but an alternative that may help us not exacerbate the shortfall in meeting their demands through innovative and creative ways, as an example.

Mr. LARSEN. And, Mr. Chairman, just before I yield back, I apologize for going over time. For the QFR [Question for the Record], can you break that down by COCOM as well, and maybe give me every 2 years, going back to 2000, the percentage every 2 years that is being fulfilled and by COCOM, I guess. So I might get some perspective on this?

Admiral CLINGAN. Yes, sir, we can.

Mr. LARSEN. Good. Thank you.

General MILLS. Representative Larsen, if I could comment——

Mr. LARSEN. It will be up to the chairman. I am over my time. Sorry, General Mills. It will be up to the chairman.

Mr. AKIN. You can finish the question.

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. Thank you, General.

General MILLS. I would just add to the admiral’s statement, in addition to the maintenance, of course, which the Marine Corps also faces on its equipment, which is being used both for training and for operational purposes, sequestration also impacts our modernization programs, which are critical to us resetting the force as it begins to proceed ahead.

Regarding the COCOM requirements, those are validated requirements. The joint system has a system in which they submit their requirements to a single point of entry, which are then prioritized and filled as best.

The Navy, Marine Corps, and the Air Force have looked at ways of meeting those requirements in really extraordinary means. I will give you an example. The USS Kearsarge battle group that was out in the Pacific over the spring and summer of this year; three ships, at one point, separated literally by thousands of miles. As each ship conducted and met a COCOM’s requirement, everything from the Pakistani floods to the operations off Libya to the landing force
in support of my forces that were ashore in Afghanistan at the time when we saw an opportunity to deal a blow to the enemy.

And so by spreading that force out literally over thousands of miles, those ships operating semi-independently, we were able to come to, with one asset, if you will, meet three requirements.

So the Navy-Marine Corps team, and with the Air Force, and with the Army, are trying to meet those requirements as best we can using somewhat extraordinary procedures at times.

Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Akin. And Congressman Mike.

Mr. Coffman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you all for you dedicated years of service to this country.

I certainly share the majority's concern within this committee that the cuts from sequestration, should they occur, on the Department of Defense would be far too deep and would hurt this country's capability. I disagree, probably, with the majority where they feel that no savings, further savings are available from the Department of Defense.

And first I want to say that we have made progress in acquisition that have, I think, created efficiencies. We are going more to fixed-price contracting. And I think that that is a big help.

I think there is a natural shift that is occurring from a counter-insurgency doctrine to a counterterrorism doctrine, and I think that that will bring about substantial savings to this country.

And I certainly hope we never go down the path of nation-building again.

And I think it will take a good decade for our military to reestablish the combined arms capabilities that have been lost in counter-insurgency warfare that are essential to the deterring our adversaries.

I have a concern that on the personnel side, the personnel costs. And Secretary of Defense Gates warned us about this, that the trajectory of personnel costs are eating into acquisition costs.

So even if we can deal with a problem external to the Department of Defense, which is essentially the rise of entitlement spending, mandatory spending eating into the discretionary budget, I think we have a problem internal to the Department of Defense to the military in terms of the trajectory of personnel costs eating into acquisition costs. And, again, Secretary of Defense Gates warned us about this.

And I want to express, when I am looking at this chart, where we talk about 1990 to today and the decline of our military going from, say, Army maneuver battalions to 180 to 98; Navy ships, 546 in 1990 to 288 today; U.S. Air Force fighters, 4,355 to 1,990, et cetera.

My guess is, and I will be asking the Department of Defense this, that we have more flag officers today than we did in 1990 with a much larger force. I believe our military is just much too top-heavy today and there is an unnecessary cost associated to that.

I think that we ought to be looking at, when we look at the force structure, what additional units could be placed in the Guard and Reserve for savings. I think, probably, we should look at, on the increasing-cost side, plussing up, I think, compensation for our de-
ployed military, whether it is sea service or whether it is hazardous-duty or imminent-danger pay, to recognize the disparity between our deployed forces and our non-deployed forces.

But I think that we are going to have to deal with the trajectory of personnel costs, and that is going to be very unpopular for this committee, and it is going to take a lot of courage.

But we have got a two-front war going on against our capability: again, the external one that is coming upon us on November 23rd and an internal one on rising personnel costs. And I wonder if any of you would like to respond to any of the comments that I made.

Admiral.

Admiral CLINGAN. Sir, thank you for the question.

The Department of Defense and the Navy appreciate that challenge of the rising personnel costs. And in almost every case senior leadership in the Departments have said all things are on the table.

So many of the things that you have identified we are exploring with great detail, procurement program, process improvements, deficiencies, the rising costs of personnel. The top-heavy, I know we have looked at adjusting, and I believe have made adjustments, to the number of flag and general officers we have.

And Active Component–Reserve Component balance, while not going back to the circumstance we found ourselves a decade ago where we didn’t quite have the combat support and combat service support allocations across Active and Reserve right.

You know, this budget challenge has caused us to look at all those things. And I think when the dust settles that you will find appropriate thought has been applied in those directions.

Mr. COFFMAN. Lieutenant General Mills, do you have any comment?

General MILLS. I would agree with the admiral. I think that we have done, as I said, we did a force structure review last winter; took a look at the requirements for the Marine Corps and how they could be met with an appropriately sized force, looking at the draw-down in Afghanistan.

I think that we designed a force that met our requirements and that was affordable under those budget conditions. Those conditions, we know now, are shifting and we are taking another look at being able to meet our commitments with a, perhaps, reduced force.

I agree with you, sir, that we need to identify and to recognize our commitment of our people who are forward deployed and in harm’s way. We do a good job of it. Perhaps we could do a better of it.

I do believe that Secretary Panetta’s guidance has been relatively consistent over the past couple of months, and it is critical that we do not break faith with our forces, both with our men and their families. I think that is important to our future.

I think that we are going to have some tough choices to make. We basically got, I think, three ways to look at the cuts. We look at it through man, through train, or through equip. And those are the kind of hard selection processes that we are going to have to make and perhaps ask our question: “What is good enough?”
General HESTERMAN. Sir, Air Force leadership is very similar to what my brother described here.

I will tell you, I was the no-taker this weekend when our Chief and Secretary sat down with our Guard and Reserve leadership. They are committed to an optimal mix. They are committed to doing this together and to making sure that we get this right.

General MILLS. Sir, if I could add just one more thought, please?

When you spoke about the 10 years you felt that would take for us to move back to a combined arms environment, I think that the, if one thing all of our services have shown over the past few years is our ability to turn, to adjust, and to adapt. I would argue that perhaps no other force in the world other than the United States force could have done what was done in Iraq and Afghanistan, which was move from a high-intensity conflict, a very traditional armor-against-armor force, to pivot on a dime, if you will, to moving to a very effective counterinsurgency campaign.

I think that the flexibility of all of our forces was paramount to that. And very few people in the world could have done that.

And I think we will show that same adaptability over the years to come if we move back to perhaps what you would think of as more traditional roles.

I believe the combined arms force is still in effect. I believe an amphibiously capable force is still in effect. And I think that we are still able to accomplish a wide range of missions despite the fact that we have been focusing, perhaps, a bit on the Afghan fight over the past few years.

Mr. COFFMAN. And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. Akin. Thank you.

And we also have our Congressman Gibson here.

Mr. GIBSON. Well, thanks very much, Chairman. And I appreciate you calling this joint meeting.

I appreciate the panelists today, for your service and leadership.

The question has to do for the Air Force, General Hesterman, about joint forcible-entry capabilities, particularly United States Army airborne, air assault, and then also United States Marine Corps supported by Navy, obviously.

And looking at it both 12 months out and then also 5 years out, Air Force support in terms of simulations, but then also as building capabilities, the training exercises; the commitment in terms of platforms—C-17s, C-130s, joint arm airborne command-and-control, electronic warfare, fighters, bombers—the frequency that the Air Force will be able to support these exercises used to go on about six times a year at Fort Bragg, and the level of commitment you are going to be able to make.

And then is there anything in the long-term planning to bring this all together, Air Force support to a truly joint exercise, whether that be simulated or at some point sort of like what Ocean Venture used to do years ago, bring in the whole joint team together?

General HESTERMAN. Sir, first of all, let me say that our commitment to our joint brothers to be able to provide that capability you described is, that is why we are here. I mean, that is what we do.

As far as being able to sustain these exercises or to grow them in, the reason we are here is to talk about the potential impact.
You can be sure that if we go much beyond the cuts that we have now or into sequester, that those kinds of things will be at risk.

Mr. GIBSON. Well, then, based on, go with the assumption for the moment, no sequester. What is the Air Force's commitment at this point in terms of platforms and really the diversity of platforms to continue to build that capability going forward? Do you have any sense or do you want to do that for the record?

General HESTERMAN. The sense of it is, is there is a lot of discussion now about which platforms we'll carry forward. The commitment, and my Service Chief articulated it yesterday, to provide this support to our land component is 100 percent.

So what platform we will do that with will be decided in the next few months, I think.

Mr. GIBSON. Yes. You know, my experience with this, I led the brigade task force that was part of the global response force, and clearly we had pressing priorities all over the globe. So, you know, this had to move down in the prioritization, but of course over time we are incurring more risk when we do that.

I would assess our risk at very high risk at this point to be able to conduct a full-blown joint forcible entry. When you look at the fact that, as you know, it is a very complex operation, and we often had to pull platforms from all across the eastern United States and in some cases all throughout the continental United States to be able to support these exercises, understandably.

And I know you are juggling a lot of things. And what I am trying to get a sense of is where we are today in terms of the Air Force's ability to support. It may very well be that we are not able to afford doing this six times a year, but what is that right frequency, are we going to be able to pull this all together, the entire joint team? Because otherwise I don't know that the American people and the people's representatives fully understand the risk that we are incurring over time.

General HESTERMAN. Sir, what I will tell you is whatever size we end up, our leadership is committed to it being exceptionally capable. So, you know, I think we do know how to do this. And I think the problem will be is in how many places we can do it, you know, and because obviously we don't get to decide where it is needed.

But, you know, our capability, I think, will be pure. How much of that capability exists, I think, is the subject of this hearing.

Mr. GIBSON. Yes. And lastly, I think your pilots will tell you that, you know, the longer you go without doing these type of exercises, the more difficult it is to try to restart and to pull that capability together.

General HESTERMAN. No argument, sir.

Mr. GIBSON. Yes.

Okay. Thanks very much, Chairman.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you. Good questions.

One last question to Congresswoman Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I just want a clarification before we disperse this afternoon. And I think you made some comments, and others here, and I have heard them as well: Why don't we bring our troops back from these foreign countries? This would save us millions and millions of dollars.
Well, I would, since we have three very important officers here before us, I am sure they will be able to answer these questions. And I will take these two countries: Korea and Japan.

Now, aside from the need for forward presence to deter potential adversaries, how much host-nation support are Japan and Korea providing to station our troops in their countries?

My understanding is that they are paying the bill. And it is a significant amount of money—billions of dollars—for MILCON [Military Construction], base operations, facilities sustainment. In fact, it would cost us a lot more to send all our troops back to the United States. We would have to build bases. We would have to build housing.

Am I right in this? And I don't think they charge us any kind of lease or lots of money for using their properties. Am I correct in this? Yes, in Japan and Korea, we don't pay leasing fees and they are providing all the facilities and so forth. Is this correct?

Admiral CLINGAN. Congresswoman, I cannot confirm for you exactly what costs the United States Navy, in our case, is paying and what costs Japan is carrying. But I do know that Japan, for example, does pay a significant amount of money to facilitate hosting us there.

Ms. BORDALLO. General.

General MILLS. I would agree with the admiral. I will have to get back to you on the exact split between what the host nation provides and what we provide.

I would absolutely agree with you that if we brought all the marines back home, that it would be a MILCON bill back in the states as our facilities are designed and built and structured that a certain percentage of our force will be forward-deployed and therefore they don't need barracks or office space or training grounds to operate on.

So I absolutely concur with the second half of your comment.

Ms. BORDALLO. And General.

General HESTERMAN. Ma'am, we will get you the exact numbers, but I believe your premise is correct.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 75.]

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. I just wanted to clarify that, Mr. Chairman, that it would cost us more to bring our troops back home than when they are stationed over in places like Japan and Korea, where they are picking up the tab.

Mr. AKIN. I very much appreciate all of you sticking with us today on the committee and for your testimony. I think that the message is pretty straightforward that we have gone about as far as she can go on this thing. And I think you have developed that in terms of a fair amount of detail for us.

So thank you all for coming out, Generals and Admiral, and I look forward to the next time. God bless you all.

Thanks.

[Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX

November 3, 2011
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

November 3, 2011
Statement of Hon. W. Todd Akin

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces

Hearing on

A Day Without Seapower and Projection Forces

November 3, 2011

Our witnesses represent those organizations within their respective services which are responsible for development of the strategy by which their departments can build a program by which to execute that strategy. Once the elements of the program have been defined, the necessary resources can be determined. Usually there will never be enough resources to execute the strategy with little or no risks in all of the elements, and a prioritization process is necessary. The less resources—the more risk.

The thing about risk in the Armed Services of the United States usually means the higher the risk, the more casualties are taken should a conflict occur.

We are about to enter a period of constrained resources, and I am sure our witnesses are well aware of the impacts in their respective services of the roughly $465 billion cut to the budget over the next 10 years from internal Department cuts and the enactment of the Budget Control Act. To further complicate things, if the Special Committee for Deficit Reduction fails to find an additional $1.2 trillion in cuts over the next 10 years, and a sequestration scenario ensues, the Defense Department will face the potential for additional cuts of roughly another $600 billion.

This all happened so fast—and I do not envy our witnesses’ predicament of having to developing strategies that have been dictated by budgets—it should be the other way around. I am sure the subcommittees would be interested in hearing the witnesses’ thoughts on this, as well as on what prioritization processes you are using to comply with the $465 billion cut, and what would happen were sequestration to occur. I want to thank the witnesses for appearing today, and look forward to your testimony.
I want to thank Chairman Akin for co-chairing this hearing, and to thank all of our members and the distinguished panel of experts and welcome them to today’s hearing focused on what the future of seapower and projection capabilities may portend in an era of austere budgets.

As Chairman Akin already offered, I want to add my thanks to our witnesses for being with us this morning to continue this very important dialogue regarding potential cuts to defense, potential impacts to the future force, and the readiness of our maritime and projection assets today and in the future.

I believe it is vital that you are all here with us today to continue to inform the members of these subcommittees and the public in advance of the “super committee” delivering its ultimate recommendations to the Congress. I will keep my remarks short in order that we proceed to the heart of the discussion.

The Readiness Subcommittee has convened numerous times in the past few months to hear from each of the Services, and most recently the Vice Chiefs regarding the current state of the force, the increased risk, and the uncertainty of the future and potential impacts to military readiness if sequestration were enacted.

While there seems to be a prevailing consensus that sequestration under the Budget Control Act would be devastating to the military, I remain severely concerned that we have already gone too far. Last year, when the DOD began closing Joint Forces Command without analysis, I told members this would soon be coming to a theater near you. Currently we are dealing with the $465 billion DOD cut that was arbitrarily made without analysis to underpin that number. Now, another shoe has dropped with regard to civilian personnel. The Air Force announced just yesterday that they will eliminate 16,500 civilian positions in Fiscal Year 2012. That is just the Air Force and only one fiscal year. What happens if the other shoe drops under sequestration? With all of these individual decisions, the cumulative effect will be devastating. At this point I would say get ready, the show is only just beginning.

This leads me to reiterate my concern regarding additional short-term decisions that could lead to the potential “hollowing of the force” under sequestration. That would be a situation that cannot be quickly reversed. General Dunford articulated this very point before the Readiness Subcommittee last week, regarding concerns that “we will make these cuts without an adequate appreciation of the strategic implications, the implications on our readiness, or the implications of breaking faith. And also . . . that folks would think that if we get it wrong, well, we can just simply fix it in a year or two. That is not possible, particularly in the latter category. And
if we break the trust of our marines, sailors, soldiers and airmen today, it would be decades before we get it back.”

The question I continue to ask is what is the risk to the national defense of our country if we continue making some of the cuts to defense we hear being discussed in Washington? There are never enough resources to eliminate all of our risks, but, there must be a *strategic assessment* to underpin the decisions. Instead, I feel that currently the DOD is just responding to budgetary pressures, the result of which could severely degrade the military’s ability to operate.

In Vice Admiral Clingan’s written testimony for this hearing today, he indicates “Without question, the Fleet is operating now at an unsustainable level. To best meet the Combatant Commanders’ need for deployed Navy forces since September 11, 2001 and to respond to emergent requirements, we have increased the frequency and average length of unit deployments. This has resulted in reduced training time; reduced maintenance availabilities; a narrowing of pre-deployment training for certain units to mission-specific tasks; and an accelerated aging of our ships and aircraft.”

Consistent with the testimony that Vice Admiral Burke provided before the Readiness Subcommittee, the Navy has been operating in a sustained surge, precluding the opportunity to do deep maintenance on fleet assets. How will that impact the future force? Looking forward, will our forces be “ready” for the mission they are called upon to do when the time comes?

While there are many contributing factors that brought us to this point today, we are currently at a crossroads where we have time yet to prepare for the many tough decisions that lie ahead. In doing so, we must not forget our obligation to ensure our men and women in uniform are given all the tools necessary for the job we ask them to do.

I look forward to learning from each of our witnesses about how we cope with these challenging fiscal times while also maintaining a ready military.
STATEMENT OF
VICE ADMIRAL BRUCE W. CLINGAN
DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS AND STRATEGY
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPower AND PROJECTION FORCES
AND
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
ON
A DAY WITHOUT SEAPower AND PROJECTION FORCES
3 NOVEMBER 2011
Chairman Akin, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member McIntyre, Ranking Member Bordallo and members of the Subcommittee, it is my honor and pleasure to appear with you, representing over 600,000 Navy men and women - active, reserve and civilian. Today, as we have done for over 200 years, our Navy is forward-deployed around the world protecting our nation. Our dedicated Navy men and women operate at sea, on land, in the air, in space and in cyberspace. I appreciate your continued support for our Sailors, our civilians, and their families.

**Seapower in the Evolving Security Environment**

The value of seapower cannot be fully appreciated outside the context of the evolving security environment, defined by a combination of recognizable trends and consequential uncertainties. The changing distribution of power in an increasingly competitive global environment poses challenges and opportunities for U.S. interests. Nation states with growing economic and political power such as China, India, Russia, Brazil and Turkey are continuing to field advanced military capabilities. Civil unrest is spreading throughout North Africa and the Middle East, fueling disorder and unexpected regime changes; and nations are employing all means of state power to restore order and extend both regional and global influence.

Rapid population growth, increased urbanization and migration into the littoral regions are exacerbating the impacts of multiple concurrent and diverse crises that challenge the capacity of nations to respond and threaten the continuity of global systems. Energy resources, precious minerals, fishing rights and food and water scarcity will continue to be the root of competition and flashpoints of conflict. Natural and man-made disasters, terrorist attacks, cyber warfare, proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and employment of advanced military technology by both state and non-state actors is causing disruptions that threaten global stability and increase the possibility of conflicts today and in the future.

These global trends in an uncertain world underpin an increasing demand for seapower. As a maritime nation, the United States is dependent upon the sea for both national security and economic prosperity. To this end, the Navy employs the global reach, persistent presence and operational flexibility inherent in U.S. Navy seapower to accomplish six strategic imperatives.

**Strategic Imperatives**

Where tensions are high or where we wish to demonstrate to our allies and friends our commitment to security and stability, U.S. naval forces regionally concentrate forward-deployed task forces with the combat power to limit regional conflict, deter major power war, and should deterrence fail, win our Nation’s wars as part of a joint or combined campaign. In the Asia-Pacific region, for example, the U.S. is bound by defense treaties with the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, the Philippines, Japan and Thailand. The U.S. Navy maintains forward capabilities in the Western Pacific to support interagency efforts to limit aggression by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), as well as to respond to other assertive or coercive actions in the region. To this end, frequent interaction to maintain and improve interoperability with the ROK, Japan, Australia and our other allies and partners is critical to effective crisis response operations and limiting the potential for regional conflicts.
The U.S. Navy provides a broad range of offshore options to deter major power war that include a survivable nuclear strike capability and forward deployed conventional combat power capable of achieving and sustaining operational access in contested areas.

As U.S. ground forces reduce their role in active combat missions in Southwest Asia and transfer internal security responsibilities to Iraq’s and Afghanistan’s national forces, these new partners and residual U.S. joint security force assistance teams – akin to those working with numerous other partners throughout the world – will rely increasingly on offshore capabilities and support. Concurrently, the Navy will continue to work with interagency and international partners to disrupt and defeat Al Qaeda, its affiliates and their support structures as our nation continues its war against violent extremist organizations.

Throughout the world, mission-tailored naval forces are distributed in order to contribute to homeland defense-in-depth, foster and sustain cooperative relationships and prevent or mitigate disruptions and crises before they impact the global systems. The Navy’s most significant contribution to homeland security is identifying and neutralizing threats as far away from our shores as possible. When required, the Navy rapidly responds to threats approaching our coastlines and off-shore assets, primarily through maritime interdiction and air/missile defense missions. Closer to home, the Navy works closely with the Coast Guard to support domestic maritime security efforts while increasing Navy-Coast Guard interoperability. The Navy also maintains the capability to support civil authorities in times of emergency and in response to natural and man-made
disasters, as well as working with the interagency to defend the nation’s cyberspace infrastructure.

Building and sustaining cooperative relationships to prevent disruptions of the interdependent global networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance is at the forefront of Navy international engagement initiatives. The Navy plays a significant role in preventing disruptions that occur if the flow of resources, commodities and components are interrupted; terrorist attacks undermine the rule of law; or natural or man-made disasters prevent economic activities. In fact, cooperative relationships play a critical role across all of the strategic imperatives and will be increasingly critical in the emerging security environment.

**The Daily Impact of U.S. Navy Seapower**

March 19, 2011 is representative of the daily impact the U.S. Navy has on achieving these strategic imperatives and protecting our national interests.

**Win Our Nation’s Wars**

On March 19, the Navy was engaged on the ground in Afghanistan and in Iraq with 8,066 Sailors, among them 1,428 mobilized Reservists. Many of these Sailors were applying core Navy competencies such as medical, construction, explosive ordnance disposal, intelligence exploitation/analysis, electronic warfare, base operations, military police, maritime and port security, airlift support, Joint Task Force (ISAF, MNF-I, USF-A)/COCOM staff support and Navy Special Warfare expertise to make significant contributions to the successful accomplishment of our joint operations ashore. Still others were applying their initiative, creativity and adaptability to
perform tasks outside Navy’s core competencies, leading and contributing to Provincial Reconstruction Teams, detainee operations, civil affairs, Embedded Training Teams, customs inspections, counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) exploitation and combat support. In total, nearly 13,000 Sailors were employed throughout the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) conducting ground-based combat, combat support and combat service support missions.

On the same day, more than 13,000 additional Sailors were conducting naval missions afloat in CENTCOM’s AOR. Sailors from Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron 5 were providing security aboard vessels supporting the rotation and sustainment of the joint force operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. Carrier Air Wing 1 embarked in USS ENTERPRISE completed 28 sorties from the Arabian Sea in support of U.S. and coalition ground forces conducting counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations throughout Afghanistan. USS CARL VINSON, having just completed a month at sea conducting similar flight operations, was heading to Jebel Ali for a short maintenance availability in preparation for follow-on tasking to support Operation NEW DAWN in Iraq. Within the week, the USS CARL VINSON/Carrier Air Wing 17 team would fly 13 sorties in support of Operation NEW DAWN, contributing to the Navy’s share of air support for Multi-National Forces-Iraq which averages 30 percent of the fixed-wing sorties and almost 60 percent of the electronic attack sorties flown over Iraq each day.

On March 19, Navy also conducted 54 flight hours of manned Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) mission support for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq that included seven Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft (P-3/EP-3) sorties. Elsewhere throughout the world, six P-3 ISR missions,
three EP-3 missions and 230 hours of ISR coverage from 17 forward-deployed unmanned systems (BAMS-D, Fire Scout, Scan Eagle and Shadow) were provided by the Navy, some of it in the continuing fight against violent extremist organizations. On this day in particular, surface combatants and both manned and unmanned ISR were pursuing high-value terrorist targets in both Somalia and Yemen.

Limit Regional Conflict

March 19 marked the beginning of ODYSSEY DAWN, an operation initially mounted to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya to protect its citizens from potential genocide perpetrated by their own government. Subsequently, the mission was expanded to support the internationally recognized transition government and its ground forces as they endeavored to displace the Qaddafi regime. On the first day of ODYSSEY DAWN, the U.S. Navy launched 122 Tomahawk Cruise Missiles from two surface ships and three submarines, including the USS FLORIDA. This strike marked the first time an OHIO-class guided-missile submarine launched TLAMs during hostilities. Navy E/A-18G Growlers ground-based in Iraq were retasked to support ODYSSEY DAWN, and within 44 hours of completing a combat mission over Iraq were engaged against hostile forces in Libya. Other ODYSSEY DAWN highlights in the days after March 19th include the engagement of the Libyan Coast Guard vessel VITTORIA, suspected of laying mines, with a AGM-65 Maverick missile fired from a P-3; and the employment of a MV-22 Osprey from the deck of the USS KEARSARGE in a Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) mission that successfully recovered an Air Force pilot who had ejected over northeastern Libya.
On March 19 in the Asia-Pacific region, both a Carrier Strike Group and an Expeditionary Strike Group were underway, visibly demonstrating to North Korea that belligerent acts like the sinking of South Korea’s corvette CHEONAN, which had occurred almost a year prior, could invite an immediate proportional response to prevent potential ‘anniversary’ aggression from spiraling into a regional conflict.

Deter Major Power War

On March 19, 23 submarines were forward deployed around the world conducting missions vital to national security, including ballistic missile submarines on strategic nuclear deterrent patrols. Moreover, four carrier strike groups, three amphibious ready groups, 23 independently deploying surface combatants and amphibious ships, nine fleet oilers and 15 P-3s from three Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft detachments were forward deployed, prepared to aggregate credible combat power capable of generating decisive effects in response to a crisis.

Contribute to Homeland Defense-in-depth

Among the forward deployed forces that the Navy employs to contribute to homeland defense-in-depth, surface combatants with AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability are increasingly in demand as the range of ballistic missile systems increase and the systems proliferate. On March 19, USS MONTEREY deployed to begin the enduring presence of Aegis BMD-capable ships in the Mediterranean as part of the Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense in Europe as directed by the President. MONTEREY joined the USS STOUT conducting Operation SHARP SENTRY in the Eastern Mediterranean supporting ballistic missile defense of Israel; and USS FITZGERALD, USS TRUXTON and
USS PICKNEY and three alternate ships were providing similar defense of Japan and defense-in-depth for the United States.

Ballistic missiles are not the only proliferating threats that pose a growing challenge to the United States. Numerous state and non-state actors are developing and employing cyber capabilities to exploit intellectual capital and military capabilities, as well as mounting attacks that disrupt or damage networks, data repositories, automated control systems and hardware. To deal with this growing threat, the Navy re-established the U.S. 10th Fleet. Cyberspace has become an important warfighting domain, and 10th Fleet's mission is to integrate cyber capabilities into naval operations to achieve information dominance. On March 19, 10th Fleet and its subordinate commands countered approximately 150 malicious attacks.

Foster and Sustain Cooperative Relationships

The Navy's premier maritime security engagement program employs "Partnership Stations" to strengthen the maritime security capacity of partners by developing maritime professionals, infrastructure, domain awareness and response capabilities. It is designed to be a multi-national security cooperation initiative that involves allies and able partners in planning, training and other aspects of the endeavor, ultimately building national and regional capabilities that can be aggregated to achieve global maritime security. To this end, on March 19 USS CLEVELAND was in the South Pacific conducting a Pacific Partnership Station with numerous Pacific island nations; Sailors and Marines from High Speed Vessel SWIFT were performing community relations projects in Honduras; USS OAK HILL was conducting Southern Partnership Station to counter
transnational organized crime in the Caribbean Sea; USNS COMFORT was participating in CONTINUING PROMISE, providing medical care to the citizens of various South American countries; and USS ROBERT G BRADLEY was in Freetown, Sierra Leone, conducting Africa Partnership Station West maritime security training events.

In other engagement efforts on March 19th, Virginia Class submarine USS NEW HAMPSHIRE and the Seawolf Class submarine USS CONNECTICUT commenced Ice Exercise 2011 in the Arctic Ocean with other U.S., Canadian and United Kingdom units. Seabees from several Naval Mobile Construction Battalions were building schools in Djibouti and drilling water wells in Ethiopia, as part of our humanitarian civil assistance efforts in Africa to help our partners prevent the establishment of violent extremist safe havens.

Prevent or Contain Local Disruptions

On March 19, the REAGAN Carrier Strike Group responded to one of largest humanitarian disasters in recent memory as the earthquake and tsunami in Japan affected our strongest ally in the Pacific region. Navy was on-hand immediately to provide critical humanitarian assistance in the face of widespread devastation from the opening hours of the tragedy. REAGAN was transiting the Western Pacific en route to conduct combat air operations over Afghanistan and quickly altered course. Within hours they were headed to Japan where they used much of the same training practiced for Afghanistan to deliver humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. At the same time, the ESSEX Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), normally stationed in Okinawa with USS HARPERS FERRY, USS GERMANTOWN and with the embarked 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), continued their transit to the
Sea of Japan near Honshu, to be in position to launch Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HADR) missions over land. Military Sealift Command's dry cargo/ammunition ship USNS MATTHEW PERRY conducted replenishment-at-sea operations with the USS ESSEX ARG, sustaining their support of what eventually became known as Operation TOMODACHI. Additionally, USS TORTUGA, with two embarked heavy-lift MH-53 helicopters, on-loaded approximately 300 Japanese Ground Self Defense Force personnel and 90 vehicles in Tomakomai, Hokkaido to transport them to the disaster area. USNS SAFEGUARD, along with Mobile Dive and Salvage Unit 1, Companies 1 and 2, arrived in Yokosuka, Japan, to begin on-loading HADR supplies for transport to devastated regions throughout the country. Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 62 transported 10,375 pounds of radiological control equipment and 18 members of Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard's Radiological Control Team to Atsugi, Japan, to assist with HADR and nuclear monitoring efforts.

On March 19, USS HALYBURTON, USS RULKELEY, USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN, USNS ARCTIC and USNS ALAN SHEPARD conducted counter-piracy operations in the vicinity of the Horn of Africa to prevent the disruption of the free flow of resources and trade through the Gulf of Aden. HALYBURTON responded to a bridge-to-bridge call from a pirated vessel, M/V IRENE, requesting immediate medical assistance for a suspected pirate. HALYBURTON agreed to provide medical assistance and requested that the pirates release their hostages, to which the suspected pirates agreed. Though the injured pirate succumbed to his injuries, the pirates released 13 hostages to HALYBURTON where they received food and medical attention and were ultimately repatriated.
On March 19, USS DOYLE was at sea conducting counter-illicit trafficking operations with its embarked U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment. Three E-2C Hawkeye aircraft and crews from Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron 77 (VAW-77) flew three missions for a total of 13 flight hours in support of counter-illicit trafficking operations in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility. Meanwhile, the Reserve crew of Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 53 delivered 20 personnel and 10,000 pounds of maintenance support equipment for VAW-77 from Naval Air Station New Orleans to El Salvador, allowing VAW-77 to continue uninterrupted anti-drug/stability operations.

**A Day Without Navy Seapower**

In total, 152 of the Navy's 288 Battle Force Ships were underway or forward-deployed on March 19, along with a similar percentage of our other capabilities - training for or engaged in missions focused on accomplishing our strategic imperatives and advancing our national interests. Without the seapower the Navy uniquely provides our nation, not one of the activities undertaken on the 19th of March would have been accomplished; nor would a similar number and range of activities be accomplished every day of every year.

**Impact of Budget Control Act**

Even with all the activity taking place on March 19, the Navy was still not able to meet the global demand for naval forces requested by the Geographic Combatant Commanders. Throughout fiscal year 2011, the Navy was only able to source an average of 59 percent of the Combatant Commander’s requirements.
Without question, the Fleet is operating now at an unsustainable level. To best meet the Combatant Commanders' need for deployed Navy forces since September 11, 2001 and to respond to emergent requirements, we have increased the frequency and average length of unit deployments. This has resulted in reduced training time; reduced maintenance availabilities; a narrowing of pre-deployment training for certain units to mission-specific tasks; and an accelerated aging of our ships and aircraft. As our ground forces draw down from combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, every indication is that demand for naval forces' presence, deterrence and engagement activities will increase.

The impact of the cuts directed by the Budget Control Act is still being determined, and so a detailed discussion of how those cuts might affect the Force and the allocation of Navy resources to the Combatant Commanders would be premature. Clearly, each of the Services stands to be affected by the budget decisions made in the weeks and months ahead—and Navy, with its capital-intensive shipbuilding and aircraft procurement and maintenance accounts, could potentially be the Service most adversely affected. The Navy has postured itself over the past decade to meet its requirements in the most efficient manner possible, but not without assuming some manageable risk in the process. Careful consideration will be given to decisions meant to keep the fleet at a high state of readiness while investing in future capabilities and building the ships, submarines and aircraft that will patrol the seas in an increasingly lethal environment during the coming decades. We anticipate that a Navy top-line decrease as a result of the Budget Control Act will reduce the capability, capacity and proficiency required by the fleet to accomplish our global missions; reduce the
operational availability of those forces that we retain; and increase the risk to mission success and our naval forces to the maximum acceptable limit.

Should additional cuts beyond those expected from the Budget Control Act be imposed on the Navy, we anticipate confronting stark choices with further reductions in our ability to perform our most vital missions. While we would continue to make informed decisions with regard to prioritizing those missions and managing the associated risks, the impacts of potential Navy budgets resulting from sequestration will drastically affect the readiness of all of our Sailors and platforms as well as their ability to successfully perform their vital missions as part of the Joint Force tasked with guaranteeing national security.

The Navy will manage the risks of reduced resources by continuing to put our core war-fighting responsibilities first—ensuring we are ready to fight and win today, while building the ability to win tomorrow as resources allow. Operating forward, we will continue to provide offshore options to deter, influence and win in an era of uncertainty and harness the teamwork, talent and imagination of our diverse force to employ resources responsibly in order to be ready to fight.

**Enduring Value of Navy Seapower**

In an ever-changing and uncertain global environment, one fact remains clear. The United States is, and always will be, a maritime nation. Vast quantities of global goods—over 70 percent of the total of all trade value are moved by sea, mandating a dedicated and vigilant force to safeguard maritime routes and promote economic prosperity and security. When one considers that almost 90 percent of the earth's population lives
within 500 miles of the sea, it becomes clear how much humanity still relies on the freedom of the oceans as a medium for trade and sustenance. Our maritime forces not only contribute to national and global economic health, but also provide Combatant Commanders with flexible and rapid response options that include sustained high-intensity operations without the need for a sizeable footprint ashore or permission from any other nation. The Navy’s global presence in defense of free access to the global commons by all nations is vital to our national security and prosperity. The Navy’s preeminent role in this regard is unique among the Armed Forces and cannot be replaced.

Once again, I thank you for this opportunity to address the Subcommittee and I appreciate your support for those who sail in harm’s way.
United States Navy

Biography

Vice Admiral Bruce W. Clingan
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
for Operations, Plans and Strategy (N3/N5)

Vice Admiral Bruce W. Clingan is a native of Lafayette, Ind., but
was raised in Bellevue, Wash. He graduated from the University
of Washington and holds a Masters of Science from the
University of Southern California. He received his commission
through the NROTC program in June 1977.

Designated a naval aviator in May 1979, Clingan flew F-14
Tomcats with Fighter Squadron 124, Fighter Squadron 114, and
Fighter Squadron 211, making deployments aboard USS
America (CV 66), USS Enterprise (CVN 65), USS Kitty Hawk
(CV 63), and USS Nimitz (CVN 68). He commanded Fighter
Squadron 11, and after completing the nuclear power program,
served as executive officer of USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72).
Subsequently, he commanded the 6th Fleet flagship USS
LaSalle (AGF 3) and USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70).

Ashore, Clingan served as an F-14 flight instructor at Fighter Squadron 124, where he helped
Naval Air Systems Command and Grumman Aerospace Corporation develop the F-14D Super
Tomcat as a member of the Aircrew Systems Advisory Panel.

Clingan’s first Joint assignment was in Europe, as a member of the Operations and Readiness
Branch, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, where he helped negotiate various North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/Spanish Coordination Agreements.

After selection to flag rank, Clingan joined United States Central Command, serving as deputy
director of Operations from April 2002 to May 2004 during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi
Freedom. Clingan assumed command of Carrier Strike Group 3 / Carl Vinson Strike Group in June
2004 and served as CTF-50/152 during an extended deployment in support of Operation Iraqi
Freedom in 2005. Subsequently, he joined the staff of the chief of Naval Operations in September
2005 as deputy director, Air Warfare Division (N78B), followed by assignments as director, Air
Warfare Division (N88) and director, Warfare Integration/Senior National Representative (N8F).
Following his tour on chief of Naval Operations staff, he assumed command of Joint Command
Lisbon; commander, U.S. 6th Fleet; commander, Allied Joint Command Lisbon; commander,
Striking and Support Forces NATO; deputy commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe; deputy
commander, U.S. Naval Forces Africa; and Joint Forces Maritime Component commander, Europe.

Clingan began his current tour of duty in December 2009 as deputy chief of Naval Operations for
Operations, Plans and Strategy (N3/N5).

Clingan’s personal decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service
Medal (two awards), the Legion of Merit (four awards), the Bronze Star, the Defense Meritorious
Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal, the Navy Achievement Medal (two awards) and
various service and campaign awards.
STATEMENT OF
LIEUTENANT GENERAL RICHARD P. MILLS
DEPUTY COMMANDANT
COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION &
COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT
COMMAND
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
CONCERNING
A DAY WITHOUT SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
NOVEMBER 3, 2011
Introduction

Chairman Akin, Ranking Member McIntyre, and distinguished members of this Subcommittee, I am honored to appear here today.

Our Nation faces an uncertain future in an era of considerable fiscal constraints. Competing economic pressures have generated vigorous debate regarding the military capabilities and capacities necessary to protect the broad range of U.S. national security interests across the globe.

In today’s testimony, I will describe the vital and increased requirement for seapower that supports our National Security Strategy, and enable us to fulfill Joint Force requirements. In these challenging times, the United States Marine Corps is uniquely positioned to provide a stabilizing force in critical regions of the world.

Overview

We are a maritime nation with global interests and responsibilities. The future, like today, will be characterized by shifting demographics, economic transition, political upheaval, increasingly swift access to information, the proliferation of advanced weapons, and technology and resource competition. Environmental degradation and the associated loss of resources, especially clean water and arable land, will add to instability.

Forward-deployed amphibious forces provide the capability to conduct security cooperation and engagement activities to build partnership capacity; respond to natural and man-made crises; and overcome access challenges to gain entry. In times of international crises the ability to position amphibious forces offshore allows policy makers to signal U.S. concerns or intentions without prematurely committing forces ashore, providing an invaluable means of deterring potential foes. For example, amphibious forces have conducted strikes against terrorist targets in Afghanistan and loyalist forces in Libya, conducted counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, responded to national disasters in Japan, conducted numerous security cooperation activities with the forces of our partner nations, reinforced combat operations in Afghanistan, and stood off the coasts of several countries in crisis ready to rescue American citizens if called upon to do so. While one might assume these various events have occurred over a number of years, in point of fact they occurred in a mere five month period this year.

These events reveal why persistent forward presence is a cornerstone of American seapower. Failure to maintain an adequate forward presence undermines our national security and economic well-being. Without an adequate forward presence the United States puts maritime commerce at risk; loses credibility among both friends and foes; forfeits opportunities to establish and maintain influence; relinquishes the ability to operate in austere environments or overcome damaged infrastructure; and divests itself of a critical means of responding to crises. We diminish our ability to protect our citizens, our interests, or to project power overseas, becoming reliant on the willingness of others to grant access.
Strategic Environment

Assured access to and freedom of maneuver within the global commons is being challenged by state and non-state actors. Terrorists, criminal networks, and pirates undermine the rule of law and present obstacles to the free flow of goods through the world’s oceanic network. The U.S. two-way trade in goods and services totals $1.4 trillion annually. With 95% of U.S. international trade, 90% of world trade, and two-thirds of world petroleum transported by sea, maritime security is paramount. The world economy is tightly interconnected and economic prosperity is not possible without secure passageways for the flow of goods.

Trends in the world’s population further complicate the need for stability in the maritime domain. We live in a dynamic, interconnected world in which our Nation’s security and prosperity are inseparable. Nations with poor economic conditions and weak governance are more prone to armed conflict. With the majority of the world’s population residing within 200 miles of the sea, and global population projected to increase by approximately 1.2 billion by 2025, access to the littorals is paramount. The mix of population density, social instability, mass communication, and extremist ideologies highlights the potential for significant international disruptions.

The result of these environmental challenges was seen this year in the outbreak of protests throughout North African and Middle Eastern countries during what is now known as the Arab Spring. The spark for these uprisings was a combination of high youth unemployment/economic disparity, authoritarian leaders, corruption, lack of human rights, and low levels of development – basic economic and governance issues. Social networks enabled these otherwise small-scale incidents of discontent to mobilize into full blown revolutions.

The world’s littoral regions sit at the nexus of this challenging new world, increasing the importance of the littorals to the more interconnected global economy and increasing the potential for instability in those regions. In an era of growing sensitivities to U.S. and coalition presence on sovereign soil, sea-based forces provide a discrete, flexible and effective means of selectively engaging to build partners and prevent conflict. Seapower is that singular unifying force that assures stability, access, and confidence in the maritime domain.

A Day Without Seapower

The Backgrounder piece “Thinking About a Day Without Seapower: Implications for U.S. Defense Policy” is enlightening but does not go far enough. The U.S. Air Force recently conducted a study of the impacts of a day without space – highlighting the challenges we might face if we lose our space-based communications and surveillance systems – among others. In a world without seapower, the outlook for U.S. and global economic stability is similarly bleak.

If we lose our ability to be forward deployed and ready to respond to crisis, the challenges are similar to those uncovered by the Air Force study – but terrestrial. This change would create challenges in terms of weapons of mass destruction, protection of shipping on the high seas, protection of American citizens living and working abroad, reduced employment,
harm to our economic and financial systems, and, lastly, in our ability to face adversaries on their ground – not American soil.

Without seapower, piracy would increase from a regional challenge in a couple of locations – to becoming almost worldwide. While our citizens may be vaguely aware of piracy off the coast of Africa, they would be outraged by piracy in the Caribbean. With recent events in Libya, Americans may recognize the shores of Tripoli as something more than a line in a well known hymn – but we must remember that it was a lack of seapower – or the ability to project the same – that developed the circumstances that gave the Barbary pirates the confidence to openly feed on trade. That is why a young nation established a Navy and Marine Corps.

Americans have become accustomed to traveling and working abroad with very few restrictions. While there are those that choose to hike in areas where westerners are not welcome, most Americans travel with a high level of assurance for their safety. When circumstances rapidly change - and local tensions risk the safety of Americans - like they did in Lebanon in 2006 - we expect forward deployed sea-based forces to save the day. In Lebanon, nearly fifteen thousand Americans were evacuated from the country - enabled by American seapower. While we are all uncomfortable when a couple of hikers in Iran are taken prisoner - having thousands held hostage by the Hezbollah would have been unthinkable. Yet, without the forward presence of naval forces, this scenario was absolutely in the realm of the possible. Without seapower, on July 16-24, 2006, the 26th MEU would not have been forward deployed and able to rescue these Americans from Lebanon when war broke out between Israel and Hezbollah paramilitary forces.

Without seapower, on November 25, 2001, Task Force 58 would not have been able to launch from the amphibious assault ship Peleliu and travel nearly 400 miles from the North Arabian Sea before touching down in Afghanistan. Within a week of the initial assault, more than 1,000 Marines had landed on the dusty airstrip in Kandahar province.

Without seapower, on 12 August 2010, the USS Peleliu (LHA-5) Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)/15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) would not have been able to rapidly respond with humanitarian assistance after the record-breaking monsoon rains caused massive flooding in Pakistan.

Without seapower, 28 days later on 9 September 2010, 24 Marines from 15th MEU’s Maritime Raid Force would not have been postured to recover the Magellan Star and liberate its crew from nine pirates who had seized the vessel a day earlier.

Without seapower, on March 12, 2011, the Marines with 31st MEU would not have been able to rapidly deploy critically-needed supplies and aid to areas that need it most in the wake of the earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan on March 11, 2010.

Without seapower, on March 22, 2011, Marines from the 26th MEU would not have been positioned of the coast of Libya where they safely rescued a pilot of a downed Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle after it crashed during a mission against a missile site. The Marine aircraft began
launching off the USS Kearsarge, which was roughly 130 nautical miles from the pilot, within 30
minutes of the crash.

The force for the future must be able to project power overseas, build partnerships to
reduce the bravado of would be belligerents, respond to small-scale crisis and, when necessary,
forcibly enter the sovereign domain of another state or the area held by non-state actors to do
whatever has to be done. Amphibious forces have inherent strategic mobility and operational
flexibility. They can rapidly sail to a position to influence potential crises from the sea, without
forcing escalation or aggravating sovereignty concerns. They can loiter unseen over the horizon
or provide a visible deterrent. Once action ashore is deemed necessary, they can maneuver by air
or surface means, as the situation warrants, while being sustained from the sea. Amphibious
forces can create access, forcibly if necessary, and return to the sea with the same swiftness with
which they went ashore.

This national ability to project power at a time, place, and manner of our choosing creates
a strategic asymmetry that imposes great costs on potential enemies. The U.S. is unlikely to
engage in extended land campaigns in the visible future, but addressing the smaller-scale
contingencies that accompany an uncertain world demand a team that can protect our citizens
and interests swiftly and effectively. Other methods for crisis response may be subject to denial
of over flight or landing permissions, lack of infrastructure in the objective area, or have inherent
limitations regarding the operational capabilities of the force, especially with respect to self-
sustainment.

Conclusion

Even with economic headwinds, the United States remains the world’s largest economy.
We are, however, critically dependent on the global commons for the exports and imports that
sustain our livelihood. Disruptions in the global system have measurable economic impacts on
every family. Maritime commerce is most vulnerable in the littorals—where sea meets land. The
Nation’s amphibious forces provide the ability to maneuver throughout the seaward and
landward portions of the littorals to deter, defend, and protect these vital areas from a variety of
threats without dependence on bases or stations ashore.

The Marine Corps provides this amphibious flexibility at an affordable cost. For
approximately 8% of the total DoD budget (Marine Corps budget plus Navy budget portions that
support the Marine mission, including amphibious shipping and naval aviation, corpsmen,
doctors, chaplains, etc.), our Nation gains the ability to respond to unexpected crises, from
humanitarian disaster relief efforts, to non-combatant evacuation operations, to conduct counter-
piracy operations, raids or strikes. That same force can assure access for other critical joint
capabilities anywhere in the world in the event of a major contingency; it can be dialed up or
down like a rheostat to be relevant across the range of military operations. No other force
possesses the flexibility to provide these capabilities and yet sustain itself logistically for
significant periods of time, at a time and place of its choosing. As the early 20th century military
historian Sir B.H. Liddell Hart accurately stated, amphibious flexibility is the greatest strategic
asset that a sea based power possesses.
In this age of uncertainty, the demand for adaptable forces—capable of immediately responding to crises—is certain. All things are not equally important or affordable. As the Nation resources its future national security, it will be forced to make tough choices between capabilities, capacities, and levels of readiness in and among the Services. Although it is impossible to know where the next flare-up will be, well trained and equipped amphibious forces will be ready to respond and protect interests or prevent undesired effects. We are ever mindful of what we provide to this Nation and the resources we ask for in order to conduct our missions.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and I look forward to answering your questions.
A native of Huntington, New York, Lieutenant General Mills was commissioned via Officer Candidate School. As a Lieutenant he served at the battalion level in two Marine Divisions as a rifle platoon commander, weapons platoon commander, rifle company executive officer, and adjutant. As a Captain he attended Amphibious Warfare School, served at Parris Island as a series officer and commanded a recruit company before joining the 6th Marines, 2d Marine Division, as the Commanding Officer of Alpha Company and Regimental Assistant Operations Officer.

As a Major, he was assigned to the Officer Assignment Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps, attended the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, was a Military Observer with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, and served as the Air/Ground Liaison Officer, Marine Air Group 29, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing.

Lieutenant Colonel Mills served as Operations Officer, 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU SOC) taking part in operations off Bosnia and Somalia, was assigned as the Amphibious Exercise/Operations Officer on the staff of the Commander, United States Sixth Fleet in Gaeta, Italy, and as Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 6th Marines (deploying as Battalion Landing Team 3/6, 24th MEU (SOC)).

While a Colonel, he studied at the Royal College of Defense Studies, London, England, was the Officer-In-Charge of the Special Operations Training Group, II MEF before commanding the 24th MEU (SOC). While under his command the 24th MEU (SOC) participated in Operations Joint Guardian in Kosovo, Enduring Freedom, and combat operations ashore in Iraq as part of Task Force Tarawa.

Next Colonel Mills went to Headquarters, United States European Command (EUCOM) in Stuttgart, Germany for duty as the Assistant Chief of Staff then, selected to Brigadier General, was the Deputy Director of Operations at EUCOM. Subsequently he was Director, Manpower Management Division at Headquarters Marine Corps before assuming command of the 1st Marine Division.

From 2007 to 2009 Brigadier General Mills served concurrently as Assistant Division Commander, 1st Marine Division and upon promotion to Major general as Commander, Ground Combat Element, Multi-National Forces - West, Al Anbar Province, Iraq. Upon returning from Iraq he again assumed command of the 1st Marine Division and then was selected to command the 1 Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) which deployed to Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In June 2010, he assumed command of the newly-created Regional Command (Southwest) and in October 2010 he relinquished command of the 1st Marine Division. In March 2011 he relinquished his duties as the Commander, Regional Command (Southwest). Lieutenant General Mills is the first Marine Corps General Officer to command NATO forces in combat. In July 2011 and upon promotion Lieutenant General Mills assumed the duties as the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration.
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

PRESENTATION TO THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SUBJECT: Strategic Bombers, Aerial Refueling, and Airlift Projection Forces

STATEMENT OF: Major General John W. Hesterman, III
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations,
Plans and Requirements

November 3, 2011
I. Introduction

Chairman Akin, Ranking Member McIntyre, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for calling this hearing, and for the opportunity to provide you with an update on the missions and accomplishments of Air Force strategic bombers, aerial refueling platforms, and airlift projection forces. The Air Force is fully engaged in operations across the globe, enabling Combatant Commanders to successfully execute their missions. As we manage this effort in an era of fiscal challenges, preserving the readiness of the force is our prime imperative. Looking ahead, the joint and coalition team will continue to rely on the Air Force to provide these unique bomber, tanker and airlift contributions to national security.

In a complex environment requiring a wide range of mission capabilities, the Air Force provides what we have called “Four plus one” unique contributions—gaining control of air, space, and cyberspace; holding targets at risk around the world; providing responsive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); rapidly transporting people and equipment across the globe; and providing command and control to conduct operations rapidly, effectively and efficiently. Collectively, they not only distinguish our Air Force as the preeminent air and space power, they also bolster the United States’ reputation as the world’s most responsive and capable strategic actor. We provide America with a wide range of strategic options for rapid power projection with minimum vulnerability and maximum precision.

II. Contributions of our Air Force

Today, the Air Force flies and fights in air, space, and cyberspace as a valued member of our joint and coalition teams. Last fiscal year the Air Force conducted more than 41,000 sorties in support of Operation NEW DAWN (OND), almost 118,000 sorties in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), delivered over 1.78 million passengers and 712,000 tons of cargo, and employed almost 2,580 short tons of munitions. Additionally, since 2003, we have transported nearly 86,000 patients from the Central Command area of responsibility to hospital facilities in Europe and the United States.

The Air Force possesses unique capabilities to achieve lethal and non-lethal effects that shape the strategic behavior of others, often at long range and in heavily opposed environments. Maintaining our conventional precision strike capability, along with credible nuclear deterrence, will continue to play a critical role in strategic deterrence, crisis response, and global stability.
Based on Secretary of Defense direction, the Air Force is developing a new Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B). The LRS-B will be one component of a larger family of systems for conventional Long Range Strike, including ISR, electronic attack, communications and other capabilities. The LRS-B will also be nuclear capable and designed to accommodate manned or unmanned operations. The Air Force will use a streamlined management approach and make capability tradeoffs as necessary to hold procurement unit costs at estimated targets. The program plans to ensure sufficient production for a sustainable inventory over the long term (approximately 80-100 aircraft), delivering an initial capability in the mid-2020s.

Military operations rely on Air Force mobility to transport people, fuel, and equipment quickly and precisely around the world. The dedicated people and high-tech systems providing rapid global mobility underpin U.S. crisis response, long-range strike, joint combat support, humanitarian relief, and global logistics. The distinctive capability of intercontinental and intra-theater airlift remains a bedrock of U.S. power projection.

These effects are realized by the success of our tanker fleet, the backbone of the Department of Defense’s global power projection and global reach capabilities. This fleet consists of 414 KC-135 and 59 KC-10 aircraft, both with a projected service life through 2040. At that time, the average age of the KC-135 will be over 80 years, and the KC-10 will average over 54 years. This past year, our tankers flew over 99,000 hours in support of OEF, 14,000 hours in support of ODD, and 19,000 hours in support Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP) for operations in Libya.

While the Air Force is fully committed to ongoing operations, we must also continue to identify and prepare counter future threats. Current and emerging capabilities and strategies, sometimes referred to as “anti-access and area denial”, reflect the changing character of future warfare. The Air Force must adapt, by enhancing existing capabilities and, where necessary, carefully adding new ones, while more integrating conceptually and operationally with our sister services. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps are working together to develop and implement the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) operational concept. By collaborating with the sea services, and by seeking methods to integrate our operations both within the services and our allies, we can maintain the US military’s advantage in the air, space, and maritime domains and guarantee both access to the global commons and our freedom of action.
Finally, our efforts succeed only through the sacrifice, hard work and dedication of every Airman in the Total Force. Nearly 39,000 Active Duty, Reserve, and National Guard Airmen are deployed to 135 locations across the globe, with over 29,000 in and around Afghanistan and Iraq, as we unwaveringly do whatever it takes to prevail in today’s wars.

III. Current Platforms

Strategic Bombers

The Air Force’s bomber fleet of B-1, B-2, and B-52 aircraft provides an unmatched long-range precision strike capability. On a daily basis, these 162 aircraft perform critical missions from precision strike in support of OEF, to the continuous bomber presence in the Pacific, and the enduring nuclear deterrence mission. The Air Force is committed to future long-range strike capabilities as part of a comprehensive, phased plan, valued at $5.5 billion over the FYDP, to modernize and sustain our bomber force.

B-1 LANCER

The 66 aircraft B-1 fleet has maintained a deployed presence since the 9/11 attacks in support of both OEF and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). During this time, the B-1 has flown more than 9,000 missions and amassed more than 105,000 combat hours. In OEF alone, the B-1 has delivered nearly 40 percent of all munitions dropped, while flying only 5 percent of all sorties. In March of this year, the B-1 demonstrated its range and lethality as two aircraft departed from Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota in the middle of a snowstorm, flying over 20 hours to Libya to conduct four strike missions within 96 hours of each other in direct support of Operation ODYSSEY DAWN (OOD).

As part of a continuing effort to ensure the capability of the B-1, the Air Force is retiring six aircraft to fund modifications through the remainder of the B-1 fleet. These modifications are essential to correct safety-of-flight discrepancies and without which the B-1 fleet system will begin to experience grounding issues which will severely undermine its deterrence and power projection capabilities. This is strictly a programming action, taking acceptable (moderate) risk to the overall bomber capability requirement.

BUDGET IMPACT: With respect to the FY12 budget, the Air Force strongly opposes Congressional language that imposes B-1 force structure restrictions. A six and a half year
moratorium on B-1 force structure will critically impact the Air Force’s ability to operate efficiently and effectively by restricting force structure decision-making to comply with rigid Congressional requirements. The overall health and viability of the B-1 fleet will be significantly enhanced by the platform modification and sustainment funding made possible with the retirement of six B-1 bombers as outlined in the FY12 Presidential Budget. Modification of the B-1 fleet is essential to correct safety-of-flight discrepancies attributed to the Vertical Situation Display Upgrade. The retirement of six B-1s will be used to fund these programs. Without the availability of this funding, the B-1 weapon system will begin to experience grounding issues which will severely undermine its deterrence and power projection capabilities. The Air Force strongly recommends Congressional support to retire six B-1s as outlined in the FY12 Presidential Budget to ensure the health and continued viability of the B-1 fleet.

B-2 SPIRIT

The 20 aircraft B-2 fleet performs nuclear deterrence and strategic attack missions to provide the U.S. with global range, precision strike, large and flexible payload capability. It is the only aircraft capable of long-range delivery of direct attack munitions in an anti-access environment. Like the B-1, the B-2 also showed its global reach by flying combat missions from Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri non-stop to Libya in support of OOD. Additionally, the B-2 is part of Pacific Command’s Continuous Bomber Presence to assure allies and support US interests in the Pacific.

BUDGET IMPACT: With respect to the FY12 budget, the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) has proposed a reduction of $22.0 million Research Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding in FY12 to the B-2 Defensive Management System (DMS). The DMS was just approved to begin technology development. This reduction will prevent the Air Force from pursuing development acceleration initiatives that can potentially reduce the overall program schedule by three years, and save half a billion dollars. Additionally, the SAC passed two separate rescissions of FY11 procurement funding – $33 million of B-2 modification funding and $22.579 million of B-2 MultiDisplay Unit funding. The combined rescissions would decimate B-2 FY11 procurement funds, leaving less remaining in the modification account than has already been spent.

Furthermore, the House reduced B-2 FY12 modernization funding by $10.3 million. The reduction is roughly one quarter of the $41.315 million requested, and will prevent installation of
the final two radar antenna kits as part of the Radar Modernization Program, prevent training system upgrades, and eliminate the ability to perform low cost low observable improvements to the B-2 aircraft.

**B-52 STRATOFORTRESS**

The 76 aircraft of the B-52 fleet are our nation’s oldest bombers yet they maintain a diverse range of critical capabilities. The B-52 has flown combat missions in support of OIF, OIF and supported the Pacific Command’s Continuous Bomber Presence mission on Guam in addition to its nuclear deterrence mission. The Air Force remains committed to ensuring the B-52 fleet, the backbone of the manned strategic bomber for the United States, remains viable through 2040. Major B-52 modernizations include upgrades to communications, radar, and to the internal weapons bay. Updated with modern technology, the B-52 will be capable of delivering the full array of jointly developed weapons.

**BUDGET IMPACT:** With respect to the FY12 budget, the SAC has reduced the FY12 RDT&E funding by $16.0 million for 1760 Internal Weapons Bay Upgrade. This reduction will prevent timely procurement of weapon flight test articles to support FY14 testing thus delaying integration of Joint Direct Attack Munition, Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile, and Miniature Air Launched Decoy onto the B-52.

**Aerial Refueling**

**KC-10 EXTENDER**

The KC-10 provides a unique capability through its combination of strategic offload, ability to receive fuel in-flight, significant dual role cargo capacity, and same-sortie boom and drogue refueling comprise a flexible mobility asset. Deployed worldwide, its ability to refuel U.S., allied, and coalition receivers same-sortie with boom or drogue as well as to consolidate fuel from other tankers has provided outstanding flexibility. In FY11, the KC-10 flew over 33,000 hours in OEF, 2,700 hours in OND and 4,000 hours in OUP.

The Air Force is modernizing the KC-10 fleet to maintain capabilities such as the replacing the Boom Control Unit and the Communication/Navigation/Surveillance Air Traffic Management modification program, designed to ensure access to international civil airspace in general and fuel efficient routes and altitudes in particular.

**BUDGET IMPACT:** For the FY12 budget, there are no impacts to the KC-10 program.

**KC-135 STRATOTANKER**
The KC-135 is the primary workhorse of our refueling aircraft, comprising 88% of the Mobility Air Forces (MAF) tanker force with a fleet of 414 aircraft. It currently supports every major overseas contingency operation, enabling a wide range of missions from fighter aircraft employment and deployment missions, air bridge support for airlift operations requiring long range with strategic payloads, providing extended range and loiter to special operations forces, and enhancing the speed and range of aeromedical evacuation. In FY11, the KC-135 flew over 66,000 hours in support of OEF, 12,000 hours in OND, and 15,000 hours for OUP.

The Air Force is committed to the modernization of the KC-135 to ensure sufficient air refueling capacity and capability until sufficient replacement tanker capacity exists. Due to the KC-46A fielding and eventual retirement of the KC-135, new major modifications are restricted by a “Sunset Clause” that restricts major modifications within five years of retirement. Aircraft planned for later retirements may receive modifications that are not fleet wide.

**BUDGET IMPACT:** For the FY12 budget, there are no impacts to the KC-135 program.

**Airlift Projection**

**C-5 GALAXY**

The C-5 provides passenger and outsized/oversized cargo airlift, airdrop, and special operations missions. The aircraft can carry fully equipped, combat-ready military units to any region in the world on short notice and provide field support required to help sustain the force. Additionally, with the C-5’s unique visor door and kneeling capability, the aircraft can both load and offload (roll on/roll off), simultaneously. The Air Force continues to modernize the C-5 through avionics modernization and engine upgrades. These modernizations programs improve aircraft availability, climb and cruise performance, reduce fuel usage 10-20%, and meet Stage IV Federal Aviation Administration noise standards.

**BUDGET IMPACT:** For the FY12 budget, there are no any impacts to the C-5 program.

**C-17 GLOBEMASTER III**

The C-17 is the nation’s primary intertheater military airlifter and continues to excel in a wide range of operational missions. It is the only aircraft capable of delivering outsized cargo to small, austere airfields. It is also capable of aerial delivery, night vision goggle (NVG) operations, nuclear weapons transportation, and aeromedical evacuation. The C-17 provides the flexibility to support both intertheater and intratheater missions and allows Air Mobility Command to significantly improve throughput during contingency operations. The Air Force
continues to make capability improvements to production aircraft with fielded aircraft systematically undergoing block upgrades through the Global Reach Improvement Program or field retrofits. Both methodologies are used to achieve a single-model “homogenous” aircraft fleet.

**BUDGET IMPACT:** For the FY12 budget, there are no impacts to the C-17 program.

### C-130 HERCULES

The C-130 Hercules is the primary combat delivery aircraft for the military. Employed primarily in an intratheater airlift role, the “Herk” provides rapid transport of personnel and cargo by aerial delivery to a designated drop zone, or by landing at austere locations within a theater of operations. A highly versatile weapon system, C-130 variants routinely provide combat delivery capability, conduct aeromedical evacuation missions, penetrate hurricanes, provide combat communications links, facilitate rescues on land or at sea, service our remote stations at the North and South Poles, refuel aircraft, broadcast radio and television messages, and fight forest fires, as well as provide for clandestine penetration and close air support/battlefield interdiction. In addition, C-130s have the capability to augment intertheater airlift forces as well as support humanitarian, peacekeeping, and disaster relief operations when needed.

**BUDGET IMPACT:** For the FY12 budget, there are no impacts to the C-130 program.

### IV. Long Term Impact of Sequestration

Further budget reductions in addition to those imposed by the Budget Control Act of 2011 will require and enterprise-wide review of all resources and potentially restrict or terminate critical acquisition initiatives, modernization requirements and possibly eliminate lower priority missions and activities executed by the Air Force. As the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force stated in his October 27, 2011 hearing to the House Armed Services Committee, “In a scenario where the budget reductions exceed the $450 billion of cuts envisioned by the BCA, we would need to go beyond merely constricting our capacity, and instead shed several required capabilities, thereby fundamentally changing the complexion and character of the Air Force. We may be unable to continue to perform certain missions and would certainly increase the risk of mission failure in those capabilities that we retain.”
V. Closing

The Air Force stands ready to win today’s joint fight and plan for tomorrow’s challenges. We are committed to working together to determine a fiscally sound procurement, sustainment and retirement strategy to remain prepared for the current fight, while posturing for future demands. Dominance of air, space, and cyberspace continues to be vital to the defense of the United States; our projection forces remain an integral part of that strategy. As Secretary Panetta recently testified at his October 13, 2011 hearing to the House Armed Services Committee, “…we absolutely have to avoid a hollow force and maintain a military that, even if smaller, will being ready, agile and deployable.” We appreciate your continued support and look forward to working in concert to ensure our decisions enable us to strengthen our Air Force to meet future requirements.
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN W. HESTERMAN III

Maj. Gen. John W. Hesterman III is Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. General Hesterman is responsible to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff for formulating policy supporting air, space, irregular warfare, counterproliferation, homeland security, weather and cyber operations. As the deputy Air Force Operations Deputy to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Hesterman determines operational requirements, capabilities and training necessary to support national security objectives and military strategy.

General Hesterman grew up in an Air Force family and graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1983. He has served in a variety of positions in Germany, Korea, England and the United States, and has held staff assignments on the Air Staff and the Joint Staff. The general has commanded the 494th Fighter Squadron, the 4th Operations Group, the 12th Flying Training Wing, and the 48th Fighter Wing.

General Hesterman has served as an instructor pilot in the F-16C, F-117A, F-15E and T-38C. He flew in the first wave of Operation Desert Storm and served as an expeditionary squadron commander in operations Provide Comfort, Deny Flight, Deliberate Guard, and Northern Watch. Most recently, he served as U.S. Central Command’s Deputy Combined Force Air Component Commander.

EDUCATION
1983 Bachelor of Science degree in international affairs, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.
1988 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
1989 Master of Aviation Science degree, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, Fla.
1994 Air Command and Staff College, by correspondence
1999 Master of Strategic Studies degree, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
2003 Summer Program in History and Politics, University of Oxford, England
2008 Combined Maritime Component Commanders Course, Naples, Italy
2009 Joint Force Air Component Commander Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

ASSIGNMENTS
2. September 1984 - January 1985, student, lead-in fighter training, Holloman AFB, N.M.
4. October 1985 - June 1987, F-4E pilot, Spangdahlem Air Base, West Germany
6. September 1987 - October 1988, F-16C pilot, Spangdahlem AB, West Germany
7. January 1989 - March 1990, F-16C instructor pilot, Kunsan AB, South Korea
15. June 1999 - May 2001, Special assistant to the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.
18. May 2004 - January 2006, Commander, 12th Flying Training Wing, Randolph AFB, Texas
22. September 2008 - June 2010, Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs for Europe, NATO, Russia and Africa (JS), Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
23. July 2010 - June 2011, Deputy Commander, Air Forces Central Command; Deputy, Combined Force Air Component Commander, U.S. Central Command; Vice Commander 9th Air Expeditionary Task Force, Air Combat Command, Southwest Asia

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS
1. June 1999 - May 2001, special assistant to the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., as a colonel
2. September 2008 - June 2010, Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs for Europe, NATO, Russia and Africa (JS), Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., as a brigadier general and major general
3. July 2010 - June 2011, Deputy, Combined Force Air Component Commander, U.S. Central Command, as a major general

FLIGHT INFORMATION
Rating: Command pilot
Flight hours: More than 2,200
Aircraft flown: F-4E, F-16C, F-117A, F-15E and T-38C

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
Defense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters
Distinguished Flying Cross with "V" device
Bronze Star Medal
Merit Award Medal with two oak leaf clusters
Air Medal with three oak leaf clusters
Aerial Achievement Medal
Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION
Second Lieutenant June 1, 1983
First Lieutenant June 1, 1985
Captain June 1, 1987
Major March 1, 1994
Lieutenant Colonel Jan. 1, 1997
Colonel April 1, 2000
Brigadier General June 4, 2007
Major General Feb. 12, 2010

(Current as of August 2011)
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING

November 3, 2011
RESPONSES TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN

Admiral C Lingan. From 1991 through 2004, naval forces were allocated by the Joint Staff through the Global Naval Force Presence Policy. This policy dictated the COCOM allocation via a long range schedule. The current Global Force Management (GFM) process, which started in 2005, allocates forces based on yearly COCOM demand. Accessible summary records are available going back to 2007, as follows:

Percent of COCOM unit demand fulfilled:

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<th>PACOM</th>
<th>EUCOM/AFRICOM</th>
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[See page 24.]

General Mills. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.][See page 24.]

General Hesterman. The Air Force fulfills nearly 100% of the Joint Staff-validated requirements that are subsequently tasked by the Secretary of Defense. The Air Force also supports a significant number of requirements from in garrison—also referred to as “deployed in place.” Many space and cyber capabilities are provided from stateside locations, and the vast majority of our Remotely Piloted Aircraft are controlled from non-deployed units in the United States. While not physically deployed, these forces operate on the Combatant Commander’s battle rhythm in support of theater objectives. The Air Force remains fully committed to supporting overseas contingency operations and the high rotational demand from our Combatant Commanders.

Within the Global Force Management process run by the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commanders submit their force requirements for needed capabilities to be filled from across the Services. Requests are not necessarily made for Air Force, Army or Navy forces—they are requests for capability such as close air support, combat engineering, etc. Unfortunately the COCOM’s needs in some areas far exceed the combined Services’ capacity to fill, so requests are prioritized, coordinated and then sourced from the available forces (this requires Secretary of Defense approval). Since the Services all have some measure of air capability, the Air Force does not fill all airpower requirements. Due to these factors the Air Force does not report the percentage of initial requests that enter the Global Force Management process and are ultimately not filled as a shortfall in AF capability. [See page 24.]

RESPONSES TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO

Admiral C Lingan. The Republic of Korea (RoK) provides the U.S. Navy approximately 64% for logistics cost and 70% for salaries under a Special Measures Agreement. The RoK provided $19M in 2009 for the construction of a Fleet and Family Town Center, $5M in 2011 (68% of the annual Navy budget) for Logistics Cost sharing (acquisition of logistics equipment, supplies, and/or services), and $4.5M in 2011 (71% of salaries) for Labor Cost Sharing. The U.S. Navy does not pay for the land
and facilities provided for its use under the Status of Forces Agreement; this currently totals 95 acres and 344 buildings in Korea.

The Government of Japan (GoJ) provides approximately 75% of the Navy’s total utility bill which covers electricity, water, sewer, and gas for heating ($62M in 2011). The GoJ voluntarily initiated the Japan Facilities Improvement Program which provides funding of approximately $200M per year for services. This program supports infrastructure capital investment similar to MILCON but it does not provide support to any base operations or facilities.

The Republic of Korea (ROK)

1.) Salaries: Navy Region Korea has received the following amounts for Labor. The ROK Government pays 71% of salaries for Korean Government Service (KGS) employees.
- FY 09 $5.2M
- FY 10 $4.1M
- FY 11 $4.5M

2.) Leases: U.S. Navy does not pay for the land and facilities provided for its use under Status of Forces Agreement. This currently totals 95 acres and 344 buildings in Korea.

3.) Construction: In recent years Navy Region Korea has received the following host nation funded construction funds, totaling $32.7M.
- CY07 Bachelor Enlisted Quarters $5.7M—Completed 2011
- Natural Gas Line $2.7M—Completed 2010
- Vehicle Maintenance Facility $2.5M—Under construction
- Fire Station $2.9M—Completed 2011
- CY09 Fleet and Family Town Center $18.9M—Under construction

4.) Sustainment: Navy Region Korea has received the following amounts for sustainment/equipment from the host nation, totaling $9.6M.
- CY09 $2.1M
- CY10 $2.6M
- CY11 $4.9M

5.) Utilities: Navy Region Korea does not receive utility funding for consumption, but are given the lowest industrial rates offered. However, over the past decade, the Korean government has paid for a completely new electrical system; water storage tank and pipeline system; and natural gas line installation; shore power mounds at Piers 11 and 22 for use by USN ships; and has funded a number of green energy projects via host nation construction and sustainment funds, greatly reducing Navy costs for utilities.

6.) Other funding: Other in-kind support provided includes highway toll waivers and docking and security patrols at ROK Navy bases for visiting U.S. Navy ships.

Government of Japan (GOJ)

1.) Salaries: Labor Cost Sharing Program under Special Measures Agreement Article I. The Government of Japan has for over two decades funded 85–90 percent of the overall labor costs of DON’s largest foreign national workforce worldwide—13,703 personnel (9,423 with Navy and 4,280 with Marine Corps) who perform work supporting the United States Government’s (USG) forward deployment strategy in the western Pacific, including ship repair, supply, communications and infrastructure maintenance. Most recent financial information in existence is Japanese Fiscal Year (JFY) 10 (1 Apr 10–31 Mar 11). The weighted average actual exchange rate obtained by Defense Finance & Accounting Service for payment of the USG portion was 82.2 yen per U.S. dollar. Budget Execution Rates and other rates used often vary throughout the year or by activity.
- Navy:
  - ¥38,936,621,525 was spent on Master Labor Contracts (MLC)s
  - ¥5,924,115,963 was covered by USG
  - ¥33,012,505,562 was covered by GOJ
- Marines:
  - ¥14,645,746,145 was spent on MLCs
  - ¥859,315,904 was covered by USG
  - ¥13,786,430,241 was covered by GOJ

2.) Leases: USN does not pay the GOJ for the use of land and facilities provided under the Status Of Forces Agreement (SOFA) grant. USN does have exclusive use of approximately 16,000 acres of land and 24,109 facilities with Plant Replacement Value of approximately $12,873M in Japan. The only type of “lease or rental” payment made is $209,894/year to a private Japanese company for 50 apartment units
that houses the ship repair workforce surge from Puget Sound Naval Shipyard during CVN maintenance.

3.) Construction: Japanese Facilities Improvement Program (JFIP) provides infrastructure capital investment similar to MILCON, but project selection, programming, and award differs greatly from MILCON. Funding levels have been steadily declining since the mid 1990s from approximately $1.0B to less than $200M a year since FY08 through FY12 for all the services. Funding varies by year since JFIP vary depending on projects programmed in each year. Historically, Navy has received approximately 1/3 of the annual JFIP.

4.) Sustainment: USN does not receive any funds from the GOJ for base operation support or facilities sustainment.

5.) Utilities: Utilities Cost Share Program provides GOJ funds to help offset USN’s utility cost of electricity, water, sewer, and gas for heating. USN receives ¥6.3 billion annually, approximately $68.0M a year depending yen/dollar exchange rate, which covers approximately 75% of USN’s total utility bill. For past three years, USN received JFY09 $68.0M, JFY10 $73.0M, and JFY11 $62.0M respectively.

6.) Other funding: N/A [See page 30.]

General Mills. Government of Korea Logistics Cost Share support received for the past 3 fiscal years follows:

FY09:
- Labor—$1,202,767
- Vehicles—$43,640
- Aircraft In-service Repair—$163,583
- Service Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM) for CH–53—$7,046,340
- Supplies—$0
- Facilities sustainment—$254,826

FY10:
- Labor—$1,011,896
- Vehicles—$194,731
- Aircraft In-service Repair—$148,152
- SDLM for CH–53—$6,258,065
- Supplies—$0
- Facilities sustainment—$381,848

FY11:
- Labor—$1,061,339
- Vehicles—$257,605
- Aircraft In-service Repair—$104,374
- SDLM for CH–53—$6,049,020
- Supplies—$2,019,051
- Facilities sustainment—$695,951

Government of Japan provided Utility and Labor support: (Please note that the Japanese Fiscal Year begins on 1 April and ends on 31 March)

FY09:
- Labor Cost Sharing—$147,549,249
- Utility Cost Sharing—$60,911,050

FY10:
- Labor Cost Sharing—$149,067,628
- Utility Cost Sharing—$62,051,558

FY11:
- Labor Cost Sharing—$158,721,331
- Utility Cost Sharing—$64,983,396

Government of Japan provided support under the Japanese Facilities Improvement Program (JFIP) for various levels of effort including MCAS Iwakuni, MCB Butler and CATC Camp Fuji:

FY09 MCAS Iwakuni—$86 Million
FY09 MCB Butler—$2 Million
FY09 Camp Fuji—$0

FY10 MCAS Iwakuni—$29 Million
FY10 MCB Butler—$800,000
FY10 Camp Fuji—$300,000

FY11 MCAS Iwakuni—$35 Million
FY11 MCB Butler—$2.1 Million
FY11 Camp Fuji—$200,000
Government of Japan lease payments made to land owners: There are 23,000 land owners on Okinawa who are paid by the Japanese Government. Land owners are paid two times per year in March and July. The following figures are payments made to land owners Okinawa wide to include the Marine Corps, Air Force, and Army.

JFY08—78,375 mil Yen (conversion rate 114.7781) = $682,839,322
JFY09—79,090 mil Yen (conversion rate 114.3007) = $691,946,768
JFY10—79,295 mil Yen (conversion rate 108.9969) = $663,275,744

The U.S. Government does not pay rent for land or facilities in Japan.
The Government of Japan does not fund any facilities maintenance.

Government of Japan (GOJ) has constructed family housing under the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement. GOJ has only constructed four of eight phases of new family housing. The remaining four phases are on hold. The GOJ will construct the 56 housing units that will serve the new hospital. Construction is tentatively scheduled for FY15. [See page 30.]

General HESTERMAN. Japan will provide $332 million and Korea will provide $125 million to support the United States Air Force for FY12. [See page 30.]
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

November 3, 2011
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES

Mr. FORBES. Adoption of advanced predictive logistics technologies to enable major cost avoidance: Section 328 of the FY 2010 NDAA required DOD to develop a comprehensive plan for improving inventory management systems, including addressing weaknesses in demand forecasting procedures. GAO’s review of the Comprehensive Inventory Management Improvement Plan, submitted to Congress in January of this year, cited difficulties in predicting demand patterns as a key challenge in implementing improved forecasting. However, we are aware that several program offices have already effectively addressed this challenge by adopting advanced modeling and simulation tools, and the results have been billions of dollars in cost avoidance and savings. If some program offices have already dealt with this problem, what is preventing wider application of these tools in the immediate future across each of the services?

Admiral CLINGAN. The objective of the Comprehensive Inventory Management Improvement Plan (CIMIP) is to ensure DOD buys only what we need and retains only what we use. This OSD-led effort involves considerable sharing of ideas and lessons learned on techniques to improve forecasting as well as vetting ideas and adopting proven techniques across DOD.

As part of our Enterprise Resource Planning implementation, Navy is currently implementing a SAP1 business solution with an enhanced forecasting module which will improve our demand forecasting capabilities and allow for more efficient management of Navy wholesale inventories. Additionally Navy is utilizing a Multi-Indenture Multi-Echelon Readiness Based Sparing (RBS) capable model called Supply Planning and Optimization (SPO) to compute wholesale and retail stock levels for aviation programs. This model uses advanced RBS techniques to optimize inventory levels across the enterprise, delivering weapon systems readiness at least cost.

While customer demands are often difficult to forecast due to operating tempo changes and low weapon system population density, Navy is currently working to expand SPO utilization to maritime retail products and is also researching further integration of wholesale and retail inventory computation. Navy continues to pursue opportunities to improve demand forecasting; as successful techniques are identified the challenge lies in understanding how to apply those techniques to what are often times widely different customer bases. Demand patterns for aviation platforms, where there are thousands of airframes, can be fundamentally different from those for surface ship or submarine platforms with very small populations.

Furthermore, OSD (Supply Chain Integration) is beginning a study in which the Navy and Air Force will explore alternative demand forecasting methodologies for low-demand repairable items.

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General MILLS. The Marine Corps cannot answer the question on behalf of the other services. However the Marine Corps is applying predictive tools to its inventories as follows:

At this time, the Marine Corps is in the process of implementing Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps (GCSS–MC) and is currently using and exploring the full potential of the Advance Planning Suite (APS) of applications inherent in the system to implement total force demand planning. APS is comprised of Oracle Demand Planning (ODP), Inventory Optimization (IO) and Advance Supply Chain Planning (ASC). Marine Corps Logistics Command administers the plans while the
Marine Forces (MARFORS) provide input and ultimately execute to their specific requirements and constraints. The Marine Corps is using 24 months of shipment history to produce a demand forecast one year in the future. As this process matures, the Marines will observe, measure, and modify our forecasts to best support our demand planning while minimizing the amount of inventory on hand. Additionally an enterprise forecast will enable better collaboration and communication of Marine Corps requirements with our suppliers. The GCSS–MC benefits realized are increased accountability, enhanced visibility, and a right-sized inventory to reduce inventory carrying costs.

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General HESTERMAN. The Department of Defense Comprehensive Inventory Management Improvement Plan includes a Demand Forecasting sub-plan which lays out a course of action to improve the inventory level setting process, demand planning accuracy, and forecast accuracy. The Air Force is collaborating with other components to baseline current demand forecast methodologies, review best practices, and establish diagnostic metrics on forecast accuracy and forecast bias. In our review of best practices, we look across all levels in our supply chain.

Contributing to improved forecasting, the Air Force has undertaken a Logistics Modeling and Simulation (M&S) effort which has identified and catalogued M&S tools in use or available across the Air Force. However, M&S tools used by our acquisition program offices are not sustainment inventory forecasting models and have limited application to Air Force Supply Chain Management.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN

Mr. COFFMAN. What is the number of Flag Officers in the Navy in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010? What was the total number of personnel in your service in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010?

Admiral CLINGAN.

Flag Officers:
- 1990: 256
- 1995: 218
- 2000: 219
- 2005: 213
- 2010: 253

Total Personnel:
- 1990: 582,854
- 1995: 434,617
- 2000: 373,193
- 2005: 362,941
- 2010: 328,303

The increase in Flag Officers between 2005 and 2010 primarily reflects the growth in Joint Flag/General Officer billet requirements.
Mr. COFFMAN. What is the number of General Officers in the Marine Corps in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010? What was the total number of personnel in your service in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010?

General MILLS.

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Mr. COFFMAN. What is the number of General Officers in the Air Force in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010? What was the total number of personnel in your service in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010?

General HESTERMAN. In 1990, there were 333 general officers in the Air Force and the total number of personnel was 530,861.
In 1995, there were 274 general officers in the Air Force and the total number of personnel was 396,376.
In 2000, there were 271 general officers in the Air Force and the total number of personnel was 351,375.
In 2005, there were 273 general officers in the Air Force and the total number of personnel was 349,369.
In 2010, there were 315 general officers in the Air Force. 300 of these general officers were in authorizations contained in the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act. The additional officers were in positions that were exempted by title 10 of the U.S. Code and therefore did not count against Air Force authorizations. The total number of Air Force personnel was 329,638.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCHILLING

Mr. SCHILLING. What is the impact of reducing our forward power globally on our organic base here at home? Will there be reductions in the amount of work that is required to be done by the military organic base? Will the military be able to keep our capabilities warm here at home if we pull back our service members and ships?

Admiral CLINGAN. The Navy has continued to operate globally even while providing significant forces to Commander, U.S. Central Command. Following the end of combat operations in Afghanistan, the Navy expects to continue to operate forward, employing a combination of Forward Deployed Naval Forces and rotational forces, at a sustainable level. While we continuously seek the most efficient and cost effective approach for ship and aviation depot maintenance, both organic Navy and private sector capabilities will remain in demand to support Navy maintenance requirements. As it has historically, this demand will largely reflect our force structure; the operational tempo of our forces; and available resources.

Mr. SCHILLING. How can we maintain force projection in the current fiscal climate? Are there roadblocks impeding the defense industrial base that could be fixed to create a more efficient system and help project better forward strength at a lower cost?

Admiral CLINGAN. Navy rotational forces have, and will continue to, reset-in-stride to execute our global responsibilities. While we continue to seek the most efficient and cost effective approach for ship and aviation depot maintenance, both organic Navy and private sector capabilities will remain in demand to support Navy maintenance requirements. The Fleet Response Plan remains the Navy’s force generation model, and is a proven means to provide ready forces to the Combatant Commanders globally, in addition to forces ready to surge in response to crises.

Sustaining the defense industrial base is critical to our war fighting capability. To this end, potential efficiencies include:
- Clearly defining core industrial requirements in the public and private sectors to sustain present capabilities and field new capabilities.
- Establishing the roles of both public depots and private industry in meeting these core requirements.
- Increased partnering between public and private sectors. Depot maintenance should not be thought of as a fixed activity or location, but as a level of main-
tenance that must be performed by highly skilled artisans within a core competency.

- Effective integration of product support. This would include sharing of technical data, public-private partnering in both technical and trade skills, and maximizing use of capabilities across our public and private industrial facilities.

The new DOD Defense Strategy and supporting Fiscal Year 2013 budget both focus on balancing DOD force structure to address warfighting needs while sustaining the industrial base. Deliberations on Navy's force structure are ongoing by the Secretary of the Navy and Office of the Secretary of Defense; results will be submitted in the President's Fiscal Year 2013 budget request. Navy is confident our resulting force structure will be aligned with the new Defense Strategy.

Mr. SCHILLING. What is the impact of reducing our forward power globally on our organic base here at home? Will there be reductions in the amount of work that is required to be done by the military organic base? Will the military be able to keep our capabilities warm here at home if we pull back our service members and ships?

General MILLS. Reducing forward presence will have a number of impacts on the forces in the contiguous United States (CONUS).

First, the number of un-planned deployments will increase. Instead of reacting to crisis with forces that are positioned forward—we will have to deploy CONUS forces to respond. We currently maintain forces that are ready to rapidly deploy—these forces will be required to deploy more frequently. In the past 20 years we would have had to deploy CONUS reaction forces more than 100 times—for periods of up to 6 months.

Forces used to transport crisis response forces (air and sea lift) will be at even greater demand. Crises require a rapid response—and most require a force that is flexible and responsive to a rapidly changing situation. Marines on the ground have proven to be one of the best alternatives for these types of situations. If we reduce our forward presence we will have two options when crisis develop: use diplomacy and support from partner nations to meet our objectives, or rapidly deploy a force.

If partner nations are willing to provide airfields and ports, we can respond to many crisis using maritime prepositioning forces and strategic airlift.

Mr. SCHILLING. How can we maintain force projection in the current fiscal climate? Are there roadblocks impeding the defense industrial base that could be fixed to create a more efficient system and help project better forward strength at a lower cost?

General MILLS. Although the world is continuing to change and budgets continue to fluctuate, America's requirement to maintain a forward based force-in-readiness remains. Physical presence matters. It shows our economic and our military commitment to a particular region. It deters potential adversaries, assures our friends, and permits response in a timely manner to crises. Our current combination of amphibious, air borne and, prepositioned forces provide the minimal capacity to realistically address this challenge. During these times of constrained resources, we remain committed to refining operations, identifying efficiencies, and reinvesting savings to conserve scarce public funds. For 7.8% of the total DOD budget, our Nation gains the ability to respond to unexpected crises, from humanitarian disaster relief efforts, to non-combatant evacuation operations, to conduct counter-piracy operations, or full scale combat.

The Marine Corps is not aware of roadblocks impeding the industrial base. That being said, we recognize that our operational capabilities are enabled by the diverse industrial base. The Marine Corps works aggressively to identify and mitigate activities or decisions that could unintentionally destabilize the base upon which we depend.

Mr. SCHILLING. What is the impact of reducing our forward power globally on our organic base here at home? Will there be reductions in the amount of work that is required to be done by the military organic base? Will the military be able to keep our capabilities warm here at home if we pull back our service members and ships?

General HESTERMAN. A forward presence reduction could impact the ability of CONUS bases to absorb additional force structure, including limitations of CONUS airspace and ranges to support training requirements. Also, increased airlift requirements would extend deployment timelines, affect joint force synchronization, and add risk to Combatant Commander's Operational Plans. Further, reduced forward presence would degrade our interoperability and capability to building partnerships with friends and allies. Lastly, such reductions could jeopardize our ability to assure access to overseas locations as well as overcome anti-access or area-denial measures—all are considerations when determining our global force posture.
Mr. SCOTT. Can you describe how a Day without the U.S. Coast Guard would impact the U.S. Navy?

Admiral CLINGAN. The full strength and value of our Nation's seapower cannot be fully appreciated without considering realized without the U.S. Coast Guard. This Service provides unique capabilities and authorities that enable it to prevent and respond to a broad array of maritime threats and to seamlessly integrate into naval operations in all maritime theaters. An invaluable partner and force multiplier, Coast Guard forces complement the U.S. Navy's ability to employ the global reach, persistent presence and operational flexibility it needs to accomplish its strategic imperatives.

As stated in the 2006 National Fleet Policy Statement, the Coast Guard and Navy mutually support and complement each Service's roles and missions. To this end, Coast Guard cutters serve alongside U.S. Navy ships in the Northern Arabian Gulf and other areas of the world. In theater, Coast Guard forces protect seaports of debarkation, the combat logistics force, and maritime pre-positioning ships. Coast Guard ships deployed individually or with Navy task forces support U.S. Navy "Partnership Stations." Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments serve aboard Navy ships performing counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa and counterdrug operations in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. The 21st century maritime security environment requires these types of cooperative initiatives to effectively protect and promote our national maritime interests.

Because a majority of the world's navies and coastguards are not blue-water, power projection forces, many countries routinely accept, desire, and explicitly request interaction with the Coast Guard. Speaking the language of both civil and military organizations, the Coast Guard's inter-agency expertise provides multiple access points into foreign nation governments that might otherwise be inaccessible through purely military channels. Coast Guard training teams and international port security liaisons also assist developing nations with building the maritime expertise, infrastructure, domain awareness and response capabilities needed to protect their maritime interests. This helps develop layered, integrated maritime regimes that promote regional security and ultimately contribute to U.S. homeland defense in depth.

The Coast Guard also provides an exceptional first responder capability for foreign and domestic disruptions. Events such as Hurricane Katrina, Haiti Earthquake Response, and Deepwater Horizon demonstrate the Coast Guard's ability to integrate across jointed military (e.g. Navy, National Guard, Air Force, etc.) and non-military agencies to provide a timely and highly effective unified and organized response.

A day without the U.S. Coast Guard would be a significantly more difficult day for the U.S. Navy and our Nation.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO

Mr. PALAZZO. The Navy is short about 30 ships from the 313 goal set by Secretary Mabus as the minimum necessary to meet current operational needs. How does the Navy intend to reach its goal in the budgetary environment, especially when current shortfalls in maintenance funding have left one in five of existing vessels unfit for combat?

Admiral CLINGAN. Although less that the 313 ship floor, the current Navy battle force of 284 ships provides a fleet capable of meeting Combatant Commander demands with manageable risk. Going forward, our current shipbuilding and aviation plans balance the anticipated future demand for naval forces with expected resources. With anticipated funding being flat or declining in the future, we will focus our investments to ensure the battle force has the capability for Navy’s core missions such as ensuring Joint operational access and the capacity to remain forward in the most critical regions. Our plans also take into account the importance of maintaining an adequate national shipbuilding design and industrial base.

Our deployed ships are materially fit for combat. Ships that are in deep maintenance are not ready for combat operations and are a normal part of our ongoing Fleet Readiness and Training Process. As for operating ships, recent readiness reports by the fleet indicate that the trend of higher failure rates by surface ships on inspections by the Navy Board of Inspections and Survey is turning—and we will remain vigilant and proactive. We conducted a review of Surface Force readiness over the last year, which identified a number of root causes. These include reduced surface ship and intermediate maintenance center manning and the disestablishment (by BRAC 1995) of the surface ship life cycle engineering organization. These changes stopped updates to ship class maintenance plans, eliminated the technical support to plan maintenance periods, and reduced the ability of crews to complete required maintenance.

To address these problems, we put executive-level oversight in place and initiated a multi-prong plan to improve surface ship readiness. This plan includes increases to surface ship manning, restoring organizations to plan and manage ship lifecycle maintenance, and reestablishing technical support for planning and conducting maintenance periods. These corrections are all in place or in progress. We also significantly increased the FY 2011 and FY 2012 baseline Ship Maintenance budget submissions (compared to FY 2010). Today, Navy’s maintenance account is fully funded.

While our ability to plan and conduct maintenance is much more comprehensive, an additional factor affecting surface ship readiness is the high operational tempo of the last ten years. Since 2001, underway days per ship increased by 15 percent while fleet size decreased by 10 percent. This reduces the time a ship is available in port to conduct maintenance—even if it is pre-planned and fully funded. The Navy is investigating options to improve the balance between presence and pre-deployment training and maintenance requirements, in order to achieve a sustainable level of operations that is consistent with the size of the fleet.

Mr. PALAZZO. Can we reach the 313 mark, or more as the need arises? What is the consequence if we do not reach this minimum number?

Admiral CLINGAN. The Fiscal Year 2012 Long-Range Shipbuilding Tables submitted to Congress show the fleet reaching 313 ships by Fiscal Year 2019. The main assumptions behind this plan are that our ships reach their expected service lives and that we and our shipbuilders can continue to build and deliver ships on schedule.

Today, these key assumptions are not being met. Since 2000, the fleet has about 10% fewer ships, and on average each ship spends about 15% more days underway each year to meet Combatant Commander demands. The greater amount of underway time comes at the expense of training and maintenance. Today we are unable to complete all the maintenance needed on each ship and aircraft, reducing their service lives. Resources alone cannot alleviate this issue. We will need to establish a sustainable level of deployed forces through the DOD Global Force Management process. In conjunction with adjusting the GFM plan, we are adjusting our Fleet Readiness and Training Plan to establish a sustainable operational tempo and complete required maintenance and training between deployments. This will constrain the number of ships and aircraft we deliver to Combatant Commanders in the future, but will ensure ships and aircraft reach their expected service lives and help avoid a further decrease in fleet capacity.

To reach our ship inventory goals, we also need to build and deliver ships on schedule. We continue to work to reduce costs and incentivize our industry partners to remain on schedule and maximize the Navy’s return on investment. To reduce costs in general, our shipbuilding strategy leverages existing designs and proven
technologies as much as possible. The Department has also refined its internal 2–Pass/6–Gate review process to ensure requirements are set early and balanced against cost, and that this balance is visible and managed throughout the acquisition process. The Navy has strengthened acquisition policy to improve program oversight, control cost growth, and more effectively monitor contractor performance. The ability to build and deliver our fleet on time and under cost continues to require the combined effort of and collaboration between the Navy, the Congress, and the shipbuilding industry.

Mr. PaLaZZO. Many people have questioned the relevancy of amphibious operations in this day and age. Could you please give us your opinion on the relevancy of amphibious operations in the modern era?

General MILLS. Amphibious flexibility is the greatest strategic asset that a sea based power possesses. The inherent flexibility and utility of amphibious forces are not widely understood, as evidenced by the frequent and mistaken direct correlation between the term amphibious operations and mental images of World War II marines assaulting Tarawa or Iwo Jima. In fact, in the last 20 years the Navy-Marine Corps team has conducted well over 100 amphibious operations of various types. The majority of these involved humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) or noncombatant evacuations and defense of U.S. diplomatic posts during periods of host nation unrest occurring in permissive or uncertain environments. A smaller number involved operations in openly hostile environments to project or withdraw U.S. or partner-nation forces. Not included in the last 20 year tally—because they were only recently codified as a type of amphibious operation within joint doctrine—are the numerous military engagement and security cooperation activities routinely conducted by amphibious forces. Given the National Security Strategy's emphasis on engagement, these operations are becoming increasingly prominent.

Regardless of the type of amphibious operation conducted, they generally involve overcoming diplomatic, geographic, and/or military challenges to access. Regular employment of amphibious forces in uncertain and austere environments where access is challenged is chronicled by over 50 amphibious operations conducted since Sept. 11, 2001.

Rapid action is the critical enabler in these operations requiring immediate response regardless of access afforded. Organic capabilities such as well decks and flight decks, billeting, communications, medical, dental, messing, and command and control all combine to increase the utility of amphibious forces. More importantly, an amphibious force can loiter off shore indefinitely providing valuable time for diplomatic efforts to unfold; complementing diplomacy with demonstrated resolve. Amphibious forces can be task organized to the mission and threat, and scaled to bring only those capabilities ashore necessary for mission accomplishment. In a security environment characterized by uncertainty, operating from the sea provides a degree of flexibility, force protection, and freedom of action not realized by traditional ground force lay-down.