

**TO PROVIDE FOR A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY
TO COUNTER IRAN'S GROWING PRESENCE AND
HOSTILE ACTIVITY IN THE WESTERN
HEMISPHERE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES**

MARKUP

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM,
NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

H.R. 3783

MARCH 1, 2012

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TO PROVIDE FOR A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY TO COUNTER IRAN'S GROWING PRESENCE AND HOSTILE ACTIVITY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

THURSDAY, MARCH 1, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM,
NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o'clock a.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. ROYCE. The subcommittee will come to order. Pursuant to notice, we meet today to mark up H.R. 3783, the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012. Without objection, the amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Mr. Duncan, which incorporates changes from both sides of the aisle and was provided to your offices earlier this week and posted on the committee Web site, will be considered base text for purposes of this markup.

The clerk will report the base text.

Mr. STRUPP. Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 3783 offered by Mr. Duncan of South Carolina.

Mr. ROYCE. Without objection, the text is considered read and is open for amendment at any point. And before proceeding to the ranking member and any other members seeking recognition, I recognize myself for a brief statement on the measure before us.

[The information referred to follows:]

112TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 3783

To provide for a comprehensive strategy to counter Iran's growing presence and hostile activity in the Western Hemisphere, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 18, 2012

Mr. DUNCAN of South Carolina (for himself, Mr. HIGGINS, Mr. MACK, Mr. MCCAUL, Mrs. MYRICK, Ms. HOCHUL, Mr. MEEHAN, Mr. CANSICO, Mr. KING of Iowa, Mr. HULTGREN, Mr. FRANKS of Arizona, Mr. WALSH of Illinois, Mr. HUNTER, Mr. ROYCE, Mr. PITTS, Mrs. BLACKBURN, Mrs. LUMMIS, Mr. AUSTRIA, Mr. DESJARDAIS, Mr. QUAYLE, Mr. CULBERSON, Mr. CALVERT, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. POE of Texas, Mr. BILIRAKIS, and Mr. LAMBORN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To provide for a comprehensive strategy to counter Iran's growing presence and hostile activity in the Western Hemisphere, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the "Countering Iran in
5 the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012".

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress finds the following:

1 (1) The United States has vital political, eco-
2 nomic, and security interests in the Western Hemi-
3 sphere.

4 (2) Iran is pursuing cooperation with Latin
5 American countries by signing economic and security
6 agreements in order to create a network of diplo-
7 matic and economic relationships to lessen the blow
8 of international sanctions and oppose Western at-
9 tempts to constrict its ambitions.

10 (3) According to the Department of State,
11 Hezbollah, with Iran as its state sponsor, is consid-
12 ered the “most technically capable terrorist group in
13 the world” with “thousands of supporters, several
14 thousand members, and a few hundred terrorist
15 operatives”, and officials from Iran’s IRGC’s Qods
16 Force have been working in concert with Hezbollah
17 since the 1990s.

18 (4) The IRGC’s Qods Force has a long history
19 of supporting Hezbollah’s military, paramilitary, and
20 terrorist activities, providing it with guidance, fund-
21 ing, weapons, intelligence, and logistical support,
22 and in 2007, the Department of the Treasury placed
23 sanctions on the IRGC and its Qods Force for their
24 support of terrorism and proliferation activities.

1 (5) The IRGC's Qods Force stations operatives
2 in foreign embassies, charities, and religious and cul-
3 tural institutions to foster relationships, often build-
4 ing on existing socio-economic ties with the well es-
5 tablished Shia Diaspora, and recent years have wit-
6 nessed an increased presence in Latin America.

7 (6) According to the Department of Defense,
8 the IRGC and its Qods Force were involved in or be-
9 hind some of the deadliest terrorist attacks of the
10 past two decades, including the 1994 attack on the
11 AMIA Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires,
12 by generally directing or supporting the groups that
13 actually executed the attacks.

14 (7) Reports of Iranian intelligence agents being
15 implicated in Hezbollah-linked activities since the
16 early 1990s suggest direct Iranian government sup-
17 port of Hezbollah activities in the Tri-Border Area
18 of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, and in the past
19 decade, Iran has dramatically increased its diplo-
20 matic missions to Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Ec-
21 uador, Argentina, and Brazil. Iran has built 17 cul-
22 tural centers in Latin America, and it currently
23 maintains 11 embassies, up from six in 2005.

24 (8) Iran has used its proxies in Latin America
25 to raise revenues through illicit activities, including

1 drug and arms trafficking, counterfeiting, money
2 laundering, forging travel documents, pirating soft-
3 ware and music, and providing haven and assistance
4 to other terrorists transiting the region.

5 (9) According to the Department of Defense,
6 Iran provides support for Hamas despite ideological
7 differences, and there is concern that Hamas is ac-
8 tive in the Western Hemisphere, most notably in Ca-
9 racas.

10 (10) Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and
11 Venezuela expressed their intention to assist Iran in
12 breaking international sanctions signing a statement
13 supporting Iran's nuclear activities and announcing
14 at a 2010 joint press conference in Tehran their de-
15 termination to "continue and expand their economic
16 ties to Iran" with confidence that "Iran can give a
17 crushing response to the threats and sanctions im-
18 posed by the West and imperialism".

19 (11) Sophisticated narco-tunneling reportedly
20 resembling the types used by Hezbollah in Lebanon
21 have been discovered along the United States-Mexico
22 border, and arrested Mexican gang members enter-
23 ing the United States allegedly with Farsi tattoos
24 have led to concerns about Hezbollah's ability to co-
25 operate with Mexican drug cartels to utilize smug-

1 gling techniques and routes in order to transport
2 drugs and people into the United States.

3 (12) Since the fall of 2008, at least 111 sus-
4 pects of a Hezbollah-linked international network of
5 drug traffickers and money launderers have been ar-
6 rested in Drug Enforcement Administration oper-
7 ations.

8 (13) In October 2011, the United States
9 charged two men, including Iranian-American
10 Manssor Arbabsiar, a member of the IRGC's Qods
11 Force, on conspiracy to murder a foreign official
12 using a weapon of mass destruction in an act of ter-
13 rorism. Arbabsiar traveled to Mexico with the ex-
14 press intent to hire "someone in the narcotics busi-
15 ness" to carry out the assassination of the Saudi
16 Arabian Ambassador in the United States.

17 (14) The Obama Administration's 2011 Strat-
18 egy for Counterterrorism does not adequately ad-
19 dress Iran's growing influence and operations in the
20 Western Hemisphere.

21 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

22 It shall be the policy of the United States to use all
23 elements of national power to counter Iran's growing pres-
24 ence and hostile activity in the Western Hemisphere.

1 **SEC. 4. REQUIREMENT OF A STRATEGY TO ADDRESS IRAN'S**
2 **GROWING PRESENCE AND ACTIVITY IN THE**
3 **WESTERN HEMISPHERE.**

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
5 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
6 shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
7 House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
8 Relations of the Senate a strategy to address Iran's grow-
9 ing presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere
10 that—

11 (1) defines and outlines the presence and activi-
12 ties of Iran, the IRGC, its Qods Force, Hezbollah,
13 and Hamas in the Western Hemisphere, including
14 information about their leaders, goals, objectives,
15 and areas of influence;

16 (2) provides an assessment of the terrain, popu-
17 lation, ports, foreign firms, airports, borders, media
18 outlets, financial centers, foreign embassies, char-
19 ities, religious and cultural centers, and income-gen-
20 erating activities in the Western Hemisphere utilized
21 by Iran, the IRGC, its Qods Force, Hezbollah, and
22 Hamas;

23 (3) details operations of Iran, the IRGC, its
24 Qods Force, Hezbollah, and Hamas within the
25 United States, including information on financial
26 networks, trafficking activities, and safe havens;

1 (4) documents the relationship of Iran, the
2 IRGC, its Qods Force, Hezbollah, and Hamas with
3 transnational criminal organizations and other ter-
4 rorist organizations in the Western Hemisphere;

5 (5) describes the relationship of Iran, the
6 IRGC, its Qods Force, Hezbollah, and Hamas with
7 the governments in the Western Hemisphere, includ-
8 ing military-to-military relations and diplomatic, eco-
9 nomic, and security partnerships;

10 (6) assesses the Federal law enforcement capa-
11 bilities, military forces, state and local government
12 institutions, and other critical elements, such as
13 nongovernmental organizations, of the governments
14 in the Western Hemisphere that may organize to
15 counter the threat posed by Iran, the IRGC, its
16 Qods Force, Hezbollah, and Hamas;

17 (7) details operations of Iran, the IRGC, its
18 Qods Force, Hezbollah, and Hamas at the United
19 States-Mexico border and other international borders
20 within the Western Hemisphere, including oper-
21 ations related to drug, human, and arms trafficking,
22 human support networks, financial support, and
23 technological advancements; and

24 (8) includes—

1 (A) with respect to the United States–Mex-
2 ico border, in coordination with the Government
3 of Mexico and the Secretary of Homeland Secu-
4 rity, a plan to address resources, technology,
5 and infrastructure to create a secure Southwest
6 Border and prevent operatives from Iran, the
7 IRGC, its Qods Force, Hezbollah, or Hamas
8 from entering the United States;

9 (B) within Latin American countries, a
10 multi-agency action plan including the develop-
11 ment of strong rule-of-law institutions to pro-
12 vide security for the people and businesses of
13 such countries, a counterterrorism and counter-
14 radicalization plan within communities to iso-
15 late Iran, the IRGC, its Qods Force, Hezbollah,
16 and Hamas from their sources of financial sup-
17 port, and combat terrorist activity; and

18 (C) incorporation of all of the elements of
19 national power, including diplomatic, economic,
20 and security elements, designed to counter
21 Iran’s growing presence and hostile activity in
22 the Western Hemisphere.

23 (b) DEVELOPMENT.—In developing the strategy
24 under this section, the Secretary of State shall consult
25 with the heads of all appropriate United States depart-

1 ments and agencies, including the Secretary of Defense,
2 the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of
3 Homeland Security, the Secretary of the Treasury, and
4 the Attorney General.

5 (c) FORM.—The strategy under this section shall be
6 submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified
7 annex.

8 **SEC. 5. REPORT.**

9 Not later than one year after the submission of the
10 strategy required under section 4, the Secretary of State
11 shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
12 House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
13 Relations of the Senate a report on the progress made to-
14 ward the implementation of the strategy and a description
15 and evaluation toward achieving the policy objective de-
16 scribed in section 3.

17 **SEC. 6. FUNDING FOR DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTA-**
18 **TION OF STRATEGY TO COUNTER IRAN IN**
19 **THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.**

20 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, funds
21 made available to any office or bureau of the Department
22 of State for counter-terrorism programs are authorized to
23 be made available to carry out this Act.

**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H.R. 3783
OFFERED BY MR. DUNCAN OF SOUTH CAROLINA**

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 This Act may be cited as the “Countering Iran in
3 the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012”.

4 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

5 Congress finds the following:

6 (1) The United States has vital political, eco-
7 nomic, and security interests in the Western Hemi-
8 sphere.

9 (2) Iran is pursuing cooperation with Latin
10 American countries by signing economic and security
11 agreements in order to create a network of diplo-
12 matic and economic relationships to lessen the blow
13 of international sanctions and oppose Western at-
14 tempts to constrict its ambitions.

15 (3) According to the Department of State,
16 Hezbollah, with Iran as its state sponsor, is consid-
17 ered the “most technically capable terrorist group in
18 the world” with “thousands of supporters, several

1 thousand members, and a few hundred terrorist
2 operatives,” and officials from the Iranian Revolu-
3 tionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Qods Force have been
4 working in concert with Hezbollah for many years.

5 (4) The IRGC’s Qods Force has a long history
6 of supporting Hezbollah’s military, paramilitary, and
7 terrorist activities, providing it with guidance, fund-
8 ing, weapons, intelligence, and logistical support,
9 and in 2007, the Department of the Treasury placed
10 sanctions on the IRGC and its Qods Force for their
11 support of terrorism and proliferation activities.

12 (5) The IRGC’s Qods Force stations operatives
13 in foreign embassies, charities, and religious and cul-
14 tural institutions to foster relationships, often build-
15 ing on existing socioeconomic ties with the well es-
16 tablished Shia Diaspora, and recent years have wit-
17 nessed an increased presence in Latin America.

18 (6) According to the Department of Defense,
19 the IRGC and its Qods Force played a significant
20 role in some of the deadliest terrorist attacks of the
21 past two decades, including the 1994 attack on the
22 AMIA Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires,
23 by generally directing or supporting the groups that
24 actually executed the attacks.

1 (7) Reports of Iranian intelligence agents being
2 implicated in Hezbollah-linked activities since the
3 early 1990s suggest direct Iranian government sup-
4 port of Hezbollah activities in the Tri-Border Area
5 of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, and in the past
6 decade, Iran has dramatically increased its diplo-
7 matic missions to Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Ec-
8 uador, Argentina, and Brazil. Iran has built 17 cul-
9 tural centers in Latin America, and it currently
10 maintains 11 embassies, up from 6 in 2005.

11 (8) Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies with a
12 presence in Latin America have raised revenues
13 through illicit activities, including drug and arms
14 trafficking, counterfeiting, money laundering, forg-
15 ing travel documents, pirating software and music,
16 and providing haven and assistance to other terror-
17 ists transiting the region.

18 (9) Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and
19 Venezuela expressed their intention to assist Iran in
20 evading sanctions by signing a statement supporting
21 Iran's nuclear activities and announcing at a 2010
22 joint press conference in Tehran their determination
23 to "continue and expand their economic ties to Iran"
24 with confidence that "Iran can give a crushing re-

1 sponse to the threats and sanctions imposed by the
2 West and imperialism”.

3 (10) The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency con-
4 cluded in 2007 that almost one-half of the foreign
5 terrorist organizations in the world are linked to
6 narcotics trade and trafficking, including Hezbollah
7 and Hamas. Sophisticated narco-tunneling has also
8 been discovered along the United States–Mexico bor-
9 der that has led to concerns about Hezbollah’s abil-
10 ity to cooperate with Mexican drug trafficking orga-
11 nizations to utilize smuggling techniques and routes
12 in order to transport drugs and people into the
13 United States.

14 (11) In October 2011, the United States
15 charged two men, Manssor Arbabsiar, a United
16 States citizen holding both Iranian and United
17 States passports, and Gholam Shakuri, an Iran-
18 based member of Iran’s IRGC Qods Force, with con-
19 spiracy to murder a foreign official using explosives
20 in an act of terrorism. Arbabsiar traveled to Mexico
21 with the express intent to hire “someone in the nar-
22 cotics business” to carry out the assassination of the
23 Saudi Arabian Ambassador in the United States.
24 While in the end, he only engaged a U.S. Drug En-
25 forcement Agency informant posing as an associate

1 of a drug trafficking cartel, Arbabsiar believed that
2 he was working with a member of a Mexican drug
3 trafficking organization and sought to send money
4 to this individual in installments and not in a single
5 transfer.

6 (12) In February 2011, actions by the Depart-
7 ment of the Treasury effectively shut down the Leb-
8 anese Canadian Bank. Subsequent actions by the
9 United States Government in connection with the in-
10 vestigation into Lebanese Canadian Bank resulted in
11 the indictment in December 2011 of Ayman
12 Joumaa, a former Medellin Cartel member with ties
13 to Hezbollah, for trafficking cocaine to the Los
14 Zetas drug trafficking organization in Mexico City
15 for sale in the United States and for laundering the
16 proceeds.

17 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

18 It shall be the policy of the United States to use ap-
19 propriate elements of national power to counter Iran's
20 growing hostile presence and activity in the Western
21 Hemisphere by working together with United States allies
22 and partners in the region to mutually deter threats to
23 our interests by the Government of Iran.

24 **SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.**

25 In this Act:

1 (1) WESTERN HEMISPHERE.—The term “West-
2 ern Hemisphere” means the United States, Canada,
3 Mexico, the Caribbean, South America, and Central
4 America.

5 (2) RELEVANT CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
6 TEES.—The term “relevant congressional commit-
7 tees” means the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
8 the House of Representatives and the Committee on
9 Foreign Relations of the Senate.

10 **SEC. 5. REQUIREMENT OF A STRATEGY TO ADDRESS IRAN’S**
11 **GROWING HOSTILE PRESENCE AND ACTIVITY**
12 **IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.**

13 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
14 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
15 shall conduct an assessment of the threats posed to the
16 United States by Iran’s growing hostile presence and ac-
17 tivity in the Western Hemisphere and submit to the rel-
18 evant congressional committees the results of the assess-
19 ment and a strategy to address Iran’s growing hostile
20 presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere.

21 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy de-
22 scribed in subsection (a) should include—

23 (1) a description of the presence, activities, and
24 operations of Iran, the Iranian Revolutionary
25 Guards Corps (IRGC), its Qods Force, Hezbollah,

1 and other terrorist organizations linked to Iran that
2 may be present in the Western Hemisphere, includ-
3 ing information about their leaders, objectives, and
4 areas of influence and information on their financial
5 networks, trafficking activities, and safe havens;

6 (2) an assessment of the terrain, population,
7 ports, foreign firms, airports, borders, media outlets,
8 financial centers, foreign embassies, charities, reli-
9 gious and cultural centers, and income-generating
10 activities in the Western Hemisphere utilized by
11 Iran, the IRGC, its Qods Force, Hezbollah, and
12 other terrorist organizations linked to Iran that may
13 be present in the Western Hemisphere;

14 (3) a description of the relationship of Iran, the
15 IRGC, its Qods Force, and Hezbollah with
16 transnational criminal organizations linked to Iran
17 and other terrorist organizations in the Western
18 Hemisphere, including information on financial net-
19 works and trafficking activities;

20 (4) a description of the relationship of Iran, the
21 IRGC, its Qods Force, Hezbollah, and other ter-
22 rorist organizations linked to Iran that may be
23 present in the Western Hemisphere with the govern-
24 ments in the Western Hemisphere, including mili-

1 tary-to-military relations and diplomatic, economic,
2 and security partnerships and agreements;

3 (5) an assessment of the Federal law enforce-
4 ment capabilities, military forces, State and local
5 government institutions, and other critical elements,
6 such as nongovernmental organizations, in the West-
7 ern Hemisphere that may organize to counter the
8 threat posed by Iran, the IRGC, its Qods Force,
9 Hezbollah, and other terrorist organizations linked
10 to Iran that may be present in the Western Hemi-
11 sphere;

12 (6) a description of activity by Iran, the IRGC,
13 its Qods Force, Hezbollah, and other terrorist orga-
14 nizations linked to Iran that may be present at the
15 United States borders with Mexico and Canada and
16 at other international borders within the Western
17 Hemisphere, including operations related to drug,
18 human, and arms trafficking, human support net-
19 works, financial support, narco-tunneling, and tech-
20 nological advancements that incorporates—

21 (A) with respect to the United States bor-
22 ders, in coordination with the Governments of
23 Mexico and Canada and the Secretary of Home-
24 land Security, a plan to address resources, tech-
25 nology, and infrastructure to create a secure

1 United States border and strengthen the ability
2 of the United States and its allies to prevent
3 operatives from Iran, the IRGC, its Qods
4 Force, Hezbollah, or any other terrorist organi-
5 zation from entering the United States; and

6 (B) within Latin American countries, a
7 multiagency action plan, in coordination with
8 United States allies and partners in the region,
9 that includes the development of strong rule-of-
10 law institutions to provide security in such
11 countries and a counterterrorism and counter-
12 radicalization plan to isolate Iran, the IRGC, its
13 Qods Force, Hezbollah, and other terrorist or-
14 ganizations linked to Iran that may be present
15 in the Western Hemisphere from their sources
16 of financial support and counter their facilita-
17 tion of terrorist activity; and

18 (7) a plan—

19 (A) to address any efforts by foreign per-
20 sons, entities, and governments in the region to
21 assist Iran in evading United States and inter-
22 national sanctions;

23 (B) to protect United States interests and
24 assets in the Western Hemisphere, including
25 embassies, consulates, businesses, energy pipe-

1 lines, and cultural organizations, including
2 threats to United States allies;

3 (C) to support United States efforts to
4 designate persons and entities in the Western
5 Hemisphere for proliferation activities and ter-
6 rorist activities relating to Iran, including affili-
7 ates of the IRGC, its Qods Force, and
8 Hezbollah, under applicable law including the
9 International Emergency Economic Powers Act;
10 and

11 (D) to address the vital national security
12 interests of the United States in securing en-
13 ergy supplies from the Western Hemisphere.

14 (c) DEVELOPMENT.—In developing the strategy
15 under this section, the Secretary of State shall consult
16 with the heads of all appropriate United States depart-
17 ments and agencies, including the Secretary of Defense,
18 the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of
19 Homeland Security, the Secretary of the Treasury, the At-
20 torney General, and the United States Trade Representa-
21 tive.

22 (d) FORM.—The strategy under this section shall be
23 submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classi-
24 fied annex if necessary.

1 **SEC. 6. REPORT.**

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the
3 submission of the strategy required under section 5, the
4 Secretary of State shall submit to the relevant congres-
5 sional committees a report on the progress made toward
6 the implementation of the strategy and a description and
7 evaluation toward achieving the policy objective described
8 in section 3.

9 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
10 gress that the Secretary of State should keep the relevant
11 congressional committees continually informed on the hos-
12 tile actions of Iran in the Western Hemisphere.

13 **SEC. 7. SUNSET.**

14 (a) SUNSET.—The provisions of this Act shall termi-
15 nate, and shall cease to be effective, on the date that is
16 30 days after the date on which the President certifies
17 to Congress that Iran—

18 (1) has ceased and verifiably dismantled its ef-
19 forts to design, develop, manufacture, or acquire—

20 (A) a nuclear explosive device or related
21 materials and technology;

22 (B) chemical and biological weapons; and

23 (C) ballistic missiles and ballistic missile
24 launch technology;

25 (2) no longer provides support for acts of inter-
26 national terrorism; and

Mr. ROYCE. In recent years Iran has developed close ties with several leaders in the Western Hemisphere who share its violent anti-Americanism. And most recently Iranian President Ahmadinejad undertook his sixth visit to the hemisphere, undertaking what some in the press quipped a “tyrant’s tour” of Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Ecuador.

The growing Iranian role in the Western Hemisphere has been the subject of several committee hearings and classified briefings. Many members are concerned, however, that the administration has not adequately examined or sought to counter Iran’s growing and hostile diplomatic and intelligence presence in our hemisphere.

Let’s be clear. The Iranian threat isn’t just thousands of miles away. It is close to home. Back in the 1990s, Iran was behind the bombings in Argentina. More recently, Hezbollah operatives have penetrated our borders. The Iranian attempt to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador on U.S. soil using a Mexican drug cartel is the latest demonstration of this threat.

Indeed, recently testifying before Congress, the Director of National Intelligence stated that Iranian officials—I’ll give his quote here—“have changed their calculus and are now willing to conduct an attack in the United States.” The DNI went on to say that the Iranians are “trying to penetrate and engage in this hemisphere.”

Besides a potential platform to conduct terrorist attacks, some experts see other sources of motivation for closer Iranian links to the hemisphere. Many believe that the countries Iran is courting in the Western Hemisphere can help them circumvent sanctions.

Testifying before Congress recently, one former U.S. official noted,

“The dangerous activities of Iran and Hezbollah so near our borders demand a whole of government strategy beginning with an interagency review to understand and assess the transnational multifaceted nature of this problem [and] to mobilize friendly governments to respond.”

This bill, H.R. 3783, the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012, authored by our colleagues Mr. Duncan of South Carolina and Mr. Higgins of New York, two members of the subcommittee, requires such a review and strategy and basically would kick the bureaucracy into gear. With 60 co-sponsors, including myself, it deserves support. And I urge its passage.

I remind the members of the committee that we will very soon have the last votes of this day on the floor. So brevity is appreciated. And, without objection, all members can submit their full statements for the record.

I now recognize from the other side the member from Rhode Island for any remarks he may have before I turn to the legislation’s author.

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, am concerned, I think, as most Americans, about the growing influence of Iran in the Western Hemisphere. And I think this is an issue which the President and the administration are taking very seriously and remain fully engaged in as they monitor these events and confront the growing threat of Iran around the world.

And I think this legislation, of course, begins with an assessment by the Secretary of this threat, which I think is an important step. And I support the legislation and thank you for the opportunity to make some opening comments.

Mr. ROYCE. I thank the gentleman from Rhode Island.

Are there any other members who wish to strike the last word and speak on this measure?

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I move to strike the last word and ask that my statement be submitted in its entirety into the record.

Mr. ROYCE. That was brief. I think we are going to hold the vote open for a few minutes for our ranking member. I am going to allow Mr. Duncan, the author of the measure, then, to go ahead with the statement that he has submitted for the record if you want to elaborate on that at this moment.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Duncan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JEFF DUNCAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

1

Jeff's Statement for the Record on H.R. 3783 ANSIntroduction:

Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Sherman, I want to start by thanking you and your staff for your assistance on this legislation. I appreciate the bipartisan cooperation on this bill and the 63 Members who have cosponsored it. As you all know, this bill offers us an opportunity to work together with our allies and partners in the Western Hemisphere to identify mutual threats to our interests and to act together to protect those interests. The U.S. is linked to our neighbors to the north and south by geography, culture, trade, military cooperation, and many shared values. But, I believe the U.S. needs to do a better job of engaging with our friends and developing broader cooperation on threats posed to the entire Western Hemisphere community.

Iran's Presence in Latin America:

Today, one of the most subversive threats facing the U.S. and our neighbors comes from Iran's hostile activity and strategic influence in our hemisphere. Let me be very clear. The U.S. has vital political, economic, and security interests in the Western Hemisphere, and Iran's penetration into the region represents a threat to the U.S. as well as to the rest of the Hemisphere. In 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected President of Iran. Within his first few months in office, he made a public tour throughout the Latin American region. Today, Iran has nearly doubled its number of embassies in the region from 6 to 11. President Ahmadinejad also recently completed his sixth visit to the region.

In March 2008, Iran and Bolivia agreed to joint projects valued at \$1 billion. While this was later swapped for a content-sharing agreement, in May 2011, Iran's Foreign Ministry and the Cuban Institute of Radio and Television announced a joint network venture. Last month, Iran expanded its outreach to Latin America with "Hispan TV." Iran has also used its Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI) to tap into Western Hemisphere banks, opening a branch with Venezuela in 2008.

Despite U.S. sanctions, the Central Bank of Ecuador established a relationship with EDBI, and in 2010, Bolivia signed agreements calling for a branch of the EDBI in Bolivia. While Iran as a sovereign country has a right to engage in public diplomacy, when its actions are hostile to American interests and incite anti-American views among our neighbors, and when it seeks to use its influence to evade U.S. and international sanctions, we need to take notice and respond accordingly.

At a 2010 joint press conference in Tchrn, the Bolivarian states (Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua) expressed their intention to assist Iran in evading sanctions by announcing their determination to “continue and expand their economic ties to Iran” with confidence that “Iran can give a crushing response to the threats and sanctions imposed by the West and imperialism.” We also know that Ecuador and Venezuela have negotiated bilateral agreements for Iran to secure joint shipping lines, enabling Iran to evade U.S. efforts to monitor and report on its actions.

Today, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps’ (IRGC) elite Qods Force stations operatives in foreign embassies, charities, and religious and cultural institutions to build relationships with the local population. Recent years have witnessed an increased presence of the IRGC in Latin America. Additionally, the IRGC’s Qods Force has a history of supporting Hezbollah’s military, paramilitary, and terrorist activities. Hezbollah, considered by the U.S. State Department as the “most technically capable terrorist group in the world,” tends to use mostly multifaceted international cells that contain a recruitment entity, fundraising entity, and an operational entity.

While Hezbollah cells may focus primarily on only one of these areas, in all cases, each Hezbollah operative has an operational mandate. This is very important to realize because while Hezbollah’s actions in our hemisphere may seem to only engage in fundraising right now, should things change on the international stage (i.e. — an attack on Iran’s nuclear program, a conflict in the Strait of Hormuz, or more biting sanctions), we could face a serious backlash from an Iran positioned perfectly with a foothold in our neighborhood. Evidence also suggests that there are 80

Hezbollah operatives in 12 countries throughout Latin America, including Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Panama, Costa Rica, and Mexico. We have reason to believe that this is only a small sample of the Hezbollah network in the region.

Iran's Presence in Mexico:

In Mexico, we have also seen evidence of Hezbollah's activity. In 2005, Mahmoud Youssef Kourani, a Lebanese man, pled guilty to providing material support to Hezbollah after crossing the Mexican border illegally into the U.S. In 2006, the FBI broke up a Mexican smuggling ring organized by Hezbollah to transport operatives across the U.S.-Mexico border. In 2010, Jamal Yousef, a member of the Syrian military, was indicted for his involvement in a narco-terrorism conspiracy to sell weapons to FARC in exchange for cocaine. According to the indictment, "the weapons were stolen from Iraq and [were] being stored in Mexico at the home of Yousef's relative, who according to Yousef, is a member of Hezbollah." Last summer, a Kuwait newspaper reported that Mexican authorities had successfully identified and disbanded a similar network of Lebanese-Mexicans that was being set up by Hezbollah.

When we take these individual incidents and add them to the foiled Iranian plot last October, the *Univision* documentary on *The Iranian Threat* released last December, and the established nexus between narco-trafficking and terrorism, we see credible evidence for concern that possible terrorist networks are emerging in our hemisphere. This subcommittee has held hearings on this issue, and in 2007, the U.S. DEA concluded that almost half of the foreign terrorist organizations in the world are linked to narcotics trade and trafficking, including Hezbollah and Hamas. I am also greatly concerned that the sophisticated narco-tunneling discovered along the U.S.-Mexican border may be evidence that the Mexican drug trafficking organizations' (DTO) are tapping into Hezbollah's resources and expertise in order to better transport drugs or people into the U.S.

Iran's Presence in Canada:

We also have reason to suspect Iran has sought influence with Hezbollah in Canada. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, an investigation by the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service found that a Hezbollah network in Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal had laundered tens of thousands of dollars through Canadian banks and shipped equipment to the Middle East for use by Hezbollah against Israel. Evidence also suggests that Hezbollah may have a fundraising presence in Ottawa as well as in towns surrounding Toronto. Most recently, the U.S. DEA and Treasury Department's success in effectively shutting down the Lebanese Canadian Bank raises questions on Iran's actions in Canada because the Lebanese Canadian Bank, a former subsidiary of the Royal Bank of Canada, also had offices in Montreal.

Iran's Presence in the United States:

Today, many experts believe that Hezbollah is better established in North America – and in the United States – than any other terrorist organization in the world. In 2002, the FBI testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that “FBI investigations to date continue to indicate that many Hezbollah subjects based in the United States have the capacity to attempt terrorist attack here should this be a desired objective of the group.” In 2005, testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs showed that a Hezbollah cell in Charlotte, North Carolina, “received receipts from Hezbollah for their donations,” and “law enforcement authorities were able to trace half a million dollars through various accounts tied to members of the Charlotte cell.” The U.S. DEA also believes that Mexican DTOs are operating in over 230 American cities. With the connection between drugs, money, and terrorism, we have to wonder how many of these DTOs are working with Hezbollah or others in the Arab Network here within the U.S.

Reason for H.R. 3783:

Congress has approved trillions of dollars for military operations in the Global War on Terror. Yet, Iran has steadily been establishing a presence here in our own neighborhood from which it can exercise influence. What are we doing about it? Overestimating the threat does not serve the American people well. But, underestimating the threat could bring great harm to the American people, to our friends in the region, and to U.S. values and allies abroad. I was very disappointed to read in the Administration's *2011 Strategy for Counterterrorism* that the Western Hemisphere and South and Central American in particular were not included in the "Area of Focus." How can we fight an enemy's strategy and alliances without a strategy of our own?

I believe this bill is a necessary first step to redoubling efforts to better understand the extent of Iranian activity and presence in the Western Hemisphere community by repairing faltering relationships and establishing a strong U.S. posture and policy with our neighbors. It has several components to it to leverage tools of U.S. power to combat Iran's hostile actions in our hemisphere. It calls on the Secretary of State to conduct an assessment of the threat and submit a strategy to Congress that protects U.S. interests and assets in the Western Hemisphere such as embassies, consulates, businesses, energy pipelines, and cultural organizations. It addresses U.S. vital energy security interests, as Venezuela is the fourth largest exporter of crude oil to the U.S. It requires a secure U.S. border working with our friends in Canada and Mexico to prevent Iranian operatives from entering the U.S. It also highlights the importance of strategic communication by requiring a counterterrorism and counter-radicalization plan for countries the Western Hemisphere community.

Last month, DNI Director James Clapper testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that "some Iranian officials -- probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khomeini -- have changed their calculus and are now more willing to conduct an attack in the United States in response to real or perceived U.S. actions that threaten the regime." I believe the time could not be

riper for this bill with the recent assassination attempts in Azerbaijan last month and in Georgia, India, and Thailand this month. Escalation of tensions at the Strait of Hormuz or military action due to Iran's major advances in its nuclear program could be the trigger that unleashes Iran's proxies in our hemisphere to the danger of the American people and our friends in this neighborhood. We need to be prepared, and I encourage you to support this bill.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Sherman and Mr. Cicilline from Rhode Island, I want to start by thanking you and your staff for the assistance on this legislation. I appreciate the bipartisan cooperation on the bill today. We have 63 members who have co-sponsored it.

And, as you all know, this bill offers us an opportunity to work together with our allies and partners in the Western Hemisphere to identify the mutual threats to our interests and act together to protect those interests. And, just of note, I met with an Ambassador to Mexico to further that conversation to make sure that we all understand that this is our neighborhood and that we're working for mutual protection of our interest.

And today one of the most subversive threats facing the U.S. and our neighbors comes from Iran's hostile activity and strategy influence in our hemisphere. The United States' vital political, economic, and security interest in the Western Hemisphere and Iran's penetration into the region represents a threat to the U.S. as well as the rest of the hemisphere.

Today Iran has nearly doubled its number of Embassies in the region from 6 to 11. And President Ahmadinejad has also recently completed his sixth visit to the region. While Iran as a sovereign country does have the right to engage in public diplomacy, when its actions are hostile to American interests and incite anti-American views among our neighbors and would seek to use as influence to evade U.S. and international sanctions, we need to take notice. And we need to respond accordingly.

Today the Iranian Revolutionary Guard's Corps elite Qods force stations operatives in foreign Embassies, charities, religious, and cultural institutions to build relationships with local population.

As the chairman mentioned, Hezbollah, considered by the U.S. State Department as the most technically capable terrorist group in the world, tends to use sales that contain a recruitment entity, fundraising entity, and operational entity. While Hezbollah sales may focus primarily only on fundraising, in all cases, each Hezbollah operative has an operational mandate. In Mexico, we have seen evidence of Hezbollah's activity, the full Iranian plot just of this last June revealed by the administration publicly in October, as a prime example.

The Univision documentary that was released in December on the Iranian threat, the established nexus between narcotrafficking and terrorism and sophisticated narco towing discovered along the U.S.-Mexico border provide credible evidence for a concern that possible terrorist networks are engaging in our hemisphere and may be evidence that Mexican drug trafficking organizations are tapping in to Hezbollah's expertise in order to better transport drugs, people, and who knows what into the United States of America.

We have also reason to suspect Iran has sought influence through Hezbollah in Canada. Most recently the USDA and Treasury Department's success in effectively shutting down the Lebanese Canadian Bank raises question on Iran's actions in Canada because the Lebanese Canadian Bank, formerly a subsidiary of the Royal Bank of Canada, also had offices in Montreal.

Today many experts believe that Hezbollah is better established in North America and in the United States than any other terrorist organization in the world. With the connection between drugs, money, and terrorism, we have to wonder how many of these designated drug trafficking organizations are working with Hezbollah and other Arab networks here within the United States.

Now, Congress had authorized trillions of dollars for military operations in the global war on terror in the last decade. Yet, Iran has steadily been establishing a presence here in our own neighborhood, from which it can exercise influence.

What are we doing about it? Overestimating the threat does not serve the American people well, but underestimating the threat could bring great harm to the American people, to our friends in the region, and U.S. assets and to our allies here and abroad.

So I believe this bill is necessary as a first step to redoubling our efforts to better understand the extent of the Iranian activity here at home by establishing a strong U.S. relationship with our neighbors. It requires an assessment of the threat and a strategy to counter Iran's hostile actions that protects the U.S. interests and the assets in the Western Hemisphere, addresses U.S. vital energy security interests, and calls for a secure U.S. border to prevent Iranian operatives from entering the United States.

Just last month, the Director of DNI, James Clapper, testified that Iranian officials are "more willing to conduct an attack in the United States in response to real or perceived U.S. actions that threaten the regime."

We need to be prepared with a strategy to counter Iran's hostile presence in our neighborhood. And I ask my colleagues to and I encourage you to please support the bill.

And, with that, I yield back.

Mr. ROYCE. I thank the gentleman. Your point about every agent having an operational mandate is a correct one. From our experience—and I would just cite the example of Mahmoud Kourani, who successfully infiltrated our country over our southern border in the State of California. It was done through a process whereby he was put in the trunk of a car, brought into this country, reached the midwest before it was discovered that he and a host of fellow Iranian trained agents were here, over 50 in total.

And here is what was interesting about the training. It wasn't just, as you mentioned, in fundraising. It was also in weapons training. It was also in explosives. It wasn't intelligence. It was the full range of how to show terror.

And what is equally interesting to me is that his brother was General Kourani. General Kourani was in charge of the bombardment during the Israel-Hezbollah war. And I was up in Haifa in '06, when it was coming under attack. And I saw the effectiveness of these Hezbollah operatives as they were working, you know, these missiles that had been given to them by Iranian and Syrian forces. And the thought that the brother of that individual was able to go into a consulate in Beirut and pay a \$5,000 bribe, in this case to an official from Mexico in order to get the phony documentation to go into Mexico and then would link up with one of these cartels that move people through the border in order to get through our southern border and the fact that we wouldn't find him until—I think he was up in Detroit when he was finally apprehended. Of course, he and these other individuals subsequently were convicted, but it shows the necessity of having this legislation. And I am going to turn to the gentleman of Ohio, Mr. Johnson, for any remarks he might want to make.

Mr. JOHNSON. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate, first of all, my colleague from South Carolina for offering H.R. 3783, the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012.

This is a very, very important piece of legislation. We have seen increasing evidence. We have known it for a long time, but it is becoming increasingly evident to the rest of the world, certainly to the American people, of Iran's intentions to negatively impact the freedoms and the liberties that we enjoy here in America.

And so I stand in full support of this piece of legislation. And I again want to thank my colleague for introducing it.

Mr. ROYCE. I thank the gentleman from Ohio.

Hearing no further requests to speak, are there any amendments?

[No response.]

Mr. ROYCE. Hearing no further amendments, the question is on agreeing to the amendment in the nature of a substitute. All of those in favor say aye.

[Chorus of ayes.]

Mr. ROYCE. All those opposed?

[No response.]

Mr. ROYCE. In the opinion of the Chair, the ayes have it. And the amendment in the nature of a substitute is agreed to. Without objection, the bill, as amended, will be reported favorably to the full committee in the form of a single amendment in the nature of a substitute. And the staff is directed to make any technical and conforming amendments.

We are not going to adjourn because our ranking member I believe wanted to say a few remarks, make a few brief remarks on this legislation.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This bill is so important that I felt my opportunity to pontificate on it was less important than moving it as quickly as possible. As you know, you wanted to schedule this hearing at a time when I couldn't be here.

Mr. ROYCE. However, without objection—

Mr. SHERMAN. I made it in time to—

Mr. ROYCE. You did.

Mr. SHERMAN [continuing]. Thank you for your decision to schedule the meeting at a time when you could move this bill.

Mr. ROYCE. If I could interrupt? Without objection, I would like to move for a revote. And at the same time, I am going to yield to the ranking member for his opening statement.

Mr. Sherman, we're fine. We've got over 10 minutes before the clock.

Mr. SHERMAN. I thank the chairman for his indulgence.

I have long advocated the strongest possible sanctions on Iran due to its terrorism. And perhaps the greatest example of the worldwide ambitions of Iran took

place in the early 1990s when they attacked the Israeli Embassy in Argentina and the Jewish Cultural Center there as well.

But just recently Iranian agents planned to kill a Saudi Ambassador on U.S. soil. This demonstrates that Iran is not content to make mischief in the old world. They have come to our hemisphere as well. I believe the strongest possible sanctions and the maximum possible diplomatic isolation of Iran—that's why I am glad that just yesterday Ben Bernanke said that he would use his voice and vote to assert a supervisory role over the Swiss system to prevent Iranian banks from conducting business with banks around the world providing he had a clear indication from those concerned with national security that that was indeed a good U.S. policy.

Then in this room just yesterday Secretary Clinton in response to my question said, "Yes, indeed, that would be a furtherance of U.S. policy."

And we need the strongest possible sanctions. Last year I introduced the Stop Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program Act, much of which has been included in legislation passed by the House through the Iran Threat Reduction Act.

The legislation will hopefully be the subject of a conference once the Senate passes its version. The Iran Threat Reduction Act includes the toughest sanctions yet on the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Qods Force. And these are among the provisions I authored.

I am currently compiling provisions that didn't make it into ITRA along with other provisions in a new package, which I will introduce soon. And my goal is to keep introducing the strongest possible sanctions bills against Iran until that government changes its policies.

Since 2003, I have worked with Chairman Royce on this subcommittee, where we have focused on so many issues of proliferation. And I am perhaps more concerned about those impending votes than our chairman. So I will put the rest of the statement in the record and thank him for his decision to revote our action here.

Mr. ROYCE. Well, I thank the ranking member.

And, without objection, we will void the prior vote and consider the question de novo. The question is on agreeing to the amendment in the nature of a substitute. All of those in favor say aye.

[Chorus of ayes.]

Mr. ROYCE. All those opposed, no?

[No response.]

Mr. ROYCE. In the opinion of the Chair, the ayes have it. And the amendment in the nature of a substitute is agreed to. Without objection, the bill, as amended, will be reported favorably to the full committee in the form of a single amendment in the nature of a substitute. And the staff is directed to make any technical and conforming amendments.

That concludes our business. The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 10:25 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X



MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

SUBCOMMITTEE MARKUP NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
Edward R. Royce (R-CA), Chairman

March 1, 2012

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN meeting of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, to be held in **Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live, via the WEBCAST link on the Committee website at <http://www.hcfa.house.gov>)**:

DATE: Thursday, March 1, 2012

TIME: 10:30 a.m.

MARKUP OF: H.R. 3783, To provide for a comprehensive strategy to counter Iran's growing presence and hostile activity in the Western Hemisphere, and for other purposes.

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202/225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE MARKUP

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade MARKUP

Day Thursday Date March 1, 2012 Room 2172

Starting Time 10:06 Ending Time 10:25

Recesses N/A (to) (to)

Presiding Member(s)

Rep. Ed Royce

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session

Executive (closed) Session

Televised

Electronically Recorded (taped)

Stenographic Record

BILLS FOR MARKUP: (include bill number(s) and title(s) of legislation.)

H.R. 3783 - Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

Reps. Royce, Duncan, Cicilline, Johnson, and Sherman

NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.)

Rep. Duncan

ACTIONS TAKEN DURING THE MARKUP: (Attach copies of legislation and amendments.)

The Chair called up the bill for consideration by the Subcommittee. An amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Representative Jeff Duncan was agreed to by voice vote. H.R. 3783, as amended, was agreed to by voice vote, and was ordered favorably reported to the full committee by unanimous consent.


RECORDED VOTES TAKEN (FOR MARKUP): (Attach final vote tally sheet listing each member.)

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Yeas</u>	<u>Nays</u>	<u>Present</u>	<u>Not Voting</u>
<i>N/A - Voice Vote</i>				

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____

or

TIME ADJOURNED _____


Subcommittee Staff Director

Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee
Member Attendance

Republicans

- Rep. Edward Royce (Chair)
- Rep. Ted Poe
- Rep. Jeff Duncan
- Rep. Bill Johnson
- Rep. Tim Griffin
- Rep. Ann Marie Buerkle
- Rep. Renee Ellmers

Democrats

- Rep. Brad Sherman (Ranking Member)
- Rep. David Cicilline
- Rep. Gerry Connolly
- Rep. Brian Higgins
- Rep. Allyson Schwartz