NEXT STEPS IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

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### ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

April 29, 2011, Foreign Policy Magazine article, “What the World Got Wrong in Côte D’Ivoire” submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe ........................................... 49
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:30 p.m., in room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher A. Coons (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Coons, Isakson, and Inhofe.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

Senator Coons. I'm pleased to chair today’s Africa Subcommittee hearing entitled “Next Steps on Cote d'Ivoire.” I’d like to call the subcommittee to order.

I am privileged to serve in this capacity with my good friend Senator Isakson. And I want to take the opportunity to thank him for his partnership in leading this subcommittee.

Cote d'Ivoire, as we all know, is emerging from a severe political military crisis that followed historic elections held on November 28, 2010. Just to underscore, these were, in many ways, the first truly national elections in Cote d'Ivoire’s history, with candidates representing every region in the country. And while President Ouattara’s victory was certified by the Ivoirian Independent Electoral Commission and the United Nations, Mr. Gbagbo, the former President, refused to recognize these results. The subsequent violence and conflict that emerged resulted in the tragic death of nearly 1,000 Ivoirians and the displacement of up to a million people. Fortunately, the armed conflict largely ended, days after Mr. Gbagbo’s arrest on April 11, and President Ouattara was sworn in, less than a month later, with a formal inauguration plan for next week.

I am pleased that President Ouattara has recently reaffirmed his commitment to ensuring accountability for those implicated in the violence, including forces loyal to both him and former President Gbagbo. As President Ouattara asserted on his recent state visit to Senegal, “No one is above the law. All those who have committed crimes of blood will be punished.” Real political reconciliation, in addition to accountability and justice for all, are absolutely essential to promoting a stable and prosperous future, in my view, in Cote d'Ivoire.

Political reconciliation will be a very real challenge for the nation and for President Ouattara, who has made it a top priority, along
with restoring security, addressing some very real human rights abuses that have occurred, ensuring transitional justice, reviving the economy, and reforming the security sector.

Today’s hearing will provide an opportunity to hear several perspectives on this recent history and the ambitious agenda for the nation, going forward, and to consider the role of the United States and the international community in supporting President Ouattara as he addresses governance issues and humanitarian concerns.

Today’s hearing will also consider the role of multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, the African Union, and the Economic Community of West African States, known as ECOWAS, in response to the conflict, as well as regional implications of these difficult recent events.

Cote d'Ivoire, as we all know, is an important economic hub in Africa; as well, the world’s largest cocoa producer and one of the largest U.S. trading partners in the region. We will, therefore, also today explore economic consequences of this recent crisis and steps forward toward economic recovery and growth.

An additional goal of today’s hearing is to consider military sector reform, which has been a very real challenge since the Ivoirian civil war of 2002. We will hear recommendations for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process which President Ouattara has undertaken, and steps forward to create a unified military that could offer real protection to the Ivoirian people and serve as a source of stability in the region, if successful.

I was deeply concerned about allegations of mass atrocities carried out by both sides in this conflict. And I am disturbed by reports of ongoing looting and violence in Abidjan. I also am acutely aware of the continuing humanitarian crisis, and look forward to hearing about the strategy for providing assistance to refugees, to those displaced persons, and Ivoirians facing ongoing security concerns.

Beyond the immediate crisis, I look forward to hearing suggestions about how the international community can best support the new Ouattara government as it attempts to address the underlying, lasting causes of instability in Cote d’Ivoire. In my view, it’s essential to build upon lessons learned from this past election in order to build stronger institutions of governance going forward, especially as Cote d’Ivoire prepares for legislative elections.

As President Obama said, in a speech delivered earlier just today, “We in America have a stake, not just in the stability of nations, but in the self-determination of individuals.” I agree with this statement, and believe it should serve as a guiding principle for our foreign policy.

We will have two panels today, to speak to these challenging and current questions about Cote d’Ivoire and its future, composed of representatives from the State Department and USAID, and then the second panel consisting of nongovernmental experts on West Africa and, in particular, Cote d’Ivoire.

First, we’ll be hearing from Bill Fitzgerald, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, who will discuss the U.S. diplomatic priorities in Cote d’Ivoire and the administration’s plan for the country, going forward. We will next hear from Nancy Lindborg, assistant administrator for democracy, conflict, and
humanitarian assistance at USAID, who will discuss the humanitarian efforts undertaken by USAID, and its plans for supporting this critical political reconciliation and economic recovery.

On our second panel, we'll hear from Dr. Michael McGovern, assistant professor of anthropology at Yale, who will discuss the prospects for this important political reconciliation and the challenges of demilitarization. Then, Jennifer Cooke, director of Africa Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, will discuss the role of the international community and regional implications of these events in Cote d'Ivoire. Finally, we will hear from Dr. Raymond Gilpin, director of the Center for Sustainable Economies at the U.S. Institute of Peace, who will discuss the economic causes and consequences of instability in Cote d'Ivoire and provide suggestions for how we can best support and sustain its economic health and growth, going forward.

I'd like to, at the outset, thank all of our witnesses for being here today, and for contributing to this important hearing. And I look forward to your testimony.

Senator Isakson.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA

Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's the custom of this subcommittee for opening statements to be reserved to the ranking member and the chair, with the chair going first, ranking member second. Out of deference to Senator Inhofe, who's made a request to make an opening statement, I will yield my time to him, with the understanding I'll have my say during the question and answer period, later on, if that's OK with the Chair.

Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Isakson. I appreciate your courtesy to Senator Inhofe, and invite Senator Inhofe to make a brief opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OKLAHOMA

Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, I also appreciate the fact that you have offered to give me time, and, in addition to that time, of course, that which has been yielded by Senator Isakson.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, I spoke four times on the Senate floor in the last month on the tragic civil war that unfolded in Cote d'Ivoire and which ended with a full-scale attack upon the city of Abidjan by the rebel forces of Alassane Ouattara, the United Nations, and the French military. At the end of that military operation, President Gbagbo and his wife Simone were captured by the French military forces, acting with rebel forces loyal to Ouattara. Now, while I was thankful that both the President and the First Lady were taken alive, both were mutilated and brutalized. And I condemned the use of so-called peacekeeping forces, made up of the United Nations, and the French forces, which attacked the city of Abidjan and the Presidential palace that—it is these forces that have caused countless deaths.

I happen to know—I'm very familiar with that area. I've been there many times. I've been to Cote d'Ivoire, to Abidjan, specifically, almost 15 times—maybe 15 times. That area, right there, is
an area that was detonated—there are small—I have no idea—of knowing how many, in that particular picture of people, citizens of Abidjan, were burned to death.

And I have to say that the African—it’s not a role of the United Nations, and I question why the French participated in this battle. The African Union, a supporter of ousting President Gbagbo, has since come out and condemned what it called foreign military intervention. In addition, President Museveni, of Uganda, has said, on November 11—on—I’m sorry, on April 11, 1 day prior to the capture of the Gbagbos—and I’m going to read this. This is a quote, now, from President Museveni, “I have not been happy with the way the United Nations and the international community, especially the French, have responded to the events of the post-election Ivory Coast. I’m not pleased with the way the international community can sanction a situation of bloodbath in the domestic affairs of African countries. I would prefer a peaceful intervention by an African Union committee that would investigate into the matter, give the parties a fair hearing, and come out with a workable recommendation that can promote peace and stability in the region.”

Other Africans, Mr. Chairman—the current African Union Chairman Obiang also condemned this military intervention in Cote d’Ivoire by saying, “Africa does not need any external influence. Africa must manage its own affairs.”

Kenyan President Odinga, was also quoted as saying that President Gbagbo “has been captured. And I say that he should not be hurt. I have actually already sent word to Mr. Ouattara saying that Gbagbo should not be hurt. If he wants to go out into exile, he should be allowed to go into exile. But, he needs to be treated humanely.” Remember the world “exile,” because we’re going to come back to that.

And former South African President Mbeki has written an eloquent condemnation of the United Nations and the French-led civil war in the April 29 edition of Foreign Policy magazine. I strongly recommend that the members get this. And I’ll make sure they have copies of this.

Mr. Chairman, I had warned the State Department and the United Nations and the French, on the Senate floor, in four separate times last month, that they would have blood on their hands if they continued supporting the rebel forces of Ouattara and continued the bombing the financial capital of Cote d’Ivoire, Abidjan, and did not agree to an immediate cease-fire. I said, on April 4, that “I think we can avert a real tragedy, something maybe comparable to what happened in the 1994 Rwanda genocide.” I called for a cease-fire and no one responded.

Next day, April 5, I said, on the Senator floor, that, “Ouattara has tried to deny his involvement in the slaughter of up to 1,000 innocent civilians, in the western town of Deukoue. His forces took out the town earlier last week”—now, this is on April 5 that I made this statement—“after the Gbagbo forces had gone.” Now, the Gbagbo forces weren’t there.

What you’re looking at here—this is—these are hundreds—and I can’t tell you—quantify them—somewhere up to 1,000 people in the town of Deukoue that were murdered by the Ouattara forces. Look at them, down in the far left. The other pictures were actually
in other communities around there. I can’t really identify that, but they’re in that vicinity. Those pictures down there were the ones that Ouattara’s forces came in and brutally murdered.

I called, again, for a cease-fire, and with no response. That was on April the 7th. On April 7 and 8, I pointed out that the U.N. and French were bombing downtown Abidjan, near the Presidential palace, where hundreds of young supporters of President Gbagbo had encircled the Presidential palace in a human shield for the bombing. Who knows how many of them were killed. This is what they did. These were young kids—baseball bats, boards that were up there. There they are. That’s all of these young kids. You can’t see how young they are. You can, if you look up close. I invite you to come up and look. But, all of these are different places. That happens to be a garage. You can see that they’re working on there. And these are the kids that are crying and are—you can tell they’ve been abused. We don’t how many of them were killed during this process.

Mr. Chairman, I pointed out, in April 8, that there were roving Ouattara death squads who were “disappearing”—they use that word instead of “killing”—disappearing supporters of President Gbagbo—meaning, killing them. I called again for immediate cease-fire. No one responded. That is the—and you can tell by what they’re wearing, those are the Ouattara death squad. Those are the individuals, let there be no doubt about that.

So, Mr. Chairman, I also pointed out that I believe a massive voter fraud occurred in November 28, in 2010, in the Cote d’Ivoire Presidential election between President Laurent Gbagbo and the rebel leader Ouattara. I submitted evidence, in two letters, to the State Department that showed massive voter fraud and to steal the election. In one instance, it showed that the first round of the Presidential election—this is very significant—not quite yet—the first round was—they had, in the—what we would call the primary election, the President, President Gbagbo, got thousands and thousands of votes in the northern areas, the Muslim areas, the areas which were Ouattara’s areas. And yet, when they had the next election—we would call that, here in the United States, a runoff—he got zero. That is a statistical impossibility. Everybody here knows it.

In another case, the voter tabulation return sheet for one of the five regions in the rebel-held north showed that Ouattara received an extra 94,000 votes made up out of thin air. We don’t know where they came—just in the tabulation. Now, you can see very clearly—that’s the official tabulation. If you look to the results, on this side over here, the total of that would be 149,000 votes. However, they recorded, as you can see, 244,000 votes, an additional 94,000 votes. Now, if you do your math and you figure out how many of these areas are up there—clearly, if this type of abuse went on in the rest of them, it was Gbagbo who won the election.

The Department of State responded to this allegation, on April 8, by claiming that this document appeared to be fraudulent, without offering any proof. And I’m going to ask these government witnesses today—and they know I’m going to ask, because I already sent a letter telling them I was going to ask—on the record, what, if any, investigation into the authenticity of this document was
undertaken. I will also ask them, on the record, if that document is fraudulent.

So, Mr. Chairman, despite my warnings, all that I predicted and warned against came to a pass. An orgy of bloodletting occurred during the Ouattaran offensive, which was joined by the United Nations and the French. They have left behind villages and streets filled with the stench of rotting bodies.

And there you can see it, right there. That is in Abidjan. The bottom left, you can see that they are burning the bodies down there. You can see the—what the stench is. We have witnesses that said that there were hogs eating the remains of the charred bodies that were lying in the street.

Down there, the next one to the right, in the lower right, he’s about to be executed. You can see the gun is to his head.

And the top one, that happens to be the Interior Minister of President Gbagbo. He was shot in the face, just enough to leave him alive and let him die a very slow death. That’s the picture, right up there in the top right.

Senator COONS. Senator——

Senator INHOFE. Interior Minister.

I call, again, for an independent investigation into all atrocities committed by all military forces involved in the fighting in Côte d’Ivoire. And I call for the United Nations and the French and the Ouattaran forces to halt the immediate death squads, still roving—it’s happening right now—around the streets in Abidjan, killing people out in the streets.

You know, I have several friends who are hiding. I’ve had personal conversations—you can’t use their names, because they’re killing all of them that they can find—where they witness the deaths taking place out in the street, and they can’t even go out there, because they know that they would be considered to be a Gbagbo supporter, and they, too, would be——

Senator COONS. Senator, please conclude in 1 more minute, if you would.

Senator INHOFE. Well, I’m—I will conclude; this is the last page.

So, last, I’ll ask the witnesses if they have any information about the whereabouts and conditions of both President and Simone Gbagbo. Ouattara has decades-long political, and now militant, foes of the Gbagbos. I’ve read the books about it. We all know it goes back to the 1990s. And I fear that great harm will come to the Gbagbos now if they remain in separate secret locations under this control. I would like to know what our State Department is doing to ensure their safety. And I renew my demand for the United—that the United States step in and examine the possibility of seeking a place of exile for the Gbagbos.

I have already located one place in one of the major countries in sub-Saharan Africa. They’re willing to take him into exile. This is going to be my plea when I talk to the witnesses.

Thank you for your tolerance, Mr. Chairman.

Senator COONS. You’re welcome, Senator.

I’d like to now turn it over to our witnesses, our first panel, starting with Deputy Assistant Secretary Bill Fitzgerald, and then followed by Assistant Administrator Lindborg. If you would, please limit your comments to roughly 5 minutes. Your full testimony will
be placed in the record, although, given the issues that have just been raised, feel free to keep your comments to about 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM FITZGERALD, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. FITZGERALD. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Isakson, and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify before you today on Cote d'Ivoire.

The post-election crisis in Cote d'Ivoire sharpened international focus on democracy and good governance in sub-Saharan Africa. The resolution of the crisis in favor of democracy sends a clear message to would-be dictators and antidemocrats across the continent that neither Africans nor the international community will stand for ignoring the peoples' voice, as expressed through the ballot box. Democracy, of course, does not begin nor end at the ballot box, but it is an important step to building accountable governance. The United States and its international partners must now step forward to work with the newly elected government to rebuild Cote d'Ivoire for all Ivoirians.

First, let me express our concern for the very real human tragedy that has befallen the Ivoirian people as a result of this political crisis. The road to democratic elections was a long and turbulent one. In fact, the fall 2010 Presidential elections were the culmination of nearly 10 years of international community engagement to broker peace in Cote d'Ivoire. The post-election political crisis involved gross abuses of human rights, crippled the country's once-vibrant economy, exacerbated existing divisions among Ivoirians, and allowed armed groups to take advantage of weakened security institutions. The international community must remain engaged in Cote d'Ivoire to help as the Ivoirian Government takes on the challenge of rebuilding and reconciling a fractured nation.

Moving forward, we will work with our international partners to support the Ivoirian Government as it addresses national reconciliation, economic recovery, and, above all, security sector reform, and as a response to the ongoing humanitarian crisis.

President Ouattara has pledged to make national reconciliation a primary focus of this Presidency. He recently created a Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation Commission, and named former Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny as chairman.

The Commission's specific plan of action has not been finalized, but President Ouattara has indicated that the Commission will also include two religious leaders, one Christian and one Muslim. As a vehicle for national dialogue and reconciliation process, the Commission can shed light on the events in the post-election period and can also be a forum for Ivoirians to participate in a reconciliation process, again, after 10 years of instability and intermittent armed conflict. To achieve lasting results, reconciliation efforts, however, must be Ivoirian-led, with support from the international community, as needed.

As we await details on how the Commission will operate, we are encouraging President Ouattara and his government to embrace good governance and transparency to create a wider culture of rec-
conciliation. Indeed, ensuring accountability for those who committed serious human rights abuses will be an important aspect of national reconciliation.

The United States cosponsored a resolution, at the U.N. Human Rights Council in Geneva, that created a Commission of Inquiry to investigate allegations of abuses and violations of human rights committed by both sides since November 28. Indeed, the Commission is currently in Côte d’Ivoire, carrying out its mandate to “investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations in order to identify those responsible for such acts, and bring them to justice.”

Again, President Ouattara has repeatedly promised to cooperate with the Commission of Inquiry’s findings, regardless of whether his forces or former President Gbagbo’s troops or militiamen were involved. We will hold him to that promise. We will ensure that there is no impunity for those who carried out these egregious human rights violations.

Former President Gbagbo remains under house arrest in northern Côte d’Ivoire, under the joint protection of the U.N. force, UNOCI, as well as President Ouattara’s republican forces. President Ouattara’s government is currently investigating what, if any, charges can be brought against Mr. Gbagbo and his coterie, domestically. He has also said that he supports the International Criminal Court’s role in investigating alleged abuses since the crisis began.

We remain concerned about abuses allegedly committed by Ouattara’s republican forces, and will press for full accountability for all human rights violators. Accountability and a meaningful reconciliation process will be essential not only for Côte d’Ivoire’s future, but for regional stability in the wake of the Ivoirian crisis. With some 200,000 Ivoirian refugees in Liberia, President Ouattara must create a stable and peaceful environment to allow them to return. Particularly in the west, I would say, it is absolutely essential for security forces to stand up. That includes members of the peacekeeping forces, because it is in the west where the bulk of the violence has been carried out.

Now, I’m going to submit the rest, and I’ll cut to my close to allow as much time as possible for questions.

But, I say, we remain committed to working with President Ouattara and the Ivoirian people to help reestablish Côte d’Ivoire as the beacon of stability and economic prosperity as it once was. A prosperous, peaceful Côte d’Ivoire is an asset to the region and to the continent. We look forward to playing a part in the hopeful future that lies ahead.

Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to speak. And I’m looking forward to the ability and the chance to answer any questions.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fitzgerald follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM FITZGERALD

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Isakson, and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify before you today on Côte d’Ivoire. The post-election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire sharpened international focus on democracy and good governance in sub-Saharan Africa. The resolution of the crisis in favor of democracy
sends a clear message to would-be dictators and antidemocrats across the continent that neither Africans, nor the international community, will stand for ignoring the people’s voice as expressed through the ballot box. Democracy does not begin or end at the ballot box, but it is an important step to building accountable governance. The United States and its international partners must now step forward to work with the newly elected government to rebuild a Cote d’Ivoire for all Ivoirians.

First, let me express our concern for the very real human tragedy that has befallen the Ivoirian people as a result of the political crisis. The road to democratic elections was a long and turbulent one. The fall 2010 Presidential elections were the culmination of nearly 10 years of international community engagement to broker peace in Cote d’Ivoire. The post-electoral political crisis involved gross abuses of human rights, wounded the country’s once-vibrant economy, exacerbated existing divisions among Ivoirians, and allowed armed groups to take advantage of weakened security institutions. The international community must remain engaged in Cote d’Ivoire to help as the Ivoirian Government takes on the challenge of rebuilding and reconciliation. Moving forward, we will work with our international partners to support the Ivoirian Government as it addresses national reconciliation, economic recovery, and security sector reform, and as it responds to the ongoing humanitarian crisis.

President Ouattara has pledged to make national reconciliation a primary focus of his Presidency. He recently created a Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation Commission (DTRC), and named former Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny as chair-

man. The DTRC’s specific plan of action has not been finalized, but President Ouattara has indicated that the Commission will also include two religious leaders (a Christian and a Muslim.) As a vehicle for a national dialogue and reconciliation process, the DTRC can shed light on the events in the post-election period and also be a forum for Ivoirians to participate in a reconciliation process after a decade of instability and intermittent armed conflict. To achieve lasting results, reconciliation efforts must be Ivoirian-led, with support from the international community as needed. As we await details on how the DTRC will operate, we are encouraging President Ouattara and his government to embrace good governance and transparency to create a wider culture of reconciliation.

Ensuring accountability for those who committed serious human rights abuses in the post-election period will be an important aspect of national reconciliation. The United States cosponsored a resolution at the U.N. Human Rights Council that created a Commission of Inquiry to investigate allegations of abuses and violations of human rights committed by both sides since November 28. The Commission is currently in Cote d’Ivoire, carrying out its mandate to “investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations . . . in order to identify those responsible for such acts and bring them to justice.” President Ouattara has repeatedly promised to cooperate with the Commission of Inquiry’s findings, regardless of whether his forces or former President Gbagbo’s troops or militia men were involved. We will hold him to that promise and ensure there will be no impunity.

Former President Gbagbo remains under house arrest in northern Cote d’Ivoire under the joint protection of United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire and President Ouattara’s Republican Forces. President Ouattara’s government is currently investigating what, if any, charges can be brought against Mr. Gbagbo and his coterie domestically. Ouattara has also said that he supports the International Criminal Court’s role in investigating alleged abuses since the November elections. We remain concerned about abuses allegedly committed by Ouattara’s Republican Forces since the November elections, and will press for full accountability for all human rights violators.

Accountability and a meaningful reconciliation process will be essential not only for Cote d’Ivoire’s future, but for regional stability in the wake of the Ivoirian crisis. With some 200,000 Ivoirian refugees in Liberia and other neighboring countries, President Ouattara must create a stable and peaceful environment to allow them to return. Restoring law and order to parts of the country where it has been absent for years will be central to this effort, and will not be easily achieved. Rebuilding trust between the Ivoirian people and the security sector—both military and police—will be challenging, particularly in the western regions where lawlessness and insecurity were commonplace even before the political crisis.

Security sector reform is critical for Cote d’Ivoire’s long-term stability, and the success of other programs in the short term. Reestablishment of U.N. programs for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of militia on both sides of the conflict will be an important factor in stabilizing the more volatile regions. The U.N. is completing a technical assessment mission to Cote d’Ivoire, which will provide recommendations to the U.N. and U.N. Security Council on how to best adjust UNOCI mission priorities to contribute to critical post-conflict tasks. Restoration of
state authority and law and order throughout the country presents a very immediate challenge for the Ouattara government, and support from the U.N. and international community will be critical. Broad security sector reform, including reform of the military, police and gendarmeries, and professionalization writ large, will require intensive international community coordination and support. As President Ouattara outlines his vision for the security sector organization and structure, we will work with our partners in the international community to coordinate assistance efforts in line with that vision.

Given Côte d’Ivoire’s regional importance and the negative impact of its instability on neighboring countries, there is a role for regional actors and institutions to play in helping Côte d’Ivoire achieve lasting stability and peace. The Ivorian political crisis demonstrated the important role that regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union can play in building international consensus on difficult issues. These organizations must remain actively engaged in helping Côte d’Ivoire avoid a return to instability. ECOWAS has provided humanitarian assistance for Côte d’Ivoire, and the African Union has promised to remain engaged in coordination with the international community to promote peace and genuine national reconciliation among Ivoirians.

Currently, U.S. assistance to Côte d’Ivoire is limited to humanitarian programs including disaster relief and the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief; many other programs are currently subject to foreign assistance restrictions that were triggered well before President Ouattara took office. We are exploring the process for lifting or waiving those restrictions, as appropriate, in order to broaden the types of assistance we can provide, and will consult with Congress in that effort. As we move through the process of addressing those foreign assistance restrictions, we have already begun careful coordination with our international partners to ensure that our efforts in supporting political reconciliation, economic recovery, and security sector reform are not duplicative.

We remain committed to working with President Ouattara and the Ivoirian people to help reestablish Côte d’Ivoire as the beacon of stability and economic prosperity it once was. A prosperous and peaceful Côte d’Ivoire is an asset to the region and the continent, and we look forward to playing a part in the hopeful future that lies ahead.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak today, and I welcome any questions you may have.

Senator Coons. Thank you, Secretary Fitzgerald.

Ms. Lindborg.

STATEMENT OF HON. NANCY E. LINDBORG, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID), WASHINGTON, DC

Ms. Lindborg. Good afternoon, Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, Senator Inhofe. Thank you for convening this hearing. And I welcome the opportunity to talk about the humanitarian assistance that we’ve provided to date in Côte d’Ivoire, and a brief look at the situation ahead. You have my full testimony, so let me just make a few reflections.

As Mr. Fitzgerald has just indicated, Côte d’Ivoire has been—after having been one of the most prosperous nations in West Africa, has been the victim of a decade of political instability, and it’s taken a heavy toll on both the population and the economy.

Since the November 2010 elections, there’s been a spiral of violence, and both sides have committed brutalities and killings. The result has been nearly half a million Ivoirians have fled their homes, including 180,000 who have fled into Liberia.

Despite the arrest of former President Gbagbo on April 11, the simmering and underlying conflicts remain: unresolved land tenure conflicts, longstanding tension over ethnicity, religion, national identity, and fear of potential retaliation by forces loyal to both
sides. All of this contributes to continued insecurity in Cote d’Ivoire. And our reports from the field indicate that there has been widespread destruction and displacement, particularly in western Cote d’Ivoire, where the fighting was particularly intensive over these last few months. Whole villages have been burned and destroyed, and many stand virtually empty.

In some villages, the destruction appears particularly targeted, perhaps based on increased ethnic and political tensions that were intensified since the elections. We’ve seen many hospitals that have been looted, and essential services are not provided.

Many of the displaced are staying with host families instead of in camps. In Liberia, up to 90 to 95 percent of the refugees are staying with host families in, really, a remarkable spirit of generosity. And this is straining the resources of many of the host communities. U.S. Agency for International Development representatives met with one household in western Cote d’Ivoire that was hosting three families in one household, for a total of 51 people. This is potentially straining the resources of an already very poor population, on both sides of the border, in Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia.

We know that people have been traumatized by the violence they’ve just witnessed and by the repeated losses, frankly, over the last decade, and a population that already had many displaced. We don’t know, as a result, when they will return. What we are told by those we speak to is that a return to security is paramount. Many of the refugees and host families in Liberia are already asking for seeds and tools for this May-to-October planting season, indicating to us that they don’t plan to return anytime soon.

Since the crisis began, we’ve intensified our efforts, through the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, to provide life-saving assistance to those who are affected by the conflict, both in Cote d’Ivoire and in neighboring Liberia. And our immediate priorities were to ensure that the conflict-affected populations had access to food, to water, and to adequate health care. We focus the majority of our assistance in western Cote d’Ivoire, in Abidjan, and across the border in Liberia.

Through our office of Food for Peace, we provided $16.4 million of emergency food assistance that went primarily through the World Food Programme. And we provided that assistance both to those who were displaced and to the host families whose resources were being stretched. This provided aid to 80,000 internally displaced persons and 100,000 refugees in Liberia. Through the USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, we provided $5.4 million in programs that provided water, sanitation, hygiene, working with communities to provide protection programs. Many of these people left their homes with virtually nothing. This is in addition to the $21.1 million provided by the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugee, and Migration that particularly focused on the refugee population in Liberia.

We’ve responded generously to this crisis. We also know that our emergency assistance will not contribute to durable solutions unless we continue to work with the international community to address the larger underlying issues. Within USAID, the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance has capa-
bilities and surge teams that enable us both to provide humanitarian assistance, as well as to work with our colleagues at the State Department to move into a more effective transition. We’re currently in discussions, with the State Department and the Embassy, on how we can best respond to the needs for additional assistance and move into a post-conflict era. We’re developing a menu of response options that look at a range of programs tailored to meet the specific transition needs of Côte d’Ivoire and the post-conflict requirements, building on what we’ve already done. We’re ready to deploy additional experts to do the assessment that’s so critical to identify what will be important to do next. And as Côte d’Ivoire looks to its future, we know that they need to address improved security, to rebuild its economy, and to rebuild the confidence of its people in its government through the reconciliation so critical to the future. We’ll continue to work alongside the international community to provide the assistance and the support so critically needed for this very important country.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lindborg follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NANCY E. LINDBORG

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Isakson, and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify before you today on Côte d’Ivoire. I will give you a brief update on the current situation in Côte d’Ivoire, the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) efforts in the aftermath of post-election violence, and what capabilities we have that might be brought to bear in the future.

Côte d’Ivoire was once one of the most prosperous states in West Africa, but political instability in the past decade has taken a heavy toll on the population and the economy. In late November 2010, the country held the second round of the long-awaited Presidential elections, which pitted incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo against former Prime Minister Alassane Dramane Ouattara in a runoff.

The Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) declared Ouattara the winner, with 54 percent of votes cast in his favor, and the U.N. Operation in Côte d’Ivoire certified these results. The Ivorian Constitutional Court, however, in a highly questionable move, annulled votes from several pro-Ouattara regions, and overturned the CEI’s ruling by declaring Gbagbo the winner with 51 percent of valid votes. Despite international community recognition that Ouattara was the duly elected President of Côte d’Ivoire, Gbagbo refused to step aside peacefully.

Following the disputed Presidential election, increasingly intense fighting between forces loyal to the two sides caused at least 500,000 people to flee their homes, including some 180,000 who fled to neighboring Liberia. The number of deaths reported varies, but has been reported in the thousands. Brutal massacres and killings along ethnic and political lines appear to have been committed by both sides of the political divide. The number of deaths reported varies, but has been reported in the thousands. Brutal massacres and killings along ethnic and political lines appear to have been committed by both sides of the political divide.

Despite former President Gbagbo’s arrest on April 11, unresolved land tenure conflicts, longstanding tensions over ethnicity and national identity, and fear of potential retaliation by forces loyal to either former President Gbagbo or President Ouattara all contribute to an uncertain security situation in Côte d’Ivoire.

CURRENT HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

Our reports from the field indicate that destruction and displacement are widespread. In western Côte d’Ivoire, whole villages have been burned, destroyed, and stand virtually empty. In some villages, the destruction appears more targeted, which is likely based on the ethnic and political tensions that have intensified since 2002. Hospitals have been looted and essential services are nonexistent.

To help describe the magnitude of the displacement, let me provide an illustrative example. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reports that there is severe destruction in Côte d’Ivoire near the border with Liberia between Zouan Hounien—where the fighting began—to Toulepleu to Blolequin. Before the recent vi-
ence, the town of Toulepleu had a population between 40,000 to 50,000 people. ICRC reported in March that only about 3,000 people remained while the rest fled.

Security in Cote d'Ivoire is gradually improving, allowing greater humanitarian access to affected areas. That said, armed combatants continue to cause random insecurity. Earlier this month, insecurity forced health officials to delay a polio vaccine campaign in Bas Sassandra, a southern region where at least three people have recently contracted polio.

According to Human Rights Watch, sexual violence has been increasingly prevalent in Cote d'Ivoire over the past decade, and the United Nations reports that gender-based violence, especially rape, has increased in most areas since the recent conflict began. All who have lived through the conflict have witnessed horrific events, further deteriorating trust levels between ethnic groups and political rivals.

In western Cote d'Ivoire and eastern Liberia, there are simultaneous displacements and returns, which are inhibiting efforts to determine the actual number of refugees and returnees. Fear of possible reprisal attacks and interethnic violence, coupled with ongoing insecurity, continue to prompt Ivorians to flee into Liberia. Grand Gedeh and Maryland counties, along the border with Cote d'Ivoire, are receiving as many as 250 refugees per day. Most who fled their homes left with nothing but the clothes on their back, and they are in need of food, basic household and hygiene items, and health care.

Most of the displaced, whether in Cote d'Ivoire or in Liberia, are not located in camps but are instead residing with host families. Between 90 and 95 percent of the refugees are staying with Liberian host families, depleting already scarce resources in host villages. Many host families are sheltering more than one displaced family, further stretching already scarce resources such as food and health supplies. USAID met with one household in far western Cote d'Ivoire that was hosting three families, for a total of 51 people in the household.

While refugees have been welcomed into Liberian homes and villages, the situation must be closely monitored to assure that basic needs of refugees and host families are met so tensions do not rise. There are also reports of Liberian mercenaries and Ivorian militias crossing the border into Liberia, which further heightens security concerns. The onset of the rainy season has prompted concerns that the poor condition of roads and bridges in southeastern Liberia will hamper food distributions in the coming months, further exacerbating the situation.

In this current crisis, refugees and IDPs cite security as a major factor in deciding whether to return to areas of origin in Cote d'Ivoire. Nearly all refugees and some host families in Liberia continue to request seeds and tools for the current May to October farming season, suggesting that refugees plan to remain in the country for at least 6 months. Traumatized by the violence they have witnessed and the repeated losses during the current and previous conflicts, many of the displaced told USAID that they are waiting to see security restored before they return home.

After the 2002 civil war in Cote d'Ivoire, upward of a million people were displaced. Insecurity, coupled with longstanding political and ethnic divides, hindered timely returns. By mid-2010, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that some 519,000 Ivorians remained internally displaced. That figure only accounts for people in the west and not from other areas of displacement so the number of Ivorians who were displaced when this current crisis began is likely greater than 519,000.

The needs are great, and the United States Government continues to find ways to provide assistance that is mindful of the fragile situation.

CURRENT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Since the recent crisis began, the United States—primarily through USAID and the Department of State—has been working to provide life-saving humanitarian assistance to those affected by the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire, whether they remained in country, fled into Liberia, or are serving as a host family for those who fled.

The immediate priorities for our humanitarian assistance are to assure that conflict-affected populations have access to food and adequate health care. We are also working to provide access to clean water and appropriate sanitation and hygiene, as well as assuring that vulnerable populations are adequately protected.

Based on our recent assessments, USAID will focus the majority of our humanitarian assistance in Cote d'Ivoire in the west, where widespread destruction and the general lack of law and order and social cohesion will pose significant challenges to recovery. As a complement to the work of the U.S. Department of State's Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration (State/PRM), USAID will continue to provide support to the refugees as well as host families in Liberia.
As you know, USAID does not have a Mission in Côte d’Ivoire. Our development assistance is managed primarily by the USAID West Africa Regional Mission in Accra, Ghana. USAID does maintain one staff member in Abidjan to oversee the daily management of the HIV/AIDS program as part of the larger President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). That individual, like many of his Embassy colleagues, is on Ordered Departure. In the face of the current situation in Côte d’Ivoire, PEPFAR partners have led heroic efforts to keep life-saving programs running by prioritizing programs that provide essential services such as antiretroviral drug distribution, HIV/AIDS treatment services for existing patients, and prevention of mother-to-child transmission programs.

USAID’s Office of Food for Peace is currently providing approximately $16.4 million of emergency food assistance through the U.N. World Food Programme (WFP) to meet the needs of vulnerable groups inside Côte d’Ivoire and in Liberia. In Côte d’Ivoire, USAID is supporting WFP’s “Emergency Assistance to Displaced Populations in Response to the Political Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire” program which is designed to address the food needs of displaced persons and people in host families in the western, center, northern, and Abidjan regions. In Liberia, USAID is supporting WFP’s “Emergency Assistance to Ivorian Refugees and Host Populations in North-Central and South-Eastern Liberia.” This program is designed to address the food needs of approximately 180,000 Ivorian refugees and Liberian host community members in affected areas of Liberia. To date, WFP has provided life-saving support to over 80,000 IDPs and host community members in Côte d’Ivoire and to over 100,000 Ivorian refugees and host community members in Liberia.

USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance has provided more than $5.4 million in emergency humanitarian programs that provide better health care, increase food security, promote economic recovery, protect vulnerable populations, provide clean water, and improve hygiene and sanitation.

For example, one program in Côte d’Ivoire provides clean water, access to sanitation and hygiene education at IDP camps, as well as providing household water treatment, hygiene kits and sanitation promotion for 50,000 host families. In Liberia, USAID is providing medical supplies and medical staff to clinics that have been overstretched by the large refugee populations.

To help survivors of sexual- and gender-based violence, USAID provides psychosocial support and access to health care. We have also worked with communities to encourage them to identify risks to their community members, discuss the causes and consequences, and seek ways in which they can work to prevent harm, abuse, and exploitation.

In addition to the $21.8 million in USAID support, State/PRM has provided $21.1 million to assist conflict-affected populations. In Côte d’Ivoire, PRM is supporting the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to provide camp coordination and protection programs for IDPs. PRM is also supporting the International Committee of the Red Cross, working to protect and assist victims of conflict, and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) which has provided emergency transport for people at risk. In Liberia and other neighboring states, PRM is helping UNHCR and partner agencies respond to the basic assistance and protection needs of Ivorian refugees, including the provision of livelihoods support, medical care, clean water and sanitation, and family reunification.

The United States has responded generously to this crisis, but we know that our emergency assistance will not be durable unless the much larger underlying issues are addressed. The future course of the political transition is now in the hands of the Ivorians. President Ouattara faces significant and multiple challenges, particularly in reaching across the political divide and giving all Ivorians confidence in the new government.

LOOKING BEYOND EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

USAID is currently in discussions with the U.S. Embassy in Abidjan about how we can best respond to the needs for additional humanitarian assistance as well as support post-conflict transition programs. We have developed a menu of response options in line with the State Department’s strategic framework. USAID is prepared to support a range of programming options that are tailored to address the specific transition and post-conflict requirements in Côte d’Ivoire, building upon the foundations provided by our humanitarian assistance activities.

USAID stands ready to deploy experts for an in-country assessment of transitional needs including overall democracy and governance opportunities and challenges, as well as political reconciliation, transitional justice, and security sector reform.
USAID assistance could also provide skills-building and training to help enable all key stakeholders—from ordinary citizens, to the media and civil society, to the highest echelons of executive government—to support and demand peaceful political transitions as a matter of status quo for the upcoming legislative elections and reform measures. Working together, USAID's humanitarian and development experts can design highly effective programs based on assessment findings.

Reconciliation is a daunting task in the wake of the recent violence and heated political discourse. The Ouattara government has pledged to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, along with investigations of war crimes committed by both sides since the November election. Unless societal divisions and grievances are addressed, political divisions are reconciled, and perpetrators of violence are held accountable to their communities, our efforts will be ineffective. Ivoirians will need to build or restore mechanisms for peace and justice at both the national and community levels. USAID brings capabilities to analyze the dynamics of latent conflict, grievance, and social resilience to tailor assistance appropriately to the present context and political climate.

Though the United States has the capabilities to help meet priority needs in Cote d'Ivoire, we cannot do it alone. We will continue to work alongside the international community to assure that gaps are filled and needs are met as quickly and efficiently as possible. And when possible, we will seek opportunities to engage the private sector, which can bring to bear new resources, ideas, and technologies that could be key components to the recovery in Cote d'Ivoire.

CONCLUSION

The hard work of governing a divided nation is just beginning for President Ouattara, and the humanitarian crisis is far from over. The United States stands by the Ivoirian people, and we appreciate the need to ensure our assistance is as long-lasting and sustainable as possible.

Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.

Senator Coons. Thank you, Ms. Lindborg.

Secretary Fitzgerald, if I might sort of begin our first round of questions with a question to each of you. The administration's called on President Ouattara to govern on behalf of all Ivoirians, including those who supported former President Gbagbo. What steps, in your view, can President Ouattara take to encourage reconciliation, greater unity among the Ivoirian people, to address this enormous tragedy? And what do you think will be the most successful support we can provide to the Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation Commission?

Mr. Fitzgerald. Absolutely. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question, because it's an important one, and one that we focus on every day since the crisis dropped down to a level where we can focus on what we're going to do in the future.

Political reconciliation is absolutely essential. I think that all people who were involved in human rights abuses need to be brought to trial. There needs to be accountability. The people, after 10 years, have suffered long and hard, and they're tired of insecurity. They're tired of fighting.

I think that President Ouattara has already indicated that he will take steps to include members of former President Gbagbo's party in his Cabinet. And I think that's an important step; perhaps two or three ministers. I think that it's essential, for instance, to reach out to the people. He delivered an Easter address. And again, Mr. Ouattara is from the north. And again, he's trying to show
that, in fact, the religious divide, which traditionally has not been deep in Cote d’Ivoire—in fact, it’s a very diverse society; you have a lot of intermarriages—and I think he—first, accountability; second, I think he needs to move to legislative elections as quickly as possible so people in their home districts feel like they have some sort of representation.

And I think, to be perfectly honest with you, he needs to stand up, along with the United Nations, a security force that guarantees the security and the protection of all people, which is, of course, the mandate that UNOCI has been carrying out, along with the French. This is particularly true in the west. I hate to say it—I hate to bring bad news, but just yesterday—well, last week, the last of the fighting, in Abidjan ended in the Upegon Cartier, which is pro-Gbagbo—typically pro-Gbagbo. They were routed, the folks, in the mopping-up exercise, and they fled. And there were also approximately 50 to 100 Liberian mercenaries who were fighting for former President Gbagbo.

On their way west, as they headed toward Liberia, they attacked at least three villages and killed 170 people.

Senator Coons. The committee will be in order.

Mr. Fitzgerald. And this is——

Senator Coons. Please continue.

Mr. Fitzgerald. This is—information that——

Senator Coons. Please maintain order.

Mr. Fitzgerald [continuing]. Has been published by well-known NGOs, as well as well-known newspapers and wire services and magazines. A hundred and seventy people are dead. The Commission of Inquiry is going to investigate that, as well. Security is key to political reconciliation.

Thank you.

Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I mean, obviously, the passions of the people of Cote d’Ivoire, in response to many acts of violence and many humanitarian abuses, are going to be a very real challenge for reconciliation.

Ms. Lindborg, I understand that extraordinary efforts were taken by USAID partners to continue to deliver life-saving drugs and treatments during this crisis, through the PEPFAR Program. Could you describe some of that in more detail, and then contrast them with some of the difficulties you’ve had in the western part of the country in continuing to deliver polio vaccines? And I’d just be interested in what I understand are some extraordinary efforts by USAID during this crisis.

Ms. Lindborg. Thank you. I really want to highlight how dedicated so many of our partners are to ensuring that life-saving programs continue even when security conditions really limit access. Many of the partners were able to ensure that programs continued, through working with community members, ensuring that food and supplies went forward when there were moments of security that enable transport to go forward.

There does remain insecurity that still inhibits our ability to fully reach certain parts of the country. And, as Mr. Fitzgerald said, one of the critical requirements, going forward, is that security is returned to the country so that people are able to return to their lives to have restored confidence in a future, and also to
ensure that we’re able to get critical food supplies, medical supplies, and access to clean water to go forward.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ms. Lindborg.

Mr. FITZGERALD. If I could add on to that, Mr. Chairman, the PEPFAR Program has been extremely successful in Cote d’Ivoire. And I think—I know I speak for Ms. Lindborg when I say that we’re extraordinarily proud of it. It’s carried out by indigenous non-governmental organizations, as well as international nongovernmental organizations. Even before, years ago, it was really the life-line between the north and the south. You know, the country has been split in two. Yet, the PEPFAR, these NGO’s, have been able to serve both the north and the south. And an essential part of reconciliation is for President Ouattara to show that he’s not favoring one region over the other, but is really trying to unify Cote d’Ivoire.

Thank you.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Ms. Lindborg.

Senator Isakson.

Senator ISAKSON. Mr. Chairman, out of concern for the length that we may go here, I might suggest that we have one round of questions for the first panel and one round for the second panel, so we can hear from the second panel, as well. I think we’ll be talking about more of a way forward. Do you object to that?

Senator COONS. No. There’s no objection.

Senator ISAKSON. Hearing no objection, I’ll let you rule. [Laughter.]

Mr. Fitzgerald, my experiences in Africa, particularly where there are places of conflict, such as Darfur and the Sudan, the African Union can play a critical role in ensuring some equitable handling of investigations of atrocities, crimes, et cetera. Your statement says, “The African Union can play a critical role in building an international consensus on difficult issues.” I wish the word “can” was the word “will.” Do you think they will play?

Mr. FITZGERALD. Yes, I think they will. And in fact, in the latter part of my testimony, I discuss that both ECOWAS, the West African organization, as well as the African Union, in fact, must play an important role.

Now, I would thank you, Senator Isakson, for raising the discussion about the African Union, because the African Union was not as quick to recognize Alassane Ouattara’s victory in the polls and, in fact, sent a factfinding team, led by President Aziz of Mauritania—but, most importantly, with President Zuma from South Africa. Now, South Africa had very serious doubts about the validity of this election, so President Zuma’s participation was important.

There were three other members: Blaise Compaore, from Burkina Faso; President Debi, from Chad; and President Choete, from Tanzania. And they traveled numerous times to Abidjan, met with all the people—they met with Ouattara; they met with Gbagbo; they met with the Independent Electoral Commission; they met with the Constitutional Council. President Zuma had said, before he made these trips, that there should be a recount or they should hold the elections over. He came away from that convinced, by the description by special representative of the Secretary
General Choi, that, in fact, the election had been held properly, transparently, and fairly, and Alassane Ouattara won the election. The institutions worked. The institutions worked. And I think that's very important, because we had a doubter at the beginning, in President Zuma, who, at the end of the day, the African Union, in totality, accepted the victory of Alassane Ouattara.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Coons. Mr. Secretary, just suspend for a moment, if you would.

If we can't maintain order in the course of this hearing, we will stand in recess and I will ask the Capitol Police to clear the room. So, please conduct yourselves in accordance with the rules of our Senate, which requires that we be able to hear our witnesses and conduct ourselves in accordance with the rules and decorum that's expected in this body.

Senator Isakson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Fitzgerald, one other question for you. Charles Konan Banny—what is his history? Will he be able to lead a legitimate group of reconciliation?

Mr. Fitzgerald. I think he will, Senator. Charles Konan Banny was a Prime Minister, under President Gbagbo. He is a member of former President Bedie's political party. We're not thrilled that he's a member of a political party, yet it's a political party that participated, but lost, in the election in the first round. The important thing, I think, is the fact that there will be participation by a Muslim and a Christian cleric.

And I want to point out something. One of the first things that Alassane Ouattara did to begin this process is, he called on Desmond Tutu, famous for his Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, to come up and meet with him and discuss how to go about setting up a good Truth and Reconciliation Commission that will enable the country to identify those who've committed atrocities, to convict and prosecute those who've committed atrocities, to allow people to vent. Ten years is a long time in a state of insecurity. And I think it was absolutely critical.

I would also—if I can answer one of Senator Inhofe's earlier questions, we do know where Laurent Gbagbo and Simone Gbagbo are. They're in the northern parts of the country, in separate places. Mr. Gbagbo received a group of the elders, including Desmond Tutu, very recently—Desmond Tutu, Mary Robinson, the former President of Ireland, and former Secretary General Kofi Annan. So, I think it's fair to say that his treatment is—he's in good condition, and that his treatment is fair, and they are gathering evidence for either a local trial or it will be in the ICC.

Thank you.

Senator Isakson. Thank you.

Ms. Lindborg. I did some quick math in my head, which is always a very dangerous thing for me to do. But, on your map, as of May 5, it looks like, to me, there are about 450,000 either individually displaced persons or refugees now, after this conflict. Is that right?

Ms. Lindborg. A little bit more. Just a little more than that, yes. Senator Isakson. Well, my math was close, then. [Laughter.]
One of the big problems on the continent of Africa are refugees, and in bordering countries. We have the problem with Kenya having the Somalis. We have the problem of Darfur, between Chad and the Sudan. And from what your testimony said, they're planning on staying for a while—I thought I heard you say that—the refugees. Is that correct?

Ms. LINDBORG. We're hearing, as of right now, from the surveys that we've done of the refugee population—and, you know, these are fluid numbers, because people move frequently. But, that, among many of those who are in Liberia, they don't currently have intentions of returning. And clearly, we're concerned that that not create undue burdens on the populations on the Liberia side.

Senator ISAKSON. Are the individually displaced persons in camps within Cote d'Ivoire?

Ms. LINDBORG. In Cote d'Ivoire, they're both in camps. But, the majority, really on both sides of the border, are with host communities.

Senator ISAKSON. Well, that was the comment I wanted—I thought I heard your comment say that. Based on my experience, that is a good sign for the way forward, because when these camps develop, they end up becoming enclaves in perpetuity. But, if they are housed with other people, there's a good chance, if the stability comes to Cote d'Ivoire, they can come back. Am I correct?

Ms. LINDBORG. You are exactly right. And camps always have the possibility of creating new sets of problems. And for that reason, we're being very careful to ensure that the host families receive assistance, as well, so they don't have their very scarce resources unduly strained by providing that hospitality to the refugees and the displaced.

Senator ISAKSON. Thanks, to both of you, for your testimony.

Senator COONS. Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me ask, first of all, if the two witnesses—are you—will you stay through the next line of—the next panel? Would both of you agree to do that?

Senator COONS. Senator, our practice is to do one round, one panel——

Senator INHOFE. I understand that.

Senator COONS [continuing]. And then another round.

Senator INHOFE. I understand that. But, if they will stay, I want to respond to one of his questions. Secretary Fitzgerald talked about how good a treatment President Gbagbo is getting—and that's not true. And I want to show you it's not true. But, if you leave before I get a chance to show the other panel, I'll be quite upset.

You'll be happy to stay. That's——

Mr. FITZGERALD. I'd be happy to stay for as long as you'd like, sir.

Senator INHOFE. All right. Let me ask you each a question. How many times have you been in Abidjan, Mr. Fitzgerald?

Mr. FITZGERALD. Three times, sir.

Senator INHOFE. How many times have you been, Ms. Lindborg?

Ms. LINDBORG. I have not.
Senator INHOFE. OK. First of all—let me just ask you two questions, Secretary Fitzgerald—first of all, you heard what I said about the election——

Mr. FITZGERALD. Yes, sir.

Senator INHOFE [continuing]. In terms of the fact that we showed that 94,000, in just one region, was taken out, was intentionally miscalculated. That's an official record. They said that it's a fraudulent document. Now, I sent you a letter and told you to check that out. Tell me why it's fraudulent.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Sir, I can't say whether it's fraudulent or not. We based our——

Senator INHOFE. OK, that's fine.

Mr. FITZGERALD. We based our decision on accepting the results of the election because of the certification process by Secretary——

Senator INHOFE. That——

Mr. FITZGERALD [continuing]. General Choi.

Senator INHOFE [continuing]. Isn't the question. That isn't the question. They said it——

Mr. FITZGERALD. Sorry?

Senator INHOFE [continuing]. Was fraudulent, and we tried to get the——

Mr. FITZGERALD. No, I——

Senator INHOFE [continuing]. State Department to say why it was fraudulent.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Excuse me, Senator.

Senator INHOFE. You're representing the State Department, and I'm asking you, Do you have any evidence that it's fraudulent? Just yes or no is fine, because I don't want to——

Mr. FITZGERALD. Senator, I can't say whether it's fraudulent or not.

Senator INHOFE. OK. Several—put up that one picture there that shows—you talked about reconciliation and that Ouattara was going to be inviting some of the Cabinet and some of those individuals from Gbagbo's administration to join in. Here's one right here, the top right picture. That happens to be the Secretary of—Interior, is it?—Minister of Interior. They shot him, first, in the face. They—this is the Ouattara forces. They left him to die a slow, painful death. Is this being inclusive of putting their people into the Ouattara——

Mr. FITZGERALD. Senator, thank you. No, absolutely not. I share with you the same repulsion and revulsion toward any egregious human rights violations like that. However, it was a combat situation, I'm sure. It was conflict. It was wide open. It was very difficult.

Senator INHOFE. No, this was after it was over.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Sorry?

Senator INHOFE. This was after it was over, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Excuse me? I thought you said, sir, that, in fact, the conflict is still going on.

Senator INHOFE. No. I was saying that this occurred after the—after this conflict was over, in the area where they were gathering up their supporters. I have personally——

Mr. FITZGERALD. Sir——
Senator INHOFE [continuing]. I have—don't interrupt me—I have personally talked to friends of Gbagbo, people who are on the Cabinet, and others, whose names I wouldn't use, because they would be summarily executed, and you know that as well as I do.

I want to ask Ms. Lindborg a question. We had three areas where very large numbers of people were killed, either by the Ouattara forces, such as in a town—put that one up first—of Deukoué. I would like to ask you, Do you have any idea of how many people were murdered in Deukoué? And this, I hasten to say, is after it was documented that the Gbagbo forces were gone. About how many people? Do you have any idea? I mean, it's been—it's been several weeks now. Do we have a number of how many people have been killed?

Ms. LINDBORG. My understanding is that they're still determining what are the exact numbers. And, as Mr. Fitzgerald indicated, holding people accountable will be a critical part of the healing process.

Senator INHOFE. Well, the——

Ms. LINDBORG. And so, we're looking——

Senator INHOFE [continuing]. Healing process is—the first thing you want to do is see how many of these people—well, let's just skip, now, from there to the U.N. and the French bombing in Abidjan.

Which one—do you have one of those—we have several on that. Yes, this area, here, as I said—and I know that you say you haven't been there, and Secretary Fitzgerald has been there three times. I've been there 15 times. And I've been over every square inch of this area down there. I've walked through and seen, and even commented, Why could you—why would they have all these people moving into this area? If it ever blew up, there'd be hundreds, maybe thousands, of people that would go with it. There they are, right there. Do you have an accounting of how many people were killed during that bombing? And this was one that was—the French and the United Nations—we have the pictures of the helicopters. Do you have any—do you have a round figure, within 50,000 people, who—how many have been killed in that particular incident?

I'm asking you, yes.

Ms. LINDBORG. I don't have an exact accounting. And we—as I just mentioned, I understand that they're still looking at——

Senator INHOFE. OK.

Ms. LINDBORG [continuing]. Determining that. And, you know, the really critical piece of looking forward, for a country that's been gripped in conflict for the last decade, is determining how, through the various mechanisms—the Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation Commission, the ICC, the Commission of Inquiry——

Senator INHOFE. That——

Ms. LINDBORG [continuing]. How these mechanisms——

Senator INHOFE. That's fine.

Ms. LINDBORG [continuing]. Can enable us.

Senator INHOFE. I don't want to be rude, Ms. Lindborg, and you're a very nice person, but let's just don't get into a different subject. I'm talking about what happened. Get the third group. I'm going to ask the question—simple yes or no——
Put up the one of the—all the kids. These are the human shields that were surrounding the palace. The kids didn't have any armaments, other than some wood sticks and baseball bats. There they are. All four pictures are there. The question I would ask you, Do you have an accounting—this should be a lot easier—accounting of how many of these kids were killed?

Ms. LINDBORG. Senator, we completely share your concern and your sense of outrage at what may have happened. And the—for us, the focus was on providing humanitarian assistance as quickly and as effectively as we could——

Senator INHOFE. Let me ask both of——

Ms. LINDBORG [continuing]. And going forward——

Senator INHOFE. My time is about to expire. Let me just—I know the assistance. You spent your opening remarks talking about assistance. That's not the subject right here, at least with me. Would the two of you—when you—we are concerned. I think everyone in here should be concerned about reconciliation. Would you be willing, when you stop—I mean, consider the alternatives. One would be to turn them over to the International Court, which means it's over, they're gone forever. Then you're going to have—you know what's going to happen: they'll be martyrs, and all kinds of things can happen. You've weighed these things. I think everyone in this room has.

One of the most logical things, I would think, would be to allow them to go into exile. Would the two of you agree that that would be a act of reconciliation that is worth pursuing?

Mr. FITZGERALD. I think there was a time for that, sir. Now is not the time. They've been captured. They're drawing up charges. The Commission of Inquiry is investigating. The ICC apparently is poised to send a team down. If they are found guilty of crimes, they need to serve the time. That is the accountability that we were looking for, sir.

Senator INHOFE. Well, that's what I thought you would say. And, by the way, I have to add that this offer was made long before—when you say “this wasn't the time”—this offer was made when the time is there. And I know I'm out of time on this panel, but I would only say that I believe in my heart, and after going there, that this would be the best solution. There have been offers from all around. And, Mr. Fitzgerald, when you talked about the African Union, you heard the quote that I had, that I gave, on President Obiang. You talked about the South African President Mbeki and his comment. I think the one thing that most of the Presidents that I have talked to—all of them I’ve personally talked to, and that's quite a few of them, because I know most of them have all concluded one thing, and that is the way this was done—the outsiders coming in, the French coming in, the United Nations coming in and making this happen—was something that is very, very offensive, something that reverts back to the old colonial days, and they find it very offensive.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator COONS. Senator.

Ms. Lindborg, Secretary Fitzgerald, thank you so much for coming today, for your testimony, both prepared and delivered in response to questions. As is evident, this is a panel of Senators
concerned about, and deeply interested in, the path forward for Cote d'Ivoire, which faces enormous challenges, in terms of reconciliation and being able to make progress. And I'm grateful for your determined work on behalf of the people of the United States, to represent us well in that challenge, going forward. So, thank you for appearing before us today.

I'm going to invite our second panel to come forward, if I might. Our next panel includes the three members: Dr. Michael McGovern, of Yale; Ms. Jennifer Cooke, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Dr. Gilpin, of the United States Institute of Peace.

[Pause.]

Senator Coons. Thank you for appearing before us today.

Dr. McGovern, I invite you to begin.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MCGOVERN, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND DIRECTOR OF GRADUATE STUDIES OF AFRICAN STUDIES, YALE UNIVERSITY, NEW HAVEN, CT

Dr. McGovern. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and your colleagues for the invitation to join you today in a hearing on reconstruction and reconciliation in Cote d'Ivoire.

The situation in Cote d'Ivoire has been worrying for over a decade. We've heard the phrase “a decade” over and over. But, I would actually date it back two or even three decades. Xenophobic policies have been promoted. A virulent and inflammatory press has added to the problems. And security forces have become more of a praetorian guard than a law-abiding neutral force that should protect the country and its citizens.

Having identified these worrying factors, I'd also like to make a comparison. All these dynamics that I've just described, from arguments about citizenship rights to land disputes to the deleterious effects of polarized and irresponsible press, are considered to be among the causes of the Rwandan genocide. However, in Rwanda, in 3 months, nearly a million people were killed, while, in Cote d'Ivoire, over the 12 years of the conflict, the number of people killed directly in this conflict is probably a little bit on one side or the other of 10,000 people, several orders of magnitude smaller than what happened in Rwanda. To me, this suggests that Ivoirian society has significant resiliency and capacity to manage its conflicts internally. These capacities are not easily visible—for instance, through the images that we've already seen; they can't be seen, easily, at first glance; and they have been placed under tremendous stress over the last months. But, I believe that the role of the United States Government, and its agencies, should be to find these areas of resiliency and strength, and to support them further.

I'll limit the rest of my comments to outlining three points that are developed in my written remarks.

First, in the area of social and political reconciliation, as we've heard, President Ouattara has already established a Commission on Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation. From an anthropological perspective—that's my own discipline—I would say that the deeper psychological and sociological processes of reconciliation will probably not be accomplished by this Commission. And it may be
unhelpful to expect that they could be. That work is going to have to take place at very local levels in ways that may well be different from village to village and from block to block within cities like Abidjan.

I'm somewhat skeptical of the idea that reconciliation can be engineered from above, whether at the national level or internationally. But, what makes politics and ordinary life in Côte d'Ivoire tick, I would say, is money. And the greatest possible boon to Ivorian reconciliation, I would like to suggest, would be the creation of jobs. And, in that spirit, I'd like to urge this committee to insist that American economic assistance to Côte d'Ivoire be very much oriented toward job creation, first and foremost—not economic growth, because oftentimes policies that do lead to measurable economic growth in Africa don't create that many jobs. What Côte d'Ivoire really needs is jobs. I can come back to that in questions.

My second point is that one of the challenges for creating jobs, and thus, social reconciliation, will be reinstating security. We've already heard this. And there are challenges and opportunities in the area of security sector reform. I'll just suggest that there should be systematic vetting of all of those people who are being incorporated into the new security forces and might have been accused of abuses or war crimes from every side—the former Forces Nouvelles, the former Forces de Sécurité, and so forth.

Noncriminal elements, once they've been integrated from all sides of the conflict, should be incorporated, with clear plans to gradually draw down the size of what will certainly be a bloated military over a period of 10 to 15 years, on the basis of meritocratic evaluation. In this way, the military can serve a useful function as a kind of social sponge that would soak up some percentage of the most volatile young men who've experienced making a living with guns; but, at the same time, by establishing clear criteria for evaluation, review, promotion, and, ultimately, retention, security sector reform could help to begin the process of reprofessionalizing a military that has become overly politicized, abusive, and characterized by extremely weak command-and-control discipline.

Third and finally, there are several key measures that should be taken to promote the functioning of the Ouattara government and the long-term peace and stability in Côte d'Ivoire. I'll just mention two.

One is that the legislative elections deserve U.S. Government support to ensure that they take place in a timely and credible manner. We've already heard that those who've lost out in the Presidential elections may find themselves winners, locally, when they elect their legislators. I don't need to convince you of the importance of balance of powers.

The other is judicial reform, and I would really urge that, in Côte d'Ivoire, this ought to be oriented toward improved systems of economic governance and financial accountability. The cocoa and coffee sector has been the historical slush fund of the government. But, over the last decade, actually, it's the petroleum sector that has become the opaque focus of a lot of illicit and illegal economic activity.

Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. McGovern follows:]

**PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MCGOVERN**

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and your colleagues for the invitation to join you in today’s hearing on “The Reconstruction and Reconciliation Process in Cote d’Ivoire.” My name is Mike McGovern, and I am an anthropology professor at Yale University. I was previously the West Africa Director of the International Crisis Group, where I conducted research in Cote d’Ivoire and neighboring countries. My book, “Making War in Cote d’Ivoire,” deals with the conflict we are discussing.

The situation in Cote d’Ivoire has been worrying for over a decade. Xenophobic policies promoted by three successive governments began by attempting to exclude rival candidates, and ended by fueling interethnic massacres. A virulent and inflammatory press has used innuendo, lies, and ethnonationalist rhetoric to incite violence. President Gbagbo worked hard to take what had been an ethnically representative army, and to stock it with members of the relatively small number of ethnic groups that supported him. The security forces consequently became more of a praetorian guard than a law-abiding neutral force to protect the country and its citizens. On top of this, both the Gbagbo government and the former rebels in the north (who are now aligned with President Ouattara) have relied heavily on militias and on mercenary fighters, most infamously from Liberia. All sides have abused civilians, and have regularly done so with impunity.

All of these factors fed into a pattern of dramatic spikes in violence, followed by equally quick de-escalations. The fighting in March and April of this year was the most significant such outbreak since the 2002 coup attempt turned civil war. These dynamics pose serious challenges to the reconstruction of Cote d’Ivoire’s social, economic, and political institutions, but I would also like to make a comparison. All of the dynamics I have described above—from arguments about citizenship rights, to land disputes, to the deleterious effects of a polarized and irresponsible press—are considered to be among the causes of the Rwandan genocide. Indeed, people on both sides of the Ivorian conflict have regularly signaled the possibility that Cote d’Ivoire could melt down into Rwandan-style genocidal violence. And yet, while every death in Cote d’Ivoire is undoubtedly a tragedy, those killed in this conflict over the past 12 years can be counted around 8,000 to 10,000, not in the hundreds of thousands.

Part of the credit for this goes to international actors including the U.N., West African body ECOWAS and even the United States, which have taken active steps to tamp down incipient violence. However, I think we must also credit Ivorian society with having significant capacity to manage conflict internally. These capacities are not easily visible at first glance, and they have been placed under tremendous stress in the last months. I believe the role of the U.S. Government and its agencies should be to find these areas of resiliency and strength, and to support them further.

In the area of social and political reconciliation, President Ouattara has already established a Commission on Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation. The Head of this commission, Charles Konan Banny, is respected and is a relatively neutral figure. He is trained as an economist, is a former West African Central Bank head and was the Prime Minister proposed as an honest broker by international actors during the middle years of the Ivorian conflict (2005–07). The commission probably has the greatest chance of success if the parameters of its operations are kept modest. It could gather the many different versions of the events of the last decade, and recounting these events may or may not bring some solace to certain witnesses. However, researchers who have looked closely at Truth and Reconciliation Commissions around the world have become increasingly skeptical of the therapeutic value of such recounting of past violence and injustices for those who do the telling. In some cultural contexts (and West Africa may be one), there is a relative discomfort with verbally rehashing the painful events of the past, and little sense that such recounting is cathartic. What people may prefer is rather a situation in which the conditions of possibility are set in place for people to act properly, operating according to an implicit dictum that “actions speak louder than words.” One invaluable service such a commission can render is to give an exhaustive accounting of who did what to whom and when. This will serve as an important historical starting point for Ivorians as they decide to address these events over the coming decades. Neutrality and the appearance of neutrality are key here, and the U.S. Government could play a role as a relatively uninvolved actor that has been invited by all sides in the conflict to become more involved in helping to resolve the conflict.

The deeper psychological and sociological processes of reconciliation will probably not be accomplished by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and it may be
unhelpful to expect that it could. That work will have to take place at very local levels in ways that may well be different from village to village, or from block to block within the cities. I am not sure that such processes can be orchestrated at the national level, let alone from outside the country. However, I believe there is one area of crucial importance in this process that should be accomplished in the context of a countrywide conversation about the events of the past decade. Many Ivorians have taken a certain moral distance from the events in their country, even while they may have played a role, however small, in the process of polarization, vituperation, and violence that has led to the country’s slide into conflict.

An excellent example of this is the way that many of the really gruesome massacres in the Ivorian conflict have systematically been blamed on Liberians, even while both sides in the conflict blame the other for having engaged the services of these “barbaric” mercenary fighters. What joins Ivorians who are otherwise opposed is their shared notion that no Ivorian could be capable of burning whole families alive in their houses, or of killing people with machetes. However, in many cases it was Ivorians who have undertaken this violence, Ivorian military who have benefited by shaking down civilians at roadblocks, Ivorian militias who have systematically raped their female compatriots, Ivorian villagers who have used the fog of war as an opportunity to murder those with whom they have contested ownership of land. There is a kind of playfulness surrounding the “game” of plausible deniability where everyone from leading politicians through the national press and down to ordinary people utilizes barely veiled code for xenophobic speech or uses the threat of violence to get what they want, and then claims they did not really mean what they said or did. This is a form of playing with fire that has gone too far in Cote d’Ivoire. Too many people have been burned by it, and Ivorians need to take stock of the fact that they bear primary responsibility for allowing this poisonous political culture to flourish in their country.

Aside from this stocktaking, however, I am somewhat skeptical of the idea that reconciliation can be engineered from above. What makes politics and ordinary life in Cote d’Ivoire tick is money, and the greatest possible boon to Ivorian reconciliation would be the creation of new jobs. This will require reinstating security and stability, tamping down the criminality that has as often as not been perpetrated by actors claiming to work on behalf of the state, and it will require economic growth. However, I must emphasize that what Cote d’Ivoire needs is jobs, not growth per se. Many of the forms of “growth” measured by economists do not necessarily translate into jobs that pay a living wage for Ivorians, even if they result in economic activity. I hope that the activities of the U.S. Agency for International Development, and those of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, African Development Bank and other institutions that receive American government funds will take this distinction to heart. What was once called the Ivorian “miracle” has been tarnished by 30 years of economic decline, and if there is a single root cause to the xenophobia and intercommunal violence in the country, it is that this decline has led to the perception that one’s neighbor’s gain is one’s own loss.

The winner-takes-all political culture that emerged over the last 20 years was driven by the reality that the economic pie was shrinking and that the only way to promise jobs to one’s base was to gut the civil service and the military upon taking power, and to fill those positions not with those who were best qualified, but with those who were perceived to be most loyal. A good example of this was the FESCI student union that turned into a criminal and quasi-military organization, and that gave us both Charles Ble Goude, the most inflammatory of Laurent Gbagbo’s youth supporters, and Guillaume Soro, who was head of the Forces Nouvelles rebels until he became Prime Minister first in Laurent Gbagbo’s and then in Alassane Ouattara’s governments. In order to quiet them after the December 1999 coup d’etat, it was first putchiste Robert Guel who turned over the stock of university dormitory housing to the FESCI so that they could skim money off the top of every student’s rent, and dole out the best rooms to their members and favorites. The FESCI thus was not presenting student concerns about grading practices or complaints about food in the cafeteria but was transformed into a mafiaesque protection racket that provided the country with some of its most ruthless and violent young politicians. Returning to the issue of jobs, the reason this was possible was because everyone involved understood that this type of distribution of political and economic favor stood in for the possibility that hard-working students might make a decent living upon graduation. The many young people who refused the violent and cynical trajectory of the FESCI students sat for years, even decades, unemployed, and in some cases returned embittered to their villages only to contribute to tensions over land ownership, as they reclaimed land their parents or grandparents had sold to “strangers” who have now often lived in those villages for decades or even generations.
I mentioned that one of the challenges for creating jobs and thus social reconciliation was reinstating security. There are both challenges and opportunities for the disarmament, professionalization and integration of the security forces in Côte d'Ivoire. The greatest challenges are first that the Ivorian security forces have come primarily to terrorize, rather than to protect the civilian population, and second that Our plan includes the army, gendarmerie, and the multiple militias in the country has become the primary means of employing potentially volatile unemployed young men. Members of all the armed services and all the militias, from the north and the south, have been credibly accused of abuses including rape, extrajudicial killings and torture. There is a U.N. commission of inquiry in Côte d'Ivoire now, and it is the fourth such commission to have to undertake investigations of human rights abuses in Côte d'Ivoire since 2002.

Security Sector reform in Côte d'Ivoire will be difficult given obvious pressures to integrate the members of all of the northern forces that ultimately contributed to putting Alassane Ouattara in power. Whether he asked them to or not, they defected the ostensibly pro-Gbagbo army, and then fought their way through Abidjan against pro-Gbagbo military units, militias, and mercenary forces. They expect to be compensated for the risks they took. Managing these expectations will be a delicate balancing act. On one hand, incorporating the Forces Nouvelles Zone Commanders and other fighters into the military will help to take pressure off of Ouattara's civilian government. On the other hand, isolating the former Forces Nouvelles in the army could lead to an eventual coup. Either way, Ouattara will be far more beholden than he would like to Guillaume Soro and the other members of the ex-rebel forces that have now become the pro-Ouattara forces. The fact that these forces have been credibly accused of committing war crimes and atrocities both in Abidjan and in the interior introduces yet another complication. Ouattara needs to be seen to deal justly with these abusers at the same time that he deals with those from the Gbagbo side. Still, if he is too aggressive in pursuing Gbagbo and those close to him, he could plausibly find himself losing vital support in the country's south. This could take place not only among those who voted for Gbagbo, but also among those ambivalent supporters (many of them from Henri Konan Bedies PDCI party who might have voted as much against Gbagbo as for Ouattara) who are most interested in restoring a functioning state rather than pursuing what some will see as a settling of political scores.

The U.S. Government has growing experience in security sector reform in Africa. There are a variety of approaches to this challenge. At one end of the spectrum is the process undertaken in Liberia, where the army was drawn down to zero, and a new military was recruited, vetted for human rights abuses, and trained from scratch by contractors hired by the U.S. Government. At the other end is the strategy (or nonstrategy, perhaps) used in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where members of all the combatant groups were integrated into the national army, most of them being allowed to retain the inflated ranks they had been given (or had given themselves) in the bush while fighting.

The strategy in Côte d'Ivoire will probably have to borrow elements of both these approaches, and may resemble the SSR process undertaken in Guinea, in which the United States is already involved. There should be vetting of accused human rights abusers and war criminals from all sides, but it is unrealistic to think that the army will be drawn down to zero. Instead, noncriminal elements from all sides of the conflict should be incorporated, with clear plans to gradually draw down the size of the military over 10 to 15 years on the basis of meritocratic evaluation. In this way, the military can serve a useful function as a temporary social “sponge,” soaking up some portion of the most volatile young men who have experience making a living with guns. At the same time, by establishing clear criteria for evaluation, review and promotion (and ultimately for retention in the security forces), SSR could help to begin the process of reprofessionalizing a military that has become overly politicized, abusive, and characterized by extremely weak command and control discipline.

Finally, there are several key measures that should be taken to promote the functioning of the Ouattara government and long-term peace and stability in Côte d'Ivoire. My first recommendation is that the U.S. Government lend significant financial and technical support to ensuring that legislative elections take place in a timely and credible manner. This will begin the important process of supporting a balance of powers, and will give supporters of Gbagbo's FPI party, Henri Konan Bedie's PDCI party and the other political parties in the country a sense that they will have their voices heard in the governance of their country. These elections (like last year's Presidential elections) are more than 5 years overdue, and the 2,000 legislative elections were badly flawed and characterized by high levels of violence. The U.S. Government should also support upcoming municipal elections. The 2002 mu-
nicipals are probably the most credible elections the country has known, and new municipal elections will help to reinstate the presence of a single government throughout the territory of Cote d’Ivoire.

Far too often, foreign actors including the United States lend too much attention to Presidential elections and then walk away precisely at the moment that democratic practice is just getting a toehold in a country with limited democratic experience. Especially in the case of highly contested elections like the recent Presidential in Cote d’Ivoire, it is vitally important for voters supporting all candidates to have the sense not that they are out in the cold for 5 or more years, but that they still have a role to play as voters and as citizens, and that their votes can lead toward the creation of a vibrant, balanced, and fair system. Most importantly, in such a system, their means of redress are not limited to taking up arms. Many African intellectuals are becoming increasingly cynical about the democratic mantra they sometimes portray as a Eurocentric import that is ill-suited to African realities. I disagree, but the single-minded obsession with Presidential elections in fact gives an antidemocratic message, and contributes in very direct ways to creating autocrats, not democrats. The U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives like legislatures in Europe, Japan, and the emerging BRIC countries all have a role to play by budgeting for electoral support for legislative elections. What might seem an exorbitant amount now will only be dwarfed by the cost of U.S. support to peacekeeping missions when those on the outside decide that insurgency warfare is their only chance of getting into power.

In the same vein, judicial reform is essential. Cote d’Ivoire has many well-qualified lawyers and judges, but the judicial system has become tremendously polarized and politicized. One area where the Ivorian justice system should play a central role is in the creation of improved systems of economic governance and financial accountability. For decades, the cocoa and coffee marketing board served as a political and personal slush fund for the party in power, its elites, and even French politicians, who would receive money from this fund when they had election campaigns in France. To say that these practices created very deleterious patterns that further contributed to the perception of politics as an all-or-nothing competition is an understatement. Over the past decade, the petroleum sector has become more lucrative than cocoa and coffee, and is in much greater need of reform. Initiatives like the World Bank-sponsored Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative offer a valuable model, but such an undertaking should be driven by Ivorian actors. The Ivorian judiciary and the legislature, should play central roles in drafting, enacting, enforcing and adjudicating Ivorian laws that will hold Ivorians to account for managing the country’s wealth responsibly and honestly. Given the importance of Ivorian initiative and ownership of this process, this is an area where American support would be best undertaken in a spirit of advice and accompaniment, whereas in the area of security sector reform, the new government may welcome a more robust initiative by a U.S. Government that could be seen as a neutral third party.

This third party role is not inconsequential. Especially given the French military role in ousting Laurent Gbagbo, President Ouattara will (or should) be keen to seek out less politically costly sources of support and advice. The United States has played this role in a number of other francophone African countries that have tense relations with France, such as Guinea and Rwanda. Provided that U.S. engagement remains truly neutral, such an engagement would be beneficial both to Cote d’Ivoire and to the United States, which has already invested heavily in helping Liberia, Guinea, and Cote d’Ivoire achieve peace and development.

Senator Coons. Thank you, Doctor.

Ms. Cooke.

STATEMENT OF JENNIFER COOKE, DIRECTOR OF AFRICA STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Ms. Cooke. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, Senator Inhofe, I’d like to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the challenges of reconstruction and reconciliation in Cote d’Ivoire.

It’s important to keep in mind that the Ivorian crisis did not begin with the recent election standoff, nor with Alassane Ouattara and Laurent Gbagbo. The country’s social, class, and political fissures have longstanding roots dating to the years when the country was considered an African success case. Malgovernance, cynical
manipulation of social divisions, and ultimately, civil war, have deepened these fissures. The recent standoff and the atrocities committed make their resolution all the more fraught and complex.

In my testimony, I’d like to emphasize three areas for U.S. engagement.

First, security. In the short-term, the United States should give full support to the U.N. mission in Cote d’Ivoire in quickly launching a process of disarmament and reintegration, assistance to refugees and displaced persons, and the restoration of regular forces and administrative structures throughout the country. In the longer term, it should play a role in vetting and helping reestablish professional, accountable security forces in Cote d’Ivoire. Security sector reform should not fall by default to the French, who are viewed with deep resentment by many Ivoirians, nor to the U.N., which may lack the capacities.

The U.N. must approach Ivoirian security in the context of the broader West African region. Renewed conflict in Cote d’Ivoire could reenergize regional warlords. We saw fighters from Liberia moving in during the standoff. Likewise, securing Cote d’Ivoire could push fighters out over the border, into neighboring states. We’ve already had reports of supporters of Gbagbo moving into Ghana, with some suspicions that they may attempt a counteroffensive there. The United States should leverage its strong diplomatic and security relationships with Cote d’Ivoire’s neighbors—Ghana, Liberia, Burkina Faso, and Mali—to ensure a holistic regional security approach.

Second, reconciliation efforts. In the short term, reconciliation on the national level will depend, to a large extent, on the choices Ivoirian leadership makes, very soon, in building a broad-based government and ensuring evenhandedness in investigating and prosecuting atrocities. Going forward, the United States should give special attention to efforts targeting local communities traumatized by violence, and to youth. I’d like to echo Mike McGovern—it should also give robust support to preparations for eventual national legislative elections and the restoration of credible, impartial judicial institutions.

Third, economic recovery and job creation. I’ll keep this brief. But, again, transparency in the big contract areas—oil, electricity, customs—is a must, as is job creation. The United States might consider supporting a major public works project for the areas that were hardest hit in the conflict.

Beyond the specific areas of U.S. engagement, I think how the United States engages will be almost equally important. The country is deeply divided. President Ouattara will be beset by multiple conflicting pressures that he needs to balance carefully to preserve stability and a fragile accord with former adversaries. He’s being portrayed by his hard-line opponents as a puppet of the West, and needs to shake off this perception if he’s to establish his authority. So, while the United States should avoid an uncritical embrace of the new leadership, it must be sensitive, in the short term, to the extremely difficult tradeoffs that must be made.

Diplomatically, I’d like to say, the U.S. response to the standoff was exemplary—swift, intense, and sustained high-level diplomacy, with the personal support and engagement of President Obama.
was undertaken in close concert with the regional and international partners. It offered a balanced approach of gradually escalating pressures and incentives for peaceful resolution and a grace-ful exit for Mr. Gbagbo. That the crisis was ultimately ended through the use of force should not detract from the merits of that approach. Ultimately, it isolated Mr. Gbagbo, weakened his sys-tems of support, and prevented what could have been a much longer and bloodier conflagration.

The United States should build on this powerful model of re-gional diplomatic engagement, should commend the ECOWAS for their principled stance and encourage their continued commitment to the continental norms of what they have set out for themselves in democracy and good governance.

The United States should encourage other regional bodies to step up in defense of rule of law in similar situations. In this regard, SADC and the protracted political debacle in Zimbabwe, which may come to a head fairly soon, come most immediately to mind.

I’m going to end my remarks there, but I’m very happy to take questions during the Q&A.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Cooke follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JENNIFER COOKE

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the challenges of reconstruction and reconciliation in Cote d'Ivoire, challenges that will have important repercussions throughout West Africa and the broader continent, but most important in meeting the needs and aspirations of Ivoirian citizens for peace and for a voice in their political affairs.

Having lived in Cote d’Ivoire in the days when it was considered an “oasis of sta-bility” in West Africa, I have followed developments there over many years with con-siderable personal interest—and sadness. Now as director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, I follow the country as an impor-tant test case for the consolidation of democratic norms in Africa, for concerted international engagement in preventive diplomacy and crisis response, and, going forward, for the long, hard slog of reconstruction and reconciliation.

In my testimony I would like to emphasize three key areas for U.S. engagement over the longer term in Cote d’Ivoire:

Security: In the short-term, the United States should give full support to the U.N. mission in Cote d’Ivoire in the process of disarmament and reintegration, the repatriation of refugees and displaced, and the restoration of regular forces and authori-ties throughout the country. In the longer term it should play a key role in assisting with the reestablishment of professional, accountable security forces in Cote d’Ivoire. It should also work capitalizing on his strong diplomatic and security relationships with neighboring West African countries—Ghana, Liberia, Burkina Faso, and Mali—to ensure a holistic, regional security approach.

Reconciliation efforts: In the short-term, reconciliation on the national level will depend to a large extent on choices the Ivoirian leadership makes in building a broad-based government and in ensuring even-handedness in investigating and prosecuting atrocities committed against civilian populations. Going forward, the United States should give special attention to efforts targeting local communities traumatized by violence. It should also give robust support to preparations for eventual national legislative elections, the restoration of credible, impartial judicial insti-tutions.

Economic recovery and job creation: Job creation must be a priority for the Ivoirian Government, with an emphasis on labor-intensive sectors such as agricul-ture and construction. To jump-start a mass employment program, the United States might consider supporting a major public works program in those areas hard-est hit by conflict, and longer term engagement in bolstering the agricultural sector in the North.
As important as the areas of engagement with the new Ivorian Government will be how the United States engages. The country is deeply divided, and mutual suspicions abound. President Ouattara will face multiple conflicting pressures that he will need to balance carefully to preserve stability and a fragile accord. He has been portrayed by his hard-line opponents as a puppet of the West and will need to shake off this perception to establish his authority. While the United States should avoid an uncritical embrace of the new leadership, it must also be sensitive to the precarious trade-offs that must be made in the short term.

Finally, the United States should build on the powerful model of regional diplomatic engagement in the Ivorian post-election crisis. It should commend African regional organizations and leaders for their principled stance and encourage their continued commitment to the continental norms of democracy and governance that they have set for themselves.

UNDERSTANDING THE FRAGILITY OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT

The 5-month standoff in Cote d'Ivoire between President Alassane Ouattara and previous incumbent Laurent Gbagbo ended on April 11 as opposition forces, with support from U.N. peacekeepers and French troops, forcibly extracted the former President, in flak jacket and helmet, from the basement of his residence in Abidjan. Gbagbo's refusal to relinquish power to President Ouattara, broadly recognized by the international community as the legitimate winner of the country's November 28 Presidential runoff election, precipitated a post-election stalemate that has left at least 3,000 Ivoirians dead and displaced over 1 million from their homes and livelihoods.

The Ivoirian crisis did not begin with the recent election standoff nor with the persons of Alassane Ouattara and Laurent Gbagbo. Cote d'Ivoire's social, class, and political fissures have longstanding roots, dating to the years when the country was considered an African "success case" and an economic "miracle" (see endnote). Fissures have deepened over time through years of economic decline, malgovernance, cynical manipulation of social divisions by political elites, and ultimately civil war. The standoff and post-election violence have served to deepen animosity, fear, and uncertainty in a society already deeply polarized and will make resolution of these issues all the more fraught and complex.

The new government under President Ouattara will face a monumental task in addressing the interrelated challenges of restoring security, responding to demands for accountability and justice, galvanizing economic growth and employment, and setting the tone for a longer-term process of local reconciliation and national unity.

In undertaking these tasks, Ouattara will be beset by multiple competing pressures. The President will be pressed hard to respond to demands by supporters and allies—many of whom will have expectations of recompense for their role in helping bring him to office—and at the same time to be magnanimous in victory and take concrete steps to allay the suspicions and uncertainties of his opponents. He will be pressed by human rights advocates and the international community to mete out swift and impartial justice to those most responsible for the atrocities by armed actors committed over the last months and at the same time to maintain a fragile accord and avoid alienating powerful individuals and constituencies from among both his supporters and his political opponents. He will need the sustained assistance of the international community to rebuild and reintegrate the country, but will need to assert his own agency and that of his government and avoid the appearance of doing the bidding of external powers, an accusation used to powerful effect by his predecessor to discredit Ouattara in the eyes of pro-Gbagbo loyalists.

In assisting Cote d'Ivoire to rebuild, the United States and broader international community should avoid an uncritical embrace of President Ouattara, a tendency that has bedeviled U.S. engagement with a number of post-conflict African leaders. Ouattara's leadership skills, political will, and commitment to genuine conciliation are as yet untested in practice, and the United States will want to gauge progress objectively and calibrate engagement and support accordingly. Nonetheless, in the short term at least, international partners need to be acutely aware of the precarious balancing act that Ouattara must perform and the narrow parameters in which he can operate. International partners must give him the space he needs to assert his leadership and authority, particularly as he seeks to build and maintain a ruling coalition and reestablish order and the authority of regular forces and administrative structures.
PRIORITY CHALLENGES AND AREAS FOR U.S. ENGAGEMENT

Security and security sector reform

A first priority for the new Ivorian Government must be to restore basic security to the country and rein in the various militias from all sides. Having marched southward in their campaign to topple Gbagbo, various factions of the Forces Republicaines de Cote d'Ivoire (FRCI, formerly the Forces Nouvelles) now occupy police offices, military headquarters, and neighborhoods in Abidjan, at times competing with one another to divide and control zones within the city. Populations in rural areas, particularly in the country's west, deeply traumatized by the brutal violence of the past month, remain vulnerable and fearful of renewed violence and the return of militias or mercenary forces from across the border in Liberia. Guillaume Soro, currently Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, has for now the allegiance of the majority of FRCI commanders, but his authority and commitment to peace (and to Ouattara) will be tested in persuading these forces to quit the spoils of Abidjan and other towns and return northward. Soro is a key personality to engage. He is young and politically ambitious, with the leverage of the FRCI behind him. He is very likely expecting to remain in a senior position in Ouattara's future Cabinet, and he may balk at serious investigations of atrocities committed by forces under his ostensible command. The role of Soro's forces in neutralizing Ibrahim Coulibaly, his personal rival, in the aftermath of Gbagbo's arrest, reveals a ruthless streak that does not bode well for reconciliatory tendencies. But there is also an opportunity for him to demonstrate magnanimity, restraint, and his potential as national statesman. The United States should encourage him in this regard.

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of armed actors, as well as the integration of personnel into a professional national security force, will be somewhat less fraught than in the frozen uncertainty of the last 5 years, but it will nonetheless be a highly sensitive and difficult endeavor. In keeping with the 2007 Ouagadougou Accord, a force of 80,000 (55,000 military and 17,000 police) is envisioned, including 5,000 integrated from among the FRCI. A renewed mandate by the U.N. mission in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) is likely to include DDR in its purview. The United States should provide the support required to ensure this process can go forward quickly and should push for coordination with the U.N. mission in Liberia, given the flow of arms and fighters across the two countries' shared border.

The task of longer term security sector reform (SSR) will best be undertaken by bilateral partners. Because French engagement has been so deeply polarizing in Cote d'Ivoire, the United States should consider stepping up in partnership with France and perhaps the United Kingdom, to support a more nationally credible and acceptable SSR process. The United States can build on experiences in SSR in Liberia, including vetting and training military forces, but also developing accountable and professional police services.

Cote d'Ivoire's security must be seen in the context of the broader West African region. Renewed conflict in Cote d'Ivoire could reenergize militia groups, regional warlords, and young men with few economic opportunities. In this recent standoff, we saw the reentry of Liberian mercenaries into Cote d'Ivoire's Western region. Likewise, securing Cote d'Ivoire could push Ivorian militias and warlords over the border into neighboring states to seek mercenary/profiteering opportunities elsewhere. Already, reports of Gbagbo's rump forces fleeing into Ghana with apprehension mounting that they may seek to base there to mount a coup or destabilizing putsch. The United States should leverage its strong diplomatic and security relationships with Cote d'Ivoire's neighbors to assist in monitoring and preempting any efforts to destabilize or reignite violent conflict.

National and local reconciliation

Reconciliation will be a long and arduous process, but the country's leadership must take immediate steps to set the tone and translate promising rhetoric into action. At a national level, Ouattara's follow-through on promises to form a broad-based, inclusive government will be closely scrutinized. Equally important will be his seriousness in investigating crimes committed by all sides during the conflict and bringing key perpetrators—of whatever political leaning—to account. Even-handedness and regional balance in restoration of basic services, delivery of humanitarian assistance, and longer term investments in education, reconstruction, and employment generation are equally critical components of reconciliation. Free and credible legislative elections, slated to take place in the coming year, and empowerment of the legislature and an independent judiciary will be important in building a genuinely national government. U.S. assistance with electoral preparations and in strengthening judicial institutions should be a high priority, along with security sector reform.
Equally—if not more—important will be reconciliation throughout the country at the local level. Much of the violence of the last 10 years, and of the last 5 months, was inflicted on local civilian populations by local militias with parochial rather than national objectives. As a first step, citizens need to be assured of their safety; their grievances must be heard and redressed, and investigations into the crimes committed must be robust and credible. Over the longer term, the United States and international community should support local initiatives on reconciliation through civil society actors, media and communication strategies, with a particular emphasis on youth, who have grown up in an increasingly divided country with national role models like militia leaders Blé Goudé and Guillaume Soro. This is an area where the United States should consider supporting innovative uses of communication technology, which has been so transformative in neighboring Nigeria and further afield in building constituencies and national dialogue.

Jump-starting the economy and generating economic opportunity

The many tasks that confront the new government will be made easier in a climate of economic recovery and growth. Businesses suffered major losses during the standoff, and investor confidence was badly shaken. Financial flows and loans cut off during the standoff to increase pressure on an intransigent Gbagbo need to be quickly restored. Cocoa and the agro-industry can likely recuperate in reasonable time, although the government may wish to offer tax advantages or similar incentives to mitigate the damage inflicted during the crisis and accelerate recovery. The government should be pushed to ensure far greater transparency in the big-money public contract arena, such as oil, electricity, and customs—both to ensure efficiency and set a new standard for opening public accounts to public scrutiny. Over the longer term, job creation must be a priority with an emphasis on labor-intensive sectors such as agriculture and construction. This will be particularly important in the impoverished North where investments in traditional agricultural mainstays—cotton and cashew production—have languished and should be accelerated. The government might consider launching in the near term a major public works program to rebuild a decaying infrastructure, restore electrification, sanitation, and expand access to clean water.

As an economist and former senior official in the International Monetary Fund, President Ouattara should be well-suited to map out a plan to restructure and revitalize the economy, but he will need considerable external support to implement such a plan in the short term.

THE REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE IVOIRIAN CRISIS

Throughout the post-election standoff, the international community came together with remarkable resolve and consensus in seeking a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Its efforts were critical in averting what very easily could have been a much longer and more devastating humanitarian disaster. It should now seek to preserve that unity of purpose and resolve in assisting the country to rebuild, reconcile, and respond to the needs of its citizenry.

Côte d'Ivoire has not generally been a top-tier issue in U.S. policy toward Africa, as it has traditionally been seen as more firmly within the French sphere of influence and engagement. But the post-election crisis brought home in a very stark way what was at stake for broader U.S. interests in Africa: in upholding the principles of democracy and supporting the aspirations of citizens to choose their leaders; in conflict prevention; in safeguarding investments in regional security; and in supporting regional organizations as they seek to entrench norms of good governance and respect for the rule of law. The U.S. response was exemplary: swift, intense, and sustained high-level diplomacy, with the personal support and engagement of President Obama. It was undertaken in close concert with regional and international partners, and offered a balanced approach of gradually escalating pressures, as well as incentives for peaceful resolution. That the crisis was ultimately ended through the use of force should not detract from the merits of the approach, which isolated Gbagbo, weakened his systems of support, and prevented what could have been a much bloodier conflagration.

Perhaps the single most important factor in building international resolve was the early and relatively united response from the regional grouping ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States. That early commitment and voice helped catalyze a series of expanding circles of consensus that helped shape an international strategy remarkable in its unanimity. The United States should acknowledge and support that kind of principled, collective diplomatic approach by African regional players, and could encourage other regional bodies to step up in defense of rule of law in similar situations—the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the protracted political debacle in Zimbabwe, which may come to head
in the coming year, come most immediately to mind. The United States should commend the leadership role of ECOWAS chair President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, who despite his engagement in electoral preparations of his own nonetheless gave heft and drive to the regional grouping’s response. In late March, Nigeria co-sponsored with France a Security Council resolution condemning the use of heavy weapons against civilians by Gbagbo forces and mandating UNOCI to remove them.

The early ECOWAS response brought the African Union initially on side. Both organizations recognized Alassane Ouattara as the legitimate electoral winner and suspended the country from membership as long as Gbagbo remained in office. Their voice was almost certainly critical in bringing China and Russia on board in the Security Council in recognizing Ouattara as the winner (although U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Susan Rice reportedly played an important role in doggedly persuading the initially reluctant Russians to agree) and in generating a unanimous General Assembly vote recognizing Ouattara as Cote d’Ivoire’s legitimate leader. The concerted international response enabled a gradual layering on of sanctions—suspension of World Bank assistance and funding from the West African Central Bank, travel bans against Gbagbo and his coterie by the United States and European Union, freezing of Gbagbo’s U.S. assets, a boycott of Ivorian cocoa exports, withdrawal of Western banks, and ultimately a U.N. resolution giving greater powers to U.N. forces for civilian protection. As the crisis went on, fissures appeared within the African Union, with major powers Angola, South Africa, and Uganda persisting in support for Gbagbo, making an end-run around ECOWAS leadership. Ultimately a five-member panel of African heads of state, including South Africa’s Jacob Zuma, came on side with ECOWAS and the broader international community, an important signal to Gbagbo and his supporters of how isolated he had become.

The international response to Cote d’Ivoire was an important rebuke to the precedent in which a Presidential incumbent, in the face of electoral defeat, need only cling to office and threaten force to maintain power, or at worst keep a seat at the table in a negotiated power-sharing deal. There were circumstances unique to Cote d’Ivoire that made concerted push-back possible, but the experience will nonetheless send an important signal to other African leaders who may wish to prolong their stay in office.

But the crisis is not yet over, and the Cote d’Ivoire will remain fragile for many years to come. A return to civil conflict could have devastating regional consequences, with the possibility of destabilizing outflows of refugees and economic impacts on neighboring countries that rely on the country for goods, jobs, and access to the port in Abidjan. Cote d’Ivoire was a critical piece in the regional “conflict system” that engulfed Liberia and Sierra Leone from the mid-1990s, with arms, young men, and proxy militias moving fluidly across borders, with instability in one country metastasizing to broader regional insecurity. This conflict system, spearheaded by Liberia’s Charles Taylor, engulfed Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote d’Ivoire; drew in proxy fighters from Guinea; was facilitated by Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso; and was fueled by financial and military support from Muammar Qaddafi of Libya. Both Sierra Leone and Liberia remain vulnerable, despite major international investments in U.N. peacekeeping missions and development assistance. Neighboring Guinea narrowly escaped a violent post-election meltdown just last summer. President Compaore is facing a sustained challenge to his rule both from elements of his military and his general public.

ECOWAS was clearly attuned to the potential regional impacts of renewed crisis in Cote d’Ivoire, and going forward the United States should work with ECOWAS and the broader international community in a long-term regional security strategy.

CONCLUSION

The United States has played a robust and positive diplomatic role in bringing the immediate crisis to a conclusion and reinforcing the evolving role of African regional bodies in upholding principles of democracy and good governance. It must now sustain its engagement as Cote d’Ivoire embarks on the long road to economic recovery, national reconciliation, and security sector reform. In this it should give robust support to President Ouattara’s efforts to rebuild the country and restore social cohesion, but it should condition longer term support on demonstrable commitment to conciliation and participatory governance.

ENDNOTE: A (VERY) BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CRISIS

Cote d’Ivoire’s social, class, and political fissures have long-standing roots, dating to the years when the country was considered an African “success case” and an “economic miracle.” In the 1960s and 70s, Cote d’Ivoire was a major economic engine
in West Africa, the world's largest producer of cocoa, the third largest producer of coffee, rich in gold and timber resources, with a major port, good infrastructure, and an attractive investment climate. Among the reasons for the country's economic growth was that the country's first President, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, encouraged and welcomed workers from the north of the country and from northern neighbors Burkina Faso and Mali to work the lucrative plantations in Côte d’Ivoire's West and South. In addition to providing labor in the plantations, these migrants and immigrants often took on jobs that southern Ivoirians considered menial and underpaid. Many migrants settled and had children and families, who have been there now for generations. An estimated 25–30 percent of the population is of immigrant stock.

Although Houphouet brought considerable economic prosperity to Côte d’Ivoire, he did little to strengthen institutions and norms of participatory governance, political succession, or equitable economic growth. The country's strong economic performance masked unresolved issues of national identity, land tenure, and social fissure. In the 1990s, Houphouet’s anointed successor, Henri Konan Bedie, presided over increasing levels of corruption and an economic decline brought on by global commodity price shocks and financial mismanagement. As his political support began to wane, Bedie popularized the concept of Ivoirite, or a “true” Ivoirian identity. Bedie's xenophobic rhetoric resonated with many in the South who were seeing their fortunes decline and began to blame foreigners for taking jobs away. Burkinabe were the principal scapegoats, but northerners more generally came to be lumped in as well. Alassane Ouattara, despite having served as Prime Minister under Houphouet, was excluded from successive elections because of questions about his parentage and nationality. He became a rallying point for northern grievances and feelings of exclusion.

A military coup in 1999 ousted Bedie, and elections in 2000 (also contested) brought Laurent Gbagbo to power. Ouattara was again excluded from those elections on the basis of his alleged nationality, intensifying northerners' feeling of disenfranchisement and exclusion. In September 2002, members of the Ivoirian military (largely northern) mutinied and quickly seized control of key positions in the country's north. These forces ultimately joined with other opposition militias to create the Forces Nouvelles. Conflict escalated and in 2003 a U.N. peacekeeping force was deployed, backed by French forces. The French deployment created a buffer zone between North and South, dividing the country in two and freezing it into a situation of neither peace nor war. Gbagbo's 5-year term came to an end in 2005, but elections were postponed six times in 5 years, as progress on disarmament and resolving questions of identity and voter eligibility stalled.

Elections were eventually held on October 31, 2010, and a runoff between Ouattara and Gbagbo was held on November 28. After the Independent Electoral Commission announced a 54.1 percent to 45.9 percent outcome in favor of Ouattara, the country's Constitutional Council annulled results in select northern precincts, giving Gbagbo a 51 to 49 percent victory. ECOWAS and the U.N., which in successive agreements signed by Gbagbo in Pretoria and Ouagadougou were given an explicit role in ensuring the integrity of the election process, endorsed the Electoral Commission's announced tally, recognizing Ouattara as the country's chosen president. Gbagbo and Ouattara swore themselves in as President in separate ceremonies, precipitating the standoff that ultimately ended on April 11.

It is important to note that in signing the AU-brokered Pretoria Accord in 2005 and the ECOWAS-brokered Ouagadougou Accord of 2007, Gbagbo himself explicitly invited the U.N. and ECOWAS to engage in all phases of the electoral process to ensure free, fair, and transparent elections and to act as guarantors of the agreements. An amendment to the Ivoirian electoral code in 2008, by Gbagbo's decree, gives the U.N. Special Representative in Côte d'Ivoire, as well as the ECOWAS facilitator (Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaore), a role in certifying the results. Security Council Resolution 1765, issued in 2007, with Gbagbo's acquiescence, gives the U.N. Special Representative in Côte d'Ivoire the mandate of certifying the election processes and results. On the domestic front, the Ivoirian Constitutional Court, which has the power either to annul or endorse election results in their entirety; it is not empowered to simply cancel results in select precincts and thereby change the final tally.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ms. Cooke.
Dr. Gilpin.
STATEMENT OF DR. RAYMOND GILPIN, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. Gilpin. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, Senator Inhofe, I am grateful for this opportunity to appear before this subcommittee to testify on the economic costs and consequences of the recent post-election crisis in Cote d’Ivoire.

The views I’ll express are my own. However, they are informed by my work at the United States Institute of Peace, as well as first-hand knowledge of the Ivoirian domestic, economic, and political environment, having lived in Cote d’Ivoire from 1998 to 2000, during my tenure at the African Development Bank group.

The structure of economic activity in Cote d’Ivoire has contributed to a climate of inequity and mistrust that fueled violent and protracted conflict and unrest in recent years. This is why economic reconstruction in Cote d’Ivoire must not be “business as usual.” The approach should be conflict-sensitive, with a keen focus on easing intergroup tensions, providing incentives for supporters of the peace process, and laying the foundation for equity and sustainability.

Empirical work at the IMF suggests that Cote d’Ivoire has lost as much as $8.7 billion in subregional trade alone over the past decade. In the months since the contested November 28 elections, the Ivoirian economy has experienced a number of setbacks. In the cocoa industry—and we know Cote d’Ivoire is the world’s most important exporter—unrest and uncertainty halted exports; a liquidity crunch in the financial system constrained buying; and a host of nontariff barriers and bottlenecks facilitated smuggling to neighboring countries. Consequently, the economy lost revenue; farmers received less than half of the regular market price for their produce; trade was diverted; and farming communities became increasingly indebted and destitute.

Nonpayment on the 2.3 billion Eurobond coupon increased Cote d’Ivoire’s risk profile, especially since this Eurobond issue was the second time the country’s longstanding international debt has been restructured. This is bad news for an economy that relies on foreign direct investment for a significant chunk of capital inflows. The alternative would be other investors who are less likely to do business in a transparent and development-friendly manner. And this is particularly worrisome in view of Cote d’Ivoire’s fledgling oil and gas sector.

Economic reconstruction efforts in Cote d’Ivoire should focus on establishing macroeconomic stability and structural reforms that promote two things: equity and growth. A conflict-sensitive approach to these issues should aim to do three things. First, it should transform the economic landscape and ensure access and equal opportunity for all. Second, it should carefully analyze incentive frameworks for key actors and groups. And third, it should prioritize the provision of appropriate and adequate safety nets for those who have borne a disproportionate share of the economic consequences of the recent conflict.

In the weeks following the resolution of the recent crisis, the international community has responded by easing sanctions, pledging additional humanitarian assistance, and reinstating suspended
development assistance projects. This is commendable, but there is still a lot that could be done. And I believe that careful attention should be paid to five key issues.

First, mechanisms should be adopted to promote coordination, define leadership responsibilities, and ensure that all instruments of foreign policy such as security, economic development, rule of law and diplomacy should be balanced and collectively reinforcing.

Second, steps should be taken to involve the local labor force and local firms in the provision of humanitarian assistance and in the repair of physical infrastructure. This will have the dual benefits of creating income-generating opportunities outside the public sector and garnering buy-in from affected communities.

Third, partners should design quick-disbursing initiatives to address indebtedness and ease credit bottlenecks in farming communities. These projects should aim to strengthen, and not replace, existing social capital.

Fourth, strategies should be designed to improve Cote d'Ivoire's investment profile by addressing a host of issues, and also providing technical assistance to improve the management of Cote d'Ivoire's external debt and international reserves.

And, finally, stakeholders should establish a clear baseline of easily measurable benchmarks that will enable us to track progress and reduce the likelihood of misuse, abuse, and waste.

I believe that these steps will help put Cote d'Ivoire on a path toward meaningful, sustained, and sustainable economic recovery. But, this is not achievable in isolation. It should be done in concert with reconciliation, security sector reform, governance, and rule of law.

Thank you very much. And I will be happy to respond to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gilpin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. RAYMOND GILPIN

Mr Chairman, Ranking Member Lugar, members of the committee, I am honored to testify before the Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs on the economic costs and consequences of the recent post-election crisis in Cote d'Ivoire, which lasted from November 28, 2011, until the ouster of former President Laurent Gbagbo on April 10, 2011.

The views expressed in this testimony are my own. They are informed by my work at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) which provides analysis, training, and tools to help prevent, manage, and end violent international conflicts, promote stability, and professionalize the field of peacebuilding. In directing the Sustainable Economies Center of Innovation at USIP, I lead research and field work on economic dimensions of peacebuilding in conflict-affected countries like Cote d'Ivoire. We leverage extensive partnerships in conflict zones to deepen our understanding of complex and evolving dynamics on the ground and sharpen our insights on remedial strategies that are both practical and effective. I also draw from first-hand knowledge of the Ivorian domestic economic and political environment, having lived in Cote d'Ivoire from 1998 to 2000 during my tenure as a senior macroeconomist at the African Development Bank Group. As a development economist, I have followed events in Cote d'Ivoire closely for over two decades.

ECONOMIC ROOTS OF THE CRISIS

The evolution and structure of the Ivorian economy is central to understanding the current crisis. Since the 1940s, agricultural exports have been the mainstay of the economy. Pro-private sector policies adopted by the first President, Felix Houphouet Boigny, established a tradition of strong, export-led growth in the 1960s. Houphouet Boigny promoted investment, minimized price distortions, facilitated trade by improving vital infrastructure and provided credit/extension services for
farmers. Within a decade Côte d’Ivoire had become a world leader in cocoa exports, macroeconomic performance was robust and the Ivorian economy was a regional powerhouse. However, these gains masked growing regional inequalities. While the vast amount of manual labor required for cocoa plantations in the South was provided by migrant workers from the North (a significant proportion of whom were from neighboring countries), most of the farms and agro-businesses were owned by the relatively more prosperous Southerners. The main political party, the PDCI (Parti Democratique de Cote d’Ivoire; the democratic party of Cote d’Ivoire) had its base in the South and ensured that most government and private sector investment was concentrated in the South.

By the mid-1970s the structural dynamics of the cocoa industry had effectively created a two-tier society based on an increasingly accentuated North-South divide. Infrastructure, services, and amenities were virtually nonexistent in the North. Health and education facilities were woefully deficient and economic opportunity was limited. The opposite was true in the South. Deep poverty and deprivation in the North were in stark contrast to the advancement and burgeoning wealth in the South. That Abidjan (the commercial capital in the South) earned the moniker “Petit Paris” speaks to the vast disparities that existed. The discovery of oil and gas reserves in 1975 and Côte d’Ivoire’s ascendency as a regional financial hub in the 1980s only served to widen the gap, as the structural arrangements established in the cocoa industry were replicated in the oil and gas sectors. Relatively little of the nation’s wealth made its way to the North.

The oil shocks and commodity price downturn of the early 1980s delivered a double blow to the Ivorian economy. As export earnings fell and import bills rose, the government introduced a program of stringent austerity measures. This unpopular program coincided with increased calls for more meaningful political and economic participation by groups in the North. There was restlessness in the South as the impacts of the cuts began to deepen, assets lost value and Southern political dominance threatened by calls for inclusion in the political process. There was also restlessness in the North as groups with ethnic ties to neighboring countries felt marginalized and were convinced that they were bearing a disproportionate share of the austerity measures (particularly unemployment and lower wages). The faultlines had an ethnoreligious element. The predominantly Christian South is mainly comprised of members of the Baoule ethnic group, while the predominantly Muslim North is made up of a number of smaller ethnic groups.

The economic and political turmoil of the 1980s and 1990s sowed the seeds of discord that led to the violence that typified the first decade of this century. Houphouet Boigny successor, Henri Konan Bedie, compensated for his relatively poor political and leadership skills by playing on the now openly fractious North-South divide. The overthrow of Bedie in 1999 and the subsequent de facto partition of the country in 2002 further accentuated the relative deprivation of the North.

The 2010 elections were the first truly national elections in Côte d’Ivoire, with credible candidates fielded from all regions. The November 28 Presidential runoff pitted the incumbent Laurent Gbagbo of the Southern-based FPI (Front Populaire Ivoirien—Ivorian Popular Front) party against the Northern-based RDR (Rassemblement des Republicains—Rally of Republicans) candidate Alassane Ouattara. Although regional and international observers adjudged Ouattara to have been the winner, Gbagbo contested the results. The country’s Constitutional Council nullified some 600,000 votes in the North and declared Gbagbo President. Both candidates held swearing-in ceremonies. This set the stage for a 5-month stalemate that ended with the forcible ousting and arrest of Gbagbo on April 10, 2011.

**ECONOMIC COSTS OF THE POST-2010 ELECTIONS STALEMATE**

Even though the Ivorian economy had been reeling from almost a decade of violent conflict and political instability, the post-elections stalemate imposed additional economic costs. Analysts estimate that conflict over the past decade has cost Côte d’Ivoire some $8.7 billion in lost trade within West Africa; global estimates will be much higher.† The full economic costs of the post-elections crisis are still being assessed. There is also some evidence of substantial trade diversion to neighboring countries as traders and investors vote with their feet. The combination of significant financial losses and potential structural changes in trading relationships could constrain Côte d’Ivoire’s recovery.

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The Ivorian economy became a post-elections battleground as Gbagbo sought to solidify his hold on power by controlling revenue streams from the cocoa industry, petroleum sector, and financial sector. Even though the economy had been weakened, it still held the prospects of significant current and future revenue streams, which Gbagbo needed to pay salaries, provide basic services and prosecute the ongoing civil war. For his part, Ouattara put in motion a series of events that sanctioned economic activity in a bid to prevent Gbagbo from controlling state economic assets. Both sets of action had serious economic costs.

Costs to the Cocoa Industry

Côte d'Ivoire is the world’s leading cocoa exporter. It contributes some $1.3 billion in annual revenues, making it a lucrative revenue source. The main 2010 harvest was almost over when the unrest started and most farms and storage facilities were neither damaged nor destroyed. An estimated half a million tonnes of cocoa were already in preshipment storage facilities. Gbagbo started to run out of financing options in early 2011 as financial sanctions imposed by the West African central bank, the BECAO (Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l'Ouest; the central bank for francophone West Africa), the European Commission and the United States started to take effect. He attempted to wrest control of the industry after failing to convince major exporters to pay taxes and otherwise support his cause. Ouattara countered by successfully orchestrating a ban on cocoa exports and the three main exporters (Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland of the United States, and Swiss-based Barry Callebaut AG) suspended exports.

These developments imposed a number of costs. First, fears of a prolonged supply disruption put upward pressure on world cocoa prices, which hit a 32-year high of $3,775/tonne on March 4. The 7 million Ivorians involved in the cocoa industry did not benefit from this price hike since exports were suspended. Second, on account of the sanctions an estimated 450,000 tonnes of cocoa was not exported and remained in warehouses for months. Although rotting was minimal (only about 10 percent), many analysts believe that the quality could have deteriorated forcing exporters to accept much lower prices. Third, cocoa prices could also be dampened by the supply glut that will be created as the stockpile is released. The combined effects of these factors could run into tens of millions of dollars in losses.

In addition to these macro level costs there are a number of farm-level costs that might be even more pernicious. Post-elections insecurity led to the displacement of roughly 1 million, while 150,000 fled to neighboring countries. Many of these were members of the industry’s large workforce—including those involved in buying and transportation. Farmers who had not transported their produce to the warehouses in the port city of San Pedro before the onset of the unrest faced serious difficulties. First, a liquidity crunch meant that buying agents did not have cash to pay farmers for their produce. Checks were not clearing and the Gbagbo administration imposed limits on withdrawals. Second, various militia “taxed” cargo on the highways. Third, most of the usual transporters and buyers had fled. And, fourth, warehouses were full and not accepting any new produce. Consequently, farmers sought alternative channels to sell their produce—most of which was smuggled via neighboring countries. During the first 4 months of 2011, the cocoa marketing agency in neighboring Ghana recorded a 50-percent increase in exports over the same period in 2010. Smuggling cost the Ivorian economy millions in lost business and revenue.

Farmers were also forced to accept significantly lower prices for their produce (at a time when prices were peaking at record highs). Without other viable options, the farmers had to sell to the few buyers with liquidity, who took advantage of the crisis to underpay for the cocoa beans. So, while Côte d’Ivoire’s farmers had to contend with much higher prices for food and fuel, they received only 50–60 percent of what they would normally have been paid for their produce. This situation compounded their hardship, increased household debt burdens, and constrained their ability to invest and fully prepare for the coming season.

Côte d’Ivoire’s cocoa marketing woes persisted even after the ousting of Gbagbo. Liquidity remains problematic, tax and tariff payments are complicated because customs officials do not accept checks and credit is still scarce. These constraints

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3 Orla Ryan, “Ivory Coast Cocoa Farmers Get Taste Of Politics,” Financial Times, February 14, 2011, (www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7c95f38c-3884-11e0-909c-00144fabad60.html#axzz1MiXmYe2C4)
5 The Ghanaian authorities attributed the increase to a bumper crop but analysts believe that that Ivoirian cocoa accounted for some of the increase.
require urgent action if the costs to the economy and cocoa farmers are to be minimized.

**Costs to the Petroleum Sector**

With production levels below 60,000 barrels per day and 100 million in proven oil reserves, Cote d’Ivoire is not a major oil producer. However, the sector accounts for roughly one-third of the country’s export. Cote d’Ivoire also has significant refining capacity that services both domestic and regional markets. Potential new oil and gas fields could boost output. For example, Block CI–112 off the western coast could hold over 2 billion barrels of crude reserves, while Block CI–40 along the southern coast could hold up to 200 million barrels. Insecurity will impact the likelihood (and quality) of investment. Promising exploration for new oil and gas fields were suspended because of the post-election crisis. Texas-based Anadarko Petroleum Corporation and U.K.-based Tullow oil halted exploration in fields that analysts believe could have doubled Cote d’Ivoire’s output in a few years. One of the new fields could potentially add an estimated 550 million barrels to the proven reserves. Although not a major setback (as exploration is likely to resume shortly), the delay will result in increased costs and increased wariness by investors.

**Costs to the Financial Sector**

A major financial issue in the post-election crisis was the payment of the country’s $29 million coupon payment on $2.3 billion Eurobond issue. These dollar-denominated bonds were basically past-due Brady Bonds owed to commercial creditors that were rescheduled in April 2010. This is the second time this stock of debt has been rescheduled. In spite of a January 10, 2011, letter signed by then-Finance Minister, Desire Dallo, promising to make the coupon payment within the 30-day grace period (the payment was due on December 31, 2010), this obligation was not honored. This increases the country’s risk profile in the eyes of potential investors and could impact the cost of borrowing.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES**

The economic costs and consequences of the Ivorian crisis impact U.S. interests. First, because leading U.S. agro-business firms (Archer Daniels Midland and Cargill) are heavily invested in Cote d’Ivoire, continued instability, structural bottlenecks and weakened institutions in that country could affect their bottom line. The same is true of the lucrative chocolate industry in the United States. Opportunities for diversification are slim in the short to medium term. The windfall harvests (such as experienced in neighboring Ghana in 2010) and anticipated increases in export volumes in Indonesia (following an expected downward revision of export taxes later this year) are unlikely to cover the shortfall if Cote d’Ivoire’s cocoa industry does not recover expeditiously.

Second, uncertainty in Cote d’Ivoire’s petroleum sector could further heighten concerns about the reliability of supply from West Africa, which accounts for about a fifth of U.S. oil imports. Some analysts believe that pending exploration could more than double output in that country over the medium term. Existing facilities also need to be upgraded to enhance efficiency. Prospective investors will be concerned about Cote d’Ivoire’s creditworthiness given recent defaults on bond payments.

Third, continued weak economic performance would undermine efforts to build stable, reliable democratic governance in Cote d’Ivoire, which is a strategic objective of the United States. Furthermore, failure to address the plight of thousands of small-holder farmers would make IDPs and refugees less likely to return. There is evidence that economic conditions weigh heavily on the minds of the displaced. Large displaced and disaffected groups could compromise national and regional stability and make communities less stable and conflict more intractable.
Some analysts anticipate a swift economic recovery for Cote d'Ivoire, given its resource endowment and middle income ranking. This is highly unlikely in view of the macro and micro challenges already outlined. Rebuilding conflict-affected states, like Cote d'Ivoire, is a complex undertaking. The comprehensive guidelines in USIP’s “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction” are applicable in the Ivorian context. This publication emphasizes the collectively reinforcing nature of policy instruments that should be applied in such cases. These include sustainable economies, security, effective governance, the establishment of the rule of law and social well-being. This is the key to success in Cote d'Ivoire.

Given the nature of economic factors that precipitated and sustained violent unrest in Cote d'Ivoire, efforts at economic transformation should be anchored on two Es: equity and employment. A history of stark regional and ethnoreligious schisms combined with deep distrust contributed to the violence and unrest of recent months. An important peace dividend would be the establishment of conditions that facilitate equal access and opportunity for all. Targeted programs to redress these imbalances could include expanding the provision of infrastructure and services, targeted “access to credit” programs and capacity building initiatives. These must be designed in a conflict-sensitive manner. By this I mean that care should be taken to avoid rewarding “spoilers” and it must not be presented a zero-sum solution (i.e., groups in the South should not feel punished or excluded, or vice versa).

Cote d'Ivoire's youthful population is a great asset but it could also be a potential powder keg. High rates of unemployment and underemployment could precipitate disquiet and unrest. This is particularly worrisome when a significant proportion of the unemployed have been involved in the violence and there is a proliferation of small arms and light weapons across the country. In addition to developing training and retraining programs, serious thought should be given to the development of labor-intensive infrastructure programs. In addition, close attention should be paid to initiatives that promote the development of small- and medium-scale businesses. Cote d'Ivoire is a middle-income country with a number of core economic activities (agriculture, minerals, finance, and services) around which a wide range of small businesses could thrive. Policymakers should resist the temptation to rely on the public sector (particularly security services) to absorb the bulk of the unemployed, directly or indirectly.

Although the United States and other development partners already provide significant humanitarian and development assistance to support economic recovery, political stability and security in Cote d'Ivoire, the needs remain great and expectations are high. Consolidating the fragile peace necessitates proactive economic interventions by international partners in the following areas:

- Address the immediate needs of the cocoa farmers and implement social safety net programs to mitigate the impact of indebtedness caused by recent events.
- Invest in programs to improve cocoa yields, minimize post-harvest losses and improve the quality of the beans.
- Ease bottlenecks by supporting the expansion of cocoa marketing networks, extensions services and credit facilities.
- Technical assistance to improve external debt management and restore credibility in international financial markets.
- Establish effective monitoring and evaluation programs that are both credible and consistent.
- Create mechanisms to engage the private sector and civil society in the provision of humanitarian and development assistance.
- Clearly connect short-term assistance (such as security, humanitarian and repair of physical infrastructure) with longer term initiatives (such as strength-
ening state institutions, fostering inclusive and participatory governance, and promoting market development).

• Pay particular attention to small-scale farmers and marginalized groups who have borne a disproportionate share of the economic consequences of the recent unrest.

CONCLUSION

In the months leading up to the 2010 elections Cote d’Ivoire benefited from a substantial rescheduling of its debt and millions in debt relief. It also stood to benefit from an economic reconstruction package worth over half a billion U.S. dollars. These programs will be reinstated relatively quickly. The World Bank announced that it will fast-track the release of some $100 million in humanitarian assistance and expedite the delivery of $3 billion in debt relief. The French government has pledged an additional $577 million, the European Commission $260 million and so far the United States has provided $33.7 million. However, care should be taken to avoid falling victim to a numbers game. Throwing money at the problem will probably worsen the situation. What is needed is a coordinated, comprehensive, and conflict-sensitive approach to economic recovery in Cote d’Ivoire.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Dr. Gilpin.

I’d like to start with a question, if I might, to Dr. McGovern. All of you spoke about the critical need for economic growth, for reconciliation, and for stability. Dr. McGovern, you pointed to the critical need for both judicial and security reforms. We’ve had some success in other countries in the region, particularly in security reforms that required fundamentally restructuring, almost recreating, the national security forces. You also pointed, in your written testimony, to some of the very real challenges in getting a judicial system that could be a real partner in economic growth and could restore a sense of transparency and fairness.

What do you think are the most critical steps for the new government to take? And how can the United States best support them in that work?

Dr. MCGOVERN. The United States is involved, as you know, in Liberian security sector reform, and also, to some extent, in Guinea. They’ve been involved in Nigeria and a number of other African countries. The Liberian model is drawing the army down to zero and starting from scratch. That won’t happen in Cote d’Ivoire. That’s not really politically viable. But, the DR Congo sort of model, where you just throw everybody in a pot and let them keep whatever rank they gave themselves when they were fighting in the bush, is also not very helpful. So, I think what I suggested is that drawing on the West African expertise and also the American expertise, as Ms. Cooke already suggested, the United States can play an important role as a neutral party, as an honest broker, in a way that the French simply cannot do in Cote d’Ivoire anymore.

And I think accompanying that process where—as I said, the most important thing, to my mind, in the security sector, is going to be reestablishing command and control. Officers, right now, can be slapped, they can be disobeyed by rank-and-file soldiers, with no consequences, as long as the rank-and-file soldier has some kind of
political backer. And that’s a real problem. And that’s been characteristic in the north, as well as the south—people who are just sort of free actors and doing what they please. That has to end.

And that ties into the judicial aspect, the prosecution of those who have, you know, committed crimes, is also going to contribute to that process.

Senator Coons. Thank you, Doctor.

Ms. Cooke, you spoke about the importance of ECOWAS, the African Union, and the regional structures and continentwide structures that acted fairly quickly and effectively in finding a resolution to this crisis. What are the regional implications of the outcome of these events in Cote d’Ivoire? What should the United States be doing, given those regional implications? And I was interested—you mentioned Zimbabwe and SADC—what does this teach us about other regions of the continent and how we should be engaged there in creating multilateral structures?

Ms. Cooke. Thank you, Chairman. Yes, I think, actually, ECOWAS has shown really tremendous progress, over the years, in upholding these principles of democratic governance and transparency and peer pressure on members of the group who fail to live up to those standards. It has intervened, preemptively, in several other West African crises as well that might have devolved to something much worse. I think that was important here.

The response of ECOWAS cleared the way for the African Union and the U.N. to play a greater and more unified role. And I hope that the African Union and SADC will look to the ECOWAS model and recognize that consensus and action within a regional grouping can pull the international community behind it, with substantial support, if it takes that initial diplomatic step.

So, I think it’s a very important model that we should encourage and acknowledge. I think we need to commend the leadership of Nigeria and President Goodluck Jonathan, who was going through his own election preparations at that time. And I think acknowledging that will encourage other regional bodies, and the African Union as a whole, to follow through on that example.

Senator Coons. Thank you, Ms. Cooke.

Dr. Gilpin, your other two panel mates emphasize the centrality of economic growth, and, in particular, of jobs—of the possibility of infrastructure jobs or of other jobs. And some folks who are reviewing the situation in Cote d’Ivoire suggest the prospects for economic recovery are actually relatively good, coming out of a conflict of this intensity, because there was relatively little infrastructure damage. But, one of the real challenges, right now, as you mentioned, is liquidity and access to credit.

The recent actions by the World Bank—are they sufficient? What else needs to be done in order to provide credit access? And what do you think are the most constructive or important steps the United States could take in addition to those already talked about—the security and judicial reforms—that could lead to sustained economic growth and job creation for the Ivoirian people?

Dr. Gilpin. Thank you very much, Senator. I would echo comments that have already been made, that I believe the United States could not only play the role of an honest broker, but also provide strategic leadership. After over a decade of violent conflict,
I think the most important thing that most people in Cote d’Ivoire are looking forward to is a tangible peace dividend—being able to earn, but also being able to build wealth. The international community, both bilateral and multilateral, have been very generous in their pledges. But, this needs to go beyond the usual development model. It is not enough to throw money at the problems. We need to take a closer look at some of the structural changes that have happened because of the conflict.

And in terms of liquidity, it’s not just an issue of the commercial banks being able to make credit available to the buyers and traders, it is being able to ensure that all farmers have equal access. And for that to happen, we need to take a close look at how models of microfinance could be adapted at the village level, and so that, irrespective of political coloring, religion, or ethnicity, people who have the ability to contribute, whether it’s in the real economy—agriculture—the manufacturing economy or the service economy—would be able to do this.

I think the key to their economic recovery is not so much what is going to happen in the macrolevel, in terms of foreign assistance, but is the ability of small- and medium-scale enterprises to restart and start contributing to sustainable economic growth.

The United States could support a lot of NGOs and private organizations that are thinking about programs to ensure that they are coordinated in a manner that supports the most important players in the economy, who I think are the small- and medium-scale businesses and also the small-scale farmers.

Senator Coons. Let me ask one last question, if I might, of the panel as a whole. I’m just about out of time. All three of you have mentioned that, in your view, the United States can play a constructive honest-broker role, and that there are some real challenges in either the French or the U.N. continuing to play those roles effectively. Given our very constrained financial situation, as a country, what do you view as the most critical investment the United States can make in the nation of Cote d’Ivoire to help advance reconciliation, economic stability, and regional integration? If you would, each.

Dr. McGovern.


Ms. Cooke. I would agree with that, but I would also add diplomatic engagement—a sustained diplomatic engagement beyond the immediate crisis, which doesn’t cost a whole lot.

Dr. Gilpin. I think the most important thing would be the ability to ensure that there is coordinated assistance. And there are many players in Cote d’Ivoire, both state and nonstate. Our ability to coordinate foreign assistance has challenged us in places like Haiti, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Afghanistan. And we now have an opportunity, in a medium-income country, to press the restart button and have coordinated, consistent, and long-term, vision-oriented reconstruction. I believe the United States could play that role and perform that function.

Senator Coons. Thank you.

Senator Inhofe.

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Well, first of all, I don't find a lot of disagreement with anything that any of the members on this panel have said. They're looking forward to—trying to look forward to seeing—that's supposed to be the subject of this thing. But, I find a couple of things, Dr. McGovern that—to be interesting.

For one thing, my granddaughter was just accepted into Yale, so you'll see Maggie Inhofe walking around the halls. [Laughter.]

Senator COONS. That's a suggestion to be particularly generous in your grading. [Laughter.]

Senator INHOFE. And she needs financial assistance. [Laughter.]

Dr. McGovern, I appreciate some of the things that you have said. And I agree with almost everything. I take issue with a couple of things.

First of all, on the threat, I think you are approximating, maybe, in the range of 10,000 deaths, and I would only ask that—not that you respond now, but you look at some of these things that we have. We actually have the videos of going in there. And these are the U.N. helicopters—gunships—going in, destroying huge parts of the city. I've spent so much time in the very parts that I've seen destroyed. I can't see that it's even possible that it wouldn't—it isn't at least 10 times that number. Just keep that—I would like to have you just keep that open.

Second, I appreciated you talking about that reconciliation will not be achieved by a commission. And I agree with that.

Third, I would like to ask what you think about the comments that were made by President Museveni, President Mbeki, Obiang, the—Odinga—and you just have to take my word for it, there are many, many more that I've talked to personally, just—we don't have their names or their permission to use them.

This perhaps was—it was bungled, the way it was handled, and that there are so many out there that perceive this as a neocolonialism effort by the French—I'd like to have your thoughts on that. And then I have one last question to ask.

Dr. MCGOVERN. Yes. I think that one thing that's very important to remember is that the ball started rolling with ECOWAS. It was passed to the AU, and then it went from there outside of Africa. So, I personally find that it was, strategically, a very unfortunate decision to have French helicopters join in, in the attacks. I'm sure you've read the U.N. Security Council resolution. It was worded in an ambiguous way, which may well have given scope for the French to be involved. Other people think not.

In any case, the U.N. mission did have chapter 7 ability and was specifically empowered by that resolution to take aggressive action against the Gbagbo government. Whether you agree with that or not, I think that's clear.

As far as whether or not it's a neocolonial intervention, I think it's important to remember that the reason Laurent Gbagbo—in my view, the reason he has been treated differently from, say, Robert Mugabe, has a lot to do with the fact that he burned his bridges not only with Europeans and with the U.N., but also with his peers in West Africa. Having people from his FPI party threaten the lives of other West Africans who were resident in Cote d'Ivoire—not once, but several times—was something that made Nigerians, Burkinabés, others, very angry. And it ended up, over time—this
is over 5 or 7 years—it ended up building a coalition of African leaders who actually outnumber the ones that you’ve listed. And I think that’s simply a fact.

Thank you.

Senator INHOFE. The other thing you had mentioned—and I thought it was significant, because, the first panel, in my opinion, by making several comments referring to the previous 10 years, were trying to say this was President Gbagbo. You are good enough to be honest about it and say that this goes three—it could be maybe two or three decades back. That would include the time when Ouattara was the Prime Minister, which was—1990 is when that began. So, I think we want to make sure that we don’t all say that this is all this administration. I think that’s very significant.

And also I would like to ask, as a favor, that anyone, particularly my colleagues up here, read the article, “What the World Got Wrong in Côte d’Ivoire.” This was an article that was written in the—what was it?—the—which magazine?—Foreign Policy magazine. That’s a well-respected magazine. I pretty much agree with everything that’s in here.

Last, I would just say this. Sure, I’ve given up with what I originally intended to do. I thought we had such incontrovertible evidence. There isn’t anyone on this panel, or anyone in this room, who will say that, if President Laurent Gbagbo—the first election—got thousands and thousands of votes in those northern regions, which they call them, not precincts—and then turned around, in the runoff, and got zero—that can’t happen. We all know that. And all you have to do is do your math and you can see this election was up in the air.

Well, there should have been a reelection, another election. I did everything I could to make that happen. It’s not going to happen now. I understand that.

So, as we look at the things that are open, I would only suggest that the option of an effort to put the President and the First Lady, and a lot of the others, into an exile situation—maybe I’m not using the right word—but, to me, when I look at it, and I look at the repercussions, and I look at the number of people who I know and who live in Abidjan, in that part—in the southern part of Côte d’Ivoire—and I see the number of people who are watching and observing, as we’re sitting here today, the death squads going around and killing people in the streets today, right now, that this is something that’s going on, and it is something that is going to be—you’re going to have to think of some way of reconciliation. To me, the best way would be to accept the invitation. And I would hope that there are those who are listening, with the State Department. I doubt it, but I hope that they are.

The last thing I would do is, respond to something that Mr. Fitzgerald had referred to. You know, if I showed all the pictures that I had—you’ve already seen those—if you still come to the conclusion that there’s any level of fairness, that it wasn’t just sheer brutality, I don’t know where you could come from. But, the statement that President Gbagbo is being treated fair—I’m going to ask for—let’s look at, first of all, the picture of the Laurent Gbagbo that I know, the one that I’ve known for many years—I’ve known even before he was President. There he is, a happy face, jovial man. A
lot of people loved him. Let's look at his picture today. As you can see, the side of his face is kicked in. That's the Gbagbo of today.

Then let's go to Simone. I've gotten to know her very well over the years, back when she was a member of Parliament and not even married to Laurent Gbagbo—before that time. This is the beautiful lady. I don't think anyone's going to question how beautiful this lady is. Let's look at Simone today. When they ravaged her, they pulled her hair out by the roots—danced in the streets. This is all Ouattara's people. We know that. Nobody denies that.

Then the one that is most revealing as to what's happening today. There she is, folks. There's Ouattara's people. Use your imagination. Just—you know what happened. You know what's happening now. And all I can say is, this is a travesty. It's something that, in the 15 years that I been in Africa—I've visited—I've made 116 African country visits. I have a heart for Africa. This is the worst that I've seen.

I'm going to make every effort to try to encourage people to examine very carefully the option of exile. I think that's the reasonable thing to do. And I think it's the best thing, in terms of going forward, in terms of how people are going to keep from being a martyr. And I think that, perhaps, is the best of a lot of not too pleasant options that are out there.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Isakson, we passed over you during this session, this round, so I'd defer to you, at this point, for a round of questions of the panel.

Senator Isakson. I deserved being passed over, because I was running in and out, trying to handle another situation. So, I appreciated the courtesy.

And I think I'm going to end with the right question for the future. And both Ms. Cooke and Dr. McGovern and Dr. Gilpin all, in one way or another, referred to it. First, Dr. McGovern talked about the genocide in Rwanda, in the post-Rwandan period of time. I think Ms. Cooke mentioned the numbers of killed in Rwanda, which was a million, and the numbers estimated that may have been killed in—was significantly less, although any death is significant.

I've been to Rwanda, and what Kokome did there, I think, was somewhat remarkable, to go from a period of genocide between the Hutus and the Tutsis, to a country that, today—although there've been a few issues lately, I know—but, has been a remarkable reconciliation. And when I went there to—what struck me was how they finally got the Hutus and the Tutsis together. And they did it economically, by the way. I think, when you mentioned jobs, that—I've visited the National Basket Company of Rwanda and, in their employment, they require a Hutu and a Tutsi to sit side by side. They won't let them get in groups. So, they had to work together.

I don't understand the Cote d'Ivoire complexity as much. I think it's both tribal, as well as religious, to a certain extent, in terms of the conflict. At least, that's what I believe from what I've read. But, that type of example, of what Kokome did in Rwanda, seems to me, hopefully, the best look forward for the country of Cote
d'Ivoire, in terms of improving economics, first of all, for the people—providing jobs or getting jobs for the people—and then having the tribal and ethnic differences work together in those jobs to bring about a sense of stability.

Is that possible? And I'd just ask each one of you to comment on that.

Dr. McGovern. I think it's very possible. Ivoirians, for as long as Cote d'Ivoire has existed as nation, have lived together, been intermarried, been eating in maquis together, dancing together. It's really—it's not an issue. It is made an issue by politicians who cynically try to derive some benefit from dividing people. But, I think, at the level of the ordinary Ivoirian people, it's not a problem.

Thank you.

Senator Isakson. Ms. Cooke.

Ms. Cooke. I think economic growth and prosperity can do a lot, in terms of giving political leaders room for reconciliation. I think one of the cautions about the Rwandan example is that, unless economic prosperity is accompanied by truly national institutions, by participatory governance, by an open field for political competition—for peaceful political competition, that it can come unraveled very quickly.

Senator Isakson. Understood.

Ms. Cooke. You have to remember that Cote d'Ivoire was once an economic success case. Zimbabwe was once an economic success case. Rwanda was once considered an economic model, before the genocide. So, prosperity and jobs do give room. They are an important part of reconciliation, but not the sole one.

Senator Isakson. Dr. Gilpin.

Dr. Gilpin. I would agree with my fellow panelists. I think it is possible, but it is not an easy road. And there is a lot of work that goes on behind the scenes to ensure that reconciliation efforts are both effective and lasting. And the trick is to have successful reconciliation efforts moving in tandem with efforts to improve the rule of law, efforts to improve the regulatory and institutional frameworks, and efforts to improve income-generating opportunities for all, regardless of creed, regardless of religion, and regardless of ethnicity.

The challenge in bringing this about is something I alluded to in my testimony. We have to find a way to ensure that the overlap of these important end states, whether it's economic, governance, or security—the overlap is very well coordinated so it fits the Cote d'Ivoire situation and it enables not just the politics, but also socio-economic factors, to move in a positive direction.

Senator Isakson. Well, I'd like to thank all of our panelists for their input today, and thank the Chairman for calling this important hearing. Thanks, to all of you.

Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, could I—

Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Isakson.

Senator Inhofe. Senator Inhofe [continuing]. Ask unanimous consent that this article that I referred to, "What the World Got Wrong in Cote d'Ivoire," be made a part of the record of this proceeding today?

Senator Coons. Without objection.
Senator Coons. I will also keep the record open, for Senators who wish to submit statements for the record, until the close of business tomorrow, May 20.

I want to thank all of our participants today, all five of our witnesses, who brought forward some, in my view, very compelling and very important testimony for us to consider about the appropriate path forward. All of you have raised the very real prospect of the central role that the United States can play in trying to encourage reconciliation and trying to support accountability, transparency, and some positive economic growth for a nation that has long been a real model for the region. And it is my hope that, working together, we can find a peaceful and prosperous path forward for the Ivorian people, who have suffered so long, and that we can move forward the reconciliation that is so desperately needed in this wonderful country that has so much promise for the future.

Thank you very much.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

NEWSPAPER ARTICLE SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

[From Foreign Policy Magazine, Apr. 29, 2011]

WHAT THE WORLD GOT WRONG IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE

(By Thabo Mbeki)

WHY IS THE UNITED NATIONS ENTRENCHING FORMER COLONIAL POWERS ON OUR CONTINENT? AFRICANS CAN AND SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN RESOLVING THEIR OWN DISPUTES.

The second round of the Nov. 28, 2010, presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire pitted against each other two longstanding political opponents, Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara. For this reason, and of strategic importance, it was inevitable that this electoral contest would decide the long-term future of the country. Everybody concerned should have probed very seriously the critical question: Would the 2010 elections create the conditions that would establish the basis for the best possible future for the Ivorian people?

This was not done.

Rather, the international community insisted that what Côte d’Ivoire required to end its crisis was to hold democratic elections, even though the conditions did not exist to conduct such elections. Though they knew that this proposition was fundamentally wrong, the Ivorians could not withstand the international pressure to hold the elections.

However, the objective reality is that the Ivorian presidential elections should not have been held when they were held. It was perfectly foreseeable that they would further entrench the very conflict it was suggested they would end.

The 2002 rebellion in Côte d’Ivoire divided the country into two parts, with the north controlled by the rebel Forces Nouvelles, which supported Allassane Ouattara, and the south in the hands of the Gbagbo-led government. Since then, Côte d’Ivoire has had two governments, administrations, armies, and “national” leaders.

Any elections held under these circumstances would inevitably entrench the divisions and animosities represented and exacerbated by the 2002 rebellion.

The structural faults which lay at the base of the 2002 rebellion include such in-flammable issues as trans-national tensions affecting especially Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, Ivorian ethnic and religious antagonisms, sharing of political power, and access to economic and social power and opportunities.

In this regard, the international community has assiduously suppressed proper appreciation of various explosive allegations which, rightly or wrongly, have informed and will continue to inform the views of the Gbagbo-supporting population in southern Côte d’Ivoire—and much of Francophone Africa!
These are that Ouattara is a foreigner born in Burkina Faso, that together with Burkinabé President Blaise Compaoré he was responsible for the 2002 rebellion, that his accession to power would result in the takeover of the country especially by Burkinabé foreigners, and that historically, to date, he has been ready to advance French interests in Côte d’Ivoire.

Taking all this into account, the African Union understood that a lasting solution of the Ivorian crisis necessitated a negotiated agreement between the two belligerent Ivorian factions, focused on the interdependent issues of democracy, peace, national reconciliation and unity.

In protracted negotiations from 2002, the Ivorians agreed that the presidential elections would not be held until various conditions had been met. These included the reunification of the country, the restoration of the national administration to all parts of the Ivorian territory, and the disarmament of the rebels and all militia and their integration in the national security machinery, with the latter process completed at least two months ahead of any presidential elections. Despite the fact that none of this was honoured, the presidential elections were allowed to proceed.

In the end, Ouattara has been installed as president of Côte d’Ivoire. Gbagbo, and his wife Simone, have ended up as humiliated prisoners. Many Ivorians have died and have been displaced, much infrastructure has been destroyed, and historic animosities have been exacerbated in the lead up to this outcome. Many things have gone radically wrong along the road to this result.

Agreements relating to what needed to be done to create conditions for free and fair elections were wilfully and contemptuously ignored. The Ivorian Constitutional Council (CC) is the only body constitutionally empowered to determine the winner in any presidential election and to install the president, with the Electoral Commission (IEC) mandated to forward its provisional results to the CC. However, the very people who insist on the sanctity of the rule of law as fundamental to all democratic practice, elected illegally to recognise the provisional result announced by the chairperson of the IEC on his own, as the authentic outcome of the presidential election.

As provided by the law, Gbagbo contested the fairness of the elections in certain parts of the country, especially the north. The CC, rightly or wrongly, accepted the majority of the complaints made by Gbagbo, identified other “irregularities,” annulled the votes in some districts, and declared Gbagbo the victor. The chairperson of the IEC did not take these alleged irregularities into account and decided that Ouattara had won.

The envoy of U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, his fellow South Korean, SRSG Young-jin Choi, also determined that Ouattara had won, but on the basis of fewer votes than those announced by the IEC, having determined that some of the complaints made by Gbagbo were legitimate. In terms of the votes cast for the two candidates, the IEC, the CC, and the U.N. SRSG made three different determinations.

Gbagbo proposed that to resolve this matter, which bears on the important issue of the will of the Ivorian people, an international commission should be established to verify the election results, with the important pre-condition that both he and Ouattara should accept the determination of the commission.

This proposal was rejected by the international community—despite the fact that it would have resolved the electoral dispute without resort to war, and despite the fact that some election observers questioned the fairness of the elections, especially in northern Côte d’Ivoire.

For instance, reporting on the elections in the north, the election observer mission of the AU led by Joseph Kokou Kofigoh, former prime minister of Togo, the independent civil society Société Chile Africaine pour la Democratie et l’Assistance Electorale led by Seynabou Indieguene of Senegal, and the Coordination of African Election Experts (CAEE) from Cameroon, Senegal, Benin, Mali, Morocco, Gabon, and Togo led by Jean-Marie Ongibangte of Cameroon, all sounded the alarm about the elections in the north.

For instance, the CAEE said: “After sharing information with other national and international election observers, we hereby state that the second round of the presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire was held amidst major problems in (various northern) regions.

“These problems were stealing of ballot boxes, arresting of candidates’ representatives, multiple voting, refusal to admit international observers to witness counting of ballots, and the murder of representatives of candidates. To that effect, we hereby declare that the second round of voting was not free, fair and transparent in these (northern) localities.”

For its part, to this day, the ECOWAS election observer mission has not issued its report on the second round of the presidential election! Why?
Clearly the independent international commission proposed by Laurent Gbagbo could have been established and empowered to make a definitive and binding determination about what had happened. Time will tell why this was not done!

Further, the U.N. SRSG took the extraordinary decision to exceed his mandate by declaring who had won the presidential election, contrary to his tasks as detailed by the Security Council. This positioned the U.N. Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) as a partisan in the Ivorian conflict, rather than a neutral peacemaker, equidistant from the belligerent parties.

From this point onwards, UNOCI had no choice but actively to work for the installation of Ouattara as president of the country and the removal of Gbagbo. Ultimately, this found expression in the blatant use of its military capacities to open the way for the Forces Nouvelles to defeat the Gbagbo forces and capture Gbagbo, under the shameless pretence that it was acting to protect civilians.

While obliged to respect its peacekeeping mandate, which included keeping the belligerent forces apart, UNOCI did nothing to stop the advance of the Forces Nouvelles from the north to the south, including and up to Abidjan. Nor did UNOCI or the French Licorne forces, as mandated by the United Nations, act to protect civilians in the area of Duekoue, where, evidently, the most concentrated murder of civilians took place! This recalls the United Nations’s failure to end the more catastrophic murder and abuse of civilians in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo!

The Ivorian reality points to a number of incontrovertible conclusions.

The agreed conditions for the holding of democratic elections in Côte d’Ivoire were not created. Despite strong allegations of electoral fraud, the international community decided against conducting any verification of the process and the announced results. This left unanswered the vitally important question of who actually had won the elections, which Ouattara might have done.

The United Nations elected to abandon its neutrality as a peacemaker, deciding to be a partisan belligerent in the Ivorian conflict.

France used its privileged place in the Security Council to position itself to play an important role in determining the future of Côte d’Ivoire, its former colony in which, inter alia, it has significant economic interests. It joined the United Nations to ensure that Ouattara emerged as the victor in the Ivorian conflict.

This addressed the national interests of France, consistent with its Françafrique policies, which aim to perpetuate a particular relationship with its former African colonies. This is in keeping with remarks made by former French President François Mitterand when he said, “Without Africa, France will have no history in the 21st century,” which former French foreign minister Jacques Godfrain confirmed when he said: “A little country [France], with a small amount of strength, we can move a planet because [of our] . . . relations with 15 or 20 African countries . . .”

The AU is also not without blame, as it failed to assert itself to persuade everybody to work to achieve reconciliation among the Ivorians, and therefore durable peace. Tragically, the outcome that has been achieved in Côte d’Ivoire further entrenches the endemic conflict in this country. This is because it has placed in the exclusive hands of the failed rebellion of 2002 the ability to determine the future of the country, whereas the objective situation dictated and dictates that the people of Côte d’Ivoire should engage one another as equals to determine their shared destiny.

During the decade he served as president of Côte d’Ivoire, Gbagbo had no possibility to act on his own to reunify the country and achieve reconciliation among its diverse people, despite the existence of negotiated agreements in this regard. As he serves as president of the country, Ouattara will not succeed to realise these objectives, acting on his own, outside the context of honest agreement with the sections of the Ivorian population represented by Gbagbo.

What was to come was foreseen by the then U.S. ambassador in Côte d’Ivoire, Wanda L. Nesbitt. In July 2009, she advised the U.S. government:

“It now appears that the Ouaga IV agreement, [the fourth agreement to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement which prescribed that disarmament should precede the elections], is fundamentally an agreement between Blaise Compaore [President of Burkina Faso] and Laurent Gbagbo to share control of the north until after the presidential election, despite the fact that the text calls for the Forces Nouvelles to return control of the north to the government and complete disarmament two months before the election. . . .

“But the 5,000 Forces Nouvelles soldiers who are to be “disarmed” and regrouped into barracks in four key cities in the north and west until a new national army is created, represent a serious military capability that the FAFN [Forces Nouvelles] intends to keep well-trained and in reserve until after the election. The hand-over of administrative power from the FAFN to civilian government authorities is a pre-
the "pre-requisite for elections" predetermined their outcome. The rebel "control" of the north, mentioned by Ambassador Nesbitt, prescribed the outcome of the 2010 presidential election. Similarly, it was the "military capability" of the rebellion, which Ambassador Nesbitt mentioned, that was used to ensure that Ouattara became president of Côte d’Ivoire.

It is little wonder that as the post-election crisis deepened, Laurent Gbagbo would cry out: I was betrayed! At the end of it all, there are many casualties.

One of these is the African Union. The tragic events in Côte d’Ivoire have confirmed the marginalization of the union in its ability to resolve the most important African challenges.

Instead, the AU has asserted the ability of the major powers to intervene to resolve these challenges by using their various capacities to legitimize their actions by persuading the United Nations to authorize their self-serving interventions.

The United Nations is yet another casualty. It has severely undermined its acceptability as a neutral force in the resolution of internal conflicts, such as the one in Côte d’Ivoire. It will now be difficult for the United Nations to convince Africa and the rest of the developing world that it is not a mere instrument in the hands of the world’s major powers. This has confirmed the urgency of the need to restructure the organisation, based on the view that as presently structured the United Nations has no ability to act as a truly democratic representative of its member states.

Thus, in various ways, the events in Côte d’Ivoire could serve as a defining moment in terms of the urgent need to reengineer the system of international relations. They have exposed the reality of the balance and abuse of power in the post-Cold War era, and put paid to the fiction that the major powers respect the rule of law in the conduct of international relations, even as defined by the U.N. Charter, and that, as democrats, they respect the views of the peoples of the world.

We can only hope that Laurent and Simone Gbagbo and the Ivorian people do not continue to suffer as abused and humiliated victims of a global system which, in its interests, while shouting loudly about universal human rights, only seeks to perpetuate the domination of the many by the few who dispose of preponderant political, economic, military and media power.

The perverse and poisonous proceedings that have afflicted Côte d’Ivoire pose the urgent question: How many blatant abuses of power will Africa and the rest of the developing world experience before the vision of a democratic system of global governance is realised?

RESPONSES OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY WILLIAM FITZGERALD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER COONS

**Question.** You mentioned that the State Department is considering lifting restrictions on assistance to Côte d’Ivoire which have been in place since 1999. What additional forms of aid do you hope to provide to Côte d’Ivoire, and what legal restrictions stand in the way?

**Answer.** Currently, direct assistance to the Government of Côte d’Ivoire is limited due to restrictions under section 7008 of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (SPOAA.) These restrictions were imposed following a military coup in December 1999. When these restrictions are lifted, U.S. assistance in Côte d’Ivoire will focus on political reconciliation, economic recovery, and security sector reform initiatives as part of the international effort to support President Ouattara’s outlined plan for governing.

**Question.** As the State Department reviews its policies toward Côte d’Ivoire, what concrete benchmarks will you use to measure the commitment to good governance by the Ouattara government? What steps can President Ouattara take to meet such benchmarks, and how might the ongoing government formation and reconciliation process impact U.S. policy going forward?

**Answer.** An important benchmark for governance will be holding legislative elections in a timely manner, which will help ensure that the Ivoirian Government is representative and responsive. Additionally, following through on President Ouattara’s commitments to cooperate with impartial investigations into the alleged human rights abuses during the post-election period will be an important element of reconciliation and set the tone for good governance moving forward. This includes cooperation with the International Criminal Court’s investigation, as well as the
consideration of any recommendations that may come from the United Nations Commission of Inquiry. We will continue to engage with President Ouattara to ensure that reconciliation and good governance remain top priorities as he makes key decisions about the makeup of his government and future policies.

**Question.** What do you envision as both the U.S. and broader international role in supporting the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process in Cote d'Ivoire? Are we currently providing any form of assistance to the Republican Forces of Cote d'Ivoire (FRCI) and is the State Department considering expanding such assistance in the future? To what degree are you consulting with DOD—especially AFRICOM—on this issue?

**Answer.** In the short term, U.S. and international efforts on DDR will likely be focused on support for the United Nations' DDR programs. In the longer term, as President Ouattara outlines his plans for broad security sector reform, the United States and the international community will play an important role in supporting professionalization, training, and reform of the military, police, and gendarmes. Due to longstanding restrictions on assistance to the Government of Cote d'Ivoire, we are not currently providing any form of assistance to the FRCI. We are working closely with the Department of Defense and AFRICOM, as well as international partners, to explore options for supporting security sector reform should those restrictions be lifted.

**Question.** How do you assess the role of the U.N. Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) over the past 6 months, and what is its projected role going forward? Does it have sufficient financial, logistical, personnel means to fulfill its mandate, and what steps can the United States take to support its efforts?

**Answer.** The United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) played a very important role as a part of the wider international effort to end the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire and to ensure that the results of credible elections were respected. Following former President Gbagbo's use of heavy weaponry against unarmed civilians, the U.N. Security Council called for the UNOCI and French military force Licorne to act under their mandates and take "all necessary measures" to protect civilians under imminent threat, including by neutralizing heavy weapons in and around Abidjan. These operations were critical in preventing further escalation of violence in Abidjan.

UNOCI's current mandate includes provision of logistical and technical support for the legislative elections, and contains a certification role for the Special Representative (SRSG). UNOCI's support for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants from both sides of the conflict will also be an important factor in stabilizing the more volatile regions and creating a safe environment for legislative elections to proceed.

We remain closely engaged with the SRSG in Abidjan and the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations to ensure that UNOCI has the resources it needs to carry out its mandate, and as we consider options for further U.S. assistance in these areas we will ensure that our efforts complement, rather than duplicate, UNOCI's work.

**Question.** Cote d'Ivoire has been on the Global Office of Trafficking in Persons (G/TIP) Tier 2 Watch List for the past 2 years and there is an expectation that it may be downgraded to Tier 3. Understanding that the State Department may not be able to comment in advance of the release of the G/TIP report in June, what are State's plans for reaching out to the Ouattara Ivoirian Government on this issue? Is it possible that prospective sanctions would interfere with U.S. aid for Cote d'Ivoire?

**Answer.** Trafficking in persons remains a key element of our overall engagement with the Government of Cote d'Ivoire, as it was under former President Gbagbo as well. We will press for trafficking in persons and other human rights concerns to be prioritized as the new government is formed and policies are announced. Should Cote d'Ivoire be ranked Tier 3 in the TIP Report, it would potentially be subject to sanctions under the TVPA, which could restrict some forms of U.S. assistance to the country.
Answer. The challenges faced by the Ivoirian Government are many and multi-faceted. The degree to which Cote d'Ivoire forms an effective and legitimate government will determine the sustainability of our humanitarian assistance. Key steps in this process will include creating the conditions for reconciliation, accountability, security sector reform, and economic opportunities.

Ensuring the impact of our assistance will require the new government to avoid the exploitation of religion and ethnicity for political gain. Thus the Government of Cote d'Ivoire will need to promote reconciliation and restore the trust between the state and its citizens, working closely with the country's vibrant business and civil society communities. Broad-based political participation will instill a sense of confidence in the Ivoirian people and create the conditions for unity. The government has done a good job in promoting messages of reconciliation and should continue to build this foundation for peace and prosperity for which Cote d'Ivoire was once known.

Likewise, accountability will play a key role moving Cote d'Ivoire beyond conflict. The nascent Truth and Reconciliation Commission is a forum to address past injustices and transition to an era of respect for human rights and democracy. Prosecution should be based on the extent of rights abuses and done regardless of political affiliation. Individuals that committed human rights abuses from both sides need to be held accountable and brought to justice.

Many of the reported abuses have been committed by the country's security sector. Reforming this sector will be one of the Ivoirian Government's greatest challenges and should be supported. The transformation of the security forces into a trusted institution will ensure long-term stability. Additionally, it will create confidence in the new government that it can provide essential services to regions plagued by violence and impunity.

Cote d'Ivoire was once known as an African success story with a vibrant economy. Its people remain proud and eager to restore this reputation. The cocoa, cotton, and cashew industries have great potential and could again provide jobs for thousands of Ivoirians throughout the country. The ability of these sectors to create economic opportunities will reduce the need for further humanitarian assistance.

Question. Describe the challenges USAID faces in allocating funds in Cote d'Ivoire, especially without a mission on the ground. To what extent might reprogramming be necessary, and how will this impact the scope and amount of requested funds in the next fiscal year?

Answer. USAID's FY 2011 and FY 2012 budget requests for Cote d'Ivoire were limited to health and humanitarian assistance activities, largely as a result of political turmoil and sanctions currently in place. USAID and the State Department are currently reviewing options for assistance and potential funding availability as we craft the FY 2011 operating year budget. Given limited resources, USAID and State will need to be selective in the types of activities initiated in Cote d'Ivoire to ensure that we are fully utilizing our comparative advantage and coordinating our work with other donors.

In lieu of a bilateral mission, USAID programs in Cote d'Ivoire are managed from the West Africa Regional Mission in Accra, Ghana. One full-time Senior Health Officer provides oversight for the portion of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) program managed by USAID. Broader USAID engagement in Cote d'Ivoire will require a reevaluation of management structure and support.

The Africa budget requests for FY 2013 will take into account the current situation in Cote d'Ivoire as well as USAID's regional priorities in Africa.