[Senate Hearing 112-590, Part 7]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-590, Pt. 7
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 3254
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
----------
PART 7
STRATEGIC FORCES
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MARCH 14, 21, 28; APRIL 25, 2012
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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20402-0001
S. Hrg. 112-590 Pt. 7
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 3254
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
__________
PART 7
STRATEGIC FORCES
__________
MARCH 14, 21, 28; APRIL 25, 2012
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Ann E. Sauer, Minority Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
MARK UDALL, Colorado ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK BEGICH, Alaska ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Strategic Forces Programs of the National Nuclear Security
Administration and the Department of Energy's Office of Environmental
Management in Review of the Department of Energy Budget Request for
Fiscal Year 2013
march 14, 2012
Page
D'Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., Ph.D., Administrator, National
Nuclear Security Administration, and Under Secretary for
Nuclear Security, Department of Energy......................... 7
Donald, ADM Kirkland H., USN, Deputy Administrator for Naval
Reactors and Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion, National
Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy.......... 49
Cook, Hon. Donald L., Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs,
National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy. 53
Huizenga, David G., Senior Advisor for Environmental Management,
Office of Environmental Management, Department of Energy....... 55
Military Space Programs
march 21, 2012
Creedon, Hon. Madelyn R., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Global Strategic Affairs....................................... 95
Shelton, Gen. William L., USAF, Commander, Air Force Space
Command........................................................ 100
Formica, LTG Richard P., USA, Commander, U.S. Army Space and
Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command.......... 110
Winokur, Robert S., Director of Oceanography, Space, and Maritime
Domain Awareness, Department of the Navy....................... 117
Zangardi, Dr. John A., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Information Operations, and Space.............................. 123
Chaplain, Cristina T. Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
Management, Government Accountability Office................... 123
Department of Defense Nuclear Forces and Policies
march 28, 2012
Creedon, Hon. Madelyn R., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Global Strategic Affairs....................................... 178
Weber, Hon. Andrew C., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs............. 187
Benedict, RADM Terry J., USN, Director, Strategic Systems
Programs, U.S. Navy............................................ 190
(iii)
Kowalski, Lt. Gen. James M., USAF, Commander, Air Force Global
Strike Command, U.S. Air Force................................. 198
Chambers, Maj. Gen. William A., USAF, Assistant Chief of Staff
for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, U.S. Air
Force.......................................................... 202
Ballistic Missile Defense Policies and Programs
april 25, 2012
Roberts, Bradley H., Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy......................... 239
O'Reilly, LTG Patrick J., USA, Director, Missile Defense Agency.. 246
Formica, LTG Richard P., USA, Commander, U.S. Army Space and
Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command, and
Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated
Missile Defense................................................ 253
Gilmore, Hon. J. Michael Ph.D., Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, Department of Defense.............................. 259
Chaplain, Cristina T., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
Management, Government Accountability Office................... 263
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 14, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
STRATEGIC FORCES PROGRAMS OF THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT IN REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY BUDGET REQUEST FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2013
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:36 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E.
Benjamin Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Nelson and Sessions.
Majority staff member present: Jonathan S. Epstein,
counsel.
Minority staff member present: Daniel A. Lerner,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Hannah I. Lloyd and Brian F.
Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: Ryan Ehly, assistant
to Senator Nelson; Chad Kreikemeier and Lenwood Landrum,
assistants to Senator Sessions; and Charles Brittingham,
assistant to Senator Vitter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, CHAIRMAN
Senator Nelson. Let me call today's hearing to order.
Today's hearing will be on the fiscal year 2013 budget
submission for the defense-related programs at the Department
of Energy (DOE). We'll hear testimony from the Administrator of
the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the
Honorable Thomas P. D'Agostino, who maintains the safety,
reliability, and military utility of our Nation's nuclear
weapons. We'll also hear testimony from the Office of
Environmental Management (EM), whose mission is to clean up
former Cold War nuclear weapons production sites.
I want to thank our witnesses today for taking the time out
of their schedules to testify on these programs, and I of
course want to thank my good friend and ranking member of this
committee. We've worked so well together over the years, having
traveled on congressional delegations and other opportunities
to be together. I want to thank Senator Sessions for all of his
help and support over the years.
In August, we passed the Budget Control Act (BCA), which
set a 10-year ceiling on the defense and non-defense portions
of our discretionary budget. For the Department of Defense
(DOD) relative to the 2012 baseline, that translates to a $259
billion reduction in the 5-year budget window from 2013 to
2017, with a growth of about 1 percent annually.
DOD made hard decisions to meet the reductions under the
act, and likewise I expect similar hard decisions have been
made by NNSA and the Office of EM. This hearing will examine
those decisions.
This hearing will also examine recent findings from the
National Academies from a study we legislated in the fiscal
year 2010 defense authorization bill on the role of NNSA in
managing its laboratories. NNSA has proposed a top-line budget
of $11.5 billion, a 4.9 percent increase over the enacted
fiscal year 2012 levels. Within that budget, the amount to
maintain and modernize our nuclear weapons increased by 5
percent to $7.6 billion, nonproliferation increased by 7.1
percent to $2.5 billion, and the amount for naval reactors
increased by .8 capability to $1.1 billion.
So compared to DOD, I would say NNSA came out a winner. In
terms of the commitment made as a part of the New Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (START) debate, the budget does fall
short, about 4 percent short, of the $7.9 billion as found in
what we refer to as the 1251 report, which is the 10-year
nuclear modernization plan required under section 1251 of the
2010 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
Realistically, given that the 1251 report was submitted to
Congress in November 2010, 9 months before the BCA became law,
falling 4 percent short of the $7.9 billion target is
reasonable, given the fiscal reality facing us today.
The same can be said for the budget of the Office of EM.
Its fiscal year 2013 budget request is $5.65 billion, about 2
percent below last year's enacted level. Now, this office has
some of the most challenging and pressing problems in DOE in
cleaning up millions of gallons of highly radioactive wastes
left behind from 50 years of nuclear weapons production.
While the top-line numbers of the NNSA look good compared
to DOD, there are, however, questionable decisions in its
formulation. Let me go over my five top concerns. First and
foremost is the decision to defer for 5 years the construction
of the replacement for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement (CMRR) facility, building in Los Alamos, first
built in 1952 with a mandate for closing it by 2019 for safety
reasons. This new CMRR facility along with the Uranium
Processing Facility (UPF) at the Oak Ridge Y12 plant, are the
two cornerstones for a modernized nuclear weapons
infrastructure.
The administration agreed to build these facilities as part
of the New START debate. The new CMRR facility was to
facilitate an ability to manufacture, if needed, 50 to 80
plutonium pits per year, which as recently as 2 weeks ago
General Kehler of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) stated was
still a DOD requirement. Without the new CMRR facility, Dr.
McMillan, the Director of Los Alamos, has flatly stated an
inability to meet that requirement.
In its place, NNSA is now looking at spreading out its
plutonium operations to multiple NNSA facilities across the
United States, from Lawrence Livermore in California to the
Savannah River Site in South Carolina, just to be able to
manufacture 20 to 30 pits per year. I hope Dr. D'Agostino and
Don Cook can help me understand how they came to this decision
and whether they believe the proposed alternative strategy is a
sound and final decision.
In this current fiscal environment, deferring anything for
any length of time implies a cancellation to Congress. It just
implies that. So I am pleased that NNSA is proceeding with
replacing the UPF, another Manhattan era facility used for
making the secondaries in our nuclear weapons, but as I
understand it they're increasing its budget by $150 million. It
raises the question: Why couldn't NNSA use this increase to at
least begin construction of the new CMRR facility, perhaps at a
slower pace, but to get the process started? Multi-year
budgeting is very difficult, but it does occur within this
structure.
Second, I understand that the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC)
has given approval to begin the engineering for overhauling the
B61 gravity bomb and I'm eager to hear what NNSA believes are
the major costs and hurdles they face going forward in
combining several variants of this weapon system into one,
which ultimately, as we know, can save costs in its
maintenance.
Third, in order to find funds for the B61 program, NNSA has
slowed down its production of reworked W76 warheads that the
Navy uses in its Ohio-class submarines. In a later hearing, I
hope to explore the implications of this slowdown with the
Navy, but I'm concerned whether it's disrupting the fleet's
overhaul schedule of when the boats come to home port for
installing the rebuilt warheads and whether the Navy will
suffer increased costs and have a risk related to that as a
result.
Fourth, DOD tells us they're delaying the schedule of the
replacement for the Ohio-class submarines by 2 years, with
first construction starting in 2021. This slip has caused a
decrease in the research funds for its reactor by about $31
million in fiscal year 2013. So I would like to know from
Admiral Donald what is the impact of this decrease and what is
your concern on this trend, particularly in fiscal year 2014
and beyond?
Fifth, there are concerns about NNSA governance. The
National Academy of Sciences released report that we referred
to, mandated in the 2010 NDAA, which commented that ``the
relationship between NNSA and its national security
laboratories is becoming dysfunctional.'' NNSA was created in
the 1999 NDAA to give the weapons program independence, but the
original intent of a stand-alone agency only reporting to the
Secretary of Energy now seems lost.
So when you look at the DOE organization chart, it still
resides within the DOE bureaucracy. I'd like to know from Dr.
D'Agostino what his response to the report's findings might be
and what we in Congress can do to help carry out your mission.
Finally, not to let you off the hook--and I'm going to
butcher the word, the name; ``Hue-ZIN-gah,'' am I close?
Mr. Huizenga. Yes.
Senator Nelson. Huizenga. I don't want to let you off the
hook entirely here. The Hanford waste treatment plant had the
honor in January of making the front page of USA Today, as we
all know, with large cost overruns, up to a billion dollars
over the life of the plant, which is currently budgeted at $12
billion and will begin operations in 2019.
The original cost was $5.7 billion, with operations to
begin in 2011. This is the largest and most technically complex
project in DOE, with a mission to retrieve and solidify into
glass logs 53 million gallons of highly radioactive sludge and
liquid waste residing in 177 underground tanks at the Hanford
site. 144 of the tanks are just one layer of carbon steel,
instead of the double-shell construction used today to contain
leakage.
These tanks reside 7 to 12 miles from the Columbia River,
which runs the length of the border between Oregon and
Washington, where about 1.5 million people reside. So I'd like
to know what action you have undertaken since August 2011, that
review to reduce technical risk in the treatment facility and
what efforts are there to resolve workers' concerns about
safety and engineering design.
With that long opening, let me now turn to my good friend,
Senator Sessions, for any opening remarks that he might like to
make.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Chairman Nelson. It's been
such a great pleasure to work with you on this subcommittee.
Your knowledge and experience and judgment on these matters are
invaluable to us, and I really value your judgment.
I share some of the concerns that you've raised. We do have
responsibility to our constituents to challenge the proposals
that are before us to make sure every dollar that we spend is
wisely spent. I've been somewhat uneasy for a number of years
about some of the nuclear programs that NNSA has been involved
in, and we'll continue to raise those as time goes by.
Over the past few years, this subcommittee has heard
testimony from countless experts who have unanimously
recognized the critical need for modernizing our nuclear
weapons complex. We have to do that. Unfortunately and counter
to the bipartisan progress that we have made thus far, NNSA's
fiscal year 2013 budget undermines that progress and the
agreements that were reached, it seems, and jeopardizes the
future viability of the nuclear weapons complex.
This budget incorrectly suggests that the recapitalization
of our nuclear weapons complex is unaffordable and suggests
that we as a Nation cannot afford to modernize in a way that
assures confidence, confidence in competent stewardship.
I disagree with that. Despite our need for fiscal
austerity--and there is a need--shortchanging nuclear
modernization at a time when we face threats and uncertainty
ahead, and they even grow, is simply not acceptable. We must
continue to pursue the robust modernization the experts, such
as the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission, have testified
has been critical to the recapitalization, recapitalizing a
vanishing intellectual base and crumbling infrastructure.
It has been only 1 year since the ratification of New START
and the President has already failed to honor the commitments
in this budget that he made at that time. I don't know exactly
what the amount of money we need, but the amount that was
committed is not provided for in this budget. Senator Kyl, who
worked so hard on that, is deeply disappointed.
I'm prepared to hear testimony that some of the things
could be done for less money, but I'm not prepared to concede
that we should in any way reduce our plans to modernize our
nuclear weapons.
So when first proposed in 2010, both Congress and the
administration agreed that the 10-year nuclear modernization
plan was a matter of national importance and, even with our
dismal fiscal outlook and overwhelming consensus, concluded
that fully funding a comprehensive modernization plan was
essential for the future. Vice President Biden wrote in the
Wall Street Journal in January 2010: ``Over the next 5 years,
we need to boost funding for these important activities by more
than $5 billion. Even in a time of tough budget decisions,
these are investments we must make for our security.''
This plan and these budget decisions were the result of a
lot of study and some bipartisan agreements. They had the full
support of DOD, which even in the face of significant cuts to
DOD was to contribute over $7 billion to NNSA.
As the ranking member of the Senate Budget Committee, I'm
acutely aware of the fiscal challenges that face us. I
appreciate that NNSA is looking for ways to do more with less.
I certainly celebrate that. However, the decision to ignore
critical DOD requirements and to defer the facility at Los
Alamos construction and repair, while also increasing funding
for the multi-billion dollar facility at Y12, is something I'm
not comfortable with at this point.
It perpetuates the status quo mentality that everything
nuclear has to be exceedingly expensive. Some things do, some
things don't. I believe there are smarter and less onerous ways
to affordably recapitalize the nuclear weapons complex and I'm
disappointed not to see any serious proposals for addressing
the out-of-control risk aversion that has ballooned costs.
The NNSA budget favors short-term cost avoidance over
strategy and is based on a number of assumptions that are
contrary to the national security of the United States and its
allies. The budget neglects a standing DOD requirement for a
capability to manufacture between 50 and 80 pits per year and
recklessly presumes that future life extension program (LEP)
plans will be allowed to cannibalize the pits of weapons
currently held in strategic reserve. While the reuse of pits
may be an attractive option, the studies to support its long-
term feasibility have not taken place. Furthermore and most
telling, these decisions are not supported by STRATCOM.
The budget underscores a growing disconnect between DOD and
NNSA. A number of the fiscal year 2013 budget cuts have
prompted our military leadership to question and raise concerns
about NNSA's ability to meet DOD requirements. NNSA's mission
is not just to produce a product; it's to serve a customer, and
the customer are the people charged with the defense of the
United States of America. So I'm uneasy if the customer is not
happy.
NNSA's decisions to ignore Navy requirements and delay the
life extension of the W76 warhead is yet another example.
Finally, the lack of a 5-year budget plan has instilled a
level of uncertainty the 10-year modernization plan and over $7
billion in DOD resources were determined to fix and to prevent.
Every agency is facing unprecedented budget pressures. We
are facing unprecedented budget pressures. We really are. We do
not have the money to do everything that we need to do for this
country. Congress does not fully understand it. I'm not sure
it's understood down to the depths of all of our agencies,
including DOE and DOD. It's just serious. We don't have the
money. That's what Admiral Mullen meant when he said the debt
is the greatest threat to our national security. It could cause
us to make bad decisions with regard to how we defend this
country.
Every agency is facing challenges. However, DOD was able to
maintain its commitment to modernizing the triad of delivery
vehicles with minimal change. NNSA's decision to abandon
cornerstone efforts at the CMRR facility at Los Alamos is
troubling. Further, misplaced priorities like a nearly half a
billion dollar increase to the $5.5 billion request for EM are
unacceptable, given DOE's inability to meet critical national
security requirements. So maybe I'm wrong about that. I'd like
to hear that explained. That's the way our staff calculates an
additional request for $500 million.
The lack of leadership demonstrated in this request is
indicative of the White House attempting to undermine the long-
term requirements in the agreement that was reached as part of
the START Treaty, I am afraid. I know we're short money, but a
serious agreement was made as part of that treaty to ensure
that we modernize our nuclear weapons. That's something that
most of us, I thought virtually all of us, had agreed to, and
we're seeing a major retreat from that in this budget.
The threat, uncertainty, and risk of the international
environment is growing and more nuclear power is coming on
line. The budget before us for NNSA, with misguided cuts, seems
to exacerbate the risk. The fiscal problem before us will not
be solved by degrading our ability to maintain a safe, secure,
and reliable nuclear stockpile.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for letting me express some
concerns. I hope I have overstated the problem, and we'll give
our witnesses a chance to explain.
Senator Nelson. You certainly didn't candy-coat your
opening statement. So we appreciate your candor. Thank you very
much.
At this point, I would like to submit for the record the
opening statement of my colleague and a member of this
subcommittee, Senator Lieberman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lieberman follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman
As I have expressed throughout the course of the Senate Armed
Services Committee's hearings in relation to the fiscal year 2013
defense authorization, I am deeply concerned about the reductions to
our forces and deferment of crucial modernization programs caused by
the constrained budget. We are pursuing these cuts to our national
defense without sufficient reference to the continuing threats and
challenges we face across the globe. I believe we need to consider
steps in the fiscal year 2013 authorization process to mitigate the
risks posed to our national security by these budget cuts.
Our nuclear deterrent remains one of the most crucial aspects of
our national defense. We may aspire to a more secure and peaceful world
free of nuclear weapons but we must live in today's world where nuclear
weapons are an unfortunate requirement for preserving the security of
our country. As long as that is the case, the United States must
maintain a credible deterrent capability. That requires investments in
modernization of our nuclear weapons which have already been deferred
for much of the past two decades. This budget envisions further delays
to key elements of the modernization strategy, including a 2-year life
extension of the B-61 gravity bomb, fielding of the Navy's refurbished
W-76 warhead, and a minimum of a 5-year determent of the construction
of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility
(CMRR-NF) at Los Alamos National Laboratory. These delays, particularly
to the CMRR-NF, raise serious questions about our ability to develop
and sustain the deterrent force envisioned in the 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review. I hope we can work together to identify ways to provide more
funding to NNSA Weapons Activities to change some of the decisions
presented here.
Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, the floor is now yours.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO, Ph.D., ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, AND UNDER SECRETARY
FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. D'Agostino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Nelson,
Ranking Member Sessions. Good afternoon and thank you for
having me here to discuss the President's fiscal year 2013
budget request. Your ongoing support for the men and women of
DOE and NNSA and the work that we do really help us keep
American people safe, help protect our allies, and it really
has enhanced global security.
In February, President Obama released his budget for 2013.
Due in part to the constraints established by the BCA, this is
a time to precisely target our investments. I want to assure
you that NNSA and EM are being thoughtful, pragmatic, and
efficient in how we complete our missions. We have continuously
improved the way we operate and we're committed to doing our
part in this constrained budget environment.
I also want to acknowledge that this is the first time I've
come before you with more than NNSA to discuss. In an effort to
maximize the accomplishments of mission-critical projects and
organize needs more closely with DOE resources, EM and the
Office of Legacy Management (LM) were aligned under my office
last August, August 2011. It's been less than a year since the
realignment and we're already seeing tangible benefits from
working in a more thoughtful and coordinated way.
Still, NNSA and EM have separate budget requests and I'll
talk about both here today. I know that both Don Cook and
Admiral Donald from NNSA and Dave Huizenga from EM are
testifying after I do, but I want to briefly discuss the
President's 2013 request.
For NNSA, the President's request is $11.5 billion, an
increase of $536 million over the fiscal year 2012
appropriation. The request reaffirms our commitment to building
a 21st century nuclear security enterprise through innovative
approaches to some of our greatest nuclear security challenges
and key investments in our infrastructure. As Dr. Cook will
detail for you, we're continuing our critical work to maintain
the Nation's nuclear stockpile and ensuring that as long as
nuclear weapons exist they are safe, secure, and effective.
The request provides $7.58 billion for the weapons activity
account to implement the President's strategy in coordination
with our partners in DOD.
We're also here this morning to discuss the President's
budget request for NNSA's naval reactors program, as Admiral
Donald will detail for you shortly. NNSA has helped American
sailors reach destinations across the globe safely and reliably
for decades and the $1.1 billion 2013 request will support the
effort on the Ohio-class submarine replacement and modernize
key elements of our infrastructure. I'll leave it to Admiral
Donald to expand on that, but support for the President's
request is key to our ability to support the nuclear Navy.
EM's budget request of $5.65 billion enables the continued
safe cleanup of environmental legacy brought out from 5 decades
of nuclear weapons development and government-sponsored nuclear
energy research. EM's cleanup priorities are based on risk,
while continuing to meet the regulatory compliance commitments.
Completing cleanup protects human health and the environment of
communities surrounding our cities and sites--excuse me--
surrounding sites, and enables other crucial DOE missions to
continue.
By reducing the cleanup footprint, EM is lowering the cost
of security, lowering costs of surveillance, infrastructure,
and overhead activities that would otherwise continue for
decades.
A core value of EM is safety, which is incorporated into
every aspect of the EM program, and the EM program has
maintained a strong safety record, continually striving for a
workplace free of accidents or incidents, and promotes a robust
safety culture throughout our enterprise.
NNSA, EM, and the Office of LM have many uniquely different
challenges and each remains and operates separately. However,
they also have some similar challenges and EM and LM's
realignment under my role as the Under Secretary for Nuclear
Security has allowed us to capitalize on the expertise that
exists between the various programs in this portfolio, in areas
such as project management, nuclear materials, and waste,
nuclear safety and security. We've already seen the benefits of
this realignment.
For example, at the Savannah River Site, EM and NNSA are
working very closely together to fully utilize the H Canyon
Facility and support multiple missions, including converting
about 3.7 metric tons of plutonium into suitable feed for
NNSA's Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility, removing
contaminants in the plutonium to make it amenable for use as
MOX feed, and reducing the amount of plutonium that EM needs to
package and send to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for
disposal. These activities will occur in addition to EM
utilizing H Canyon to disposition spent nuclear fuel in H
Canyon that is not suitable for extended storage in the L
Basin.
At Oak Ridge, we're working together across our programs in
order to accelerate the transfer of certain components of the
uranium-233 inventory at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory that
are valuable for national security applications from EM to
NNSA. The transfer of this material will support ongoing NNSA
missions related to safety, nuclear emergency response, and
special nuclear material measurement and detection. This
initiative will result in significant cost savings to the EM
program and enable EM to move forward on cleanup of nuclear
facilities.
EM has also established a partnership with NNSA to build
upon the success in NNSA with the supply chain management
center, in other words managing the way we procure our
components and commodity products by leveraging our buying
power across the combined EM and NNSA complexes for commonly
used goods and services with the objective of realizing cost
savings for the EM program similar to the cost savings achieved
in NNSA. These cost savings have well exceeded the $300 million
mark.
In addition, NNSA is also working closely with LM to
benchmark long-term surveillance and maintenance costs. Large
closed sites with ongoing groundwater issues such as Fernault,
Rocky Flats, Weldon Springs, Tuba City, and Mound may have
post-closure requirements similar to some of the Savannah River
Site facilities. So we're learning from each other by comparing
scope and costs to refine our estimates.
I'm proud of what we've been able to accomplish so far and
I'm excited about what we'll accomplish next. We're dedicated
to achieving the President's nuclear security objectives,
continuously improving the way we do business, and doing our
part in this tough fiscal environment.
Thank you again for having me today and I'll be happy to
answer any questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. D'Agostino follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Thomas P. D'Agostino
introduction
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, members of the
subcommittee, good morning and thank you for having me here to discuss
the President's fiscal year 2013 budget request. Your ongoing support
for the men and women of the Department of Energy and the work they do,
and your bi-partisan leadership on some of the most challenging
national security issues of our time, has helped keep the American
people safe, helped protect our allies, and enhanced global security.
Earlier this month, President Obama released his budget for fiscal
year 2013. Due in part to the constraints established by the Budget
Control Act, this is a time to precisely target our investments. I want
to assure you that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
and the Office of Environmental Management (EM) are being thoughtful,
pragmatic, and efficient in how we complete our missions.
improving through realignment
First, I want to acknowledge that this is the first time I have
come before you with more than NNSA to discuss. In an effort to
maximize the accomplishments of mission-critical projects and organize
needs more closely with DOE's resources, EM and the Office of Legacy
Management (LM) were aligned under my office in August 2011.
NNSA and each office have uniquely different challenges, and each
remains and operates separately. However, they also have some similar
challenges, and EM and LM's realignment under my role as the Under
Secretary for Nuclear Security has allowed us to capitalize on the
expertise that exists between the various programs in this portfolio in
areas such as project management, nuclear materials and waste, and
nuclear safety and security. We have already seen the benefits from
this realignment.
At Savannah River Site, EM and NNSA are working closely together to
utilize the H-Canyon facility and support multiple missions including:
converting about 3.7 metric tons of plutonium into suitable feed for
NNSA's Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) Fabrication Facility; removing
contaminants in the plutonium to make it amenable for use as MOX feed;
and reducing the amount of plutonium that EM needs to package and send
to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant for disposal. These activities will
occur in addition to EM utilizing H-Canyon to disposition spent (used)
nuclear fuel in H-Canyon that is not suitable for extended storage in
L-Basin.
At Oak Ridge, we are working together to accelerate the transfer of
certain components of the Uranium-233 inventory at Oak Ridge National
Laboratory that are valuable for national security applications from EM
to NNSA. The transfer of this material will support ongoing NNSA
missions related to safety, nuclear emergency response, and special
nuclear material measurement and detection. This initiative will result
in cost savings for the EM program and enable EM to move forward on
cleanup of nuclear facilities.
EM has established a partnership with NNSA to build upon their
success with the Supply Chain Management Center, leveraging buying
power across the combined EM and NNSA complexes for commonly used goods
and services with the objective of realizing cost savings for the EM
program similar to those NNSA has achieved.
In addition, NNSA is also working closely with LM to benchmark
long-term surveillance and maintenance costs. Large closed sites with
ongoing groundwater issues, such as Fernald, Rocky Flats, Weldon
Spring, Tuba City, and Mound, may have post-closure requirements
similar to some of the Savannah River facilities, so we are learning
from each other by comparing scope and cost to refine our estimates.
It has been less than a year since the realignment, and we are
already seeing tangible benefits from working in a more thoughtful,
coordinated way. Still, NNSA and EM have separate budget requests, and
I'll talk about both here today.
nnsa: achieving the president's nuclear security objectives, shaping
the future
In April 2009 in Prague, President Obama shared his vision for a
world without nuclear weapons, free from the threat of nuclear
terrorism, and united in our approach toward shared nuclear security
goals. The President's fiscal year 2013 request for NNSA is $11.5
billion, an increase of $536 million, or 4.9 percent, over the fiscal
year 2012 appropriation. The request reaffirms the national commitment
to his vision, applying world-class science that addresses our Nation's
greatest nuclear security challenges and building NNSA's 21st century
nuclear security enterprise through key investments in our people and
infrastructure, including the revitalization of our existing
facilities.
We are doing this in a number of key ways. We are continuing our
critical work to maintain the Nation's nuclear stockpile, and ensuring
that, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the stockpile is safe, secure,
and effective. The fiscal year 2013 budget provides $7.58 billion for
our Weapons Activities account, an increase of 5 percent over fiscal
year 2012, to implement the President's strategy in coordination with
our partners at the Department of Defense.
The President continues to support our life extension programs
(LEP) including funding for B61-12 activities in response to the
Nuclear Weapons Council's (NWC) anticipated approval and entry into
Phase 6.3 Development Engineering. He has also requested increased
funding for our Stockpile Systems to support the W78 and W88 life
extension study, which I discussed with you last year.
The President's budget also reflects his commitment to completing
key dismantlements, with $51.3 million requested in fiscal year 2013 to
continue reducing the number of legacy nuclear weapons retired from the
stockpile. NNSA has previously committed to completing the
dismantlement of all warheads retired as of fiscal year 2009 by fiscal
year 2022, and we continue to be on a path to do that. In fact, in
fiscal year 2011, NNSA completed the dismantlement of the last B53
nuclear bomb, one of the largest ever built, ahead of schedule and
under budget. We also eliminated the last components of the W70 warhead
which was originally in the U.S. Army's arsenal.
Our request for investments in the science, technology, and
engineering that support NNSA's missions will ensure that our national
security laboratories continue to lead the world in advanced scientific
capabilities. $150.6 million is requested for our engineering campaign,
which reflects the need for validation-related testing and surety
options required for current and future refurbishments; $350.1 million
is requested for our science campaign, expanding and refining our
experiments and capabilities, which coupled to simulation, improves our
confidence in and broadens the national security application of our
predictive capabilities; and $460 million is requested for our inertial
confinement fusion and high yield campaign, to operate NNSA's suite of
world-leading high energy density facilities--National Ignition
Facility (NIF), Omega, and Z--to support stockpile stewardship in a
safe and secure manner.
The Advanced Simulation and Computing campaign's request of $600
million is requested for the continued improvement of full system
calculations and metric suites that are essential to annual assessments
and also to future stockpile changes. Our capabilities directly impact
our stockpile by generating incredibly sophisticated models against
which we can validate our nuclear weapons codes. Not only has
supercomputing helped us solve some existing questions such as energy
balance, it also allows us to plan for issues that impact the future
health of our deterrent: aging, component lifetimes, and new models for
abnormal and hostile environment certification. Supercomputing is
critical for LEPs and stockpile modernization: the implementation of
various concepts such as reuse and enhanced multipoint safety are only
possible with the power of ASC platforms.
For over a decade, NNSA has been building the science, technology,
and engineering tools and capabilities needed to take care of the
stockpile. We are now entering a time when we will fully utilize these
analytical tools and capabilities towards the mission of maintaining a
safe, secure, and effective stockpile and performing the necessary life
extension work. These capabilities also provide the critical base for
nonproliferation and counterterrorism work, allowing us to apply our
investments to the full scope of our mission.
To support our stockpile and to continue producing the world-class
capabilities we need to modernize our Cold War-era facilities and
maintain the Nation's expertise in uranium processing and plutonium
research. This budget includes $2.24 billion to maintain our
infrastructure, and execute our construction projects.
The President also requests support for infrastructure improvements
necessary to maintain the stockpile well into the future. Major efforts
include extending the life of enduring facilities needed for Directed
Stockpile Work (DSW) and ST&E program requirements, construction of the
Uranium Processing Facility at Y-12, and construction of the TRU Waste
Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Funding will also provide
for the start of construction of the Electrical Infrastructure Upgrades
project at Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories, and
continued construction activities for various projects at Los Alamos
and Sandia National Laboratories, the Y-12 National Security Complex,
and Pantex. The budget request also includes the resources we need to
ensure a comprehensive physical and cyber security posture that
provides strong security to support NNSA missions--protecting our
nuclear materials, facilities, and information.
However, our nuclear deterrent is only one part of NNSA's mission.
Our nonproliferation programs perform an equally critical function. One
of our most important missions has been to support the administration's
commitment to secure the most vulnerable nuclear material across the
globe in 4 years. Our accomplishments in securing plutonium and highly
enriched uranium around the world have made it significantly more
difficult to acquire and traffic the materials required to make an
improvised nuclear device, and I am proud to say that we are on track
to meet our goals to remove or dispose of 4,353 kilograms of highly
enriched uranium and plutonium in foreign countries, and equip
approximately 229 buildings containing weapons-usable material with
state-of-the-art security upgrades.
The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget request provides the
$2.46 billion to continue these and other critical nonproliferation and
nuclear security efforts. Our continued focus on innovative and
ambitious nonproliferation and nuclear security efforts is vital. The
threat is not gone, and the consequences of nuclear terrorism and state
proliferation would be devastating. Detonation of a nuclear device
anywhere in the world would lead to significant loss of life, and
overwhelming economic, political, and psychological consequences. We
must remain committed to reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism and
state-based proliferation.
The fiscal year 2013 budget request also gives us the resources we
need to maintain our one-of-a-kind emergency response capabilities,
which allow us to respond to a nuclear or radiological incidents
anywhere in the world. In fiscal year 2011, we were able to assist the
U.S. military, military families, and the Japanese people by deploying
our unique emergency response assets in the aftermath of devastating
tsunami that affected the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.
In response to the President's concern regarding the threat of
nuclear terrorism, which is also a key goal within the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review, we have established a new organization that is now the
focal point for all counterterrorism and counter proliferation
activities within NNSA. This organization, the Office of
Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation, not only provides unique
technical contributions based on NNSA's core nuclear science and
technology expertise, but also is designed to coordinate all nuclear
counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and post-detonation nuclear
forensics related efforts without drastic restructuring.
In addition, NNSA's Naval Reactors program directly supports all
aspects of the U.S. Navy's nuclear fleet, which encompasses the Navy's
submarines and aircraft carriers, over 40 percent of the U.S. Navy's
major combatants. Currently, the nuclear fleet is composed of 54 attack
submarines, 14 ballistic missile submarines, 4 guided missile
submarines, and 11 aircraft carriers. Over 8,300 nuclear-trained Navy
personnel safely operate the propulsion plants on these ships all over
the world, and their consistent forward presence protects our national
interests. Our $1.1 billion fiscal year 2013 request will support the
refueling overhaul for the S8G Land-based Prototype reactor, the design
of the Ohio Replacement reactor plant, and recapitalization of our
naval spent nuclear fuel infrastructure.
Each of the projects is critical to fulfillment of the Navy's
longer term needs. The S8G Land-based Prototype Refueling Overhaul
reactor plant has served Naval Reactors' needs for research,
development, and training since 1978, and the reactor provides a cost-
effective testing platform for new technologies and components before
they are introduced. To continue vital research capabilities, as well
as train sufficient operators to man the Fleet, the S8G Land-based
Prototype Refueling Overhaul must begin in 2018. The Ohio Replacement
reactor plant design continues and the fiscal year 2013 requested
amount supports continuing this work to meet the Navy's revised
schedule and procurement of reactor plant components in 2019 (to
support a 2021 lead-ship procurement). We need to recapitalize its
naval spent fuel infrastructure in a cost-effective way that does not
impede the refueling of active ships and their return to operations.
The existing facility is more than 50 years old, and was never designed
for its current primary mission of packaging naval spent nuclear fuel
for permanent dry storage.
Finally, $411 million is requested for NNSA's Office of the
Administrator account. This funds Federal personnel and provides for
resources necessary to plan, manage, and oversee the operation of NNSA
missions which strengthen U.S. security.
nnsa: doing our part
We are committed to being responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars.
We have taken steps to ensure that we are building a capabilities-based
enterprise focused on needs and solutions. We view this constrained
budget environment as an additional incentive to ask ourselves how we
can re-think the way we are operating, how we can innovate, and how we
can get better.
For example, in close consultation with our national laboratories
and national security sites, we are adjusting our plutonium strategy by
deferring for at least 5 years construction of the Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) project at
Los Alamos National Laboratory and focusing instead on how we can meet
our plutonium needs on an interim basis by using the capabilities and
expertise found at existing facilities. Utilizing existing facilities
will allow us to meet anticipated near term requirements for plutonium
operations while focusing on other key modernization projects.
Deferring CMRR-NF will have an estimated cost avoidance from 2013 to
2017 that totals approximately $1.8 billion, which will help offset the
costs of other priorities such as Weapons Lifetime Extension programs
and other infrastructure needs.
We have also updated our strategy to stop the spread of dangerous
nuclear material as we meet the President's 4-year lockdown goal. We
have developed an innovative approach to scientist engagement tailored
for an age when knowledge spreads effortlessly through Google,
Facebook, and Twitter.
We are not resting on old ideas to solve tomorrow's problems--we're
shaping the future of nuclear security, and we're doing it in a
fiscally responsible way. However, I want to stress that as we make
adjustments and look toward the future, our plans are based on the
fiscal year 2013 budget request, which give us the resources we need to
carry out our mission. Budget uncertainty adds cost and complexity to
how we achieve our goals. You have been supportive of our efforts in
the past, I ask again for your help in providing the stability we need
to do our jobs efficiently and effectively.
nnsa: continuously improving
I would like to acknowledge that I have come before you in the past
and talked at length about how NNSA has been working to change the way
we do business. I am proud of the work the men and women of our NNSA
have done to come together and operate as one. We are defining
ourselves as a fully integrated enterprise that operates efficiently,
is organized to succeed, that performs our work seamlessly, and speaks
with one voice.
We are improving everywhere, from our governance model to our
network infrastructure, from our contracting processes to leadership
and development programs. We are improving business processes by
implementing the ISO 9001 standard, looking toward the future through a
workforce analysis, and improving efficiency through consolidated
contracts.
We are continuously improving so we are able to do the work the
American people need us to do, in a time when everyone is looking to do
more with less. We are positioning ourselves for the next decade by
making big decisions focused on the future.
For example, after more than 2 years of analysis and outside
reviews, we released an RFP for the combined management of the Y-12
National Security Complex and Pantex Plant, with an option for phase-in
of Tritium Operations performed at the Savannah River Site. Combining
contracts and site offices will allow us to improve performance, reduce
the cost of work, and operate as an integrated enterprise. We also
decided to compete the contract for management and operation of Sandia
National Laboratories, a move designed to find meaningful improvement
in performance and reduce cost for taxpayers.
We have taken other significant steps to continue improving, from
top-to-bottom. We created an Acquisition and Project Management
organization to help institutionalize our commitment to improving the
way we do business. This move will improve the quality of our work
while keeping our projects on time and on budget.
We awarded a Blanket Purchasing Agreement for Enterprise
Construction Management Services. The BPA will standardize our approach
to project management across the enterprise and provide subject matter
experts to provide independent analysis and advice related to the
design and construction of facilities.
Importantly, we have institutionalized a culture of safety. Through
a unique series of Biennial Reviews, including reviews at Headquarters,
we have improved nuclear safety across our Nuclear Security Enterprise.
We have provided objective, value-added information to managers that
ensure our nuclear safety oversight is consistent and effective. Since
the reviews began in 2005, we have seen continuous improvement at every
site.
environmental management
The Senior Advisor for the Office of Environmental Management will
provide more detail to you through separate testimony, but I want to
note that EM's fiscal year 2013 budget request of $5.65 billion enables
the continued safe cleanup of the environmental legacy brought about
from five decades of nuclear weapons development and government-
sponsored nuclear energy research. EM's cleanup priorities are based on
risk while continuing to meet regulatory compliance commitments.
Completing cleanup protects human health and the environment of the
communities surrounding our sites and enables other crucial DOE
missions to continue. By reducing the cleanup footprint, EM is lowering
the cost of security, surveillance, infrastructure, and overhead
activities that would otherwise continue for years to come. A core
value of EM is safety, which is incorporated into every aspect of the
EM program. EM has maintained a strong safety record, continuously
strives for a workplace free of accidents or incidents, and promotes a
robust safety culture throughout the complex.
conclusion
Our mission is vital, and your past support has been key in helping
us accomplish it. The fiscal year 2013 budget reflects our commitment
to keeping the American people safe while continuously improving and
doing our part in a time of fiscal austerity. We are looking toward the
future and building an organization that is aligned to succeed. I look
forward to working with each of you to help us do that. Thank you.
Senator Nelson. The fiscal year 2013 budget submission, as
I indicated in my opening statement, for the weapons program,
didn't contain a 5-year projection, and in some cases where it
did, such as for naval reactors or nonproliferation, it simply
indexed out the out-years--indexed the out-years by inflation,
making it impossible to satisfy the modernization report which
was required under section 1043 of last year's defense
authorization. Can you give us some idea of how this happened
or how this would be consistent with what we were seeking a
year ago?
Mr. D'Agostino. Absolutely. The fiscal year 2012
appropriation came through in December of last year, just
basically a month before budgets were to be locked down. That,
in addition to what we've discussed already in our statements
about the BCA out-year commitments, put us in a situation that
is documented in the President's budget itself, that the out-
year numbers in essence are a placeholder to reflect
essentially the limits imposed by the BCA, giving us time to
work with our DOD partners in order to work on the details of
the out-years, the details of the out-years associated with
making sure that we can fully support the LEPs as we've laid
out and requested in this budget, making sure that we can
follow through on our commitments on infrastructure
improvements for both UPF, the High Explosive Pressing
Facility, and continue to do our plutonium capabilities.
The details of how the out-years will look is being worked
on. We have a joint team with DOD to look at this, and there's
a lot of concern, of course. I know, I recognize that both
Departments, the NNSA and DOD having some challenges. Of
course, we have challenges. We have a very significant fiscal
environment and we have a tremendous amount of work to do. But
that's why we're working together on the same team in order to
make sure that these out-years are well-identified and laid
out.
We expect to have an update to what's now called the 1043
report, essentially which lays out those out-years. We expect
to have that update report done jointly by DOD and NNSA later
this year.
Senator Nelson. When you say later, do you have some idea
about how much later?
Mr. D'Agostino. I know the teams are working to get
essentially agreement some time this summer. The question would
be exactly how much detail we put into it. We want the detail
because, of course, we need it to get that fiscal year 2014
budget built. That's the key budget and out-years that we want
to make sure that we're all on the same page. We're together on
fiscal year 2013. We're working the out-years together and we
want to get this completed because we know we have a commitment
to Congress in order to give you the 1043 report.
Senator Nelson. In the report, you're deferring the
construction of the CMRR facility, which is a key tenet of the
commitment to the Senate and Congress during the New START
debate. You're adding $150 million to the budget for UPF
instead. My understanding is it may cost $500 million over 5
years for such a deferral, and the director of Los Alamos has
flatly stated that he cannot meet the DOD requirement for 50 to
80 plutonium pits per year. But yet you're proposing instead to
ship plutonium all across the United States as an alternative.
Just how committed--how committed can we feel to this
alternate plutonium strategy if during the course of
congressional investigation it's determined that it's just too
costly and makes no practical sense to engage in it? Once the
cost is known, it could very easily exceed the capabilities to
cover it.
Mr. D'Agostino. We're deeply committed to ensuring that the
Nation has the plutonium capability it needs to do the job, do
the job to support the nuclear weapons stockpile, do the job in
order to do the nuclear forensics for emergency response, and
do the job that we know needs to happen in order to satisfy our
nuclear nonproliferation work.
We do have capabilities in our enterprise. We have
capabilities, significant capabilities, at Los Alamos. We have
capabilities at Nevada at the Device Assembly Facility, and we
have capabilities at Lawrence Livermore. What we plan on doing
is making full use of these capabilities. We expect the
deferral for 5 years of the CMRR Nuclear Facility Project, not
the cancellation but the deferral, to defer $1.3 billion of
liability on the government while we fully utilize the
capabilities that we have.
There are a couple of things that have changed from last
year that I think are important to point out, because I do--
it's very fair to ask the question, what's changed in the last
year and why would we go about making this change since it was,
as mentioned. A couple of things have changed. First of all, we
now are implementing what is known as modern dose conversion
factors into the safety basis analysis in our enterprise. What
that allows us to do is use modern, agreed-upon international
standards for safety basis calculations. This in effect has
allowed us to fully utilize the existing brand-new building
that you have authorized and has been appropriated and we have
done, which is the CMRR Radiological Facility.
This just one simple change of using international
standards, using modern international standards, has allowed us
to significantly increase the amount of work we can actually do
in a building that's brand new, that was just built for
plutonium.
The second thing that's changed dramatically since last
year is the laboratory has just done a marvelous job in
reducing the amount of material inside the PF4, which is the
roughly 25-year-old plutonium facility that exists. By reducing
the amount of material significantly, this allows us to
essentially--this was one of the key elements of the nuclear
facility, to build a very large plutonium vault. The need and
the pressure to build that very large plutonium vault has
decreased. We still need a modern plutonium vault, but what we
can do is really take advantage of the existing vault that the
Nation has right now.
Both of these changes, along with the fact that we have now
new insight into our fiscal year 2012 appropriation, which is
over $400 million less than what we needed to do the job, and
we have the BCA out-year limitations which put additional
pressure, caused us to look, take a fresh new look at how we do
business, not just programmatically, but also internally on how
we do business.
I recognize you may have more questions on that, so I'll
stop.
Senator Nelson. My time has expired, but was the decision
to try to find more effective ways of space utilization driven
by trying to control costs or was it just on its face making
sense to utilize the space better? Sometimes the costs can
drive it. What we don't want to see is costs driving us into a
less than excellent way of handling this project.
Mr. D'Agostino. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. It's driven by a
couple of things. Primarily it's driven by our recognition with
DOD that we have a tremendous amount of real work that we have
to do on the stockpile. That's number one. Given the fact that
we have this tremendous pressure on us, it has caused us to
look at all of our business lines with increased scrutiny.
That's my obligation to you, sir, and it's my obligation to the
taxpayers, it's my obligation to the Secretary and the
President, to go look at these things in a way that makes sure
that we are capitalizing on what we currently have from a
capabilities standpoint--that's the most important thing,
having a plutonium capability to take care of the stockpile. I
am convinced--and Don Cook can describe the work that he's
specifically doing with the laboratory--that it's important to
continue the work on the stockpile itself, particularly the
life extension on the B61 bomb and the studies in order to get
these things done, instead of just saying that we would build a
large facility.
We want to exercise our scientists and engineers at our
laboratories. It's like exercise, it's good, it's good for our
brain and our brains are at the laboratories where they do the
work for us.
Senator Nelson. Okay, thank you.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
I would just say if you can make a proposal that shows that
you can do the work without a multi-billion dollar new
building, I'd be interested in hearing it. Perhaps you could.
Everybody would like a new building and sometimes you really
could use one. Sometimes you could use one, but you can't
afford one.
But we do have a mission we can't afford to miss, the
mission of modernizing our nuclear facilities.
Mr. D'Agostino, how many facilities are there directly
involved in the nuclear manufacture and modernization effort?
Mr. D'Agostino. I want to make sure I understand your
question correctly, Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. You can define it as you'd like maybe.
Mr. D'Agostino. Okay.
Senator Sessions. What do you think would be relevant to my
question?
Mr. D'Agostino. I think we have a real concern on uranium
production and manufacture.
Senator Sessions. I just asked how many are there.
Mr. D'Agostino. Oh, how many facilities are there involved?
Senator Sessions. Yes.
Mr. D'Agostino. In order to take care of our stockpile?
Senator Sessions. Right.
Mr. D'Agostino. Hundreds of facilities, sir.
Senator Sessions. What about the manufacture and
maintenance of them, the core labs and all that are involved?
You can see where I'm going. My question is, we're having a
base realignment and closure (BRAC). Probably we're looking at
another BRAC, and I'm wondering if there could be savings from
some consolidation for efficiency purposes in our historic
operations.
Mr. D'Agostino. We've looked at this question. I think it's
a great question to ask, and I'll give you the insight of the
analysis we have done over the last couple of years here.
Senator Sessions. Briefly.
Mr. D'Agostino. Okay, absolutely. The most important thing
for us is to maintain capabilities in all the disciplines that
we need to take care of the assessment of the stockpile. So we
look at where all of those capabilities exist around our whole
enterprise, and we've consolidated those particular
capabilities. So we've BRAC'ed along not geographic bounds, but
BRAC'ed along functional areas.
So we've decided that it's better to have one area in the
country to do uranium work, one area in the country where we
press large sizes of high explosives, one area in the country
where we do environmental testing on our stockpile itself. What
that's allowed us to do is consolidate nuclear material, save
money on security costs, and focus our investments so that we
don't at the same time we're building a high explosive press at
the Pantex facility, we don't rebuild the high explosive
pressing capability that exists at Los Alamos, that existed for
many decades during the Cold War.
So we are BRAC'ing along these functional areas: high
explosives, uranium, plutonium.
Senator Sessions. You're doing that as you would like to
reorganize, whereas in BRAC an independent commission
ultimately tells DOD or recommends to Congress how to do that,
and of course takes inputs from the agency, the department
that's affected.
With regard to the current situation, you don't disagree,
do you, that the budget you have does not meet the necessary
DOD requirements?
Mr. D'Agostino. I agree that the budget that we have before
us meets the needs that we've laid out and with DOD on working
on the B61, taking care of the W78 and the W76 warheads.
Senator Sessions. But they're not hampered--they don't
believe that it fully meets their requirements, isn't that
correct?
Mr. D'Agostino. It depends on who the ``they'' are, sir.
Senator Sessions. Your customer is the one you need to keep
happy.
Mr. D'Agostino. Absolutely.
Senator Sessions. So do you dispute that? As presently
configured, the amount of money and the plans that you have to
spend it don't meet the requirements that DOD has said they
need to be met.
Mr. D'Agostino. The NWC, which represents the strategic
commander, represents the Under Secretary for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics in DOD, the Under Secretary for
Policy, and the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, agree that the President's budget that we've
submitted addresses what needs to be done, and--I have to add
the ``and'' here because I think it's an important piece of
this--and that DOE and DOD need to work together, which we are
doing, to study the out-year concerns and making sure that we
get the out-years right.
Those are the requirements that we have before us and this
budget actually does that.
Senator Sessions. Is it true that this budget would result
in a 2-year delay of the B61 LEP, moving the first production
unit from 2017 to 2019?
Just yes or no? Does it do that? 2017 is what DOD said they
needed, did they not?
Mr. D'Agostino. No, DOD supports the fiscal year 2013
budget, which says 2019.
Senator Sessions. Is it true that this budget would delay
the completion of the W76 LEP by 4 years and that the Navy in
response has publicly expressed concern over that?
Mr. D'Agostino. It's true that this budget accurately shows
that we have an adjustment in our W76 production rate in order
to meet the Navy's operational requirements. I don't keep track
of what every Navy person says publicly, but I'm former Navy,
so I believe I can say that. But at the same time, we have a
program and budget that is supported by the NWC.
Senator Sessions. When you get to the last lick and the
things are up before them and they have to sign off sometimes,
I'm not sure that it's a matter of anything other than
basically no choice.
Is it true that this budget would delay the previously
agreed to schedule for the W78-88 LEP by 3 years to 2023?
Mr. D'Agostino. It's true that the budget that we have
before us causes us to relook at the W78 cycle. These three
items, the W78-88 study, the W76 production rate specifically,
and the out-years associated with that are a part of the study
that we're doing with DOD on our out-year program.
Senator Sessions. Is it true that the budget did not
provide the resources necessary to meet the DOD requirement for
developing a pit production capacity and capability of up to a
minimum of 50 to 80 pits per year in 2022?
Mr. D'Agostino. This budget proposes a deferral of the
CMRR, which is a 5-year deferral of the 50 to 80 requirement
that you mention.
Senator Sessions. That would be to 2027 from 2022?
Mr. D'Agostino. The deferral has to do with the CMRR, would
have to do, depending on when the CMRR Nuclear Facility starts
construction.
Senator Sessions. According to the OMB budget tables, over
the next 10 years DOD will transfer $7.1 billion in budget
authority to NNSA in support of the memorandum of agreement
that was signed in May 2010 dealing with stockpile
modernization and the CMRR. Given that the NNSA budget no
longer meets the terms of the DOD-DOE agreement, does NNSA
intend to return the money back to DOD?
Mr. D'Agostino. Given the fact that we've received
significantly less appropriation by Congress in fiscal year
2012, over $400 million, it's very difficult to recover from
that kind of an adjustment.
Senator Sessions. You've told us these cuts, you're okay
with them, everybody's fine, there's no problem with these
cuts.
Mr. D'Agostino. Senator, I said we have significant----
Senator Sessions. I'm showing you that you're delaying the
plans significantly in critical function after critical
function. You say everything's okay, everybody signed off on
it. But we had an agreement at the time the START thing was
done. Senator Kyl executed it. I don't think it's being met. I
think it's being missed, and we need to have a conversation
that's connected to reality.
The reality is that things have slipped significantly from
what we thought we were heading toward. Isn't that true?
Mr. D'Agostino. Senator, with great respect, the reality
also is true that NNSA was appropriated more than $400 million
less than what we needed to do the job, and that you cannot
jump back on the saddle. The President has been very clear for
the last 2 years in this commitment. We've put forth and
requested 10 percent increases to this particular program. The
message we get back is that the environment doesn't exist to
support that kind of an increase. We've gotten 5 percent
increases consistently. Therefore it has caused us to relook at
this program. That's the reality, unfortunately, that I see
from my end. As a result of that, I want to take--we're taking
a clean look, not at the program requirements--we are not
backing down on the LEP, we are not backing down on a very
significant operationally needed infrastructure requirement on
uranium processing. These are absolutely critical. In my view,
this is about what does it take to get the job done to meet the
DOD requirements.
We are working very closely with DOD. I recognize that our
departments, both DOE and DOD, are large departments, but we're
working very closely at the core center to evaluate the out
years situation. We want to solve this problem. We know we can
solve this problem. It will require us to look at governance
changes, of which I have--there are many things we can do in
the governance area, and I can describe some of them.
But that's what we have to do. We have to figure out how to
address and meet the Nation's needs, and I'm committed to that,
for nuclear security----
Senator Sessions. My time is up, but we're all committed,
but we need to understand that the funding is not followed
through to maintain the goals that we'd set. We might as well
be honest about that and put it out here.
I'm saying that if DOE were run by private business I
believe you'd be running more efficiently. That's just my
opinion. I don't know how many buildings we'd have to build. I
don't know how many different facilities we'd have to keep out
there to keep politicians happy. We all like it in our
neighborhood. I'm an offender, too.
But we're at a crisis. We're running out of money and we
need to do this as a core function of government. I do hope
that as we go forward somehow we can get DOD and DOE together,
make this occur with the least possible cost.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Let me ask the question this way. Is it your opinion that,
even though you're now walking away from, let's say, new
construction, that what you're doing will not adversely impact
the core function that we have of dealing with our nuclear
warheads and the other structural requirements for those?
In other words, I thought we were going to have to have a
new building because it was going to take the new building as a
new--as something that is required to meet those functions.
Now, I'm certainly not going to criticize you for finding other
ways of doing it. As a matter of fact, I praise somebody that
finds a cheaper way of doing the same thing to get the same
result. But I think what the fear is that we don't get the same
result here because we don't have enough money in the budget
and we're patching rather than building. I don't know. That's
the concern I think my colleague has and, frankly, I have it,
too.
Mr. D'Agostino. Mr. Chairman, there's a term called ``risk
management'' that we use. Sometimes we throw it around blandly,
if you will. But this is something we looked at very closely.
Dr. Cook has worked with the laboratory on this idea of
deferral of the CMRR, about looking at what capabilities exist
across our enterprise in order to ensure that we are accepting
the right amount of risk in order to meet the Nation's needs.
We're confident that a 5-year deferral is not going to
impact our ability to take care of our stockpile. It will
continue in our ability to do the material characterization and
analytical chemistry work that we need to do to take care of
the stockpile. The Nation will need ultimately a replacement
capability because we have a 30-year-old facility right next
door that's part of our manufacturing facility, we have a 50,
close to 60-year-old facility that's doing the material
characterization and analytical chemistry work that we have
right now. But we're going to get out of that 60-year-old
facility and we're going to use the new part of CMRR that's
actually built and done, with the changes that I have
personally signed up to on using these modern safety codes, in
order to allow us to ramp up the amount of work that actually
can happen in this radiological facility.
That change alone has meant a lot to both laboratory
directors, because they now know that they're in the business;
they can do more with the facilities that they have this year
and out in the future than they could have done last year. That
buys down a lot of the risk.
Senator Nelson. Let's see. The fiscal year 2010 defense
bill asked the National Academy of Sciences to examine how
effectively NNSA was managing the quality of science and
engineering at the national laboratories. I know you're
familiar with this report and its findings. In the second
report to Congress on the organization and operation of NNSA,
dated February 25, 2002, Administrator Gordon laid out a very
basic principle on the NNSA governance, stating: ``Federal
employees, with contractor input, will establish broad program
objectives and goals. Contractors, in consultation with Federal
employees, will be given the flexibility to execute programs
efficiently and will be held accountable for meeting those
goals and objectives.''
He further went on to say: ``NNSA will develop and
implement a simpler, less adversarial contracting model that
capitalizes on private sector expertise and experience of its
contractors, while simultaneously increasing the
accountability, with high performance and responsiveness.''
Now, the 2002 report sounds like today. Do you think that
NNSA today is meeting those original goals laid out by
Administrator Gordon?
Mr. D'Agostino. We've met some of them. We haven't met all
of them, and our commitment is to meet all of those particular
goals. If I could talk about, just for a second about the
National Academy of Sciences report. One of the first
recommendations of the report had to do with it reaffirmed
essentially our vision to take a look at these, what previously
had been called nuclear weapons laboratories, and we
conscientiously said these are national security laboratories,
these are laboratories that take care of a broad range of
national security needs, not just in DOE, but also in the DOD,
Intelligence Community, and Department of Homeland Security.
So we reaffirmed our commitment and the actions we were
taking on that front, as well as to encourage more laboratory-
directed research and development and work for all those
activities.
On the particular point you raised, what we have decided to
do, working together with our laboratories, we meet on a
regular basis. I think it comes down to probably three core
things. One is the directives, the DOE directives and the
directives we as Federal employees need in order to manage our
contracts and make sure that the taxpayer gets what it needs.
The second is trust, to build and maintain a level of trust
between our organizations. The third is a level and a
consistency in governance.
On the directives side, DOE and NNSA have separately, but
it overlaps, taken a strong look at directives. If I could just
give one example, in security, if one takes a look at the
security budget request over the last 3 years, our security
request has gone down significantly, over 10 percent in our
security area. That's due to the fact that we've simplified,
clarified our security directives. That's allowed us to save,
essentially reduced our security request from $718 million to
$643 million from fiscal year 2010 to 2011.
That savings, that difference of over $60, $70 million, is
going right back to doing the scientific and programmatic work
that we need to do. Are we going to stop there? We're going to
continue on, because there's more we can do on cleaning up and
simplifying our directives.
On the trust area, we have our laboratory directors. I meet
with our laboratory directors on the phone every week. No
substitutes allowed. We can't have the deputy or the deputy of
the deputy or someone down the line. It's a personal phone
call. We have monthly video calls with the laboratory
directors, as well as the whole enterprise together, both the
Federal and contractor team together, to work out these
problems.
We recognize we have a lot more to do on the governance
side. On the governance side, we've taken action and as
recently as within the past 12 months, to drive efficiencies by
consolidating our contracts between Y12 and Pantex. We've now
established a single site office, Federal site office. Instead
of having two offices, one in Texas and one in Tennessee, we
have an integrated office so that there's no question about a
consistent set of documents and guidance and directives that
are coming out. It makes it easier to ensure that the things
that we talk about, my Principal Deputy Administrator, Ms.
Neile L. Miller, on pushing forward the concept of integrating
as one organization, making sure that actually gets to the
contracting officer that has a day-to-day impact on our
particular laboratory.
The final point--and I recognize time is limited--is that
we've taken a look and we've brought on board--Admiral Donald
was kind enough to allow one of his star performers, Michael
Lemke, to come into, report directly to me, and take a look at
all of our sites and drive consistency in how our Federal site
offices are run, organized, and how they interface with their
functional heads.
Previously the site office work was reporting within the
weapons program itself, and that provides--that makes it a
little bit more difficult for us to drive consistency on
functional operations, like human resources, procurement, and
contracting. Those types of activities drive costs into our
laboratories and plants, and that's a piece that we think is
very ripe for helping out on.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, I respect you and know
that you're committed to doing the right thing.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. I'm pushing you to be aggressive in
making progress. But I think you remember the debate over the
START Treaty, and my colleague Senator Kyl, with whom I worked
very closely, ranking Republican, he was one of the more active
members of that entire effort. He feels that the agreement that
was made in exchange for certain decisions about the START
treaty has been breached and it has not been honored by this
budget.
It seems to me plain that that's correct. Am I wrong? Is
there another way to look at that?
Mr. D'Agostino. I think there's another way to look at it.
I greatly appreciate Senator Kyl's commitment to this mission
area.
Senator Sessions. He's leaving the Senate and his belief is
that one of the critical issues facing America is to get out of
this ``we're not going to do anything about nuclear weapons,
they're all going to go away one day and we don't have to
invest any more money in it,'' and we have to do what experts
have all told us, modernize the weapons systems.
You agree that's a good goal, I trust?
Mr. D'Agostino. Absolutely.
Senator Sessions. That's why it was such a big issue. This
was not a little matter. The wording of the thing was discussed
with the White House in depth.
So I'm asking you, does not this budget break faith with
that commitment?
Mr. D'Agostino. It does not break faith with that
commitment. The President has committed and if the fiscal year
2013 budget is authorized and appropriated as proposed there
will be a 20 percent increase in essentially a 2-year period of
time, or a 3-year period of time, to our program. This is a
significant increase by any measure in a very complicated area.
Senator Sessions. I'm not saying did you have an increase
or not. I'm asking if it met the agreement that was entered
into at that time.
Mr. D'Agostino. It met the agreement in order to take care
of the stockpile and recapitalize our enterprise. We have, of
course, as we've discussed, deferred the plutonium facility for
the reasons that I've identified, and that is a prudent risk
management approach, given that the laboratory directors and I
had actually talked about this before the budget was released,
that if faced with challenges the priority is work actually on
the stockpile itself. That is why we're going forward with the
fiscal year 2013 budget as proposed.
Senator Sessions. I'm going to look at the numbers. It
won't be long, we'll figure out who is correct about that.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. It's not going to be words. We have real
numbers on this situation.
Mr. Chairman, we have other witnesses coming. I won't
utilize any more time. I do think it's important that Energy
and Defense be more in sync here. I've had a fundamental
concern that Energy's focus is too disconnected from the
interests of the Nation in getting the system. To me, we don't
have a real good, clear chain of command and interest that
would help us.
I think these laboratories have provided fabulous service
to America that has kept us in the forefront of the world. But
when any institution ages over these many years, not only the
building but the whole institutions and bureaucracies,
frequently larger and larger numbers of people and efforts get
spent on things that are not as critical as they might be. If
you're in a competitive business environment, you go out of
business if that's so. Sometimes in Washington, when you're not
performing up to schedule you ask Washington for more money.
I don't know what the situation is. But it's really
important. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting us discuss it.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator.
In that regard, I think there is a continuing question
about the independent role of NNSA as it might relate to DOE,
because when Congress created NNSA in 1999, a principal concern
at that time was to create a ``semi-autonomous agency'' that
was free from the larger elements of DOE, so that it could
focus on its core defense-related missions. In fact, if you
read the first sentence of the statute it says: ``There is
established within the Department of Energy a separately-
organized agency to be known as the National Nuclear Security
Administration.'' That's exactly what it says.
Can you provide the subcommittee, say maybe within the next
30 days, some legislative suggestions or technical drafting
assistance on how NNSA can still report to the Secretary of
Energy, but be more independent of the rest of DOE? Because I
think it was supposed to be on the organizational chart out
here [indicating], not down here [indicating]. That's how it's
been explained to me.
It's probably just similar to the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission as it has a separate independent, semi-autonomous
relationship. Could you give us some ideas of that, and then
provide us with something if you agree?
[The information referred to follows:]
The legislative decision raised in your question is clearly within
the congressional prerogative. Although we are committed to assisting
Congress in legislative endeavors, there has not been sufficient time
to provide the appropriate analysis and support for your request at
this time. We will keep you apprised as we review all the potential
alternatives and impacts that are identified.
Mr. D'Agostino. Mr. Chairman, we'd be glad to work with the
subcommittee in any way possible to make sure that we
accomplish the objectives of the NNSA Act and consistent with
DOE.
I do want to say that we are a part of DOE. We absolutely
depend on DOE, the broader DOE technical infrastructure in
order to get our job done, whether it's our NNSA job or not. We
are an integrated part of DOE. They need us; we need them.
The key, of course, is making sure that we have the right
balance on governance----
Senator Nelson. Yes.
Mr. D'Agostino. The Secretary--I talked to him today, as a
matter of fact, on this topic, because I knew it was important.
The question of governance has come up a number of times in the
press and now in the hearing today, sir, with both of you. The
Secretary, first of all, told me that he's committed to
continuing to move forward. I could provide to the subcommittee
details on where we have moved forward in many areas and what
we're planning on doing out in the future. So I'd be happy to
work with you, sir.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Perhaps to put it a little bit differently, I know that you
have a certain integration for the mutual responsibilities for
your support with DOE, but Walter Mondale once commented that
working from his office in the Old Executive Office Building,
that: ``You might as well be in Baltimore.'' That speaks
volumes about location in this busy town.
I don't want to say that we ought to move your office
necessarily, but there is something to be said about a
disconnect that comes from different locations. Sometimes it's
very positive; sometimes it's very negative. I don't think you
have to answer that question. I just throw it out as an idea
for consideration.
Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, looking at the numbers on
the written testimony I have, I think these are official
numbers, we were projected to have an appropriation for total
weapons of $7.9 billion this year. It's going to be $7.5
billion; is that correct?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir, about $7.5 billion.
Senator Sessions. This is an inauspicious start, would you
not agree? Next year was projected to go to $8.4 billion, the
next year $8.7, the next year $8.9, $9, $9.3, $9.6, $9.8, and
$10.1 over the 10 years.
So I guess what I'm saying to you, if we're going to have
this much of a miss in really the first year of our new
agreement, I thought, to modernize our weapons, aren't we
facing inevitably a failure to be able to complete what we've
committed to do?
Mr. D'Agostino. Senator Sessions, this is our third year of
increases that we're asking for in this program. We've
essentially received 10 percent increase the first year. We
asked for a 10 percent increase the second year, did not get
that 10 percent increase. We only got a 5 percent increase the
second year. On top of that, we have the BCA amendment lid on
top of it.
So as a result of that environment, we made adjustments.
Remember, the fiscal year 2012 budget that was appropriated was
not what we had asked for. It was over $400 million less, and
as a result we received $7 billion. There were reasons for
that. I'm not going to second-guess, tell Congress how to do
authorizations and appropriations. I'm on the executive branch.
I'm going to execute the program that's authorized and
appropriated, and, in fact, that's what we're doing.
You have to use fiscal year 2012 as our jumping off point
in order to put together the right program in the out-years.
Senator Sessions. Looking at under the blue line at the
bottom of this chart, it says 2012, $7.6 billion; 2013, it
looks like we're coming in at $7.5. Why isn't that a decline?
Help me on that? You didn't meet the $7.6 last year, either. So
you missed the $7.6 last year, is that the answer?
Mr. D'Agostino. In fiscal year 2011, there was a year-long
Continuing Resolution in the works. We received an anomaly for
the weapons activities account that would allow us to get the
full amount consistent with the President's promises. Congress
gave us the anomaly, which was very much appreciated.
In fiscal year 2012 we asked for a very significant
increase in this program and we did not get it. The increase in
the program was to do a broad scope of work and assumed
increases into the out-years. That, of course, was done in a
different fiscal environment, and now we have a good handle on
the kind of workload that's important to DOD and important to
what we need to get done. That is why we've asked for this
essentially close to a 5 percent increase overall for NNSA, and
I think actually it's separating out the Defense Programs
piece, it might even be closer to 7 percent increase for the
Defense Programs piece.
So it's a very strong request and a strong commitment to
nuclear security, and particularly working on the stockpile.
Senator Sessions. It seems like the numbers just are not
coming in to meet the requirement, and that's the whole concern
I have.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. We don't want to just smooth it over and
say we can delay this or delay that. Pretty soon you just don't
have the money to complete the mission you've been given, and
I'm afraid that's where we are, which is contrary to what we
thought we had agreed to after much discussion last year.
Maybe we'll pursue it and we'll submit you some questions
for the record.
Mr. D'Agostino. Senator, we're glad to take those.
Senator Nelson. You must feel like this: that we gave you
$400 million less than you needed and now we're criticizing you
for having $400 million less to deal with.
Mr. D'Agostino. Something like that, sir.
Senator Nelson. Something like that, I understand.
Senator Sessions. You need to say that. You need to say:
``You guys are not giving me enough money to meet the mission
you gave me to meet.'' If you won't say that then it's hard for
us to help.
Senator Nelson. Yes, because I was very uncomfortable
seeing that $400 million disappear, with the representations
that we've made to be fully funded to carry out the program. So
my discomfort continues, and I commend you for trying to find
ways to do the same amount that you needed to do in a different
way with less. We're all faced with that. We just don't want to
be critical. What we want to know is as some things slip, will
the mission slip? If you tell us no, the mission is not going
to slip, even though you may defer some things, then I perhaps
would feel better.
But I would have felt a lot more at ease with the $400
million being in your budget to do it the way we were initially
representing to others that we were going to do it.
Mr. D'Agostino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. Thank you. You are excused, Mr. D'Agostino,
so we can call forward the next panel of witnesses, thank you
again. [Pause.]
On the second panel we have the Honorable Donald L. Cook,
Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs at the NNSA; Admiral
Kirkland H. Donald, USN, Deputy Administrator for Naval
Reactors and Director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion at the NNSA;
and Mr. David G. Huizenga, Senior Advisor for EM at the Office
of EM at DOE; all from DOE. We appreciate your being here.
``Hie-ZEN-ga.'' I'll get it right one of these days. I may
just call you ``Doctor H,'' I don't know.
Mr. Huizenga. That will be fine, sir.
Senator Nelson. Let's see. Would you like to make some
brief opening statements? I know you have statements for the
record, but please, if you would, why don't we start with you,
Admiral Donald, and move in that direction.
STATEMENT OF ADM KIRKLAND H. DONALD, USN, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR
FOR NAVAL REACTORS AND DIRECTOR, NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION,
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Admiral Donald. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and
Ranking Member Sessions. I do have an opening statement I would
like to make if that's suitable to you. I appreciate the
opportunity to testify before you today on the Naval Reactors
fiscal year 2013 budget request. Our budget request is for $1.1
billion and this funding provides the resources required for
the day-to-day work associated with the safe and reliable
operation of 104 naval nuclear propulsion plants, plants which
provide power to more than 40 percent of the U.S. Navy's major
combatants.
The fiscal year 2013 budget also supports the President's
national security strategy with the continued development of
the Ohio-class replacement submarine and stewardship of our
naval nuclear infrastructure. DOD has decided to delay the
Ohio-class replacement by 2 years. The Naval Reactors fiscal
year 2013 request reflects that shift and supports the Navy's
revised shipbuilding schedule, while ensuring the continuity of
a sea-based strategic deterrent.
The budget further provides funding for the land-based
prototype refueling overhaul, a critical aspect of the
development of a life-of-the-ship core for the Ohio-class
replacement. Core manufacturing, development, and demonstration
for a life-of-the-ship core will be performed as a part of this
project. By constructing the replacement core for the prototype
with the technologies we plan to use for Ohio-class
replacement, we will mitigate technical, cost, and schedule
risks associated with that ship construction program.
Finally, resources are requested for the recapitalization
of the aging spent nuclear fuel handling facility at the Naval
Reactors Facility in Idaho. As you may recall from previous
testimony, we must remain in compliance with the 1995 Idaho
settlement agreement for movement of our fuel from wet storage
to dry storage and ultimately for disposal. While working to
meet this commitment to the people of Idaho, that aging
infrastructure must also support the demands of a challenging
refueling schedule for our nuclear-powered fleet, specifically
our Nimitz-class aircraft carriers.
Mr. Chairman, the Naval Reactors budget for fiscal year
2013 is consistent with the goals set out in the BCA of 2011.
However, as Mr. D'Agostino has pointed out, the out-years with
the placeholder numbers between fiscal years 2014 and 2017 is
less than Naval Reactors' validated requirements and is subject
to review between DOE and the Navy.
Within these constraints, my first priority must be to
safely sustain the Naval Reactors fleet support and regulatory
oversight mission within our baseline funding, followed by
continued progress on these major projects. Within the BCA
funding constraints in the out-years, I cannot deliver the very
important projects and maintain the proven standards of
oversight and technical support that will continue to ensure
nuclear fleet safety and effectiveness. Given the vital
importance of our nuclear ships, the growing challenges of both
the high operational tempo and an aging fleet, and the grave
consequences of even the perception of eroding day-to-day
standards and support, I must apply my resources, as available,
to sustaining today's nuclear fleet. This prevents me from
progressing on the new projects absent some additional funding
to be addressed in the out-years.
As a result, the fiscal year 2013 budget will maintain the
land-based prototype refueling overhaul to be executed in 2018.
The fiscal year 2013 request will support reactor design for
the Ohio-class replacement on the DOD revised schedule, but it
will not support the recapitalization of the spent fuel
handling infrastructure in time to support the existing plan
for refueling of CVN-73, USS George Washington.
We're currently reviewing options as work-arounds, but all
options will include some additional cost and risk. I will keep
this subcommittee apprised of that analysis.
In addition, I'm further forced to consider deferral of
maintenance of facilities work, decontamination, and
decommissionings across our infrastructure. But I understand
the impacts of those and we judge those to be prudent risks to
be taking at this time.
I recognize that we've come before you today in a time of
daunting fiscal constraints, constraints we haven't seen in
decades. Prior to initiating the new projects in 2010, I
embarked on a large-scale strategic alignment of funding as
well as significant initiatives to streamline our support
infrastructure and gain cost savings and efficiencies, such as
combining the maintenance, management, and operations contracts
for our two laboratories.
I respectfully ask that you consider the contributions our
program makes every day to national security and will be
required to make well into the future to meet our strategic
objectives.
I would like to point out before I close one important
milestone for Naval Reactors and for the Nation. This year
marks the final deployment of the world's first nuclear-powered
aircraft carrier, USS Enterprise. Commissioned in 1961,
Enterprise has deployed for the last time as of Sunday. No
other ship better illustrates the successes and evolutions of
the nuclear-powered Navy like the Enterprise. She has served us
well since 1961. After her final deployment, she'll commence
her inactivation in November 2012.
Chairman Nelson, pending your retirement and the completion
of my term as the Director of Naval Reactors later this year,
this will likely be the last time that I will testify before
you, and I thank you. It's been an honor to work with you and I
thank you for all that you've done for my program and for the
U.S. Navy.
My written statement has been submitted for the record and
I look forward to responding to any questions that you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Donald follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM Kirkland H. Donald, USN
The request for this appropriation is $1.089 billion; an increase
of almost 1 percent over the fiscal year 2012 appropriation. The
program directly supports all aspects of the U.S. Navy's nuclear fleet,
which encompasses the Navy's submarines and aircraft carriers, over 40
percent of the U.S. Navy's major combatants. Currently, the nuclear
fleet is comprised of 54 attack submarines, 14 ballistic missile
submarines, 4 guided missile submarines, and 11 aircraft carriers. Over
8300 nuclear-trained Navy personnel safely operate the propulsion
plants on these ships all over the world, and their consistent forward
presence protects our national interests. At any given time, about half
of these ships are at sea.
2011 was a successful year for Naval Reactors. The nuclear-powered
fleet surpassed 148 million cumulative miles safely steamed, providing
the Navy with a consistent forward presence, capable of rapid response
to emerging world events. The endurance, forward-presence, and instant
readiness enabled by nuclear propulsion plants were on full display
during Operation Odyssey Dawn, with deployed submarines launching over
half of the initial salvo of cruise missiles, just one of this year's
57 submarine missions of significance to national security. Naval
Reactors has also surpassed important milestones in the Ohio
Replacement reactor design, including sufficient completion of design
and manufacturing development of core materials to support the 2012
core materials decision. In Idaho, the Program loaded its 50th spent
fuel dry storage canister, with a third of the Navy's current spent
fuel inventory now ready for shipment to a permanent repository.
Finally, as highlighted by the commissioning of the USS California (SSN
781) and the christening of the PCU Mississippi (SSN 782), Virginia-
class submarines are consistently delivered under-budget and ahead of
schedule. Throughout all these significant efforts, Naval Reactors also
contributed to the relief in response to the tragic earthquake, tsunami
and resultant events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in
Japan.
Continued safe and reliable Naval nuclear propulsion requires that
Naval Reactors maintains the capability to anticipate and respond to
small problems before they become larger. The technical base and
laboratory infrastructure allows thorough and quick evaluation of
technical issues that arise from design, manufacture, operation and
maintenance with technically-sound dispositions, ensuring crew and
public safety without unnecessarily restricting the important missions
of our nuclear powered-ships. Through careful collection and meticulous
technical analysis of fleet operational and inspection data, and
rigorously engineered designs, as well as prudent maintenance and
modernization, the Program maintains a record of over 60 years of safe
and effective operations. Uncompromising and timely support of the
nuclear fleet continues to be the highest priority for Naval Reactors.
This focus will prove even more important as the nuclear fleet, whose
oldest ship, USS Enterprise (CVN 65), recently celebrated her 50th
birthday, continues to increase its average age. Day-to-day activities
include oversight and operation of two laboratories across multiple
sites, including a prototype site with two operating reactor plants,
and a spent nuclear fuel processing and handling facility. This budget
funds all required facilities, maintenance, capital equipment,
compliance, and remediation for these facilities. The work at these
facilities enables complete lifecycle support for every nuclear-powered
warship, from construction through inactivation. Technical work is
conducted in areas such as structural mechanics, electrical
engineering, nuclear engineering, materials science, reactor servicing,
chemistry, and spent fuel management.
In addition to fleet support, Naval Reactors has embarked on
important new projects: namely, the refueling overhaul for the S8G
Land-based Prototype reactor, the design of the Ohio Replacement
reactor plant, and recapitalization of our naval spent nuclear fuel
infrastructure. Each of the projects is critical to fulfillment of the
Navy's longer term needs.
The Budget Control Act of 2011 established discretionary caps,
which are delaying several of the administration's nuclear
modernization initiatives. Of the three new projects, only the S8G
Land-based Prototype Refueling Overhaul remains on the originally
envisioned schedule that was presented to Congress last year. The
Prototype reactor plant has served Naval Reactors' needs for research,
development, and training since 1978, and the reactor provides a cost-
effective testing platform for new technologies and components before
they are introduced to the Fleet. Equally important, it provides an
essential, hands-on training platform for the fleet's reactor plant
operators, every one of whom qualifies on an operating reactor before
their assignment to a submarine or aircraft carrier. To continue vital
research capabilities, as well as train sufficient operators to man the
Fleet, the S8G Land-based Prototype Refueling Overhaul must begin in
2018. This budget fully funds the fiscal year 2013 effort required for
the upcoming refueling overhaul of the S8G Land-based Prototype. The
new prototype reactor core work will be used to test the
manufacturability of new core materials required for the Ohio
Replacement submarine.
The Ohio Replacement reactor plant design continues and the fiscal
year 2013 requested amount supports continuing this work to meet the
Navy's revised schedule and procurement of reactor plant components in
2019 (to support a 2021 lead-ship procurement). This represents a 2-
year delay compared to the schedule presented to Congress last year,
which the Navy considers the best balance between BCA constraints and
operational risk. The current Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines
are reaching the end of their operational life and will begin to retire
in 2027. Naval Reactors is designing and developing a life-of-ship core
to ensure continuous and credible strategic deterrence, as well as
enable substantial cost savings. The planned life-of-ship core will
have a longer reactor life than any previous core, and will eliminate
the need for a mid-life refueling, enabling the Navy to reduce
maintenance requirements by shortening the mid-life overhaul. This
increased SSBN operational availability will reduce strategic
deterrence submarine procurements by two. Full funding for this program
is crucial to support designing, building, and testing of systems for a
new design of a nuclear reactor plant on the identified schedule.
Completion of this work drives the overall design maturity of the
reactor plant, which, as demonstrated by the successful construction of
Virginia-class submarines, is vital to minimizing risk and cost during
component procurement and ship construction. The request is sufficient
for Ohio Replacement development through fiscal year 2013 and we are
working with DOD to address the out-years.
Finally, the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project is needed
to maintain the capability to manage naval spent nuclear fuel in a
cost-effective way that does not impede the refueling of active ships
and their return to operations. This project includes receipt,
inspection, processing, packaging, and secure dry storage. The existing
facility is more than 50 years old, and was never designed for its
current primary mission of packaging naval spent nuclear fuel for
permanent dry storage. Although the current Expended Core Facility
continues to be maintained and operated in a safe and environmentally
responsible manner, it no longer efficiently supports the nuclear
Fleet. Uninterrupted receipt of naval spent nuclear fuel is vital to
the timely refueling and return of warships to full operational status.
Due to the fiscal constraints of the Budget Control Act, Naval Reactors
is reviewing the schedule for the SFHP and developing a revised
profile. Delays past 2020 will require the procurement of additional M-
290 shipping containers to store CVN fuel until it can be unloaded at a
new facility. These additional containers will be procured using
Department of the Navy funds at an estimated cost of $200 million.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Admiral.
Senator Sessions has a 4 o'clock that he has to take, and
so he has a question. We'll just go out of order and we can
wait.
Senator Sessions. Thank you very, very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Huizenga, the request for the fiscal year 2013 for EM
is $5.49 billion. That is almost $500 million more than the
level appropriated in fiscal year 2012. You and I briefly
discussed it before. You indicated it was not an increase, but
it seems to be delineated on page 377 of your DOE budget
manual, and that money is for a defense environmental cleanup
contribution program.
Given the EM funding is part of the security spending, how
do you justify that large an increase for EM while we're
getting a $371 million reduction from Dr. Cook from the funding
level that was planned for fiscal year 2013 for the weapons
program? It appears to me that the national security
requirements of weapons modernization has been reduced in favor
of additional money in environmental cleanup; is that correct?
If you'd like to answer for the record, you could do that. If
you have a brief response to that now, I'd be glad to take it.
[The information referred to follows:]
The fiscal year 2013 request for the defense environmental cleanup
account is $5.49 billion. This amount includes the $463 million that
would be transferred from the General Fund to be deposited into the
Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund--netting to
zero in the request. There is no programmatic increase of $463 million.
The total fiscal year 2013 request for the Environmental Management
program is $5.65 billion, which is a reduction of $60 million from the
fiscal year 2012 enacted level of $5.71 billion.
Mr. Huizenga. Sir, thank you for bringing that up. I think
maybe I misunderstood before. Our overall request of $5.65
billion this year is down about 1 percent, or just a little bit
more than 1 percent, from the request from last year. That's
what I was referring to in our previous conversation.
I think that with the overall constraints that we do find
ourselves in this year, we believe that our request will allow
us to meet our compliance agreements and commitments to the
citizens around these facilities that supported us in the Cold
War efforts, and we think it's a responsible request, sir.
Senator Sessions. I'll be glad to examine it and I may
follow up with a more detailed question.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's been an excellent hearing.
Admiral Donald, thank you for your work and your
patriotism, all of you. All of those associated with the labs
have done really great work. But it just may be in this point
in history that it's time for a rigorous reevaluation of the
massive amounts of monies that are being handled. Maybe some of
the bureaucracies need to be realigned and people reorganized
and we could get more production and maybe save some money at
the same time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate it.
Dr. Cook.
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD L. COOK, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR
DEFENSE PROGRAMS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Dr. Cook. Chairman Nelson and Ranking Member Sessions, good
afternoon. I want to thank you for the opportunity to come here
to testify before you on the President's fiscal year 2013
budget request.
The fiscal year 2013 budget request provides $7.57 billion
for weapons activities. That's an increase of 5 percent. Within
that, the amount for Defense Programs is $6.23 billion. That's
an increase of $420 million in fiscal year 2013. NNSA has the
responsibility to maintain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear
weapons stockpile to help ensure the security of the United
States and of its allies, to deter aggression, and to support
international stability.
Maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile
necessitates continuing progress in mission-essential sciences
to achieve accurate health and status assessments of our aging
nuclear weapons systems. Over the last decade, NNSA has been
devoted to filling this need.
The $17 million increase in this year's budget request for
science campaigns further demonstrates the administration's
support. The science and the experimental tools developed by
Defense Programs allow our scientists, our technicians, and
engineers to perform the needed assessments of the weapons
systems and the components within to ensure that the effects of
aging have not deteriorated the desired performance levels and
to guarantee the safety, the security, and the reliability of
these systems without having to resort to a new underground
nuclear weapons test.
I should note that September 2012 will mark the 20th
consecutive year in which we have not required a nuclear test
in order to ensure the safety, the security, and the
reliability of our weapons stockpile. The Stockpile Stewardship
Program is working.
As these systems, designed in the 1960s and 1970s, continue
to age, life extension activities are required to preserve the
established safety, security, and reliability thresholds. The
fiscal year 2013 budget request includes a $214 million
increase to the directed stockpile work that supports the W76,
B61, W78, and W88 LEPs.
We've worked diligently with DOD and the NWC in crafting
the programmatic schedule that is necessary to meet the NWC's
requirements established for these systems. The B61 is a
critical component of the U.S. strategic and of the extended
nuclear deterrent. The current system is among the oldest in
the stockpile. It has key non-nuclear components that are
reaching their end-of-life and in need of replacement. The B61
LEP will allow consolidation of four variants into a single
version of the B61 bomb, allowing NNSA and DOD to save on long-
term sustainment costs, enable future stockpile reductions,
ensure safety, and reduce the amount of special nuclear
material used. The NWC has endorsed entry of the B61 LEP into
phase 6.3, the engineering development phase.
Defense Programs is also charged with maintaining and
replacing the infrastructure that provides the foundation and
basis of the nuclear security enterprise. Some of the
facilities have survived beyond their lifespan and are in dire
need of replacement. The efforts and activities executed within
Defense Programs are vital to the Nation's nuclear deterrent
and in order for this critical work to continue we have to have
both a safe and a secure operational environment.
The President's budget request includes an increase of $179
million in fiscal year 2013, enabling accelerated construction
of the UPF at Y12. The completion of this facility will allow
our personnel to vacate Building 9212 at Y12, which has already
endured 63 years of operational use and it poses one of the
highest programmatic and operational risks across the nuclear
enterprise should it fail. NNSA has determined that an
acceleration of the UPF at Y12 is required to ensure continuity
of our sole uranium manufacturing capability.
We're also working with the General Services Administration
on completing the construction of the Kansas City Responsive
Infrastructure Manufacturing and Sourcing Campus. We will begin
transitioning to the new facilities in 2013. We will complete
the transition in 2014.
We'll also finish the construction of the High Explosive
Pressing Facility at Pantex in fiscal year 2017. That's
designed to support the LEPs. We will start construction as
well of the Transuranic Waste Facility Phase B at Los Alamos.
The Resource Conservation Recovery Act permit modification
approval is expected by the State of New Mexico still in fiscal
year 2012.
With all that said, however, under the BCA we now face new
fiscal realities. Adding to this fiscal challenge is the fact
that the funds appropriated to the NNSA weapons activities in
fiscal year 2012 were $416 million less than the President's
request and that forced us to make tough decisions on which
projects can or cannot be executed at this time.
In light of these actions, we've been compelled to deviate
from our previous strategy and to modify our programmatic
schedule to meet the Nation's immediate military requirements.
Through coordination with DOD and the NWC, we have selected a
path forward within the Nation's budgetary limitations. One of
the decisions selected is the deferral for at least 5 years of
the CMRR Nuclear Facility (CMRRNF) Project planned for Los
Alamos National Lab. Deferring the CMRRNF will create an
estimated $1.3 billion in cost avoidance over the next 5 years,
permitting the funding of the most critical programs and
capabilities, such as the weapons LEPs I've already mentioned
and an accelerated UPF construction profile.
We will continue to maintain our plutonium capabilities by
utilizing facilities at Los Alamos, such as the PF4, Plutonium
Facility No. 4, and a part of the CMRR project already
constructed, that is the radiological lab and utility office
building. That building, incidentally, has been completed ahead
of schedule and under budget.
In agreement with the NWC, we have delayed the first
production unit of the B61-12 gravity bomb to 2019, but we will
still meet the military requirements of the Nation. Despite the
tough decisions made, we remain resolute in meeting the
Nation's operational requirements, and we intend to remain
vigilant in our mission to ensure the safety, security, and
reliability of the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile.
Lastly, we recognize that a critical element of our
enduring mission is the need to maintain healthy relationships
between the national labs, the production plants, the Federal
site offices, and headquarters. We're implementing governance
and oversight transformations in order to streamline how NNSA
will do business, reduce the cost of operations, and increase
productivity, and we will strive to maximize mission
performance while maintaining or enhancing overall safety and
security of the nuclear security enterprise.
I want to thank you again for the opportunity. I'll look
forward to answering questions.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
I'm going to try to get it right: Mr. Huizenga.
Mr. Huizenga. Excellent, sir. It's a good Dutch name and
you got it just right.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF DAVID G. HUIZENGA, SENIOR ADVISOR FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT,
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Huizenga. Chairman Nelson, I'm honored to be here today
to discuss the positive things that we are doing for the Nation
through our ongoing efforts of the EM program. Our request of
$5.65 billion enables the Office of EM to continue the safe
cleanup of the environmental legacy brought about from 5
decades of nuclear weapons development and government-sponsored
nuclear energy research. Our cleanup priorities are based on
risk and our continuing efforts to meet our regulatory
compliance commitments. Completing cleanup promotes the
economic vitality of the communities surrounding our sites and
enables other crucial DOE missions to continue. By reducing the
cleanup footprint, we are lowering the cost of security and
other overhead activities that would otherwise continue for
years to come.
In August 2011, the Office of EM was aligned under the
Office of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, as was
pointed out by Under Secretary D'Agostino earlier this
afternoon. This realignment promotes the natural synergies that
exist between EM and NNSA. For example, at the Oak Ridge
National Laboratory we're working with NNSA to accelerate the
transfer of certain components of uranium-233 inventory. This
inventory is valuable for national security applications and
supports NNSA's missions related to safety, nuclear emergency
response, special nuclear material measurement, and detection.
This initiative will result in cost savings for EM and enable
us to move forward on a cleanup of nuclear facilities in the
heart of the Oak Ridge National Lab.
Over the years the Office of EM has made significant
progress in accelerating environmental cleanup across the
departmental complex. For example, last December at the Defense
Waste Processing Facility at our Savannah River Site in South
Carolina, we solidified a record 37 canisters of highly
radioactive waste, marking the most canisters filled in 1 month
in the facility's 15-year history. Out west, at the Moab site
in Utah, we celebrated the removal of 5 million tons of uranium
tailings from the site to a safe location away from the
Colorado River. Through 2011, we safely conducted over 10,000
shipments of transuranic waste to the WIPP in New Mexico, the
world's largest operating deep geologic repository. As you can
see from these accomplishments, the Office of EM has made great
progress and will continue to do so with your help.
We could not have achieved such notable accomplishments
without an outstanding Federal and contractor workforce. The
safety of our workers is a core value that is incorporated into
every aspect of our program. We've maintained a strong safety
record and continuously strive for an accident-free and
incident-free workplace. We seek to continue improvements in
the area of safety by instituting corrective actions and by
aggressively promoting lessons learned across our sites. In
collaboration with DOE's Office of Health, Safety, and Security
and our field sites, we're working to achieve a stronger safety
culture within the program, thereby improving the safety of our
construction and operations facilities.
We will continue to identify opportunities to reduce the
life cycle costs of our program, including the development of
new technologies and other strategic investments. For example,
in 2013 we will continue our efforts to develop technologies
that allow for the segregation and stabilization of mercury-
contaminated debris and improve groundwater monitoring.
We continue working with the Government Accountability
Office to institutionalize improvements in contracting and
project management. We have established project sponsors at
headquarters for all of our capital asset projects and conduct
regular peer reviews of our most complex projects. We are
including U.S. Army Corps of Engineers personnel who have
demonstrated experience in project and contract management on
these project review teams. We are committed to becoming a
best-in-class performer in this area.
Chairman Nelson, we will continue to apply innovative
cleanup strategies so that we can complete quality work safely,
on schedule, and within cost, thereby demonstrating our value
to the American taxpayers.
Thank you, and I would be pleased, as the others, to answer
any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Huizenga follows:]
Prepared Statement by David G. Huizenga
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sessions, and Members
of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to answer your
questions on the President's fiscal year 2013 budget request for the
Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM).
The EM fiscal year 2013 budget request of $5.65 billion enables EM to
continue the safe cleanup of the environmental legacy brought about
from 5 decades of nuclear weapons development and government-sponsored
nuclear energy research.
environmental management program strategies: a national responsibility
The DOE Strategic Plan highlights EM's objective to complete the
environmental remediation of our legacy and active sites by disposing
of radioactive wastes, remediating contaminated soil and groundwater,
and deactivating and decommissioning (D&D) radioactively contaminated
facilities. EM is committed to sound technology development and
deployment. EM develops and implements first-of-a-kind technologies to
further enhance its ability and efficiency in cleaning up radioactive
waste. Through these innovations, EM and the companies that perform its
cleanup work have remained world leaders in this arena. Our work in EM
enables other crucial DOE missions to continue across the United
States. By reducing our cleanup footprint, EM is lowering the cost of
security, surveillance, infrastructure, and overhead costs that would
otherwise continue for years to come.
overview of program priorities
To best address our cleanup objectives, EM's cleanup prioritization
is based on achieving the greatest risk reduction benefit per
radioactive content (wastes that contain the highest concentrations of
radionuclides) while continuing to meet regulatory compliance
commitments and promote best business practices. EM's priorities to
support this approach include:
Radioactive tank waste stabilization, treatment, and
disposal;
Spent (used) nuclear fuel storage, receipt, and
disposition;
Special nuclear materials consolidation, processing,
and disposition;
Transuranic waste and mixed low-level/low-level waste
disposition;
Soil and groundwater remediation; and
Excess facilities D&D.
creating synergies that last
In an effort to maximize the accomplishments of mission-critical
projects and organize needs more closely with DOE's resources, EM was
aligned under the Office of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security in
August 2011. This alignment allows DOE to capitalize on the expertise
that exists among the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA),
EM, the Office of Legacy Management, and the DOE Chief Nuclear Safety
Officer on areas related to project management, nuclear materials and
waste handling, and nuclear safety and security.
There are natural synergies between EM and NNSA. At Savannah River
Site, EM and NNSA are working closely together to utilize the H-Canyon
facility and support multiple missions including: converting about 3.7
metric tons of plutonium into suitable feed for NNSA's Mixed Oxide Fuel
(MOX) Fabrication Facility; removing contaminants in the plutonium to
make it amenable for use as MOX feed; and reducing the amount of
plutonium that EM needs to package and send to the Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant for disposal. These activities will occur in addition to
EM's utilization of H-Canyon for activities such as the commencement of
the process for the disposition of spent (used) nuclear fuel that is
not suitable for extended storage in L-Basin.
At Oak Ridge National Laboratory, EM and NNSA are working together
to accelerate the transfer of certain components of the Uranium-233
inventory that are valuable for national security applications. This
cooperative effort will support NNSA's missions related to safety,
nuclear emergency response, and special nuclear material measurement
and detection. This initiative will result in cost savings for the EM
program and enable EM to move forward on cleanup of nuclear facilities
which will allow other DOE missions to continue. In addition, EM has
established a partnership with NNSA to build upon the success of the
Supply Chain Management Center, leveraging buying power across the
combined EM and NNSA complexes for commonly used goods and services
with the objective of realizing cost savings for the EM program similar
to those NNSA has achieved.
safety culture
The safety of EM workers is a core value that is incorporated into
every aspect of the EM program. To best protect our workers, EM has a
goal of zero accidents or incidents in the work place and to date, has
maintained a strong safety record. EM continues to utilize the
Integrated Safety Management System to ensure that all work activities
are appropriately scoped, analyzed for hazards, comprehensively planned
to eliminate or mitigate those hazards, and effectively performed by
trained employees. In addition, EM follows DOE Order 226.1B,
Implementation of Department of Energy Oversight Policy which instills
the philosophy that line management is responsible for ensuring the
safety when work is being performed. EM seeks to continue improvements
in the area of safety by instituting corrective actions, promoting
lessons learned, and developing new or improved processes.
EM strives to promote and maintain a healthy safety culture at all
of its sites. DOE defines safety culture as ``an organization's values
and behaviors modeled by its leaders and internalized by its members,
which serve to make safe performance of work the overriding priority to
protect the workers, public, and the environment.'' As part of this
effort, EM is working with DOE's Office of Health Safety and Security
(HSS) and utilizing DOE's Implementation Plan for the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board Recommendations 2011-1, Safety Culture at the
Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant to guide its actions and
decisionmaking. As part of this effort, HSS has provided guidance and
recommendations including how to better promote the raising of safety
concerns on projects such as the Waste Treatment and Immobilization
Plant. HSS will also conduct independent ``extent of condition
reviews'' of major EM capital projects this year including the Sodium
Bearing Waste Treatment Facility at Idaho and the Salt Waste Processing
Facility at the Savannah River Site. In accordance with the
Consolidated Appropriations Act Conference Report, fiscal year 2012,
DOE, including EM and HSS, will conduct reviews of nuclear facility
construction projects with a total project cost greater than $1
billion, to determine if those projects are being managed in a way that
could pressure contractors or Department managers to lessen nuclear
safety in order to demonstrate acceptable project performance.
To further instill a healthy safety culture in EM, within the next
year, EM will conduct `town hall' style meetings at its sites with
defense nuclear facilities. At these meetings, EM senior leadership
will emphasize the importance of maintaining a strong safety culture
and soliciting employee input regarding safety. EM will continue to
keep its employees, the public, and the states where cleanup sites are
located, safe from radioactive and hazardous materials contamination.
EM will also further instill core values and principles that will allow
for improved communication and team building in order to accomplish its
mission goals.
compliance
Over the last 22 years, EM has maintained a working relationship
with regulators and developed agreements and compliance milestones that
provide the framework and schedule for cleaning up the Cold War legacy
at DOE sites. There are approximately 40 such agreements. In fiscal
year 2011, EM met 97 percent of its enforceable agreement milestones.
In light of the potential need to renegotiate some of the compliance
milestones, EM's goal in fiscal year 2013 is to meet 100 percent of its
compliance agreement milestones.
The fiscal year 2013 EM budget request funds the closure of high
level waste tanks 18 and 19 in the Savannah River Site F-Tank Farm. At
Los Alamos National Laboratory, fiscal year 2013 funds expedite the
disposal of much of the above-ground transuranic waste that is
currently stored on the mesa at the Laboratory. In addition, all
remedial actions related to soil cleanup will be completed in the
northwest section of Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
reducing life-cycle cost
EM will continue to identify opportunities to make strategic
investments that reduce the overall cost of the cleanup program while
shortening project and program schedules. The current life-cycle cost
estimate for EM is $274 to $309 billion. This includes $100 billion in
actual costs from 1997 through 2011, and an additional estimate of $174
to $209 billion to complete EM's remaining mission in the timeframe of
2050 to 2062. EM will continue to identify opportunities, including
technology development, to reduce the life-cycle cost of its program.
In fiscal year 2013, EM will continue efforts to develop technologies
that allow for the segregation and stabilization of mercury
contaminated debris; develop attenuation-based remedies for
groundwater; and utilize technologies that enable the safe extended
storage of spent (used) nuclear fuel at DOE sites. To enhance its
technology program, EM has established the position of Chief Scientist
to provide recommendations to the Senior Advisor for Environmental
Management on complex technical and design issues.
contract and project management
To ensure that EM delivers the best value for the American
taxpayers, the fiscal year 2013 budget request reflects its continued
improvement in acquisition, contract, and project management. EM will
require more rigorous front-end planning ensuring contract statements
of work and deliverables are based on clear project requirements and
assessment of risks; nuclear safety requirements are addressed early;
and changes to the contract and the project baseline are managed
through strict and timely change control processes. EM will further
improve acquisition processes by obtaining early involvement and
approvals on various acquisition approaches from DOE senior management,
including the Office of Engineering and Construction Management, the
Office of Procurement and Assistance Management, the Office of the
General Counsel, and the Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business
Utilization.
In terms of project management, since August 2009, EM has been
utilizing the Office of Science model for construction project review/
project peer review process that relies on the expert knowledge and
experience of certified engineers, scientists, DOE contractors,
engineering laboratories, and the academic community. These reviews
determine whether the scope of projects and the underlying assumptions
regarding technology, management, cost, scope, and schedule baselines
are valid and within budget. These reviews are scheduled to occur
approximately every 6 months and assist EM with actively addressing
problems and monitoring the effectiveness of the resulting corrective
actions.
Over the last 2 years, EM has established separate operations
activities and capital asset projects within its Project Baseline
Summaries. Capital asset projects are managed in accordance with DOE
Order 413.3B, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of
Capital Assets. EM is currently finalizing the operations activities
policy and the protocol to manage operations activities, which are not
governed by DOE Order 413.3B.
EM's continued progress in contract and project management has
resulted in EM meeting three of the five criteria needed in order to be
removed from the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) High Risk
List. GAO has noted that: EM has demonstrated strong commitment and
leadership; demonstrated progress in implementing corrective measures;
and developed a corrective action plan that identifies root causes,
effective solutions, and a near-term plan for implementing those
solutions.
One of GAO's remaining concerns is that EM must provide the
capacity (people and resources) to address problems. To address GAO's
first concern, EM's reorganization establishes project sponsor
positions at Headquarters for all capital asset projects. EM is also
continuing to enhance its partnership with the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers by supplementing selected project peer review teams with U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers personnel who have demonstrated expertise in
project and contract management.
GAO's second remaining concern is that EM must monitor and
independently validate the many corrective measures that it has taken
are both effective and sustainable over the long term. To address this
concern, EM's Annual Performance Plans have been established as a
vehicle for measuring, tracking, and validating progress. In addition,
EM has developed an annual Continuous Improvement Plan for Contract and
Project Management to guide and monitor improvements. EM will continue
to share improvements in project and contract management with GAO and
other stakeholders. EM is committed to continued improvements in
contract and project management and is focused on being removed from
GAO's High Risk List.
highlights of the fiscal year 2013 budget request
The fiscal year 2013 budget request for EM is $5.65 billion, after
offsets of $485.1 million. The offsets reflect the proposed
reauthorization of the D&D Fund deposit ($463 million), and the use of
prior year uncosted ($12.1 million) and unobligated ($10 million)
balances to offset ongoing mission work in the EM program. The fiscal
year 2013 budget request for EM is made up of $5.49 billion for defense
environmental cleanup activities. Examples of planned activities and
milestones for fiscal year 2013 by site-specific categories are:
Idaho National Laboratory, Idaho
(In Thousands of Dollars)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2012 Current Appropriation Fiscal Year 2013 Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$389,800.................................. $405,397
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Complete operations of the Sodium Bearing Waste
Treatment Facility.
The Sodium Bearing Waste Treatment Facility supports the
cleanup mission at Idaho National Laboratory by treating the
remaining approximately 900,000 gallons of sodium bearing waste
stored in tanks that are 35 to 45 years old. The treatment of
this waste will enable EM to close the final four tanks,
complete treatment of all tank waste at Idaho, and meet the
Notice of Noncompliance Consent Order Modification to cease use
of the Tank Farm Facility by December 31, 2012. Testing and
readiness verification on the Sodium Bearing Waste Treatment
Facility will be completed in preparation for startup in the
third quarter of fiscal year 2012.
Ship contact-handled transuranic waste to the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant, as well as retrieve buried waste.
During fiscal year 2013, approximately 4,500 cubic meters or
more of contact-handled transuranic waste will be shipped to
the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant for disposal. In addition,
small quantities of buried waste will be retrieved and shipped
to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant for disposal.
Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico
(In Thousands of Dollars)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2012 Current Appropriation Fiscal Year 2013 Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$188,561.................................. $239,143
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disposition of transuranic waste and low-level/mixed
low-level waste.
The Solid Waste Stabilization and Disposition Project is
comprised of the treatment, storage, and disposal of legacy
transuranic waste and low-level/mixed low-level waste generated
between 1970 and 1999 at Los Alamos National Laboratory. The
end-state of this project is the safe disposal of legacy waste.
In fiscal year 2013, to support the requirements in the 2005
Compliance Order on Consent, Los Alamos National Laboratory
will disposition 1,603 cubic meters of transuranic waste and
continue low-level/mixed low-level waste disposal activities.
Maintain soil and water remediation.
The Soil and Water Remediation Project scope at Los Alamos
National Laboratory includes identification, investigation, and
remediation of chemical and/or radiological contamination
attributable to past Laboratory operations and practices. The
remaining scope of the project includes characterization,
monitoring, and protection of the surface and groundwater at
the Laboratory and approximately 860 Potential Release Sites
left to be investigated, remediated or closed after evaluation
and assessment of human health and ecological risks. In fiscal
year 2013, activities include: investigation and
characterization of two Technical Areas under the Canon de
Valle Capital Asset Project and completion of the investigation
and corrective measures evaluation of Material Disposal Area T
to obtain final regulatory remedy selection.
Oak Ridge Reservation, Tennessee
(In Thousands of Dollars)
(Includes Safeguards & Security Funding)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2012 Current Appropriation Fiscal Year 2013 Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$419,758.................................. $421,250
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maintain operation of the Transuranic Waste Processing
Center.
The continued operation of the Transuranic Waste Processing
Center enables EM to meet various regulatory milestones. By the
end of fiscal year 2013, Oak Ridge will process a cumulative
total of 236 cubic meters of contact-handled transuranic waste
and a cumulative total of 70 cubic meters of remote-handled
transuranic waste at the Transuranic Waste Processing Center in
preparation for eventual disposition. Fiscal year 2013
activities include the: continued transfers of transuranic
waste bound for the Transuranic Waste Processing Facility; and
the continued processing and disposition of contact-handled
transuranic and remote-handled transuranic waste.
Mitigate mercury contamination at the Y-12 National
Security Complex.
Mercury cleanup activities within the Y-12 National Security
Complex are necessary to reduce the potential contamination of
the Upper East Fork Poplar Creek that flows through the city of
Oak Ridge. In fiscal year 2013, with the utilization of
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funds, EM will complete
characterization activities at the Y-12 National Security
Complex land area formerly housing the Building 81-10 Mercury
Recovery Facility.
Richland Site, Washington
(In Thousands of Dollars)
(Includes Safeguards & Security Funding)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2012 Current Appropriation Fiscal Year 2013 Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$1,021,824................................ $1,037,773
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Continue facility D&D and remedial actions within the
River Corridor.
The River Corridor Closure Project includes the D&D of
contaminated facilities and various remedial actions along the
Columbia River Corridor as part of EM's continued pursuit of
the Hanford 2015 Vision. In an effort to reduce Hanford's
cleanup footprint, fiscal year 2013 activities include:
operating the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility in
support of Hanford Site demolition and remediation activities;
completing the interim response actions for the 100 N Area;
completing the interim remedial actions for the 300-FF-2 Waste
Sites; completing the selected removal and/or remedial actions
for 13 high risk facilities in the 300 Area; and continuing the
remediation of the 618-10 and 618-11 burial grounds.
Conduct groundwater remediation efforts.
To protect the groundwater resources within the Hanford site,
remediation activities that address groundwater contamination,
including carbon tetrachloride, chromium, technetium, and
strontium, must be conducted. In fiscal year 2013, EM will:
continue site-wide groundwater and vadose zone cleanup
activities; groundwater contamination monitoring, operations,
and necessary modifications of existing remediation systems;
and deploy chemical and biological treatment to select areas in
support of final remedies.
Office of River Protection, Washington
(In Thousands of Dollars)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2012 Current Appropriation Fiscal Year 2013 Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$1,181,800................................ $1,172,113
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manage the tank farms in a safe and compliant manner
until closure.
The radioactive waste stored in the Hanford tanks was produced
as part of the Nation's defense program and has been
accumulating since 1944. To ensure protection of the Columbia
River, over 50 million gallons of radioactive waste must be
removed and processed to a form suitable for disposal, and the
177 underground storage tanks to be stabilized. In fiscal year
2013, activities include: complete bulk retrieval of one C Farm
single shell tank; completing hard heel removal of two C Farm
single shell tanks; operating the 222-S laboratory and 242-A
evaporator; and continuing activities for tank waste mixing.
Continue construction of the Waste Treatment and
Immobilization Plant complex.
The Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant is pivotal to
EM's tank waste cleanup mission at Hanford. The Waste Treatment
and Immobilization Plant provides the primary treatment
capability to immobilize (vitrify) the radioactive tank waste
at the Hanford Site. The Waste Treatment and Immobilization
Plant complex includes five major facilities: Pretreatment
Facility, High-Level Waste Facility, Low-Activity Waste
Facility, Analytical Laboratory, and the Balance of Facilities.
As of December 2011, the Waste Treatment and Immobilization
Plant construction is approximately 59 percent complete and
design is 84 percent complete. In fiscal year 2013, activities
include the following:
At the Pretreatment Facility, continue engineering,
design and large scale integrated testing to confirm the design
of critical Pretreatment process vessels.
At the High-Level Waste Facility, continue forming,
rebar, and placement of concrete for High-Level Waste Facility
walls and slabs on the third to fourth stories.
At the Low-Activity Waste Facility, continue planning
activities for construction startup and turnover of multiple
Low-Activity Waste Facility systems to operations.
At the Analytical Laboratory, complete mechanical
systems procurement and complete electrical terminations.
At the Balance of Facilities, complete Balance of
Facilities Plant design engineering and complete construction
of nine facilities that make up the Balance of Facilities
including the Chiller Compressor Plant and Steam Plant.
Savannah River Site, South Carolina
(In Thousands of Dollars)
(Includes Safeguards & Security Funding)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2012 Current Appropriation Fiscal Year 2013 Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$1,316,922................................ $1,303,493
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reduce radioactive liquid waste.
The mission of the Liquid Tank Waste Management Program at
Savannah River Site is to safely and efficiently treat,
stabilize, and dispose of approximately 37 million gallons of
legacy radioactive waste currently stored in 49 underground
storage tanks. In fiscal year 2013, activities include:
continue construction of Salt Waste Processing Facility;
continued operation of F and H Tank Farms; continued to
operation the Defense Waste Processing Facility and the
production of 312 canisters of high-level waste packaged for
final disposition; continued operation of the actinide Removal
Process and Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction at planned
rates; continued operation of the Saltstone Facility at planned
rates; and continue construction of Saltstone Disposal Units 3-
5.
Consolidation of special nuclear materials.
In fiscal year 2013, activities include: initiation of the
processing of non-pit plutonium to produce plutonium oxide
suitable for use in the MOX Fabrication Facility; packaging the
non-MOX plutonium for disposition to the Waste Isolation Pilot
Plant; reducing the residual plutonium-238 contamination in the
F Area Materials Storage Facility; and initiating the
disposition of any vulnerable spent (used) nuclear fuel in H
Canyon that is not suitable for extended storage in L-Basin.
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, New Mexico
(In Thousands of Dollars)
(Includes Safeguards & Security Funding)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2012 Current Appropriation Fiscal Year 2013 Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$218,179.................................. $202,987
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operate the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in a safe and
compliant manner and dispose of contact-handled and remote-
handled transuranic waste from DOE sites.
The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, New Mexico, is
the Nation's only mined geologic repository for the permanent
disposal of defense-generated transuranic waste. In fiscal year
2013, the EM budget request supports maintaining an average
shipping capability of 21 contact-handled transuranic waste and
5 remote-handled transuranic waste shipments per week from
major shipping sites such as Idaho, Savannah River Site, and
Los Alamos National Laboratory.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
subcommittee, I am honored to be here today representing the Office of
Environmental Management. EM is committed to achieving its mission and
will continue to apply innovative environmental cleanup strategies to
complete work safely, on schedule, and within cost thereby
demonstrating value to the American taxpayers. I am pleased to answer
any questions you may have.
Senator Nelson. Thank you. Thank you, all three.
Admiral, what is it, fair seas and prevailing wind, or
whatever; may I wish you that.
Admiral Donald. Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Thank you for your service.
Dr. Cook, you mentioned the B61 gravity bomb, but it's my
understanding you've been recently granted the go-ahead for the
engineering work on the B61 gravity bomb. If that's true, it's
good news and congratulations. Of course, the question that
follows is when would you be able to provide us with a design
definition and cost estimate study, or more commonly called a
6.2A study, for the LEP of the B61 that would come from this
work?
Dr. Cook. The short answer is we expect to provide a full
report by July. We're doing costing work now between NNSA and
the Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE) Group of DOE.
That work is aggressively underway, and it is a fact that the
NWC Chairman Frank Kendall signed out the authorization letter,
and so we're now going through the steps we require and are
normal to begin the engineering work.
Senator Nelson. Very good. In connection with the
extension, in DOD any major acquisition program requires by
statute an independent cost estimate by the CAPE Office. Do you
believe that it's sound policy and likewise should be so for
any major extension program or similar large engineering
weapons effort in NNSA as in the case of the B61?
Dr. Cook. I generally do, sir.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Cook, what's the status of the 6.1
study on the W78 warhead, and do you think having a common
warhead with the W88 is feasible?
Dr. Cook. The current status of the W78/88 study is that,
first, it is joint. The study has both Air Force and Navy
participation, certainly NNSA participation with our labs, and
some elements of the production plants, as well as STRATCOM and
DOD civilian participation. So we believe that we are likely to
complete the 6.1 study this fiscal year and move into a 6.2
study. 6.2A comes later, but we still have more work to do. So
that will be a topic for NWC determination later in the year.
Senator Nelson. It's my understanding that DOE worked with
DOD to transfer some $8 billion budgetary authority over the
next 10 years to perform a number of tasks, one of which was to
complete design and begin construction of the CMRR and commence
operations by 2022. As part of this transfer, my understanding
is that DOE was to plan to produce 50 to 80 pits per year in
2022 in the Los Alamos PF4 facility which makes the plutonium
pits. Do you still believe that there is the ability to produce
50 to 80 pits per year and that that's a valid requirement?
Will you have to renegotiate the 2022 date for making those 50
to 80 pits per year based on your decision to defer the
construction of the CMRR building?
Dr. Cook. If I could, I'd address several points of your
question, and I'll try to speak fairly quickly.
Senator Nelson. Yes, sure.
Dr. Cook. With regard to CMRR and the UPF, I will link
those, and the LEPs, our strategy is a balanced strategy. We
have worked it through with the Senate Armed Services
Committee, with STRATCOM, and DOD. When we looked at the key
priorities first for B61, would we start that or not, for the
UPF and the CMRR Nuclear Facility, there was a very large body
of work, and the requirement for providing cost for that to do
all three in parallel did not look like it could be supported
in the budget reality that we have. There was a change in 2012,
as you all know, and going forward we determined that we would
choose not to delay the B61, and there's a sizable investment
there.
We determined that the most cost-effective strategy for the
UPF, where we don't have another option because we make the
secondaries in building 9212, the best cost strategy would be
to actually accelerate the UPF conventional construction. We'll
deal with the tooling near the end of the project, but we want
to move aggressively once the conventional construction is
completed in the period of a few years to move out of building
9212 because of the large operational and programmatic risk.
It's our intent to begin that migration in 2019.
With regard to CMRR now, a piece that's already done is the
radiological lab, as mentioned already. We will substantially
complete the engineering design for CMRR in 2012 and we will
tie that up with a cost estimate for that design when we then
defer construction. But it's a rational point. Without that
deferral on CMRR we could not do both the B61 and the UPF. So
it was a conscious choice.
With regard to now the pit numbers, it's a fact that what
we're doing with the W76 LEP, known as the 76-1, and what we
intend to do with the B61-12 is pit reuse. There are three
different approaches here. They're certainly written in our
program plans. One is pit reuse, one is pit refurbishment, and
one is manufacturing newly manufactured pits, but of existing
design. No new military requirements or characteristics that
are essential.
So to get to the end of the answer, we do believe that we
can continue conducting a very aggressive modernization program
for LEPs by using all three of those. But the real impact of
the decision to defer CMRR by 5 years means that it will not be
operational by, the correct number was 2023, as we laid out in
the last set of reports last year. That will now not be sooner
than 2028.
But I again will emphasize, as the Administrator has, we've
not cancelled it. We have decided that the immediate need was
to support the B61 LEP as it is the oldest weapons system that
we have in our stockpile. I think I've mentioned the rest.
Senator Nelson. Thank you. Do you agree with Mr.
D'Agostino's risk management and risk assessment and risk
analysis comments about that this will not impair the ability
to move forward with the missions that are being undertaken?
Dr. Cook. I absolutely do. I'll state that we have made
conscious decisions to have a balanced program, and part of
those decisions has been to accept a higher risk and to manage
that risk. We have many talented people. They understand the
decisions that we've taken and we're going forward with the
priorities that we have agreed at the NWC.
Senator Nelson. Can you explain the differences in numbers
for the B61 and W76 warhead LEPs? In your fiscal year 2012
budget submission, you were going to request for fiscal year
2013 about $279 million for the B61 and $255 million for the
W76 LEPs. This year, for the fiscal year 2013 request, we see
you requested $361 million for the B61, $82 million more than
you thought you'd need last year, and $175 million for the W76
LEP, actually about $80 million less than you thought you'd
need last year.
Dr. Cook. That is accurate. So this is part of the trade
study that we did and the balance. We recognized, as more work
was done on the B61-12, when we went through the options in the
decisionmaking process for the NWC, we wound up taking, not the
largest cost option and not the lowest cost option, which would
not have been a LEP but only replacing limited life components.
The latter would have driven us into either needing to take
that weapons system out of service in a matter of time or we
would have just kicked down the road for a few years, maybe 5
years, possibly 10, a more aggressive LEP for the B61.
So you see that that larger cost estimate for the B61 is
reflected in the President's request for fiscal year 2013.
With regard to the W76, the strategy is that we will build
the hedge for the W76-1s after we have supported all
operational requirements. Once again, there's no question that
we are taking a somewhat higher risk. We have used up some of
the margin that we might otherwise have in building ahead
should we have an operational difficulty in manufacturing the
76-1s, and the budget reflects having a rate of manufacturing
and production which is comparable to the current rate,
extending the hedge-building at the end of the operationally
deployed weapons.
Senator Nelson. What is the effect of this lower request
number for fiscal year 2013 on the W76 program with the Navy's
submarine fleet?
Dr. Cook. I'll say where we are in the President's request.
We believe that we have a manageable program, but there is very
little margin for error. NNSA is working with the Navy to
understand some of the details now of the Navy requirements, at
the same time that we're sharing in a very open and transparent
way what our operating plans are at Pantex for assembly or at
Kansas City site for components.
We're working that together. If we determine that there's
something that has a risk that we feel we cannot manage, that
the risk is too large, then we'll make accommodations for that
when we determine it. At this point we've not yet found a major
stumbling block.
Senator Nelson. So this is a dynamic effort that could
change depending on what risk assessment you might do as you
engage in the life extension?
Dr. Cook. That is correct.
Senator Nelson. Admiral Donald, from our discussion the
other day, I understand DOD is moving the construction of the
first Ohio-class replacement submarine by 2 years to 2021,
which saves some $4.3 billion over the next 10 years. I
understand this has also impacted your budget profile, such
that last year you were going to ask for $149.7 million for
fiscal year 2013 and this year it is now $89.7 million, down
some $60 million.
Can you explain to us what impact this will have on the
funding reduction and whether it affects any other portions of
the naval reactors program?
Admiral Donald. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. The decision to
extend the Ohio replacement, and to delay it 2 years, was part
of a larger discussion to address the BCA reductions with DOD
overall. I participated in that decisionmaking process both
from my point of view as the hat in the U.S. Navy, but also
with great interest from my role in NNSA. I agreed with that
decision, acknowledging there's risk, and I'd characterize the
risk in two categories.
First, is programmatic risk. Implicit in the decision is
that the resources would be made available to conduct the work
so that we can start construction on the ship in 2021 with a
sufficiently mature design, such that we can control cost,
schedule, and deliver a quality product. On the Navy side, the
DOD side, that is the case. In fiscal year 2013 and beyond, the
resources are there for us to execute that program as we deem
necessary and effective.
On the NNSA side, for fiscal year 2013, I'm comfortable
with the resources I have. But, as Mr. D'Agostino pointed out,
the placeholder numbers that are in the fiscal years 2014
through 2017, if they were to remain in place, I would not be
able to fulfill that obligation to deliver the reactor plant
for that ship on time. That's acknowledged both in DOD and
NNSA, and the work to resolve that is ongoing right now.
Senator Nelson. Is that part of what you would call the
appropriations risk?
Admiral Donald. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. That's not a risk--it's a risk you assume,
but not one you have a lot of control over, right?
Admiral Donald. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. It's on this side of the desk we have to
reduce that risk; is that a fair way of saying it?
Admiral Donald. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. I understand.
Admiral Donald. The second element of risk is operational
risk. What that delay entails is the number of SSBNs available
for the strategic mission when you get out to 2029 to 2041, a
long way off obviously, but that's when the first of the Ohio-
class replacements will be coming on line with the delayed
schedule. The result during that period of a time is only have
10 SSBNs available to fulfill the strategic mission.
Now, remember we've reduced the number of SSBNs required
from 14 to 12. That was based on our action to develop the
life-of-the-ship core so we could eliminate the midlife
refueling, minimize the time in maintenance, and improve the
operational availability. So there was already some risk
associated with that. This further adds to that risk.
It's acknowledged that if the strategic requirement does
not change, there will be some periods of challenge during that
window of time with the number of ships out there to meet
STRATCOM's requirements for ships at sea and ships available on
notice.
The second aspect of that operational risk is a recognition
that in 2029--that's right before the first Ohio-class
replacement comes on line--the average age of the ballistic
missile submarine force will be 37 years. That is well in
excess of, on a class basis, anything we've ever done in the
past. We acknowledge that that does come with some risk. We are
certainly committed to mitigating that risk and we do take good
care of these ships to ensure they last for their full life
expectancy.
But, as with anything that arrives at that age with that
operational tempo that they fulfill, there is a certain risk
that ships may not be available because of material problems
and things of that sort. That tends to be the situation with
ships of that age.
Senator Nelson. Is it fair to say--this goes to Dr. Cook as
well--that in life extensions, we're able to make those life
extensions because as time goes by we develop new ways, new
methods of life extension? In other words, some things we can't
change, but other things we learn we can improve? Is that one
of the reasons why we get life extensions beyond the original
projections?
Admiral Donald. I would say there's a couple of issues that
are a part of being able to extend the life. First, it starts
off with a good design from the beginning, and if you look at
the Ohio-class submarines, that was a very well-designed ship.
It was designed to be maintained over a long lifetime. That
facilitates our ability to maintain it and maintain it
effectively.
Second, you do have to invest in the maintenance as you go
along. It's just like changing the oil in your car. If you do
that when you're supposed to, you're going to get the life out
of it that you would fully expect to get for an investment of
that nature.
The third thing is, you do, in fact, learn things as you
get more experience with the design, as life goes on. We see
that even today in such mundane things as how do you prevent
rust and corrosion and add life. You get a sense of the
operational tempo of the ship and how much fatigue, stress, and
things like that. So you do learn as you go along.
But the fourth thing, and I think it's critically
important, is applicable both to Dr. Cook and to me as well, is
that you have the technical resources at your disposal to
address issues as they arise, and they do. Unexpected things do
come along. You do have to address those types of things with
knowledgeable people, with engineers, designers who understand
that, who have the experience to deal with those types of
things. Hence, the importance of the intellectual capital that
we have in our laboratories to go and address those. We see
that to this very day.
Senator Nelson. Very good.
Dr. Cook?
Dr. Cook. If I can follow up to Admiral Donald, I agree
that many of the things he's mentioned are correct in
weaponland as well. When we talk about science and weapons
science, we could use words such as the ``core capability'' for
the national lab directors to do annual assessments of the
existing stockpile. That's one of the most important jobs that
we have. You could tell from my voice we are proud that the
Stockpile Stewardship Program has given us 20 consecutive years
of not having to go back to do underground testing.
The fact that these weapons systems are so thoroughly
surveilled--and you are well aware and you supported a more
aggressive surveillance program for the past few years--that
gives us an ability to determine with data which parts of these
weapons systems give us the most concern, and by the people, as
Admiral Donald said, who are most technically able to do that
for weapons within the weapons labs.
So, that's the choice. In fact, sometimes we say we can go
further on because some of the concerns have not grown more
severe, where in other systems something unanticipated
happened, but, thankfully, corrosion or whatever occurred was
noticed and now we know we need to adjust our schedules.
Senator Nelson. Admiral Donald, I know you maintain a large
fleet of reactors at sea that's funded by the Navy. Can you
explain any impacts that the BCA might have on these reactors?
Admiral Donald. Yes, sir. In my opening statement, I
discussed that my first priority is to ensure the safety and
effectiveness of those reactors that are operating at sea, the
two that we have in land-based locations, and the two that we
have in shore facilities as well. That's my charter, that's my
responsibility, and when it comes to applying my resources,
that's where they will be applied first. That is my strategy
right now for dealing with, if there should happen to be some
shortfalls in the overall budget, that I will first make sure
that the fleet is operating safely and has what it needs to
continue to operate, and then I will apply my resources to the
projects, whether they be the replacement for the Ohio-class,
the land-based prototype refueling, or the expended core
facility in Idaho. I will deal with those next in order.
Senator Nelson. But there could be some implications to the
rest of the budget, that you might have to rob one account to
take care of the other account to take care of the safety of
the reactors; is that fair to say?
Admiral Donald. That's correct, yes, sir. The first
priority is safety of those reactor plants.
Senator Nelson. Admiral Donald, can you explain the status
of the construction of the new spent fuel pool at the Idaho
National Laboratory?
Admiral Donald. Yes, sir. The Spent Fuel Handling
Recapitalization Project that's in my budget, I do have $28.6
million this year for some conceptual work and also some
environmental studies. This facility is vital to our business.
This is where all of our spent fuel goes to be examined and
ultimately processed into dry storage. The facility allows us
to meet our commitments to the State of Idaho, but also to
support the operating fleet, to ensure that the cores that we
load into these ships perform as we expect them to perform.
This facility is aging. It's 50 years old in many parts. It
has its challenges, whether it be seismic certifications,
whether it be leaks and things of that sort, that we manage on
a day-to-day basis. But it is aging and needs to be replaced,
and that's the project that we're here to undertake.
Senator Nelson. So you're not going to be in a position
where you can use both simultaneously? One will replace the
other? I understand that there's already another spent fuel
pool at the Idaho Laboratory, but that you're designing for a
new one. My question is, will you be able to use both or will
the new one replace the old one?
Admiral Donald. We have an existing facility that needs to
be replaced. There is also another water pit facility.
Senator Nelson. That's operational?
Admiral Donald. That's operational. It's Building 666, as
it's referred to in Idaho. We have looked at that as a
potential source for us to use whether during the interim as a
part of the transition from our old facility to the new
facility. We found it to be unsatisfactory. It doesn't meet our
requirements from a capability point of view, from a capacity
point of view, and from a timing point of view.
Specifically, the water pit is not configured properly to
handle the fuel that we will be bringing off of our aircraft
carriers. It's not deep enough. The fuel is in a configuration
that's too long. There are a couple of locations in the water
pit where it would handle that longer fuel, but those locations
are currently occupied by existing spent fuel that won't be out
of that water pit until the 2023 timeframe. Even if it were
available, it wouldn't be of sufficient capacity to deal with
the flow that we have coming off the ships.
The other aspect of this facility is, even if we tried,
there'd be some significant facility modifications that would
be required, whether in additional cranes, raising the height
of the building to support the extra length of the fuel. All of
that would have to be done in a radiologically controlled area,
which would add significantly to the cost.
So we looked at it both in 2005 and 2009 and concluded
that, no, it did not meet the need. Ultimately it doesn't--we'd
still have to have a new facility at our facility anyway to
deal with this 50-year-old facility we have right now.
Senator Nelson. I understand. Thank you.
Mr. Huizenga, I understand you've recently taken over the
job of managing the DOE's Office of EM. Congratulations again.
Having said that, what is the status of the Hanford Waste
Treatment Plant and when will you begin to drain the high-level
waste tanks into the plant to produce what are called glass
logs?
Mr. Huizenga. Thank you, sir. You did point out we were on
the front page of USA Today in your opening remarks, and I will
try to address that. It's a complicated, extremely large
facility, of course, with many different individual facilities.
The good news is that four out of the five major facilities
we're making steady progress on. I think it's fair to say that
we do have some issues with the final one, the pretreatment
facility, and we're indeed in the process now of trying to work
through some testing to ultimately prove that that facility
will be able to mix these complicated wastes in a satisfactory
fashion.
So we are making steady progress on some, we're working on
testing for the others. The fiscal year 2013 funding level will
allow us to continue to make steady progress and do this
testing and also work on the tank farms that are associated
with this facility that will ultimately feed liquid into these
facilities. So we think we have a solid strategy for success.
Senator Nelson. What's the status of the salt waste
processing facility at the Savannah River Site? I understand
there may have been some cost overruns and some delays in that
project.
Mr. Huizenga. Yes. As a matter of fact, I was down there
earlier this week with Under Secretary D'Agostino. We had an
opportunity to walk through that facility personally and ask a
lot of questions, make sure that we are indeed understanding
what needs to be done.
The biggest problem that we have there, frankly, is we have
some complicated vessels that are being manufactured and we've
had some delays in receipt of those vessels. We were supposed
to have received them late last year. Now it looks like we'll
be receiving them in the next month or so.
I know the Under Secretary made a trip to this vendor to
actually make sure that they were focused. We haven't had this
discussion with Admiral Donald, but I know they're doing some
work for him as well. So they have a lot of work on their plate
and we're trying to get them to make sure that they deliver.
But the bottom line is we've had to leave a hole in the top
of the facility and do some work-arounds in order for us to be
able to lower those vessels. There are 10 of them, 6 in one
area and 4 in another--in order to lower those down onto the
floor and then go ahead and put the ceiling or the roof in
place.
So we don't know for a fact what it's going to do to our
schedule. We still think that we can complete this some time
around October 2015, which is our baseline. When we get the
vessels in, we're going to have to address what it will do to
our overall costs.
Senator Nelson. In the 2011 DOE financial report, it lists
the cleanup liability for former Cold War production sites at
some $250 billion over the next 75 years. Some of these are
highly contaminated sites that will require, once cleaned up,
even continued monitoring into perpetuity. We're now in a world
of flat or declining budgets, and yet your office is driven by
legally enforceable milestones with the States where many of
these sites, like Hanford, reside in.
How are we going to make it work? How are we going to, over
a longer strategy, make the dollars work to meet the
obligations we've undertaken?
Mr. Huizenga. I think it's fair to say, Mr. Chairman, that
we're going to have to continue to look for efficiencies and
technology improvements, to look for basically some game-
changers in the way we do business as these budgets flatten
out. It's been tough for the last couple of years. I know
you've had a lot of things to balance up here, and we've indeed
had some reductions in our requests, and to that extent we're
looking now strategically across the complex at a way that we
might rebaseline our efforts over the next few years to
accommodate what is likely to be a flatter budget portfolio.
I think again there are some bright spots. When we were at
the Savannah River Site, we were talking to them about the fact
that they're developing some new solvents that will help remove
radioactivity from one vessel or one solution and bring it into
another one to be resolidified in these glass logs. There are
ways that you can do this that can actually increase the
effectiveness and reduce the time of operations of the
facilities by several years and save several billions of
dollars. So we're looking for ways to improve the way we're
doing business.
Senator Nelson. Obviously, that is going to be required,
because--and it's not to say that we can't get smarter as we
have more experience moving forward. So hopefully there will be
some cost savings achieved with better techniques as we learn
more about what we're doing.
Then finally, what's the status of the Greater-Than-Class C
waste environmental impact statement (EIS)? I understand this
type of waste is particularly troublesome and, as difficult as
everything else is, this is perhaps even more so.
Mr. Huizenga. We issued an EIS on the Greater-Than-Class C
waste in February 2011, and we conducted a 120-day public
comment period. We got over 5,000 comments. We're in the
process right now of reviewing those and taking those into
consideration. We hope to issue a final EIS later this year,
and we're going to consult with Congress, as is required by the
Energy Policy Act of 2005. When we develop our preferred
alternatives, we'll be up here talking to you about ways that
we hope to move forward.
This is another area of the synergies between NNSA and the
EM program, because ultimately when we can develop a preferred
place to dispose of these materials you know that NNSA has been
collecting materials that could be used for dirty bombs. Some
of those are Greater-Than-Class C, sealed sources, and those
we'd hope to be able to dispose of permanently and take them
out of harm's way.
Senator Nelson. I wish you good luck in doing that. While I
don't have a strong portfolio in science, I do have to point
out that I was president of the science club in high school.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Huizenga. We might come to you with some questions
then, sir. [Laughter.]
Senator Nelson. I knew a few things back then and that's
probably where it all stayed.
I want to thank you particularly, Admiral Donald, for your
continuing service over the years. Thank you for service to our
country. To all of you, thank you for what you're doing for our
country in a very vital area. We want to work with you, with
budgets. Obviously, we're going to ask serious, deep, probing
questions, deep for us at least, to try to understand more
about what it is you're doing and also how we can help you do
what you need to do to reduce the appropriations risk that you
always face. The requirement will be there. You need to have
the adequate resources to be able to meet those requirements,
and sometimes when they don't quite match, we need to work
together to find different ways of doing it.
So thank you all. The hearing is adjourned. Thank you.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Ben Nelson
national nuclear security administration
1. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, when Congress created the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) in 1999, its principal
concern was to create a semi-autonomous agency that was free from the
larger elements of the Department of Energy (DOE) so that it could
focus on its core defense-related missions. In fact, if you read the
first sentence of the statute it says, ``There is established within
the Department of Energy a separately organized agency to be known as
the National Nuclear Security Administration.'' Would you please
provide legislative suggestions or technical drafting assistance on how
the NNSA can still report to the Secretary of Energy but be more
independent of the rest of the DOE, similar to say the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC)?
Mr. D'Agostino. The legislative decision raised in your question is
clearly within the congressional prerogative. Although we are committed
to assisting Congress in legislative endeavors, there has not been
sufficient time to provide the appropriate analysis and support for
your request at this time. We will keep you apprised as we review all
the potential alternatives and impacts that are identified.
2. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, there has been concern in the
NNSA about satisfying the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
(DNFSB) recommendations. This board is an advisory body, not a
regulator. Some in either Department of Defense (DOD) or NNSA have gone
so far as to suggest NNSA and DOE be regulated by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC). Do you support having NNSA regulated by
NRC?
Mr. D'Agostino. As you indicated, DNFSB is an advisory agency
instead of a regulatory authority. This relationship was designed for
conditions that existed in DOE over 20 years ago. Since that time,
there have been studies that evaluated the feasibility of the NRC
regulating DOE/NNSA. The consistent conclusion from those studies has
been that NRC regulation is technically feasible, but it is unclear
whether one of the several regulatory models used by the NRC would
improve safety, improve efficiency, or save money. Given that there is
no clear conclusion that a change of regulatory model would be an
improvement, I neither support nor oppose regulation of the NNSA by the
NRC. I do believe that any decision to change our regulatory approach
should be preceded by a thorough evaluation of the different regulatory
models available at the NRC and specifically how they would apply to
NNSA, and whether there would be clear benefits. I would be reluctant
to support a change without first identifying the problem the change
was intended to fix, and being able to demonstrate that the change
would provide benefits that justified the expense.
3. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, the Secretary of Energy has
three exemptions to DNFSB recommendations: (1) national security; (2)
technical reasons; or (3) they are cost prohibitive; and that DNFSB is
to consider cost as one of its factors but not the sole one. Do you
believe this is a sound approach?
Mr. D'Agostino. I believe that our overall approach to responding
to board advice, and the provisions that enable us to decline their
advice, if warranted, is sound and is in keeping with our statutory
responsibility for the safety of our operations.
As you indicated, there are three bases by which the Secretary of
Energy can decline a DNFSB recommendation. We consider them when
responding to a board recommendation, and there have been very few
cases where the Secretary has rejected a board recommendation, even in
part. In more than 20 years of oversight by the DNFSB, there have been
only three recommendations that have been rejected in part (1995-2 on
integrated safety management; 2011-1 on safety culture; and 2010-1 on
the standards/regulations covering safety bases).
Asking the Secretary to reject a safety recommendation, even when
DOE/NNSA believes that it is appropriate, is not something we undertake
lightly. Significant internal debate always precedes such an action.
chemistry and metallurgy research replacement facility
4. Senator Nelson. Dr. Cook, my understanding is that DOE worked
with DOD to transfer some $8 billion of budgetary authority over the
next 10 years to perform a number of tasks, one of which was to
complete design and begin construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research Replacement (CMRR) Facility and commence operations by 2022.
As part of this transfer, my understanding is that DOE was to plan to
produce 50 to 80 pits per year in 2022 in the Los Alamos PF-4 facility,
which makes the plutonium pits. Do you still believe the ability to
produce 50 to 80 pits per year is a valid requirement?
Dr. Cook. There were a number of factors DOD and NNSA considered
that informed the decision to seek a pit production capability of 50 to
80 newly manufactured pits per year. First, at an unclassified level,
the best estimate for minimum pit lifetimes in the U.S. stockpile is 85
to 100 years, and most pits are nearing half that age. There are many
uncertainties with regard to the pit lifetime estimates and performance
of aged pits (the details of which are classified) which all support
the prudent maintenance of a capability to manufacture pits to ensure
against technological surprise. Furthermore, adding modern safety and
surety capabilities to the majority of the enduring stockpile will
require capabilities to remanufacture and rework pits and pit
components. These factors have not changed, and therefore a pit
production rate of 50 to 80 pits per year is currently assessed to be a
prudent, long-term capability to achieve.
As noted in a letter from the Secretaries of Energy and Defense on
March 2, 2012, the programmatic modifications made as a result of the
requirement to operate within the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011
included deferring construction of the CMRR for at least 5 years. We
plan to employ a strategy of reusing existing pits at a rate of up to
125 per year and remanufacturing existing pit designs at a rate up to
20 to 30 pits per year to meet the short- to medium-term needs of
stockpile life extension programs (LEP). The timeframe to increase pit
manufacturing capacity will be determined by working closely with DOD,
and will take into account a number of factors, including cost, future
stockpile size, and specific LEPs for weapons systems.
5. Senator Nelson. Dr. Cook, will you have to renegotiate the 2022
date for making 50 to 80 pits per year based on your decision to defer
construction of the CMRR Facility?
Dr. Cook. The timeframe to increase pit manufacturing capacity will
be determined by working closely with DOD, and will take into account a
number of factors, including cost, future stockpile size, and specific
LEPs for weapons systems.
6. Senator Nelson. Admiral Donald, I understand there is another
spent fuel facility at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Can you
explain whether this facility can be used in place of the one you are
designing?
Admiral Donald. It is important to recognize the reasons underlying
Naval Reactors' (NR) need for the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization
Project. NR requires a new facility to handle spent nuclear fuel
because the existing Expended Core Facility (ECF) is over 50 years old,
does not meet current design standards, and carries escalating risk and
costs with each year of continued operations. Also, the existing ECF
does not have the capability to unload full-length aircraft carrier
fuel from M290 shipping containers.
At the INL, some naval nuclear fuel is currently stored in Building
666 at Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC [BL
666]), but that facility does not meet all necessary spent fuel
handling requirements. INTEC (BL 666) is not a viable permanent
replacement for the current ECF, as it lacks the size and capability to
safely receive, inspect, and process all spent naval nuclear fuel.
INTEC (BL 666) is also not an acceptable temporary solution for
many reasons. Primarily, it does nothing to address my long-term need
for a new facility. Further, with respect to carrier fuel unloading
capability, most of the water pits in INTEC (BL 666) are incapable of
receiving full-length aircraft carrier fuel. The two water pits that
are deep enough will not be empty for several years. Once those water
pits are free, several hundred million dollars in modifications such as
rail installation, crane procurement, and high-bay extension would be
required for conversion to handling aircraft carrier fuel. Even after
storage and initial processing in INTEC (BL 666), the aircraft carrier
fuel would still be transported to NRF for inspection and final
processing for dry-storage in a naval spent fuel canister. Further,
because of space limitations at INTEC (BL 666), submarine fuel would
still be handled at another facility.
On balance, use of INTEC (BL 666) is not cost effective, and does
not provide me with the long-term spent fuel handling and processing
capabilities I need to reliably support fleet submarine and aircraft
carrier needs.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman
pit production
7. Senator Lieberman. Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook, U.S. Strategic
Command (STRATCOM) has a validated requirement for the production of 50
to 80 plutonium pits per year starting in 2021 as part of the agreement
between DOD and DOE to transfer some $8 billion in budget authority
from DOD to DOE for modernization. The director of Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL) has stated that without the CMRR Facility he cannot
meet that requirement. Do you believe the 50 to 80 pit requirement is
valid?
Mr. D'Agostino. There were a number of factors DOD and NNSA
considered that informed the decision to seek a pit production
capability of 50 to 80 newly manufactured pits per year. First, at an
unclassified level, the best estimate for minimum pit lifetimes in the
U.S. stockpile is 85 to 100 years, and most pits are nearing half that
age. There are many uncertainties with regard to the pit lifetime
estimates and performance of aged pits (the details of which are
classified) which all support the prudent maintenance of a capability
to manufacture pits to ensure against technological surprise.
Furthermore, adding modern safety and surety capabilities to the
majority of the enduring stockpile will require capabilities to
remanufacture and rework pits and pit components. These factors have
not changed, and therefore a pit production rate of 50 to 80 pits per
year is currently assessed to be a prudent, long-term capability to
achieve.
As noted in a letter from the Secretaries of Energy and Defense on
March 2, 2012, the programmatic modifications made as a result of the
requirement to operate within the BCA of 2011 included deferring
construction of the CMRR Facility for at least 5 years. We plan to
employ a strategy of reusing existing pits at a rate of up to 125 per
year and remanufacturing existing pit designs at a rate up to 20 to 30
pits per year to meet the short- to medium-term needs of stockpile
LEPs. The timeframe to increase pit manufacturing capacity will be
determined by working closely with DOD, and will take into account a
number of factors, including cost, future stockpile size, and specific
LEPs for weapons systems.
Dr. Cook. I agree.
8. Senator Lieberman. Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook, what steps are
you taking to try to reduce the expected shortfall in pit production
capability and what production rate do you aim to achieve?
Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook. NNSA is assessing a planning
production rate of 30 pits per year by 2021. NNSA and LANL are
evaluating capabilities and approaches to support this planning rate
without CMRR Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) (at LANL and elsewhere in the
enterprise) and what investments are needed to increase capacity at
LANL's plutonium facility (PF-4).
9. Senator Lieberman. Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook, do you believe
that there is any risk that this stated 5-year delay to the CMRR
Facility will become lengthier or turn into a permanent cancellation?
Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook. In a time of fiscal austerity, such a
risk always exists; however, NNSA is committed to being responsible
stewards of both taxpayers' dollars and the nuclear security
enterprise. The decision to defer CMRR-NF construction for at least 5
years and move forward with Uranium Processing Facility (UPF)
construction is fully consistent with an independent DOD review of both
projects completed in 2011. As we develop plans for future budgets,
NNSA will continue to assess the most cost-effective delivery of
maintaining analytical chemistry, materials characterization, and
plutonium storage capabilities.
10. Senator Lieberman. Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook, how would you
address the pit production shortfall in that event?
Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook. The administration plans to address
the manufacturing shortfall by reusing existing pits. For the W76-1
LEP, we are reusing pits, and our current plans for the B61-12 LEP also
include pit reuse. NNSA is evaluating the technical viability of
possible additional pit reuse options for meeting stockpile needs, and
is working on cost estimates for such a pit reuse capability (which
would be in addition to manufacturing 30 pits per year) if the reuse
options require work in LANL's plutonium facility.
headquarters funding
11. Senator Lieberman. Mr. D'Agostino, I noticed a 66 percent
increase in the fiscal year 2013 NNSA request for headquarters funding
over the fiscal year 2012 appropriations. Can you describe what
comprises ``headquarters?''
Mr. D'Agostino. Funding allocated to headquarters is mainly
comprised of salaries and related expenses for NNSA Federal employees,
procurements that occur from our Washington, DC, area offices, legacy
contractor pension payments, and funding awaiting programmatic
decisions or competitive solicitation that will ultimately be
distributed throughout the NNSA and DOE complex during the year of
execution. For example, the fiscal year 2012 budget request for NNSA
showed approximately $942 million for headquarters in fiscal year 2012.
The estimate for fiscal year 2012 in the fiscal year 2013 budget
request is now $705 million, a reduction of 25 percent, largely
reflecting solidification of programmatic decisions and the initial
distribution of the funds from headquarters to NNSA and DOE sites/
contractors. It is anticipated a significant portion of the estimated
$1,175 million reflected at headquarters in the fiscal year 2013 budget
request will eventually be allocated to NNSA and DOE sites/contractors
as well.
Some examples of the scope associated with the estimated $1,175
million identified for headquarters are:
$283 million associated with NNSA Federal salaries and
related expenses within the Office of the Administrator
appropriation;
$247 million associated with Legacy Contractor
Pensions;
$150 million associated with the domestic uranium
enrichment research, development, and demonstration project
within Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation;
$35 million associated with identification of
plutonium storage alternatives within Readiness in Technical
Base and Facilities;
$41 million associated with platform and hardware
procurements within the Advanced Simulation and Computing
Campaign;
$30 million associated with implementing the NNSA
Network Vision (2NV) Strategy within the NNSA Chief Information
Officer Activities program;
$45 million associated with the DOE Working Capital
Fund across all programs; and
$15 million associated with Minority Serving
Institution initiatives across most programs.
When these procurements are issued, the funding will be spent at
various locations throughout the NNSA and DOE complex.
12. Senator Lieberman. Mr. D'Agostino, is any headquarters funding
directly supporting Weapons Activities, and if so, how much and what
does it support?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, approximately $626 million is directly
supporting the Weapons Activities programs. As noted above, much of
this funding will get distributed to the labs and plants during the
year of execution.
The funding identified at headquarters supports the following
programs:
efficiencies initiatives
13. Senator Lieberman. Mr. D'Agostino, early last year former
Secretary of Defense Gates announced that he was undertaking an
efficiencies initiative within DOD to find savings and invest them in
modernization. I believe that the principles behind Secretary Gates'
efforts are applicable to other Federal agencies. Have you undertaken
any efficiencies initiatives within NNSA? If so, please describe them
and the outcomes they have achieved.
Mr. D'Agostino. We also believe that the principles behind
Secretary Gates' efforts are applicable to other Federal agencies. That
said, NNSA is currently undergoing a governance reform effort in the
interest of increasing efficiency, eliminating redundancy, and
reexamining the requirements set to make sure requirements are not
overly burdensome and facilitate the safe, productive operation of the
national nuclear security enterprise.
One of the key undertakings that we are embarking on is balancing
oversight of safety, security, and business practices while allowing
flexibility and minimizing intrusive bureaucracy. This will require
sustained effort on the part of NNSA management and our private sector
partners.
NNSA, in partnership with DOE, has been working actively to enhance
the relationship between the laboratories, sites, and headquarters; to
enact a series of management reforms intended to improve the way we do
business; to increase efficiency; and to maintain safe, secure, and
responsible operations at our sites.
Here are examples of ongoing efforts at reshaping our relationship:
The Secretary's ``National Laboratory Director's
Council,'' which includes the NNSA Labs, was tasked with
identifying Burdensome Requirements for the DOE and NNSA. Of
the 28 identified to date by the Lab Directors, 25 have been
resolved, 2 are on hold at the request of the Directors, and 1
is still being worked.
The NNSA's Enterprise Operating Requirements Review
Board engages Lab and Plant Directors, Site Managers, and
Headquarters leadership to look at requirements and directives
in order to right-size them.
The Administrator's NAP-21 ``Transformational
Governance and Oversight,'' signed out last year, defined
principles, responsibilities, processes, and requirements to
help in transforming and improving governance and oversight. We
also develop implementation plans for each fiscal year to track
performance in meeting the NAP-21's Governance goals.
To maximize trust, the Administrator has initiated
monthly executive video teleconferences including the executive
core from labs, plants, and headquarters, and has hosted two
off-site retreats.
We believe that the current contractual arrangements will allow
NNSA to establish broad program objectives and goals and to capitalize
on the private sector expertise of our contractors, while giving them
sufficient flexibility to do their jobs efficiently and while holding
them accountable for results. We are undertaking the actions described
above to continuously improve relationships between laboratories,
sites, and headquarters and to improve the way we do business.
14. Senator Lieberman. Mr. D'Agostino, do you believe further
streamlining of NNSA is possible to find further savings to invest
elsewhere within the agency?
Mr. D'Agostino. The initial governance reform efforts have achieved
some significant streamlining in the Site Office and M&O contractor
interface. A number of DOE directives have been reviewed and some
balance restored between the degree of oversight and the acceptance of
risk by the program managers, such as myself and Dr. Don Cook. This
effort has cleared away some brush so that we can more clearly see
additional aspects of the problem. Through our governance initiative,
we are continually seeking additional opportunities to streamline and
improve the efficiency of our organization. I believe that the savings
from this approach would not only be in reduced direct Federal staff
expenses (salaries, travel, training) but also over time in the
opportunity for staffs at the M&Os to shift to more direct mission
support activities.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
memorandum of agreement on stockpile modernization
15. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino, according to the May 2010
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between DOD and DOE on the modernization
of the U.S. nuclear infrastructure, DOE agreed to fully fund the CMRR
Facility to complete construction in 2020 and ramp up to a minimum of
50 to 80 pits per year in 2022. According to the Office of Management
and Budget budget tables, over the next 10 years DOD will transfer $7.1
billion in budget authority to NNSA in support of this MOA. Given the
NNSA budget no longer meets the terms of the DOD/DOE agreement, does
NNSA intend to return that budget authority back to DOD?
Mr. D'Agostino. No, the transfer in budget authority is intended to
assist NNSA in meeting DOD requirements. The decision to defer the
CMRR-NF for at least 5 years is an adjustment to one element of the
plans to meet multiple DOD requirements called for in the Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) and represents the best use of available Federal
resources.
The May 2010 MOA between DOD and DOE on modernization of the U.S.
nuclear infrastructure delineated funding for a number of important
efforts defined in the NPR. Beyond the CMRR-NF and pit production
efforts, the MOA also included the B61 and W78/W88 LEPs, completion of
W76-1 production, the UPF at Y-12, and the development of capabilities
for the conduct of future LEPs to increase margin and enhance warhead
safety, security, and control.
The program envisioned at the time of the MOA has been revised for
a number of reasons. The total level of resources available to pursue
these efforts for fiscal year 2013 and beyond is not what was
envisioned in fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 due to the new
fiscal climate reflected by the BCA. Additionally, the cost of pursuing
some of these efforts, such as the B61 and W78/W88 LEPs and CMRR-NF,
increased as planning for these efforts matured. The revised program
reflected in the President's budget request represents the best use of
the available Federal dollars and has been coordinated with DOD through
the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC). We continue to work with DOD to
refine cost data on these and other Stockpile Stewardship programs.
16. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino, if NNSA no longer intends to
honor the terms of the MOA, why should DOD--which the budget proposes
be cut by $487 billion over the next 10 years--be taxed to supplement
baseline DOE responsibilities?
Mr. D'Agostino. Even though recent budgetary constraints have
certainly caused scheduling changes and adjustments to the original MOA
project timelines, DOD is still the major beneficiary of these efforts.
Beyond two major construction projects, the MOA also included the B61
and W78/W88 LEPs, completion of W76-1, and production and development
of technologies for the conduct of future LEPs to increase margin and
enhance warhead safety, security, and control. NNSA will continue to
work with DOD to meet their requirements while performing within
available resources.
chemistry and metallurgy research replacement facility requirement
17. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino, in a question for the record
from our hearing last year, I asked you to highlight some of the
consequences for not pursuing the CMRR Facility at Los Alamos.
Specifically, I asked how a delay in construction would impact both
future LEP and NNSA's ability to meet existing STRATCOM requirements.
In response, you said that: ``NNSA will not be able to achieve the
required 80 pits per-year rate until the new CMRR Facility is in
operation. This capability is required for the W78 LEP by 2021.'' Is it
correct that your budget assumes that an 80-pit-per-year rate is no
longer necessary for the W-78 LEP? If so, what has changed in less than
1 year to suggest that a capability you told me was once required for
the W78, now no longer is?
Mr. D'Agostino. Recent budgetary constraints in the form of the BCA
have caused NNSA to reevaluate the W78 LEP schedule and the scope of
the design options for the LEP. As the study has progressed, NNSA has
become increasingly confident that, at least for the W78 LEP, pits can
be reused rather than remanufactured. There will certainly be added
risk as the technical details of reusing pits requires further
evaluation, but this risk, and the risk of delaying CMRR, were assessed
to be manageable. Being able to produce 50 to 80 newly manufactured
pits per year would have allowed us to avoid making the decision to
accept that risk, but budgetary realities have driven us in a different
direction. Consistent with this production rate change, we have also
slipped the schedule for the W78, with the first production unit
required in 2023 rather than 2021. We believe the decision to push back
first production on the W78 by 2 years and delay CMRR and the ability
to produce 50 to 80 newly manufactured pits by 5 years, though not
ideal, is the most prudent use of our available resources.
18. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino, is it correct that one of your
justifications for indefinitely deferring CMRR Facility is that you
assume that new pits will not be required for the W78 LEP and that you
will be allowed to cannibalize pits currently held in the strategic
weapons reserve?
Mr. D'Agostino. The decision to defer CMRR-NF for at least 5 years
was not driven by assumptions for the W78 LEP. Again, CMRR-NF was never
intended to produce pits--pit production is within Plutonium Facility
4--but would provide the analytical chemistry and materials
characterization necessary to qualify the pits. Deferral was driven by
budgetary and strategic decisions, as well as the NNSA taking the
opportunity to utilize existing infrastructure, ie: Radiological
Laboratory, Utility, and Office Building (RLUOB) under the modern dose
conversation factors which increased the amount of plutonium we could
characterize in the new lab.
Our W78 Life Extension Study, Phase 6.1, concept study includes pit
production and reuse options to evaluate program cost, ability to meet
design requirements, and production capability. All three of these
constraints will factor into our final decision on newly produced or
reuse pits. At this phase, we have not made any assumptions but, we
must consider the budget, and therefore production, constraints we are
facing regarding pits.
19. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino, has DOD, the NWC, or the White
House made a policy decision that the only option to be considered for
the W78 is the reuse of pits currently held in the strategic hedge? If
not, is your decision to indefinitely defer CMRR Facility limiting the
options of future policy decisions?
Mr. D'Agostino. To date, we continue to follow the policy outlined
in the 2010 NPR report to look at reuse, refurbishment, and replacement
options to ensure the labs have maximum flexibility and the full range
of options. We have not received any external policy decisions
regarding limiting pit options for the W78/88 common warhead. NNSA is
conducting analysis to determine how we can increase our planned
capacity for remanufacturing war reserve pits. We will retain options
for pit reuse up to 125 per annum and remanufactured pits up to 20 to
30 per annum. We believe that this set of options will enable the W78/
88 LEP to be conducted effectively.
20. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino, am I correct in understanding
that the most recent NPR states the full range of LEP approaches will
be considered, including the replacement of nuclear components?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, while the NPR is clear that the United States
will give preference to nuclear component refurbishment or reuse, it is
equally clear that the full range of options will be considered for
each warhead LEP, including replacement of nuclear components. As noted
in their April 9, 2010, statement on the NPR, the laboratory directors
affirmed that this approach ``provides the necessary technical
flexibility to manage the nuclear stockpile into the future with an
acceptable level of risk.''
21. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino, in another question for the
record from our last hearing less than 1 year ago, I asked you how a
delay in CMRR Facility could impact future LEPs. In response you
stated: ``the safety, security, and environmental issues associated
with the aging existing facilities are mounting, as are the costs of
addressing them . . . in the event that [existing] facilities had to be
shut down due to safety, security, or environmental concerns, the loss
of workforce and critical skills would be considerable, and it would
likely be extremely expensive to restart operations.'' What
requirements have changed in less than 1 year to justify the indefinite
deferral of CMRR Facility?
Mr. D'Agostino. The BCA required difficult program choices,
including the deferral of CMRR-NF construction for at least 5 years. I
would note that the question for the record you reference from last
year concerned not only CMRR-NF, but UPF, which is being accelerated to
address the risks you cite. The decision to defer construction of the
CMRR-NF still provides for the planned orderly phase-out of program
activities from the CMR building, concluding in approximately 2019.
During the deferral period for CMRR-NF construction, NNSA is focused on
ensuring our plutonium needs are met by using the capabilities and
expertise found at existing facilities. Maximizing use of existing
facilities will allow us to ensure uninterrupted plutonium operations
while focusing on other key modernization projects. While this path is
not ideal, and likely not sustainable for the long-term, the risk to
plutonium operations was assessed to be manageable--though NNSA is
examining where additional investments are required for this strategy
to be execute successfully. More broadly, this plan was assessed to be
the most prudent path forward given budget constraints.
cost of nuclear construction
22. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino, as I mentioned in my opening
remarks, indefinitely deferring the facility at Los Alamos while also
increasing funding for the multibillion dollar facility at Y-12 sends
the wrong message. It perpetuates the status quo mentality that
everything nuclear has to be cost prohibitive. It also validates the
out-of-control risk aversion that has ballooned cost. As of March 2012,
how much to date has been spent on studying and designing the CMRR
Facility?
Mr. D'Agostino. A decision has been made to defer CMRR-NF
construction for at least 5 years, but not indefinitely. Through March,
the CMRR project has spent approximately $362 million on design of the
NF to reach a design maturity of approximately 80 percent. Closing out
NF design efforts in fiscal year 2012 will inform future projects by
improving the application of safety requirements in the design of
nuclear facilities and enhancing our understanding of the seismology at
Los Alamos. A part of the CMRR project, the RLUOB, is now complete and
preparing for finishing equipment installation and beginning operations
in fiscal year 2013.
23. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino, as of March 2012, what are the
current cost estimates for the UPF at Y-12?
Mr. D'Agostino. The current cost range for the UPF is $4.2 to $6.5
billion as reported in the construction Project Data Sheet. The project
baseline for cost and schedule will be established at Critical
Decision-2 which is scheduled for the end of fiscal year 2013.
24. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino, what specific steps are you
taking to ensure affordability?
Mr. D'Agostino. NNSA has, and will continue to have, external
reviews that evaluate project cost-saving opportunities as the design
matures. To ensure the costs of the UPF project remain affordable, NNSA
is in the process of revising the execution plan to construct the
building and support systems and phase installation of process
equipment according to a priority of the processes at greatest risk of
failure. Moving capabilities out of Building 9212 are of the highest
priority.
25. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino, what cost-savings measures
have you considered?
Mr. D'Agostino. The project has an ongoing effort to seek
opportunities to reduce costs without compromising safety, security,
and continuity of capability. To name a few, the project is exploring
options in project acquisition, technology development, reduction of
existing security areas, and optimization of phases of construction.
NNSA has recently created the Office of Acquisition and Project
Management which is an independent organization that combines critical
elements of project execution oversight and is dedicated to ensuring
that costs and schedules are validated and maintained through the life
of a project. Under this new project oversight strategy, NNSA has
emphasized that construction contractors for all construction projects,
including UPF, are accountable to meet milestones, deliverables, safety
and security elements, and cost with annual monetary incentives. In
addition, NNSA has hired a new Federal Project Director, John
Eschenberg, to lead the design and construction efforts for the Y-12-
based UPF in Oak Ridge.
26. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino, are there any cost-savings
measures you haven't considered because of government regulation or
legislative restrictions?
Mr. D'Agostino. NNSA has not eliminated any cost-saving measures
from consideration due to government regulation or legislative
restrictions, and continues to seek cost-savings opportunities.
27. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino, given your proposal to
indefinitely defer CMRR Facility, what steps will you take to ensure
that the hundreds of millions of dollars that were spent designing this
facility will not go to waste?
Mr. D'Agostino. Through March, $32 million has been spent on design
of the CMRR-NF. The CMRR-NF design will continue until the project
achieves a substantially complete design in 2012. The decision whether
or not to construct the CMRR-NF has yet to be made. The strategy for
CMRR-NF is to defer construction for at least 5 years. Closing out NF
design efforts in fiscal year 2012 will inform future projects by
improving the application of safety requirements in the design of
nuclear facilities and enhancing our understanding of the seismology at
Los Alamos. Moreover, the CMRR-NF design and other alternatives will be
evaluated over the next 5 years to determine the most effective
approach to sustain the plutonium capability.
new plutonium strategy
28. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook, in your prepared
statement you state that the decisions made were in ``close
consultation with our national laboratories and national security
sites.'' However, I understand that it was not until the day of the
budget release that NNSA sent a memo to Los Alamos informing them of
the decision to cancel the CMRR Facility and requesting that they
develop a plan within 60 days for implementing a new NNSA plutonium
strategy. I understand this new strategy will utilize a number of
various facilities, some of which will require additional investments
to prepare, and will require the shipment of plutonium across a large
portion of the southwest. Some estimate that your alternative plutonium
strategy will cost at least $500 million over the next 5 years. As of
March 2012, has a cost benefit analysis taken place confirming that the
long-term cost implications of deferring CMRR Facility over the next 5
years will be significantly less than the costs of pursing an
alternative strategy?
Mr. D'Agostino. NNSA tasked LANL to develop high-level plans to
evaluate the implications for our plutonium capability in the event
that construction of the CMRR-NF was delayed, considering several
options and alternatives. Although preliminary estimates of cost for
options and alternatives are under development for consideration, as of
March 2012, no cost benefit analysis has been completed, and NNSA will
continue to evaluate costs of alternatives and options with LANL
through the fiscal year.
Dr. Cook. Planning actions were underway in late 2011 regarding
options for the B61-12 LEP, the UPF, and the CMRR-NF, once the BCA of
2011 was passed. The letter requesting formal planning and evaluation
by LANL was released as soon as the President's budget request for 2013
was no longer embargoed.
29. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook, as of March 2012,
what studies have taken place to validate that the new proposed plan is
viable?
Mr. D'Agostino. NNSA tasked LANL to develop high-level plans to
evaluate the implications for our plutonium capability in the event
that construction of CMRR-NF was deferred, considering several options
and alternatives. As of March 2012, NNSA has not dispositioned,
selected, or validated the viability of any option or alternative, but
will continue to work towards a preferred alternative and assess
viability throughout the fiscal year.
Dr. Cook. I agree.
30. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook, as of March 2012,
can you certify today that the cost of implementing the new strategy
will be cheaper and safer than the cost of proceeding with CMRR
Facility?
Mr. D'Agostino. Total cost impacts associated with deferral of NF
construction are not known at this time. As NNSA moves forward with the
analysis of recommendations from LANL to provide for CMRR-NF
capabilities using existing infrastructure, it will weigh recommended
options against current fiscal realities. NNSA always considers nuclear
safety as a high priority in all aspects of the enterprise to include
plutonium production.
Dr. Cook. I agree.
31. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook, I understand that
the budget does not include funding to increase PF-4 capacity from 11
per year to the 20 to 30 claimed by the administration, is that
correct?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes. The fiscal year 2013 President's budget
includes a minimum sustainment profile to support the manufacturing
process transition from W88 pits to W87 pits, but not any funding to
increase capacity.
Dr. Cook. I agree.
32. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook, do we know for
certain if pits stored at Pantex can be reused or how much it will cost
to make that determination?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, we do know for certain that some of the pits
stored at Pantex can be reused. The cost for reuse in a particular
weapon and certification of pit reuse options in a LEP depend on the
design of the LEP. The total cost for certification of existing pits in
new systems has not yet been determined. Without completing a 6.2/2a
study, the cost for certification of a remanufactured pit into a new
system would also be undetermined.
Dr. Cook. I agree.
33. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook, is it true that
the budget does not include funding to analyze this?
Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook. The budget does include funding which
will allow for preliminary evaluation of technical options and
associated costs. These results will be reflected in the 2014 and
subsequent budget requests.
issues with a pit reuse strategy
34. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook, is it true that
old pits generally do not meet some modern requirements and that
existing pits typically considered for reuse are already between 20 and
50 years old?
Mr. D'Agostino. Existing pits that are candidates for reuse span a
variety of ages. Not all of the existing pit types are the best
candidates for future LEP designs. However, this is more due to
physical characteristics (e.g., the fact that they have been designed
to function using conventional high explosive rather than designed for
insensitive high explosive) and not their age. We have several existing
pit types that are viable to meet requirements for modernized LEP
designs.
Dr. Cook. I agree.
35. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook, is it true that
there are a fixed number of existing pits and pit types and that not
every pit type is compatible with every weapons system type?
Mr. D'Agostino. It is true that there is a finite quantity of
existing pits and pit types. Not every existing pit type is a candidate
for reuse to modernize existing systems.
Dr. Cook. I agree.
36. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook, is it true that
there is a risk that an approach to mix and match pits and weapon types
could exhaust the available supply of a given pit type, limiting
stockpile options?
Mr. D'Agostino. We continue to review the viability of pit designs
to support future reuse and modernization of the stockpile. Our
analysis includes the quantities necessary to support the full scope of
a LEP including sufficient quantities to support system qualification
and destructive evaluation for an associated stockpile evaluation
program. When we consider reuse and refurbishment options, we include
in the analysis the flexibility and additional capability to produce
prior designs at the level of 20 to 30 new pits annually.
Dr. Cook. I agree.
national academy of sciences study
37. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino, in a recently published study
authorized by this committee in the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010, the National Academy of Sciences
characterized the relationship between NNSA and the weapons labs by a
persistent level of mistrust exacerbated by poor communications and
lack of transparency at the highest levels. Do you agree with the
study?
Mr. D'Agostino. We are continuing our efforts to reduce
administrative burdens and increase transparency, and therefore
building trust through governance reform. We are committed and
energized to continue to make improvements in NNSA oversight efforts
and in rebuilding trust in the NNSA/laboratory relationship.
38. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino, what do you believe should be
done to overcome the issues raised in the study?
Mr. D'Agostino. One of the key undertakings that we are embarking
on is balancing oversight of safety, security, and business practices
while allowing flexibility. This will require sustained effort on the
part of NNSA management and our private sector partners.
NNSA, in partnership with DOE, has been working actively to enhance
the relationship between the laboratories, sites, and headquarters to
improve the way we do business; to increase efficiency; and to maintain
safe, secure, and responsible operations at our sites.
We believe that the current contractual arrangements will allow
NNSA to establish broad program objectives and goals and to capitalize
on the private sector expertise of our contractors, while giving them
sufficient flexibility to do their jobs efficiently and while holding
them accountable for results. We are undertaking the actions to
continuously improve relationships between laboratories, sites, and
headquarters and to improve the way we do business.
improving relationships
39. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino, one key recommendation of the
bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission (SPC) focused on the current
NNSA governance structure and the determination that it is ``not
delivering the needed results.'' To address this shortfall, the SPC
recommended that Congress should amend the NNSA Act to ``establish the
NNSA as a separate agency reporting to the President through the
Secretary of Energy.'' Do you agree with the SPC's findings? If yes,
how do you believe we should reform NNSA governance? If not, why not?
Mr. D'Agostino. We are investigating ways to reduce the
administrative burden and increase flexibility for management and staff
operating our mission facilities. NNSA has, however, faithfully
delivered on all national security requirements, and will continue to
do so through any transition in governance structure.
We believe that the current contractual arrangements will allow
NNSA to establish broad program objectives and goals and to capitalize
on the private sector expertise of our contractors, while giving them
sufficient flexibility to do their jobs efficiently and while holding
them accountable for results. We are undertaking the actions described
above to continuously improve relationships between laboratories,
sites, and headquarters and to improve the way we do business.
environmental management
40. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino and Mr. Huizenga, the fiscal
year 2013 request for Environmental Management (EM) is $5.49 billion,
almost $500 million more than the level appropriated in fiscal year
2012. Given EM funding is a part of security spending, how do you
justify large increases for EM and a $371 million reduction from the
funding level planned for fiscal year 2013 in the fiscal year 2012
budget for the weapons program? It appears to me that national security
requirements are being traded for environmental cleanup.
Mr. D'Agostino and Mr. Huizenga. The fiscal year 2013 request for
the Defense Environmental Cleanup account is $5.49 billion. This amount
includes $463 million that would be transferred from the General Fund
to be deposited into the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and
Decommissioning Fund--netting to zero in the request. There is no
programmatic increase of $463 million. The total fiscal year 2013
request for the EM program is $5.65 billion, which is a reduction of
$60 million from the fiscal year 2012 enacted level of $5.71 billion.
41. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino and Mr. Huizenga, a January
2012 front page USA Today article on the cleanup project at Hanford
painted a very troubling picture of the decade-long, multi-billion-
dollar symbol of what is wrong with the EM program. According to the
article, the Waste Treatment Plant's (WTP) $12.3 billion price tag is
not only triple original estimates but is ``well short of what it will
cost to address the problems and finish the project.'' What will it
cost and how much more time will it take to finish this project?
Mr. D'Agostino and Mr. Huizenga. Today, the WTP Project is over 62
percent complete, and DOE has directed the WTP Project contractor to
develop a Baseline Change Proposal projecting the total project costs
and schedule for completing the capital project. This proposal should
be completed by the fall of 2012. Until we receive the Baseline Change
Proposal from the contractor, and conduct our own independent
government cost estimate that will serve as the basis for the
independent review of that proposal, we are unable to address potential
cost and schedule changes. DOE remains committed to working with
Congress and its stakeholders to complete this important project and
reduce the risk posed by the tank waste at Hanford.
42. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino and Mr. Huizenga, given the
complexity of a high-risk, one-of-a-kind NF, why was a design-build
approach--which a Government Accountability Office official quoted as
being ``good, if you're building a McDonald's''--taken?
Mr. D'Agostino and Mr. Huizenga. DOE selected a design-build
approach because it vests a single contractor with the responsibility
to design, build, and commission the WTP under a single contract. One
entity is clearly responsible to assure the adequacy of design to meet
project performance expectations; to assure construction meets design
specifications; and to demonstrate, through commissioning, that
performance expectations are met. Another reason that a design-build
strategy was selected was that this approach allowed facilities to be
completed and commissioned earlier, meeting stakeholder desires to
begin processing waste as soon as possible. At the time the decision
was made to apply the design-build strategy to the WTP, no one
anticipated that the resolution of the technical issues would be so
complex. If DOE were presented with the same decision now with the
current level of knowledge, a key consideration would focus on the
development of a plan for closing the technical issues and validating
design.
43. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino and Mr. Huizenga, who is being
held accountable for this project?
Mr. D'Agostino and Mr. Huizenga. Accountability for the successful
completion and operation of the WTP Project extends to all levels of
DOE. This project has the attention of and support from the most senior
levels in DOE, and I assure you that they have clearly communicated
their expectations and hold me and my management team--which extends
down to the Federal Project Director of the WTP--accountable for safely
and successfully completing this project.
44. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino and Mr. Huizenga, why shouldn't
this project be terminated immediately or stopped to evaluate whether
the current plan is affordable?
Mr. D'Agostino and Mr. Huizenga. The safe cleanup of the 56 million
gallons of chemical and radioactive waste stored in underground tanks
at the Hanford Site in Washington State, only 7 to 10 miles from the
Columbia River, is one of the highest priorities for the Office of EM's
mission. This waste, the legacy of DOE's plutonium production mission
for the national defense, is highly complex, and is currently stored in
tanks that are decades beyond their design life. The WTP Project is the
cornerstone of EM's cleanup strategy, and it is of utmost importance
that we continue to move forward to get this solution in place and
operating to reduce the risk posed by Hanford's tank waste. Today, the
WTP Project is over 62 percent complete, and there is unmistakable
physical progress toward accomplishing the tank waste cleanup mission
at Hanford.
45. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino and Mr. Huizenga, in 2005,
Senator Graham was able to speed up cleanup at the Savannah River Site
(SRS) by 23 years and save taxpayers $16 billion. Section 3116 of the
2005 NDAA illustrates that there are, in fact, vehicles and legislative
options for reducing both cost and schedule of environmental cleanup
programs. What over the past year has EM done to address the staggering
and growing cost of cleanup and what can Congress and the executive
branch do to make sure that we get the job done without spending such a
staggering amount of taxpayers' dollars?
Mr. D'Agostino and Mr. Huizenga. The Office of EM continues to use
a risk-informed decisionmaking process to set priorities and, working
with our regulators, establish cleanup standards that are protective of
human health and the environment. EM also continues to incorporate
efficiencies into the processes used to complete environmental
remediation at all of the DOE sites. This is attained by developing new
technologies to address highly complex technical issues and
implementing contract strategies that achieve more cost-effective
cleanup while maintaining high safety standards.
Section 3116 has saved costs and reduced schedule in DOE's high-
level waste tank closure efforts at SRS and INL. Using this waste
determination process, DOE has closed at INL, 11 large tanks (300,000
gallons), and 4 small tanks (30,000 gallons), and at SRS, low activity
radioactive waste is being disposed of as saltstone in onsite vaults
and the closure process for the F Tank Farm, specifically, Tanks 18 and
19, began in April 2012.
At Oak Ridge, we have reevaluated the disposition of U-233 at the
Oak Ridge National Laboratory. In the first phase of the U-233 project,
approximately half of the inventory is being shipped directly without
processing to the Nevada National Security Site for disposal or storage
for future programmatic use. This alternative strategy significantly
reduces the capital asset requirements for the project and is estimated
to avoid hundreds of millions of dollars from the previous project cost
estimate.
Using funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009, EM has accelerated decommissioning and deactivation of excess
facilities and cleanup of contaminated areas to reduce the legacy
cleanup from over 900 square miles in 2009 to 318 square miles by the
end of fiscal year 2011; significantly below the end of the fiscal year
2011 target of 540 square miles. EM is using cost-effective processes
such as entombment of reactors to reduce the inventory of excess
facilities. The continued management and removal of legacy transuranic
waste from generator sites will directly support risk reduction and aid
in the goal of reducing site footprint.
EM continues to implement sustainable remediation remedies and to
explore new technologies that are more effective and efficient. EM is
continuing to look at using monitored natural attenuation and enhanced
attenuation to remove contaminants from groundwater, therefore
eliminating constructing and operating pump and treat systems, which
generally must operate for long periods of time, thereby reducing
costs. EM is also using new types of impermeable barriers to reduce the
spread of contamination in the subsurface, further reducing the cost to
remediate groundwater. At West Valley, NY, an 860-foot-long and 30-
foot-deep impermeable barrier was installed to prevent the spread of
strontium. At SRS, a gate and funnel type barrier was used to funnel
the groundwater into an area where it can be treated. At Hanford, EM is
using a new treatment material (resin) to remove chromium from the
groundwater. The use of this new resin removes about 15 times the
amount of chromium, therefore reducing the operating costs associated
with resin change out.
For high level waste, EM is investing in technologies to improve
glass formulation to increase the amount of radionuclides that can be
incorporated into glass at Hanford's WTP. EM is also developing a small
column ion exchange (SCIX) to be coupled with a rotary microfilter to
pretreat the radioactive tank waste at SRS and Hanford. Since 2008, EM
has been employing at SRS the Caustic-Side Solvent Extraction process
for removing radioactive cesium-137 from waste in a modular unit, and
will be implementing it at full scale at the SRS's Salt Waste
Processing Facility. The next-generation chemistry promises to be
transformational in its impact, especially when coupled with SCIX.
These technology advances accelerate waste processing to shorten the
schedule and reduce cost.
The EM program is large and complex. Many of the problems require
unique solutions to address the cleanup. EM will continue to find
innovative ways to address these problems, reduce risks, maintain
safety, and be protective of human health and environment while
continuing to explore innovative ways to reduce the cost.
ssbn(x) life-of-the-hull reactor
46. Senator Session. Admiral Donald, what is the current technology
readiness level for the life-of-the-hull reactor anticipated for the
SSBN(X)?
Admiral Donald. The reactor for Ohio replacement will incorporate
technologies proven over the last 30 years that provide greater energy
and a longer lifetime than any previous submarine core.
Development of the materials required to achieve the life-of-ship
core were part of previous research, design, and manufacturing efforts
that NR is evaluating today. The knowledge gained from these efforts
identified the additional steps needed to be ready for full-scale
production in support of Ohio replacement. NR is confident in the
ability of the material to support the life-of-ship core and will
validate through manufacturing demonstrations as part of efforts
supporting the Land-Based Prototype Refueling Overhaul.
While NR has not historically used technology readiness levels to
manage its technical efforts, the program judges that the life-of-ship
core material technology would represent a level 5 (component and/or
breadboard validation in a relevant environment). This assessment is
based on the fact that a prototype test cell incorporating the new
material has been inserted in an operating, land-based, reactor plant.
Manufacturing development at the ship-production scale needs to be
demonstrated, and will be derisked as part of the Land-Based Prototype
Refueling Overhaul.
47. Senator Session. Admiral Donald, how are the requirements for
the life-of-the-hull reactor design for SSBN(X) different from those in
current Virginia-class submarines?
Admiral Donald. SSBNs spend more time at sea than SSNs in order to
meet the requirements for strategic patrols and therefore are operated
by two distinct crews. Ohio replacement will also be designed for a
life of 42 years, vice 33 for Virginia. The Ohio replacement core will
operate at sea for more than twice as many days as Virginia's core. In
order to achieve this increase in energy and lifetime demand, NR is
designing a core with new materials to support the increased demands.
48. Senator Session. Admiral Donald, I understand that the current
milestone and decision point for determining the technical feasibility
of developing a life-of-the-hull reactor for the SSBN(X) will occur
this year. Are those studies on track?
Admiral Donald. Yes. Based on the materials analysis work completed
to date, NR is in the process of evaluating a recommendation from its
prime contractor laboratory to verify that the technology is
sufficiently mature for inclusion in the Ohio replacement core design.
Continued funding will be necessary to refine the Ohio replacement core
design and manufacturing capabilities as the core vendor increases to a
production scale and ensure that our projections regarding
manufacturing capability and core performance remain valid.
49. Senator Session. Admiral Donald, do you foresee any significant
hurdles which could preclude your ability to develop a life-of-the-hull
reactor for the SSBN(X)?
Admiral Donald. The funding levels for the Ohio replacement reactor
plant design and the associated work in the Land-Based Prototype
Refueling Overhaul in the President's budget for fiscal year 2013 for
fiscal years 2014 to 2017 are placeholders. The administration is
currently conducting the analysis required to develop a profile that
not only provides sufficient resources for Ohio replacement and the
Land-Based Prototype, but also meets the requirements of the BCA. If
the profile is funded from fiscal year 2014 and beyond, we do not see
any insurmountable technical hurdles.
50. Senator Session. Admiral Donald, if it is determined that a
life-of-the-hull reactor for the SSBN(X) is not possible, how will that
impact the overall number of boats required to meet STRATCOM's
requirements? In other words, would additional boats be required to
compensate for refueling?
Admiral Donald. With adequate funding, NR expects to deliver a
life-of-ship core for Ohio replacement. Without a life-of-ship core
though, two additional ships, at a cost of at least $10 billion, would
be required to meet STRATCOM's requirements due to the decreased
availability of the class during refuelings.
priorities regarding cmrr and upf
51. Senator Session. Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook, according to the
SPC report, four factors should be assessed when determining if CMRR
Facility or UPF is of greatest need. While the SPC concluded that
funding both would ``best serve the national interest,'' they stated
that if a decision were made to put one before the other, then CMRR
Facility at Los Alamos should take precedence. According to SPC:
A short-term loss of plutonium capabilities may hurt
the weapons program more than a short-term loss of enriched
uranium capabilities.
The Los Alamos plutonium facility makes a direct
contribution to maintaining intellectual infrastructure that is
in immediate danger of attrition.
Because the future size of the stockpile is
uncertain, projects that are relatively independent of
stockpile size should take priority . . . [and] the Los Alamos
plutonium facility and required independent of stockpile size.
Given the fiscal year 2013 budget decision to forgo the plutonium
facility at Los Alamos, perhaps indefinitely, why does the
administration proposal, once aligned with SPC, now contradict some of
the key findings?
Mr. D'Agostino. CMRR-NF construction is deferred for at least 5
years. The decision to defer CMRR-NF construction and move forward with
UPF construction is fully consistent with an independent DOD review and
recommendations for both projects completed in 2011. The decision to
accelerate the UPF project was made because NNSA and DOE concurred with
DOD's independent view that Building 9212 at Y-12 presents the highest
program and operational risk. In addition, all three weapons laboratory
directors were consulted frequently during the NNSA budget formulation
process, and reflects their recommendations. While the SPC Report
provides an excellent analysis of America's Strategic Posture, it was
published in 2009; prior to the BCA and revised project cost estimate
ranges for both CMRR-NF and UPF. Based on input from stakeholders and
reflecting increased fiscal austerity, NNSA decided to defer
construction of the CMRR-NF for at least 5 years.
Dr. Cook. I agree.
[Whereupon, at 4:42 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 21, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E.
Benjamin Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Nelson and Sessions.
Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations
and hearings clerk.
Majority staff member present: Jonathan S. Epstein,
counsel.
Minority staff member present: Daniel A. Lerner,
professional staff member.
Staff assistant present: Hannah I. Lloyd.
Committee members' assistants present: Ryan Ehly, assistant
to Senator Nelson; and Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator
Sessions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, CHAIRMAN
Senator Nelson. Senator Sessions is on the way, but we will
go ahead and start and then when he gets here, he will give his
opening statement.
So let me today call our hearing to order.
The purpose of today's hearing is to receive testimony on
the Department of Defense's (DOD) fiscal year 2013 budget
submission for its space activities.
First, let me thank today's witnesses for appearing before
the subcommittee. I know you are all busy and this subcommittee
very much appreciates the time that you are taking to testify.
Let me note that sitting at the table and not behind me, as
she once did, is Assistant Secretary Madelyn Creedon. Our
committee misses you very much. Welcome back, Madelyn. It is
good to have you. Congratulations again on your new position.
The President's fiscal year 2013 request for DOD space
programs totals about $9.7 billion, down roughly 17 percent
from fiscal year 2012. The decrease mainly represents the
completion and launch of several large satellites that were
under development in prior years. So for the first time in many
years, DOD has more satellites than launch capacity, indicating
that we seem to be overcoming several major acquisition
challenges in DOD's space programs. However, there are still
several concerns that I have that I hope we can discuss to
inform this subcommittee as we begin drafting our annual
defense authorization bill.
First and foremost is the way forward with our Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. Last fall, there was
a critical Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the
program's costs growth and the ability to let in new and
innovative launch providers for competition to drive down cost
without sacrificing our mission assurance.
Second, while we are now launching satellites into space on
a regular basis, we are failing to effectively utilize some of
them here on Earth.
The Space-Based Infrared Satellite (SBIRS) after many
delays and cost overruns is delayed in implementing its ground
system. The Navy's Mobile User Objective System (MUOS)
satellite does not have terminals that effectively use the
satellite's new frequencies.
The Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite
seems to win the prize with a signal so advanced that it has
caused the cancelation of the ground system that was to use it,
the Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T).
This cancelation has in turn affected our Air Force strategic
bombers' ability to have nuclear hardened, high data rate
communications with the satellite. The AEHF's new waveform also
caused a cancelation in the Air Force's ground element of their
Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network (MEECN). I
will be asking each of the witnesses and the GAO about this
issue and what we might do in future programs to avoid it.
Third, I understand that somehow in this budget we managed
to cancel two small but highly significant programs that have
been paving the way forward on space innovation with low cost
but responsive satellites.
The first program, the Space Test Program, was a $50
million a year effort that General Schriever himself, the
father of DOD Space, established in 1965 to provide a means to
launch innovative and high-risk satellites. This small program
led to groundbreaking satellites such as the Global Positioning
System (GPS), our first secure communications system called
MILSTAR, and finally our defense weather satellites. More
importantly, it has served as the venue for students at our
universities and military academies to launch and control
innovative satellites. Many of these same students who got
excited about space from this program are today's military
space leaders.
The second program is the Operationally Responsive Space
(ORS) program whose purpose is to develop innovative low-cost
and responsive satellites that are designed for tactical use by
our battlefield commanders and, if necessary, to rapidly
reconstitute our satellite system if it were to be disabled. I
understand that ORS-1 was developed from start to finish in
less than 3 years for a fraction of the cost of normal imagery
payloads and is being tasked directly by U.S. Central Command
rather than through the traditional tasking processes.
I would like to know how the Air Force came to this
decision and whether they understand its full impact. I
understand the Army has begun to experiment with small tactical
payloads as well. So I look forward to their testimony here to
compare and contrast what happened to these two programs.
The third issue is what DOD is going to do about preserving
its allocated radio frequency spectrum. We nearly lost a DOD
block of spectrum as a pay-for in a recent tax bill and this
committee worked very hard to avert what many in DOD saw as a
crisis. I would ask consent to enter into the record a letter
dated February 3, 2012, on this issue from the Deputy Secretary
of Defense, Ashton B. Carter.
[The letter and information paper of Secretary Carter
follows:]
Senator Nelson. It details clearly the impact of losing
portions of the frequency spectrum that DOD currently uses. I
will be asking each of you about this topic to ensure its
importance is known to our committee members.
Fourth and finally, I would like to learn about how we are
coordinating space activities both within the United States and
internationally. Madelyn, this is your area. I would like to
know where we are with the code of conduct for space. There are
concerns amongst some members that we are taking actions that
resemble a treaty. I know treaties are the realm of the
Department of State (DOS), but DOD must have views on the
implications of this code of conduct on its space operations.
It may not be a treaty, but as you well know, it will establish
international norms amongst nations.
Within the United States, I would like to know what we are
doing to coordinate our space efforts with the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA), National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
and the Intelligence Community. I understand the MDA is
proposing to launch and control up to 12 satellites to detect
missile tracks in space. How is this being coordinated and why
is MDA controlling a fleet of satellites? Past DOD efforts with
NOAA resulted in a failed weather satellite program. What did
we learn here that will apply to any future interagency space
efforts? It seems to me that the failure of past coordination
has resulted either in failed programs or large cost increases
to DOD. So I would like your help for us to understand what is
being done to avoid future problems in this area.
With that, it is my pleasure to turn the microphone over to
my good friend and ranking member, Senator Sessions, for his
opening statement. Let me say that we have had great
cooperation and friendship in dealing with these issues in the
past, and I know that we will continue to do that.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS
Senator Sessions. Absolutely. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
that good statement. You raise a lot of issues. I will be
brief.
I thank all of you for being here and for the work that you
do. Secretary Creedon, it is especially good to have you back
to this committee room where you have harassed other witnesses.
[Laughter.]
So maybe you deserve to get some harassment today or, at
least, help us harass other people.
I was pleased that the Defense Strategic Guidance released
in January recognized space as an area where DOD should
prioritize and protect new capabilities and investments. It is
a critical mission area. Our entire military depends on
communication and observation from satellites that we just must
have and be able to maintain even under hostile conditions.
Defense is not immune, however, to budget cuts in fiscal
year 2013. The budget request makes a number of difficult
choices, some of which I agree with and some of which cause me
concern. The fiscal year 2013 budget proposes significant
reductions to the Air Force budget which is the majority of
space funding, General Shelton, we calculate as being down 22
percent. You and I have talked about that. You feel like that
number may appear larger than it is based on some things that
will not be needed by this year. But still, it is a pretty big
number, Mr. Chairman. Given the magnitude of the reductions, I
look forward to hearing from our witnesses about how we are
doing for the future.
The defense space enterprise is benefitting today from
investments in the past over a long period of years, as it
shifts from a challenging period of development to what I hope
is a more stable period of production. Avoiding the challenges
of the past decade will again require continued smart
investments for the future.
Over the course of the past few years, DOD has taken a
number of important steps to address the rapidly growing costs
of space, both out of necessity driven by budget pressures and
NASA-related impacts on an already fragile industrial base,
their reductions. The cost of developing, procuring, launching,
and operating military space systems remains volatile.
Affordability remains the central concern and despite some
continuing instability, the fiscal year 2013 budget
appropriately recognizes that significant strides must still be
made to address the cost trends.
Mr. Chairman, you mentioned ORS. I share your concerns
there and maybe we can talk about that more.
I am also pleased to see that GAO is participating in the
hearing today. Good to see you. In recent months, GAO has
published a number of assessments on programs spanning the
defense space enterprise. GAO serves as an invaluable resource
to the committee, Congress, and the American taxpayer taking
into account some of GAO's recent recommendations on program
improvement. I look forward to hearing from our DOD witnesses
on what progress they have made in addressing these concerns.
Finally, during our last hearing, I raised concerns about
the administration's support for joining a European Union (EU)
code of conduct for space, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman. But
I am pleased and I believe I understand that since that
hearing, the administration appears to have concluded that
signing this code as originally drafted would not be in the
national interest unless significant modifications were made.
So I look forward to understanding the administration's plan
moving forward and specifically how DOD intends to protect our
national security interest in space.
There are other issues that I have concerns about,
including some matters not appropriate for an open venue. I
look forward to working with you to address those concerns. I
know that you will be cooperative with our staff as Secretary
Creedon used to benefit from when she was staff over here. So I
know you will work with us on those issues.
Thank you for joining us today. I look forward to the
testimony.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
We will start with the testimony today, and we will start
first with Secretary Creedon.
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELYN R. CREEDON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL STRATEGIC AFFAIRS
Ms. Creedon. Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, it is a
pleasure to be back here today, albeit a little bit strange to
be at this side of the table and not in markup. But it surely
is a pleasure, and thank you for the opportunity.
Just a year has passed since the release of the first-ever
National Security Space Strategy (NSSS), and I am pleased to be
here to discuss its implementation and the defense space
programs.
This past January, as you mentioned, DOD published new
Defense Strategic Guidance. This guidance was informed by the
space strategy and reinforces the strategy's main tenets. Both
documents stress the importance of operating effectively in
space, promoting responsible behavior, operating when possible
with allied and coalition forces, and increasing the resilience
of our space-based capabilities.
The goals serve a critical objective of DOD: protecting the
advantages we derive from a domain that is increasingly
congested, contested, and competitive. I would like to explain
briefly and expand briefly on three important aspects of our
space strategy.
First, the NSSS and the new Defense Strategic Guidance both
stress the need for resilience in our space capabilities in
response to emerging anti-access, area-denial challenges.
Resilience strengthens deterrence of attacks on our space
assets and enables us to continue vital missions in a degraded
space environment. Resilience is not the property of a single
system. Rather, it is the ability of a whole architecture to
provide functional capabilities that are necessary for mission
success despite environmental adversity or hostile action.
Resilience can be achieved in a variety of ways, including
hosted payloads, commercial augmentation, international
cooperation, and backup capabilities in other domains.
A second key aspect of our strategy is promoting
responsible behavior in space. In this area, DOD is playing a
leadership role by providing countries and companies across the
globe with warnings of potential collisions in space. In
addition, DOD supports DOS's efforts to work with the EU and
others to develop an international code of conduct for space
activities. A widely subscribed code can encourage responsible
space behavior and single out those who act otherwise while
reducing the risks of misunderstanding and misconduct.
The EU's draft is a promising basis for an international
code of conduct, but it is just that. It is just a starting
point. It focuses on reducing the risk of creating debris and
increasing the transparency of space operations. It is not
legally binding, and it does recognize the inherent right to
self-defense. Further, this draft addresses behavior rather
than unverifiable capabilities. Ultimately, it serves our
interests much better than legally binding agreements, and it
will not ban space weapons or any of the other capabilities
that we have proposed.
DOD is committed to ensuring that a code advances our
national security as we continue to support the development and
adoption of such measures moving forward.
Third, the strategy emphasizes the need for a strong space
industrial base. We can help energize the industrial base by
allowing U.S. industry to compete internationally in sales of
satellites and technologies that are already widely available.
Last year, DOD and DOS provided an interim assessment of space
export controls which concluded that commercial communication
satellites and related components with a few exceptions can be
moved from the U.S. munitions list to the Commerce Control List
without posing an unacceptable security risk. Such a transition
has dual benefits. It provides much needed support to the U.S.
space industry while also focusing controls and enforcement on
those technologies that are most sensitive and that are
critical to national security.
The forthcoming report, which we hope to have to Congress
in just a few weeks, will recommend the movement of additional
items to the Commerce Control List. This approach, higher
fences around fewer items, will require new legislation, and
your support will be needed.
Implementation of the NSSS is ongoing, and I am pleased
that DOD's new Defense Strategic Guidance reinforces our
approach. DOD needs your continued support to deploy necessary
capabilities, increase their resilience, and protect the
industrial base that underpins the critical domain and that is
so important to our national security.
Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Creedon follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Madelyn R. Creedon
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
subcommittee, I am pleased to join General Shelton, Dr. Zangardi, Mr.
Winokur, Lieutenant General Formica, and Ms. Chaplain to testify on the
Department of Defense (DOD) space program and policies. When Ambassador
Greg Schulte testified here a year ago, the Department, together with
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, had just released
the National Security Space Strategy (NSSS). Today, I am pleased to
discuss our progress in implementing that strategy.
U.S. space capabilities allow our military to see with clarity,
communicate with certainty, navigate with accuracy, and operate with
assurance. Maintaining the benefits afforded to the United States by
space is central to our national security, but the evolving strategic
environment increasingly challenges U.S. space advantages. Space is
increasingly congested, with over 22,000 trackable manmade objects in
orbit, contested, by an ever-increasing number of manmade threats, and
competitive, as the U.S. competitive advantage and technological lead
in space erodes.
However, the challenges of a congested, contested, and competitive
environment also present the United States with opportunities for
leadership and partnership. The joint DOD and Intelligence Community
NSSS released last year charts a path for the next decade to respond to
the current and projected space strategic environment.
The NSSS identifies three U.S. national security space objectives:
strengthen safety, stability, and security in space; maintain and
enhance the strategic national security advantages afforded to the
United States by space; and energize the space industrial base that
supports U.S. national security. Achieving these objectives will ensure
our military continued access to space-based assets national security
purposes.
The United States will retain leadership in space by strengthening
our national security, civil, and commercial space capabilities and
improving our collaboration with others worldwide. Leadership cannot be
predicated on declaratory policy alone. It must build upon a
willingness to maintain strategic advantages while working with the
international community to develop collective norms of responsible
behavior, collaborate on capabilities with international and industry
partners, and improve our coordination and information sharing.
The President and Secretary of Defense recently released the
Defense Strategic Guidance. This Guidance articulates priorities for a
21st century defense that protects the country and sustains U.S. global
leadership. It reflects the need for DOD and the military to adapt in
order to proactively address the changing nature of the security
environment and to reflect new fiscal realities. This Defense Strategic
Guidance identifies the need to operate effectively in space as one of
the missions most important to protecting national interests. Further,
it cites resilience of space capabilities as an important component in
projecting power in response to Anti-Access/Area Denial challenges.
The new Defense Strategic Guidance builds on and reinforces key
elements of the NSSS. The NSSS outlines five interrelated strategic
approaches to chart a future course for national security in space, and
many of those key approaches are also reflected in this Guidance. Both
documents emphasize strengthening norms of responsible behavior, and
finding opportunities to leverage growing civil, foreign and commercial
capabilities. Both detail the need to strengthen deterrence while
ensuring preparedness to operate in a degraded environment should
deterrence fail. Both highlight the importance of the industrial base,
as well as the need for innovative approaches and continued investment
in science and technology.
The Defense Strategic Guidance gives us renewed impetus to
implement the NSSS, and we are incorporating the key points of the
strategy into the departmental directives, guidance, and instructions.
These documents shape how the DOD conducts the space enterprise, and
changes here are integral to ensuring that we respond to this more
challenging space environment.
Additionally, we are further defining concepts like resilience as
they relate to space. An important facet of the NSSS's effort to
prevent and deter aggression against our space infrastructure is to
strengthen the resilience of our architectures to deny the benefits of
an attack. The strategy notes that resilience will also enable our
ability to operate in a degraded space environment. As we invest in
next generation space capabilities and fill gaps in current
capabilities, the strategy directs us to include resilience as a key
criterion in evaluating alternative architectures. Resilience is not
the property of a single system. Rather, it is the ability of a whole
architecture to provide functional capabilities necessary for mission
success despite environmental adversity or hostile action. Resilience
can be achieved in a variety of ways in space and beyond. These include
system protection, cross-domain solutions, leveraging foreign
capabilities, maturing responsive space capabilities, and hosting
payloads on a mix of platforms.
With this in mind, we developed a definition for resilience and
criteria for assessment. We can no longer think only in terms of cost
and capability. We must also consider whether that capability will be
available when the warfighter needs it and an adversary seeks to deny
it. This definition was reviewed and improved by the Defense Space
Council and is now being promulgated. Our definition is simple:
``Resilience is the ability of an architecture to support the
functions necessary for mission success in spite of hostile action or
adverse conditions. An architecture is ``more resilient'' if it can
provide these functions with higher probability, shorter periods of
reduced capability, and across a wider range of scenarios, conditions,
and threats. Resilience may leverage cross-domain or alternative
government, commercial, or international capabilities.''
We are implementing the definition and associated methodology for
evaluation through current and future architectures, as well as across
the Department's requirements, acquisition, and budget processes.
Resilience is a key criterion in ongoing architecture reviews for our
SATCOM, defense weather, and other satellite-based capabilities.
We are taking a leading role in international efforts to promote
responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space. The NSSS emphasizes that
the United States will promote the responsible, peaceful, and safe use
of space as the foundational step to addressing the congested and
contested space domain. A more cooperative, predictable environment
enhances U.S. national security and discourages destabilizing crisis
behavior. We are supporting development of data standards, best
practices, transparency and confidence-building measures, and norms of
behavior for responsible space operations. For instance, we are
participating, with other U.S. departments and agencies, in efforts
taking place in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space to further the long-term sustainability of space.
DOD supports U.S. efforts to work with the European Union and other
spacefaring countries to develop an international code of conduct for
space activities. A widely-subscribed Code can encourage responsible
space behavior and single out those who act otherwise, while reducing
risk of misunderstanding and misconduct. We view the European Union's
draft code of conduct for space activities as a promising basis for an
international code. The EU's draft focuses on reducing the risk of
creating debris and increasing transparency of space operations. It
already reflects U.S. best practices and is consistent with current
practices such as notification of space launches and sharing of space
data to avoid collisions. Significantly, the EU's draft is not legally
binding and recognizes the inherent right of self-defense. It focuses
on activities, rather than unverifiable capabilities, and better serves
our interests than the legally-binding ban on space weapons proposed by
others. In your recent letter to President Obama, you expressed
concerns about the consequences of developing a code of conduct for
space activities. As we go through the process of developing an
international code, we are committed to ensuring that any code of
conduct for space activities advances national security. The United
States has been closely consulted by the EU on its draft, and we will
continue to shape an international Code through active participation in
international negotiations. Additionally, DOD has assessed the
operational impact of the current draft and developed steps to ensure
that a final Code fully supports our national interests and strategy.
We are committed to keeping you informed on the process of developing
an international Code.
Working with international partners on encouraging responsible
behavior in space is only a part of how our engagement with other
spacefarers is evolving. The NSSS is driving changes in how we leverage
the capabilities of domestic, international, and industry partners. The
strategy directs us to pursue opportunities to partner with responsible
nations, international organizations, and commercial firms to augment
the U.S. national security space posture. Through these partnerships,
we can ensure access to information and services from a more diverse
set of systems--and advantage in a contested space environment.
Decisions on partnering will be consistent with U.S. policy and
international commitments and will consider cost, protection of sources
and methods, and effects on the U.S. industrial base.
We are expanding our international partnerships and coalition
operations. Space is a domain in which we once operated alone.
Increasingly, however, we need to think of operating in space as we do
in other domains: in coalition.
Allies like France, Japan, Germany, and Italy have increasing
space-based capabilities in a range of mission areas. By leveraging
their systems, we can augment our capabilities, add diversity and
resilience, and complicate the decisionmaking of potential adversaries.
Cooperation can also better enable coalition operations on land, at
sea, and in the air, which for our allies and us are increasingly
dependent on space-based capabilities.
The Air Force's Wideband Global Satellite (WGS) system provides a
good example. Earlier this year, the Air Force announced that Canada,
Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and New Zealand have joined with
the United States and Australia in a long-term multilateral
partnership. This effort will increase WGS capacity to U.S. warfighters
by jointly acquiring and launching a ninth WGS satellite vehicle, while
also providing system capacity to the partners. In addition to
increasing the size and capacity of the constellation,
internationalizing WGS also complicates the calculations of any country
contemplating interference with the system.
Led by General Kehler at U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), the
Department is working to transition today's Joint Space Operations
Center into a Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC). A CSpOC will
leverage allied space capabilities to augment our own and increase
resilience. It will support our ability to operate in coalition
operations as we do in other domains and bolster collective defense and
deterrence of attack against collective space assets. As the Department
works through this transition, we are building on recent space
exercises and cooperative activities, including tracking and analysis
of the recent Phobos-Grunt spacecraft re-entry,
Combined space operations require increased sharing of space
situational awareness (SSA) and operational information. Earlier this
year, the Secretary of Defense transferred to the Commander of STRATCOM
his authority to enter into SSA data sharing agreements with foreign
governments. This compliments STRATCOM's existing authority to
negotiate SSA sharing agreements with commercial satellite operators.
With the extension of this authority to foreign governments, the United
States will be able to better assist partners with current space
operations and lay the groundwork for future cooperative projects. The
increasingly challenging space environment means that an unprecedented
level of information sharing is needed among space actors, to promote
safe and responsible operations in space and reduce the likelihood of
mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust.
Commercial satellite owner/operators play an important role in SAA.
STRATCOM currently has more than 30 data sharing agreements with these
companies. This is just one of the innovative approaches to working
with commercial space operators and protecting the space industrial
base that is driven by the NSSS. We seek to foster a space industrial
base that is robust, competitive, flexible, healthy, and delivers
reliable space capabilities on time and on budget. We are exploring
innovative approaches, such as anchor tenancy and hosted payloads, and
pursuing strategic partnerships with commercial firms to stabilize
costs and improve resilience.
International advances in space technology have put increased
importance on reforming U.S. export controls to ensure the
competitiveness of the U.S. space industrial base while addressing
technology security. Reforming export controls will facilitate U.S.
firms' ability to compete in the international marketplace for
capabilities that are, or will soon become, widely available globally,
while strengthening our ability to protect the most significant U.S.
technology advantages. The NSSS reaffirms the necessity of these
reforms and echoes the National Space Policy's call for giving
favorable consideration for export of those items and technologies that
are generally available on the global market, consistent with U.S.
national security interests. Reforming export controls on space items
will increase U.S. manufacturers' ability to provide U.S. content in
foreign satellites, increase opportunities for partnering with foreign
manufacturers, and help energize the U.S. space industrial base.
The NSSS responds to an increasingly challenging space environment.
The changes detailed in the strategy will allow us to maintain and
enhance the strategic advantages we derive from space. Over the past
year, we have begun to implement those changes, both in our internal
policies, and in how we relate to other spacefaring entities. DOD's
fiscal year 2013 budget request, building on the new Defense Strategic
Guidance, helps further the implementation of these changes and
maintains the U.S. military's leading edge in space. The future
architectures that we are developing will increase resilience while
leveraging growing international and commercial capabilities in space.
The Department looks forward to working closely with Congress, our
allies, and U.S. industry to continue implementing this new strategy
for space.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
General Shelton.
STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM L. SHELTON, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR
FORCE SPACE COMMAND
General Shelton. Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions, it is an
honor to appear before you today as the Commander of Air Force
Space Command.
It is also my privilege to appear with these other
colleagues in the national security space enterprise.
The recently released Defense Strategic Guidance puts a
premium on space and cyberspace capabilities, and in accordance
with that guidance, the men and women of Air Force Space
Command maintain a singular focus, providing vital space and
cyberspace assets to the warfighter and to our Nation. Our
assured access to space and cyberspace is foundational to
today's military operations and to our ability to project power
whenever and wherever needed across the planet.
Accordingly, the fiscal year 2013 President's budget
invests in programs which enhance the effectiveness of our
space capabilities, namely missile warning, positioning,
navigation, and timing (PNT), satellite communications, space
situational awareness, and space launch. Admittedly, there is
an overall reduction in funding levels in the space budget, but
that is primarily due to fact-of-life programmatic changes
rather than deep cuts in our programs.
First, several of our key satellite programs will ramp down
development activity as they transition to procurement, and
this is a good news story.
Second, Congress funded two wideband global satellites in
fiscal year 2012, so there was no need to fund a satellite in
2013.
Third, the defense weather satellite system was canceled in
the fiscal year 2012 Defense Appropriations Act, so there is no
longer funding required for that program in this year's
President's budget.
In addition to these fact-of-life changes, we made some
difficult space program budget reductions as a result of the
$487 billion reduction mandated by the Budget Control Act
(BCA). This led to relatively minor cuts in some modernization
programs and a full restructuring of our approach to ORS and
space testing. We continue to pursue acquisition efficiencies
through our efficient space procurement actions for the AEHF
program and SBIRS.
Finally, we are committed to working closely with our
partners in the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and NASA
to lower the cost and bring stability to our launch programs.
I thank the subcommittee for your steadfast support of my
command and DOD's space programs. I look forward to your
questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of General Shelton follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. William L. Shelton, USAF
introduction
Mister Chairman, Senator Sessions, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, it is my honor to appear before you today as the
Commander of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC).
I am privileged to lead over 42,000 Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve
airmen; government civilians; and contractors delivering space and
cyberspace capabilities around the world for our Nation. The men and
women of AFSPC accomplish our mission at 134 worldwide locations, yet
we operate in the space and cyberspace domains where borders are
nonexistent. AFSPC space and cyberspace capabilities are integral to
joint warfighting, as well as the daily lives of all Americans, and our
professionals are passionate in their commitment to excellence and
mission success.
This year, AFSPC celebrates its 30th anniversary, and for over two
of those three decades, the command has been involved in continuous
combat operations. While AFSPC has evolved over the years, with the
inclusion and then departure of intercontinental ballistic missile
responsibilities, and the relatively new addition of cyberspace
operations, a single focus has endured: providing the best capability
possible to ensure success on the battlefield.
On January 5, 2012, the Secretary of Defense released a new
strategy document titled Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities
for 21st Century Defense. This new strategy identifies the need to
operate effectively in space and cyberspace by stating, ``Modern Armed
Forces cannot conduct high-tempo, effective operations without reliable
information and communication networks and assured access to cyberspace
and space.'' Space and cyberspace forces are key components to the
Nation's ability to project power. In concert with the strategy, our
mission is to provide resilient and cost-effective space and cyberspace
capabilities for the joint force and the Nation. AFSPC's activities are
guided by three priorities: support the current fight; control space
system costs and deliver capabilities on time and on budget; and for
the purpose of organizing, training and equipping, we are
operationalizing and normalizing Air Force efforts involving
cyberspace. From these general priorities we have adopted three goals
to ensure mission success: provide assured full spectrum space and
cyberspace capabilities; field resilient, integrated systems that
preserve the operational advantage; and provide highly skilled and
innovative space and cyberspace professionals. The remainder of the
statement is organized around these goals.
provide assured full spectrum space and cyberspace capabilities
Our ability to detect launches, track missiles, navigate with
precision, detect nuclear events, support military communications
requirements, improve space situational awareness, predict weather, and
perform operations in cyberspace are all foundational to the way the
joint force fights today. We depend on the vast capability of our 14th
Air Force, 24th Air Force (24 AF), the Space and Missile Systems Center
(SMC), Air Force Network Integration Center (AFNIC), Space Innovation
and Development Center (SIDC), and the Air Force Spectrum Management
Office (AFSMO) to acquire and operate these space and cyberspace
systems. The precision and responsiveness needed to deter aggression
and win America's wars stem from our ability to integrate and
synchronize capabilities across the full range of military operations
and all warfighting domains. In space, the command is deploying the
next generation of spacecraft and continuing to provide technologically
advanced capabilities. Also, we are pursuing international agreements
to expand missile warning, space-based communication capabilities and
space situational awareness (SSA). In cyberspace, the command is
expanding collaboration with our joint, interagency, and international
partners on several initiatives to safeguard our access to the domain.
We are operationalizing the Air Force's approach to cyberspace with
emphasis on protecting the Air Force infrastructure, developing
expertise to meet mission needs, and accelerating our acquisition
processes to match the rate of change in cyberspace.
Missile Warning (Launch Detection and Missile Tracking)
Our ability to provide strategic missile warning is critical to the
Nation's survival. Ballistic missiles also pose a significant threat to
deployed U.S. forces and our allies. AFSPC operates both space- and
ground-based sensors, providing correlated data that supports the
strategic and tactical missile warning missions. Our space
professionals continue to improve upon our missile warning capabilities
and processes to better alert and inform our commanders. In U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM), Captain Kara Sartori, Chief of the Combat
Operations Division Space Cell at the Combined Air and Space Operations
Center, built revolutionary new procedures which provide more accurate
and timely missile warning, thereby better protecting personnel
assigned across the CENTCOM theater of operations.
Space Based Infrared Systems
The Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), along with the legacy
Defense Support Program satellites, provide advanced early warning of
hostile missile threats, allowing our warfighters to take swift and
precise action. The Active Duty and Reserve airmen of the 460th Space
Wing, Buckley Air Force Base (AFB), CO, as well as assigned British,
Canadian and Australian personnel, provided U.S. Combatant Commanders
(COCOMs), coalition partners and allies assured warning for nearly 200
missile launches in 2011. They also reported 7,100 special infrared
events--an 82 percent increase from 2010. Part of that increase was due
to the work of Captain William Sanders and Staff Sergeant Justin
Rutherford, 11th Space Warning Squadron, Schriever AFB, who developed
new and innovative ways to use the data from these sensors to identify
more events of interest to the warfighter.
In May 2011, AFSPC launched the program's first SBIRS
Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) satellite and early mission data are
exceeding expectations. This system detects dimmer, shorter duration
infrared events and provides more accurate missile launch and impact
point predictions than the Defense Support Program satellites. To
reduce costs on future acquisitions of these vital satellites, Colonel
Michael Guetlein from SMC, Los Angeles AFB, CA, and his program
management team streamlined schedules, reduced contractor overhead, and
achieved production efficiencies. This effort, and many more like it,
will ensure affordable capability well into the future.
The Air Force fiscal year 2013 request for SBIRS Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) and Procurement is $950
million, paced by ground development and continuing efforts on SBIRS
GEO satellites 3 and 4 as well as the procurement of SBIRS GEO
satellites 5 and 6. We are requesting the use of advance appropriations
to fully fund satellites 5 and 6.
Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR)
The UEWR radars are ground-based components of missile warning and
missile defense against current and emerging ballistic missile threats.
They also provide space object tracking data to help achieve space
situational awareness. Throughout 2011, we continued work with the
Missile Defense Agency to finalize UEWR deployments to Beale AFB, CA,
Royal Air Force Fylingdales, United Kingdom and Thule Air Base,
Greenland. In 2012, we will begin the process to upgrade Clear Air
Force Station, AK and Cape Cod Air Force Station, MA to the UEWR
configuration. At the operational units, long-time system experts, like
Mr. Clennis Burress at Beale AFB, CA, analyzed data from the upgraded
radar to assess performance on recent space and missile events. Using
his experience and creativity, he has devised ways to extract even more
capability from these radars.
U.S. Nuclear Detonation (NUDET) Detection System (NDS)
The NDS has maintained the global situational awareness needed by
our national decisionmakers and monitored nuclear treaty compliance
since the early 1960s. NDS payloads are hosted on the Global
Positioning System (GPS) satellites and our Defense Support Program
satellites. This capability is also included in the next generation of
GPS satellites. The Department of Energy and AFSPC are conducting
studies to determine the most effective solution to a long-term space-
based NDS architecture.
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT)
It is difficult to overstate the impact of GPS on the world. On-
line banking, vehicle navigation systems, precision farming, cellular
phone location for emergency purposes, precise military operations--
these are all enabled by GPS. Last October, I was honored to accept, on
behalf of the GPS program, an award from the International
Astronautical Federation on the occasion of their 60th Anniversary. The
award was given to the program which most benefitted mankind throughout
the entire 60 year history of the Federation. I was joined by Colonel
(Retired) Bradford Parkinson, who is universally regarded as the father
of GPS, and the current program manager, Colonel Bernard Gruber.
The GPS program made great strides in 2011. We improved the
security and functionality of GPS-enabled military systems by providing
for over-the-air distribution of rekeying for our military receivers.
Under the leadership of Captains Vernon Reddick and Jayson Andersen
from the 2nd Space Operations Squadron, Schriever AFB, we completed the
final phase of an operation called ``Expandable 24''--the largest
satellite repositioning effort in GPS history. The constellation is now
optimized for terrestrial coverage in challenging environments such as
cities with tall buildings and the mountains and valleys of
Afghanistan.
Through the summer and fall of 2011, Captain Justin Deifel from
SMC's GPS System Program Office, Los Angeles AFB, expertly led three
rigorous tests on behalf of the National Space-Based PNT Systems
Engineering Forum to quantify the potential for interference to
military and civilian GPS users from LightSquared's proposed
terrestrial network. His technical prowess and objectivity ensured
these nationally significant tests were professionally accomplished in
a thorough, fact-based manner.
We currently have 34 GPS satellites on-orbit with a combined 380
years of service. The oldest GPS operational satellite on orbit was
launched 21 years ago. The second launch of our newest version, GPS-
IIF, occurred in July 2011. Captain Steve Dirks from our GPS Reserve
Associate Unit, 19th Space Operations Squadron, Schriever AFB, led the
check-out of the satellite, integrating it into the operational
constellation in August 2011. GPS-IIF satellites are a major component
of the GPS modernization process: introducing greater accuracy through
advanced atomic clock technology, providing military signals that are
more resistant to jamming, adding a new ``safety of life'' civilian
signal, and lowering operating costs through a longer design life.
Development of the next generation satellite, GPS-III, is on-cost and
on-schedule. These satellites add a fourth civil signal to the
constellation and complete the deployment of two civil signals and
military signal capabilities that began with earlier GPS satellites.
GPS-III will allow us to affordably sustain and modernize the
constellation. AFSPC will continue to be proud stewards of this
incredible capability, and in line with the National Space Policy, we
will strive to ensure it remains the gold standard for global timing
and navigation.
With the ubiquitous use of space systems, to include GPS, in the
CENTCOM Area of Operations, AFSPC forward deploys experts to ensure
warfighter needs are satisfied. Captain Bryony Veater, assigned to the
504th Expeditionary Air Support Operations Group in Afghanistan,
provided critical forward-based space expertise and training to help
deployed forces fully exploit GPS capabilities. As an example of the
versatile use of GPS, CENTCOM performs the precision airdrop of
supplies with the Joint Precision Air Drop System, using GPS guided,
steerable parachutes. In November 2011, CENTCOM used this system to
airdrop 18,000 pounds of winter fuel to Air National Guard soldiers
from my home State of Oklahoma, at Combat Outpost Herrera in eastern
Afghanistan.
The Air Force fiscal year 2013 request for GPS III in RDT&E and
Procurement is $1.264B, which continues GPS III space and ground
segment RDT&E and procures additional GPS III Space Vehicles.
Military Satellite Communications
The demand for Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM)
continues to grow as warfighters increasingly depend on information
relayed from space, especially for today's distributed operations in
this era of information-enabled warfare. Our protected and survivable
MILSATCOM supports presidential communications, forms the backbone of
our Nuclear Command and Control System, and provides services for
operations in contested environments. MILSATCOM also enables day-to-day
communications in more benign environments. There are 18 MILSATCOM
satellites on-orbit with a combined 183 years of service.
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
The first satellite in the next generation of protected and
survivable MILSATCOM, AEHF-1, reached geosynchronous orbit in October
2011, approximately 14 months after a spacecraft propulsion anomaly had
stranded the satellite far short of its operational orbit. The AEHF-1
operations team designed an innovative orbit-raising strategy to
preserve the planned 14-year design life of the satellite. The team,
led by Mr. David Madden, SMC, is a finalist for an Aviation Week
Laureate Award to recognize their extraordinary achievement. Each AEHF
satellite will provide a ten-fold throughput increase over Milstar in
secure, jam-resistant communications for national leaders, COCOMs and
our international partners--Canada, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom.
The Air Force fiscal year 2013 request for AEHF RDT&E and
Procurement is $786 million, which provides for remaining development
efforts and continued procurement of AEHF Space Vehicles 5 and 6. We
are also requesting the use of advance appropriations to fully fund
satellites 5 and 6.
Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS)
The WGS system provides flexible, high-capacity communications to
the Department of Defense, the White House Communications Agency and
the State Department. Each satellite improves on the communications
capacity, connectivity and flexibility of legacy systems, allowing for
seamless crossbanding between users with X and Ka frequency band
terminals. WGS supported the Reagan Carrier Strike Group as it provided
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief support to Japan in the
aftermath of the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, allowing users
outside of Japan with Ka-terminals to communicate directly with users
in Japan with X-band terminals.
WGS-4, the first WGS Block II satellite, launched this past
January. These satellites were developed in direct response to
warfighter feedback and will support the transmission of airborne
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance imagery at data rates
approximately three times greater than those currently available on
Block I satellites. In addition, we are exploring future enhancements
to WGS that will deliver even more flexibility and capacity as we
incorporate commercial technology advances and cost-saving practices
into the system.
We are especially proud of the robust international partnerships we
have formed as part of this program. Australia provided funding for
WGS-6, and in January 2012, the Department of Defense and counterpart
agencies from Canada, Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands and New Zealand
signed a Memorandum of Agreement to procure WGS-9 through a cooperative
effort.
Space Situational Awareness
SSA is fundamental to everything we do in space. As our dependence
on space capabilities increases, and as the number of space faring
nations and objects in space increase, so does the need to improve our
SSA. We have a vast amount of SSA data, but we cannot yet fuse those
data into a single, correlated, comprehensive situational awareness
picture. The Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) Mission System (JMS)
program will correct this shortfall.
Joint Space Operations Center
The JSpOC, at Vandenberg AFB, is the primary national security
space command and control center for our Nation. Thanks to the
dedicated efforts of Airmen such as Major Brian Capps and Master
Sergeant Thomas Clark, during one noteworthy surge period, the JSpOC
provided simultaneous support to day-to-day global space missions,
CENTCOM activities, U.S. Africa Command military operations in Libya
and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts in Japan. In
2011, JSpOC personnel provided SSA in support of COCOMs by processing
155 million sensor observations and tracking approximately 22,000
manmade objects. They provided reentry warning and analysis for 72
high-interest objects, including the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration's decommissioned Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite,
and most recently, the Russian Phobos-Grunt spacecraft.
While accomplishing their complex missions, JSpOC personnel manage
and update the catalog of all manmade objects that orbit the earth
using a system called the Space Defense Operations Center which has
been operational since the mid-1980s, and which hasn't had a major
software upgrade since the early 1990s. The replacement for this legacy
system is the JMS. It will automate many of the tasks done manually
today and will incorporate traditional and non-traditional sensor
inputs to produce relevant, actionable information for the Commander,
Joint Functional Component Command for Space, currently Lieutenant
General Susan Helms. In 2011, we completed the restructure of the JMS
acquisition program to significantly lower costs, better align initial
capability deliveries with warfighter needs and more efficiently
execute the program. This streamlined approach leverages existing
industry and government investments, while providing on-ramps for
industry to contribute products. Initial Operational Capability of the
first increment is scheduled for the end of 2012.
The Air Force fiscal year 2013 request for JMS in RDT&E is $54.6
million, which continues incremental upgrades to SSA and Space Command
and Control capabilities.
Weather
The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) celebrates its
50th anniversary in 2012. We will extend the tradition of a half
century of unique and superb weather forecasting capabilities when we
launch the final two DMSP satellites later this decade. Following the
congressional direction in the fiscal year 2012 budget, the follow-on
program to DMSP was cancelled. We will conduct a study this year to
define a lower cost, yet capable, weather satellite follow-on program.
Cyberspace
National and Department of Defense leaders recognize the
criticality of operations and freedom of action in cyberspace. As the
pace of technological, environmental and geopolitical change quickens,
the ability of Joint Force Commanders to defend America's interests
will increasingly rely on the access, persistence and awareness
provided by cyberspace systems and capabilities. To that end, 24 AF is
taking a disciplined approach to cyberspace operations to significantly
increase our security posture, defend freedom of action, leverage our
effectiveness across Joint and coalition operations, and be more
efficient with resources consumed for and by our Air Force cyberspace
enterprise.
We are presenting cyberspace capabilities, organized by fixed and
expeditionary forces, to support our Air Force and Joint Commanders'
objectives and required effects. In 2011, cyberspace operators from 24
AF supported 5 COCOMs in more than 25 operations. Our deployed
cyberspace experts facilitated interaction with the COCOMs,
contributing to the success of these Joint operations. For Operation
Odyssey Dawn, Captain Michael Piersimoni deployed from the 624
Operations Center (OC) to assist with U.S. Africa Command's efforts to
leverage cyberspace effects.
In the area of cyberspace operations and innovation, we are
pursuing practices to expeditiously leverage new technologies in a
cost-effective manner--essential to staying ahead of emerging threats
and achieving desired end states. With the help of programmers like
Staff Sergeant Ryan Knight and testers like Captain Benjamin Truax, the
688th Information Operations Wing, Lackland AFB, is exercising rapid
cyberspace capability innovation processes. In just 7 days, they met
COCOM needs by developing and testing a new cyberspace capability;
creating tactics, techniques and procedures; and training operators.
Using similar processes, we were able to expeditiously deliver 28 new
cyberspace enhancements to support warfighter urgent needs in 2011.
We are also building a consolidated Air Force Network, known as the
AFNet. Major General Suzanne Vautrinot, 24 AF Commander, leads the
operation and defense of this network for the Air Force as the AFNet
Operations Commander. We continue to make progress toward consolidation
of the AFNet projected for completion by the end of fiscal year 2013.
As of February 13, 2012, Major Gregory Roberts, 561st Network
Operations Squadron, Detachment 3, Scott AFB, IL, and Mr. Nick
Davenport, AFNIC, also at Scott AFB, led the migration of 34 bases onto
the AFNet, retiring 30 legacy networks and collapsing 104 connections
to the Global Information Grid to 16 defensible gateways. These
significant steps reduce the costs to operate and enable us to better
defend our complex network, supporting over 845,000 users. Operating
the network under the principle of centralized control and
decentralized execution cleared the way for Senior Airman Zane Williams
and other members from the 561st Network Operations Squadron's
Detachment 1 at Hickam AFB, HI, to restore AFNet connectivity and
services less than 5 hours after the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami.
Our Combat Communications units execute another facet of the
cyberspace mission by extending our networks and providing
communications to disadvantaged users. Due to the planning efforts of
individuals such as Captain David Cox, 54th Combat Communications
Squadron, Robins AFB, GA, combat communications personnel provided
``last out'' communications for redeploying United States combat forces
from Iraq. In one case, members of the 263rd Combat Communications
Squadron, an Air National Guard unit, volunteered for a short notice
deployment, establishing critical communications for the 332nd Air
Expeditionary Wing as it relocated from Joint Base Balad in Iraq. In
Afghanistan, Staff Sergeant Stephen Herron, from the 52nd Combat
Communications Squadron, Robins AFB, received the Bronze Star for his
actions as the sole communications member assigned to an Explosive
Ordnance Disposal Joint Task Force where he provided tactical
communications and force tracking capabilities for ten teams. Within
the United States, our Combat Communications Guardsmen supported
firefighters near Bastrop, TX, as well as recovery efforts following
the tragic tornado in Alabama.
Director of Space Forces
Our space professionals are assigned and deployed to COCOMs around
the globe. In January, I met with Colonel Clinton Crosier, the Air
Force Central Command Director of Space Forces, and his team. Captain
Tracy Lloyd is revolutionizing how the DOD is providing operations
planning products for GPS-enabled systems--making them more combat
relevant. Major Natalie Mock and Captain Abraham Brunner are using the
multi-spectral Operationally Responsive Space-1 (ORS-1) satellite to
solve tough intelligence problems in theater. Colonel Crosier's staff
is working hand-in-hand with Lieutenant Colonel Chad Le'Maire, from the
Cyber Operations Liaison Element, to oversee systems that bring to bear
the full synergy of integrated space and cyberspace capabilities in the
CENTCOM Area of Responsibility.
Colonel Alan Rebholz, the Pacific Air Forces Director of Space
Forces, and the team of space professionals in the Pacific are
integrating space at new levels as the emphasis increasingly turns to
this area. Major Robert McConnell, a space professional in the Strategy
Division of the 613th Air and Space Operations Center, and his
teammates are planning the space operations portion of Exercise
Terminal Fury 2012, which will be conducted simultaneously with U.S.
Strategic Command's Global Lightning exercise. This combined exercise
will have an unprecedented, robust space scenario involving
participants across the globe.
field resilient, integrated systems that preserve the operational
advantage
Our second goal is to field resilient, integrated systems that
preserve the operational advantage. As the Air Force lead for the space
and cyberspace domains, AFSPC is working hard to build efficient
architectures and processes. We are defining better ways of doing
business to decrease cost while delivering resilient, integrated and
affordable space and cyberspace systems--without compromising mission
assurance. As part of our efficient approach, the Command is leveraging
the Total Force--Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve airmen; government
civilians; and contractors--across all areas within the command.
Launch, Ranges, and Networks
Every on-orbit space capability begins with a successful launch--
there is no room for error in the launch business. Our 45th Space Wing
at Patrick AFB, FL, and our 30th Space Wing at Vandenberg AFB, operate
the Eastern and Western Ranges, respectively. They supported a combined
19 commercial and government launches in 2011, including the final 3
Space Shuttle missions. They also conducted over 2,500 weapon system
tests, aeronautical tests and launch support operations. Our emphasis
on mission assurance underscores an unprecedented record in the history
of space flight--83 consecutive successful National Security Space
launches since 1999. Mission assurance is a rigorous, structured, and
disciplined application of systems engineering, risk management,
quality assurance, and program management principles throughout a space
system's life cycle.
Launch is often the greatest risk to any space system. There are
many examples of how rigorous mission assurance detected and corrected
issues that would have led to launch failures if uncorrected. We have a
dedicated team of mission assurance technicians at both launch bases
performing meticulous quality control for launch operations. On the
East Coast, Master Sergeant Michael Claus, 5th Space Launch Squadron,
identified a safety violation during hardware movement operations,
preventing costly damage to the Atlas V assigned to the Navy's Mobile
User Objective System satellite. On the West Coast, Staff Sergeant Paul
Lillie from the 4th Space Launch Squadron, Vandenberg AFB, observed and
reported a leak in a valve during processing of an Atlas V in
preparation for an April 2011 National Reconnaissance Office mission.
Failure of this component during launch would have prevented proper
orbital insertion of the payload, leading to mission failure.
Mission assurance also includes careful oversight of spacecraft
processing at the launch base in preparation for launch. Captain Amanda
Zuber and other members of the 45th Launch Support Squadron, Patrick
AFB, performed spacecraft mission assurance activities for the first
SBIRS GEO spacecraft, which is now exceeding performance expectations
on-orbit. Air Force launch and range services are on track to support
11 Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle missions in 2012: 8 National
Security Space launches, 2 National Aeronautics and Space
Administration launches, and 1 commercial Orbital Test Vehicle launch.
Due to the critical dependence of the space mission on our launch
capabilities, the Air Force established a Program Executive Office for
Space Launch to provide a focused effort as we define the future of
space launch. In November 2011, the Air Force Service Acquisition
Executive approved a new acquisition strategy addressing industrial
base viability and cost growth while making provisions to leverage
emerging competition. The Air Force, in cooperation with the National
Reconnaissance Office, is committed to an annual production rate of
launch vehicles, creating more predictability and stability in the
program. In addition, the Air Force published a New Entrant
Certification Guide, providing a structured certification process by
which prospective commercial launch providers become eligible to
compete for national security launch service contract awards. Both the
annual production rate commitment and the leveraging of new entrants
are key elements we must balance as we conduct the fiscal year 2013
through fiscal year 2017 acquisition program, led by Colonel William
Hodgkiss, our program manager at SMC. This acquisition program will
define the landscape for National Security Space assured access into
the next decade.
The Air Force fiscal year 2013 request for the Evolved Expendable
Launch Vehicle Procurement is $1.680 billion, which provides launch
infrastructure and boosters for national security space launches.
For many of our Nation's most critical satellites, the Air Force
Satellite Control Network provides launch support, the capability to
receive satellite data, and command and control of these spacecraft
once on-orbit. In 2011, our space professionals used the network to
conduct over 159,000 satellite contacts, support 15 launches and more
than 20 space vehicle emergencies, averaging 450 satellite contacts per
day. The network added a new operational antenna in Diego Garcia,
doubling our capacity in the Indian Ocean to support satellite
operations and to meet near-real-time warfighter, weather, missile
warning, PNT, surveillance and communication needs. We are modernizing
the Air Force Satellite Control Network by replacing its decades-old
communication, scheduling, and antenna systems.
Commercially Hosted Infrared Payload
One avenue AFSPC is exploring for improving system resiliency is
the concept of hosting government payloads on commercial satellites.
The Commercially Hosted Infrared Payload is a government infrared
payload hosted on the SES-2 commercial spacecraft. From program
initiation to launch in 39 months, this payload successfully reached
orbit with its host, after launch on a European Ariane V rocket from
Kourou, French Guiana in September 2011. This mission is providing
lessons learned on the operational- and cost-effectiveness of hosting
government payloads on commercial satellites, while also demonstrating
a potential approach to mission resiliency.
Defensive Space Control
We rely on resilient architectures complemented with passive and
active defense measures to deter, and if necessary, defeat potential
adversary attacks against our forces. In the defensive space control
mission, the Rapid Attack, Identification, Detection, and Reporting
System Deployable Ground Segment-0 (RDGS-0), continues its trend of
sustained excellence in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility. In the past
year, the members of the 16th Space Control Squadron, Peterson AFB, CO,
and its collocated Reserve Associate unit, the 380th Space Control
Squadron, deployed the Bounty Hunter system to increase the capability
of RDGS-0. The current deployment team, led by Major Matthew Wingert
from the 380th Space Control Squadron, and Master Sergeant Timothy
Tennerman from 460th Space Wing, are helping protect the vital
communications links across all of CENTCOM's operations.
Responsive Capabilities
In 2011, the Air Force launched two space systems demonstrating
responsive space principles. ORS-1 launched in June 2011 on a Minotaur
I rocket from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Wallops
Flight Facility, Wallops Island, VA, only 32 months from program
initiation. CENTCOM began using the imagery products from this
satellite 1 month later. Personnel from the 1st Space Operations
Squadron and their Reserve Associate Unit, the 7th Space Operations
Squadron, at Schriever AFB, are using the Multi-Mission Satellite
Operations Center to command and control the satellite. This command
and control suite is AFSPC's first step toward a common ground system
across multiple satellite programs, with the goal of reducing ground
system costs for new programs. Captain David Gwilt from SMC is leading
the maturation of this architecture.
The second Orbital Test Vehicle, X-37B, mission launched in March
2011 and has surpassed the first mission's 8-month duration, proving
the flexibility of this unique system. Major Scott Babb, from the SIDC
3rd Space Experimentation Squadron, is leading the operations team as
they explore the capabilities of this system.
Electromagnetic Spectrum
Electronic devices are pervasive in modern warfare, increasing the
demand for electromagnetic spectrum access. AFSPC's AFSMO preserves
access to the electromagnetic spectrum for Air Force and selected
Department of Defense activities. Mr. Joseph Sulick and his team
maintained over 30,000 frequency assignments essential to test,
training, Joint and Service exercises and operations. AFSMO's strategic
planning efforts, led by Mr. Frederick Moorefield, focus on assuring
the continued and improved spectrum access required for critical
military systems as both national and international demand increases
for finite spectrum resources. Within the United States, they are
supporting the President's direction to identify spectrum for broadband
wireless services. Internationally, they are engaged with the U.S.
delegation to the United Nations International Telecommunication
Union's World Radiocommunication Conference to protect United States
and Air Force spectrum interests.
Single Integrated Network Environment
The Air Force requires an integrated enterprise network to assure
core cyberspace capabilities. Colonel Rizwan Ali, Commander of AFNIC at
Scott AFB is forging the AFSPC Single Integrated Network Environment
into reality. Mr. Frederick Chambers and his team of professionals are
collaborating with leaders from SMC, 24 AF and my staff to achieve the
desired end state of seamless information flow across terrestrial, air
and space domains. Networthiness, as a component of the Single
Integrated Network Environment, will offer integration and
interoperability for Air Force networks.
To fuse partnerships with industry leaders, Lieutenant Colonel Jeri
Harvey led the Air Force's inaugural Software Development Forum. During
the forum, AFNIC announced upcoming changes to Air Force standards for
integrating and supporting applications across the AFNet. These
standards will increase our security posture while reducing the number
of network resources required. The Software Development Forum, along
with other efforts, will help us to provide cyberspace network-centric
capabilities to the warfighter.
provide highly skilled and innovative space and cyberspace
professionals
Our third goal is to provide highly skilled and innovative space
and cyberspace professionals. AFSPC is educating, training and
cultivating experts skilled in space and cyberspace capabilities and
their integration across the full range of military operations in all
domains. They are tactically and operationally proficient, and are
ready to deploy at a moment's notice.
Space Education, Training, Wargames, and Exercises
Each year, the SIDC's Advanced Space Operations School (ASOpS)
provides advanced training to more than 1,930 DOD personnel, while the
National Security Space Institute (NSSI) provides space professional
certification courses to over 800 personnel from all Services and
military representatives from select allied nations. At the end of
2011, the Air Force had over 13,000 certified space professionals. The
military construction project to house ASOpS and NSSI on Peterson AFB
is near completion and a ribbon-cutting ceremony is scheduled for this
spring.
The Schriever Wargame series is a valuable tool for examining the
opportunities and threats inherent to the space and cyberspace
environments. The Wargame Director, Major David Manhire, from the SIDC,
Schriever AFB, will execute the Schriever 2012 Wargame in two phases
with a renewed focus on the operational level of planning. The
International Wargame is based on a contingency operation, involving
North Atlantic Treaty Organization nation participation on the game
floor for the first time. In September 2012, Australia, Canada, and
Great Britain will join the United States in executing the second phase
of the Wargame.
Last year marked the first time a tactical space unit participated
in a Distributed Mission Operations exercise from their home station.
The SIDC's Distributed Mission Operations Center for Space served as
the environment for the 2nd Space Warning Squadron at Buckley AFB, to
provide theater ballistic missile warning to the 612th Air and Space
Operations Center at Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ. SIDC also premiered the GPS
Environment Generator during a Blue Flag exercise. This system
generates realistic degraded navigation effects and weapons accuracy,
allowing operators and planners to see the direct influence of
anticipated hostile and non-hostile GPS interference. Further
integration of this model is in work to allow aircrews to plan and
employ weapons in a virtual environment.
Cyberspace Education, Training, and Wargames
The Air Force must have professionals capable of integrating
cyberspace capabilities across the warfighting domains. Under the
Cyberspace Professional Development Program, Total Force personnel
receive continuing education to progress from a foundation of
fundamentals, through demonstrated depth of knowledge of experience and
application, to a strategic understanding of cyberspace. In December
2011, the Air Force formalized this program to include a certification
process. We now have over 5,200 Air Force Total Force personnel
certified as cyberspace professionals.
In partnership with Air Education and Training Command and Air
Combat Command, AFSPC continues to build a highly skilled cyberspace
work force by providing cyberspace training at all levels of the Air
Force. The 333rd Training Squadron at Keesler AFB, MS graduated the
first class of enlisted Cyberspace Defense Operators. With the
dedicated efforts of Airmen such as Captain Laura Sepeda, the 39th
Information Operations Squadron, Hurlburt Field, FL, graduated the
first class of students from Intermediate Network Warfare Training in
2011. They also developed the first Initial Qualification Training,
allowing cyberspace operators to arrive at operational units fully
qualified to perform the mission. Members of this squadron received the
2011 United States National Cybersecurity Innovation Award from the
SANS Institute for ``Developing World-Class Cyberspace Talent'' through
their use of simulators and training ranges to allow students to
conduct defensive cyberspace operations. The Air Force Institute of
Technology's Cyberspace Technical Center of Excellence began conducting
the Cyberspace 200 and 300 intermediate and advanced professional
development courses in June 2010. Through the end of 2011, they have
graduated 754 people from these courses. In June 2012, the U.S. Air
Force Weapons School at Nellis AFB, NV will conduct the first
Cyberspace Weapons Instructor Course. Once the students complete this
difficult 6-month course, the initial cadre of weapons officers will be
instrumental in developing unit level tactics and supporting
operational level planning to meet the challenges of evolving
cyberspace threats.
Red Flag is the Air Force's advanced aerial combat training
exercise. During Red Flag 2011-3 missions, Major Benjamin Montgomery,
624 OC, made history as the first cyberspace operator to lead an
exercise event as the designated Mission Commander--integrating full
spectrum capabilities into Air and Space Operations Center mission
planning and operations. Red Flag is the ideal venue for demonstrating
and exercising full spectrum cyberspace capabilities and we intend to
continue on this path.
Our cyberspace operators reached a major milestone with the
planning and execution of the first Cyber Flag in October 2011 at
Nellis AFB, NV. This Joint exercise fused cyberspace across the full
spectrum of operations against a realistic and thinking enemy in a
virtual environment. Personnel from the AFNIC Simulator Training
Exercise Division, led by Major Russell Montante, gave cyberspace
operators the opportunity to gain hands-on experience in protecting,
defending and fighting in a safe realm without impact to operational
networks.
Technically educated U.S. citizens are a national resource--vital
to national security, and essential to our ability to operate in, from
and through the space and cyberspace domains. The Air Force provides
world class space and cyberspace education and training that builds on
our Airmen's secondary and university education. However, increasingly
fewer of our Nation's students are pursuing science, technology,
engineering, and math (STEM) degrees. As many STEM-educated
professionals reach retirement age in this country, the lack of
technically educated U.S. citizens creates serious shortfalls in many
industries, which results in tough competition for this vital resource.
As a Nation, we must comprehensively address this shortage in technical
talent if we hope to maintain our advantage in an increasingly complex
global environment.
continue to take care of people--our most treasured asset, america's
sons and daughters
As AFSPC reaches our three goals, we remember that our first and
highest priority is to support our Nation's warfighters in harm's way--
to give them the tools needed to fight and win as quickly and safely as
possible. At the same time, we maintain a continuing focus on ensuring
our military and their families have access to necessary services on
the homefront.
In Colorado Springs, AFSPC partnered with the local community on
several initiatives. One element of this partnership is providing
resources for those dealing with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and
Traumatic Brain Injuries as they transition to civilian life.
This summer, the Los Angeles AFB Airman and Family Readiness
Center, working with the Air Force Recovery Care Coordinator for
California, intervened in the military out-processing of one of our
highest decorated heroes. They guided him through the process to
receive a medical retirement, vice separation, allowing for continued
access to the medical care he needs to recover. The team also provided
support when this quiet hero lost a family member in combat in
Afghanistan.
This spring, Colorado Springs is once again hosting the Warrior
Games. These athletic endeavors allow wounded and seriously ill service
members to incorporate sports training as a part of their overall
transition and recovery plan. It is the command's privilege to support
this event and help honor our Nation's Wounded Warriors.
Unfortunately, not all of our warriors return home. This year AFSPC
remembers two of our own who fell on the battlefield: Major Charles
Ransom and Airman First Class Matthew Seidler. Their sacrifice serves
as a very personal reminder that we owe our best efforts to our
warfighters each and every day. We will never forget them and we pray
that their families find comfort in their loved one's contribution to
freedom.
conclusion
The members of AFSPC have a passion about service to our Nation.
Our professionals are innovative. They continue to provide the world
class space and cyberspace capabilities for which AFSPC is known, and
they have the courage to not only do the right things, but also to do
things right. Our command is about producing excellence--every day. We
believe passion, innovation and courage lead to that excellence.
Because we operate in domains that reach well beyond the globe, our
slogan is Excellence, Global and Beyond. It is truly a privilege to
command AFSPC and I appreciate the opportunity to represent this great
command before the subcommittee.
Senator Nelson. General Formica.
STATEMENT OF LTG RICHARD P. FORMICA, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY
SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND/ARMY FORCES STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Formica. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Sessions. It is my privilege as the Commander of Army
Space and Missile Defense Command to appear before your
subcommittee again this year. I thank you for your continued
support of our soldiers, civilians, and families.
My intent today is to briefly outline for you the necessity
of space-based capabilities to our Army, our Nation's force of
decisive action.
In the 2012 posture statement, the Army focuses on three
areas: support to Afghanistan, responsible stewardship, and the
leaner Army. Inherent to these focus areas and the building of
the Army of 2020 is an increasing reliance on space. The Army
is the biggest user of space-based capabilities which are
critical to the conduct of unified land operations. If the Army
wants to shoot, move, or communicate, it needs space.
This reliance becomes more critical in an era of tight
fiscal resources, smaller Army force structure, and potentially
reduced forward presence. The Army works closely with the Air
Force who is the executive agent for space and other agencies
to define requirements and ensure future warfighters have
access to the essential space capabilities General Shelton has
laid out.
As a partner of the joint space enterprise, the Army is
also a provider of space-based capabilities. Let me summarize
our command's contributions to the joint force through our
three core tasks.
Our first core task is to provide trained and ready space
forces and capabilities to support today's operations. Our
forces, comprised of Active, Guard, and Reserve soldiers and
civilians, conduct global space operations to include access to
wideband satellite communications, missile warning, space
control, friendly force tracking, and geospatial intelligence
analysis. We support Army operations with our space support
teams. These forward-deployed men and women provide access to
joint and national capabilities in order to meet our
warfighters' needs. Since September 11, more than 70 teams have
deployed support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Our second core task is to build the future space forces
and capabilities for the Army of tomorrow. The development of
operational concepts, adjustments to doctrine, conduct of
analyses and studies, and improvements to our space training
enable the Army to build and improve our future space forces.
Our final core task is to provide the warfighter with
space-related technologies that enable dominant advantages to
the battlefield for the day after tomorrow. We focus our
science and technology (S&T) efforts on capabilities that will
bring maximum advances in our combat effectiveness. The Joint
Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD), enables us to find,
demonstrate, transition, and transfer the best space
operational concepts, technology solutions, and products. We
have proposed three space-related JCTDs, two of which aim to
provide economical nanosatellite capabilities to the tactical
ground component warfighter. The third JCTD will develop a low-
cost launch system for nanosatellites. These have been approved
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and we look
forward to favorable consideration by Congress.
In conclusion, as we become a leaner Army, space
capabilities will be critical enablers to our ability to
conduct unified land operations. Assured access to space and
well-trained, experienced space professionals reduce the fog,
friction, and uncertainty of warfare. As a command, we will
remain disciplined stewards of our Nation's resources. This
committee's continued support is essential in enabling us to
maintain and further improve our space capabilities and provide
the best trained space professionals to combatant commanders.
I appreciate again the opportunity to speak on the value of
space to our Army. I look forward to answering any questions
you may have.
Army Strong.
[The prepared statement of General Formica follows:]
Prepared Statement by LTG Richard P. Formica, USA
introduction
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sessions, and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, thank you for your ongoing support of our soldiers,
civilians, and families. After my initial appearance last year, I
appreciate the opportunity to testify again before this subcommittee.
Thank you also for your continued strong support of the Army and the
key capabilities that space affords our warfighters. Your continued
support is important as we pursue our joint efforts to provide critical
space capabilities in support of our Nation, our fighting forces, and
our allies.
My role has not changed since my previous subcommittee appearance.
I wear three hats that entail distinct responsibilities in support of
our warfighters. First, as the commander of the U.S. Army Space and
Missile Defense Command, I have Title 10 responsibilities to train,
maintain, and equip space and missile defense forces for the Army.
Second, I am the Army Service Component Commander (ASCC) to the U.S.
Strategic Command (STRATCOM), or Commander, Army Forces Strategic
Command. I am charged with the responsibility for planning,
integrating, and coordinating Army forces and capabilities in support
of STRATCOM missions. Third, I serve as the Commander of STRATCOM's
Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense
(JFCC-IMD), enabling me to leverage the capabilities and skill sets of
the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic
Command (USASMDC/ARSTRAT).
In my role here today as the Commander of USASMDC/ARSTRAT, I am
honored to testify with these distinguished witnesses--all providers of
critical space capabilities to the warfighter and essential
contributors to the Joint space planning process and our Nation's
continued advances to effectively operate in space.
Within the Army, space operations and space-related activities are
pursued as an enterprise and are not the exclusive domain of the
USASMDC/ARSTRAT, or any other single functional proponent. However, the
Chief of Staff of the Army has assigned USASMDC/ARSTRAT as the Army's
proponent for space. In this role, we coordinate closely with the other
members of the Army Space enterprise, particularly the Army
Intelligence, Signal, and Topographic communities. We are increasingly
engaged across the broader Army community to ensure space capabilities
are maximized and integrated across our entire force and that potential
vulnerabilities to our systems are mitigated to the greatest extent
possible. We also collaborate with STRATCOM and its Joint Functional
Component Command for Space (JFCC Space) and other members of the Joint
community to provide trained and ready space forces and space-based
capabilities to the warfighter. We also work closely with the
acquisition developers in the other Services to ensure the development
of systems that provide the best capabilities for ground forces.
Within USASMDC/ARSTRAT, we strive to achieve three core tasks
within the space arena:
To provide trained and ready Space Forces and
capabilities to the combatant commanders--our operations
function that addresses today's requirements.
To build future Space Forces--our capability
development function that is responsible for meeting tomorrow's
requirements.
To research, test, and integrate space and space
related technologies--our materiel development function that
aims to advance the Army's and warfighter's use of space the
day after tomorrow.
During my appearance last year, my desire was threefold: to outline
the Army as a user of space capabilities; to articulate the Army's
space strategy and policy; and to inform the committee about the Army
as a provider of space capabilities. Today, within the context of my
testimony from that appearance, I would like to again address the
absolute necessity of space-based capabilities for our warfighters and
to expand upon the above three core space tasks that our soldiers,
civilians, and contractors diligently execute each and every day.
space-based products and capabilities--a force multiplier
As I reported last year, our Army must be organized, trained, and
equipped to provide responsive and sustained combat operations in order
to fight as a joint team and to respond, as directed, to crises at home
and abroad. The Army is dependent on space capabilities to execute
unified land operations in support of the combatant commander's
objectives. Army space forces contribute to the Army's ability to be
adaptive, versatile, and agile to meet tomorrow's security challenges.
In other words, space is critical to our ability to shoot, move, and
communicate.
The Army is the biggest user of space and it is also a provider of
space-based capabilities. Integrating space capabilities enables
commanders, down to the lowest echelon, to conduct unified land
operations through decisive action and operational adaptability. The
Army's Operating Concept identifies six warfighting functions that
contribute to operational adaptability: mission command, movement and
maneuver, intelligence, protection, fires, and sustainment. Space-based
capabilities leveraged and employed across the Army space enterprise
enable each of these warfighting functions. Virtually every Army
operation relies on space capabilities to enhance the effectiveness of
our force--there is no going back. In the coming years, our reliance on
space capabilities will continue to grow. This reliance will be even
more critical in an era of tight fiscal resources, a smaller force
structure, and potentially a reduced forward presence. In essence,
space-based capabilities are a force multiplier. When combined with
other capabilities, space systems allow joint forces to see the
battlefield with clarity, navigate with accuracy, strike with
precision, communicate with certainty, and operate with assurance.
The Army depends on space-based capabilities and systems, such as
global positioning satellites, communication satellites, weather
satellites, and intelligence collection platforms. They are critical
enablers to our ability to plan, communicate, navigate, and maintain
battlefield situational awareness, target the enemy, provide missile
warning, and protect and sustain our forces. The Army and the Joint
Forces require assured access to space capabilities and, when required,
have the ability to deny our adversaries the same space-based
capabilities.
The Army works diligently with the Air Force and other agencies to
define our requirements in order to ensure future warfighters have
access to essential capabilities and services derived from space-based
assets. Most of these services are so well integrated into weapon
systems and support processes that many of our soldiers are unaware
they are leveraging space capabilities in the daily conduct of their
operations. This seamless integration is due in large part to the
coordination and cooperation of space professionals across the National
Security Space Enterprise at Air Force Space Command, the Joint
Functional Component Command for Space, the Navy, the Army, and other
Department of Defense (DOD) and joint agencies.
As previously stated, the Army has been and continues to be a
provider of space capabilities. In the past, the Army's greatest
investment in space capabilities has been in the ground segment--the
integration of space capabilities into operational forces through
command and control systems, communication terminals, and intelligence
feeds. Recently, the Army has strengthened and broadened its efforts to
more fully exploit national and strategic space capabilities, defend
our space capabilities, leverage space to enhance missile defense
systems, and train and develop the needed space professionals and space
enablers.
In 2013, as in past years, the Army plans to invest significant
resources, both funding and people, in pursuing space and space-related
activities. The Army is evolving from a position of simply exploiting
strategic space-based capabilities to one where the Army is fully
engaged in the planning, development, and use of theater-focused
operational and tactical space applications.
provide trained and ready space forces and capabilities to today's
operations
Within our first core task of providing trained and ready space
forces and capabilities to the combatant commanders (COCOMs) and the
Warfighter, there are numerous recurring operations, capabilities, and
training responsibilities that we provide each day. Within our 1st
Space Brigade, over 1,000 soldiers and civilians provide space
capabilities via access to space-based products and services that are
essential in all phases of combat operations. The Brigade, a multi-
component organization comprised of Active, National Guard, and U.S.
Army Reserve soldiers, has space forces assigned world-wide that are
responsible for conducting continuous global space support, space
control, and space force enhancement operations. The Brigade's three
battalions support combatant commanders by providing satellite
communications, space operations, missile warning, and forward-deployed
space support teams. These Space Operations Officers, along with
members of the Army's Space Cadre, directly influence the execution of
strategic operations in support of operational and tactical level
ground maneuver forces. Their principal duties include planning,
developing, resourcing, acquiring, integrating, and operating space
forces, systems, concepts, applications, or capabilities in any element
of the DOD space mission areas.
The Army Space Personnel Development Office (ASPDO), part of
USASMDC/ARSTRAT, develops policies, procedures, and metrics for the
Army Space Cadre and executes the life-cycle management functions of FA
40 Space Operations Officers. The Army's Space Cadre, initiated in 2007
and utilizing FA40s as its foundation, is comprised of over 2,300
soldiers and civilians who perform space and space-related functions in
support of the Army's interests in space operations, capability
development, materiel development, and policy. The Cadre consists of
soldiers and civilians from a wide variety of branches, career fields,
disciplines, and functional areas.
The approximately 410 multi-component FA 40s serve in Army and
joint commands and organizations across all echelons--tactical,
operational, and strategic. The Army continues to integrate space
professionals into the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
Staff, the North American Aerospace Defense Command, the U.S. Strategic
Command, the Air Staff, the Air Force Space Command, and other space
focused organizations and academic institutions. In each of these
organizations, personnel not only provide the Army perspective of space
related capabilities, they articulate requirements from a ground
component standpoint in the joint environment. A summary of the
critical space capabilities provided by Army's space professionals is
highlighted below.
Army Space Support Teams: During the current
Afghanistan operations, the USASMDC/ARSTRAT's Army Space
Support Teams continuously provide space-based products and
services to combatant commanders and other international
government agencies. The teams are on-the-ground space experts,
pulling key commercial imagery, forecasting the impact of space
weather, and providing responsive space support to their units.
Forward deployed Army space forces support the new defense
strategy by providing rotational presence and advisory
capabilities in support of broader security operations. The
bottom line is these teams bring tailored space products and
capabilities that meet critical theater commander's needs.
During the Iraq operations, Army Space Support Teams provided
essential space capabilities for those commanders and
warfighters. More than 70 teams have deployed in support of
Operations Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom in
order to provide invaluable on-the-ground responsive expertise
to combatant commanders and the warfighter.
Satellite Communications: USASMDC/ARSTRAT's role in
satellite communications (SATCOM) has grown beyond our payload
operations and transmission control responsibilities for the
Defense Satellite Communication System (DSCS) and the Wideband
Global SATCOM System (WGS) constellations. We also serve as the
Consolidated SATCOM System Expert for the DOD narrowband and
wideband SATCOM constellations--the DSCS, the WGS, the Mobile
User Objective System (MUOS), the Ultra-High Frequency (UHF)
SATCOM, and the Fleet Communications Satellite. Transmission
control for more than 97 percent of DOD-owned SATCOM bandwidth
is provided by Army operators controlling the payloads on the
DSCS and the WGS. These systems provide critical SATCOM
capability for Combatant Commanders, other Federal agencies,
the Diplomatic Corps, the White House, and now allied nations
in accordance with recent international agreements extending
our cooperation in SATCOM operations. The 1st Space Brigade's
53rd Signal Battalion and Department of the Army civilians
perform this mission via the Wideband Satellite Communications
Operations Centers and DOD's Regional Satellite Communications
Support Centers located around the globe. A new Wideband
Satellite Communications Operations Center opened in Hawaii
last year, and just this month, we completed the lifecycle
replacement of essential equipment and infrastructure at our
Fort Detrick, MD, satellite operations facility. Construction
on the replacement for our facility at Fort Meade, MD, is
underway and the construction at our site in Landstuhl, Germany
will begin soon. The operations centers required modernization
and replacement of aging antennas and terminal equipment in
order to be compatible with the fleet of new and expanding WGS
assets being acquired and launched by the Air Force, and to
ensure the continued operation of the regional management hubs
for a majority of the DOD's satellite communications
capabilities. As the SATCOM System Expert for MUOS, the Army is
responsible for DOD's use of our next generation tactical
system which will transform tactical SATCOM from radios into
secure cellular networked communication tools. During this past
year, our Satellite Support Centers participated in numerous
worldwide operations and exercises, including Enduring Freedom,
New Dawn, Odyssey Dawn/Unified Protector, Tomodachi, and other
operations.
Friendly Force Tracking: USASMDC/ARSTRAT operates the
DOD's Friendly Force Tracking Mission Management Center (MMC)
on behalf of STRATCOM. The MMC provides situational awareness
of U.S. military and other government personnel, along with
coalition and allied partners. Translating more than one and a
half million location tracks a day, this capability is an
essential enabler for our force. As the Army has the greatest
number of warfighters and systems to track on the battlefield,
our friendly force tracking assets are critical in identifying
friendly forces during unified land operations.
Ballistic Missile Early Warning: Critical to the Joint
Force Commander's theater force protection, the Army provides
ballistic missile early warning and missile defense support
from within the theater or region. The 1st Space Brigade's
Joint Tactical Ground Stations (JTAGS) Detachments, operated by
Army personnel, monitor enemy missile launch activity and other
infrared events of interest and share the information with
members of the air and missile defense and operational
communities. Our JTAGS Detachments are forward-stationed across
the globe, providing 24/7/365 dedicated, assured missile
warning to STRATCOM for deployed forces.
Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) Support: The Army
provides geospatial intelligence production in direct support
of the combatant commands, as an operational element of the
National System for Geospatial Intelligence. The Army's space
and intelligence experts perform exploitation of a variety of
commercial, civil, and DOD imagery data derived from space and
airborne sources. Additionally, they aid in the exploration of
emerging spectral system technologies and in transitioning new
capabilities to the warfighter. Last fall, USASMDC/ARSTRAT
activated a new GEOINT branch to support STRATCOM's mapping
requirements. In 2011, we provided geospatial situational
awareness in support of Hurricane Irene and the Japanese
earthquake relief efforts as well as crisis support operations
around the globe including North Atlantic Treaty Organization
operations in Libya--Operation Unified Protector. We also
provided almost 100,000 unclassified commercial imagery
products to U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S.
Central Command, the State Department, and other agencies.
Operations Reach-back Support and Services: The
USASMDC/ARSTRAT Operations Center, located at Peterson Air
Force Base in Colorado Springs, CO, provides reach-back support
for our space experts deployed throughout the operational force
and allows us to reduce our forward-deployed footprint. This
center maintains constant situational awareness of deployed
elements, continuously responds to requests for information,
and provides the essential reach-back system of connectivity
with technical subject matter experts.
Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities: The
Army Special Programs Office is the Army's focal point for the
exploitation of national intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance assets and products through the Tactical
Exploitation of National Capabilities program. The Army is
fully integrated into the National Reconnaissance Office and
the Intelligence Community.
Strategic Space Surveillance: The Army also operates
facilities and assets that are of utmost importance to
protecting the Nation's use of space. The U.S. Army Kwajalein
Atoll/ Reagan Test Site (RTS), located in the Marshall Islands,
is a national asset that provides unique radars and sensors
that contribute to STRATCOM's space situational awareness
mission, enabling protection of the Nation's manned and
unmanned space assets.
build future space forces--meeting tomorrow's requirements
The Army's ever increasing dependency on space-based capabilities
requires active participation in defining space-related requirement
needs. The identified needs serve to ensure necessary Joint force
structure, systems, and concept of operations (CONOPs) are developed
and acquired, thereby enabling the land force to conduct the full range
of military operations now and in the future. Ensuring tactical and
assured access to space is our focus--reassuring the requisite
capabilities and effects are delivered to the tactical warfighter on
time, every time demands that our space capabilities and architectures
become more resilient against attacks and disruption. We must ensure
that our Army does not face a day without space and space-related
capabilities.
In our second core task of building future space forces, we use our
capability development function to meet tomorrow's space requirements.
As reported last year, the Army uses established and emerging processes
to document its space-based needs and pursue Army and Joint validation
of its requirements. This disciplined approach helps ensure limited
resources are applied where warfighter operational utility can be most
effectively served. As a recognized Army Center for Analysis, USASMDC/
ARSTRAT conducts studies, in conjunction with the Army and the other
Services, to determine how best to meet Army space requirements. With
this information, we continue to pursue and develop the necessary
adaptability across the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel,
Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) to
mitigate threats and vulnerabilities while sustaining land force
operations.
The Army's Space Policy, published in 2009, focuses on the
operational and tactical needs of land forces and assigns space related
Army organizational responsibilities. It follows implemented DOD space
policies and procedures, reestablishes objectives for Army space, and
continues the Army Space Council. The Army's Space Policy outlines four
broad space related objectives:
Maximize the effectiveness of current space
capabilities in support of operational and tactical land
warfighting needs.
Influence the design, development, acquisition, and
concepts of operation of future space systems that enable and
enhance current and future land forces.
Advance the development and effective use of
responsive, timely, and assured Joint interoperable space
capabilities.
Seamlessly integrate relevant space capabilities into
the operating force.
In May 2011, the Chief of Staff of the Army approved the Army's
Space Strategic Plan. This document, which was shaped by national level
guidance such as the National Space Policy and the National Security
Space Strategy, outlines the Army's space enterprise path for strategic
planning, programming, and resourcing.
The essence of our space strategy and the guiding vision of the
Army space enterprise are to assure access to resilient and relevant
space-enabled capabilities to ensure Army forces can conduct unified
land operations. To achieve this, our space strategy rests on three
tenets that link Army strategic planning and programming for space to
the guidance in national and DOD space policy and strategy. The three
essential tenets are:
To enable the Army's enduring mission by providing
requisite space-enabled capabilities to support current
operations, as well as future transformation efforts.
To leverage existing DOD, national, commercial, and
international space-based capabilities.
To pursue cross-domain solutions to create a resilient
architecture to mitigate threats, vulnerabilities, and assure
access to critical capabilities needed to sustain land force
operations.
To properly train space professionals, the Army developed the Space
Operations Officer Qualification Course and the Army Space Cadre Basic
Course. These two courses provide the necessary foundation for the
Space Cadre. The Army has come a long way since the first Space
Operations Officer Qualification class in 2001. Today, through USASMDC/
ARSTRAT's Directorate of Training and Doctrine, we conduct space
training via resident, mobile training teams, and distributed learning
venues to support initial skills and qualification training, leader
development, lifelong learning and professional development in support
of life cycle management.
The Army also leverages the high-quality space training developed
and administrated by the Air Force. Finally, numerous space officers
complete additional post-graduate studies at the Naval Postgraduate
School, accredited civilian institutions, and training with industry.
The Army is committed to growing, training, developing, tutoring, and
advancing space professionals. In 2011, the Army Space Council assigned
USASMDC/ARSTRAT the task to execute an Army-level initiative and
incorporate space knowledge and leader development training into all
Army Schools. We are leading this effort with support from the U.S.
Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and are researching and
identifying gaps in space knowledge training at the Centers of
Excellence and associated schools. Once completed, the analytical
results will help us define the what and how of soldier space knowledge
training and facilitate the integration of that space knowledge
training into existing lessons and school curricula.
Our Battle Lab continues to find new ways to exploit space
capabilities, to bring more space-based products to the tactical
warfighter and integrate them with Army network capabilities. Via a
Joint effort between Air Force Space Command and USASMDC/ARSTRAT, we
have developed a way to provide situational awareness of Space
capabilities to the tactical user, via a handheld tablet device,
similar to an iPad. Prototype iSpace tablets are currently in the hands
of deployed Army space professionals while specialized variants are
being used by deployed Army Special Operations soldiers.
research, test, and integrate space and space related technologies
Our final core task entails our materiel development function in
which we seek to provide the warfighter with space and space related
technologies that provide dominant advantages on the battlefield--
essential enhancements for the day-after-tomorrow. We realize that
fiscal challenges will stress all modernization efforts. As such, we
have focused our science and technology research, development, and
demonstrations on capabilities that return maximal advances in our
combat effectiveness. Recognition of the inextricable dependence of our
weapon systems and battle command capabilities on orbiting spacecraft
specifically highlights our determined effort to develop affordable
spacecraft and launch systems which, in turn, will enable assured
access to global reach from space. Our focus on affordability ensures a
feasible means to field sufficient numbers of space systems to
completely and effectively complement our active combat brigades.
Despite the current and projected resource constrained environment,
the Army recognizes the continued need to prioritize, leverage, and
invest in promising space research and development technologies. As
such, within our materiel development core task, we are striving to
better utilize the Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD)
Program. This will enable us to find, demonstrate, transition, and
transfer the best operational concepts and technology solutions for
transformational, Joint, and coalition warfare. Leveraging the JCTD
program, I would like to briefly highlight three small satellite
technology endeavors that have the potential to provide enhanced space
capabilities to the ground commanders and warfighters.
SMDC Nanosatellite Program-3 (SNaP-3): Constellations
of highly affordable nanosatellites deployed in mission-
specific, low earth orbits can provide a cost effective,
beyond-line-of-sight data communications capability for users
who currently have no access to satellite communications. SNaP-
3, an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) approved JCTD,
seeks to utilize three of these small satellites to provide
dedicated coverage to a wide range of under-served users in
remote areas. Pending final approval of the JCTD, the Army will
build and launch three nanosatellites to address the current
shortfall. We are hopeful this initiative will transfer to a
program of record in fiscal year 2014.
Kestrel Eye Visible Imagery Nanosatellite: New
technologies are enabling the production of low-cost
nanosatellites which have ever increasing military utility.
Kestrel Eye, an OSD approved JCTD, is an endeavor to
manufacture an electro-optical near-nanosatellite-class imagery
satellite that can be tasked directly by the tactical ground
component warfighter. Weighing about 30 pounds and capable of
producing 1.5 meter resolution imagery, Kestrel Eye's data will
be down-linked directly to the same warfighter via a data relay
system that is also accessible by other warfighters in theater
without any continental United States relay pass-through or
data filtering. At the low cost of about $1 million per
spacecraft in a production mode, the intent is to demonstrate a
small, tactical space-based imagery microsatellite that could
be propagated in large numbers to provide a cost effective,
persistent capability to ground forces. Each satellite would
have an operational life of greater than 2 years in low earth
orbit. Pending final JCTD approval, the initial Kestrel Eye
launch is scheduled for next year.
Soldier-Warfighter Operationally Responsive Deployer
for Space (SWORDS): Concurrent with the shrinking size and cost
of militarily useful satellites is a need for an appropriately
sized and priced launch system. SWORDS, an OSD approved JCTD,
is an initiative to develop a very low cost launch vehicle.
This launch system is designed to take advantage of low cost,
proven technologies, and non-exotic materials to provide launch
for small weight payloads to low earth orbit for about one
million dollars per launch vehicle. SWORDS is low cost because
it is very simple: it is an integrated tank/booster/engine
design; it has a benign bi-propellant liquid propulsion system;
and it uses existing launch support and launch site hardware.
conclusion
The Army is and will grow more dependent upon the capabilities that
space brings to the battlefield. In current and all future conflicts,
space capabilities will be inextricably linked to warfighting. The Army
will continue to rely on and advocate for space products and services
provided by the DOD, other government agencies, our allies and
coalition partners, and commercial entities in order to shoot, move,
and communicate. The Army's goal is to continue to provide trained and
ready space forces and capabilities to the combatant commanders and the
warfighter, build future space forces, and research, develop, test, and
integrate future space capabilities. Fully integrated capabilities will
provide depth, persistence, and reach capabilities for commanders at
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Assured space systems
and well-trained and experienced space professionals significantly
reduce the fog, friction, and uncertainty of warfare. Our use of and
reliance on space is integral and absolutely critical to the Army's
successful defense of this Nation. This committee's continued support
is essential in enabling us to maintain and further improve our space
capabilities and provide the best-trained space professionals to
combatant commanders. The courageous warfighters that serve to protect
the safety and welfare of our Nation deserve nothing less.
I appreciate having the opportunity to speak on these important
matters and look forward to addressing any questions you may have.
Secure the High Ground and Army Strong!
Senator Nelson. Thank you, General.
Mr. Winokur.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT S. WINOKUR, DIRECTOR OF OCEANOGRAPHY,
SPACE, AND MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Mr. Winokur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions. I
appreciate the opportunity to be here in my role as Acting
Oceanographer for the Navy and Director of Oceanography, Space,
and Maritime Domain Awareness.
Our Navy requires access to a combination of joint
interagency, commercial, and international satellite systems
for information dominance and synchronized safe operations.
These space-based assets provide critical communication paths,
PNT signals, environmental data, and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Space
capabilities enable effective command and control,
responsiveness, and agility necessary for a globally engaged,
superior naval force consistent with emphasis on forward
operations and joint interoperability.
The Navy depends on others within DOD to acquire sufficient
wideband communication satellites to meet the variety of needs
in these bands. However, as the executive agent for narrowband
satellite communications, it is the Navy that supplies the
necessary narrowband capabilities to meet joint force
requirements.
The increasing demand for narrowband satellite
communication (SATCOM) access at ever-higher data rates
requires moving beyond legacy ultra-high frequency (UHF)
satellite capabilities. While the MUOS will carry a legacy UHF
payload for near-term usage, most importantly, it will increase
future user capacity by over 10 times through its wideband
signal. MUOS will also connect users to the Defense Information
Systems Network, resulting in worldwide tactical narrowband
netted point-to-point and broadcast voice and data services in
challenging environments.
The first of five MUOS satellites launched on February 24th
is well on its way to meet its scheduled on-orbit capability in
May. The second spacecraft is on track for a November 2012
delivery and has a tentative launch date of July 2013.
Assembling and testing of the third spacecraft is nearly
complete.
Additionally, the radio access facility in Hawaii and the
Naval Satellite Operations Center in Point Magoo, CA, have
received the necessary upgrades for initial operation of MUOS.
Navy optimized the UHF SATCOM constellation to ensure joint
staff requirements are met in legacy UHF payload capacity, even
in the event of an unplanned loss. Measures included
enhancements in existing DOD systems, leases with commercial
companies, and a memorandum of understanding with the
Australian Ministry of Defense for use of channels on an
Australian-hosted payload. Based on the improvements already
employed, the recent successful launch of MUOS-1 and the
statistical reliability analysis of the legacy UHF SATCOM
constellation's lifespan, Navy does not foresee a need for
additional legacy capacity.
The GPS is the Navy's primary source of precise PNT, data
for platforms, munitions, combat, and C4I systems. Last summer,
Navy awarded a multiyear contract for its follow-on shipboard
PNT distribution system. The new GPS PNT service will replace
decades-old, legacy systems incorporating the latest security
architecture, redundant clocks, and anti-jam antennas.
Space-based operations are an essential element to Navy's
global atmospheric and ocean numerical models, relying on
partnerships with the Air Force, civil, and international
organizations to meet our space-based environmental sensing
requirements. To this end, the Navy is engaged in defining
requirements for the follow-on to the Defense Meteorological
Satellite Program.
By using a variety of space-based assets, we are providing
greater maritime domain awareness, leading to more efficient
defenses from threats to safety and commerce. Navy continues to
engage the intelligence community as they explore future
acquisitions and consider the capabilities of commercial
vendors to meet Federal ISR needs.
In closing, I would like to reiterate that the Navy is
heavily reliant upon space assets for success in the maritime
domain. In the face of today's fiscal realities, this requires
balancing investments and new acquisitions, training in the use
of existing assets, and continued examination of alternatives
to provide sound operations and acquisition options.
Mr. Chairman, we look forward to answering any questions
you and the subcommittee may have. Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Winokur and Dr.
Zangardi follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Mr. Robert S. Winokur and Dr. John A.
Zangardi
introduction
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, we are
honored to appear before you today to address the Navy's space
activities. Navy's forward and geographically-dispersed operations
underlines the importance of a healthy satellite constellation and
assured access to those capabilities that support getting the necessary
information to leadership in a timely manner to inform decisions at
tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The space constellation
brings synchronization of guidance and objectives between the shore-
based headquarters and the forward-deployed Fleet, incorporates the
tactical picture of each asset forward into a global common operational
picture for increased awareness, and allows orchestration of operations
amongst the detached units.
The Defense Strategic Guidance, released in January 2012, directs a
rebalancing toward the vast Asia-Pacific region, due to the United
State's ``inextricably linked'' economic and security interests with
countries in East and South Asia and the Western Pacific. The 30th
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, delivered his
Sailing Directions in September 2011, directing the Navy to place
warfighting principles and capabilities first, to operate forward, and
to be ready to employ all Navy resources to accomplish assigned
missions. The continued emphasis in forward operations combined with
the re-emphasis on the global nature of U.S. security interests require
Navy position itself to take full advantage of the critical benefits
afforded from space. It also demands Navy continue to work with the
other Services to develop and refine the necessary tactics, techniques,
procedures, and capabilities to maximize the use of available
constellations and maintain continual access in degraded or denied
space environments. Navy continues to recognize the need for space
expertise as a guide in developing our space capabilities, and
therefore is routinely examining its Space Cadre community management
and optimizing its training and exercise regimen to strengthen Navy's
ability to maximize the access to, and use of, these critical satellite
constellations.
Information Dominance and synchronized, safe operations in the vast
domains of the global commons require access to a combination of joint,
interagency, commercial, and international space systems providing our
Navy commanders with critical satellite communications (SATCOM) paths;
positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) signals; environmental
monitoring (EM) data; missile warning (MW); and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) reporting necessary for the full
range of operations from humanitarian missions to combat operations in
one or more theaters. Access to, and mastery in, operations utilizing
this combination of space capabilities enables decisiveness,
sustainability, responsiveness, and agility--critical requirements for
a globally engaged, superior naval force.
mobile user objective system (muos)
SATCOM access is the backbone of space-based capabilities
supporting Navy's geographically-dispersed, forward operations. It is
the pathway across which commanders can provide updates and receive
guidance from higher headquarters ``on the beach'' and synchronize
operations with land-based and other distant Fleet assets. It is also
an important path to disseminate critical MW, ISR, and EM information
to forward-deployed ships, providing threat warning, situational
awareness, and a solid foundation with which the operational or
tactical commander can make sound decisions. Navy depends on others
within the Department of Defense (DOD) to acquire sufficient wideband
communications satellites to meet the variety of Navy missions
requiring communications in these bands. As the Executive Agent for
Narrowband Satellite Communications, Navy supplies the necessary
narrowband capabilities to meet the total joint force requirements.
The increasing joint demand for narrowband SATCOM access at ever-
higher data rates requires moving beyond antiquated legacy UHF
satellite capabilities. The Mobile User Objective System, or MUOS, will
use a wideband code division, multiple access (WCDMA) capability,
similar to third generation (3G) cellular telephones, that will satisfy
those demands by providing over 10 times the capacity of the current
UHF Follow-On (UFO) satellite constellation. With this capability and
the increased capacity, MUOS will support Unified Commands and Joint
Task Force Components, DOD and non-DOD agencies, and our coalition
partners by providing worldwide tactical narrowband netted, point-to-
point, and broadcast voice and data services in challenging
environments, including double-canopy foliage, urban environments, high
sea states, and all weather conditions.
Over the past year, the MUOS program made significant progress. The
first MUOS satellite in the planned constellation of five satellites
launched on February 24, 2012, and is scheduled for on-orbit capability
in May 2012. Ground infrastructure improvements are completed for the
initial MUOS capability, as is training of the operators at Naval
Satellite Operations Center, who will be responsible for on-orbit
maintenance and operation of the constellation. The second spacecraft
is assembled and undergoing spacecraft level integrated testing. It is
on track for a November 2012 delivery to the government and has a
tentative launch date of July 2013, as assigned by the Air Force.
Assembly and system level testing of the third spacecraft is nearly
complete, and the program projects its on-time delivery for an
anticipated fiscal year 2014 launch.
With the launch of MUOS 1, the Department of Defense (DOD) begins
its transition to a new UHF SATCOM capability based on 3G cellular
telephone technology; however it will take time to launch the full
constellation and shift the thousands of DOD UHF SATCOM users to this
new technology. This transition will be made smooth through a number of
proactive measures to extend access to the legacy UHF signals. First,
each MUOS satellite has a legacy UHF payload that will be accessible by
current UHF radios and will remain available throughout the satellite's
lifetime. Navy also optimized the UHF SATCOM constellation to
significantly increase the number of available channels and implemented
the Integrated Waveform, a software upgrade to UHF SATCOM tactical
terminals and control systems, to optimize the use of legacy UHF
satellite channels. Navy continues to leverage commercial legacy UHF
capabilities through leases directly with commercial companies and
through a Memorandum of Understanding with the Australian Ministry of
Defense for use of channels on an Australian hosted payload. Navy has
explored additional options using commercially hosted payloads, but
based on the improvements already employed, the recent successful
launch of MUOS 1, planned future launches of the subsequent MUOS
satellites, and the projected lifespan of the legacy UHF SATCOM
constellation, Navy does not foresee a need for any additional legacy
capacity now or through MUOS's projected lifecycle.
The final piece in realizing the full capability of MUOS is the
fielding of MUOS-capable Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) terminals
and by upgrading existing legacy UHF software programmable terminals to
give access to the WCDMA waveform. Due to cost overruns and schedule
delays, the MUOS compatible terminals of the JTRS program were reduced
to the Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit (HMS) Manpack radio and the
Airborne, Maritime, Fixed Station (AMF) Small Airborne radio versions.
Recently, the Office of the Secretary of Defense made Navy responsible
for systems engineering and integration of the end to end MUOS
capability to include ensuring compatible user terminals are developed.
Navy has appointed the MUOS Program Manager as the government
development and integration lead and is implementing additional early
end to end testing of the new MUOS capability in order to maximize the
successful operational deployment of MUOS-capable JTRS terminals when
fielded. With this new direction, Navy expects the JTRS HMS program to
have the HMS Manpack certified and ready for testing in late fiscal
year 2013, in time to conduct the operational evaluation of the MUOS
satellite system in fiscal year 2014.
With five programmed satellites on orbit, MUOS will be the common
denominator for future narrowband command and control, enhancing the
capability to communicate from the tactical edge to theater
headquarters. MUOS will allow more comprehensive and coordinated
support to regional engagement efforts, providing the capability to
synchronize actions with other Services and agencies.
tacsat-4
The level of importance that Navy places on SATCOM access directs
the exploration of a variety of measures to counter anti-access and
area denial efforts of potential adversaries. Navy is examining signal
processing techniques that can be employed in the architectures of
already on orbit satellites to maintain access to their signals in a
degraded or denied space environment. Navy is also looking at
technology that can be placed on satellites that are still under
construction to give us an on-orbit capability.
On September 27, 2011, Navy launched Tactical Satellite 4 (TacSat-
4) to examine another tenant of space resiliency, that of operationally
responsive space launches. TacSat-4 is a fourth-generation
microsatellite funded by the Office of Naval Research and developed by
the Naval Research Laboratory in response to a U.S. Marine Corps
requirement for satellite communications ``on the move'' and Navy's
requirement for rapid replenishment of SATCOM. Since launch, TacSat-4
has undergone, and continues to undergo, testing by the Navy, Marine
Corps, Army, and Coast Guard, as well as the Canadian and British
militaries, to better understand its true military utility in providing
communications access to ground units in urban and mountainous terrain,
ships and submarines on the high seas, and even units operating in the
polar regions where traditional SATCOM satellites in geosynchronous
orbits cannot reach. TacSat-4's inclined low-earth orbit, somewhat
atypical for SATCOM satellites, is also being studied for its potential
benefit for data exfiltration from ground and oceanographic sensors.
positioning, navigation, and timing (pnt)
The Air Force's NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) continues
to be Navy's space-based signal source for precise PNT data for
platforms, munitions, combat systems and command, control,
communications, computer, and intelligence systems. Received and
processed by Navy GPS receivers, it allows for precise navigation to
ensure safe operations in, under, and above the seas. It provides
accurate location data for guided munitions to ensure precise delivery
to the target, minimizing inaccurate attacks that can often result in
greater collateral damage. These, and many more benefits Navy enjoys
from PNT data, underscore Navy's emphasis in maintaining user access to
this capability, even in anti-access and area denial efforts of our
adversaries.
Last summer, Navy awarded a multi-year contract to Raytheon
Integrated Defense Systems for its follow on shipboard PNT system. The
new system, GPS-based PNT Service (GPNTS), will replace legacy GPS user
systems dating from the 1980s and 1990s. GPNTS will incorporate the
latest GPS security architecture and feature redundant clocks and anti-
jam antennas. Additionally, it will serve as a major stepping stone for
Navy's transition to the new GPS M-code signal.
Navy is also undertaking an initiative to improve our critical
shore-based timing services by implementing a common architecture that
will improve assured time and frequency services. Additionally, Navy,
as the DOD manager for Precise Time and Time Interval, is working
closely with the Air Force to ensure the U.S. Naval Observatory's
Master Clock is fully supportive of the new GPS III architecture.
environmental monitoring
Navy provides DOD with global atmospheric modeling and global and
regional ocean modeling. We rely on partnerships with the Air Force,
civil, and international agencies to meet our space-based environmental
sensing requirements. Meeting these requirements is critical to the
planning for and execution of safe, effective military operations. To
this end, the Navy is engaged in defining the requirements for the
follow-on to the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP).
As stated in last year's testimony, Navy deferred procurement of an
altimeter satellite, GEOSAT Follow-On 2 (GFO-2), until fiscal year
2016, assuming risk in antisubmarine warfare and mine warfare areas in
exchange for increased emphasis in areas deemed of greater importance
to DOD. However, with the 2012 emphasis on forward operations in the
Pacific and Indian Oceans, Navy has altered its planning assumptions
and must reduce risk in antisubmarine warfare and mine warfare through
an assured source of space-based altimetry data, critical data for
battlespace awareness and planning undersea warfare operations. Navy is
considering all options to meet this altimetry requirement, from GFO-2
to civil or international partnerships consistent with Presidential
Policy Directive 4.
missile warning and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
Space-based assets can provide unique access to information
critical to decision making throughout the range of military
operations, whether it is insight into potentially hazardous areas
resulting from natural disasters or the preparatory activities of an
emerging threat to U.S. and our partners' interests. The global
maritime picture built by quilting together a variety of assets,
including those that allow mapping ice boundaries in the polar regions
and the EM assets that support other oceanographic studies, can result
in greater maritime domain awareness and lead to more efficient
defenses from seaborne threats to safety and commerce, as well as safer
navigation for the world's merchant fleets.
Navy continues to engage the Intelligence Community as they explore
future acquisitions and consider the capabilities of commercial vendors
to meet the ISR needs of the U.S. Government. Navy's relationship
building fosters better understanding throughout the Intelligence
Community of the unique ISR requirements in the maritime domain,
improving the accuracy of factoring Navy requirements into acquisition
decisions and the probability of them ``making the cut.'' These
requirements can vary significantly from the traditional ISR
collections of terrestrial targets to which we have become accustomed
and, thus, require extra emphasis and explanation. For example, terrain
such as mountains and river crossings can help focus collections on
mobile, land-based elements, but maritime vessels of interests have
greater freedom of movement and, therefore, require a much broader area
surveillance method and more frequent revisits to maintain a credible
and reliable track. In support of this, Navy, under Presidential Policy
Directive-4 (PPD-4), the National Space Policy, is working with
partners to foster international collaboration using civil and
commercial space systems to enhance global maritime domain awareness.
The recommended program has three major facets: Harmonization,
Operational Cooperation and Experimentation, and Influencing Technology
Development, through which it will achieve the advantages of increased
persistence, increased coverage, and reduced cost.
To complement the efforts to build requirements into future
systems, Navy continues to leverage its Tactical Exploitation of
National Capabilities Branch and various research labs to explore new
methods in which we can use the current, traditional data collection
systems in often nontraditional manners or in an atypical combination
of sources to meet these unique requirements. These efforts are paying
dividends, but more work and investment in the research and development
of such techniques is necessary. As budgets continue to decline, it
will be these efforts in non-traditional processing and exploitation,
combined with ensuring future architectures take into account the
unique maritime ISR requirements, that will give Navy the necessary,
timely intelligence to make the right decision within realistic time
constraints.
navy space cadre
Key to Navy's development and full exploitation of space-based
capabilities is our Space Cadre. As Navy continues to operationalize
space amongst the Fleets and develop its capabilities to maintain
access to the critical functions our Nation's space constellations
provide, Navy will rely on its Space Cadre to lead the development of
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) unique to the maritime
domain. Deployed forces need these TTPs to take full advantage of the
benefits space provides and maintain critical warfighting functions
despite the anti-access and area denial efforts of future adversaries.
Development of this expertise requires formal education, intense
training, and challenging exercises. Navy continues to integrate space
awareness training into core training opportunities throughout the
Information Dominance Corps and in pre-deployment training for Strike
Group staffs. This broad training raises general awareness throughout
the Navy of available capabilities and how to take full advantage of
all DOD space assets.
From this baseline, Navy grows an experienced group of people
identified as Space Cadre who receive advanced education in space
operations, technology, and engineering and are placed in specific
space-related jobs to assist in translating Navy requirements to the
joint force. The unique needs of maritime domain operations are often
not intuitively obvious to those more experienced in land-based
operations, so placement of these ``translators'' at key acquisition
and space operations billets ensures appropriate advocacy for the
unique requirements for space-based capabilities to support maritime
operations.
Finally, Navy is incorporating more demanding scenarios in Strike
Group and other pre-deployment exercises to increase the Fleet
experiences in operating in degraded or denied space environments.
These exercises give the Fleet a chance to test TTPs and transform them
from something read in a publication to a second-nature reaction to
maintain access to those key space capabilities the Navy needs to
execute our assigned missions.
conclusion
The Navy is heavily reliant upon space for mission enhancement from
SATCOM, PNT, MW, EM, and ISR assets to communicate with, and provide
valuable information to, our commanders and leadership at sea and
ashore to inform their decisions and guide maritime operations. This
requires balancing investments in new acquisitions, additional training
in the use of already available assets, and continued development of a
Space Cadre core that can examine alternatives and provide sound
operations and acquisition recommendations to leadership, especially
within the bounds of today's fiscal realities. Navy will continue to
consider the threat posed to these critical resources by those
developing cutting-edge space denial technologies and the probability
of their use against the United States as we examine the balance
between the cost, benefit, and investment timing into necessary
capabilities to protect our access to space constellations and ensure
our forward-deployed commanders have the tools necessary to maintain
information dominance and decision superiority.
Mr. Chairman--thank you for the opportunity to share our efforts
with you today. We look forward to answering any questions you and the
subcommittee may have.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Dr. Zangardi.
STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN A. ZANGARDI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF THE NAVY FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS,
INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION OPERATIONS, AND SPACE
Dr. Zangardi. Good afternoon. Mr. Chairman and Senator
Sessions, thank you very much for this privilege to speak
before you today. I will keep my opening comments very brief.
At last year's hearing, I was asked when the Navy believed
the MUOS space vehicle number 1 would launch. I stated at that
hearing that the Navy's projection was February 2012. I am
pleased to inform you that MUOS space vehicle number 1 was
launched Friday, February 24, from Cape Canaveral, FL. The
satellite is currently in a geosynchronous orbit in its test
slot over the Pacific.
Deployments of the solar arrays and mesh antenna are
complete. Payload testing has commenced and is ongoing. Both
the UHF legacy package, test signals, and KA band signals are
being received by the ground station. The MUOS Government and
contractor team continues to execute the plan and the
satellite's health and performance are as expected.
After a 90-day on-orbit check, it will be handed over to
Navy and be ready for legacy UHF SATCOM operations and the
initial testing of the new wideband code division, multiple
access capability, otherwise known as the MUOS waveform.
The second satellite is assembled undergoing spacecraft
level testing. Currently it is in its TVAC chamber. The second
satellite is on track for November 2012 delivery.
Space vehicle number 2 has been tentatively given a July
2013 launch slot. We expect that to firm up here soon.
The remaining three satellites are under a fixed-price
incentive contract and are tracking both to cost and schedule
at this time.
The Navy will continue to focus on the successful roll-out
of MUOS constellation. We will also continue to monitor the
health of the UFO constellation to ensure essential UHF
satellite communication services are provided to the
warfighter.
Sir, that ends my comments and I stand by to answer your
questions. Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Ms. Chaplain.
STATEMENT OF CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND
SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Chaplain. Chairman Nelson and Senator Sessions, thank
you for asking us to share our views on the military space
acquisition programs.
As I commented last year, the landscape for acquisitions in
space has changed considerably over the past decade. If I were
here 5 years ago, I would be talking about all the major
programs having very large cost increases and schedule delays
adding up to years. I would be talking about resistance to
implementing best practices. I would also be talking about even
a separate acquisition policy for space altogether. I would be
talking about a lot of programs moving forward with a lot of
technical and other kinds of unknowns, like requirements and
cost. I would be talking about lax oversight. What we see today
is that space programs do have some problems, but they are not
to the same extent that we had a decade ago.
Some of the systems we have concerns about do include the
GPS III program which had an 18 percent cost increase for the
first two satellites. So that one is on our watch list. We have
some concerns about newer programs such as the ground system
that accompanies GPS III. Of course, we have some concerns
about some of the user equipment programs that are lagging
behind schedule like FAB-T.
On the other hand, we have seen some positive steps taken
this year in programs like the Joint Space Operations Center
mission system where they saw an acquisition strategy that was
not maybe as executable and oversight-friendly as it could be,
and they took steps to revamp the strategy and make it more
executable.
In general, today I would say there are very different
conditions than we saw 10 years ago. The best practices are
being adopted. There is more of an emphasis on evolutionary
development for systems. There is more of an emphasis on
developing technologies before beginning programs. There is
definitely more emphasis on instituting higher quality
standards for programs and following them. Then there has also
been a number of actions to strengthen and streamline
leadership across DOD.
What we worry about today are some barriers to making all
these things work together to the maximum extent possible, and
the barriers that we worry about are much like what you talked
about in your opening statement.
First is the disconnects between ground equipment,
particularly user equipment, and the satellites themselves. We
are seeing too many programs that the user equipment is just
arriving years later than the satellites. You really have a
situation where you are wasting expensive capability in space
when that happens.
A second barrier is the rising cost of launch. There is no
easy way to address this. In our report last year, what we
stressed is the lack of good data on suppliers and costs. It
just makes it more difficult to get your arms around the cost
of launch and to reduce it.
A third barrier that we talk about in our statement is S&T
planning. As you mentioned, two key programs have been proposed
for termination, including the space test program and the ORS
program. When you look at those being terminated and combined
with some planning weaknesses that we reported earlier this
year, it raises cause for concern about the way forward for S&T
in space and how do we expect to make technological
advancements in the future. We do not see enough coordination
between DOD agencies and other agencies involved in space in
terms of strategic planning for space S&T.
The last barrier fits in the bucket of coordination and
leadership. It is exactly what you were talking about in your
opening statement about programs all over Government. There is
a lot of opportunity to optimize investments and work together
better. Instead, we still see a lot of stovepiping in terms of
programs being started and not enough looking at things from a
Government-wide perspective and a very strategic perspective to
see how investments in things like launch acquisitions, for
example, could be maximized.
With that, I will conclude my statement. Our written
statement is much more detailed. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Cristina T. Chaplain
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department
of Defense's (DOD) space acquisitions. Each year, billions of dollars
are spent by DOD to acquire space-based capabilities that support
military and other government operations--such as intelligence,
reconnaissance and surveillance, and homeland security--and to enable
transformation of the way DOD collects and disseminates information.
The worst of DOD's space acquisition problems may be behind the
department, as programs long plagued by serious cost and schedule
overruns are finally being launched. Though acquisition challenges
persist, they are not as widespread and significant as they were
several years ago, and to its credit, DOD has taken an array of actions
to reduce risks. The challenge DOD now faces is how best to keep its
major space systems acquisitions on track in light of fiscal
constraints. Operating in space is expensive and DOD is still in the
process of replenishing legacy capabilities, such as missile warning,
protected communications, and environmental monitoring. While upgrading
existing satellite constellations amid declining budgets is a daunting
challenge, there are significant barriers to ensuring investments are
optimized, including fragmented leadership, the rising cost of launch,
uncertainty about the future for technology advancements, and
disconnects between the fielding of satellites with user equipment and
ground systems needed to take advantage of expensive new capabilities.
In addition to discussing the progress DOD has made this year, my
testimony will focus on these challenges as they stand in the way of
DOD fully realizing the benefits of satellite acquisition improvements.
The objectives of this testimony are to address: (1) the current
status of space system acquisitions; (2) the results of Government
Accountability Office's (GAO) space-related reviews this past year; (3)
actions being taken to address DOD space acquisition problems; and (4)
remaining challenges. In preparing this testimony, we relied on
previous GAO reports on: (1) space programs; and (2) weapon system
acquisition best practices as well as ongoing work on satellite control
networks.\1\ We also relied on work performed in support of our annual
weapons system assessments, and analyzed DOD funding estimates to
assess cost increases and investment trends for selected major space
system acquisition programs. We obtained updates on improvement actions
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Air Force. We also
analyzed recent funding estimates for space programs. More information
on our scope and methodology is available in the issued reports. The
work that supports this statement was performed in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
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\1\ See GAO related reports at the end of this statement.
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background
The past decade has been troubling for defense space acquisitions.
Despite years of significant investment, most of the DOD large space
acquisition programs collectively experienced billions of dollars in
cost increases, stretched schedules, and increased technical risks.
Significant schedule delays of as much as 9 years have resulted in
potential capability gaps in missile warning, military communications,
and weather monitoring. Unit costs for one of the most troubled
programs, the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), for instance, have
climbed about 231 percent to over $3 billion per satellite. Moreover,
the first satellite was launched about 9 years later than predicted.
Similarly, by the end of fiscal year 2010, the U.S. Government had
spent 16 years and over $5 billion to develop the National Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), but had
not launched a single satellite. In February 2010, citing the program's
cost overruns, schedule delays, and management problems, the White
House announced that the NPOESS tri-agency structure would be
eliminated and the program would be restructured by splitting
procurements and responsibilities. Other programs, such as the
Transformational Satellite Communications System, were canceled several
years earlier because they were found to be too highly ambitious and
not affordable at a time when the DOD was struggling to address
critical acquisition problems elsewhere in the space portfolio.
the current status of space system acquisitions
In 2011, we testified that though problems still existed on many
programs, DOD was beginning to make progress by finally launching
satellites that had been lagging behind schedule.\2\ These included the
Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) Space Tracking and Surveillance System,
the Air Force's first Global Positioning System (GPS) IIF satellite and
the first Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite although
AEHF had not yet reached its final planned orbit at the time we
testified because of an anomaly with the satellite's propulsion system.
At the same time, however, several programs still in development were
at risk of cost and schedule growth, such as the Joint Space Operations
Center Mission System (JMS).
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\2\ GAO, Space Acquisitions: DOD Delivering New Generations of
Satellites, but Space System Acquisition Challenges Remain, GA0-11-590T
(Washington, DC: May 11, 2011).
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Progress has continued since we testified last year. For instance:
DOD launched the second GPS IIF satellite in July
2011, and the third is scheduled to launch in September 2012.
DOD launched the first of the Navy's Mobile User
Objective System (MUOS) satellites in February 2012, and the
second is scheduled for launch in July 2013.
The first of six SBIRS geosynchronous earth orbit
(GEO) satellites successfully launched in May 2011, after a
roughly 9 year delay.\3\ The second SBIRS satellite is planned
for delivery in spring 2012 and may launch late this year or
early 2013.
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\3\ Two highly elliptical orbit sensors have already been launched.
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The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program
continues to successfully launch DOD and National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) satellites, and is planning 11
launches in 2012.
The first AEHF satellite reached its intended orbit
after having experienced propulsion trouble after launch. The
second AEHF satellite is scheduled to launch in April 2012.
While these launches represent solid progress, there have been some
drawbacks to the programs that have launched their first satellites.
For instance, the second GPS IIF satellite experienced technical
problems that could possibly shorten the satellite's operational
lifetime. Also, though a MUOS satellite has been launched, the DOD
estimates that over 90 percent of the first satellite's on-orbit
capabilities will likely be initially underutilized because of delays
in development of the compatible Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)
terminals.
Moreover, other acquisition programs are experiencing cost and
schedule growth, though not to the extent yet as those experienced in
the last decades. For instance:
The GPS III program is currently experiencing cost
growth and the contractor is behind schedule. In November 2011,
the contractor's estimated cost at completion for the
development and production of the first two satellites was over
$1.4 billion or 18 percent greater than originally estimated;
the program office estimated the cost to be about $1.6 billion.
The GPS III program has cited multiple reasons for the
projected cost increases including reductions in the program's
production rate; test equipment delays; and inefficiencies in
the development of both the navigation and communication
payload and satellite bus. The contractor is also behind in
completing some tasks on schedule, but the program does not
expect these delays to affect the launch of the first
satellite.
Though the first SBIRS satellite has launched, and the
second is close to delivery, program officials are predicting a
1-year delay on production of the 3rd and 4th GEO satellites
due in part to technical challenges, parts obsolescence and
test failures. Along with the production delay, program
officials are predicting a $438 million cost overrun for the
3rd and 4th GEO satellites.
The Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS), which was
the Air Force's follow-on to the restructured NPOESS, was
terminated in fiscal year 2012. The restructuring of NPOESS and
the subsequent cancellation of DWSS have resulted in a
potential capability gap for weather and environmental
monitoring.
Table 1 describes the status of the space programs we have been
tracking in more detail.
Acquisition Challenges Have Reverberating Effects on Investment
Portfolio
Even though DOD has finally overcome some technical and production
difficulties and begun to launch high risk satellites such as SBIRS and
AEHF, the department is still contending with the effects of their
significant cost growth on its investment portfolio. Figure 1 compares
original cost estimates to current cost estimates for the broader
portfolio of major space acquisitions for fiscal years 2011 through
2016.
A longstanding problem in DOD space acquisitions is that program
and unit costs tend to go up significantly from initial cost estimates,
and the gap between original and current estimates shows that DOD has
fewer dollars available to invest in new programs or add to existing
ones. In fact, estimated costs for the major space acquisition programs
have increased by about $11.6 billion--321 percent--from initial
estimates for fiscal years 2011 through 2016.\4\ It should also be
noted that the declining investment in the later years is the result of
mature programs that have planned lower out-year funding, cancellation
of a major space acquisition program and several development efforts,
and the exclusion of several major space acquisition efforts for which
total cost data were unavailable. These include the Space Fence, Space
Based Space Surveillance, and the Defense Weather Satellite effort.
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\4\ Costs adjusted for inflation.
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gao space-related reviews over the past year
Over the past year, we have reported on of the need for sound and
sufficient information for the new DOD acquisition strategy for the
EELV program; parts quality problems in major DOD, MDA, and NASA
programs; and greater content and coordination in the space Science and
Technology (S&T) strategy. We are also conducting a review of satellite
operations and have briefed Defense authorization and appropriations
committees on our findings. These reviews, discussed further below,
highlight both the successes and challenges that have faced the DOD
space community as it has completed or sought to complete problematic
legacy efforts and deliver modernized capabilities.
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Acquisition Strategy
DOD's EELV program serves a vital mission of placing critical
national security and civilian satellites into their required orbits.
It is also on the brink of major changes. In 2009, the Air Force and
the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) determined that the current
approach for acquiring EELV launch vehicles was likely not the best
business model and decided that a new acquisition strategy needed to be
developed. This strategy favors committing the government to a longer
span of purchases and to more certainty in the number of vehicles
acquired to help stabilize the industrial base. Such a change is
significant as the DOD and the NRO plan to spend about $15 billion to
acquire launch services from fiscal year 2013 to 2017 and commercial
companies other than the current provider, United Launch Alliance,
would like to become launch service providers to the government. We
were asked to review and assess whether DOD has the knowledge it needs
to develop the new trategy, which has subsequently been released, and
to identify issues that could benefit future launch acquisitions.
We found that DOD lacked critical knowledge needed to develop a new
acquisition strategy.\5\ For example, program officials, recent launch
studies, and the prime contractor all cited a diminishing launch
industrial base as a risk to the mission success of the program, but
DOD analysis supporting this condition was minimal. Moreover, under the
new acquisition strategy, contracting officials may have difficulty
assessing fair and reasonable prices given limited availability of
contractor and subcontractor cost or pricing data. Since the United
Launch Alliance joint venture formed in 2006, financial and business
systems needed to get insight into costs have been lacking. There was
also considerable uncertainty about costs associated with mission
assurance activities, even though there have been concerns about
whether such activities are excessive. Moreover, we found that if the
acquisition strategy commits the Air Force and the NRO to buy eight
common booster cores per year for a 5 year period, which was
anticipated at the time of our review, DOD may face an oversupply of
vehicles. In addition to these findings, we have reported prior
concerns about oversight for the EELV program, such as: (1) a prior
decision to designate the program as in the sustainment phase rather
than in the development phase essentially lifted the need for oversight
reporting on costs and major changes; and (2) the DOD had not updated a
life cycle cost estimate for the program despite significant changes
being made to it.\6\
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\5\ GAO, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Needs to Ensure New
Acquisition Strategy Is Based on Sufficient Information, GA0-11-641
(Washington, DC: Sep. 15, 2011).
\6\ GAO, Space Acquisitions: Uncertainties in the Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle Program Pose Management and Oversight
Challenges, GA0-08-1039 (Washington, DC: Sep. 26, 2008).
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Among other actions, we recommended that DOD conduct an independent
assessment of the health of the U.S. launch industrial base; reassess
the block buy contract length given the additional knowledge DOD is
gaining; not waive Federal Acquisition Regulations requirements for
contractor and subcontractor certified cost and pricing data as DOD
finalizes its strategy; and ensure launch mission assurance activities
be sufficient and not excessive. Congress reinforced these and other
GAO recommendations in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012
by requiring that DOD redesignate the program as a major defense
acquisition program (which would require the submission of certain
kinds of data annually) and provide to Congressional defense committees
a description of how its acquisition strategy will address the
recommendations of our EELV report issued in 2011.\7\ The Act also
requires us to submit an assessment of the information DOD provides,
and additional findings or recommendations, as appropriate. The Air
Force has taken actions to expand its knowledge about EELV since our
2011 audit work was completed and we look forward to assessing this
progress.
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\7\ Pub. L. No. 112-81, Sec. Sec. 838 & 839 (2011).
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Parts Quality for DOD, MDA, and NASA
Quality is paramount to the success of U.S. space and missile
defense programs due to their complexity, the environment they operate
in, and the high degree of accuracy and precision needed for their
operations. Yet in recent years, many programs have experienced
difficulties with quality workmanship and parts. Less visible problems
have led to unnecessary repair, scrap, rework, and stoppage; long
delays; and millions of dollars in cost growth. In some instances,
entire missions have been endangered. As a result, we assessed the
extent to which such problems affect related programs, their causes,
and what initiatives have been undertaken in response.
We found that parts quality problems had affected all 21 programs
we reviewed, in some cases contributing to significant cost overruns
and schedule delays associated with electronic versus mechanical parts
or materials.\8\ We also found that if quality problems were discovered
late in the development cycle they had more significant cost and
schedule consequences: in one such case, an additional cost of at least
$250 million and a 2-year launch delay. We found several causes of
these problems: poor workmanship, undocumented and untested
manufacturing processes, poor control of those processes and materials
and failure to prevent contamination, poor part design, design
complexity, and an inattention to manufacturing risks. Ineffective
supplier management also resulted in concerns about whether
subcontractors and contractors met program requirements.
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\8\ GAO, Space and Missile Defense Acquisitions: Periodic
Assessment Needed to Correct Parts Quality Problems in Major Programs,
GA0-11-404 (Washington, DC: June 24, 2011).
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Recognition of these difficulties has spurred agencies to adopt new
policies, but they were still in early stages of implementation at the
time of our review. Post-policy programs are not yet mature enough for
parts problems to be apparent. To address current and future problems,
agencies and industry have begun to collect and share information,
develop testing guidance and criteria, manage subcontractors, and
mitigate problems, although their impact has yet to be determined. In
any event, significant barriers hinder such efforts, including broader
acquisition management problems, workforce gaps, diffuse leadership in
the national security space community, the government's decreasing
influence on the electronics parts market, and an increase in
counterfeited parts. Our reports over the past decade have made
recommendations for addressing these broader barriers, such as
stabilizing requirements before beginning product development,
separating technology development from product development, and
strengthening leadership. The DOD is in the process of adopting these
recommendations. Because space agencies and the Missile Defense Agency
were undertaking additional actions to address parts quality problems
and they had recently established a broad range of coordination
mechanisms, we recommended that the community undertake periodic
assessments of progress being made to address parts quality problems.
The agencies generally agreed with our recommendation.
Space S&T Strategy
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010
required DOD and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to jointly
develop a space S&T strategy and it required us to assess the strategy
submitted in April 2011.\9\ We reported that a strong foundation in
space S&T should help DOD and the intelligence community address the
most challenging national security problems, reduce risk in major
acquisition programs, maintain technological superiority over
adversaries, maintain a healthy industrial base and mitigate
vulnerabilities in space systems.\10\
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\9\ Pub. L. No. 111-84, Sec. 911(b) (2009).
\10\ GAO, Space Research: Content and Coordination of Space Science
and Technology Strategy Need to Be More Robust, GA0-11-722 (Washington,
DC: July 19, 2011).
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We found that the strategy largely met the requirements of the
authorization act, but it was not a rigorous, comprehensive strategic
plan. Instead, it embraced the status quo without laying out a path for
assuring effective and efficient progress. For instance, the strategy
identified goals, but did not prioritize them. The strategy described
existing reviews used to assess progress in space S&T but did not
identify new metrics or performance measures to be used to assess
achievement of the strategy's newly established goals. Nor did the
strategy address fundamental challenges facing the S&T community, such
as human capital shortages, growing fiscal pressures, and the
difficulty in transitioning space S&T to acquisition programs. We
identified some strategic planning best practices such as identifying
required human capital and required funding; prioritizing initiatives;
and establishing ways to measure progress and processes for revising
goals in the future. Additionally, we found that organizations involved
in developing the strategy were active in creating its long- and short-
term goals, but their participation in other of its aspects was more
limited. DOD and DNI officials did not believe they were required to do
more than they did, and also did not include other agencies active in
space S&T that were not included by law in the strategy. We recommended
that DOD enhance its next version of the strategy by developing a
detailed implementation plan for achieving goals, addressing funding
prioritization and other challenges, and enhancing coordination with
other agencies involved in space technology development. DOD concurred
with these recommendations.
DOD Satellite Operations
The Air Force and Navy operate separate satellite control networks
within DOD through multiple operations centers, enabling their
satellites to perform missions from launch to on-orbit operations and
eventually through deactivation. Other Federal Government agencies,
such as the NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), and commercial companies also operate satellites
using various networks and operations centers. Combined, these networks
assist the Nation's communications, missile warning, navigation,
meteorological, environmental, and scientific satellites or missions.
DOD has efforts underway to modernize various satellite operations
centers using proprietary and interoperable network architectures using
standard protocols. For example, since 2006, the Air Force has operated
a multi-mission operations center that uses a standard interface and
telemetry, tracking, and commanding system which allows expedited
transition of research satellites to operational satellites. In
addition, in 2000, the Naval Research Laboratory initiated a web-based
service concept designed to optimize software code reuse and allow
faster delivery of mission capabilities, which could lower mission
development costs and facilitate system maintenance. Considering the
longstanding need to replace the Air Force's aging and costly satellite
control capabilities, and the importance associated with satellite
operations, it is important that DOD not miss an opportunity to improve
satellite operations and create greater efficiencies by leveraging
commercial practices and other satellite networks and associated
infrastructure.
In ongoing work, we assessed DOD's satellite operations
capabilities, specifically modernization efforts, compare DOD satellite
operations concepts with those in other government entities and
commercial industry; and, identify practices that could improve DOD
satellite operations, consistent with mission requirements. We
identified several challenges associated with DOD's modernization
efforts. For example, DOD's ability to plan and implement upgrades may
be limited by current budget uncertainties and plans to reallocate a
portion of DOD's spectrum may affect its satellite operations. In
addition, we found indications that the potential for unnecessary
overlap and fragmentation still exists within satellite operations and
associated infrastructure, including potential duplication of
facilities and hardware. For instance, there are multiple, completely
separate government satellite control networks that exist that depend
on DOD's Air Force satellite control network, including military and
civil networks, but none are interoperable. Finally, we have thus far
found that although research and development in government satellite
operations has led to the use of practices that, according to agency
officials, have improved efficiency, there are other commercial
practices that could provide further improvements to DOD's satellite
network. For example, increased automation of routine satellite
telemetry, tracking, and commanding functions could increase satellite
operations efficiencies. We expect to issue our report based on this
review later this fall.
actions being taken to address space acquisition problems
Though our reports over the year indicate there is more room for
improvement, DOD continues to work to ensure that its space programs
are more executable and produce a better return on investment. Many of
the actions it has been taking are intended to address root causes of
problems, though it will take time to determine whether these actions
are successful and they need to be complemented by decisions on how
best to lead, organize, and support space activities.
Causes of Acquisition Problems
Our past work has identified a number of causes of acquisition
problems, but several consistently stand out. At a higher level, DOD
has tended to start more weapon programs than is affordable, creating a
competition for funding that focuses on advocacy at the expense of
realism and sound management. DOD has also tended to start its space
programs before it has the assurance that the capabilities it is
pursuing can be achieved within available resources and time
constraints. There is no way to accurately estimate how long it would
take to design, develop, and build a satellite system when critical
technologies planned for that system are still in relatively early
stages of discovery and invention. Finally, programs have historically
attempted to satisfy all requirements in a single step, regardless of
the design challenges or the maturity of the technologies necessary to
achieve the full capability. DOD's preference to make larger, complex
satellites that perform a multitude of missions has stretched
technology challenges beyond current capabilities in some cases. Figure
6 illustrates the negative influences that can cause programs to fail.
Our work has recommended numerous actions that can be taken to
address the problems we identified. Generally, we have recommended that
DOD separate technology discovery from acquisition, follow an
incremental path toward meeting user needs, match resources and
requirements at program start, and use quantifiable data and
demonstrable knowledge to make decisions to move to next phases. We
have also identified practices related to cost estimating, program
manager tenure, quality assurance, technology transition, and an array
of other aspects of acquisition program management that could benefit
space programs.\11\ DOD has generally concurred with our
recommendations, and, as described below, has undertaken an array of
actions to establish a better foundation for acquisition success.
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\11\ GAO, Space Acquisitions: DOD Poised to Enhance Space
Capabilities but, Persistent Challenges Remain in Developing Space
Systems, GA0-10-447T (Washington, DC: March 10, 2010).
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Actions to Improve Space and Weapon Systems Acquisitions
As we reported last year, DOD has implemented or has been
implementing a number of actions to reform how space and weapon systems
are acquired, both through its own initiatives as well as those
required by statute. Among other actions, DOD intends to follow
incremental or evolutionary acquisition processes for space programs
versus pursuing significant leaps in capabilities involving technology
risk, and has done so with the only new satellite program undertaken by
the Air Force in recent years--GPS III and more recently with Joint
Space Operations Center Mission System, which supports space
situational awareness activities. DOD and the Air Force are also
working to streamline management and oversight of the national security
space enterprise. For example, all Air Force space system acquisition
responsibility has been assigned to the office responsible for all
other Air Force acquisition efforts, and options for streamlining the
many space committees, boards, and councils is under ongoing review.
These and other actions being taken that could improve space system
acquisition outcomes, that we have not assessed, are described in table
2.
Congress and DOD have taken major steps toward reforming the
defense acquisition system in ways that may increase the likelihood
that weapon programs will succeed in meeting planned cost and schedule
objectives.\12\ In particular, DOD policy and legislative provisions
place greater emphasis on front-end planning and establishing sound
business cases for starting programs. For example, the provisions
require programs to invest more time and resources to refine concepts
through early systems engineering, strengthening cost estimating,
developing technologies, building prototypes, holding early milestone
reviews, and developing preliminary designs before starting system
development.\13\ These provisions are intended to enable programs to
refine a weapon system concept and make cost, schedule, and performance
trade-offs before significant commitments are made. In addition, DOD
policy requires establishment of configuration steering boards that
meet annually to review program requirements changes as well as to make
recommendations on proposed descoping options that could reduce program
costs or moderate requirements. Fundamentally, these provisions should
help: (1) programs replace risk with knowledge; and (2) set up more
executable programs.
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\12\ GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Strong Leadership Is Key to
Planning and Executing Stable Weapon Programs, GA0-10-522 (Washington,
DC: May 6, 2010).
\13\ Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA), Pub. L.
No. 111-23; DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense
Acquisition System (2008).
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While DOD has taken steps to implement the provisions, it is too
soon to determine if Congress's and DOD's reform efforts will improve
weapon program outcomes. For example, in June 2011 we reported on the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council's (JROC) efforts to ensure trade-
offs among cost, schedule, and performance objectives, as directed by
the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act.\14\ We found that the JROC
did not always consider tradeoffs or influence tradeoff decisions,
military services did not consistently provide high quality resource
estimates to the JROC, and JROC did not consistently prioritize
requirements and capability gaps. We recommended that the JROC
establish a mechanism to review analysis of alternatives results
earlier in the acquisition process, require higher quality resource
estimates from requirements sponsors, prioritize requirements across
proposed programs, and address potential redundancies during
requirements reviews. The Joint Staff partially concurred with our
recommendations and generally agreed with their intent, but differed
with us on how to implement them.
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\14\ GAO, DOD Weapons Systems: Missed Trade-off Opportunities
During Requirements Reviews, GA0-11-502 (Washington, DC: June 16,
2011).
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remaining challenges
The actions that the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air
Force have been taking to address acquisition problems are good steps.
But there are still significant barriers to ensuring investments are
optimized, including fragmented leadership, the high cost of launch,
uncertainty about the future for technology advancements, and
disconnects between the fielding of satellites with user equipment and
ground systems needed to take advantage of expensive new capabilities.
In particular:
Leadership. In past years, we have reported that a
major challenge to leadership is that the community's
authorities and responsibilities are spread across the
department, and there is no single authority responsible for
these programs below the President. Both the DOD and Air Force
have taken a number of steps to streamline and clarify
leadership for space. Time will tell whether these steps will
help resolve issues such as a difficulty holding any one person
or organization accountable for balancing needs against wants,
for resolving conflicts among the many organizations involved
with space, and for ensuring that resources are dedicated where
they need to be dedicated. The department is still struggling
with disconnects between programs that need to be linked
together, such as a satellite program and its user equipment
program. At a higher level, we have reported that it still
appears as if agencies involved in space acquisitions do not
coordinate to the extent that they can in such areas as launch
acquisitions and space S&T planning.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ GAO, 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication,
Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue, GA0-
12-342SP (Washington, DC: Feb.28, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Launch costs. A factor influencing how space programs
are designed is the price of launch, which can range anywhere
from around $100 million to well over $200 million. With prices
being so high, programs often seek to maximize the ``real
estate'' on board a satellite by including more capabilities
than can sometimes be handled by a single program or within the
time period desired for the program. Moreover, the Air Force
recently developed a new launch acquisition strategy designed
in part to contain launch prices, but given remaining knowledge
gaps, achieving this outcome is uncertain. At the same time,
potential new providers promise lower costs for launch, but
none of them have been certified to launch the larger national
security satellites, and it is uncertain whether their prices
can stay low as they work to meet standards and expectations
set by government agencies. The dilemma of high launch costs,
in our view, makes it more important for the Air Force to gain
insight into costs and pricing behind its new strategy and to
have a complete understanding of the industrial base and
related vulnerabilities as well as mission assurance activities
and related costs. It would also behoove agencies to work
together, not only to bring in new entrants which they are now
doing, but in setting a future course for launch. S&T planning,
for example, has been cited as a weak area for launch, even
though investments in new propulsion and vehicle concepts have
the potential to evolve capabilities and lower costs.
S&T and related investments. Recent proposed funding
cuts have raised questions about how future technology
advancements will be achieved in space. The Space Test Program
(STP) was targeted for termination in the fiscal year 2013
budget. STP was created in 1965 to serve as an integrator to
provide launch opportunities for experimental satellites. This
program enabled new technologies to get on orbit, and pave the
way in an affordable manner for new space capabilities. STP has
spawned many current and valuable space programs, most notably
GPS. With the cancelation of this program, the Secretary of the
Air Force has stated that the organizations that develop these
new space technologies, including academic institutions,
government laboratories, and others, will be required to
shoulder the burden of launch costs, estimated at around $50
million per year. DOD has also proposed cancellation of the
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) program. ORS was intended
to provide short-term and low-cost tactical capabilities to
warfighters. The ORS program's long-term goals were to reduce
the cost of space development by fostering low cost launch
methods as well as common design and interface methods. Average
spending by the ORS program was about $100 million per year
from fiscal years 2007 through 2011. While there are still
investments available for the Air Force Research Laboratory and
other organizations involved in S&T, as we mentioned earlier,
planning for these investments has not been robust or very
strategic. Another potential challenge to future space
capability innovations is the Efficient Space Procurement (ESP)
initiative, formerly known as the Evolutionary Acquisition for
Space Efficiency (EASE). ESP is intended as a way to reduce
costs for DOD space programs while improving acquisition
outcomes by buying satellites in ``block buys'' instead of
individually, accruing cost savings which are to be reinvested
into a modernization program to evolve capabilities for future
increments of that satellite program. At this time, it is
unclear how this approach will ensure there will still be a
focus on making significant leaps in technology or what the
next generation of space systems will look like and be able to
come into fruition.
Disconnects between fielding satellites, ground
systems, and user equipment. DOD faces challenges in
synchronizing capabilities offered by new satellite programs
with the ground control stations that are necessary for
receiving and processing information from the new space
systems, and in some cases, the user terminals that deliver
this information to users.\16\ When space, ground and user
segments are not synchronized, there is the potential for
wasted on-orbit capability and delays in the ability of users
to take advantage of new systems. As long as this condition
exists, the improvements being made to acquisition practices on
the satellite side will be minimized. A few examples are
highlighted below in table 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Challenges in Aligning Space System
Components, GA0-10-55 (Washington, DC: Oct. 29, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
concluding remarks
After more than a decade of serious acquisition difficulties, DOD
is starting to launch new generations of satellites that promise vast
enhancements in capability. Moreover, given the Nation's fiscal
challenges, DOD's focus on streamlining leadership, fixing problems,
and implementing reforms is promising. But there are still significant
barriers to achieve acquisition success that need to be addressed to
maintain space superiority in an era of fiscal austerity. All of the
barriers-leadership fragmentation, launch costs, S&T planning, and
disconnects between space and ground assets-require action from the Air
Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense as well as the
participation and cooperation of all the military services, the
intelligence community, and other agencies such as NASA and NOAA.
Moreover, though successful launches are being experienced, problems
within ongoing development efforts such as GPS III, indicate that space
acquisitions are still at risk of significant cost and schedule
problems, and attention to reforms must be sustained.
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, this completes my
prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you
and members of the subcommittee may have at this time.
contacts and acknowledgments
For further information about this statement, please contact
Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected]. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made
key contributions to this statement include Art Gallegos, Assistant
Director; Maricela Cherveny; Laura Hook; Angela Pleasants; Roxanna Sun;
Bob Swierczek; and Alyssa Weir.
related gao products
2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap
and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue, GA0-12-342SP
(Washington, DC: February 28, 2012).
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Needs to Ensure New
Acquisition Strategy Is Based on Sufficient Information, GA0-11-641
(Washington, DC: September 15, 2011 ).
Space Research: Content and Coordination of Space Science and
Technology Strategy Need to Be More Robust, GA0-11-722 (Washington, DC:
July 19, 2011).
Space and Missile Defense Acquisitions: Periodic Assessment Needed
to Correct Parts Quality Problems in Major Programs, GA0-11-404
(Washington, DC: June 24, 2011).
DOD Weapons Systems: Missed Trade-off Opportunities During
Requirements Reviews, GA0-11-502 (Washington, DC: June 16, 2011).
Space Acquisitions: DOD Delivering New Generations of Satellites,
but Space System Acquisition Challenges Remain, GA0-11-590T
(Washington, DC: May 11, 2011).
Defense Acquisitions: Challenges in Aligning Space System
Components, GA0-10-55 (Washington, DC: October 29, 2009).
Global Positioning System: Challenges in Sustaining and Upgrading
Capabilities Persist. GA0-10-636. (Washington, DC: September 15, 2010).
Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act Quickly
to Address Risks That Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and Climate
Data. GA0-10-558. (Washington, DC: May 27, 2010).
Defense Acquisitions: Strong Leadership Is Key to Planning and
Executing Stable Weapon Programs, GA0-10-522 (Washington, DC: May 6,
2010).
Space Acquisitions: DOD Poised to Enhance Space Capabilities but,
Persistent Challenges Remain in Developing Space Systems, GA0-10-447T
(Washington, DC: March 10, 2010).
Space Acquisitions: Government and Industry Partners Face
Substantial Challenges in Developing New DOD Space Systems. GA0-09-
648T. (Washington, DC: April 30, 2009).
Space Acquisitions: Uncertainties in the Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle Program Pose Management and Oversight Challenges. GA0-08-1 039.
(Washington, DC: September 26, 2008).
Defense Space Activities: National Security Space Strategy Needed
to Guide Future DOD Space Efforts. GA0-08-431 R. (Washington, DC: March
27, 2008).
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Washington, DC 20548
Senator Nelson. Shall we begin with about 6-minute
questions?
Senator Sessions. Fine.
Senator Nelson. Secretary Creedon, as we indicated--and in
your testimony you made some reference to it as well--the
administration is working to develop some multilateral
understanding, starting with Europe, on how to conduct space
operations, given the congestion in space, that we have to do
something.
From DOD's view, are you satisfied that the current track
does not hinder military operations in space?
Ms. Creedon. Senator, DOD and DOS in February announced
that they were going to work together and seek a code of
conduct. The code of conduct is an opportunity, we think, to
get all the space-faring nations together and look at how to
address shared concerns, debris mitigation, radio frequency
interference, joint situational awareness, and work together in
a way that benefits our national security interest.
We have just begun this journey. In fact, the very first
meeting of experts will be in June, and from then on, we will
go down this path and work on getting an agreement that really
is in our best interest, set norms for responsible behavior,
and in some period of time, hopefully, get a conduct that is in
our national security interest.
This is not going to be a quick process. It is probably
going to be at least a year, maybe 2. We think it is worth it
in the long run to go down this road and try and obtain a
voluntary agreement. It is not legally binding and it will not
limit our ability to either develop systems or to defend
ourselves.
Senator Nelson. Could you give us an idea, let us say, of
just one aspect of the code of conduct that you would be
working on?
Ms. Creedon. One of the most important is probably debris
mitigation. One of the elements that we would expect to be in a
final code of conduct would be setting norms for debris
mitigation. It would establish the requirement that as
countries launch satellites, as they do any sort of
experimentation, that they minimize the amount of debris
created. This was very important as we all discovered when the
Chinese conducted their ASAT test and made a substantial amount
of debris. Debris creation hurts everybody, and this is
probably one of the main focuses of this agreement.
Senator Nelson. So there would be some sort of protocol for
disintegration of out-of-date, out-of-service units within
space. Is that one of the things that would be included? Is
that how you would say that?
Ms. Creedon. That would be one of the norms that a country
makes sure that a satellite that has died does not stay in
orbit. One of it would be as you launch satellites, that you
minimize the amount of debris that is created. Even a
coordinated space situational awareness would help because then
it would allow advanced opportunities to maneuver satellites so
you did not have collisions like the Iridium satellite that
occurred several years ago that collided with the Russian space
satellite.
Senator Nelson. Moving on the spectrum issue, Madam
Secretary, in February DOD almost lost a block of spectrum
through a legislated auction to pay for a tax offset. Can you
explain the importance of DOD spectrum in general and how any
movement from it should be paid for and coordinated?
Ms. Creedon. Yes, sir. Spectrum is essential to almost
everything that DOD does, ISR, communications, command, and
control, navigation. It goes on and on and on. DOD needs
spectrum to function. Making sure that spectrum is available is
absolutely essential. As we look at supporting the efforts to
utilize spectrum more efficiently if DOD is going to move out
of different areas of spectrum, it is going to take a while to
understand exactly what other areas are available. Are these
other areas technically compatible with requirements? What is
the cost to move, and what is the timeframe to move? In some
instances, there might be some systems that would never be able
to move. In any sort of an auction, they would have to be
allowed to stay.
Senator Nelson. In any event, we have it under control
where this is not going to happen again, as far as we know.
Ms. Creedon. We certainly hope not. DOD is also right now
looking at a long-term strategy for spectrum allocation that
should help in terms of both understanding the requirements and
understanding where we can move.
Senator Nelson. In your statement, you stress the
importance of resiliency and the ability to rapidly
reconstitute critical satellite capacity if hostile action or a
collision would occur. It sounds like you might want me to tee
up a question here on why this is so important. Did DOD propose
in the fiscal year 2013 budget to cancel the ORS program? If
so, do you agree with that decision?
Ms. Creedon. DOD did propose to cancel the office. On the
other hand, DOD does recognize the successes of the office,
both the ORS-1 SAT and the TacSat-3, and it is those successes
that have enabled DOD to say now is the time to take the idea
of ORS, normalize it across all programs, and then move the
capability to the Air Force primarily, to have the Air Force
then work with all the Services to make sure that all space
programs have this notion of resiliency and redundancy built
into them.
Senator Nelson. Being able to bounce back from some sort of
a lights-out situation is critically important. Do you think
that we have it adequately handled right now?
Ms. Creedon. Not yet, but it is certainly something that is
on the radar, if you will, and it is certainly something that
DOD is working very hard to accomplish. I might, at some point,
turn over the answer to General Shelton as the programmatic
person to really address more of the specifics of how the
satellites themselves are looking more at how to build in this
concept of resiliency and redundancy into future space
programs.
Senator Nelson. Even though my time has expired, General
Shelton, anything you would like to add to that?
General Shelton. Mr. Chairman, I would completely agree on
spreading the ORS concepts across all of our programs. In fact,
a lot of the activities at Kirtland Air Force Base that
occurred with a dedicated office will continue because there
were organizations in place that supported the ORS office
there. There are also offices at the Space and Missile Systems
Center in Los Angeles that will continue to provide that kind
of support. So I am confident that that concept will continue.
As far as resiliency across all of our programs, we just
completed all this research and development (R&D) work, and we
are in the production phase of many of our foundational
capabilities. However, we are looking at alternative
architectures for the future, and I believe those alternative
architectures will produce some of the resilience that we would
like to have. The question is when can you afford to implement
those, and that will be a hard decision we will face in the
coming years.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you very much.
General Shelton, with regard to ORS and the need, as
Secretary Creedon mentioned, for resiliency, for the record is
it not true that currently we do not plan to have any
satellites in reserve that could be immediately launched if one
of our satellites is disabled for some reason?
General Shelton. Senator, that is true. We do not build
satellites as spares and store them on the ground. If we have
capability that is in storage, it is because we have had good
fortune in a satellite lasting longer or we did not have the
launch ready at the time we had the satellite ready, by and
large.
Senator Sessions. I guess my question--I am not sure what
we thought as ORS development. But one of the things that we
understood was that we would be able to launch a capable, maybe
not highly sophisticated, satellite that would meet our basic
needs in pretty short order if one were disabled, recognizing
that there are quite a number of countries, would you not
agree, that have the capability to disable a U.S. satellite?
General Shelton. Senator, there are quite a few.
Senator Sessions. More will probably come along in the
future. Was that originally part of the idea, to your
knowledge?
General Shelton. It was part of the concept that we would
develop rapid launch capability, rapid assembly of satellite
capability. But the idea that we would have a stock, a storage
of satellites and boosters waiting--that decision had not been
made. So there was conceptual work to be done as part of ORS,
but no decision on how to actually develop a concept of
operations to take advantage of what might have been developed.
Senator Sessions. I think it is a matter worthy of thinking
about whether we need that capability. I do not know. You may
could use every satellite that you have, and you might as well
put them in space would be one argument. But also, if there was
a danger of a satellite that just failed for one reason or
another in a critical area, we might need immediate response.
General Formica, the Space and Missile Defense Command is
an important part of our defense system. first, thank you for
your leadership, and second, how do you see your budget this
year? The Air Force space budget is pretty substantially
reduced. What about SMD?
General Formica. Mr. Senator, thank you. I appreciate it.
It is an honor to serve at Space and Missile Defense Command.
Our budget in fiscal year 2013 right now is holding its
own, about the same as we had in fiscal year 2012. We have
sufficient budget to be able to provide our operational
capability, to do capability development, and to do the
material development functions that we have. If funded, we will
benefit from the JCD program which will be funding not directly
given to Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces
Strategic Command (SMDC/ARSTRAT).
Senator Sessions. The GAO representative mentioned
terminated programs and sort of asked the question how do we
advance without S&T. Some of the S&T programs have been
reduced. Maybe, General Shelton, General Formica, do you have
any comment about that? Does that concern you?
General Shelton. Senator, it does.
Senator Sessions. First, let me just say that I know that
you support the budget request that you have been given. You
have had a chance to review it. But I know that it was clear to
both of you that there is a limited amount of money. So I am
asking you do you have concerns or are their worries to tell us
honestly what they might be with regard to S&T because what the
experts tell us--experts or the old hands or whatever you call
them--when budgets get cut, S&T is one of he first casualties,
and we do not want to go too far in that regard. So would you
give us your best judgment about what kind of risk we may be
taking there?
General Shelton. Yes, sir. First, a couple of statistics.
The S&T budget space-related for Air Force Research Laboratory
(AFRL) is going to be $242 million in fiscal year 2013. The
budget for Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
for space-related S&T, roughly $160 million. In the Navy,
roughly $27 million. In the Army, roughly $22 million. There is
still substantial space-related S&T despite the cancelation of
the space test program.
Senator Sessions. All right. How much would you say it has
been reduced? You mentioned those numbers, but is that a
reduction from current expenditures, any of those accounts?
General Shelton. We had roughly $50 million in the space
test program in fiscal year 2012. We have $10 million in fiscal
year 2013 remaining, largely to conduct the launch of Space
Test Program-2 (STP-2) as one of our new entrants into the EELV
program. So it is not totally decimated, but by the same token,
to be honest with you, that $10 million is really only for that
launch.
Senator Sessions. So you do not have more for other
launches that might occur. But the space test you mentioned--is
that included in your $240 million?
General Shelton. It is all space-related S&T.
Now, how we develop the priorities for that is important.
We meet every year with AFRL, my leadership, AFRL's leadership.
We establish 174 technology needs across the entire enterprise.
We do the same thing with DARPA, establish priorities that we
want them to work on. So we get a voice in how that money is
spent. It is not the same as having the space test program
directly under me, but we certainly have a voice.
Senator Sessions. Would you say that we may be cutting it
close here, or are you just perfectly happy with where we are?
General Shelton. Senator, I wish we could spend more money
on it. I truly do. But again, the BCA called for reductions.
That is one of the places where we felt like we could take
reductions.
Senator Sessions. I understand the choices you make. Every
defense agency, every congressional group that sits, and every
President has a responsibility to the future, as well as to the
immediate DOD. If we do not spend our money now to perhaps
develop the systems that are serving us so well now for the
future, then we fail too. So I hope that you will be candid
with us if you see threats in that area of our budget.
I guess I could ask the Navy and the Army too. Maybe GAO.
Ms. Chaplain, do you have any comment on that? You expressed
some concern about it.
Ms. Chaplain. Yes. I have a couple of comments. I do
acknowledge that there is still funding going to some of these
labs, and it is a good amount of funding. But what we have not
seen is very robust strategic planning about what are our goals
for technology advances and how are we going to achieve them
and how are we going to optimize these investments because they
will probably have more budget pressure over time.
The thing with the space test program I would like to
emphasize is that it provided an avenue for different kinds of
players to test technologies, universities, small businesses,
those who do not really get to be able to participate in some
of these bigger programs all the time. So you might be losing
that opportunity.
Then the third thing is that DOD would like to go on a
multiyear approach to some of its bigger programs, like AEHF
and SBIRS-High. There is an assertion there that whatever
savings are gained from that will be reinvested in S&T, but we
have not really seen a robust plan there for the path forward.
Where do we go after programs like AEHF and SBIRS? We have not
seen that path yet and how are we going to get there because
you have to start now especially given the budget situation.
Senator Sessions. I think that is a good challenge. I think
we do need a good plan.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Secretary Creedon, does DOD have in place a policy for
coordination of space activities within the interagency
structure?
Ms. Creedon. Yes, sir. There is a White House-led process
called--it is an interagency process. All of the entities that
have any interest in space participate in this process. It gets
together to meet periodically depending on when there are
issues. For instance, one of the meetings was in January and
February about dealing with the space code of conduct, and that
is where the interagency got together and said, yes, this is
something that is important and we are going to go work on. So
it is there. It exists and it is pretty good.
Senator Nelson. Is it? So it is at least somewhat
successful in breaking down the stovepipe approach to get
cross-fertilization and cross-cooperation within the
interagency system?
Ms. Creedon. It is and it is also a good forum if there are
issues that need specific resolution or specific input or
guidance. It serves that function as well.
Senator Nelson. Does it function pretty much automatically
or does it have to be enforced?
Ms. Creedon. Because it is run by the White House,
enforcement generally is not an issue. When the White House
calls a meeting, everybody shows up.
Senator Nelson. So there is some force behind it then when
that occurs that way.
General Shelton, I understand that you effectively canceled
the space test program and the ORS program due to lack of
funding. I think we both feel that there ought to be some sort
of backup system in place, and I wonder if the information we
have is accurate.
General Shelton. That is part of the President's budget
request for fiscal year 2013, Senator. It was after 5 years of
ORS, we felt like we had taken away quite a few lessons
learned, and it was time to mainstream those concepts
throughout all of our programs but yet continue things like
hosted payload opportunities, further resiliency concepts,
those kinds of things. So we will centralize the intellectual
capital, if you will, in the Space and Missile Systems Center
long-range planning staff. We will continue to have the kind of
support we have at Kirtland today out of the Space and Missile
Systems Center. So we will continue the conceptual work. It
does not end.
Senator Nelson. You are making do with what you have, but
if you had your druthers and if you had the additional funding,
would you prefer to have kept the programs going?
General Shelton. Senator, that is a tough question. We wish
we had fiscal year 2012 level funding across the board to tell
you the truth.
Senator Nelson. I suspect that there are opportunities to
give up those things that you would like and those things that
you would want, but it is a tough choice when it is something
you need.
General Shelton. It does make for very difficult decisions.
We did protect the foundational space capability, missile
warning, GPS, satellite communications, all those things that
are foundational for our brothers and sisters in all services
that we highly depend on not only for warfighting capability,
but for national capability as well. All of that was protected.
Hard choices had to be made.
Senator Nelson. In terms of just missile warning, what is
your biggest concern in strategic missile warning right now,
General?
General Shelton. Senator, in strategic missile warning, we
are not in the place where we would like to be and being able
to take full advantage of our latest satellite, SBIRS
Geosynchronous Earth Orbit-1. It has two sensors. It has a
scanning sensor and a staring sensor. The scanning sensor we
can take advantage of today. The staring sensor, which provides
a wonderful capability and our testing has been fantastic. In
fact, we are seeing probably a 25 percent or more sensitivity,
better sensitivity than we had expected out of that satellite.
What that allows you to do, of course, is much dimmer targets,
lower classes of missiles, lots of things that infrared
capability will give you. We are not able to take full
advantage of that in real time.
Now, we are taking advantage of that in the intelligence
agencies by shipping the data out to them, but that is a
reactive kind of thing instead of being able to see it in real
time.
Senator Nelson. General Formica, I understand that SMDC/
AFSTRAT completed a successful test of the Advanced Hypersonic
Weapon (AHW) which is one of the several designs under
development as part of U.S. Strategic Command's (STRATCOM)
conventional prompt global strike requirement. Obviously,
congratulations are in order.
Can you explain this successful test and how it was
coordinated with other Army functions at Redstone and perhaps
elsewhere?
General Formica. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Of course, we are
very proud of the success of the AHW test, and I am very proud
of the civilians and the military personnel that worked hard to
bring that test to successful completion.
The technology for the AHW test really began with the work
at Sandia Laboratory and then was matured at Redstone Arsenal
in technology development with the Aviation and Missile
Research, Development, and Engineering Center (AMRDEC), and the
SMDC/AFSTRAT engineers. That brought for successful technology,
and the AMRDEC's contribution was really the development of the
thermal protection system which was fundamental to the success
of the technology.
The test itself took the efforts of the Navy as AHW was
launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii. It
landed at the Army's Reagan Test Site, Kwajalein Atoll, having
traveled 2,100 nautical miles, and took advantage of Army,
Navy, and MDA test assets. So it required the collaboration
both in technology development and in test operations of
several organizations, many of them Redstone-based. It took the
leadership of the OSD and prompt global strike, and it would
require the same kind of cooperation and collaboration as we
move forward.
Senator Nelson. It is nice when you get this kind of
cooperation to get the result that you have had. Please share
the congratulations with the other participants as well. Thank
you.
General Formica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Ms. Creedon, in your statement you talk about the code of
conduct with the Europeans over space as just the beginning,
which is a bit troubling to me because it does have treaty-type
implications. I would like to be confident that the U.S.
Government, DOD is not making commitments with regard to what
we plan to do that will bind us and maybe make it impossible
for us to effectively maintain our space and missile defense
capability that we need because we need to be able to dominate
space really.
So can you give me some reassurance on that? What is the
nature of the beginnings and where do you see it going?
Ms. Creedon. Senator, we are just beginning the discussions
that we hope will lead to a voluntary code of conduct.
Senator Sessions. Is this mainly driven by the debris
question?
Ms. Creedon. Debris is a major aspect of this. We are also
looking at making sure that there is not radio frequency
interference with satellites. There are a number of responsible
behaviors that we hope this code will identify and then set
what would be the norms for which responsible space-faring
nations would conform their conduct.
Senator Sessions. One of the things that seems to concern
itself with is an arms race. As one wise observer at one of our
hearings said when asked, ``are we going to have war in
space,'' he said, ``we have had war on the land. We have had
war on the water. We have had war in the air. I suspect we will
have war in space one day.''
I think it is hard to write a piece of paper that says we
are not going to defend our assets or utilize capabilities we
have to save lives and defend America's sovereignty and
security.
So I guess there is some emphasis, I understand, in the
talks about preventing an arms race in space. Is that involved
in this, and if so, we need to be very careful about it.
Ms. Creedon. Sir, one of the fundamental tenets of this
discussion of the code of conduct would be the inherent right
of self-defense reserved to every country that would be a
voluntary participant in this code. So that is also one of our
major goals. If we are not successful as we go through the
discussions over the course of the next year or so in
negotiating a code of conduct that is in our national security
interest, then, frankly, we would not sign it. It is not about
limiting capabilities. It is about responsible behavior. It is
not a treaty. It is not an arms control treaty. It is not any
sort of a legally binding undertaking. It would be a voluntary
code of conduct trying to get other space-faring nations to, in
many respects, adapt the behavior that, frankly, we have in
terms of being a responsible space-faring nation.
Senator Sessions. I would hope we would all be responsible
utilizers of space, and I think pressure should be put on
nations to behave in responsible ways. I certainly do not think
there is anything wrong with that, but I am not sure you always
gain a lot by formalizing written agreements that can be turned
around and be used against the United States since we are the
premier space utilizer.
The DOD Joint Staff analysis provided to the House Armed
Services Committee states that if the United States, ``were to
make a good faith effort at implementing the requirements of
the draft code,'' it could likely have an adverse impact on
military operations. Have you recognized that statement, and is
what you are doing designed to make sure that we do not
adversely impact our operations?
Ms. Creedon. Yes, sir. One of the decisions that we made
when we decided to go for the code of conduct was informed by
the analysis that was tasked by the OSD about a year ago to the
Joint Staff and to STRATCOM to look at this underlying document
that the EU had put together and to provide guidance to us as
to what needed to be modified, changed, eliminated, added so
that it would, in time, be a document that would be in our
national security interest. We have used the work of the Joint
Staff to begin these negotiations which will kick off at a
fairly low level, but will kick off for the first time in June.
Senator Sessions. I have doubts about whether it is that
wise or not. So you are contemplating that we would actually
sign a document?
Ms. Creedon. That would be the goal.
Senator Sessions. ``We'' who? Would it be DOD, or DOS, or
the President, or who?
Ms. Creedon. It would be the United States, and the goal
would be to sign an agreement at some point if it is in our
national security interest to do so. If it is not, we will not.
Senator Sessions. Would you consult Congress before you
were to sign such an agreement?
Ms. Creedon. Of course. Between meetings and some briefings
and discussions, already, I think, we have had on the order of
about six or seven discussions with various committees now, and
we would absolutely keep Congress informed--all the
committees--as to where we are in the progress and if we are
making progress or if we are not.
Senator Sessions. Europeans ceded their sovereignty to
Brussels. They do not worry about those things too much. But
most Americans do and they want to maintain our legitimate
range of actions, and we have burdens around the world that the
Europeans do not feel and do not carry and we need capabilities
that are not so important to them that could be for us. I would
just urge you to be very cautious before you sign agreements
that could in any way complicate our ability in the future to
take reasonable actions for our national interest or to support
our allies in that fashion. So it will be something, I think,
Congress will be interested in and watching.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator.
General Shelton, I think we are all so painfully aware of
the lack of competition in space launch and the recent critical
GAO report on the use of a single vendor. I understand now that
the Air Force has issued a new entrant criteria based on Air
Force mission assurance standards. Can you describe what
efforts you are currently undertaking to bring new launch
entrants to the Air Force, what payloads you are providing for
launch to the new entrants, and what would be the timeframe for
something to materialize to create this kind of a potential
competition?
General Shelton. Senator, we have done two things. We came
up with a new entrant strategy and a new entrant guide, a
certification guide, both in October of last year, and that is
a fundamental part of our reacquisition of EELV capability that
is in the very near future here. Those new entrants--their
maturity really is going to drive the rapidity that we can
bring them on board.
We have reserved two missions that we will not compete with
the EELV contractor, Discover-2 and STP-2. Those two missions
will be set aside. They will be competed. Any new entrant will
be able to compete, and if they show that they have the
maturity, they have the technical capability to launch those
missions, we will go on contract with them. That will be a step
along the path toward certification for any new entrant.
But again, for a national security payload, something that
is a national treasure, we will be very cautious as we bring
them on board and we launch a national security payload on top
of a new entrant.
Senator Nelson. This is essentially the same question I
asked to Secretary Creedon, General Shelton. Can you explain
the importance of Air Force spectrum in general and how any
movement from it should be paid for and coordinated so that
there are not unfortunate implications to your budget?
General Shelton. Secretary Creedon said it very well, that
we are heavily dependent on the radio frequency spectrum for
almost every operation. In the case of the part of the spectrum
that is being talked about now in terms of repurposing, we have
satellite operations in that part of the spectrum and are very
concerned that vacating that part of the spectrum would be both
long-term and expensive, anywhere from somewhere around the
neighborhood of $240 million all the way up to $2 billion,
depending on which option you chose. So we are watching this
very closely and are very concerned.
There are three things that we are concerned about that
would have to come together simultaneously to make this work.
First, is finding alternative comparable spectrum. Second, is
having enough time to plan for vacating that part of the
spectrum. Third, having the resources, either through the
auction or appropriations. I could not pay for it today. If
somebody came to me with a $2 billion bill to vacate part of
the spectrum, I could not pay it.
Senator Nelson. I understand.
General Formica, the same question of you.
General Formica. Yes, Mr. Chairman. As Secretary Creedon
and General Shelton have said, the spectrum is obviously a
requirement for Army operations. The area of the spectrum that
we are talking about principally would affect radar and
satellite communications for the Army, and it is our interest
in this that we would continue to have the spectrum
capabilities that would enable us to do military operations
without an increased cost to the Army.
Senator Nelson. So all of you agree it is not a very good
pay-for for some other program that is not otherwise paid for.
General Shelton. Certainly the promise of the auction would
produce quite a bit of money if the projections are right, but
it is how that money then gets rolled back into repurposing.
Senator Nelson. General Formica, unlike the ORS
cancelation, I understand you continue to invest in small
tactical satellites that can be rapidly fielded. Do you see a
future in small rapidly responsive satellites for our Army's
soldiers, and if so, what is your vision for such a program?
General Formica. Mr. Chairman, we are absolutely trying to
move forward with technology demonstration for nanosatellites.
We have demonstrated nanosatellite capability for digital
communications relay in what we call SMDC-1, which had its
initial test flight last year. We are developing nanosatellite
capability for imagery in what we call Kestrel Eye. Those two
programs, which would be an augmentation to the national and
joint space capabilities that are already provided to our
soldiers, would be envisioned to provide rapidly responsive
satellite capability at the tactical level. That is why this
joint technology demonstration program is so important to us.
We are encouraged that they have received support at OSD,
and again, we look forward to favorable consideration by
Congress in funding those.
Senator Nelson. I understand that you operate the wideband
global satellite. Are you experiencing problems with bandwidth
based on the use of more unmanned systems, and as that
continues, will that make matters even more challenging?
General Formica. Mr. Chairman, we do operate five wideband
satellite operation centers around the globe. By the way, I am
very proud of the soldiers that operate those centers 24 hours
a day, 7 days a week, to bring capabilities to our warfighters.
Managing bandwidth is always a challenge in the wideband
satellite operation centers.
With respect to unmanned systems, we do not currently
manage the bandwidth that allows the unmanned systems to
transmit down to the ground station, but we do manage the
bandwidth for the dissemination of that data, processed data,
once it leaves the ground station and goes out to Army users.
Future capabilities in the wideband satellite system will,
in fact, enable us to manage bandwidth for the direct downlink
to the ground station.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. General Shelton, an unclassified excerpt
from the executive summary of a Joint Staff operations
assessment dealing with the draft EU code says, ``if the United
States were to make a good faith effort at implementing the
requirements of the draft code, there could be operations
impact on U.S. military space operations in several areas.''
Has that been communicated in detail to the negotiators who
are working on this?
General Shelton. Absolutely, Senator. We are in lockstep
with Secretary Creedon's office, with STRATCOM, and others in
making our views heard as well.
Senator Sessions. Now, could you explain why there would be
operational impacts on the military and intelligence community
and under what authority DOD and the Intelligence Community
would express those restrictions?
General Shelton. I do not know that I quite follow the
question, Senator.
Senator Sessions. Can you tell us in this session some of
the operational impacts that might occur based on some of the
drafts that have been floated out there?
General Shelton. Just as an example, if somebody were to
prescribe distances from satellites, that might be something
that would be tough to live with. If someone were to say
absolutely zero debris, that might be something that would be
tough to live with. So those kinds of restrictions we would
want to watch very closely. We are all about minimizing debris.
It does not take a very big object in space moving at orbital
velocities to destroy a fragile satellite. But we want to
preserve our freedom of action in space through any kind of
code of conduct, and I know that is exactly where the OSD is on
this as well.
Senator Sessions. Have we ever had a situation in which a
satellite has been damaged by debris?
General Shelton. We have.
Senator Sessions. How many times?
General Shelton. We know of a couple of times. It is very
difficult to do the forensics. It might be a small enough piece
of debris that it was not even in our satellite catalog. So you
have to go backwards and try to figure out if that is exactly
what happened.
A very famous case is a paint chip that got embedded in the
windshield of the Space Shuttle. So it can be a very hazardous
environment.
Senator Sessions. I remember this from high school, I
think, this science fiction novel, and everybody on the Earth
had been killed and these people had plotted and they had this
rocket that they were going to fly to Mars or somewhere.
Everybody that made it on the rocket was going to survive. They
took off and ran into a Sputnik and all were killed.
[Laughter.]
So that is typical science fiction.
But I guess it is possible that we can have those kinds of
events, but it is a big space up there, a lot of space in
space. We cannot alter everything we do based on that.
We do a pretty good job of tracking that so you can avoid
those areas. Is that not correct, General Shelton?
General Shelton. To the best of our ability. We can get
down now to about an object the size of 10 centimeters or so.
We are going to get better. We will get down to about a
baseball-sized object with some capability we have planned.
Senator Sessions. All right, good.
Thank you all for your work. We know, as the chairman and I
both have learned, just how critical your work is to the men
and women who are at risk on the ground in Iraq and
Afghanistan, on ships and airplanes. They need these
capabilities. We are reaching a point where a determined
hostile power could neutralize a considerable portion of it, I
would think. In the scheme of all the expenditures we make, we
do not need to be in a position where we are not able to
respond to that and maintain that advantage. So I hope that our
research, science, technology, testing, and your thinking about
the future will not put us in a position where we have
overlooked some danger to our capabilities and comprise our
security.
So thank you for what you do.
I would have to say, for the most part, what has been
achieved by space science on missile defense exceeds what most
people thought was possible 25 years ago. It is just
unbelievable the capabilities that we have now achieved. As
that science improves, there are probably ways to neutralize
those capabilities by hostile powers.
Thank you for what you do.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator.
Madam Secretary, is it fair to say that the agreement that
we are looking for is one of developing stewardship over space,
recognizing that there are those who still discard paper or
trash or something without regard to the implications for the
environment, let alone for aesthetics? But we are not dealing
with aesthetics here. We are dealing with the reality of people
just not necessarily caring or not being encouraged to care for
space the same way we want to encourage it and take care of our
environment on earth. Is that a fair way of saying it? It is
dangerous as well.
Ms. Creedon. Yes, sir. That is a large part of it. There
are other aspects that we hope could be achieved in the code as
well, things that would say improve the ability to understand
other activities and other actions. So if someone was going to
move a satellite, there would be an understanding of why that
satellite was moved. So part of this is to reduce the risks of
not only mishaps but mistrust and misconduct, misperceptions.
Just improve the overall understanding in situational space as
well.
Senator Nelson. There are some that are better actors than
others. Is that fair to say?
Ms. Creedon. That would be a true statement.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Winokur, the Navy is proposing to
develop a radar altimeter with NOAA to place on a European
Space Agency satellite as a means to save on the cost of
developing a standalone satellite. What are your plans with the
fiscal year to develop this system, and what will happen if it
is not developed in time for the satellite launch? Will it be a
day late and maybe a dollar short?
Mr. Winokur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, we definitely
will be a day late and a dollar short.
The Navy had plans to launch its own radar altimeter
satellite which measures sea surface height which, in turn,
supports our tactical anti-submarine warfare operations.
Unfortunately, due to fiscal pressures, we terminated or
deferred those plans for what we call GFO-2.
Our mitigation strategy was to work with our civilian
colleagues at NOAA and, in turn, their colleagues and, in fact,
U.S. allies and some of the European space agencies to see if
we can partner and leverage what is called Jason-3. So the Navy
plan is to use, frankly, residual dollars in a one-time only
funding transfer to NOAA to help keep Jason-3 on schedule. We
are very concerned about the potential for an altimeter gap,
and without the Navy funding, it is likely that Jason-3 will
slip a minimum of a year. It has already slipped, frankly.
Our goal is to work for a calendar year 2014 launch. We
have had serious conversations with NOAA that if maybe funds
become available, and that would give the Navy a voice at the
table and a say, actually an assured access to the data. So we
think this is a reasonable mitigation plan for the Navy to get
what we need at a minimum cost.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Zangardi, I am going to ask you the
same question that was asked of Secretary Creedon. Can you
explain the importance of preserving your operating spectrum in
general and how any movement from it should be paid for and
coordinated from your perspective, the Navy's?
Dr. Zangardi. Yes, sir. Secretary Creedon answered the
question quite well, and I would echo her comments and General
Shelton's and General Formica's comments.
Both the Navy and the Marine Corps use spectrum for land,
air, and space operations with communications systems, sensors,
radars, navigation, and guidance systems. Spectrum access is
critically important to the Navy and Marine Corps warfighter.
Further erosion will reduce operational capabilities and
endanger possibly military personnel. We see, as we move
forward into the future, a greater reliance upon spectrum.
Coming from the acquisition side of the Navy, I tend to
look at it in terms of cost, schedule, and performance. In
terms of schedule, we need time to assess any impact of a
spectrum move. In terms of cost, we have to understand the
cost. What will it cost to move it? There is a performance
piece here. So if you move the system, what is the impact to
the performance of that particular system?
Senator Nelson. I think everybody can see what we are
clearly doing. We are setting the record so that we do not have
to go through this unexpectedly at some time in the future
without having the backup testimony available to explain why
somebody cannot just pull the spectrum away and think it is
okay.
On commercially hosted payloads, Mr. Winokur, your
testimony describes the work that you are undertaking with the
commercial sector for ISR. Are you able to describe your
activities in these areas? For example, are you utilizing
hosted payloads on a commercial satellite?
Mr. Winokur. No. At this point, the Navy is not planning on
using a specific hosted payload for ISR purposes. What we are
doing is leveraging the funding that is available through the
National Geospatial Agency (NGA) for access to some of the
commercial data that is provided through synthetic aperture
radar providers and some of the electro-optical systems. Our
goal actually is to leverage available commercial systems,
develop unique Navy-specific applications using the available
data, and leverage NGA resources to the maximum extent
possible.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Zangardi, congratulation is coming your
way as well on launching MUOS last month, and I am happy the
system is finally being fielded. I understand the next one will
be in 2013 to make the system operational at that time.
My question to you is when will we have ground terminals
deployed that can use the advanced signal of the system. The
GAO indicates that it could be as late as 2014. Do you agree
with that? Do you have another point of view?
Dr. Zangardi. Yes, sir. I have been around both the Joint
Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program which is developing the
radio or terminal that will port this waveform and around the
MUOS program for many years.
We have made significant progress in the past year
synchronizing the MUOS SATCOM program with its waveform
development and JTRS Manpack Terminal Integration by
establishing one lead JTRS MUOS manager working with the Navy,
Army, and JPEO JTRS. We project that the MUOS waveform will be
certified and ready for porting into the Handheld, Manpack,
Small Force Fit Manpack Radio by September 2012.
JTRS Manpack terminal appliques will start rolling off the
production line in late 2013. That being said, we expect to
have our over-the-air certification test or multi-service
operational test and evaluation conducted in early calendar
year 2014 from MUOS, and that will require 50 Navy JTRS Manpack
radios.
The Multi-Service Operational Test and Evaluation (MOT&E)
requires two MUOS satellites plus the ground stations. So we
are dependent upon launching the next MUOS satellite in July
2013 for it to be operational by our MOT&E. Following a
successful MOT&E, we will continue delivery of the Manpack
terminals across all the Services, and we anticipate using more
of the advanced signal of MUOS as we move to 2014.
Also inherent within the MUOS satellite is a legacy UHF
package, similar to the UFO satellites that are currently
flying. That package provides a graceful transition period
between the existing SATCOM capability and our future MUOS
capability.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The chairman will be back in just a minute, and I have
another meeting that I have to attend.
So I want to thank all of you for your presentation. This
is something I take very seriously. I hope that you will
cooperate with our staff. We want to be sure that we are frugal
and we do not waste a dime because we do not have a dime to
waste. This is really so, really so.
There will be demands for expenditure cuts time and time
again, and all of you want to be good DOD members. But I would
just urge you to stand your ground when something is really
important, and if we ask about it here, you will have to tell
us even if it requires you to be somewhat at odds with
somebody's superior because that is the deal. Right? You come
here. You have to tell us your best judgment. We are asking
your best judgment.
But it is not going to be a pretty sight because we are,
indeed, borrowing about 40 cents of every dollar we spend. The
trends do not get better. They actually get worse, and the
budget that the House has put forward would eliminate the
sequester on DOD, the one they announced yesterday, and maybe
even reduce some of the cuts you were looking at already. But
regardless, they would not go forward with the next sequester,
and they would yet have the same savings, but they find them
across the whole budget and not targeting DOD as the sequester
now does.
I could ask you what the impact of the sequester would be,
but I know, General Shelton, you told me what I am hearing from
everyone, including Secretary Panetta, and that is that you
think you can sustain the cuts that have been required, $480-
something billion, but another $500 billion would be
devastating to many of the programs that we now depend on.
So that is our challenge. Keep looking for ways to maintain
our capabilities at less cost. I know you will do that, and if
something is critically important and does not need to be
eliminated, you will have to tell us and maybe we in Congress
can say, well, some other program ought to pay a little bit
more price and maybe we can save this critical program. So that
is what I would like to share with you.
The chairman will be back in a few moments; thank you for
standing by. [Pause.]
Senator Nelson. Dr. Zangardi, the Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) reported that in 2011, the Navy
recently experienced a mean time between failures of 892 hours
instead of the required 1,400 hours of the Navy Multiband
Terminal (NMT) system. What actions are you taking to remedy
this situation, and when do you expect to have the full rate of
production at the terminals? I think you can sense that we are
concerned about making certain that there is a connection with
the terminals for full utilization.
Dr. Zangardi. Yes, sir. We pay very close attention to NMT.
So first off, the demand signal from the fleet for the Navy
multi-man terminal is high. They want it now. The current
antennas, the WSC-6, for example, requires significant
maintenance. We recently conducted a gate review or it was just
a general in-depth review of the program in January, and as
part of that, we--myself and the program manager--came over
here and briefed each of the four defense committee staffs on
the program and it was exactly on this point here.
The DOT&E found that NMT is operationally effective, but
that it is not operationally suitable. The systems reliability
tested below threshold, and the key reasons included
operational availability, for sure, and long lead times for
system maintenance. So the maintenance drivers were basically
failure diagnosis timelines and logistics delays of spare
parts.
Let me give you a brief example. We also believe we have
solutions in place for these.
On one of the shore facilities, the power supply for a fan
failed during the test. The system continued to work. However,
it was logged as a failure of the system because there was a
part failure. So that counted against it. The system operated.
Communications continued, but it was a failure. Most of the
failures that occurred during this OT&E were like this.
We believe we have corrected the issues, and for all the
systems that are being procured in the future and all of those
that are coming off the assembly line, the contractor will be
putting in place the fixes at no cost to DOD.
The lessons learned for failure diagnosis are being
incorporated into the on-board diagnostic tools and technical
documentation, as well as updating all the training curriculum.
Naval Supply is working to optimize sparing levels, and we
expect to see continued improvements in this area, in other
words, get the parts out there in time. So part of the new
program is really what happens when you have outed so you can
anticipate and optimize the sparing levels.
We believe that NMT is currently on track to conduct a
follow-on OT&E event in June of this year. We anticipate that
the full rate production decision will be in the fall of this
year. Currently, the program is in a low-rate initial
production.
Senator Nelson. I understand that TacSat-4 is proving to be
a success meeting warfighters' requirements for a small,
rapidly fieldable satellite that can communicate in urban and
mountain terrain. I understand that the ORS office helped
launch this satellite.
Do you think these satellites are proving their utility for
the investment that has been made so far?
Dr. Zangardi. Yes, sir. I would like to hold off on
providing you an assessment on that until the Joint Military
Utility Assessment is completed later this year, and we can
provide you formal feedback from DOD as to whether or not it is
operationally effective or useful.
Senator Nelson. Okay. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Joint Military Utility Assessment report is scheduled to be
released on August 1, 2012. After reviewing the report, the Department
of Defense will be able to provide the committee with formal feedback
regarding the usefulness and operational effectiveness of TacSat-4.
Senator Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, we seem to be finally putting
satellites in orbit, but it seems that talking to them on the
ground is now a challenge. So my understanding is that we are
delayed in the ground terminals, as we have just heard a little
bit here, terminals for GPS III, MUOS, SBIRS, and AEHF. The
problem is so bad with AEHF that the contract for its ground
terminal, called the FAB-T, is being restructured, leaving the
B-52 and B-2, our nuclear bombers, with only a very low
frequency capacity. I understand that we may have a Nunn-
McCurdy breach on the FAB-T program.
If you would, please provide us with your overall
recommendation for remedying this DOD-wide problem, and can you
give the committee legislative drafting assistance to avoid it
from happening in the future?
Ms. Chaplain. Yes, of course, we love providing assistance
where you guys need it on writing legislation. [Laughter.]
We have done work in this area, even on this problem, in
particular, and we had a number of recommendations. DOD has
been taking actions, but I think a couple things are still
outstanding.
First, is making sure that the ground programs and the user
programs do adopt best practices and, most importantly,
understand the complexity of what they are trying to achieve
when they set out to do it. I think with JTRS and FAB-T that
understanding was not quite there.
The second thing is having good insight into the
synchronizing between user ground systems and satellites
throughout the life of a program, and that would include
activities within DOD but also insight on your part. I know DOD
has started some of the activities on their part, but the more
they can conduct enterprise-level reviews on this issue, the
better.
On your part, if Congress could require some reporting that
illustrates the status of these programs, the ones that are
linked together, on a regular basis, you would have insight,
and then when you see the disconnects coming down the road, you
can do something about it. Too often it just appears as a
surprise when it is already too late. We have launched a
satellite and everyone is happy, and then everybody realizes,
uh-oh, it is not going to be fully utilized for a couple years.
So having that kind of insight is very important really early
on.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
I am going to ask you the same question about preserving
the operating spectrum in general and how any movement should
be paid for and coordinated from your vantage point from the
GAO.
Ms. Chaplain. I think it is hard to even understand the
cost without knowing where you would move to. That is the first
question that has to be answered.
Another thing I think that has not been discussed today is
really how difficult it would be to get satellites to move to a
new spectrum. All the satellites that are out there cannot just
get a simple fix to move to spectrum, and you just cannot
simply replace them all. That would just be a tremendous,
tremendous cost. Even with ongoing programs like GPS III, to go
into that program now and change the requirement for spectrum
would create a lot of disruption and a lot of cost increases
and schedule delays, and that is not a program where we want to
see more of that.
Also, when we talk about the word ``resilience'' in terms
of space policy, I look at it as very applicable in this
situation because the particular spectrum that they rely on for
satellite control networks is one of the optimum pieces of
spectrum for maintaining resiliency. When satellites have
trouble and they are spinning out of orbit, the wideness of the
spectrum allows DOD to correct satellites that are having
issues. So it is important to remember that these certain types
of spectrum that are being used for satellite control is there
for a reason.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
I think lurking in the background of this whole hearing is
how DOD can be innovative in the design, cost, and launch of
satellites. The ORS program was supposed to be the competition
in DOD like DARPA to do that. In your opinion, was the business
case or model for ORS working? If Congress could fund it, would
you concur that it should be funded?
Ms. Chaplain. Yes. We try not to be advocates for programs,
but we certainly have always endorsed the goals of the ORS
program. I think some of them have not really been brought out
today. In addition to developing smaller and more responsive
satellites, there were other goals in that program: to lower
the cost of launch, to standardize design methods, and to
standardize satellite buses. So while maybe you would not have
a whole barn full of satellites ready to, you might have a barn
full of pieces that you could put together in rapid order.
In moving forward, if the program is canceled, I just do
not see yet the way forward for how lessons learned are going
to be incorporated elsewhere in DOD. There had been resistance
to that program and what it was doing, and we did not see the
big programs making progress to adopting these kind of
philosophies. I would like to just see a formal plan for how
ORS is going to be evolving in other places in DOD if it is
going to be canceled.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Just a general overall question. What do you see today as
the largest single acquisition challenge to space systems?
Ms. Chaplain. I think it is something we have been talking
a lot about today, and that is: affordability. It creates a lot
of good challenges because it makes you find ways to do things
more efficiently. It incentivizes you to adopt things like best
practices, but at the same time, it has raised a lot of
questions about where are we going next and how are we going to
pay for it. When you look across the portfolio of defense space
systems, there really are not many that you would say should be
cut. They all provide very, very important capabilities.
So when you make these kinds of decisions, they really do
need to be made with a Government-wide perspective and with the
idea that agencies are going to coordinate more to optimize the
investments they do have. We do not see enough of that kind of
strategic thinking across Government and that coordination that
is really focused on optimizing investments. There is
coordination. It happens here and there, but we just do not see
it in a concerted way when it relates to the issue of
affordability.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
We have asked a number of questions and received a number
of answers; but are there questions that have not been asked
yet that you would have answers to that if you had been asked,
you would offer us answers? In other words, what have we not
touched on today that perhaps we should have or something that
we should know that we have not explored? Anything in
particular? Or do you think we have done just enough? If there
is something else that you would like to offer, we certainly
want to give you the opportunity.
General Shelton. Senator, we have touched on this, and I
said this privately to you earlier. But there is undoubtedly a
foundational level of space capability that regardless of force
structure size in DOD, regardless of almost any other decisions
made from a budget perspective, that space capability has to
continue. If we are going to continue to fight wars the way we
fight wars today, and in this era of information-enabled
warfare, there is such a heavy dependence on space capabilities
that I think that that foundational layer just has to continue.
Senator Nelson. General Formica, anything you would like to
add?
General Formica. Mr. Chairman, I would obviously echo
General Shelton's comments. They are very consistent with what
I said in my opening statement and consistent with the approach
we bring. We are reliant on space. There is no going back. If
we are going to shoot, move, and communicate, we require space
systems. I would absolutely endorse General Shelton's
foundational basis.
I do appreciate the opportunity to appear today, sir.
Senator Nelson. This is more than parity for us. We have to
stay ahead of the game. We cannot just be catching up or trying
to stay at par with the rest of the world or otherwise our
defenses are down. Is that fair to say?
General Shelton. I would agree with that, and that is
exactly what we try to do. Even though we talk about going from
the R&D to the production phase, those capabilities are very,
very good.
General Formica. Mr. Chairman, I would just add, those are
the critical enablers that will allow us to get better.
Especially as we look at force reductions and other
efficiencies, it is those critical space enablers that will
make a difference.
Senator Nelson. We cannot state definitively that it is
always just about money because it is about other matters as
well. But adequate funding is going to be important to our
progress as well. That is why, I think, it is important to get
the funding right. But in the process, we need to be sure, and
I know GAO and Ms. Chaplain are interested, as we all are, in
making sure that we get it right, for whatever dollar we spend,
that we get the result that we are seeking or otherwise we are
not maximizing or optimizing what opportunities we have.
Mr. Winokur, any comments that you might like to add?
Mr. Winokur. I think the only thing I would add, Senator,
is actually picking up on one of the comments you made in your
introductory remarks. So if you allow me to wear my
Oceanographer-of-the-Navy hat, we are very concerned about
affordable, next-generation weather satellites. We in the Navy
are very dependent on the civil community and the Air Force
since we do not fly our own weather environmental satellites.
From our perspective and from a national perspective, I think
affordable, next-generation weather satellites become very
critical not only from a DOD perspective, but from a national
perspective as well. So I think that would be the one thing I
would add.
We in the Navy are working very closely with the Air Force,
as I mentioned in my introductory remarks about defining our
needs, and we are working closely with NOAA as well and
defining our needs to them so we can leverage their capability
and planning.
Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Zangardi?
Dr. Zangardi. Yes, sir. Thank you for this opportunity to
give you a last remark.
We are clearly heavily reliant on space, and given the
current budget environment, it is becoming increasingly
important to focus our efforts on delivering our space programs
on time and on budget. I think we have made great strides over
the past few years to move the Navy programs in that direction.
I would like to say that since I have been in this role, I
have seen great cooperation among the Services. I find that we
work very well together in trying to bring these future
capabilities to bear for the warfighters.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Nelson. Last, but not least, Madam Secretary?
Ms. Creedon. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
One of the things that I have really gotten to participate
in and I think has gotten better since I went to DOD--and
nothing to do with me, it is just getting better--about 18
months ago, DOD stood up the Defense Space Council, and it is
chaired by the Secretary of the Air Force. He is chairing this
in his role as the Executive Agent for space for DOD. The
Defense Space Council brings all of the various aspects of DOD
together, all of the Services, and the Comptroller's Office. It
brings together the intelligence side, so NRO, and the policy,
the General Counsel's Office. It brings everybody together to
work on and to stay focused on the space systems, space budget,
space architectures.
I have to say I have been very impressed with how this
group, which meets notionally monthly, 4 to 5 weeks, something
like that, really has taken on some pretty difficult issues and
is looking at a lot of the space issues in a very holistic
manner. So right now, the Defense Space Council is undertaking
two very large architecture studies to look at how you
coordinate across the various Services for various
requirements.
I think this addresses a little bit what you had raised
earlier about, are we looking at making sure that the money is
utilized, that there is good cooperation and coordination, at
least within the national security space community. Obviously,
it does not address so much outside, but it is really a very
good body and it has really taken on some very difficult topics
of discussion, including ORS, as it works through the various
space issues. It is taking a growing role in budgets. So I have
been very impressed with this organization and its efforts
since I have been there.
Senator Nelson. It is encouraging to know that there is
that effort at coordination and collaboration because if there
is any quick way to lose opportunity or to miss optimization,
it is everyone going off on their own way. It will increase the
costs, I think decrease the efficiency and efficacy of being
able to put something together in a far more comprehensive and
cost-effective way. I appreciate that that is being undertaken.
I thank you all for your presence here today and for your
responses. If there is something at some point that we ought to
have a behind-closed-doors session, let us know that and we
would be glad to follow through on that. So I guess we will
come back to make a decision about that a little bit later.
Thank you all very much. I appreciate your testimony.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
fundamental space capabilities
1. Senator Nelson. General Shelton, you have mentioned that we must
preserve our core fundamental space capabilities in this tight budget
environment. Can you list what they are?
General Shelton. The core fundamental space capabilities are
Nuclear and National Survivable Satellite Communications; Launch
Detection and Missile Tracking; Position, Navigation, and Timing; Space
Situational Awareness and Battlespace Awareness; and Defensive Space
Control and Assured Access to Space.
global positioning system iii
2. Senator Nelson. General Shelton, in your written statement you
mention that the development of Global Positioning System (GPS) III is
on cost and on schedule. In the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
written statement, the GPS III program is identified as an acquisition
program that is ``experiencing cost and schedule growth, though not to
the extent yet as those experienced in the last decades.'' What are the
challenges of the GPS III program and what are you doing to stay on
cost and on schedule?
General Shelton. The major challenges on the program are to ensure
that we remain focused on addressing parts requirements, test
equipment, detailed design, and first time integration complexities.
The government accounted for these risks in the original estimates and
budgeted accordingly.
The government has added significantly more risk reduction
activities and systems engineering rigor in the GPS III development
program than in past acquisition reform programs. The program is
resolving technical and manufacturing issues in the development phase
so they are not carried forward into production. We expect our
significant upfront investments in systems engineering, worst-case
analyses, industry-leading parts standards, and comprehensive hardware
testing will prevent expensive rework and retest of flight vehicles in
the production flow. GPS III SV-1 is still projected to be available
for launch in 2014, as per the original Acquisition Program Baseline
(APB). The program is fully funded to the government Independent Cost
Estimate (ICE).
air force research laboratory
3. Senator Nelson. General Shelton, the GAO's written statement
indicates that the planning efforts for investments at the Air Force
Research Laboratory (AFRL) are not very strategic. How does AFRL
interface with Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) to produce current and
future AFSPC science and technology (S&T) requirements for space
systems and capabilities?
General Shelton. AFRL routinely interfaces with AFSPC primarily
through the command's S&T Corporate Process which produces strategic
investment strategies. The annual process begins with an AFSPC data
call to all combatant commands, major commands, and selected
operational units (e.g., National Air and Space Intelligence Center and
the Joint Space Operations Center). AFSPC uses the responses to
identify capability gaps and technical needs, which are then
prioritized based on both the Space Superiority Core Function Master
Plan and potential impact to future capabilities.
In addition to the space S&T processes discussed above, there are
additional opportunities to coordinate and collaborate through Air
Force and Department of Defense (DOD)-level S&T programs as well as
space management forums such as the Air Force Space Board; the Air
Force, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and National Air and Space
Administration (NASA) Summit; and the Defense Space Council.
4. Senator Nelson. General Shelton, what interfaces exist between
AFRL and AFSPC to provide S&T solutions to the AFSPC S&T needs?
General Shelton. AFRL routinely interfaces with AFSPC primarily
through the command's S&T Corporate Process which produces strategic
investment strategies. The annual process begins with an AFSPC data
call to all combatant commands, major commands, and selected
operational units (e.g., National Air and Space Intelligence Center and
the Joint Space Operations Center). AFSPC uses the responses to
identify capability gaps and technical needs, which are then
prioritized based on both the Space Superiority Core Function Master
Plan and potential impact to future capabilities.
In addition to the space S&T processes discussed above, there are
additional opportunities to coordinate and collaborate through Air
Force and DOD-level S&T programs as well as space management forums
such as the Air Force Space Board; the Air Force, NRO, and NASA Summit;
and the Defense Space Council.
space based infrared system
5. Senator Nelson. General Shelton, the first Space Based Infrared
System (SBIRS) Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) was launched in May
2011 with both scanning and staring sensors. The GAO written statement
states that the ground segment software that is to process the sensor's
data is not planned to be fully functional until at least 2018. What is
the plan for processing the sensor data between now and 2018?
General Shelton. The first SBIRS GEO satellite is undergoing a
rigorous operational certification process. Preliminary test results
show the space vehicle is meeting or exceeding performance
requirements. The staring sensor is undergoing preliminary
calibrations--at the payload level it is detecting targets 25 percent
dimmer than expected and the data are being shared with the research
and development and technical intelligence communities. The DOD funded
initiatives, separate from the program of record, will deliver interim
capabilities to process the data from the staring sensor in fiscal year
2015/2016. The sensor will contribute to the most stressing missile
warning/missile defense performance requirements with full mission
operations after acceptance of the final SBIRS Increment 2 ground
system in fiscal year 2018. While our ground system certification for
the staring sensor is several years away, we will still take advantage
of the sensor data with many off-line tools.
space test program
6. Senator Nelson. General Shelton, the Space Test Program (STP) is
being terminated but the President's budget includes $10 million for
the program in fiscal year 2013. What will these funds be used for?
General Shelton. The $10 million allocated for the STP are for
program support ($0.28 million), launch vehicle and launch services
($1.74 million), and on-orbit satellite operations ($8.03 million).
This level of funding is required to complete funded missions and
execute contract termination liabilities.
7. Senator Nelson. General Shelton, the Air Force has mentioned
that the STP-2 mission is a candidate for a new entrant into the
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)-class launch arena. How much
funding is included in the fiscal year 2013 budget request for the
launch vehicle and satellite for this mission?
General Shelton. In support of the STP-2 mission, $172 million in
fiscal year 2012 funds is for purchase of the launch vehicle and $16
million in fiscal year 2013 funds is for payload integration and
operations. The manifest for STP-2 is not finalized; therefore,
satellite costs for this mission are not available.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
sequestration
8. Senator Sessions. Secretary Creedon, Dr. Zangardi, Mr. Winokur,
General Shelton, Lieutenant General Formica, and Ms. Chaplain, the
Budget Control Act requires DOD in January 2013 to reduce all major
accounts over 10 years by a total of $492 billion through
sequestration. This will result in an immediate $55 billion reduction
to the fiscal year 2013 defense program. The Secretary of Defense has
been quoted on numerous occasions that the impact of these cuts would
be ``devastating'' and ``catastrophic'', leading to a hollow force and
inflicting serious damage to our national defense. Yet, the Military
Services must begin this month with some type of guidance on developing
a Service budget for fiscal year 2014. What are some of the specific
anticipated implications of sequestration to defense space programs?
Ms. Creedon. If the sequester is enacted, it will hollow out the
force. It will lead to a disruption of DOD's investment program which
would impact defense space programs across-the-board.
Dr. Zangardi and Mr. Winokur. DOD has not begun planning for
sequestration with the hopes that Congress will work out a larger
deficit-reduction plan. Any planning for sequestration would be a
government-wide effort guided by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB). If sequestration occurs, automatic percentage cuts are required
to be applied without regard to strategy, importance, or priorities.
General Shelton. OMB has not issued planning guidance; therefore,
AFSPC has not yet begun detailed planning for sequestration.
General Formica. The U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/
Army Forces Strategic Command has not received direction from the
Department of the Army to plan or budget for sequestration. As such, we
have not assessed the potential impact or altered our fiscal year 2014
budget plan. However, if sequestration does occur, I expect that the
implementation would negatively impact our space operations and
capabilities.
Ms. Chaplain. We have not done work to project the impact of
possible sequestration on DOD's projects and activities. Importantly,
the execution and impact of any spending reductions will depend on the
legal interpretations and actions taken by OMB. As such, we are not in
a position to provide you with an informed response. Generally, in
terms of risks of cuts to the DOD space budget, most of the space-based
capabilities DOD is pursuing--for example, protected communications,
missile warning, positioning, navigation, and timing--are critical to
ongoing military operations.
We have in the past criticized across-the-board cuts--primarily
across-the-board rescissions. This approach can result in protecting
ineffective programs while cutting muscle from high-priority and high-
performing programs. Across-the-board cuts are not substitutes for
making tough and informed choices about the foundation of government.
9. Senator Sessions. Secretary Creedon, Dr. Zangardi, Mr. Winokur,
General Shelton, Lieutenant General Formica, and Ms. Chaplain, what
programs would have the most significant impact to operations or
readiness?
Ms. Creedon. DOD is not planning for the effects of sequestration.
As OMB has not put out sequestration planning guidance, no planning has
begun.
Dr. Zangardi and Mr. Winokur. DOD has not begun planning for
sequestration with the hopes that Congress will work out a larger
deficit-reduction plan. Any planning for sequestration would be a
government-wide effort guided by OMB. If sequestration occurs,
automatic percentage cuts are required to be applied without regard to
strategy, importance, or priorities.
General Shelton. Since sequestration would apply to all programs,
it will have an impact on Air Force operations and readiness.
Sequestration also would likely have a negative impact on the space
industrial base.
General Formica. Within the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense
Command/Army Forces Strategic Command, an assessment has yet to be
conducted. However, I would expect our operational capabilities to be
degraded.
Ms. Chaplain. See answer to question #8.
10. Senator Sessions. Secretary Creedon, Dr. Zangardi, Mr. Winokur,
General Shelton, Lieutenant General Formica, and Ms. Chaplain, would
sequestration lead to contract cancellations, terminations, cost
increases, or schedule delays?
Ms. Creedon. DOD is not currently planning for sequestration. OMB
has not directed agencies, including DOD, to initiate any plans for
sequestration.
Dr. Zangardi and Mr. Winokur. DOD has not begun planning for
sequestration with the hopes that Congress will work out a larger
deficit-reduction plan. If sequestration happens, automatic percentage
cuts are required to be applied without regard to strategy, importance,
or priorities.
General Shelton. Yes, we anticipate sequestration would force
program restructures, schedule delays, and reduced procurement
quantities.
General Formica. Within the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense
Command/Army Forces Strategic Command, we have not been directed by the
Department of the Army to assess sequestration-caused contract
cancellations, terminations, cost impacts, or possible schedule delays.
But, I would expect an impact on our materiel development programs.
Ms. Chaplain. See answer to question #8.
11. Senator Sessions. Secretary Creedon, Dr. Zangardi, Mr. Winokur,
General Shelton, Lieutenant General Formica, and Ms. Chaplain, is DOD
currently conducting any planning in your areas of responsibility? If
so, can you describe the plan?
Ms. Creedon. DOD is not planning for the effects of sequestration.
As OMB has not put out sequestration planning guidance, no planning has
begun.
Dr. Zangardi and Mr. Winokur. DOD has not begun planning for
sequestration with the hopes that Congress will work out a larger
deficit-reduction plan. If sequestration happens, automatic percentage
cuts are required to be applied without regard to strategy, importance,
or priorities.
General Shelton. OMB has not issued planning guidance; therefore,
AFSPC has not yet begun detailed planning for the effects of
sequestration.
General Formica. I am not aware of any DOD sequestration planning
that impacts U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces
Strategic Command assigned space responsibilities.
Ms. Chaplain. See answer to question #8.
12. Senator Sessions. Secretary Creedon, Dr. Zangardi, Mr. Winokur,
General Shelton, Lieutenant General Formica, and Ms. Chaplain, how will
you assess the risk of each cut?
Ms. Creedon. Sequestration will lead to disruption of DOD's
investment programs which would impact DOD programs across-the-board.
Dr. Zangardi and Mr. Winokur. DOD has not begun planning for
sequestration with the hopes that Congress will work out a larger
deficit-reduction plan. If sequestration happens, automatic percentage
cuts are required to be applied without regard to strategy, importance,
or priorities.
General Shelton. If AFSPC is directed to plan for sequestration, we
will follow the risk assessment methodology provided by the Office of
the Secretary of Defense in the Defense Planning Guidance and by the
Air Force in the Air Force Planning and Programming Guidance.
General Formica. When directed to review programs under
sequestration, we will assess risk to our ability to provide space
capabilities to the force. I do expect we would experience a
degradation in capabilities.
Ms. Chaplain. See answer to question #8.
13. Senator Sessions. Secretary Creedon, Dr. Zangardi, Mr. Winokur,
General Shelton, Lieutenant General Formica, and Ms. Chaplain, has any
planning commenced to date to assess the impact of such sequestration
reductions, such as prioritizing programs in preparation for
reprogramming actions or terminations?
Ms. Creedon. DOD is not planning for the effects of sequestration.
As OMB has not put out sequestration planning guidance, no planning has
begun.
Dr. Zangardi and Mr. Winokur. DOD has not begun planning for
sequestration with the hopes that Congress will work out a larger
deficit-reduction plan. If sequestration happens, automatic percentage
cuts are required to be applied without regard to strategy, importance,
or priorities.
General Shelton. OMB has not issued planning guidance; therefore,
AFSPC has not yet begun detailed planning for the effects of
sequestration.
General Formica. To my knowledge, no sequestration impact planning
has commenced.
Ms. Chaplain. See answer to question #8.
family of advanced beyond line of site terminals
14. Senator Sessions. General Shelton, the Family of Advanced
Beyond Line of Site Terminals (FAB-T) has experienced significant
delays and for the third year in a row, procurement has had to be
deferred to address development issues. According to GAO, the programs
software development schedule is still unrealistic and the Air Force
announced that it would be terminating its FAB-T contract and was going
to seek alternative providers. How much margin do you have in meeting
U.S. Strategic Command's (STRATCOM) required delivery date?
General Shelton. AFSPC is working with the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, the Joint Staff, and STRATCOM to de-scope the FAB-T
requirements to support just presidential and national secure
teleconferencing for ground terminals and airborne platforms such as
the E-4B and E-6B. We are collectively developing a revised strategy to
ensure critical warfighters' needs are met.
15. Senator Sessions. General Shelton, is the Air Force developing
contingencies in the event FAB-T cannot meet that need date?
General Shelton. Yes. The Air Force is proceeding with a
solicitation for a potential alternative source development effort with
production options for the FAB-T air and ground command post terminals.
Also, the Advanced Extremely High Frequency system is backward
compatible with existing Milstar command post terminals.
16. Senator Sessions. General Shelton and Ms. Chaplain, is it true
that unless significant savings can be achieved through the
restructuring, FAB-T is likely to breach Nunn-McCurdy unit cost
thresholds?
General Shelton. No. The new acquisition strategy incorporates
fixed price contracts to limit the risk of cost growth on the program.
AFSPC is working with the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency and the Office
of the Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
(CAPE) to develop ICE. These independent assessments will enable an
accurate determination of Nunn-McCurdy thresholds.
Ms. Chaplain. An independent review team noted in October 2010 that
the FAB-T program would likely breach critical Nunn-McCurdy unit cost
thresholds; however, a breach has yet to be reported by the program.
Several factors make it difficult to determine how close the program is
to breaching the Nunn-McCurdy thresholds. First, the program is
currently being restructured, to include a revised acquisition
strategy. Second, a new APB which reflects these changes and their
projected costs has yet to be approved. And third, while program
officials stated that a recent ICE showed substantial program cost
growth, it did not reflect the contents of the new acquisition
strategy. Until these factors are addressed, it is difficult to know
whether FAB-T will breach Nunn-McCurdy unit cost thresholds.
Complicating matters, the FAB-T program plans to convert its current
cost reimbursement terminal development contract to a firm-fixed-price
(FFP) contract, negotiate fixed-price production efforts with the
current contractor, and award a second, competing FFP terminal
development contract with production options to an alternate source.
However, the proposals provided by the current contractor reflect
higher development and production costs and the price of the contract
with an alternate source is not known at this time. A new ICE is
expected to be conducted by July 2012 and a revised APB is expected to
be completed by August 2012.
17. Senator Sessions. General Shelton and Ms. Chaplain, what is
being done to address FAB-T affordability and should requirements be
reexamined?
General Shelton. AFSPC completed a thorough review of the FAB-T
requirements and is in the process of briefing the results to the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). This summer, the command will
request production proposals from the current contractor and from an
alternative source to validate costs.
Ms. Chaplain. The FAB-T program has recently undertaken significant
program restructuring efforts. Although initially directed to terminate
the existing terminal development contract, the program office was
redirected to evaluate the possibility of changing the development
contract type from cost reimbursement to firm-fixed price and
negotiating fixed-price production efforts with the current contractor.
In addition, the program office is to complete development of the full
set of requirements in the current capabilities development document--
both command post terminals and airborne wideband terminals. To lock in
production prices, the Air Force plans to award a FFP contract for
terminal production near the beginning of fiscal year 2013, although
the program of record is not expected to be ready to enter low-rate
initial production until fiscal year 2014. At the same time, the
program office plans to award a second FFP contract for terminal
development, with more limited requirements and capabilities--command
post terminals only--to an alternate contractor by the end of fiscal
year 2012. In either case, the Air Force is focusing on delivering a
presidential national voice conferencing capability in fiscal year
2015. To assess the deferment of this capability and others, the JROC
has directed the Air Force to support a Joint Staff functional
capability board in developing a decision brief outlining the impacts
of this decision. In fiscal year 2013, the Air Force plans to decide
whether to continue production with the current or alternate
contractor, tying knowledge points together for both contractors and
assessing overall program risk for delivering presidential national
voice conferencing capability in fiscal year 2015.
Our work has long shown the need to follow acquisition best
practices--of achieving a match between requirements and resources in
programs and of not pursuing overly ambitious and lengthy product
developments. There must be an early, solid business case with a
rational balance between requirements, costs, and schedule. Given that
the current contractor is pursuing development of the full set of
requirements and the alternate contractor is to develop a more limited
capability, it is unclear how these solutions can be compared for a
production decision or how this strategy will provide better value to
the government.
relocation of spectrum
18. Senator Sessions. Ms. Creedon, in February, Deputy Secretary of
Defense Lynn sent a letter to Chairman Levin expressing concern with a
revenue raising proposal to relocate and auction 1755-1780 MHz and
3550-3650 MHz Federal bands within a 3-year timeframe. According to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, setting arbitrary timelines of 3 years
``contradicts existing law'' and does not provide sufficient time for
DOD to conduct sufficient analysis and determine cost. Dr. Lynn stated
that ``a failure to address these concerns could cause significant
adverse impacts to military training, operations, and combat readiness
and/or cause DOD to incur unacceptably high implementation costs.'' I
know you have a lot of experience with this issue from your time on
this committee. Can you share some of your thoughts on recent proposals
to relocate national security spectrum?
Ms. Creedon. In order to make balanced decisions about relocating,
national security stakeholders require adequate time to conduct
operational and cost-feasibility analyses to ensure national security
and other Federal capabilities are preserved, while supporting the
economic benefits spectrum provides to the Nation. These studies are
critical to prevent adverse effects on operational capabilities and
avoid high implementation costs.
To relocate national security capabilities while maintaining
mission effectiveness, DOD requires alternate spectrum with comparable
technical characteristics, cost reimbursement for modifying complex
weapons systems, and adequate time to make the transition.
19. Senator Sessions. Secretary Creedon, do you believe existing
law regarding Federal relocation of spectrum is adequate to ensure that
DOD will not be unfairly taxed and that warfighters will have access to
comparable spectrum?
Ms. Creedon. Section 1062 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2000, Public Law (PL) 106-65, is very important to
protecting warfighting capabilities. This statutory requirement is
intended to ensure DOD is provided access to comparable spectrum,
certified by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and the Secretary of Commerce, before surrendering use of any
given spectrum. Legislation mandating spectrum reallocations and
auctions without time for certification of alternate spectrum with
comparable technical characteristics would place PL 106-65 at risk, and
pose risk to national security operations.
20. Senator Sessions. Secretary Creedon, recognizing that there are
compelling interests for increasing spectrum efficiency, do you believe
there is a need for any additional protections to ensure that DOD is
not unfairly taxed and that if required to move, DOD will be able to
recover the cost of doing so?
Ms. Creedon. Under current statutes, relocation of Federal systems
to comparable spectrum bands is funded by the proceeds from the
spectrum auction. These statutes also outline the steps required to
establish timelines to vacate spectrum. However, in order to make
balanced decisions about relocating, national security stakeholders
require adequate time to conduct operational and cost-feasibility
analyses to ensure national security and other Federal capabilities are
preserved, while supporting the economic benefits spectrum provides to
the Nation.
precision tracking space system
21. Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
programs are also a part of your GAO portfolio. Do you have any
concerns with MDA's strategy for the Precision Tracking Space System
(PTSS) or MDA leading the acquisition of a major space system?
Ms. Chaplain. We issued a report on MDA's Ballistic Missile Defense
System in April 2012. In this report we note that the new acquisition
strategy for PTSS is at risk due to concurrency in the development of
its satellites. While a laboratory-led contractor team is still in the
development phase of building two development satellites, MDA plans to
have an industry team develop and produce two engineering and
manufacturing development satellites. The PTSS program plans then have
industry compete for the production of the follow-on satellites. While
the strategy incorporates several important aspects of sound
acquisition practices, such as competition and short development time
frames, acquisition risks remain because the industry-built development
satellites will be under contract and under construction before on-
orbit testing of the lab-built satellites. As such, the strategy may
not give decisionmakers full benefit from the knowledge to be gained
about the design and function of the lab-built satellites derived from
on-orbit testing before making additional major commitments.
22. Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, while they have yet to conduct
an ICE, MDA claims PTSS will be low in cost close to the $200 million
per satellite range. Do you have any confidence in this estimate?
Ms. Chaplain. In our March 2011 report, we reported that the MDA
cost estimates we reviewed were not sufficiently credible and did not
meet the characteristics of high-quality cost estimates based on GAO's
Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide founded on best practices in cost
estimating. We also made recommendations that MDA take steps to ensure
that their cost estimates are high quality, reliable cost estimates
that are documented to facilitate external review. In follow-on
meetings with MDA, program officials outlined several steps that MDA
intended to take to improve the quality of their cost estimates.
However, in the results of our latest April 2012 review, we have yet to
see the steps implemented.
We cannot assess whether the $200 million cost of each PTSS
satellite is credible or be sure of what costs are included or excluded
until we have the opportunity to review the cost estimate.
For example, based on information provided by program officials,
MDA plans to use a medium EELV to launch two PTSS satellites at one
time. According to Air Force officials, the cost of launching a medium
EELV would be about $142 to $179 million, depending on which launch
vehicle is used and excluding some propellants, transportation, and
launch capability costs. Without reviewing the PTSS cost estimate, we
cannot be sure whether launch costs are included in the estimate. In
addition, as we noted in our 2011 report, one of the criteria for a
credible cost estimate is having an independent cost assessment. DOD's
CAPE group is expected to complete its ICE for PTSS the end of fiscal
year 2012, which will help provide an important independent view of
PTSS costs.
23. Senator Sessions. General Shelton, what is the military utility
of the PTSS?
General Shelton. AFSPC is engaged in a joint study with MDA to
understand the full potential of applying the capabilities inherent to
PTSS to the command's missions. The inherent capabilities may provide
significant utility to the Space Situational Awareness, Missile
Warning, and Battlespace Awareness missions.
24. Senator Sessions. General Shelton, do you believe the
development and deployment of PTSS should be a priority?
General Shelton. PTSS, if deployed, will likely be a significant
contributor to the Nation's missile warning mission, and there is
potential for PTSS to support the Space Situational Awareness and
Battlespace Awareness missions through its inherent capability. AFSPC
and MDA are engaged in a joint study to understand the full potential
of PTSS to support these missions.
25. Senator Sessions. General Shelton, given the Air Force
expertise in space acquisition, do you believe Air Force Space or MDA
would be best suited for managing this acquisition?
General Shelton. As the designated lead major command for PTSS,
AFSPC is engaging with MDA in a hybrid program office which will take
advantage of the expertise in both organizations. I believe this
arrangement positions the MDA and AFSPC team for success.
mobile user objective system
26. Senator Sessions. Dr. Zangardi, what is the current status of
the Navy's Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) program?
Dr. Zangardi. MUOS-1 launched on February 24, 2012, and the
manufacturer is currently conducting on-orbit test and checkout of all
spacecraft systems, which is executing to plan with spacecraft health
and performance nominal and on schedule to complete in late May 2012.
The testing includes activation of both the legacy Ultra High Frequency
(UHF) and the new Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA)
payloads. The Navy will complete its Technical Evaluation in June 2012
followed by Multi-Service Operational Test and Evaluation (MOT&E),
which is planned to be complete by late summer 2012. After completion
of MOT&E, MUOS-1 will be available to support legacy UHF Satellite
Communications (SATCOM) operations.
MUOS-2 is assembled, undergoing spacecraft level testing, and on
track for a November 2012 delivery. The remaining three satellites are
tracking to cost and schedule with assembly and system level testing of
MUOS-3 nearly complete. The MUOS Radio Access Facility (RAF) in
Wahiawa, HI, and the Navy Satellite Operations Center (NAVSOC) at Pt.
Mugu, CA, are complete. Both sites have the initial software build and
an interim authority to operate as a standalone system. Both sites are
being used for on-orbit operations of MUOS-1. The RAFs in Northwest
(Chesapeake), Virginia; Geraldton, Australia; and Niscemi, Italy, are
on track for completion by June 2013 to support the launch of MUOS-2 in
July 2013. The Navy expects the MUOS system to reach Full Operational
Capability in 2016 and operate as the primary DOD UHF SATCOM system
through 2026 and beyond.
27. Senator Sessions. Dr. Zangardi, according to a recent review by
GAO, new baseline cost estimates for MUOS have not yet been approved.
When do you plan to have a new acquisition baseline established?
Dr. Zangardi. The new MUOS APB was signed by the Navy Service
Acquisition Executive on April 4, 2012. The signed APB has been
forwarded to the Milestone Decision Authority, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, for signature.
28. Senator Sessions. Dr. Zangardi, how likely are we to experience
a capability gap and what is being done to mitigate the potential for
gaps in coverage?
Dr. Zangardi. Navy conducted a statistical analysis of the
reliability of the UHF Follow-On (UFO) satellite constellation and,
when combined with the launches of legacy UHF payloads on MUOS
satellites, determined that DOD legacy UHF SATCOM Chairman Joint Chiefs
of Staff (CJCS) mandated requirements are projected to be met through
2018. MUOS satellites were designed to enable a graceful transition
from legacy UHF SATCOM capability to a revolutionary new SATCOM
Wideband Code Division Multiple Access capability, which uses cellular
telephone technology to provide a ten-fold increase in UHF SATCOM
capacity and throughput to the warfighter.
To mitigate against unplanned losses of additional UFO satellites,
Navy has implemented several mitigation activities to extend the
service life of the existing constellation and increase on-orbit
capacity. As a result, the current legacy UHF SATCOM provides the
warfighter with approximately 459 more accesses (111 more channels)
worldwide than required by the CJCS capacity requirement. This
additional capacity is equivalent to three UFO satellites and provides
a buffer against unplanned losses in the future. Additionally, each
MUOS satellite carries a legacy UHF SATCOM payload that provides
capacity equivalent to that provided by one UFO satellite. Commander,
STRATCOM, recently signed out a letter to the DOD Chief Information
Officer confirming their position that the MUOS legacy UHF payloads
were added to the MUOS satellites as one of many UFO resiliency
measures.
[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 28, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR FORCES AND POLICIES
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:29 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E.
Benjamin Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Nelson, Reed, Sessions,
and Cornyn.
Majority staff member present: Jonathan S. Epstein,
counsel.
Minority staff member present: Daniel A. Lerner,
professional staff member.
Staff assistant present: Hannah I. Lloyd.
Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta,
assistant to Senator Reed; Ryan Ehly, assistant to Senator
Nelson; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; and
Dave Hanke and Grace Smitham, assistants to Senator Cornyn.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, CHAIRMAN
Senator Nelson. Let me bring today's hearing to order. This
hearing will receive testimony from the Department of Defense
(DOD) as it pertains to nuclear matters for fiscal year 2013.
First, I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here
today. I know taking time from your schedule is not the easiest
thing to do, but we appreciate very much your doing that.
We're going to have a closed session on the Long-Range
Strike Bomber program. It will be in Senate Security, room SVC-
217, and to accommodate the closed session we'll try to wrap up
by 3:30 p.m. here; and after Senator Sessions and I give some
brief comments we thought it might be best to just go straight
to some questions.
But before I begin, I have a letter to Senator Sessions and
to me from eight of our fellow Senators supporting sustainment
for our Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), that I ask
consent to enter into the record. I think you may have a copy
of the letter as well. Without objection, it will be.
Senator Sessions. No objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Nelson. Also with that, let me make just a couple
of short comments before I turn it over to Senator Sessions for
some comments as well. The 1251 report was revised in section
1043 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for
Fiscal Year 2012 to include additional data and make it part of
the President's annual budget submission.
I have a letter to Chairman Levin, dated March 2, 2012,
signed by Secretaries Chu and Panetta, that states that they
can't submit a unified DOD-Department of Energy (DOE) 10-year
plan. Instead, DOD will submit its 10-year plan ``in the coming
weeks''; and then ``over the next several months'' DOD and DOE
will submit a plan consistent with the spending levels of the
Budget Control Act.
I ask that this letter be entered into the record as well.
Senator Sessions. No objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Nelson. Congress is now left without the long-term
data to determine whether we are making the investments to
ensure our DOD delivery platforms and DOD infrastructure are on
a sustained path for modernization. I'm hopeful that Assistant
Secretaries Creedon and Weber can explain what happened and
when Congress might see the funding data requested in section
1043.
The W76 warhead refurbishment was decremented some $80
million in the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
budget to help cover cost increases for the B61 refurbishment.
Of course, Admiral Benedict, we want to know, does that affect
our posture? Also, how does the 2-year delay in the Ohio
replacement submarine affect your program?
The B-52 fleet is not getting the Combat Network
Communications Technology (CONECT) system upgrade to overhaul
its aging analog controls and help it retarget. General
Kowalski, can you help explain the implications on our force
posture?
The B-2 and B-52 are not getting terminals to communicate
with the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite for
nuclear command and control. This was a U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM) requirement. So, General Chambers, I guess we ask
what is the fix and will it suffice over the long haul?
NNSA has decided to defer the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research Replacement (CMRR) facility at Los Alamos to help
store and test plutonium. The laboratory director has flatly
stated he cannot meet DOD's 50 to 80 pit requirement for the
W78 warhead life extension. So, Secretary Weber, can you help
us explain its impacts to DOD readiness? I hope you're not
going to change the 50 to 80 pit requirement to meet the NNSA
decision, which might be one of the options that could be
looked at.
Finally, Secretary Creedon has had more time before this
committee than almost anybody else here recently. To my
knowledge, Congress has yet to see any changes to the nuclear
force structure as a result of the New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (New START). We thought that was coming in the fiscal
year 2013 budget, but we haven't heard anything about that, and
hopefully you will be able to help us with that.
Now, having said all those things, there's still more to be
said, I'm sure. So I'm turning to my good friend and co-chair,
Senator Sessions, for any comments that he might wish to give.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's been such a
great pleasure to work with you. Maybe this will be our last
one together.
Senator Nelson. Maybe.
Senator Sessions. Last markup, but not the last roundup,
for Senator Nelson.
The purpose of today's hearing is to assess the fiscal year
2013 request for the sustainment and modernization of the triad
of nuclear delivery vehicles. Unlike NNSA's budget, I applaud
DOD. You have done a good job of maintaining a clear commitment
to modernization despite tough budget times.
While the DOD budget is not immune to cuts, the key
elements of the plan appear to be intact. Risk will increase
with this budget and, while I have not yet concluded whether
all of these risks are acceptable, I look forward to hearing
from the witnesses why they believe the increased risk and the
possibility of not meeting future STRATCOM requirements is
manageable.
The sustainment and modernization of the triad will not be
cheap and will require long-term sustained commitments spanning
future Congresses and administrations. Last year the cost for
just 10 years was projected to be over $120 billion. While the
most recent estimate has not yet been provided, I am unaware of
any major changes in the plan that would significantly alter
that.
Nevertheless, our next generation nuclear capabilities must
be affordable and every effort must be made to ensure each
dollar is spent wisely. A robust triad of nuclear delivery
vehicles is essential and I believe that uncontrollable costs
perhaps more than anything else could be a threat to our
ensuring it in the future. I think that's what Admiral Mullen
meant when he said the greatest threat to our national security
is our deficit, because the numbers are so bad and so serious
that it's forcing cuts in areas that we would rather not.
Mr. Chairman, I will just briefly conclude and note that we
have much to do. I would offer my remarks for the record, and I
look forward to hearing from the witnesses. I believe that DOD
has every right to be deeply engaged in the production of the
weapons you will use, and I think we need transparency on the
producing side and we need influence and leadership from the
consumer side.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Sessions follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Jeff Sessions
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our
distinguished panel of witnesses. We have a number of witnesses and
plan to move to a closed session, so in the interest of time I will
keep my remarks brief.
The purpose of today's hearing is to assess the fiscal year 2013
request for the sustainment and modernization of the triad of nuclear
delivery vehicles. Unlike the National Nuclear Security Administration
budget, I applaud the Department of Defense (DOD) for maintaining its
commitment to modernization. While the DOD budget was not immune to
cuts, the key elements of the plan appear to remain intact. Risk will
increase with this budget and while I have not yet concluded whether
all of these increased risks are acceptable, I look forward to hearing
from our witnesses why they believe the increased risk and the
possibility of not meeting future U.S. Strategic Command requirements
is manageable.
The sustainment and modernization of the triad will not be cheap
and will require a long-term sustained commitment spanning future
Congresses and administrations. Last year the cost of just the next 10
years was projected to be over $120 billion and while the most recent
estimate has not yet been provided, I am unaware of any major changes
to the plan that would significantly alter that funding requirement.
Nevertheless, our next-generation nuclear capabilities must be
affordable and every effort must be made to ensure that each dollar is
being spent wisely. A robust triad of nuclear delivery vehicles is
essential and I believe that uncontrollable cost more than anything
else is the greatest threat to ensuring its future. I look forward to
better understanding the steps each of you are taking to insist that
your programs are delivered on time and within cost.
Section 1043 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2012 requires the President each year to provide Congress with a
report and 10-year funding requirement for nuclear modernization
efforts at both DOD and the Department of Energy (DOE). This report
which replaces the old 1251 report is intended to ensure that strategy
and budgets are aligned. While we learned just a few weeks ago how
fungible DOE views the modernization strategy, I hope the same is not
true for DOD and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses when the
administration intends to provide the 1043 report to Congress.
DOD, at the direction of the White House, recently completed a 90-
day study to look at force posture in support of a follow-on arms
control agreement. I happen to agree with a recent assessment by John
Bolton, that ``Instead of dealing with real nuclear threats like Iran
and North Korea, [the President is] going to magic shows and talking
about a world without nuclear weapons, which would be a much less safe
world for the United States.'' This administration has already undercut
its commitment to modernizing the nuclear weapons complex which was a
prerequisite for considering additional reductions. For the President
to even consider additional reductions in a fiscal environment that he
has concluded is not suitable for making the necessary infrastructure
investments is irresponsible and counter to our national security
interests. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses what was
considered in the 90-day study and if they believe additional
reductions would be feasible without the modernization efforts that
experts have unanimously recognized as critical to the future viability
of the weapons complex at any level.
I thank the witnesses for joining us today and look forward to
their testimony.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Let me first start with Secretary Creedon. Number one, the
New START force structure. Can you tell us when we can expect
to see the nuclear force structure sent to Congress from the
New START treaty? Do you have a timeframe?
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELYN R. CREEDON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL STRATEGIC AFFAIRS
Ms. Creedon. Sir, the central limits of the New START
treaty have to be met within 7 years from entry into the force,
which occurred in February 2011. So at the outset, DOD and the
Services are focused on getting rid of those assets that would
count under the treaty, but are, as we refer to them, phantoms.
In other words, they're previously retired and can be retired
now without any initial impact on the actual active forces.
So this would include 50 previously retired Peacekeeper
silos, 50 previously retired Minuteman III silos, and B-52H
bombers that are at Davis-Monthan. So that's the initial focus,
addressing these phantoms, systems that are no longer in active
service.
After that, then we'll move on to what the active
reductions will be. The assumption at the moment is that the
active reduction decisions will be made at the end of the year,
but in the context of the fiscal year 2014 budget.
[The prepared joint statement of Ms. Creedon and Mr. Weber
follows:]
Prepared Joint Statement by Hon. Madelyn R. Creedon and
Hon. Andrew C. Weber
introduction
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
subcommittee, we are pleased to have the opportunity to join Lieutenant
General Kowalski, Major General Chambers, and Rear Admiral Benedict in
discussing a critical topic--U.S. nuclear forces and policy.
This statement constitutes the combined testimony of our
organizations--the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD)
for Global Strategic Affairs (GSA) in the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy and the Office of the ASD for Nuclear, Chemical,
and Biological Defense Programs (NCB) in the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L).
Our offices are responsible for policy development, acquisition
management, and oversight for nuclear weapons for the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. As the ASDs for GSA and NCB, we also serve as the
advisor and executive secretary, respectively, to the Nuclear Weapons
Council (NWC) on all areas dealing with nuclear deterrence.
GSA is responsible for policy development in a number of areas,
including: nuclear deterrence; countering the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction; strategies for defending against the threat of
ballistic missiles; and addressing the emerging challenges the Nation
faces in the cyber and space domains. GSA leads the Department of
Defense's (DOD) efforts to execute the President's vision to take
concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons while maintaining
a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for the Nation. We also
lead DOD's work with U.S. Government departments and agencies and our
international partners to strengthen deterrence around the world.
NCB plays a key role in managing the U.S. nuclear deterrent and
leading DOD's efforts to acquire the warheads for nuclear systems in
order to meet the operational needs of our Armed Forces. Two of the
ASD(NCB)'s main responsibilities are the missions of providing the
United States and its allies with a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
deterrent capability and determining the nuclear survivability of U.S.
military forces. In addition to these missions, NCB leads DOD's efforts
to counter nuclear terrorism through activities such as the 4-year
initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide, the
Nuclear Security Summit, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism.
As the January 2012 DOD strategic guidance makes clear, the United
States will field nuclear forces that can--under any circumstances--
confront an adversary with the prospect of unacceptable damage, both to
deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and security
partners that they can count on the United States' commitment to our
shared security.
Today, we would like to touch on several topics: the global nuclear
balance; our implementation of the New START treaty and its
implications for U.S. nuclear forces and policy; our work to strengthen
regional deterrence and assurance for our allies and partners; work
underway to ensure a future nuclear force structure in line with the
President's vision; the important role the budget will play in meeting
this vision; efforts that DOD and the NWC are undertaking to ensure
that we have the forces we require for the foreseeable future,
including revitalizing the nuclear infrastructure, meeting DOD
stockpile requirements, and modernizing delivery systems and command
and control; nuclear physical security; and international efforts to
counter nuclear threats.
the global nuclear balance
Let us first set the scene by discussing the nuclear arsenals
around the world. In September 2009, the Obama administration publicly
stated that the U.S. nuclear arsenal included 5,113 weapons, not
including weapons awaiting dismantlement. That arsenal, although
sizeable, has shrunk significantly from a high point of approximately
31,000 warheads in 1967.
Russia has approximately 4,000 to 6,500 nuclear weapons, according
to unclassified estimates, of which approximately 2,000 to 4,000 are
non-strategic--or ``tactical''--nuclear weapons. Russian strategic
nuclear warheads are reported under the New START treaty, and the
limits on its deployed strategic nuclear weapons are monitored through
onsite inspections, but we lack confidence in estimates of Russian
tactical nuclear weapons.
Russia maintains a robust nuclear warhead production capability to
remanufacture warheads regularly rather than conduct Life Extension
Programs (LEP). Russia is also working to modernize delivery systems,
including a mobile variant of the Topol intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) and new Borey-class missile submarines with Bulava
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). Under the New START
treaty, Russian forces will be limited to 800 total and 700 deployed
strategic delivery systems. Russia will also be limited to 1,550
deployed strategic warheads to comply with the central limits of the
New START treaty.
We do not have arms control insight into China's nuclear
capabilities. China appears to be increasing the size of its nuclear
arsenal, which today consists of a few hundred nuclear weapons. We know
that China has a broad range of missile-development programs, including
an effort to replace some liquid-fueled systems with more advanced
solid-fueled systems. China is also pursuing a sea-based deterrent with
the construction of the Jin-class submarine.
Of course, the list of the world's declared nuclear powers includes
two of our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. The United
Kingdom and France each have a few hundred nuclear weapons. France is
upgrading its nuclear capabilities by replacing legacy delivery
aircraft with the Rafale and by fielding the new M51 SLBM. The United
Kingdom is focused on replacing its Vanguard-class strategic ballistic
missile submarines and is collaborating with the United States on a new
common missile compartment to be used on both the Vanguard-class and
the U.S. Ohio-class replacement submarine.
In recent years, the situation has grown more complicated as other
states seek nuclear weapons of their own or enhance their existing
nuclear arsenals. Today, India and Pakistan are each estimated to have
fewer weapons than China, but they are increasing the size of their
nuclear arsenals. Pakistan is expanding its plutonium production
capabilities, and both India and Pakistan are seeking advanced delivery
systems. In addition, North Korea has tested a plutonium-based weapon
design and claims to be enriching uranium. Based on recent events, it
is possible that the downward trend of recent years may be reversing
with respect to North Korea. However, in the absence of full
transparency and cooperation with the International Atomic Energy
Agency, we remain concerned about Pyongyang's ultimate intentions.
Likewise, we are profoundly troubled by Tehran's nuclear ambitions and
its unwillingness to meet its international nonproliferation
obligations.
This complex global security environment is the context in which
our future force structure decisions must be made.
implementation of the new start treaty
One very important step toward addressing the security environment
we face, given that the United States and Russia continue to have the
vast majority of the world's nuclear weapons, was the entry into force
of the New START treaty in February 2011.
President Obama made the decision to expedite negotiations for the
New START treaty in order to reinvigorate arms control and to minimize
the lapse in verification measures occasioned by the expiration of the
START treaty. This decision was consistent with the recommendations of
the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United
States, which called for an initial agreement with Russia to ensure
that a verification program would be in place after the START treaty
expired, followed by negotiations on potential further reductions.
Implementation of the New START treaty is fully underway. From
February 5, 2011 to February 5, 2012, the United States and Russia
conducted 18 onsite inspections, which is the maximum number allowed
under the New START treaty. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency
conducts these inspections, and the organization's extensive experience
with onsite inspections ensures the maximum value of this exercise. The
two countries have also exchanged roughly 1,800 notifications regarding
nuclear weapons dispositions, deployments, and repairs since the New
START treaty entered into force. This represents a 28 percent increase
above the predecessor START treaty over a comparable period. These
exchanges and inspections provide transparency that is crucial to
fostering mutual trust between the two countries. Additionally,
delegations of both sides have already met three times under the New
START treaty's Bilateral Consultative Commission to discuss
implementation issues.
We are on track to meet the 2018 deadline for the central limits of
1,550 warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and accountable
nuclear warheads for deployed heavy bombers; 700 deployed ICBMs,
deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; and 800 deployed and non-
deployed launchers and bombers--thresholds that, based on careful
analysis, are adequate to meet U.S. national security requirements.
The New START treaty is the first step in the Obama
administration's vision for further reductions in strategic and non-
strategic nuclear weapons. The timing and framework for the next round
of arms control negotiations have not been set, but new discussions
with Russia will need to be broader in scope and more ambitious. The
President has made clear that the next phase should include the total
arsenal of nuclear weapons: deployed and non-deployed, strategic and
non-strategic. To that end, we fully support the Senate's condition in
its New START treaty Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification
to pursue an agreement with Russia that would address the disparity
between the tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian
Federation and of the United States and would secure and reduce
tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner. As the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) states, Russia's nuclear forces will remain a
significant factor in determining how much and how fast we are prepared
to reduce U.S. forces. Strict numerical parity in nuclear weapons
between the two countries is no longer as compelling as it was during
the Cold War. However, large disparities in nuclear capabilities could
raise concerns on both sides, as well as among U.S. allies and
partners, and may not be conducive to maintaining a stable, long-term
strategic relationship. Therefore, we would emphasize the importance of
Russia joining us as we move to lower levels of nuclear forces.
We continue to pursue high-level, bilateral dialogues with both
Russia and China that are aimed at promoting stable, resilient, and
transparent strategic relationships. The United States took a bold step
toward transparency by making public the number of nuclear weapons in
the U.S. stockpile. We would welcome reciprocal declarations by Russia
and China.
strengthening regional deterrence and assurance
The United States remains committed to our allies' continuing
security through our policy of extended deterrence. We seek to
reiterate this message as often as possible, including through efforts
to bolster regional deterrence architectures around the world. We are
building regional cooperative missile defenses, forward-deploying U.S.
forces, and maintaining what is commonly referred to as the ``nuclear
umbrella.'' The Obama administration will uphold U.S. security
commitments to our allies.
We would like to touch briefly on deterrence issues in three
regions, starting with the Asia-Pacific region. As DOD's new strategic
guidance makes clear, this region is being accorded increased
importance, and we are strengthening our security partnerships there.
In 2010, for example, we added new forums to our already robust
relationships to enhance extended deterrence in Northeast Asia--the
Extended Deterrence Policy Committee with the Republic of Korea and the
Extended Deterrence Dialogue with Japan.
Japan is also a strong partner in ballistic missile defenses,
successfully developing its own layered capabilities and co-developing
an advanced version of the SM-3 interceptor, the SM-3 Block IIA. We
regularly train together, learn from each other, and conduct
cooperative missile defense exercises. In addition, the United States
is consulting with the Republic of Korea and Australia about
possibilities for missile defense cooperation.
Another priority region for DOD is the Middle East. For the United
States, the Arab Awakening and the withdrawal of U.S. military forces
from Iraq present new strategic opportunities and new challenges.
Developments stemming from the Arab Awakening provide an opportunity to
support governments that are responsive to the aspirations of their
people. At the same time, we remain unrelenting in our commitment to
counter the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass
destruction. The United States is nurturing longstanding relationships
and expanding new ones to prevent Iran's development of a nuclear
weapon capability and to counter destabilizing policies in the region.
Israel and the United States coordinate and cooperate extensively
on missile defense. We have a long history of cooperation on plans and
operations, combined exercises, and combined research and development
programs. The United States maintains a constant missile defense
presence in the Persian Gulf region, and we are working with a number
of Gulf Cooperation Council members--Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)--on missile defense,
including the purchase of U.S. capabilities. The UAE, for example,
recently announced its plan to purchase Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) and Patriot systems from the United States.
DOD's strategic guidance also makes clear that ``Europe is our
principal partner in seeking global and economic security, and will
remain so for the foreseeable future.'' The guidance affirms the
critical importance of NATO, as President Obama did in November 2010
when he invited his fellow heads of state and government to Chicago for
the first NATO Summit in the United States in 13 years. This came on
the heels of the Lisbon Summit, which made real progress in
strengthening our ties as allies through the approval of a new
Strategic Concept for the Alliance and through NATO's adoption of
territorial missile defense as an Alliance mission. Allies at Lisbon
also agreed to undertake a Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR)
to determine the appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile
defense forces that NATO will need to deter and defend against threats
to the alliance. This review will consider how arms control,
disarmament and nonproliferation could promote alliance security.
Guided by the Strategic Concept, allies are working to complete the
DDPR by the time of the NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012. The primary
aim of the DDPR is to determine the appropriate mix of nuclear,
conventional, and missile defense forces that NATO will need to deter
and defend against threats to the alliance, and to ensure its members'
security. The drafting of the DDPR is proceeding in accordance with the
premises that continue to be central to NATO's nuclear posture,
particularly the basic principles reaffirmed by the United States in
the 2010 NPR that any changes in NATO's nuclear posture will be taken
only after a thorough review within--and decision by--the Alliance as a
whole.
a nuclear force structure for the future
As part of the NPR, the President called for follow-on analysis to
set a goal for future nuclear reductions below New START levels while
strengthening deterrence of potential regional adversaries, enhancing
strategic stability vis-a-vis Russia and China, and assuring our allies
and partners. Even as we consider future reductions, the President has
made clear that the entire administration remains committed to
retaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal for as long as
nuclear weapons exist.
The administration's review of nuclear guidance in light of the
current and expected future security environment is making good on the
President's commitment, and it is consistent with how past Presidents
have managed their responsibilities as Commander in Chief. We want to
underscore that this process is not a re-evaluation of the NPR, but
that it is a key part of its implementation.
The study is not revisiting the first principles outlined in the
NPR. Indeed, in undertaking this effort, we are focused on achieving
the NPR's five strategic objectives: preventing nuclear proliferation
and nuclear terrorism; reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in
U.S. national security strategy; maintaining strategic deterrence and
stability at reduced nuclear force levels; strengthening regional
deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and sustaining a
safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. These are the standards by
which we will assess deterrence requirements.
Our analysis is also considering the critical question of what to
do if deterrence fails. In effect, we are asking: What are the guiding
concepts for employing nuclear weapons to deter adversaries, and what
are the guiding concepts for ending a nuclear conflict on the least
catastrophic terms if one has already started?
The Office of the Secretary of Defense is working closely with the
Joint Staff and U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) in conducting this
analysis. We are closely coordinating with the National Security Staff
and senior representatives from the Departments of Energy and State.
The results are intended to inform the President's guidance to DOD on
nuclear planning and to shape the force structure needed to protect the
United States, its allies, and its partners.
budget
The budget, of course, influences our plans looking forward. The
current fiscal situation is putting pressure on the entire DOD, and the
nuclear enterprise is no exception.
For fiscal year 2013, we have made careful choices to protect high-
priority programs while allowing some efforts to be delayed with
acceptable or manageable risk. Some programs, including the replacement
for the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine, will be delayed.
Others, such as a new bomber, will remain on schedule. As we look to
sustain the current triad and develop the appropriate force mix, cost
efficiencies must be factored into the sequencing of our upgrade
efforts.
Ensuring that our nuclear forces are properly sized and configured
to face real threats, both today and in the future, is a responsibility
this administration takes very seriously. The Obama administration
continues to believe that maintaining a nuclear triad is essential to
U.S. national security.
The budget request protects investments in homeland missile
defense, and we will continue to develop our regional missile defense
capabilities, although at a somewhat slower rate.
In this budget, we will also continue to fund the development of
conventional strike capabilities, another important part of deterrence.
The DOD budget includes a Defense-wide technology development program
on Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS), the objective of which is
to develop and demonstrate boost-glide CPGS technologies and test
capabilities. CPGS would provide the President with a wider range of
options to engage targets at strategic ranges in less than an hour, a
capability that has previously only been available with nuclear-armed
strategic missiles. DOD has no current plans to replace nuclear
warheads on our Minuteman ICBMs or Trident SLBMs with conventional
warheads.
It is worth bearing in mind that some of the most important
initiatives detailed in the NPR do not require any additional funding.
These include support to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, pursuing
future arms control negotiations, and reducing the role of nuclear
weapons in national strategy. Such efforts continue apace.
revitalizing the nuclear infrastructure
Despite an overall declining top line for DOD, the President's
fiscal year 2013 budget request makes the investments necessary for DOD
to meet its deterrence requirements. To do so, these investments must
span the nuclear enterprise, including the infrastructure that provides
agile research and development and manufacturing capabilities upon
which an effective strategic deterrent relies.
DOD and the Department of Energy (DOE) are committed to a shared
approach to recapitalizing the Nation's nuclear infrastructure in a
responsible, fiscally prudent way. The NPR states that the physical
infrastructure supporting the nuclear weapons complex ``has fallen into
neglect'' and that increased investments in the nuclear infrastructure
are ``needed to ensure the long-term safety, security, and
effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal and to support the full range of
nuclear security work to include nonproliferation, nuclear forensics,
nuclear counterterrorism, emergency management, intelligence analysis
and treaty verification.'' The NPR also emphasizes that the human
capital of the nuclear enterprise has been ``underfunded and
underdeveloped.'' It is clear that reversing these trends and
accomplishing this revitalization will require significant investment
over a sustained period of time.
Fiscal year 2013 funding levels in the President's budget will
allow us to work with DOE in continuing our efforts to restore the
health of the intellectual infrastructure that our national
laboratories provide. The scientific and technological base at our
nuclear weapons laboratories forms the backbone of our deterrent. As
the 2010 NPR states, rehabilitation and modernization in the nuclear
weapons infrastructure would allow the United States to ``shift away
from retaining large numbers of non-deployed warheads as a hedge
against technical failure, allowing major reductions in the nuclear
stockpile.''
DOD has agreed to transfer approximately $8.2 billion to the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) during fiscal year
2011-2016. This funding will help ensure that we can successfully
extend the life of our current weapons and modernize the supporting
infrastructure. In addition, we are currently working with NNSA on a
budget issue team to review joint priorities for support of the nuclear
deterrent and to ensure that we are fully aligned for fiscal year 2014
and beyond. We expect the issue team's results later this year.
The aging of the nuclear weapons physical infrastructure presents
significant challenges for ensuring that the capabilities needed to
support the nuclear deterrent are maintained over the long term. To
address these obstacles, construction of the Uranium Processing
Facility (UPF) has been accelerated to ensure that current uranium
processing capabilities are not jeopardized.
Building a large, one-of-a-kind nuclear facility such as the UPF,
presents substantial planning, design, and development challenges.
Indeed, the estimated costs for the UPF have grown substantially,
raising concerns about the affordability of the project. Particularly
in today's fiscally constrained environment, the NWC is prioritizing
efforts to control costs.
DOD has worked closely with NNSA in the last year, and will
continue to do so, to ensure that necessary plutonium capabilities are
available to meet future projected requirements.
Finally, crucial to continued certification of the nuclear arsenal
is a robust weapon surveillance program that provides sufficient
information for NNSA laboratories to assess the state-of-health of the
weapons. NNSA has increased its surveillance funding and reduced test
backlogs. With improved science tools, such as advanced computers and
new experimental facilities, the national laboratories have increased
their capability to understand and resolve stockpile issues. DOD will
continue to support these efforts, for example, by providing sufficient
flight test assets.
Beyond their national deterrent mission, the national laboratories
contribute greatly to our efforts in nonproliferation and WMD
counterterrorism. They have become ``dual-use'' nuclear security
research and development organizations that provide considerable
leverage to enhance all aspects of global security. Prioritizing these
important missions among U.S. national security objectives and
supporting the laboratories with sufficient resources are mandatory for
recruiting, training, and retaining a talented workforce.
dod stockpile requirements
Today, the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile is the smallest it has
been since the Eisenhower administration. All three nuclear weapons
laboratory directors and Commander, STRATCOM, assess the stockpile
annually. The most recent assessment found that the stockpile is safe,
secure, and effective and that there is no need to conduct explosive
nuclear testing.
Looking to the future of the nuclear arsenal, DOD and DOE will
continue several weapon-system LEPs in fiscal year 2013 to support
long-term deterrence capabilities. Among the near-term efforts, DOE
will continue the B61 and W76 LEPs. Given fiscal challenges, the NWC
agreed to extend the duration of the LEPs, enabling DOD to meet
deterrence requirements effectively while more efficiently managing
annual costs among multiple programs.
Other ballistic missile warheads are also nearing end-of-life. DOD
and DOE are conducting a W78/W88 common warhead study to examine a
warhead option that could be deployed with both ICBMs and SLBMs. To
leverage this effort, DOE, the Air Force, and the Navy are jointly
developing a modern Arming, Fuzing, and Firing system, initially for
the W88 SLBM warhead but also adaptable for use in a potential W78/W88
common warhead.
Efforts to develop a common warhead for deployment on multiple
platforms would allow DOD to reduce the number of warhead types in the
stockpile and the number of warheads needed to maintain the nuclear
deterrent should a failure occur with a delivery platform or warhead.
Warhead commonality would also allow for substantial reductions in
life-cycle and production costs.
Life extension of the B61 gravity bomb is needed for support to the
bomber leg of the triad and to provide U.S. extended deterrence to our
allies. The NPR reaffirms both the extended and strategic deterrent
roles of the B61 and affirmed its full-scope life extension. The result
will be the B61 mod 12 bomb, which will replace four of the five B61
variants (mods -3,-4,-7, and -10), further promoting efficiencies and
lowering costs.
delivery systems and command and control modernization
DOD will continue to modernize programs for the delivery systems
that underpin nuclear deterrence. The NPR's conclusion to retain a
nuclear triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers is
premised on maintaining these delivery systems, and the President's
fiscal year 2013 budget reflects this approach.
Sustaining the sea-based, and most survivable, leg of our nuclear
deterrent is particularly vital as we move to lower numbers under the
New START treaty. To ensure the continued health of this critical
capability, the service lives of our Trident D-5 missiles are being
extended to 2042, and construction of the first of the Ohio-class
replacement submarines is scheduled to begin in 2021. As mentioned,
this represents a 2-year slip compared with last year's plan. However,
the Navy believes it can manage the challenges resulting from the
delay: specifically, that the first Ohio-class SSBNs would reach end-
of-life before replacement boats come on-line, and that the common
missile compartment would be installed first in the new British
submarine. Twelve new boats are planned for purchase, with the first
scheduled to begin patrol in 2031. All DOD sustainment and
modernization efforts for the submarine-based deterrent are fully
funded in the President's fiscal year 2013-2017 request.
With respect to ICBMs, the administration plans to sustain the
Minuteman III (MMIII) through 2030. Ongoing intensive flight test and
surveillance efforts will inform sustainment and modernization planning
by providing better estimates for component aging and system
reliability. The Air Force will begin an Analysis of Alternatives in
2013 (to be completed in 2014), examining options and required
capabilities for a follow-on system. Further, a small-scale program to
maintain a ``warm'' production line for MMIII solid rocket motors was
completed last year. Among key modernization issues is sustainment of
the large-diameter solid rocket motor industrial base, pending
decisions to produce a follow-on system. The President's budget request
includes an $8 million Air Force study to evaluate a path forward to
sustain this key industrial capability.
Third, the United States will maintain two B-52H strategic bomber
wings and one B-2 wing. Both bombers, however, are aging, and sustained
funding and support are required to ensure operational effectiveness
through the remainder of the aircrafts' service lives. The fiscal year
2013 budget request allocates funding to upgrade these platforms; for
example, providing the B-2 with survivable communications, a modern
flight system, and updated radar.
In addition, this year DOD intends to begin a program for a new,
long-range, nuclear-capable, penetrating bomber that is fully
integrated with a family of supporting aircraft and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. DOD continues to invest to
ensure that we maintain an effective stand-off capability as the anti-
access threat continues to evolve. Thus, DOD is carrying out an
Analysis of Alternatives, to be completed early in 2013, for an air-
launched cruise missile (ALCM) follow-on system called the long-range
standoff (LRSO) missile. We plan to sustain the ALCM and the W80 ALCM
warhead until the LRSO can be fielded.
To allow us to continue the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe in
support of our extended deterrence and assurance commitments, DOD is
planning to provide a nuclear capability to the Joint Strike Fighter to
replace aging F-16 dual-capable aircraft. The original plan was to
deliver a dual-capable Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) in 2017. As a result
of changes in the JSF program, the Air Force now intends to deliver
nuclear capability to all JSFs in Europe in the 2020 timeframe via the
Block IV upgrade. The Air Force will ensure there is no gap in our
ability to meet extended deterrence assurances to our allies and
partners.
We also want to take note of a critical but often underappreciated
component of strategic deterrence: the nuclear command and control
(NC2) system that links the triad of nuclear forces. Independent of
deployed delivery systems and warheads, we require robust, survivable,
and effective systems for early warning, attack assessment, and force
direction to support our existing nuclear employment plans, as well as
associated contingencies.
An effective NC2 system must clearly and unambiguously detect and
characterize an attack; assemble key decision makers in a conference so
an appropriate response can be chosen in a timely manner; disseminate
emergency action messages to nuclear forces taking into account the
survivability of the force elements involved; and provide enduring
control of surviving forces.
We plan to spend significant resources on NC2 system research and
development, procurement, and operations and maintenance to address a
range of challenges, including: the need for survivable satellite
communications; survivable communications to forces; early-warning
satellite modernization; improved, secure senior leader conferencing;
hardening of critical communications links to electromagnetic pulse;
and airborne and ground mobile command post sustainment/modernization.
physical security
In addition to our efforts to revitalize weapons, delivery systems,
and facilities, we continue to enhance nuclear physical security. Most
notably, we have formalized DOD-DOE collaboration through a memorandum
to pursue a common basis for the protection of nuclear weapons and
weapons-usable fissile material. This effort will provide consistency
when addressing enterprise nuclear concerns, facilitate collaborative
risk-informed decisions, and provide better communication with
Congress.
The first major step in this process was the Nuclear Security
Threat Capabilities Assessment, which was jointly developed by the
Defense Intelligence Agency and the DOE Office of Intelligence/
Counterintelligence. This assessment provides the basis for developing
a baseline of terrorist attack force size and capabilities to inform
security system design and evaluation. DOD and DOE are moving forward
to shape the methodology for vulnerability assessments, test and
evaluation, and physical security standards to maximum commonality.
Although the memorandum specifically links DOD and DOE efforts, DOD is
also actively engaging with the Nuclear Regulatory Agency and our
United Kingdom counterparts to optimize physical security methodology
and our understanding of threats to the nuclear enterprise.
Finally, DOD is enhancing the physical security posture in
``nuclear mission environments,'' where the current environments meet
nuclear weapons security standards, but there is room for improvement.
international efforts to counter nuclear threats
The last area we want to highlight is DOD's efforts to ensure that
terrorists and proliferators cannot access nuclear materials and
expertise abroad. Since September 11, 2001, there has been tremendous
collaboration on this goal at the Federal level. President Obama has
called nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists ``the single biggest
threat to U.S. security.'' In his words, just one nuclear weapon
detonated in an American city would devastate ``our very way of life''
and represent a ``catastrophe for the world.'' For this reason, the NPR
outlines a series of policies that reflect the gravity of this threat.
Specifically, it placed the prevention of nuclear proliferation and
nuclear terrorism at the very top of its list of five key objectives.
To meet this goal, the United States has been aggressive in its
threat reduction efforts; but it cannot meet this challenge alone. In
President Obama's view, there is a pressing need to ``deepen our
cooperation and to strengthen the institutions and partnerships that
help prevent nuclear materials from ever falling into the hands of
terrorists.'' Thus, DOD and its interagency partners are building on
our long history of nuclear cooperation with allies such as the United
Kingdom and France to expand that partnership into threat reduction
activities. This mission is growing in importance for an increasing
number of countries, and we will continue to make building
international partnership capacity in this area a high priority.
Just yesterday, we concluded the second Nuclear Security Summit in
Seoul, South Korea. This gathering brought together more than 50 heads
of state to address measures to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism,
protect nuclear materials, and prevent the illicit trafficking of these
materials. The Summit successfully built on the achievements of the
first-ever Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, in 2010, which
focused on improving the security of weapons-grade plutonium and
uranium. An outgrowth of the Washington, DC, Summit was the Global
Nuclear Lockdown initiative, a 4-year effort to secure all vulnerable
fissionable materials worldwide. This initiative involves participation
from across the U.S. Government, including the Departments of State,
Defense, Energy, Justice, and Homeland Security.
conclusion
Upon taking office, President Obama made it a priority to sustain a
safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. Implementing these
commitments requires a partnership between the executive branch and
Congress. President Obama has demonstrated his commitment to these
priorities, which have enjoyed strong bipartisan support in the past.
We trust that Congress will continue to demonstrate the same
commitment. These programs are central to our national security. They
deserve full, bipartisan support.
Our nuclear forces remain the foundation of deterrence. Our arsenal
needs significant and immediate investment. Given the declining defense
budget, some modernization efforts may proceed more slowly than
desired, but to reiterate the President's statements, the NPR, and
DOD's strategic guidance, the United States will maintain a safe,
secure, and effective arsenal to deter threats to our Homeland, our
deployed forces around the world, and our allies and partners. The
President's fiscal year 2013 budget ensures that this will remain a
leading national security priority.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
In terms of the 10-year funding plan, Secretary Creedon,
Secretaries Chu and Panetta sent the letter that I referenced
before to Chairman Levin, dated March 2, 2012, explaining
basically that they can't give Congress the 10-year funding
projections from the revised 1251 plan, now known as section
1043 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012.
Maybe you can tell us what happened and when we might be
able to see something from DOD on that 10-year projection?
Ms. Creedon. We obviously recognize that the report is
late. With the reductions that needed to be made in the defense
budget, there were also obvious adjustments in the strategic
enterprise. So, we needed some time to look at the long-term
impact of the reductions that were made in the 2013 budget, for
instance the 2-year delay of the SSBN-X. We are right now in
the process of completing that report, so hopefully, if it
doesn't take too terribly long to get through all the various
review procedures in DOD, we would hope that it would be
provided in weeks.
Senator Nelson. Weeks?
Ms. Creedon. Weeks, not months. So hopefully in April.
Senator Nelson. All right, thank you.
Then, Secretary Creedon, in terms of the nuclear employment
strategy, the President stated in a speech just this week in
Korea that the administration is almost finished with the
nuclear employment strategy that was originally called for in
the 2010 nuclear posture review, and again in April of last
year by National Security Adviser Donilon.
Do you have any idea when we might see that strategy?
Ms. Creedon. Again, Senator, I think that, as the President
said, we are in the final throes of concluding that work.
Obviously, it's difficult to tell when the President himself
will be making the final decision, when this will happen. But
here again, the hope is that it will be within the next couple
of weeks.
Senator Nelson. Secretary Weber, DOD signed a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with DOE to transfer some $8 billion in DOD
budgetary authority to increase the top line of the NNSA
budget. The MOU requires construction and operation of a new
CMRR facility by 2022. Are you going to have to go back and
renegotiate the terms of the MOU with the 5-year deferral of
the CMRR facility proposed by NNSA in fiscal year 2013? A lot
of concern has been raised about the replacement for the
building and the proposal here. Can you tell us what might
happen in terms of having to renegotiate?
STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW C. WEBER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Mr. Weber. Thank you, Senator. We will not have to
renegotiate the MOU. Through the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC),
which is the vehicle that DOE and DOD use to coordinate
between, as Senator Sessions said, the consumer and the
producer of the weapons in the stockpile, we had to make some
hard choices this year in the President's 2013 budget request.
One of those was the deferral of construction of the CMRR
facility at Los Alamos for at least 5 years. The requirement
for pit production capacity of 50 to 80, which is based on the
current stockpile size, remains, so we accepted some schedule
slip in order to sustain the critical life extension programs
(LEP), such as the B61 gravity bomb LEP, which will enter the
engineering development phase this year.
The uranium processing facility at the Y12 plant in Oak
Ridge, TN, this budget request actually accelerates
construction of that facility, which DOD recommended to DOE as
a higher priority of the two facilities because we have an
urgent need. The current building where secondaries are
produced at the Y12 plant dates back to the 1950s and is at
risk. So we essentially staggered those two facilities, putting
more of a near-term emphasis on the uranium processing
facility.
As far as the plutonium production capacity and capability,
the revised NNSA plutonium strategy will give us some near-term
capacity, we hope up to 20 to 30 pits per year, within the next
5 years, and that's very important in support of the LEP for
the W78-W88 common ICBM-Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
(SLBM) warhead that we're currently studying.
Thank you.
Senator Nelson. I'll come back to that in a minute. Senator
Sessions?
Senator Sessions. Secretary Creedon, how does DOD interface
with DOE as you move forward with issues like this building?
It's really not your choice whether Oak Ridge or Los Alamos
goes first, is it, or is it? Are you consulted as to what you
think the priorities are?
Ms. Creedon. Senator, the NWC is a statutorily-mandated
body that is actually chaired by DOD and is also populated by
DOE. It's through that body that a lot of these decisions are
made. It's through that body that there was a joint decision
that the uranium processing facility, the facility at Y12 that
Andy Weber was talking about, that builds the uranium
secondaries, there was a decision that of the two buildings, if
we couldn't afford to build both at the same time, which was at
one point the plan, if we had to pick who goes first, NWC said
plutonium goes second, uranium goes first. So that was, in
fact, a joint decision of NWC.
Senator Sessions. A joint decision, but the money is in the
DOE budget. But you participated in that decision.
Do you have any ability--I suppose you really don't, but
what ability might you have to examine the plan for
construction and see if it can be done at less expense? I have
to say I believe we need to do whatever it takes to modernize
our nuclear weapons, but I have been taken aback by the cost of
these construction projects.
DOE seems to be not as responsive as I would like to see
them and as intensely interested in trying to accomplish the
goal at the least possible expense, if you will forgive me. I'm
sure they don't see it that way, but I haven't sensed the kind
of intense interest in it.
So where is that headed?
Ms. Creedon. Again, in the context of NWC, there has been a
lot of discussion about these two buildings and also about the
cost of these two buildings, about the overall NNSA budget. In
the MOU that Senator Nelson mentioned last year, there was an
agreement for DOD to actually transfer money to NNSA, do some
top-line transfers, to provide some more money to NNSA so that
they could meet some of these obligations.
DOD, in particular, through NWC, but DOD independently has
also been engaged pretty closely with NNSA looking at the costs
of things like the LEP for the B61, also for the uranium
processing facility. So for instance, the Army Corps of
Engineers did a pretty comprehensive study on the costs of the
uranium processing facility and their estimate in their study
was about $4.1 billion.
Senator Sessions. $4.1 billion?
Ms. Creedon. $4.1 billion.
Senator Sessions. What was the DOE estimate?
Ms. Creedon. The DOE estimate actually had been a little
bit lower originally. So the Corps, by the time----
Senator Sessions. It was about $8 or $10 billion total. Was
that for both buildings?
Ms. Creedon. That's about right, because the estimate at
this point is they're about $4 to $4.5 billion apiece. That's
where we were right now.
So the Corps' estimate when they went through it, having
also built in a contingency, was actually a little more than
the initial DOE. But one of the things that's really important
that NNSA is doing that DOD has encouraged NNSA to do is
complete the design to the 90 percent level so that you can get
a really good cost estimate.
One of the historic problems with NNSA in some of the
construction projects is they didn't have a good completed
design, so that they didn't have really good cost estimates. So
for both these two buildings they're going to get to that 90
percent design level to do real independent cost estimates, so
they have a real no-kidding baseline.
Senator Sessions. I know I'm a Senate Budget Committee
member here, but I'm not interested in buildings. I'm only
interested in what we need, which is the weapons being
modernized. If we have to have buildings, I guess we have to
have buildings. If we have to have them, they should be as
cost-effective as we possibly can get them and as much of the
money as possible directed to the product that you need, the
American people need, and not just for building buildings.
The fiscal year 2013 budget for NNSA makes a number of
changes. During a hearing yesterday General Kehler, head of
STRATCOM, testified that he is concerned with the lack of a
plan and strategy to meet STRATCOM requirements. According to
General Kehler, he will ``be concerned until someone presents a
plan that we can look at and be comfortable with and understand
that it's being supported.''
Secretary Weber, do you want to comment on that? Do you
agree the commitment to modernize the nuclear weapons complex
was a key element in ratification of the START treaty, and do
you agree that the fiscal year 2013 budget does not meet the
terms of the plan that was committed to at that time?
Mr. Weber. As Secretary Panetta and Secretary Chu indicated
in their letter to Chairman Levin, modernization remains a firm
commitment for them and for this administration. We are dealing
with a difficult budget situation in the country and that
forced us to accept a little bit of schedule risk. We are
comfortable with the President's fiscal year 2013 budget
request, which actually increases the NNSA funding by $363
million, about a 5 percent increase.
Where we need to do work and, as General Kehler indicated
in his testimony yesterday, we need to work closely with NNSA,
and we've established a joint issue team to develop an
executable, affordable plan for the out-years, 2014 and on,
that meet our highest priorities, which are the weapons, the
LEPs for the weapons and the capabilities in the complex, in
the national laboratories, that support certification of the
stockpile and design and production of the actual weapons.
So we work very closely through the NWC, with General
Kehler, with the Navy and Air Force Secretaries and Service
Chiefs, to make sure that DOE maintains its focus on what the
Nation needs for its safe, secure, and effective deterrent.
Senator Sessions. I guess two questions. First, I think you
said you agree that modernization is universally recognized as
essential to the future viability of the nuclear weapons
complex, and is a prerequisite for future reductions in our
nuclear arsenal; is that correct?
Mr. Weber. Yes, Senator. Modernization is essential, and as
the stockpile----
Senator Sessions. Now, DOD, for the record, of course,
doesn't do this. DOE does this, and I understand General Kehler
is saying that he's not comfortable with the plan that he's
seen. He's the man that has the responsibility of receiving the
weapons and he has to certify that they are ready to be used
effectively if such an event were to occur.
Would you say you agree that this budget does not honor the
commitments that we need to achieve that goal? It's not your
fault the money is not there. I'm just asking you your
professional opinion. The goals that were laid out by DOD, does
this budget meet those goals?
Mr. Weber. The fiscal year 2013 budget request does meet
those goals. It's the out-years that General Kehler and I and
other members of the NWC are concerned about, and we owe you,
together with NNSA, as the two Secretaries described in their
letter, by this summer a solid, executable plan that will
ensure in the long-term that the modernization objectives are
met and that we have a sustained, safe, secure, and effective
deterrent for the Nation.
Senator Sessions. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator.
There's no question that General Kehler was uncomfortable
with the expectation that the future might not deliver what is
needed. At best, it seems that you may be able to manufacture
20 to 30 pits per year in 5 years, whereas the MOU requires
NNSA be able to have the capacity to produce 50 to 80 pits per
year in the 2022 timeframe.
Has the 50 to 80 pit requirement changed? The second
question is, has the timeframe when the capability is needed in
2022 changed? Secretary Weber?
Mr. Weber. No, the DOD requirement has not changed.
However, the NWC did accept some schedule risk. We accepted
deferral of the CMRR facility. What we need is a capability to
produce plutonium pits in the near-term, and the revised
plutonium strategy that NNSA presented to the NWC will provide
a 20- to 30-pit per year capacity in the near-term, within 5
years, and that will support the LEP for the common warhead
that is among our highest priorities for the deterrent.
Senator Nelson. Obviously everybody is interested in
meeting the timeframes and meeting the other requirements.
Let me switch now briefly here. Secretary Weber, my
understanding is the initial estimates from NNSA for the B61
gravity bomb that were submitted last fall by NNSA were far too
expensive and they are now having to revise downward, a less
expensive option. Can you explain what's happened from your
perspective as executive agent for the NWC?
Mr. Weber. Yes. The LEP for the B61 gravity bomb, which is
used for both the B-2 strategic bomber as well as our dual-
capable aircraft that supports the deterrence mission in
Europe, is critical. It's an aging weapon and we need to have a
LEP underway.
Last summer NNSA, based on the work done at the National
Laboratories, presented essentially three options for the LEP.
The high-cost option exceeded the threshold military
requirement and clearly was not affordable. The NWC settled on
the middle option that meets our military requirements, that
will enhance the safety, security, and reliability of that
warhead, and that will allow for consolidation of four variants
into one, which we're calling the B61-12. This is synchronized
with the tail kit program that the Air Force is initiating.
Senator Nelson. Admiral Benedict, on the W76 warhead
refurbishment delay, I understand NNSA has delayed the rate of
refurbishment of the W76 Trident D5 warhead. What impact does
this have and what kind of risk does it create for the fleet?
STATEMENT OF RADM TERRY J. BENEDICT, USN, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC
SYSTEMS PROGRAMS, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, as Secretary
Creedon and Secretary Weber have discussed, as part of the
budget discussions through the NWC, the decision was made to
essentially rephase the program. The Navy will receive all
operational reentry bodies and assets from NNSA by 2018. What
we accepted was a 3-year delay in completing the total
delivery, the last 3 years, which were the hedge requirements
which we're required to have.
So in terms of impacts to the fleet, sir, there are no
impacts from an operational warfighting requirement due to the
readjustment of the schedule.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Benedict follows:]
Prepared Statement by RADM Terry J. Benedict, USN
introduction
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, distinguished members of
the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss Navy's
strategic programs. It is an honor to testify before you this morning
representing the Navy's Strategic Systems Programs (SSP).
SSP's mission is to design, develop, produce, support, and ensure
the safety of our Navy's sea-based strategic deterrent, the Trident II
(D5) Strategic Weapon System (SWS). The Trident II (D5) Submarine
Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) represents the Nation's most
survivable strategic deterrent capability. The men and women of SSP and
our industry partners remain dedicated to supporting the mission of our
sailors on strategic deterrent patrol and our marines and sailors who
are standing the watch, ensuring the security of the weapons we are
entrusted with by this Nation.
The Navy provides the most survivable leg of the U.S. nuclear triad
with our ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and the Trident II (D5)
SWS. A number of factors have contributed to an increased reliance on
the sea-based leg of the triad. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
reinforced the importance of the SSBNs and the SLBMs they carry. Under
the New START treaty, SLBMs will comprise a majority of the Nation's
operationally deployed nuclear warheads, thus increasing the Nation's
reliance on the sea-based leg.
Ensuring the sustainment of the sea-based strategic deterrent
capability is a vital, national requirement today and into the
foreseeable future. Our budget request provides the required funding in
fiscal year 2013 for the Trident II (D5) SWS. To sustain this
capability, I am focusing on four priorities: Nuclear Weapons Surety;
the Trident II (D5) SWS Life Extension Program; the Ohio Replacement
Program; and the Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Industrial Base. Today, I
would like to discuss my four priorities and why these priorities are
keys to the sustainment of the Navy's sea-based strategic deterrent and
its future viability.
nuclear weapons surety
The first priority I would like to address, and arguably the most
important priority, is the safety and security of the Navy's nuclear
weapons. Navy leadership has clearly delegated and defined SSP's role
as the program manager and technical authority for the Navy's nuclear
weapons and nuclear weapons security.
At its most basic level, this priority is the physical security of
one of our Nation's most valuable assets. Our Marines and Navy Masters
at Arms provide an effective and integrated elite security force at our
two Strategic Weapons Facilities in Kings Bay, GA, and Bangor, WA. U.S.
Coast Guard Maritime Force Protection Units have been commissioned at
both facilities to protect our submarines as they transit to and from
their dive points. These coast guardsmen and the vessels they man
provide a security umbrella for our Ohio-class submarines. Together,
the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard team form the foundation of our
Nuclear Weapons Security Program.
SSP's efforts to sustain the safety and improve the security of
these national assets continue at all levels of the organization. My
command maintains a culture of self-assessment in order to sustain
safety and security. We continue to focus on the custody and
accountability of the nuclear assets that have been entrusted to the
Navy. SSP's number one priority is to maintain a safe, secure and
effective strategic deterrent.
d5 life extension program
The next priority I would like to discuss is SSP's life extension
efforts to ensure a future, effective, and reliable sea-based
deterrent. We are executing the Trident II (D5) Life Extension Program
in cooperation with the United Kingdom, under the auspices of the
Polaris Sales Agreement. I am pleased to report that our longstanding
partnership with the United Kingdom remains strong.
The Trident II (D5) SWS continues to demonstrate itself as a
credible deterrent and exceeds the operational requirements established
for the system almost 30 years ago. Our allies and any potential rivals
are assured the U.S. strategic deterrent is ready, credible, and
effective. However, we must remain vigilant of age-related issues to
ensure a continued high level of reliability.
The Trident II (D5) SWS has been deployed on our Ohio-class
ballistic missile submarines for over 20 years, and is planned for a
service life of 50 years. This is well beyond its original design life
of 25 years and more than double the historical service life of any
previous sea-based deterrent system. As a result, significant efforts
will be required to sustain a credible and viable SLBM force from now
until the end of the current Ohio-class SSBN in the 2040s as well as
the end of the service life of the Ohio-replacement SSBN in 2080s.
The Navy is proactively taking steps to address aging and
technology obsolescence. SSP is extending the life of the Trident II
(D5) SWS to match the Ohio-class submarine service life and to serve as
the initial baseline mission payload for the Ohio-replacement submarine
platform. This is being accomplished through an update to all the
Trident II (D5) SWS subsystems: launcher, navigation, fire control,
guidance, missile and reentry. Our flight hardware--missile and
guidance--life extension efforts are designed to meet the same form,
fit, and function of the original system, in order to keep the deployed
system as one homogeneous population and to control costs. We will also
remain in continuous production of energetic components such as solid
rocket motors. These efforts will provide the Navy with the missiles
and guidance systems we need to meet operational requirements.
SSP recently achieved a significant programmatic milestone in our
life extension program. The first end-to-end operational test of
Trident II (D5) life-extension guidance system was successfully
conducted in February from the USS Tennessee (SSBN 734). SSP embarked
on a major overhaul of the guidance system over a decade ago to extend
the life of the guidance system to match the hull-life of the Ohio-
class SSBNs. This represented the most significant guidance engineering
effort since the development of D5 over 30 years ago.
Another major step to ensure the continued sustainment of our SWS
is our SSP Shipboard Integration efforts, which utilizes open
architecture and commercial off-the-shelf hardware and software for
shipboard systems. The first increment of this update is now being
installed throughout the fleet and training facilities. To date,
installation is complete on seven U.S. SSBNs and all four United
Kingdom SSBNs. This effort is a technical obsolescence refresh of
shipboard electronics hardware and software upgrades, which will
provide greater maintainability of the SWS and ensure we continue to
provide the highest nuclear weapons safety and security for our
deployed SSBNs.
To sustain the Trident II (D5) SWS, SSP is extending the life of
the W76 reentry system through a refurbishment program known as the
W76-1. This program is being executed in partnership with the
Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration. The
W76-1 refurbishment maintains the military capability of the original
W76 for approximately an additional 30 years.
In addition to the W76-1, the Navy also is in the initial stages of
refurbishing the W88 reentry system. The Navy is collaborating with the
Air Force to reduce costs through shared technology. These programs
will provide the Navy with the weapons we need to meet operational
requirements throughout the Ohio service life and the planned follow-on
platform.
ohio replacement program
One of the highest Navy priorities is the Ohio Replacement Program.
The continued assurance of our sea-based strategic deterrent requires a
credible SWS as well as the development of the next class of ballistic
missile submarine. The Navy team is taking aggressive steps to ensure
the Ohio Replacement SSBN is designed, built, and delivered on time
with the right capabilities at an affordable cost.
The Navy team has the benefit of leveraging the success of the
Virginia-class build program and the opportunity to implement many of
those lessons-learned to help ensure we design the Ohio Replacement
Program for affordability both in terms of acquisition and life cycle
maintenance. Maintaining this capability is critical to the continued
success of our sea-based strategic deterrent now and into the future.
The Ohio Replacement Program will replace the existing Ohio-class
submarines. To lower development costs and leverage the proven
reliability of the Trident II (D5) SWS, the Ohio Replacement SSBN will
enter service with the Trident II (D5) SWS and D5 life-extended
missiles onboard. These D5 life extended missiles will be shared with
the existing Ohio Class submarine until the current Ohio-class retires.
Maintaining one SWS during the transition to the Ohio-class replacement
is beneficial from a cost, performance, and risk reduction standpoint.
A critical component of the Ohio Replacement Program is the
development of a common missile compartment that will support Trident
II (D5) deployment on both the Ohio-class replacement and the successor
to the United Kingdom Vanguard-class. The United States and the United
Kingdom have maintained a shared commitment to nuclear deterrence
through the Polaris Sales Agreement since April 1963. The United States
will continue to maintain its strong strategic relationship with the
United Kingdom for our respective follow-on platforms, based upon the
Polaris Sales Agreement. As the Director of SSP, I am the U.S. Project
Officer for this agreement. Our programs are tightly coupled both
programmatically and technically to ensure we are providing the most
cost effective, technically capable nuclear strategic deterrent for
both nations.
Consistent with the defense strategic guidance, the Navy is
delaying the Ohio Replacement Program by 2 years. While the overall
program is being delayed by 2 years, we are maintaining the original
program of record for the design of the common missile compartment and
SWS deliverables in order to meet our obligations to the United
Kingdom. The United States and United Kingdom are working jointly to
prioritize risk and develop a mitigation plan underthe auspices of the
Polaris Sales Agreement.
Our continued stewardship of the Trident II (D5) SWS is necessary
to ensure a credible and reliable SWS is deployed today on our Ohio
Class submarines, as well as in the future on the Ohio Replacement
SSBN. This is of particular importance as the reliance on the sea-based
leg of the Triad increases as New START treaty reductions are
implemented. The Ohio Replacement will be a strategic, national asset
whose endurance and stealth will enable the Navy to provide continuous,
uninterrupted strategic deterrence into the 2080s.
solid rocket motor industrial base
The fourth priority I would like to discuss is the importance of
the defense and aerospace industrial base. In particular, the decline
in demand for the SRM industry has placed a heavy burden on Navy
resources. The Navy is maintaining a continuous production capability
at a minimum sustaining rate of 12 rocket motor sets per year through
the Future Years Defense Plan. However, we previously have faced
significant cost challenges as both the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) and Air Force demands have declined.
Over the past few years the Navy has worked with our industry
partners to reduce overhead costs and minimize cost increases to the
Department. Despite many efforts to address this issue, the industrial
base remains volatile. Potential future unit cost increases due to
further decline in SRM industrial base demand could impact the D5 Life
Extension Program. We will continue to cautiously monitor the
industrial base.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense-led Interagency Task Force
developed a SRM Industrial Base Sustainment and Implementation Plan.
One of the conclusions of the report is that ``The Department must
preserve the scientific, engineering and design skills and production
capabilities necessary to support both large- and small-SRMs.'' SSP
will continue to work with our industry partners, the Department of
Defense, NASA, Air Force, and Congress to sustain the SRM industrial
base and find ways to maintain successful partnerships to ensure this
vital national capability is maintained.
conclusion
SSP will continue to maintain a safe, secure, and effective
strategic deterrent capability and focus on the custody and
accountability of the nuclear assets entrusted to the Navy. Our budget
request provides the necessary funds to sustain this capability in
fiscal year 2013. However, we must continue to be vigilant of
unforeseen age-related issues to ensure the high reliability required
of our SWS. SSP must maintain the engineering support and critical
skills of our industry and government team to address any future issues
with the current system as well as prepare for the future of the
program.
Our Nation's sea-based deterrent has been a critical component of
our national security since the 1950s and will continue to assure our
allies and deter our rivals well into the future. I am privileged to
represent this unique organization as we work to serve the best
interests of our great Nation.
Senator Nelson. Admiral Benedict, I understand that the
Ohio replacement's going to be delayed 2 years. Once again, can
you explain what impacts this may have on the common missile
compartment program that you manage with the British, and how
old the first Ohio-class boat will be when it's retired?
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. Today the Ohio replacement
program will have 12 submarines, which will replace the 14
existing Ohio-class submarines. You're correct that the
decision was made to delay by 2 years. Having 12 Ohio
replacement submarines will give us the 10 operational that we
require in order to support the STRATCOM at-sea requirement.
We will have a period of time, essentially through the
2030s, when we will be at that 10 minimum number in order to
sustain the warfighting requirement. That will impose
additional risk on the Navy. We believe that is manageable.
Essentially, all Ohio-class will be, give or take a number of
months, sir, within about 42 years of age at their retirement.
Senator Nelson. My time has expired. Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just have a few questions with regard to nuclear
modernization funding. When the New START treaty was ratified
in the Senate, there were certain representations made by the
administration, as well as assurances given by the
appropriators in the Senate. I hear Senator Sessions may have
touched on this some.
During yesterday's full committee hearing of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, General Kehler of STRATCOM expressed
his concerns about the funding shortfall in the President's
budget request. Using the 1251 modernization plan as a
baseline, the fiscal year 2013 request falls $372 million short
and funding between fiscal years 2012 and 2017 could fall $4
billion short on the 1251 commitment.
General Kehler noted the slips to the B61 and W75 LEPs
indicated that, while it would increase risk, it would be
manageable, which I appreciate always. When our military says
it's manageable, that's your job, to manage with the resources
that you are given; not that it's optimal, but that it may be
manageable.
He was concerned about deferring the start of construction
of the plutonium handling facility, the CMRR facility, and
perhaps more important, was uncertain about the
administration's alternative course of action for producing the
necessary number of nuclear pits to maintain a responsive
infrastructure. It seems odd to me that DOD would agree to the
fiscal year 2013 funding request and alternative to CMRR
without knowing whether it's technically feasible or cost-
effective or whether the funding will be provided in the out-
years necessary to accomplish these tasks.
So I would ask, Secretary Creedon and Secretary Weber,
perhaps in light of these comments, can you tell us whether you
share these concerns and what the state of thinking of DOD is
with regard to the way forward. How could NWC approve the
fiscal year 2013 budget request with so much uncertainty?
Ms. Creedon. Thank you, sir. In general terms, yes, we do
share the concerns of General Kehler. To focus on the 2013
budget request, at the moment, the 2013 budget request is okay.
We've made some adjustments in some of the scheduled programs,
but 2013 is okay.
Where we are all concerned and where we have work to do is
in the out-years.
Senator Cornyn. If I may just ask for clarification, you
say you're okay in fiscal year 2013, and that is because the
funding request meets what was represented to be the
prospective funding at the time the New START treaty was
ratified?
Ms. Creedon. 2013 is a little bit less than what was
projected to be in 2013 in the 1251 report, but it's only a
slight degree. It's only a little bit less, and it's more than
the appropriated amount in 2012. With some schedule adjustments
to some of the systems, specifically the 61, the 76-1 LEP,
there's been some opportunity to have this reduction and have
2013 be okay.
Now, one of the big issues, obviously, is the issue of not
doing both the plutonium building and the uranium building
simultaneously. That was the decision that NWC made, to put the
uranium building first and the plutonium building second, with
some adjustments that NNSA is going to do in their overall
plutonium strategy to allow an increase in production at the
PF4 facility where the pits are actually made. So PF4 is the
facility where pits are actually made and the CMRR, in other
words the replacement facility, is where they do a lot of the
analytical work, they store the plutonium, and they do a lot of
the support work to allow the production of the pits.
So with some adjustments in the PF4 building and some
adjustments throughout the complex, there is an ability to
increase the production at PF4 in the near-term to about 20
pits and possibly a little bit more in the near-term, until we
can get the plutonium building completely designed, the uranium
building built, and then the plan is to go back then and pick
up the construction and funding of the CMRR, the plutonium
building.
So that's the current plan. But we need to fit this in the
out-year's budgets, because right now the out-year's budgets
are, as General Kehler said, not a reliable plan at the moment.
Senator Cornyn. So if I understood you correctly, there is
a potential of producing as many as 20 pits using the current
operations facility?
Ms. Creedon. Yes.
Senator Cornyn. But the requirement is multiples of that,
is it not?
Ms. Creedon. The objective requirement is 50 to 80, based
on what the longer-term LEP decisions are. So right now, with
the decisions for the LEP on the 61 and the completion of the
76-1, the capability at PF4 that will be provided in the
interim is adequate. It's the decision on the next round of LEP
that starts to then generate the requirement for pits at PF4.
Senator Cornyn. Mr. Chairman, may I have one last question,
if I may, please?
Senator Nelson. Sure, sure.
Senator Cornyn. I'd like to ask whether DOD would be
willing to help our committee identify efficiencies within the
National Laboratories or NNSA that would free up funding for
the important weapons LEPs or perhaps even to fund the
construction of CMRR on its original schedule. In other words,
about $300 million is needed in fiscal year 2013 and $1.8
billion over the next 5 years.
First of all, do you believe that there are efficiencies
that could be identified within the National Laboratories and
NNSA? If there are, would you be willing to work with us to try
to find those in a way that keeps the original commitment, that
I believe a lot of Senators relied upon in voting to ratify the
New START treaty?
Ms. Creedon. Senator, we would be happy--in fact, DOD is
working very closely with NNSA right now, going through a
process to try and identify efficiencies. But at some point, it
really depends on what the annual budget is as to what we can
accomplish. Even with efficiencies, there's only so much you
can do with efficiencies based on whatever the outyear top line
is. But we would be more than happy--in fact, we've already
started that process internally.
Senator Cornyn. I appreciate that. We'll be happy to work
with you to find those, and if there's money that's not being
used to good purpose it seems to me that that's something--
that's a commitment that was made that we need to make sure is
kept.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, witnesses. I think the chairman touched upon the
delay of the Ohio-class submarine, but I want to ask a few more
questions. When General Kehler was before us as STRATCOM
commander, in response to Senator Blumenthal he pointed out
that survivability of the deterrent is one of the key factors
that must be considered. My understanding of this conversation
was that he saw the submarine as providing the most survivable
deterrent and therefore the Ohio-class replacement is the top
priority in terms of the rebuilding or refurbishing the nuclear
triad.
Madam Secretary, can you talk about this priority in the
context of support by DOD to the Navy to make sure we get this
done? Because I think one of the issues that we're running
into, and I think similarly with respect to the other Services,
these platforms, this replacement, is expensive. It crowds out
shipbuilding and other key aspects that we have to do, unless
there's some support from DOD because of the strategic nature
of the platform.
Can you comment on that, Madam Secretary?
Ms. Creedon. Yes, sir. From a policy perspective,
maintaining all three legs of the triad is DOD and the
administration's commitment, and the submarine, as you
mentioned, is the most survivable leg of the triad. So from a
policy perspective, the ability to maintain and fund that leg
of the triad is critical.
But, recognizing the fiscal constraints, the decision to
slip the first Trident--to slip the program by 2 years and then
save about $4 billion within the Future Years Defense Program,
that level of risk was acceptable. We recognize the fiscal
constraints and it still maintains the commitment to the triad.
For any operational specifics, I think I'd rather defer,
though, to Admiral Benedict.
Senator Reed. I'd be happy to hear from Admiral Benedict.
One further elaboration is that this slip is just for 2 years,
so we will begin in earnest the research and design,
construction, et cetera. But what happens still, even though
we've pushed the problem back 2 years, at some point you have a
lot of different platforms, ships in this case, that have to be
built and, given the strategic nature of this system, the Navy
top line might have to be adjusted upwards by DOD resources to
make sure it can be done to maintain the triad, all three parts
of it, but leading with the submarine.
Admiral Benedict, please, your comments?
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir, Senator. As Mr. Stackley and
Vice Admiral Blake described this morning, the Navy is in
conversation, Navy leadership, with the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) on the potential to do that. Those discussions
are ongoing. It's clearly recognized within all levels of
leadership the pressure that the Ohio replacement program puts
on the total Navy shipbuilding program, and I believe that
those discussions will run their course in due time, sir, as
Mr. Stackley described.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
A final question and this goes back to the very difficult
budget choices you have to make. You might want to comment, and
this is not particularly profound--we're going to have to do
some prioritizing in terms of what we build and the sequence of
building these platforms. So the goal is, and I agree with you,
to maintain the triad, but the pace of replacement of air- and
land-based systems and sea-based systems is something that
you're going to have to consider because of the budget. Is that
fair?
Ms. Creedon. Yes, sir. Looking from a policy perspective,
again looking at all of the systems in the triad, looking at
what their current life expectancy is, when we need new ones,
that's part of the overall OSD discussions in terms of
maintaining the triad. At the moment it was clear that, based
on the extended life of the hull of the Tridents, that was an
acceptable risk, to slip it by 2 years.
On the other hand, the bombers stayed on schedule and we're
continuing with the Minuteman LEP to get the Minuteman up to
2030.
Senator Reed. One final question. That is, there's a new--I
guess it's not that new, but there's a new factor. That's
cyber, in terms of development of systems, the deployment of
systems, the survivability of systems. I'm old enough--in the
1950s, 1960s, 1970s, this was not a significant factor. I'm
talking about the effect of a cyber attack, not on military
installations directly, but the utilities that serve it, so
that your power's down, disrupting communications, et cetera.
Is that being weighed also, and does that go to the point
that General Kehler made about the survivability of the
seaborne deterrent because of its potential to withstand cyber?
Conversely, are other systems more vulnerable to cyber? It's a
big question, but if anyone would like to comment.
Ms. Creedon. Other than just generally yes, we are looking
at that. Nuclear command and control is extraordinarily
important. But in terms of the specifics for the platform, I
would prefer, frankly, to defer to my colleagues from the
Services.
Senator Reed. General?
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAMES M. KOWALSKI, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR
FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND, U.S. AIR FORCE
General Kowalski. Yes, Senator. We just wrapped up a study
of the cyber vulnerabilities of the ICBM and the conclusion of
the study was it was an invulnerable system in terms of getting
into the actual command and control. I take your point, that
some of the supporting systems might be vulnerable. In fact,
we've already taken measures to close those gaps. It was a
worthwhile effort. It took us about a year.
In our other systems, we have looked at the same thing and
we're pretty confident with where we are.
[The prepared statement of General Kowalski follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. James M. Kowalski, USAF
introduction
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and distinguished members
of the subcommittee; I am honored to appear again before you today as
the Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC), representing
nearly 24,000 dedicated airmen and civilians.
Our mission at AFGSC is clear. We organize, train, and equip combat
ready forces for nuclear deterrence and global strike operations with
an intense focus on ensuring a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
arsenal and global strike force to support the President of the United
States and the combatant commanders.
As we move forward in reducing our force to the New START levels, I
am confident that with your support our airmen will meet that mission
while demonstrating the disciplined professionalism our Nation expects
of the stewards of this fundamental national security capability.
air force global strike command update--organize, train, equip
I would like to take this opportunity to update you on the command
by discussing the initiatives and challenges to ``organize, train, and
equip'' our force so we remain ready across a broad mission set. Only
through constant attention to readiness metrics can we responsibly
balance fiscal austerity with ready forces to support the combatant
commanders for nuclear deterrence and a broad range of conventional
missions.
Organize
During this past year, our Command grew with the transfer of
nuclear weapons Munitions Squadrons from Air Force Materiel Command.
This transfer to AFGSC further strengthened the nuclear enterprise
through enhanced unity of command and streamlined operational
coordination. Additionally, we activated a new munitions division at
the headquarters to provide advocacy, guidance and oversight to the
conventional, nuclear, and armament systems activities across the
command.
We also strengthened the nuclear enterprise through our efforts as
the core function lead integrator for Air Force nuclear deterrence
operations. In support of the Air Force corporate planning and
programming structure, we developed the Nuclear Deterrence Operations
Core Function Master Plan (NDO CFMP) in collaboration with key
stakeholders across the Air Force. The NDO CFMP aligns nuclear
deterrence strategy, operating concepts, and capability development. It
is a long range plan that forms a reference point for helping the Air
Force mold its strategic priorities, risks, and tradeoffs.
As we looked for opportunities to improve our nuclear deterrence
operations, we won approval to serve as the chief architect for the Air
Force Nuclear Command and Control system. This strengthens our role as
lead program manager for 14 nuclear command, control, and
communications (NC3) systems and programs. In this capacity, AFGSC
created a roadmap to effectively sustain the Strategic Automated
Command and Control System through 2030.
We also found that by developing a governance structure of
stakeholders in our key weapon systems we were able to establish
relationships and understanding that has led to continued improvements
in weapon system performance and faster solutions to problems. These
General Officer Steering Groups for the B-2, B-52, Minuteman III, and
UH-1N ensure decisionmakers prioritize and resolve key sustainment
support issues.
To better support our missile wings, AFGSC adopted the Schlesinger
Report recommendation to renew the assignment of intelligence officers
to the missile wings. Today, those officers fill a critical gap,
providing a better understanding of real-world events and deploying a
number of intelligence tools that were not previously accessible. Our
missile wing intelligence officers are also playing a vital role in
ensuring the safety and security of our nuclear weapons and personnel
through support for force protection and anti-terrorism programs at the
wings.
We also continue to refine our Nuclear Surety Council (NSC). The
NSC is a quarterly meeting across our enterprise to identify nuclear
surety issues and track them to resolution. During the course of 2011,
the NSC successfully monitored and closed a number of issues to include
improvements to nuclear convoy security, implementing technical order
changes at Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Launch Control
Centers, increasing missile field security by upgrading land mobile
radio coverage, and completing permanent repairs to flooded defense
access roads used to reach launch facilities in North Dakota. The
success of the AFGSC NSC in 2011 ensured continued strengthening of the
nuclear enterprise.
As part of our efficiency efforts, we reviewed our ongoing
operations and adjusted how we provide forces to U.S. Pacific Command
under the Continuous Bomber Presence (CBP) mission. We transitioned
deployment duration from 4 to 6 months and changed our logistics and
support concepts to reduce the rotations of aircraft, tools, and parts.
These actions yielded $21 million of savings in annual flying hours and
logistic shipment costs.
Train
In partnership with Air Combat Command we reviewed and prioritized
our aircrew training to better align with the missions the combatant
commanders have told us are most important to them. We have improved
the execution of our flying hour program and established benchmarks for
sortie production. The most critical training in our bomb wings--for
operations, maintenance, munitions and support--is done by generating
the sorties needed to meet the weekly flying schedule.
AFGSC played a major role in U.S. Strategic Command's (STRATCOM)
capstone nuclear exercise, while also directing the first major
command-level nuclear operational readiness exercise in over 20 years.
These two major exercises serve to focus the command's nuclear training
and provide recurring mission emphasis.
Conducting inspections is an essential command function, and we
have made significant progress in this area. Over the course of the
last year, the command conducted 19 scheduled and no-notice inspections
of which 15 were focused on strategic bomber and ICBM nuclear mission
areas. We also established an Inspection Deficiency Review Board to
track deficiencies indentified during our unit inspections. This
deliberate process puts the command staff's attention on both the
deficiencies and corrective actions.
Another command initiative is to reduce, synchronize, and integrate
all non-nuclear inspections, audits, assessments, and evaluations into
a consolidated unit inspection regime providing commanders at every
level a more comprehensive organizational assessment of readiness and
compliance.
This initiative, coupled with our efforts that deconflict and
synchronize inspection and exercise schedules, provides a more
predictable unit calendar allowing our wing commanders additional time
to focus on individual and small unit training.
Exercises and inspections are important training tools, but we are
also using competition to promote esprit de corps and stimulate
tactical innovation. Global Strike Challenge 2011 marked it's the
second year as the Air Force's premiere bomber, missile, security
forces, and maintenance competition. The competition is rooted in the
rich heritage of Strategic Air Command's Proud Shield, Giant Sword, and
Olympic Titan competitions. Global Strike Challenge has become an event
that Airmen across the command eagerly anticipate and has contributed
to improved morale, pride in our mission, and a culture of excellence
through the crucible of competition.
Equip
AFGSC is the lead command for the B-2, B-52, Minuteman III, and UH-
1N weapon systems. We identify requirements, advocate and program for
resources, and maintain weapons systems stewardship for these mission-
critical assets.
B-2
Our 20 B-2s represent the Nation's only long-range bomber capable
of penetrating advanced enemy air defenses in an anti-access, areal
denial scenario. The B-2 is the most modern bomber in America's
arsenal, yet it is approaching 20 years old.
The President's budget contains critical B-2 sustainment
initiatives, to include $656 million for modernization of the B-2's
Defensive Management System which will improve aircrew awareness and
facilitate avoidance of modern and future air defense threats. This
system is crucial to the B-2's ability to hold any target at risk by
penetrating enemy air defenses.
The B-2 has other important requirements to be addressed in the
future. A secure, survivable, strategic communications path is required
as current communications systems rapidly approach the end of their
service life. We are working a more affordable very low frequency/low
frequency solution to prevent a nuclear-survivable communications gap
while we await the maturation of a common EHF SATCOM terminal for
integration on the B-2.
B-52
The B-52Hs flying today entered service from 1961 to 1962.
Regularly updated over the past 50 years, the dual-role capable B-52 is
capable across the range of military operations and employs the widest
variety of ordnance in the fleet.
We are celebrating this year as the ``Year of the B-52,'' marking
both the 50th anniversary of the last delivery of a B-52 to Minot AFB,
and the 60th anniversary of the first test flight of the YB-52. This
aircraft may be the most universally recognized symbol of American
airpower, and its contributions to our national security through the
Cold War, Vietnam, Operation Desert Storm, Kosovo, Operation Iraqi
Freedom, and Allied Force are remarkable. We invite Congress to join us
in this celebration.
Of course, there are B-52 sustainment issues we must address. The
President's budget request contains $24 million for a 1760 databus to
the B-52's internal bomb bay. This upgrade will enable the B-52 to
carry 20 J-series ``smart'' weapons instead of 12, and the internal
carriage of smart weapons also improves the aircraft's fuel efficiency.
Finally, this upgrade will allow us to carry mixed internal weapons
loads, providing even more flexibility for combatant commanders.
Future B-52 requirements include a data link and voice
communications to facilitate net-centric warfare operations envisioned
in the Air/Sea Battle concept. The aging radar on the venerable bomber
will also need to be replaced within the next decade as sustainment
costs grow and failure rates increase.
Minuteman III
The Minuteman III ICBM is the least expensive and most responsive
leg of the nuclear triad and is fundamental to ensuring strategic
stability with nuclear peers. The Minuteman III dramatically
complicates any adversary's offensive and defensive plans, and hedges
against technical or geo-political surprise.
The Minuteman III system became operational in 1970 with an
expected life span of 10 years but still maintains an alert rate of
over 99 percent. We thank Congress for funding a number of sustainment
programs to include replacing the boosters, upgrading environmental
controls, modernizing security and support equipment, and procuring new
reentry system payload transport vehicles.
The President's fiscal year 2013 budget request fully funds warhead
fuze replacement initiatives in partnership with the Navy, a new
transporter erector, and continues effort toward the next solid rocket
motor program. We continue to closely examine emerging needs to include
guidance systems upgrades to ensure Minuteman III reliability and
readiness through 2030.
UH-1N
With the proposed termination of the Common Vertical Lift Support
Program (CVLSP), also known as the common support helicopter (CSH), the
Air Force will continue to fly UH-1N ``Hueys,'' with a focus on two
critical national security missions: nuclear asset security for AFGSC
and Continuity of Operations/Continuity of Government taskings for the
Air Force District of Washington.
The average age of the UH-1N fleet is over 40 years old.
Anticipating the Air Force may fly the UH-1N for another decade or
longer, we must selectively modernize the UH-1N to minimize existing
capability gaps and to avoid increased sustainment costs brought on by
obsolescence. These efforts include making the cockpit fully night
vision compatible, upgrading the sensors to better support our security
mission, and performing some delayed safety and sustainment
improvements. We will continue to look for pragmatic and creative ways
to mitigate risk with the current fleet.
Long-Range Strike Family of Systems
We are strong advocates and partners in the development of a Long-
Range Strike (LRS) Family of Systems that will provide a visible
deterrent and global strike capability well into the future. The Air
Force LRS strategy conceptually uses a Family of Systems construct
consisting of three precision-strike pillars: a Long-Range Strike
Platform (LRSP), a Long Range Standoff Missile (LRSO), and a
Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capability. Work continues on
the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) for LRSO to replace the Air Launched
Cruise Missile (ALCM), though recent budgetary realities have resulted
in a 2-year slip of this program. The AoA will be completed in late
2012 and will be used to inform future funding decisions.
We are also eager to make progress with Air Combat Command in
developing and fielding the new Long-Range Strike Bomber. This bomber
will be essential in providing capabilities needed for strategic
deterrence of adversaries fielding advanced anti-access and area denial
weapons. Those capabilities must include penetrating denied airspace to
find and efficiently engage mobile systems and time sensitive targets.
Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
In March 2010, STRATCOM requested AFGSC initiate mission
requirements analysis for the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent, the
follow-on system to the Minuteman III. The Nuclear Posture Review
reiterated the need and stated that although a decision on any follow-
on ICBM is not needed for several years, studies to inform that
decision are needed now.
In January of last year, we began the Capabilities Based Assessment
(CBA), which is the first step in the Joint Capabilities Integration
and Development System process. The CBA was a joint effort of a team
composed of representatives from across the Air Force, the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Force. The CBA took a
``strategy to task'' look at higher level guidance and from that
guidance, identified those tasks required to meet our mission
objectives. The next step is to conduct a formal AoA identifying
potential solutions and provide comparative cost, effectiveness, and
risk assessments of each. This work is scheduled to start March 2013.
challenges and conclusion
Our challenge for the next year is to strengthen a culture in which
every airman embraces the special trust and responsibility of our
nuclear deterrent mission, maintaining our excellence in conventional
missions across the range of military operations, and finally enhancing
and sustaining the current force while modernizing for the future.
Mr. Chairman, our airmen continue to rise to these enduring
challenges and they have made measurable improvements across the
command. It is my distinct privilege to lead them through the
challenges, and opportunities, our Nation faces. I assure you and this
committee they remain fully committed to executing all current missions
to the highest standards, and I know their professionalism allows AFGSC
to stand by its motto: To Deter and Assure.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Secretary Creedon, does DOD agree that
the 5-year delay in the CMRR is acceptable?
Ms. Creedon. Yes, sir. We looked at the budgetary
constraints. We looked at the requirements for pits. We looked
at the relative conditions of the two buildings, and looked at
some of the efficiencies that actually NNSA has identified, and
decided that we can't build two--there's not enough money to
build the two buildings concurrently and the most critical----
Senator Sessions. I know that. You're saying we don't have
the money.
Ms. Creedon. We don't have the money.
Senator Sessions. You had a requirement. Has the
requirement for 50 to 80 pits per year changed?
Ms. Creedon. No, sir, that requirement has not changed. But
the timing of when we need 50 to 80 pits has also moved.
Senator Sessions. But you had a requirement to have the 50
to 80 pits within a time period that's no longer going to be
met, is that right?
Ms. Creedon. That's true.
Senator Sessions. That's basically what I was asking. So
you have a requirement. We've run out of money and now you say
we've changed, and it's not meeting the requirement we had just
recently. So this worries me.
Isn't it true, and I'm not sure I should get our military
people involved in this, but, Admiral Benedict, is it true the
budget would result in a 2-year delay of the B61 LEP, moving
the production from 2017 to 2019? Or is that General Kowalski?
Admiral Benedict. Senator, that's the Air Force.
Senator Sessions. All right.
General Kowalski. Senator, yes, it does delay it from 2017
to 2019. But that's still consistent with the lifetime of the
current modifications of the B61 that we have out in the
fielded force.
Senator Sessions. Is it true the budget would delay the
completion of the W76 by 4 years and the Navy, in response, has
publicly expressed concern? Is that right, Admiral Benedict?
Admiral Benedict. Sir, as I explained earlier, it will
delay the final numbers, which are my hedge requirements, by 3
years, but the operational requirement numbers will be met on
the baseline schedule.
Senator Sessions. Did the Navy express concern at one
point?
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir, the Chief of Naval Operations
did.
Senator Sessions. Is it true this budget would delay the
previously agreed-to schedule for the W78-W88 by 3 years, to
2023?
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM A. CHAMBERS, USAF, ASSISTANT
CHIEF OF STAFF FOR STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR
INTEGRATION, U.S. AIR FORCE
General Chambers. Yes, Senator, that's true.
[The prepared statement of General Chambers follows:]
Prepared Statement by Maj. Gen. William A. Chambers, USAF
introduction
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, distinguished members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss your Air
Force's strategic forces.
As Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear
Integration, my team, on behalf of the Chief of Staff, leads planning,
policy development, advocacy, integration, and assessment for the
airmen and the weapon systems performing Nuclear Deterrence Operations,
a core function of our U.S. Air Force. Continuing to Strengthen our
nuclear enterprise remains an Air Force priority, in fulfillment of the
President's mandate that, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United
States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal.
The Strategic Guidance announced by the President and Secretary of
Defense on the 5th of January states, ``U.S. forces will be capable of
deterring and defeating aggression by any potential adversary.'' It
continues, ``Credible deterrence results from both the capabilities to
deny an aggressor the prospect of achieving his objectives and from the
complementary capability to impose unacceptable costs on the
aggressor.''
Maintaining the credibility of our strategic deterrent requires a
long-term commitment to our nuclear capabilities, through sustainment,
investments in modernization, and eventual recapitalization. Most
importantly, it requires deliberate development of the precious Human
Capital required to maintain and operate our nuclear forces, and
leading-edge Intellectual Capital to provide the innovative thinking
that the 21st century security setting demands. The Air Force
demonstrates such commitment every day.
In a constrained fiscal environment, the Air Force has made
investments in the distinctive capabilities we provide to our joint and
coalition partners. One of the distinct capabilities the Air Force
provides the Nation is Global Strike, and the Air Force's ability to
carry and deliver nuclear weapons to hold any target at risk is
continually exercised under operational conditions. Results continue to
confirm the readiness and accuracy of such capability. The Air Force
helps ensure the Nation's worldwide power projection, even in the face
of growing anti-access and area denial challenges, through funding of
Air-Sea Battle priorities and through prudent investment in Continuing
to Strengthen its Nuclear Enterprise.
revitalizing thinking
Every day, about 36,000 airmen in the U.S. Air Force are performing
Nuclear Deterrence Operations, a mission that remains vital in the 21st
century. In many respects, the Cold War was fairly simple and mutual
deterrence with the Soviet Union seemed predictable. As the 2010
Nuclear Posture Review indicated, ``Russia remains America's only peer
in the area of nuclear weapons capabilities. But the nature of the
U.S.-Russia relationship has changed fundamentally since the days of
the Cold War.'' During the Cold War, we became experts at Sovietology.
We understood them and they understood us. Today, we have hit fast-
forward in our thinking, seeking that same level of understanding about
a wide array of potential adversaries and potential proliferators.
The Chief of Staff of the Air Force has tasked us to, ``Revitalize
thinking within the Air Force about crisis stability and 21st century
deterrence dynamics.'' For 21st century deterrence, one size does not
fit all, and deterrence of near-peers and other nuclear armed states
requires new thinking and tailored application. Still, deterrence must
ensure that potential adversaries, both peers and non-peers, lack
incentive to use their nuclear capabilities. The non-peer case may be
the most challenging, and our more likely threat. Our power projection
capabilities must be credible in the eyes of potential adversaries,
increasingly so in pre-crisis situations and especially in a regional
context. The assurances and extended deterrence we provide allies
strengthen our security relationships while supporting our
nonproliferation goals. Such effects increase in importance in a
complex, multi-polar environment. The Air Force is focused on these new
dynamics.
sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization
America continues to be a leader in nuclear nonproliferation. In
fact, since the end of the Cold War, we have retired or dismantled tens
of thousands of nuclear weapons. The current stockpile has undergone a
75-percent reduction since the fall of the Berlin Wall. While our
arsenal size declines, the commitment to sustainment and modernization
grows. This is not a paradox. The importance of each individual weapon
increases as overall numbers go down; every weapon system and every
warhead must be reliable. The fiscal year 2013 President's budget
submission makes hard choices, appropriate to our constrained fiscal
environment, but continues to invest in the enduring and compelling
attributes the Nation needs from its Air Force deterrent forces.
We have a plan for two decades of sustainment and modernization to
keep Minuteman III viable and credible until 2030. To prepare for
beyond 2030, the Air Force has begun a Capability-Based Assessment and
Initial Capabilities Document for a successor program, Ground Based
Strategic Deterrence (GBSD). The DOD is preparing to begin a GBSD
Analysis of Alternatives to study the full range of concepts to
recapitalize the land-based leg of the Triad.
The recent Strategic Guidance also states that ``. . . while the
U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will
of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.'' Our ability to
project power and hold targets at risk despite adversary employment of
anti-access and area denial strategies is driving our choices in bomber
force programs reflected in the President's budget submission.
The B-52 continues to provide critical stand-off capability and
will be sustained until a replacement capability comes on line. We are
accepting some risk in B-52 modernization in order to apply resources
to ensure the B-2, our only long-range direct-strike asset, remains
capable of penetrating in an anti-access and area denial environment.
The combined capabilities of these bombers directly support our power
projection requirements.
Over time, our ability to hold targets at risk with current
technologies and systems will diminish. The nuclear-capable Long-Range
Strike Bomber is a Department of Defense commitment to address that
eventual shortfall. We remain committed to delivering a force of 80-100
new bombers starting in the mid-2020s.
We currently have service life extension programs in progress for
the Air Launched Cruise Missile to ensure its viability beyond 2030;
such programs include the propulsion system, guidance and flight
control systems, and warhead arming components. In the fiscal year 2013
President's budget, the program for its replacement, the Long-Range
Standoff (LRSO), was delayed until fiscal year 2015 as part of the
adjustments necessary in our constrained fiscal environment. However,
the LRSO Analysis of Alternatives, which began in August 2011,
continues apace and is scheduled to be completed in early fiscal year
2013. Despite the LRSO delay, there will not be a gap between ALCM and
LRSO.
The B61 is an aging weapon, originally designed and built in the
1960s. Though they remain ready and reliable, some warheads in our
current stockpile date back to 1978. Without refurbishment of key
components, it will continue to age and eventually will not meet the
requirements for a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent. The
Department has fully funded the Air Force portion of the B61 Life
Extension Program, which will deliver the first production unit at the
end of fiscal year 2019. The B61 is critical to bomber viability,
deterrence of adversaries in a regional context, and support of our
extended deterrence commitments.
To fund these high priority programs, the Air Force had to make the
hard decision to restructure programs with unacceptable cost growth and
technical challenges. Last year, we briefed you about initial steps we
were taking to replace the UH-1N Huey helicopters, under a program
called the Common Vertical Lift Support Program (CVLSP). Prioritization
of available funding demands difficult choices, and as a result, the
CVLSP has been deferred. UH-1N Huey helicopters will continue to
operate and support the nuclear security mission. We made other
investments in missile security to reduce the risk of meeting
requirements. In the United States, we installed Remote Visual
Assessment cameras at our Minuteman III Launch Facilities and started
installing Remote Targeting Engagement Systems at our nuclear storage
locations. We also recently began a $14.4 million Military Construction
project to build a new security forces training facility at Camp
Guernsey, WY. In addition, U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization funds are producing security upgrades for weapon storage
sites in Europe.
One critical capability that underpins our deterrent forces is
nuclear command, control, and communications, otherwise known as NC3.
NC3 underpins U.S. nuclear deterrence and provides our Nation's leaders
with the means to manage and employ a wide range of strategic options
for rapid power projection. It is especially important with lower force
structure numbers. The Air Force is entrusted with a major portion of
our Nation's NC3 systems, and many of these systems are nearing the end
of their lifecycles. Constrained budgets and increasing system
complexity require us to pay special attention and use innovative
management and program oversight. Over the past 2 years, the Air Force
has developed strong links with all the other key NC3 stakeholders
throughout the government, codified Air Force NC3 roles and
responsibilities, and prioritized near-term NC3 programs for
investment.
nst implementation
A little over a year ago, the New START treaty (NST) entered into
force, giving us until 5 February 2018 to meet our obligations to
reduce and limit our strategic forces to meet the NST's central limits.
To ensure the activities needed to achieve an intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) and heavy bomber force compliant with NST's
central limits, the Air Force has fully funded NST implementation with
$20.1 million in fiscal year 2013 and an additional $50.6 million
through the Future Years Defense Program. Implementation activities are
underway including the reduction of systems no longer used to perform
the nuclear mission. This includes the elimination of 39 heavy bombers
in storage at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base and an environmental study
to eliminate 103 empty ICBM silos. We are also looking at methods to
convert some B-52Hs from dual-use mode to a conventional-only
capability.
human capital
A safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for the 21st
century requires top-notch people dedicated to uncompromising
stewardship. We are institutionalizing fixes and developing an enduring
culture of self-assessment to Continue to Strengthen the nuclear
enterprise. Increasing pass rates and leveling of repeat deficiencies
during Nuclear Surety Inspections indicate success in this endeavor.
Root cause analysis is embedded into process improvements in our
enhanced nuclear inspection program and in initiatives to improve unit
performance. Over the past 3 years, root cause analysis led to several
structural, procedural, and process improvements.
As part of our culture of self-assessment, we continue to refine
our organizational constructs, an example being the successful transfer
of CONUS munitions squadrons from Air Force Materiel Command to Air
Force Global Strike Command.
We are also committed to the professional development of our airmen
through new formal training programs and more deliberate developmental
education, all designed not only to bring airmen up to date quickly on
the current issues within the nuclear enterprise, but also to foster
the critical thinking necessary for the 21st century security setting.
closing
The Air Force provides two legs of our nuclear Triad and extended
deterrence for allies and partners for a relatively low cost. Nuclear
Deterrence Operations amount to 4.6 percent of the total Air Force
budget, about 1 percent of the total Department of Defense budget.
As events over the past year demonstrate, the United States does
not get to choose the timing or location of a crisis. Having ready,
diverse, and resilient capabilities to ensure stability during crises
remains very important. The attributes of the Air Force's deterrent
forces--the responsiveness of the ICBM and the flexibility of the
bomber--underwrite the Nation's ability to achieve stability in the
midst of the crises and challenges of the next few decades.
The President's budget submission makes hard choices, but retains
the commitment to strong deterrent capabilities through modernization
and recapitalization programs. That commitment is made manifest every
day by the 36,000 airmen performing deterrence operations,
demonstrating those capabilities, and doing it with precision and
reliability. They are trustworthy stewards of our Nation's most
powerful weapons, still needed to project power, to deter and assure in
the 21st century.
Senator Sessions. Is it true the budget does not provide
the resources necessary to meet a DOD requirement for
developing pit production capacity to 50 to 80 pits that you
had previously declared would be for 2022? You'll not meet that
goal?
Ms. Creedon. Sir, that's correct. But because of what
General Chambers has said, the actual time when that
requirement becomes an essential requirement has also slipped.
Senator Sessions. The Navy, Admiral Benedict, previously
had stated that the schedule for the SSBN, the new Ohio
replacement, and the 12 follow-ons, 12 of them, is
``inextricably linked to the legacy Ohio-class SSBN
requirements,'' and that there is ``no leeway in this plan to
allow a start or any delay in the procurement plan.'' Did the
Navy make that statement in previous years to your knowledge?
Admiral Benedict. Sir, I don't know who made that
statement, sir.
Senator Sessions. You didn't make that statement?
Admiral Benedict. No, sir.
Senator Sessions. You'd remember, I know. But that's the
information I have.
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. So I'm just saying, gentlemen, one thing
sometimes in uniform you don't focus on and maybe you
shouldn't, but the problem is that when you keep moving things
to the right all of them don't get completed. If you don't get
started and you don't do them and Congress comes along or some
other problem or something, the next thing you know a program
that was designed to be completed isn't ever completed, number
one; number two, you don't really save $4 billion when you move
a submarine 1 year, or $8 billion when you move it 2 years.
What you do is you create a hole that has to be filled because
you spent that money on something else.
So we have to have from you realistic testimony concerning
the threat. I'm going to take you at your word based on what I
know today, but fundamentally what I'm saying is when we keep
moving things to the right we're endangering our defense
capability, and I'm worried about it. It's for one reason. As
Admiral Mullen said, the debt is a great threat to our national
security. So we have money shortages.
Then I also have to say that I'm uneasy because this
administration has not been strongly committed on the strategic
issues, whether it's national missile defense or whether it's
nuclear weapons. The President said recently that we have more
weapons than we need, and General Chilton, when asked about
this by Senator Feingold in 2010, said: ``I do not agree that
it is more than needed. I think the arsenal that we have is
exactly what is needed today to provide the deterrent.''
So I think the President better communicate with DOD to
make sure that he knows what he's saying. He's proposed and
openly and repeatedly stated he's in favor of moving to a world
without nuclear weapons.
So this makes me concerned that our nuclear triad submarine
is being delayed, modernization is being delayed, that
agreements we thought we had are not being followed. So that's
the problem, Mr. Chairman. I know it's a challenge, but these
issues are so important that I do feel like I should express
them.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator Sessions. I think we're
all concerned about slippage on timeframes, because it can slip
right into the future, and we all know that the future doesn't
become the present and will remain the future, obviously.
That's what our concern is.
Then when it comes to the CMRR and the building, not having
enough to construct both buildings, with respect to the
STRATCOM headquarters, we have phased-in or incremental
funding. Has DOD looked at incremental funding? Because once
you start the building it's not going to finish in a single
year, but you could get at least started?
I think the fear is that it'll just keep going, slipping
off into the future. In the next budget, there won't be
anything; there will be other reasons. It looks like we have a
plan for fiscal year 2013. What's the plan for fiscal year 2014
and beyond?
I guess any one of you that might want to respond to
phased-in or incremental funding would be fine with me.
Ms. Creedon. Senator, unlike DOD, where incremental funding
is the exception to the rule, the way the budget is structured
at NNSA, the construction projects are always incrementally
funded. So the NNSA budget is built in a way that, particularly
because NNSA tends to do very large, one-of-a-kind, first-of-a-
kind, technically complex, very expensive buildings, that you
couldn't possibly fund, nor do you need all that money in 1
year because they take so long to build. NNSA is always
incrementally funded.
So the uranium processing facility, the money for that that
starts in 2013, assuming that it's appropriated, but it's
requested over a period of years and we hope that it will be
appropriated over a period of years.
Senator Nelson. Wouldn't it be possible to get started with
the planning or some of the basic requirements that are almost
always initial funded? I guess everybody seems to be
concerned--I know General Kehler was concerned, we're all
concerned--about not having the building. We're concerned about
slipping, dropping down the number of pits that will be taken
care of. So we don't just slide way off into the future, I
would hope that maybe with what Senator Cornyn was saying about
getting together and looking at other ways to do this, to find
a way to put us into a position to begin moving forward.
I know we're not talking about tens of millions. We're
talking about a lot more money than that. But it does seem that
that is desirable to at least explore.
I have a question here. Admiral Benedict, I understand that
NNSA is now undertaking a common warhead design for the W88
Trident D5 warhead and the W78 Minuteman III warhead. Will you
tell us whether you think it's possible to have a single
warhead for both families of missiles and what is the risk to
the Navy for a common design of sorts?
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. I do believe it is possible and
the Navy does support that program. Right now it is envisioned
that the Air Force would lead that and we would be in a
supporting role as that effort rolls out.
As in any program right now, which it's in the initial 6.1
phase of development, there are programmatic and technical
challenges which we are exploring today. I do believe that it
is the intention of DOD to go to NWC in fiscal year 2012 and
ask for permission, authorization to proceed to phase 6.2, at
which time we would go into further development and design
understanding.
Of course, in this type of a program a common warhead will
need to be able to meet both the Navy requirements for the SLBM
as well as the Air Force requirements for the ICBM. That's
never been done before. I do believe that, given the right time
and talent, we can achieve those requirements, sir.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
General Kowalski, what impact will delaying the
installation of the B-52 CONECT system have? I understand it
was to provide a digital backbone for the B-52 and provide
rapid retargeting recognizing moving from analog to digital.
What will that involve?
General Kowalski. Mr. Chairman, the B-52 combination of its
extremely long range--it has the longest range of any of our
bombers--along with the wide variety of munitions it carries--
it has the widest variety of any of our bombers--makes it
extremely well-suited for the role of a standoff weapons
platform, especially in the more high-end conflict, where we're
going against a denied air space environment with this
proliferation we have of anti-access and area denial kinds of
weapons.
So as we think about what that joint force looks like, we
need that standoff platform to be fully integrated into that
joint force, meaning that we can communicate to it and pass it
information related to threats, related to retargeting, et
cetera, as it moves to be able to access global targets. So
that requires beyond line-of-sight communication.
So that digital backbone is going to be important as we
think about the future employment of the B-52. The reality that
we're in is that the combination of budget pressures and
problems with the program has caused us to restructure the
CONECT system. We've separated it from the AEHF part of that,
the AEHF radio and communications systems, and we are looking
now at options to bring it back in.
The bottom line is the requirement for that capability
remains and we're going to continue to advocate for it.
Senator Nelson. Should the requirement remain to do the
CONECT as well?
Admiral Benedict. The requirement remains for that kind of
capability. So as we go through and we look at the funding that
we have for 2013 and we look at what we can get outside of 2013
for the rest of the program, we'll be able to come back with a
better answer. But right now we're reviewing all our options.
Senator Nelson. Senator Sessions, I notice the time. Do you
have some more?
Senator Sessions. I really don't. I thank all of you for
your excellent testimony and service to the country. I believe
that all of us in Congress need to examine carefully the
financial restraints that are falling on this part of our
strategic forces. It's a key component of our strategic forces
and as we make choices, difficult choices, I don't think we
need to allow too much to fall on this aspect of our defense
posture.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Let me add my thoughts. We ask you to reduce budgets, to
watch the growth, and then when you come before us after you've
done it, then we question why you've done it and whether you've
done it right or not. But thank you for your explanations. We
appreciate it very much. Thank you for your service. We are
adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
w-76 warhead refurbishment delay
1. Senator Nelson. Admiral Benedict, I understand the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has delayed the rate of
refurbishment of the W-76 Trident D-5 warhead. Can you please explain
what is the delay and how does this impact the risk to the fleet?
Admiral Benedict. In order to fund the B61 refurbishment, NNSA has
decremented its Directed Stockpile Work budget. The W76-1/Mk4A is one
of the donor programs. The production period has been extended by 3
years, but the NNSA has committed to meeting the Navy SSBN fleet
operational requirements by 2018 and the remaining assets will be
delivered by 2021. This is consistent with Navy fleet needs and
Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) Strategic Weapons Facility planning
requirements.
delay of the ohio replacement
2. Senator Nelson. Admiral Benedict, I understand the Ohio
replacement will be delayed by 2 years. Can you explain how this
impacts the Common Missile Compartment (CMC) program you manage with
the British and how old the first Ohio-class boat will be when it is
retired?
Admiral Benedict. PB13 has sufficient resources for the Navy to
maintain the CMC and Strategic Weapon System (SWS) design efforts on a
schedule that supports the United Kingdom (U.K.) Successor program. The
2-year delay to the U.S. Ohio replacement lead ship will slow rest-of-
ship design activities, however, systems and interfaces affecting the
CMC design will be sufficiently mature to deliver a CMC design package
to U.K. for construction. The U.K. will now lead the United States and
be first to construct a CMC, integrate a SWS, and launch a Trident II
(D5) missile from a CMC. The United States is working closely with the
U.K. to mitigate U.K. first-use risks by prototyping and proofing CMC
construction techniques and test programs. Maximum use of U.S. First
Article prototypes and SWS Ashore facilities will mitigate risk shifted
to the U.K. program.
The Ohio-class SSBNs begin retiring in 2027 following their 42 year
extended service life. The Ohio-class will then retire at a rate of one
per year with the first Ohio replacement SSBN entering strategic
service as the fifth Ohio retires.
conventional prompt global strike
3. Senator Nelson. Admiral Benedict, the Department of Defense
(DOD) has been researching delivery methods to strike targets using
conventional warheads several thousand miles away in less than an hour.
Is the Navy participating in this?
Admiral Benedict. The Navy does not have a requirement or program
of record to develop a sea-based Conventional Prompt Global Strike
(CPGS) capability and has not requested funds in the President's budget
for fiscal year 2013 for CPGS. However, the Navy has provided subject
matter expertise, including conceptual solutions, to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Techology, and Logistics-led CPGS
working group.
w-78/88 warheads
4. Senator Nelson. Admiral Benedict, I understand that NNSA is now
undertaking a common warhead design for the W-88 Trident D-5 warhead
and the W-78 Minuteman III warhead. Do you think it is possible to have
a single warhead for both families of missiles and what is the risk to
the Navy in this common design?
Admiral Benedict. A W88/Mk5 Reentry Body is composed of an
Aeroshell, electronics, non-nuclear components and a Nuclear Explosives
Package (often referred to as a warhead). It is not possible to have a
common reentry body for both the Trident D5 missile and the Minuteman
III missile systems. It is theoretically possible to design a Nuclear
Explosives Package that, with adaptable mounting hardware, could be
fielded in both the W88/Mk5 Aeroshell and the W78/Mk12A Aeroshell.
Preliminary concept studies have indicated potential designs to meet
this purpose. However, all designs which have their qualification basis
in underground test require new pit production to meet both the Air
Force and Navy inventory requirements. Current and foreseeable future
pit production capacity is far short of what would be needed to support
any of these concepts within service timeline requirements.
b-52 connect system
5. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, I understand the B-52 connect
system was to provide a digital backbone for the B-52 and provide rapid
retargeting. What impact will delaying the installation of the B-52
connect system have?
General Kowalski. [Deleted.]
uh-1n program
6. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, what impact will the delay of
replacing the UH-1N have on your missile field operations?
General Kowalski. Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) is
committed to providing the strongest security measures possible using
available resources. The UH-1N continues to be a reliable helicopter
but capability gaps complicate missile field security operations. AFGSC
is mitigating risks with the current fleet by putting a UH-1N response
force on alert, pursuing low-cost UH-1N modernization, and revising our
security concept-of-operations to take full advantage of other security
enhancements we have made to include the Remove Visual Assessment
cameras at our launch facilities. However, we will continue to advocate
for replacement to the UH-1N that meets DOD's mandated requirement for
speed, range, and payload.
7. Senator Nelson. General Chambers, is the replacement for the UH-
1N canceled or deferred. It is not clear from the budget documents.
General Chambers. The Air Force program to replace to UH-1N
helicopter, now referred to as the Common Support Helicopter, is
deferred. Budget constraints prevented the Air Force from funding the
previously proposed Common Vertical Lift Support Platform and is
currently reexamining options to initiate a new acquisition strategy to
fulfill the requirement for vertical lift in the missile fields and the
National Capital Region. In deferring the UH-1N replacement, the Air
Force is committed to mitigating risk while it pursues new means to
meet the requirement. Until a long-term replacement is possible, the
Air Force will work to mitigate aircraft safety and capability gaps.
b-2 advanced extremely high frequency terminal
8. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, I understand that the terminal
for connecting the B-2 to the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
Satellite has either been delayed or canceled. This is to provide
secure nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3). What impact
will that have on your B-2 fleet?
General Kowalski. [Deleted.]
nuclear command, control, and communications
9. Senator Nelson. General Chambers, what is the Air Force doing to
assess and modernize its NC3 network?
General Chambers. In July 2011, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force
directed the Air Force to evaluate its NC3 requirements, and modernize
lagging infrastructure to ensure credible, reliable, and survivable
nuclear command and control. To that end, the Air Force has made
significant strides in assessing and modernizing its NC3 network. For
example, Phase IV of the Air Force's Comprehensive Assessment of
Nuclear Sustainment conducted an in-depth survey of NC3. Regarding
modernization, the Air Force is currently focused on AEHF and Very Low
Frequency capability for our bomber fleet through the Family of Beyond
Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T) and the Common Very Low Frequency
Receiver, respectively. By July 2012, we will complete the
cryptographic modernization of the Strategic Automated Command and
Control System, our fastest, most reliable NC3 communications system,
extending its service life to 2030. We are also exploring materiel
options to upgrade the Low Frequency/Very Low Frequency transmitter on
the National Airborne Operations Center. Additional modernization
upgrades include the Minuteman MEECN Program Upgrade (MMPU), which will
deliver AEHF connectivity to our ICBM fleet, and the Global Aircrew
Strategic Network Terminal (Global-ASNT), which will deliver both AEHF
and VLF to our nuclear command posts.
slip in b-61 gravity bomb
10. Senator Nelson. General Chambers, I understand the B-61 gravity
bomb refurbishment has slipped from coming on line by 2 years to 2019.
Can you explain why this slip occurred; was it on the Air Force end or
the NNSA end?
General Chambers. The NNSA requested and the Nuclear Weapons
Council (NWC) approved a 2-year delay in the First Production Unit
(FPU) of the B61. The NNSA provided analysis showing critical B61
limited life components have longer lives than originally estimated and
U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) has confirmed that a fiscal year 2019
FPU will meet their requirements.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
sequestration
11. Senator Sessions. Secretary Creedon, Secretary Weber, General
Kowalski, and Admiral Benedict, the Budget Control Act (BCA) requires
DOD in January 2013, to reduce all major accounts over 10 years by a
total of $492 billion through sequestration. This will result in an
immediate $55 billion reduction to the fiscal year 2013 DOD program.
The Secretary of Defense has stated on numerous occasions that the
impact of these cuts would be ``devastating'' and ``catastrophic,''
leading to a hollow force and inflicting serious damage to our national
defense. Yet, the Military Services must begin this month with some
type of guidance on developing a Service budget for fiscal year 2014.
What are some of the specific anticipated implications of sequestration
to DOD nuclear programs and the modernization of the nuclear triad?
Ms. Creedon, Mr. Weber, General Kowalski, and Admiral Benedict. If
triggered, sequestration would indeed have a profound impact across
DOD, and nuclear programs would be no exception. At this time, no
analysis on specific programmatic impacts is available.
12. Senator Sessions. Secretary Creedon, Secretary Weber, General
Kowalski, and Admiral Benedict, what programs would have the most
significant impact to operations or readiness?
Ms. Creedon, Mr. Weber, General Kowalski, and Admiral Benedict. If
sequestration occurs, automatic percentage cuts are required to be
applied without regard to strategy, importance, or priorities, which
would impact almost every program within DOD.
13. Senator Sessions. Secretary Creedon, Secretary Weber, General
Kowalski, and Admiral Benedict, would sequestration lead to a contract
cancellation, termination, cost increases, or schedule delays?
Ms. Creedon, Mr. Weber, General Kowalski, and Admiral Benedict. A
sequester could disrupt thousands of contracts and programs.
14. Senator Sessions. Secretary Creedon, Secretary Weber, General
Kowalski, and Admiral Benedict, is DOD currently conducting any
planning in your areas of responsibility? If so, can you describe the
plan?
Ms. Creedon, Mr. Weber, General Kowalski, and Admiral Benedict. DOD
is not currently preparing for sequestration, and the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) has not directed agencies, including DOD,
to initiate plans for sequestration.
15. Senator Sessions. Secretary Creedon, Secretary Weber, General
Kowalski, and Admiral Benedict, how will you assess the risk of each
cut?
Ms. Creedon, Mr. Weber, General Kowalski, and Admiral Benedict. DOD
is not planning for such an event; hence, it would be premature to
attempt to assess the risk of sequestration.
16. Senator Sessions. Secretary Creedon, Secretary Weber, General
Kowalski, and Admiral Benedict, has any planning commenced to date to
assess the impact of such sequestration reductions, such as
prioritizing programs in preparation for reprogramming actions or
terminations?
Ms. Creedon, Mr. Weber, General Kowalski, and Admiral Benedict. DOD
is not currently preparing for sequestration, and OMB has not directed
agencies, including DOD, to initiate plans for sequestration.
solid rocket motor industrial base
17. Senator Sessions. Admiral Benedict, during our hearing last
year you told us that the unit cost for Submarine Launched Ballistic
Missile (SLBM) motors had increased in cost from approximately $10.7
million in fiscal year 2011 to approximately $19.2 million in fiscal
year 2012, an $8.5 million increase. Has anything improved over the
past year to address the fragility of the solid rocket motor (SRM)
industrial base?
Admiral Benedict. SSP has proactively worked with their prime
missile contractor, Lockheed Martin (LM), and SRM subcontractor,
Alliant Techsystems (ATK), to respond to the eroding business base for
large rocket motors and take steps to reduce the infrastructure and
personnel at both of ATK facilities in Utah. Over the past few years
SSP has engaged LM and ATK senior leadership to review and develop
action plans to reduce overhead costs and minimize cost increase. As a
result, ATK has significantly (up to 50 percent) reduced its workforce
in line with future production demands. Moreover, in an effort to
reduce its physical infrastructure, ATK has shut down many buildings
within its Bacchus and Promontory campuses to consolidate operations.
SSP has engaged LM and ATK leadership to address: required
requalification to minimize production disruptions; retention of
critical skills and safety disciplines during downsizing/consolidation
of ATK operations; reduction in ATK overhead costs; and viability of
sub-tier suppliers for critical materials. As a result of these
actions, the Navy has lowered the projected SRM unit cost in the
President's budget request for fiscal year 2013 approximately $1.6
million per year. The fragility of the SRM industry is still a concern.
Despite efforts to reduce overhead costs, the SRM industrial base
remains volatile. National Aeronautics and Space Administration's
(NASA) decision to consider SRM for Space Launch System (SLS)
applications has a stabilizing impact on industry for the time being.
The next key milestone is in 2015 when NASA has to make a decision on
the Advanced Booster System. If NASA decides to exit SRM industry for
SLS booster application, it will have a significant cost impact on Navy
and other DOD programs.
18. Senator Sessions. Admiral Benedict, is there more that should
be done to ensure that NASA and DOD approach this issue together from a
whole-of-government perspective?
Admiral Benedict. NASA programs have been a key contributor to the
viability of the SRM industrial base. During the last several years,
there has been significant cooperation among SSP and NASA to jointly
study and address this issue. Both programs have been part of the
Interagency Task Force for the past few years and, recently, SSP has
jointly worked with NASA to complete a Cost Sensitivity Study. Although
basic design and application is different for Fleet Ballistic Missile
and Space Exploration, SSP and NASA deal with the same SRM vendors and
have many common sub-tier suppliers. NASA decisions have strong
implications for the FBM program. It is worth noting that two shuttle-
like rocket motors are roughly equivalent to 20 Trident II D5 motor
sets.
SSP is actively participating in the recently started National
Institute for Rocket Propulsion Systems (NIRPS), a NASA led effort
focused on addressing the needs of U.S. solid and liquid rocket
propulsion capabilities to promote resilience of the industrial base. A
combined U.S. Government strategy involving NASA and DOD (including Air
Force, Navy, and Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is imperative where both
departments can jointly define future production and development needs
in order to provide stability for this industry that depends on U.S.
Government business.
19. Senator Sessions. Admiral Benedict, concern of the past has
involved costs driven up by overhead costs tailored to meet a demand no
longer necessary with the end of the shuttle program. Do you believe
the industrial base today is appropriately sized?
Admiral Benedict. The current SRM industrial base is adequately
sized to meet all U.S. Government demands. Less than 2 decades ago
there were five major SRM vendors. Today, there are only two large
motor manufacturing companies--ATK and Aerojet. This was a major
industry adjustment driven by the space commercial market that helped
keep costs under control. Right-sizing of facilities and workforce has
been going on for over a decade at Aerojet. ATK has recently taken
numerous steps to right size its capacity after completion of the NASA
Shuttle program. This included a significant reduction in workforce and
consolidation of buildings and work centers. The SRM industry continues
to make progress and SSP is working proactively with industrial
partners to reduce overhead costs and help industry to right size,
keeping in mind our future needs.
20. Senator Sessions. Secretary Creedon, Secretary Weber, General
Kowalski, and Admiral Benedict, while demand today is low, our long-
term need for SRMs is not going away any time soon, especially with
respect to strategic missile and future follow-on Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and SLBM programs. If we were to let the
temporary lapse in the SRM base take place, how much do you anticipate
it would cost to restart that industrial base in the future?
Ms. Creedon and Mr. Weber. DOD has not developed a cost estimate to
restart the industrial base from a cold start. DOD does not expect
there to be a lapse in the SRM industrial base. The SRM industrial base
has been on a steady decline for the last 2 decades and remains an area
of concern for DOD. The completion of Minuteman III and Shuttle SRM
production and the cancellation of both the MDA's Kinetic Energy
Interceptor (KEI) and NASA's Constellation programs have dramatically
decreased demand for SRM. Last year, DOD submitted a SRM Industrial
Base Sustainment Plan (April 4, 2011) to Congress as required by
section 1078 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010, Public Law 111-84. DOD's primary objectives for the SRM
Industrial Base Sustainment Plan were to: (1) sustain production
capabilities for national assets; (2) keep critical design teams in
place for future system needs; and (3) to the extent practical,
preserve the option to satisfy new government demand in the future.
After careful analysis, DOD concluded that it could achieve its
sustainment goals through a combination of initiatives. DOD needs
industry to take the lead by right-sizing its excess capacity to align
with projected demand. DOD must invest in SRM science and technology
(S&T) and research and development (R&D), along with adequate
production that will sustain the base. Currently, the Navy's Trident II
D5 missile is the program of significance sustaining the large SRM
production capability. The S&T program includes the Integrated High
Payoff Rocket Propulsion Technology (IHPRPT) program, and the R&D
programs include the Air Force Propulsion Application Program (PAP),
and the proposed Air Force Minuteman III SRM modernization program.
General Kowalski. I defer to Secretary Creedon to address the
question in that she is more familiar with the details of this matter.
Admiral Benedict. SSP has kept a low optimum production rate of 12
motor sets a year since 1999 in order to provide affordable stability
in the strategic industrial base and to maintain unique critical skills
and production capabilities. The Navy must continue rocket motor
production in order to support D5 deployment through 2042 because most
of the currently inventoried D5 rocket motors will age out before then.
The Navy uses unique Class 1.1 high energy propellant instead of the
Class 1.3 propellants typically used by the Air Force and NASA. High
energy Class 1.1 propellant is necessary in order to meet range and
performance requirements, as well as deployment on a volume-
constrained, manned launch platform. The Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM)
propellants have mechanical properties far superior to any Class 1.3
propellant for reasons of long life, damage tolerance, and reliability
for underwater launch from manned platforms.
In SSP's assessment, given the current industrial base environment,
if D5 rocket motor production is gapped or stopped, there will be
significant costs associated with the restarts. Cost drivers will
include resurrecting the infrastructure with unique skills required and
reestablishing the supply chain. Depending upon the length of the
lapse, it could take 5 to 10 years to restart D5 rocket motor
production with an associated cost of several billion dollars.
family of advanced beyond line of site terminals
21. Senator Sessions. Secretary Creedon, General Kowalski, and
Admiral Benedict, the FAB-T has experienced significant delays, and for
the third year in a row procurement has had to be deferred to address
development issues. According to the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), the program's software development schedule is still unrealistic
and the Air Force announced that it would be terminating its FAB-T
contract and seeking alternative providers. How do delays in FAB-T
impact the efforts to modernize nuclear command and control?
Ms. Creedon. Further delays in FAB-T will affect efforts to
modernize NC3; however, the Air Force's current alternate acquisition
strategy will meet the most pressing requirements for warfighter
capabilities (e.g., the Command Post Terminals (air/ground) with
President and National Voice Conferencing (PVNC)) and will provide for
deferring the bombers and RC-135 capabilities outside the Future Years
Defense Program. This deferral presents minimal risk. The B-52
currently has Low Frequency/Very Low Frequency (LF/VLF) capability, and
the Air Force is developing LF/VLF capability for the B-2 via the
Common VLF Receiver Program. The RC-135 program is also pursuing an
alternate solution to FAB-T.
General Kowalski. I defer to Secretary Creedon to address the
question in that she is more familiar with the details of this matter.
Admiral Benedict. The FAB-T is not a SSP. As such, I cannot comment
on changes to the FAB-T program schedule.
22. Senator Sessions. Secretary Creedon, General Kowalski, and
Admiral Benedict, is the Air Force developing contingencies in the
event FAB-T cannot meet that need date?
Ms. Creedon. Yes. First, the AEHF system is backwards compatible
with our existing Milstar command post terminals. Although those
terminals are aging, and do not have all of the capability of the FAB-
T, we will continue to use their services if FAB-T deliveries are
further delayed. Second, we just released the Request for Proposals to
develop in parallel an alternative source for the FAB-T capability.
This alternative source will be focused on meeting our more urgent,
near-term need to provide strategic communications. As the program
matures, we will be able to assess the progress of the alternative
source and the current FAB-T effort and determine a path forward for
production.
General Kowalski. I defer to Secretary Creedon to address the
question in that she is more familiar with the details of this matter.
Admiral Benedict. The FAB-T is not a SSP. As such, I cannot comment
on changes to the FAB-T program schedule.
23. Senator Sessions. Secretary Creedon, General Kowalski, and
Admiral Benedict, what is being done to address FAB-T affordability and
should requirements be reexamined?
Ms. Creedon. Air Force Space Command recently completed a thorough
review of the FAB-T requirements and will brief the results to the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council. Due to the critical Nuclear
Command and Control mission FAB-T supports, we did not find any
significant areas where we could reduce requirements without
unnecessarily increasing risk. We did clarify the priority of
requirements to allow our acquisition community more flexibility in
delivering that capability. We believe this will lead to an affordable
solution, and we will seek production proposals from our current
contractor and from alternative sources this summer to validate those
costs.
General Kowalski. I defer to Secretary Creedon to address the
question in that she is more familiar with the details of this matter.
Admiral Benedict. The FAB-T is not a SSP. As such, I cannot comment
on the FAB-T program's affordability or its requirements.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
goal of a nuclear-free world
24. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Creedon and Secretary Weber, in
December 2010, I opposed ratification of the President's New Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), in part because of serious doubt
about the President's long-term nuclear weapons policies. The reality
is that nuclear weapons are proliferating in the world, not going away.
The Russians maintain a sizeable nuclear arsenal. But, more alarmingly,
Iran continues to make progress in its pursuit of nuclear weapons,
North Korea's nuclear weapons program remains a serious threat to
regional security and stability, and the full extent of the Chinese
nuclear arsenal is not known. Nuclear weapons exist, and this is not a
genie that we can put back in the bottle by unilaterally disarming and
dismantling our nuclear weapons. Yet, all the while, the administration
is reportedly contemplating deep reductions in U.S. nuclear forces. How
realistic is the President's goal of a world without nuclear weapons?
Ms. Creedon and Mr. Weber. As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) (2010), the conditions that would ultimately permit the United
States and others to give up their nuclear weapons without risking
greater international instability and insecurity are very demanding.
Among those are the resolution of regional disputes that can motivate
rival states to acquire and maintain nuclear weapons, success in
halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, much greater transparency
into the programs and capabilities of key countries of concern,
verification methods and technologies capable of detecting violations
of disarmament obligations, and enforcement measures that are strong
and credible enough to deter such violations. Clearly, such conditions
do not exist today, but they are achievable and we must work to create
those conditions.
The administration remains committed to the safety, security, and
effectiveness of the nuclear arsenal as long as nuclear weapons exist.
As the President stated in 2010, nuclear modernization requires
investment for the long-term, and, even in light of the new fiscal
realities of the BCA, the administration continues to pursue these
programs and capabilities.
25. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Creedon and Secretary Weber, if
President Obama were to succeed in eliminating the entire U.S. nuclear
arsenal, what effect do you think that would that have on the global
threat picture for the United States?
Ms. Creedon and Mr. Weber. The President has specified the
conditions that would need to exist to support a world without nuclear
weapons. Those conditions would ensure that the United States was not
accepting undue risk. Clearly, such conditions do not exist today.
deeper nuclear force reductions
26. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Creedon and Secretary Weber, the
administration is conducting a review of U.S. nuclear deterrence
requirements, ostensibly to support another round of nuclear arms
reductions with Russia. It appears, however, that the President has
already determined that additional reductions are necessary. This past
weekend, he told an audience in South Korea that he ``can already say
with confidence that we have more nuclear weapons than we need.'' Yet,
during consideration of the New START treaty, the then-Commander of
STRATCOM, General Kevin Chilton, told the Senate, ``I think the arsenal
that we have is exactly what is needed today to provide the
deterrent.'' In light of this authoritative statement from a subject
matter expert on nuclear forces, how can the President subsequently
conclude that we have more nuclear weapons than we need?
Ms. Creedon and Mr. Weber. Detailed analysis of potential
reductions in strategic weapons, conducted in spring 2009 as part of
the NPR, concluded that the United States could sustain stable
deterrence with significantly fewer deployed strategic nuclear
warheads, assuming parallel Russian reductions. The NPR analysis
considered several specific levels of nuclear weapons, all below
current levels of approximately 2,200 deployed strategic warheads. Its
conclusions, concurred in by the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and Commander, STRATCOM, and approved by the President,
formed the basis for U.S. negotiations with Russia on the New START
treaty. Because the New START treaty is intended to be only an initial
step in a continuing process of bilateral nuclear reductions, this
initial analysis used conservative assumptions to determine acceptable
reductions in deployed strategic nuclear weapons.
The administration is conducting an NPR implementation study to
determine the nuclear force size and structure needed to support U.S.
national security requirements and meet international obligations in a
dynamic security environment. The ongoing study was directed by the
President as part of the NPR of 2010. The analysis from this study will
provide a basis for the President's guidance to DOD and the Department
of Energy on nuclear planning with respect to the force structure,
force posture, and stockpile requirements needed to protect the United
States and its allies and partners, and to inform plans for the
employment of nuclear weapons in the event that deterrence fails. As
stated in the NPR, the United States intends to pursue further
reductions in nuclear weapons with Russia. When complete, the analysis
of deterrence requirements and force postures will inform the
development of any future arms control objectives.
27. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Creedon and Secretary Weber, we have
been told that the deterrence relationship between the United States
and Russia is stable. We've been told that neither side has an
incentive to strike first in a crisis, and that there is no arms race.
So, in light of this stability achieved by our current approach, why
must we reduce below New START levels of 1,550 warheads on 700
strategic delivery systems?
Ms. Creedon and Mr. Weber. Even under the New START treaty levels,
the United States and Russia still have approximately 90 percent of the
nuclear weapons in the world. Seeking further bilateral reductions will
not diminish, but rather, strengthen the deterrence and strategic
stability relationship between the United States and Russia.
28. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Creedon and Secretary Weber, what
justifications can you offer for risking national security by altering
nuclear strategy in pursuit of deeper reductions?
Ms. Creedon and Mr. Weber. As stated in the 2010 NPR, the United
States intends to pursue with Russia further reductions in nuclear
weapons. When complete, the analysis of deterrence requirements that
was called for in the NPR will inform the development of any future
arms control objectives. However, several factors will influence the
magnitude and pace of such reductions:
First, any future reductions in U.S. nuclear forces
must continue to strengthen deterrence of potential regional
adversaries, strategic stability vis-a-vis Russia and China,
and assurance of our allies and partners.
Second, implementation of the Stockpile Stewardship
Program and the nuclear infrastructure investments recommended
in the NPR would allow the United States over time to shift
away from retaining large numbers of non-deployed warheads as a
hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise, allowing
major reductions in the nuclear stockpile.
Third, Russia's nuclear force will remain a
significant factor in determining how much we can reduce U.S.
forces and how fast we are prepared to reduce U.S. forces.
As stated in the NPR, increased investments in the nuclear
infrastructure and a highly skilled workforce are needed to ensure the
long-term safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal
and to support the full range of nuclear security work, including
nonproliferation, nuclear forensics, nuclear counterterrorism,
emergency management, intelligence analysis, and treaty verification.
These investments are essential to facilitating reductions while
sustaining deterrence under the New START treaty and beyond.
We can take the practical steps identified in the NPR of 2010 that
will not only move us toward the ultimate goal of eliminating all
nuclear weapons worldwide but will, in their own right, reinvigorate
the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, erect higher barriers to
the acquisition of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials by terrorist
groups, and strengthen U.S. and international security.
29. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Creedon and Secretary Weber, do you
believe U.S. allies still feel assured under our nuclear umbrella? If
not, do you foresee them building up their own nuclear capabilities?
Ms. Creedon and Mr. Weber. We have strong and positive indications
that our allies and partners continue to feel assured. We meet
regularly with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
Australia, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, and the Republic of Korea
to discuss our ongoing extended deterrence.
30. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Creedon and Secretary Weber, would a
shift in U.S. nuclear doctrine away from counterforce and flexibility
toward minimum deterrence weaken the credibility of U.S. nuclear use on
behalf of allies?
Ms. Creedon and Mr. Weber. Yes. For decades, the United States has
rejected a minimum deterrence doctrine as ill-suited to meet our
deterrence objectives, including the extension of U.S. nuclear
deterrence to our allies and partners.
31. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Creedon and Secretary Weber, do you
believe that at lower numbers, the implications of cheating become more
important?
Ms. Creedon and Mr. Weber. Yes. In general, as the number of
strategic forces diminishes, the military significance of cheating
could be more significant. The United States would view any deliberate
effort by Russia to exceed the New START treaty's limits or circumvent
its verification regime with great concern, especially if the cheating
had military significance. For that reason, it is important that
militarily significant cheating can be detected in time to respond
appropriately. Should there be any signs of Russian cheating or
preparations to break out from the New START treaty, this would be
raised through diplomatic channels immediately, and if not resolved,
raised to higher levels immediately. The administration would also keep
the Senate informed.
As stated in the NPR of 2010, because of our improved relations,
the need for strict numerical parity between the United States and
Russia is no longer as compelling as it was during the Cold War.
However, large disparities in nuclear capabilities could raise concerns
on both sides and among U.S. allies and partners, and may not be
conducive to maintaining a stable, long-term, strategic relationship,
especially as nuclear forces are significantly reduced.
32. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Creedon and Secretary Weber, would
lower strategic nuclear force levels exacerbate the existing disparity
in tactical nuclear weapons between Russia and the United States? If
so, wouldn't this affect allied calculations during future crises?
Ms. Creedon and Mr. Weber. Because of our improved relations, the
need for strict numerical parity between the two countries is no longer
as compelling as it was during the Cold War. But large disparities in
nuclear capabilities could raise concerns on both sides and among U.S.
allies and partners, and may not be conducive to maintaining a stable,
long-term strategic relationship, especially as nuclear forces are
significantly reduced. Therefore, it is important for Russia to join in
any move to lower levels. In any post-New START treaty negotiations
with Russia, we plan to address non-strategic nuclear weapons, as well
as the non-deployed nuclear weapons of both sides.
china's nuclear forces
33. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Creedon and Secretary Weber,
according to DOD data, since 2001, China has perhaps tripled the size
of its ICBM force. Add to this, China's ambitions for a submarine-based
nuclear force, as well as increasing numbers of short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles. Dr. James Miller, who is currently the Acting Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, testified to Congress in March 2011,
that ``the lack of transparency surrounding China's nuclear programs--
their pace and scope, as well as the strategy and doctrine that guide
them--raises questions about China's future strategic intentions.'' His
concerns seemed to be confirmed in December 2011, when research by
Georgetown University revealed that China could have as many as 3,000
nuclear missiles and thousands of miles of underground tunnels to hide
this arsenal. How large is this force likely to be in another 10 years?
Ms. Creedon and Mr. Weber. [Deleted.]
34. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Creedon and Secretary Weber, what is
your assessment of the incentive that further reductions in U.S.
nuclear weapons would provide to China and other nuclear powers to
build up to United States and Russian levels?
Ms. Creedon and Mr. Weber. The United States and Russia still have
approximately 90 percent of the nuclear weapons that exist today. China
and others are far from being in parity with the United States and
Russia. We seek a relationship of strategic stability with China, as we
do with Russia, focused on improving transparency and mutual
confidence.
35. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Creedon and Secretary Weber, how many
nuclear weapons does the United States need to maintain to convince
China not to seek strategic equivalence?
Ms. Creedon and Mr. Weber. We need to continue to foster strategic
stability in the Asia-Pacific region so that China does not conclude
that it needs to seek parity in nuclear arsenals.
missile defense
36. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Creedon and Secretary Weber, I am
also particularly concerned regarding President Obama's recent
unfortunate admission to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev that he is
waiting until after the election, when he can exercise more flexibility
to deal with issues relating to missile defense. Although not having to
worry about the judgment of the American people on this issue may be
convenient, allowing the President to make more concessions to the
Russians would be antithetical to our safety and security, as well as
dishonest and contrary to the assurances President Obama has given. In
order to secure Senate support for the New START treaty, President
Obama pledged to continue development and deployment of all stages of
the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to missile defense in Europe. What
is the precise status of the plan to deploy the remaining three phases
of PAA?
Ms. Creedon and Mr. Weber. The United States has pursued missile
defense cooperation with Russia with the clear understanding that we
would not accept constraints on missile defense and we would implement
all four phases of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). The
plan has not changed.
37. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Creedon and Secretary Weber,
President Obama's discussions with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev at
the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul do not appear to have produced any
fruit, with Medvedev stressing that the United States and Russia remain
in their respective, opposing positions on missile defense. Ellen
Tauscher, former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security Affairs, stated at the 10th Annual Missile
Defense Conference this week that the administration is committed to
``getting Russia inside the missile defense tent now,'' so that the
United States can demonstrate to Russia that missile defense systems,
``will not threaten Russia's strategic forces.'' She believes this
conversation, and associated exchanges of information that have been
discussed, are ``essential because Russia has not been convinced by our
technical arguments that the NATO system isn't a threat even despite .
. . detailed technical responses to Russia's inaccurate assumptions
about our missile defense capabilities.'' It seems that Secretary
Tauscher is operating based on a flawed assumption that Russia will
eventually agree to our missile defense plan, despite already receiving
repeated assurances and technical responses from the United States.
What is your assessment of the likelihood that further dialogue will
placate Russia's fears regarding the deployment of missile defense
systems in Europe?
Ms. Creedon and Mr. Weber. We continue to believe that cooperation
with Russia on missile defense, both bilaterally and through NATO, can
enhance the security of the United States, our allies and partners in
Europe, and Russia. We will continue to work with Russia to define the
parameters of possible cooperation.
Russia has an extensive and capable sensor network for tracking
ballistic missiles that could make a real contribution to the
protection of U.S. deployed forces, and allies and partners in Europe.
In addition, U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia cooperation would send a
strong signal to Iran that its development of missiles and pursuit of
nuclear capabilities are reducing rather than enhancing Iranian
security. Cooperation would also signal that the United States and
Russia agree on the dangers posed by the proliferation of ballistic
missile and nuclear technology.
At their meeting, President Obama and President Medvedev reaffirmed
their intent to continue a dialogue on missile defense cooperation.
38. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Creedon and Secretary Weber, do you
believe that offering them concessions, such as viewing Aegis SM-3
missile defense flight tests, will improve the likelihood that Russia
will be willing to cooperate in the future?
Ms. Creedon and Mr. Weber. Offering Russia the opportunity to
observe a missile defense flight test is not a concession. Flight test
observations have been used by this administration and the previous
administration to provide Russia the opportunity to understand more
fully the purpose and intent underpinning our missile defense plans and
programs.
Transparency regarding our missile defense plans and programs
increases the credibility of our arguments that our missile defenses
are not directed at Russia and will not negate Russia's strategic
deterrent. Credibility on this issue is important for our current
missile defense cooperation with allies and partners, as well as for
potential future cooperation with Russia.
39. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Creedon and Secretary Weber, what
would the ramifications be if the United States were to continue
fielding the PAA without Russia's blessing?
Ms. Creedon and Mr. Weber. The United States is not seeking
Russia's blessing on the implementation of the EPAA. The United States
remains committed to fully deploying all four phases of the EPAA to
counter a real and growing threat from the Middle East. We remain
hopeful that Russia will work with us to counter the threat from
ballistic missile proliferation.
funding for the strategic nuclear deterrent
40. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Creedon and Secretary Weber, last
year, Dr. James Miller testified to Congress that the 10-year cost of
sustaining and modernizing U.S. strategic nuclear forces will be
approximately $125 billion over 10 years, which does not include the
NNSA funding for the nuclear weapons complex and the warheads. Assuming
that amount remains roughly constant, that is about $12.5 billion per
year for the nuclear deterrent, which equates to approximately 3
percent of the defense budget. During the Cold War, we devoted up to 25
percent of the defense budget to nuclear deterrence. We should bear
this in mind. It's important for Congress to understand just how much
our nuclear deterrent costs. What is the total that DOD plans to spend
over the next 10 years to sustain and modernize U.S. strategic forces?
Please provide a breakdown of that funding by weapon system or whatever
category makes the most sense.
Ms. Creedon and Mr. Weber. The information will be provided to you
in the report pursuant to section 1043 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. This report will be submitted
to you within a few weeks. This document will update our 10-year cost
profile as provided in the previous reports provided pursuant to
section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010, and will provide additional information on the 10-year cost of
sustaining and modernizing our nuclear command and control assets.
nuclear modernization and reduction
41. Senator Cornyn. Secretary Creedon and Secretary Weber, the 2010
NPR stated: ``Implementation of the Stockpile Stewardship Program and
the nuclear infrastructure investments recommended in the NPR will
allow the United States to shift away from retaining large numbers of
nondeployed warheads as a hedge against technical or geopolitical
surprise, allowing major reductions in the nuclear stockpile. These
investments are essential to facilitating reductions while sustaining
deterrence under New START and beyond.'' In other words, the
modernization program was intended to give us, among other things, a
modern manufacturing capability necessary to extend the life of our
nuclear weapons and to be able to respond to unforeseen events that may
require the manufacturing of nuclear weapons components, such as the
nuclear pits. The logic was that once we had this capability, we would
eliminate some of the nuclear warheads that are in the non-deployed or
hedge category. For example, the United States has approximately 5,000
nuclear warheads of all types; of this, approximately 2,000 are in the
operational category, the rest are non-deployed. If the Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research Replacement-Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) is delayed
from 2021 to 2028 at the earliest, does it not follow that we should
similarly delay the elimination of our nondeployed or hedge weapons?
Ms. Creedon and Mr. Weber. The NNSA is reviewing the impacts that
resulted from the deferral of the CMRR-NF. This will help inform the
NWC on the path forward regarding plutonium pits for our life-extension
programs and related decisions on hedge weapons. The uranium processing
facility (UPF) is also an important contributor to the manufacturing
capability of the nuclear infrastructure. DOD fully supports staggering
the two projects with UPF going first.
[Whereupon, at 3:31 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 25, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:56 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E.
Benjamin Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Nelson and Sessions.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan S. Epstein,
counsel; and Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member.
Minority staff member present: Daniel A. Lerner,
professional staff member.
Staff assistant present: Brian F. Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: Ryan Ehly, assistant
to Senator Nelson; and Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator
Sessions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, CHAIRMAN
Senator Nelson. Senator Sessions will be just a little bit
late and he's asked that I go ahead and start, so it won't
matter if we start a little bit early. We might have a couple
more minutes to have the hearing.
The subcommittee is now in session and is meeting today
under somewhat unusual circumstances. Since the Senate will
have a series of votes throughout this afternoon, we had to
move up the hearing to start early. Otherwise we wouldn't have
been able to hold the hearing before our committee marks up the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.
Since the votes will start at 2 o'clock, we'll have a
highly compressed hearing. Probably that doesn't break your
hearts, to have to have a little bit less time in the hearing.
But we won't be making the ordinary, normal opening statements.
Instead we'll put all the opening statements in the record,
together with your other prepared testimony, in order to
maximize our time.
We'll also give members an opportunity, when Senator
Sessions gets here, to submit statements and questions for the
record. The record will remain open until the end of next
Tuesday, to make certain we get the complete record in the
transcript. We would greatly appreciate if you could respond
promptly to the questions so that we can then answer some of
the questions that are so important that are facing us.
I want to thank all of you today, each of you, for your
service, for your flexibility and understanding of our need to
start the hearing early. Our witnesses today are: the Honorable
J. Michael Gilmore, Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation, Department of Defense (DOD); Dr. Bradley H.
Roberts, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear
and Missile Defense Policy; Lieutenant General Patrick J.
O'Reilly, USA, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA); Lieutenant General Richard P. Formica, USA, the
Commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/
Army Forces Strategic Command and Commander, Joint Functional
Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense; and Ms.
Cristina T. Chaplain, the Director of Acquisition and Sourcing
Management at the Government Accountability Office (GAO).
I thank Senator Sessions and his staff for being able to
accommodate the rescheduling of the hearing today.
We'll begin the question and answer period with 7-minute
rounds. I'll use all the time that I can until Senator Sessions
gets here and then we'll recognize him right away.
In terms of Homeland defense as a priority--and this is a
question for Dr. Roberts and our two generals--General
O'Reilly's prepared statement says that, ``Defense of the
Homeland is our highest priority,'' which is consistent with
the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). But some have
questioned whether it is the top missile defense priority or
suggested that we have to choose between Homeland defense and
regional missile defense.
Can each of you tell us if Homeland defense is the
administration's top missile defense priority and if you
believe we can and should and do provide both Homeland defense
and regional missile defense capability simultaneously in a
balanced manner that meets our warfighters' needs?
Dr. Roberts?
Dr. Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The BMDR actually sets out six priorities and we would
continue to hold to all of them. Top of the list, the first
priority, is the protection of the Homeland. But it's a false
choice between the first priority and the other priorities. We
have it within our means and within the current budget to do
everything we need to do to advance our commitment to both
Homeland defense and regional defense.
The perception of an imbalance of investment here has been
reinforced by some inaccurate information that was put into
play earlier. My reading of the budget in front of you is that
roughly one-third or 37 percent can be uniquely associated with
regional missile defense and the remaining two-thirds is either
uniquely associated with Homeland defense or reinforces both
sets of commitments, for example investments in command and
control, investments in the Precision Tracking Space System
(PTSS) sensor system.
So we don't see that our investments are skewed heavily
away from Homeland defense. We see a robust set of investments
in addressing the reliability problems in the ground-based
interceptor (GBI), strengthening the sensor system, taking
additional steps to strengthen the defense of the Homeland. The
budget permits us to do all of those things in a balanced
manner with acceptable risk.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Nelson. Isn't it also true that this concept of
dual protection isn't new with this administration? The
previous administration introduced the idea of some regional
defense mechanisms during the last administration; isn't that
accurate?
Dr. Roberts. Yes, indeed, that's accurate. Our national
commitment to both of these areas has been clear since the end
of the Cold War. The Persian Gulf war woke us up to the fact of
regional missile proliferation and long-range missile
proliferation. So in the 1990s, first the Bush administration
and then the Clinton administration talked about theater
missile defense and national missile defense. The Bush
administration for the last decade set out a different set of
shorthands, but the same basic concept, that we pursue a
balanced approach. We similarly have set out a balanced
approach.
So yes, sir, we see continuity over the last 3 decades to
our national commitment in this area.
Senator Nelson. Part of that would be consistent with the
Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) that is under consideration
right now; is that accurate?
Dr. Roberts. Yes, sir. The notion of bringing together
regional defensive capabilities in tailored support of our
commitments in individual regions goes back to the initial
development of these capabilities in the 1990s. It would be--
although our principal political debate has been focused on
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) missile defense, I
would say there's a longer history of phasing and adapting
missile defense in Northeast Asia, in partnership with Japan,
and similarly in the Middle East in partnership with Israel and
some others.
So we have a long history of adapting and integrating these
capabilities as they emerged proven from the technology
developers, and indeed that dates back a good number of years.
Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly?
General O'Reilly. Senator, I would also add that this
budget that we've submitted is balanced, and the balancing
occurred with the full participation of not only the Office of
the Secretary of Defense for Policy, but also Dr. Gilmore in
considering the test needs, also warfighter priorities, the
combatant commands, the Joint Chiefs, and the Services.
In that balancing and looking at both regional and Homeland
defense, we considered the intelligence. In the area of
regional defense, there's a significant disparity between the
number of missile defense systems we have and interceptors and
the number of threat missiles that we see in the regional
context, globally. We're not in that position with Homeland
defense. We want to stay in a position of strength, where today
we have a greater Homeland defense than the threat of future
ICBMs from current regional threats.
Finally, technical progress. In the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense (GMD) program right now, we are addressing and are
prepared to come back to flight testing, but we are paced by
the flight test progress that we've had, and we've had two
failures. No matter what budget we are discussing, we have to
get over those flight test failures. I don't think those
failures would have been avoided if we would have had a larger
or a lesser budget than we had. It's a matter of working
through the flight environments and the other issues which we
uncovered in testing.
Senator Nelson. In terms of let's say even the regional
defense mechanisms, aren't we finding that some of the nations
in connection with the regional defense are providing us help
with their own radar and their own capacity for technology?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. We've had very extensive
discussions in many theaters around the world, in the North
Arabian Gulf and Europe and Northeast Asia. We participate with
over 20 countries that work either on missile defense, working
in analyzing architectures, or where they can contribute, as
you said. They have lower tier systems, some of them have Aegis
systems, Patriot, their own indigenous systems like the French
surface-to-air missile (SAMP-T), and the Dutch and others have
made declarations this year that they are investing in their
own budgets to modify their ship radars so they can participate
and we can utilize the data coming off those radars.
So we've had an extensive amount of cooperation in order to
leverage their capability, which is primarily a lower tier, and
we bring the higher intercept altitudes, the upper tier, to a
missile defense architecture.
Senator Nelson. General Formica?
General Formica. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the
opportunity to add to this discussion. From an operator's
perspective, this really does come down to a balance of many
competing priorities--Homeland, region, operational risk, and
affordability. We recognize the six priorities laid out in the
BMDR and recognize that Homeland defense clearly identifies the
number one priority and protecting our forces, allies, and
friends abroad as our number two priority.
My assessment is that it was appropriately discussed and
adequately represented in the discussions that led to the
approval of the MDA's budget that you have in front of you. It
also recognizes that there is never going to be enough missile
defense assets to satisfy all of the warfighters' demands. But
this budget, I believe, is an appropriate balance of Homeland
defense, regional capability, operational risk, and
affordability.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
General O'Reilly, our missile defenses must provide force
protection for our forward-deployed military personnel and
that's an overarching national priority referred to by General
Formica, and it's a responsibility to our troops as well. If we
were just trying to provide protection for our military forces
deployed in Europe, wouldn't that require some missile defense
capabilities very similar to our planned EPAA, with the number
of troops that we have stationed and the number of bases that
are located within that area?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir, it would. As I said before, we
provide primarily the high altitude intercepts. Because of the
nature of that intercept, occurring exoatmospherically or up in
the higher parts of our atmosphere, you get a very broad area
coverage for that layer of defense. If we only isolated on U.S.
bases or U.S. interests in the region, we still would cover a
very large portion of Europe, because the coverage extends
beyond just the particular asset you're trying to protect.
Under article 5 of our North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) agreement, we are committed to, if we have the
opportunity, we will defend another threatened portion of NATO.
Senator Nelson. Our troops' force protection has to be
among the highest priorities, together with protecting the
Homeland, as General Formica said. So in a sense we get two
areas of protection, one of our allies and the other is for our
own troops, with this regional or theater protection system; is
that accurate?
General O'Reilly. Yes, Senator.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
General O'Reilly, in previous testimony you've indicated
that the missile defense program and budget request were
reviewed, and General Formica has made reference to it as well,
by an array of senior decisionmakers at the Missile Defense
Executive Board (MDEB), with the participation of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Services, combatant commands, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, and finally the Secretary of Defense.
Can you tell us, did they review and approve the current
budget request for missile defense?
General O'Reilly. Yes, Senator, they did. The process
involves typically at least a half a year of me returning to
that board, presenting different options, getting guidance from
them. It is a very rigorous process, very iterative process, as
they balance the intelligence and the other needs to formulate
a final budget.
I would also add, Senator, that Dr. Gilmore is part of that
board, too, and our testing represents a large part of the
budget every year in order to give the combatant commanders
confidence that we have the capability and also to support and
address any issues which my programs may reveal based on
previous testing.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Gilmore, could you give us your
perspective on this process of review and the conclusions that
were drawn?
Dr. Gilmore. It's a rigorous review, and to support the
reviews that are actually done by the MDEB, General O'Reilly
and I and our staffs participate in a number of reviews, as the
two versions that are done each year of the integrated master
test plan, that lays out all the testing for all the elements
of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), is developed,
and we have a good technical interchange and sometimes robust
debate about what the content of the test program ought to be,
and we always reach good conclusions about what it ought to be.
The plan in my opinion that was recently submitted this
year is a very rigorous plan. In fact, in the 20 years I've
been dealing with missile defense, the most rigorous plans for
testing ballistic missile defenses (BMD) that I've seen are the
ones that General O'Reilly has produced when he started with
the Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) process.
I'd note that the testing for ground-based missile defense,
the defense of the Homeland, in the most recent IMTP, the pace
of that and the content of it has been preserved despite the
budget cuts that DOD has taken to comply with the Budget
Control Act (BCA), and the pace and content of GMD testing is
essentially the same as it's been for the last 2 or 3 years
since I've been involved in this process.
The focus of the testing is on doing flight testing to
discover the problems that have been discovered, which are very
important--actually, sometimes you learn a lot more from the
failures than you do from the successes--but also on validating
and accrediting the models that are going to be key. In fact,
it is the only way to build high confidence in the performance
of the system, because none of these elements, including GMD,
are actually going to be able to be tested in all aspects
across the full battle space and in totally operationally
realistic conditions, because of real world constraints, like
we can't fire out of the Russian information flight region when
we do tests.
So I'm very happy with the process that's in place and the
plan I think is very rigorous and defensible.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
General Formica, you made some reference to the amount of
time and the number of individuals doing the review. Are you
satisfied that the review was appropriately undertaken and that
the conclusions drawn are the best conclusions that could be
drawn?
General Formica. Mr. Chairman, again thank you for the
chance to comment. I'm new to this business; 24 months ago I
didn't know what an MDEB was. So I haven't had an opportunity
to participate in the system. I walked away with confidence in
the system as it is laid out and in the way and manner in which
it was applied in the development of this budget.
It started with the requirements of the demands that the
combatant commanders have brought forward, synthesized by the
U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) in a Prioritized Capability
List (PCL). Every time that MDA brought forth a budget
proposal, what we call the Program Objective Memorandum (POM),
and a series of alternate POMs--and there were several
iterations--and we also considered alternatives that weren't
necessarily done by the MDA, to look at a full range of
budgeting options--program options.
We compared those against the PCL. The operators, both
Deputy Commander of STRATCOM and I, were at the MDEB to provide
that operational assessment. U.S. Northern Command was
generally represented there, as well as the Services. There
was, as you heard in this testimony, healthy discussion and
debate and it is my assessment that this budget that you have
in front of you is a reflection of an appropriate balance of
affordability versus risk, and again Homeland versus region,
and we discussed all of those tradeoffs in this process.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Ms. Chaplain, the report you issued last Friday focuses on
what you assess to be high levels of concurrency in a number of
MDA programs. Although DOD has agreed with almost all of your
recommendations, I take it that General O'Reilly has a maybe
perhaps different view on concurrency. I'd like to explore the
issue.
Ms. Chaplain, you acknowledge that some concurrency is
acceptable and probably inevitable under the circumstances.
What do you believe constitutes an acceptable level of
concurrency and perhaps you could give us an example that would
be helpful?
Ms. Chaplain. Yes. You can look at concurrency in terms of
a spectrum and not as an on and off switch in terms of when it
gets bad or isn't bad. A lot of programs need to buy some long
lead items, for example, that represent some concurrency in a
program and that's okay to do. Where we get concerned is where
we see what we believe to be pretty extreme levels of
concurrency. For example, if you're testing and producing
assets at the same time, and therefore when you find problems
you're going to have to do a lot of expensive retrofits. We've
seen that in a couple of the programs. That's where we've
highlighted concerns.
I don't believe we had really acknowledged enough that some
concurrency was okay in our draft and General O'Reilly was
responding to some of that.
Another example, though, where we see concurrency as being
a little bit more on the extreme side is with the lining up of
knowledge for making a long-term program commitment. We'd like
to see a preliminary design review inform that decision to make
a long-term commitment to a program, because that review helps
ensure that you can match resources to requirements, your
technologies are well understood, and that you can get
something done within the resources you have.
In a couple of cases we've seen that particular review come
after that commitment. So we've already made a long-term
commitment to something and yet you don't have that knowledge
that you need, that we believe you need, to make that
commitment.
Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, what do you believe would
be an acceptable level of concurrency, and have you been taking
steps to reduce the level of concurrency in the programs?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. We agree in large part with
what the GAO report contained from the point of view of it's
very high risk, as far as cost goes, to deploying a missile
system, for example, that hasn't gone through what we call
ground qualification testing, testing all the environments and
the components.
I do believe there has to be some concurrency, first of all
from an industrial base point of view. What we typically do is
develop prototypes or early production models, and those are
the items which we fly. However, if we do not sustain the
production base during that period--and a lot of times our test
programs take 2 years or more--we actually raise risk to the
program by not continuing to produce at a low level.
I think the best balance is to ensure you have very good
ground qualification to convince yourself that we have no
inherent problems in the designs, and then move to flight
testing, but continue at a low production rate, which most
programs do. Unfortunately, with missile defense programs,
there are very few end items in the end because we're limited
in the number of missiles we procure, and the budget. So we
have to be very careful of sustaining some production while
we're going through testing.
We have, in fact, reduced a significant amount of
concurrency. I did not concur with the level of concurrency in
the current programs when I became the director. We reviewed
them and we added approximately a year to the test program and
the design phase of the program for the 1B, and we also added
approximately 2 years to the 2A program to address concurrency.
That was prior to the GAO report, and we do balance that. It
also depends on the maturity of the technology.
Senator Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, do you agree with General
O'Reilly's assessment there?
Ms. Chaplain. I would make a couple points. I think in
terms of what's the optimum amount of production numbers when
you're in that phase trying to sustain an industrial base,
where we've had disagreements is actually the amount that is
being produced and is it too much, is it going beyond what you
need for test assets. In that case, I think MDA recently took
action to address that concern we had in the 1B program.
In terms of trying not to put in gaps in the industrial
base, our concern is when there is too much concurrency and you
have the need to retrofit and stop production, you're actually
creating more disruptions to the industrial base. So there is a
careful balance there.
Lastly, I would just also recognize that, I think, after
our audit work MDA took a step on the GMD side to put off
production until it has that flight intercept test, which we
had a very specific recommendation about. So we were happy with
some of the steps that were made that we weren't able to really
recognize in our report because they were made after our audit
work.
Senator Nelson. I assume that you agree that the practical
realities of production are such that you can't always have a
line of production sitting idle, so that there are some
requirements that things continue to move. But your concern
would be that they not move too quickly, so that you get ahead
of your testing. Is that a fair statement?
Ms. Chaplain. Yes. It's not ramping up too much before that
testing is complete so that it becomes very expensive to make
those adjustments.
Senator Nelson. By the same token, having a line idle is
not very likely and that's costly as well.
Ms. Chaplain. It's costly and you could lose key skills,
which are difficult to find in this kind of system development.
So it's a balancing act. We recognize that. We're not trying to
be very black and white about this. But in the cases we've
looked at it--the concurrency there was more than we were
comfortable with. It's resulted in problems. Our
recommendations are just aimed at having DOD go back and look
across the portfolio, see where concurrency could be reduced. I
don't think it's realistic to expect it to be reduced across
the board.
Senator Nelson. I think it's safe to say that General
O'Reilly will do his best to keep concurrency at an acceptable
level, recognizing the costly nature of getting ahead or
falling behind. We appreciate those thoughts.
My friend and colleague has arrived, the ranking member.
I've taken all of your time.
Senator Sessions. I don't have anything left. [Laughter.]
Senator Nelson. No, I think you do. But we compressed the
timeframe without opening statements, but you're entitled to an
opening statement--I made one--if you choose. We're in a 7-
minute round for questions. I have answered--I have raised
several questions and have several more. But at this point I'd
say the floor is yours.
Senator Sessions. Thank you. I had a very important
engagement. I grew up in a little town, there were 30 in my
senior class, and I just got to have lunch with my classmate of
first through 12 grades, who's the President of the University
of Alabama, who just got elevated. Of course, her brother's
Congressman Joe Bonner from the House. We also have a
lieutenant governor of Alabama who's a couple of years ahead of
us. So we're a pretty good little group, I guess, all things
considered. So it was a real pleasure to see her.
Senator Nelson. I'll brag on mine next hearing.
Senator Sessions. It was a pleasure to see my classmate
just after she's been selected to that important office. In
Alabama, that's a big deal. Next to the football coach or the
President, it's pretty important.
I request my prepared statement be inserted for the record
to save time.
[The prepared statement of Senator Sessions follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Jeff Sessions
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our
distinguished panel of witnesses.
Today's hearing focuses on the President's fiscal year 2013 budget
for the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). In today's fiscal environment, no
budget is immune to cuts and the $7.75 billion request for MDA was
certainly no exception. Unfortunately, MDA's reductions reflect a
concerning imbalance and underfund the procurement, sustainment, and
modernization of proven capabilities, to pay for the development
efforts necessary to fulfill the President's unproven vision for the
defense of Europe. We had a plan, which would have provided a lower
risk option to augment the defense of the Homeland against a long-range
Iranian threat. Now because of our dismal fiscal situation, we are
faced with unfortunate tradeoffs, such as having to cut funding for the
procurement of high demand mature systems--like transportable radars
and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system--in order to sustain
funding for the development of higher risk efforts, like the SM-3 IIB.
Rogue nations continue to pursue the capabilities necessary to
inflict unimaginable harm on the United States. Now is not the time to
rest on our laurels and sacrifice the security of the Homeland for
regional architectures. Regional and Homeland defense can and should
coexist. System robustness and diversity should be encouraged. However,
funding must be balanced and encourage the refinement of proven
capabilities, not poorly defined ones that rely on high levels of
concurrency and provide questionable benefit to Homeland defense.
It has been almost a year and a half since the last Ground-based
Midcourse Defense (GMD) test failure and unfortunately the problems
remain unfixed. I look forward to understanding why MDA believes it can
achieve and sustain success in returning GMD back to its full
capability as quickly as possible, while also fulfilling the
modernization efforts that have been postponed since 2010. After all of
the money we have spent developing this capability, taking our eye off
the ball is simply unacceptable. As North Korea reminded us a couple of
weeks ago, diplomacy is not going to sway their intent to develop a
missile capable of reaching the United States. We welcome their
failures; however, North Korea is not going to quit their reckless
ways. Returning GMD--the only system currently capable of protecting
the United States from ballistic missiles--to its full capability must
be our highest priority.
I applaud MDA for the successful competition of the GMD development
and sustainment contract. Through this competition, MDA was able to
find efficiencies and savings that benefit the taxpayer, by achieving a
20 percent cost savings, and ensure that the GMD program is well-
positioned to develop, improve, and expand this critical capability.
Section 233 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for
Fiscal Year 2012 required the Department of Defense to submit a report
on the Homeland missile defense hedging strategy. This strategy and
policy framework, originally proposed in the Ballistic Missile Defense
Review of 2010, is long overdue and was included in the NDAA for Fiscal
Year 2012 to compel the administration to take a serious look at the
technical risks associated with the later phases of the Phased Adaptive
Approach. Thus far, I am disappointed that little has been relayed to
Congress on how this administration intends to mitigate technological
and threat-based risk. I look forward to hearing more from our
witnesses on the hedging options being evaluated in the study, if those
options include an assessment on the feasibility of deploying an east
coast missile defense site, and when they expect this report will be
delivered to Congress.
The President has made it very clear that if reelected he intends
to do whatever it takes to appease Russian concerns on missile defense,
even if that means going beyond the restrictions Congress tried to set
on sharing classified information. The President's ``more flexibility''
gaffe confirms what many of us have warned, that the President will do
whatever it takes to reassure the Russians on missile defense even if
that means giving them the keys to the front door and the pass code to
the alarm. The extraordinary level of transparency shared today with
Russia exceeds that of some of our closest allies. ``More flexibility''
with Russia on missile defense would make us less secure, and it must
be made clear to President Obama that undermining our defensive
capabilities is unacceptable.
I thank the witnesses for joining us today and look forward to
their testimony.
Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, General Formica, and
Dr. Roberts: the fiscal year 2013 MDA budget creates an
imbalance, an underfunding, it seems, underfunding the
procurement, sustainment, and modernization of the proven
capabilities, it seems to me, the things that we worked on and
got ready to deploy, to pay for developing efforts necessary to
fulfill the President's vision for a new kind of defense of
Europe.
We had a plan for a number of years that would have
provided a lower-risk option to augment the defense of the
Homeland against a long-range Iranian threat and also Europe.
So now we're using monies from those programs to help pay for
the more high risk programs--you and I have talked about it, so
this is not a surprise--but to pay for the Standard Missile-3
(SM-3) Block IIB, which is, I think, not developed, just
beginning to go forward, and the risk factor in a lot of
different areas is great.
The budget proposes a reduction of more than $3 billion, it
looks like to us, across the Future Years Defense Program for
the procurement of Terminal High Altitude Aerial Defense
(THAAD) and the AN/TPY-2 portable radars, two high demand
systems that the Joint Staff-led joint capability mix study
justified in past budgets.
So is it true--I guess yes or no: Is it true that this
budget reduces the number of planned THAAD battery purchases
from nine to six? Who wants to be first on that? General?
General O'Reilly. Sir, it has been reduced from nine to
six. There was a process that we went through of many different
budget alternatives and they were reviewed by DOD at the
highest levels, including the Joint Chiefs, the combatant
commanders, the Services. We went through many trades and part
of the balance was the BCA requirements. But of the priorities
that came out of it--and again, they were set by the priorities
that General Formica's organization sets--this budget is
consistent with those priorities.
Senator Sessions. Of course we know that DOD has been asked
to take a very substantial reduction and it had to make tough
choices. So we're just trying to ascertain how that's playing
out in real events.
Isn't it true that the budget reduces the number of planned
THAAD interceptors from 503 to 320?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. It matches the number of units
that we are now procuring.
Senator Sessions. Doesn't it reduce the number of planned
TPY-2 radars from 18 to 11?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. Those radars are associated
with the units.
Senator Sessions. Is it true that the Joint Staff-led
capability, joint capability mix study endorsed and was used as
a justification for increasing quantities of these high-demand
assets in last year's budget?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir, that was. As that was reviewed
again this year, again by General Formica's organizations and
others, and that was taken into account.
Senator Sessions. Has the demand from the combatant
commands for THAAD and TPY-2 radar decreased over the last
year?
General Formica. Sir, if I may, I would like to respond to
that.
Senator Sessions. Yes.
General Formica. The demand for THAAD and TPY-2 radars,
like the demand for other missile defense assets, continues to
increase and has not been reduced by combatant commanders. The
discussion on how many THAADs to procure as it came up in the
review process during the MDEB really came down to going back
to the priority between investing in the Homeland and investing
in the region. THAAD is a capability that predominantly
provides for investment--for defense, regional missile defense.
So the decision was made to reduce the number of THAAD
batteries from nine to six. Six was the minimum acceptable that
the operators had identified, so we didn't go anywhere below
that. There's demand for more than six. There's actually demand
for more than nine. But again, balancing operational risk,
affordability, Homeland defense, and regional defense, the
decision was----
Senator Sessions. Balancing the amount of money that you
had.
General Formica. Yes, sir, there is no doubt that was part
of it. That was the affordability.
Then I would just say, one of the important decisions that
we take for granted is that the three THAADs that were reduced
were the last three in the program. So this budget will build
THAAD capability in the early years on the time and schedule
that was originally programmed. It allows us to build that
capability and establish increased capacity, and we will be
able to assess based on operational requirements and budget in
the following years.
Senator Sessions. So you plan to stick at the 320, is that
what that means?
General Formica. It means that the current budget will
start at the 320 interceptors. Again, as General O'Reilly said,
that is appropriate for the number of launchers that are being
procured. The number of launchers, it's tied to the number of
batteries.
Senator Sessions. Right. So the number of batteries and the
number of launchers, the 320 would be where you plan to stop.
General Formica. That's in the current program.
Dr. Roberts. May I add a point to that discussion?
Senator Sessions. Yes.
Dr. Roberts. It's not where we plan to stop. We plan to
continue to build capability for the Homeland and for the
regions for decades to come. That's the plan in the FYDP. It's
not as if at the end of that we've drawn a line and said that's
enough. This is just what we're currently capable of funding.
It leaves the production line open and it continues the
capability in the regions, and it also gives our allies the
opportunity to buy some of their own.
Senator Sessions. I understand that allies might help keep
an assembly line going. But if we allow the assembly line to go
down, you just can't start it up so easily, and the price per
copy would go up, would it not?
General O'Reilly, it's been almost a year and a half since
the GMD test failure. Unfortunately, the problems I understand
have not been fixed. I understand that the flight test to
validate the fix will not take place until December of this
year, a full 2 years after the failure.
Is there anything that you could have done, that you think
now you could have done, to fix that capability enhancement
sooner than we planned?
General O'Reilly. Sir, the first issue we had was a quality
control issue. We showed in the second flight that we have
addressed that issue, and we did not have that in the second
flight.
Unfortunately, that delayed us from getting into a test
regime and environments where we did find where we needed to
revise the design of some of the components of the missile.
Once we finish that, sir, going through the time it took to
validate exactly what the issue was and convince ourselves we
understood it, and then we started the process of building the
revised components. But out of that understanding we now have
changed--we have more stringent manufacturing requirements and
we've found we were not meeting those manufacturing more
stringent requirements, and that caused us to start again to
adjust the production.
What's really key in the time it's taking is,
unfortunately, the components that we've had to redesign and
revalidate and requalify are at the very beginning of the
assembly process. So we have to literally disassemble most of
the kill vehicle (KV) in order to get to the component and then
very precisely build them back up. If it was some of the
components on the outside, like a thruster problem or
something, we could have very quickly replaced out the
components once we had a redesign.
So it's the nature, it happens to be, of the actual
components where we found the issue that is the driver in the
long timeline.
Senator Sessions. Sometimes those things happen. We can all
pretend that these things shouldn't happen, but sometimes they
just do and I understand that.
I guess, Mr. Chairman, if we look at it, we had the GMD
trying to use a two-stage in Europe, and we have a THAAD
program and a Patriot program, but we're shifting a good deal
of money and resources to what is projected to work, an SM-3
Block IIB, that I think now will be about 2020 before it's
projected to be ready to deploy. Would that be about right,
General O'Reilly?
General O'Reilly. Sir, that's what we projected last year.
But our budget we received--we requested $123.5 million. We
received $13 million. So that has effectively delayed the
program a year because we didn't have the funding to execute.
So 2021 I believe is a more accurate number.
Senator Sessions. We have severe financial challenges in
this country, and I'm not sure how tough it's going to be. I'm
not prepared to say that we're not going to have additional
cuts, that it's not going to be put off longer, or you might
have a technical difficulty and it's 2025, when we could have
had in the ground, as I understand it, the two-stage by what,
2017, something like that? What was the plan for the two-stage
GMD for the Polish site? How long would it have been to be
deployed?
General O'Reilly. Sir, first of all, we flew the two-stage
2 years ago and it has the same KV on it that we have in our
three-stage. So we believe it is a very mature missile design
and capability.
As I recall, it was a 2014 delivery when we finished, when
we'd begin delivering those. I defer to Dr. Roberts. I'm trying
to remember.
Dr. Roberts. Sir, when I assumed my responsibilities my
first briefing on the European third site was that initial
operational capability (IOC) had slipped to 2018. At the same
time, we'd also lost the support of the Czech Government for
the radar. But that was IOC, and as a result of the approach
that we've taken with our allies we now actually have what
might equate to IOC. We actually have phase one of the PAA
already in place, the capabilities in place, radars deployed.
We will continue to grow this capability to protect our
forces and to give our allies opportunities to protect
themselves. In other words, we will have covered a lot of
ground in providing protection against the emerging Iranian
threat, that would not have been covered at all until IOC,
whenever it was. The briefing I got was 2018.
So we can have a discussion about whether beyond 2018 we're
on the right path, where you grow the capability. But the
regional approach that's now in place puts capability into the
field now that wasn't planned for another few years.
Senator Sessions. I'm aware that this happened. I think
some of it was to try to accommodate the Russians' concerns.
But I believe had we been strong and firm the Czechs would have
stayed in line, I think the Poles would have been happy to see
the system deployed, and we would be on the road to doing it
now. I'm a little bit concerned about where it all will end.
We'll need to look at that. I just share that concern.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Dr. Gilmore, there have been numerous concerns raised over
the years, especially after flight test failures, that our
missile defense systems won't work in an effective manner.
There have been some recent press articles on this. Part of
your job is to evaluate whether our missile defense systems
have demonstrated that they will work effectively in an
operational environment. Do you believe that testing to date
has demonstrated that our fielded systems are able to
accomplish their initial missions and are improving in their
capability against increasing missions?
Dr. Gilmore. Testing to date has demonstrated the systems
can work. What I will not make is a statement about confidence
in the performance of the systems, because a statement of
confidence for me is a statistical statement and it won't be
ready for some time. As I have said in the two or three reports
to Congress that I have submitted on testing of BMD, until we
have, as I pointed out in my comments a minute ago, conducted
enough flight tests, which will give us the information needed
to verify, validate, and accredit the models that we will have
to use in order to evaluate the performance of the systems
across the full battle space in which they'll have to operate.
In the report that I submitted this year, I provided
quantitative estimates of performance and confidence in that
performance for Aegis and Patriot. We're close and next year
we'll provide the same kind of information on THAAD. But it
takes time to gather the data, to verify, validate, and
accredit the models. That is the focus of the test program and
it will take a number of more years until we can do that
comprehensively for all the elements of the system.
We're continuing to gather data and improve the models, so
we're making progress in that regard constantly. But a
complete, comprehensive assessment is still a number of years
away.
Senator Nelson. General Formica, from the warfighter's
perspective, do you have confidence in the capability of our
fielded missile defense systems, and do you agree that they're
becoming more capable?
General Formica. Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman. The
warfighter actively participates in and supports MDA's robust
test program. The test program enables the system to
demonstrate reliability in its performance. It improves
warfighter confidence in the systems as they continue to test.
It allows operators to develop tactics, techniques, and
procedures so that when those systems are eventually fielded we
are ahead of the game in having those procedures in place and
begin to develop them, and it allows for us to begin training
our operators. Finally, it provides an opportunity for
interface between the operator and the material developer early
on, so that they can consider adjustments based on operator
input.
So we support the test program, have confidence, continued
growing confidence in the capability of the BMD system, and do
agree that it is improving.
Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, from time to time as
failures have occurred I'm sure that others have talked to you
about those failures and asked questions as to what you're
going to do to fix them. What do you say when people ask you
whether or not these systems are going to work effectively if
needed, after the failures?
General O'Reilly. Sir, what we do is as we proceed forward
with our flight test programs, we make each test tougher. We've
had in the last 10 years, as I recall, 51 intercepts or 52
intercepts out of 64 hit-to-kill intercepts. So we have a very
high percentage of success. But each test we make it, again
working with Dr. Gilmore and the test community, we make it
harder.
We also test in different environments. The basic
environments, which for GMD for example, we've gone through the
functionality. We've flown the older version. A large portion
of the current version of our fleet of GBIs has flown five
times and we have not found significant issues with it and we
adjust to it.
But when we have a failure, we have a very disciplined
process. In fact, our failure review boards are formed before
we have a test, just to make sure we don't lose anything and we
can immediately capture data. Then it takes an extreme amount
of analysis. These are complex programs, complex systems. We
not only determine with renowned experts from around the
country what the probable cause is. I require they demonstrate
it to me, they prove it, that this is a failure.
If they come up with three or four things that could have
been the failure and they can't prove any one of them, then we
do fixes to all of those probable causes. So that's a key
point, sir. Our flight test at the end of this year is a non-
intercept test, purposefully, because we're going to fly that
missile in a much rougher environment than you normally would
in any of our missions to protect the United States, just to
validate that we have solved this problem.
Senator Nelson. There has been some confusion about the SM-
3, Block IIB system that's intended for phase 4 of the EPAA to
missile defense. In addition to providing robust defense of our
forces and allies in Europe against potential long-range
missiles from Iran, it would also augment our Homeland defense
capability by providing a forward-based and cost-effective
early defense capability against potential future long-range
Iranian missiles that could reach the United States.
General O'Reilly, can you explain why you believe, if you
do, the SM-3 IIB is important to our Homeland defense and what
the impact would be if we didn't develop it.
General O'Reilly. Sir, there's two levels of answers to
this. First of all, the SM-3 IIB program is designed to be a
program that intercepts a long-range ballistic missile, an
ICBM, and that is what it's designed to do, a longer-range
missile. That is its primary purpose. It's to intercept it if
you're in the right location and you're on a mobile launcher,
like a ship.
If you intercept--and you can have a quite small missile
compared to the capability if you're in the right location for
the threat. If you're worried about, an example, Iran in the
future and the United States, it's goal-tending. You get into
the right position.
The benefit of it is our regional systems are built by
having shoot-look-shoot. You have several opportunities to make
an attempt and then determine have you been successful, and
then you shoot again. We have that for all our regional
systems. We do not have that for our Homeland defense system,
for all of the scenarios for Homeland defense. We want that so
that GMD is the system we're dedicated to and it is our primary
defense, but we would first like to have a shot at any early
intercept to determine whether or not we need to shoot the
second one.
The second is, sir, is that in our industrial base we have
a limited opportunity for companies to continue to compete and
use their well-developed design teams in order to develop an
intercept program to accomplish that capability.
So I am concerned about the industrial base and I am
concerned about the opportunity for multiple companies. I think
it's important for competition that multiple companies have the
opportunity to compete for our missile defense interceptor
programs. Without the IIB program, that tremendously limits the
ability for the industrial base to maintain their expertise and
capability.
Dr. Roberts. Sir, may I add an additional point to the
discussion?
Senator Nelson. Sure, please.
Dr. Roberts. This goes to Senator Sessions' concern about
the balance of investment between GBIs and SM-3 IIB. General
O'Reilly has set out the important operational benefit of being
able to have two tiers in this defense of the Homeland. So when
we've talked about EPAA phase 4, people associate the SM-3 IIB
with the defense of Europe. Yes, we'll have some ancillary
benefit there, but phase 4 is about the defense of the
Homeland. It's getting that first shot in early.
An entirely separate discussion is cost. We all expect
we're going to have to continue to grow missile defense of the
Homeland for a long time to come. The proliferation trends are
clear enough. There's a question of when threats will mature,
but we don't expect them to stop maturing.
So we've tried to take a long-term look while ensuring that
we remain well-protected in the short- and medium-term. So
strengthening the defense of the Homeland involves addressing
the technical problems in the GMD system, the results of
concurrency that we discussed earlier. It involves being well-
hedged against the possibility that we need to put a lot more
capability into the ground quickly because there's a breakout
somewhere that would somehow call into question the fact that
we're already well-protected with 30 GBIs in the ground.
But looking ahead to the future growth, we'd rather put
that future growth in two areas: first, improving the
performance of the existing system. If your shot doctrine is
four to one, six to one, eight to one, you're much better off
having a shot doctrine of two to one than buying a whole bunch
of new GBIs.
Second, we'd like to put money into the IIB because it
gives you the opportunity to grow at a much more cost-
affordable way that future capability we're going to need. So
from our perspective it's not a ransack the GBI budget to go do
regional missile defense. Rather, it's a strategy for
strengthening the Homeland defense over the long-term in a way
that is cost affordable and enhances the performance of the
system through the addition of this second layer.
Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Dr. Gilmore. Just one additional comment.
Senator Nelson. Sure.
Dr. Gilmore. With regard to the GMD test program, the
content and pace of the GMD test program is essentially the
same today as it was when I first looked at the integrated
master test plan when I first took office almost 3 years ago.
So it is not the case that we have used the GMD test program
budget to pay for anything else in this budget or in previous
budgets.
Senator Nelson. Senator Sessions?
Senator Sessions. I'll just say this about the SM-3 Block
IIB. It's not developed, it's not on the assembly line, it's
not ready to be deployed, it's not a mature technology. We've
gone from a bird in the hand to two in the bush. You're not
going to be here probably, Mr. Roberts, and President Obama is
not going to be here, in 2022, 2023, 2024, whenever this thing,
if it ever gets funded to conclusion.
So we've gone from a virtual certainty to a very uncertain
situation. From a politician who handles the money and knowing
what we're going to be looking like, that's what we're doing.
I'm uneasy about it, frankly.
General O'Reilly, you talked about competition. You had
some success with competition recently you were sharing with
me. I was very impressed. Maybe we ought to hear that and what
your concerns might be if we lose competition in the future.
General O'Reilly. Sir, we have had a benefit. We've had
multiple programs. In, first of all, our GMD contract, it was
over 10 years old. We have recompeted it. We believe because of
the competition the actual cost of the contract was a billion
dollars less than the government cost estimate that looked at
all the factors, and we use history to predict what the cost of
the contract should be.
We saw extremely innovative ideas in the company that
ultimately won, Boeing, in order to save costs and have a very
effective program.
There were some other benefits, too. Because we were in a
competitive situation, it allows the government to make clear
what its desires are and to ensure that industry is highly
motivated to respond. For example, our defects clause that's in
this contract now. Previously, if we had a flight test failure,
there's a limited amount of award fee money that we had planned
to award the contractor, given a successful flight. Often,
though, the failure of a flight can cost many times more than
that award fee.
Under the new contract, all of their award fee from the
moment the contract was first awarded is under consideration,
rather than just the award fee associated for an event if the
government determines harm has occurred to the government by a
failure or something that we determine should have been
preventable.
We have great access to data within the program that often
isn't part of another contract. So we think that the
competition, sir, has saved in this case $1 billion. We have
also determined that we've had several others. This isn't the
only one. We have a trend. Every time we've competed in our
missile programs and targets programs, the savings has been in
the hundreds of millions of dollars. This is all over the past
year alone.
Senator Sessions. I think that's good news, and I think
some of the things that we were prepared to pay a lot of money
for because they were so difficult and unproven, once the
technology has become available, it's like computers and cell
phones to some degree; they're just less expensive today.
Hopefully, we can build on all that good work that's been done
and the price per copy of a lot of the new systems will be less
and we can achieve even better capabilities.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is an important part of
America's defense. One of the things that I learned a number of
years ago--when the issue was hot and I asked people at town
meetings, what would happen if a country launched a missile at
us, and they said: We'd shoot it down. This was before the GMD
was in the ground. I think there's a general perception by the
American people that we have perhaps more capability than we
do. But we have some people that think the system won't work at
all, that it's too complex and can't work.
But the truth is, we are developing a missile defense
capability that is reliable, that consistently defends America,
but we need more of them. We need to keep the cost low. I think
all in all we've accomplished more than a lot of people ever
thought possible. So I congratulate all of you.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
I have one final question. General O'Reilly, the Aegis BMD
program had a flight test failure last September during the
first flight test of the SM-3 Block IB missile, which has
delayed the scheduled production of that missile, and now it
requires a plan to fix the problem and demonstrate the fix in
flight testing. Can you tell us the likely cause, if it's not a
matter of security, and how you're planning to correct it, and
give us some indication of the criteria for a production
decision on it? Do you agree in general that we should
demonstrate the problem is corrected in flight testing before
we make a full rate production decision?
General O'Reilly. Sir, I offer to answer that question in a
closed session. I can describe the exact reason why we believe
the failure occurred. I can say we've duplicated it many times
on the ground. We've proven this is the cause. We fly again
next month. To answer your question, sir, there were planned
three flight tests across the summer, and next year three more,
to firmly address that we have resolved it and flown it in many
different scenarios before we go for a production decision.
Senator Nelson. We don't have a getting-the-cart-before-
the-horse situation here at all. You're going through a very
significant methodology of identifying the problem, with a plan
to fix it and test it before production; is that fair?
General O'Reilly. Sir, that is fair, and it's the same
criteria we set with Dr. Gilmore years ago. The criteria hasn't
changed. When we have a failure and a problem, we maintain the
criteria. We just have to be ready to continue on with the
flight testing.
So effectively it has delayed the start of the production,
but again to address risk for EPAA phase 2 which it will be
used in, that's a 2015 deployment. So we're many years in front
of it right now.
Senator Nelson. The delay is just a structural
technological delay, not as a result of not having enough money
to be able to do the testing?
General O'Reilly. No, sir. It's not related to funding.
Senator Nelson. I want to add my appreciation to all of you
today. I think we've set a record for an abbreviated hearing,
but I think if there are other questions we'll be submitting
them, and the record will remain open until next Tuesday to try
to get as many questions answered if there are remaining
questions.
Thank you very much.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Chairman, I just would say how much
I've enjoyed working with you on this. Your leadership, your
commitment to developing the kind of strategic capability this
Nation needs to protect us, that's been your goal from the
beginning. You've been an honest and strong advocate for those
issues. So it's been a good hearing and I appreciate the
opportunity to be with you again.
Senator Nelson. Thank you very much for those kind remarks.
I'm really glad that you did arrive at the hearing in time to
be able to make those remarks as well. [Laughter.]
General Formica. Mr. Chairman, can I make one closing
thought?
Senator Nelson. Sure.
General Formica. I appreciate the discussion today and the
investment of the technology and the systems that will deliver
BMD, and we appreciate this committee's support for that. We
recognize that there will never be enough and so there are
other opportunities that we have to take in the offense/defense
mix. But most importantly, we appreciate the support of the
committee in investing in the soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, and civilians who will operate these systems, and we
appreciate your commitment to them.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, and we should never forget them.
They are essentially what makes this country strong and what
will help our defense against these kinds of threats.
So thank you all and thank them for us, too.
General Formica. Thank you, Senator. I will.
STATEMENT OF BRADLEY H. ROBERTS, Ph.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY
[The oral and prepared statements of Dr. Roberts follow:]
Oral Statement by Dr. Bradley H. Roberts
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, members of the committee,
it is my pleasure to appear before you today in support of the
President's fiscal year 2013 budget request for ballistic missile
defense (BMD). I have prepared a formal written statement and would
like to submit that for the record. That statement:
reviews the key policy priorities as set out in the
administration's 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (MDR)
and
describes our progress in advancing three of those
goals:
sustaining a strong Homeland defense posture
strengthening regional defense, and
increasing international cooperation for
missile defense.
In these introductory remarks, I would like to focus in on the
overall balance in our missile defense strategy and investments.
Specifically, I want to address the concern expressed by some that we
have put regional defense ahead of Homeland defense.
On regional defense, in our assessment there is both a need and
opportunity to strengthen our defensive posture.
The need arises from the rapidly emerging threats to
our forces in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia from
regional missile proliferators and the basic challenge such
proliferation poses to the safety and security of our forces
and allies and to our power projection strategy.
The opportunity to strengthen our regional posture
arises from the fact that investments made over the last 2-3
decades have resulted in effective and affordable protection
against these missiles.
There is also an important knock-on effect for
Homeland defense, which can be made more effective with the
deployment of some assets closer to the threat.
Accordingly, we have put in place an investment program to ramp up
these regional defense capabilities over the years ahead. These
regional missile defense programs also provide an increasingly
promising opportunity for burden sharing with our allies and partners.
They are not along for a free ride.
Our first priority, however, is and remains Homeland defense. We
are committed to strengthening the Homeland defense posture and to
ensuring that it remains overwhelmingly advantageous for the United
States even in the face of future missile proliferation. Therefore, the
question is not whether we should continue to strengthen Homeland
defense--I believe we are in agreement on this--but how best to
strengthen it.
A simple way to grow the posture is to put more ground-based
interceptors (GBI) into the ground, whether at one of the existing
sites or at a new one. We prefer a different approach, one that relies
on a pairing of GBIs and Standard Missile-3 (SM-3)-IIBs. Here is our
case:
1. For regional defense, we now have two layers of protection. The
homeland deserves the same. Depth and redundancy are better than
reliance on a single system.
2. Effectively exploiting the full missile defense battle space
requires forward and rear basing of interceptors. A shoot-look-shoot
capability is more effective--and more efficient--with forward
placement of the first shooter.
3. Forward placement of the first shooter becomes even more
important if and as proliferators field missile defense
countermeasures.
4. A ramp up of SM-3-IIB capability will be much more affordable
than a ramp up of GBIs. With the SM-3-IIB projected to be roughly one-
third the cost of the GBI, we can grow capability at triple the rate
for each dollar invested.
Until the SM-3-IIB becomes available, our focus for Homeland
defense needs to be on improving the performance of the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense (GMD) system. Working closely with the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA), we have determined that significant improvement
is possible in the performance of the existing GMD system. Indeed, the
performance can be at least doubled. In essence, we can double the
number of ICBMs the current force is capable of defeating without
adding a single new GBI.
This paired strategy (GBI and SM-3-IIB) for strengthening the
Homeland defense posture directly informs the work we have had underway
in the Department of Defense since conclusion of the Ballistic Missile
Defense Review (BMDR) on how best to hedge against new threats to the
homeland that could call into question the viability ofthe existing
posture before the SM-3-IIB becomes available. The hedge analysis has
informed the budget you are now considering: for example, the proposed
addition of the east coast data relay center derives from that work, as
does the decision to keep the GBI production line open. We continue to
analyze additional steps that might be taken, as well as the
intelligence information that informs such decisions. No option has
been ruled out, but nor have we determined a need for additional steps
at this time. We recognize our obligation to report to you on this work
in a classified session and are committed to doing so as soon as the
current cycle of analysis is complete.
The budget before you reflects this balanced approach to missile
defense. Approximately one third of that budget is uniquely associated
with regional missile defense. The rest is either uniquely associated
with Homeland defense or supports both domains. As a result of the
Budget Control Act, we have had to accept some additional risk in these
programs. But the budget before you preserves our full set of
commitments to homeland and regional defense.
In sum, in the BMDR we promised:
a balanced approach and
an affordable approach that would ensure stronger
protection for our forces and allies abroad and effective
Homeland defense in both the near-term and longer-term.
We believe that the current budget effectively supports these
commitments and hope that it will benefit from your support. I look
forward to answering your questions.
______
Prepared Statement by Dr. Bradley H. Roberts
introduction
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify in support of
the Department's fiscal year 2013 budget request for missile defense.
As the new defense strategy makes clear, ballistic missile defense is a
key capability for the United States with important ramifications in
several of the Department's key mission areas.
In February 2010, the administration completed the statutorily
required review of missile defense policies and plans, the Ballistic
Missile Defense Review (BMDR). This comprehensive review set out the
following key policy priorities:
First: The United States will continue to defend the
homeland against the threat of limited ballistic missile
attack.
Second: The United States will defend against regional
missile threats to U.S. forces, while protecting allies and
partners--and enabling them to defend themselves.
Third: Before new capabilities are deployed, they must
undergo testing that enables assessment under realistic
operational conditions.
Fourth: The commitment to new capabilities must be
fiscally sustainable over the long term.
Fifth: Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capabilities
must be flexible enough to adapt as threats change.
Sixth: The United States will seek to lead expanded
international efforts for missile defense.
A year ago, we provided you an update on the status of our efforts
to implement these policies. That testimony highlighted our progress
with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in
implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).
This year I would like to focus on our progress in three key areas:
sustaining a strong Homeland defense, strengthening regional missile
defense, and fostering increased international cooperation.
sustaining a strong homeland defense
On Homeland defense, our policy is informed by the following key
judgments:
The homeland is currently protected against potential
limited intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attacks from
states like North Korea and Iran. This is a result of the
steady progress over the past decade in developing and
deploying the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system. This
system consists of Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs), early-
warning radars, sea-based radar systems, and a sophisticated
command and control architecture. With 30 GBIs in place, the
United States is in an advantageous position vis-a-vis the
threats from North Korea and Iran. Although both countries have
active programs to develop long-range ballistic missiles and
space-launch vehicles, most recently evidenced by North Korea's
failed attempt to launch a Taepo Dong-2 missile, neither has
successfully tested an ICBM or demonstrated an ICBM-class
warhead.
Maintaining this advantageous position is essential.
This requires continued improvement to the GMD system,
including enhanced performance by the GBIs and the deployment
of new sensors. It also requires the development of the
Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS) to handle larger raid
sizes and the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIB as the ICBM
threat from states like Iran and North Korea matures. These
efforts will help to ensure that the United States possesses
the capability to counter the projected threat for the
foreseeable future.
The United States must also be well hedged against the
possibility that new threats may emerge so rapidly as to call
into question the currently advantageous position. It is also
prudent for the United States to have a hedge strategy to
address possible delays in the development of our missile
defense. Key elements of the hedge strategy were set out in the
BMDR 2 years ago, including completion of the second field of
14 silos at Fort Greely, AK. This increases the availability of
silos in the event that additional GBI deployments become
necessary. Additionally, we continue to develop the two-stage
GBI. In addition, the BMDR conveyed the administration's
commitment to pursue additional programs to hedge against
future uncertainties.
The commitment to continued improvement of the GMD system is
reflected in budget requests to:
Implement an aggressive GBI reliability improvement
program;
Deploy forward-based AN/TPY-2 radars;
Develop the Precision Tracking Space System;
Upgrade the Command, Control, Battle Management, and
Communications (C2BMC) system;
Emplace an additional In-Flight Interceptor
Communications System Data Terminal on the U.S. East Coast; and
Upgrade the Early Warning Radars at Clear, AK, and
Cape Cod, MA, by 2017; and
Accelerate C2BMC development and discrimination
software to handle larger raid sizes.
These improvements in sensor coverage, command and control, and
interceptor reliability will have a significant impact on the expected
performance of the GMD system. Their net effect will be to reduce the
number of GBIs required per intercept, which will increase the number
of ICBMs that can be defeated by the GMD system.
The commitment to the SM-3 IIB as part of the longer-term solution
is reflected in a request for a renewal of full funding for its
development. Due to congressional actions , the SM-3 IIB program has
been delayed by a year. The SM-3 IIB interceptor is now scheduled to be
available for deployment in 2021 timeframe. When deployed in Europe,
the SM-3 IIB will provide an opportunity for early intercept of
potential Iranian ICBMs. This will also provide the United States with
an additional type of interceptor for defeating ICBMs.
The commitment to being well hedged is reflected in a request to
purchase an additional five GBIs. This will ensure the capability to
emplace additional missiles rapidly in Missile Field 2, if necessary.
It will also maintain enough GBIs for testing and operational spares.
This decision also keeps the GBI production line ``warm'' in case the
purchase of additional GBIs is needed in the future. These decisions
follow the Department's commitment to pursue ``additional programs to
hedge against future uncertainty,'' as stated in the 2010 BMDR Report.
To support those decisions, the Department is conducting a
comprehensive review of possible future developments in the threat and
of how best to ensure timely response to currently unpredicted
developments. The Department will provide a classified summary of this
work to the Subcommittee.
strengthen regional missile defenses
On regional missile defense, our policy is informed by the
following key judgments:
After a decade of significant progress in developing
and fielding capabilities for protection against short- and
medium-range ballistic missiles, the United States is capable
now of significantly strengthening protection of its forces
abroad and assisting its allies and partners in providing for
their own defense.
The need to strengthen protection significantly is
clear, as the threat is rapidly expanding in regions where the
United States offers security assurances.
Fixed architectures lack the flexibility to meet rapid
and unexpected developments in the regional missile threat, so
a more flexible approach is needed.
Regional approaches must be tailored to the unique
deterrence and defense requirements of each region, which vary
considerably in their geography, history, and character of the
threat faced, and in the military-to-military relationships on
which we seek to build cooperative missile defenses.
Because the demand for missile defense assets within
each region over the next decade will exceed supply, the United
States will develop capabilities that are mobile and
relocatable.
Missile defense is an integral part of a comprehensive
U.S. effort to strengthen regional deterrence architectures. It
plays a central role in the new strategic guidance the
Department released in January 2012.
Regional missile defense architectures are not meant
as a substitute for the defense of the homeland. However, over
time they can become effective means to that end if threats to
the homeland appear in specific regions as states like Iran and
North Korea develop and deploy intercontinental-range
capabilities.
The BMDR set out this new policy framework and committed the United
States to pursue a phased adaptive approach (PAA) to missile defense
within each region. The 2010 BMDR Report set out in detail the first
regional application--in Europe. It also indicated that the approach
would be applied in East Asia and the Middle East. A short summary of
our progress on each of these projects follows.
paa implementation: europe
A year ago, we were pleased to be able to report to you substantial
progress within NATO in support of missile defense. At the November
2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, NATO Heads of State and Government had
taken the unprecedented step of deciding to put in place full coverage
and protection for the Alliance's European populations, territories,
and forces against ballistic missile attacks. NATO also decided at
Lisbon to expand its existing missile defense command-and-control
backbone--the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
(ALTBMD)--to encompass territorial missile defense. ALTBMD's initial
capability is now in place, and will continue to evolve towards full
capacity in 2018. EPAA will be the U.S. contribution to NATO missile
defense. More than 1 year ago, the first deployment of EPAA
capabilities came when the guided missile cruiser USS Monterey,
carrying SM-3 interceptors, deployed to Europe in March 2011.
We also have continued to make steady progress in implementing all
four phases of the EPAA.
The elements of the first phase of EPAA are now in place. As noted,
Phase 1 began with deployment of the first BMD-capable ship in March
2011. We have continued to maintain a sea-based missile defense
presence in the region since that time. In August of 2011, Turkey
announced that it would host the forward-based radar as part of NATO's
missile defense plan. By the end of 2011, the radar was deployed to the
Turkish military base at Kurecik. Additionally, associated command and
control capabilities are now operational, such as the U.S. Air
Operations Center at Ramstein Air Base, Germany. Also of note, ALTBMD's
interim capability is operational, and will continue to evolve towards
full capability in the 2018-2020 timeframe.
In Phase 2, the architecture will be expanded with a land-based SM-
3 site, or Aegis Ashore, in Romania, and with SM-3 Block IB
interceptors that will be deployed on land and at sea. The Ballistic
Missile Defense Agreement (BMDA) with Romania entered into force in
December 2011, so the groundwork has been set for the site to become
operational in the 2015 timeframe.
In Phase 3, a second land-based SM-3 site will be deployed in
Poland. The more capable SM-3 Block IIA interceptors will be deployed
on land and at sea, extending coverage to all NATO European countries.
The Polish BMDA entered into force in September 2011.
Finally, with respect to Phase 4, the Department has begun concept
development of a more advanced version of the SM-3 interceptor, the
Block IIB, for deployment in the 2021 timeframe. This interceptor will
be an especially important enhancement to the EPAA because Iran
continues to develop ballistic missiles that are capable of threatening
all of NATO Europe and the technology needed to field an ICBM that
could threaten the U.S. Homeland. The SM-3 IIB will be the most capable
interceptor for addressing intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)
threats to Europe and will enhance the protection of the United States
by providing an early shot against an Iranian ICBM headed towards the
U.S. Homeland.
We have also taken steps to resource the requirement for sea-based
BMD capabilities efficiently in all phases of the EPAA. Spain has
agreed to host four U.S. Aegis destroyers at the existing naval
facility at Rota. These multi-mission ships will support the EPAA, as
well as other U.S. European Command and NATO maritime missions. The
first two ships are scheduled to arrive in 2014, and two more ships
will arrive in 2015.
nato missile defense
As we continue to implement the EPAA, we are also supporting the
President's commitment to contribute the EPAA capabilities to NATO
missile defense. The U.S. decision to implement the EPAA in a NATO
context was instrumental in building a strong consensus among the
allies in support of missile defense.
NATO is now focusing on defining the command and control procedures
that will guide how NATO missile defense will operate. At the May 2012
NATO Summit in Chicago, the United States and the allies plan to
declare that NATO has achieved an ``Interim BMD Capability.''
In essence, this will mean that each nation's missile defense
contributions, including the U.S. EPAA assets, will operate under the
same ``playbook'' developed and agreed by allies. Much of this work has
already been completed, and the United States will continue to support
and guide these efforts to ensure that NATO missile defense procedures
result in the most effective and efficient missile defense protection
of NATO European populations, territory, and forces possible.
As the EPAA continues to evolve, so will NATO missile defense. In
the coming years, NATO will work towards future milestones for
territorial missile defense. NATO is fully engaged in developing the
details necessary to implement fully the alliance missile defense
decisions announced at the Lisbon Summit. Key enhancements of the
future NATO missile defense capability will include:
Engagement coordination among allies to ensure the
most efficient defense;
Real-time sharing of engagement-quality data to
improve the chances of engagement success;
The ability to coordinate and manage ``upper-layer''
missile defense capabilities (defense against longer-range
threats).
As a result, NATO's capacity to accommodate and coordinate
additional allied contributions will grow. Meanwhile, the United States
will continue to deploy all four phases of the EPAA as a contribution
to NATO missile defense.
There are still some complicated issues that must be resolved, as
there are with any new capability at NATO, but the work is being driven
by the political consensus achieved at Lisbon. The allies agree that
the ballistic missile threat to NATO is growing more urgent, not less.
Furthermore, we agree that missile defense is a critical new capability
in order to meet this threat and adapt to the evolving 21st century
security landscape.
phased adaptive approaches in other regions
We are also working to implement the principles of the phased
adaptive approach in the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East,
building on the existing foundations of U.S. defense cooperation in
these regions. These regional approaches must be tailored to the unique
mix of threat and geography in each region. In Asia, the security
environment is largely maritime in character, with some vast distances.
The Middle East is far more compact, and the threat comes from missiles
of short and medium range. Moreover, the footprint of U.S. military
presence is different in each region, and will evolve in different ways
over the coming decade. The potential threat to the U.S. Homeland from
regional actors varies, and with it requirements for the role that
regional defenses play in protection of the United States change as
well.
These regional approaches to ballistic missile defense should allow
strong partnerships with regional allies and partners in meeting
emerging security challenges, and provide opportunities for building
partner capacity.
strengthening international cooperation
There has been significant progress in the area of international
cooperation on missile defense. Let me highlight a few areas of
particular note.
Europe
Within NATO, allies are stepping up as contributors to the NATO
missile defense effort. Germany and the Netherlands currently field
Patriot PAC-3, Greece and Spain operate Patriot PAC-2, and France and
Italy have the SAMP/T system, which has capabilities similar to those
of the Patriot.
Other allies plan to commit additional capabilities to contribute
to NATO missile defense. The Netherlands has approved plans and funding
to upgrade the SMART-L radar on four air defense frigates, giving the
ships a BMD sensor capability. Additional sensor capabilities can
greatly enhance the effectiveness of a BMD architecture. Germany is
also exploring airborne sensor concepts that could support NATO BMD. In
addition, France has proposed a concept for a shared-early warning
satellite, and is developing a transportable midcourse radar for BMD
and early warning.
NATO allies have shown their financial, political, and military
support for the implementation of EPAA and NATO missile defense in
other ways. The commitment to upgrade the ALTBMD command and control
system noted above was backed with an alliance funding commitment.
Turkey, Romania, Poland, and Spain have all agreed to host U.S. assets
in support of NATO missile defense. These host governments will bear
the costs of providing perimeter defense and security for the U.S.
assets and infrastructure.
Looking to the future, the United States will continue to encourage
its NATO allies to do even more to cooperate and invest in missile
defense. Several allies have modern surface combatant ships that could
be upgraded with a BMD sensor or shooter capability. A number of NATO
allies also have proposed concepts for a multinational interceptor
``pool'' concept, whereby allies collectively purchase interceptors
such as the SM-3 to support NATO missile defense. Additionally, some
allies are considering the purchase of Patriot PAC-3.
Asia-Pacific
In the Asia-Pacific region, Japan has acquired its own layered
missile defense system, and the United States and Japan regularly train
together, learn from each other, and have successfully executed
cooperative BMD exercises and operations. The United States and Japan
are also partnering in the co-development of an advanced version of the
SM-3 interceptor, the SM-3 Block IIA.
The United States and Australia signed a memorandum of
understanding on missile defense cooperation in 2004 and partner on
ballistic missile defense research and development, most notably in the
field of sensors.
The United States also continues to consult with the Republic of
Korea regarding its future ballistic missile defense requirements.
The United States engages in a trilateral dialogue with Japan and
Australia, and separate trilateral dialogue with Japan and the Republic
of Korea. In each, we address a wide range of regional security issues,
including missile threats and defenses. These trilateral dialogues
support U.S. efforts to deepen missile defense cooperation and
strengthen regional security architectures.
Middle East
The United States and Israel cooperate extensively on missile
defense issues. We have a long history of cooperation on plans and
operations as well as specific missile defense programs. We hold
regular consultations, and have conducted joint exercises since 2001
that are aimed at improving interoperability between U.S. and Israeli
missile defense systems. In 2008, our countries worked together to
deploy a forward-based radar in Israel to enhance U.S. and Israeli
missile detection capabilities. U.S. support to the security of Israel
remains steadfast. U.S. security assistance to Israel has increased
every year since fiscal year 2009. The administration has requested
nearly $450 million for Israeli rocket and missile defense between
fiscal year 2010 and 2013 and secured an additional $205 million in
fiscal year 2011 to procure Iron Dome defense systems.
Separately, the United States is working with a number of Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries on missile defense, including
exploring the purchase of U.S. missile defenses through the Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) program. For example, the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) recently signed an FMS case to purchase Terminal High Altitude
Aerial Defense (THAAD) batteries, interceptors, and associated
equipment, and had earlier made a decision to purchase Patriot systems
from the United States. These systems will greatly enhance the UAE's
defense against ballistic missile attack. As our partners acquire
greater missile defense capabilities, the United States will work to
promote interoperability and information sharing among the GCC states.
This will allow for more efficient missile defenses and could lead to
greater security cooperation in the region.
A primary purpose of the phased adaptive approaches to regional
missile defense is to build upon this solid foundation of cooperation
in each of these regions to achieve needed protection improvements over
the coming decade.
Russia
The United States has sought cooperation with Russia on missile
defense, both bilaterally and with our allies through the NATO-Russia
Council. We are pursuing this cooperation because it would be in the
security interests of the United States, NATO, and Russia by
strengthening the defensive capabilities of both NATO and Russia.
Allies embraced such cooperation with the hope of advancing broader
strategic partnership with Russia. The United States has pursued
missile defense cooperation with Russia with the clear understanding
that we would not accept constraints on missile defense, we would
implement all four EPAA phases, and Russia would not have command and
control over the defense of NATO territory. NATO would be responsible
for the defense of NATO, and Russia would be responsible for the
defense of Russia.
The United States has kept Congress and our allies informed about
our efforts to reach agreement with Russia to cooperate on missile
defense, which have included the proposal of two missile defense
cooperation centers in Europe. The United States has been open and
transparent with Russia about our plans for missile defenses in Europe,
and explained our view that missile defense in Europe does not negate
the Russian strategic nuclear deterrent.
Although we have had no breakthroughs, the administration remains
committed to pursuing substantive missile defense cooperation with
Russia because it remains in our security interests to do so and, as
President Medvedev noted in a statement last fall, Russia indicates
that it remains open to further discussions and seeks a mutually
acceptable agreement on the way forward.
the president's budget for fiscal year 2013
The fiscal year 2013 budget requests $9.7 billion in fiscal year
2013 and $47.4 billion over the next 5 years to develop and deploy
missile defense capabilities that protect the U.S. Homeland and
strengthen regional missile defenses. This number is less than last
year's request, but it nevertheless demonstrates a continued high-level
commitment to developing cost-effective missile defense capabilities
while maintaining our commitments to homeland and regional defense. The
phased adaptive approach to regional missile defense is fully in line
with the main themes of U.S. defense strategy in a period of budget
austerity.
This approach puts emphasis on a flexible military toolkit with
forces that are mobile and scaleable so that they underwrite deterrence
in peacetime, but can be surged in crisis to support additional
warfighter requirements.
On Homeland defense, the budget takes advantage of savings from the
GMD system competition, while continuing to improve the performance of
the system and at the same time hedging against uncertainty. With
regard to regional missile defenses, the budget request continues to
increase the pool of mobile, relocatable assets for the phased adaptive
approaches--but at a somewhat slower rate. This budget includes the
purchase of an additional THAAD battery, an AN/TPY-2 radar, and SM-3 IB
interceptors, as well as the conversion of 3 Aegis ships to bring the
total number of BMD-capable ships to 32. The budget also includes $46.9
million for directed energy research. The budget forced us to make
difficult choices that entail some risk. However, the missile defense
capabilities we are pursuing enable us to field a force that is
flexible and adaptive, and that can surge to meet the requirements of
an uncertain future.
The fiscal year 2013 budget request also includes funding for the
SM-3 IIB and PTSS, two programs that faced congressional reductions in
the previous budget that will cause delays in their deployment
timelines. These programs are vital to addressing the long-term threats
from regional actors such as Iran and North Korea, so slips in the
program schedules due to budget reductions introduce additional risk.
The SM-3 IIB will provide improved protection against IRBM threats as
well as supplement the protection of the homeland provided by the GMD
system against ICBM threats with a significantly lower cost interceptor
than the GBI. PTSS will also contribute to both homeland and regional
missile defense by providing persistent coverage and tracking of
ballistic missiles over their entire flights and address larger raid
sizes. This will improve the performance of our missile defenses by
providing better data to the interceptors and allowing us to allocate
terrestrial sensor resources more efficiently.
conclusion
With your support, we have been able to make significant progress
in strengthening the protection of the United States, our forces, and
our allies and partners abroad from the threat of coercion and attack
by ballistic missiles. We appreciate congressional support for the
President's missile defense annual budget requests, and in these more
austere budget times, we hope for your continued support. We have had
to make some difficult choices in this year's budget, but the result is
fully consistent with the policy commitments set out in the BMDR.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to speak here today before the
members of this subcommittee. I look forward to answering your
questions.
STATEMENT OF LTG PATRICK J. O'REILLY, USA, DIRECTOR, MISSILE
DEFENSE AGENCY
[The oral and prepared statements of General O'Reilly
follow:]
Oral Statement by LTG Patrick J. O'Reilly, USA
Good afternoon, Chairman Nelson, Ranking member Sessions, and other
distinguished members of the subcommittee. The Missile Defense Agency's
(MDA) $7.75 billion fiscal year 2013 President's budget request
balances: the Secretary of Defense's policies; U.S. Strategic Command's
Missile Defense Priorities; the MDA's technical feasibility
assessments; budget affordability; and Intelligence Community
estimates. I describe our past year's accomplishments and justification
of this year's budget request in my written statement submitted to this
committee. However, I'd like to highlight that last year we improved
our Homeland defense by activating our newest missile field and an
additional fire control node at Fort Greely, AK, and an Upgraded Early
Warning Radar in Thule Greenland. The agency's highest priority is to
intercept a missile with the newest version of our Ground-Based
Interceptor (GBI) after two previous flight test failures. We conducted
a failure review by renowned experts, redesigned critical GBI
components, and established more stringent component manufacturing
requirements. We incurred delays meeting those stringent requirements,
but we will not execute flight tests until our engineers and
independent experts are convinced that we have resolved all issues. We
anticipate our next non-intercept flight test by the end of this year
to verify issue resolution and then conduct an intercept flight test
early next year before we re-activate the GBI production line. This
year, we will also activate our hardened power plant at Fort Greely,
AK, and we will increase the firepower of fielded GBIs by upgrading the
reliability of GBI components. Finally, we continue to enhance the Sea-
Based X-band radar, but we have cost-effectively limited its operations
to flight testing and contingency deployments under the command of the
Navy's Pacific Fleet.
During the past year we: deployed on-time the first phase of the
European Phased Adaptive Approach, demonstrated an Aegis intercept of a
3,700 km target, and simUltaneously intercepted two missiles with the
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. This year, the
first two THAAD batteries will be available for deployment; the number
of total Aegis BMD capable ships will reach 29; we will conduct three
SM-3 Block IB flight tests to demonstrate the resolution of last year's
flight test failure; and we will conduct the largest missile defense
test in history by simultaneously intercepting three ballistic missiles
and two cruise missiles with an integrated Patriot, THAAD. Aegis BMD
and forward based radar systems. We also continue to work with over 20
countries. including cooperative development programs with Israel and
Japan, the first foreign military sale of THAAD to the UAE, and support
discussions with the Russians on cooperative missile defense.
I am concerned about developing the critically needed, persistent,
and cost effective missile tracking capability of the Precision
Tracking Space System and developing a second, independent, and layer
of Homeland defense with the SM-3 IIB interceptor due to fiscal year
2012 congressional funding reductions to both programs. These programs
allow our homeland to benefit from the same layered missile defense
approach we successfully employ for our regional defenses.
Finally, while some concurrency of development, test, and limited
production is needed to sustain our industry base during testing, I
concur with the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) recent report
that concurrency must be balanced with program and technical risk. We
already implemented six of the seven GAO recommendations prior to the
GAO's review. For example, GMD schedule concurrency was high risk, but
in 2009 and 2010 we reviewed the risks and reduced the schedule
concurrency of the SM-3 IB and SM-3 IIA programs. However, I disagree
that the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) program schedules are
driven by Presidential directed dates. EPAA programs have risk-based
concurrency; knowledge-based program decisions, and historically-based
schedules. Finally, causes of the GBI flight test failures were
workmanship and unknown flight environments, not schedule concurrency.
Thank you and I look forward to the committee's questions.
______
Prepared Statement by LTG Patrick J. O'Reilly, USA
Good afternoon, Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, other
distinguished members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity
to testify before you today on the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) $7.75
billion fiscal year 2013 budget request to develop protection for our
Nation, our Armed Forces, allies, and partners against the
proliferation of increasingly capable ballistic missiles. The
Department developed the fiscal year 2013 President's budget request in
accordance with the February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review
(BMDR), which balanced warfighter needs as expressed in the U.S.
Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)
Prioritized Capability List (PCL) with technical feasibility and
affordability constraints and Intelligence Community updates. We
continue to demonstrate and improve the integration of sensor, fire
control, battle management, and interceptor systems that transforms
individual missile defense projects into a Ballistic Missile Defense
System (BMDS) capable of defeating large raids of a growing variety of
ballistic missiles over the next decade. For Homeland defense, last
year we completed the construction of the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense (GMD) infrastructure for protection of the U.S. Homeland
against future limited intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
threats from current regional threats including the activation of our
newest hardened missile field at Fort Greely, AK (FGA). This year, we
will continue to aggressively pursue the Agency's highest priority--
successful return to flight and intercept tests of the Capability
Enhancement II (CE II) version of the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI).
We will prepare for the next GMD non-intercept flight test by the end
of this year and our next intercept early in the following year,
activate the hardened power plant at FGA, prepare to restart the GBI
production line, and aggressively conduct component testing and
refurbish currently deployed missiles to test and improve their
reliability. For regional defenses, last year we deployed Phase 1 of
the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) consisting of a command
and control, battle management system in Germany, forward-based radar
in Turkey, and an Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) ship in the
Eastern Mediterranean Sea. This year, we will have 2 operational THAAD
batteries, convert 5 Aegis ships and upgrade 1 for a total of 29 ships
with BMD capability installed, and increase the number of associated
SM-3 interceptors. In our test program, we will conduct three flight
tests of the SM-3 Block IB to demonstrate resolution of last year's
flight test failure and its ability to intercept complex short-range
ballistic missile (SRBM) (up to 1,000km) targets. Finally, this year we
will demonstrate the maturity of our layered regional defense with the
first simultaneous intercepts of three short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles (MRBM) and two cruise missiles by an integrated
architecture of Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3, THAAD, and Aegis
BMD systems assisted by a remote AN/TPY-2 forward based radar--the
largest, most complex, live fire missile defense test in history.
enhancing homeland defense
MDA's highest priority is the successful GMD intercept flight test
of the newest GBI Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV)--the CE II EKV.
Last year, we concluded the Failure Review Board (FRB) evaluation for
the December 2010 FTG-06a flight test by identifying the most probable
cause of the failure and revising the CE II EKV design to correct the
problem. As a result of that FRB, we have redesigned critical GBI Exo-
atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) components and established more
stringent manufacturing and component test standards--standards
previously not used anywhere in the U.S. aerospace industry. As a
result of these stringent manufacturing standards, we have encountered
several delays in preparing for our next non-intercept and intercept
flight tests. MDA is fully committed to test the GMD system as soon and
often as possible, but we will not approve executing a flight test
until our engineers, and independent government and industry experts,
have been convinced that we have resolved all issues discovered in
previous testing and will be successful in our next test. Flight
testing as often as possible is our goal, but we risk further failure
if we conduct GMD testing prior to verification that we resolved
problems discovered in previous flight tests. Also, conducting flight
tests at a pace greater than once a year prohibits thorough analysis of
pre-mission and post-mission flight test data and causes greater risk
of further failure and setbacks to developing our Homeland defense
capability as rapidly as possible. If our CE II non-intercept
(Controlled Test Vehicle (CTV) flight) is not successful later this
year, we will be prepared to conduct the next test of the previous
version of the EKV (the CE I EKV) GBI test while we continue to resolve
any CE II issues in order to continue to test other improvements in our
Homeland defense. Other improvements to Homeland defense include: the
upgrades and integration of the Thule Early Warning Radar into the BMDS
to view and track threats originating in the Middle East; upgrade of
three emplaced FGA GBIs as part of our ongoing GMD fleet refurbishment
and reliability enhancement program; fielding improved GMD fire control
software to allow testing or exercises to be conducted while
simultaneously controlling the operational system; and upgrading the
FGA communications system. We activated Missile Field 2 earlier this
year, thus increasing the number of total GBI operational silos to 38
(34 at FGA and 4 at Vandenberg Air Force Base ((VAFB)) in California).
This past December, we awarded the GMD Development and Sustainment
contract, one of the Agency's largest and most complex competitive
acquisitions, with a price of almost $1 billion less than the
independent government cost estimate. For the next 7 years, this $3.5
billion contract will provide for sustainment and operations as well as
improvements and enhancements of the current capability, provide for a
robust and vigorous testing program, and deliver new and upgraded
interceptors. A key part of the scope of this new contract is
comprehensive verification and reliability testing, and upgrades as
needed, of every component of our GBIs. These component reliability
improvements and tests will require 3 years to complete and will
provide the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) commander convincing GBI
reliability data resulting in a greater number of ICBMs that can be
engaged with a higher probability of protection of our homeland.
We are requesting $903.2 million in fiscal year 2013 in RDT&E
funding for the GMD program. We plan to continue to upgrade our fleet
of 30 operational GBIs and acquire 5 additional GBIs for enhanced
testing, stockpile reliability, and spares, for a total of 57 GBIs. We
will continue GBI component vendor requalifications for the future GBI
avionics upgrade and obsolescence program.
Today, 30 operational GBIs protect the United States against a
limited ICBM raid size launched from current regional threats. If, at
some point in the future, this capability is determined to be
insufficient against a growing ICBM threat, it is possible that we can
increase the operational GBIs' fire power by utilizing all 38
operational silos, refurbishing our 6-silo prototype missile field, and
accelerating the delivery of new sensor and interceptor capabilities.
Additionally, our GBI reliability improvement program will enable more
successful intercepts with fewer GBIs with the same probability of
successful intercept. In fiscal year 2013, we will begin construction
of the GBI In-Flight Interceptor Communication System (IFCS) Data
Terminal (IDT) at Fort Drum, New York, with a completion date by 2015.
The East Coast IDT will enable communication with GBIs launched from
FGA and VAFB over longer distances, thus improving the defense of the
eastern United States. We will also continue to develop and assess the
two-stage GBI to preserve future deployment options, including an
intercept flight test in fiscal year 2014.
Because the defense of our homeland is our highest priority, we are
pursuing a layered defense concept--similar to that in regional missile
defense--to achieve high protection effectiveness by deploying more
than one independently developed missile defense interceptor system;
therefore, we will continue development of the SM-3 Block IIB to
protect our homeland in the future by creating a new first layer of
intercept opportunities, expanding the forward edge of our Homeland
defense battle space, and providing our warfighters highly feasible
``Shoot-Assess-Shoot (SAS)'' firing doctrine. The recent Defense
Science Board (DSB) agreed with our assessment that the SM-3 IIB will
be challenged to destroy ICBMs before their earliest possible
deployment of countermeasures. The DSB also supports MDA's development
of the SM-3 IIB to significantly expand the forward edge of our ICBM
battle space and enable SAS to obtain very high levels of ICBM
protection of our homeland. The fiscal year 2012 congressional
reduction of the SM-3 IIB funding has increased the challenge of
fielding this improvement in Homeland Defense against ICBMs in the 2020
timeframe. My additional concern is the impact of reducing funding for
the SM-3 IIB will eliminate the only new interceptor design and
development opportunity for our Nation's missile defense industrial
base for the foreseeable future. The three SM-3 IIB industry teams lead
by Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Raytheon have shown rapid progress in
developing very effective and feasible SM-3 IIB interceptor design
concepts. To terminate, or slow down, the SM-3 IIB development effort
will have a significant negative impact on missile defense aerospace
industrial base at this time and risk our ability to cost-effectively
respond to emerging regional ICBM threats to our homeland for decades
in the future.
This year, we will begin upgrading the Clear Early Warning Radar in
Alaska for full missile defense capability by 2016. We will also
continue operations of the Sea-Based X-band (SBX) radar and development
of algorithms to improve its discrimination capability. We are
requesting $347.0 million in fiscal year 2013 for BMDS Sensors
development for Homeland defense, including support of the Cobra Dane
radar, the Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWRs) at Beale AFB
(California), Fylingdales (United Kingdom), and Thule (Greenland). We
are requesting $192.1 million to operate and sustain these radars and
$227.4 million to procure additional radars and radar spares. In fiscal
year 2013, we will also place the SBX in a limited test operations
status for affordability reasons, but we will be prepared to activate
the SBX if indications and warnings of an advanced threat from
Northeast Asia become evident. We will also continue to upgrade the GMD
system software to address new and evolving threats, including
enhancing EKV discrimination algorithms by 2015, improving GBI
avionics, and increasing GBI interoperability with the Command and
Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) system.
enhancing regional defense
This year, we will demonstrate integrated, layered regional missile
defense in the largest, most complex missile defense test ever
attempted. We will simultaneously engage up to five air and ballistic
missile targets with an Aegis, THAAD, Patriot and Forward Based Mode
AN/TPY-2 radar integrated C2BMC system operated by soldiers, sailors,
and airmen from multiple Combatant Commands. This live-fire test will
allow our warfighters to refine operational doctrine and tactics while
providing confidence in the execution of their integrated air and
missile defense plans.
Last year, in addition to deploying EPAA Phase 1, we successfully
supported negotiations for host nation agreements to deploy Aegis
Ashore batteries to Romania (Phase 2) and Poland (Phase 3); we
successfully tested the NATO Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile
Defense (ALTBMD) Interim Capability with EUCOM C2BMC to enhance NATO
situational awareness and planning; we installed the Aegis BMD 3.6.1
weapon system on 3 Aegis ships and upgraded one Aegis BMD ship to Aegis
BMD 4.0.1 (increasing the Aegis BMD fleet to 22 operationally
configured BMD ships); and we delivered 19 SM-3 Block IA interceptors
and the first SM-3 Block IB interceptor. We continued SM-3 Block IIA
system and component Preliminary Design Reviews. We delivered 11
interceptors for THAAD Batteries 1 and 2 and flight test, and started
production of Batteries 3 and 4. We also delivered the latest C2BMC
upgrades to Northern Command, Strategic Command, Pacific Command, and
Central Command. These software builds will improve situational
awareness, sensor management, and planner functions.
We also demonstrated critical BMDS regional capabilities in key
tests over the past year. In April 2011, we conducted an Aegis BMD
flight test (FTM-15) using the SM-3 Block IA interceptor launched using
track data from the AN/TPY-2 radar passed through the C2BMC system to
intercept an Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), target
(3,000km to 5,500km) to demonstrate the EPAA Phase 1 capability. This
mission also was the first Launch-on-Remote Aegis engagement and
intercept of an IRBM with the SM-3 Block IA. In October 2011, the BMDS
Operational Test Agency (OTA), with the oversight of the Director,
Operational Test & Evaluation, conducted a successful Initial
Operational Test & Evaluation test (FTT-12) of THAAD's ability to
detect, track, and engage SRBM and MRBM targets simultaneously.
Enhanced MRBM Defense in Europe by 2015 (EPAA Phase 2)
Our goal in this phase is to provide a robust capability against
SRBMs and MRBMs by deploying several interceptors to engage each threat
missile multiple times in its flight. The architecture includes the
deployment of the Aegis BMD 5.0 weapon systems with SM-3 Block IB
interceptors at sea and at an Aegis Ashore site in Romania. When
compared to the current SM-3 Block IA, the IB will be more producible,
have an improved two-color seeker for greater on-board discrimination,
and have improvements to enhance reliability of the SM-3 Block IB's
divert and attitude control system. These improvements also provide an
enhanced capability to simultaneously engage larger sized raids of
threat missiles.
We are requesting $992.4 million in fiscal year 2013 for sea-based
Aegis BMD to continue development and testing of the SM-3 Block IB,
continue outfitting of ships with the BMD 4.0.1 system as well as
spiral upgrades to Aegis 5.0 to support the operation of the SM-3 Block
IB and IIA interceptors and associated flight tests. We are requesting
$389.6 million in fiscal year 2013 for the procurement of 29 SM-3 Block
IB interceptors and $12.2 million to operate and maintain already
deployed SM-3 Block IA interceptors. In fiscal year 2013, we are also
requesting $276.3 million to develop and build the Aegis Ashore Test
Facility at the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii and $157.9
million to construct the first Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System
battery in Romania by fiscal year 2015. We request $366.5 million in
fiscal year 2013 to operate and sustain C2BMC at fielded sites and
continue C2BMC program spiral development of software and engineering
to incorporate enhanced C2BMC capability into the battle management
architecture and promote further interoperability among the BMDS
elements, incorporate boost phase tracking, and improve system-level
correlation and tracking. We will also continue communications support
for the AN/TPY-2 radars and PAA-related C2BMC upgrades.
In September 2011, we conducted FTM-16 to demonstrate Aegis BMD
4.0.1 fire control and the first flight test of the SM-3 Block IB
interceptor. While we did not achieve the intercept of the SRBM
separating payload, we demonstrated critical system functions,
including the exceptional performance of the kinetic warhead divert
system, which allowed the Navy's partial certification of the Aegis BMD
4.0.1 computer program. In the third quarter of fiscal year 2012, we
will conduct FTM-16 (Event 2a) to demonstrate the resolution of the
previous flight test issue and the SM-3 Block IB's Kill Warhead's
capability. We will also demonstrate the ability of the SM-3 Block IB
to intercept more complex SRBM targets in FTM-18 and FTM-19 later this
summer. In the third quarter fiscal year 2013, we will conduct the
first operational flight test led by the BMDS OTA team involving a
coordinated and simultaneous engagement involving Aegis BMD, THAAD and
PAC-3 systems against three targets and two cruise missiles. Our fiscal
year 2013 testing program continues to demonstrate the SM-3 Block IB
and Aegis BMD 4.0.1 (FTM-21 and FTM-22), including a salvo engagement
involving two interceptors against an SRBM.
Enhanced IRBM Defenses in Europe by 2018 (EPAA Phase 3)
The SM-3 Block IIA interceptor, being co-developed with the
Japanese government, is on schedule for deployment at Aegis Ashore
sites in Romania and Poland, and at sea, in 2018 to provide enhanced
protection for European NATO countries from all ballistic missile
threats from the Middle East. This year we completed the SM-3 Block IIA
preliminary design review, and continue shock and vibration testing of
the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor canister, and development of Aegis BMD
5.1 fire control system. We also reduced the execution risk of the SM-3
Block IIA program by increasing the time between flight tests while
maintaining the original initial capability date of 2018. The fiscal
year 2013 request for SM-3 Block IIA co-development is $420.6 million.
Expanded Interceptor Battle Space by 2020 (EPAA Phase 4)
The SM-3 Block IIB will provide a pre-apogee intercept capability
against IRBMs and an additional layer for a more enhanced Homeland
defense against potential non-advanced ICBMs launched from today's
regional threats. This program is in the technology development phase,
and its 7-year development timeline is consistent with typical
interceptor development timelines according to Government
Accountability Office data. Last year we awarded risk reduction
contracts for missile subsystem components, including advanced
propulsion, seeker, and lightweight material technologies. We also
awarded concept design contracts for the SM-3 Block IIB interceptor to
three aerospace industry teams. In fiscal year 2013, we are requesting
$224.1 million to develop the Request For Proposal and begin source
selection for the SM-3 Block IIB Product Development Phase, which we
propose to begin in early 2014. The SM-3 Block IIB is leveraging
advanced tracking and discrimination technologies planned for
deployment during EPAA Phase 4, as well as the entire sensor network,
with PTSS and C2BMC upgrades to maximize Homeland defense.
additional missile defense capabilities
This year, we are procuring 42 THAAD interceptors for Batteries 1
and 2, 6 launchers, and 2 THAAD Tactical Station Groups. We are
requesting $316.9 million in RDT&E funding in fiscal year 2013 to
enhance communications and debris mitigation, which will allow THAAD to
be more interoperable with PAC-3 and Aegis BMD and connected to the
BMDS, and $55.7 million for THAAD operations and maintenance. We also
request $460.7 million to procure 36 THAAD interceptors. THAAD will
complete delivery of the first fifty interceptors in June 2012,
demonstrating the capacity of the contractor supply chain and the main
assembly factory in Troy, AL, to deliver interceptors. The next
production lots are under contract, with delivery beginning this
summer. We will maintain a production rate of four THAAD missiles per
month through June 2012 due to components on hand and enhance the
supply chain's production capacity to sustain a three missile per month
production rate beginning in spring 2013. In late fiscal year 2012, we
will demonstrate THAAD's ability to intercept an MRBM as part of an
integrated operational test with PAC-3 and Aegis BMD.
Additional BMDS improvements include expanded coordination of
missile defense fire control systems and improvements in radar
discrimination. We are requesting $51.3 million for the Space Tracking
and Surveillance System (STSS) in fiscal year 2013. We continue to
operate the two STSS demonstration satellites to conduct cooperative
tests with other BMDS elements and demonstrate the capability of STSS
satellites against targets of opportunity. These tests demonstrate the
ability of a space sensor to provide high precision, real-time tracking
of missiles and midcourse objects that enable closing the fire control
loops with BMDS interceptors. In fiscal year 2013, we plan the first
live intercept of a threat missile by the Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) system using only STSS data to form the fire control
solution for the SM-3 IB interceptor. Additionally, lessons learned
from the two STSS demonstration satellites inform Precision Tracking
Space System (PTSS) design development decisions.
developing new capabilities
We are requesting $80 million in fiscal year 2013 to continue
development of fiscally sustainable advanced BMD technologies that can
be integrated into the BMDS to adapt as threats change. Intercepts
early in the battle space will provide additional opportunities to kill
threat missiles, enlarge protection areas, and improve the overall
performance of the BMDS.
Last year, we accelerated our test campaign with the Airborne Laser
Test Bed (ALTB) to collect data on tracking and atmospheric
compensation, system jitter, and boundary layer effects on propagation
for future directed energy applications. This year, in accordance with
the funding reduction enacted by Congress, we grounded the ALTB
aircraft and are examining the technical feasibility of high efficiency
directed energy technology for the next decade. In fiscal year 2013, we
are requesting $46.9 million to pursue Diode Pumped Alkaline-gas Laser
System and coherent fiber combining laser technologies, which promise
to provide high efficiency, electrically-driven, compact, and light-
weight high energy lasers for a wide variety of missions of interest to
MDA and the Department of Defense and support concept development for
the next generation of airborne missile defense directed energy
systems.
We request $58.7 million in fiscal year 2013 to continue support
for research and development of advanced remote sensing technologies,
demonstrate acquisition, tracking and discrimination of multi-color
infrared sensors, and investigate techniques to improve the system's
data fusion capability to further strengthen the Nation's missile
defense sensor network. We have integrated our international and
domestic university research programs into the same structure, allowing
the Agency to capitalize on the creativity and innovation within our
small business and academic communities to enhance our science and
technology programs.
The greatest future enhancement for both homeland and regional
defense in the next 10 years is the development of the Precision
Tracking Space System (PTSS) satellites, which will provide fire
control quality track data of raids of hostile ballistic missiles over
their entire flight trajectories and greatly expand the forward edge of
the our interceptors' battle space for persistent coverage of over 70
percent of the Earth's landmass. The need for persistent, full
trajectory, tracking of ballistic missiles is one of the warfighter's
highest development priorities as stated in the 2012 STRATCOM PCL. PTSS
will enhance the performance of all missile defense interceptors at an
operational cost significantly less (and with much greater ability to
track large raid sizes of threat missiles) than forward based AN/TPY-2
radars, based on MDA's experience with STSS program costs. The emerging
concept design of the PTSS spacecraft is much simpler than STSS because
it relies on the mature Air Force Space Based Infra-Red (SBIR)
satellite system to acquire threat ballistic missiles, leverages PTSS's
ability to provide precision tracks of the remainder of threat
missiles' trajectories, and uses only satellite components with high
technology readiness levels. Due to the intrinsic simplicity and
component maturity of the PTSS design, the integration of concurrent
developments is considered to be a low acquisition risk. Key to our
acquisition strategy is MDA partnering Air Force Space Command and the
Naval Research Laboratory with Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics
Laboratory (APL), with participation of six aerospace corporations, to
develop a fully government owned preliminary design and technical data
package to enable full competitions by our aerospace industry for the
production for the first and subsequent PTSS satellite constellations.
MDA is requesting $297.4 million for PTSS in fiscal year 2013 to
continue development of preliminary design requirements to create these
multi-mission satellites (e.g., missile defense, space situation
awareness, DOD and Intelligence Community support). APL has a
noteworthy track record, dating back to 1979, for meeting planned
development cost and schedule projections involving 17 significant
spacecraft missions. We will complete final design and engineering
models for the PTSS bus, optical payload, and communications payload in
fiscal year 2013. PTSS project scope includes delivery of PTSS ground
segments and launch of the first two PTSS spacecraft in fiscal year
2017. We are fully cooperating in an Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) of
the development and 20 year life cycle cost of the PTSS constellation
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of Capability
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), to achieve a high confidence
cost estimate of the development and 20 year life of the PTSS
constellation. Of note, this ICE will provide great insight into the
validity of the recent National Academy of Science (NAS) Boost Phase
Intercept study cost estimate for the PTSS constellation that we
believe is considerably higher than our estimates. Although the NAS
study was critical of PTSS's ability to discriminate a Re-entry Vehicle
(RV) from other objects accompanying a missile, the NAS did not benefit
from an understanding of our sensor discrimination architecture concept
nor our classified programs developing PTSS's future RV discrimination
capability. However, the NAS study did benefit from understanding our
disciplined systems engineering process that scrutinizes capability
trades to achieve urgent, cost-effective, satisfaction of the
warfighters BMD needs as documented in STRATCOM's PCL.
international cooperation
As stated in the 2010 BMDR, developing international missile
defense capacity is a key aspect of our strategy to counter ballistic
missile proliferation. A significant accomplishment of international
cooperation in 2011 was the signing of the first foreign military sale
case for the THAAD system to the United Arab Emirates, valued at nearly
$3.5 billion. In Europe, we successfully completed interoperability
testing of our C2BMC system with the Active Layer Theater Ballistic
Missile Defense (ALTBMD) Interim Capability, demonstrating U.S. and
NATO's ability to share situational awareness of missile defense
execution and status and planning data. NATO plans to invest more than
600M Euros for the ALTBMD capability. Moreover, we are working with our
NATO allies on developing requirements for territorial NATO missile
defense. We continue to pursue potential missile defense contributions
of NATO countries such as the Netherlands' announcement that they are
upgrading their maritime radars with missile defense surveillance and
tracking capability. In East Asia, we are supporting the BMDR-based
objective in leading expanded international efforts for missile defense
through bilateral projects and efforts with Japan, the Republic of
Korea, and Australia. In the Middle East, we continue to work with
long-term partners, such as Israel, and are pursuing strengthened
cooperation with various Gulf Cooperation Council countries that have
expressed interest in missile defense. MDA is currently engaged in
missile defense projects, studies and analyses with over 20 countries,
including Australia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany,
Israel, Japan, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,
the United Kingdom, and NATO.
MDA continues its close partnership with Japan on the SM-3 IIA
interceptor (Japan is leading the development efforts on the SM-3 Block
IIA second and third stage rocket motors and the nosecone), studying
future missile defense architectures for defense of Japan, and
supporting that nation's SM-3 Block IA flight test program, to include
the successful intercept flight test in October 2010 involving a
Japanese SM-3 Block IA. This test completed the first foreign military
sale of Aegis BMD to a key maritime partner. Japan now has four Aegis
destroyers equipped with Aegis BMD systems and a complement of SM-3
Block IA interceptors.
We also continue collaboration with Israel on the development and
employment of several missile defense capabilities that are
interoperable with the U.S. BMDS. Last year, at a U.S. test range off
the coast of California, the Arrow Weapon System successfully
intercepted a target representative of potential ballistic missile
threats facing Israel today. This year, we plan to conduct several
first time demonstrations of significant David's Sling, Arrow-2 block
4, and Arrow-3 system capabilities. We are requesting $99.8 million for
Israeli Cooperative Programs (including Arrow System Improvement and
the David's Sling Weapon System) in fiscal year 2013 to continue our
cooperative development of Israeli and U.S. missile defense technology
and capability. MDA will conduct a David's Sling flight test to
demonstrate end game and midcourse algorithms and initiate David's
Sling and Arrow-3 Low Rate Initial Production.
conclusion
Our fiscal year 2013 budget funds the continued development and
deployment of SRBM, MRBM, IRBM, and ICBM defenses while meeting the
warfighters' near-term and future missile defense development
priorities. We are dedicated to returning to successful GMD flight
testing as soon as possible as well as developing an additional layer
of Homeland defense with the SM-3 IIB to ensure we have a robust and
responsive ICBM defense for our Nation, during this decade and for many
decades in the future. Additionally, we are committed to develop a
persistent, space based, PTSS constellation to ensure always available,
early tracking of large size raids of missiles to enable cost-effective
homeland and regional missile defense. We are also dedicated to
creating an international and enhanced network of integrated BMD
capabilities that is flexible, survivable, affordable, and tolerant of
uncertainties of estimates of both nation-state and extremist ballistic
missile threats.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering the
committee's questions.
STATEMENT OF LTG RICHARD P. FORMICA, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY
SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND/ARMY FORCES STRATEGIC
COMMAND, AND COMMANDER, JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR
INTEGRATED MISSILE DEFENSE
[The oral and prepared statements of General Formica
follow:]
Oral Statement by LTG Richard P. Formica, USA
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sessions, and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, thank you for your ongoing support of our soldiers,
civilians, and families. I am honored to testify again before this
panel. This subcommittee is a strong supporter of the Army, the
Department of Defense, and the missile defense community. As the
Commander of the U.S. Army's Space and Missile Defense Command (USAMDC)
and Army Forces Strategic Command, the Army's specified proponent for
missile defense, and as the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command's
(STRATCOM) Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile
Defense (JFCC IMD), we value your continued support.
My intent today is to briefly highlight our missile defense force
provider role for both the Army and Global Combatant Commanders and our
JFCC IMD role as an operational integrator of joint missile defense for
STRATCOM.
usasmdc/arstrat force provider
USASMDC/ARSTRAT, a force provider for missile defense capabilities,
has a vital role in missile defense as JFCC IMD, STRATCOM, and U.S.
Northern Command are able to leverage the capabilities of USASMDC/
ARSTAT.
To accomplish our assigned mission, we focus on three core tasks
within the missile defense arena:
To provide trained and ready missile defense forces
and capabilities to the combatant commanders--our operations
function, capabilities that we provide today.
To build future missile defense forces-our capability
development function, the capabilities we will provide
tomorrow.
To research, test, and integrate missile defense
related technologiesour materiel development function, those
capabilities we will provide the day-atter-tomorrow.
jfcc imd--synchronizing md operational level planning & support
JFCC IMD serves an integrating role for missile defense across
geographic regions as we operationalize new capabilities, evolve
command relationships, and reinforce our missile defense partnerships
with allies. Our missile defense capability continues to strengthen as
warfighters gain increased competence with and confidence in the
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). Continued progress has been
made to evolve the global missile defense capabilities, strengthening
the defense of the homeland, and to advance our capability to defend
our forces, allies, and friends abroad.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, as a member of the joint missile defense community,
the Army will continue to pursue operational, capability, and materiel
enhancements to the Nation's BMDS. Our trained and ready soldiers
operating the Ground-based Missile Defense elements in Colorado,
Alaska, and California remain on point to defend the homeland against a
limited intercontinental ballistic missile attack. As a force provider
to the global combatant commanders, our soldiers ensure essential
regional sensor capabilities and ballistic missile early warning.
STRATCOM, through the JFCC IMD, will continue to integrate BMDS
capabilities to counter global asymmetric threats and protect our
Nation, deployed forces, friends, and allies.
I appreciate having the opportunity to speak on these important
matters and look forward to addressing any questions you may have.
Secure the High Ground and Army Strong!
______
Prepared Statement by LTG Richard P. Formica, USA
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sessions, and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, thank you for your ongoing support of our soldiers,
civilians, and families. Following my previous appearances on the
importance of space and space-based capabilities to the Army, I am
honored to testify before this subcommittee as the Joint and Service
advocate for effective missile defense capabilities. This subcommittee
is a strong supporter of the Army, the Department of Defense (DOD), and
the missile defense community. Your support is important as we continue
to enhance missile defense capabilities and development of future
capabilities for the Nation and our global partners.
In my present assignment, I have three distinct responsibilities in
support of our Warfighters. First, as the commander of the U.S. Army
Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC), I have Title 10
responsibilities to train, maintain, and equip space and missile
defense forces for the Army. Second, I am the Army Service Component
Commander (ASCC) to the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) as the
Commander of the Army Forces Strategic Command (ARSTRAT). I am
responsible for planning, integrating, and coordinating Army forces and
capabilities in support of STRATCOM missions. Third, I serve as the
Commander of STRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command for
Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD), supporting the Joint Force to
synchronize operational-level planning and global missile defense
operations support. I am honored to testify with these distinguished
witnesses--all firm advocates in support of a strong missile defense
capability for our Nation, forward deployed forces, friends, and
allies.
During my appearance before you today, my purpose is threefold. The
first is to highlight USASMDC/ARSTRAT's responsibilities as a force
provider of missile defense capabilities for the Army and the Global
Combatant Commanders (GCCs). I will also underscore our force
modernization proponent as well as our research and development roles
for the Army. The second is to outline JFCC IMD's role as an
operational integrator of joint missile defense for STRATCOM. Finally,
I will provide a summary of some of the Army's missile defense programs
of record that contribute to the Nation's ability to defend against
ballistic missiles, both today and tomorrow.
usasmdc/arstrat--accomplishing our three core missile defense tasks
USASMDC/ARSTRAT, a force provider for missile defense capabilities,
is one command that is split-based with dispersed locations around the
globe, manned by multi-component soldiers, civilians, and contractors.
I am proud of the capabilities they deliver to the warfighter. As our
command name implies, USASMDC/ARSTRAT has a vital role in missile
defense; JFCC IMD, STRATCOM, and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) are
able to leverage the capabilities of USASMDC/ARSTAT. USASMDC/ARSTRAT's
Title 10 responsibilities include operational as well as planning,
integration, control, and coordination of Army forces and capabilities
in support of STRATCOM's missile defense mission. USASMDC/ARSTRAT also
serves as the Army's operational integrator for missile defense, the
Army's missile defense force modernization proponent, and conducts
missile defense related research and development in support of Army
Title 10 responsibilities.
To accomplish our assigned mission, we focus on three core tasks
within the missile defense arena:
To provide trained and ready missile defense forces
and capabilities to the combatant commanders--our operations
function that addresses today's requirements.
To build future missile defense forces--our capability
development function that is responsible for meeting tomorrow's
requirements.
To research, test, and integrate missile defense
related technologies--our materiel development function that
aims to advance the Army's and warfighter's missile defense
capabilities the day-after-tomorrow.
Our first core task is to provide trained and ready missile defense
forces and capabilities to the GCCs and the warfighter--our operations
function that addresses today's requirements. For missile defense,
USASMDC/ARSTRAT soldiers, serving on the homeland and in forward
deployed locations, operate the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
consoles and the Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance Forward-
Based Mode (AN/TPY-2 FBM) radars. A summary of the critical missile
defense capabilities provided by our missile defense professionals is
highlighted below.
Support to Global Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
Soldiers from the 100th GMD Brigade, headquartered at Colorado
Springs, CO, and the 49th GMD Battalion, headquartered at Fort Greely,
AK, stand ready, 24/7/365, to defend our Nation and its territories
from a limited intercontinental ballistic missile attack. Under the
operational control of NORTHCOM, Active component and Army National
Guard soldiers operate the GMD Fire Control Systems located at the
Missile Defense Element in Colorado, the Fire Direction Center in
Alaska, and the GMD Command Launch Element at Vandenberg Air Force
Base, CA. These soldiers, in conjunction with JFCC IMD and NORTHCOM,
also oversee the maintenance of GMD interceptors and ground system
components. At Fort Greely, soldiers that serve as military police are
assigned to the 49th GMD Battalion to secure the interceptors and
communications capabilities at the Missile Defense Complex from
physical threats.
Support to Regional Capabilities
The 100th GMD Brigade is also a force provider to other GCCs for
the AN/TPY-2 FBM radar detachments at isolated locations and provides
subject matter expertise on training and certification of the radar's
operations.
GMD System Test and Development
Soldiers from the 100th GMD Brigade actively participate in GMD
test activities and routinely work with Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
developers on future improvements to the GMD system.
Ballistic Missile Early Warning
Critical to the Joint Force Commander's theater force protection,
USASMDC/ARSTRAT provides ballistic missile early warning within the
various theaters. The 1st Space Brigade's Joint Tactical Ground Station
(JTAGS) Detachments, under the operational control of STRATCOM's Joint
Functional Component Command for Space, but operated by USASMDC/ARSTRAT
space-professional soldiers, monitor enemy missile launch activity and
other infrared events. They provide this essential information to
members of the air and missile defense and operational communities. Our
JTAGS Detachments are forward-stationed across critical regions,
providing 24/7/365, dedicated, assured missile warning to STRATCOM in
support of deployed forces.
Our second core task is to build future missile defense forces--our
capability development function. These are the missile defense
capabilities we will provide tomorrow. The Army uses established and
emerging processes to document its missile defense needs and pursue
Army and Joint validation of its requirements. As a recognized Army
Center for Analysis, USASMDC/ARSTRAT conducts studies to determine how
best to meet the Army's missile defense assigned responsibilities. With
this information, we develop the Doctrine, Organization, Training,
Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF)
domains to mitigate threats and vulnerabilities for the MDA developed
GMD and AN/TPY-2 FBM missile defense systems. This disciplined approach
helps ensure limited resources are applied where warfighter operational
utility can be most effectively served.
In our third core task, USASDMC/ARSTRAT provides critical
technologies to address future needs that will enhance warfighter
effectiveness--our materiel development function. These are the
capabilities we will provide for the day-after-tomorrow. In USASMDC/
ARSTRAT, our technology development function is primarily focused on
space and high altitude. While MDA is the principal materiel developer
for missile defense, we do have a number of ongoing missile defense
related materiel development efforts. A brief summary of two of these
research and development efforts as well as an overview of an essential
Army testing range follows.
High Energy Laser Mobile Demonstrator
As we have learned often during the Afghanistan and Iraq wars,
insurgents posed serious dangers to U.S. forward operating bases by
employing quick-attack, low-trajectory, rockets, artillery, and mortars
(RAM) strikes. The technology objective of the High Energy Laser Mobile
Demonstrator (HEL MD) is to demonstrate a solid state laser weapon
system that will serve as a defensive complementary resource to kinetic
energy capabilities in countering RAM projectiles. When completed and
if successful, the HEL MD will consist of a ruggedized and supportable
high energy laser and subsystems installed on a tactical military
vehicle that greatly enhance the safety of deployed forces.
Economical Target-1
Replicating an enemy missile threat is expensive. The Economical
Target-1 (ET-1) is a research and development effort to supplement
present flight test inventories and to provide a cost effective
alternative. The ET-1, which recently successfully completed its
initial flight test objectives, uses existing technology and hardware
to develop a new missile defense target configuration that permits
enhanced kinematic capabilities and signature tailoring.
Missile Defense Testing
In addition, USASMDC/ARSTRAT operates the Reagan Test Site at
Kwajalein Atoll. Located in the Marshall Islands, the U.S. Army
Kwajalein Atoll/Reagan Test Site is critical to the testing of missile
defense capabilities, testing of the U.S. Air Force's strategic
ballistic missiles assets, and other testing requirements. In addition
to its testing mission, we conduct continuous operational space
surveillance and tracking at the Reagan Test Site.
joint functional component command for integrated missile defense--
synchronizing missile defense operational level planning and support
JFCC IMD, STRATCOM's missile defense integrating element, has been
operational for 7 years. Like the other JFCCs, JFCC IMD was formed to
operationalize STRATCOM missions and allow the headquarters to focus on
strategic-level integration and advocacy. Headquartered at Schriever
Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, CO, the JFCC IMD is manned by
extremely capable Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and civilian
personnel.
STRATCOM has been assigned seven Unified Command Plan (UCP)
responsibilities for missile defense. As the operational and functional
component command of STRATCOM, JFCC IMD has derived four key mission
tasks from the STRATCOM UCP responsibilities:
Synchronize operational level ballistic missile
defense (BMD) planning across the Areas of Responsibility
(AORs).
Optimize the deployed force as the BMD Joint
Functional Manager.
Plan and coordinate developmental and operational
activities by conducting BMD asset management.
Provide alternate missile defense execution support in
times of crisis.
To accomplish each of these four tasks, we maintain close
collaborative relationships with the GCCs, the MDA, the Services, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, our
coalition allies, and our industry partners. Through collaborative
processes, we continually add to our deployed capability while gaining
operational experience and confidence in our collective ability to
defend our Nation, deployed forces, and our friends and allies.
Following, I will highlight some of our collaborative efforts to
enhance missile defense planning and capabilities for both the homeland
and regional architectures.
Expansion and Integration of a Missile Defense Architecture
While Homeland defense remains the missile defense priority, the
Nation is expanding regional capabilities to deployed forces, friends
and allies. The phased adaptive approach (PAA) is meant to address the
unique regional threat environments and partnerships that, in turn,
will serve to further Homeland defense. Given many of the challenges
associated with implementation of these architectures, JFCC IMD,
supporting STRATCOM as the synchronizer for missile defense,
collaborates with the GCCs to assess and address the cross regional
gaps in the areas of planning, policy, capabilities, and operations to
enhance our global defense capabilities.
Global BMD Assessment
While PAAs mature and with Homeland defense at the forefront, JFCC
IMD collaborates closely with the GCCs to assess the level of risk
associated with the execution of their operational plans given their
allocation of BMD capabilities. The overall assessment serves to shape
recommendations for global force management and advocacy efforts for
future capability investments. STRATCOM will soon forward the most
recent theater assessments, consolidated into a global BMD viewpoint,
to OSD.
With regards to regional threats, JFCC IMD assessments indicate
that addressing missile defense threats will remain a challenge. Our
analysis, reinforced by a recent senior leader tabletop exercise,
bolsters the fact that GCCs demands for missile defense capabilities
will always exceed the available BMD inventory. The shortfall
highlights the need for an Offense/Defense Integration approach to
missile defense. We must be able to address some of the ballistic
missile threats before they are in the air. In the short term, we will
address this mismatch through a comprehensive force management process.
Over the longer term, we plan to continue to assess the evolving threat
and look at procurement pathways to meet surging demand while
emphasizing deterrence alternatives, to include diplomatic,
information, and economic strategies.
Multi-Regional BMD Asset Management
While maintaining a holistic, multi-regional perspective but with
priority on defense of the homeland, JFCC IMD manages the availability
of missile defense assets to balance operational readiness conditions,
scheduled and unscheduled maintenance activities, and MDA's test
requirements. This important process allows us to assess, at all times,
our readiness to defend against a ballistic missile attack.
Training, Exercises, and War Games
The PAAs also focus on the expansion of international efforts to
integrate allies into our regional missile defense architectures. We
leverage training, exercises, and war games to increase dialogue and
partnership with our allies. Just last week, we concluded Nimble Titan
12, a global BMD war game involving 14 participating nations and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It enabled us to collectively
examine issues such as command and control, consequence management, and
rules of engagement. Efforts such as Nimble Titan allow us to explore
opportunities and continue to develop those cooperative relationships
that will be critical to developing our combined architectures.
Conclusions derived from training, exercises, and war games will
continue to shape our recommendations on asset allocation, resources,
and operational planning through the existing DOD and missile defense
community management structures.
Warfighter Acceptance and Integrated Master Test Plan
As the missile defense architectures mature, we must ensure a
credible, comprehensive assessment of new abilities to inform
warfighter decisions for capability acceptance. The MDA, in
coordination with the Office of the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, executes a robust, operational Integrated Master Test Plan.
A rigorous test program builds the confidence of stakeholders and
bolsters deterrence. As part of the Warfighters' Operational Readiness
and Acceptance process, JFCC IMD works closely with MDA and the GCCs to
ensure our warfighters take full advantage of these tests to better
understand the capabilities of the system, to rapidly integrate new
capabilities into the architecture, and to provide improvement
recommendations back to the developer.
In summary, JFCC IMD serves an integrating role for missile defense
across multiple regions as we operationalize new capabilities, evolve
command relationships, and reinforce our missile defense partnerships
with allies. Our missile defense capability continues to strengthen as
warfighters gain increased competence and confidence in the BMDS. While
work remains to be done, significant progress has been made to evolve
the global missile defense capabilities, thereby strengthening the
defense of the homeland, and to advance our partnership with our allies
in this important endeavor.
army contributions to the nation's ballistic missile defense system
In addition to the MDA's materiel development BMD systems and
capabilities, the Army continues to develop and field systems that are
integral contributors to our Nation's BMDS. A summary of the Army's
major missile defense systems, aligned within the assistant Secretary
of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology organizational
structure, follows.
Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (AIAMD) Program: Within the
air and missile defense arena, AIAMD is the Army's highest priority
developmental effort. This initiative will provide a common network-
centric system that integrates sensors, weapons, and command and
control technologies. The fielded program will provide an enhanced
capability for unparalleled situational awareness, an ability to tailor
the force to optimize battle space protection, and a smaller logistics
footprint. The initial operational capability for the AIAMD
architecture is scheduled for fielding in 2016.
Medium Extended Air Defense System
As Congress is aware, based on previous and projected cost and
schedule growth, the DOD decided to complete only the design and
development phase of the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS)
program. The fiscal year 2013 budget request is the last in which the
Army will seek MEADS funding. The Army's intent is to harvest
technology from past program investments. Based on enactment of the
fiscal year 2012 MEADS request, execution is underway to complete
prototypes, demonstrate and document capabilities, and complete limited
system integration.
Patriot/Patriot Advanced Capability-3
Patriot/Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) is the Army's primary
weapon system against air, cruise, and tactical ballistic missile
threats. With the DOD decision on the MEADS program, the Army is
investing in improvements to Patriot system reliability and driving
down operational and sustainment costs. This year, we will complete the
effort to ``Grow the Army'' to field 15 Patriot Battalions and intend
to continue to reduce system life cycle costs while supporting ongoing
operational requirements. The Army is integrating Patriot and other air
defense assets into the AIAMD architecture. PAC-3 interceptors continue
to expand the battle space allowing operational flexibility to our
Army, GCCs, and international partners. The next generation PAC-3
missile, the Missile Segment Enhancement, is on track for a 2015
delivery to the force.
Terminal High Attitude Area Defense System
Developed by the MDA, the Terminal High Attitude Area Defense
System (THAAD) is a long-range, land-based, theater defense weapon
designed to intercept threat missiles during late mid-course or final
stage flight. THAAD capability for our GCCs is on the near-term horizon
as the MDA-designed system transfers capability to the Army. Just last
month, THAAD Batteries 1 and 2 were granted conditional material
release. Each of the batteries, consisting of 95 soldiers, an AN/TPY-2
radar, a fire control and communications element, a battery support
center, and an interim contractor support element, has completed
equipment and unit collective training. The two batteries currently
have three THAAD launching systems each but will soon have their full
complement of six systems. Equipment fielding is also underway for
THAAD Battery 3 and production has begun on Battery 4 equipment. The
addition of THAAD capabilities to the Army's air and missile defense
portfolio brings an unprecedented level of protection against missile
attacks to deployed U.S. forces, friends, and allies.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, as a member of the Joint missile defense community,
the Army will continue to pursue operational, capability, and materiel
enhancements to the Nation's BMDS. As a Service, we have lead
responsibility for GMD, AN/TPY-2 FBM, Patriot, and THAAD. Our trained
and ready soldiers operating the GMD elements in Colorado, Alaska, and
California remain on point to defend the homeland against a limited
intercontinental ballistic missile attack. As a force provider to the
GCCs, our soldiers ensure essential regional sensor capabilities and
ballistic missile early warning. STRATCOM, through the JFCC IMD, will
continue to integrate BMDS capabilities to counter global asymmetric
threats and protect our Nation, deployed forces, friends, and allies.
The fiscal year 2013 budget proposal supports the modernization and
improvements of the Army's missile defense systems and forces to
support the Nation's global BMDS.
I appreciate having the opportunity to speak on these important
matters and look forward to addressing any questions you may have.
Secure the High Ground and Army Strong!
STATEMENT OF HON. J. MICHAEL GILMORE, Ph.D., DIRECTOR,
OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
[The prepared statement of Dr. Gilmore follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. J. Michael Gilmore
Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss missile defense
test planning, processes, and programs, including my assessment of the
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) and the Integrated Master Test
Plan (IMTP). I will focus my remarks in four areas:
First, my assessment of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
flight and ground test program during the past year, the
details of which are in my annual report submitted to you on
February 13th;
Second, the major events this last fiscal year that influenced
the most recent update to the IMTP, version 12.1;
Third, my assessments of the Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD), the AN/TPY-2 Radar, and the Phased Adaptive
Approach for the defense of Europe; and
Finally, I will provide my assessment of the current IMTP.
fiscal year 2011 flight and ground test program
The MDA conducted four intercept flight tests this past year: two
for Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), one for Ground-based
Midcourse Defense (GMD), and one for THAAD. The U.S. Army conducted
four Patriot intercept flight tests, one for the PAC-3 Missile Segment
Enhancement interceptor, and three supporting Post Deployment Build 7.
The MDA conducted 11 ground tests and exercises, with the most
significant ground test, the Ground Test Distributed-04 (GTD-04)
series, occurring late in the calendar year supporting the
implementation of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Phase 1
capability on December 31, 2011. These flight and ground tests were
included in the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)-
approved IMTP.
During this period, Aegis BMD 3.6.1 and THAAD demonstrated progress
toward intermediate and short-range threat class capability,
respectively. Aegis BMD successfully completed Flight Test Standard
Missile-15 (FTM-15) and THAAD successfully completed Flight Test THAAD-
12 (FTT-12). However, in its first flight test of the Standard Missile-
3 (SM-3) Block IB missile, the MDA failed to achieve a successful
intercept during FTM-16 Event 2, although the MDA was successful in
demonstrating many other 4.0.1 Aegis Weapon System capabilities. The
cause of the FTM-16 failure is under investigation.
In April 2011, Aegis BMD completed FTM-15, the first intercept of
an intermediate-range ballistic missile. In this test, an SM-3 Block IA
interceptor was launched from an Aegis BMD 3.6.1 destroyer, set up with
remote engagements authorized. The ship used up-range track data from
an AN/TPY-2 radar in forward-based mode as well as data from its
organic Aegis radar to prosecute the engagement and intercept the
target.
In October 2011, THAAD completed an Initial Operational Test and
Evaluation (IOT&E) (FTT-12) in which the system intercepted two
incoming threat missiles nearly simultaneously. In February 2012, DOT&E
published a detailed report supporting a decision to proceed with
material release of the system to the Army for operational use.
GMD suffered a second consecutive flight test failure flying the
Capability Enhancement II Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle, and did not
demonstrate any progress toward intermediate-range or Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) threat class capability. A Failure Review
Board has identified the root cause of the failure of the kill vehicle
to intercept and the MDA has developed and is implementing corrective
actions on the associated kill vehicle components to correct the
problems that caused the failure. It will first test these fixes on a
non-intercept flight test this spring followed several months later
with a repeat of the previously attempted intercept flight test.
For the first time, the Command, Control, Battle Management, and
Communications (C2BMC) element demonstrated during a ground test in
December 2011 the capability to control two operationally-deployed AN/
TPY-2 radars in forward-based mode, using existing operational
communications architectures, personnel, and tactics, techniques, and
procedures.
My assessment, based on the testing, is that the MDA flight and
ground test program for fiscal year/calendar year 2011 was adequate to
support the development of the BMDS. The flight test program allowed
the MDA to collect important data on Empirical Measurement Events and
Critical Engagement Conditions (such as THAAD's near-simultaneous
intercept of two short-range targets during FTT-12 and an Aegis BMD
intercept conducted at high closing velocity during the FTM-15
intercept of an intermediate-range target, respectively) that support
model and simulation verification, validation, and accreditation.
During the reporting period, the MDA continued to incorporate elements
of operational realism when planning for and conducting both ground and
flight testing.
The MDA and the BMDS Operational Test Agency have now collected
sufficient data to permit a quantitative assessment of Aegis BMD and
THAAD capability. This allowed me to include estimates of the
probability of engagement success over the tested battlespace of these
two weapon systems in my 2011 Annual BMDS Assessment Report.
events affecting test planning
Four events affected the development of version 12.1 of the IMTP,
approved in March 2012:
1. The FTM-16 Event 2 flight test failure,
2. Funding changes to the 2013 test baseline and the Future Years
Defense Program,
3. The availability of the targets originally planned for use in
FTO-01 in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2012, and
4. A Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) tracking
exercise, demonstrating target detection and stereo tracking, that
enabled the inclusion of a launch-on-STSS in future flight testing.
Due to the FTM-16 Event 2 failure, the MDA added FTM-16 Event 2a as
part of the SM-3 return-to-flight plan. This flight test will also
support the future SM-3 Block IB production decision and provide data
to certify the performance of the 4.0.1 Aegis Weapon System.
The MDA maintained the GMD test sequence in IMTP version 12.1. The
MDA will conduct their first engagement of an ICBM, with the target
flying a range of greater than 5,000 kilometers, in fiscal year 2015.
This will also be the first salvo test of two interceptors fired at a
single target. The MDA will conduct a multiple simultaneous engagement
of two interceptors on two targets in fiscal year 2018.
The MDA slowed the THAAD test cadence to 18-month test centers due
to budget constraints within the agency. As a result, FTT-11a
(exoatmospheric engagement of a complex short-range target) is delayed
by five quarters to the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2014, FTT-15
(endo-atmospheric engagement of a medium-range target with an Aegis BMD
cue) by 11 quarters to the second quarter of fiscal year 2017, FTT-16
(endoatmospheric engagement of a unitary short-range target with high
re-entry heating effects), and FTT-17 (engagement of a maximum range
medium-range target) deferred beyond the Future Years Defense Program.
However, THAAD will nonetheless participate in several previously
planned integrated and operational BMDS tests to be conducted through
fiscal year 2015.
The FTO-01 operational test of layered defenses comprising THAAD,
Aegis, and Patriot was delayed, primarily due to the unavailability of
the originally planned targets. Analysis conducted last year also
raised currently unresolved issues regarding the performance of THAAD
under the planned conditions of the test. As a result, MDA now plans to
conduct an integration test using the ballistic and cruise missile
targets that will be available to provide data needed to resolve the
identified performance issues, as well as to provide operational
commanders with information they will use to develop tactics,
techniques, and procedures for employing layered theater missile
defenses. The MDA moved FTO-01 from the fourth quarter of fiscal year
2012 to the third quarter of fiscal year 2013 and, in its place, added
the walk-up event FTI-01 in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2012.
FTI-01 will be conducted as a combined developmental/operational test
utilizing Aegis BMD, THAAD, and Patriot simulating a layered defense of
the Central Command Area of Responsibility.
The MDA added FTM-20 in fiscal year 2014 to demonstrate launch-on-
STSS capability. The STSS-generated track will be forwarded by the
C2BMC to an Aegis BMD 3.6.1 ship that will engage the target with an
SM-3 Block 1A interceptor.
assessments of thaad, the an/tpy-2 radar, and the epaa
In February, I published a report on the initial operation test and
evaluation (IOT&E) of THAAD and the AN/TPY-2 radar. I based my
assessment primarily on FTT-12, the IOT&E conducted at the Pacific
Missile Range Facility from August to October 2011. However, I used
significant contributing data from prior flight tests, lethality
testing, and other testing of mobility, safety, and electromagnetic/
environmental effects conducted from 2006 through 2011. To assess AN/
TPY-2 performance in its Forward-Based Mode (FBM), I also used data
from FTG-06a, FTM-15, and ground testing associated with the radars
currently deployed in Israel, Japan, and Turkey.
THAAD is operationally effective against simple short-range
ballistic missile threats intercepted in both the endo- and low exo-
atmosphere. Although THAAD has not yet demonstrated its capability
against medium-range threats, ground testing and analyses indicate it
has an inherent capability to deal with those threats. The AN/TPY-2
(FBM) radar is operationally effective at providing track data on
intermediate-range threats to the C2BMC, the BMDS command and control
architecture, for use by Aegis BMD or GMD.
THAAD is operationally suitable, but examination of reliability
data, ground test results, problems encountered during testing, and
soldier feedback indicate that the THAAD system has a number of
limitations that the MDA should investigate or correct to increase the
suitability of the system. Available contractor data, combined with
THAAD test results, indicate the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar is operationally
suitable.
In February, I also published my annual BMDS Assessment Report that
includes an assessment of EPAA Phase 1 capability. I based my
assessment primarily on FTM-15, an operational test featuring an Aegis
BMD launch-onremote engagement of an intermediate-range ballistic
missile using up-range track data provided by an AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar.
However, I also used data from previous Aegis BMD 3.6.1 testing and
ground testing conducted from July to October 2011. I also used
Technical Assessment-04 that explored EPAA Phase 1 capability by
simultaneously executing multiple theater engagements with Aegis BMD,
AN/TPY-2 (FBM), and C2BMC in a digital modeling and simulation
environment. All of this testing supported an assessment of capability
over a limited region of the overall EPAA battlespace.
As currently deployed, Aegis BMD 3.6.1 provides some BMDS
capabilities against short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic
missiles targeted at Europe. Aegis BMD 3.6.1 includes midcourse-phase
engagement capabilities with SM-3 Block IA interceptors and terminal-
phase engagement capabilities with modified SM-2 Block IV interceptors.
While the MDA has made progress toward achieving and demonstrating
integrated engagement planning and execution to support the EPAA, such
capability for use against all potential threat classes during all
relevant phases of flight has not yet been demonstrated. BMDS battle
management includes engagement planning, sensor management, track
forwarding, sensor-weapon system pairing, and BMDS engagement
direction. C2BMC is the element that is planned to perform global
battle management while BMD weapon elements retain element-level battle
management and fire control functionality. In December 2011, the U.S.
European Command upgraded C2BMC to Spiral 6.4 (S6.4), replacing S6.2,
as part of the EPAA Phase 1 deployment.
The capability to launch on remote track data is crucial to the
defense of Europe as it increases battlespace. In the fully implemented
EPAA, Aegis BMD will rely upon at least two AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radars to
provide radar cues and launch-on-remote track data. Aegis BMD executed
a launch-on-remote engagement of an intermediate range target using AN/
TPY-2 (FBM) tracks forwarded by C2BMC during FTM-15. Several ground
tests in the GT-04 campaign also exercised launch-on-remote capability
culminating in GTD-04d Part 3, which used assets that are part of the
initial EPAA Phase 1 deployment.
C2BMC software demonstrated track forwarding of single AN/TPY-2
(FBM) tracks to Tactical Digital Information Link J (Link 16) users in
multiple ground tests and FTM-15 in fiscal year 2011. C2BMC also
exercised the forwarding of track data from two AN/TPY-2(FBM) radars in
two integrated and one distributed ground tests as part of the EPAA
Phase 1 capability demonstration. However, there has been no
demonstration of this capability using multiple AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radars
and Aegis BMD ships in a flight test.
As the MDA executes the IMTP during the next several years,
additional test data supporting more comprehensive quantitative
assessments of the EPAA, as well as other elements of the BMDS will
become available. However, complete quantitative assessments of EPAA
capability are still a number of years away because it will take time
to collect the test data needed to verify, validate, and accredit the
models and simulations required to perform these assessments.
assessment of the current imtp
The Director of MDA, General O'Reilly, has continued to pursue a
rigorous IMTP development process that has produced a rigorous and
well-justified set of tests. My office continues to be involved
throughout the 6-month review and revision process leading to each
update of the IMTP. This process has worked well during the preparation
of the five previous semiannual plans, including the most recent IMTP
(version 12.1), that I approved jointly with General O'Reilly in March.
The process has enabled each version of the IMTP to be revised in a
timely manner consistent with policy changes, flight test results
(including unsuccessful intercepts) such as those I have mentioned
previously, or, fact-of-life changes in budgetary resources. The
current IMTP is a rigorous plan for obtaining the test information
needed to assess BMDS performance quantitatively.
However, the IMTP continues to be success-oriented, which is the
case for most of the Department's test programs. It does not explicitly
include plans for backup or repeat tests that would be needed in the
event of flight test mission failures. Therefore, the effects of
unsuccessful tests, such as the FTG-06a and FTM-16 Event 2 failures,
need to be mitigated through future updates of the IMTP. Nonetheless,
the 6-month revision process has allowed MDA to make the necessary
adjustments and create flexibility when it has been needed.
conclusion
The ability to conduct comprehensive quantitative assessments of
all BMDS capability across the full battlespace for each of the
elements is still a number of years away. Nonetheless, BMDS testing has
now produced sufficient data to enable a quantitative assessment of
capability for both THAAD and Aegis BMD covering a portion of their
battlespace. Notwithstanding the reductions made to the overall MDA
budget as a result of the Budget Control Act, the pace and content of
GMD testing has been sustained relative to previous IMTPs. In
particular, the pace of GMD flight testing continues to be consistent
with the best that has been achieved historically. Fact-of-life
limitations on flight testing make it impossible for such testing alone
to provide sufficient data to perform a statistically rigorous
assessment of the performance of any BMDS element across its full
battlespace. This is why a key focus of the IMTP has been since its
inception to collect the data needed to validate the models and
simulations that will provide the means to assess BMDS operational
capability across that full battlespace. The rigorous testing
incorporated in the IMTP will inevitably lead to flight test failures.
These failures, although often perceived as setbacks, provide
information that is absolutely critical to assuring that our ballistic
missile defenses will work under realistic and stressing conditions.
STATEMENT OF CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND
SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
[The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Cristina Chaplain
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the progress
made by the Department of Defense's (DOD) Missile Defense Agency (MDA).
In 2002, MDA was charged with developing and fielding the Ballistic
Missile Defense System (BMDS), expected to be capable of defending the
United States, deployed troops, friends, and allies against ballistic
missiles of all ranges in all phases of flight. To enable MDA to field
and enhance a missile defense system quickly, the Secretary of Defense
in 2002 delayed entry of the BMDS program into DOD's traditional
acquisition process until a mature capability was ready to be handed
over to a military service for production and operation. To meet a
presidential directive to deliver an initial capability by 2004 and to
meet a presidential announcement in 2009 to deploy missile defenses to
Europe, the program concurrently developed and fielded assets and
continues to utilize this approach. Since its inception, MDA has spent
more than $80 billion and plans to spend an additional $44 billion
through 2016 to develop a highly complex system of systems.
Since 2002, National Defense Authorization Acts have mandated that
we prepare annual assessments of MDA's ongoing cost, schedule, testing,
and performance progress.\1\ We recently issued our report covering
MDA's progress during fiscal year 2011 as well as challenges related to
MDA's use of highly concurrent acquisition strategies.\2\ My statement
today will focus on the issues covered in that report as well our June
2011 report on parts quality issues affecting space and missile defense
systems.\3\ Our work highlighted a number of causal factors behind the
parts quality problems being experienced at MDA and space agencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-107, Sec. 232(g) (2001); Ronald W. Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, Sec. 233
(2004); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub.
L. No. 109-163, Sec. 232; John Warner National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, Sec. 224 (2006); and
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-181, Sec. 225. See also National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, Sec. 232 (2011).
\2\ GAO, Missile Defense: Opportunity Exists to Strengthen
Acquisitions by Reducing Concurrency, GAO-12-486 (Washington, DC: Apr.
20, 2012).
\3\ GAO, Space and Missile Defense Acquisitions: Periodic
Assessment Needed to Correct Parts Quality Problems in Major Programs,
GAO-11-404 (Washington, DC: June 24, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We conducted the work underlying this testimony according to
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives. Additional information on our scope and
methodology is available in each of the issued reports.
background
MDA's BMDS is being designed to counter ballistic missiles of all
ranges--short, medium, intermediate, and intercontinental.\4\ Since
ballistic missiles have different ranges, speeds, sizes, and
performance characteristics, MDA is developing multiple systems that
when integrated provide multiple opportunities to destroy ballistic
missiles before they can reach their targets. The BMDS architecture
includes space-based and airborne sensors as well as ground- and sea-
based radars; ground- and sea-based interceptor missiles; and a command
and control, battle management, and communications system to provide
the warfighter with the necessary communication links to the sensors
and interceptor missiles.
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\4\ Ballistic missiles are classified by range: short-range
ballistic missiles have a range of less than1,000 kilometers (621
miles), medium-range ballistic missiles have a range of from 1,000 to
3,000 kilometers (621-1,864 miles), intermediate-range ballistic
missiles have a range of from 3,000 to 5,500 kilometers (1,864-3,418
miles), and intercontinental ballistic missiles have a range of greater
than 5,500 kilometers (3,418 miles).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 1 provides a brief description of 10 BMDS elements and
supporting efforts currently under development by MDA.
TABLE 1: DESCRIPTION OF MDA'S BMDS ELEMENTS AND SUPPORTING EFFORTS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMDS Element/Supporting Effort Description
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis Aegis BMD is a sea-based
BMD) with Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block missile defense system
IA and Block IB. being developed in
capability-based increments
to defend against ballistic
missiles of all ranges. Key
components include the
shipboard SPY-1 radar, SM-3
missiles, and command and
control systems. It also is
used as a forward-deployed
sensor for surveillance and
tracking of ballistic
missiles. The SM-3 missile
has multiple versions in
development or production.
The first two variants are
referred to as the SM-3
Block IA and SM-3 Block
IB.a
Aegis Ashore.............................. Aegis Ashore is a future
land-based variant of the
ship-based Aegis BMD. It is
expected to track and
intercept ballistic
missiles in their midcourse
phase of flight using SM-3
interceptor variants as
they become available. Key
components include a
vertical launch system and
a reconstitutable enclosure
that houses the SPY-1 radar
and command and control
system known as the
deckhouse. DOD plans to
deploy the first Aegis
Ashore with SM-3 Block IB
in the 2015 time frame as
part of the missile defense
of Europe called the
European Phased Adaptive
Approach (EPAA).
Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IIA.................. The SM-3 Block IIA is the
third SM-3 variant to be
developed for use with the
sea-based and future land-
based Aegis BMD. This
program began in 2006 as a
joint development with
Japan, and it was added to
the EPAA when that approach
was announced in 2009. As
part of EPAA Phase III, the
SM-3 Block IIA is planned
to be fielded with Aegis
Weapons System version 5.1
by the 2018 timeframe.
Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IIB.................. The SM-3 IIB is the fourth
SM-3 variant planned. It is
intended to defend against
medium- and intermediate-
range ballistic missiles
and provide early intercept
capabilities against some
intercontinental ballistic
missiles. The SM-3 Block
IIB program began in June
2010 and is planned to be
fielded by the 2020 time
frame as part of the EPAA
Phase IV. Given its early
stage of development,
program management
officials stated that the
SM-3 Block IIB is not
managed within the Aegis
BMD Program Office and has
not been baselined.
BMDS Sensors.............................. MDA is developing various
sensors for fielding. These
include forward-based
sensors; mobile, sea-based,
space-based, and airborne
sensors; as well as
upgrades to existing early
warning radars. The BMDS
uses these sensors to
identify and continuously
track ballistic missiles in
all phases of flight.
Command, Control, Battle Management, and C2BMC is the integrating
Communications (C2BMC). element of the BMDS. Its
role is to provide
deliberate planning,
situational awareness,
sensor management, and
battle management for the
integrated BMDS.
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)...... GMD is a ground-based
missile defense system
designed to destroy
intermediate and
intercontinental ballistic
missiles during the
midcourse phase of their
flight. Its mission is to
protect the U.S. Homeland
against ballistic missile
attacks from North Korea
and the Middle East. GMD
has two Ground-based
Interceptor (GBI) variants--
the Capability Enhancement
I (CE-I) and the Capability
Enhancement II (CE-II). MDA
has emplaced its total
planned inventory of 30
interceptors at two missile
field sites--Fort Greely,
AK, and Vandenberg, CA.
Precision Tracking and Space System (PTSS) PTSS is being developed as
an operational component of
the BMDS designed to
support intercept of
regional medium- and
intermediate-range
ballistic missile threats
to U.S. Forces and allies
and long-range threats to
the United States. PTSS
will track large missile
raid sizes after booster
burnout, which could enable
earlier intercepts.
Targets and Countermeasures............... MDA develops and
manufactures highly complex
targets for short, medium,
intermediate, and
eventually intercontinental
ranges used in BMDS flight
tests to present realistic
threat scenarios. The
targets are designed to
encompass the full spectrum
of threat missile ranges
and capabilities.
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense THAAD is a ground-based
(THAAD). missile defense system
designed to destroy short-
and medium-range ballistic
missiles during the late-
midcourse and terminal
phases of flight. Its
mission is to defend
deployed U.S. Forces and
friendly foreign population
centers.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: MDA data.
Note: The EPAA is a policy announced by the President in 2009 that
articulates a schedule for delivering four phases of capability to
defend Europe and augment current protection of the U.S. Homeland in
the following timeframes: Phase 1 in 2011, Phase 2 in 2015, Phase 3 in
2018, and Phase 4 in 2020.
a MDA is currently developing or producing four versions of the SM-3
interceptor--IA, IB, IIA, and IIB. The SM-3 Block IA and SM-3 Block IB
are the earlier variants of the missile. The SM-3 Block IIA and SM-3
Block IIB are planned to provide successively greater range and
velocity to intercept medium to long-range ballistic missiles.
mda experienced mixed progress in development and delivery efforts
MDA experienced mixed results in executing its fiscal year 2011
development goals and BMDS tests. For the first time in 5 years, we are
able to report that all of the targets used in fiscal year 2011 test
events were delivered as planned and performed as expected. In
addition, the Aegis BMD program's SM-3 Block IA missile was able to
intercept an intermediate-range target for the first time. Also, the
THAAD program successfully conducted its first operational flight test
in October 2011. However, none of the programs we assessed were able to
fully accomplish their asset delivery and capability goals for the
year.
See table 2 for how each of these programs met some of its goals
during the fiscal year. Our report provides further detail on these
selected accomplishments.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ GAO-12-486.
TABLE 2: BMDS FISCAL YEAR 2011 SELECTED ACCOMPLISHMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fully Accomplished Partially or Not
Element Goals Accomplished Goals
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IA......... An April 2011 Delivered 6 out of
flight test 19 planned
demonstrated missiles by the
capability end of fiscal
required for year 2011;
European Phased delivery of 12
Adaptive Approach missiles is on
(EPAA) Phase I. hold pending the
Deployed first results of the
ship in support failure
of EPAA Phase I. investigation of
the anomaly that
occurred during
an April 2011
flight test.
Depending on the
results,
delivered
missiles may have
to be
retrofitted.
Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB......... Delivered first SM- The SM-3 Block IB
3 Block IB failed to
developmental intercept the
interceptor and target during its
fired it in the first flight
first flight test test, resulting
in September 2011. in a failure
review board
investigation of
the cause of the
failure. The
flight test is
scheduled to be
reconducted in
2012, delaying
the certification
of the Aegis BMD
4.0.1 weapon
system.
Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IIA........ None. Subsystem
preliminary
design review
failures led to a
program replan
that adjusted the
preliminary
design review
date to fiscal
year 2012 and
included new
subsystem reviews
for the failed
components. The
new subsystem
reviews were
completed in
fiscal year 2011
and early fiscal
year 2012.
Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IIB........ Awarded three Demonstration of
concept low-cost divert
definition and and attitude
program planning control system
contracts in components was
April 2011 and delayed until the
approved to begin first quarter of
technology fiscal year 2012.
development in
July 2011.
Aegis Ashore Completed A new deckhouse
preliminary fabrication plan
design review in delayed the award
August 2011. of the deckhouse
fabrication
contract,
procurement of
deckhouse
fabrication
materials, and
the start of
construction.
GMD Completed three of Flight test
the five limited failure in the
interceptor first quarter of
upgrades, fiscal year 2011
partially to resulted in
resolve component interceptor
issues identified production
in developmental suspension
testing and pending the
manufacturing. completion of an
investigation and
a successful non-
intercept flight
test.
PTSS Completed system Approval to begin
requirements and technology
system design development was
reviews in the delayed to the
second quarter of fourth quarter of
fiscal year 2011. fiscal year 2012.
Targets Launched all 11 Delivered 11 out
targets as of 14 targets it
planned. had planned.
THAAD Successfully Materiel release
conducted first to Army delayed
operational to the second
flight test in quarter of fiscal
October 2011. year 2012. THAAD
Delivered 11 delayed plans to
missiles. deliver first
battery to fiscal
year 2012 because
of production
issues with the
interceptor.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of MDA data.
Note: BMDS fiscal year 2011 asset and capability deliveries for Airborne
Infrared; C2BMC; joint U.S.-Israel BMDS; Sea-based X-band radar; and
Space Tracking and Surveillance System elements were not reviewed.
Although some programs completed significant accomplishments during
the fiscal year, there were also several critical test failures. These
as well as a test anomaly and delays disrupted MDA's flight test plan
and the acquisition strategies of several components. Overall, flight
test failures and an anomaly forced MDA to suspend or slow production
of three out of four interceptors currently being manufactured.
The Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IA program conducted a
successful intercept in April 2011, but there was an anomaly in
a critical component of the interceptor during the test. This
component is common with the Block IB missile. Program
management officials stated that the SM-3 Block IA deliveries
have been suspended while the failure reviews are being
conducted.
The Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB program failed in its
first intercept attempt in September 2011. The Aegis program
has had to add an additional flight test and delay multiple
other flight tests. Program management officials stated that
the SM-3 Block IB production has been slowed while the failure
reviews are being conducted.
The GMD program has been disrupted by two recent test
failures. As a result of a failed flight test in January 2010,
MDA added a retest designated as Flight Test GMD-06a (FTG-
06a).\6\ However, this retest also failed in December 2010
because of a failure in a key component of the kill vehicle. As
a result of these failures, MDA has decided to halt flight
testing and restructure its multiyear flight test program, halt
production of the interceptors, and redirect resources to
return-to-flight activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ The failed January 2010 flight test--FTG-06--was planned as the
first test of GMD's enhanced version of the kill vehicle--the CE-II.
Production issues forced MDA to slow production of the THAAD
interceptors, the fourth missile being manufactured.
highly concurrent acquisition strategies often lead to performance,
cost, and schedule consequences
To meet the 2002 presidential direction to initially rapidly field
and update missile defense capabilities as well as a 2009 presidential
announcement to deploy missile defenses in Europe, MDA has undertaken
and continues to undertake highly concurrent acquisitions. While this
approach enabled MDA to rapidly deploy an initial capability in 2005 by
concurrently developing, manufacturing, and fielding BMDS assets, it
also led to the initiation of large-scale acquisition efforts before
critical technologies were fully understood and allowed programs to
move forward into production without having tests completed to verify
performance. After delivering its initial capability in 2005, MDA
continued these high-risk practices that have resulted in problems
requiring extensive retrofits, redesigns, delays, and cost increases.
While MDA has incorporated some acquisition best practices in its newer
programs, its acquisition strategies still include high or elevated
levels of concurrency that result in increased acquisition risk--
including performance shortfalls, cost growth, and schedule delays--for
these newer programs.
Concurrency is broadly defined as overlap between technology
development and product development or between product development and
production of a system. This overlap is intended to introduce systems
rapidly, to fulfill an urgent need, to avoid technology obsolescence,
and to maintain an efficient industrial development and production
workforce. However, while some concurrency is understandable,
committing to product development before requirements are understood
and technologies mature as well as committing to production and
fielding before development is complete is a high-risk strategy that
often results in performance shortfalls, unexpected cost increases,
schedule delays, and test problems.\7\ At the very least, a highly
concurrent strategy forces decisionmakers to make key decisions without
adequate information about the weapon's demonstrated operational
effectiveness, reliability, logistic supportability, and readiness for
production. Also, starting production before critical tests have been
successfully completed has resulted in the purchase of systems that do
not perform as intended. These premature commitments mean that a
substantial commitment to production has been made before the results
of testing are available to decisionmakers. Accordingly, they create
pressure to avoid production breaks even when problems are discovered
in testing. These premature purchases have affected the operational
readiness of our forces and quite often have led to expensive
modifications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ GAO, Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing
Knowledge Early Improves Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-02-701 (Washington,
DC: July 15, 2002), and Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding
of Missile Defense Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation
Than Planned, GAO-09-338 (Washington, DC: Mar. 13, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In contrast, our work has found that successful programs that
deliver promised capabilities for the estimated cost and schedule
follow a systematic and disciplined knowledge-based approach, in which
high levels of product knowledge are demonstrated at critical points in
development.\8\ This approach recognizes that development programs
require an appropriate balance between schedule and risk and, in
practice, programs can be executed successfully with some level of
concurrency. For example, it is appropriate to order long-lead
production material in advance of the production decision, with the
pre-requisite that developmental testing is substantially accomplished
and the design confirmed to work as intended. This knowledge-based
approach is not unduly concurrent. Rather, programs gather knowledge
that demonstrates that their technologies are mature, designs are
stable, and production processes are in control before transitioning
between acquisition phases, which helps programs identify and resolve
risks early. It is a process in which technology development and
product development are treated differently and managed separately.
Technology development must allow room for unexpected results and
delays. Developing a product culminates in delivery and therefore gives
great weight to design and production. If a program falls short in
technology maturity, it is harder to achieve design stability and
almost impossible to achieve production maturity. It is therefore key
to separate technology from product development and product development
from production--and thus avoid concurrency. A knowledge-based approach
delivers a product on time, within budget, and with the promised
capabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon
Programs, GAO-06-391 (Washington, DC: Mar. 31, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
See figure 1 for depictions of a concurrent schedule and a schedule
that uses a knowledge-based approach.
MDA's Concurrent Acquisition Strategies Allowed It to Deliver Assets
Quickly but Also Led to Performance Issues with Cost and
Schedule Consequences
To meet the 2002 presidential direction to initially rapidly field
and update missile defense capabilities as well as the 2009
presidential announcement to deploy missile defenses in Europe, MDA has
undertaken and continues to undertake highly concurrent acquisitions.
Such practices enabled MDA to quickly ramp up efforts in order to meet
tight presidential deadlines, but they were high risk and resulted in
problems that required extensive retrofits, redesigns, delays, and cost
increases.
Table 3 illustrates concurrency in past efforts and its associated
effects. Among earlier MDA programs, concurrency was most pronounced in
the GMD program, where the agency was pressed to deliver initial
capabilities within a few years to meet the 2002 presidential
directive. The consequences here have been significant, in terms of
production delays and performance shortfalls, and are still affecting
the agency.
TABLE 3: EXAMPLES OF CONCURRENCY IN MDA PROGRAMS' ACQUISITION STRATEGIES
AND ASSOCIATED EFFECTS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Acquisition
MDA Program Concurrency Associated Effects
------------------------------------------------------------------------
GMD's initial capability To meet the CE-I interceptors
including CE-I interceptors in presidential were rapidly
2004 a. directive to delivered to the
deploy an initial warfighter
set of missile requiring an
defense extensive and
capabilities by expensive
2004, the program retrofit and
concurrently refurbishment
matured program that is
technology, still ongoing.
designed the
system, tested
the design, and
produced and
deployed an
initial set of
missile defense
capabilities.
GMD's enhanced interceptor Prior to fully CE-II interceptors
production a. completing were delivered
development and prematurely to
demonstrating the the warfighter
capability of the and will require
CE-I interceptor, an extensive and
MDA committed in expensive
2004 to retrofit. It will
development of an take several
enhanced version additional years
of the to demonstrate
interceptor full CE-II
called the CE-II. capabilities.
MDA proceeded to Production has
concurrently been halted and
develop, the flight test
manufacture, and plan has been
deliver 12 of altered,
these increasing the
interceptors The cost to initially
first and second confirm the CE-II
flight tests of capability from
the enhanced $236 million to
interceptor about $1 billion.
failed.
Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB......... MDA approved Production has
production of the been delayed,
SM-3 Block IB delivery of
missile before capability has
completing been delayed, and
developmental development costs
testing to have grown. The
confirm that the program has had
technologies were to add an
fully mature and additional flight
the design worked test and delay
as intended. In multiple
addition, MDA additional flight
decided to tests due to the
manufacture SM-3 failure of the
Block IB missiles program's first
beyond those attempted
needed for intercept in
developmental September 2011.
testing before Because of the
some criteria failure, MDA was
were met, unable to
including a validate initial
successful first SM-3 Block IB
flight test capability. In
demonstrating addition, an
that the system anomaly occurred
functioned as in an April 2011
intended. flight test of
the SM-3 Block IA
in a booster
component that is
common with the
Block IB missile.
Block IB
production is
being slowed
while failure
reviews are being
conducted.
THAAD. The agency awarded Problems
a contract for encountered while
the production of THAAD was
THAAD's first two concurrently
operational designing and
batteries before producing assets
its design was delayed fielding
stable and of the first two
developmental THAAD batteries
testing of all by more than 2
critical years and
components was increased costs
complete. by $40 million.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of MDA data.
a High levels of concurrency will continue for the GMD program with
developmental flight testing extending until at least 2022, well after
production of the interceptor is scheduled to be completed. MDA is
accepting the risk that these developmental flight tests may discover
issues that require costly design changes and retrofit programs to
resolve.
In recent years, MDA has taken positive steps to incorporate some
acquisition best practices, such as increasing competition and
partnering with laboratories to build prototypes. For example, MDA took
actions in fiscal year 2011 to reduce acquisition risks and prevent
future cost growth in its Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IIA program. The agency
recognized that the program's schedule included elevated acquisition
risks, so it appropriately added more time to the program by revising
the schedule to relieve schedule compression between its subsystem and
system-level design reviews. In addition, it incorporated lessons
learned from other SM-3 variants into its development to further
mitigate production unit costs. Moreover, for its PTSS program, MDA has
simplified the design and requirements.
However, table 4 shows that the agency's current acquisition
strategies still include high or elevated levels of concurrency that
set many of its newer programs up for increased acquisition risk,
including performance shortfalls, cost growth, and schedule delays.
TABLE 4: MDA'S ACQUISITION CONCURRENCY AND ASSOCIATED RISKS IN ITS NEWER
PROGRAMS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Acquisition
MDA Program Concurrency Risks
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IIB. Based on a Without holding
tentative key system
schedule, the engineering
program plans to events
commit to product culminating in a
development more preliminary
than a year prior design review,
to holding a programs cannot
preliminary ensure that
design review. By requirements are
contrast, major defined and
defense feasible and that
acquisition the proposed
programs outside design can meet
MDA are generally those
required to requirements
complete this within cost,
review before schedule, and
committing to other system
product constraints.
development.
Aegis Ashore. The program began There are
product increased
development for technical risks
two Aegis Ashore and increased
systems--one risk of cost
designated for growth because
testing and the the agency
other committed to
operational--and product
set the development for
acquisition the two systems
baseline before with less
completing the technical
preliminary knowledge than
design review. recommended by
High levels of acquisition best
concurrency can practices and
be seen in its without ensuring
construction and that requirements
procurement plan, were defined,
and the program feasible, and
has not aligned achievable within
its flight cost and schedule
testing schedule constraints.
with construction
and component
procurement
decisions.
Precision Tracking and Space An industry team This strategy may
System. will develop and not enable
produce two decisionmakers to
engineering and fully benefit
manufacturing from the
development knowledge gained
satellites while through on-orbit
a laboratory-led testing of the
contractor team lab-built
is still in the satellites and
development phase its design before
of building two making major
lab development commitments on
satellites. the industry-
built development
satellites since
those will be
under contract
and under
construction
before the on-
orbit testing can
take place.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of MDA data.
In our April 2012 report, we made two recommendations to strengthen
MDA's longer-term acquisition prospects.\9\ We recommended that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Office of Acquisition Technology and
Logistics to: (1) review all of MDA's acquisitions for concurrency and
determine whether the proper balance has been struck between the
planned deployment dates and the concurrency risks taken to achieve
those dates; and (2) review and report to the Secretary of Defense the
extent to which the directed capability delivery dates announced by the
President in 2009 are contributing to concurrency in missile defense
acquisitions and recommend schedule adjustments where significant
benefits can be obtained by reducing concurrency. DOD concurred with
both of these recommendations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ GAO-12-486.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, we recommended specific steps to reduce concurrency in
several of MDA's programs. DOD agreed with four of the five missile
defense element-specific recommendations and partially agreed with our
recommendation to report to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and
to Congress the root cause of the SM-3 Block IB developmental flight
test failure, path forward for future development, and the plans to
bridge production from the SM-3 Block IA to the SM-3 Block IB before
committing to additional purchases of the SM-3 Block IB. DOD commented
that MDA will report this information to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and to Congress upon completion of the failure review in the
third quarter of fiscal year 2012. However, DOD makes no reference to
delaying additional purchases until the recommended actions are
completed. We maintain our position that MDA should take the
recommended actions before committing to additional purchases of the
SM-3 Block IB.
parts quality issues have also had a significant effect on performance,
cost, and schedule
MDA parts quality issues have seriously impeded the development of
the BMDS in recent years. For example, during a THAAD flight test in
fiscal year 2010, the air-launched target failed to initiate after it
was dropped from the aircraft and fell into the ocean. The test was
aborted and a subsequent failure review board investigation identified
as the immediate cause of the failure the rigging of cables to the
missile in the aircraft and shortcomings in internal processes at the
contractor as the underlying cause. This failure led to a delay of the
planned test, restructuring of other planned tests, and hundreds of
millions of dollars being spent to develop and acquire new medium-range
air-launched targets. In another widely-reported example, the GMD
element's first intercept test of its CE-II GBI failed and the ensuing
investigation determined the root cause of the failure to be a quality
control event. This failure also caused multiple flight tests to be
rescheduled, delayed program milestones, and cost hundreds of millions
of dollars for a retest.
In view of the cost and importance of space and missile defense
acquisitions, we were asked to examine parts quality problems affecting
satellites and missile defense systems across DOD and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). In June 2011, we reported
that parts problems discovered after assembly or integration of the
instrument or spacecraft had more significant consequences as they
required lengthy failure analysis, disassembly, rework, and
reassembly--sometimes resulting in a launch delay. For example, the
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) program, a space-based
infrared sensor program with two demonstration satellites that launched
in September 2009, discovered problems with defective electronic parts
in the Space-Ground Link Subsystem during system-level testing and
integration of the satellite. By the time the problem was discovered,
the manufacturer no longer produced the part and an alternate
contractor had to be found to manufacture and test replacement parts.
According to officials, the problem cost about $7 million and was one
of the factors that contributed to a 17-month launch delay of two
demonstration satellites and delayed participation in the BMDS testing
we reported on in March 2009.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon
Programs, GAO-09-326SP (Washington, DC: Mar. 30, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our work highlighted a number of causal factors behind the parts
quality problems being experienced at MDA and space agencies.\11\ While
we present examples of the parts quality issues we found at MDA below,
the June 2011 report also describes the parts quality issues we found
with other space agencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ GAO-11-404.
Poor workmanship. For example, poor soldering
workmanship caused a power distribution unit to experience
problems during vehicle-level testing on MDA's Targets and
Countermeasures program. According to MDA officials, all units
of the same design by the same manufacturer had to be X-ray
inspected and reworked, involving extensive hardware
disassembly. As a corrective action, soldering technicians were
provided with training to improve their soldering operations
and ability to perform better visual inspections after
soldering.
The use of undocumented and untested manufacturing
processes. For example, MDA's Aegis BMD program reported that
the brackets used to accommodate communications and power
cabling were improperly bonded to SM-3 Block IA rocket motors,
potentially leading to mission failure. A failure review board
determined that the subcontractor had changed the bonding
process to reduce high scrap rates and that the new process was
not tested and verified before it was implemented.
Poor control of manufacturing materials and the
failure to prevent contamination. The GMD program reported a
problem with defective titanium tubing. The defective tubing
was rejected in 2004 and was to be returned to the supplier;
however, because of poor control of manufacturing materials, a
portion of the material was not returned and was inadvertently
used to fabricate manifolds for two complete CE-II GBIs. The
vehicles had already been processed and delivered to the prime
contractor for integration when the problem was discovered.
Prime contractor's failure to ensure that its
subcontractors and suppliers met program requirements. The GMD
program experienced a failure with an electronics part
purchased from an unauthorized supplier. According to program
officials, the prime contractor required subcontractors to only
purchase parts from authorized suppliers; however, the
subcontractor failed to execute the requirement and the prime
contractor did not verify compliance.
At the time of our June 2011 report, MDA had instituted policies to
prevent and detect parts quality problems. The programs reviewed in the
report--GMD, Aegis BMD, STSS, and Targets and Countermeasures--were
initiated before these recent policies aimed at preventing and
detecting parts quality problems took full effect. In addition to new
policies focused on quality, MDA has developed a supplier road map
database in an effort to gain greater visibility into the supply chain
to more effectively manage supply chain risks. In addition, according
to MDA officials, MDA has recently been auditing parts distributors in
order to rank them for risk in terms of counterfeit parts.
MDA also participates in a variety of collaborative initiatives to
address quality, in particular, parts quality. These range from
informal groups focused on identifying and sharing news about emerging
problems as quickly as possible, to partnerships that conduct supplier
assessments, to formal groups focused on identifying ways industry and
the government can work together to prevent and mitigate problems.
Moreover, since our report, MDA has added a new clause in one of
its GMD contracts to provide contractor accountability for quality. We
have not yet fully assessed the clause but it may allow the contracting
officer to make an equitable reduction of performance incentive fee on
two contract line items for certain types of quality problems. This new
clause shows some leadership by MDA to hold contractors accountable for
parts quality. But, we do not yet know what the impact of this clause
will be on improving MDA's problems with parts quality.
Our June 2011 report recommended greater coordination between
government organizations responsible for major space and missile
defense programs on parts quality issues and periodic reporting to
Congress. DOD partially concurred with our recommendation for greater
coordination but responded that it would work with NASA to determine
the optimal government-wide assessment and reporting implementation to
include all quality issues, of which parts, materials, and processes
would be one of the major focus areas. In addition, DOD proposed an
annual reporting period to ensure planned, deliberate, and consistent
assessments. We support DOD's willingness to address all quality issues
and to include parts, materials, and processes as an important focus
area in an annual report. DOD further stated that it had no objection
to providing a report to Congress, if Congress wanted one. We believe
that DOD should proactively provide its proposed annual reports to
Congress on a routine basis, rather than waiting for any requests from
Congress, which could be inconsistent from year to year.
The parts quality issues will require sustained attention from both
the executive and legislative branches to improve the quality of the
systems in development, particularly because there are significant
barriers to addressing quality problems, such as an increase in
counterfeit electronic parts, a declining government share of the
overall electronic parts market, and workforce gaps within the
aerospace sector.
concluding observations
In conclusion, as the MDA completes a decade of its work, it
continues to make progress in delivering assets, completing intercept
tests, and addressing some of the quality issues that have plagued it
in the past. This year, there were significant accomplishments, such as
the successful operational test for THAAD, but also setbacks, including
failed tests and their aftermath. Such setbacks reflect inherent risks
associated with the challenging nature of missile defense development,
but they are also exacerbated by strategies that adopt high levels of
concurrency that leave decisionmakers with less knowledge than needed
to move programs forward. Given that initial capabilities are now in
place and broader fiscal pressures require sound and more efficient
management approaches, it is now time for DOD to reassess MDA's
strategy of accelerating development and production to determine
whether this approach needs to be rethought for current and future BMDS
programs.
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I am happy to answer any
questions you have.
Senator Nelson. This hearing is now adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
defects clause in contracts
1. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, several years ago, after a
string of contractor failures, you and I discussed the need for a
defects clause in Missile Defense Agency (MDA) contracts to protect
taxpayers from paying for defective work. I understand that the new
Ground-based Missile Defense (GMD) Development and Sustainment Contract
(DSC) contains such a clause. Under the new clause, who would pay for
defective work--the contractor responsible for the defective work or
the taxpayers--and will you pursue that as a standard clause for future
contracts?
General O'Reilly. Under the new clause, the government may reduce a
contractor's potential performance incentive fee, and recover
previously awarded fees, to offset the cost of defective work
accomplished. At present, this clause is only in the Ground-based
Interceptor (GBI) contract line item numbers (CLINs).
The clause provides the government the latitude to reduce the
performance incentive fee if the following three criteria are
reasonably determined: (1) a quality escape \1\ occurred; (2) the
contractor or any subcontractors solely caused the quality escape; and
(3) the quality escape caused substantial harm to the government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Quality escape is defined as: the contractor, or any
subcontractors: (1) failed to detect a nonconformance or failed to
follow command media (instructions); (2) the nonconformance or failure
could adversely affect the component's performance or the performance
of a system or subsystem; and (3) requires government or contractor
action to bring the item back to compliance with specifications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The GMD DSC Contractor Accountability for Quality clause was
approved for one-time use. If determined to be beneficial and product
quality is improved, MDA will request the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics approve using a similar
clause in future competitively awarded contracts.
savings under new contract
2. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, I understand that the new GMD
DSC cost nearly $1 billion less than the government cost estimate, and
that you reduced the cost of each GBI by some $20 million below the
previous contract cost. How did you achieve such savings and will you
seek to achieve such cost savings with future MDA contracts?
General O'Reilly. The GMD DSC savings are attributable to a full
and open competitive environment. The $1 billion less than the
government cost estimate is expected to be realized during the next 7
years of GMD DSC period of performance through innovations and
efficiencies proposed by the winning contractor, including:
An integrated weapon system management approach with a
flat organizational structure using lower cost centers and rate
structures
Prime contractor teaming with existing GMD Original
Equipment Manufacturers
Reducing program risk through upfront investment in
software development, procurement of obsolete interceptor
parts, and development of an Integrated Digital Environment to
provide a collaborative work environment tool that is projected
to both reduce and contain costs and risks
Consolidating and relocating interceptor, ground
systems, test, development facilities and laboratories,
personnel, and equipment items
No fee on Other Direct Costs (ODC) and a no fee-on-fee
approach, which means that the prime contractor will not charge
fee on the profit/fee portion of its subcontractors.
MDA will execute appropriate market research as part of future
acquisition strategy development to pursue if competition can achieve
similar benefits for other programs.
3. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, are there other advantageous
features of the new contract that you will seek to include in future
MDA contracts?
General O'Reilly. There are features in the GMD DSC that would be
appropriate for other MDA programs. Those features under consideration
for future acquisition strategies include:
Quality clause for contractor accountability that will
incentivize delivery of quality, non-defective interceptors and
hold the contractor liable for all harm to the government,
including an ability to make previously earned performance
incentives subject to rescission
Standard contract clause for direct government access
to subcontractors
Performance-based logistics approach to maintain and
incentivize system operational availability
Contractual provision that eliminates cost
inefficiencies by requiring the contractor's proposal, as well
as future change order proposals, to reflect a no fee on ODC
and a no fee-on-fee approach. This provision eliminates the fee
prime contractors would add on top of their subcontractors'
fee.
why u.s. missile defense can't threaten russia
4. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, I understand you have had an
opportunity to explain to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO)-Russia Council why our missile defense systems planned for
Europe can't threaten Russia's nuclear deterrent missile force. Can you
explain, on an unclassified basis, why our missile defenses can't
threaten Russia's deterrent?
General O'Reilly. I briefed the NATO-Russia Council on May 5, 2011,
on why missile defense cannot threaten Russia's deterrent. The missile
defense interceptors planned for Europe have insufficient velocity to
threaten Russia's nuclear deterrent missile force. Russian
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) launch facilities are spread
over 2,000 miles of distance and five time zones. ICBMs launched from
Russia to the United States travel over the North Pole, not within
reach of interceptors launched from Poland or Romania where the
European missile defense interceptors are located.
independent report on cooperation with russia
5. Senator Levin. Dr. Roberts, in February, an independent group of
international experts, known as the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative,
issued a report recommending that the United States and NATO should
cooperate on missile defense with Russia by sharing satellite and radar
early warning information in joint cooperation centers. One of the
report's leaders was Stephen Hadley, the National Security Advisor to
President George W. Bush. Is their proposal consistent with U.S. and
NATO proposals for cooperating with Russia on missile defense and does
the administration support their proposal?
Dr. Roberts. Cooperation with Russia on missile defense has long
been a priority for both Republican and Democratic administrations.
Successful U.S.-Russia cooperation in this area could send a strong
signal to Iran that Iran's development of missiles and pursuit of
nuclear capabilities are a waste of resources and are reducing rather
than enhancing Iran's security. In addition, cooperation would add to
the effectiveness of U.S., NATO, and Russian missile defenses, and it
would help to improve U.S-Russia relations overall.
Russia initially proposed the creation of NATO-Russia missile
defense centers. The United States has welcomed the idea of data
sharing between Russia and NATO, which would improve early warning and
defense of all parties. Such data sharing is envisioned to take place
in a NATO-Russia missile defense data fusion center. Such sharing could
have direct operational benefits, resulting in a more efficient and
effective defense. A second potential center, the NATO-Russia Planning
and Operations Center, would have the function of coordinating missile
defense efforts. Any agreements on such centers or any other form of
data sharing would have to be consistent with U.S. National Disclosure
Policy and other applicable laws.
There would also be wider political benefits to cooperation. NATO
and Russia working together on missile defense would send a strong
signal to regional actors that ballistic missile proliferation will not
go unchallenged. Cooperation would enhance strategic stability by
improving the U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia relationships, and could pay
further dividends by building cooperative relationships that might flow
to other areas.
6. Senator Levin. Dr. Roberts, is it correct that we already share
such early warning information with numerous countries?
Dr. Roberts. Yes, the United States does share early warning
information with select foreign countries. All sharing of classified
military information is conducted in accordance with U.S. National
Disclosure Policy and other applicable law and policy. Classified
military information is only shared when there is a clearly defined
benefit to U.S. security. In addition, the content and scope of such
information shared is defined in a specific agreement with the country
in question.
sharing information with russia
7. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, you have indicated previously
that Russian radar data would be useful in enhancing our missile
defense capability relative to Iran. I want to clarify what sort of
data you have in mind. As I understand it, there is relatively
unspecific early warning data, which could be shared on an unclassified
basis with other nations, that would provide warning that a missile had
been launched and would land in a certain area at a certain time. But
that information is not precise enough to enhance missile defense
operations. There is also, however, very precise and specific
information on the position and velocity of a threat missile, what is
called a missile track, that would contribute to the ability to defeat
a threat missile. I gather that missile track information is
classified, but we have such information and Russia has it from radars
in different places. If Russia and the United States shared missile
track information, would that enhance our ability to defeat Iranian
ballistic missiles?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sharing missile track information has the
potential to enhance both United States and Russian ability to defeat
projected Middle Eastern threat ballistic missiles.
Sharing unclassified early warning data would speed reaction times
and increase situational awareness. Beyond unclassified data, the
potential exchange of classified missile tracks could increase raid
capacity and probability of engagement success.
8. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, given that Russia has radars in
locations where we do not, if Russia shared missile track data, would
it improve our missile defense capabilities relative to North Korea?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sharing missile track information with
Russia would improve our ability to defeat North Korean ballistic
missiles.
9. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, in your view, could we share
such information with Russia without compromising the security or
capability of our missile defenses?
General O'Reilly. Yes. Sharing missile tracking data would not
necessarily reveal capabilities of, or vulnerabilities to, the system.
We informed the committee in November 2011 that since 2001, in
accordance with National Disclosure Policy and procedures, the MDA
disclosed limited classified missile defense information/data to
Russian Federation personnel observing two missile defense test events.
In both cases, MDA requested and was granted an Exception to National
Disclosure Policy to enable this data release. The overall impact on
security or capability of our missile defense depends on the decision
regarding what information to share with the Russian Federation. As
such, the U.S. ability to share early warning or other specific missile
track data with the Russian Federation depends on the classification
and the level of detail in the data.
In order to share information, we would need a formal Defense
Technology Cooperation Agreement (DTCA). The United States will only
provide the Russian Federation information that is consistent with both
National Disclosure Policy, which limits information disclosure to the
Russian Federation to unclassified information only, and guidance
contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012, section 1244 ``Sharing of Classified United States Ballistic
Missile Defense Information With The Russian Federation.''
fly-before-you-buy acquisition strategy
10. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, General Formica, Mr. Gilmore,
Dr. Roberts, and Ms. Chaplain, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review
(BMDR) stated our policy that before new missile defense systems are
deployed they must be tested in a manner that permits evaluation in a
realistic manner. This policy indicates that we will not deploy a new
system before it has demonstrated its capability through realistic
testing. Would you agree that we should not deploy any new missile
defense systems unless and until they have demonstrated their
capability through realistic flight testing--even if that means taking
longer than the original timelines announced for the European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA)?
General O'Reilly. I agree. The Fly-Before-You-Buy acquisition
strategy, and demonstrating capability through realistic flight-
testing, are Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) priorities.
Operationally realistic testing is also a priority highlighted in the
2010 BMDR report. Comprehensive testing has always been the cornerstone
of the MDA's development efforts.
Flight testing of BMDS capabilities planned for different phases of
the EPAA is scheduled for completion before production decisions and
fielding timelines. For example, the SM-3 Block IB is being flight-
tested this year, including the recent successful intercept in early
May. Production decisions for the SM-3 Block 1B will depend on
successful completion of additional flight tests.
General Formica. The policy expressed in the BMDR is sound. As a
warfighter, I'm interested in the timely delivery of relevant
capabilities. MDA, utilizing a robust test program, delivers those
capabilities. MDA's approach provides a reasonable balance of getting
tested capabilities to the warfighter in a timely manner.
Mr. Gilmore. I agree that we should not deploy any new missile
defense systems unless and until they have demonstrated their
capability through realistic flight testing. Prior to a system or
element transitioning to a service for deployment, the system should
undergo adequate flight testing to verify, validate, and accredit the
modeling and simulation and operational testing to determine the
system's capability with a reasonable level of statistical confidence.
Recent examples include extensive Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
(Aegis BMD) 3.6.1 testing leading up to FTM-15 in support of Phase 1 of
the EPAA, and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Initial
Operational Test and Evaluation (FTT-12) in support of a full rate
production decision. Deployment timelines should be event-driven, where
required system capabilities have been adequately demonstrated, and not
schedule-driven. The Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP), Version 12.1,
that General O'Reilly and I approved on March 1, 2012, includes
extensive flight testing supporting the Phase 2 EPAA. This testing will
consist of 9 Aegis BMD 4.01/5.0 intercept flight tests (10 intercepts)
using SM-3 Block IB (9)/Block IA (1) missiles; 3 Aegis BMD 4.01/5.0
flight test simulating 7 intercepts; 3 Aegis Ashore flight tests (2
intercept tests); and a final operational test (FTO-02) involving an
Aegis BMD ship-board intercept, an Aegis Ashore intercept, a THAAD
intercept, and a Patriot intercept. The MDA has planned all this
testing to be complete by December 31, 2015, to meet the President's
Phase 2 EPAA timeline.
Dr. Roberts. Before new capabilities are deployed, they must
undergo testing that enables an assessment under realistic operational
conditions against threat-representative targets to demonstrate that
they can reliably and effectively help U.S. forces accomplish their
mission. The administration is committed to this approach, best
characterized as fly-before-you-buy, which will result in a posture
based on proven technology in order to improve reliability, confidence,
and cost control. To date, the only anticipated delay to the EPAA
schedule is due to the funding cut to the SM-3 IIB program from the
President's budget request for fiscal year 2012.
Ms. Chaplain. The GAO concurs with the administration's commitment
in the BMDR to deploy capabilities that have been proven under
extensive testing and assessment and are affordable over the long term.
Extensive testing is a key tenet of GAO's knowledge-based approach,
which we have found in our work in both government and commercial
acquisitions helps to ensure delivery and deployment of systems with
the performance desired at a cost and schedule that is both affordable
and on time. While we concur with the BMDR commitment, our knowledge-
based approach goes further in finding that extensive testing is also
crucial to the production decision, which usually occurs many years
before capabilities are deployed. We have found that premature
commitments to production have led to expensive efforts to resolve or
mitigate problems after systems are fielded. We reported this year that
the GBI continues to suffer from the premature commitment to
production.
In our April 2012 report, we determined that MDA has undertaken and
continues to undertake highly concurrent acquisitions in response to
the 2002 presidential direction to initially rapidly field and update
missile defense capabilities as well as the 2009 presidential
announcement to deploy missile defenses in Europe. This concurrency can
be seen in programs that proceed into product development before
technologies are mature or appropriate system engineering has been
completed. But it also exists in programs that proceed into production
before a significant amount of independent testing is conducted to
confirm that the product works as intended. While MDA has embraced the
value of reducing unknowns before making key decisions in some of its
newer programs, such as the SM-3 Block IIA, and adopted good practices,
such as awarding competitive contracts to multiple contractors in the
SM-3 Block IIB program, it continues to plan and implement highly
concurrent approaches. In fact, today, MDA is still operating at a fast
pace, as production and fielding of assets remains, in many cases,
ahead of the ability to test and validate them. In light of MDA's long
history of pursuing highly concurrent acquisitions in order to meet
challenging deadlines set by the administration, we recommended in our
report that DOD review the extent to which the EPAA capability delivery
dates are contributing to concurrency in missile defense acquisitions
and recommend schedule adjustments where significant benefits can be
obtained by reducing concurrency.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
hedging strategy status and results
11. Senator Nelson. Dr. Roberts, as indicated in the BMDR, the
Department of Defense (DOD) has been engaged in a Homeland defense
hedging strategy review, considering options to enhance our defensive
capability in case the threat emerges more quickly or robustly than
anticipated. I understand that quite a number of actions have already
been decided or implemented, and others are still under consideration.
Can you explain what actions have already been decided or implemented
as a result of the hedging strategy review?
Dr. Roberts. Key elements of the hedge were set out in the BMDR 2
years ago, including completion of the second field of 14 silos at Fort
Greely, AK. This increases the availability of silos in the event that
additional GBI deployments become necessary. Additionally, we continue
to develop the two-stage GBI.
The commitment made in the BMDR to being well hedged is further
reflected in a request to purchase an additional five GBIs in the
fiscal year 2013 budget. This action provides an option to emplace
additional missiles in Missile Field 2 rapidly, if necessary. It will
also maintain enough GBIs for testing and operational spares. This
decision also keeps the GBI production line warm in case the purchase
of additional GBIs is needed in the future. These decisions follow the
commitment in the BMDR to pursue additional programs to hedge against
future uncertainty. To support those decisions, DOD is conducting a
comprehensive review of possible future developments in the projected
threat and of how best to ensure timely response to unpredicted threat
developments.
12. Senator Nelson. Dr. Roberts, what is the current status of the
review, do you expect any further decisions soon, and will the review
process continue as the threat evolves?
Dr. Roberts. DOD is continuing to work to deliver the hedge report
to Congress as soon as possible. Given the sensitive intelligence basis
of the hedging strategy review, and also the classified performance
characteristics of U.S. systems, the results of the review can only be
discussed in an appropriate setting. As stated in the BMDR, DOD is
committed to pursuing additional programs to hedge against future
uncertainty.
gbi reliability improvement program
13. Senator Nelson. Dr. Roberts, regarding our efforts to improve
our GBIs for Homeland defense, in previous testimony you noted that we
have ``an aggressive GBI reliability improvement program'' that is
intended to ``reduce the number of GBIs required per intercept, which
will increase the number of ICBMs that can be defeated by the GMD
system.'' You also noted that we could ``double the number of ICBMs the
current force is capable of defeating without adding a single new
GBI.'' Can you describe how this GBI reliability effort fits into our
strategy?
Dr. Roberts. The GMD system currently protects the United States
from limited ICBM attacks. Due to continuing improvements in the GMD
system and the number of GBIs now deployed compared to potential North
Korean and Iranian long-range ballistic missile capabilities, the
United States possesses a capability to counter the projected threat
from North Korea and Iran for the foreseeable future. The GBI
reliability effort is a key part of our continuing commitment to
improve the GMD system.
The GMD milestones for increasing reliability include successful
GBI flight testing, GBI component reliability growth testing, upgrade
of current GBIs, and delivery of the new version of GBIs. While
component reliability testing will be conducted over the life of the
program, additional GBI component testing is being planned for fiscal
years 2013 to 2015. Capability Enhancement (CE)-I interceptors will
continue to be upgraded through fiscal year 2017. Manufacturing of CE-
II interceptors will restart in the second quarter of fiscal year 2013.
The milestones for increasing discrimination include completion of
testing to provide the capability to process near-term discrimination
data from BMDS sensors. Options to improve Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle
(EKV) on-board discrimination capabilities are under study and will be
incorporated in the next EKV software upgrades.
14. Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, can you describe the scope of
the program in unclassified terms?
General O'Reilly. The MDA's plan to improve the reliability of GBIs
consists of four initiatives: Fleet Upgrade Program, Flight Test
Rotation Program, Reliability Growth Testing Program, and Component
Reliability Program. These initiatives will be guided by a Boeing-led
GBI reliability assessment, part of the recently awarded DSC. The
assessment, to be completed in early fiscal year 2013, will evaluate
all GBI components against known risks, design operating life
requirements, and environments. The results will identify components
for additional reliability growth that require development,
procurement, testing, and replacement.
GBI Fleet Upgrade Program removes fielded interceptors from silos,
upgrades them to remove known risks, performs mandatory maintenance,
and replaces limited-life items. After acceptance testing, the program
returns the upgraded interceptors to the operational fleet. Replaced
components are used in the Component Reliability Program. All currently
fielded interceptors will be upgraded by the end of fiscal year 2017.
Reliability and performance upgrades to the GBI booster and EKV are in
development and planned for integration into five new-build GBIs. Four
of the new-build interceptors will be placed into service in fiscal
year 2016 through fiscal year 2017. One is planned for flight test as
described in the IMTP.
Flight Test Rotation Program removes older interceptors from silos,
performs a limited upgrade to meet flight test configuration
requirements, performs mandatory maintenance, and replaces limited-life
items. After acceptance testing, the program delivers what is now a
test interceptor for the flight test program. The removed interceptors
are replaced by new or upgraded GBIs.
The GBI Reliability Growth Testing Program ensures that corrections
to known risks are effective and eliminate risks. In the near-term,
Control Test Vehicle-One (CTV-01) and Flight Test Ground-based
Interceptor (FTG)-06b are the final verification test milestones to
demonstrate the design fixes to correct the problems uncovered in the
FTG-06a flight test. There will be additional ground testing of
components and assemblies to verify design fixes, demonstrate component
reliability, qualify the item, and increase confidence in component
reliability.
The Component Reliability Program includes testing, analyzing
trends, and identifying reliability improvements for GBI component
hardware. Service life extension testing will continue for one-shot
devices, including the firing of all one-shot devices removed from
fielded interceptors during upgrade and flight test rotation to obtain
performance reliability data. The program identifies older interceptors
for disassembly and component reliability testing. Over the next 7
years, four interceptors will be removed from service and undergo
reliability testing.
15. Senator Nelson. General Formica, from a warfighter perspective,
how significant would it be if we could double the number of ICBMs we
could defeat with our current number of GBIs?
General Formica. While there may be strategic considerations to
take into account, from an operational perspective, it would be a
significant advantage if we could double the number of ICBMs we can
defeat with the current inventory of GBIs. The current U.S. Northern
Command (NORTHCOM) shot doctrine is optimized to balance risk against
system capability. Improvements to the GBI, sensor capabilities, and
deterrence would be key considerations for the commander of NORTHCOM to
revise shot doctrine.
benefit of precision tracking space system
16. Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, your prepared testimony
includes the following statement about the value of the Precision
Tracking Space System (PTSS) under development: ``The greatest future
enhancement for both Homeland and regional defense in the next 10 years
is the development of the PTSS satellites, which will provide fire-
control quality track data of raids of hostile ballistic missiles over
their entire flight trajectories. . . . '' Can you explain why you
believe PTSS would provide such a significant contribution to missile
defense and how it would differ from our current radar-based sensor
system?
General O'Reilly. PTSS is being designed and developed to meet the
needs documented in the Air and Missile Defense Prioritized
Capabilities List (PCL), the primary input from the U.S. Strategic
Command (STRATCOM)-led Warfighter Involvement Process to MDA's
requirements process. Specifically, as an agile, effective sensor
against mobile and emerging threats, it will uniquely address the post-
boost challenge, continuous tracking of ballistic missile objects,
increased raid capacity, and object characterization and
discrimination. PTSS track data will be available to any missile
defense weapon system connected to the BMDS fire control network.
PTSS will contribute to missile defense by expanding interceptor
access to the early post-boost phase of a ballistic missile's flight,
preventing an adversary missile from traversing undetected into
midcourse and using advanced countermeasures. PTSS will increase BMDS
capability by providing the warfighter a shoot-assess-shoot engagement
tactic essential to the efficient use of interceptor inventory, and
will defeat adversary attempts to evade defense in all phases of
flight.
The constellation will support simultaneous missile defense
operations against widely separated adversaries, and provide
simultaneous coverage from threats to the United States, deployed
forces, and friends and allies without the logistic or political
challenges to basing terrestrial sensors in other countries. PTSS will
increase BMDS raid handling capacity and engagement success by
providing early views of midcourse countermeasures and preferential
tracking of threats that carry multiple warheads or complex
countermeasures. The system will provide fire control support to early
thinning of raids to avoid saturation in subsequent layers, one of the
first steps in the discrimination process through persistent track.
Consisting of multiple, mutually reinforcing sensor systems (radar
and infrared, or IR), PTSS will provide on-demand sensor coverage, and
will cover the ballistic missile battlespace from threat ignition to
reentry. The low Earth orbit satellite constellation and ground-
processing infrastructure will track medium-, intermediate-, and long-
range ballistic missiles in the post-boost and midcourse phases of
flight, providing early access to threats launched from land, sea, and
the deepest interiors of countries. For comparison, PTSS will provide
sensor coverage for over 70 percent of the Earth for approximately $75
million per year in operations and sustainment costs, compared to AN/
TPY-2 sensor coverage of only one theater for approximately $150
million per year in operations and sustainment costs.
PTSS's precise and expanded sensor coverage, without the need for
host nation basing agreements or advance warning of an impending
attack, provides beyond line-of-sight tracking not possible with
horizon-limited terrestrial sensors. PTSS's over-the-horizon capability
will greatly extend the operating areas of land- and sea-based defense
units, and will also expand the geographical territory that can be
protected by a single fire unit, leading to significantly more
efficient employment of limited interceptor inventory. Integrated with
the BMDS sensor network, PTSS will fill the time gap between the end of
overhead persistent IR satellite boost phase tracks and the start of
midcourse radar tracks. Sensor coverage for critical threat corridors
will be provided where early commit-quality radar coverage is fiscally
and politically not sustainable. Post-boost IR tracking from space also
increases BMDS survivability and denies adversaries the ability to
optimize attacks to circumvent radar-only defenses. PTSS will increase
BMDS sensor capability for an uncertain future where threats may come
from new adversaries and geographically diverse regions not under
consideration today.
17. Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, in your view, what would be
the impact on our missile defense capability if we did not develop and
deploy the PTSS?
General O'Reilly. There will be several critical impacts to the
BMDS if the PTSS is not developed and deployed:
(1) No realistic way to expand and rapidly adjust coverage to meet
evolving threats. PTSS provides persistent, near-global fire control
quality sensor coverage of prospective ballistic missile launch sites
and attack corridors. PTSS coverage includes not just the land masses
of current potential adversaries, but also broad ocean areas and new
territories from which future adversaries could threaten the United
States and its interests. Terrestrial deployment options with similar
capabilities would necessitate impractical and unaffordable deployment
of fixed and/or transportable radars, available on demand, and then
only when their use was not outright precluded by geographical
obstacles or host nation politics.
(2) Warfighter needs for the BMDS are documented in the Air and
Missile Defense PCL, a major product of the STRATCOM-led Warfighter
Involvement Process. PTSS is being designed and developed to meet these
needs by providing persistent coverage for over 70 percent of the
Earth's surface, specifically in the projected threat areas. As an
agile, effective sensor against mobile and emerging threats, it
uniquely addresses the post-boost challenge, continuous tracking of
ballistic missile objects, increased raid capacity, and object
characterization and discrimination through persistent track.
(3) Scores of ballistic missiles can be in flight simultaneously,
placing severe loads on sensor and weapon resource managers. PTSS is
the only sensor system in the architecture that can provide the track
handling capacity and the engagement battlespace necessary to
neutralize mass raids.
(4) Architecture would be susceptible to technical and tactical
countermeasures designed to exploit the vulnerabilities of a radio
frequency-only sensor architecture. It is more difficult and expensive
for adversaries to design credible countermeasures against
architectures that combine parallel or serial looks at a threat using
both radio frequency and electro-optic sensors. Sensor coverage in
depth would also result in adversaries being less effective with
precursor suppression attacks against BMDS assets.
(5) Without PTSS BMDS will have gaps for threats and launch
locations between Overhead Persistent Infrared boost phase tracking
sensors and midcourse fire control radars. Within that sensor coverage
gap the offense could choose to deploy, deceive, confuse, and/or evade
the BMDS. PTSS fills that coverage gap, placing severe pressure on
adversary timelines and depriving the offense of free rides into
midcourse.
priorities for missile defense
18. Senator Nelson. General Formica, each year STRATCOM creates the
STRATCOM Integrated Air and Missile Defense PCL which expresses the
integrated missile defense priorities of the combatant commands.
General O'Reilly's prepared statement notes that, ``the need for
persistent full trajectory tracking of ballistic missiles is one of the
warfighter's highest development priorities as stated in the 2012
STRATCOM PCL.'' Can you confirm in an unclassified manner that it is
one of the highest priorities of the STRATCOM PCL to develop a
persistent full trajectory missile tracking capability?
General Formica. Yes, the need for persistent full trajectory
tracking of ballistic missiles is one of the highest priorities. Full
trajectory tracking expands our options to defeat the missile threat,
and enhances our early warning capability. PTSS would be a critical
component of this capability as it could provide sensor coverage in
depth, expands our tracking capability for large raid sizes, and
reduces our reliance on terrestrial sensors.
future sensors study
19. Senator Nelson. General Formica, I understand that you led a
study for STRATCOM on future sensors for missile defense and that the
study considered the PTSS now under development. In unclassified terms,
can you explain whether your study indicated that PTSS would provide an
important capability for future missile defense of the Homeland and of
regional missile threats?
General Formica. STRATCOM led the Remote Sensor Assessment which
included PTSS. At JFCC IMD, we participated directly in STRATCOM's
assessment. While classified, the results of the study confirmed that
PTSS would be a critical component of both Homeland and regional
missile defense as it greatly enhances sensor coverage. The results of
this study have been briefed to congressional staff, the Missile
Defense Executive Board (MDEB), and informed the budget submission.
deploying standard missile-3 block iib interceptor
20. Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, you are seeking to develop
the SM-3 Block IIB interceptor for Phase 4 of the EPAA. That missile is
planned for deployment at Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland to
intercept potential future long-range Iranian missiles. I understand
that such a missile might not be deployed on ships for safety reasons
if its fuel is too dangerous. Do you believe it is possible that the
missile could be made safe for deployment on ships and, if so, do you
believe that that would be a significant enhancement to our missile
defense capability?
General O'Reilly. Yes, it is possible to safely deploy SM-3 Block
IIB on ships. The MDA, in cooperation with the U.S. Navy, will design
the SM-3 Block IIB to have both sea-based and ashore capability. The
industry concept development teams have been given direction to propose
ship-compatible SM-3 Block IIB concepts.
The SM-3 Block IIB design is being optimized for its primary
mission to counter first generation ICBMs targeted at the U.S. Homeland
as a first and independent interceptor layer. Developing and deploying
the SM-3 Block IIB at sea and ashore will maximize deployment options
for a flexible response to emerging and evolving threats. The SM-3
Block IIB will also provide a significant enhancement to current
missile defense capability by expanding the battle space against
medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.
21. Senator Nelson. General Formica, from a warfighter's
perspective, would you support having the SM-3 Block IIB deployed at
sea? Please explain your view.
General Formica. Yes, I am supportive of the SM-3 Block IIB
capabilities and believe its fielding, both at sea and on land, will
provide operational advantages against a limited ballistic missile
attack. I understand there are significant technical challenges and
safety concerns that would need to be resolved in order to deploy the
SM-3 Block IIB on board ships.
east coast missile defense sites
22. Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, when the missile defense site
in Alaska was being debated, we understood that no GBI flight tests
would take place from Fort Greely, AK, because of concern that a
booster might cause damage to people or property on the ground where it
falls. If people are considering an east coast GBI site, which would be
much more densely populated than Alaska, wouldn't there also be a
concern for possible damage that GBI boosters could cause within some
distance from the site?
General O'Reilly. Potential siting locations for an east coast GBI
site would have similar considerations with regard to possible damage
to people or property on the ground from the two GBI booster stage
drops, and would have to account for a 50 km radius for a first stage
booster drop zone and a 600 km radius for a second stage booster drop
zone.
If a decision were made to construct an east coast GBI site, the
site selection and operational implementation would include hazard
assessment and mitigation measures to limit potential damage from
booster stage drops as a result of an operational launch in response to
a ballistic missile attack. The evaluation of hazards to the public is
part of the siting analysis process that would be completed prior to
beginning any east coast missile field construction. As with the Alaska
GBI missile field, an east coast GBI site would only be used to defend
against an actual ballistic missile attack and not for testing.
benefit of radar in turkey for homeland defense
23. Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, at the end of last year, the
United States began operating a forward-based X-band radar (designated
AN/TPY-2) in Turkey as part of Phase 1 of the EPAA to missile defense.
In addition to improving protection of Europe against ballistic
missiles from Iran, this radar also is said to improve our defense of
the Homeland against potential future long-range missiles from Iran.
Can you explain how this radar in Turkey helps our Homeland defense
capability?
General O'Reilly. (Deleted.]
24. Senator Nelson. General Formica, do you believe this forward-
deployed radar in Turkey is a significant contribution to our Homeland
defense capability?
General Formica. The forward-based AN/TYP-2 radar in Turkey was
deployed as a U.S. contribution to NATO territorial defense as part of
the EPAA. It contributes to Homeland defense and supports deterrence
and assurance. As future missile defense capabilities are deployed to
the European region, the radar's contribution to Homeland defense will
increase.
concerns about contractor quality
25. Senator Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, your testimony included a
discussion of quality problems with MDA's contractors, including
problems that caused failed flight tests and cost hundreds of millions
of dollars for the rescheduled tests. You note that MDA has included a
quality clause in its new GMD contract, but that there has not yet been
time to assess its effect. Do you plan to monitor the impact of this
clause and other steps to improve contractor quality performance for
missile defense?
Ms. Chaplain. As part of our ongoing missile defense work, we
regularly meet with the GMD program office and contractors and follow-
up on programmatic and technical progress in the program. We plan to
monitor quality issues as we have in the past, and to also monitor the
effect of this clause should a quality problem occur and the government
take action under this clause. We will report future findings, if they
arise, as part of our mandated reviews of the BMDS.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
ground-based midcourse defense
26. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, the recent GMD contract
competition is indicative of the impact competition can have in
benefiting taxpayers. The new DSC is estimated to achieve at least a 20
percent cost savings over the contract it replaces and provides for an
option to procure five additional GBIs. Is this new contract a firm-
fixed price contract?
General O'Reilly. The DSC, HQ0147-12-C-0004, is comprised of
multiple contract types that vary by the requirement's complexity as
follows:
The Fixed Price Incentive-Firm Target (FPIF) structure is similar
to a firm fixed price arrangement in that the contractor may reach a
point of total assumption (PTA) in which the contractor bears all costs
to complete the remainder of the requirement. A target cost is
established, along with a share ratio which determines the percentage
which the government and contractor share for overrun or underrun. For
example, the share ratio may provide that the government pays 70
percent of the overrun and the contractor pays 30 percent. The
contractor's share is paid out of the contractor's target profit until
the PTA is reached. At the PTA, the contractor has reached a point
where all remaining costs between the PTA and the FPIF ceiling price
(equivalent to a firm fixed price) are paid for out of the contractor's
remaining profit on the contract. Once the ceiling price is reached,
the contractor's profit is exhausted, but the contractor must still
complete performance, and pay any additional costs to complete out of
corporate funding; there is no further liability by the government for
any additional costs above the ceiling price. So, in essence, the FPIF
contract provides some margin to address program and cost uncertainty,
but at a certain point (PTA) the contractor becomes responsible for all
remaining costs of performance (similar to a firm fixed price
contract). In the case of the DSC FPIF, the share ratio is 50/50, and
the ceiling price is 120 percent of target cost.
In the case of the Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee (CPIF) arrangement
(which constitutes 82 percent of the overall contract price), the
arrangement enables the contractor to bill for actual costs of
performance (subject to allowability criteria set forth in the Federal
Acquisition Regulation), but the CPIF still provides a specific
incentive for the contractor to control costs. Similar to the FPIF
arrangement, in a CPIF a target cost is established, and then a share
ratio is established which provides the basis by which the government
and contractor share the overrun according to a predetermined formula.
The difference between the FPIF and CPIF contract types is that the
FPIF type reflects lower risk to the contractor, thus it has a ceiling
price that converts to firm fixed price. The CPIF contract type has
greater risk to the contractor, thus there is no ceiling price, and
minimum and maximum fees are applicable. In the case of DSC, the CPIF
arrangement calls for a 60/40 share ratio for overruns, meaning that
the contractor must pay 40 percent of the overrun until the minimum fee
is reached. The target fee is $162 million and the minimum fee is $72
million, which means that $90 million, or over half of the contractor's
fee, is at risk in the event of any cost overruns. These dollar amounts
and percentages were proposed by Boeing as part of the source
selection. Generally speaking, a 60/40 share ratio is extremely steep
for a CPIF contract; the government's interests are adequately
protected.
The CPAF arrangement provides for an estimated cost and an award
fee which is paid based on the government's subjective evaluation based
on criteria contained in an Award Fee Plan. Those criteria typically
deal with performance and responsiveness, and provide the government
significant leverage. If the contractor is not performing well in areas
that relate to the award fee criteria, then the government will
normally reduce the fee as part of its determination.
27. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, does the MDA intend to
exercise the option for five additional GBIs?
General O'Reilly. Yes. The MDA intends to exercise the DSC option
to manufacture five additional CE-II interceptors in fiscal year 2013.
28. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, does MDA believe that the
threat may merit the deployment of additional GBIs, and if so, why is
the option only for five additional interceptors?
General O'Reilly. Based on current threat projections, 30
operational GBIs are sufficient to protect the United States from a
limited ICBM raid launched from projected regional threats.
Procuring 5 additional GBIs (57 total) will make available 16
interceptors for IMTP events, and 11 interceptors for reliability
growth program testing and spares in addition to the 30 operational
interceptors. In doing so, IMTP events, reliability growth program, and
spare interceptors will be supported through 2032.
If future threat assessments indicate this capability is
insufficient against a growing ICBM threat, operational GBI firepower
could be increased by filling out all 38 operational silos in the new
Missile Field-2 (increase of 8), refurbishing and making available the
6-silo prototype missile field (MF-1) for a total of 44 operational
silos, and accelerating delivery of new sensor and interceptor
capabilities.
29. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, does MDA believe that long-
term GMD sustainment and flight test needs may require additional GBIs?
General O'Reilly. (Deleted.]
30. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, is the option for
additional GBIs a firm fixed price option, and if not, why not, and
what prevents the contractor from recovering profit lost under the
umbrella contract on the price it charges for the procurement of the
five additional GBIs?
General O'Reilly.
(1) The option for additional GBIs is not firm fixed price.
(2) Due to the continuing research and developmental nature of the
interceptors, the option for additional interceptor manufacturing is a
CPIF-type CLIN. At this stage of the ongoing development and associated
testing of the interceptors, a firm fixed price contract would be cost
prohibitive to the government due to the contingencies the contractor
could include in the proposed price.
(3) While a cost reimbursable arrangement would typically place
the majority of risk on the government, the use of incentive fee with
both performance and cost control incentives guarantees the contractor
will lose potential fee should there be overrun on those affected
CLINs.
31. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, if I remember correctly,
the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) program which was canceled in 2009 was
supposed to be the successor to the CE-II kill vehicle. Does the GMD
modernization strategy include plans for upgrading or replacing current
kill vehicles with new ones?
General O'Reilly. (Deleted.]
32. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, could SM-3 IIA MKVs be
integrated onto a GBI to increase the number of intercepts possible per
GBI?
General O'Reilly. No. Though the GBI's physical dimensions can hold
one or more SM-3 IIA kill vehicles, these kill vehicles are not
compatible with the GBI mission. The SM-3 IIA kill vehicle is designed
to engage intermediate, medium-range and certain short-range ballistic
missile threats. The GBI EKV is designed to engage ICBM threats over a
broader battle space.
The GBI mission requires that the GBI kill vehicle operate eight
times longer than the currently designed SM-3 IIA kill vehicle. The in-
flight communication frequencies of the SM-3 IIA kill vehicle are also
incompatible with the GBI weapon system. These incompatibilities are
also applicable in a GBI with multiple SM-3 IIA kill vehicles.
33. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, what is the current service
life expectancy of the CE I and CE II MKVs?
General O'Reilly. (Deleted.]
sea-based x-band radar
34. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, the fiscal year 2013 budget
proposes to mothball the Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX) and transition it
to limited test support status. However, I question whether everyone is
in agreement with your proposal given U.S. Pacific Command's (PACOM)
recent request that SBX be deployed to observe the recent failed North
Korean launch. Did PACOM endorse the MDA's proposal to mothball SBX? If
so, do MDA and PACOM agree that the funding requested may not be enough
to support multiple deployments like the one in response to the North
Korean launch?
General O'Reilly. The SBX radar is not going to be mothballed. The
President's budget request for fiscal year 2013 proposes to place the
SBX radar in limited test support status. In this status, the SBX radar
will retain its unique capabilities.
Its technical performance capability will continue to be tested and
exercised, including connectivity to the GMD Fire Control System. SBX
will also maintain its American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) and Coast
Guard certifications, and will be staffed to maintain the vessel, X-
band radar (XBR), and other critical systems for support to both
testing and contingency activation.
The MDA is collaborating with all to optimize SBX availability and
support for operating in future BMDS flight tests. MDA is also working
with the Joint Staff, STRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command for
Integrated Missile Defense, and the combatant commands to determine SBX
response times to support contingency operations when directed. The
recent successful SBX deployment to observe the failed North Korean
launch is an example of the support the SBX can provide, in limited
test support status, to contingency operations.
Funding for contingency operations will be determined on a case-by-
case basis.
35. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, in testimony before this
committee back in June 2010, then Vice Chairman General Cartwright
testified that SBX played a key role in facilitating a shoot-look-shoot
capability for GMD. According to General Cartwright, ``the addition of
the SBX also took some of the stress off of the midcourse. It allowed
us to tell--that was the first capability that we had that told us
whether we actually hit the missile or not.'' Is it true that SBX helps
facilitate a shoot-look-shoot capability? If so, what has changed to
justify the early retirement of SBX?
General O'Reilly. (Deleted.]
homeland hedging strategy
36. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts, as I mentioned in my opening
remarks, I am disappointed that little has been relayed to Congress on
how this administration intends to hedge the technological and threat-
based risk associated with missile defense in Europe. Secretary Gates
told us that you would continue the development of the two-stage GBI as
a contingency to the SM-3 IIB, but little to date has been provided to
Congress to explain what that means. What is the current status of the
hedging strategy and when will it be delivered to Congress?
Dr. Roberts. DOD is continuing to work to deliver the hedge report
to Congress as soon as possible. Given the sensitive intelligence basis
of the hedging strategy review, and also the classified performance
characteristics of U.S. systems, the results of the review can only be
discussed in an appropriate setting.
37. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts, protecting the Homeland from the
possibility of a long-range Iranian threat is a real concern, a concern
that could merit the development of an interceptor site located on the
east coast of the United States. Will this report include a discussion
regarding the construction of an east coast site for the deployment of
either GBIs or Aegis Ashore?
Dr. Roberts. DOD is continuing to work to deliver the hedge report
to Congress as soon as possible. Given the sensitive intelligence basis
of the hedging strategy review, and also the classified performance
characteristics of U.S. systems, the results of the review can only be
discussed in an appropriate setting.
DOD is studying the benefit of placing a GBI field on the east
coast of the United States as part of the hedge strategy. A detailed
comparison of the operational utility of an east coast site to other
deployment options is part of the ongoing hedge assessment, and will be
contained in the hedge report.
38. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts, what additional benefit could an
east coast site provide?
Dr. Roberts. DOD has studied the benefit of placing a GBI field on
the east coast of the United States as part of the hedge strategy. A
detailed comparison of the operational utility of an east coast site to
other deployment options is part of the ongoing hedge assessment, and
will be contained within the hedge report.
precision tracking space system
39. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, this committee is painfully
aware of the troubles associated with space system acquisition. What is
your acquisition strategy for PTSS and why do you feel you are better
suited than the Air Force Space Command to execute this strategy?
General O'Reilly.
PTSS Acquisition Strategy
The MDA is developing and acquiring PTSS in two program phases that
combine the benefit of government-owned design and an integrated
approach that leverages all Overhead Persistent Infrared and BMDS
assets, with competitive forces to ensure contractor efficiencies are
maximized:
The development program will use a team of trusted
laboratories and industry participation to develop and deploy
two spacecraft and the required ground system. The government
will have unlimited and/or government purpose rights to any
changes to the PTSS design which will be approved by the
government prior to incorporation into PTSS.
The manufacturing and production program will be
awarded to a competitively selected commercial entity that
produces multiple spacecraft using the government acquired data
rights.
The overarching PTSS acquisition strategy reflects these consistent
recommendations of multiple GAO reports and studies:
Establish a sound executable business case.
Research and define requirements before programs are
started. Limit changes after they are started.
Shorten product development times.
Deploy larger constellations of smaller, less complex
satellites that gradually increase in sophistication.
Follow an evolutionary path toward meeting mission
needs rather than trying to satisfy all needs in a single step.
Ensure competition whenever possible.
The PTSS program is a Hybrid Program Office (HPO) with colocated
military department representatives. In the PTSS HPO, the Air Force and
Navy have embedded personnel to speak for their Services' equities to
facilitate a seamless transfer from development to operations. The Air
Force provides key input to the PTSS design on satellite operations
architecture integration and DOT-LPF considerations (i.e., doctrine,
organization, training, leadership and education, personnel, and
facilities). The Navy informs the PTSS operational implementation with
critical Aegis BMD and SM-3 missile details on assured, timely
communications and weapon system integration.
The development program will establish the performance baseline for
the production program. The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics
Laboratory (JHU/APL), as the technical direction agent, will provide
systems engineering continuity for the life cycle of the program.
Ball Aerospace, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Orbital
Sciences, and Raytheon companies are part of the lab team studying
manufacturing and production readiness. They will do this in an
environment that is non-proprietary and free of organizational
conflicts of interest to insert producibility solutions.
The manufacturing and production program will be a full and open
competition. To maximize competition on the production program, MDA
will encourage open, non-exclusive teaming between offerors on the
manufacturing and production program. MDA will encourage similar
teaming among subcontractors on the development program. It will be
advantageous for proposing vendors to minimize changes to the
government-developed system design, limiting them to lessons learned
imperatives and component obsolescence issues.
MDA will competitively award launch services contracts using the
Air Force as the contracting entity to leverage existing contract
vehicles. The first two satellites are compatible with the Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) class of launch vehicles. Future
satellites are planned to be compatible with multiple launch vehicles,
including EELV-class, as they become available in the commercial
marketplace.
MDA as Lead in PTSS Acquisition
PTSS is more than a collection of spacecraft. It is an integral
part of the BMD fire-control system, and MDA has the requisite
experience and expertise to integrate PTSS into the BMDS. PTSS
development will take advantage of technical and design lessons learned
from previous MDA satellite programs, the Space Tracking and
Surveillance System-Demonstration (STSS-D) and the Near-Field Infrared
Experiment. For example, STSS-D is a pathfinder for designing and
developing PTSS's ability to close the fire control loop with Aegis.
MDA developed PTSS requirements and system concepts over the past 3
years using JHU/APL as the technical direction agent. Industry has been
incorporated and involved with the material solution analysis phase,
and flight experiments using MDA spacecraft were executed to validate
critical design concepts. We developed the core expertise necessary to
successfully implement the PTSS development program. With the
established team of trusted laboratories and industry participation,
MDA is fully prepared to develop and deploy the PTSS spacecraft and
ground system in collaboration with the Air Force and government
technical experts from JHU/APL and Naval Research Laboratory.
40. Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, the recently released
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report highlights the increased
risk of highly concurrent acquisition processes. MDA approved a new
acquisition strategy for PTSS in January 2012 and acknowledges some
concurrency and maintains there are benefits to this approach. How does
the current PTSS acquisition strategy measure against GAO's knowledge-
based acquisition practices?
Ms. Chaplain. We issued a report on MDA's BMDS in April 2012. In
this report we note that the new acquisition strategy for PTSS is at
risk due to concurrency in the development of its satellites. While a
laboratory-led contractor team is still in the development phase of
building two development satellites, MDA plans to have an industry team
develop and produce two engineering and manufacturing development
satellites. The PTSS program plans to then have industry compete for
the production of the follow-on satellites. While the strategy
incorporates several important aspects of sound acquisition practices,
such as competition and short development timeframes, acquisition risks
remain because the industry-built development satellites will be under
contract and under construction before on-orbit testing of the lab-
built satellites. As such, the strategy may not give decisionmakers
full benefit from the knowledge to be gained about the design and
function of the lab-built satellites derived from on-orbit testing
before making additional major commitments.
41. Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, what steps can be taken to
strengthen the PTSS acquisition?
Ms. Chaplain. There are two areas related to the PTSS acquisition
that could be strengthened. The first is to ensure that DOD is pursuing
the right acquisition, and the second is to ensure that the acquisition
is implemented in the right way. To ensure DOD is pursuing the right
acquisition, we believe the agency would benefit from conducting an
analysis of alternatives (AOA) for the PTSS program. An AOA is one of
the inputs generally required for the initiation of a new program and
our work has found that programs with only a limited assessment of
alternatives tended to have poorer outcomes than those that had more
robust AOAs.\1\ MDA is developing the PTSS outside the normal DOD
acquisition cycle and is not subject to this requirement. However,
since MDA has not yet conducted a robust analysis to compare the
operational effectiveness, cost, and risks of a number of alternative
potential solutions, DOD may want to conduct an independent AOA to help
ensure that a broad range of alternatives are considered in order to
make fully informed programmatic and budgetary decisions going forward.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Defense Acquisition: Many Analyses of Alternatives Have
Not Provided a Robust Assessment of Weapon System Options, GAO-09-665
(Washington, DC: Sept. 24, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To ensure that the acquisition is implemented in the right way,
decisionmakers would need a sound cost estimate as part of a business
case and, if it were approved to proceed, MDA should ensure the design
works as intended before committing to a large-scale constellation. As
we reported in April 2012, although the PTSS satellite is intended to
be a low-cost unit, the full cost of development has not yet been
determined. DOD major defense acquisition programs are required to
perform an Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) before advancing through
certain major milestones.\2\ Although not required to for PTSS, the
agency is currently working with the Office of the Director of Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) to complete an ICE expected in
the first quarter of fiscal year 2013. Having a sound cost estimate
would help ensure that the program is affordable and executable. We
also reported in April that the acquisition strategy includes some
concurrency that puts a commitment for future production before the
program has a full understanding of program performance. Under the
current acquisition plan, an industry team will be approved for
production of long-lead items for two development satellites, while a
laboratory team is still working to complete the first two development
satellites. The program intends to conduct on-orbit checkout and
testing of the two laboratory-produced development satellites prior to
the decision to complete the assembly of the two industry-built
development satellites. This strategy may not enable decisionmakers to
fully benefit from the knowledge to be gained and the risk reduction
opportunity afforded through on-orbit testing of lab-built satellites
before committing to industry-built developmental satellites.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2434 requires an ICE of the full life-cycle cost
of the program before a major defense acquisition program can advance
into system development and demonstration (now known as engineering and
manufacturing development) or production and deployment. The full life-
cycle cost must be provided to the decisionmaker for consideration.
42. Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, do you have any confidence in
the current $200 million per satellite cost estimate?
Ms. Chaplain. In our March 2011 report, we reported that the MDA
cost estimates we reviewed were not sufficiently credible and did not
meet the characteristics of high-quality cost estimates based on GAO's
Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide founded on best practices in cost
estimating. We also made recommendations that MDA take steps to ensure
that their cost estimates are high quality, reliable cost estimates
that are documented to facilitate external review. In follow-on
meetings with MDA, program officials outlined several steps that MDA
intended to take to improve the quality of their cost estimates.
However, in the results of our latest April 2012 review, we have yet to
see the steps implemented.
We cannot assess whether the $200 million cost of each PTSS
satellite is credible or be sure of what costs are included or excluded
until we have the opportunity to review the cost estimate. For example,
based on information provided by program officials, MDA plans to use a
medium EELV to launch two PTSS satellites at one time. According to Air
Force officials, the cost of launching a medium EELV would be about
$142 to $179 million, depending on which launch vehicle is used and
excluding some propellants, transportation, and launch capability
costs. Without reviewing the PTSS cost estimate, we cannot be sure
whether launch costs are included in the estimate. In addition, as we
noted in our 2011 report, one of the criteria for a credible cost
estimate is having an independent cost assessment. DOD's CAPE group is
expected to complete its ICE for PTSS in the first quarter of fiscal
year 2013, which will help provide an important independent view of
PTSS costs.
sequestration
43. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, General Formica, Mr.
Gilmore, Dr. Roberts, and Ms. Chaplain, the Budget Control Act (BCA)
requires DOD in January 2013 to reduce all major accounts over 10 years
by a total of $492 billion through sequestration. This will result in
an immediate $55 billion reduction to the fiscal year 2013 defense
program. The Secretary of Defense has been quoted on numerous occasions
that the impact of these cuts would be ``devastating'' and
``catastrophic'', leading to a hollow force and inflicting serious
damage to our national defense. Yet, the Military Services must begin
this month with some type of guidance on developing a service budget
for fiscal year 2014. What are some of the specific anticipated
implications of sequestration to missile defense programs?
General O'Reilly. DOD has not formed contingency plans or risk
assessments in the event of a sequester. If budget sequestration
reduced DOD's budget and, in turn, the MDA budget, MDA would propose
options for budget reduction for presentation at the MDEB for approval
by the Defense Management Advisory Group (DMAG). Resultant schedule
delays and additional costs for termination of work would need to be
assessed part of this process as well.
General Formica. The U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/
Army Forces Strategic Command has not received direction from the Army
to plan or budget for sequestration. As such, we have not assessed the
potential implications or altered our fiscal year 2014 budget plan.
However, if sequestration does occur, I expect that the implementation
would negatively impact our missile defense operations and
capabilities.
Mr. Gilmore. If sequestration occurs, automatic percentage cuts are
required to be applied without regard to strategy, importance, or
priority.
Dr. Roberts. As Secretary Panetta made clear in his letter to
Senators McCain and Graham in November 2011, if maximum sequestration
is triggered, DOD would face huge cuts in its budgets. The impacts of
these cuts would be devastating for DOD, and missile defense would not
be exempt from these large and indiscriminate cuts.
If budget sequestration reduces DOD's budget, we would propose
options for budget reduction for discussion at the MDEB for approval by
the DMAG. Resultant schedule delays and additional costs for
termination of work would need to be assessed as part of this process.
Ms. Chaplain. We have not done work to project the impact of
possible sequestration on DOD's projects and activities. Importantly,
the execution and impact of any spending reductions will depend on the
legal interpretations and actions taken by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB). As such, we are not in a position to provide you with an
informed response. Generally, in terms of risks of cuts to the DOD
missile defense budget, most of the missile defense capabilities DOD is
pursuing are critical to strategic and regional defense plans.
We have in the past criticized across-the-board cuts--primarily
across-the-board rescissions. This approach can result in protecting
ineffective programs while cutting muscle from high-priority and high-
performing programs. Across-the-board cuts are not substitutes for
making tough and informed choices about the foundation of government.
44. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, General Formica, Mr.
Gilmore, Dr. Roberts, and Ms. Chaplain, what programs would have the
most significant impact to operations or readiness?
General O'Reilly. DOD has not formed contingency plans in the event
of a sequester. If budget sequestration reduced DOD's budget and, in
turn, the MDA budget, MDA would propose options for budget reduction
for presentation at the MDEB for approval by the DMAG.
General Formica. Within the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense
Command/Army Forces Strategic Command, an assessment has yet to be
conducted. However, I would expect our operational capabilities to be
degraded.
Mr. Gilmore. In the most recently signed IMTP, Version 12.1,
General O'Reilly and I worked hard to maintain the content of the BMDS
test program in spite of fact-of-life budget pressures. Although we had
to stretch out the THAAD test program to 18-month test centers, for the
most part we maintained the schedules and test frequencies for the GMD
and Aegis BMD programs. Sequestration required by the BCA will likely
impact GMD and Aegis schedules and content.
Dr. Roberts. If budget sequestration reduces DOD's budget, we would
propose options for budget reduction for discussion at the MDEB for
approval by the DMAG.
Ms. Chaplain. See response to question #43.
45. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, General Formica, Mr.
Gilmore, Dr. Roberts, and Ms. Chaplain, would sequestration lead to a
contract cancellation, termination, cost increase, or schedule delay?
General O'Reilly. DOD has not formed contingency plans in the event
of a sequester. If budget sequestration reduced DOD's budget and, in
turn, the MDA budget, MDA would propose options for budget reduction
for presentation at the MDEB for approval by the DMAG.
General Formica. Within the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense
Command/Army Forces Strategic Command, we have not been directed by the
Army to assess sequestration-caused contract cancellations,
terminations, cost impacts, or possible schedule delays. But, I would
expect an impact on our material development programs.
Mr. Gilmore. MDA is best qualified to answer this question.
Dr. Roberts. Yes, the large and indiscriminate cuts of
sequestration would have a devastating effect on U.S. missile defense
programs.
Ms. Chaplain. See response to question #43.
46. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, General Formica, Mr.
Gilmore, Dr. Roberts, and Ms. Chaplain, is DOD currently conducting any
planning in your area of responsibility? If so, can you describe the
plan?
General O'Reilly. DOD has not formed contingency plans in the event
of a sequester. If budget sequestration reduced DOD's budget and, in
turn, the MDA budget, MDA would propose options for budget reduction
for presentation at the MDEB for approval by the DMAG.
General Formica. I am not aware of any DOD sequestration planning
that impact U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces
Strategic Command assigned missile defense responsibilities.
Mr. Gilmore. DOD is not currently preparing for sequestration, and
OMB has not directed agencies, including DOD, to initiate plans for
sequestration.
Dr. Roberts. DOD has not formed contingency plans or risk
assessments in the event of a sequester. If budget sequestration
reduces DOD's budget, we would propose options for budget reduction for
discussion at the MDEB for approval by the DMAG.
Ms. Chaplain. See response to question #43.
47. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, General Formica, Mr.
Gilmore, Dr. Roberts, and Ms. Chaplain, how will you assess the risk of
each cut?
General O'Reilly. DOD has not formed contingency plans in the event
of a sequester. If budget sequestration reduced DOD's budget and, in
turn, the MDA budget, MDA would propose options for budget reduction
for presentation at the MDEB for approval by the DMAG.
General Formica. When directed to review programs under
sequestration, we will assess risk to our ability to provide missile
defense capabilities to the force. I do expect we would experience
degradation in capabilities.
Mr. Gilmore. It is important that DOT&E remain neutral with respect
to program decisions. My role as DOT&E is to specify what is required
for adequate testing. I will not accept or approve inadequate testing
for budgetary reasons.
Dr. Roberts. DOD has not formed contingency plans or risk
assessments in the event of a sequester. If budget sequestration
reduces DOD's budget, we would propose options for budget reduction for
discussion at the MDEB for approval by the DMAG.
Ms. Chaplain. See response to question #43.
48. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, General Formica, Mr.
Gilmore, Dr. Roberts, and Ms. Chaplain, has any planning commenced to
date to assess the impact of sequestration reductions, such as
prioritizing programs in preparation for reprogramming actions or
terminations?
General O'Reilly. DOD has not formed contingency plans in the event
of a sequester. If budget sequestration reduced DOD's budget and, in
turn, the MDA budget, MDA would propose options for budget reduction
for presentation at the MDEB for approval by the DMAG.
General Formica. DOD is not currently preparing for sequestration,
and OMB has not directed agencies, including DOD, to initiate plans for
sequestration.
Mr. Gilmore. DOD is not currently preparing for sequestration, and
OMB has not directed agencies, including DOD, to initiate plans for
sequestration.
Dr. Roberts. DOD has not formed contingency plans or risk
assessments in the event of a sequester. If budget sequestration
reduces DOD's budget, we would propose options for budget reduction for
discussion at the MDEB for approval by the DMAG.
Ms. Chaplain. See response to question #43.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
european phased adaptive approach
49. Senator Inhofe. General O'Reilly, my concerns about President
Obama's PAA have been compounded by recent reporting by the Defense
Science Board and the GAO. The reports voiced concerns about our EPAA
stating that it faces major delays, cost overruns, and critical
technological problems. I would like to see the current and planned
funding, total procurement and fielding timeline for the SM-3 IB, IIA,
and IIB, as well as original program costs and current project costs.
Please provide the same information for radars, Aegis ships, command
center, and other sensors required to fully field PAA and provide full
coverage.
General O'Reilly. The EPAA is not a single program of record nor is
it tied to a specific inventory of systems, but rather EPAA is an
approach to fielding missile defense capabilities over time to meet
evolving ballistic missile threats while providing opportunities to
involve international partners. EPAA relies on mobile and relocatable
assets in order to provide maximum adaptability and flexibility. These
mobile and relocatable assets could be redeployed to other regions,
depending on the crisis/conflict, making analysis of costs solely
attributable to EPAA challenging. The Assistant Secretary of Defense
for CAPE is completing a detailed accounting of EPAA costs.
50. Senator Inhofe. General O'Reilly, are the current timelines of
2018 for the IIA and 2020 for the IIB still realistic?
General O'Reilly. The SM-3 Block IIA program is on schedule and
within cost to complete the ongoing cooperative development program
with Japan. Both the 5.1 Aegis Weapons System and the SM-3 Block IIA
missile associated with the effort will meet all EPAA Phase 3
objectives.
The SM-3 Block IIB initial fielding timeline has been delayed from
2020 to 2021 due to fiscal year 2012 budget reductions. All three
industry teams are pursuing viable concepts with capacity for the SM-3
Block IIB to achieve a 2021 fielding in support of EPAA Phase 4.
51. Senator Inhofe. General O'Reilly, does the President's Future
Years Defense Program (FYDP) provide you with the resources necessary
to field PAA as planned on schedule?
General O'Reilly. The President's fiscal year 2013 budget request
for the BMDS and associated FYDP funding profile for the BMDS currently
provides for the necessary resources to field the EPAA. Due to
congressionally-directed reduction to the fiscal year 2012 budget
request for the SM-3 Block IIB, fielding for that interceptor as part
of Phase 4 of the EPAA will be 1 year later than stated in the fiscal
year 2013 President's budget submission, moving from 2020 to 2021.
exoatmospheric kill vehicle
52. Senator Inhofe. General O'Reilly, you reference in your
testimony the problems you have experienced with the EKV on the GMD
system. I understand that you are nearing a fix for the problems most
recently identified and I hope that those efforts are successful.
However, I fear that this will not be the last problem to surface with
the EKV, which has long been a source of concern. The EKV was never
meant to be the permanent kill vehicle for GMD and the current system
is heavier, less capable, and less reliable then I think it can or
should be. But with the cancellation in 2009 of the MKV program, we are
locked into the current system for the foreseeable future. At present,
the only development effort underway at MDA that will result in a brand
new kill vehicle is the SM-3 IIB program. Has the MDA given any thought
to leveraging the kill vehicle development work from the SM-3 IIB to
produce an interceptor that could be used for GMD as well?
General O'Reilly. Once all capabilities are enabled by software
upgrades, the current EKV will be sufficient to meet all anticipated
midcourse defense requirements for the next decade and beyond. The EKV
intercept battle space is much larger than that of the SM-3 IIB, given
its much higher thrust to weight ratio, greater acquisition range, and
longer time of fight. Moreover, the EKV's guidance, navigation, and
controls are optimized to handle ICBM signatures and the much higher
intercept closing velocities. Though EKV performance is enhanced with
in-flight data updates, it can autonomously execute its mission without
post-launch ground communication. The EKV is designed with three-color
optical sensor systems and state-of-the-art discrimination software to
counter sophisticated threats and countermeasures. C0, CE-I, and CE-II
EKVs have correctly discriminated the threat object in every flight
test conducted since the first intercept test in 1999.
However, the MDA studied the feasibility of developing a common
kill vehicle for SM-3 IIB and GBI in order to improve the
manufacturability and reliability of EKVs. Results indicate that a
common kill vehicle is not feasible. SM-3 IIB shipboard safety
requirements, launcher size constraints, and weapon system interfaces
reduce kill vehicle performance below GBI requirements. Conversely,
changes are required to the SM-3 IIB kill vehicle to meet the more
stringent GBI performance requirements, different communication
frequency and data structure. These changes result in a significantly
heavier kill vehicle, reducing SM-3 IIB missile velocity and its
forward-based Homeland defense capability.
Additionally, establishing common component technologies may save
money and improve reliability without sacrificing performance. This
approach promotes developing, reusing, or scaling of common high-cost
items in seeker technologies (focal plane arrays, read out integrated
circuits, and optics), avionics technologies (processors, inertial
navigation systems, telemetry systems, initiators, and encryption
devices), algorithms, and software.
53. Senator Inhofe. General O'Reilly, what would it take to pursue
a common kill vehicle approach?
General O'Reilly. A common kill vehicle cannot be developed without
compromising the mission effectiveness of the GBI or SM-3 IIB.
Establishing a common kill vehicle architecture with common interface
standards may enable common component technologies and save money.
Incorporating commonality at any level will require revising our SM-3
IIB and GMD acquisition strategies. It would take a business case study
to determine if there is net cost/benefit.
russia and missile defense
54. Senator Inhofe. General O'Reilly and Dr. Roberts, at the end of
President Obama's now infamous meeting with Russian President Dmitri
Medvedev on March 26, President Obama said: ``On all these issues, but
particularly missile defense, this, this can be solved but it's
important for him [incoming Russian President Vladimir Putin] to give
me space. This is my last election. After my election, I have more
flexibility.'' On March 13, Ellen Tauscher, the Department of State's
Special Envoy on Strategic Stability and Missile Defense, led a U.S.
delegation to Moscow and meet with Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister,
Deputy Defense Minister, and Vice Premier. It has been reported that
during that meeting, the Russians told the U.S. delegation they wanted
limits on the speed and basing of U.S. missile defense interceptors in
Europe. It has also been reported that the Obama administration is
looking at providing the Russians with data on our missile defense
interceptors to include velocity at burnout which tells how fast an
interceptor is going when its rocket-booster motor fuel is spent and
the motor burns out. Is the United States considering providing Russia
with classified data on our missile defense interceptors?
General O'Reilly. The U.S. State Department, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have
the lead for U.S. missile defense cooperation efforts with the Russian
Federation on missile defense. Those organizations can more
appropriately address this question. I have no knowledge of any
initiative to transfer classified missile defense data to the Russians.
Dr. Roberts. DOD is continuing to examine projects that would
benefit the United States through the Defense Technology Cooperation
Subworking under the Defense Relations Working Group. A DTCA would
permit the United States and Russia to undertake bilateral projects by
providing a legal framework to conduct bilateral projects and by
including required intellectual property and information security
provisions for such projects. Any sharing of missile defense
information with Russia would be conducted in accordance with U.S.
National Disclosure Policy and other applicable laws.
55. Senator Inhofe. General O'Reilly, will the United States allow
Russia to place any limitations on U.S. missile defense?
General O'Reilly. The U.S. State Department, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy have the lead for U.S. engagement with the Russian
Federation on missile defense cooperation. Administration officials
have been clear in testimony to Congress, as well as in international
meetings with Russian officials, that the United States will not agree
to limitations on the capabilities and numbers of U.S. missile defense
systems.
missile defense and global threats
56. Senator Inhofe. General O'Reilly, outside of our allies,
Russia, and China, are there over 6,000 ballistic missiles currently
deployed around the world?
General O'Reilly. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency's
(DIA) Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC), there are, aside
from Russia, China, and our allies, between 5,780 and 6,310 ballistic
missiles deployed worldwide.
Source: MSIC, e-mail, RE: Unclassified Force Level Numbers, 6 April
2012.
57. Senator Inhofe. General O'Reilly, was the number of ballistic
missiles currently deployed around the world 4,000 only 4 years ago?
General O'Reilly. No, according to the DIA's MSIC, there were,
aside from Russia and China, approximately 5,900 ballistic missiles
deployed worldwide in 2008.
Source: DIA/MSIC Message 2009281441SS(U).
58. Senator Inhofe. General O'Reilly, has the number of countries
making their own ballistic missiles tripled in the last 4 years from 4
to 12 countries?
General O'Reilly. Although the number of producing countries has
remained constant at 10, the threat from ballistic missiles continues
to increase.\1\ Aside from Russia, China, and our allies, ballistic
missile force levels have increased from 5,900 in 2008 to over 6,300
today. The percentage of missiles, medium-range or longer, has grown
from 6 percent to 15 percent.2,3 Potential adversaries are
using technology sharing to accelerate the speed with which they deploy
new, more capable ballistic missile systems.\4\ These missiles are
becoming more survivable, reliable, and longer-ranged. Countries are
designing them to launch from multiple transporters against a broad
array of targets, enhancing their mobility and effectiveness on the
battlefield. Technology is also improving the accuracy of ballistic
missiles.\5\ As an example, Iran is developing and claims to have
deployed short-range ballistic missiles with seekers that enable the
missile to identify and maneuver toward ships during flight. This
technology also may be capable of striking land-based targets.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ DIA, Response to MDA Requirement A128-12-0040, 28 June 2012
(Extract).
\2\ MSIC, DIA/MSIC Message 2009281441SS(U).
\3\ MSIC, Unclassified Force Levels, e-mail, 6 April 2012.
\4\ Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., Lieutenant General, U.S. Army,
Director, DIA, Worldwide Threat Assessment, Statement before the
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 10 March 2011.
\5\ Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., Lieutenant General, U.S. Army,
Director, DIA, Annual Threat Assessment, Statement before the Senate
Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate, 16 February 2012.
\6\ Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report on Military
Power of Iran, Full Update, April 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The problem of secondary proliferation continues to expand, as more
countries that previously imported weapons and technologies, such as
Iran and Syria, begin indigenous production and export those
systems.\7\ Countries that have not possessed ballistic missiles, such
as Burma, have actively cooperated with North Korea to develop missile
technology.\8\ This proliferation has not been limited to states: in
close cooperation with Syria, Iran has provided Lebanese Hizballah with
increasingly sophisticated weapons, including a wide array of missiles
and rockets.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Director of National Intelligence, Unclassified Report to
Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to
31 December 2011.
\8\ State Department, Administration Eases Financial and
Investment Sanctions on Burma, Fact Sheet, July 11, 2012.
\9\ Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report on Military
Power of Iran, Full Update, April 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Countries that are developing ICBMs include India, which claims it
is developing a nuclear-capable 6,000 kilometer-range missile that will
carry multiple warheads,\10\ and North Korea, which launched a Taepo
Dong-2 in 2012 and is developing a road-mobile ICBM.\11\ Since 2008,
Iran has launched multistage space launch vehicles that could serve as
a test bed for developing long-range ballistic missile technologies. It
may be technically capable of flight-testing an ICBM by 2015.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., Lieutenant General, U.S. Army,
Director, DIA, Annual Threat Assessment, Statement before the Senate
Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate, 16 February 2012.
\11\ Tal Inbar, Controlling the Axis, Defense News, 1 May 2012
(Secretary of Defense Gates quote).
\12\ Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report on Military
Power of Iran, Full Update, April 2012.
59. Senator Inhofe. General O'Reilly, is it true that the
proliferation of ballistic missile technologies continues to increase?
General O'Reilly. Yes, the Director of the DIA stated in his Annual
Threat Assessment that ``Theater ballistic missiles already are a
formidable threat in the Middle East and Asia, and proliferation is
expanding their availability worldwide. Technology sharing will
accelerate the speed with which potential adversaries deploy new, more
capable ballistic missile systems over the next decade. Sophisticated
missiles and the equipment to produce them are marketed openly.''
Source: Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., Lieutenant General, USA, Director,
DIA, (U) Annual Threat Assessment, Statement Before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, United States Senate, February 16, 2012.
60. Senator Inhofe. General O'Reilly, has the capability and range
of ballistic missiles continued to increase, making them more accurate
with longer ranges?
General O'Reilly. Yes. The Director of the DIA, in his Annual
Threat Assessment, stated ``Ballistic missiles continue to pose a
threat as they become more survivable, reliable, and accurate at
greater range.''
Source: Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., Lieutenant General, USA, Director,
DIA, (U) Annual Threat Assessment, Statement Before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, United States Senate, February 16, 2012.
61. Senator Inhofe. General O'Reilly, do you agree with the
statement made by Secretary Panetta to the House Armed Services
Committee on April 19 that ``there is no question that North Korea's
capabilities with regards to ICBMs and their developing nuclear
capability represent a threat to the United States''?
General O'Reilly. Yes. Any questions on North Korean nuclear
weapons and ICBMs should be referred to the DIA for a thorough
assessment.
62. Senator Inhofe. General O'Reilly, do you agree with the
statement made by Secretary Panetta last month that Iran could have a
nuclear weapon and a delivery vehicle within 3 to 4 years?
General O'Reilly. Questions regarding the projected threat, and
specifically for an assessment on Iranian nuclear weapons and delivery
systems should be referred to the Intelligence Community.
63. Senator Inhofe. General O'Reilly, are there enough Aegis ships
and missiles programmed in the budget to support the President's PAA
while meeting other combatant commanders' requirements, such as PACOM?
General O'Reilly. Aegis BMD ships and SM-3 missiles are managed
within the Global Forces Management Process and this question is best
answered by the Joint Staff.
The MDA provides the combatant commanders and Navy capabilities to
conduct BMD operations. Assessment of the adequacy of number of ships
and missiles programmed in the budget to support the Phased Adaptive
Approach and other combatant command requirements is managed within the
MDEB process, with input from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Staff, Joint Chiefs, combatant commanders, and the Services.
64. Senator Inhofe. General O'Reilly, if Iran is able to develop a
nuclear weapon and marry that weapon to a ballistic missile by 2015 or
2016, as estimated by Secretary Panetta, will we have the capability to
provide all our deployed forces and our allies in Europe protection
against that missile?
General O'Reilly. By the 2015 or 2016 timeframe, Phase II of the
EPAA will have been deployed. The EPAA Phase II architecture will have
the capability to provide protection against an Iranian missile attack
against our deployed forces and NATO allies in Europe.
The current planned stationing of Aegis BMD ships, along with the
Aegis Ashore battery in Romania, will provide a layer of defense for
all NATO European allies within range of the projected Middle East
short- and medium-range ballistic missile threat.
65. Senator Inhofe. General O'Reilly, would a GMD site in Europe or
on the east coast of the United States provide a greater capability to
defend against an Iranian ICBM threat?
General O'Reilly. [Deleted.]
66. Senator Inhofe. General O'Reilly, the administration has failed
to provide Congress a hedge strategy in the event North Korea or Iran
continue to develop their ICBM capabilities to target the United
States. Is this due to the administration's ambivalence towards missile
defense and the growing threat?
General O'Reilly. DOD is continuing to develop the strategy and
options for defense of the U.S. Homeland against an unexpected long-
range ballistic missile threat. The Office of the Secretary of Defense
for Policy is the lead in DOD for developing this strategy. MDA has
provided technical analysis in support of this effort.
[Whereupon, at 2:00 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]