THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW:
PROCESS, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES

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THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW: PROCESS, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES

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[There were no Documents submitted.]

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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARTHA ROBY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

Mrs. ROBY. Welcome. And I am delighted to gavel to order the first hearing for the 113th Congress of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. And I am pleased to have as ranking member my colleague, Ms. Tsongas from Massachusetts. She and I have worked together in the past on other important matters, and I am really looking forward to her guidance and collaboration in her new leadership role in this subcommittee. So it is a pleasure to be working with you.

And as members know, this subcommittee plays an important role, a very special role with the Armed Services Committee. And Ms. Tsongas and I have received comments from many of our members, and we have met to discuss the subcommittee’s prospective activities. Ms. Tsongas and I also have both met with the bipartisan subcommittee staff to review all of our shared goals. And as you know, pursuant to established procedures, the chairman of the full committee works with the full committee ranking member to determine issues and subject matter appropriate for consideration and investigation by the subcommittee. The chairman, in coordination with the ranking member, also provides approval authority for investigations.

So soon we will receive our guidance for the coming months. And I intend to work with Ms. Tsongas and other members and staff to establish a plan to fulfill not only Chairman McKeon’s directive but also address other pressing matters requiring this subcommittee’s attention. And I look forward to working with all members and staff to exercise our responsibility in a close and collaborative fashion.

Let me now turn to the important topic of today’s hearing. The Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR], which the Pentagon undertakes every 4 years, is an extraordinary effort. It is a very important mechanism for our defense leaders to consider our Nation’s
long-term military strategy. It is a way to attempt to match our defenses to the likely threats of the future.

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a clear articulation of the U.S. defense strategy has become more challenging, which I know all of you, our witnesses, certainly understand. And the threats to the United States have become more varied and unpredictable. And clearly describing our national defense posture in an unstable world is a difficult task of the QDR.

The QDR process is just now beginning. And over the next year, the Department of Defense [DOD] will carefully consider how to approach the world and determine what resources and force structure are consequently needed. The Department has committed to come before us in the coming months to learn more about how that effort is proceeding. Today, we will hear from three distinguished witnesses who are knowledgeable about the past QDRs and defense strategy in general. And they will testify about how the QDR process might be shaped and about broader strategic issues they believe the coming QDR should consider.

I hope this panel can help clarify the principles on which a National Defense Strategy should be based and how those involved in the current effort might approach their task.

In 2 months, we will mark the 33rd anniversary of the historic testimony before this subcommittee; in May of 1980, the chief of staff of the Army, General Edward “Shy” Meyer coined the phrase “hollow Army” in describing the conditions of Army units deployed across the globe to members of this subcommittee. The world has changed tremendously in the intervening years, but it remains dangerous. This 2014 QDR is meant to guide our planning as we anticipate the threats to our Nation and the forces that we must maintain in response to those threats. We cannot return to the days of a hollow Army.

I thank the witnesses for their attendance today, and I look forward to hearing your testimony.

I now turn to my distinguished ranking member for any remarks that Ms. Tsongas may wish to make.

[The prepared statement of Mrs. Roby can be found in the Appendix on page 27.]

STATEMENT OF HON. NIKI TSONGAS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

Ms. Tsongas. Well, thank you, Chairman Roby. And I, like you, look forward to working with you on this most important of committees.

And good afternoon to all of you, Mr. Brimley, Mr. Thomas, and Mr. Dueck. Great.

I want to thank you for appearing before our subcommittee today, and I look forward to your testimony.

As Martha, Chairwoman Roby, said, this is the first hearing of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee for the 113th Congress. And I want to congratulate Representative Roby on her selection as chairman. I am glad that we have already been able to meet personally. And I know the staff has been meeting regularly
as well. And I look forward to working with you and all of your colleagues on the subcommittee.

I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome my Democratic colleagues, Representative Rob Andrews, Representative Tammy Duckworth, and Representative Speier, who will also be serving with us.

I know we are going to meet soon to discuss the issues and agenda for this subcommittee. This subcommittee has the ability to dive deeply into some of the long-term issues facing the Department of Defense, its service men, service women, and their families. And I look forward to doing so in the bipartisan spirit of the Armed Services Committee. We have much to do.

Turning to the QDR, I think it is always important to have a regular, thoughtful, and reflective review of both the long-term and short-term issues confronting the Department of Defense. Having this regular review of the review, so to speak, is also critical. As with all that we do, we can always do it better. If we did it right the first time, we would be out of a job. This is even more so with the unsettled environment we are dealing with fiscally, and with the new and evolving threats to our national security.

We are well past the Cold War and a decade past 9/11. We all have very difficult decisions to make regarding the best way to protect our Nation in the future. And I look forward to hearing our panelists’ views. As of now, we have the QDR, an independent review of the QDR, a GAO review of the sufficiency of the QDR, a military strategy assessment by the Joint Chiefs, as well as a recent National Security Strategy by the White House and the joint DOD–Joint Staff Defense Strategic Review. We need to make sure all of these reviews are consistent and don’t contradict each other.

I want to make sure we get this right. And I am pleased we have such an experienced panel here today.

With sequestration set to take effect just 3 days from now, I believe that this hearing is also quite timely. Our defense strategy, after all, does not exist in an intellectual void. It must reflect the resources that we extend to our armed services. I am curious to hear all of your thoughts on how we can evolve our strategy to meet 21st century threats in a period of fiscal austerity. I look forward to our discussion today with our distinguished panel. I hope you can help us with these difficult decisions we have ahead. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Tsongas can be found in the Appendix on page 29.]

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you, Ms. Tsongas.

I will introduce our witnesses and review how we will proceed. All of the witnesses have provided written statements to the subcommittee. These were circulated to members in advance of today’s hearing, along with full witness biographies.

The statements will be entered into the hearing record as received. Therefore, I invite each of you to summarize your written statements within 5 minutes.

Then we will have rounds of questions, with each member allotted 5 minutes.

Our witnesses today are Mr. Shawn Brimley, who is Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for New American Secu-
rity. From February 2009 to October 2010, Mr. Brimley served in the Obama administration, including as Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, where he focused on the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.

Mr. Colin Dueck is an Associate Professor in the department of health—excuse me, the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University. He has published two books on American foreign and national security policies. He studied politics at Princeton University and international relations at Oxford under a Rhodes Scholarship.

Mr. Jim Thomas is Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Among previous positions, Mr. Thomas served for 13 years in a variety of policy, planning, and resource analysis posts in the Department of Defense, including spearheading the 2005–2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.

So, Mr. Brimley, I will start with you.

STATEMENT OF SHAWN BRIMLEY, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF STUDIES, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY

Mr. BRIMLEY. Thank you, Chairman Roby, Ranking Member Tsongas, and members of the subcommittee.

I am honored to testify on the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. I had the privilege of serving as the lead drafter for the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, but I wanted to be clear up front that I was not a senior decisionmaker, just one of many, many action officers working in that year-long process.

I would like to quickly highlight a few items from my written statement. The principal challenge with QDRs as I see them is that they generally have attempted to satisfy multiple audiences for multiple purposes. QDRs are often judged by their ability to do five things: One, be a reasonable response to specific congressional legislation; two, an enterprise-wide strategy document for the Department; three, an important near-term lever for the current budget cycle; four, a vehicle for the Secretary of Defense to advance particularly important initiatives; and five, a critical public relations and strategic communications document.

I believe the 2014 QDR should deprioritize the perceived need to be a big public relations document and strategic communications approach and focus on providing Congress the 20-year vision for the Department of Defense and then, coupled with that, a detailed examination of how that vision can best be applied given constrained resources. The essence of good strategy, after all, is aligning ends, ways and means.

I have some thoughts on some recommended areas of focus for the 2014 QDR. And a core challenge for any defense review is avoiding the powerful gravitational pull toward the perceived need to cover everything. The QDR cannot afford at this time to be a mile wide and an inch deep, and it not need not be. This will be a second term QDR that has a highly detailed predecessor and, more importantly, a recently concluded strategic review closely overseen by the Commander in Chief.
The 2014 QDR should therefore use the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance as the baseline strategy, and focus on how best to implement that strategy over 20 years at various plausible levels of resources and risk. I believe the 2014 QDR could best achieve this by focusing in part on a few strategic issues. First, we need to preserve investment in game-changing technologies. One of the biggest challenges in this environment will be to ensure that investments in generation-after-next technologies continue. And Congress should really focus on this area. A good example of this is the ongoing attempt to develop a carrier-based long-range unmanned combat aerial vehicle, or UCAV, that can provide real capability in an anti-access environment.

And we should think about how to preserve and protect these investments over—even in the face of continued budget pressure. And we should remember we have done this before in very constrained budget environments. In the so-called interwar years of the 1920s and 1930s, America and other nations developed and fielded tanks, long-range bombers, radar, submarines and aircraft carriers. And if these kinds of investments could be preserved in that kind of economic environment—remember it was the Great Depression—surely we can find a way to prioritize game-changing technology investments today.

Second, I think the QDR should focus on reversing the declining value of the defense dollar. I think the 2014 QDR must deal forthrightly with the ballooning cost of military personnel accounts. The 2014 QDR cannot be confined to defense strategy and force structure alone. To be truly meaningful, it must tackle head-on the challenge of identifying specific ways to put personnel, health care, benefits, and retirement spending on a more sustainable trajectory for the Department. And this will require elements of DOD that are not historically involved in the year-long minutiae of the QDR to be structurally integrated into that process from the very beginning.

On the important role of Congress and you all play in the QDR, I have a couple recommendations. First, really try to leverage the QDR independent panel. I think you should carefully consider all appointments to the panel, biasing toward former policymakers with Pentagon experience, and also those with a bipartisan pedigree. Also important will be a key supporting staff of people who have had previous QDR experience, also hopefully with a bipartisan ethos. I think the Department should provide the QDR independent panel with all the materials necessary—all the materials they need to succeed; for instance, the QDR terms of reference, all the scenarios that involve force size and shaping that the Department will use to assess force structure over 20 years. And I think they should also consider providing the QDR independent panel with a dedicated space in the Pentagon and some reasonable level of administrative support to make sure they get the briefings that they need.

Second, I think you should consider requiring the QDR to have some classified components of the review. One of the big problems with these documents is they do a lot of work in the classified domain, and they then translate that into an unclassified report. And I think oftentimes a lot of the important details get lost. Sometimes
they use classified annexes, but I think it would be interesting to consider mandating the Department to classify certain sections of the QDR into the actual report itself and not just a series of annexes.

And finally, I think the QDR should really try to be resource informed. Now, I know the legislation specifies specifically that it is a 20-year time frame unconstrained. But I think the problem potentially is that the QDR will go and skew toward fantasy rather than reality. But it can’t simply be a near-term budget drill. A reasonable approach would be for Congress to make sure the 2014 QDR outlines the size and shape of the force structure required over 20 years and then also a series of alternative force structures, given the plausible and increasingly constrained budget environment.

I think, with that, my time is up. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brimley can be found in the Appendix on page 31.]

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you.

Dr. Dueck.

STATEMENT OF DR. COLIN DUECK, PROFESSOR, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY

Dr. Dueck. Thank you. I would like to thank the members of the subcommittee for inviting me to speak with you. The overpowering consideration with defense strategy in some ways has been—can you hear me? The overpowering consideration for some time now has been budget cuts to defense. And unfortunately, this trend looks likely to continue. The temptation has been to let budget cuts drive strategic thinking rather than the other way around.

The QDR is supposed to help outline national defense strategy. A strategy begins by identifying certain vital national interests. It then identifies threats to those interests arising from specific real-world adversaries. Finally, it recommends the development of specific policy instruments, including military capabilities, to meet those threats. It is sometimes said that we live in an age of austerity, so inevitably budgetary constraints drive the strategy. But resources are always limited, and strategy is always about developing a coherent approach toward specific threats under conditions of limited resources.

So if we simply let declining budgets dictate how we identify threats to our national interests, then we are not really engaging in strategy at all. Strategy is about facing trade-offs. It is about matching up commitments and capabilities so the two are in some kind of reasonable balance. And the truth is that right now there is a wide and growing gap, or imbalance between America’s declared international security objectives on the one hand and its military capabilities on the other.

Just a couple of examples: The United States has adopted a policy of pivoting or rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific. At the same time, however, we have continued to cut back the number of ships in the Navy. The two opposing directions don’t really add up. If one of the purposes of the pivot is to reassure our Asian allies and remind China that the United States is in East Asia to stay, then
how can we bolster that impression while at the same time cutting back on our maritime capabilities?

The overall trend, which is growing worse, is that we have broad international commitments that are under-resourced militarily. Under such circumstances, basically only a few options exist. Either the country can boost its military capabilities to match existing commitments or it can scale back dramatically on existing commitments to match reduced capabilities. There is, of course, a third option, which is to claim that we will do more with less while denying that any real trade-offs exist. I would call this strategic denial. But this is not a true option. We can do more with more. We can do less with less. But when it comes to national defense, we can't actually do more with less.

Assuming we now add on additional defense cuts of some $500 billion over the next decade, then it has to be emphasized that even the downscaled national defense strategy implied in the 2012 Strategic Guidance will no longer be coherent or sustainable. Perhaps the only good thing about this dire prospect is that it might force a genuine debate and assessment of some of the basic assumptions surrounding U.S. defense strategy. The relative emphasis today on long-range strike capacity, Special Operations, drone strikes, cyber war, area denial, and light-footed approaches rather than on heavy ground forces, stability operations, counterinsurgency or major regional war contingencies, is a move in the direction of what some call offshore balancing. And such a strategy has a certain appeal. But it carries risks or downsides as well.

For many years, America's overarching forward presence abroad, including its related bases, its alliance system, and clear U.S. military superiority, have played a crucial role in deterring authoritarian powers, reassuring democratic allies, and upholding a particular international order that, for all its discontents, is remarkably prosperous and free by historical standards. If this strategic presence becomes detached or uncertain, there is no reason to expect that the benefits of that order for the United States will continue. And if we give up on that presence, we can't assume it will be easy or cheap to buy back. It never has been before.

So if you ask me to make policy recommendations related to the coming QDR without regard to the immediate political climate, the first thing I would say is we do have to stop cutting national defense. Because if we don’t, we will soon be left with no honest strategic options other than some form of offshore balancing. And as I have indicated, there are multiple reasons to believe that such a choice could have negative international consequences on a scale we can barely foresee today.

But the second thing I would say is let’s at least not engage in strategic denial. Let’s not pretend we can maintain existing commitments while continually cutting military capabilities. Let’s have the debate. And this is where I believe you can play a vital role in relation to the coming QDR. You can help ensure that it reflects the original and stated intention of Congress to produce a long-term reflection on international security trends and a serious strategy from start to finish, rather than denying or glossing over the growing gap between our capabilities and our commitments.

Thank you.
STATEMENT OF JIM THOMAS, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS

Mr. Thomas. Chairman Roby, Ranking Member Tsongas, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for your invitation to testify today on the QDR. As you know, one of the QDR’s major tasks is to develop a defense strategy which is supposed to be the foundation for determining the Department’s priorities, where it should invest and what activities it should undertake.

It is difficult, however, to imagine a process less suited to developing good strategy than a QDR, a highly bureaucratic process involving thousands of people that results in an unclassified report that is read by our foes and our friends alike. In trying to capture everything the Department does and address every challenge it faces, previous QDRs have often delivered simplistic, lowest-common-denominator results. Challenges as diverse as transnational terrorism, long-term strategic competitions with other great powers and weapons of mass destruction each demands their own strategy, rather than a single unclassified strategy intended to address them all.

Such challenges do, however, share one common trait. They will require U.S. forces in the future to operate in far less permissive environments than in the recent past. Increasingly, terrorists will be pursued outside of designated war zones in places like Africa, with more restrictive rules of engagement, more surveillance requirements, but less logistical support. Frequently, they will require working indirectly, through foreign forces, to pursue common objectives.

Unlike Afghanistan, we should also expect that future adversaries will contest the air domain more vigorously with sophisticated air defenses and communications jamming. Future adversaries, moreover, could hold regional ports and airfields, the key choke points through which many of our forces arrive in theaters and from which they operate, at risk with precision-guided missiles and weapons of mass destruction. They could threaten large surface naval combatants that operate close to their shores with missiles and mines specifically designed to target them. And they are more likely to threaten our global space, logistics, and information systems, as well as critical infrastructure at home, with anti-satellite weapons and cyber attacks.

Given such nonpermissive environments, the next QDR should emphasize highly distributed, autonomous, and low-signature forces capable of operating independently far forward in denied areas. This isn’t a recipe for offshore balancing, but this is a recipe for how we maintain viable power projection and how we stay forward as a nation. These forces and capabilities include Special Operations Forces for both surgical strike and working by, with, and through foreign partners; submarines with greater strike capacity, and unmanned underwater vehicles with greater endurance; land-
and sea-based long-range, air-refuelable, unmanned stealth aircraft for surveillance, strike, and electronic attack; deeper inventories of stand-off munitions that can overcome modern air defenses and electronic countermeasures, as well as more powerful air-delivered conventional weapons for holding deep underground facilities at risk; more survivable and/or resilient space-based systems; and finally, nonkinetic cyber, electronic warfare, and directed energy capabilities to achieve both lethal and nonlethal effects.

Combinations of such access and sensitive forces are likely to be the spearhead of future campaigns against terrorists, WMD [weapons of mass destruction] powers, and adversaries possessing robust anti-access networks. Moreover, these conventional and Special Operations crown jewel capabilities, coupled with a robust nuclear deterrent, should become more central in U.S. military planning, especially in an era of declining resources. Beyond external challenges, strategy development also has to take explicitly into account available resources. None of us want a strategy that is simply budget driven, but neither can we responsibly craft a strategy that is unconstrained by our resources.

One of the tricky risk balances that the next QDR needs to get right is the balance between America’s sustained economic health and maintaining a strong national defense. Failing to take measures now to reduce our national debt as a percentage of GDP will only compound our fiscal problems that our children will face and will leave only fewer resources for our future defense. While DOD leaders should rightly fight for every penny they can get to maintain a strong defense, there also needs to be a recognition that putting the United States on a path back to strong economic growth and fiscal rectitude is essential to sustaining the country’s long-term military predominance.

Thank you, Madam Chairman. That concludes my opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thomas can be found in the Appendix on page 51.]

Mrs. ROBY. Again, I appreciate you all being here today.

And we will now start our questions. Each member will have 5 minutes, and we will see how far we get.

My questions are for any of you, so please feel free to jump in. But I want to start with the issues that we have in this current budgetary environment. And I want to know how can the Department better address the mismatch between defense strategy and resources. And I want to kind of dig down on this a little bit.

But Mr. Thomas outlined some suggestions, and I think what I will do is try to shift it to the other two panelists and ask you if you have a better way in mind to set defense priorities than the existing QDR process, beyond what Mr. Thomas has already outlined.

Mr. BRIMLEY. If I could, Madam Chairwoman, I think—and I think Jim and I had very similar comments. You know, one of the challenges is to satisfy the congressional legislation for a true 20-year strategic vision for the Department of Defense that is unconstrained in terms of the immediate budget picture. But at the same time, that is really only half of the question.
I think the QDR can really, you know, with the support of this subcommittee and Congress, really take that other view of translating that unconstrained picture and translating that back into the near- to mid-term environment where the budget environment is pretty fraught. And I think part of the way you can do that is take the Defense Strategic Guidance that the President spent a lot of time with in 2011 and early 2012 and use that as the baseline approach. And, you know, through your oversight, require the Department of Defense to submit to you a series of alternative force structures that outline plausible levels of budget funding over the near- to mid-term and require them to assess those alternative force structures in terms of the overall risk that poses to the defense strategy.

No strategy is without risks. There is no such thing as an unconstrained strategy. It is all about aligning ends, ways, and means. So if we think the budget environment is going to continue to be fraught, I think one way you get around that is you require the Department to assess along different plausible lines of activity and lines of funding what kinds of risk could we as a nation take against the defense strategy over time? And there will be a point where the risk is too much, that it requires a fundamental relook about defense strategy. I personally am not there. I think that the Defense Strategic Guidance as outlined in early 2012 is—I would guess is fairly sufficient in terms of articulating the overall strategic thrust for defense policy, i.e. the focus on Asia and the Middle East, for instance. But I think if you require the Department to take an educated view as to what levels of risk they could incur in different alternative force structures, that would go a long way I think to address for Congress and the Nation the kinds of defense strategy choices we might not have to face.

Mrs. ROBY. Dr. Dueck.

Dr. DUECK. Thank you. Do I have this right now? Can you hear me?

Mrs. ROBY. I think so.

Dr. DUECK. Okay. Yeah, the 2012 Strategic Guidance in some ways was a significant change from the 2010 QDR. It moved away from the traditional two-war standard. So that was, in a way, an accommodation of the fact that the budget has been cut already.

Now, I actually think if you are going to ask me in the abstract is that a good idea, I would say no, because you are raising the risk that one rogue state or another is going to engage in more aggressive behavior because it judges the U.S. can only handle one crisis at a time; so, for example, North Korea versus Iran.

However, having said that, if what you are looking for is just a more internally coherent strategic document, given where defense cuts are headed, I mean, it has to be said, we can't really sustain the two-war standard right now. So as you probably could tell from my opening statement, I would prefer to maintain the two-war standard and then fund it. But if we are not going to, it has to be said the 2012 Strategic Guidance is more internally coherent. I think it raises risks very high. But if the question is internal coherence, it does that.

Now, just one good point that Mr. Brimley made in his statement was personnel costs. If you wanted a practical suggestion, it is not
always the case of, as all of you well know, simply whether expend-
itures are higher or lower. I think that he is exactly right to say
that the ballooning level of personnel costs would be an area to
tackle. In other areas, though, really, the U.S. should spend more.
I mentioned shipbuilding. So if you could redirect in that way, have
an effect in that sense, it would help close the gap between capa-
bilities and commitments.

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you.
And we will circle back on those. But I think probably in light
of what you have said, the dangers associated with that are inher-
et in what our future security threats look like. And we don't nec-
essarily know that, although we can have that conversation.

My time has expired. And in the interests of setting a good ex-
ample, Ms. Tsongas.

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you all for your testimony.

We do live in a very dynamic time, as I said, both on our fiscal
situation and sort of the resources that allows us to work with but
also in a very changing world.

And it was interesting, Dr. Dueck, when you talk about a change
from being able to conduct two wars simultaneously. In essence,
even currently, we had to divert our efforts in Afghanistan, kind
of sort of put them on the back burner, as we went to Iraq because
we really didn't even—didn't even have the resources then to fully
engage in two wars at the same time. So to change to kind of deal
with the change that that is dictated by more apparent fiscal con-
straints I think kind of reinforces or kind of highlights the fact that
we actually haven't done that in recent times, haven't been able to
do that. So I think the issue of what we have, the resources we
have, the fiscal resources we have is very real.

I am curious, since you all have been involved in the QDR proc-
ess and obviously studied it very carefully, it is why you are here
today, but if each of you could give one thing, what is the most im-
portant thing for the QDR to do, what that would be. And how
would that help both the Defense Department and Congress as it
wrestles with some very difficult decisions? And you can——

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you, Congresswoman Tsongas. All I would
say is that there are really two things that really have to occur in
tandem. One is getting the strategic diagnosis of the problem right.
What are the core challenges? And how, and this is really I would
underscore the word how, how are you going to address them? And
then the second part of that, which really goes in tandem, is align-
ing the program and the efforts of the Department with that stra-
tegic direction.

Dr. DUECK. Well, I would echo that. I think that is exactly right.
The task is one of—although Mr. Thomas has pointed out that it is—in some ways, it is a strange process because it is public, I
think it would be helpful to try as far as possible to truly align in-
terests, threats, resources within that document. And as difficult as
it is with a public document, let's not shy away from mentioning
and describing intentions and capabilities of real world adversaries.
I understand there are arguments against it because it is a stra-
tegic communication document. But, at least for our own concep-
tual clarity, it might be worthwhile to have that discussion and
clarify it.
Mr. Brimley, I think there are two things I would say. One, and I mentioned in my opening statement, you know, when budgets start to collapse or decline, and they will, military services historically have tended to sort of get into a bunker mentality. And so a lot of what I would call game-changing technologies—Jim talked long-range unmanned submersible vehicles and likely aerial vehicles—a lot of these capabilities that have been fully funded in times of plenty, when the budget starts to decline, they may be perceived as threats to other things, like manned fighter aircraft, for instance.

I would encourage Congress to really pay attention to, you know, we have to invest in these game-changing technologies now. Take the Asia-Pacific, for instance. There is a lot of talk about how the anti-access area-denial environment in East Asia is rather fraught. Well, you think it is bad now, wait 12, 15, 20 years in the future. And so we need to make sure that as we go through this pretty austere environment, that we focus on preserving our pretty substantial investments in these game-changing technologies so we can lock in some comparative advantages when that environment is really going to get rather challenging in 10 or 12 years.

And finally, I do think elements of the QDR should employ the classified realm more aggressively. I think a lot tends to get lost in translation. And then the QDR gets published, and then we turn around in the Pentagon, and we reargue first principles because now we are rearguing an unclassified document. I think it would be helpful for Congress, frankly, to use the classified realm to get more out of the Pentagon in terms of its actual strategies and scenarios and plans. But it also would really help the Pentagon to make sure that it has a document, parts of which are classified, that it can then go right into implementation documents that the Department does as part of its annual budget cycle.

Ms. Tsongas. Thank you.
I am almost out of time, so I will yield back.

Mrs. Roby. Mr. Conaway.

Mr. Conaway. Well, Madam Chairman, out of respect for my colleagues who have been here the whole time, I will defer to the end, since I just got here. Chairing the Ethics Committee, so I was on official business. But it is fairer for the other folks who have been here the whole time to go first.

Mrs. Roby. Mr. Andrews.

Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank the witnesses for their preparation. I was looking at a document today that identified the security environment for the United States. And the document highlighted cross-border aggression, particularly in the Middle East and in the Korean Peninsula; civil wars within failed states, such as the former Yugoslavia and Somalia; and then what the report identified as transnational dangers, which they identified three in this order: Drug trafficking; flows of immigrants that could cause threats to United States citizens; and one sentence, increasingly violent and capable terrorists will continue to directly threaten the lives of United States citizens and try to undermine U.S. interests and alliances. This was the 1997 QDR; one sentence devoted to the asymmetric threat of terrorism 4 years prior to 9/11.
What are we missing this time? Are we geared up to begin thinking outside the box and thinking about threats and issues that threaten our citizens and our country that we so—we didn’t miss it in 1997, but I mean, one sentence out of about four pages on the international security environment. It is human nature to always be fighting the most recent war. But what mechanism do we have within our defense structure to think about what we might be missing today that would cause the country great peril down the road?

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you, Mr. Andrews.
You know, every QDR is going to get it wrong as we look out, just given the mandate in looking out over a 20-year period. It is going to miss things. So I think a critical part has to be what sort of agility or adaptability or resilience are we building into our posture so that we are in a better position to respond to those surprises if and when they emerge? That said, I think there are three enduring challenges. And we talk about preparing for the near term versus preparing for the long term. I think if you think about the dangers and the threat posed by Al Qaeda and associated movements, if you think about the rise of great powers in the Middle East and Eurasia and elsewhere, and also the growing specter of, not only the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but their use, whether it is against our homeland or it is overseas, those challenges are with us today. And I don’t see them falling off the table anytime in the next 20 years. And I would say those are three of probably the most pressing that I can imagine.

Mr. ANDREWS. But I would say that to look for new problems doesn’t mean you ignore the existing ones. Let me use this example that he is not with us now on the committee, but Mr. Bartlett in these kind of hearings occasionally would ask questions that would kind of furrow people’s brows, and he would talk about electric pulse shock and things of that nature. And I admire him for that because he was thinking in a way that someone who might want to do harm to our country would be thinking, which is what bag of tricks do they have? What weapons do they have? What incentives do they have?

And again, I am so troubled when I read the—I was here for the 1997 QDR, so I have my own share of blame and responsibility. But if you would have said to this committee in 1997 that we would be at war in Afghanistan for a decade in the next decade, I think people would have probably ordered a saliva test for you. So what are we missing? What aren’t we thinking about?

Mr. BRIMLEY. If I could, Congressman, I think you are onto one of the perennial challenges with these documents. You know, Fareed Zakaria, in 2003, wrote a book called “The Future of Freedom,” where he talked about the democratization of violence, essentially. We obviously saw that on 9/11, and we saw that, as you allude to, years before that.

But when we think about things like 3D manufacturing, the ability to literally print out weapons perhaps, nanotechnology, proliferation of very advanced cyber tools, you know, the democratization of violence, the lowering entry barriers, where previously these technologies would be available only to states, now they are being increasingly pushed down farther and farther down. You know,
Hezbollah is now using very rudimentary drones, for instance. It is this area that I think we should focus on. Partly that is why I am talking about preserving investments in these game-changing technologies, both to take advantage of them on behalf of our defense strategy but also to make sure that we understand what these game-changing technologies are, investing in them, and also investing in potential defenses. But that is an area where I think certainly the 2014 QDR should spend some time looking.

Mr. ANDREWS. I thank you, and I thank the chair.

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Madam Chair.

So, you know, I think this hearing is timely because of the impending threat of sequestration and continuing resolution will be devastating to our country’s current National Security Strategy and readiness. You know, in the face of a Middle East that is roiled by the Arab Spring, in the face of North Korea and Iran continuing to pursue a nuclear program, I am concerned that we are balancing budgetary requirements and the mounting costs of our current forces with what we need to do to project into the future with these new threats that are emerging.

So, you know, Mr. Thomas, I sort of looked at your testimony, and in your written testimony, you said that none of us wants a strategy that is simply budget driven, but neither can we responsibly craft a strategy that is unconstrained by resources. So, in looking at the QDR process, do you have any best practices? Do you have any recommendations in terms of the cost monitoring portion of it? For example, would you recommend having an individual, such as an IG [inspector general] or a comptroller, with a very specific expertise who would be in charge of looking at budgetary impacts on proposed initiatives? Or how do we pay for some of the new emerging technologies if we are going to balance the threats versus what we are capable of doing so that we are not wasting money on programs that are no longer effective or programs that are no longer relevant to the emerging threat, so that we can indeed pay for those unmanned submersibles and aircraft? And while we are maintaining and, you know, making sure that our forces get the equipment that they need? And also modernizing the existing force. I am a member of the National Guard. And over half of the Blackhawks in the National Guard are still alpha model Blackhawks. When are we going to upgrade those? So can you talk about that comptroller-IG part? Would that be something that would be a best practice or something that you would recommend as part of the QDR process?

Mr. THOMAS. I think that is an interesting idea. I mean, ultimately, as I was thinking about it, it is really Congress that has the power of the purse. And so, you know, one possibility might actually be closer consultation between the executive and legislative branches at the start of a QDR to think about what the fiscal outlook is. And I don’t think we are trying to get it down to the penny, but just to have some idea of rough order of magnitude what should we anticipate? Is the slope going to be straight-lined? Is it up? Is it down? But what should we plan on? And I am really reminded, historically, in the 1930s, it was a time of severe austerity,
especially for the U.S. Army. And you had folks who they weren’t sure if they were going to get their next paycheck. They were really living on a shoestring. The senior leadership of the Army never questioned the resources that were provided to them by the Nation. They just said we will do the best we can with what we are given. And that is still the attitude of our U.S. military today.

But I think the other element of this is that before we get into a lot of the meat, how we project power abroad, there is a lot of overhead and backroom office functions, there are a lot of reforms that we can make, whether it is reducing headquarters’ staffs, it is thinking about how we better manage personnel costs and tailor personnel benefits that are most suitable for the people we have got in our service today, those sorts of steps we can take. And I think we can preserve a lot of our ability to project power overseas.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Thomas.

Mr. Brimley, do you have similar types of best practices you can perhaps talk to? You know, I think about, for example, the increasing privatization of—well, moving a lot of military services to contractors. When I was in Iraq, our food was provided under contract at $38 per meal, three meals a day, per soldier. And that was in 2004.

So, Mr. Brimley, can you talk a little bit about best practices and how you feel about a person that could provide that oversight of the budgetary aspect of the QDR?

Mr. BRIMLEY. I think it would be interesting to go back and look at—for instance, in my written statement, I say that the 2014 QDR could be the most important since the 1993 Bottom-Up Review. The Bottom-Up Review was interesting because it basically presented three alternative force structures, with all the underlying implications that would be associated with that. It would be interesting to think about whether the 2014 QDR could do something similar, to come up with three or more alternative force structures that potentially bias in certain strategic ways. What does an Asia-Pacific focused strategy really look like? And what would a force structure look there? Should we invest much more in the Navy? What would a force structure look like where we can maintain the abilities to do long-term stability operations in the Middle East? That would be an interesting exercise. And I think it would be tough. But if you mandated something like that and the associated cost implications thereof, that could be something that I think could be pretty useful.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. I am out of time.

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

Mrs. ROBY. Mrs. Speier.

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Brimley, you just said, “interesting exercise.” And I am sitting here beginning to wonder if this whole QDR process is just an interesting exercise. All three of you have been critical on one level or another, calling it a, you know, these conflicting goals, being a PR [public relations] exercise. Supposedly, it is supposed to help us guide us in terms of the budget. If you were to grade how the QDRs have helped us, or how it has been reflected in strategy, what grade would you give the military and Congress?

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, the military.
Mr. BRIMLEY. I will go first and give my panelists a chance to think. I mean, my first inclination would be to say, you know, F. But I think when you look at each individual QDR as a snapshot in time, and you look at all the QDRs all the way from the base force that Chairman Colin Powell did in 1991 and the Bottom-Up Review, and the four QDRs, and the next one, and the Defense Strategic Guidance, if you look at all of those that provide sort of an arc or a narrative arc of U.S. defense strategy, or really even U.S. grand strategy over the entire post-Cold War period, I think we have done a pretty good job as a nation, as a Department, as a congressional branch, grappling with the question of what is the role of the United States in the post-Cold War world? What is the role of the United States in the post-9/11 world? So I wouldn’t say I am bullish on QDRs, but I think they are useful exercises because it is a really good forcing mechanism for the Secretary of Defense, but also for Congress to really engage on these issues.

Ms. SPEIER. All right. Dr. Dueck.

Dr. DUECK. I think I am known as a relatively easy grader, maybe a gentleman’s C or something like that for the grade.

Ms. SPEIER. All right.

Dr. DUECK. I mean, I think the United States, in terms of its overall ability to adjust, in spite of initial hiccups and failures, has been much more impressive than the QDR process itself. Put it that way.

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Thomas.

Mr. THOMAS. I would just say that, just picking up on Shawn’s comment earlier, I mean, there has been an awful lot of consistency across the last four Quadrennial Defense Reviews in terms of the challenges that they have highlighted and the steps that need to be taken. I think where they all have fallen down is the lack of alignment, their inability to align the program. It is not going to happen overnight, but we are still running on the force structure and the program that was essentially laid out in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review. We really haven’t moved beyond that. We talk a good game about changing the force planning construct, getting beyond the two major theater war construct, but we still aren’t there. And I think we have a long way to go.

The last point I would just say, ma’am, is I think there is a danger that the QDRs have just gotten too big. It has gone from being an innovative practice to being institutionalized, where you have a bureaucracy that is working this. Tons of contractors, lots of folks, each service has its own QDR office that is already established. It just gets to a point where I think it has gone too far. And I think simplifying that process and getting it down to where it is not all things to all people would be a step in the right direction.

Ms. SPEIER. All right. Maybe we need a separate hearing in which you can come back and suggest to us how it should be reconstructed. I have a question on energy costs that are eating the Defense Department up. But I think you, Mr. Brimley, actually referred to it in your testimony. For every 25-cent increase in the price of a gallon of oil it costs the Department of Defense a billion dollars. That is staggering. And the idea that somehow we are not going to engage in alternative energy would be deeply troubling to
me. Do you have any comments that you would make on that in terms of strategy?

Mr. BRIMLEY. I would say one thing, Congresswoman. It is regarding overseas posture. One of the things I did when I was at the Pentagon was I was a member of the team that convinced Secretary Gates to make investments in forward architecture in Southeast Asia in places like Darwin, Australia, or pushing forward the deployment of littoral combat ships to Singapore. I think there is a key strategic need for us to remain engaged overseas. But part of it is a cost issue. I think if you look at in the very near term, yes, it costs money. But if you look at our forward presence over the long term, say 15 to 20 years, you know, the ability to forward station in particular naval assets in Asia I think is a very real cost saver over the long term, because you are not paying for the fuel to go back and forth, back and forth across the Pacific for 20 years. I think there is real cost savings associated with overseas basing and forward posture. And I know that is not a popular issue on the Hill, but I think it is one we should look at.

Mrs. ROBY. Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, thank you, Madam Chairman. It is some interesting comments. Kind of playing off of some of the things that have already been said, the role of the national strategy, which was developed by the White House and, in 2011, just kind of rolled out there, I have been in the process during that time frame, and I didn’t see a lot of transparency, a lot of discussion as to why we made that change or what was the analysis done. What would be the role of the QDR at creating the National Security Strategy? It is a chicken or egg kind of thing, I guess. But should as a part of this QDR process say that that National Security Strategy is valid and we ought to plan against that? Or where is the interplay between the two? And you got one group working for the White House who kicked it out. And I understand the tension there. But where in the system does the White House get graded on changes to the National Security Strategy?

Mr. THOMAS. Well, just, sir, I think normally Quadrennial Defense Reviews don’t take on the issue of evaluating the National Security Strategy. And perhaps they should. And I think you are raising an interesting point. The other thing is that a lot of Quadrennial Defense Reviews have ended up rolling out a year or so before the National Security Strategy comes out. So there is kind of a disconnect in terms of the sequencing of events; that normally it is the top-level strategy that drives the defense strategy and so forth.

The other thing I would say that is really missing is we have a Quadrennial Defense Review, the State Department now has its own Quadrennial Diplomatic and Development Review that it does, and other departments are doing this as well. But it seems to me there is a crying need for some sort of a national security review that occurs across departments. And I think one of the goals should be to take on this issue of informing or crafting what a National Security Strategy should be at the grand strategy level.

Mr. CONAWAY. Kind of playing off what Ms. Speier talked about, we brag on the 1993 QDR. Can you give us an example of how 2011 and 10 or 11 years in Afghanistan and a big fight in Iraq,
what happened out of the 1993 QDR that made us better prepared and more nimble?

Mr. Dueck, you made the comment that made the most sense, and that is we are incredibly adaptive. And we will take, if you watch our military, we will take folks who are trained to do a lot of things and ask them to do totally out-of-their-lane things, and they get it done. So what happened out of the 1993 QDR that helped us in this decade that we ought to brag on?

Dr. Dueck. Well, I think Mr. Brimley was right initially when he said that that in some ways was probably the most impressive, over the years, of the QDRs. It necessarily adapted to a post-Cold War world. So there was a pressure of necessity.

And but, you know, over the years, the trend has been this gap between capabilities and commitments. One point I would just make, going back to an earlier comment, was that it is true, as Mr. Andrews said, that we never can predict exactly what the future will hold, which in a way is an argument for simply being very strong. I mean, you can make the case to say there is a risk that if we try to get too far ahead, that we could give up on existing capabilities. For example, if we now plan on the premise that we won’t face anything like Iraq or Afghanistan, and it is safe to say we won’t, I mean, the historical pattern has been since the 1940s we never get it right in terms of predicting what the next conflict is going to be. So, in a sense, it is not simply a matter of predicting some very futuristic wave; it is actually a sense of being strong across the board.

Mr. Conaway. I guess the point would be that the reason that our team is so good at doing whatever it is we ask them to do, and many times it is nothing they have been trained to do, is it is about personnel. So as we try to deal with that tension between the costs of personnel, which are huge, and a big deal, versus the capacity to do other kinds of things, you know, we have never been really good at making those—you know, I hate to use the word hollow out the force, but it has been used an awful lot. We have not seemed to be able to learn our lessons and protecting that American mindset that wears our uniforms that gets things done no matter what the odds, no matter what the resources available. Whether it is in the 1930s when they just took what they got or the folks who have been in this fight for 12 years now. You know, undervaluing that I think is probably the biggest danger to the system, and not being able to have folks in place who can adapt, who can take a tool that is used for one thing and use it for something else.

Madam Chairman, I yield back.

Mrs. Roby. Thank you.

And I have a few more questions, and Ms. Speier has a few more questions. So we are just going to—and then, Mr. Conaway, if you have any follow-up. We are just going to plow through this. I know we are expecting votes soon. But then we will be able to wrap it up.

And I want to also echo the sentiments, as I said in my previous questions, that what our enemies look like in the future and what Mr. Andrews makes an excellent point in being prepared for that.

And I hear, Dr. Dueck, what you are saying as well.
But I really think in light of this balance between, you know, unconstrained by resources, but the budgetary constraints, we have got to be realistic in making sure that we are prepared. And I think this is an opportunity to do that. And so I hope that we will take into consideration our evolving relationships with places like India and China and Iran, but also those that may be unanticipated in other parts of the world as well.

We talked about the grade for QDR, not Congress. If it is an F, and we have an opportunity right now to improve upon it, I want to spend a little bit of time and hear your comments, because it hasn't come up yet, about the role that the independent panel is going to play in this QDR as opposed to the previous. By having them involved, a smaller panel involved ongoing throughout the process, as opposed to them reviewing it at the end and telling us this document is worthless and doesn't mean anything. So maybe they didn't say it like that, but essentially that is what they told us. So how is this, the independent panel's involvement throughout going to improve? Because a lot of the suggestions that have been made, and these are very valid questions about the process, may be too late for the 2014. This is an opportunity to improve upon the final document. So if you could just explain to us about that.

Mr. BRIMLEY. If I could, I spent some time in my written testimony looking at this. I mean, I was in the Pentagon when the first independent panel started up, and I thought it was very useful, but it was handicapped in a sense because it started when—we were probably 75 percent of the way done, and then it was really this dynamic of them grading the homework, which I think was a useful thing to do, but I think, as you allude to, Madam Chairwoman, you know, standing up the independent panel now and giving them the documents they need to succeed, to include, I think, a lot of classified material, maybe secure space at the Pentagon with some administrative support, with a support staff that maybe is part-time, maybe some full-time that have, you know, full clearances that have—you know, that have a background in this stuff could be extremely useful.

I remember when we were doing the 2010 QDR, we had internal red teams, and we brought in external folks from the think tank community, so there was a lot—there was a willingness, I think, on the part of the Pentagon, the folks crafting the QDR to really use these sorts of mechanisms. And I think you are right, if you stand up the independent panel now, staff it the right way, select panelists who have a background and interest in this stuff, I think it could be a very, very powerful mechanism to track all the way through.

The final thing I would say is to structure in, you know, on and off ramps throughout the process where the panelists come back and brief this committee and others but also brief the Secretary of Defense. I think this could be a useful process, not just for Congress but also for the Secretary of Defense and the executive branch.

Mrs. ROBY. Absolutely.

Does anybody want to add anything?

Okay. I will forego the rest of my time.
Ms. Tsongas, you had a couple of follow-up questions, and then we will go to Ms. Speier.

Ms. Tsongas. Not so much a question but just this hearing really is our opportunity to sort of revisit and visit the QDR process as we are poised for this next round, and as I said in my opening comments, if we got it right at the first—if we got it out of the gate, we would do ourselves out of a job. And I do know that we’ve revisited this QDR process over time and that now having the independent panel do its work in concert with the QDR rather than being a follow-on to sort of revisit and assess, I think, is an important reform, and we will see how it works. Thank you.

Mrs. Roby. Mrs. Speier.

Ms. Speier. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Brimley, you referred to wasting assets, and you know, some would argue that aircraft carriers and stealth technology are examples of assets that have limited comparative advantage. Are you—could you point to any other wasting assets that we should be looking at?

Mr. Brimley. I think that term is generally—I should cite that, Jim’s boss, Andy Krepinevich, wrote a great article in Foreign Affairs that talked about wasting assets, so, in some ways, this is really a question for Jim. But I think, yes, you named a couple of capabilities that I think stealth, even aircraft carriers, if you want aircraft carriers to be survivable in the future, you really need to make investments now in increasing the range of the carrier air wing. I think that is a huge issue, so that is one aspect.

I think investing in aviation capabilities that can help America project and sustain power over much longer ranges than we have in the past is really— is really what I was trying to get at when I used that term. You know, the massive amount of money we are spending procuring thousands of relatively short-range type of flyer aircraft does not really align, in my view, to the future of security environment we are going to see in places like the Middle East or the Asia-Pacific.

Ms. Speier. Comments by Mr. Thomas.

Mr. Thomas. To echo Shawn a little bit, I mean, especially when it comes to the aircraft carrier, the Nation has made an incredible investment in carrier aviation over many decades, but we see today that the challenges we face in areas like the Western Pacific and even the Persian Gulf where countries with anti-ship ballistic missile technologies and anti-ship cruise missiles as well as mine and torpedo threats using their submarine forces, they are going to end up pushing our forces—our naval forces out, and they are going to have to operate from greater ranges.

So, figuring out how we extend the life of the aircraft—extend the range of the aircraft that fly off the decks of the carriers is absolutely critical to getting every penny of value out of the aircraft carriers that are in the fleet today and that we are going to have in the future.

Ms. Speier. Thank you all.

Mrs. Roby. Well, I just want to thank you, Mr. Brimley and Dr. Dueck, and Mr. Thomas. We really value what—the information that you brought us today and all of the information contained in your testimony, and I just want to say, as we really enter into this
process and think about the things that we talked about today and, you know, God willing, improve upon this process so we have an end product that is going to be useful in these outyears and really not focusing so much on the now, which we got caught up in a little too much in the last, but really, really taking this opportunity to prepare for 20 years from now.

So thank you again for your time and your testimony, and to the members of the committee.

And with that, we are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX

February 26, 2013
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

February 26, 2013
Opening Remarks
As Prepared For Delivery

Rep. Martha Roby
Chairman
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee

February 26, 2013

The Quadrennial Defense Review undertaken by the Pentagon every four years is an extraordinary effort.

It is a very important mechanism for our defense leaders to consider our nation’s long-term military strategy.

It is a way to attempt to match our defenses to the likely threats of the future.

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a clear articulation of the U.S. defense strategy has become more challenging. In this period, the threats to the United States have become more varied and unpredictable. Clearly describing our national defense posture in an unstable world is the difficult task of the QDR.

The QDR process is just now beginning. Over the next year, Department of Defense officials will carefully consider how to approach the world and determine what resources and force structure are consequently needed. The Department has committed to come before us in coming months to learn more about how the effort is proceeding.

Today we will hear from three distinguished witnesses who are knowledgeable about past QDRs and defense strategy in general. They will testify about how the QDR process might be shaped and about broader strategic issues they believe the coming QDR should consider.

I hope this panel can help to clarify the principles on which a national defense strategy should be based, and how those involved in the current effort might approach their task.

In two months, we will mark the thirty-third anniversary of historic testimony before this subcommittee. In May 1980, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Edward “Shy” Meyer coined the phrase “hollow Army” in describing the conditions of Army units deployed across the globe to Members of this subcommittee.

The world has changed tremendously in the intervening years. But, it remains dangerous. The 2014 QDR is meant to guide our planning as we anticipate the threats to the nation and the
forces we must maintain in response. We cannot return to the days of a “hollow Army.”

I thank the witnesses for their attendance today and look forward to hearing their testimony.

I now turn to my distinguished Ranking Member for any remarks Rep. Tsongas may wish to make.
Chairman Roby, thank you for your kind remarks.

Good morning, Mr. Brimley, Mr. Thomas, and Dr. Dueck. Thank you for appearing before our Subcommittee today. I look forward to your testimony.

This is the first hearing of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee for the 113th Congress and I want to congratulate Representative Roby on her selection as Chairman. I am glad that you and I have already been able to meet personally and I know the staff has been meeting regularly as well. I look forward to working with you and all of your colleagues on the Subcommittee.

I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome my Democratic colleagues, Representative Rob Andrews, Representative Jackie Speier and Representative Tammy Duckworth. I am excited to work together.

I know we are going to meet together soon to discuss the issues and agenda for the Subcommittee. This Subcommittee has the ability to dive deeply into some of the more long-term issues facing the Department of Defense and its servicemen, servicewomen, and their families. I look forward to doing so in the bipartisan spirit of the Armed Services Committee. We have much to do.

Turning to the QDR, I think it is always important to have a regular thoughtful and reflective review of both the long-term and short-term issues confronting the Department of Defense. Having a regular review of the review, so to speak, is also critical. As with all that we do, we can always do it better. This is even more so with the unsettled environment we are dealing with, both fiscally and with the new and evolving threats to our national security. We are well past the Cold War and a decade past 9/11. We all have very difficult decisions to make regarding the best way to protect our Nation in the future.

As of now we have the QDR, an independent review of the QDR, a GAO review of the sufficiency of the QDR, a military strategy assessment by the Joint Chiefs, as well at the recent National Security Strategy by the White House and the joint
DoD/Joint Staff Defense Strategic Review. We need to make sure all of these reviews are consistent and don’t contradict each other.

I want to make sure we get this right and I am pleased we have such an experienced panel here today. With sequestration set to take effect just three days from now, I believe that this hearing is also quite timely. Our defense strategy, after all, does not exist in an intellectual void; it must reflect the resources that we extend to our Armed Services. I am curious to hear all of your thoughts on how we can evolve our strategy to meet 21st century threats in a period of fiscal austerity.

I look forward to our discussion today with our distinguished panel. I hope you can help us with these difficult decisions we have ahead.
Thank you Chairwomen Roby, Ranking Member Tsongas and members of the committee. I am honored to testify today on the important topic of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). I had the privilege of serving as the lead drafter for the 2010 QDR, but I want to make clear up-front that I was not a senior decision-maker but rather one of many action officers participating in the year-long review. My comments reflect my personal views, not those of the Department of Defense (DOD) or the Center for a New American Security.

My comments are organized along several lines of approach: the strategic environment; the purpose and role of the QDR; key issues for the 2014 QDR; and the critical role of Congress during a QDR cycle.

The Strategic Environment

The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review will occur in a strategic environment quite different than the one the Obama administration inherited in early 2009. The global economy, though still uncertain, no longer teeters on the brink of collapse. The 100,000 U.S. troops that were fighting in Iraq are home. A transition strategy is underway in Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden is dead. Great power relations are stable.

President Obama’s first term included several challenges that have carried over and will frame U.S. foreign policy for at least the next four years. Today’s security environment features a Middle East and North Africa rolled by political change. The so-called Arab Spring is, at root, a story of people rising up to claim their rightful agency after decades of authoritarianism—even so, the implications remain unclear.

North Korea’s nuclear test and Iran’s continued investments in a nuclear program keep the prospect of nuclear-armed pariah states on the front-burner. The war in Afghanistan may be winding down, but it is not over so long as tens of thousands of our men and women in uniform remain in harm’s way. It is in America’s interest to remain the security partner of choice in Afghanistan as part of a sustainable counterterrorism strategy and to influence the development of Afghan security forces.

The most important geopolitical story remains the rise of both India, the world’s most populous democracy, and China, the world’s most populous country. As India rises and looks increasingly east toward Asian markets, and as China rises and looks increasingly east toward Asian markets, and as China rises and looks increasingly south into the South China Sea and southwest into the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean—their interaction will cause powerful ripples in the global security environment that we must factor into U.S. statecraft.


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This security environment will also be shaped by several powerful underlying trends of which I would like to highlight two:

1. **An energy revolution centered in the United States.** The pace of recent advances in domestic energy production has put the United States on a path to become the largest global oil producer by about 2020 and North America as a net oil exporter by 2030. 2 This development—due largely to rapid advances in hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling—will have profound geopolitical consequences that are only now becoming apparent. Policymakers must contemplate the future of U.S. defense strategy in the Middle East as the vast majority of exported oil shifts to Asia instead of North America; the resultant consequences for key U.S. alliances and partners around the world; and the diplomatic, trade, and defense investments that should begin today to prepare for this rapidly approaching shift. How this generation of U.S. leaders addresses these issues will have a generational impact on the international system and on the practice of American statecraft.

2. **The continued proliferation of advanced technology.** The scale and breadth of the technology available to state and non-state actors continues to increase. What Fareed Zakaria called the "democratization of violence" a decade ago has only accelerated. 3 Rapid advances in global navigation and surveillance technology coupled with a significant diffusion of long-range, precise, automated, and increasingly unmanned technology will pose significant challenges to U.S. defense strategy. 4 Systems and operational concepts long considered bastions of comparative advantage may become "wasting assets"—particularly capabilities designed to project U.S. military power in contested air and maritime domains. 5 The coming years will see the continued spread of unmanned and autonomous systems, powerful offensive cyberspace tools, directed energy capabilities, widely available 3D printing platforms, human performance enhancement technologies, and a miniaturization of weapons spurred by advances in nanotechnology. It is not at all clear that the United States will lead in these areas.

The fiscal environment is also an important component of this strategic picture. The looming prospect of sequestration—a particularly astrategic method of reducing the defense budget—will reduce the readiness of U.S. military forces and thus their ability to properly secure U.S. interests while preparing for a range of

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plausible contingencies. While I believe that the U.S. defense budget can be responsibly reduced by a reasonable margin given the massive increase in spending over the last decade, the failure to give the Secretary of Defense the ability to be precise and targeted with these cuts amounts to an unnecessary self-inflicted strategic wound.

The combination of a changing geopolitical environment; accelerating energy and technological revolutions; and a much more constrained discretionary spending picture will combine to make the 2014 QDR perhaps the most important review since the 1993 Bottom-Up Review.

**Purpose and Role of the 2014 QDR**

QDRs are best understood as "snapshots" in time along the entire arc of the post-Cold War era. These snapshots should be viewed together—from the Base Force and the Bottom-Up Review to the previous QDRs. When viewed this way, recurring contours of inquiry come into sharp relief:

- How to best assess the sufficiency of the current and planned force;
- How to understand core missions and how those missions relate to one another;
- How to address lowering entry barriers and access to increasingly advanced technology;
- How to understand U.S. security commitments to key allies and partners;
- How to conceive of America’s forward deployed forces and overseas bases;
- How to account for stability operations in doctrine and force sizing; and
- How to preserve America’s ability to project power given the spread of anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities.

Beyond the above relatively constant lines of inquiry, individual QDRs are also highly dependent on other factors, chief among them the disposition and priorities of the Secretary of Defense. While QDRs are in the most important sense an obligation to Congress, most Secretaries of Defense also consider QDRs as an important tool to affect positive change in DOD.

The principal challenge with QDRs is that they have generally attempted to satisfy multiple purposes. QDRs are often judged by their ability to be:

1. A response to specific Congressional legislation;
2. An enterprise-wide long-term strategy document;
3. An important near-term lever for the current budget cycle;
4. A vehicle for the Secretary of Defense to advance particularly important initiatives; and
5. A critical public relations and strategic communications document.

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*The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance was a consequential document but it was not designed to be as detailed as the four previous QDRs nor the two reviews done at the end of the Cold War—the so-called "Base Force" in 1991 and the Bottom-Up Review in 1993—all of which contained implementation guidance and specific recommendations on force structure.*

*Points in this section draw on comments I delivered on January 25, 2013 during a conference at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).*
No QDR has ever been able to fully satisfy all five of these expectations. In 2009, Secretary Robert Gates made a choice that the 2010 review would be "a wartime QDR" designed to help him focus the Department on ensuring that the tens of thousands of U.S. troops in harm's way in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere were given the resources and attention they needed and deserved. This is why the 2010 QDR prioritized "prevailing in today's wars," and focused on so-called "enabling capabilities"—manned and unmanned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, rotary-wing assets, and counterinsurgency capabilities—that tended to be overlooked by a Pentagon focused on plausible but hypothetical future conventional wars. I believed then and now that when the United States is actively at war, the QDR process should be used to assist the men and women in harm's way as much as possible.

The tension—as existed in 2009 and 2010—was between a Congressional requirement to focus on an ideal force structure 20 years into the future with no resource limitations, and a Secretary of Defense focused on prevailing in ongoing conflicts and managing the most complex budget in the world. Some might argue the Pentagon can do both, but the same senior civilian and military leaders charged with executing a QDR are the same figures the Secretary relies on for advice on how to prevail in ongoing conflicts and support the troops in harm's way. I believe the 2010 QDR did a reasonably good job at identifying ways to help resource U.S. troops at war and in setting parameters to guide the evolution of the force over time.

This tension will be much reduced in the 2014 QDR. While U.S. troops remain in harm's way in Afghanistan, the transition strategy has been set and it is proper to shift more fully toward the question of how to sustain and enhance the best all-volunteer military in the world over the long haul. In order to enable this focus the 2014 QDR should de-emphasize the perceived need to be a public relations document—delineating in detail core U.S. interests, overall defense strategy, the importance of particular alliances and partnerships, and various other perceived requirements—and provide Congress a 20-year vision coupled with a detailed examination of how that vision can be best applied given constrained resources. The essence of good strategy, after all, is an alignment of ends, ways, and means.

**Recommended Areas of Focus for the 2014 QDR**

A core challenge for any defense review is the powerful gravitational pull toward the perceived need to cover everything. This QDR cannot afford to be a mile wide and an inch deep, and it need not be. This will be a second-term QDR that has a very detailed predecessor and, more importantly, a recently concluded strategic review overseen in detail by the Commander-in-Chief. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) is an effective document that sets clear strategic priorities for a Pentagon facing...
Constrained budgets. The 2014 QDR therefore should not retreat ground plowed by previous efforts, but rather use the DSG as the baseline strategy and focus on how best to implement the strategy over a 20-year period at varying plausible levels of resources and risk. I believe the 2014 QDR can best achieve this by focusing in part on the following strategic issues:

**Preserve Investment in Game-Changing Technologies.** Absent extraordinary leadership and vision, in constrained budget environments the natural inclination of each military service will be to preserve capabilities it considers “core” to its unique history, traditions, and threat assessments. The current budget environment reflects a relatively “normal” defense drawdown by historical standards, so most analysts expect continued defense reductions over the next decade absent a major strategic shock. The biggest challenge in this environment will be to ensure that investments in “generation-after-next” technologies continue. Congress should ensure that programs designed to sustain the ability to project and sustain U.S. military power over long ranges into contested air and maritime theaters are prioritized and protected. A good example of this is the ongoing attempt to develop a carrier-based unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) that can provide real capability in contested environments. It is unclear whether this capability will be prioritized in the face of continued budget pressure, or whether it will wither on the vine in favor of developing yet another manned fighter aircraft after the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

Protecting investments in game-changing technologies (and the experimentation required) in very constrained budget environments has been done before. The so-called “interwar years” of the 1920s and 1930s saw America and other nations develop, refine, and field tanks, long-range bombers, radar, submarines, and aircraft carriers. If these innovations could be achieved in the context of the greatest economic downturn in history—the Great Depression—surely we can find a way to prioritize and preserve innovation today.

**Reverse the Declining Value of the Defense Dollar:** The 2014 QDR must deal forthrightly with the largest budget challenge—the ballooning cost of military personnel accounts. As several leading analysts have concluded, if the defense budget is held constant in real terms and personnel costs continue to rise at the same rate as the last decade, the entire defense budget will be consumed by personnel accounts before the year 2040. As retired Major General Arnold Punaro has colorfully put it, “We’re on the path in the

32 The recent testing of the Northrop Grumman built X-47B should continue—to include carrier landings and aerial refueling. For the most detailed argument in favor of developing a carrier-based unmanned precision strike platform, see Robert Work and Thomas Ehrhard, *Rage Persistence and Stealth: The Case for a Carrier-Based Unmanned Combat Air System* (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2007).
Department of Defense to turn it into a benefits company that may occasionally kill a terrorist.\footnote{Quoted in Tamara Keith, "Health Care Costs New Threat to U.S. Military," National Public Radio (June 7, 2011).} A close second to personnel costs include the massive overhead in the Pentagon, defense agencies and headquarters staffs.\footnote{See Michele Flournoy, "The Right Way to Cut Pentagon Spending," The Wall Street Journal (February 4, 2013).} The 2014 QDR cannot be confined to defense strategy and force structure alone—to be truly meaningful it must identify specific ways to flatten the cost curve of personnel, overhead, health care, and infrastructure. This will require elements of DOD not typically involved in the year-long minuet of a QDR to be structurally integrated into all aspects of the review.\footnote{The usual QDR players tend to be: OSD Policy, AT&L, and CAPE; the strategy and force structure directorates in the military services and the Joint Staff; and the various combatant commands. Other elements of DOD that focus on military personnel, health care, retirement, and infrastructure tend to not be involved until the very end of the process, if at all.}

**Enhance Overseas Presence:** The 2010 QDR helped to accelerate what has become known as the “rebalancing” strategy toward Asia. The review concluded that U.S. defense posture needed to remain operationally resilient in Northeast Asia, but also more geographically distributed into Southeast Asia. This insight helped to accelerate discussions with Australia and Singapore that resulted in a growing contingent of U.S. Marines rotationally deployed to Darwin, Australia and U.S. Navy Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) being slated to operate out of Singapore on a rotational basis.\footnote{This logic also applied to U.S. defense strategy in the Mediterranean, where four U.S. Navy Aegis ships will be forward-deployed to Rota, Spain.} These initial moves reflected not only the strategic need for increased U.S. presence in Southeast Asia, but also an emerging realization that, over the long term, forward air and maritime presence can be more affordable than constantly deploying air and maritime forces over transoceanic distances. I believe that if the United States is to fully resource the “rebalancing” strategy in Asia over a 20-year timeframe and also retain credible air and maritime deterrence in the Persian Gulf, DOD must continue to assess in detail the nature of forward presence and creative ways to sustain and enhance it.\footnote{See Shawn Brimley and Ely Ratner, "Smart Shift," Foreign Affairs (January/February 2013), and also Michele Flournoy and Janine Davidson, "Obama’s New Global Posture," Foreign Affairs (July/August 2012).}

**Provide Detailed Risk Assessment:** The 2014 QDR report should provide Congress with a detailed assessment of the missions required under the defense strategy and the force structure required to execute them under several combinations of plausible scenarios. Having met the basic requirement to provide a force structure unconstrained by the current budget, the 2014 QDR ought to then provide various alternative force structures which can be plausibly sustained given the current and expected budget environment. The QDR should then identify how these alternative force structures would perform under the scenario combinations and the different ways each alternative would pose strategic, operational, force management, and institutional risk to the overall defense strategy. In a way not dissimilar to the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, the 2014 QDR should recommend to Congress a force structure that best balances prudent budget choices with risk to the proposed defense strategy. As I will outline below, this element of the QDR should be classified.
The Important Role of Congress

Congress plays a critical important role in any QDR cycle. The frequency, nature, and quality of its oversight during the review have a powerful impact on the final product. I recommend Members consider the following recommendations during their oversight of this QDR cycle:

Empower a Bipartisan QDR Independent Panel (QDR IP): Congress and the Secretary of Defense should carefully consider appointments to the panel, biasing toward former policymakers with experience at the highest levels of the Pentagon, and those with a bipartisan pedigree. Also important will be the selection of a small support staff with previous QDR experience. The staff should also be balanced to ensure a bipartisan ethos. The QDR IP should be provided with the material necessary to fully execute its charter, to include: the QDR terms of reference; the set of scenarios used for force sizing and shaping; the methodology used to assess strategic and operational risk associated with various options; and a detailed assessment of the drivers of military personnel costs and plausible options under consideration to reduce their rates of growth. The panelists and support staff should also be provided with detailed monthly classified briefings by OSD, Joint Staff, and Service representatives. The panel’s staff should be provided a secure space in the Pentagon, and reasonable administrative support. The panelists should also be expected to brief Congressional leaders and the Secretary of Defense on their findings throughout the process, not simply after the QDR is published in 2014. Led, staffed, and resourced properly, the QDR Independent Panel could be a valuable tool not only for Congress but also for the Secretary of Defense.

Require an Integrated Classified Review: Previous QDRs have made use of classified materials submitted to Congress, but the 2014 QDR ought to formally integrate one or more classified sections into the review itself. One of the biggest challenges in the 2010 QDR was explaining, in an unclassified format, the force sizing and shaping construct that informed the force structure recommendations. The use of integrated sets of contingency scenarios overlaid on a so-called “steady-state” global security posture was a powerful analytic engine that helped Pentagon officials consider various alternatives, but this was difficult to fully convey in the unclassified QDR report. It is worth considering whether to classify certain sections of the report in order to provide Congress with the best possible integrated product. I believe this would also have a positive secondary effect at the Pentagon by obviating the need for policymakers to reargue elements of the unclassified QDR when drafting follow-on classified implementation guidance such as the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF), and the relevant program guidance for the budget cycle following the QDR’s release.

Require the QDR to be Resource-Informed: One of the bigger issues in recent years has been the argument that QDRs need to be totally unconstrained by budget pressure. It would be a mistake for QDRs to be entirely unconstrained, as that would surely exacerbate the gap between strategy and resources. This approach would ultimately result in QDRs skewing toward fantasy rather than reality.

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20 The best description of this can be found in Kathleen Hicks and Sam Brannen, “Force Planning in the 2010 QDR,” Joint Force Quarterly (Issue 59, 4th quarter 2010).
At the same time the QDR cannot simply be a near-term budget drill. A reasonable approach would be for Congress to make clear that it expects the 2014 QDR to outline the size and shape of U.S. military forces required to execute the most stressing overlapping set of plausible scenarios under consideration. The QDR could then develop a set of budget-informed force structures that could then be tested in similar ways to determine which one best balances risk across the 20 year time period. Given the relatively advantageous position the United States is in today, it would be prudent to accept a modest degree of risk in the near-term to ensure that U.S. military forces are investing in the right capabilities and structure to operate effectively in the more challenging future security environment.

Conclusion

In closing, let me express my admiration to the Committee for its attention to this important issue. Quadrennial Defense Reviews are complicated processes with many dozens of important players—all with particular views on how to create and sustain the best defense strategy for the United States and the military forces required to succeed. I believe this particular QDR will be the most important since the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, as it comes at the end of a prolonged period of war, the rise of new powers, and the need to make tough, clear-headed choices in a constrained budget environment. I am confident that with the active support of Congress, the Department of Defense will rise to the occasion. Thank you.
Biography

Shawn Brimley
Vice President and Director of Studies, Center for a New American Security

Shawn Brimley is Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) where he oversees the center’s research and serves on the executive leadership team. Mr. Brimley rejoined CNAS after serving in the Obama Administration from February 2009 to October 2012 most recently as Director for Strategic Planning on the National Security Council staff at the White House. He also served as Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the Pentagon from 2009 to 2011, where he focused on the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, overseas basing and posture, and long-range strategy development. In 2012, he was awarded the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service and in 2010 he was awarded the Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Public Service.

Mr. Brimley was a founding member of CNAS in 2007 and was the inaugural recipient of the Lt. Andrew Bacevich Jr. Memorial Fellowship. He has also worked at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Mr. Brimley has been published in a variety of venues, including the New York Times, Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy. Educated at Queen’s University and George Washington University, his research interests include U.S. national security strategy and defense policy, the impact of emerging technology on U.S. strategic choices, and the evolution of America’s global defense posture. Mr. Brimley is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He lives in Washington with his wife Marjorie and their two children, Claire and Austin.

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CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(5), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 113th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Committee on Armed Services in complying with the House rule. Please note that a copy of these statements, with appropriate redactions to protect the witness’s personal privacy (including home address and phone number) will be made publicly available in electronic form not later than one day after the witness’s appearance before the committee.

Witness name: Shawn Brimley

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

☐ Individual

☐ Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented:

FISCAL YEAR 2013

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**Federal Contract Information:** If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

**Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:**

Current fiscal year (2013): None
Fiscal year 2012: None
Fiscal year 2011: None

**Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:**

Current fiscal year (2013): None
Fiscal year 2012: None
Fiscal year 2011: None

**List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):**

Current fiscal year (2013): None
Fiscal year 2012: None
Fiscal year 2011: None

**Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:**

Current fiscal year (2013): None
Fiscal year 2012: None
Fiscal year 2011: None
Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

- Current fiscal year (2013): None
- Fiscal year 2012: None
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List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

- Current fiscal year (2013): None
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Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

- Current fiscal year (2013): None
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I'd like to thank the members of this subcommittee for inviting me to speak with you today.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was originally described by Congress as having the purpose of providing a coherent, big-picture outlook on probable international security trends, along with their logical implications for U.S. defense strategy, military budgets, and force posture. It is widely observed that the QDR process has tended to stray from that original purpose, over the years. The overpowering consideration for some time now has been budget cuts to defense. Unfortunately this trend looks likely to continue. And the temptation has been to let budget cuts drive strategic thinking, rather than the other way around.

I know that members of this subcommittee, along with those at the Department of Defense directly responsible for formulating the coming QDR, must operate under practical constraints which those of us who testify here can only begin to understand. To paraphrase one of America's greatest Secretaries of State, Dean Acheson, defense strategy is not a graduate seminar. Having said that, most of this country's wars have resulted, at least in part, from some failure of strategic conception or strategic signaling to U.S. adversaries beforehand. So there are real-world consequences, in blood and treasure, when we fail to think strategically, or to pursue consistent strategies in the nation's defense. In the time allotted here, I will not attempt to give a detailed, technical assessment of what is after all going to be an incredibly complicated QDR 2014 process. But allow me to make a few broad points for your consideration as that process gets underway.

The QDR is supposed to help outline national defense strategy. A strategy begins by identifying certain vital national interests, goals, or objectives. It then identifies threats to those interests, arising from particular real-world adversaries. Finally, it recommends the development and maintenance of specific policy instruments, including a variety of military capabilities, to meet those threats. It is sometimes said that we live in an age of austerity, so inevitably budgetary constraints will drive the strategy. But resources are always limited, and strategy is always about developing a coherent approach toward specific threats under

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conditions of limited resources. So if we simply let declining budgets dictate how we identify threats to our national interests, we’re not really engaging in strategy at all.\(^1\)

Strategy is about prioritizing and facing tradeoffs. It’s about matching up commitments and capabilities, policy objectives and policy instruments, so that the two are in some kind of reasonable balance. And the truth is that right now there is a wide and growing gap or imbalance between America’s declared international security objectives, on the one hand, and its military capabilities on the other.

To be fair, this is a pattern which has repeated itself in different ways and at different times, in what might be called a bipartisan fashion, over the course of more than one administration. Nevertheless, we are speaking here today at a time when the gap between America’s overall military capabilities and its existing international commitments is truly disturbing, and is likely to only get worse.

Here are just a couple of concrete examples. The United States has adopted a policy of pivoting or rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific. At the same time, however, we have continued to cut back the number of ships in the Navy. The two opposing directions do not add up. If one of the purposes of the pivot is to reassure our Asian allies and remind China that the United States is in East Asia to stay, then how can we bolster that impression, while at the same time cutting back on our maritime capabilities? China may not be simply an adversary, but it is certainly a strategic competitor. Another example: just a few weeks ago, the Pentagon indicated that it would not deploy the USS *Harry S. Truman* to the Middle East, as scheduled. America’s naval presence in the Persian Gulf region has now been reduced from two aircraft carriers, to one. What possible conclusion can the Iranian government, and for that matter our Gulf allies, reach from this announcement, other than that the United States is now weaker in the region, relative to Iran? Our allies, adversaries and competitors will not simply watch what we say, they will watch what we do. And as our ships draw down or come home, they will notice.

The overall trend, which is growing worse, is that we have broad, declared international commitments that are under-resourced militarily. Under such circumstances, fundamentally, only a few basic options exist. Either the country can boost its military capabilities, to match existing commitments, or it can scale back dramatically on existing commitments, to match reduced capabilities.

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There is of course a third option, which is to claim that we will do more with less, while denying that any real tradeoffs exist. I would call this strategic denial. But this is not a true option. We can do more with more. We can do less with less. But when it comes to national defense, we can’t actually do more with less.

To give credit to the administration, its 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance began to head in the direction of greater internal coherence, relative to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. For example, the 2012 guidance moved away from the traditional two-war standard, by which U.S. forces are prepared to fight two major regional conflicts simultaneously. I happen to believe that being incapable of fighting two such conflicts at the same time is a mistake, because it more or less invites rogue states to think they might succeed with aggressive behavior while the U.S. is preoccupied in some other part of the world. But it must be conceded that given dramatic cuts in defense since 2011, there are serious doubts as to whether the U.S. can maintain the traditional two-war standard. In that narrow sense, the 2012 guidance is an improvement, in terms of strategic consistency: it implies less with less, rather than simply trying to be all things to all people.

Assuming we now add on additional defense cuts of some $500 billion over the next decade - which seems increasingly likely to happen, regardless of short-term adjustments around sequestration - then it has to be emphasized that even the downscaled national defense strategy implied in the 2012 guidance will no longer be coherent or sustainable. Perhaps the only good thing about this dire prospect is that it might force a genuine debate and assessment of some of the basic assumptions surrounding U.S. defense strategy.

If the United States implements defense cuts anything like the ones envisioned under sequestration, on top of existing cuts from the 2011 Budget Control Act, then the only way to bring shrinking military capabilities into balance with international commitments will be to cut back dramatically on those commitments. The U.S. would then be headed toward a defense strategy resembling what political scientists call "offshore balancing." Indeed in certain ways we already seem to be headed in that direction. The relative emphasis today on long-range strike capacity, special operations, drone strikes, cyber war, area denial, and light-footed approaches to international security challenges, rather than on heavy ground forces, stability operations, counterinsurgency, or major regional war contingencies, is at least a move in the direction of offshore balancing. Such a strategy has always had a certain appeal in this country, because it appears to promise national security at minimal cost. But it carries certain risks or downsides as well. A strategy of offshore balancing, if that is where we are headed, risks

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signaling to U.S. adversaries and allies alike that we are not really in the game. Naturally this will reduce America’s leverage abroad, diplomatically, economically, and militarily. And it will make it much harder to achieve our stated goals of preventing aggression, succeeding in counterterrorism operations, maintaining open sea-lanes, and preserving a balance of power in Europe and Asia friendly to the United States and to its democratic values.

For many years now, America’s overarching and forward strategic presence abroad - including its related bases, its alliance system, and clear U.S. military superiority - have played a crucial role in deterring authoritarian powers, reassuring democratic allies, and upholding a particular international order that for all its current discontents is remarkably prosperous and free by historical standards. If this strategic presence becomes detached or uncertain, there is no reason to expect that the benefits of that particular order for the United States will continue. If we adopt what is in effect a strategy of offshore balancing, whether or not we call it that, then we will have adopted a strategic approach that is at least internally coherent, and in line with current projected defense cuts. But we will have done so by giving up on key commitments and features of America’s stabilizing presence overseas going back several decades. And if we give up on that presence, we cannot assume it will be easy or cheap to buy back. It never has been before.

So if you have asked me here to make policy recommendations related to the coming QDR, without regard to the immediate political climate, then the first thing I would say is: we have to stop cutting national defense. Because if we don’t, we will soon be left with no honest strategic options other than some form of offshore balancing - and as I have indicated, there are multiple reasons to believe that such a choice could have negative international consequences on a scale we can barely foresee today.

But the second thing I would say is, let’s at least not engage in strategic denial. Let’s not pretend we can maintain existing commitments while continually cutting military capabilities. Let’s have a genuine debate over U.S. defense strategy. And this is where I believe you can play a vital role in relation to the coming QDR. You can help ensure that the QDR 2014 process reflects the original and stated intention of Congress, to produce both a long-term reflection on international security trends and a serious strategy from start to finish which sets clear priorities, identifies real-world adversaries, and faces up to the necessary tradeoffs, rather than denying or glossing over the growing gap between our military capabilities and our international commitments.

Thank you for your time.

Colin Dueck

George Mason University
Colin Dueck
Associate Professor
Department of Public and International Affairs
George Mason University

Colin Dueck is an Associate Professor in George Mason University’s Department of Public and International Affairs. He studied politics at Princeton University, and international relations at Oxford under a Rhodes scholarship. He has published two books on American foreign and national security policies, Hard Line: The Republican Party and U.S. Foreign Policy since World War II (Princeton, 2010), and Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton, 2006). He has also published articles on these same subjects in journals such as International Security, Orbis, Political Science Quarterly, Review of International Studies, Security Studies, and World Policy Journal. His current research focus is on the relationship between party politics, presidential leadership, American conservatism, and U.S. foreign policy. His broader research and teaching interests are in the history and practice of international strategy and diplomacy. He is the faculty advisor for the Alexander Hamilton Society at George Mason University, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(5), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 113th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Committee on Armed Services in complying with the House rule. Please note that a copy of these statements, with appropriate redactions to protect the witness’s personal privacy (including home address and phone number) will be made publicly available in electronic form not later than one day after the witness’s appearance before the committee.

Witness name: Colin Dueck

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

_x_ Individual

___ Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented:

**FISCAL YEAR 2013**

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**Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:**

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- Fiscal year 2012: ________________________
- Fiscal year 2011: ________________________

**Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:**

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**Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:**

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Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

- Current fiscal year (2013):
- Fiscal year 2012:
- Fiscal year 2011:
Chairman Roby, Ranking Member Tsongas, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify this afternoon on the subject of the Quadrennial Defense Review. In my testimony, I will offer some lessons from past QDRs and recommendations for the upcoming review. These lessons and recommendations are based on my involvement in the 1997, 2001, and 2006 QDRs, as well as the 2010 QDR, during which I served on the Secretary of Defense’s external “Red Team.” I will first address the issue of the defense strategy, and then turn to how the upcoming QDR might weigh risks, prioritize forces and capabilities, and reformulate the force planning construct.

I. Thinking About “Defense Strategy”

One of the QDR’s major tasks is to set out a defense strategy that articulates a vision of what the Department of Defense seeks to accomplish and how it will do so. The strategy is supposed to be the foundation for determining the Department’s priorities, where it should invest and what activities it should undertake. Given its importance, it is difficult to imagine a process less suited to developing good strategy than the highly bureaucratic QDR process. That process involves thousands of well-meaning military personnel and civilians, ultimately resulting in a strategy being publicly communicated to friends and foes alike in a glossy, unclassified report. The QDR’s development of strategy is a far cry from the War and Navy Departments’ efforts to formulate strategy at the start of World War II. In the aftermath of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the nation’s most senior civilian and military leaders devised a secret military strategy that focused on defeating Nazi Germany first while conducting a holding action with a far smaller force in the Pacific. That prioritization and sequencing of efforts – coupled with the adoption of a peripheral, indirect campaign in North Africa, while delaying the invasion of Europe and avoiding altogether the invasion of the Japanese main islands – proved to be a war-winning strategy. It is doubtful a QDR-like process could ever have produced such a result.
The Pentagon’s record of fashioning strategies since the end of the Cold War is poor. For two decades now, those who aspire to take up George Kennan’s pen have taken their best shot at drafting a one-size-fits-all “defense strategy” that addresses all of the threats we face. Many have attempted to articulate a strategy for how we will reconcile our national ends and means that can be summed up in a single word like “Containment,” but the security challenges we face today defy such Cold War era approaches. Recent strategies, moreover, have often degenerated into “laundry lists” of objectives with no real plan for how they will be achieved, much less where we will accept greater risks against some lower priority threats to reduce the risks from current adversaries and emerging rivals that pose the most significant threats to our vital interests. Having failed here, they cannot help but fail to provide a realistic estimate of the resources required to achieve these objectives. Strategies that have been offered in past QDRs, such as “Shape, Respond, Prepare” (1997); “Deter, Dissuade, Deter, Defeat” (2001); “Prevail, Prevent, Prepare, Preserve” (2010) had catchy titles, but lacked the conceptual “connective tissue” linking strategy to capabilities and plans in the form of meaningful guidance and prioritization about how to design, posture, and prepare our forces. As public documents, they also skirted awkward, undiplomatic, albeit necessary discussions, such as what we should do if friendly states collapse. Moreover, a bureaucratic process that tries to capture everything the Department does and address every challenge it faces within a single defense strategy inevitably leads to a simplistic, lowest common denominator result. Challenges as diverse as transnational terrorism, long-term strategic competitions with other great powers, volatility in key regions, nuclear proliferation, and cyber warfare each demand their own strategies. I would argue, therefore, that developing a coherent set of strategies, each tailored and differentiated for a particular challenge, would be preferable to attempting to craft a single defense strategy intended to address all of them.

Strategy development also has to explicitly take into account available resources. None of us want a strategy that is simply “budget-driven,” but neither can we responsibly craft a strategy that is unconstrained by resources. The crafting of a good strategy requires a sensible estimate of the resources likely to be available, which in turn should inform our strategic appetite. To draw from another historical example, Army planners in the years before World War II firmly believed their Service was woefully under-resourced. But they saw their task as formulating a strategy that could be executed at the current level of resourcing, rather than bemoaning their lack of funding. They crafted a modest strategy of hemispheric defense even as they perceived the clouds of war gathering in Europe and Asia. The planners recommended this limited strategy – consisting of a rudimentary “anti-access/area denial perimeter” around North America and the Caribbean to oppose the most formidable naval fleets in the world – believing that it was the extent of what the nation could afford at the time. However, they also assumed that if war broke out with Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, the nation would rapidly increase the resources available for national defense and that the Army and Navy would have to massively expand their power-projection capabilities. This would require a very different and far more expansive strategy, in which the Services would have to “digest” a massive inflow of resources and conduct an unprecedented mass mobilization of manpower and industry. Thus, they actually had to develop two very different strategies – one for the present and one they would keep in their hip pocket in the event of war – and they had to have a transition plan to shift from one to the other when the time came. To a large degree, strategy has mattered less for the United States since the end of the Cold War because we have enjoyed such a large margin of advantage economically and militarily over our rivals. But as those margins are reduced, strategy will matter far more, just as in the past.
Recalling the words of Lord Rutherford, “gentlemen we are out of money; now we must think.”

Historically, single individuals and small groups have tended to formulate the best strategies. Their details are classified to avoid signaling to adversaries how we intend to compete, deter, counter, or defeat them. They are also kept secret to avoid embarrassing our friendly foreign relations; sometimes we must hedge against friendly states failing, shifting sides, or not meeting their commitments. Frequently, good strategies are counter-intuitive and orthogonal; they defy expectations, while delivering surprise. They leverage nonobvious asymmetries in competitions and play on the propensities of competitors to entice them to follow their preferences to a point of excess that accentuates their vulnerabilities. Good strategies tend to exploit trends rather than trying to defy them.

Finally, strategy development should not be something that occurs in four-year increments but rather requires constant reappraisal as our estimates of situations change. Good strategy should be dynamic. The implementation of successful strategies also requires socialization across the military and interagency bureaucracies, with the Congress, defense industry, and with allies to achieve “buy-in” and sustain support for them over time.

II. Weighing Risks

The 2010 QDR accurately described the major factors in the international environment that could affect national security in the coming years and outlined a set of priority missions that built on the core tasks defined in the 2006 QDR. It failed, however, to foresee or address the most significant national security threats we face today: a stalling global economy, America’s own sluggish economic growth, and its unsustainable fiscal trajectory. Consequently, less than 18 months after the 2010 QDR report was issued, it was overtaken by the Budget Control Act and the specter of sequestration. America’s fiscal predicament and the prospect of more economic hard times ahead will undoubtedly dominate the upcoming QDR. Budgetary concerns have the potential to crowd out broader strategic considerations. Rather than making hard choices about what portions of the force should be maintained or expanded even as the overall size of the Defense pie shrinks, the danger is that the Department will simply choose the politically less painful option of across-the-board, “salami-slice” cuts to the force.

One of the tricky “risk balances” that the next QDR needs to get right is the balance between America’s sustained economic health and maintaining a strong national defense. Drastically cutting defense discretionary spending in an era of austerity could lead to a world in which the global commons of the high seas, skies, space, and cyberspace – so critical to our economic well-being – become far more vulnerable. Similarly, large-scale wars could become more probable, requiring even greater defense spending in the future. On the other hand, failing to take measures now to reduce our national debt over time as a percentage of our Gross National Product will only compound the fiscal problems our children will face and leave even fewer resources for our future defense. While DoD leaders should fight for every penny they can get to maintain a strong defense, there also needs to be a recognition that putting the United States on a path back to strong economic growth and fiscal rectitude is essential to sustain the country’s long-term military predominance.
The other key risk balance is related to the first: balancing between military preparations for current operations and future operations. There is a danger that in fiscal hard times, we will attempt to preserve near-term readiness (largely defined in terms of operations and maintenance spending) at the expense of longer-term readiness (defined more in terms of research, development, and procurement). Clearly, we must strike a balance to ensure that we preserve sufficient forces and capabilities to deal with today’s challenges and avoid hollowing out our forces, while also reshaping our forces and capabilities to meet the challenges of tomorrow. Although this debate is often portrayed as the “fighting-the-last-war” crowd versus the “next-war-itis” gang, the reality is that the major challenges facing the United States today are likely to be of an enduring character. Thus, I believe that the choice between preparing for current and future threats may be less stark. More accurately, we have to strike a balance between addressing challenges in the forms they take today while anticipating how they will evolve in the future.

III. Prioritizing Forces and Capabilities

Although it is impossible to predict the future, three key challenges are likely to persist and evolve over the next several decades.

- First, while al Qaida has been weakened through the intelligence, military, and law enforcement efforts of the United States and its partners in recent years, Islamist extremism has metastasized and new nodes have spawned in an ever-adapting global terrorist network.
- Second, as nascent nuclear powers grow their arsenals and aspirants like Iran continue to pursue nuclear capabilities, the threat of nuclear proliferation as well as the potential for actual use of nuclear weapons will increase.
- Third, a number of countries are fielding anti-access and area-denial capabilities including ballistic and cruise missiles, attack submarines, advanced fighter aircraft, and sophisticated air defense, as well as robust cyber warfare capabilities that will challenge the U.S. military’s ability to conduct power-projection operations in vital theaters and could be used to hold at risk our critical infrastructure at home.

The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance accurately captured these challenges, but fell short of aligning the Department’s program — defined as the forces and capabilities it will need to develop, field, and sustain — with them. The upcoming QDR offers an opportunity to better align the Department’s program with the guidance. The challenges and top missions outlined in that guidance remain a good filter for establishing what the Department’s priorities should be in an era of austerity.

The major decisions taken by the Secretaries of Defense over the past several years appear to take this approach, although more work remains to be done. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates appears to have used such a filter in January 2011 when he announced cuts in defense spending and the cancellation of a number of defense programs, while at the same time calling for expanding or initiating a number of new programs including long-range, nuclear-capable bombers, sea-based unmanned surveillance and strike aircraft, and electronic jammers to enhance the survivability of
U.S. forces. Building on Gates’ decisions and even in the shadow of the sequestration threat, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has called for an enhanced Virginia-class submarine with a new payload module to greatly increase the number of weapons each platform can carry, advanced U.S. cyber capabilities, and improved precision weapons. Outside analyses, including one conducted last year by CSBA that brought together diverse teams of defense analysts, Congressional staff, former government officials, and retired military officers in exercises to rebalance DoD’s program assuming sequestration-level cuts over the next decade, tend to confirm the strategic direction Secretary Gates and Panetta set out.

The key security challenges we face and the priority missions outlined in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance place a premium, in particular, on highly distributed, autonomous, and low-signature forces capable of operating independently, far forward in denied areas. Such forces and capabilities will need to be far less dependent on vulnerable forward bases but vastly more effective operating in non-permissive environments where adversaries will contest our air forces, jam our communications, and blind our sensors and command and control. Accordingly, among the highest capability priorities for countering terrorism, eliminating WMD, or projecting power into anti-access zones will be:

- Special operations forces for both direct action and indirect efforts to enable foreign security partner forces;
- Submarines with greater strike capacity, larger unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), advanced mines, and the ability to communicate at depth;
- Land and sea-based long-range, air-refuelable, unmanned stealth aircraft for surveillance, kinetic strike, and non-kinetic electronic attack;
- Deeper inventories of stand-off precision munitions that can overcome modern air defenses and electronic countermeasures, as well as more powerful air-delivered conventional weapons for holding deep underground facilities at risk;
- More survivable and/or resilient, space-based precision, navigation and timing (PNT), intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and secure satellite communications (SATCOM) to enable operations; and
- Non-kinetic cyber, electronic warfare, and directed energy capabilities to achieve both lethal and non-lethal effects.

Combinations of such access-insensitive forces and capabilities are likely to be the spearhead of future campaigns against terrorists, WMD powers, and adversaries possessing robust anti-access networks. As DoD aligns its program with the challenges and missions outlined in the Defense Strategic Guidance and continues to improve the

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3 Mark Gonskowski and Todd Harrison, Strategic Choices: Navigating Anxiety (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, November 2012).
ability of U.S. forces to operate in contested environments, these conventional and special operations “crown jewel” capabilities – coupled with a robust nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist in this world – should become more central in the American military, especially in an era of declining resources.

IV. Reformulating the Force Planning Construct

Another major component of every QDR is the development of a so-called “force planning construct” which provides guidance for determining what kinds of forces will be needed in the future, and their size. The reality is that QDR force planning constructs have had very little practical effect on shaping forces. To all intents and purposes, the force structure outlined in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review remains the force structure blueprint of the Department to this day. Where the force is smaller, it has largely been the result of budgetary pressures and the retirement of older ships and aircraft, rather than any conscious effort made during QDRs. The modest exceptions to this are the substantial increases in Special Operations Forces, as directed by the 2006 QDR, and subsequent increases in support forces (e.g., intelligence, logistics, and rotary wing aviation) to enable them, as directed by the 2010 QDR.

Across the last two administrations, DoD leaders have also struggled to move beyond the canonical “two regional war” construct that was first outlined in the 1993 Bottom Up Review. Each QDR has offered what it claimed was a shift from the “two war” construct. Nevertheless, because decision makers across multiple administrations have seen value in maintaining the principle of “concurrency” – defined as the ability to deal with multiple threats simultaneously – they have been loath to adopt more innovative alternatives that might facilitate greater changes in defense.

I support the principle of concurrency and believe it is the sine qua non for a military superpower with global commitments. Relinquishing the ability to fight multiple wars could invite collusion between potential adversaries as they try to stretch our resources thin responding to multiple crises for which we are ill-prepared. At the same time, however, maintaining the forces and capabilities to fight multiple combined arms campaigns similar to Operation Desert Storm or Operation Iraqi Freedom over-optimizes our forces for a particular type of war while leaving our forces less prepared for a wider range of contingencies. It would be prudent, therefore, to accelerate the shift away from preparing to conduct multiple, traditional land combat-centric campaigns (focused on invasion/counter-invasion scenarios), toward a new set of scenarios to inform the shaping and sizing of U.S. forces. Specifically, any future force planning construct should ensure sufficient U.S. forces and capabilities to:

- Eliminate or secure a hostile power’s WMD and delivery means should its government threaten to use those capabilities against the United States or its allies, or should it lose control of its WMD arsenal during the collapse of the state or civil war.
- Wage a long-term strategic competition with cost-imposing measures short of war against rising military powers and prevent their domination of critical regions, limit their ability to coerce neighbors and, be prepared to deny their military objectives and ability to project power. The latter may be accomplished
in part by encouraging U.S. allies and partners to build their own anti-access/area denial capabilities.

- Deter or punish “second mover” aggression. The United States should anticipate that if it must fight a war in one region, it must maintain sufficient global strike capabilities – including special operations forces, cyber, conventional, and nuclear – to deter opportunistic aggression or coercion by third parties elsewhere by holding out the prospect of swift and devastating punitive attacks and/or the denial of their military objectives.

V. Conclusion

Given both the fiscal and external security challenges facing the nation, the upcoming QDR could be the most consequential of the last two decades. However, a “business as usual” approach in the QDR is unlikely to lead to the major changes in our forces and capabilities that are needed. The new Secretary of Defense with the Joint Chiefs would do well to agree up front on the major trades and decisions the QDR should make before drafting Terms of Reference for the QDR. The classified Terms of Reference should then outline concepts that explain how U.S. forces should address the most pressing security challenges (rather than trying to define a single defense strategy). It should also identify highest priority capabilities and offer a new planning construct at the start of the process, thereby allowing the review to focus on the implementation and alignment details. Such an approach would also minimize the risk of a protracted strategy debate. Among the most critical issues DoD will face, is the choice between pursuing a smaller version of today’s force or a rebalanced force that better aligns DoD’s programs with the critical challenges it faces and its priority missions. To preserve the country’s military edge in austere times, I believe DoD has no choice but to aggressively rebalance its portfolio of capabilities. It will need to prioritize those capabilities that perform best in contested operating environments, while divesting those that depend on relatively benign operating conditions. Finally, it is worth bearing in mind that the upcoming QDR will have far less margin for error than previous reviews. Given the bleak fiscal outlook, we will likely be stuck with the force that results from the upcoming review for decades to come, for better or worse.

About the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) is an independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, security policy and resource allocation. CSBA provides timely, impartial and insightful analyses to senior decision makers in the executive and legislative branches, as well as to the media and the broader national security community. CSBA encourages thoughtful participation in the development of national security strategy and policy, and in the allocation of scarce human and capital resources. CSBA’s analysis and outreach focus on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to US national security. Meeting these challenges will require transforming the national security establishment, and we are devoted to helping achieve this end.
Jim Thomas
Vice President and Director of Studies

Areas of Expertise
Strategy, Future Warfare, Concept Development, Defense Planning, Political-Military Relations

Biography
Jim Thomas is Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He oversees CSBA’s research programs and directs the Strategic and Budget Studies staff.

Prior to joining CSBA, he was Vice President of Applied Minds, Inc., a private research and development company specializing in rapid, interdisciplinary technology prototyping. Before that, Jim served for thirteen years in a variety of policy, planning and resource analysis posts in the Department of Defense, culminating in his dual appointment as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Resources and Plans and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy. In these capacities, he was responsible for the development of the Defense Strategy, conventional force planning, resource assessment, and the oversight of war plans. He spearheaded the 2005-2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and was the principal author of the QDR report to Congress.

Jim began his career in national security at Los Alamos National Laboratory, analyzing foreign technological lessons learned from the first Gulf War. After serving as research assistant to Ambassador Paul H. Nitze, Jim joined the Department of Defense as a Presidential Management Intern in 1993 and undertook developmental management assignments across the Department of Defense over the next two years. From 1995 to 1998, he managed a NATO counterproliferation
initiative and wrote three reports endorsed by allied foreign and defense ministers to integrate countering-WMD as a mission area into NATO post-Cold War force planning. From 1998 to 1999, he was seconded to the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, where he wrote *Adelphi Paper 333, The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). From 1999 to 2001, Jim worked in the Secretary of Defense’s Strategy Office, playing a lead role developing the defense strategy and force planning construct for the 2001 QDR. From 2001 to 2003, he served as Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. He was promoted to the Senior Executive Service in 2003.

Jim received the Department of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service in 1997 for his work at NATO, and the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, the department’s highest civilian award, in 2006 for his strategy work.

Jim is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He holds a B.A. with high honors from the College of William and Mary, an M.A. from the University of Virginia and an M.A. from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.

A former Naval reserve officer, Jim attained the rank of lieutenant commander.
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Witness name: James P. Thomas

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

- Individual
- X Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA)

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DOD Acquisition
Directorate
National Defense University
$84,000
Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellows Program Orientation

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WHS DOD/ONA $1,800,000 Assessments/analysis, wargames, and briefings on international security environment, strategic challenges, future warfare, and portfolio rebalancing.

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CTTSO SETA OASD (SO/LIC) $551,000 Future requirements and visioning.

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Fiscal year 2012: 3
Fiscal year 2011: 3
Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2013): 2 contracts;
Fiscal year 2012: 2 contracts;
Fiscal year 2011: 3 contracts.

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2013): Research and analysis;
Fiscal year 2012: Research and analysis;
Fiscal year 2011: Research and analysis.

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2013): $1,284,000
Fiscal year 2012: $2,431,000
Fiscal year 2011: $2,470,000.
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Fiscal year 2011: _________________________________.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

February 26, 2013
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Thomas mentioned the Red Team as playing an important role in the 2006 QDR, and participated in the 2010 external Red Team. Do you think an external Red Team should be part of the process for the 2014 QDR, and do you have any sense as to whether one will be in place?

Mr. BRIMLEY. Given the scale of the challenges facing the Department and Congress in working through the current fiscal environment to make smart, prudent, and pragmatic defense choices, it is right and proper to leverage a Red Team process to help those working the QDR produce the best possible product. It will be important for any red team effort to not attempt to develop an alternative QDR or to get in the way of the QDR Independent Panel. I would suggest that Congress request that the Secretary of Defense establish a QDR Red Team that shall be exposed to the initial QDR conclusions in the July/August 2014 timeframe, with the goal of reporting to the Secretary of Defense no later than October 31, 2013, in order to ensure that the conclusions of the team are received in time to be influential to the end-game of the formal QDR process. This timing also ensures that the red team will not get in the way of the assessment of the QDR Independent Panel, which will report after the QDR is released in February 2014. I do not believe a formal QDR Red Team has yet been established by the Secretary of Defense.

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Brimley, I’m very concerned with personnel and healthcare costs at the Department of Defense, and was struck by your comment that the QDR must also look at these costs. Most of the concerns we’ve heard about the QDR is that it’s not sufficiently engaged in strategic thinking, why do you argue that the QDR is the right forum to develop a strategy for addressing these costs?

Mr. BRIMLEY. It may well be the case that the QDR is not the right forum to develop a strategy for addressing the spiraling cost of personnel and healthcare costs, but I am concerned that it is possible that no other forum currently exists that is structurally important enough to signal real change. I believe that the essence of strategic planning is understanding where you are, where you are likely to go given current trends, and making informed choices about how to navigate into the future. If the QDR process does not include any references to, or assumptions about, the projected costs of military personnel and healthcare than any discussion about levels of investment with respect to military capabilities would be fundamentally ignorant and nearly useless for the Secretary of Defense and for Congress. So whether it is the QDR, the current Strategic Choices and Management Review, or some other high-level forum, it is critical that the underlying cost drivers for the Department of Defense be fully exposed to scrutiny in order to have a meaningful conversation about the sustainability of U.S. defense strategy.

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Dr. DUECK. I do think a “red team” should be part of the process for the 2014 QDR. Such an independent assessment from the outside helps to test the assumptions behind the QDR and in the end makes them stronger. In 2010, for example, there was an Independent Panel for the QDR that year, a genuinely bipartisan panel, that made good recommendations across a range of areas and actually anticipated certain policies such as the administration’s strategic pivot to Asia. Congress has mandated that a similar independent panel, the National Defense Panel, provide independent assessment of the upcoming QDR 2014, and a number of excellent appointments have already been made to that panel by members from both parties. I believe the National Defense Panel will play an indispensable role in the 2014 QDR process.

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Mr. THOMAS. Yes, I believe that a Red Team should [be] part of the 2014 QDR. It should be composed of a group of distinguished civilians and retired senior mili-
tary officers with reputations for challenging the status quo. They should be unencumbered from normal bureaucratic concerns. However, the aim should NOT be to create a bi-partisan group like the National Defense Panel that offers its own independent assessment of the security environment and the strategy. Rather, the Red Team should be to bring together a group of apolitical strategy and force planning experts (thus avoiding the typical bipartisan commission result of “splitting the difference,” that removes any sharp edges from their recommendations and is more likely to maintain the status quo) to advise and assist the Secretary of Defense.

The Red Team’s mandate should be to consider how best to align the defense program with the Secretary of Defense’s strategic guidance. The Red Team should make its recommendations directly to the Secretary of Defense, free from requirements to coordinate or staff their findings. To maximize its effectiveness, the chairman and executive director of the Red Team should be granted accesses to all Department Special Access Programs. The Red Team’s findings should be classified.

I am not aware that the Secretary of Defense has made any decision to establish a Red Team for the upcoming QDR.