THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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CONTENTs

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2013

HEARING:
Wednesday, February 27, 2013, The Role of Intelligence in the Department of Defense .............................................. 1

APPENDIX:
Wednesday, February 27, 2013 ................................................................. 9

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2013
THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities 8
Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities ...................... 1

WITNESSES
Flynn, LTG Michael T., USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency .......... 5
Vickers, Dr. Michael G., Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, U.S. Department of Defense ....................................................... 2

APPENDIX
PREPARED STATEMENTS:
Vickers, Dr. Michael G., joint with LTG Michael T. Flynn ......................... 13

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
[There were no Documents submitted.]

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES,  
Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 27, 2013.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:05 p.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mac Thornberry (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

Mr. THORNBERRY. The subcommittee will come to order. And let me thank the witnesses and guests for your patience, as we have had votes that went on longer than expected. The other administrative note is that Mr. Langevin is on his way and will be here momentarily. But I want to go ahead and begin the hearing, and whenever he arrives, before or after, we will give him the opportunity to make his opening statement.

I want to welcome members, witnesses, and guests to this hearing on the role of intelligence in the Department of Defense [DOD]. I suspect our witnesses will agree that the central role of intelligence is growing rapidly for our warfighters and for the Nation as a whole in an increasingly complex, fast-changing world. And as one of our witnesses testified at our last hearing, today there is no part of the world that we can ignore. Clause 1(c) of rule X of the House rules place responsibility on the House Armed Services Committee for, quote, “tactical intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Department of Defense,” end quote.

While the overall committee has always followed these issues closely, Chairman McKeon decided this year that we should focus more closely on the array of military intelligence issues. The committee rules now assign this subcommittee with responsibility for intelligence policy, including coordination of military intelligence programs, national intelligence programs, and DOD elements that are part of the Intelligence Community.

The fact that Mr. Langevin, Chairman Miller, Dr. Heck, and I also serve on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence helps ensure that Congress fulfills its responsibilities to the American people in conducting independent oversight and in making budgetary decisions on these crucial programs and agencies.

Having responsibility for military intelligence, science and technology, special operations, cyber, and counter-weapons of mass de-
struction [WMD] helps give this subcommittee a broad and more integrated picture of many of the most challenging national security issues facing our Nation. Of course, these capabilities are some of those that we would undoubtedly rely upon in meeting some of the threats that arise, but they are also some of the capabilities that can help identify and prevent threats before they arise. Having both intelligence oversight and operational oversight enables us to have a more complete view of all that faces our warfighters.

Today we want to look at the role intelligence plays in the Department of Defense. A primary focus for us will always be whether and how DOD intelligence is meeting the needs of the warfighters, wherever they are and whatever they may be asked to do. We also want to examine DOD’s current intelligence requirements, including gaps in our knowledge and capabilities, integration of intelligence with military planning, organization and personnel issues, as well as DOD support to and from the broader Intelligence Community.

We all, on both sides of the river, have our hands full. As the witnesses note in their written statement, intelligence budgets are declining even before the across-the-board cuts known as sequestration begin on Friday. But the world is not getting any safer. It is not getting any less complex. We have limited resources, but unlimited problems. That is part of what makes intelligence so crucial.

More than ever, I think it is essential that the administration and those in uniform work together with us in Congress to use our resources as efficiently and as effectively as possible. And I look forward to working with both of our distinguished witnesses toward that goal.

At this point, we will turn for the opening statements of our distinguished witnesses, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence [USD(I)], Michael G. Vickers, and the Director of Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA], Lieutenant General Michael Flynn. And then, as I say, when Mr. Langevin gets here, we will have his opening statement.

Dr. Vickers.

STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL G. VICKERS, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Secretary VICKERS. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry and distinguished members of the committee. General Flynn and I are pleased to appear before you today to discuss the importance of intelligence within the Department of Defense.

The unclassified nature of the opening portion of this hearing precludes us from discussing in detail many aspects of Defense Intelligence, as well as sharing some of our greatest successes. We welcome the opportunity to meet in closed session to fully discuss Defense Intelligence capabilities and contributions with you.

Before I discuss the importance of Defense Intelligence in achieving our national security objective, I would like to review some of our most pressing national security challenges.

First and foremost, we seek nothing less than the strategic defeat of Al Qaeda—dismantling and defeating core Al Qaeda in the
Pakistan-Afghanistan region, defeating its affiliates on the Arabian Peninsula, in Iraq and Syria, and in East and North Africa, and preventing the group from reconstituting.

Second, we must successfully transition our mission in Afghanistan.

Third, as the Arab world undergoes a historic transition, we must posture ourselves for the new normal that brings with it increased instability and violence, and we must accelerate the transition to a representative government in Syria.

Fourth, we must prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated delivery systems, specifically, but not exclusively, with regard to Iran and North Korea.

Fifth, we must defend against cyber threats.

Sixth, we must deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression and ensure our continued access to the global commons and to critical regions such as East Asia. To be successful in this effort, we must be able to counter rapidly evolving anti-access/aerial denial threats.

Seventh, we must ensure that we continue to provide decisive intelligence and decision advantage to our national policymakers, and our operators and warfighters, and that we are postured to prevent strategic surprise.

Finally, we must ensure the continued economic leadership of the United States. This is the foundation upon which our long-term national security rests.

At the same time as our intelligence and defense budgets are declining, the challenges, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, are increasing and becoming more complex. Intelligence is a major source of U.S. advantage. It informs wise policy and it enables precision operations. It is our front line of defense.

The continued war against Al Qaeda and instability in the Middle East and North Africa requires us to continue to enhance our counterterrorism capabilities. Our national security strategy in Asia will require significantly different investments over the next 15 years in order to obtain the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities most appropriate to the unique challenges of ensuring access in the Pacific.

Likewise, countering cyber threats and nuclear proliferation requires new resources, as well as new ways of operating. We are also improving our human intelligence capability by implementing the Defense Clandestine Service. Lastly, critical intelligence capability, such as our overhead and cryptologic architectures, continue to require modernization and recapitalization. Budgetary instability and the prospect of further deep cuts put these investments at risk.

Defense Intelligence is comprised of the DOD organizations, infrastructures, and measures of intelligence and counterintelligence components of the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, the military services, the three combat support agencies, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency [NSA], and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency [NGIA], and the National Reconnaissance Office [NRO]. I also exercise oversight of the security elements of the Department of Defense, including the Defense Security Service [DSS].
Defense Intelligence has just under 60,000 civilians and 123,000 military members supporting our national military intelligence missions both here at home and alongside our combat forces worldwide. Defense Intelligence partners at all levels with our counterparts in the broader Intelligence Community [IC], including the Director of National Intelligence [DNI], the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], Department of Homeland Security [DHS], Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], and numerous other elements.

Under Titles 10 and 50 of the United States Code, the Secretary of Defense has broad policy and budgetary responsibility for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities conducted by DOD components and personnel. In addition, under Title 50, the Secretary has several specific statutory responsibilities for elements of the IC that are part of DOD, including DIA, NGA, NSA, and the NRO.

Consistent with the DNI statutory responsibilities, the Secretary is responsible for the continued operation of those elements as effective organizations for the conduct of their missions in order to satisfy DOD and IC requirements. Congress established the position of USD(I) in fiscal year 2003, enabling DOD to strengthen its management of Defense Intelligence. As the USD(I), I am the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary regarding intelligence, counterintelligence, and security matters, and to that end, I exercise his authority, direction, and control over the defense agencies and DOD field activities that are defense intelligence, counterintelligence [CI], or security components.

I am also dual-hatted as the Director of Defense Intelligence in the office of the DNI. The DNI and Secretary of Defense jointly established this position in 2007 to ensure the integration, collaboration, and information sharing between our two organizations.

My close relationship with Director Clapper, himself a former USD(I) and someone intimately familiar with Defense Intelligence, enable us to work together seamlessly to manage resources in pursuit of our national security objective. We each manage our respective resource portfolios. The DNI executes the National Intelligence Program [NIP]. I execute the Military Intelligence Program [MIP].

To characterize the relative scale of our portfolios in the fiscal 2013 President's budget request, the NIP totaled $52.6 billion compared to $19.2 billion request to fund the MIP. DOD MIP funds intelligence, CI, and intelligence-related programs, projects, and activities that provide capabilities to effectively meet warfighter operational and tactical requirements. I also oversee the Department's broader Battlespace Awareness Portfolio, which includes the NIP, intelligence-related special access programs, and other intelligence-related activities.

Let me close, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, by thanking you for your support for Defense Intelligence. I am committed to working with the Congress and this subcommittee in its new responsibility to find the best way to continue to deliver intelligence advantage to our Nation, and I look forward to your questions.

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Vickers and General Flynn can be found in the Appendix on page 13.]

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Dr. Vickers.
General Flynn.

STATEMENT OF LTG MICHAEL T. FLYNN, USA, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

General Flynn. Good afternoon, Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin and distinguished members of this committee. Thanks for the opportunity to discuss the Defense Intelligence Agency and our contributions to the Department of Defense. I have been the director of DIA now for 7 months and I cannot over-emphasize how proud I am to serve our Nation in this capacity.

As our defense strategy highlights, our Nation is at a moment of transition. The global security environment presents increasingly complex challenges and a growing list of threats and adversaries. The demands on the U.S. intelligence system have skyrocketed in recent years and these demands are only expected to increase.

That said, DIA's mission is to prevent strategic surprise by providing our warfighters and our national security leaders the best intelligence available on foreign nation-state military capabilities and military-like capabilities of non-nation-state actors, as well as their intentions. With over 16,000 employees in 262 locations around the world, including 142 countries and 31 U.S. States, I believe DIA is well postured to accomplish that mission.

Our workforce boasts an impressive range of skills necessary to accomplish our mission. For instance, over 5,000 of our men and women have served on one or more deployments in combat zones in Iraq and Afghanistan, and more than 550 employees currently are deployed in theater today. Additionally, over 50 percent of DIA's employees are assigned outside of Washington, DC. DIA people have proficiency in 54 languages with more than 500 employees who speak a critical language, and we are planning to further expand our language capacity in the coming years.

DIA's mission breaks down into two essential tasks, collection and analysis, and I would like to begin by outlining our collection capabilities first. As Director of DIA, I serve as the Defense Collection Manager, so I ensure that the agency provides robust intelligence collection requirements management that helps drive our collection in all-source analysis missions. Much of this activity is in direct support of our combatant commands and our service intelligence centers.

These responsibilities include planning and assessing the Defense Department's intelligence collection requirements, managing the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of the Department, and ensuring the professionalization of the collection management career field. In addition to managing intelligence requirements, our specific collection operational capabilities fall into two categories. First is our human intelligence, counterintelligence, and Defense Attaché System. And second is our measurement and signature intelligence collection capabilities.

DIA gains vital information from our highly specialized overt and clandestine human intelligence [HUMINT] activities. DIA manages the Defense Clandestine Service, which leverages our unique military access and proficiencies to fulfill defense and national level intelligence requirements in a fully integrated operational environment with our interagency partners.
DIA also manages the Defense Attaché System, which trains, directs, and supports U.S. military attachés assigned to U.S. embassies or consulates in 139 countries around the world. These talented attachés work for the U.S. ambassador as members of the country team and coordinate military activities with the host nation's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and DOD equivalents.

Further, in close coordination with the Defense Clandestine Service and the Defense Attaché System, DIA's counterintelligence professionals identify and neutralize threats posed by hostile foreign intelligence and terrorist groups. As Director of DIA, I am also the Defense Department HUMINT and CI manager. In this management capacity, DIA leads, directs, and centrally manages the worldwide defense HUMINT and CI enterprise by ensuring that properly trained HUMINT and CI professionals, fully integrated across the defense and national HUMINT and CI communities, coordinate and deconflict their efforts to best support defense and national intelligence collection requirements.

Second is our measurement and signature collection capability. DIA is responsible for managing the policy, requirements, and standards for this vital national intelligence mission. Measurement and signature intelligence [MASINT] capabilities primarily identify, measure, and track the unique signatures or attributes of all foreign military equipment and chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Aside from this core responsibility, DIA's technical collectors also use other techniques, such as biometrics, forensics, and document and media exploitation, to satisfy tactical to strategic intelligence requirements. While collection is a vital component of what we do, the foundation of DIA's mission is to provide all-source defense intelligence analysis in support of our warfighters, our military services, our Joint Staff, and our Nation's policymakers.

Regardless of its source, whether it comes from open source or a Twitter feed, from an agent inside a terrorist group or a scientist abroad, from biometric data or a chemical signature left behind after a weapons test, or from overhead imagery or a cyber attack, DIA collects, analyzes, processes, and disseminates to our customers all-source analysis assessments and key judgments, painting as clear a picture as possible, enabling leaders at all levels to make better, more informed decisions.

We are continuously seeking ways to apply the right mix of classified and open-source information that identifies future national security challenges and threats, and the people, trends, movements, ideologies, and social phenomena fueling them. From feedback received across our customer base that I stated above, to include our law enforcement partners and allied and coalition partners, what our analysts produce provides these customers, especially our troops in harm's way, a more decisive advantage in today's increasingly complex national security environment. That is our litmus test for judging our performance.

As we transition from a decade of war and hard-won lessons learned, DIA is building on the best practices we have learned since September 11, 2001. Principally, we are focusing on the integration and fusion of intelligence and operations and the success of applying the full range of intelligence capabilities, such as HUMINT, signals intelligence [SIGINT], geospatial and cyber,
against some of the hardest targets we face, whether those are state or non-state actors. This all must be done in close collaboration with our Intelligence Community and interagency partners, as well as our foreign partners.

These two essential tasks, collection and analysis, represent critical components in our Nation’s arsenal of intelligence weapons and are increasingly in demand during these very uncertain times. Because of the pace of events and this growing uncertainty, we find ourselves in an era where strategic warning cycles and timelines are much faster than they were even 5 years ago. So in all that we do, we must operate at our customers’ speed and inside their decisionmaking cycles, no matter the time zone.

To this end, my goal for DIA is simple: We will remain the best defense intelligence agency in the world and continue to provide world-class intelligence support to those men and women willing to sacrifice for this country. To do so, we must continue to carefully recruit, retain, and manage the talent that represents our Nation’s national security future. This is vital.

Before I conclude, I would like to take this opportunity to mention the impact that sequestration will potentially have on DIA. First, I am in complete agreement with Under Secretary Vickers and his complete statement, and I hope I have made clear that DIA is about putting our people first. We cannot accomplish our mission without the men and women who serve this Nation so well. The impact sequestration will have on an organization which depends on human resources for its capability is astoundingly complex and far-reaching. There is a geometric impact which includes not only the cost of lost opportunity, but also the cost of rebuilding the capability that we stand to lose.

What we cannot predict is the real impact on national security of that lost capability. If we think that our adversaries will use this time to take a strategic pause or that we will somehow manage to stay ahead of the most potentially catastrophic intelligence issues while opting to take cuts against the low-threat areas, then we are deluding ourselves. The real cost of this action is in public insecurity and potential strategic surprise.

Since it is very difficult to prove a negative, there is no way to know what we will have missed, nor to appreciate the cost of that missing intelligence. At best, we may never know what key intelligence we have missed as a result of sequestration. At worst, I fear we may find ourselves rehashing another major intelligence failure.

Above all else, what defines DIA is the value our people bring to our operating forces, our Nation’s military, and national security leaders, as well as our coalition and foreign partners who depend on our capabilities. Speaking truth to power is critical during these uncertain times and no other standard is more important. Thank you all for your service to our Nation, and I look forward to the questions in closed session.

[The joint prepared statement of General Flynn and Secretary Vickers can be found in the Appendix on page 13.]

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.

I would yield to the distinguished ranking member for any comments he would like to make.
Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize for running behind schedule. I had to speak on the floor just before this hearing started. So first of all I want to welcome our witnesses, Secretary Vickers and General Flynn.

Thank you for your testimony. I certainly look forward to hearing more and getting into the questions and answers.

Most especially, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing. As you are well aware, the Intelligence Community is an issue that is of great interest to me, as it is to you, and of great importance to this committee and to the Congress. And I am certainly pleased that this subcommittee now has jurisdiction over intelligence policy within the Department of Defense because, like the gentleman from Texas, I also have the benefit of examining intelligence matters from my position on the Select Committee on Intelligence. So it provides great crossover.

I certainly look forward to working with the gentleman to ensure that our intelligence efforts and resourcing are harmonized between the two committees, particularly with regard to the provision of timely and accurate intelligence to decisionmakers, the defeat of Al Qaeda and its affiliates, and the new geopolitical challenges that we face across the globe, and the burgeoning field also of cybersecurity.

It is my goal to make sure that our Intelligence Community is properly resourced between the MIP and the NIP and that, wherever possible, it is well coordinated, but also, when necessary, deconflicted.

So with that, in the interest of brevity and maximizing the utility of our time today, I would yield back so that we can proceed with the classified component of this hearing, but I would be remiss if I didn't first again welcome the panel, Under Secretary Vickers and Lieutenant General Flynn, who I might mention is a fellow Rhode Islander.

And great to have you both here, and I certainly look forward to our continued work together as we work to move forward.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. THORNBERRY. I thank the gentleman.

And with that, the open portion of this hearing is adjourned, and we will reconvene immediately next door in closed classified session.

[Whereupon, at 4:28 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in closed session.]
Statement for the Record

Dr. Michael G. Vickers
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
And
LTG Michael T. Flynn
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Before the House Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities

27 Feb 2013
INTRODUCTION

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, LTG Flynn and I are pleased to appear before you today to discuss the importance of intelligence within the Department of Defense. The unclassified nature of this statement precludes us from discussing in detail many aspects of Defense Intelligence, as well as sharing some of our greatest successes. We welcome the opportunity to meet in closed session to fully discuss Defense Intelligence capabilities and contributions with you.

THE IMPORTANCE OF INTELLIGENCE IN DOD

Before I discuss the importance of Defense Intelligence in achieving our national security objectives, I would like to review some of our most pressing national security challenges. First and foremost, we seek nothing less than the strategic defeat of al-Qa’ida—dismantling and defeating core al-Qa’ida in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region, defeating its affiliates on the Arabian Peninsula, in Iraq and Syria, and in East and North Africa, and preventing the group from reconstituting. Second, we must successfully transition our mission in Afghanistan. Third, as the Arab world undergoes a historic transition, we must posture ourselves for the “new normal” that brings with it increased instability and violence and we must accelerate the transition to a representative government in Syria. Fourth, we must prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated delivery systems, specifically with regard to Iran and North Korea. Fifth, we must defend against cyber threats. Sixth, we must deter and defeat aggression, ensuring our continued access to the global commons, and to critical regions such as
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East Asia. To be successful in this effort, we must be able to counter rapidly evolving anti-access/area denial threats. Seventh, we must ensure that we continue to provide decisive intelligence and decision advantage to national policy makers and our operators, and that we are postured to prevent strategic surprise. Finally, we must ensure the continued economic leadership of the United States—this is the foundation upon which our long-term national security rests.

At the same time as our intelligence and defense budgets are declining, the challenges we face are increasing and becoming more complex. Intelligence is a major source of U.S. advantage. It informs wise policy and enables precision operations. It is our front line of defense. The continued war against al-Qa’ida and the instability in the Middle East and North Africa requires us to continue to enhance our counter-terrorism capabilities. Our national security strategy in Asia will require significantly different investments over the next 15 years in order to obtain the Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities most appropriate to the unique challenge of ensuring access in the Pacific. Likewise, countering cyber threats and nuclear proliferation requires new resources as well as new ways of operating. We also are improving our human intelligence capabilities by implementing our Defense Clandestine Service. Lastly, critical intelligence capabilities such as our overhead and cryptologic architectures continue to require recapitalization and modernization. Budgetary instability and the prospect of further deep cuts put these investments at risk.
HOW DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE IS STRUCTURED

Defense Intelligence is comprised of the DoD organizations, infrastructure, and measures of the intelligence and counter-intelligence components of the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands (COCOMs), the military services, the three Combat Support Agencies (CSAs) (Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency), the National Reconnaissance Office. Defense Intelligence has just under 60,000 civilians and 123,000 military members supporting our national and military intelligence missions, both here at home and alongside our combat forces worldwide.

Defense Intelligence partners at all levels with our counterparts in the broader Intelligence Community (IC), including the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and numerous other elements.

Defense Intelligence consists of the following intelligence and counter-intelligence elements:

- **Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA):** The DIA mission is to satisfy the military intelligence requirements of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and the DNI. DIA provides the military intelligence contribution to national foreign intelligence and CI. The Director, DIA, serves as the Defense Collection Manager, operates the Joint Staff Intelligence Directorate (J-2) in support of the Secretary and CJCS, and is the Functional Manager for Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) as well as Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT), including the Defense Clandestine Service (DCS).
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- **National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS):** NSA is the U.S. government lead for cryptology, and its mission encompasses both Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and information assurance (IA) activities. As the Functional Manager for SIGINT, the Director, NSA, serves as the principal SIGINT and IA advisor to the Secretary, CICS, COCOMs, Secretaries of the military services, and the DNI. The Director also serves as Chief of the CSS, which is comprised of the military elements conducting SIGINT and other cryptologic operations. Lastly, the Director is dual-hatted as Commander, USCYBERCOM, ensuring DoD’s ability to operate effectively in cyberspace.

- **National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA):** NGA provides geospatial intelligence in support of U.S. national security objectives to DoD, the IC, and other federal entities. It also provides GEOINT for both safety of navigation and combat support for U.S. & allied forces. The Director, NGA, serves as the program manager for the National Geospatial Intelligence Program and the Functional Manager for the National System for Geospatial Intelligence.

- **National Reconnaissance Office (NRO):** The NRO is responsible for the research, development, acquisition, launch and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems to collect intelligence and information in support of national and DoD missions. Jointly staffed by the DoD and the CIA, NRO-provided capabilities empower the CSAs to accomplish their missions. The Director, NRO, serves as the principal advisor for overhead reconnaissance.

- **Army Intelligence:** Led by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G-2), Army military intelligence (MI) soldiers and sensors provide a full-spectrum intelligence capability to support Army efforts ranging from irregular warfare to major combat operations. Organic MI units are embedded in every Army echelon from tactical maneuver elements to theater headquarters. Example components include the Army’s Intelligence and Security Command
(INSCOM), a major command that conducts multi-discipline and all-source intelligence operations, and the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), which produces and disseminates all-source intelligence on foreign nation-state and irregular ground forces.

- **Navy Intelligence**: Led by the Director of Naval Intelligence/Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance (DCNO N2/N6), Navy Intelligence ensures a deep understanding of the maritime domain, including forward presence, maritime security, humanitarian assistance & disaster relief, power projection, sea control, and deterrence, providing decision advantage for Navy and Joint warfighters. Naval Intelligence also includes the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Fleet Intelligence Office, and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service.

- **Marine Corps Intelligence**: Led by the Director of Intelligence, the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) has service staff responsibility for ISR, GEOINT, advanced geospatial intelligence, SIGINT, HUMINT, MASINT, and CI for Marine Corps units.

- **Air Force Intelligence**: The Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for ISR (AF/A2) is responsible for end-to-end functional management of all Air Force ISR capabilities in the air and space domains. Two field operating agencies report to the AF/A2: the Air Force Intelligence Analysis Agency (AFI AA), and the Air Force ISR Agency (AFISRA), the latter organization also overseeing the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC).

Additionally, the USD(I) exercises oversight of the security elements of the Department of Defense, including the Defense Security Service:

- **Defense Security Service (DSS)**: The DSS administers the National Industrial Security Program (NISP) on behalf of DoD and 23 other federal agencies, as well as overseeing approximately 13,000 contractor facilities cleared for access to classified information.
addition to security, DSS provides the U.S. cleared industrial base with counterintelligence support to protect classified information.

MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE

Under Titles 10 and 50 of the United States Code, the Secretary of Defense has broad policy and budgetary responsibility for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities conducted by DoD components and personnel. In addition, under Title 50, the Secretary has several specific statutory responsibilities for elements of the IC that are part of the DoD, including DIA, NGA, NSA, and the NRO. Consistent with the DNI’s statutory responsibilities, the Secretary is responsible for the continued operation of those elements as effective organizations for the conduct of their missions in order to satisfy DoD and IC requirements.

Congress established the USD(I) in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 National Defense Authorization Act, enabling DoD to strengthen its management of Defense Intelligence. As the USD(I), I am the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence, CI, and security matters. It is my job to relate and integrate Defense Intelligence, and to that end I exercise the Secretary’s authority, direction, and control over the defense agencies and DoD field activities that are defense intelligence, CI, or security components.

I am also dual-hatted as the Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI) in the office of the DNI. The DNI and Secretary of Defense jointly established the DDI in 2007 to enhance integration, collaboration and information sharing between Defense Intelligence and the broader IC. My close relationship with Director Clapper—himself a former USD(I) and the first DDI, and someone intimately familiar with Defense Intelligence—enables DoD and the IC to work
seamlessly to manage, resource, and apply intelligence capabilities in pursuit of our national security objectives.

Director Clapper and I each manage our respective resource portfolios: the DNI executes the National Intelligence Program (NIP), and the USD(I) executes the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). To characterize the relative scale of our portfolios, in the FY 2013 President’s Budget Request, the NIP request totaled $52.6 billion compared to a $19.2 billion request to fund the MIP. The DoD MIP includes intelligence, CI, and intelligence-related programs, projects, or activities that provide capabilities to effectively meet warfighter operational and tactical requirements. As the MIP Program Executive, I provide governance and oversight to the MIP through a structured business process, closely integrated with the DoD Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES).

SUPPORTING NATIONAL DECISION MAKERS AND THE WARFIGHTER

Defense Intelligence enables our national decision makers and our warfighters to accomplish their objectives. As I previously mentioned, many of our successes are by necessity classified, and I look forward to discussing them in closed session.

In broad terms, however, Defense Intelligence enables national and tactical collection and analysis in pursuit of our national security objectives. Consumers of Defense Intelligence range from the President, the Secretary, Combatant Commanders, foreign partners and allies, all the way down to our tactical warfighters: the soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and civilian intelligence professionals deployed in harm’s way. Defense Intelligence helps these men and women understand the nature of emerging threats, establishing our peacetime situational awareness and alerting our leadership to when that peace is threatened in order to avoid strategic surprise. Once engaged in conflict, our air, space, sea, ground and cyber ISR capabilities deliver
unparalleled intelligence advantage to U.S. forces. Delivering that intelligence advantage requires the dedicated efforts of tens of thousands of highly skilled personnel, supported globally, no matter how austere or remote their operating environment.

CONCLUSION

Returning to my earlier comments, we are living in a dangerous world. Developing and sustaining intelligence advantage is challenging in the best of times; it is sure to be made even more difficult in an era of declining resources. I am committed to working with the Congress to find the best way to continue delivering this intelligence advantage to the nation.

Thank you for the opportunity to address this Subcommittee today, and we look forward to your questions.
Michael G. Vickers
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

Michael G. ("Mike") Vickers was nominated by President Barack Obama as the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I) on September 29, 2010, and was unanimously confirmed by the United States Senate on March 17, 2011. Secretary Vickers served as Acting USD(I) from January 28, 2011, to March 17, 2011, and as first and only Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity & Interdependent Capabilities (ASD SO/LIC&IC) from July 23, 2007 to March 17, 2011. His service has spanned the administrations of both President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama.

As the USD(I), Secretary Vickers is the principal intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense. He exercises authority, direction, and control on behalf of the Secretary of Defense over all intelligence organizations within the Department of Defense, including the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the intelligence components of the combatant commands and military services. Secretary Vickers is the Program Executive for the Military Intelligence Program. He is also dual-hatted as Director of Defense Intelligence in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and reports to the DNI in this capacity. He is the Department’s principal interface with the Central Intelligence Agency and other elements of the Intelligence Community, and represents the Department on intelligence and sensitive operations at Deputies and Principals Committee meetings of the National Security Council.

As ASD (SO/LIC&IC) from July 23, 2007, to March 17, 2011, Secretary Vickers had oversight of global operations, and served as the senior civilian adviser to the Secretary of Defense on counterterrorism, irregular warfare and special activities. He played a central role in shaping U.S. strategy for the war with al Qaeda, and the war in Afghanistan. He had oversight of the core operational capabilities (strategic forces, conventional forces, and special operations forces) of the Department of Defense, as well as the functional combatant commands (United States Strategic Command, Special Operations Command, Joint Forces Command and Transportation Command). With the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he had oversight of the force application (maneuver and fires) joint capability area.

From 1973 to 1986, Secretary Vickers served as an Army Special Forces Non-Commissioned Officer, Special Forces Officer, and CIA Operations Officer. He had operational and combat experience in Central America and the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Central and South Asia. His operational experience spans covert action and espionage, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and foreign internal defense. During the mid-1980s, Secretary Vickers was the principal strategist for the largest covert action program in the CIA’s history: the paramilitary operation that drove the Soviet army out of Afghanistan. From 1996-2007, Secretary Vickers was Senior Vice President, Strategic Studies, at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

Secretary Vickers holds a Bachelor of Arts, with honors, from the University of Alabama, a Master of Business Administration from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, and a Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations/Strategic Studies from the Johns Hopkins University.
LEADERSHIP

Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn, USA
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

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Michael T. Flynn graduated from the University of Rhode Island in 1981 and was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Army Intelligence. He first assigned as an operations planner with the 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Benning, Georgia. Since then, he has served in a variety of command and staff positions to include, Commander, 115th Military Intelligence Battalion; and G2, 82nd Airborne Division; G2, 18th Airborne Corps; G2, 1st Theater Command; G2, 1st Army; G2, 1st US Army; G2, 3rd Army; G2, 10th Corps; G2, I Corps; and G2, Eighth US Army in Korea. Since June 2011, he has served as the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Cyber and Emerging Technologies. He also served as the Director of Cyber Policy on the National Security Council Staff and as the Commander, Joint Intel Integration Agency. General Flynn also served as Director, J3, Joint Staff; and J3, National Security Council.

LTG Michael T. Flynn, USA
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