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HEARING  
ON  
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT  
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014  
AND  
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED  
PROGRAMS  
BEFORE THE  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING  
ON  
**THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC  
COMMAND AND U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND**

HEARING HELD  
MARCH 5, 2013



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# CONTENTS

## CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2013

	Page
HEARING:	
Tuesday, March 5, 2013, The Posture of the U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Pacific Command .....	1
APPENDIX:	
Tuesday, March 5, 2013 .....	43

### TUESDAY, MARCH 5, 2013

#### THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

##### STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. "Buck," a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .....	1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services .....	2

##### WITNESSES

Kehler, Gen C. Robert, USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command .....	3
Locklear, ADM Samuel J., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command .....	5

##### APPENDIX

##### PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Kehler, Gen C. Robert .....	51
Locklear, ADM Samuel J. ....	74
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. "Buck" .....	47
Smith, Hon. Adam .....	49

##### DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

##### WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:

Mr. Bishop .....	115
Mr. Langevin .....	115

##### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING:

Mr. Barber .....	128
Mr. Bridenstine .....	129
Mr. Johnson .....	126
Mr. Langevin .....	122
Mr. Larsen .....	122
Mr. McKeon .....	119
Mr. Rogers .....	123
Ms. Shea-Porter .....	127
Mr. Wittman .....	126



**THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND  
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 5, 2013.*

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. "Buck" McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. "BUCK" MCKEON,  
A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COM-  
MITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. I would like to welcome everyone to today's hearing on the posture of the U.S. Strategic Command and the U.S. Pacific Command. Unfortunately we still don't have a budget from the President and sequestration has now taken effect. But this committee intends to move ahead with our annual posture hearings to ensure there are no gaps in the committee's oversight. With that in mind, I would like to thank our two witnesses for agreeing to be the first to testify in our posture hearing lineup.

With us today we have General C. Robert Kehler, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, and Admiral Samuel L. Locklear, the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command. General Kehler, I know you have many different hats that you wear, from missile defense, to cyber, to nuclear deterrence. I am deeply troubled about what sequestration means to these areas of responsibility, which pose existential challenges to this Nation. I also am very concerned by the direction the President wants to go in driving further U.S. nuclear reductions at the present time.

I understand the President has been considering a new nuclear guidance document that will seek to reduce our nuclear forces even further. If that is in fact the case, nothing has been shared with this committee. Furthermore, it is not clear to me why this is necessary. It certainly does nothing to deal with threats like North Korea or Iran. As for Russia, why would we believe we can trust Vladimir Putin to honor new arms control agreements, when he has shown a consistent willingness to violate current arms control agreements, when he denies visas to members of this body to travel to Russia, and when he uses adoptive children as props in his neonationalism?

I am especially concerned and suspicious when the President appears to be attempting to avoid the Senate and the Congress in getting such an agreement. Without a formal ratified treaty, any agreement will inherently be nonbinding. We know the Russians

will violate such an agreement, as they did when we tried this in the early 1990s. General Kehler, understanding that you must support your chain of command, today I hope to explore further why additional reductions are in our best interest, especially since we no longer have a production capacity.

Admiral Locklear, it has been over a year since the President released the Defense Strategic Guidance and outlined the rebalancing to Asia. I am concerned about recent developments in Asia and how PACOM [Pacific Command] is postured to respond to a crisis. North Korea's threats and their nuclear and missile programs continue unabated. China's dangerous actions in the South and East China Seas pose a threat to our regional allies, and partners, to U.S. national security interests, and to the sea lines of communication that are vital to global economic stability.

This committee will continue to ask for more details on what the rebalancing means, and how we can hope to deliver on the new strategy in light of other operational demands and lack of resources. I want to thank you both again for being with us here today. Mr. Smith.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 47.]

**STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

Mr. SMITH. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I too want to thank our witnesses, General Kehler, Admiral Locklear, appreciate you being here today, and appreciate your service to our country. I think the greatest challenge is the one that the chairman outlined: how do you continue to carry out your missions and your plans, in light of sequestration? We have built a strategy based on a certain budget, and now that budget is dramatically different. And it is not just sequestration, it is the lack of an appropriations bill for the first 5 months of this fiscal year and perhaps longer depending on what happens in the next weeks ahead.

It is very difficult for you gentleman to do your job when you don't know exactly how much money you are going to have, and then when that changes from month to month. We in Congress need to pass appropriations bills for all discretionary spending, not just defense, to make it easier to govern, and make those decisions. In light of that I think the most interesting thing that we have to talk about this morning is, how that impacts the plans. Particularly in Asia, where we have made, you know, much talk about the pivot to Asia, the focus on its importance, which I think is perfectly appropriate.

It is a region of enormous importance that we should be focusing intently on, building as many positive relationships in that region as we can. I understand that Pacific Command is a very important piece of that, and I think in 2011, or 2012, I forget which, there were over 700 port calls that were done by our Navy throughout the Asian theater. That is a way to build relationships, and part of that effort to build the partnerships we need there. I want to know how that process is going, and how sequestration challenges it.

And then of course specifically the threat of North Korea, and the impact that that has on the region.

In Strategic Command, there are also obviously a number of challenges, starting with our nuclear arsenal. You know, what is the purpose and mission of that arsenal? What do the numbers need to be, to meet the requirements that we have? I personally think that it is very appropriate, some, gosh over 20 years after the Cold War, to continue to reexamine, you know, what size of a nuclear arsenal we need? When we are making difficult budget decisions, what are our most important national security objectives? Are there ways to find savings within the nuclear arsenal? I believe that there are and I am anxious to hear more about how we implement that.

And then of course, the incredible importance of missile defense. We have seen its impact in the Middle East. We know the threat that is rising from Iran and North Korea, how do we posture our forces and invest in missile defense technology to best meet those threats, again, within the tight budget constraints that we have.

So I look forward to testimony and questions from the members. I thank you both for being here, for your service to our country and I thank the chairman for holding this meeting.

With that, I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 49.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.  
General Kehler.

**STATEMENT OF GEN C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, COMMANDER,  
U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND**

General KEHLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If it is permissible with you, I would like to make my full statement a part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, both of your full statements will be in the record.

General KEHLER. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

General KEHLER. And good morning to you, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the committee, I am certainly honored to join with all of you today.

It is a privilege to begin my third year leading the outstanding men and women of the United States Strategic Command.

I am also pleased to be here with Admiral Sam Locklear, a great colleague whose responsibilities as Commander of Pacific Command cover some of the most critical areas and issues on the globe.

Pacific Command and Strategic Command are the closest of partners. Admiral Locklear and I collaborate frequently and I greatly value his leadership, vision and counsel.

Uncertainty and complexity continue to dominate the national security landscape, even as the United States transitions from a decade of active conflict in Southwest Asia.

Uncertainty and complexity make this transition unlike any we have experienced in the past. Many regions of the world remain volatile and increasing economic and information connections mean

regional issues can quickly have global consequences. Events over the past year validate this perspective.

Since my last appearance before the committee, we have seen violent extremists continue to act against or threaten U.S. interests, citizens, allies, partners and our homeland.

Cyber activity has increased in both quantity and intensity with the potential for greater exploitation of U.S. intellectual property, institutions and critical infrastructure.

Iran's nuclear ambitions remain concerning. North Korea conducted a missile launch in violation of its obligations under multiple U.N. [United Nations] Security Council Resolutions and announced last month, it conducted another nuclear test.

Civil war continues in Syria, and Russia and China continue to improve and demonstrate their strategic capabilities.

Fiscal uncertainty is adding additional unique challenges. Not only are the additional sequestration reductions steep, but the law allows little flexibility in how to apply them and we are also working from a continuing resolution while transitioning contingency needs to the base budget, this during a time when continued readiness is essential, modernization is overdue, violent extremists remain active, threats in space and cyberspace are increasing and the possibility of nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation persists.

As we confront these challenges, our enemies and potential enemies are watching. In this uncertain and complex world, STRATCOM [Strategic Command] remains focused on conducting the missions that are most critical to protect our core national security interests. My priorities support this focus.

Our fundamental purpose remains constant. With the other combatant commands, we must deter, detect and prevent attacks against the United States, assure our friends and allies of our security commitments to them and if directed, employ appropriate force to achieve national objectives should deterrence fail.

To do this, our men and women wield a range of complementary capabilities to create the tailored effects the Nation needs. Our primary objective is to prevent conflict by influencing in advance the perceptions, assessments and decisions of those who would consider threatening our vital national interests.

Ultimately, this requires the continuing credibility of America's military capabilities brought to bear in concert with other elements of national power.

While our heritage is nuclear and our nuclear vigilance will never waiver as long as those weapons exist, STRATCOM's activities today are far more diverse and versatile.

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to report that STRATCOM is capable of executing its assigned mission responsibilities today. However, given the potential impact fiscal uncertainty and declining resources could have on STRATCOM, I am concerned that I may not be able to say the same in 6 months or a year.

I am most concerned with the impact financial uncertainty is having on our people. Uniformed and non-uniformed members alike have managed the effects of sustained high stress combat deployment and operational tempos. They willingly take personal risks for their country but they are fearful of taking financial risk for their families.

Hiring restrictions, salary freezes and the likelihood of unpaid furloughs, are especially troubling to our civilians. Civilians comprise about 60 percent of the STRATCOM headquarters staff. They hold key leadership positions. They represent critical expertise and they represent much of the essential workforce which provides crucial functions like intelligence, maintenance and sustainment.

Because they are such dedicated patriots, I believe our military and civilian members will cope with the effects of financial uncertainty in the near term. But I worry that over time, our most experienced professionals will retire early and our best young people will leave to pursue more stable opportunities elsewhere. We are detecting hints of that now.

Beyond the human dimension, sequestration will eventually impact the command's readiness and curtail growth in new areas like cyber defense. Even though the services are trying to give STRATCOM's missions as much priority treatment as possible within the law, we could not remain immune.

So while the immediate impact will vary by command, overall in STRATCOM, the effect is like an avalanche. Seemingly small initial impacts are going to grow. As time passes, we will see greater impacts to the nuclear deterrent, global strike missile warning and missile defense, situational awareness in both space and cyberspace, and to our support for warfighters around the globe.

In the longer term, continuing on this financial path will affect STRATCOM's modernization and long-term sustainment needs, potentially eliminating or jeopardizing a number of important recapitalization efforts. Ultimately, reduced readiness and curtailed modernization will damage the perceived credibility of our capabilities increasing the risk to achieving our primary deterrence and assurance objectives. Mr. Chairman, STRATCOM's responsibilities have not changed. But the strategic and fiscal environment in which we must carry them out is much different than a year ago. I remain enormously proud of the superb men and women I am privileged to lead and convinced we can meet our mission responsibilities today. But the pathway we are on creates growing risks to our defense strategy and our ability to execute it.

I look forward to working with this committee and Congress on these difficult and complex challenges and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Kehler can be found in the Appendix on page 51.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.  
Admiral Locklear.

**STATEMENT OF ADM SAMUEL J. LOCKLEAR, USN,  
COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND**

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Good morning Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify today and provide you with my perspectives from the U.S. Pacific Command.

For the past 12 months, I have had the great honor to lead over 328,000 service members and 38,000 civilian employees along with their families.

Our area of responsibility is diverse and extremely complex. Stretching from California to India, the Indo-Asia-Pacific encompasses over half the Earth's surface and well over half its population.

The region is culturally, socially, economically, and geopolitically diverse. The nations of the Indo-Asia-Pacific include 5 of our Nation's 7 treaty allies; 3 of the largest and 7 of the 10 smallest economies; the most populated nations in the world, including the largest Muslim majority nation, the largest democracy, and the world's smallest republic.

The Indo-Asia-Pacific is the engine that drives the global economy. The open accessible sea lanes throughout the Asia-Pacific annually enjoy over \$8 trillion in bilateral trade with one-third of the world's bulk cargo and two-thirds of the oil shipments sailing to and from 9 of the world's 10 largest economic ports which are in this part of the world.

By any meaningful measure, the Indo-Asia-Pacific is also the world's most militarized region with 7 of the 10 largest standing armies, the world's largest and most sophisticated navies, and 5 of the world's declared nuclear armed nations.

Now when taken all together, these aspects represent a region with a unique strategic complexity and a wide diverse group of challenges that can significantly stress the overall security environment.

Effectively engaging in the Indo-Asia-Pacific requires a committed and sustained effort and USPACOM, as a military component of this commitment, is focused in our efforts to deter aggression, assure our allies and our partners and to prevent should our national interests be threatened.

While the Indo-Asia-Pacific today is relatively at peace, I am concerned by a number of security challenges that have the possibility to impact the security environment.

Examples include, climate change, where increasingly severe weather patterns and rising sea levels, along with inevitable earthquakes and tsunamis and super-typhoons, and massive flooding threaten today and will continue to threaten populations in the future in this region.

Transnational non-straight threats will persist which include pandemics, pirates, terrorists, criminal organizations as well as drugs, human trafficking and of course, weapons of mass destruction.

Historic and emerging border and territorial disputes will no doubt continue. Access and freedom of action in the shared domains of sea, air, space and cyberspace are being challenged.

Competition for water, food and energy will grow.

Instability on the Korean Peninsula will persist.

The rise of China and India as global economic powers and their emergence as regional military powers will continue.

And finally, recognition of the fact that no single organizational mechanism exists in the Indo-Asia-Pacific to manage relationships and when needed, to provide a framework for conflict resolution.

Simply put, there is no Pacific NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]. The U.S. joint force has been heavily tasked in other AORs [areas of responsibility] over the past decade and as a con-

sequence, the USPACOM AOR in many key areas has been resource-challenged and has assumed additional risk.

Our rebalance to the Pacific strategy has given us a new opportunity to begin to solve these challenges and reemphasize to our allies and our partners that we are a committed Pacific nation. It also reflects a recognition that the future prosperity of the U.S. will be defined largely by events and developments in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.

Over the past year, the rebalance has helped focus our planning and our resource decisions as we work closer with our allies and our partners to ensure a security environment favorable to U.S. interests.

However, the impacts of sequestration and the realities of continuing resolutions have created significant budget uncertainties, limited our flexibility to manage, and have the potential to undermine our strategic rebalance momentum, as our ability to operate and maintain our force is at increased risk.

Nonetheless, USPACOM will continue to work with services to preserve, to the extent possible, our essential homeland defense and crisis response capabilities, capabilities which are resident in many of our forward deployed forces.

The Pacific Ocean does not separate us from Asia; it connects us. We are connected by our economies, by our cultures, by our shared interest and by our security challenges. We have been resource-challenged in accepting risk in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region for some time. But our rebalance strategy is in place and we are making good progress.

Let me assure you that USPACOM will continue to demonstrate to our allies, our partners and others the U.S. resolve and commitment to peace and security in this important part of the world.

On behalf of our superb military and civilian members and their families who sacrifice everyday to ensure that our country is well defended, I would like to thank each member of the committee for your support.

I look forward to your questions. Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Locklear can be found in the Appendix on page 74.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. You know, we are cutting from our defense budget this year. Last year our number was \$550 billion. This year, after sequestration, it is \$501 billion. The OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] number last year was \$122 billion; this year, after sequestration, \$88.5 billion.

So we are cutting, this year, out of our national security, our defense budget, over \$80 billion. Very significant. I have an article before me that says that China, this year, plans to raise its defense budget by 10.7 percent, or \$115.7 billion.

They are raising theirs \$115, we are cutting ours over \$80. I think that is something that all of us on this committee need to pay attention to, need to understand the significance of.

We will have the opportunity this week in the House to vote for a continuing resolution which will fund the government through the end of this fiscal year, 9/30. Wrapped in that budget, or in that CR [continuing resolution], will be a defense appropriations bill.

Now this committee last year completed our National Defense Authorization Act. We went through the process. We held the hearings such as we are holding here today. We passed a bill through these subcommittees, through this full committee and in the House on the floor with a very good vote.

The Senate, while it took them a little longer, did get their work done and did pass their bill in December of last year. We conferenced. We had a very short time to do it, but we came out with a bill. We passed it. It was signed by the President of the United States.

That bill has no effect unless the appropriations bill is passed. They, the appropriators, have also done their work. They held their hearings. They passed it on the floor, passed in the Senate. They have worked jointly to do this. They followed regular order. And because of that, it is part of this CR. They are the only committee that has done that.

I think that we could probably find reasons to vote against that bill, but I think every member of this committee should understand the importance of getting that passed and the benefit it will have to at least take away some of the sting of sequestration on our military by giving them the authority to spend money on more important areas than they are having to do if they become just part of a CR without the appropriation bill.

So I urge all members of this committee to really look at that and understand the responsibility we have in protecting the national defense of this Nation.

Now General Kehler, Admiral Locklear, the sequestration deadline passed on Friday. You are still operating, at this point, under a continuing resolution. How are the current fiscal restraints that you are operating under, how do they impact your plan to execute your missions today? Six months from now? A year from now?

I would like you to please be specific. Has your ability to respond to a crisis been impacted? And what are not you able to do today or any longer because of these conditions you are operating under?

General.

General KEHLER. Mr. Chairman, I would make a couple of set-up points here. First, because of the nature of the combatant commands, I think that the immediate impacts of—

The CHAIRMAN. General, could you move that mic just a little closer?

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. Is that better?

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General KEHLER. Sir, because the nature of the impact will be different from command to command, let me just describe that. And I think it is important that the committee knows this, I think it is important that any potential adversaries know this.

Strategic Command is capable of performing its full range of missions today. We are 4 days, I guess, past the time that sequestration began. And as I sit here and look for the coming months, I do not see a dramatic impact on our ability to accomplish our mission.

But as I said in my opening remarks, what will happen is that as the service chiefs have struggled with how to apply these various financial rules that they have been given, they have had to go

to some places to take cuts that eventually are going to impact us. Flying hours, for example.

In the near term, what the Air Force is going to try to do is take their flying hours in the bomber force, for example, in such a way as to make sure that our crews that are nuclear-certified will remain so for as long as possible. But eventually, those—if unaddressed, those issues will persist. And then those impacts will begin to be felt in Strategic Command.

There are other impacts that are—we have seen out of potential moves that the services have had to make. We could see eventually impact of the reduction of maintenance, or the deferral of maintenance, for example. Eventually that will impact the forces that are assigned to Strategic Command.

Again, I think the services are trying as best they can within the rules that they have, to give us, in some of these critical places, some priority treatment. If, in fact, we have to continue with some curtailment of operations of sensors, for example, eventually that will impact space situational awareness.

Those are the kind of things that I can't sit here today, Mr. Chairman, and say, "Today we have—we have had a dramatic impact on either our readiness or our ability to perform our missions." I would be mischaracterizing where we stand today.

But I don't want to understate the impact of what is coming to us. And I believe that other commands would probably have a different assessment of where they stand today. I am concerned that as time passes that this, as I say, the best way that I can describe this is it is an avalanche. It begins very small, in Strategic Command, and then it begins to cascade as the momentum builds.

Those are the issues that we are most concerned about, because we can't see clearly yet the way forward. We know that some of these impacts are coming. I can't tell you exactly what those are going to be or when. The other issue that I think is a big one for me, personally, is the issue of the impact that all of the uncertainty is having on our members, and in particular the civilians, as I said. I think that they are being asked to sacrifice much here and I think we need to be mindful of that.

We have an intern program that one of my predecessors started where we go to universities and we try to bring interns in with the hopes that they will come to government service. We have been—we have had some success with this, especially in those technical areas that STRATCOM is reliant on, we have had a number of those new government employees, college graduates, come to their supervisors in the last several months and question whether this is a future for them.

So I don't want to overstate that either, but I don't want to understate. I think there is a human dimension to this that we need to be mindful of and I can't characterize that as an impact on readiness, but we have—our people are concerned about all of this.

The final thing that I would say is I can't characterize either the potential impact on investment because those decisions haven't been made. Again, the services are struggling with those kinds of impacts. What I can say, I believe, from STRATCOM's portfolio of capabilities is I am certain that everything that is in STRATCOM's portfolio will be on the table when we make those decisions.

So I would like to be able to be more crisp today with specifics of the impact. I can't give you that. I just know that the readiness impacts are coming, if unaddressed. And I know that there is an impact in the way our people are—the discomfort level with our people. I can't tell you yet what is happening with investment because I just don't know what the Department is going to decide yet in terms of reprioritizing and all the things that go with that. If that helps you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We understand that the chiefs had a year to work on the \$487 billion and to really plan where they would cut and the sequestration they were basically ordered not to plan. So we understand the—how those decisions haven't been made yet and it is going to take some time to do that.

And we understand how each combatant commander has different—it will impact them differently. So when we get through this whole process of listening to all of you, then we will have a little bit better picture ourselves as we move forward into the subcommittee hearings and put our bill together.

Admiral, I don't want you to telegraph any weaknesses that we may have. So if you can understand that you know how to answer the question so that we get a general understanding, without knowing specifics, that we can discuss in open session like this.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Yes, sir. Well, thank you.

First, I think the Pacific Ocean is the largest object in the world. It is the largest thing on the Earth. You could take every landmass in the world and you could put them all together and fit them in the Pacific Ocean and still have room for an African continent and a North American continent.

And I think sometimes at least people here in my hometown, they don't recognize that. They don't recognize the vast distances. They don't see the impacts of American interest here. It doesn't—it is not—it doesn't show up. They don't understand that all the goods and services, many of them come across this vast ocean through other economies that make our economy vibrant.

So one of the things that has enabled that over the last 70 years has been the presence of U.S. military forces in this part of the world that have provided really quite a remarkable presence and security that allowed the rise of these large nations, large democracies, in a peaceful way that has fueled our own economy and helped our quality of life, and will continue to do so for the next—for the future.

So with that—in that context, there is three things that I do as a combatant commander that have to look the impacts of resources. Because I am the end user from the services as they push things out to me in this vast region.

The first thing I would have to do is what is the impact on our ability to deter? And there are significant deterrence issues here. Today we are deterring a North Korea that you see through all the rhetoric and all the provocations that have occurred that this is not getting better. We are deterring to ensure that a security environment is consistent through the coming decades and not one that leads us to any kind of conflict in this very militarized part of the world.

The second thing I do is I assure. Now we only have seven allies in the world—seven treaty allies. Five of them are in my AOR. The other two are NATO and I think the Rio—Rio [1947 Inter-american Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance] is the other one. So they are—really the five nations that are our allies are here. And we have—our relationship with Thailand goes back 180 years. It is the first ally we had.

And these alliances have underpinned our security and our security strategy and our economic strategy I think in this part of the world for many decades. And so assuring those alliances that the U.S. is committed to our commitment to the alliance and that they are committed to us as well takes presence. It takes time. It takes effort. It takes exercising. It takes relationship capacity building, those types of things.

And then the third thing that I worry most about is preventing. So let's say that all the good things we do to try to ensure the security environment remain stable, yet somehow that fails. I am accountable to you and to the American people and to the President to be able to say that I can defend U.S. citizens and U.S. interests in my half of the world.

It is 52 percent of the world in the PACOM AOR, so we rely very heavily on forward deployed forces, forward station forces, the ability to rotate forces effectively that are well-trained into the theater in a way that allows me to accomplish those three things.

So what are the near-term impacts? Well first, we will start to see the readiness accounts because that is the only place the service chiefs can go, really the only place they have the flexibility to find near-term savings, so they will take that out of things like flying hour programs.

So the airplanes that I need to put on the carriers that need to come forward or that go into my fighter rotations in theater will not be trained and may not come. We will not deploy ships. We were just sitting on my front porch in Hawaii 2 days ago and there was a ship sitting there that was supposed to deploy early—the first day of this month and it hasn't gone.

And it hasn't gone because the operating dollars to send it forward to do the three things that I just said for you to do will not be available. Similarly, you could apply that across all aspects of whether my exercise programs have been truncated.

Just in my headquarters alone, one of the things, because I am in Hawaii I have about a, you know, a staff that is required to be out and active in 35 nations to do the things that we have been asked to do. My travel budget, I immediately cut it by 50 percent. So we are 50 percent effective today just because we had to cut that. And that is a small thing, but it gives you an indication of kind of the near-term impacts.

The long term, well just as General Kehler said, it is going to be like an avalanche. It is going to compound. You know, the bad decision we make today just ends up in three or four more down the road because of the way our force is structured, because of the way we deploy our force from our homeland. And pulling those dollars out will ultimately result in less capacity for my AOR.

It also will ultimately, if allowed to, undermine the rebalance. Now the rebalance strategy, I don't think—I have never found any-

body who disagreed with it. It was clear that the American people looked at it, I looked at it, I think all of you all did, and said, you know, for the next century for our children and our grandchildren, we have to get it right in the Asia-Pacific.

And that after several decades of war in the Middle East that we—where we have maybe prioritized our efforts there, and we have to look more closely at the Asia-Pacific. And a big piece of that is how we insure and put our military in a footing in the Indo-Asia-Pacific that does the three things that I talked about.

So we have a plan for rebalance. Since the last year when I saw you all a year ago, we have worked diligently to try to put things into place, but they are not all going to happen overnight. The road we are on will undermine that.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I can follow up on that a little bit on that, Admiral, talking about our pivot to Asia and some of the efforts ongoing there, our relationship with China. The first thing, I do want to clarify.

The chairman said that the Chinese budget had gone up 10 percent, which is true, but I think it also sort of implied that it had gone up by \$115 billion. It didn't go up by that much. The best estimates are that the Chinese defense budget is somewhere between \$120 billion and \$180 billion, not over a trillion.

Granted, that is difficult to calculate, but let's round up and say it is \$200 billion. That is still a little over \$350 billion less than we are spending this year. So from a money standpoint, you know, we ought to be able to compete. It is a matter of how we make the decisions going forward.

Can you talk a little bit about the—as part of the Asia pivot, there have been troop movements in the effort—the ongoing effort to try to figure out our Marines on Okinawa working with the Japanese government, how many we are going to move to Guam, how many we are going to move elsewhere. What is the latest on that?

It has sort of been stalled by the fact that the Japanese, you know, want us to move from Futenma, but they have yet to actually put in place the other spot on Okinawa where we are supposed to move to, and that has sort of been making it difficult to make those decisions. So an update on that, and then also how are things going in Australia with our rotational placement there and how the Australian government and the Australian people are reacting to that.

And then just a little bit more about the importance of partnership building as part of our strategy, that it is not just a matter of us having, you know, this huge enormous presence, but it is a matter of building allies in the Asian theater that we can work with. How is that going? So I guess there are three pieces to that. One, our troop movements. Two, Australia in particular. And then three, other allies and how that is developing.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Let me start by talking about troop movements before I talk about Okinawa and Futenma specifically.

As an obvious signal of the rebalance already, I think I would like to comment that the I Corps, which is a large Army unit up in the northwest which has been aligned to the Middle East for the better part of a decade, have now been realigned under PACOM

and are under me and are now—we are planning for their activities in the Pacific theater here. So I think that is significant.

III MEF, which has largely been out of the Pacific area for the last—Marine Expeditionary Force—for the last decade or so has now returned to the Pacific, and they are out and about and doing their traditional role in deterring, assuring and preventing in their amphibious operations. So that is a good sign that we are making some headway in the rebalance.

On the issue of Okinawa, the underlying reasons that we did this are still sound. The agreement that we have with the government of Japan remains I think in a forward progress mode at this point in time.

We plan—as far as the troop movements, I think you have been briefed on the most recent ones, but that movement would entail about I think just a little under 5,000 returning to Guam, probably about 2027—at some point in time around the time 2025, 2026, coming to Hawaii.

The issue of the Futenma had been, we disconnected that from the troop movements so that it—because it was just slowing us down too much. But there is progress in that regard, too. I believe that the government of Japan will some time in the very near future pass the EIS [Environmental Impact Statement] statements to the Okinawans and then ask for them to move forward on the permits to be able to begin their reconstruction of the Futenma facility.

So I think we are on track on that, and I believe that it is a rational—the entire thing is a very rational strategy for the way I see the Pacific—PACOM AOR and the proper positioning of our forces for the future, not necessarily for the past. I think it is a good step.

Australia figures in that equation well. We have finished our very successful first rotation of about 250 Marines. I visited them about a month and a half ago in Darwin. There are some magnificent training ranges there. We have very fine partners with, and allies with, the Australians.

The response from the, both the political and the local population has been very positive. They have been good citizens. We will do another 250 rotation this year with the hopes that we would expand that to about a thousand next year.

Now keep in mind these are rotational forces that are only there for about 5 or 6 months out of the year. We are not building a base. We are not building any more U.S. bases in the Asia-Pacific. We are using our partnership and capacity issues to allow the Australians to assist us and help us here. It doesn't mean it is free, but it does mean that we are using that to a great degree.

And I think that these Marines will now, during the 5 or 6 months that they are not out there in Australia training, they will be out and about. They will provide me better flexibility in contingency forces that are ready to respond to anything from a humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, to a contingency somewhere else.

Now, the importance of partnership, and partnership building is partnership capacity, is an important part of my theater campaign plan. I look out about 5 years. I look at all the countries, first of all the five allies, and how we strengthen our allies' capacity to work with us, to be able to be seamless with us in our operations,

and it varies among the allies about their maturity of that. And so we have to take that into consideration. But certainly my hope is that they are able to continue to do more, and that they are able to continue to contribute more across all spectrums of potential crisis, whether it is from a humanitarian disaster relief, or whether it is all the way up to a higher end contingency.

We are looking for—we continue to look for partnerships beyond our alliances. As you know, we are looking for a long-term strategic partnership with India. So I have been to India and we begin this dialogue. India has a tremendous capability to be a security guarantor in their part of the world, in the Indian Ocean, and we welcome that. And we look for opportunities to—so that we maintain our interoperability. And a lot of these things require the types of things in our budget that sometime might look like, well you can do without that. But, you know an exercise with a potential partner that allows us to improve and help them improve their capacity, becomes important. And things like CRs and sequestrations kill those first.

Mr. SMITH. I think those pieces are going to be critical going forward. We are going to need as many partners—and it is really a more effective way to operate. I know different theater, but in Africa we had a lot of success with partnership capacity, which has helped us deal with Somalia and Yemen in a much less costly, and I think more effective manner.

Thank you, Admiral, I appreciate the time.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both for being here today. I just want to follow up on this question about a CR versus appropriation bill, because we are going to have an opportunity later this week to vote on a Defense MILCON [Military Construction] appropriation bill, and within just very limited time that I have, I would appreciate each of you describing generally how big a difference it makes, whether you have the same amount of money to operate under a CR for the rest of the fiscal year, or the same amount of money to operate under a regular appropriation bill?

Is it a big deal to you? Is it medium? Is it not that much difference at all? General Kehler.

General KEHLER. Congressman it is a big deal to us. In particular I think number one, it helps put certainty back into the process. It converts uncertainty to certainty. The second thing is that of course it establishes, or at least we would hope that it establishes a different baseline instead of continuing to baseline fiscal 2012 numbers, it would baseline a different number in fiscal year 2013. And of course, I think that that would be very helpful for us in my small O&M [operations and maintenance] piece of the pie, it would also—I am—I would believe anyway it would help the service chiefs quite a bit.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. Admiral.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Yes, sir, it is a big deal. I was the programmer for the Navy in a previous job, so I had a chance to see how budgets were built, and POM [Program Objective Memo-

random] processes work, and how all that happened. And on the surface it sounds like, well what are you complaining about, you have all the same money you had last year, so why don't you just get on with it? But money is not spent that way, it is not executed that way. It is executed through, as you know through what y'all pass to us as a budget that has certain assumptions in it, and changes.

So when you look at a 2012 budget compared to a 2013 budget, there are some fundamental assumptions that the service chiefs had to make changes about, as they move forward to rebalance, to change the nature of their force structure. And those things can't be accomplished. It is—they end up, I think in the case of the Navy this year, they end up carrying excess bills on things that they thought they were going to be able to do in 2013, that you haven't allowed them to do because there hasn't been enough appropriation to allow it.

And so there are unintended large bills they have to contend with that, if they had perfect fungibility on their budget, perfect discretion, then they—we—they would be able to solve it, or maybe solve part of it, but they don't have that and I wouldn't advocate that they did, but I think it is what makes a difference.

Mr. THORBERRY. Well, I—like the chairman, I hope that we can do that. Because I am afraid we have got a limited window to get a Defense appropriation bill done, or else we are going to all be living under a CR for the rest of the year, and which would not be good.

General Kehler, let me change the subject right quick and just ask you this question, which has always perplexed me. All of this talk about nuclear weapons, and we have got charts our staff has provided with the treaty limits and so forth, but nothing ever takes into account the tactical weapons.

As you do military planning, as you try to assess the effects of a blast from one nuclear weapon versus another, is there really a difference between a tactical nuclear weapon and a strategic nuclear weapon as far as the importance that you have to place on it in terms of military consequences? Or is it more a political difference?

General KEHLER. Congressman, it is more a political difference in what you call it, really. It is like calling a platform strategic, or tactical. It is really about effect. It is not about the platform, and it is not about the weapon. In most cases, and certainly if you are on the receiving end, I don't think you notice much difference from a nuclear weapon that somebody says is a tactical weapon, or one that somebody says is a strategic weapon. I think that we have used that as an accounting method over the years for arms control purposes, and I understand why we have done that.

We used to make a bigger distinction between strategic and tactical nuclear things, different decision processes, et cetera. But I think as a practical matter as we go forward, there is probably less utility in describing the weapons that way. In fact the nuclear posture review laid out some of that, and with the suggestion that it is probably time as we go back and chat again with the Russians, for us to address what we have called historically nonstrategic, or

tactical nuclear weapons. I think that is a prudent thing for us to do, and I think it is probably time for us to do it.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Great, that is helpful to me. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, all of you for being here. I think you have tried to clarify the shift or the rebalancing to the Pacific as best you can, but I recently was at a conference, and there was really quite a bit of skepticism about that, and the fact that this was really about containing China. Could you comment on that?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Yes, Congressman. I get the same question throughout my AOR, in fact over half the world, different countries I get almost the same question.

First the rebalance is a strategy of collaboration, not one of containment. If we wanted to contain any country, we would kind of know how to do that, and we wouldn't be doing what we are doing now. Now, to that degree I can't tell you whether another country feels contained by our activities; that is in the eyes of the beholder. But in the case of China, as I have communicated to them when they have asked me this as well, I said first of all you have to recognize that the U.S. is a Pacific nation.

We have lots of national interests in this part of the world. We are going to stay here. We are here with our allies. We are concerned about a security environment that protects our interests. We recognize that China is on the rise, both economically and as a regional power. And we think that we can accommodate China into those—into the economic world, as well as the security world, and that they have the opportunity to come in as a net provider of security and that we are happy to allow that to happen, and we will actually facilitate them coming in if necessary.

But they, as all others do, have choices that have to be made, and we are just hopeful that those choices will be ones that bring them in, in a productive way.

Mrs. DAVIS. Have any of our allies in the region expressed some concern that they might have to choose between being their friends in the region? If in fact they perceive it that way?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Right, well I think there are two concerns. One is, they all express that the last thing they want to see happen is for the U.S. and China to have an adversarial relationship. It is not in our best interest, not in China's best interest, and it is certainly not in theirs. And so they are pretty emphatic about that. The second thing is as you just said, they don't want to have to choose. I don't see a reason for them to have to choose at this point in time, assuming that we all make the choice for peace and prosperity in a security environment that can ensure that.

Mrs. DAVIS. If I could just go back to a second to the discussion that we have had about building capacity. One of the things that we have tried to do, and I know you all have been actively involved in more of a whole of government approach, and yet as we see with budget cuts, and constraints that we have, that that is certainly going to affect other agencies, other government agencies that are

part of this, as well as other entities, private and certainly our allies in the region.

What role then do you play? Will we be playing to enable that relationship to continue, given the budget constraints that probably will be falling on them tougher than yours?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, I think for some time, the benefit of the Pacific Command is that they have had a view, not just at the military side, but many of the other aspects of whole of government, just because of the size of the region and how hard it is to get around. I mean if you take a look at the—just the number of your members that actually make it in the Pacific, it is because it is so long, and so hard to get there it makes it more difficult. So what I have done in my headquarters is I have expanded in there, the outreach I have to other agencies, and I have them actually in—physically inside of my headquarters. So it allows me a conduit into the other agencies that I use routinely to ensure that whatever assets and things that I do are well synergized with other activities. So I have a very close relationship with our partnerships at State, with AID [Agency for International Development], with Energy, with the Drug—DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency], the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], all these are present inside of my headquarters, and it is a team effort, not just a military one.

Mrs. DAVIS. Do you see those being compromised at all in the coming year or so?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, as I speak to them, I think they are less uncertain about the impacts on them, than I am.

Mrs. DAVIS. Would you recommend that they have the same flexibility perhaps that you all are going to be having?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. It would be a, flexibility is always good, I think, particularly if you are trying to rebalance.

Mrs. DAVIS. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. General and Admiral, we want to first thank you for your service to our country. Thank you for the weight you both carry on your shoulders and thank you for the professionalism you both display in a very unstable policy world.

Chairman, I want to thank you for trying to bring some stability to national security and all you have done to do that.

And I want to first of all set our context. We are talking about sequestration, cuts that will be about \$42.5 billion this year. But we need to realize that the administration has already come in here and voluntarily taken 19 times that amount of cuts already. Because we have cut about \$800 billion out of the last 4 years.

So if I could put those into a sequencing and, for measurement purposes, put them as 20 cuts, one of those cuts would come from sequestration, but 19 of them would have already been coming from the administration.

We fought against them because we said they do not leave us any bumps in the road. They don't leave us a situation, in case we have a downturn in the economy, or national crisis. Indeed, we spent more than this on relief for Hurricane Sandy.

But we are where we are and Admiral, the question I would have for you is this. Our Navy is currently at 286 ships. When we add the cuts already made to national security with the cuts under sequestration, this figure could fall to the 230 range. Yet the demand for Navy assets only continues to increase. Admiral, in your best military judgment, is our Navy large enough today to meet the demand of both your COCOM [combatant command] and our international responsibilities in the coming decades? And what are the risks we are assuming if it is not?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, I would like to make my comments from that of a Joint Commander's perspective, not necessarily from a person who is in the Navy because I think there is always a perception, well, you are a Navy guy, you are going to say the right thing.

The Navy and the Joint Force have consistently said that the U.S. Navy should be in the range of 306 to 313, somewhere in that number, and that number—I think you can argue about the each's of that number. Today we are at about 285 ships.

But I think when you back it up into the larger context, it is really what is it you want your Navy to do. So there are always the comments, well, your Navy is larger than the 10 largest navies in the world, so what are you worried about?

I say, if you ever put that in the context of having to defend your home shores with your Navy, whether it is off of Long Beach or whether it is off of Norfolk, that argument is pretty good.

But if you look at the world as a global common and you as a world leader in both economics, in social and military, and that you want to be able to influence what happens in that global common to the benefit of the American people and to secure our national interests there, then you start talking about size matters and the numbers matter. Because, you know, only one ship can be at one place at one time.

And they are much more powerful ships, they are, they are really great ships we have today. But when you are talking about 285 and what we have seen happen just in the last decade with the pressure that is from the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, to what is happening off the Horn of Africa for anti-piracy, to my requirement to have to deter, assure, and prevent, in a very—when an area is becoming more complex, the numbers that we have in the Navy today are too small because my requirements are not being satisfied by the Navy today.

So in that context, it is probably—285 is not meeting the global demand for the world we find ourselves in today.

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, can you give us a picture of—let's just take our most important capabilities in Asia-Pacific is probably going to be our attack submarines.

Can you give us a picture kind of where we are going to line up number-wise in the next decade between the number of submarines the Chinese will have versus ours in the Pacific area? If we stay on the course we are on today.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Yes. Well, I won't give you exact numbers, I will just give you relative. I think there are well over 300 very quiet or extremely quiet diesel submarines globally today. Some are by our—owned by our friends and allies, others by not.

And then there is another subset—another set of those that are nuclear capable ships that have much longer ranges, and that type of thing. The growth of the Chinese submarine force is a little bit puzzling to me in both its size and its sophistication. I believe the predictions are it is going to grow to about 70, high 70s or 80—in the numbers of 80.

That is the Chinese decision on how big they want their submarine community to grow and I don't—and I think as they get more global, that they are going to have to build a military that can be more global and protect their interests as well.

But that number of submarines in a very basically constricted space, it causes a little bit of questions.

Now to compare their submarines to ours is a little bit of an apples and oranges comparison, but the numbers in the Pacific will be, of submarines that we have, day-to-day to operate, will be less than that.

Mr. FORBES. How many?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. I would just rather answer that off-line to give you the exact number.

Mr. FORBES. That is great. Thank you.

General KEHLER. Congressman, may I just pitch into this?

Mr. FORBES. Please do.

General KEHLER. As a Joint Commander, we ask our Navy to do something else that is critically important. Fourteen of those ships are Trident ballistic missile submarines that form the most survivable part of our strategic deterrent.

And when we talk about deterrence and assurance, a great deal of what we must be mindful of is the extended deterrence that provides the assurance for our allies and our partners around the world.

I think, as we go forward, we need to be very mindful that those Trident submarines are going to reach the end of their service life at some point in time and part of the recapitalization that we are going to need to proceed with, even in tough financial times, will be the recapitalization of that ballistic missile submarine force.

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your patience.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to discuss briefly some of the flexibility issue. This issue came up last week when we had a hearing with the Federal Aviation Administration [FAA]. And the majority of the House and the majority of the Senate voted for the situation we are in today, sequestration. We are trying to find a way out of it now.

But to underline the inflexibility of sequestration, the question came up at the FAA hearing based on the concept that a lot of people just think there is a line item for waste, fraud and abuse in every agency, including in STRATCOM and including in PACOM, including every agency in the Federal Government.

And FAA has to cut about \$627 million out. But under sequestration, even if there is a line item of waste, fraud and abuse and it was \$627 million, they could still only cut 8 to 10 percent of that because of the strict rules of sequestration.

And that just underscores the inflexibility of the inflexibility of sequestration and underscores the importance, at least for step one, of providing some flexibility.

But I would also argue that that flexibility should apply to all agencies and not just to the Department of Defense. I have got folks who are making choices about housing vouchers in nonprofit housing authorities in my district. I have got folks who are making decisions about not delivering meals to seniors who are shut-ins in their homes through the Meals on Wheels program.

At least having some flexibility in other agencies, I mean, if it is good enough for the goose, it is good enough for the gander, in my view.

But I want to move, though, to another set of issues with regards to that. And General Kehler, you mentioned it more so in your oral testimony, and Admiral Locklear, you mentioned more of it in your written testimony. And that is the impact of the pay freeze that impacts your civilian employees, as well as the furloughs.

Can both of you, very briefly, a minute each, with General Kehler first and Admiral Locklear second, can you discuss in a little more detail the impact of the potential furlough and current pay freeze, as well as for the proposed-pay freeze, is having on your civilian employees and their ability to do their job?

General KEHLER. Sir, I would add to that a hiring freeze, as well, which we have had for quite some time. And also, a reduction. While we went through a contractor to civilian conversion, then we went through some civilian reductions over the last several years.

And so it is a combination of all of those things that have been impacting our civilians.

In terms of the furlough, though, the pay freeze and the furlough, I think as I said in my opening remarks, both of those are causing our civilians to question their future. And I think there is an intangible impact there. It will have a practical effect on some of our people. It will have an intangible effect on all of them. And how to characterize that, we have been struggling with that a little bit, certainly in my headquarters. We believe that in my headquarters we can stagger the way the civilian furlough is applied to try to minimize mission impact.

But I can tell you there are some places out beyond STRATCOM headquarters where people sustain critical parts of our nuclear deterrent, for example, where it may not be possible to stagger the workforce furlough.

And for example, I know that the Navy was looking at how they will manage civilian furloughs in the strategic warfare centers on the Atlantic and the Pacific that support the Trident ballistic missile submarines. They tell me that when you get right down to it, there is a critical pathway for sustaining those——

Mr. LARSEN. You have 10 more seconds.

General KEHLER [continuing]. There is a critical pathway and they may not be able to stagger furloughs. You may have to take block furloughs. Those are the kind of issues we are going to work our way through.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you.

Admiral Locklear.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, first, I think what we are potentially going to do with our civilians in this is somewhat tragic.

I think, over time, in an All-Volunteer Force, the line between our civil servants who serve in our Defense Department and our military have blurred to some degree, and we rely very, very heavily on these civil servants to do the type of things that you might historically have considered as kind of core military.

But let me just give you a couple of examples. In the State of Hawaii alone, there is—where my home is—there is about 20,000 civilian employees. So on 21 April, I understand, when this takes effect, they will effectively take a 20 percent reduction in pay for the rest of this year.

Now I don't know about everybody in this room, but I don't think I could take a 20 percent cut in pay in a high-cost area where I have children in school and I have mortgages in a high-cost living area. And I don't know how I would survive it. And yet we are going to ask them to do it. And chances are, many of them will, many of them may not.

In the area of things it will have trickle-down effects. For instance in our DODEA [Department of Defense Education Activity] schools which educate all of my children—our children that are overseas. Most of them are civilians—government civilians so—so that means that one-fifth of the teachers won't be teaching on any given day in those schools which are already probably pressurized to be as efficient as possible.

Our hospital systems overseas are mostly government employees. So we are going to have a decrease in the hospital care immediately. So those are—I could go—I could just keep going on but that is the tip of the iceberg.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The time has expired.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you very much, and I would just note that that same principle applies to a lot of other agencies outside the Department of Defense and services provided to people around this country.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no question that this is going to spread pain across the whole Federal Government of employees, and I wish I had the ability to bring an appropriation bill for everything, but I don't think we should let the perfect be the enemy of the good, the better. And we do have the opportunity to vote on an appropriation bill which has gone through the process, unfortunate that the—we never got a budget out of the Senate and we have had to operate under these kind of conditions. But we should really, again, be very mindful of this vote this week.

Mr. Bishop.

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Am I the good, the better or the perfect or just the enemy?

The CHAIRMAN. You are the perfect, you now have 4 minutes and 50 seconds left.

Mr. BISHOP. There is always a penalty attached.

General Kehler, if I could ask you what I think are about six pretty basic questions if I could please.

In your opinion, do you—would you say that or believe that further nuclear reduction should be bilateral and verifiable rather than unilateral? Is there a significant advantage in that?

General KEHLER. Sir, if we are going to go beyond the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] levels of 1,550 then I think that should be bilateral.

Mr. BISHOP. Are you aware of any precedent that this Nation has ever undertaken to negotiate a bilateral and verifiable agreement that did not take the form of a treaty?

And if you need time to look that up or need to be more comfortable, I can do that.

General KEHLER. Well, I would like to take that for the record. And why I am hesitating, I am not sure the agreement that was made between the United States and Russia with President Bush to go to 1,800 to 2,200 weapons. I just don't recall—I will have to take that for the record, sir.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 115.]

Mr. BISHOP. Okay.

It—I mean why do we need to have things that are verifiable? Is, I mean, is verifiable there simply because we need to know if there is cheating involved?

General KEHLER. It, certainly, there is an element of verification that gets to whether parties are cheating. I think that is a piece of it.

Another piece, I think, is, there is a transparency piece of verification. There are certainly an information exchange piece of verification, there are insights that are all gained from verification. But I think at its core, verification is about ensuring that we can place our trust in a country that we have entered an agreement with.

Mr. BISHOP. Is there kind of, is there some kind of threshold, or is cheating more military significant at a lower force level?

General KEHLER. I think that—I get the question, sir, sometimes about cheating. I think there are two answers from my perspective about cheating.

Number one, I think any country that intentionally cheats, I think there is a significant concern about that. But then the second question is, does the cheating have a military effect. I think that is a different question and the answer is it depends.

Mr. BISHOP. So, if a country were to break a key obligation under an arms control commitment, you know, like say one of the central limits of the New START Treaty, is that militarily significant?

General KEHLER. It can be, yes sir.

Mr. BISHOP. Is there a threshold level about that? I mean would ten missiles be significant, 50? How many would be required to make it significant?

General KEHLER. Well, I think we would have to take a hard look at the circumstances. I, so what I would say is, I mean you could take this to an extreme. You could say if 1,550 accountable warheads is what the treaty says and someone has 1,551, is that militarily significant? And I—we could assess that.

Mr. BISHOP. What if the concept was either developing or deploying a prohibited type of weapon?

General KEHLER. I think——

Mr. BISHOP. Is that significant?

General KEHLER. That can have military significance. It is hard to talk about this in the abstract, though.

Mr. BISHOP. I understand that. Thank you.

If you reduce your nuclear force by a third, is there any way that that is not militarily significant?

General KEHLER. Sir, we begin the conversations about how many weapons we need based on strategy and national objectives. And so, and then we take a hard look at the threat and the potential threat. Ultimately, as we work our way through this, this turns into military tasks in the face of a threat and how many weapons we need is based on that.

And so if, without some changing circumstances that go with this, without some changing conversation about the threat, it is hard, again, to look at does one-third make a difference? Does 10 weapons make a difference, et cetera.

Mr. BISHOP. So the key element then in that decision is the threat itself?

General KEHLER. I——

Mr. BISHOP. If there is no reduction in our outside threat, that would still be a significant impact.

General KEHLER. I think there are two, two primary drivers of this. One is the potential threat or the nature of the potential threat. The other is the national guidance and the strategy that we are trying, and the objectives we are trying to achieve. Those are both together.

I think in the long run though, my view is that if we are going to engage in another conversation about reductions below New START, that should be done in a bilateral sense. That should be done with the Russians.

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, I appreciate that.

Mr. Chairman, I will yield back an additional two seconds, including the ones I took earlier.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you to the witnesses for being here today.

Admiral, on page nine of your testimony, you clearly I think wanted to convey a point of highlighting the advances in undersea warfare in the Asia-Pacific area, which again, Mr. Forbes's question sort of alluded to.

You know, one question I hear all the time from other members is, you know, why do we need submarines and you know, aren't they Cold War relics?

Again, your testimony again suggests that actually there is something changing out there and I just was wondering if you could sort of, you know, maybe elaborate a little bit more than your prior answers in terms of just how submarines fit into a modern security strategy.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, I would disagree with anyone who said that they are Cold War relics. The modern submarine force of today, first is globally deployable. It is a highly proficient force and

it does things well beyond what people would think from a Cold War perspective.

They are significant in intelligence and reconnaissance collection. They have long-range strike capability when necessary. They have the ability to carry Special Forces or special operating forces into denied areas.

They have the ability to use the asymmetric advantage of stealth under the ocean and able to be a force multiplier for our force and our Nation that has global interests, particularly as you talk about maritime domain and insuring that we have proper access.

You know, it is always widely reported that 95 percent of everything that moves on the global economy moves on the ocean. That is true. What is not reported is that in the last decade or so, that number has quadrupled. And so whether it is energy or whether it is the things that need to be supplied to local stores in our country, it is—the global economy runs on the oceans. And so to cede that to anyone at any time is not in our best interest. Submarines have a significant play in making sure that we have freedom of access to our national interest.

Mr. COURTNEY. Great, thank you. That was a very good statement that I think is helpful as we again have to always deal with competing priorities here.

You know, on page 28 of your testimony, you talked about again the need for bilateral and multilateral communication collaboration as you said is really what the pivot to Asia-Pacific is really about.

At the end of January, there was an incident in East China's sea where it was reported that Chinese frigate locked actually weapons on Japanese vessels and there is obviously now this sort of competing dispute about whether it really happened or whether it did happen. And I mean, you know, to me, that is sort of where, you know, the success of whether or not collaboration is going to work in terms of whether or not we have got systems here for making sure everybody is communicating well and understands what is going on out there.

And you know, the last thing in the world is that we want an incident like this to escalate into something where we are going to be sort of involved. And I just wonder if you could sort of comment, not necessarily about what actually happened there, but, you know, how do we get ahead of these kinds of—because there is a lot of congestion out there is what we are hearing this morning—to make sure that we don't sort of run into these incidents that spin out of control.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well because I wasn't actually at the scene when it occurred, but it was reported by the Japanese forces, and I think subsequently denied by the Chinese.

First that type of activity is highly escalatory; by mature navies, that is recognized as something that you don't do unless you are directed to do it and it is because of, say, a move towards greater hostilities.

I believe that if it had occurred, that the Japanese would have been able to detect it, their navy and their military is sophisticated enough to be able to understand what was being done.

And I have been complimentary of the Japanese command and control and their ability to maintain a level of calm and as they

work through this very difficult challenging security issue they are dealing with. And I think that is indicative of the close alliance relationship we have had in building our navies and our militaries together in that alliance to understand each other. And so I think that kind of worked.

And we have very close—I have very close communication with the Japanese leadership on the military side of these issues and I am quite comfortable with that.

Now, on the Chinese side, we are trying to create these avenues. We have been successful in the last couple of years, I think historically successful in being able to keep our mil-to-mil relationships going even through the periods of time when we disagree as a nation.

I mean, there will be—you don't have two—a superpower and a rising power that won't have competition and won't have friction.

The question is how do you manage that friction so that it is productive rather than negative. So we are opening venues. We have a tremendous number of high-level engagements. I have been to Beijing twice just in the last year to talk to my counterparts. I have had them come to Hawaii.

So we are improving in our dialogue. We need—there is more to do—much more to do, and much more to do I think at the tactical level, being able to have that near-term voice-to-voice communication, mil-to-mil with the Chinese that we quite frankly don't have yet but that we are working towards.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Admiral.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Kehler, in your discussions with Representative Bishop, you were talking about threats and strategy, and basically that the process you were describing, it was in part determining what our requirements are for our nuclear deterrent.

You are the requirement setter for our nuclear deterrent, and you look at yourself as a customer of our National Nuclear Security Administration. As you know, I am very concerned about our plutonium capability and have been an advocate for the completion of the CMRR [Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement] that was part of the administration's promises in the New START process.

We have heard of the proposal, as CMRR has been delayed, of an interim strategy, perhaps a modular approach. And we are very concerned about, you know, lack of details with what those interim strategies might be for satisfying our need for plutonium capability and what the modular approach might be.

So I am assuming that you have the details of those proposals, and I have a series of questions about them. You know, one, do you have the details? And two, if you had to pick between what you are hearing about the modular approach and the interim strategy versus CMRR, which would you pick if you were only going to get one?

General KEHLER. Well, let me start with we have spent the last year—I think as you know, when we came in front of your committee last year, I expressed some grave concerns about the plan that we had for the nuclear enterprise, the weapons complex and

the weapons life extensions and other activities themselves. Because as I said at the time, the plan didn't close, as you well know.

We took the last year and we sat down as the Nuclear Weapons Council and we worked our way with the National Nuclear Security Administration through a strategic approach, through an implementation plan. We associated budget with that, and all of that is pending with the fiscal year 2014 budget release, which I can't describe today.

What I don't know is what is going to happen to it now. Because I am far more comfortable with the approach that I believe that we have hammered out over the last year. I believe that the plan does close. It is not without risk, but I don't know what is going to happen to it given the fiscal uncertainty and fiscal year 2014 in particular.

An element of that plan deals with the plutonium needs that we are going to have. And again, if you are asking me if I pick between one thing or the other, I think the practical matter is that one way or another, we are going to need to have an interim strategy for plutonium. Whatever we decide to do in the long term, we are going to need to do something on an interim basis.

Mr. TURNER. So you—are you saying you have sufficient enough details on the interim strategy, which perhaps includes a modular approach, to endorse that strategy with the Nuclear Weapons Council?

General KEHLER. Well, I think—again, I need to be a little careful here because the entire plan hasn't been released. But I have been comfortable with the proposal that we have discussed regarding an interim plutonium strategy. Now that is different than what do you do in the longer term—

Mr. TURNER. Well, and that is my next question actually. So let me frame that, which will be part of what your answer is. That is, there is the issue of, you know, which would you want, CMRR or the interim strategy, the pick. And that is the long-term strategy.

But the second aspect of that—so there is two components. One, you know, do you think we could maintain in interim strategy in perpetuity versus the investment required for CMRR? But the second aspect is would you ever consider undertaking reductions in our hedge based upon just the interim strategy versus the long-term strategy of the CMRR?

General KEHLER. Well, let me go back to the interim strategy. I—again, I don't think we have a choice. I think that we have to do some kind of an interim strategy. The question then becomes, okay, what do we do next? And I think that that isn't quite solid in my mind yet, and I think that is going to be one of the open questions as we come forward. Again, assuming—I don't know what to assume about the 2014 budget at this point in time to tell you the absolute truth.

But having said that, I believe you have to do some kind of an interim strategy. I believe that that gets us through the time period that we are talking about. Certainly in the long run we would prefer to see a more permanent solution to the plutonium needs. And I think that will also—I think there are a number of steps that impact a hedge strategy. That is one of them.

Mr. TURNER. Great. Because you would agree that our ability to have a long-term ability for production, in a production infrastructure should be a basis for us considering whether or not we reduce any of our hedge in case there isn't an issue with the weapons that we have.

General KEHLER. Sir, I think that is one consideration. I don't think that is the only consideration. And I think that there are some scenarios that you can unfold where an interim strategy will serve us even under some technical issues. So I—but I think for the United States of America in the long term that we want a permanent solution to the nuclear enterprise that includes a permanent solution to the plutonium.

Mr. TURNER. I appreciate that. I am surprised, General, by your last answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Ms. Hanabusa.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, General. And of course aloha, Admiral. Admiral, in reviewing your testimony, and this is a hearing on the posture of both of your commands, I did not see a real specific reference to PMRF [Pacific Missile Range Facility]. And I wanted to give both of you the opportunity to testify about the importance of PMRF in both of your postures. Admiral.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Aloha.

Ms. HANABUSA. Aloha.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, I mean, I think that, for those of you who visit Hawaii and go to Kauai to see PMRF, I think it becomes readily apparent the importance of it, particularly as we pursue our technologies and our research and development and are able to demonstrate in an airspace our ability to do ballistic missile defense, to develop those technologies which are critical to our own homeland defense.

One of the problems we have is finding a range in places where you can actually have the airspace and the outer space, if you call it, to be able to fly targets and to be able to do them. And PMRF is a relatively modest organization, but they carry a lot of weight in this. And I think you would see that any future strategy we have towards our ballistic missile defense will have a—PMRF will play a central role in being able to test and evaluate those systems.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. General, would you like to add to that?

General KEHLER. Congresswoman, I would just say that I completely agree, and I would add one other point, although it isn't completely related to Hawaii. The importance of the facilities on Kwajalein farther to the south and west are equally important for those same reasons.

That is where we—the entire Pacific Range Complex, that includes PMRF, it includes Kwajalein, it includes Vandenberg at the eastern end of it, it includes other assets, is critically important for us for missile defense purposes, for our ability to continue to demonstrate the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent and for lots of other reasons, development of radar and other things. So all of those are important places.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. And for those that may not understand PMRF, it is the Pacific Missile Range Facility. Admiral, I

think the chair of the subcommittee on seapower sort of got into it, and that is how many ships do you need?

We had a hearing earlier last week I believe where former SECNAV [Secretary of the Navy] Lehman testified, as well as Admiral Roughead also testified, and we had a range of numbers. Of course, we all know that Admiral—I mean the Secretary Lehman is known for his 600 fleet under President Reagan, but he says 346 is his number. And Admiral Roughead said 325 to 345.

So when I asked him, well, what does that mean, they both kind of said it depends on our needs and that we are to understand that when we are talking about a fleet that there are support vessels and everything else associated with it.

If you were to pick a number that you believe would be necessary, what would that number be, and also what would the number be for you to accomplish what you feel is necessary for what I call your DAP [Defense Acquisition Policy] in the Pacific?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, you can see you get competing numbers from almost any source you talk to. I would start by saying that the number we have today is insufficient. So from that—start from that perspective.

But if you look at I think at Navy's and its, and other aspects of our force, it really starts by how do you define your—what it is you want to do. What is your national aspirations around the globe? And from a maritime perspective, the globe is actually getting not physically bigger but it is actually getting more challenges. When I was a young junior officer, I never contemplated operating in the Horn of Africa. I probably didn't know where it was because we just didn't go there.

I would not contemplate—wouldn't have contemplated that there was a potential for Arctic operations in my lifetime, but you know, that is going to probably happen in the next generation of naval officers that have to go and deal with this. I wouldn't have anticipated the rise of some of the militaries that we are seeing and the lack of transparency in some of them and what that would mean.

So, you know, the debate about how big the Navy is has been one that is historic in our Nation, is really about how do we define ourselves. And if we think we are going to be a global maritime power and a maritime domain that is increasingly important, then we have to build a Navy that can stay out there and we can sustain it.

The one we have today I think is challenged to do that. And the exact numbers, like I said, it depends on what you want to do and where you want to do it at and what type of ships you want to do it with. But as you can see, just in my lifetime we have grown from a—basically a sea-controlled environment to now a ballistic missile defense environment.

So many of the requirements that are driven in the PACOM AOR about my service ships are equally as much about anti-submarine warfare and maritime security and patrol of the seas is equally about ballistic missile defense of our homeland and defense of our allies and the treaty allies we have.

So I think we really do need to have that debate about, what is the right size for that? And I think the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] is heading in that direction.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. ROGERS.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Kehler, good to see you again. I want to ask you if you agree with a statement made by Secretary Panetta last year before this committee in testimony, quote—"Reductions that have been made, at least in this administration have only been made as a part of the START Process, and not outside of that process, and I would expect that that would be the same in the future"—closed quote. Is that the right way to do our reductions?

General KEHLER. Congressman, yes I think so.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. Next, Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker stated in 2006 that, quote—"President Yeltsin committed to similar reductions in Russian tactical nuclear weapons, but considerable concern exists that the Russian commitments have not been entirely fulfilled"—closed quote. Mr. Rademaker was discussing the President's Nuclear Initiatives, PNIs, which President George H.W. Bush and President Yeltsin entered into. But without the treaty process, and thus it had no legal effect.

In 2009, the Perry-Schlesinger Commission stated in its final report to Congress that Russia, quote—"Is no longer in compliance with PNI commitments." Do you have reason to believe that the Perry-Schlesinger Commission was wrong?

General KEHLER. I don't although I can tell you from our perspective today in terms of New START, we believe that they are complying. They are above the ultimate numbers, so are we. We are working our way down, and we believe they are complying.

Mr. ROGERS. What about Secretary Rademaker's position that I just outlined?

General KEHLER. You know sir, I am going to have to take that for the record. I really would like to know more about what he was really talking about.

Mr. ROGERS. Would you respond in writing when you have the chance to do that?

General KEHLER. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. ROGERS. And lastly, what would you say are our most significant concerns with respect to modernization of our aging strategic deterrent enterprise?

General KEHLER. I think that I have two primary concerns. Actually, I have got three primary concerns. One is in the command and control area, to make sure that we have kept our nuclear command and control, which is more and more and more becoming national command and control capability, that we keep that such that that is the bedrock of our deterrent. I think that in the forces themselves, as I said earlier, I am committed to wanting to support the replacement for the *Ohio* ballistic missile submarines. I fully support a long-range bomber that will eventually come along to supplement the B-2 and potentially take the place of the B-52 as time passes.

I support, even though it is not within my joint command, I get the use of the Air Force's aerial refueling tankers, and so I am

deeply committed, because I see the value of those tankers every single day, and I know every combatant command would say the same thing, that they see the value of those tankers every day. And I certainly support the analysis of alternatives to look about what we might do with the Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile beyond 2030, which is where the Air Force believes they can take it today. So, that is part number two.

Part number three is the weapons themselves, and the nuclear enterprise that supports and sustains those weapons. We are in a different era today. The era that we are in, is an era of a moratorium on testing nuclear devices. And so we have got to maintain the science that underpins those weapons. We have got to make sure we are sustaining those weapons, and surveiling those weapons as they age, and then we have got life extension programs that we need to put in place.

And all of this comes at a time of significant physical challenge as you all well know, and we are going to have to make some tough choices, I am sure.

Mr. ROGERS. In your opinion is that a limitation—a prohibition on testing inhibiting your ability to modernize?

General KEHLER. No, sir not today, it is not.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, sir. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Kilmer.

Mr. KILMER. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Admiral, at the end of your written remarks targets your concerns regarding the impacts of inadequate maintenance, and a potential bow-wave of maintenance down the road. I know this is consistent with a letter that was sent out by the Secretary of the Navy, which detailed cutbacks resulting from sequestration. I was out on Friday at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, which is in my district in Washington State, and obviously the DOD [Department of Defense] civilians who were there were concerned about furloughs, and the impacts to them personally, financially.

But the broader concern that was raised and I was very impressed with, the number of people who are concerned about the implications to national security to the real physical work done there at the shipyard at the west coast hub of maintenance activity. Can you say a bit more about the immediate impacts of sequestration with regard to maintenance and the mission in the Pacific? And the downstream impacts as well? And also if you could discuss for me the impacts of delayed maintenance on carriers and the national security implications as we shift our strategic focus to the Pacific?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well certainly from my years of experience on ships, you know, you have to applaud our Navy today for how ready it is, and how it has been able to sustain itself, even the size it is globally in a pretty intense environment. But to do that, it is so far away from home, it requires a consistent approach to how you maintain and keep these ships going. As you know, they are complex platforms with tremendous amounts of capability that require sophisticated maintenance and upkeep.

And that we do in the most cost-effective way we can, using the great resources we have, like in the shipyard that is in your district. And over time, we try to build a business model that allows

us to keep our forces forward with the ones we have in the most efficient way we can. So when you put a burble in that, it is you know, you cannot change the oil in your car once, you cannot change it twice, but then when it is at 100,000 miles you have an engine replacement.

We need to have these ships around for 30 to 35 years. The same for our airframes across the Air Force, same for our submarines. So, built into them and the life expectancy that they have of many, many years, is a requirement to do maintenance, this is particularly important as well in our carrier force. Our carrier force, I think continues to be one of the most important aspects of a peaceful maritime environment around the globe. And keeping the size of the carrier force that we have today globally deployed as a very sophisticated platform requires continuous maintenance.

Of course it is amplified by the fact that they are nuclear vessels, so there is an aspect of us ensuring that the maintenance is done safely and properly, and I believe that the—if you look across the nuclear power program that the Navy has, it is an unbelievable model of success and safety. And we do that running the entire program with basically 19- to 25-year-olds. And to do that, it requires investment and ensuring that the systems are maintained properly, at the right time periodicity.

So as we interject this unpredictability into our maintenance schedules and we start doing things near term, it just—you don't—it is pay me now, or pay me later, and that is the era I think we are entering into more under sequestration.

General KEHLER. Congressman, could I add a piece to that? From another joint perspective, I think it is important to note that as we defer maintenance, we are beginning at a different starting point. We are coming out of 10 years worth of high operations tempo events. And so the stress on the platforms to begin with is higher than it has been at other places when we have tried to reset in the past. Or at the end of other conflicts. This is a force that, whether it is flying hours on aircraft, or steaming hours on ships, or vehicles that the Army has, we are starting at a far different place. And so the magnitude of deferred maintenance I think is going to be higher.

We also have some older platforms today, the car oil change analogy is—you know if your car already has 200,000 miles on it, you have got a different place to start.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentleman, thank you. I always try to take a moment just to express my gratitude for people like yourselves that give your whole lives to the cause of human freedom. On behalf of my little 4-year-old twins, I am grateful because I think they have a better chance at life because of what people like you do. With that, my first question is directed to you General Kehler. I just want to thank you for your written testimony, in which you state, and I will quote you if I can, quote—"Ballistic missile threats are likely to grow at least as rapidly as our defensive assets, giving us little margin for error in acquisition and force management decisions."

“Sustained missile defense investments support deterrence and assurance goals by significantly improving the protection of our homeland, our forward base forces, and our allies and partners.” And I am in violent agreement with you. I think that that is well stated. And I have—I wanted to ask you about your concern with the potential threat posed to our critical infrastructure by a major EMP [electromagnetic pulse] event, you know GMD [Ground-based Midcourse Defense], or something deliberate, or even in isolated cases, EMI [electromagnetic interference] technology that seems to be at least on the North Korean radar, and as stated in STRATCOM’s mission, you know, your responsibility to prepare for uncertainty and partner with other COCOMs, how is STRATCOM preparing? How does it perceive the uncertainty of a threat like EMP?

General KEHLER. Congressman, I think the entire electromagnetic spectrum needs to get more attention, and we have stood up, we were given over the past several years a number of organizations that work various parts, either assessing potential threats whether it is EMP, or in some cases cyber threats to our systems and our capabilities. We have now some organizations that do that. We have some other organizations that are looking hard at how to detect such electromagnetic spectrum issues, whether it is EMI or EMP when it occurs.

We have some others that are doing some planning against how to deal with those threats as they emerge, and we have put all of those together now in one single organization. It is in many different places, in one single organization to try to address these on behalf of STRATCOM and the other combatant commanders. I think we haven’t paid nearly enough attention to this. I am concerned about the threat of electromagnetic pulse. There are some pretty good books that have been written here recently about this, a couple of novels that were written that you turn the page looking for the happy ending and it never comes in the book.

And so I would tell you that we are still mindful of electromagnetic pulse. It is not a Cold War relic. It is something that we need to prepare some of our systems to deal with in the operational environment.

I think as we look particularly at anti-access/area-denial environments in the future, one of the ways that adversaries will try to take away our U.S. advantages will be through the electromagnetic spectrum. Whether that is jamming, whether that is some kind of electromagnetic interference or whether it is through cyberspace or whether it is via an electromagnetic pulse, we need to be prepared for that.

And I think that we need to—we have a lot of work to do. I am not yet comfortable that we have gone anywhere near where the magnitude of this problem should take us.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, sir. I am glad you are where you are.

Admiral Locklear, can you describe the capability, for this committee—some of us are perhaps more familiar with it than others—of the sea-based X-band radar and why it is important as a capability? And is it a capability that we continue to need to defend United States and deployed forces?

And what is its special significance on issues like, perhaps, protecting us from, you know, road-mobile missile threats from a North Korea sometime in the future?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, the sea-based radar has been an important part of our ballistic missile defense architecture as we built it over the last decade or so. It has played a tremendous role in research and development. It is a great radar. It is on a mobile platform, so it has those attributes to it. But it is not an end all to beat all, I mean, it is just a part of an architecture. So as we go forward in the future—and it is an expensive part of the architecture, to maintain it at sea. So as we go forward in the future, we will have to look at how it might—and we do, we are looking at that now—how it might more effectively fit into that architecture over the long run, or whether it is eventually, at some point in time, replaced by something else.

Because the nature of the platform it is on just becomes more and more expensive every year to keep it, because it is kind of an unusual, unusual thing. But it has tremendous capability and we have and will continue to use it as necessary to ensure that we are properly defending our national interests.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you.

Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am just reading some reports about North Korea and the fact that the U.N. is considering a new raft of sanctions against North Korea as the result of its testing of a nuclear device back in February. The blast from that device being about double the force of the last device that was tested back in 2009. And this device being miniaturized, as was described by the North Koreans.

So the thinking is that perhaps this miniaturized nuclear device that was successfully tested, coming behind the recent successful launch into space of a North Korean satellite, it raises the specter that there is now a nuclear device that can fit onto a missile, which can then be used to launch a nuclear strike.

And now, with this talk of new sanctions and there being an agreement, by the way, with the Chinese, the only ally of North Korea, being a party to this agreement for sanctions, we are looking at an unsafe area of the world, no doubt. A young leader who has never been told no, who has always gotten his way and who is just uneducated about military affairs, world affairs, how his country fits into the overall scheme of things.

And it is sobering to think that these kinds of things are happening throughout the world. But just using this as an example. And here we are going through senseless cuts to our ability to defend the Nation and its interest, this sequestration. Something has to happen.

But tell me, what do you think—how do things look as far as North Korea, which threatens to withdraw from its armistice agreement that has resulted in no hostilities over there, well, I won't say no hostilities, but has kept hostilities low? What do you see happening over in North Korea?

And I will ask that first of General Kehler, and then if you would respond, Admiral.

General KEHLER. Congressman, from my perspective in Strategic Command, all of the items that you described are deeply concerning. We have seen North Korea parade a long-range ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile]. There are, I think, valid questions about how far along that program is. We have seen other steps that you mentioned. And so all of that together is deeply, deeply troubling.

We have been involved with a review of our plans and our posture related to North Korea, particularly we have been working very hard with Pacific Command and Northern Command regarding our ballistic missile defense posture and our ballistic missile defense approach.

So as I said earlier, I am confident that STRATCOM can perform its deterrence and assurance mission today. And that we are capable of extending our deterrent umbrella over our key allies in Admiral Locklear's area of responsibility.

I am equally confident that we can meet a limited missile threat from North Korea with ballistic missile defenses that we have in place.

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Well, given that, could I now, since I only have 20 seconds—

General KEHLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON [continuing]. Could I go to Admiral?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, to your comments, I think you articulated what Kim Jong Un wants the world to believe. And so, the fact that he talks about it and demonstrates things and shows things, I think it causes us to have to take them—at least be concerned about them.

But I think the important thing for the new leader to recognize is that, in the end, this will be unsuccessful. In the end, this is not in the best interest of the people of North Korea, where the average citizen gets about 800 calories a day. They spent more money on the missile launch in 1 day than they could have fed their entire nation for 1 day—or for 1 month, on what they spent in 1 day to launch a missile.

And so, we are—us and our Korean allies, we are postured to ensure we are monitoring carefully what is going on on the Korea peninsula. Obviously, our defensive forces are postured in case something really crazy were to happen.

But in the end, we have to, I think, number one, applaud the efforts of the U.N. Security Council as they continue to put pressure on this regime from all sides. And in the end, just assure Kim Jong Un that his strategy will not be successful.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. Fleming.

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Kehler, I represent the 4th District of Louisiana, which is the home of Barksdale Air Force Base and Global Strike Command. And I want to thank you both for appearing before us today.

I am very much sold on the idea of nuclear deterrence and also on nuclear security. And I want to point out that in a fiscal year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress added language addressed to the issue of nuclear weapons storage areas, WSAs,

and quotes the 2008 SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] Task Force on DOD Nuclear Weapons Management, which concluded, and I quote—"the closure of WSA at one of the bomber bases was a significant mistake with a negative operational impact."

As it stands now, with the closure of the Barksdale WSA in 2007, we have a single point of failure in the ALCM [Air Launched Cruise Missile] mission.

And just to kind of expand a little bit, as you know, if we have all of our ALCMs in one location, and for whatever reason we have to gear up for battle at some point, or maybe a higher level of alert, then obviously other nations can monitor our bombers going and picking up the ALCMs from another location.

It takes a little bit of the surprise effect away and certainly it is important that we keep, again, nuclear assurance.

So I just wanted to get your response. I know that a lot of this is driven by budget issues. We are talking about anywhere from \$80 to \$200 million going forward, if you include not just the standards that have to be brought to bear on the WSA site, but also the employment and other, I guess, device expenses.

So what is your response? Is this something that we are going to be able to stand up at some point, maybe when we get past sequestration?

General KEHLER. Sir, I think that it is something for us to go look at as time passes. I think particularly as we go forward and we begin to see a long-range strike platform come into being, I think where and how we base that, how we would support the dual-capable nature of that platform.

Just like we do with the B-52s today, we made some decisions about how to support the dual-capable nature of those B-52s, I think there are many questions for us to ask and that we will have to answer as we go forward.

Today as you say, that would be a very expensive proposition to try to go back and revisit. However, I can say that commander of Global Strike Command and I have just met to discuss nuclear security and I know he has in his mind a review of that and the other storage areas because as we go forward, I think we recognize there are some investments going to have to be made to keep up to date with security standards and other things.

I can tell you we are, I think security-wise, we are in far better condition today than we were just a few years ago. But I think as we go forward to make additional security enhancements, it will be an opportunity for us to come back and take a hard look.

Dr. FLEMING. Right.

And maybe to follow up and expand that a little bit more, does the Air Force and the Department of Defense remain committed to a nuclear triad as effective deterrents, you know, the you just mentioned the long-range strike fighter platform that will eventually replace the B-52. There may be some that are critical of that and certainly we follow that closely. B-52s at some point in time will be too old to fly.

Now they may be a century old before that happens and as you know, General, they are doing an outstanding job as they are. But some day, they are just simply going to wear out.

Are we still committed to that nuclear triad and to the newer platform?

General KEHLER. I am certainly committed to the nuclear triads. Strategic Command's position is that we are committed. I have seen, certainly I heard Secretary Panetta say more than once that the Department was committed. I have seen some written commitment to that effect from Secretary Hagel. It was the recommendation of the nuclear posture review to sustain a triad, and that would certainly be my position going forward.

I think much like every other item that will be on the table as a result of fiscal issues, I suspect that that will get looked at again. But I can tell you my view is we ought to continue with that.

Regarding the replacement, one of the enduring advantages of the United States is that we have the ability to project power and—

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, the gentleman's time has expired.

General KEHLER [continuing]. Lots of reasons for that, the long-range air piece is a big part of that.

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Langevin.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, General Kehler and Admiral Locklear, for appearing before the committee today and I certainly appreciate your service and I also appreciate having the benefit of your insight and experience as we attempt to navigate a policy and budgetary challenges.

General Kehler, if I could start with you, turning to one of my favorite subjects, cyber. General, with the complex demands of operating cyberspace, it is certainly no surprise that U.S. Cyber Command has expressed a need to increase the number of its cyber professionals as recently announced. However, I am also given to understand that the situation is not as simple as adding more people, that instead they will be reallocated within the service components.

What progress has been made in acquiring these professionals? What training will they require? And how they would be allocated across the services and what is STRATCOM's role, specifically in shaping this force and in advocating for the resources needed?

General KEHLER. Sir, let me start with the last piece first. The responsibilities to protect the Department of Defense's networks and to be prepared for activity in cyberspace, remain assigned to Strategic Command to include advocacy, to include our responsibility to make sure that the service are providing us with adequately trained and resourced sufficient capacity and capability, if you will.

I delegate most of those responsibilities on a day-to-day basis to the commander of the U.S. Cyber Command, General Alexander, who executes—he is the execution arm if you will of this and of course, as you know, his command has been growing.

This is a growth area I believe for the Department as we look to the future. I will get you the specifics for the record in terms of the number of people that we have added here in the near term.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 115.]

General KEHLER. What we have finally done is we have come to grips with how to describe—how we would grow the cyber capacity and capability if this was F-16 squadrons, we would know how to do that. We would have a model for how to do that.

We finally put something in place for cyberspace as well. So we can now come back into the resource allocation process and advocate for the amount of resources that we need. I think that part of it is going well. The question will be with budget reductions, is how successful we will be and I think that is an open question that we will have to see how that goes as time passes.

But in my view, anyway, cyberspace is such an important part of our national security and our economic well-being and our ability to conduct business. As you know, the bulk of cyberspace exists in the civil domain. I think that having said that, though, its use for national security purposes is critical and it is important that we do everything we can to grow the capacity and capability we need to make sure that we can operate there effectively.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you.

Admiral, let me turn to you, can you discuss the role that cyber operations play in your activities, particularly in information operations programs and how they factor into your partnership activities in the Pacific. Do you feel that your command is adequately resourced in cyber in order to remain resilient in full spectrum conflict?

And then the second question I have for you, if you could probably start with this one first. I continue to be concerned about the capabilities of our bases to withstand a cyber attack directed against outside supporting infrastructure, such as the electric grid, which is owned and operated by the private sector, but you don't have any responsibility or capability to defend that private network. Your, but our bases are dependent on them.

Your predecessor, Admiral Willard testified on this topic last March. Can you update us on the progress that has been made in evaluating the ability of our bases in the PACOM AOR to operate and recover in the event of such an attack as well as any mitigation members that are underway?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, you know, cyber domain is the only manmade domain that we have, air time, space and others are given to us; this one we created. And sometimes we tend to think of cyber as only what shows up at the end of our computer device in our hand. But the reality is there is a large supporting infrastructure that supports cyber globally, not the least of which is under-seabed cables which are prolific throughout the world, it would have to be understood where they are and how those are protected.

So to the question of what we have done in the last year to look at our ability to operate our cyber networks. Assuming that the infrastructure in those cable networks, those things are secure which is one of the things that I have to worry about.

And from the defense perspective, from my ability to operate as a—and to operate the forces I have, I feel relatively secure that we can defend the networks that we actually would do warfighting or contingency operations on. But we are working hard at it and Cyber Command's agreement to grow and to provide experts and

allow us to know how to do computer network defense, how to recognize computer network attack, these are all important and they are critically important to me and to PACOM AOR.

Mr. LANGEVIN. I know my time expired—

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. LANGEVIN [continuing]. Admiral, if you could though write and respond what we have done to protect our ability to be resilient in our bases.

Okay, thank you

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me, I didn't hear you but your time had expired. What were you requesting?

Mr. LANGEVIN. They—the Admiral didn't quite answer my question in terms of what has been done in terms of resilience—

The CHAIRMAN. Okay, would you please respond for the record?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Can I provide it in—I will provide you a written answer to it. Will that be adequate?

Mr. LANGEVIN. That would be adequate.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Thank you.

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. Heck.

Dr. HECK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Locklear, what transnational terrorist threats are the greatest concerns to you in the PACOM AOR and how are you engaging with our international partners to address the terrorism threat in Southeast Asia and how will the current fiscal constraints impact that engagement?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Right, well, if you look globally at terrorist threats and violent extremist organizations, they are increasingly kind of popping out in the Asia-Pacific region. And whether they are in the south of the Philippines or in other areas, the vastness of the region and the way that it is structured, I think allows the opportunity for, if not monitored properly, to be a proliferation area for terrorists.

Now, but that is not the only threats. We know that Southeast Asia is the number one supplier of precursors for methamphetamines that are created in drug labs inside the United States. So we have a JIATF [Joint Interagency Task Force] West that works for me and we do a large network of looking and interdicting and understanding networks that provide these, what would appear to be innocuous chemicals that show up on ships that show up in our ports and harbors that eventually show up in garages and people's houses that are making illegal methamphetamines that are being—now I think the—they are probably one of the number one scourges of parts of our society.

So, the next thing that I would say is fairly prolific in this region is the human slave trade that has to be contended with. I am told that last year alone, the human slave trade was worth about \$30 billion globally—\$30 billion, that is as much as I think Nike, Google and Starbucks put together.

And so, looking not only at how do you stop that, but what are the networks that are benefiting by this type of unbelievable be-

havior that adds to the sense of lack of security in areas where we have a lot of national interest is a priority for us at PACOM.

So those are the ways we look at it.

Now you can't—the area is too big to interdict all this stuff. If you were taking interdiction mentality, you would run out of resources in a very short period of time.

So what we have to do is we have to—through our partnership building, through our interagency processes where we go in with the FBI or we go in with AID or we go in with the CIA or other interagencies. And we work with these nations to let them, first of all, understand what is happening to them. Let them be able to sense what is happening and then to help them, hopefully build partnership organizations or organizational structures inside their own militaries and their own governments that allow them to deal with this in an effective way. And I think we are having some great progress throughout the Asia-Pacific.

Dr. HECK. Well, can you address the last piece, the current fiscal constraints, what is it going to do to your ability to have an impact on those three areas?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, I mean, just recently my JIATF West organization took about a 20 percent reduction in their operating costs, just in this year.

So that is the organization that drives all of these discussions. It is predominantly a civilian-led, government civilian-led organization. So the ones that are left, they will be working 4 days out of the week.

So it compounds the problems in ways that I think that aren't always apparent to the people talking about sequestration.

Dr. HECK. General Kehler, I have got about a minute and a half left.

We are seeing some increased threats to our space-based capabilities. What is STRATCOM doing to monitor our space capabilities against disruption of service and other threats? And how are we postured to respond to these threats?

General KEHLER. Congressman, over the last year we have done a lot to improve our plans and to address our resilience so that we can continue to deter such attacks. But you are right. We see the potential for those kinds of activities in space, or directed against space objects, growing as time passes.

Space is no longer an operational sanctuary, for the United States, certainly. And we are dealing with that through improved plans, our improved ability to monitor what is happening. And ultimately we need to transition from monitoring and building a catalogue of items that are there to getting to real-time situational awareness, like we would have in the air, for example.

So we still have a lot to do. There could be investment impacts there, as time passes. But how we process sensor information about what is happening in space and how we maintain global awareness and situational awareness in space is going to be critical as we go to the future.

How we plan, then, to improve our resilience, I think, will be equally important.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Smith. And thank you, General and Admiral, for your time this morning.

I especially appreciate Admiral Locklear. I appreciate your opening comments and thank you for reminding the committee about the vastness of the Pacific Ocean and the strategic importance of the U.S. territory of Guam.

Admiral, I am particularly interested to hear your views on the rebalance of forces in the Pacific. Can you address some of your challenges regarding the distributed lay-down of Marines in the Pacific? How the current budget outlook may affect the timing of this plan?

And I do hope that PACOM continues to prioritize our investments and realignments in the Pacific.

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, thank you. As I said earlier, I think we have a good plan. I think it one that certainly makes sense in the context of where we want the Marines laid down for the 21st century in the AOR.

Guam is a centerpiece of that. I mean, if Hawaii is kind of the front door to the Asia-Pacific, Guam is well into the heart of the living room. All it takes is just a quick look at the vastness of the region and a map and you can see why we would want to make sure that we optimize our capabilities, both in peace and in crisis, from Guam.

And that bringing this part of the Marines back there is a critical piece of that.

So the challenges to it are ensuring—it is a little bit of a house of cards. You have to move one thing before you do the next. So ensuring that we can move ahead with the changes that we need to be funded in Okinawa, to be able to allow the movement of those Marines in a timeframe that allows us to have the infrastructure that is needed to be constructed on Guam.

And we have—quite frankly, I think we have had some struggle in trying to get those funds released. And I am hopeful that in the coming weeks and months, that that will be in our favor.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Admiral.

I would also like to ask about bilateral and multilateral military training exercises in your AOR. I understand that the current budget will place constraints on training and joint exercises. But in a more ideal fiscal situation, what would you like to see with regard to multilateral training in the Pacific?

I fear that we have a lot of bilateral training exercises that could be better leveraged through our multilateral training.

And also if you could please address how you intend to provide effective training in a more cost-efficient manner, given DOD's budget constraints?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Well, you know, after the World War II, we basically had a bilateral relationship structure, kind of a hub-and-spoke structure for U.S.—with U.S. allies and U.S. partners. It served us quite well for many decades.

But the strategic landscape has shifted to some degree now and the importance of multilaterals, I think, is growing day by day. The importance of multilaterals is if you get a larger group of like-minded people working on problems that all matter to them, you

build improved inter-operability between multilaterals instead of bilaterals.

You get in a very vast and uncertain region, you get a much better intelligence and picture of what is going on if you have multiple countries participating in that. Because they all have a little bit different view than we may have from Hawaii or we may have from Washington.

So we are pursuing multilaterals. We are very supportive of ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations], the East Asia Summit, and those multilateral forums. Even with our own allies, we are pursuing more trilateral operations where we can between Japan, the U.S. and Korea. Japan, the U.S. and Australia. Just pick one. But we are moving in the direction of multilateralism.

And you can—you really—in fact, if you take the Rim of the Pacific Exercise, which is the largest maritime exercise in the world, it is a multinational exercise. I think last year 22 nations participated. Russia came with ships for the first time. It was a great success. We invited the Chinese, the PLA [People's Liberation Army], to send ships in 2014 and we are hopeful that they will come and participate.

But in those, we get to know each other better. We get to operate together. We get a common understanding. And when you have militaries that can operate and understand each other, it lowers your threshold of crisis, no matter how you cut it. It is a good thing for all of our security and our own national security.

Now how can we be more effective in our training? One is to ensure that the bilateral training we do is effective for the strengthening of the alliance. But that where we can leverage that bilateral training into multilateral, that we take those opportunities. And we are doing that.

We also have to make sure that our range systems, where we have actually conduct our operations, our training operations, are unencumbered, remain unencumbered. Encroachment is one of the biggest problems we have everywhere in the world today, where sometimes it gets too hard to do operations because they are just too big of a population growth area or environmental concerns.

So our ranges in the Pacific Northwest are critical. Our ranges around Hawaii that we have already talked about are critical. The opportunity to find additional range space in your part of the world, I think will be important.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Admiral, for your continued interest in our area. And thank you, General.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. That is it. Thank you very much for your service. Please convey our thanks to those under your command, the men and women that are serving.

Thank you very much. This committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:19 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]



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**A P P E N D I X**

MARCH 5, 2013

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**PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

MARCH 5, 2013

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**Statement of Chairman Howard P. "Buck" McKeon  
House Committee on Armed Services  
Hearing on  
"The Posture of the U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Pacific Command"  
March 5, 2013**

I'd like to welcome everyone to today's hearing on the posture of the U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Pacific Command. Unfortunately, we still don't have a budget from the President and sequestration has now taken effect. But this committee intends to move ahead with our annual posture hearings to ensure there are no gaps in the committee's oversight. With that in mind, I'd like to thank our two witnesses for agreeing to be the first to testify in our posture hearing line up. With us today, we have General C. Robert Kehler, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, and Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command.

General Kehler, I know you have many different hats you wear, from missile defense, to cyber, to nuclear deterrence. I am deeply troubled about what sequestration means to these areas of responsibility, which pose existential challenges to this nation. I also am very concerned by the direction the President wants to go in driving further U.S. nuclear reductions at the present time. I understand the President has been considering a new nuclear guidance document that will seek to reduce our nuclear forces even further. If that is in fact the case, nothing has been shared with this committee.

Furthermore, it is not clear to me why this is necessary--it certainly does nothing to deal with threats like North Korea or Iran. As for Russia, why would we believe we can trust Vladimir Putin to honor new arms control agreements when he has shown a consistent willingness to violate current arms control agreements, when he denies visas to Members of this body to travel to Russia, and when he uses adoptive children as props in his neo-nationalism? I am especially concerned and suspicious when the President appears to be attempting to avoid the Senate and the Congress in getting such an agreement. Without a formal, ratified treaty, any agreement will inherently be non-binding. We know the Russians will violate such an agreement, as they did when we tried this in the early 1990s. General Kehler, understanding that you must support your chain of command, today I hope to explore further why additional reductions are in our

best interest, especially since we no longer have a production capacity.

Admiral Locklear, it's been over a year since the President released the Defense Strategic Guidance and outlined the rebalancing to Asia. I'm concerned about recent developments in Asia and how PACOM is postured to respond to a crisis. North Korea's threats and their nuclear and missile programs continue unabated. China's dangerous actions in the South and East China Seas pose a threat to our regional allies and partners, to U.S. national security interests, and to the sea lines of communication that are vital to global economic stability. This committee will continue to ask for more details on what the rebalancing means and how we can hope to deliver on the new strategy in light of other operational demands and lack of resources.

I want to thank you both again for being with us today.

**Opening Statement of Ranking Member Adam Smith (WA)**

**Hearing on “The Posture of the U.S.  
Strategic Command and U.S. Pacific Command”**

**March 5, 2013**

I would like to welcome General Kehler and Admiral Locklear and to thank them for being here with us today. I look forward to their testimony on a variety of important matters.

With regard to U.S. Strategic Command, the U.S. nuclear arsenal plays a unique and crucial role in national and international security, and we must ensure that it remains safe, secure, and reliable. Nuclear deterrence is a daily mission, the purpose of which is to prevent nuclear weapons from ever being used and to deter an unthinkable nuclear war.

I am interested in your thoughts, in a time of fiscal restraint, on how we can further decrease the danger of nuclear weapons, how we might be able to pursue further progress on nuclear weapons reductions and strengthen strategic stability, and how we might continue to provide strong and cost-effective extended deterrence for our allies.

The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons remain one of the gravest threats to our security, and preventing the spread of these weapons to additional countries and terrorists is paramount to international security.

In addition, missile defense remains an important mission for the defense of the United States and its allies against developing missile threats from North Korea and Iran. We must ensure that we effectively address current and near-term missile threats while preserving strategic stability.

The increasing importance of cyber operations in every aspect of national security also requires support as U.S. Cyber Command works to growing cyber threats.

This is also a dynamic time for the U.S. Pacific Command. The complex and diverse Asia-Pacific region is vital to our national interests, and it includes a number of important U.S. allies and partners. Without question, U.S. service men and women play crucial roles in maintaining these relationships and in promoting peace in the Asia-Pacific region.

We should continue to promote shared interests, mitigate concerns, and perpetuate multi-lateral cooperation in the region. We should work to cultivate a secure and mutually beneficial relationship with China, continue to develop our growing relationship with India, and strengthen existing relationships with partners like Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Singapore.

Current strategic guidance places a renewed focus on the critically important Asia-Pacific region. Strategic rebalancing will undoubtedly emphasize the roles played by the U.S.

Pacific Command in support of, and in concert with, broad U.S. diplomatic, economic, and assistance goals and efforts in the region.

Transnational threats, such as violent extremism, cyber-threats, and illicit trafficking in persons, narcotics, and weapons continue to menace the region. Unfortunately, disease, malnourishment, environmental degradation, resource scarcity, and natural disaster also persist. The more we can do to defuse tensions through cooperative efforts with our many allies and strategic partners in the region, the more we can help to realize the immense potential for growth in the region.

The United States will continue to lead in the Asia-Pacific and to offer assurances through our forward military presence in the region, and the U.S. Pacific Command's flexible force posture will continue to be essential to surmounting security challenges now and in the future.

General, Admiral, I look forward to receiving your testimony and to continuing our dialogue on these and other important issues. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

STATEMENT OF  
GENERAL C. R. KEHLER  
COMMANDER  
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND  
BEFORE THE  
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
5 MARCH 2013

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

**INTRODUCTION**

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to join you today. It is my privilege to lead United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and on behalf of our 54,500 outstanding military and civilian men and women I am pleased to report USSTRATCOM remains capable and ready to meet our assigned missions. I thank Congress and this committee for your support and I look forward to continuing to work together to ensure our national security today and tomorrow.

**USSTRATCOM TODAY**

Uncertainty and complexity continue to dominate the national security landscape. Today's operating environment is increasingly characterized by the potential for persistent conflict across all domains—air, sea, land, space and cyberspace—where state and non-state actors alike can employ highly adaptive combinations of strategies, tactics and capabilities to simultaneously and quickly exploit and transit political, geographic and domain boundaries. These hybrid threats are challenging earlier assumptions; stressing our plans, practices, and organization; compelling unity of effort; and demanding flexible and innovative approaches to create effects tailored to the unique actors, circumstances and scenarios we face. In short, yesterday's battlefield is rapidly becoming tomorrow's global battle-space.

Events continue to validate this perspective. Even as the U.S. continues to transition from today's conflicts, the reality of preparing for tomorrow's challenges has emerged. Violent extremists continue to threaten U.S. interests, allies, partners and the homeland. Their acts remind us that we must remain both vigilant and engaged with our combatant command (CCMD) partners to prevent a terrible connection between such extremists and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In December 2012, North Korea conducted a missile launch in violation of its obligations under multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions and announced last month it conducted another nuclear test. Iran continues to pursue its ballistic missile program and its nuclear ambitions. The Arab Spring continues to unfold and the outcome remains unresolved. Syria, a state with significant stocks of chemical weapons, continues to be gripped by civil war.

We continue to see improvements in more traditional militaries whose capabilities can range from low-end conventional, to sophisticated, all-domain regional and global (including WMD). China conducted a successful anti-ballistic missile test and continues to modernize its nuclear forces. South and East China Sea tensions rose between China and the Philippines (Scarborough Shoals) and Japan (Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands) respectively. Russia continues to modernize its nuclear forces and increase its level of strategic military activity.

Hostile cyber activities have increased in both quantity and intensity, and the potential exists for even greater activity against U.S. intellectual property, institutions, and critical infrastructure. U.S. national power relies heavily on cyberspace and the capabilities it enables; therefore, we must continue to improve the protection and resilience of our networks as we work to increase cyber capacity and capability.

Fiscal uncertainty presents our people with an unprecedented combination of professional and personal concerns as well. The all-volunteer military and civilian team has performed beyond our greatest expectations and is the envy of the world; but some of the best young uniformed and non-uniformed people assigned to USSTRATCOM are questioning their future. The uncertainty surrounding civilian hiring restrictions, salary freezes, and the possibility of unpaid furloughs is especially troubling since 60% of the USSTRATCOM headquarters staff and much of the essential work force which supports our missions and sustains our mission critical platforms and systems are civilians. Preserving this combat-experienced military-civilian team in the face of further force reductions, a potential decline in readiness and unpaid furloughs is one of my greatest concerns.

The challenges inherent in these examples remind us that as we plan, prepare and apply current capabilities to existing problems, we must also remain aware of and prepared for the unexpected. Within the new defense strategy we must maintain the organizational, programmatic, and intellectual flexibility to deal with surprise and meet the uncertainties of tomorrow's unforeseen problems.

USSTRATCOM remains focused on conducting the missions most critical to protect the core national security interests described in the 2012 defense strategic guidance: defeating al-Qa'ida and its

affiliates and succeeding in current conflicts; deterring and defeating aggression by adversaries, including those seeking to deny our power projection; countering WMD; effectively operating in cyberspace, space, and across all domains; maintaining a safe and effective nuclear deterrent; and protecting the homeland.

While our heritage is nuclear and our nuclear vigilance will never waver as long as nuclear weapons exist, today’s command is far more diverse and versatile. The missions and forces assigned to this command allow us to gain a global perspective and to create synergy from a range of strategic capabilities—those that can impact many people or systems, affect large physical areas, act across great distances, persist over long periods of time, change the status quo in a fundamental way, and provide the President ready military options in extreme circumstances—that is unique among the CCMDs. USSTRATCOM’s nuclear and conventional strike, space, cyber, and other capabilities remain foundational to confronting the challenges of the future. The U.S. can neither deter adversaries and assure allies nor prevail in war without them—simply put, USSTRATCOM’s responsibilities and capabilities underwrite freedom of action for our nation and generate viable options for our national leaders. Our seemingly diverse missions share commonalities: they are strategic in nature, global in scope, and they are interdependent with the responsibilities and capabilities of the other CCMDs, the whole of the U.S. government, and key allies.

**21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY DETERRENCE AND ASSURANCE**

USSTRATCOM’s primary mission objective is to deter strategic attack on the U.S., our allies and partners by making anyone who might contemplate such an attack recognize that they will not achieve their goals and will pay an extraordinary price if they try. We employ many means to

<p><b>Future conflict will:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Encompass all domains (air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace, all tied together through the electromagnetic spectrum)</li> <li>• Cross traditional geographic and man-made boundaries</li> <li>• Involve a wider range of actors with access to advanced, low-cost capabilities</li> <li>• Likely involve the U.S. homeland and multiple Combatant Commands</li> <li>• Demand that the U.S. continue to evolve toward an interdependent joint force that is integrated in every aspect</li> </ul>
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influence the perceptions and assessments of others; but the continuing credibility of America’s capabilities is the most effective deterrent against a strategic attack on the U.S.

Deterrence and assurance have been part of the national lexicon for well over half a century and, for many of those decades, strategic deterrence was synonymous with nuclear deterrence (i.e., using nuclear weapons to deter a massive nuclear or conventional attack on the U.S. or our allies). Today we believe deterrence and assurance concepts address a broader array of strategic attacks from individual actors who will have widely different capabilities and motivations. While nuclear attack will always remain unique in its potential for impact and devastation, today’s strategic attacks are potentially broader and defined by their effect versus a specific weapon or means of delivery. Therefore, it is increasingly

USSTRATCOM MISSIONS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strategic Deterrence</li> <li>• Space Operations</li> <li>• Cyberspace Operations</li> <li>• Joint Electronic Warfare</li> <li>• Global Strike</li> <li>• Missile Defense</li> <li>• Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</li> <li>• Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction</li> <li>• Analysis and Targeting</li> </ul>

clear that the capabilities we need, to deter or defeat attacks, are those that can meet multiple scenarios and take full account of the interdependencies and interactions among CCMDs and across the air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace domains—all tied together through the electromagnetic spectrum .

It is also increasingly clear that we must carefully shape our deterrence planning to specific actors and situations. To do this will require a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of our potential adversaries and their decision making processes, a robust understanding of the threats they pose, and more flexibility and speed in our strategy development and planning processes. In practice, 21<sup>st</sup> Century deterrence encompasses a wider range of complementary tools, including both nuclear and strong conventional forces, perhaps non-kinetic capabilities, limited missile defenses, unfettered access and use of space and cyberspace, and modern capabilities that are both resilient and sustained.

Future conflicts will likely involve multiple CCMDs from the outset, and so we must improve how we integrate our efforts across CCMDs and with the whole of the U.S. government and allies. We need the resources, the situational awareness, the organizations, and the decision-making capabilities with

the responsiveness and flexibility to provide the tailored effects the President might need before, during, or after armed conflict.

Assuring U.S. allies and partners also contributes to deterrence by demonstrating to our adversaries that our alliances and coalitions are resilient and enduring. Our assurance efforts must leverage the strengths of the individual CCMDs, Services, and Agencies, and complement other efforts already in place or in planning. Assurance is not necessarily a byproduct of deterrence; it is a deliberate effort in itself and one that often requires additional resources beyond those needed for deterrence.

USSTRATCOM is helping to shape the DoD's approach to deterrence and assurance. I'm pleased to report we have made significant progress in this regard through our Deterrence and Assurance Campaign. This campaign arranges USSTRATCOM's actions, operations, and messages in time, space, and purpose to achieve our deterrence objectives, ensure combat readiness, and generate unity of effort. The campaign is oriented toward four strategic military objectives.

- Enhancing strategic military deterrence. Adversaries who contemplate strategic attack on the U.S. and our allies must perceive unacceptable costs and an inability to obtain desired outcomes.
- Maintaining our readiness and capability to employ force to prevent and defeat all strategic attacks, not just nuclear.
- Strengthening efforts to prevent proliferation and use of WMD and mitigate effects if such weapons are used. This includes accelerating the speed with which we develop and field capabilities like standoff detection, better nuclear forensics and improved global situational awareness.
- Increasing the combat capability of the Joint Force by continuing to integrate and exercise USSTRATCOM capabilities and support plans across mission areas and with other CCMDs and allies.

The end result of the campaign planning and organizational effort is a USSTRATCOM that is more effective and soundly positioned to meet today's challenges, deter tomorrow's threats, and assure allies and partners of U.S. commitment to them.

**COMMAND PRIORITIES**

The new U.S. defense strategy is based on a future Joint Force that will be smaller and leaner, but will be agile, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced. The strategy also incorporates the concepts of networked warfare (recognizing the interdependence of both the forces and the CCMDs) and unity of action (integrated military action as part of a comprehensive whole of government and, when needed, multi-national approach). Within this new strategy and in support of USSTRATCOM's assigned missions, I have identified five priorities:

- | CDR USSTRATCOM PRIORITIES  |
|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deter nuclear attack with a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent force</li> <li>• Partner with the other combatant commands to win today</li> <li>• Respond to the new challenges in space</li> <li>• Build cyberspace capability and capacity</li> <li>• Prepare for uncertainty</li> </ul> |

As long as nuclear weapons exist, USSTRATCOM's top priority must be to deter nuclear attack with a safe, secure and effective strategic nuclear deterrent force. USSTRATCOM plans, operates and, if directed by the President, employs the strategic nuclear deterrent force as needed to achieve national objectives. To meet national deterrence objectives, we continue to maintain a Triad of ballistic missile submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), nuclear capable heavy bombers and associated aerial tankers, and an assured warning and command and control system. To provide the President with maximum flexibility, we maintain a portion of the missile submarine and ICBM forces in a ready-to-use posture that is governed by strict nuclear surety procedures and is constantly under the direct positive control of the President. I can assure you that today's nuclear weapons and Triad of delivery platforms are safe, secure, and effective.

My second priority is to bring USSTRATCOM's tremendous military capabilities to bear in support of our CCMD partners as needed to address today's conflicts. Over the last year we have worked hard with the other CCMDs, departments and agencies to institutionalize and enhance the integrated and

synchronized joint force capability that was the by-product of the last decade of conflict. To that end we are actively exploring and creating new processes and relationships to wield all of the nation's capabilities in responding to future threats.

My third priority is to ensure that space capabilities will be available whenever and wherever they are needed. Space capabilities are integral to the American way of warfare and today's space environment is characterized by more participants, more activity, and the proliferation of a variety of capabilities that can threaten our access to and freedom of action in space. In order to preserve the national security, humanitarian, scientific, and commercial advantages we gain from operating in space, USSTRATCOM has spent much of the last year improving our contingency plans and working with our Service components to enhance the resilience of our space capabilities.

My fourth priority is to continue building the cyberspace capability and capacity. Cyberspace is central to civil, commercial, humanitarian and national security endeavors as well and, like space, we need to protect our access to and freedom of action in cyberspace. We are also working with others in the U.S. government to help protect the nation's intellectual property and critical infrastructure. We are actively collaborating with partners in industry, academia, and the intelligence community to achieve those goals. At the same time we are working hard with United States Cyber Command to shape our future cyber force and advocate for the resources to meet the increased demands of this new domain.

Finally, we expend considerable effort trying to understand the emerging strategic environment to avoid or limit the impact of surprise which military history makes clear is a deadly enemy. We explore ways to limit the impact of surprise by integrating our plans and operations with other CCMDs, agencies, and partners through realistic and challenging exercises, and by exploring alternative scenarios and futures through aggressive table-top exercises. We are also creating opportunities for Joint Forces to exercise in an environment in which space and cyberspace capabilities are degraded.

#### **ENDURING ADVANTAGES**

Given the uncertainty in the global environment abroad and the fiscal environment at home, the Nation must rely ever more heavily on the enduring advantages represented by our people and the ability

of our interdependent Joint Force to maintain global awareness and project power. USSTRATCOM contributes and advocates for major capabilities that enable these enduring advantages.

#### **Our People**

People are our greatest and most enduring strength. The men and women of USSTRATCOM remain fully engaged with our many mission partners every day—both at home and abroad—despite uncertainty and a high mission pace multiplied by the inherent stresses of conflict and combat. As a result of DoD-wide suicide statistics and other human factors indicators, we have renewed our efforts to ensure our workforce remains viable, strong, capable, and resilient. We have taken specific steps to strengthen our workforce and enhance the working environment—addressing the wholly unacceptable nature of sexual assault within our ranks, respecting and including service members of all sexual orientations, understanding and treating combat-induced stress, and confronting and preventing the tragedy of suicide. These efforts are a good start toward protecting our most valuable asset, but we must do more. Leaders at all levels of USSTRATCOM are emphasizing the critical issues of personal health and well-being that are confronting our military and civilian members and their families.

I fully support the efforts of the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Service Chiefs, and the Congress to recruit, retain, and support our active duty, reserve, National Guard and civilian personnel. Our strategy demands that we also support educational efforts (including lifelong science, technology, engineering and math skills development) that will enable us to sustain the unique and highly technical nuclear, global strike, space and cyber workforce skills we need. However, I am extremely concerned about the impacts of actual and potential budget reductions on our people. While I believe these amazing professionals will continue to cope with uncertainty in the near-term, I cannot say the same over time if the financial risks to the individuals and their families persist.

#### **Global Awareness**

Our future success also depends on enhancing our enduring advantage in global awareness. Over the past decade, U.S. air, sea, and space-based capabilities have provided unfettered global access for the surveillance and reconnaissance information needed to detect and characterize trends and events. Most

often, these platforms operated in uncontested environments. As we go forward, USSTRATCOM and its mission partners need to work to ensure the U.S. sustains this advantage in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD), cyberspace, space, and other contested operating environments.

Space situational awareness (SSA) is foundational to unfettered freedom of action in all domains. SSA involves not only characterizing the dynamic physical arrangement of the space domain, but also the EMS through which we transmit and receive spacecraft commands and mission data. Protecting our assets from unwanted EMI is one of our highest priorities, and we are in the process of streamlining procedures to detect, identify, characterize, geo-locate and resolve such problems.

Many nations share the space domain and it is in our best interest to create an environment where the sharing of SSA data facilitates transparency. We provide conjunction analysis and collision warning for space operators around the world, intent on reducing the risk of collision that would create dangerous space debris. USSTRATCOM has entered into 35 signed commercial SSA sharing agreements. In 2012, we provided orbital data to 90 commercial and foreign, and 180 U.S. entities. We received and reviewed nearly 500,000 satellite observations and screened over 1,000 active satellites on a daily basis. From those screenings we provided over 10,000 conjunction warnings, supported 75 conjunction avoidance maneuvers, and fulfilled over 300 orbital data requests for more than 85 separate entities. Those numbers will grow every year, lending urgency to SSA improvements and establishment of appropriate "rules of the road" that will govern orbital behavior and allow us to more easily detect problems as they occur.

We are also working to share the awareness advantages of space with some of our closest allies and partners. The Combined Space Operations (CSpO) concept is built upon the current Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, with virtual connections between it and other nations' space operations centers around the world. This new paradigm enables partnering nations to work together to maintain the strategic advantage of access to space capabilities through synchronized activities and sustainable, combined military space operations.

Another component of global awareness, cyberspace, has become a key element for operations in all other domains, and cyber capabilities have enabled military forces to function with greater efficiency,

precision and lethality. Adversaries also recognize the contribution of cyberspace to their overall warfighting capabilities and continue to pursue the advantages that effective use of cyberspace can provide. The result is a competitive and continuous life cycle of modification, enhancement and replacement of information technology systems that friends and foes alike can use to gain military, economic, or social advantages. We believe that military functions and battlefield operating systems will increasingly depend upon agile use of cyberspace to gain advantages in combat.

Other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities also strengthen global awareness; the space capabilities described just above provide some of these, but a large number of other systems—manned and unmanned aircraft, ships, submarines, cyber, human—make critical contributions as well. In crisis or contingency, “ISR” is one of the first capabilities commanders request and expect for the duration of the mission. From determining the status of Syrian chemical weapons, to identifying violent extremist organizations’ safe havens in North Africa, to monitoring tensions in the South and East China Seas, to assessing Iran’s progress with nuclear weapons, to tracking the development and deployment of adversary ballistic missiles—ISR has gone from an enabler to an essential component of all military operations.

A fourth component of global awareness is control of usable portions of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). Almost every modern technological device is reliant on the EMS. The commercial sector is now the primary driver of spectrum technology development which has led to an exponential increase in the availability of EMS-dependent devices and a global proliferation of emerging commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and dual-use technologies. This proliferation creates competition with the military’s required access to the EMS and potentially pits economics against national security needs. USSTRATCOM is working with the Services, Joint Staff, and OSD to engage the whole of government to develop a cooperative way ahead to secure spectrum access.

USSTRATCOM employs capabilities in the air, space, cyberspace, and at sea in order to ensure the Nation maintains global awareness as the foundation for deterrence and, ultimately, to project power when and where needed.

**Power Projection**

The U.S. has long held a decisive military advantage through our ability to project power to any corner of the globe. U.S. conventional forces are second to none and our forward presence around the world ensures we can rapidly respond to crisis in any theater of operations. Adversaries and potential adversaries have taken note of this and are working to deny us this advantage through A2/AD strategies, improvements to their own capabilities, and the acquisition of WMD to discourage or limit U.S. action. As described in the 2012 DoD strategic guidance, “In order to credibly deter potential adversaries and to prevent them from achieving their objectives, the United States must maintain its ability to project power in areas in which our access and freedom to operate are challenged.”

The ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), ICBMs, heavy bombers, and cruise missiles assigned to USSTRATCOM remain the core of our nuclear deterrent. These highly reliable platforms are credible because we continue to invest the resources required to properly evaluate their performance and upgrade their capabilities on a recurring basis. Each time we test a ballistic missile or forward-deploy a heavy bomber, our allies and potential adversaries take note; our ability to transparently demonstrate the continued effectiveness of these tools creates a lasting impression which enhances our deterrent.

As effective as the U.S. deterrent force is today, we must plan for the likely circumstance that while we are projecting power abroad in a future crisis or conflict, we will also be defending the homeland in cyberspace and against missile or terrorist attack, perhaps at the outset of—or even before—a regional conflict goes “hot”. This is an operational challenge that has strategic implications for warning, thresholds, plans, and responses. Therefore, U.S. plans and operations across multiple CCMDs must be so well integrated and synchronized that when executed, they function as a single, coherent American campaign. Over the past year, USSTRATCOM has begun a complete reassessment of our operational plans to ensure we are well-integrated with our mission partners in the other CCMDs. We continue to exercise and seek robust training opportunities with these partners (including opportunities

that highlight operations in contested environments) to ensure we are ready to achieve the objectives directed by the country's senior leaders.

#### **KEY INVESTMENTS**

Deciding what capabilities are needed to meet these goals—hardware, people, organizations and procedures—is more difficult. Success in this context will be increasingly problematic as resources decline, but we can compensate by complementing planned investments with new operational concepts, more comprehensive and collaborative plans, and more effective use of the capabilities we have.

##### **Key Investment: Nuclear Deterrent Forces**

Over the past two decades, the United States has responded to changing geopolitical conditions by making appropriate reductions in the total number of nuclear delivery platforms we operate and the number of weapons in our nuclear stockpile. These reductions were determined based on a careful assessment of the capabilities required to provide the options and effects a President might need to achieve national security objectives. These capabilities include the nuclear weapons, the strategic delivery platforms, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, supporting intelligence, and the systems by which we command and control these unique forces. We must continue to invest in each of these areas even as we reduce to force levels specified by New START.

Many of our current nuclear command and control (NC3) systems were designed for the Cold War and require modernization in order to effectively meet the challenges presented in the evolving security environment. Using new and emerging technologies, we have set a course to transform the Nation's NC3 architecture to achieve robust and resilient 21st century capabilities. As part of modernizing nuclear command and control, last year we broke ground on the new USSTRATCOM Command and Control (C2) Facility. Our current headquarters was built in 1957 to support a single mission, nuclear deterrence and operations, with the corresponding C2 technology of the time (the land line telephone). Our greatly expanded mission set, combined with the vastly more complex supporting technology placed increasing demands on the legacy electrical and air handling systems to the point where we suffer numerous electrical, cooling, water, fire detection/suppression, and other basic service

interruptions. Your continued support for the new facility is greatly appreciated and will ultimately provide better command and control for all of our strategic forces.

The Triad of SSBNs, ICBMs and nuclear-capable heavy bombers, all with their associated support elements—offers a mutually reinforcing strategic package that provides a credible deterrent to our adversaries, assurance to our allies and partners, and flexibility for the President.

- Because of the extended service life of the current SSBN fleet, it is essential to provide sufficient resources to replace our Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines. Last year's decision to delay the Ohio-class Replacement Program by two years is all the risk I would recommend in this critical program.
- The Minuteman III force is sustainable through 2030 and potentially beyond with additional modernization investment. The ongoing Ground Based Strategic Deterrent Analysis of Alternatives is studying the full range of concepts to sustain this Triad leg beyond 2030.
- Planned sustainment and modernization activities will ensure a credible heavy nuclear and conventional bomber capability through 2040 for the B-52 and 2050 for the B-2. Looking forward, a new, long-range nuclear-capable penetrating bomber is required. USSTRATCOM is working with the Air Force to develop requirements for the next nuclear and conventional capable long-range strike platform and long-range stand-off missile. Additionally, the Air Force is replacing the aging KC-135 tanker fleet with the KC-46A, ensuring an enduring air refueling capability essential to long-range bomber operations.

Regarding the nuclear weapons themselves, modernization has in practice meant sustainment of the nuclear warheads manufactured twenty-plus years ago. At the same time, the United States has maintained a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing for over two decades. Thus, the nuclear weapons enterprise faces the complex challenges of certifying the effectiveness and reliability of nuclear weapons without actually testing them with nuclear explosions. Considerable progress has been made toward

managing these challenges with aggressive science and surveillance programs, but our future confidence in the stockpile will depend centrally on our continuing ability to attract outstanding people with scientific, engineering and technological talent to this work.

**Key Investment: Global Strike**

Today, the only prompt global strike capability to engage potentially time-sensitive, fleeting targets continues to be ballistic missile systems armed with nuclear weapons. We continue to require a deployed conventional prompt strike capability to provide the President a range of flexible military options to address a small number of highest-value targets, including in an anti-access and area denial environment.

**Key Investment: Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)**

USSTRATCOM continues to make progress in our global CWMD efforts by synchronizing planning efforts across the combatant commands through cooperation on regional CWMD campaigns, alignment with Theater Campaign Plans and incorporation of CWMD objectives and concepts in deliberate and crisis action planning efforts with combatant commands.

Identifying and countering WMD requires extensive technical knowledge, capabilities and timely and relevant intelligence. In support of DoD objectives, USSTRATCOM continues to pursue capabilities necessary to detect, interdict and contain WMD. One of my highest priorities in addition to securing and reducing dangerous materials is acquiring the capabilities to monitor and track lethal agents and their means of delivery, and defeating or responding to the use of these weapons. Just this year, we established and sponsored a new University Affiliated Research Center (UARC). The center will advance cutting-edge defense research in support of USSTRATCOM—as well as the rest of the U.S. government—in the mission areas of global deterrence and combating weapons of mass destruction, along with international space and cyber law. The UARC will help address these challenges by providing unique access to academic perspectives and research methods not currently found anywhere in the DOD, and will help ensure critical skill sets are nurtured, developed and available for DoD to engage current and future CWMD challenges. We are truly excited about this new partnership.

A key element of our CWMD efforts is the continuing maturation of USSTRATCOM's Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination (SJFHQ-E). The SJFHQ-E achieved initial operational capability in September 2012 and is successfully supporting the other combatant commands with WMD elimination expertise and planning. When fully operational, SJFHQ-E will be able to quickly integrate into an operational headquarters, conduct both deliberate and crisis planning, and maintain awareness of the WMD environment.

**Key Investment: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)**

The ISR community is increasingly being challenged to operate effectively in anti-access/area-denial environments. Additionally, our ability to process and analyze data from increasingly capable ISR platforms is a growing challenge. Analysts are dealing with more data on an increased operations tempo that imposes ever-greater demands on analysis and reporting timeliness. Greater efficiencies are clearly needed, and we are seeking them through improved data management, increased computing power and capability to help the analysts, and more effective management of ISR processing, exploitation and dissemination. Our intent is to manage resources globally while maintaining regional and local focus, thus ensuring we can more quickly reprioritize during and between emerging crises and contingencies, guaranteeing knowledge dominance for our commanders. Additionally, we are looking at ways we can reduce these gaps through globally connected, focused integration and by managing the exploitation and analytic resources in a more unified structure.

**Key Investment: Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS)**

In August 2012, USSTRATCOM established a federated Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO) Office, staffed by subject matter experts from across the headquarters and our components. This new organization supports all CCMDs with spectrum advocacy, operations, test and evaluation, and contingency planning. The JEMSO Office, in collaboration with the Joint Staff, is driving the development of a holistic JEMSO policy and doctrine that consolidates the activities of electronic warfare and spectrum management in order to significantly improve spectrum-related mission cohesion, agility, and responsiveness. We have created a mission partnership with OSD and the Joint Staff to chart

a path forward regarding strategy, doctrine, and best practices to ensure that all facets of the process are built in a cogent and logical manner. Engagement beyond DoD will be vital for success in management of this mission area. The JEMSO Office will support the combatant commands through contingency planning, training, and advocacy for EMS capabilities to enhance combat effectiveness across all warfighting domains. To address the rapid technological advances and significant proliferation of EMS-dependent systems, USSTRATCOM's Joint Electronic Warfare Center (JEWEC) is leading a comprehensive, globally oriented, cross-domain, JEMSO assessment. This assessment will continue USSTRATCOM's effort to inform EMS-dependent capability acquisitions, ensuring our warfighters are armed with the best possible training and equipment to effectively operate in this dynamic environment.

**Key Investment: Missile Defense**

Ballistic missiles continue to become more accurate, lethal, and capable—remaining a significant threat to the U.S. homeland and a growing threat to our allies and our forces deployed abroad. In response, U.S. and allied capabilities to deter, detect, and defeat these weapons are also growing, with decades of research and development continuing to pay dividends in terms of capability and credibility. Missile defense capabilities address limited threats to the homeland and our regional partners and allies. Ballistic missile threats are likely to grow at least as rapidly as our defensive assets, giving us little margin for error in acquisition and force management decisions. Sustained missile defense investments support deterrence and assurance goals by significantly improving the protection of our homeland, our forward-based forces, and our allies and partners. USSTRATCOM is committed to future capability development efforts that leverage past successes, address the most pressing and most likely threats, and produce field-tested, reliable assets in a cost-effective manner.

Over the past year, these efforts substantially improved our overall missile defenses. We deployed and integrated radars in Europe and the Middle East, improving threat coverage and available battle space. We concluded a review board and plan to test a revised design of the Capability Enhanced (CE II) interceptor to return it to full mission capability. We increased the number of Aegis BMD-equipped ships. And, we conducted testing and development of future elements of the European Phased

Adaptive Approach (EPAA), an effort that improves missile defenses through the acquisition and integration of more advanced capabilities and the expansion of key partnerships.

USSTRATCOM coordinates the integrated air and missile defense Prioritized Capabilities List (PCL) across other CCMDs to improve Service and Missile Defense Agency understanding of prioritized joint warfighter capability needs. To this end the PCL advocates for continued support to regional and homeland missile defense needs. This includes the upgrade of early warning radars and their integration with existing fire control systems for enhanced early warning and engagement. More broadly speaking we must avoid delays in development and fielding of needed missile program upgrades. We must also continue testing individual components in an operationally realistic end-to-end manner, and preserve integrated multinational exercises which contribute to enhanced operational cooperation and increased confidence in our capability and that of our allies. This enhances efforts to provide persistent detection; expand data sharing among the U.S., allies, and partners; field effective defensive systems; and provide appropriately robust joint training. As the Joint Functional Manager for missile defense capabilities, USSTRATCOM recommends the global allocation of low-density, high-demand assets, including force rotations, and force sufficiency—thus making the best use of limited resources.

**Key Investment: Space**

Space is no longer the exclusive domain of superpowers—the number of countries that share the domain continues to grow as barriers to entry continue to decline. Space is foundational to the global economy, international strategic stability, and our national security. However, the strategic advantages space provides are in danger of diminishing. America must continue its leadership role to ensure space is accessible, usable, and responsibly preserved for all users. As the CCMD responsible for military space operations, support, and capability advocacy, we remain focused on ensuring intergovernmental collaboration, international cooperation, and access to and shared use of space.

Access to orbit remains vital to national security and the key to achieving it is an industrial base that is capable, responsive and affordable. Diversity in the launch marketplace could prove a positive development, and accordingly USSTRATCOM supports the Air Force's efforts to expand the available

industrial base of certified and proven launch providers. The success of companies like Space-X is an encouraging step in the right direction but we must continue to invest in capabilities that assure our access to space.

We must retain a robust and enduring capability to detect, track and analyze each of the more than over 20,000 objects on orbit today. Clearly, there is an international demand for continued and ever-improving SSA, but challenges remain in the form of critical SSA architecture legacy elements that are well past their design life. Addressing these challenges remains a high priority but fluctuating funding profiles and constrained budgets make maintenance of existing forces and infrastructure and timely acquisition of new capabilities more difficult. The Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) is enabled by the JSpOC Mission System (JMS) which is being developed to provide key SSA, command and control, data processing, integration, and exploitation capabilities. Continued JMS progress is vital to streamlined data processing integration, information sharing with partners and allies, and understanding of adversary intent in space.

Our assessment of existing on-orbit and ground-based communication, intelligence, surveillance, geo-location, and environmental monitoring assets is acceptable yet fragile. To preclude any gaps in our ability to provide support for the warfighter, we must program and procure replacements to our aging systems in a timely manner.

**Key Investment: Cyberspace**

The great power of technology – and our reliance on it – means that cyber threats represent one of the most serious national security, public safety, and economic challenges facing the Nation. The ongoing theft of the nation’s critical commercial, civil and unclassified military data by foreign intelligence and security services continues to erode U.S. economic and national security and reduce the competitive edge of the U.S. businesses. U.S. government departments, the private sector, allies and international partners must become more actively involved in securing our collective networks and to preventing our adversaries from inadvertently gaining generational increases in technology through inadequate cyber security practices.

Improving the DoD's ability to operate effectively in cyberspace requires investment in five major areas: defensible architecture (the Joint Information Environment), trained and ready forces, effective command and control, global situational awareness, and policies and rules of engagement to defend the nation in cyberspace. Of these, the most urgent investment is increasing the numbers, training and readiness of our cyber forces. We are recruiting, training, and retaining the best and brightest our nation has to offer, but the operational demands of cyberspace exceed our capacity to conduct sustained operations. We must continue to grow and align our cyber forces to enable operations and support CCDRs and their components.

It is also essential that we prepare our forces to operate in a cyberspace environment in which expected network resources and data are degraded or unavailable, or whose confidentiality and integrity cannot be confirmed. Toward this end we have made progress in developing joint cyberspace training and certification standards that will serve as the common foundation for training all DoD cyber operators. Sharing of cyber threat indicators and countermeasures must occur in near real-time to enable prevention as well as response. We are fostering close information sharing relationships with the Department of Homeland Security, law enforcement agencies and private sector companies in the Defense Industrial Base, but we need to make it easier for the government to share threat information more broadly. At the same time we must also establish and develop baseline standards for our critical private-sector infrastructure to help companies take proactive measures to secure their networks.

#### **CONCLUSION**

The nation and our military are confronted with an unprecedented confluence of geopolitical, technological, and fiscal challenges that have the potential to threaten the readiness of our military, the execution of our National Security Strategy and the security of our Nation. These challenges may be daunting but they are not paralyzing. We are building our future on a strong and successful past, and your support, together with the hard work of the outstanding men and women of the United States Strategic Command, will ensure that we remain ready, agile and effective in deterring strategic attack, assuring our allies, and defeating current and future threats.




## BIOGRAPHY

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

### GENERAL C. ROBERT "BOB" KEHLER

Gen. C. Robert "Bob" Kehler is Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Neb. He is responsible for the plans and operations for all U.S. forces conducting strategic deterrence and Department of Defense space and cyberspace operations.

General Kehler entered the Air Force in 1975 as a distinguished graduate of the Air Force ROTC program. He has commanded at the squadron, group, wing and major command levels, and has a broad range of operational and command tours in ICBM operations, space launch, space operations, missile warning and space control. He commanded a Minuteman ICBM operations squadron at Whiteman AFB, Mo., and the Air Force's largest ICBM operations group at Malmstrom AFB, Mont. He served as Deputy Director of Operations, Air Force Space Command, and commanded both the 30th Space Wing at Vandenberg AFB, Calif., and the 21st Space Wing at Peterson AFB, Colo. As Deputy Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, he helped provide the President and Secretary of Defense with a broad range of strategic capabilities and options for the joint warfighter through several diverse mission areas, including space operations, integrated missile defense, computer network operations and global strike. General Kehler also commanded Air Force Space Command and America's ICBM force before its transition from Air Force Space Command to Air Force Global Strike Command in December 2009.



The general's staff assignments include wing-level planning and tours with the Air Staff, Strategic Air Command headquarters and Air Force Space Command. He was also assigned to the Secretary of the Air Force's Office of Legislative Liaison, where he was the point man on Capitol Hill for matters regarding the President's ICBM Modernization Program. As Director of the National Security Space Office, he integrated the activities of a number of space organizations on behalf of the Under Secretary of the Air Force and Director, National Reconnaissance Office.

**EDUCATION**

1974 Bachelor of Science degree in education, Pennsylvania State University, State College  
 1980 Distinguished graduate, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.  
 1982 Air Command and Staff College, by correspondence  
 1987 Master of Science degree in public administration, University of Oklahoma, Norman  
 1988 Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.  
 1992 Air War College, by seminar  
 1995 Naval War College, Newport, R.I.  
 1995 Master of Arts degree in national security and strategic studies, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.  
 1998 Program for Executives, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pa.  
 2002 National Security Leadership Course, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, N.Y.  
 2006 Program for Senior Executives in National and International Security, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

**ASSIGNMENTS**

1. April 1975 - June 1975, student, missile combat crew operational readiness training, Vandenberg AFB, Calif.
2. June 1975 - January 1981, missile combat crew member, instructor, senior evaluator, and Emergency War Order instructor, 341st Strategic Missile Wing, Malmstrom AFB, Mont.
3. January 1981 - April 1982, personnel staff officer, Air Staff Training Program, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
4. April 1982 - January 1985, missile operations staff officer, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, Offutt AFB, Neb.
5. January 1985 - January 1988, resource planner, Directorate of Air Force Operations Plans, and Chief, Strategic Missile Branch, Secretary of the Air Force Office of Legislative Liaison, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
6. January 1988 - June 1988, student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
7. July 1988 - July 1991, nuclear employment and policy planner, Nuclear and Chemical Division, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
8. July 1991 - July 1992, Commander, 508th Missile Squadron, Whiteman AFB, Mo.
9. July 1992 - February 1993, Deputy Commander, 351st Operations Group, Whiteman AFB, Mo.
10. February 1993 - August 1994, Commander, 341st Operations Group, Malmstrom AFB, Mont.
11. August 1994 - July 1995, student, Naval War College Newport, R.I.
12. July 1995 - August 1995, Inspector General, Headquarters Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.
13. August 1995 - June 1996, Deputy Director of Operations, Headquarters AFSPC, Peterson AFB, Colo.
14. June 1996 - June 1998, Commander, 30th Space Wing, Vandenberg AFB, Calif.
15. June 1998 - September 1999, Chief, Space Superiority Division, and Chairman, Space Superiority and Nuclear Deterrence Panel, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
16. September 1999 - August 2000, special assistant to the Director of Programs, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
17. August 2000 - May 2002, Commander, 21st Space Wing, Peterson AFB, Colo.

18. May 2002 - May 2005, Director, National Security Space Integration, Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, D.C.
19. May 2005 - October 2007, Deputy Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Neb.
20. October 2007 - January 2011, Commander, Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.
21. January 2011 - present, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Neb.

**SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS**

1. July 1988 - July 1991, nuclear employment and policy planner, Nuclear and Chemical Division, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., as a major and lieutenant colonel
2. May 2005 - October 2007, Deputy Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Neb., as a lieutenant general
3. January 2011 - present, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Neb., as a general

**OPERATIONAL INFORMATION**

Weapon systems: Minuteman II and Minuteman III, Defense Support Program  
Launch systems: Titan II, Titan IV and Delta II

**MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS**

Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster  
Defense Superior Service Medal  
Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters  
Defense Meritorious Service Medal  
Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters  
Air Force Commendation Medal

**PUBLICATIONS**

"Nuclear Armed Adversaries and the Joint Commander," Naval War College Review, Winter 1996

**EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION**

Second Lieutenant April 10, 1975  
First Lieutenant April 10, 1977  
Captain April 10, 1979  
Major May 1, 1985  
Lieutenant Colonel June 1, 1989  
Colonel Feb. 1, 1994  
Brigadier General July 1, 2000  
Major General Aug. 1, 2003  
Lieutenant General June 1, 2005  
General Oct. 12, 2007

(Current as of January 2011)

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF  
ADMIRAL SAMUEL J. LOCKLEAR, U.S. NAVY  
COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND  
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
ON U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE

5 MARCH 2013

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

*Introduction: Why is the Indo-Asia-Pacific Important?*

Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to present an update on U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). For the past 12 months I have had the honor to lead over 328,000 service members and 38,000 civilian employees as the USPACOM Commander, and I look forward to sharing my thoughts with you on the strategic environment of this diverse and complex theater.

In 2011 the President directed his national security team to make America's "presence and mission in the Asia-Pacific a top priority." This testimony discusses the foundations of our strategy and how we plan to accomplish the President's directive by providing a candid assessment of the opportunities and challenges USPACOM faces in this critical half of the world.

The Indo-Asia-Pacific stretches from California to India. It encompasses over half of the Earth's surface and well over half of its population. The Pacific Ocean is the largest physical feature on the planet. If all the world's landmasses were placed in the Pacific, there would still be room left over for additional North American and African continents. To give you an even better idea of its size, a Carrier Strike Group takes three weeks to transit from the U.S. West Coast to the Philippines; 15 hours to get there in a C-17; and from Fort Lewis, Washington, to the Maldives is 9,000 miles.

This region is culturally, socially, economically, and geo-politically diverse. The nations of the Indo-Asia-Pacific include five of our nation's seven treaty allies,<sup>1</sup> three of the largest

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<sup>1</sup> Australia, Japan, Korea, Philippines, and Thailand

economies in the world,<sup>2</sup> and seven of the ten smallest;<sup>3</sup> the most populous nations in the world,<sup>4</sup> the largest democracy;<sup>5</sup> the largest Muslim-majority nation;<sup>6</sup> and the world's smallest republic.<sup>7</sup>

The Indian Ocean is surpassing the Atlantic and Pacific as the world's busiest and most strategically significant trade corridor. One-third of the world's bulk cargo and two-thirds of its oil shipments now pass through the Indian Ocean. Nine of the world's ten largest ports are here,<sup>8</sup> and the Indo-Asia-Pacific is the engine that drives the global economy. China, Japan and India are three of the world's largest economies. Last year alone, there was over eight trillion dollars of two-way trade. Regional cooperation to ensure the safety and security of these vital trade routes will become increasingly important over coming decades.

By any meaningful measure, the Indo-Asia-Pacific is also the world's most militarized region, with seven of the ten largest standing militaries,<sup>9</sup> the world's largest and most sophisticated navies,<sup>10</sup> and five of the world's declared nuclear armed nations.<sup>11</sup> All these aspects, when you take them together, result in a unique strategic complexity. And this complexity is magnified by a wide, diverse group of challenges that can significantly stress the security environment. To be successful, we must draw on the strengths of the entire U.S. government, the U.S. economy and the American people.

At a time when the region is experiencing such significant change, we must clearly communicate to our allies and partners our commitment by maintaining a credible, forward deployed, sustainable force.

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<sup>2</sup> U.S., China and Japan

<sup>3</sup> Tokelau, Niue, Tuvalu, Futuna, Nauru, Marshall Islands, Palau

<sup>4</sup> China, India, Indonesia

<sup>5</sup> India

<sup>6</sup> Indonesia

<sup>7</sup> Nauru

<sup>8</sup> Shanghai, Ningbo-Zhoushan, Singapore, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Qingdao, Quinghuangdao, Hong Kong, Busan

<sup>9</sup> China, India, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Russia, Republic of Korea, Vietnam, U.S.

<sup>10</sup> China, India, Russia, U.S.

<sup>11</sup> Russia, China, India, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, U.S.

*Security Environment*

The Indo-Asia-Pacific has a myriad of security challenges, including rapidly growing military capabilities, nuclear developments, unresolved territorial and resource disputes, violent extremism, natural disasters, proliferation, illicit trafficking and more. This complex security environment continues to evolve with both positive and negative trends.

Overall, the region enjoys considerable political stability. In the past year, we have seen a series of peaceful leadership transitions, most notably in China, the ROK and Japan, which have reinforced existing succession processes. With the obvious exception of China, these changes have also advanced democracy and democratic principles. We've noted the positive changes occurring in Burma's government and look forward to its continued progress. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) continues efforts to provide leadership on regional security issues and to effectively address transnational challenges such as natural disaster, terrorism, transnational crime, climate change, while simultaneously working towards its goal of becoming a single economic community by 2015. We expect ASEAN to continue to grow in this role under Brunei's chairmanship in 2013. We have also seen encouraging examples of states using international bodies to address disputes peacefully, such as Bangladesh and Burma using the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to resolve their disputed maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal and Thailand and Cambodia are awaiting a ruling later this year from the International Court of Justice on their long-disputed border region. We encourage all claimant states to seek peaceful means to resolve their disputes.

However, not all developments have been positive or stabilizing. North Korea's repeated violations of U.N. Security Council resolutions that forbid building and testing of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missile technologies, represent a clear and direct threat to U.S.

national security and regional peace and stability. China's rapid development of advanced military capabilities, combined with its unclear intentions, certainly raises strategic and security concerns for the U.S and the region. And continuing plans by violent extremist organizations (VEOs) to attack host nation and U.S. targets is another example of the issues in this vast region that are of concern not just to USPACOM, but too many Indo-Asia-Pacific nations.

***North Korea:*** Kim Jong Un used 2012 to consolidate his power. Kim is the youngest head of state in the world and holds the leadership position in all significant North Korean institutions of national power – military, state and party. We were cautiously encouraged in February 2012 when North Korea agreed to implement a moratorium on long-range missile launches, nuclear tests, and nuclear activities at Yongbyon. However, Pyongyang almost immediately broke its promise by attempting to place a satellite into orbit using proscribed ballistic missile technology and parading an alleged road mobile intercontinental range ballistic missile system. Pyongyang responded to the unanimous U.N. condemnation of its December launch with renewed rhetoric, threats and bluster. Just a few weeks ago, again in clear violation of U.N. resolutions, North Korea announced it had conducted its third nuclear test, which it claimed – without any evidence – was a “smaller, more powerful weapon.” North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, its illicit sales of conventional arms, and its ongoing proliferation activities remain a threat to regional stability and underscore the requirement for effective missile defense.

North Korea maintains a significant percentage of its combat forces forward deployed along the demilitarized zone with the ROK. From these locations, they could threaten U.S. and ROK civilian and military personnel, as they showed in 2010 with the surprise attack on the ROK ship CHEONAN and the artillery attack on Yeonpyeong-Do Island. The continued

advancement of the North's nuclear and missile programs, its conventional force posture, and its willingness to resort to asymmetric actions as a tool of coercive diplomacy creates an environment marked by the potential for miscalculation that and controlled escalation could result from another North Korean provocative action.

Kim Jong Un's stated emphasis on economic development and promises of economic growth have so far yielded little, and are undermined by North Korean missile launches and nuclear tests that lead to further sanctions and international isolation. We remain concerned about the potential for peninsular and regional instability while North Korea continues to prioritize military objectives above economic recovery and reform, and thus remains unable to sufficiently provide for its own population, a concern shared by our allies and partners.

**Proliferation:** We remain concerned by North Korea's illicit proliferation activities and attempts to evade UN sanctions. North Korea's acts defy the will of the international community and represent a clear danger to the peace, prosperity and stability of the Indo-Asia-Pacific.

USPACOM's Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) program is a complementary multinational activity intended to support counter-proliferation interdiction operations. USPACOM welcomes Thailand as a recent endorsee of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and looks forward to the new opportunities their active participation will bring. CWMD provides a voluntary framework through which PSI partner nations can improve operational capabilities and domestic legal authorities in order to interdict WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. Participation in PSI is vital, as part of an interagency approach, to the reduction of WMD trafficking. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and USPACOM continue to synchronize a wide range of CWMD-related activities such as international counter proliferation with our allies and partners, and foreign and

homeland consequence management. Additionally, USPACOM is coordinating with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to establish Centers of Excellence with both China and India to promote effective nuclear security and safeguards.

***China:*** China's military has benefited from many years of double-digit economic growth, which has helped fund a comprehensive military modernization effort. China's military is an increasingly trained and capable fighting force focused, in part, on denying U.S. access to the Western Pacific during a time of crisis or conflict. There are a number of notable examples of China's improving military capabilities, including five new stealth and conventional aircraft programs and the initial deployment of a new anti-ship ballistic missile that we believe is designed to target U.S. aircraft carriers. China is producing great quantities of advanced aircraft, missiles, electronic warfare systems and other specialized military equipment, while its shipyards are currently building six classes of modern diesel-electric submarines, destroyers and frigates. These new systems augment or replace older platforms and are rapidly transforming the People's Liberation Army (PLA). China commissioned its first aircraft carrier a few months ago and is continuing efforts to integrate aircraft with the ship to achieve a nascent regional power projection capability within the next few years.

Chinese military operations are also expanding in size, complexity and geographic location. Last summer, the PLA-Navy conducted its largest ever exercise outside the first island chain and into the Western Pacific, demonstrating increasing proficiency and sending a clear message to the region. Chinese maritime intelligence collection operations increased in 2012 as well; with historic first such missions into the Indian Ocean and within the U.S. exclusive economic zones off of Guam and Hawaii.

Overall, China's intensive efforts to build, test, and field new aircraft, ships, weapons and supporting systems are of increasing concern to the region. Many Asian nations worry about Chinese current and future intentions, with many of them asking, "As China's military capabilities improve, will China's intentions change?"

Chinese naval and maritime law enforcement vessels have been active in recent years in trying to advance China's territorial and maritime claims in the South China and East China Seas. China's strong rhetoric about the indisputable nature of its claims, combined with active patrolling by civil and military ships and aircraft in the air and waters surrounding Scarborough Reef and the Senkakus Islands, has raised tensions with the Republic of the Philippines and Japan respectively. China has also used other economic and diplomatic tools to pressure those countries to accede to Chinese claims. These actions have resulted in U.S. partners and allies in East Asia seeking additional support and reassurance. I am particularly concerned that the activities around the Senkakus islands could lead to an accident and miscalculation and escalation between China and Japan. The close proximity of ships and aircraft from all sides of these disputes raises the risks of escalation. Elsewhere, in the South China Sea, periodic confrontations between Chinese and Vietnamese ships and Chinese efforts to pressure international companies to not explore for oil and gas raise tensions. China has consistently opposed using collaborative diplomatic processes – such as negotiations of a Code of Conduct or international arbitration – to address disputes in the South China Sea, instead insisting on bilateral negotiations.

China's relationship with Taiwan remains stable following the reelection of President Ma Ying-jeou in Taiwan. Cross- Strait tensions are at historic lows because Taiwan and mainland China have consistently pursued increased economic integration and people-to-people

exchanges. However, the PLA continues to maintain a robust military buildup opposite Taiwan that contradicts Beijing's stated pursuit of a "peaceful development" of cross-Strait relations. Many of China's military developments appear specifically intended for use in a possible future conflict with Taiwan. Included in this growing arsenal are hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles and land-attack cruise missiles, high-speed patrol boats equipped with advanced anti-ship cruise missiles, naval mines suitable for blockading Taiwan's ports, and various types of electronic warfare and cyber attack systems. Cyber activity presents a significant and growing threat to USPACOM.

China is rapidly improving its space and counterspace capabilities to advance its own interests, and presumably to challenge the U.S.' or other actor's use of space-based systems. China is expanding its satellite navigation, reconnaissance and communications capabilities through routine space launches. At the same time, we are concerned over extensive writings about – and apparent continued testing of – anti-satellite systems, including a purpose-built missile system, lasers and jammers.

One military development worth specifically highlighting is the advances being made across the Indo-Asia-Pacific to enhance or expand submarine forces, including in several smaller navies as a potential counter to stronger neighbors. From the northernmost part of our area of responsibility where Russia maintains attack and strategic capabilities in its Pacific Fleet, to the westernmost boundary where India is growing its submarine force, we see an emphasis on submarines throughout the region. The largest and most capable non-U.S. submarine force in the region is clearly China's, which continues to expand and modernize to complement China's increasingly capable surface fleet. Australia, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam and the ROK are nations that have recently launched – or soon will launch – new, modern submarines.

Both Russia and China are expected to soon field new ballistic missile submarines capable of ranging the U.S. homeland.

***Violent Extremism:*** Violence perpetrated by extremists, separatists, nationalists and others of varied motivations remains a concern for USPACOM and our partners. Improvised explosive devices (IED) are the asymmetric weapon of choice for many of these groups. We average over 100 IED incidents per month in South and Southeast Asia, the highest rate outside Central Command's area of responsibility. The overwhelming majority of these incidents are not linked to global transnational violent extremism, but some are. We continue to see periodic eruptions of sectarian / religious violence in a variety of places, to include Burma, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. There is also a strong correlation between criminal activities and violent extremism, which often manifests through extortion, kidnapping and other violent crime. Several countries, including Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Malaysia, are traditional focal points for extremist recruiting, fundraising, movement and other facilitation efforts. Extremists affiliated with Iran are active in USPACOM's area of responsibility as well. Iranians with links to Hezbollah conducted both successful and disrupted attacks in India and Thailand in February 2012.

USPACOM has made significant progress in countering terror through building partner capabilities and through counter radicalization programs implemented by Civil Military Support Elements and Military Information Support Teams in support of U.S. Embassies. We are encouraged by the persistent pressure that our partners and allies have applied against VEOs over the last ten years and the marked success they have achieved in countering extremist ideology and terror plots. Continued success requires a consistent long-term effort to diminish the drivers of violence that al-Qa'ida and other terrorists exploit. These efforts to prevent terrorist

radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization are critical to defeating this dangerous ideology and reducing strategic risk; neither we nor our partners can capture/kill our way to victory in this fight. Continued modest preventive efforts today will make expensive reactionary efforts far less likely in the future.

Our partners in Southeast Asia have made impressive strides in reducing the danger posed by violent extremists, but disrupted attack planning in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand last year is testament to the remaining threat. Smaller, more fragmented groups continue to pursue their disparate agendas through violence and intimidation. Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) continued to advise and assist Philippine Security Forces as they improved counterterrorism capabilities in combating the Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah in the southern Philippines. The improving security situation has supported the implementation of an initial peace framework agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. This agreement serves as a vehicle for ongoing negotiations to build lasting peace and improve security and stability in the Southern Philippines. Counterterrorism efforts, which have included improved information sharing and increased cooperation, have also had positive impacts on the related issues of piracy and crime. Piracy and robbery-at-sea in the Malacca and Singapore Straits remain low.

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) remains one, if not the most operationally capable terrorist groups through all of South Asia. LeT was responsible for the November 2008 attack in Mumbai, India that killed over 160 people, including six Americans, and has supported or executed a number of other attacks in South Asia in recent years. Beyond the direct impact of these attacks, there is a significant danger another major terrorist attack could destabilize the fragile peace between India and Pakistan. Should the perpetrators of such an attack be linked

back to Pakistan – as was the case in the 2008 attack – the Indian government may face domestic pressure to respond and the resulting spiral of escalation could be rapid. For those reasons, and more importantly to protect innocent lives, we and our partners in the U.S. Government engage regularly with the Indians and Pakistanis to avert such a crisis.

India's relationship with Pakistan has gradually improved in recent years, thanks to a series of confidence building measures, growing economic ties and the absence of large-scale destabilizing incidents. However, we remain concerned the progress could be quickly undone by a major terrorist attack. Both sides maintain modern, trained militaries underpinned by demonstrated nuclear capabilities. A major war on the subcontinent is not likely, but could be catastrophic to both sides, as well as the region. In addition, while India has seen its bilateral economic ties with China expand in recent years, its unresolved border disputes with China have remained a source of friction. We do not think war between India and China is inevitable or likely, but unresolved territorial issues and regional competition could fuel incidents.

Elsewhere, South Asia is mostly free from direct conflict, but various, mostly internal, challenges remain. Despite Nepal's inability to resolve its many political issues, reintegration of former Maoist combatants into the army is now complete and the process has remained peaceful, with all parties and entities working within the framework of peace and stability. Bangladesh may struggle to contain political violence and turmoil as they face national elections early next year. Sri Lanka needs to work to move past its recent history and reconcile a nation divided by many years of civil war.

Indo-Asia-Pacific nations continue cooperative efforts to reduce illegal trafficking in drugs, persons and commercial products, an endeavor significantly challenged by the enormous distances and varied geography of the region. Through Joint Interagency Task Force West,

USPACOM partners with international and other U.S. government agencies in this effort.

Typhoons, earthquakes, floods, tsunamis and cyclones are all too common in Indo-Asia-Pacific. Increasingly severe weather patterns and rising sea levels threaten lives and property, and could even threaten the loss of entire low-lying nations. In 2012, almost 100 natural disasters struck Asia, causing nearly 4,000 deaths and affecting over 65 million people. Amazingly, this was actually below the 10-year average of over 6,600 people killed annually by natural calamities.

The illegal trafficking of people, animals and products poses a transnational threat. Counterfeit or substandard antibiotics can promote the introduction and spread of antibiotic resistant strains of diseases, such as malaria and tuberculosis. Water sanitation and global food security issues can divert resources and halt the flow of goods and services in the event of global pandemics. Illegal trafficking in animals and plants has the potential to spread organisms that destroy crops or food chain ecosystems. As we engage with the Indo-Asia-Pacific nations through Cooperative Health Engagement (CHE), we will enhance the region's ability to deal with these and other public health risks.

Based on USPACOM's past HA/DR experience, we have initiated changes to the planning and execution of health engagement in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. The focus has shifted from one-time provision of health care to an underserved population to CHEs which build sustainable, multilateral, capability, capacity and medical interoperability in support of the USPACOM Theater Campaign Plan. CHEs tie directly to health security, homeland defense and transnational threats. Some of our more successful efforts include Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos Blood Product Safety projects. These interagency collaborations have built national civilian and military blood product capacity resulting in a national self-sustaining blood supply. Through the

DoD HIV/AIDS prevention program (DHAPP), militaries of ten Indo-Asia-Pacific countries are implementing HIV prevention programs to reduce the incidence of disease among uniformed international partners, and by extension, in the civilian communities in which they live. DoD overseas medical research laboratories have made great strides in developing countermeasures to many emerging diseases. The Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Sciences in Bangkok, Thailand, has made important breakthroughs on the Hepatitis A vaccine, the Japanese Encephalitis vaccine, and the first HIV vaccine to show efficacy in human trials. All of these engagements serve to build health security in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region and contribute to a more stable global health environment.

**Resource Competition:** Demand for water, food, and energy will only grow. Friction caused by water availability and use is evident between India and Pakistan, between India and Bangladesh, between countries in the Lower Mekong regions of Southeast Asia, between China and Southeast Asia, and even internally in China between the northern and southern regions of the industrialized east. Much of the Indo-Asia-Pacific is unable to adequately provide for their own food requirements, highlighting the need for stable, plentiful supplies available through international commerce. The same is true for energy supplies. Disruption to these supplies or unexpected price increases will quickly strain many governments' ability to ensure their population's needs are met.

**Intelligence Support to Operations:** The challenges I've addressed all place a significant strain on our theater and national intelligence organizations. Still, these challenges, which necessitated our national strategy to rebalance to the Indo-Asia-Pacific, must be met head on by our military leadership and the Intelligence Community (IC). There are several key enablers that I believe will assist in this task. Key among these is the continuing requirement for making "all

sensed data” available to our analysts so that it can be quickly absorbed into our decision cycle and visualized in a way that assists our understanding of complex issues. As we reset the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) force in the drawdown from Afghanistan and reprioritize our overhead sensors, we must ensure that those ISR sensors and accompanying processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) architectures and personnel that help us understand our unique operating environment are optimally positioned and outfitted to achieve this mission. Most importantly, I need to have effective command and control over ISR architecture in real-time through all phases of operations. We are making steady progress in all of these areas. Improving processes to rapidly share information with allies and partners creates a common understanding within the region and results in more effective and robust relationships. Maturing concepts for cloud architectures and initiatives to enhance access to those clouds have great promise to unleash knowledge from derived data in ways that we have not yet experienced. Significant advances in intelligence mission management are helping address my need for effective command and control, optimization and visualization of ISR. Still, we have much work to do to fully realize the potential advantage of a penetrating understanding of our key threats.

#### *The Indo-Asia-Pacific Rebalance*

The Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific Strategy reflects the recognition that the future prosperity of the United States will be defined largely by events and developments in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.

While the Indo-Asia-Pacific region today is at relative peace, we remain concerned as we see stress points in territorial disputes and the threat that North Korea presents to the peace and security of the region. However, the credible and persistent commitment of the United States to the region through robust presence and partnerships has, and will continue to provide, an

enduring, prosperous, and stable security environment for the region.

Fundamental to the rebalance is that USPACOM actions align and synchronize with the diplomacy, policy, and economic confidence building measures of our U.S. government partners. These coordinated efforts demonstrate an enduring resolve to show commitment to the Indo-Asia-Pacific across all facets of engagement. USPACOM remains focused as the military component of this commitment, and we will continue to plan and conduct operations, actions, and activities that support this holistic governmental approach in building upon the peace and prosperity of the region.

The posturing and forward presence of our military forces is key to USPACOM's ability to rapidly respond to any crisis or disaster. Due to the vast distances involved in our area of responsibility, it is imperative we continue to receive the support provided by our partners in the Services and through the Congress to maintain the readiness of our forward deployed forces. USPACOM manages the rebalance along four lines of operations that form the bedrock of our strategy. Those four lines of operations are; (1) strengthening alliances and partnerships, (2) improving posture and presence, (3) developing capabilities and concepts, and (4) planning for operations and contingencies.

***Strengthening Alliances and Partnerships:*** At the core of the rebalance, is an effort to renew, modernize and strengthen our alliances and partnerships in support of shared security interests. We are ensuring our alliances are adaptive so they can meet the challenges of the current security environment while capitalizing on emerging opportunities. Similarly, we are exploring innovative ways to expand cooperation through more effective strategic partnerships in order to address the complex problems presented by nontraditional security challenges. USPACOM is working closely with the five U.S. treaty allies in our AOR, Australia, Japan, the

Philippines, South Korea and Thailand, as well as key partners, including India, Indonesia and Singapore.

Australia: The U.S.-Australian alliance is an anchor of peace and stability in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, and promotes economic development and integration, good governance, and the rule of law. USPACOM coordinates closely with our Australian partners to promote security in the region. This past fall in Sydney, we co-hosted USPACOM's Pacific Chiefs of Defense annual conference, where 22 of 26 Chiefs of Defense attended. We engaged in a weeklong series of briefings and discussions on security cooperation. In addition, the Australian Chief of Defense and I attended the Australia-U.S. Ministerial (AUSMIN) Consultations in Perth in November where we jointly briefed on our robust mil-to-mil engagements.

We are continuing to implement the force posture initiatives announced by President Obama and Prime Minister Gillard in November 2011, which include U.S. Marines who will rotate through Darwin to participate in bilateral training. In addition, access by U.S. aircraft to airfields in Northern Australia, which will provide significant training opportunities. The first rotational deployment of approximately 250 U.S. Marines in Darwin was successful, and planning continues for the second rotation scheduled to begin in April 2013. We are working together to increase the USMC rotational presence in Darwin to approximately 1,100. This increase will require infrastructure improvements and we are currently in the process of identifying the details of those requirements. We are also working through the protocols and lift required to deploy these personnel in the event of a natural disaster as we did during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. I am confident that our efforts will bear fruit, and we will continue to posture in a manner that supports our strategic objectives.

We also continue to seek better opportunities to advance bilateral and multilateral

operations. For example, our biennial Exercise TALISMAN SABER 2013 is a combined U.S. - Australian exercise designed to train our respective military forces in planning and conducting Combined Task Force operations. We are further analyzing the benefits of expanding TALISMAN SABER to include other security partners.

We are also realizing increased value in the expansion of regional trilateral security cooperation engagements. The close relationship between Australia and the U.S. facilitates the inclusion of other countries to our combined security cooperation efforts, such as with Japan. This allows us to move forward together and support multilateral security exercises and activities with multiple nations focusing on Proliferation Security Initiative exercises, HA/DR operations, information sharing, intelligence, surveillance, and cyber security cooperation.

Japan: The U.S.-Japan Alliance, supported by a robust U.S. military presence in Japan, continues to provide the deterrence and capabilities necessary for the defense of Japan and for the maintenance of peace, security, and economic prosperity in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Over the last year, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and USPACOM have worked with our Japanese counterparts to realize adjustments in the U.S. force posture in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Significant achievements with realignment initiatives include: progress in the environmental impact assessment process for the Futenma Replacement Facility; the expansion of aviation training relocation programs to Guam; the relocation of the Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) Air Defense Command to Yokota Air Base; and progress in the relocation of the Japan Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) Central Readiness Force Headquarters to Camp Zama.

These movements do not alter the fundamental goals of the Realignment Roadmap, which are to maintain deterrence and mitigate the impact of U.S. forces on local communities. In fact, the adjustments improve interoperability between U.S. forces and the Japan Self Defense

Forces (JSDF) thereby strengthening the overall deterrent capability of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Bilateral exercises, such as KEEN EDGE 2012 and KEEN SWORD 2013, do the same and continue to expand earlier set precedents for expanded U.S.-Japan operations. Likewise, the deployment of Marine Corps MV-22s to Okinawa replaces outdated equipment and brings enhanced capabilities to our forward deployed Marine forces.

In concert with the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, we have begun to evaluate alliance roles, missions, and capabilities in order to fortify the alliance for the evolving challenges of the regional and global security environment. The United States and Japan continue to share common security interests such as containing the threats presented by the North Korea, providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), and supporting freedom of action in shared domains. In addition, we are cooperating to help allies and partners in the region build security capacity through training and exercises. These efforts will contribute to continued peace and stability in the region.

Philippines: Our 62-year-old alliance with the Philippines remains key to our efforts to ensure the stability and prosperity of the Western Pacific, and we are modernizing the relationship to meet the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. High-level engagements including Secretary Clinton's visit to Manila in November 2011, when she signed the "Manila Declaration," the first "Two-Plus-Two" Ministerial Consultations hosted by Secretaries Clinton and Panetta in April 2012, and President Aquino's official visit in June 2012, have reinvigorated the U.S.-Philippines relationship. We are seeing a renewed interest to redefine our relationship with capability and capacity building beyond the CT effort; increased rotational access; and more sharing of situational awareness in the maritime domain.

We remain committed to our alliance with the Philippines as defined in the 1951 Mutual

Defense Treaty. This past December, we co-chaired the annual Mutual Defense Board/Security Engagement Board in Manila, which remains the focal point of our expanding military relationship. As the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) continue to transition from internal security operations to territorial defense, we will make adjustments to the military-to-military relationship in order to effectively mitigate perceived threats. We are currently discussing opportunities to increase rotational presence of U.S. forces in jointly identified priority areas to allow new training for Philippine and U.S. forces.

We use training opportunities to address short-term AFP capability gaps while helping them build long-term capability and capacity. Additionally, our security assistance is primarily focused on supporting the AFP maritime domain awareness and maritime security capabilities, but also includes information technology and cyber security. This past May, we transferred a second Hamilton-Class Coast Guard Cutter (Ramon Alcaraz) to the Philippines, and we continue to partner with the AFP to affect the necessary maintenance and training.

Operationally, USPACOM engages the Philippines through the Joint Staff-sponsored exercise BALIKATAN and periodic PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP missions that focus on humanitarian/civic assistance and civil military engagement as well as numerous service component-led exercises. In addition, for the past decade, JSOTF-P has operated in a non-combat advisory and assist role in support of the AFP to combat and contain violent extremist organizations. We are currently assessing JSOTF-P's enduring requirements to align with the current security situation. A strong U.S.–Philippines alliance greatly enhances regional stability and helps the U.S. guarantee an environment that will help prevent miscalculation, promote regional cooperation, and protect vital Sea Lanes of Communication for all parties.

Republic of Korea (ROK): 2013 marks the 60th year of the U.S.–ROK alliance, which

remains strong and essential to the success of our strategy. For over six decades, the United States and the ROK have collectively worked to provide peace and stability in Northeast Asia by deterring a North Korean regime committed to periodic provocations and overt threats to peace and stability on the peninsula and in the region. A major conflict in Korea could have unpredictable, long term, and far reaching impacts due to the central location of the Korean peninsula in Northeast Asia and the vital importance of Northeast Asian trade to the global economy. We have limited understanding of North Korean leadership intent, which remains a concern to long-term stability.

General Thurman and I are aligned in our efforts to do what is necessary for the United States and the ROK as this alliance undergoes transformation, a change that will ultimately assist the ROK to better meet security challenges both on and off the peninsula. Part of that transformation is the transition of operational control to the ROK military, which will allow it to take the lead role in the combined defense of Korea. Transition of operational control in 2015 is conditions-based and certification of key capabilities must be accomplished. The U.S.-ROK exercise program – which includes KEY RESOLVE and ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN – is a key mechanism to certify that critical capabilities, such as C4I and command and control of combined and joint forces, are achieved. As we proceed through the transition process, USFK will seamlessly transform into U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM) and will remain capable of executing future plans.

To address the growing threat posed by North Korean missile capabilities, the U.S. and ROK have been conducting close consultations through the Alliance Counter-Missile Capabilities Committee. Last fall, these discussions resulted in the adoption of a comprehensive Alliance counter missile strategy. ROK capability improvements under this strategy include the

development of new ROK ballistic missiles that increase ranges from 300 kilometers (km) up to 800 km, strengthened missile defenses, improvements to command, control and communications, as well as enhanced ISR capabilities. All of this is to better achieve a fully-integrated and operational missile defense umbrella. As part of enabling these improvements, the Missile Guidelines governing ROK missile and unmanned aerial vehicle ranges and payloads were revised. These improvements in ROK capabilities are a smart and proportionate response to the growing North Korean missile threat.

Trilateral security cooperation between the United States, the ROK, and Japan has been evolving, although political and historical context moderates the pace at which it develops. The shared values, financial resources, logistical capability, and planning capacity to address complex contingencies make this trilateral partnership a relationship worth pursuing. USPACOM and our counterparts within Japanese and the ROK military staffs will continue to find ways to enhance trilateral cooperation with diplomatic assistance. During the April 2012 and December 2012 DPRK missile tests, USPACOM coordinated closely with both our ROK and Japanese counterparts throughout the launches. We conducted a trilateral naval exercise in the Yellow Sea in June 2012 improving our naval forces' tactical interoperability in ballistic missile defense. U.S., ROK and Japan officials issued a trilateral statement at the Defense Trilateral Talks in early 2013 stressing that we will closely coordinate to monitor a potential North Korean nuclear test and to respond to ballistic missile threats.

Thailand: As the treaty relationship between the U.S. and Thailand enters its 180<sup>th</sup> year, our relations remain strong, vibrant, and essential. Thailand has demonstrated a willingness and capability to act as a regional leader in a number of areas, including HA/DR efforts. Thailand has also been a partner supporting reform in Burma, and invited representatives from Burma, as

observers, to exercise COBRA GOLD 13, which is the U.S.'s largest co-hosted multilateral exercise in the world. Thailand is a demonstrated partner in counterterrorism and is the U.S.' oldest partner in the region.

Thailand will be increasingly important in collective security, peace and prosperity in the region. USPACOM remains committed to helping the Thai military further develop its already impressive capabilities so that it can assume even greater security responsibilities in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, particularly in counter-piracy and maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and peacekeeping operations.

India: The U.S.-India relationship is the strongest it has been since India gained its independence in 1947. A strengthened U.S.-India strategic partnership is imperative to achieve U.S. national interests including ensuring regional security, strengthening the international trading system, protecting shared domains, countering terrorism, and bolstering international nonproliferation. We remain India's most frequent partner for security engagements. Our defense relationship is built around a robust program of dialogues and engagements, military exercises, personnel exchanges and defense trade, which has grown from \$0 to \$9 billion dollars in less than a decade. The Indians now operate a fleet of six C-130J cargo aircraft; they have taken delivery of their first of eight P-8I Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft and their first of ten C-17 Strategic Airlifters.

Our relationship with India has room to grow, and we are optimistic and enthusiastic about its potential. India's legacy of non-alignment and commitment to a policy of "strategic autonomy" is often viewed as limiting the relationship. However, our shared values and commitment to democratic principles inevitably place us on parallel, if independent paths. Several of these parallel interests include cooperating in multilateral forums which address

counterterrorism and maritime security, including anti-piracy and HA/DR issues. We support India's increased desire for regional leadership.

While U.S.-Indian relations remain on an upward trajectory, we recognize there are impediments that must be overcome in the relationship. Process issues in the Indian bureaucracy and Indian concerns about U.S.-Pakistan relations are examples of challenges to achieving the strategic partnership we seek. Deputy Secretary of Defense Carter's India Defense Trade Initiative, however, has great potential to overcome much of the inertia and institutional red tape that has hampered our ability to expand cooperation. Even though progress is incremental, USPACOM continues to reinforce our desire for, and commitment to an expanded relationship that promotes a secure and stable South Asia.

Indonesia: Since President Yudhoyono signed a comprehensive partnership between Indonesia and the U.S. in 2010, progress has been made in military relations. Following a decade of political, economic, and military reform, Indonesia has surfaced as a vibrant democracy, with an emerging economy and a strengthened USPACOM – Armed Forces of Indonesia (TNI) relationship. We are working extensively with Indonesia in areas such as resilience and disaster risk reduction, counter terrorism, and, most recently, Indonesia and the United States were designated co-chairs of the Asia Pacific Intelligence Chiefs Conference. As co-chairs with Indonesia since 2011, we are now preparing to conduct the inaugural Counterterrorism Exercise (CTX) of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministers' Meeting – Plus (ADMM-Plus) Experts Working Group (EWG) on Counterterrorism in 2013.

Following a 12-year hiatus, USPACOM has reestablished security cooperation activities with the Indonesian KOPASSUS (Army Special Forces). The measured pace of this engagement

includes key leader dialogue and small-scale subject matter expert exchanges in areas such as military decision making, medical planning and law of war / human rights. More activities of this type are planned for 2013 and will gradually expand at a pace commensurate with the demonstrated progress in the TNI's transparency and institutional reform. Broadly speaking, we cannot afford to disengage just as we establish key partnerships in the Pacific.

Defense trade is also increasing as Indonesia grows its military budget. The United States is providing Foreign Military Financing and is in conversation with Indonesia on purchases of military equipment such as attack helicopters, fighters, and radar systems. The comprehensive partnership between Indonesia and the United States is strengthening ties between the two countries as well as bolstering our engagement with Southeast Asia and the region as a whole. The progress in this security relationship is very promising for both countries.

Singapore: Our bilateral relationship with Singapore is extensive and continues to strengthen and broaden. Singapore armed forces comprise a small, but capable military, and the access to port and airfield facilities they grant the United States is key to our posture in the Asia Pacific. Their main focus continues to be security within the Strait of Malacca and Singapore Strait and they cooperate with Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand in conducting security patrols within the Straits against piracy and other illicit activities.

Singapore's armed forces are also conducting counter-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden. Both of our militaries are seeking to increase engagement across all USPACOM service components. Singapore's offer to host U.S. Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) at Changi Naval Station, the first scheduled to arrive in April 2013, will also significantly enhance USPACOM's posture.

**Engaging with Other Partners:**

New Zealand: In addition, PACOM has been working hard to promote our security relationships with our partners in the region. For example, U.S.-New Zealand bilateral ties are stronger than it has been in three decades. We have made historic improvements in our relationship as we advance diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation. The growth between our countries is exemplified by regularized strategic and defense consultations, joint efforts to protect Antarctica's maritime ecosystem, and strategic dialogues on the Pacific Islands. The Washington Declaration, signed by Secretary Panetta and Defense Minister Coleman in June 2012, has allowed for greater flexibility in terms of joint exercises, military liaisons, and military educational exchanges. In 2012, Secretary Panetta announced a significant policy change, modifying restrictions on U.S. military relations with New Zealand by allowing the Secretary of Defense to waive, on a case-by-case basis, the restriction on access by Royal New Zealand Naval vessels to U.S. military and Coast Guard facilities.

China: The U.S.-China relationship has elements of cooperation and competition. The overall U.S. policy goal is to expand the areas of practical cooperation in addressing shared economic and security challenges, while preventing unhealthy and disruptive competition from undermining the relationship. In January 2011, President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao agreed to "build a cooperative partnership" that included a commitment to develop "continuous, stable, and reliable military-to-military relations." More recently, in 2012, President Obama and President Hu Jintao agreed to explore "building a new model of major power relations" in recognition of the fact that rivalry and conflict does not need to be inevitable between a rising power and an established power. Both Washington and Beijing are working towards these goals, as evidenced by the more than 60 formal dialogues a year including the

Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which USPACOM attended at the invitation of Secretary Clinton last year. Both nations recognize the importance of our bilateral relationship not only to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, but also to the world, which explains in part why, in spite of many disagreements, the United States and China stress the importance of stability in the overall bilateral relationship.

For the first time in four years, the Commander of USPACOM participated in a military-to-military engagement with China in country. To mature the partnership, I visited China twice in my first six months as a commander and hosted reciprocal visits at my headquarters.

The importance of stability presents opportunities in our bilateral military-to-military relationship. China's participation in regional multilateral and bilateral security dialogues, consultations and mechanisms has grown commensurate with its rising economic and military clout, and has provided greater potential for cooperative engagement with the United States and the region. Through those multilateral and bilateral activities, the United States is working with the Chinese to build a relationship that seeks to address regional security issues based on enhanced trust and convergent interests. Nontraditional missions such as HA/DR, counter-piracy, peacekeeping, and military medicine offer potential for growth. The Chinese received our invitation to attend the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise in 2014 very positively, and it appears both sides view U.S. outreach and Chinese attendance as an important step in fostering greater trust and openness in the bilateral military-to-military relationship.

The seventh U.S.-China Defense Policy Coordination Talks in October 2012 featured substantive discussions on U.S.-China relations including maritime security and safety, as well as regional and global security issues. In early December, USPACOM hosted a delegation of PLAN officers led by VADM Zhang Yongyi, Vice Chief of the PLAN. Discussions during the

roundtable focused on USPACOM's mission in the region and USPACOM's thoughts on the U.S. government's perspective on recent territorial and maritime disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea. During the 13<sup>th</sup> U.S.-China Defense Consultative Talks in early December, both delegations reaffirmed the importance of a healthy, stable and reliable military-to-military relationship. We achieved a broad consensus on a number of areas of common concern and candidly discussed areas of disagreement. The U.S.-PRC 2013 Military-to-Military Planning Conference in Beijing expanded on these talks. Both sides agreed to a bilateral plan consisting of over 40 events, the largest number since China suspended military-to-military engagements in 2010.

Our bilateral military dialogues with China provide us with important opportunities to discuss our respective concerns as well as to explore areas of future cooperation. The Chinese characterize our rebalance as militarily heavy, aimed at containing them, and that it has "emboldened" regional actors such as the Philippines and Japan against them, generating regional instability. However, Beijing also questions the sustainability of the rebalance, pointing to sequestration and other looming fiscal issues.

A continuing point of friction between the U.S. and China and a key part of bilateral discussions involves Chinese efforts to impede our lawful military activities in international air and maritime areas. While we do not believe China seeks a repeat of the 2001 EP-3 incident, we still see instances where Chinese forces conduct unsafe or unprofessional maneuvers in proximity to legally operating U.S. forces.

Despite our many differences with the Chinese, we have areas of common interest, and both sides agree that 2012 was an especially positive and productive year for military-to-military relations. We furthered the relationship in line with DOD's long-term objectives of increasing

cooperative capacity, fostering institutional knowledge and building a common picture of the security environment. The PLA became more amenable to conducting more complex engagements, and committed to events beyond the normal one-year time frame. USPACOM will continue to develop this relationship focusing on our converging interests in counter-piracy, counter-terrorism, protecting sea lanes, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Multilateral Relationships and Institutions: While the U.S. is committed to strengthening bilateral alliances and partnerships, we also recognize the critical role multilateral relationships and institutions will play in enhancing regional security. Common challenges like natural disasters that strike with little warning require unified efforts to respond rapidly and effectively. Institutions such as ASEAN can serve as an organizing force to harness such efforts but can likewise serve as a unifying body in establishing principles that support responsible behavior by regional actors.

USPACOM, working with the State Department and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, has supported U.S. engagement with ASEAN. I recently met with the newly-inaugurated ASEAN Secretary General and was encouraged by his desire to continue the progress made by his predecessor in addressing security-related matters in Southeast Asia. We are also participating in two major ASEAN Humanitarian and Disaster Response field training exercises in May and June 2013 reinforcing multilateral civ-mil and mil-mil cooperation as the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) Center comes online.

Engagement Tools: Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) are two of the top security cooperation engagement tools available to USPACOM. With minimal continued increases to meet our requirements, we can truly address a broad range of challenges from border security issues, HA/DR, counterterrorism,

and military-to-military engagement. USPACOM countries receive between 0.1%-0.15% of the worldwide FMF. Specific USPACOM considerations in making FMF budget recommendations include: Commander and Theater Campaign Plan priorities, coalition partner contributions or country priorities, and U.S. access objectives. The Philippines and Indonesia were the top beneficiaries of USPACOM FMF aid in FY12. IMET is a low cost, high impact program that has a longstanding track record of establishing valuable relationships with senior officers and leaders from critical partner nations.

Programs such as these contribute resources which USPACOM can synchronize with other efforts to build right-sized capacity at the right time, ultimately strengthening our relationships, building interoperability, and maintaining our leadership role in the region. The sustained engagements these programs provide also help regional nations appreciate the value of maintaining an active U.S. presence.

**Improving Posture and Presence:**

The U.S. requires a more geographically distributed, operationally resilient and politically sustainable posture that allows persistent presence and, if needed, power projection. As many of you who have frequently visited Asia know, the tyranny of distance imposed by the size of both the Pacific and Indian Oceans and intervening landmasses requires the United States to operate forward in order to achieve rapid response. This rapid response hinges on flexibility and forward positioning of both permanent and rotational military forces and is essential in enabling us to influence the onset and unfolding of crises, prevail in conflict, and provide aid in the aftermath of disasters.

Some of the most visible results of the rebalance can be seen in the ground forces now returning to theater. After a dozen years supporting wars in the Middle East, USPACOM's

permanently-assigned forces are resetting to focus on the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Recently, the Army removed I Corps and the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division from world-wide service rotation, permanently assigning them to USPACOM and, at my request, subsequently elevated Commander, U.S. Army Pacific to a four star position. Likewise, the Marine Corps removed the III Marine Expeditionary Force from its world-wide service rotations, allowing them to once again concentrate on Pacific theater missions.

A large component of USPACOM's permanent posture adjustment is the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), which is a product of an extensive force posture and footprint review conducted by USPACOM and approved by the Secretaries of Defense and State in 2005. DPRI also remains a key transformational goal of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and we are supportive of its implementation. A major element of DPRI is the significant reduction of Marine forces on Okinawa and relocation of approximately 8,000 Marines to Guam and Hawaii. The resulting end state is a transition from a heavily-concentrated Marine force in Northeast Asia region to four Marine Air Ground Task Forces geographically distributed across the Pacific providing a more flexible and balanced capability throughout the entire Western Pacific. The implementation is in progress with the Environmental Impact Statement under development in Guam and land-use alternatives being studied to support a future Environmental Impact Statement in Hawaii. While we intend to leverage the use of existing infrastructure to the maximum extent possible, resource investments will be needed to support this realignment. Based on current planning estimates we anticipate the movement of Marines to Guam by 2020 and to Hawaii by 2026. It should be noted that the government of Japan has also committed to providing \$3.1B to support the strategic realignment. It is recommended that a focused approach be adopted for the identification of required resources so that this estimated timeline can be accelerated and the strategic benefits of

a balanced forward force presence across the entire Western Pacific can be realized sooner.

Additional DPRI initiatives include the relocation of part of the Navy's air wing in Japan from Naval Air Facility Atsugi to Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni as a result of encroachment issues. In large measure, DPRI remains on track due to the contributions provided by the Government of Japan (GOJ). In December 2012, the GOJ submitted the environmental impact statement for the Henoko-based Futenma Replacement Facility to the Okinawa Prefectural Government, moving the process one step closer towards completion. Meanwhile, U.S. forces will continue to operate from the existing facility at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.

As previously mentioned, changes in rotational forces are already underway. These include the rotational presence of Marines in Darwin, Australia, and the upcoming rotational presence of Littoral Combat Ships at Changi, Singapore. Further, USPACOM is able to enhance the persistence of our rotational and forward deployed force presence through various operations such as those conducted in support of freedom of navigation, humanitarian missions, and civic assistance, to name a few. Pacific Air Force's Operation PACIFIC ANGEL and Pacific Fleet's PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP are two examples that bring joint, combined and non-governmental organizations together to deliver cooperative health engagements, engineering civic action programs and subject matter expert exchanges to many nations, specifically in areas like Oceania, Sri Lanka, and Laos – opening doors that would otherwise be closed to a U.S. military presence.

In addition to operations, exercises serve as a valuable means of augmenting presence in and around the region while simultaneously providing opportunities for robust and meaningful engagement. The USPACOM exercise program is key to maintaining a credible defense posture, strengthening relationships with our allies, expanding our partner networks, and preparing to

accomplish the full range of military contingencies. Congressional support for the Combatant Command Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation (CE2T2) program, therefore, is critical. CE2T2 directly impacts our ability to conduct joint training exercises and theater security engagement events in the Pacific region. USPACOM's portion of this essential program is comprised of 18 major exercises and involves joint military forces, interagency activities, and 30 of our 36 partner nations. In support of the rebalance, the number of major exercises conducted will expand to include events with Malaysia, regional Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) partners, and ASEAN.

The exercise program also provides important venues for joint experimentation to accelerate the development and fielding of new and maturing concepts, technologies, and procedures ahead of potential adversaries. This is essential to the development and application of innovative capabilities and concepts that comprise the third component of USPACOM's rebalance efforts.

**Developing Capabilities and Concepts:**

Today's regional threats and potential contingencies necessitate USPACOM be equipped with America's most advanced ships, aircraft, intelligence collection, logistics, and missile defense capabilities, thereby placing our finest forces forward. In order to outpace the rapidly evolving challenges of tomorrow, however, USPACOM requires further investments in hardware, systems, and innovation. For example, the Indo-Asia-Pacific's unique challenges in terms of distance and threat require development of capabilities related to lift; long-range strike; ISR; sub-surface capabilities; and missile defense. We are also working with the Deputy Secretary of Defense's Deputy's Management Action Group (DMAG Asia Pacific) to determine the optimal mix of capabilities, given competing requirements.

USPACOM is further working to improve cyber capability, capacity, and security through our recently activated Joint Cyber Center – Pacific. We believe the Joint Cyber Center is critical for synchronizing cyber operations with the other operational domains. In order to improve cyber operations with allies and partners, USPACOM continues to advocate for implementation of a Joint Information Environment (JIE) that addresses coalition networks as an organic element of the design. As a result of our cyber planning, exercise, and engagement efforts, the United States has emerged as the partner of choice in the Pacific for collaboration in the cyber domain.

We must continue to progress in strengthening the collective cyber security capabilities of the U.S. and its allies and partners. Our bilateral and multilateral communications interoperability programs have improved the management of electromagnetic spectrum, tactical data link capabilities, communications security, and satellite management in the multilateral environment. We are working to meet increasing demand for cyber and information assurance partnerships, including requests from all nations with whom we have bilateral communications agreements as well as those from emerging partner nations.

Resilient cyber and space capabilities are critical to USPACOM's ability to maintain communications, situational awareness, and command and control of forward deployed forces and coalition partners. USPACOM is working with allies and partners to strengthen collective cyber security and those efforts have the collateral benefit of strengthening relationships as they build capacity. Still, a more defensible and secure cyber architecture specifically designed for joint and coalition mission partners as well as cyber defensibility is necessary to ensure our ability to communicate securely, share information, and conduct operations. Space assets also remain vulnerable to terrestrial and on-orbit threats. For example, China possesses a mature anti-

satellite (ASAT) research and development program. Expanding USPACOM's organic satellite communications capacity will help mitigate this threat.

Because USPACOM recognizes the resource constraints the U.S. faces, we also endorse and participate in the development of concepts that augment the efficacy of our capabilities. These include warfighting approaches such as the Joint Operational Access Concept, Air Sea Battle, and efforts to deepen ally and partner capacity to prevent, respond to, and rebound from crisis.

USPACOM further supports concepts that allow for creative and innovative funding mechanisms in order to accomplish our mission. The Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) is one such tool. Its broad-based authority has the potential to allow improved interagency security cooperation in support of U.S. government strategic objectives.

Moving forward, to better deter and defeat aggression, USPACOM is taking steps to improve in-theater critical munitions stockpiles. In the past year, U.S. Army Pacific and U.S. Forces Korea have seen tangible benefits from the rebalance, improving their ability to meet future requirements through enhanced prepositioned stocks. USPACOM is working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff through the Munitions Requirement Process to ensure adequate resourcing of munitions, as well as other logistics enablers, such as the pier facilities at Military Ocean Terminal Concord, a next generation Offshore Petroleum Discharge System, our inland petroleum discharge system capability, and completion of required MILCON projects in support of our theater petroleum plan.

**Planning for Operations and Contingencies:**

The final aspect to USPACOM's rebalance efforts is the planning we conduct for operations and contingencies. Just as innovative concepts allow us to maximize our resources,

so too, does creative planning. An example of this is our approach to the USPACOM Theater Campaign Plan (TCP). The TCP operationalizes our theater strategy and puts words into execution. Although the TCP has traditionally been used to generally guide command efforts for a five year period, planning has begun too late for our service components to execute with anything but resources on hand. USPACOM has now extended the TCP's time horizon by producing a Theater Campaign Order that defines component taskings for the current fiscal year. Planning for the next fiscal year occurs in conjunction with TCP planning for the next five year period, far enough out to allow our service components time to influence their parent service budgets.

Another example of a new approach to planning is our Theater Security Cooperation Plan. Developing mutually supported objectives and goals with our allies and partners is critical, and aligning a solidified U.S. position is crucial to building capability in the region. To support this effort we have developed Country Security Cooperation Plans to support the Theater Campaign Plan. These lay the foundation for our bilateral and multilateral engagements and allow us to be smarter in the application of our resources.

Additionally we have reassessed the efficacy of our theater-wide command and control efforts and have made the adjustments necessary to better respond to the dynamic security environment we find ourselves in.

#### ***Repercussions of Sequestration and Continuing Resolution***

During the past decade the U.S. joint force has been heavily tasked in other AORs. As a consequence, the USPACOM AOR, in many areas has assumed additional risk. Examples of areas of particular concern are ISR assets, regional and homeland ballistic missile defense capabilities, carrier strike group availability, undersea warfare capabilities, munitions availability

and theater lift. The rebalance has given us a new opportunity to begin to solve this and to re-emphasize to our allies and partners that we are a committed Pacific nation. However, the impact of sequestration and shortfalls in operating accounts under the continuing appropriations resolution may begin to undermine our strategic rebalance initiatives, exasperate existing resource challenges, and result in increased risk.

Due to service funding reductions, USPACOM component training tempo will be drastically reduced; rotational forces in theater will be reduced, all leading to decreased ability to accomplish assigned missions, respond to crises, and support theater engagement objectives. These funding cuts will challenge our ability to execute both discreet operations and the broader Indo-Asia-Pacific rebalance strategy.

The net effect of sequestration will be a negative impact in the Indo-Asia-Pacific at a critical time as we look to stabilize our forward presence and increase engagement with our treaty allies and partners. Given the size of the USPACOM AOR, Service contributions, especially lift capabilities that the Air Force and Navy provide, are crucial to engagement with Indo-Asia-Pacific countries.

Facilities maintenance is critical to sustaining essential infrastructure. In order to provide immediate savings, Services will be forced to forgo facilities sustainment. Due to lack of maintenance, issues that would have been inexpensive minor problems will turn into expensive projects in future years. The inability to conduct preventive maintenance will affect the lives of our service members and will cause a bow wave of maintenance and infrastructure requirements in the out years. Degraded facilities put missions at risk and delayed MILCON projects endanger the implementation of international agreements.

Civilian furloughs and restrictions on hiring are of special interest. Civil servants

represent a noteworthy portion of our capability and capacity. If furloughs occur, every aspect of USPACOM's warfighting readiness will be adversely affected. Overseas schools, hospitals, and warfighting staffs will be impacted. Of particular concern, more than half of those who support our ISR architecture are civilians. The current budget restrictions and hiring freeze also puts at high risk the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command's (JPAC) ability to meet the NDAA 2010 required 200 identifications per year by Fiscal Year 2015.

The impact to each of these civilians will be significant - 22 unpaid days equates to 20% less pay for nearly half the year. On a personal level, it breaks faith with a skilled workforce. Much of what they do simply cannot be picked up by others in their absence.

As we work through the near-term resource implications of funding reductions and assess the increasing risk, I will continue to work with the Services to preserve, to the extent possible, our essential homeland defense and crisis response capabilities... capabilities resident in our USPACOM forward deployed forces. We will also continue to demonstrate U.S. resolve and commitment to peace and security in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.

#### *Conclusion*

The Pacific Ocean does not separate the United States from Asia; it connects us. We are connected by our economies, by our cultures, by our shared interests, and our security challenges. We have been accepting additional risk in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region for some time. Our rebalance strategy is in place, and we are making progress. Implementing and sustaining the strategic rebalance will require long-term, sustained commitment and resources.

On behalf of our military members and civilian employees that work every day to ensure that our country is successful in this effort, I would like to thank the Committee for their support, and I look forward to answering your questions.



## United States Navy Biography

### Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, III Commander, U.S. Pacific Command

Adm. Locklear is a 1977 graduate of the United States Naval Academy.

His career as a surface warfare officer includes assignments aboard USS *William V. Pratt* (DDG 44), USS *Carl Vinson* (CVN 70), USS *Callaghan* (DDG 994), and USS *Truxtun* (CG 35), culminating in command of USS *Leffwich* (DD 984). Subsequent command assignments include commander, Destroyer Squadron Two; commander, *Nimitz* Strike Group; commander, U.S. 3rd Fleet; and commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, U.S. Naval Forces Africa, and Allied Joint Force Command Naples.

Ashore, he served as executive assistant to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations; the 78th commandant of Midshipmen, United States Naval Academy; director, Assessment Division (OPNAV N81); director, Programming Division (OPNAV N80); and, as director, Navy Staff.

He is a 1992 graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and holds a master's degree in Public Administration from the George Washington University.

Locklear is the commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii.

His personal decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Service Medal with one gold star, Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit with four gold stars, Bronze Star Medal, and numerous individual, campaign and unit awards.



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**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING  
THE HEARING**

MARCH 5, 2013

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**RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP**

General KEHLER. I am not aware of any negotiated, bilateral and verifiable agreements regarding nuclear weapons that did not take the form of a treaty or a Congressional-Executive agreement (SALT I). [See page 22.]

**RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN**

General KEHLER. USSTRATCOM and U.S. Cyber Command are working with the Joint Staff and Service Chiefs to identify, train and position the highly qualified and standardized cyber force that this nation needs. The first one-third of this force is being generated this year by realigning existing personnel within U.S. Cyber Command service components to form the Cyber Mission Force. Plans are in place to provide individuals with requisite training utilizing existing DOD training courses. The remaining two-thirds of the planned force is being identified, trained and positioned in FY14–FY16. The service burden conforms to a standard 30–30–30–10 (personnel percentage from each service) model for Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps respectively. I am fully engaged with Commander U.S. Cyber Command to shape and advocate for the cyber professionals the nation needs to defend and operate in cyberspace. [See page 36.]



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**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING**

MARCH 5, 2013

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## QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON

Mr. MCKEON. I understand that the Air Force is in the process of conducting an analysis of alternatives for the next generation Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP). Additionally, a recent GAO report on government risk highlights various capability gaps in environmental satellite data that could lead to inaccurate future weather forecasting. What is the Air Force doing to mitigate risk, and has the Air Force considered purchasing commercial data from American companies as a potential solution?

General KEHLER. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) will complete an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) in the summer of 2013. The AOA will determine if and when a replacement for DMSP is required and identify alternatives to support continued mission success. To mitigate risk, we recently provided direction to reduce the DMSP constellation to a single orbit allowing the DOD to launch a replacement “on need” and potentially extend coverage through the 2025 timeframe. There are currently no commercial providers for satellite weather data; however the AOA is considering a proposal by a commercial company that could be the provider of weather data. The AOA includes many alternatives which will be assessed for cost, risk and operational utility.

Mr. MCKEON. How do you assess national intelligence support to STRATCOM? Please specifically discuss support from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, as well as the rest of the Intelligence Community. Do you have any recommendations to improve support provided by these agencies?

General KEHLER. In general, the Intelligence Community (IC) provides excellent support to USSTRATCOM:

- The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) provides a senior representative to USSTRATCOM who coordinates and aligns IC support with my highest priorities.
- DIA provides high-quality, finished all-source intelligence reporting and strategic assessments; collection management support and advocacy; and the foundational intelligence and data necessary to meet our strategic warning and targeting needs. However, I am concerned that my rapidly expanding requirement to understand adversary decision calculus combined with planned DIA reductions could impact DIA’s ability to meet USSTRATCOM’s needs.
- NGA provides excellent imagery intelligence analysis and imagery systems support. An NGA Support Team (NST) provides critical analysis in support of my missions and is fully integrated within my Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC). This arrangement has become the model for imbedded national agency support.
- NSA provides direct and reach-back support by embedding signals intelligence experts within the JIOC, and NSA’s integration with USCYBERCOM remains essential for execution of the cyber mission. NSA’s reporting and analysis has been somewhat degraded by resource reductions, but remains satisfactory overall.
- NRO maintains a liaison office at USSTRATCOM and provides critical support to my space mission.

Because budget reductions are being addressed independently by each Agency, I am concerned that unless the cuts are coordinated within the IC, the aggregate effect could introduce additional risk to IC support of Combatant Command missions.

Mr. MCKEON. How does the Joint Forces Component Command for ISR prioritize and determine ISR allocation to Combatant Commands? What are the challenges associated with such allocation determinations?

General KEHLER. JFCC ISR, through the Global Force Management (GFM) process, uses the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF), and more specifically the Force Allocation Decision Model (FADM), to inform prioritization and allocation recommendations. The FADM lays out prioritized categories for specific missions and target areas across the geographic Combatant Commands (CCMDs). However, when developing allocation plans and recommendations for Secretary of Defense approval, JFCC ISR does not only recommend ISR capabilities according to

the FADM. Instead, to the degree possible, JFCC ISR accounts for the marginal intelligence gain or loss in each GEF Category and distributes ISR capabilities across the categories to better support current operations and hedge against mid-term and long-term threats.

The challenge associated with ISR force allocation is that the process is not all science. There is an art to quantifying and/or qualifying intangible (yet invaluable) concepts such as intelligence gain and operational risk.

Mr. MCKEON. The committee understands that U.S. Pacific Command is currently undergoing a manpower study to review its size and structure as part of DOD's shift to the Asia-Pacific region.

a. Do you anticipate making any changes to its size and structure of PACOM headquarters?

b. Can you provide details of any potential areas of concern for the command in terms of staffing? For example, do you anticipate any growth or shifts of personnel within the J-code structure in PACOM?

c. We understand that PACOM has more than one-fifth of its authorized headquarters staff in the commander's staff, the J0. What functions do these staff perform versus the other staff in the plans, logistics, and other directorates? How do you avoid overlap or duplication of effort?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. a. Yes. HQ USPACOM recently underwent a manpower study to validate our rebalance manpower requirements. The study was led by the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency and contained representatives from all Services. The team conducted a comprehensive review of all the HQ missions, billets, as well as organizational structures, and validated 152 new or realigned manpower requirements (90 mil/62 civs). These are needed to "rebuild readiness areas that were deemphasized over the past decade" and "expand our networks of cooperation with emerging partners" as directed in the President's "Rebalance" strategy, documented in Sustaining Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012. The manpower study will serve as the documentation to support the USPACOM rebalance manpower request that will be submitted to the Joint Staff's Joint Manpower Validation Process (JMVP).

b. Potential areas of concern highlighted by our recent manpower analysis include insufficient staffing levels in the areas of Targeting, Space Operations, Ballistic Missile Defense, Air Defense, Global Force Management, Cyber Operations, Planners (Operations, Strategic, Engineering, Logistics), and more. USPACOM is executing internal shifts to address our priority requirements. However, we anticipate growth within the J-code structure to meet expanding mission requirements and to reduce capability gaps. We will request the manpower growth required to reduce these gaps and mitigate risk through the JMVP.

c. The J00 (Commander) personal staff consists of 18 manpower billets that provide direct support to the commander. In addition, within the J0 Staff are the Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff, Surgeon, Headquarters Commandant and their supporting staffs. Other headquarters staff elements, such as protocol, legal, and public affairs provide administrative and advisory support to the entire headquarters staff. These functions are common amongst all Combatant Command (COCOM) and Service component headquarters staffs. The recently-conducted manpower review of headquarters staff analyzed overlap and duplication of effort and resulted in subsequent staff realignments. One result of this analysis was the reallocation of 14 billets into J3, J5, and J6 in March 2013.

Mr. MCKEON. The committee understands that PACOM also has over 1,200 personnel authorized to support subordinate unified commands in South Korea, Alaska, and Japan as well as more than 1,400 in direct reporting units such as a drug task force and missing person's office.

a. How does the command manage and oversee personnel within the subordinate unified commands and direct reporting units to ensure that resources are being efficiently allocated and that there is no unnecessary overlap in functions?

b. Are some or all of these subordinate unified commands and direct reporting units part of the ongoing manpower reviews?

c. What changes, if any, do you anticipate in their size and structure?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. In fiscal year 2013, USPACOM is authorized 3,518 active duty military and civilian positions. A total of 686 positions support subordinate unified commands; US Forces Korea (468), US Alaskan Command (66), US Forces Japan (152). Direct reporting units account for 2,075 positions including: Joint Interagency Task Force-West (108), Joint Prisoners of War Accounting Command (JPAC) (631), Defense Intelligence Agency (837), Special Operation Command Pacific/Korea (336), Security Cooperation Organization (151), Center of Excellence (10), and USPACOM Rep Guam (2). The remaining 757 billets support Headquarters PACOM.

a. Over the past five years, USPACOM conducted multiple studies of the headquarters, subordinate unified commands and direct reporting units to ensure that resources are efficiently allocated and contained minimal overlap in functions. In 2007, USPACOM conducted a COCOM headquarters baseline review, led by Deputy Secretary of Defense. In 2010, PACOM conducted a zero-based manpower review of the headquarters, subordinate unified commands, and direct reporting units in response to the Secretary of Defense's 2010 efficiency initiative. We also conducted in-depth analysis looking at the feasibility of disestablishing the U.S. Alaskan Command and assessing the alignment of the Joint Interagency Task Force-West with Special Operations Command Pacific. In addition to multiple manpower reviews, U.S. Pacific Command Instruction S3020.2L, Command Relationships in the U.S. Pacific Command, defines the command relationships between Commander USPACOM and subordinate commanders and between the commanders and established coordinating authorities. Given the governing guidance and recent studies conducted over the last five years, USPACOM believes existing resources are appropriately allocated and there is minimal overlap in functions. The most recent headquarters manpower study actually highlighted a significant shortfall in manpower resourcing needed to address high risk levels and capability gaps in the following areas: Targeting; Cyber (Security, Analysts, Plans); Space Operations; Ballistic Missile Defense; Air Defense; Global Force Management; Joint Operations Center; Financial Controls; Foreign Disclosure Officers; Assessments; Medical Plans and Operations; Munitions Safety; POL Management; Senior Leader engagement; Inter-Agency coordination; and others. PACOM's participation in the Joint Manpower Validation Process (JMVP) provides the Joint Staff and OSD with an excellent opportunity to help this HQ mitigate the risk associated with these capability gaps.

b. While the commands were not included in the most recent headquarters study, each has either completed or is currently conducting individual command manpower reviews.

c. We anticipate programmatic manpower increases in the theater special operations command and JPAC (to support the requirements of the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act). We also anticipate structural changes in U.S. Forces Japan and U.S. Forces Korea.

Mr. McKEON. The committee understands that the service component commands supporting PACOM had about 2,500 authorized personnel in 2012, and the theater special operations command had 250 authorized personnel. How do you anticipate the rebalance towards the Pacific region will impact the size and structure of the service component commands and theater special operations command? Do you anticipate that they will need to get larger or need to make other structural changes?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. In FY13, the service component commands supporting USPACOM were authorized 2,871 military and civilian positions in their headquarters staffs. This includes Pacific Fleet (638), U.S. Army Pacific (977), Pacific Air Forces (725), and Marine Forces Pacific (531). Special Operations Command Pacific/Korea, which is currently a USPACOM sub-unified command, is authorized 336 military and civilian positions. We anticipate that a balance of both growth and organizational structure changes will be required for the service component commands and the theater special operations command to effectively meet the January 2012 strategic guidance for the Department of Defense to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region.

Mr. McKEON. What other changes are needed to improve "intelligence mission management" for PACOM?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. PACOM needs:

- (1) A doctrinal foundation for the Intelligence Mission Management concept
- (2) Professionalization of the Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) and Collection Management career fields at the service and Department of Defense agency levels
- (3) Better ISR visualization and planning tools
- (4) Advanced Information Technology (IT) development to refine command and control of ISR

Mr. McKEON. What role do area weapons, and particularly the Sensor-Fused Weapon (SFW), have in operational plans for the Pacific Command?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. In a Korea contingency, the North Korean military possesses a large and capable military that includes significant ground conventional armor, mechanized and light capability. Given this capability, current operational plans evaluate and address the threat posed to U.S. and allied forces. Sensor-Fused Weapons are one of the key munitions considered in countering or reducing the threat, while lowering the risk of collateral damage.

Mr. McKEON. Are area weapons seen as essential in defending the ROK should deterrence fail?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Area weapons remain a significant and essential aspect to defending the ROK. The proximity of a large and capable North Korean military with significant ground conventional armor, mechanized and light capability highlight the need for area weapons. Without area weapon options, the level of operational risk and the threat to ROK and U.S. forces and the civilian population dramatically increases.

Mr. MCKEON. What type of consequences would you foresee if U.S. forces could rely only on unitary systems to defend against a North Korean armored attack? What costs in terms of protecting friendly forces, materiel and dollars would be incurred?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Based upon a formidable North Korean threat with the capability to conduct short to no notice conventional and asymmetric attacks, U.S. reliance strictly on unitary systems will increase operational risk to the U.S. and the Alliance. This restriction would delay the U.S. and Alliance ability to swiftly defeat North Korean aggression, likely increase the number of military and civilian casualties, and increase the overall materiel and dollar cost to prosecute a Korean contingency.

Mr. MCKEON. What efforts have been undertaken and are anticipated to remove by 2018 munitions available to the Pacific Command that are prohibited by the 2008 Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. USPACOM components have removed approximately 260,000 rounds of cluster munitions from Korea since 2009 using planned surface ship retrograde missions and opportune lift, as available. Retrograde of cluster munitions is managed by the services with USPACOM service components reporting annually on their progress to-date towards meeting the reduction milestones mandated by the 2008 policy on cluster munitions. The component projections are tied to the assumption that funding for transportation and demilitarization are not significantly reduced.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, please discuss the risks and cost savings associated with any further slippage in the schedule for the *Ohio*-class submarine replacement. Will the Navy be able to fulfill STRATCOM's continuous at sea deterrence requirements in future years at the current schedule, and what is the effect if these replacement submarines are further delayed?

General KEHLER. The *Ohio*-class submarines will be the oldest class of submarine the U.S. has ever operated assuming they begin to retire in 2027, and it is my understanding that the Navy's current assessment is that they cannot be life-extended further. The *Ohio* Replacement SSBN is being delivered "just in time" to prevent a critical strategic deterrent capability gap and additional schedule slips would lead to a situation where current U.S. strategic deterrence requirements will not be met. It is also my understanding that delays could have negative impacts on the United Kingdom's efforts to recapitalize their ballistic missile submarine fleet.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN

Mr. LARSEN. As the military's strategic pivot to the Pacific continues, I would like you to comment on the importance of airborne electronic attack (AEA). As our adversaries evolve their own capabilities—and even use rudimentary technology—to try to overcome our nation's superior weapons platforms, it seems absolutely critical that we control the electro-magnetic spectrum. From your perspective as the Strategic Commander, could you talk about the importance of expeditionary AEA in the context of your ability to conduct operations?

General KEHLER. Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) is a key enabler at the initiation of hostilities, and critical to Joint Force freedom of action in any Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) environment. As the Joint Force advocate for Electronic Warfare, I am focused on retaining adequate AEA capacity and capability to ensure our success in conflict now and in the future. We must continue to press for the latest capabilities to ensure U.S. AEA capabilities remain ahead of our adversaries while retaining current capabilities within the confines of a resource limited environment. Additional investment in AEA capability and capacity will help provide the operational flexibility, responsiveness, and persistence required by the Joint Force to ensure future mission success.

**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS**

Mr. ROGERS. There are various efforts in the Department, namely Air Force, Army, and DARPA, to provide rapid low cost launch solutions. How do you foresee this type of capability being used by the warfighter? In light of increasing foreign threats to our space systems, how important is it that we prioritize these efforts?

General KEHLER. Rapid launch and low-cost launch are two very different considerations, and should be addressed separately. The priority for efforts to develop low-cost launch is very high, while the priority of effort for rapid launch development is significantly lower.

Reducing launch costs benefits the entire space enterprise and would positively impact all users—military, civil and commercial. For DOD in particular, low-cost launch would help the business case for initiatives ranging from science and technology demonstrations to emerging operational concepts like cube/nanosats or disaggregated space architectures. In an era of fiscal austerity, reducing launch costs while maintaining high assurance is a top priority.

Rapid space launch on the other hand requires a launch-ready payload—essentially developing, building and then storing satellites for future use. Historically, the costs on the payload side of the equation are too prohibitive regardless of launch costs or responsiveness. Therefore, to operate in this increasingly contested domain we are pursuing other approaches to protect/preserve our capabilities while on orbit.

Mr. ROGERS. There have been major advances in Overhead Persistent Infrared with the launch of the Space-Based Infrared System. Are we leveraging this capability to the fullest extent for missile defense? What challenges and opportunities are ahead?

General KEHLER. We are in continuous dialogue with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to exploit every operational advantage from our on-orbit systems. MDA has a plan to improve utilization of Overhead Persistent Infrared capabilities as they become available and the system matures. One challenge is the constrained fiscal environment we are in and the uncertainty surrounding the budget.

Mr. ROGERS. In your statement for the record, you outlined the competing forces on limited electromagnetic spectrum, which “potentially pits economics against national security needs.” What are the warfighter’s operational demands on electromagnetic spectrum? Based on past experiences with spectrum relocations, what would be the operational demands on the force if another round of relocations was called for? Further, based on the recommendations from the report by the President’s Council of Advisers on Science and Technology titled “Realizing the Full Potential of Government-Held Spectrum to Spur Economic Growth,” has STRATCOM assessed spectrum sharing as a feasible option in some instances?

General KEHLER. The electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) is a critical enabler of our nation’s defense capabilities—not a single military mission is executed without direct or indirect reliance on the EMS. Our military relies on access and control of the EMS to successfully perform operational tasks ranging from precision guidance of advanced weapons to global Command, Control, and Communications (C3). At home, our forces must have the spectrum access required to test and train for employment of the capabilities integral to these operations. As the Joint Force advocate for spectrum matters, USSTRATCOM takes into consideration the potential adverse impacts of domestic spectrum reallocations on current and future military operations. The USSTRATCOM Joint Electronic Magnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO) Office works with the Joint Staff, DOD Chief Information Officer, and support agencies to review the feasibility of, and advocate for military spectrum requirements in potential reallocation or sharing scenarios.

Mr. ROGERS. During your testimony, you responded to Mr. Bishop that “if we’re going to go beyond the New START levels of 1,550 then I think that should be bilateral.” Can you please elaborate as to whether you think such reductions should be both “bilateral” and verifiable?

General KEHLER. Yes, I believe such reductions should be bilateral and verifiable. Bilateral reductions ensure stability and, when combined with verification provisions, guarantee both nations are adhering to the agreement.

Mr. ROGERS. In responding to Mr. Bishop, you stated some uncertainty about the Moscow Treaty, which was ratified by the Senate. Specifically, is it your understanding, as stated in the treaty’s article-by-article summary, that the Moscow Treaty relied on the verification mechanisms in place under the START I agreement, at least until that agreement expired in 2009?

General KEHLER. The Moscow Treaty depended on the START Treaty’s comprehensive verification regime to provide the foundation for confidence, transparency, and predictability. Without the START Treaty in force, the Moscow Treaty

alone did not contain any measures to provide such confidence, transparency, and predictability.

Mr. ROGERS. Do you know of any rigorous analysis that would support the recommendations of several reports such as the Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission Report, which advocate dramatic reductions in our strategic force numbers? To your knowledge, did the authors of that specific report interview you or any members of our strategic deterrent force leadership in the process of drafting their report? Do you believe in an underlying premise of that report that "Security is mainly a state of mind, not a physical condition"?

General KEHLER. I am not aware of any rigorous analysis conducted within USSTRATCOM or the Department of Defense as a whole regarding the Global Zero or other non-DOD report. The Global Zero report authors did not interview me nor, to my knowledge, interview members of my staff. I do support critical review and examination of these key issues. I do not believe "security is mainly a state of mind." Rather, I believe national security is better characterized as both a physical condition and the perceptions that exist about those conditions.

Mr. ROGERS. Are you concerned that our present nuclear arms control agreements do not encompass tactical nuclear weapons and isn't that asymmetry in our respective stockpiles a matter of concern? Am I correct that the Russian Federation could arm an Akula sub, or other sub, like the new Yasen class, with a cruise missile and it could be a threat to the U.S.? Am I correct that these types of weapons are not presently limited by any arms control regime? What level of these forces is destabilizing and a threat to the U.S.? Are you concerned that further reductions could undermine the credibility of our extended deterrence commitments to our allies and have the perverse effect of promoting proliferation amongst our allies?

General KEHLER. I agree with the findings of the Nuclear Posture Review that strict numerical parity with the Russian Federation is no longer as compelling as it was in the Cold War but large disparities may not be conducive to maintaining stability. Further, I agree that future reductions should include all nuclear weapons. Yes, sea launched cruise missiles could threaten the United States, and sea launched cruise missiles are not currently limited by any treaty. Given the existing U.S. and Russian Federation force levels and postures, I'm not concerned about stability issues. As discussed in the NPR, I believe any further reductions must continue to strengthen deterrence of potential regional adversaries, strategic stability vis-a-vis Russia and China, and assurance of our allies and partners.

Mr. ROGERS. Would you advocate any significant changes in our present doctrine of flexible response?

General KEHLER. I would not classify our present doctrine as "flexible response" as this term is often historically used with President Kennedy's and President Johnson's administrations. More generally, I believe there are adjustments that can be made in our strategy to more properly align it with the current geopolitical environment.

Mr. ROGERS. What is Plan B if we can't do pit reuse now that we have postponed CMRR-NF? If you need a certain number of pits per year with reuse, how many do you need without it? Do you agree with the Navy and the Nuclear Weapons Council that we need an "off ramp" for the Navy and the W88 warhead if an Interoperable Warhead doesn't prove technically feasible or affordable?

General KEHLER. The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) recently approved a long term stockpile modernization strategy that includes a number of decision points and "off ramps" to address warhead life extension technical and affordability risks. NNSA has developed an interim plutonium production capability plan to support near term warhead life extension programs and they are continuing to develop an enduring plutonium pit production strategy. Elements of this plan will be included in the pit production requirements report required by the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act.

Mr. ROGERS. Two weeks ago, at the House Energy and Water Appropriations subcommittee hearing on the FY14 budget, Chairman Frelinghuysen asked Don Cook, the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, if further reductions in the U.S. stockpile would save money in the annual budget. Dr. Cook's response was, "I'd answer the question directly by saying not much . . . So not much savings will be achieved." Do you agree with Dr. Cook? With any further reductions, should we expect cost savings directly proportional to the size of the cuts in the force structure or stockpile?

General KEHLER. I agree with Dr. Cook's assessment. While over the long term, a smaller force structure and stockpile would require fewer resources, cost savings are not directly proportional to reductions. Regardless of the force structure or stockpile size, there is a certain level of fixed costs associated with maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent capability.

Mr. ROGERS. We hear that we could save \$120B over ten years by implementing the Global Zero report, which calls for postponing the next generation bomber and *Ohio*-replacement and immediately eliminating the ICBM land-based leg of our deterrent, not building CMRR-NF or UPF, and reducing the U.S. stockpile to a total of 900 warheads, with only 450 deployed. Do you support that plan? Please explain why or why not?

General KEHLER. No, I do not support the illustrative changes to our force structure, posture and supporting infrastructure in the Global Zero report. These illustrative changes are not consistent with the current security environment.

Mr. ROGERS. What are your concerns about the Global Zero recommendation that the U.S. take steps to ensure a 48 hour to 72 hour delay in responding to nuclear attack on the United States? Do you believe the President of the United States should have his hands tied in that way?

General KEHLER. In today's security environment, I do not support the introduction of a delay in response timelines. Introducing mandatory delays in response time can be destabilizing for two primary reasons: such a delay is largely unverifiable, and early moves to re posture in a crisis could be interpreted as threatening or immediately escalatory.

Mr. ROGERS. It is now March 2013, we have to implement the New START by February 2018. How soon do we need to start implementing that treaty? Some suggest we should go to New START levels now and not wait until 2017/18. Is it as easy as that? Can we just implement New START tomorrow?

General KEHLER. We began implementing the New START as soon as it entered into force in February 2011. Early treaty implementation activities included exchanging strategic databases with the Russians, conducting bomber and submarine exhibitions, and viewing a Russian exhibition of a new, mobile ICBM. The process of adjusting U.S. nuclear force levels in an efficient manner involves an intricate series of activities that will take a number of years. We completed the conversion of B-1B bombers to non-nuclear capability and continue to eliminate mothballed B-52G bombers. In the coming years, we will eliminate unused Peacekeeper and Minuteman ICBM silos, reduce the number of warheads carried aboard ballistic missile submarines, de-MIRV ICBMs, and convert additional B-52H bombers to a non-nuclear role. USSTRATCOM is overseeing the New START implementation plan and we are confident that we will meet our obligations within the prescribed timeframe.

Mr. ROGERS. At present, there is no LRSO warhead LEP in the production schedule at NNSA. When will we see an LRSO warhead in the production queue at NNSA? Will it follow the W76, B61 and W78? Will it be slipped in somewhere? To what extent is NNSA's ability to execute all of these life extension programs a concern to you?

General KEHLER. The NWC-approved stockpile modernization strategy aligns NNSA's workload with DOD platform development and acquisition schedules, including LRSO warhead production which currently follows the B61 LEP. A primary consideration in this plan is the ability of NNSA to execute multiple warhead life extension and sustainment programs in an efficient and affordable manner. With adequate, sustained funding, the risk to accomplish these life extension programs is manageable.

Mr. ROGERS. In the past several years, DOD has transferred billions of dollars in budgetary authority to NNSA to pay for DOD's top priorities in NNSA's programs. Did you support these funds transfers to DOE to help provide the resources for nuclear deterrent modernization programs? Can you say what DOE did with that Department of Defense money? Are you satisfied with DOD's ability to understand where and how DOE/NNSA is spending that money?

General KEHLER. Following the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, DOD agreed that NNSA required additional funding to support nuclear weapon stockpile and Naval Reactors activities. I support that decision and the subsequent transfer of DOD funds for weapon surveillance, maintenance, and life extension activities. Over the past year, the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) worked closely with NNSA to develop and approve an executable, long term stockpile management strategy which increased our awareness of how DOD funds are being applied to sustain our Nation's strategic deterrent capabilities. Increased NWC visibility into NNSA's financial process to include DOD certification of NNSA's budget, have been positive changes. We will continue working with NNSA to ensure our nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure and effective.

Mr. ROGERS. In your response to Mr. Turner, you said that while you believe the NNSA's most recent plan for plutonium capabilities now "does close, it's not without risk". Would you please elaborate on those risks? Are you confident that NNSA can execute this plan, if provided the resources to do so? Do you believe the interim plutonium strategy has sufficient detail for you to be comfortable with it and NNSA's

ability to carry it out? Do you believe the long-term plutonium strategy NNSA prefers—the modular approach to replacing plutonium capabilities—has sufficient detail for you to be comfortable with it and NNSA’s ability to carry it out?

General KEHLER. While every program can experience technical and production risks, an uncertain fiscal environment remains my primary concern in sustaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent. NNSA has identified the necessary resources for an interim plutonium production plan using existing facilities that will meet our near-term weapon life extension requirements. A modular approach to develop an enduring plutonium production capability seems reasonable, but I do not have sufficient details to render an opinion. I will continue to work with NNSA on the long-term plutonium strategy until I have sufficient detail to certify the concept and associated budget.

Mr. ROGERS. You mentioned in your response to Mr. Turner that a responsive production infrastructure is “one consideration” for whether or not we can reduce our hedge stockpile—but that you “don’t think that’s the only consideration.” Would you please elaborate on these considerations, as well as how the need for a responsive infrastructure is linked to potential reductions in our hedge stockpile?

General KEHLER. Historically, the U.S. retained a non-deployed stockpile of weapons to manage risk against technical problems and geopolitical uncertainty. Recapitalizing or replacing our aging plutonium and uranium production facilities could enable us to reduce the non-deployed stockpile as we demonstrate the capability to address these risks in a timely fashion. Other considerations that determine the size of the non-deployed stockpile and production infrastructure capabilities include: National policy and strategy objectives; geopolitical conditions; arms control agreements; force composition and condition of our delivery systems; warhead and component aging; and the need for improved safety and security.

Mr. ROGERS. At what force size does the ICBM force become unsustainable from a personnel standpoint? Would reductions in the size of the ICBM force below a certain level hinder the Air Force’s ability to attract and retain skilled officers and enlisted personnel to the missile force? What impacts might de-alerting the ICBM force have on personnel, morale, and the ability to attract and retain skilled officers and enlisted personnel to the missile force?

General KEHLER. The 2010 NPR concluded that the current alert posture of U.S. strategic forces, including nearly all ICBMs on alert, should be maintained. It is premature to speculate on further reductions to the ICBM force or the broader impact of potential force changes on the ICBM enterprise. As we reduce the size of the nuclear force to meet our New START obligations, we will work with the Services to ensure we attract and retain the skilled Airmen and Sailors we need for this important mission.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON

Mr. JOHNSON. I am concerned about news reports indicating discussion of a U.S. nuclear presence in South Korea. What are the risks involved with the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. The U.S.–ROK Alliance is prepared to deter, and if necessary, defeat aggression from the North without the need for nuclear weapons stationed or positioned in South Korea.

It is my judgement, and the judgement of the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, that the addition of nuclear weapons to Korea is unnecessary. If required to do so, the U.S. has the ability to deliver nuclear weapons without basing them in Korea. Further, we have robust conventional capabilities that can be immediately employed in deterrence.

The deployment of nuclear weapons, in addition to being militarily unnecessary, could appear to conflict with broader U.S. non-proliferation and denuclearization efforts, providing propaganda opportunities for North Korea and other critics.

We have been assured by ROK military and political leaders that there is no serious consideration by the new ROK government of demanding the re-introduction of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons or pursuing an indigenous program.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN

Mr. WITTMAN. What is the Joint Warfare Analysis Center’s (JWAC’s) Budget Requirement?

Does USSTRATCOM have a \$30M deficiency and is a minimum of \$4M of this associated with JWAC?

Will the \$4M shortfall at JWAC impact manpower and civilian pay?

What steps is STRATCOM taking to work with the USAF to ensure an ATR is in place to address the deficiency at JWAC?

General KEHLER.

- FY13 PB includes \$77M for JWAC Operations and Maintenance (O&M).
- H.R.933 reduces the USSTRATCOM O&M PB request by \$88M. The H.R. 933 reduction combined with Sequestration; place USSTRATCOM at high risk of a significant FY13 O&M deficiency. The exact level of deficiency is unknown pending release of Command FY13 funding.
- Included within the \$88M reduction is a negative \$12M mark citing “Civilian pay inconsistency for Joint Forces command restructure”. Per conversation with HAC and SAC Professional Staff Members, this mark is directly related to the transfer of JWAC civilian pay from USJFCOM to USSTRATCOM. While JWAC civilian pay was reduced by ~30% from the FY12 level to account for a reduction in force, the request included in the PB is the appropriate amount required to maintain the revised/authorized FY13 workforce level. To that end, the Appropriation Bill underfunds JWAC civilian pay account by \$12M. The deficiency in JWAC civilian pay coupled with general reductions to USSTRATCOM O&M accounts and Sequestration directly impacts funding available for JWAC.
- After considering mitigation measures available internally within USSTRATCOM, we currently estimate there is a minimum \$4M shortfall in JWAC O&M account for FY13.
- USSTRATCOM is engaged with USAF to address the O&M shortfalls and is confident civilian pay will be satisfactorily addressed either through below threshold reprogramming (BTR) or above threshold reprogramming (ATR) action. USSTRATCOM is also working with USAF and OSD to address remaining high priority O&M shortfalls, to include JWAC, through ATR.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SHEA-PORTER

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I agree with President Obama that, “Now is the time to reach a level of research and development not seen since the height of the space race.” I’m concerned that Federal funding for R&D has been shrinking as a percentage of our GDP, and with sequestration and current trends continuing, that we may not only lose our leadership position but be unable to meet global challenges. What do you see as the most significant challenges where our research and development investments could help in PACOM’s AOR?

General KEHLER and Admiral LOCKLEAR. With respect to the challenges we face in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, USPACOM develops the Integrated Priority List to define what we believe are our most significant challenges in the theater. These are binned into five broad categories and provided to the joint staff and the Secretary of Defense to help us address these problems. Broadly, our biggest concerns are: 1) Command and control, Cyber Defense, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, 2) mitigation of Anti-Access, Area Denial capabilities, 3) potential shortages in critical munitions, 4) detection, identification, tracking and engaging both submarines and unmanned underwater systems and 5) improvements in our logistics support capabilities.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. You say in your testimony that “China’s rapid development of advanced military capabilities, combined with its unclear intentions, certainly raises strategic and security concerns.” What are the implications of China’s military modernization for PACOM’s posture?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. China is continuing to pursue its long-standing policy of military modernization. This is the natural impulse of any nation enjoying a period of growth and prosperity. We do not view PRC’s military modernization by itself as a concern, but we do have concern about the lack of transparency of Chinese intentions and a lack of clarity of PRC willingness to use military force to resolve disputes in the region. For example, China’s comprehensive network of excessive maritime claims coupled with its military modernization program has created anxiety among its neighbors and other maritime nations. Through expanded engagement with the People’s Liberation Army, USPACOM seeks to increase the level of transparency of PRC intentions underlying this military modernization policy and message them directly on our concerns as well as those of the region. Additionally, through military readiness, we will remain ready to undertake operations across the full spectrum of military activities in support of regional security and stability. A consistent U.S. presence in the region serves to reassure partners and allies of continued U.S. commitment to the region.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. The Department's strategic guidance calls for cooperative partnerships to bolster common interests in the region. What are some examples of the kinds of innovative partnerships that PACOM can assist in developing?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Strengthening partnerships with allies, partners, and other organizations and agencies is a central pillar of the USPACOM five-year Theater Campaign Plan for peacetime activities. In ballistic missile defense (BMD), we are working with Japan and Republic of Korea to integrate sense, warn, and interdiction capabilities. We are also coordinating efforts with these allies in shared maritime, space, and cyberspace domains to strengthen the situational awareness and capabilities of partners like the Philippines and Vietnam. These activities address shared threats and advance common interests across the region. USPACOM is also reaching out to China, welcoming their participation in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) multilateral exercise in 2014.

In addition to expanding relationships with allies and partners, USPACOM works with regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) through the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Defense Minister's Meeting-Plus. Through these organizations, we build collaborative approaches to challenges ranging from maritime domain awareness to counter-terrorism and non-proliferation. For example, with our co-chair Indonesia, we are preparing to conduct the inaugural Counterterrorism Exercise (CTX) of the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) Experts Working Group (EWG) on Counterterrorism in 2013.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) activities provide a particularly important way to establish foundational relationships that can lead to greater opportunities for partnership in the future. An innovative example of this type of humanitarian assistance is PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, an annual deployment of personnel from the U.S. military, host nations, partner nations, and non-governmental organizations that provide humanitarian, medical, dental, and environmental assistance to countries in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. In 2012, PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP included twelve participating nations, four host nations, and 23 NGOs. Participants treated over 49,000 patients, 7,000 animals and performed 104 community service projects in Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. This type of cooperation strengthens host nation resiliency while building USPACOM's and other countries and organizations' capability to respond effectively to natural disasters and humanitarian crises.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. In your testimony, you say that China "questions the sustainability of the rebalance, pointing to sequestration and other looming fiscal issues." Are other Pacific nations also beginning to question our commitment to the Pacific region? Has the seemingly endless dispute over sequestration and the budget made us seem weaker and increased our strategic risk in the Pacific?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. It is fair to say that the regional audience is closely watching the political process in Washington, D.C. and they have voiced concerns to me personally over potential impacts to the theater.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. You say, as a result of sequestration cuts, that "Degraded facilities put missions at risk and delayed MILCON projects endanger the implementation of international agreements." This sounds like a real problem. Can you be more specific?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Sequestration cuts have driven the Services to cut sustainment funding by approximately 60%, causing facility sustainment activities not directly related to life, health, and safety to cease. Thus, projects like replacement or improvements to lighting and environmental systems and facility repairs are no longer being performed. Additionally, restoration or modernization projects such as those required to facilitate mission stationing or beddown decisions, and facility reduction programs to increase energy efficiency are unfunded and deferred.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARBER

Mr. BARBER. General Kehler, I understand that the United States has lost some of its institutional knowledge regarding the manufacture of rocket motors and that we have been forced to look overseas for help in the manufacture of the rocket motors we require for certain missiles. Personally, I see this loss of our ability to produce state of the art technology and products as a threat to our national security. The expertise of our industrial base, once lost, is not easily reversed, and I fear that in a time of fiscal constraint and sequestration for the Department of Defense, we could lose more experienced manufacturers. General, what is Strategic Command doing to preserve our critical industrial base skills and helping to keep them here

at home in America? Do you agree that keeping this institutional knowledge here in the United States is a matter of national security?

General KEHLER. Successful and efficient execution of any future strategic modernization or development program requires an industrial base workforce with critical engineering, technical, and program management skills. Unfortunately, strategic rocket motor demand has been on a steady decline for the last two decades, placing a heavy burden on Navy and Air Force resources to keep it viable. Planned investments across our entire strategic deterrent enterprise offer the Department and our industrial partners the opportunity to right-size rocket motor production capacity for the short term while retaining critical skills for the future. With adequate resources, the ongoing and planned delivery platform, weapon, and facility upgrade programs will exercise the unique skills across the industrial base maintaining this critical capability.

Mr. BARBER. Admiral Locklear, in your testimony, you mentioned that on average over 100 IEDs occur per month in the PACOM area of operations. This fixture of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars is now being used in the Southeastern Pacific—in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. You also mentioned that PACOM has made progress in building partner capacity in the region. In 2004, the Department of Defense began researching methods to defeat the IED threat. This effort led to the eventual creation of the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). Since its inception, JIEDDO has been on the cutting edge of technology to find and defeat IEDs. A good deal of JIEDDO's research and testing has occurred in my home district at the Electronic Proving Grounds at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Admiral, my question to you is this, how much of the hard work and testing that JIEDDO has conducted at places like the Electronic Proving Ground have we used, and will we use to continue building our partner capacity with allied nations to find and defeat IEDs in the Pacific region?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Through a JIEDDO-assigned USPACOM Integrator on the USPACOM staff and multiple Counter improvised explosive device Operations Integration Center (COIC) personnel embedded with subordinate commands, my headquarters and service components leverage the diverse capabilities of JIEDDO and its proving grounds to attack the network, defeat the device, train the force and build partnership capacity in theater. We continue to train our joint force not only to successfully operate in IED environments in Afghanistan, but in such places as the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand. The Asia Pacific CIED Fusion Center (APCFC), as part of United States Army Pacific (USARPAC), collaborate with partners in Australia and New Zealand to improve intelligence sharing and training within the theater, and plans to conduct training and engagements with over a dozen allied and partner nations this year. JIEDDO's hard work and testing enable all these efforts.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BRIDENSTINE

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Your testimony says that STRATCOM is pursuing “new processes and relationships” with other COCOMs to better synchronize planning and operations. What are examples of these “new processes and relationships”? Does this effort include reassessments of joint operational plans?

General KEHLER. The extensive re-write of our operational plans has the personal attention of our most senior government officials and will remain my highest priority over the course of this year. We have made significant progress through our objective-based, systems-based approach to planning that will ultimately align and synchronize our plans with those of other Combatant Commands. This unprecedented level of integration makes certain that when executed, these plans and operations will function as a single, coherent American campaign. Although I am very encouraged by the teamwork thus far, meeting our aggressive timeline for completion will require the continued support of the entire Command and our external partners.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. I am always concerned about international bodies or other nations being able to check our freedom of action in space. Do you support international “rules of the road” governing behavior in space? If so, wouldn't these rules impact our military freedom of action?

General KEHLER. Many nations share the space domain and it is in our best interest to create an environment where the sharing of SSA data facilitates transparency and enhances safety and security. I agree the time is right for the development of a standard set of norms that promotes the safe and responsible use of space for all space-faring nations. I support DOD's proposed norms of behavior approved by the

DepSecDef last July because I believe they are in our National Security interest and preserve sufficient military freedom of action.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Your testimony notes the challenges of spectrum management. In an increasingly spectrum-hungry world it seems like these we face tradeoffs between protecting military access to spectrum and providing spectrum for economic competitiveness. How does STRATCOM de-conflict spectrum requirements? How does the newly established Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Office (JEMSO) contribute to rational allocation of spectrum to its best uses?

General KEHLER. USSTRATCOM's spectrum use and de-confliction responsibilities are in accordance with national and associated DOD regulations and policies. The USSTRATCOM JEMSO Office serves as the lead for electromagnetic spectrum control and management issues. The JEMSO Office works with partners in the Department of Defense and other Combatant Commands to assess tradeoffs between civilian and military demands on the spectrum based on the survivability, availability, and criticality of military systems. Additionally, USSTRATCOM is the operational sponsor of the Global Electromagnetic Spectrum Information System (GEMSIS) which provides increased spectrum situational awareness to reconcile competing spectrum use.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. In your testimony, you note the importance of intelligence support to operations, specifically making "all sensed data" available to our analysts." You also stated that you need "effective command and control over ISR in real-time." Do current authorities not give you effective C2 now? What changes can Congress make to increase your ability to direct ISR assets?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. Current authorities give USPACOM effective Command and Control (C2) of its assigned forces. C2 of ISR, specifically, broadens the definition to include working with ISR capabilities, which are not necessarily "assigned" to USPACOM, but are depended on in order to execute operations. USPACOM relies upon real time visibility, transparency, and the ability to dialog with those non-USPACOM entities that do control other assets. Congress can help by continuing to support the development of information technology solutions that provide transparency with national capabilities and those of our trusted allies and partners we need.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. You note that Japan has pledged \$3.1 billion to help relocate our Marines to Hawaii and Guam as part of the Defense Policy Review Initiative. Please provide a cost breakdown for planned actions associated with the Realignment Roadmap. As the Roadmap has changed from its inception, has the U.S. assumed a greater cost sharing burden? If so, by what justification?

Admiral LOCKLEAR. The U.S. cost-sharing burden is decreased under the new Distributed Laydown Plan (DLP). Preliminary DLP analysis indicates this plan is less in cost than the original 2006 Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) to relocate 8,000 Marines to Guam.

The preliminary estimate to execute DLP is \$13.7B (FY12 dollars). The 26 Apr 2012 U.S./Japan "2+2" Statement expressed bilateral commitment to the DLP, which reduces over 9,000 Marines from Okinawa and relocates 4,700 to Guam, 2,700 to Hawaii and up to 2,500 to Australia as an expeditionary rotational presence. Japan's commitment to contribute \$3.1B was reconfirmed in the 26 Apr 2012 "2+2" Bilateral Statement. The U.S. contribution to complete the plan is currently \$10.6B for a total cost estimate of \$13.7B.

A refined budget-level quality cost estimate will occur after the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) selection of Preferred Alternatives for Marine cantonment and training range locations on Guam and Hawaii. The Guam EIS is currently under development and selection of preferred alternatives is scheduled to occur in June 2013. Master planning and detailed cost estimates for budget planning will begin once the preferred alternatives are identified. Hawaii's EIS is not scheduled to begin until early next decade following the Marine's establishment of initial operational capability on Guam. Hawaii land use studies are currently in progress to examine Hawaii Department of Defense-controlled lands to develop beddown alternatives using existing infrastructure that will be analyzed in detail in the future Hawaii EIS. Hawaii land use studies are scheduled to be completed in December 2013.