

[H.A.S.C. No. 113-36]

**THE READINESS POSTURE
OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD

APRIL 24, 2013



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

80-765

WASHINGTON : 2013

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THE READINESS POSTURE OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 24, 2013.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:31 a.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Rob Wittman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

Mr. WITTMAN. Ladies and gentlemen, I will call to order the House Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on Readiness to order. I thank you all so much for joining us today and want to welcome you to our hearing on the readiness posture of the United States Air Force. And I would like to extend a warm welcome to our witnesses today.

We have with us Lieutenant General Michael Moeller, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs; Lieutenant General Burton Field, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements; Lieutenant General Judith Fedder, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Installations and Mission Support; Lieutenant General Stanley Clarke, Director of the Air National Guard; and Major General Richard Haddad, Deputy to the Chief of the Air Force Reserve.

Thank you for being here with us today. And one administrative note before we get started. I would like to ask that you please keep your opening comments to 3 minutes in the interest of time. We have a number of members here, and we want to make sure that we get your comments. I want you to know that your written comments will be entered as part of the record, so whatever you want to make sure you get to us will be part of the record, but we ask that you truncate your opening remarks here to 3 minutes so we can get everybody in and we have opportunity for members of the panel to ask questions.

Generals, in your statement, you noted that allowing the Air Force to slip to a lower state of readiness requiring a long buildup to regain full combat effectiveness negates the essential strategic advantages of air power and puts joint forces at risk. There is no better example of such an unacceptable risk than on the Korean peninsula, where the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and the Army work hand in hand to secure our interests.

I was alarmed when General Odierno testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday that we are heading toward

a hollow force and that budget cuts could threaten Army readiness levels on the Korean peninsula. In your statement, you indicated that one-third of the fighter and bomber forces are currently standing down and that more and more pilots are not ready or trained and qualified to meet operational mission requirements, such as those in Korea, where our All-Volunteer Force serve as critical partners to assure peace and stability.

The pressing concern in my mind is: What is the level of risk we are willing to assume with these actions? When will we have assumed too much risk and essentially emboldened an already belligerent and unpredictable leader? Have we reached this point already?

I hope you will address this issue in your opening comments and highlight other direct mission impacts that have resulted because of sequestration and the budget crisis.

With that, I would like to turn things over to my distinguished ranking member, Mrs. Madeleine Bordallo from the great U.S. territory of Guam.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the Appendix on page 29.]

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE FROM GUAM, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

Ms. BORDALLO. And I thank my distinguished chairman.

I would like to welcome Generals Moeller, Field, Fedder, Clarke, and Haddad. Thank you for your testimony and for your service to our Nation, and I look forward to our dialogue this morning.

This is the second in a series of hearings that will dive into some level of detail about the readiness issues facing each of the Services. Today we will explore the readiness challenges of the Air Force, the Air Force Reserve, and the Air National Guard.

The Congress had significant concerns about last year's Air Force budget request and took action accordingly to address our concerns. So I look forward to a discussion about how the fiscal year 2014 budget addresses concerns raised by Congress and how the budget meets the goals of the 2012 DOD [Department of Defense] strategic guidance.

The Air Force will continue to experience great demands on its forces over the coming year with the emphasis on the air sea battle concept to overcome current and anticipated anti-access and area-denial threats, the continued demand for long-range strike and the ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] platforms, as well as continued demand on airlift and air refueling to sustain a forward presence, all the while maintaining an aging fleet of aircraft, which requires significant maintenance and manpower to sustain and operate.

I am greatly concerned about the impact of sequestration on Air Force readiness. The effects of sequestration have placed each of the military services in a difficult position, and I am truly concerned for the readiness of our forces. If we lose sight of our readiness for even a brief moment, our adversaries could attempt to seize on that opportunity.

In particular, I am concerned about the grounding of 17 combat-coded Air Force squadrons and the loss of 44,000 flying hours due

to budget cuts. I am concerned about the amount of time and the funding that it will take to return these units back to a state of full readiness. I hope our witnesses can talk about the tradeoff between the short-term savings found in grounding these combat-coded squadrons versus the additional cost that it will take to reactivate these squadrons and train them to their requisite standards.

In that vein, I hope our witnesses will be able to touch on strategic risk and the lack of strategic depth created by the inability to train nondeploying forces as a result of sequestration and general budget constraints. We understand that all forces deploying to Afghanistan or elsewhere will be truly trained and equipped, but some committee members need to understand the level of risk that we are embarking on with nondeployed forces.

I also am concerned about the current budget situation's potential impact on maintenance and the Air Force depot operations. As we continue to utilize aging aircraft for longer and harder hours than they were ever designated to be flown in places such as Afghanistan, we will need significant funds to refurbish and maintain our Air Force aircraft and equipment.

Given the immediate nature of the cuts imposed by sequestration, what is the short- and medium-term impact of sequestration to maintaining our current airlift? I hope our witnesses can touch on the cost growth over the next several years created by maintaining aircraft and support equipment at a lower level as a result of the significant cut in the budget caused by sequestration. What gaps in maintenance will we have as a result of some of the immediate deferrals?

Of particular interest to me is the Global Hawk [RQ-4 surveillance unmanned aerial vehicle] program. I remain concerned that the Air Force continues to plan on mothballing the Block 30 aircraft in fiscal year 2014. I hope our witnesses can speak to the analysis that has been done, if any, regarding the cost of maintaining the aged U-2 ["Dragon Lady" reconnaissance aircraft] fleet versus maintaining the Block 30 Global Hawks. I understand that the Block 30 aircraft could be enhanced with additional capabilities, but I do not feel the Air Force has thoroughly analyzed its options to include maintenance costs for the program.

Common sense dictates that maintenance for an aged U-2 aircraft is probably significantly more expensive than that of a newer, more capable aircraft. So, again, I look forward to the witnesses' testimony, and thank you, again, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bordallo. Thank you so much for your leadership.

And at this point, we will go to our witnesses. General Moeller, we will begin with you.

STATEMENT OF LT GEN MICHAEL R. MOELLER, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND PROGRAMS A8, U.S. AIR FORCE

General MOELLER. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to address the committee on the state of Air Force readiness. Despite the challenges of the dynamic fiscal environment, the Air Force remains committed to developing and im-

plementing a program that focuses on maintaining readiness at levels required to support combatant commanders in their assigned operational missions.

However, the fiscally constrained budget has already begun to increase the level of risk in our ability to provide unique Air Force capabilities required to meet our national security requirements. This new reality means we will have to make difficult decisions between maintaining the readiness levels essential to meet our global obligations today and modernizing a force that has been operationally committed since 1990.

The Air Force's portion of the fiscal year 2014 President's budget aligns resources in an effort to slow the decline in readiness and maintain the investment levels required to sustain our highest priority modernization efforts. However, the near-term negative effects and uncertainty caused by the Budget Control Act and sequestration requires us to refocus our future programming efforts to reallocate resources from our investment accounts for the future to mitigate the immediate impacts to readiness.

As important as it is to provide a ready modernized force to support the defense strategic guidance, it is equally critical to develop a cadre of highly trained personnel. To ensure the highest levels of personnel and weapon system readiness requires the Air Force to sustain a balance of capabilities across the total force—Active, Guard, and Reserve. We understand the only successful strategy to meet these new emerging challenges of the future is by working together as one team to provide the Nation with global vigilance, reach, and power.

Thank you again for the continued support and the commitment to our Air Force. I appreciate the opportunity to be here with the total force team and look forward to answering any questions you may have.

[The joint prepared statement of General Moeller, General Field, General Fedder, General Clarke, and General Haddad can be found in the Appendix on page 30.]

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Lieutenant General Moeller.
Lieutenant General Field.

STATEMENT OF LT GEN BURTON M. FIELD, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS A3/5, U.S. AIR FORCE

General FIELD. Thank you, sir. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for allowing us to appear before you today.

I would like to take the opportunity to reemphasize the troubling effect sequester will have on current and future readiness. For the first time in memory, Air Force combat forces are not flying due to a lack of funding in the middle of a fiscal year. While we are protecting the current fight, those scheduled next to deploy in baseline training at a large number of bases, combat training operations have come to a complete halt. If you have the opportunity to visit our airmen at these locations, you will find the silence unnerving.

As we speak, their combat capability and effectiveness is eroding. By canceling weapons instructor courses, we have created a gap in

the production of graduate-level instructors that will have long-term impacts on a generation of warfighters. These instructors are the heart, the soul, and the brains of our warfighting capability.

Over the years, phenomenal training programs have been developed, and they sustain a United States Air Force that is second to none, but we have just terminated a large portion of those full-spectrum training operations.

The effects of sequestration on weapon system sustainment and the flying hour program will not disappear on the 1st of October with the new fiscal year. We are developing a return to fly program for those affected units, but it will take time, additional resources, and a reduced OPSTEMPO [operations tempo] to fully recover. The sooner we begin flying a full training program, the sooner we will recover. But make no mistake: It will be an uphill battle.

The greatest challenge will be to find a balance between minimizing the impact on readiness and preserving investment dollars for modernization and recapitalization of our fighter and bomber fleets and preferred munitions inventories, all while meeting the requirements in defense strategy demand overseas.

This will be a delicate and a very tough balance to reach. I appreciate the support of the subcommittee, and I ask for your continued support to mitigate the effects of sequestration into fiscal year 2014 and beyond. The sooner we can stabilize training, modernization, and munitions funding, the sooner we can ensure we are on the track to fulfill our Nation's defense requirements now and in the future.

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Lieutenant General Field.
Lieutenant General Fedder.

STATEMENT OF LT GEN JUDITH A. FEDDER, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS, INSTALLATIONS AND MISSION SUPPORT A4/7, U.S. AIR FORCE

General FEDDER. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the current readiness of the Air Force.

And while overall readiness of our Air Force is defined by a number of factors we will discuss today, I would like to zero in on the key logistics components of weapon system sustainment and infrastructure. Over the last two decades that the Air Force has been engaged in combat operations, we have stretched to the limit our use of many critical weapon systems, while the average age of these systems continues to climb. As a consequence, our readiness rates have declined.

A primary objective of our fiscal year 2014 budget request is to address the readiness decline we are experiencing and target enhancements that would start to reverse this trend. However, sequestration now jeopardizes the gains we had hoped to achieve.

Cuts to operations and maintenance funding due to sequestration have driven some immediate and long-term effects across the readiness enterprise. In our weapons system sustainment accounts, we are currently projecting a deferral of 60 aircraft and 35 engines, assets that would otherwise be put into depots this fiscal year for overhaul, major maintenance, or repair, and this affects work that

was scheduled for both our Air Force-operated depots, as well as contract suppliers, and most importantly, it grounds this warfighting equipment if it goes overdue for inspection.

Deferring this critical maintenance and then piling on the consequences of a reduction in flying hours is contributing to a significant drop in the workload that goes into our industrial base, affecting small-business suppliers and the expertise that maintains our weapons systems.

We also cannot discuss comprehensive readiness without addressing how airmen employ forces from our installations, our power projection platforms. The kind of mission effectiveness that our Nation expects and deserves depends on installations, runways, buildings, utilities, and other critical infrastructure that is integral to a ready Air Force.

The fiscal year 2014 budget requests adequate funding for the principal components of our infrastructure readiness. It puts our \$1.3 billion military construction funding request back to historical levels. It is supporting the Department's strategic priorities, as well as the Services' top weapon system modernization programs. It also distributes MILCON [Military Construction] funding equitably between the Active, Guard, and Reserve Components.

However, the effects of sequestration are visible now at every one of our installations where we have deferred most infrastructure work unless it affects life, safety, health, or is a critical mission factor. The Air Force remains challenged to maintain the amount of infrastructure we have now and into the future.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bordallo, and members of the committee, I am honored to be here today to represent airmen from your Air Force. Thank you for your service, your engagement, and, above all, your continued strong support of our airmen and their families, and I look forward to the questions.

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, Lieutenant General Fedder.

Lieutenant General Clarke.

**STATEMENT OF LT GEN STANLEY E. CLARKE III, USAF,
DIRECTOR, AIR NATIONAL GUARD, U.S. AIR FORCE**

General CLARKE. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo, other members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to be here to represent the men and women of the Air National Guard. It is a real honor. Thank you.

Twenty years ago roughly, Air National Guard deployed with the regular Air Force to Desert Shield. Since that time, we have become an integral part of the regular Air Force, along with the Air Force Reserve, as a total force. And most of my adult life has been spent in the total force world. I started out in the regular Air Force. I moved on to the Air Force Reserve briefly and then came into the Air National Guard.

During that time, I didn't realize that senior leaders were actually setting goals for what the total force would be and what it has become. But it is a remarkable organization, and it has strength in fabric in how it is put together. The volunteers of the total military and those inside of that that volunteer to do operational deployments overseas can be proud of the mission they accomplished,

and it is thanks to the total force leadership, who put that construct together, Congress for providing the readiness resources to make sure that that happened, have been well done.

I just wanted to add that I think there are four parts to the total force. The first one is, we all accomplish and work under the same standards. Two, we all meet the same inspections. Three, operational engagement. And, four, resources. And it takes resources to make the other three happen appropriately.

I think that the total force is better today because of that, and we stand ready to work anywhere, anytime, alongside of our regular Air Force or Reserve airmen at any time. Thank you for your time, and appreciate your questions later.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Lieutenant General Clarke.
Major General Haddad.

**STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN RICHARD S. HADDAD, USAF, DEPUTY
TO THE CHIEF OF AIR FORCE RESERVE, U.S. AIR FORCE**

General HADDAD. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

I am extremely honored to represent America's citizen airmen and the Air Force Reserve. First, I wish to highlight the over 70,000 Air Force reservists who provide our Nation's defense with operational capability, strategic depth, and surge capacity. Approximately 2,000 citizen airmen are currently deployed, and 4,000 are on Active Duty status in support of combatant commander requirements.

We are still in high demand. The Air Force Reserve has three focus areas. First, we must never lose sight of our men and women in harm's way. This is why "Remember the Fight—Today's and Tomorrow's," is our top focus area.

The Air Force Reserve must be properly organized, trained, and equipped for any contingency across the spectrum of conflict. Our ability to effectively respond with a capable and ready force is increasingly challenged by sequestration and fiscal uncertainties. Reducing our operations and maintenance funding directly impacts our readiness. Cuts to both flying hours and weapon system sustainment make it more difficult to be a reliable force provider. It is less costly to maintain combat readiness than bring back lost readiness.

"Adapt the Force" is the second focus area, which refers to finding the right Air Force capability mix for the Reserve, Guard, and Active Duty. The majority of our citizen airmen serve part-time, bringing years of combat-tested experience at a cost-effective rate. We deliver a diverse portfolio of capability in Title 10 status as your Federal Reserve.

The last focus area is "Develop the Team." This refers to both developing our force and taking care of our people, which is more difficult as sequestration takes hold. Three-quarters of our full-time permanent personnel are dual-status Air Reserve technicians. Thus, civilian furloughs translate to a greater negative impact to our mission readiness. Further, cuts to travel dollars have reduced training and education opportunities and make recruiting more challenging.

I thank the subcommittee for your continued support of America's citizen airmen, and I stand ready to answer your questions. Thank you.

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you so much, Major General Haddad. We thank you for your service and for your reservists that do such a great job for our Nation.

And, Generals, thank you so much for your testimony and, again, for your service to our Nation.

I want to begin the questioning by asking you, as a total panel, this question. I know that the Air Force has requested in its 2014 budget submission an aggressive effort for a Base Realignment and Closure commission. If you look at history, and you look at where the 2005 BRAC [Base Realignment and Closure] began, it began with a study in 2004. And that study said that there was a 24-percent excess infrastructure within the Air Force.

Now, that 2004 study was based on baseline data that was actually formulated in 1989. So now we are talking about a baseline data point of almost 25 years ago. And my question is, is in going forward, does the Air Force have any up-to-date empirical evidence of what its overcapitalization might be today within its base structure? And, secondly, if that is the case, are there other contingencies that the Air Force has in mind if a BRAC is not pursued starting in 2014, going into 2015? And I will open it up for any of the panel members that wish to answer that question.

General MOELLER. I will take the second part of the question, first, Mr. Chairman, if I could.

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay, sure.

General MOELLER. When we look out to the future, in response to the evolving strategic environment—and most importantly, based on the fiscal constraints that we see over the course of the next 5 to 10 years, we know that it is going to require the Air Force to make tough choices.

To help the Air Force senior leadership make those decisions, the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force directed that we stand up a—what we call Air Force 2023, which is a 10-year planning effort to look out 10 years and then backwards, back-cast into today.

The concept is to lay out a strategic plan that will identify our priorities, required critical capabilities, and then based on those—that overarching framework, what changes in posture and basing, both overseas and in CONUS [Continental United States], processes and organizational structures are required to meet the challenges of the future.

So my answer—that was a long answer to a very simple question—in that we are right now engaged in a 10-year look that will focus, one of the efforts will focus on our force posture, basing and infrastructure.

Mr. WITTMAN. General Fedder.

General FEDDER. Mr. Chairman, if I may add a couple comments, regarding your question about the study, the 2004 study that we did for the 2005 BRAC was really the last comprehensive look that we did specifically for that effort. What we—and we haven't done anything, of course, to that degree since. But what we do know is, since that time, we have divested 500 aircraft. Our Active Duty end

strength has decreased by 8 percent. And, of course, during BRAC 2005, we only closed eight installations, seven of which were minor installations.

So the 2005 BRAC had relatively small impact. And so given those factors, we believe that there is at least about a 20-percent existing capacity—excess capacity of infrastructure. And, of course, BRAC authority would allow us the opportunity to go in and to do that comprehensive analysis again to take into consideration where we are.

And, sir, if I may echo one other thing that General Moeller said regarding contingencies, we have about \$240 billion in what we consider to be our—the value of Air Force installations and infrastructure, our plant replacement value. And when we look forward into that 2023 study and we look at what it will cost to sustain those installations in the future, we realize that it really becomes—it is not affordable for the Air Force.

And we are looking at things that we can do now in the near term and that we have done over the last few years, demolish buildings and infrastructure we don't need, consolidate some of those functions, and we will continue to do that across our Air Force to maximize the resources that we have.

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. I would urge you, as you go forward, to develop as much empirically based evidence as you can, rather than anecdotal. And I understand that there is, you know, an assumption to say that as our force structure has shrunk, our number of aircraft has shrunk, that there is a clear assumption that there is an overcapitalization there. But as a GAO [Government Accountability Office] report pointed out, I think there are a number of elements there that need to get down to some details.

I understand, too, that in the process, it is BRAC itself that almost brings on that level of study, but I am sure internally that you all have done some of that, so when those questions get asked—and I am sure that will continue to be a question that comes up in the years to come—is to make sure that there is at least a level of analysis that has been done there to say, hey, here is what we have that indicates at least empirically we have a basis for that going forward, without going through the full-blown study precipitated by a BRAC, as far as those facility capacity issues.

I wanted to ask a question about the acquisition costs for the F-35s [Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter] and the affordability of that. Obviously, as we look forward with budgets, the F-35 is attracting an awful lot of attention, and we want to make sure that, as we are going forward with that aircraft, that we understand exactly what is going on. Congress needs to understand that. Obviously, the service branches and our military partners need to understand it.

And the funding requirement now currently averages \$12.6 billion through the year 2037. And once acquired, those current forecasts for life-cycle sustainment costs for the F-35 are considered unaffordable by many defense officials. So as we look at that and we look at that next generation, what that puts us in a situation is now some of the service branches are looking at additional costs to SLEP [Service Life Extension Program] existing legacy aircraft

and what the costs will be for that until we get to this next-generation aircraft with the F-35.

Those create some concerns. Obviously, too, they create some cost concerns, they create some uncertainty with our foreign partners, that if the production levels go down, costs go up, as we have seen. Also, timing is there. It intersects with planning for maintenance of legacy aircraft. So all of those things are concerning and things that I think need to be addressed.

Can you give us some indication about how you are going to address these challenges, what the Air Force has done, and looking at their segment of the JSF [Joint Strike Fighter], the F-35, and what you all will be doing going forward to address the issues of increasing cost, stretched timelines, and life cycle sustainment costs for the F-35? And I will open it up again for any panel members that would like to address that.

General FIELD. Thank you, sir. Yes, the F-35 program is, indeed, a very expensive program. And it is scheduled to procure quite a few aircraft for the United States Air Force, the Marines, the Navy, and our partner nations.

We have recently reviewed—the JPO [Joint Program Office] has recently reviewed that program over the last 2 years, and we have assessed that we now have a very realistic way ahead in how we are going to procure those aircraft. And we are on a ramp to start procuring at a larger rate by fiscal year 2018.

Now, part of the problem, of course, is that this program, as you stated, has been delayed. And we had anticipated many years ago to actually have F-35s on the ramp right now, along with a much larger fleet of F-22s [Raptor fighter aircraft]. To have that fleet—those fleet—those aircraft on the ramp now meant we would have been able to divest our current legacy and some of the fourth-generation aircraft sooner. Well, that did not come to pass for any number of reasons, many of which involved the past 10 years of fighting in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Mr. WITTMAN. You are okay. That is just a signal that the House is going into session, so not a signal to stop.

General FIELD. I was just seeing whether I was getting graded or not.

Mr. WITTMAN. No, no. No, that is—
[Laughter.]

There is no button up here for me to push to make that buzzer go.

General FIELD. I was waiting for the shock next.
[Laughter.]

Sir, so what happened—what—we had to keep our current generation of aircraft for a longer period of time, and we are putting more money into those, because for the foreseeable future, we will have a mix of fifth-generation and fourth-generation aircraft.

So whether it is the upgrades to the A-10s [Thunderbolt II close air support aircraft], upgrades to our F-15s [Eagle fighter jet], upgrades to our F-16 [Fighting Falcon fighter jet] fleet, we are doing both service life extension programs in those to extend the service life of the airframe themselves, and we are also putting increased capability into those aircraft in the terms of sensor systems, avionics, and self-protection electronic warfare suites that will make

them more capable and able to operate in the environments we anticipate in the future.

So we are trying to balance out the effects of the delay in the F-35 program, and we are looking to make sure that we track that very closely in—along with the Navy, the Marines, and the JPO, to make sure that that gets delivered at a reasonable time on the schedule that we currently have.

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay, very good. General Field, thank you.
Lieutenant General Fedder.

General FEDDER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Regarding the life-cycle costs, we share your comments and concerns about the future costs of that with maintaining that weapon system. And I will say, even though the program is very early on, and now in the maturity of the weapon system, we have done some things in the Air Force, as we look at planning, to reduce those life cycle costs, as an example, reducing the number of field training detachments that we have, where we can share that maintenance training across different F-35 bases, instead of having it—one at every base, certain equipment items that are very expensive, that are critical to maintenance on the flightline, not perhaps having one of those expensive pieces of equipment at every squadron or even every base.

In addition, we are working with the—and supporting the Joint Program Office on what they are doing to look at now how to reduce those sustainment costs over the life cycle. We are standing up our organic depot capability at Hill Air Force Base in Utah, at our air logistics complex. We are also working with the JPO in supporting them on their initiative to compete the workload for repair and sustainment of components, again, looking at those life-cycle costs.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, General Fedder. I think it is extraordinarily important to look at sustainment plans, what elements should be in those sustainment plans, as we talk about not only today's challenges with our defense budgets, but also where are we in the future. Life-cycle cost, sustainment plans I think are going to be absolutely critical, so I would challenge the Air Force to make sure that you are doing you can to have a solid sustainment plan, looking at all the different elements of those life-cycle costs, because that is going to be not just a challenge today, but it is going to be a challenge in the long term for where we go and what then happens for the next generation of aircraft.

So that, I think, is extraordinarily important, so I appreciate you enlightening us on at least your perspective on how to go forward with those sustainment costs.

And with that, I will turn to our ranking member, Representative Madeleine Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

My first question is in three parts, and I would like to ask each of you the question, so if you could be concise in your answers, because we are time limited. How will you know that your non-deployed forces are not ready to respond to an emerging mission or threat? What will be the triggers or metrics that will tell you your forces are not ready? And the last. Also, in your opinion, how far away are we before we reach a significantly degraded readiness status?

And I will begin with you, General Moeller.

General MOELLER. Thank you, Congresswoman. That is probably the most difficult question—group of questions that I have been asked in a very long time. And it is difficult for me especially, because in my current job as the strategic plans and programs director, my job is to look out to the future and determine the impacts out into the future, so rather than focusing on the immediate impacts, I am—I have spent my days and hours over the course of the last few weeks to look out and find ways to mitigate those near-term impacts for the future.

So it is especially difficult for me to answer that specifically, and I will defer to my operations and requirements brother, Lieutenant General Field, for the specifics.

Ms. BORDALLO. General Field.

General FIELD. Yes, ma'am. There are several ways that we measure readiness in the Air Force, and we have over several years. There are many objective measures, and there are some subjective measures.

On the objective side, we can look at things like currencies, how—when was the last time we performed a landing? When was the last time we performed an instrument approach? When was the last time we did this specific mission? We can look at proficiency and recency. How many of those missions have we done recently in the past? Do they—are they representative of the kind of threat environment we might face in a conflict that we anticipate in the future?

We look at experience levels within squadrons and across the manning of each unit. That experience comes in very specific ways when we identify people having the right amount of hours to be called experienced. We have certain criteria with which they progress along their experience levels, whether it has become a flight lead or an instructor pilot, an aircraft commander, an instructor, navigator, flight evaluator.

We look at the experience level in our enlisted force that maintains and operates the aircraft with us, and we look at each skill level, and then we look at the manning involved in each unit. So those give us an objective measurement of how we can measure readiness.

The other thing we can—we have is we actually have subjective measurements, and we rely on our commanders in the field to look at how ready their units are to perform the missions assigned to that unit. Those men and women we have raised through the ranks to probably evaluate this on both an individual and a unit level.

And so we have a pretty good idea of the readiness of a unit that is tasked to do something. So that is reported on a monthly basis through a reporting system, and we review that at all levels throughout the Air Force. And that is why we come and we say that we have some readiness issues particularly in those higher-end type of missions, because we haven't had the recency, we haven't had the volume of training that we feel that we need in order to say that we are ready to go fight and dominate in a certain environment.

So in addition to those measurements, we look at other issues, such as the health of our aircraft fleets, and we look at the quan-

tity of the munitions that we have in the inventory to go perform some of those missions in support of war plans. And all of that combines to give us an idea of how ready we are.

I will tell you that, when you look at the Air Force and you find that 13 of our fighter and bomber squadrons are not flying, that is not good. And in 45 to 60 days, those air crew and those pilots and navigators and WSOs [Weapons Systems Officers] and enlisted folks will be out of currency. So that means they will have to regain currency in order to be deployed.

Now, you don't lose your combat capability just because you stopped flying for 1 day or 2 days, but certainly 45 days to 2 months, that is going to be a significant recovery problem, and 6 months is something that we are just actually going to find out, because we haven't actually done that before. So we are going to have a third of our fleet on the ground, and we are going to figure out in October exactly how we are going to get that many folks back up to a readiness level that we think is able to go perform the missions that the Nation calls for us.

Ms. BORDALLO. General Fedder.

General FEDDER. Yes, Congresswoman Bordallo, among other metrics—in addition to what General Field was talking about—and from a logistics perspective, I would say principally we are talking about aircraft availability, which he referred to. One other major metric is looking at our ability to provide spares for repair of equipment and especially aircraft that we use.

And we are in a position now where we are already looking at the spares that we have on the shelf, those components that we use to repair aircraft and those that we are able to turn in a depot or through another repair facility, and having to allocate those sparingly to units, because we don't think that we are going to have the capability to generate enough between now and the end of the fiscal year, to—as a result of furloughing—having to furlough folks at our repair facilities at our depots.

So, you know, spares being an important readiness measure and not knowing and not expecting that we will have enough to last us through the fiscal year and to make sure that we have that aircraft availability that contributes to that readiness.

Other things that we think are very important and we look at especially for our force response would be the amount of war readiness materiel, equipment that we have that is prepositioned around the world in theaters like the CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] area of responsibility or in the PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] responsibility, looking at, how are we doing with that WRM [War Readiness Materiel] And do we have enough equipment to be able to respond to operational plans?

And then the last thing I would say is important, going back to my first point, is our ability in our depots to surge, to be able to respond to a combatant commander's need, and to be able to drive an increased amount of equipment through the depot to repair equipment as needed. And, again, as we look at the potential for furloughs is, we are really jeopardizing our ability to be able to do that.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much.
General Clarke.

General CLARKE. Yes, ma'am. I think my colleagues did a really good job of articulating some of the things that would be triggers and other things that you asked for. I would tell you, though, we are not grounding any squadrons in the Air National Guard at this time, but there are things that we are not testing ourselves, so we are not flexing the bicep as much. We are not doing big exercises like Red Flag, where we used to really stress our forces to see how good they are. Once you stop doing those, you don't even know how good you are anymore. It is not—you can't even measure it. So you start getting into a realm where you are not really sure what your capability is, so it is very difficult to put your finger on it.

I will tell you that the commanders in the field are probably the best ones to ask, because they will be able to sense that their squadron is not doing as well as it used to do. It would be indicative of the fact that the air-to-air engagements don't go as well as they used to. Bomb scores are not as good. And all this can be reported eventually into a formal system—an acronym of sorts—but it is a system for reporting in where we stand as far as readiness.

Also, I would say, on the maintenance side, and I know I am in General Fedder's territory here, but all the aircraft have a—we call the forms 781 documents and all that—when you go in and you open it up, and it is just full of write-ups that haven't been accomplished, eventually you end up with an airplane—it is almost like climbing into your car and the seat doesn't adjust, the radio doesn't work, one of the windows is stuck down, and then you start flying the airplane, it is the same thing. Those kinds of things are—that is an indicative that you are not getting things done that should be done, so those are all readiness concerns that would be triggers to commanders in the field who can report that back up through their chain of command, to tell you this is where we are at.

So it is a hand-in-hand operational and maintenance, I think, and focus of the people, keep them engaged in what they are doing. I know it has got to be hard on the regular Air Force pilots who aren't flying right now, when the other air crew members—that is tough. And then we have these total force associations where you might have Guard or Reserve airmen flying in the same organization where the regular pilots can't fly. That is hard.

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, these reports are disturbing, certainly. Finally, from General Haddad, representing the Reserves?

General HADDAD. Congresswoman Bordallo, thanks for the question, and I think my colleagues have pretty much answered the question, but let me just add another aspect to it. The Air Force Reserve is celebrating its 65th anniversary this month. And for 65 years, we have prided ourselves on being that tier-one ready force, which we meet all the standards that General Clarke talked about in his opening statement, the same standards that our Active Duty members do.

We have maintained that tier-one ready force. We are that combat-ready, effective, and efficient force that our Nation calls on when needed as a strategic force, but for the past 20-some years, we like to talk about it from 9/11, but we have really been at this—the Air Force has been at this since 1990. And I personally have deployed eight different times to the theater since that time period.

So your Reserve force is that ready force. We—thankfully to Congress, you have appropriated us differently that gives us that flexibility to continue to fly. Once we sense that that tier-one readiness is starting to be mitigated, marginalized, that is when I believe we will be able to answer your questions more appropriately, and then we don't know what will happen in fiscal year 2014.

Thank you.

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, I thank you all for being very frank with your answers.

And, Mr. Chairman, I have a few others, but do we have a second round here?

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes, we will have a second round, yes.

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. And I yield back.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bordallo.

And we will now go to Mrs. Noem.

Mrs. NOEM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to thank all of you for being here and taking the time to sit in front of the committee. Recently, the B-1 [Lancer] bombers at Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota were grounded until October 1st. And as you know, the B-1 has been the workhorse of a lot of the operations that have been going on in Afghanistan for about a decade.

The B-1s at the 28th Bomb Wing in Ellsworth have performed admirably. The operations in Libya, in less than 2 days, Ellsworth generated aircraft that were able to strike targets halfway around the world. The thought of reducing the flying hours for these men and women and not providing our airmen with the cockpit time that they need is very concerning for me.

So maybe this is for General Field, the first question is, how will this new tiered readiness with reduced flying hours affect our ability to respond quickly like we saw in Libya? With the 2 days' notice, we had our B-1s in the air, going and in operation, and I am concerned that we won't have that kind of response the next time.

General FIELD. Congresswoman Noem, that is an excellent question. The way we approached this problem that we are having, based on an unpaid OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] bill and then the sequester, was to—that forced us to pay that money out of mainly our flying hour accounts and our weapon system sustainment accounts. And it equated to a 30-percent cut when you went through all the math between now and the end of the fiscal year on our flying hour program.

So what we focused on was the current fight that we are having in Afghanistan, and we wanted to protect both the airmen that were fighting that fight right now and the next to deploy into that fight, so that was our number-one priority, followed by other operations around the world, such as our support to the French in Africa, our operations in the Horn of Africa, and some other small ones around the world.

We wanted to maintain the readiness of the forces that were stationed in the Republic of Korea, in South Korea, and as much as possible in Japan, because those are “fight tonight” forces, as well.

And then we wanted to maintain the readiness of certain squadrons that are tasked to be ready to deploy in case there is an issue around the world. So when we got to that, there wasn't a lot of

money left. And there was enough money left to keep another 8 squadrons flying at a reduced rate, and that led us—and that was the end of the money. And we had 13 squadrons still left to go, and those squadrons are not flying.

Mrs. NOEM. How did you prioritize those squadrons when you got down to the eight that were funded and kept flying?

General FIELD. We went to the major commands, ACC [Air Combat Command] and Air Force Global Strike Command. We, for example, we needed to maintain the nuclear deterrence in Global Strike Command in terms of the nuclear bomber capability that they had. And then we maintained—and then it was the next schedule to deploy. And the ones that weren't next to deploy or doing some of those other missions, we stood them down.

Mrs. NOEM. So what will 2014 look like? Will this be regenerated and duplicated for the next coming year? Or do we have a different situation?

General FIELD. Well, we are not sure what the budget will be like yet, but the budget that we submitted was designed to stop that erosion of readiness. However, that budget was designed and submitted prior to the sequester action.

So the budget that we have right now does not take into account this 6 months of not flying by those 13 combat-coded squadrons, but there are several other squadrons, another 17 squadrons, that are also not flying that are not combat-coded squadrons.

Mrs. NOEM. So did you say that you did not request funding to bring them back up to the level they were before?

General FIELD. The fiscal year 2014 budget did not account for sequester, because it was submitted prior to the sequester actions being taken. So it is designed to get us back up to the readiness levels that—in a little bit better than we were prior to the sequester, is what that budget—

Mrs. NOEM. You are saying you submitted your budget to the Administration before the sequester happened?

General FIELD. Yes.

Mrs. NOEM. Okay. Thank you for that clarification.

I don't have any further questions, so thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mrs. Noem.

We will now go to Mr. Barber.

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all of the witnesses for being here today and for your candor. I appreciate that very much. And it is always—I have got to be evenhanded, you know, in terms of all of the branches are wonderful, but I have to say, having grown up in an Air Force family, it is great to see you all here today. Grew up on Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Tucson.

I have a question for General Moeller and also, I think, Generals Clarke and Haddad might want to comment on this. I am sure you all agree that the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard are very critical and complementary and cost-effective capabilities to our Air Force. In Tucson, just across the district line is the 162nd Fighter Wing of the Air National Guard. While my neighbor, really, has them in his district, I claim them, as did Congresswoman Giffords before me.

They are an incredible unit. They train foreign pilots—22 allied forces come there to train in F-16s, and they do an amazing job. I am concerned about the future for them, for all of our Air Guard, and our Reserves, because they are so critical. As we know, in the two wars that we have fought over the last decade or so, we have deployed more Reserve and Guard members than perhaps we ever expected.

So I want to ask a question about the future of the Guard and of the Reserves. We have, for example, in terms of trying to hold onto aircraft that are aging, I have done some work, and a good example is the 355th Wing at Davis-Monthan of the Air Force. We have had to rewing the A-10s. I mean, they are 30-year-old planes, but they are still incredible planes that do a wonderful job. But they are 30 years in service.

So as we think about where we are going with the Guard and Reserve, could you speak to this issue? What are the Air Force's priorities to ensure that the Guard and Reserve fleets are prepared to support the total force, particularly as we think about the F-16 being phased out, presumably being replaced by the F-35?

So as we look at these aging aircraft, certainly the A-10 is the most aging of the fighters that we have in the air now. What are the priorities for the Air Guard and for the Reserve, as we think about maintaining their capability and their aircraft going forward?

General MOELLER. Thank you for the question, Congressman. Sir, the question itself is very important to our Air Force. As we look out not just 10 years, but if we look to the foreseeable future, the way that I think all of us look at our Air Force, it is a total force in every way. All three of the components working together are—will be the key to our success to meet any future challenge.

With that in mind, we have a total force task force that is led by three 2-star generals, one from each of the components, that is literally looking exactly at the questions that you have asked, specifically focused on what capabilities, what composition and mix does the Air Force require across the total force from the three components in order to ensure that we can meet the defense strategic guidance and the national security requirements of the future?

We are looking exactly at those questions, and it covers the broad range of policies, personnel, personnel requirements, force structure, and how do we take the unique advantages that come from the Reserve Components—both the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve—and ensure that they also—that they mesh with the unique capabilities of the Active Duty to ensure that we can cover the full spectrum of our responsibilities for the future?

Mr. BARBER. Can I just follow up before anyone else comments? And that is, this task force has a timeline, I assume, that is when they are going to report back with recommendations. Can you share any information about that?

General MOELLER. Yes, sir, it was set up as a 6-to 7-month task force with recommendations to the secretary of the Air Force and the chief of staff. I believe that the task force originally was designed to report out in October. We have slipped that slightly, only because they have—as they got started, they found that they start-

ed with a comprehensive review. And to really take a good look at what has gone on before, both from a report standpoint, from an analysis standpoint, and to really come to a general agreement amongst the components on what actually is.

So I would—that is a long answer. I think November, early December, the task force will report out on its findings.

Mr. BARBER. Very good.

Mr. Chairman, and I know I am running out of time. I might suggest that we ask for a report when it is appropriate from that task force's recommendations, having gone to the Secretary. I think it is really important that we are kept current on this. I agree with other members who have said—I am really dismayed about where we are putting our Air Force and all of our military branches with sequestration. We have to come to terms with it. Hopefully that report will help us do so.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Barber. We will do just that. We will make sure that we note the request for that report, and as soon as we get it, we will make sure it is available to all members.

With that, we will go to Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Haddad, good to see you again. And as we look forward to this report on the structure of the Air Force, understanding that there are clearly some things that are going to have to be changed, efficiencies and cost savings that can be gained by moving things to the Reserve Component, what roles and missions do you believe best suit the Air Force Reserve, as we move forward from today?

General HADDAD. Congressman Scott, it is great to see you, as well. And thanks for the question.

As I mentioned in my report, my oral statement, as well as the last comment about the fact that the Reserve has always prided itself on being that combat-ready, efficient, and effective, and cost-effective force, there is no question that there is a need for us. They established the Guard and Reserve for a particular reason, and that reason was to have that strategic force to be able to be operationalized.

Well, the bottom line is, we have been operationalized since the Desert Shield, no question about it. And I was listening to the Army's testimony to you a few days ago, and they talked about the fact that we have been operationalized and the experiences that we have gained over the years. It would be—it would not be good for our Nation, I don't think, to let that be put back on a shelf.

As far as mission steps, I would not want to get ahead of the total force task force that General Moeller just talked about. And I think—and my hat goes off to Chief Welsh and General Moeller and his staff, who are being very extremely transparent with this process, and I think it is important that we really look at the roles and missions of our Guard, Reserve, and Active Duty, and then come back and make those assessments as to where we have put weapons systems and force structure. And I truly believe that it is better to put it in the Guard and Reserve, as opposed to putting it in Congressman Barber's boneyard there in Tucson, because I think it allows our Nation to have that capability and capacity at a lower cost.

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, sir. It certainly gives us the ability to surge—
General HADDAD. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCOTT [continuing]. As we—General Fedder, the requirement for the three organic depots in the Air Force, is that still there?

General FEDDER. Congressman Scott, we have plenty of work for the three organic depots that we have at Warner Robins, Oklahoma City, and at Ogden. And we have seen the workload—the amount of workload has been fairly stable over the last few years. And they have been increasing their effectiveness and productivity and fully expect that into the future, as well.

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, ma'am. So you are comfortable with the allocation of the workload across the sustainment enterprise, based on that statement?

General FEDDER. Yes, sir, Congressman Scott. We look at very carefully what should go in to the organic depots. I mean, where—what does the Government do best? And what we do best is bring great expertise, talent, and folks that can manage weapon systems together, and then we try to balance that with what is appropriate to have on the contractor side, as well.

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, ma'am. I think we do a pretty good job with that. And I will tell you, one of the concerns that I have is somebody who represents a depot, is as we make some short-term, budget-related decisions, my concern is that if we move it from what is an organic capability into the private sector, while it might be cheaper today, it might give us a better price on it today, once we are no longer able to do it ourselves, we may end up paying significantly more for it in the long run.

Mr. Chairman, I had most of my questions answered. I know my respective time for the gentlemen and lady—I will yield the remainder of my time.

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Scott.

We will now go to Mr. Enyart.

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Clarke, I was very glad to hear you talking about the total force concept the way it is. And I am sure General Haddad was, too, as well as the other members of your panel. And I just want to share with you that, frankly, I am very surprised that our chairman and our ranking member's questions were so sharp and crisp, because the two of them, along with me and three other members, just got back from Afghanistan yesterday morning.

So my questions may not be quite as crisp as theirs. Perhaps they slept better than I did. But as part of that journey that we took to meet with your airmen and our airmen, we spent more hours on a 130 [C-130 Hercules tactical airlifter] than I have spent in the last couple of months. And it was a great trip, and it showed the great work that is being done by the total force, because when we went in, we went in on an Active Duty airframe. And when we came out, it was on a Reserve airframe. And frankly, I don't know if the airmen flying those planes were Guard, Reserve, or Active Duty, because I know that you integrate those crews.

The last time I went to Afghanistan, when I was wearing a different suit than I am wearing now, I flew in on an Illinois Air National Guard 130, because it had that orange and blue flash on the

tail, and I thought I was going to talk to some of my guys, and it was an Air Reserve crew intermixed with an Active Duty crew.

So congratulations on doing great work on integrating the force. And I know that you are going to keep doing that, because they do provide the surge capacity. So having preached to the choir on that, I do have a couple questions.

Lieutenant General Fedder, if I heard you correctly, when you were talking about the military construction that is being planned, you said it was going to be the really critical, critical pieces that were being planned and going forward with. When I looked at the military construction FYDP [Future Years Defense Program] that just came down, last year, there was a mission planning center for TRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation Command] at Scott Air Force Base, which, of course, is in my district and has Guard, Reserve, and Active Duty Components there. That was on the FYDP for fiscal year 2016 last year.

There was also a squadron operations center for the 126th Air Refueling Wing at Scott Air Force Base on that FYDP for fiscal year 2016. Both of those have fallen off the FYDP. They are no longer on. And that concerns me greatly. I think—particularly with what we saw in Afghanistan, with the planning that is going on for the retrograde movement, the critical things that TRANSCOM does day in and day out to move our soldiers, sailors, and marines, and airmen around the world, and all of the materiel that is necessary to support the things that they do, to have something as important as a new mission planning center, which was justified and funded, fall off concerns me.

And with the 126th Air Guard's squadron operations center, I know that that was critically, a critical issue for that unit, and that is an active associate unit, of course. So can you tell me—and if you need to get back to me with a written answer, that is fine. But can you tell me what happened to cause those 2 projects to fall off the FYDP?

General FEDDER. Congressman, in your—I will say that with—in the process of determining what the MILCON priorities are going to be from year to year is we have—we work together and fold in the priorities from the combatant commanders, if they are a part of that installation, from both a Guard and Reserve Component, as well as the Active, and bring those together and prioritize those very carefully based on what the Components have requested as their priority, and then what do we need across the Air Force to ensure—

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, General. I am going to interrupt you and cut you off, because I have only got 40 more seconds.

General FEDDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENYART. I got one more very important question.

General FEDDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENYART. And that is that the Air Force is the largest consumer of fuel in the Department of Defense: \$9.7 billion worth of fuel gets consumed there. The U.S. Navy is currently exploring aviation uses of biofuels. I would urge the Air Force to do the same. In my district, a huge agricultural district, it is the center of the corn-growing industry, the center of the biofuels. We have a biofuel

research center at SIU [Southern Illinois University] Edwardsville, which is 10 minutes from Scott Air Force Base.

I would like to know, is the Air Force considering the use of biofuels? And if not, why not?

My time is 7 seconds, so you can submit that to me in writing, if you need.

General FEDDER. Yes, sir, Congressman. And I will say, we share your interest in alternative fuels for weapons systems, given the amount that we do consume. And I will be happy to provide some more detail back with you on that, as well as the MILCON projects that you are interested in.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 59.]

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, General.

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Enyart. And, again, thanks for your endurance on this most recent trip to Afghanistan. It was, I think, a fulfilling trip for all of us. And we look forward to doing it again.

Panel members, I appreciate you giving us your perspective. One of the things I have gained from your initial responses to our question is the issue of the impact of the current sequester, the reduction in funding, and what that does to overall readiness for the Air Force.

And let me ask this, and I will start with General Field. If you look at where the Air Force has been, pre-sequester, and I would even go back to maybe even the beginning of the 2011 BCA [Budget Control Act] process that began this process of a potential looming sequester, let me ask this, with where the Air Force is now and where it will go getting through fiscal year 2013.

What will—how long will it take for us to get back to, let's say, where we were at the beginning of 2011? And then what will it take to get us back to a full spectrum of readiness? And I understand that even going into 2011, the full spectrum of readiness, with all the elements being in green, was not something that we started from, but give me a perspective from a timeframe about how long it would take for the Air Force to get back to that particular point after this dip in 2013.

General FIELD. Sir, we think that the 3 to 6 months after this 6-month standdown is probably what it is going to take to get us back to kind of where we were before, and that is an assumption right now, because, again, we are not sure—because of the scope and magnitude of the number of people and units that are being stood down.

In terms of long-term how can we get back to full-spectrum readiness, if we are fully funded and we have enough time to do it, it would probably take about 2 years, because we—it would take shorter if we didn't have operational commitments around the world, but that is not the case. So taking into account the operational commitments that we have around the world, it would take probably about 2 years at a fully funded rate.

Our problem, of course, is that we have to balance readiness now for what now versus readiness 10 years from now, as General Moeller was pointing out. So if we trade all of our readiness 10

years from now for readiness now, we are going to have the same force 10 years from now with 10 years more problems.

So that is the delicate balance that we have when we talked about readiness. It is over a continuum of time. And it—you have to look at the different threat environments that we might be operating within across that continuum of time and make the best balanced approach that we can to provide you and the rest of our Nation with the Air Force they deserve.

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, General Field.

Anybody else on the panel would like to comment? Okay. Very good. Let me ask this. How is the “Fight Tonight” operational concept impacted if the Army can’t meet its requirements there in the Korean peninsula? And my concern is, is as we look at that joint capability, and, obviously, there is a lot of interaction that goes on there—the Korean peninsula with its developing issues there, how is the Fight Tonight operational concept affected, if the Army can’t meet their requirements for readiness in that region?

General FIELD. Well, I would be hesitant to speak for the commanders in Korea or in the Pacific, but I will give you a measured opinion on that. If something was to happen literally tonight in Korea, obviously, the people that were stationed in Korea and in Japan are the ones that would actually be doing the fighting tonight. So across our military, we have Army, or soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that are all postured to respond to such a contingency. We also have then a plan to flow forces in right behind that.

First on those lists is—most of that is Air Force right away and to get in place. So if you imagine, in Korea, the forces there, in conjunction with our allies in the Republic of Korea, would begin the defense of the Republic of Korea, the forces in Japan, all of the air forces, the marines, and the 7th Fleet would all move forward to support that effort, and then we would flow in follow-on forces that would operate both out of Korea and Japan to sustain that fight.

And if the Army, for whatever reason, they didn’t have the forces to meet the plans, then the commanders on the ground in Korea and in the AOR [Area Of Responsibility] would have to adjust that plan, because of that fact.

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, General. Anybody else on the panel would like to comment? Okay. Very good. Well, with that, we will go to Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I wish to also extend my remarks that he made on our recent trip to Afghanistan. We certainly did learn a great deal, and it was disturbing to hear how, you know, sequestration is going to affect our operations, not only there, but everywhere we are represented.

General Clarke, I want to ask this question of you, the Air National Guard. How are you incorporating Title 32 requirements into the force structure discussions? And finally, how is the Council of Governors being utilized in these discussions?

General CLARKE. Yes, ma’am. The—most of the stuff that we use for Title 32 requirements come from our Federal mission, the things that we are designed to do with the recs [recommendations] of the total force going forward, to engage overseas. So a large component—roughly, I would say, 90 percent of that is all the things

that we can put to use in the—more or less the ground equipment can be used on the ground for domestic disaster.

Honestly, we don't have a real good process for determining all of the Title 32 requirements for what is needed in the homeland. When we look at some of the complex catastrophes that I have seen portrayed by OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] policy and others, we really have to look at this pretty hard, because it could be casualties on numbers of hundreds of thousands that could happen, based on the earthquake in New Madrid, tsunamis, et cetera. So it needs more fidelity, actually.

Ms. BORDALLO. Exactly. Exactly. I agree. And how are the Council of Governors, they are being utilized in these discussions?

General CLARKE. Yes, ma'am. I have only participated in one meeting with the Council of Governors on a telecom, where we discussed a few things. They didn't get too deep into the Title 32 requirements, but we are engaged with them in providing information to them as requested.

Ms. BORDALLO. Good, all right.

Either General Fedder or General Field, whichever, what specific flexibilities or exceptions did you request in terms of furloughing the civilian personnel who provide the backbone of support for our operational Air Force? And also, what is the impact of using borrowed military manpower to backfill civilian positions or functions previously performed by contractors?

General FEDDER. Congresswoman Bordallo, I will start out and answer that we did make—we have requested some exceptions for first responders, at least in my business, but that was pretty much the extent of those that we have requested.

And with regard to using military manpower to backfill, if we do furlough our civilian workforce, there are a few places where we could do that sparingly, like at the front gate of the base, where we have civil servants that provide security or gate access. We could use security forces for that on a limited basis.

But when we are talking about the contribution of civil servants across something like our depot operations or even field-level maintenance, where we have the vast majority of our maintainers are civil servants, there is no way to account for that with using military manpower. And that is the real—

Ms. BORDALLO. Problem.

General FEDDER [continuing]. Impact of a potential furlough across maintenance in the Air Force.

Ms. BORDALLO. Uh-huh. General Fedder?

General FIELD. Yes, ma'am. I don't have much to add to what General Fedder said, but, you know, in addition to that, some of our flying units, especially in the training environment and the training commands, are maintained by our civilian workforce. And so the aircraft are maintained by them, and the simulators are taught by a lot of our civilian force. And so that would have a huge impact on the production of pilots and air crew, if we were to see the full furlough.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, General. And excuse me for referring to you as General Fedder. You don't look anything like her.

[Laughter.]

General FIELD. No, ma'am. But it is—but I don't take that as an insult. We all want to be Judy Fedder.

[Laughter.]

Ms. BORDALLO. I have now another question here for you. This is for General Fedder. The military has to continue to invest in people while also developing new and improved weapons. What changes do you anticipate in the coming years that would encourage retention of our best and brightest employees and also sustain the long-term health of the organic industrial base?

I am concerned with our specialized workforce, such as those at military depots who may leave Government service due to the threats of furloughs and sequestration.

General FEDDER. Yes, ma'am. Congresswoman Bordallo, I would say that what we can do to make sure that we are retaining that talent is, for one thing, give them the kind of work and the challenges, and that means letting them be at work every day and do what we trust them to do.

We have a great deal of talent, especially when we look at something as big as our aircraft depots, when we are talking about some very highly skilled mechanics and, as an example, some really bright talent among software engineers.

And we challenge them with developing operational flight programs for legacy weapon systems, like the B-1 and the B-52 [Stratofortress strategic bomber] and even the F-16. And we need to give them the tools, the education and training so that they can excel at those important tasks that we have given them, and I think that we will retain the kind of skills and talent we have, if we can continue to do that.

Ms. BORDALLO. Okay. Thank you. Thank you very much, General.

And I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay, thank you, Ms. Bordallo. And I think that is the end of our proceedings here, so I want to thank our panel members for coming to join us today. Thank you so much for your insights. Thank you, too, for your service to our Nation. And please pass on to the entire Reserve, Air Guard Component, and our Active Duty Air Force men and women, how much we appreciate their service and contributions to our country.

And with that, we stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:46 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

APRIL 24, 2013

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

APRIL 24, 2013

Statement of Hon. Robert J. Wittman
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Readiness
Hearing on
The Readiness Posture of the U.S. Air Force
April 24, 2013

Welcome to today's hearing on "The Readiness Posture of the United States Air Force." I'd like to extend a warm welcome to our witnesses today:

- Lieutenant General Michael Moeller, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs;
- Lieutenant General Burton Field, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements;
- Lieutenant General Judith Fedder, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Installations and Mission Support;
- Lieutenant General Stanley Clarke, Director of the Air National Guard; and
- Major General Richard Haddad, Deputy to the Chief of the Air Force Reserve.

Thank you for joining us.

Generals, in your statement, you noted that "allowing the Air Force to slip to a lower state of readiness requiring a long buildup to regain full combat effectiveness negates the essential strategic advantages of airpower and puts joint forces at risk." There is no better example of such unacceptable risk than on the Korean Peninsula where the Air Force and the Army work hand in hand to secure our interests.

I was alarmed when General Odierno testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday that we are heading toward a hollow force and that budget cuts could threaten Army readiness levels on the Korean peninsula.

In your statement, you indicated that one-third of fighter and bomber forces are currently standing down and that more and more pilots are not "ready" or trained and qualified to meet operational mission requirements such as those in Korea where the Air Force and Army work as critical partners to assure peace and stability.

The pressing concern in my mind is: What is the level of risk we're assuming by these actions? When will we have assumed too much risk and essentially emboldened an already bellicose and unpredictable leader? Have we reached this point already? I hope you'll address this issue in your opening comments and highlight other direct mission impacts that have resulted because of sequestration and the budget crisis.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
PRESENTATION TO THE ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SUBJECT: READINESS POSTURE OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE

STATEMENT OF: LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL R. MOELLER
Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Plans & Programs

LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURTON M. FIELD
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Plans & Requirements

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUDITH A. FEDDER
Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Installations & Mission
Support

LIEUTENANT GENERAL STANLEY E. CLARKE III
Director, Air National Guard

MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD S. HADDAD
Deputy Chief, Air Force Reserve

APRIL 24, 2013

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

INTRODUCTION

America's Air Force has conducted 22 years of sustained combat operations and is continuing to meet high operational tempo demands to support today's fight. This has inevitably taken a toll on our weapons systems and people, and has strained and degraded the overall readiness of the force. The Air Force fiscal year 2014 (FY14) budget request attempts to align resources to slow our readiness decline and set the stage for restoring full-spectrum readiness. However, the current fiscal environment threatens to derail these efforts and put into jeopardy the Air Force's ability to meet combatant commander requirements. The rebalance to the Asia-Pacific and our continued presence in the Middle East and Africa indicate that the demand for Air Force capabilities will remain constant, or perhaps even rise, over the next decade. To ensure that our Airmen can continue to contribute our five enduring core missions to the joint team, our readiness must improve.

READINESS

The Air Force provides *Global Vigilance*, *Global Reach*, and *Global Power* for America through its five core missions of air and space superiority, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), rapid global mobility, global strike, and command and control. By integrating capabilities across these core missions, we bring a unique set of options to deter war, deliver rapid, life-saving responses to threatened areas anywhere on the planet, and strike hard and precisely wherever and whenever the national interest demands.

The cornerstone of our Airmen's ability to provide airpower to the Nation and contribute our core missions to the joint team is their readiness. "Readiness" is the ability of a unit to provide its designed operational capabilities within the required timeframe. It is comprised of personnel requirements, training (to include flying hours), weapon system sustainment, and

infrastructure. A responsive readiness posture depends on good health in all of these key areas. While protecting future readiness includes modernizing weapons systems and equipment, creating combat readiness in the near-term is a complex task involving the intersection of personnel, materiel, and training. It includes balancing time between operational and training commitments, funding from multiple sources, informed levels of risk, and effectively managing resources to achieve the desired state of readiness. Within this balance, we must recognize that readiness is not merely a funding issue, we must also manage deployment and operational tempo to permit time for full-spectrum training.

The Air Force supports combatant command missions that require 24/7 availability. Space operations, command and control, cyber defense, ISR, special operations, personnel recovery, and nuclear deterrence are all high priority missions that cannot be done adequately, and in some cases cannot be done safely, at low readiness levels. In support of U.S. defense strategy, our Air Force must be capable of quickly responding and shifting between theaters of operation. Allowing the Air Force to slip to a lower state of readiness that requires a long buildup to full combat effectiveness negates the essential strategic advantages of airpower and puts joint forces at increased risk.

The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, combined with sequestration reductions, results in approximately \$4.4 billion less than our request from our operations and maintenance accounts from which we fund some of our foundational readiness programs, including weapons system sustainment (WSS) and our flying hour program (FHP). Sequestration will reduce WSS and FHP by about \$2.1 billion for the Active component from our original FY13 budget request. These cuts will affect FY14 and beyond by driving down

aircraft availability rates, and potentially preventing our ability to fly additional hours even if funded.

The President's Budget (PB) includes balanced deficit reduction proposals that would allow Congress to replace and repeal sequestration in FY13 and the associated cap reductions in FY14-21. If sequestration is not replaced, the Air Force will have to rebuild degraded unit readiness, accept further delays to modernization, absorb the backlog in depot maintenance inductions, and invest additional funding to restore infrastructure. However, because sequestration impacts are already occurring, even if our readiness programs are funded to the levels requested in the FY14 PB, our readiness levels may still not recover to pre-sequester levels in FY14. If the post-sequester funding caps remain in effect, the Air Force will be unable to reinvigorate readiness and align with the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG). Sequestration will have devastating impacts to readiness, will significantly affect our modernization programs, and may cause further force structure reductions.

Weapons System Sustainment

WSS is a key component of full-spectrum readiness. Years of combat demands have taken a toll across many weapon systems, we continue to see an increase in the costs of WSS requirements, which are driven by sustainment strategy, complexity of weapon systems, operations tempo, force structure changes, and growth in depot work packages for aging, legacy aircraft. A primary objective in the FY14 budget request continues our ongoing goal to slow and reverse the erosion of Air Force readiness. The request adds \$1.5 billion across the FYDP to WSS to restore aircraft and space systems readiness.

The 18 percent reduction to the WSS portfolio cuts approximately \$1.7 billion over the FYDP, and the impacts will be felt across the Total Force. We are planning to fund WSS at 81

percent of the FY14 requirement using funds from the base budget as well as overseas contingency operations (OCO) funds. Due to Operations and Maintenance funding cuts this fiscal year, we currently project deferring 60 aircraft and 35 engines across 30 weapon systems in FY13, impacting depot workloads and availability of combat weapons systems in FY14.

History tells us that recovery in our depots from the impacts of sequestration will require two to three years to regain the same level of production even with additional funding in FY14 to minimize the bow-wave of work. Additionally, these operational impacts will be particularly severe because 77 percent of the depot workforce is civilian. The impact of potential civilian furloughs will be especially crippling and drive a reduction in depot workload production, increase carryover, reduce supply chain spares for operational units, degrade workforce proficiency, and ensure future volatility and higher operational costs.

Flying Hour Program

The emphasis on readiness in the DSG reinforced the Air Force focus on the importance of maintaining our FHP as part of our full-spectrum readiness. For the FY14 budget request, the Air Force balanced the allocation of flying hours across the Total Force to maintain—and in some cases—incrementally improve readiness levels.

However, as with WSS, sequestration affects our ability to improve readiness, and in fact, readiness levels are already declining. Lost flight hours have caused unit stand-downs which will result in severe, rapid, and long-term unit combat readiness degradation. We have already ceased operations for one-third of our Active component fighter and bomber force and they will remain stood-down for FY13. Within 60 days of a stand down, these units will not be ready to meet emergent or operations plans requirements. Lost currency training requires approximately six months to return to current sub-optimal levels, with desired flying proficiency for

crewmembers requiring even longer. This recovery requires adequate funding above FY14 PB levels for both FHP and WSS.

The flying hour program will continue to rely on OCO funding to support Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and the redeployment of combat forces from Afghanistan. With the expectation of decreasing OCO flying hours, we have programmed increasing operations and maintenance (O&M)-funded flying hours in FY15 and throughout the FYDP. Beginning in FY15, the program meets approximately 90 percent of the peacetime training requirement to attain full-spectrum readiness across the Total Force.

Training Readiness

The Air Force is committed to a long-term effort to increase our live, virtual, and constructive operational training (LVC-OT) capability and capacity by funding improvements in LVC-OT devices (e.g., simulators and virtual trainers) and networks. Adjustments to the flying hour program will continue to evolve as the fidelity of simulators and LVC-OT capabilities improve. Increasing our virtual capabilities will minimize fuel consumption and aircraft maintenance costs while ensuring high quality training for our aircrews.

Full-spectrum training also includes the availability and sustainability of air-to-air and air-to-ground training ranges. Many of our ranges are venues for large-scale joint and coalition training events and are critical enablers for concepts like Air-Sea Battle. In FY14, we are increasing funding to ensure sustainment of these crucial national assets, which elevate flying training effectiveness for individuals, units, and the entire joint team. Sustainment is important, but ranges require investment as well, and budget pressures will further challenge our ability to provide the warfighter with realistic and relevant test and training ranges. Our ranges, having steadily evolved to meet the needs for combat operations in Iraq and

Afghanistan, now require substantial reinvestment to meet the demands of advanced sensors, full-spectrum warfare and a strategy rebalancing to the Pacific. Since Active component ranges rely principally on government civilians and contractors, sequestration and potential furloughs threaten the continuity of range operations. We are especially concerned that terminating range contracts may result in the loss of highly-specialized personnel not easily replaced. All of our ranges face varying degrees of encroachment from population growth, commercial development of adjacent land, commercial spectrum demands and increased civil aviation. The Air Force is diligently managing the effects of encroachment on our ranges while exploring every avenue to minimize the effects of reduced funding on range capabilities and readiness. Readiness and Modernization

The decline in future budgets does not allow us to maintain force structure and continue all planned investment programs while also improving readiness. To prioritize readiness, we have made a conscious choice to assume additional risk in some modernization programs. Although we have been more effective in our use of operating resources and garnered savings from better business practices, the Air Force has been forced to terminate or restructure several programs. Program restructures and terminations include terminating the Space Based Surveillance Block 10 follow-on, freezing Gorgon Stare at Increment II, terminating Air Force participation in the Joint Precision Approach and Landing System land-based segment. In addition, several key modernization priorities were deferred, including a replacement for the aging T-38 trainer and the JSTARS surveillance aircraft.

To achieve the readiness levels we desire, the Air Force needs sustained modernization. For example, our legacy, or fourth generation, fighter fleet has secured more than 20 years of an air superiority advantage, but may lose its ability operate as effectively in contested

environments. Weapon systems like the F-22, with contributions from the F-35, are what will carry America's Air Force forward to continue to provide air superiority. During F-35 development, it is imperative that we maintain our fourth-generation fighter fleet. Therefore, at least 300 F-16s will undergo a service life extension program and a capability enhancement called Combat Avionics Programmed Extension Suite, which permits them to remain relevant in the near-term threat environment until the F-35 is available in sufficient numbers. We are also upgrading the F-15 fleet's radar and electronic warfare capabilities that will permit it to operate in conjunction with fifth-generation aircraft in the future threat environment.

Other top modernization programs include the KC-46A and the Long Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B). Because the future will likely call for us to provide rapid global mobility to remote, austere locations in contested environments, we will require a very capable tanker fleet. The KC-46A program will ensure that our Nation retains a tanker fleet able to provide crucial air refueling capacity worldwide for decades to come. The LRS-B is a key piece of the development of our long range strike family of systems, the capabilities of which are critical to our ability to carry out our global strike mission.

America's Air Force remains the most capable in the world, but we cannot allow readiness levels to decline further and modernization cannot wait for the next cycle of increased defense spending. We have important production lines under way and development programs that are, or will soon be, mature enough for production. Cancelling programs in anticipation of a future generation of technology would be wasteful and, in some cases, risk the loss of critical engineering talent and technological advantage. New threats and corresponding investment needs are not theoretical future possibilities. They are here, now. Air superiority and long-range strike capabilities cannot be assumed. Significant investment in fifth-generation platforms and

munitions is essential to address these threats. The future success of the Nation's military and the joint team depends on modernizing our Air Force and keeping it ready to fight.

Infrastructure

Ready installations are an integral part of ensuring a ready Air Force. We consider our installations "power projection platforms" from which we employ our enduring airpower core missions, increase responsiveness, and ensure global access across the full spectrum of military operations. As such, the health of our installations directly contribute to overall Air Force readiness. Our Air Force installation investment strategy for FY14 focuses on the Air Force's enduring core missions and on building sustainable installations to enable the DSG. Consistent with the DSG, another key focus area for the Air Force is the Asia-Pacific theater and Guam remains a vital and accessible location in the western Pacific. For the past eight years, Joint Region Marianas-Andersen Air Force Base has accommodated a continual presence of our Nation's premier air assets. It will continue to serve as the strategic and operational nucleus and logistics hub for military operations, originating from and transiting through the area of responsibility in support of the full spectrum of crises. To fully support Pacific Command's strategy, the Air Force is committed to hardening critical infrastructure, including select hangars, as part of Pacific Airpower Resiliency. This strategy is a comprehensive initiative that also includes dispersal and rapid recovery capabilities after attack.

Space and Cyber Readiness

Any potential furloughs brought about by sequestration will impact space and cyber operations. Air Force civilians, as well as support contractors, provide continuity and deep expertise in space and cyber mission areas. We depend on our civilians as much as we depend on our military personnel to operate our space and cyber systems. Civilian and contract

personnel represent over 50 percent of Air Force Space Command's workforce and over 40 percent of the Air Force cyber workforce. The Air Force will mitigate these impacts as much as possible by managing leave and furlough schedules to ensure critical coverage of operations and events. However, over time, operational responsiveness will become more challenging as we are asked to do more with fewer personnel. Additionally, a reduction in support contractors in all areas will increase maintenance repair times and lead to a maintenance backlog, also resulting in reduced readiness.

In addition to potential furloughs, impacts in operations and maintenance accounts and in WSS accounts will increase operational risk in the space mission area. These reductions have driven reduced operations at one of our missile warning sites. However, the risk is reduced by the combination of missile warning satellite coverage and two overlapping ground based missile warning radars. Moreover, the radar can be recalled to full operation in a relatively short time and will be returned to full operations in heightened states of readiness. We have also started a reduction in the number of sites within our space surveillance system. This reduction could delay the detection and characterization of satellite breakups over time. Additional operations risks could occur over time as impacts from reduced WSS are fully realized.

ISR Shortfalls

Sequestration will impede our ISR investment programs at the precise time we need to invest and modernize our force structure to meet a new complex security environment. These program disruptions will cost, over time, more taxpayer dollars as we rectify contract restructures and program inefficiencies, raise unit costs, and delay delivery of validated capabilities to warfighters in the field. In FY14, our ISR budget request maintains investments in the ground stations, manned and unmanned ISR Weapons Systems. While the Air Force

remains on track to field 65 MQ-1B Predator and MQ-9A Reaper combat air patrols (CAPs) by May 2014 to maintain our ability to conduct counterterrorism operations, this Force was built to operate in a highly permissive threat environment. This ISR capability has grown 4,300 percent since 2000, but its survivability in contested environments is questionable. The enduring and universal requirement for ISR capabilities needed to operate in a complex and dangerous security environment, drives the need to modernize our ISR forces. The Air Force's FY14 budget request of \$7.1 billion for ISR which includes investment in advanced sensors; automated analytical tools to deal with the massive growth of ISR data; and additional production capacity for intelligence mission data required to enable fifth generation aircraft operating in contested environments. These investments advance our vision of an all-source, all-domain, resilient collection and analysis enterprise integrated with Air Force, Joint, Coalition, and Intelligence Community command and control architectures.

Munitions Shortfalls

The Air Force projects preferred munitions shortfalls within the FYDP based on the latest funding profiles and non-nuclear consumables annual analysis, including AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile – Extended Range (JASSM-ER), Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), Laser JDAM, AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, Small Diameter Bomb II (SDB II), general purpose and penetrator bomb bodies, and fuzes. The predicted inventories of the munitions listed range from 15-80 percent of the objective by FY19. The Air Force is working within its topline obligation authority to attempt to mitigate the shortfalls. Funding priority is being given to preferred munitions such as AIM-120, JASSM-ER and SDB II. Other munitions are funded at minimum sustainment rates in order to maintain the ability to produce the items if and when funding is available. The Air

Force, along with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the other Services, is also examining the phased threat distribution and target templates within the munitions requirements process to ensure stated total munitions requirements are accurate and realistic. Operationally, the Air Force will mitigate the shortfalls of preferred munitions where possible by supplementing or substituting them with non-preferred munitions (e.g. unguided general purpose weapons). This approach will result in a higher number of missions, a higher number of weapons employed, a higher risk to aircrew, higher attrition of assets, increased time to complete objectives, and increased collateral damage.

Total Force Task Force

As important as it is to maintain a ready and capable force, it is equally critical to ensure a trained and capable cadre of personnel to meet the challenges of the future. This requires the Air Force to maintain a balance across all three components—Active, Guard, and Reserve. In response to evolving strategic environment and fiscal constraints, the Air Force launched the Total Force Task Force (TF2), led by three two-star general officers from the Regular Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve. The TF2's mission is to conduct a comprehensive review of Total Force requirements and develop strategic options that leverage the inherent strengths and unique characteristics of each component. Additionally, upon request, the task force will serve as a focal point for the Congressionally-mandated National Commission on the Structure for the Air Force.

CONCLUSION

The Air Force's core missions will continue to serve America's long-term security interests by giving our Nation and its leadership unmatched options against the challenges of an unpredictable future. In the last several decades, Air Force airpower has been an indispensable

element of deterrence, controlled escalation, and, when so tasked by the Nation's leadership, destruction of an adversary's military capability—all accomplished with minimal casualties to U.S. servicemen and women and civilians. However, investments in Air Force capabilities and readiness remain essential to ensuring that the Nation will maintain an agile, flexible, and ready force. This force must be deliberately planned and consistently funded, as reconstitution of a highly sophisticated and capable Air Force cannot occur quickly if allowed to atrophy.

Today's Air Force provides America an indispensable hedge against the challenges of a dangerous and uncertain future, providing viable foreign policy options exclusive of a large military commitment on foreign soil. Regardless of the future security environment, the Air Force must retain and maintain its unique ability to provide America with *Global Vigilance*, *Global Reach*, and *Global Power*.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL R. MOELLER



BIOGRAPHY

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL R. MOELLER

Lt. Gen. Michael R. Moeller is Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. In support of the Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Air Force, General Moeller leads the development and integration of the Air Force's long-range plans and the five-year, \$604 billion U.S. Air Force Future Years Defense Program to ensure the Air Force's ability to build and employ effective air, space and cyber forces to achieve national defense objectives.

General Moeller received his commission from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1980. He has held multiple flying assignments as an aircraft commander and instructor pilot. He has commanded at the squadron and group levels and served as the commander of the 2nd Bomb Wing and 379th Air Expeditionary Wing. His staff experience includes tours with the Secretary of the Air Force Staff Group and in the Checkmate Division on the Air Staff; in the Plans and Policy Directorate of the Joint Staff; as the Deputy Director for Plans and Programs at Air Combat Command; as the Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy for U.S. Southern Command and as the Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy for U.S. Central Command. He also served as the executive assistant to the Vice Director of the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate on the Joint Staff and to the Air Force Assistant Vice Chief of Staff.



Prior to his current assignment, the general was the U.S. Security Coordinator, Israel-Palestinian Authority, U.S. Department of State, Tel Aviv, Israel. General Moeller is a command pilot with more than 4,440 flying hours and 670 combat hours for operations Desert Storm, Enduring and Iraqi Freedom.

EDUCATION

1980 Bachelor of Science degree in geography, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.
 1984 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
 1984 Master's degree in aeronautical science and technology, Embry-Riddle University, Daytona Beach, Fla.
 1993 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
 1994 Master's degree in airpower art and science, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
 1996 Joint Staff Officer Course, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
 1999 National Defense Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.
 2005 National Security Leadership Course, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, N.Y.
 2012 Leadership at the Peak, Center for Creative Leadership, Colorado Springs, Colo.

ASSIGNMENTS

1. June 1980 - June 1981, student, undergraduate navigator and electronic warfare training, Mather AFB, Calif.
2. July 1981 - November 1981, student, B-52 combat crew training, Castle AFB, Calif.
3. December 1981 - May 1984, electronic warfare officer, 416th Bomb Wing, Griffiss AFB, N.Y.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL R. MOELLER

4. June 1984 - June 1985, student, undergraduate pilot training, Columbus AFB, Miss.
5. July 1985 - November 1985, student, B-52 combat crew training, Castle AFB, Calif.
6. December 1985 - August 1988, B-52 co-pilot and aircraft commander, 416th Bomb Wing, Griffiss AFB, N.Y.
7. September 1988 - September 1989, Air Staff Training officer, Secretary of the Air Force Staff Group, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
8. September 1989 - August 1990, B-52 aircraft commander and instructor pilot, 42nd Bomb Wing, Loring AFB, Maine
9. August 1990 - March 1991, B-52 mission and flight commander, 4300th Provisional Bomb Wing, Southwest Asia
10. April 1991 - June 1992, Chief, Combat Tactics, 42nd Bomb Wing, Loring AFB, Maine
11. July 1992 - June 1993, student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
12. July 1993 - June 1994, student, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
13. July 1994 - March 1995, Chief, Strategy Branch, Checkmate Division, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
14. April 1995 - June 1997, executive assistant to the Vice Director, and strategic planner and action officer, Strategy Division, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
15. July 1997 - May 1999, Commander, 5th Operations Support Squadron, Minot AFB, N.D.
16. June 1999 - May 2000, National Defense Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.
17. June 2000 - July 2001, executive officer to the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
18. August 2001 - December 2001, Commander, 7th Operations Group, Dyess AFB, Texas
19. December 2001 - May 2002, Commander, 405th Expeditionary Operations Group, Southwest Asia
20. May 2002 - September 2003, Commander, 7th Operations Group, Dyess AFB, Texas
21. September 2003 - February 2004, Vice Commander, 5th Bomb Wing, Minot AFB, N.D.
22. February 2004 - September 2005, Commander, 2nd Bomb Wing, Barksdale AFB, La.
23. September 2005 - September 2006, Deputy Director of Plans and Programs, Headquarters Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, Va.
24. September 2006 - July 2008, Director, Strategy, Policy and Plans (J5), Headquarters USSOUTHCOM, Miami, Fla.
25. July 2008 - July 2009, Commander, 379th Air Expeditionary Wing, Southwest Asia
26. July 2009 - Oct 2010, Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy (J5), Headquarters U.S. Central Command, MacDill AFB, Fla.
27. October 2010 - October 2012, U.S. Security Coordinator, Israel-Palestinian Authority, U.S. Department of State, Tel Aviv, Israel.
28. October 2012 - present, Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

1. April 1995 - June 1997, executive assistant to the Vice Director, and strategic planner and action officer, Strategy Division, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., as a major and lieutenant colonel
2. September 2006 - July 2008, Director, Strategy, Policy and Plans (J5), Headquarters USSOUTHCOM, Miami, Fla., as a brigadier general
3. July 2008 - July 2009, Commander, 379th Air Expeditionary Wing, and Installation Commander, Southwest Asia, as a brigadier general
4. July 2009 - Oct 2010, Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy (J5), Headquarters U.S. Central Command, MacDill AFB, Fla., as a major general
5. October 2010 - October 2012, U.S. Security Coordinator, Israel-Palestinian Authority, Tel Aviv, Israel as a lieutenant general

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Defense Distinguished Service Medal
 Defense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
 Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster
 Distinguished Flying Cross
 Bronze Star Medal with oak leaf cluster
 Defense Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
 Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters
 Air Medal with oak leaf cluster

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL R. MOELLER

Joint Service Commendation Medal

FLIGHT INFORMATION

Rating: Command pilot

Flight hours: More than 4,400

Aircraft flown: B-1, B-52, KC-135, RC-135, E-8, E-3, C-130, C-21, T-37 and T-38

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Second Lieutenant May 28, 1980

First Lieutenant May 28, 1982

Captain May 28, 1984

Major Nov. 1, 1991

Lieutenant Colonel Nov. 1, 1996

Colonel March 1, 2001

Brigadier General July 3, 2007

Major General April 2, 2010

Lieutenant General Oct. 7, 2010

(Current as of April 2013)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURTON M. FIELD



BIOGRAPHY

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURTON M. FIELD

Lt. Gen. Burton M. Field is the deputy chief of staff for operations, plans and requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. He is responsible to the secretary of the Air Force and the chief of staff for formulating policy supporting air, space, irregular warfare, counterproliferation, homeland security, weather and cyber operations. As the Air Force operations deputy to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the general determines operational requirements, capabilities and training necessary to support national security objectives and military strategy.

General Field was commissioned in 1979 after graduating from the U.S. Air Force Academy. He has commanded the 421st Fighter Squadron at Hill Air Force Base, Utah; the USAF Weapons School at Nellis AFB, Nev.; the 8th Fighter Wing at Kunsan Air Base, South Korea; and the 1st Fighter Wing at Langley AFB, Va. He has also deployed as Commander, 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing, Balad AB, Iraq. The general served on two major command staffs as well as the Joint Staff. Prior to his current assignment he was the Commander, U.S. Forces Japan, and Commander, 5th Air Force, Yokota Air Base, Japan.



General Field is a command pilot with more than 3,400 flying hours in the F-16 and the F-22A.

EDUCATION

1979 Bachelor of Science degree, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.
 1984 Squadron Officer School, by correspondence
 1985 USAF Fighter Weapons Instructor Course, Nellis AFB, Nev.
 1986 Master's degree in business administration, Golden Gate University, Calif.
 1993 Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.
 1998 Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

ASSIGNMENTS

1. July 1979 - July 1980, student, undergraduate pilot training, Williams AFB, Ariz.
2. October 1980 - May 1981, student, F-16 Replacement Training Unit, Hill AFB, Utah
3. May 1981 - December 1983, F-16 squadron pilot and instructor pilot, 430th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Nellis AFB, Nev.
4. January 1984 - December 1984, F-16 instructor pilot, 80th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Kunsan AB, South Korea
5. January 1985 - May 1985, student, USAF Fighter Weapons Instructor Course, Nellis AFB, Nev.
6. May 1985 - May 1987, weapons and tactics officer and F-16 instructor pilot, 430th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Nellis AFB, Nev.
7. May 1987 - July 1990, F-16 instructor pilot, academic instructor and flight commander, USAF Fighter Weapons School, Nellis AFB, Nev.
8. August 1990 - June 1992, advanced medium-range air-to-air missile and F-22 action officer, Tactical Air

LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURTON M. FIELD

Command, Langley AFB, Va.

9. June 1992 - June 1993, student, Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.
10. July 1993 - June 1994, Chief, Standardization and Evaluation, 388th Fighter Wing, Hill AFB, Utah
11. June 1994 - June 1995, operations officer, 34th Fighter Squadron, Hill AFB, Utah
12. June 1995 - July 1997, Commander, 421st Fighter Squadron, Hill AFB, Utah
13. August 1997 - June 1998, student, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
14. July 1998 - May 2000, executive officer to Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein AB, Germany
15. May 2000 - April 2001, Commandant, USAF Weapons School, Nellis AFB, Nev.
16. May 2001 - May 2002, Commander, 8th Fighter Wing, Kunsan AB, South Korea
17. June 2002 - May 2003, Assistant Deputy Director, Political-Military Affairs for Europe (J5), Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
18. June 2003 - June 2005, Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs for Western Hemisphere (J5), Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
19. June 2005 - May 2007, Commander, 1st Fighter Wing, Langley AFB, Va.
20. July 2007 - July 2008, Commander, 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing, Joint Base Balad, Iraq
21. July 2008 - February 2009, Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
22. February 2009 - October 2010, Senior Military Adviser to the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan/Pakistan, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
23. October 2010 - July 2012, Commander, U.S. Forces Japan, and Commander, 5th Air Force, Pacific Air Forces, Yokota Air Base, Japan
24. July 2012 - present, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

1. June 2002 - May 2003, Assistant Deputy Director, Political-Military Affairs for Europe (J5), Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., as a colonel
2. June 2003 - June 2005, Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs for Western Hemisphere (J5), Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., as a colonel
3. July 2008 - February 2009, Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., as a major general
4. February 2009 - October 2010, Senior Military Adviser to the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan/Pakistan, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., as a major general
5. October 2010 - July 2012, Commander, U.S. Forces Japan, and Commander, 5th Air Force, Pacific Air Forces, Yokota Air Base, Japan, as a lieutenant general

FLIGHT INFORMATION

Rating: Command pilot
 Flight hours: More than 3,400
 Aircraft flown: F-16 and F-22A

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Distinguished Service Medal
 Defense Superior Service Medal
 Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster
 Bronze Star Medal
 Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters
 Air Medal with three oak leaf clusters
 Aerial Achievement Medal with oak leaf cluster
 Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS

2011 Eugene M. Zuckert Award for Outstanding Management Achievements by a Department of the Air Force Manager

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Second Lieutenant May 30, 1979
 First Lieutenant May 30, 1981
 Captain May 30, 1983

LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURTON M. FIELD

Major May 1, 1990
Lieutenant Colonel Feb. 1, 1995
Colonel March 1, 2000
Brigadier General June 1, 2005
Major General July 2, 2008
Lieutenant General Oct. 25, 2010

(Current as of November 2012)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUDITH A. FEDDER



BIOGRAPHY

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUDITH A. FEDDER

Lt. Gen. Judith A. Fedder is Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Installations and Mission Support, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. General Fedder is responsible to the Chief of Staff for leadership, management and integration of Air Force logistics readiness, aircraft and missile maintenance, civil engineering and security forces, as well as setting policy and preparing budget estimates that reflect enhancements to productivity, combat readiness and quality of life for Air Force people.

General Fedder is a 1980 distinguished graduate of the ROTC program at Michigan State University. A career maintainer, she has served as officer in charge of numerous aircraft maintenance units and as Chief of Logistics Management at the Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters for operations Proven Force and Provide Comfort at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. Her commands include the 46th Component Repair Squadron and 46th Equipment Maintenance Squadron at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.; 31st Logistics Group at Aviano AB, Italy; 65th Air Base Wing at Lajes Field, Portugal, where she also served as the Sub-Unified Commander of U.S. Forces Azores; and the 76th Maintenance Wing at Tinker AFB, Okla. She has served as Deputy Director in the Office of Legislative Liaison, Secretary of the Air Force; and as the Director of Logistics for Air Combat Command. Prior to this assignment, the General was the Director of Logistics, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Installations and Mission Support, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.



EDUCATION

1980 Bachelor of Science degree in dietetics, Michigan State University, East Lansing
 1984 Master of Systems Management degree, Florida Institute of Technology, Melbourne
 1984 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
 1992 Distinguished graduate, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
 1996 Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
 2003 National Security Management Course, Maxwell School, Syracuse University, N.Y.
 2009 National Security Studies Program, Elliott School, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
 2011 Defense Policy Program, Elliott School, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.

ASSIGNMENTS

1. November 1980 - April 1981, student, Aircraft Maintenance Officer Course, Chanute AFB, Ill.
2. April 1981 - May 1984, officer in charge, Maintenance Branch, 1st Equipment Maintenance Squadron; assistance officer in charge, 94th Aircraft Maintenance Unit; and officer in charge, 71st Aircraft Maintenance Unit, 1st Aircraft Generation Squadron, Langley AFB, Va.
3. May 1984 - July 1984, student, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
4. July 1984 - November 1986, officer in charge, 58th Aircraft Maintenance Unit, and officer in charge, William Tell Maintenance, 33rd Aircraft Generation Squadron, Eglin AFB, Fla.
5. November 1986 - June 1991, Chief F-15 and F-5 Section, assistant executive officer and Weapon Systems

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUDITH A. FEDDER

Program Manager, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Headquarters U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein Air Base, Germany

6. July 1991 - June 1992, student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

7. June 1992 - July 1995, maintenance supervisor, 46th Equipment Maintenance Squadron; Commander, 46th Component Repair Squadron; and Commander, 46th Equipment Maintenance Squadron, Eglin AFB, Fla.

8. July 1995 - June 1996, student, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

9. June 1996 - May 1999, Chief of Manpower and Maintenance Policy, Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics, and special assistant for Depot, Readiness and Logistics Programs, Office of Legislative Liaison, Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, D.C.

10. May 1999 - May 2001, Commander, 31st Logistics Group, Aviano AB, Italy

11. August 2001 - May 2003, Commander, 65th Air Base Wing, and Commander, U.S. Forces Azores, Lajes Field, Portugal

12. May 2003 - September 2005, executive officer to the Chief of Staff, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

13. September 2005 - July 2006, Deputy Director of Legislative Liaison, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, D.C.

14. July 2006 - January 2009, Commander, 76th Maintenance Wing, Oklahoma City ALC, Tinker AFB, Okla.

15. January 2009 - October 2010, Director of Logistics, Headquarters Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, Va.

16. November 2010 - November 2011, Director of Logistics, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Installations and Mission Support, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

17. December 2011 - present, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Installations and Mission Support, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

August 2001 - May 2003, Commander, U.S. Forces Azores, and Commander, 65th Air Base Wing, Lajes Field, Portugal, as a colonel

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Defense Superior Service Medal

Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster

Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters

Joint Service Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster

Air Force Commendation Medal

Air Force Achievement Medal

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Second Lieutenant Nov. 20, 1980

First Lieutenant Nov. 20, 1982

Captain Nov. 20, 1984

Major Oct. 1, 1991

Lieutenant Colonel Feb. 1, 1995

Colonel May 1, 1999

Brigadier General April 10, 2006

Major General July 17, 2009

Lieutenant General Dec. 5, 2011

(Current as of July 2012)



BIOGRAPHY

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

GENERAL STANLEY E. CLARKE III

Lt. Gen. Stanley E. Clarke III is the Director, Air National Guard, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. He is responsible for formulating, developing and coordinating all policies, plans and programs affecting more than 108,000 Guard members and civilians in more than 88 flying wings and 175 geographically separated units across 213 locations throughout the 50 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Virgin Islands.

General Clarke was commissioned in 1981 as a distinguished graduate of the ROTC program at the University of Georgia and graduated from undergraduate pilot training at Sheppard AFB, Texas, in 1983. He is a command pilot with more than 4,000 hours in the A-10, C-26 and the F-16. Before assuming his current position, General Clarke served as the Commander, Continental U.S. North American Aerospace Defense Command Region - 1st Air Force (Air Forces Northern), Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla. His command comprised of four direct reporting units, 10 aligned Air National Guard units, and a large number of active air defense alert sites--including aircraft, air defense artillery, and up to 15,000 active duty, National Guard, Air Force Reserve and civilian personnel.



He has served in various operational and staff assignments including Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché in Turkey. He has commanded a squadron, fighter wing and air expeditionary wing. He previously served as the Deputy Director of the Air National Guard and as the Assistant Adjutant General for Air, Alabama Air National Guard.

EDUCATION

1981 Bachelor of Science degree, University of Georgia
 1986 Distinguished graduate, USAF Fighter Weapons School, Nellis AFB, Nev.
 1988 Squadron Officer School, by correspondence
 1994 Air Command and Staff College, by correspondence
 1998 Air War College, in residence
 2007 Masters degree in military studies, American Military University
 2007 Capstone General and Flag Officer Course, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
 2008 Combined Forces Air Component Commander Course, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
 2009 Joint Military Attaché School
 2010 Joint Flag Officer Warfighter Course, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

ASSIGNMENTS

1. January 1982 - February 1983, student, undergraduate pilot training, Sheppard AFB, Texas
2. February 1983 - May 1983, student, T-38 pilot training, Holloman AFB, N.M.
3. May 1983 - September 1983, student, A-10 pilot training, Davis-Monthan AFB, Ariz.
4. September 1983 - April 1986, A-10 aircraft commander, 355th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Myrtle Beach AFB, S.C.
5. April 1986 - August 1986, student, USAF Fighter Weapons School, Nellis AFB, Nev.
6. August 1986 - June 1987, Chief, Weapons and Tactics, 356th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Myrtle Beach AFB, S.C.
7. June 1987 - March 1989, instructor pilot, USAF Fighter Weapons School, Nellis AFB, Nev.
8. March 1989 - February 1990, F-16 aircraft commander, 465th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Tinker AFB, Okla.
9. February 1990 - April 1991, Chief, Weapons and Tactics, 507th Tactical Fighter Wing, Tinker AFB, Okla.
10. April 1991 - June 1994, training officer, 160th Tactical Fighter Wing, Dannelly Field, Montgomery, Ala.
11. June 1994 - June 1995, Chief, Weapons and Tactics, 160th Fighter Squadron, Dannelly Field, Montgomery, Ala.
12. June 1995 - June 1997, operations officer, 160th Fighter Squadron, Dannelly Field, Montgomery, Ala.
13. June 1997 - June 1998, student, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
14. June 1998 - February 2001, Commander, 160th Fighter Squadron, Dannelly Field, Montgomery, Ala.
15. February 2001 - October 2002, Vice Commander, 187th Fighter Wing, Dannelly Field, Montgomery, Ala.
(March 2002 - June 2002, Director of Combat Operations, USCENTAF)
16. October 2002 - December 2005, Commander, 187th Fighter Wing, Dannelly Field, Montgomery, Ala. (January 2003 - June 2003, Commander, 410th Air Expeditionary Wing, Operation Iraqi Freedom)
17. December 2005 - June 2006, Assistant Adjutant General for Air, Headquarters Alabama Air National Guard, Montgomery, Ala.
18. June 2006 - May 2007, Deputy Director Strategic Planning, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs (A8), Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. (September 2006 - October 2006, Co-president, Combined Investigation Board, Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan)
19. May 2007 - June 2008, Deputy Director, Air National Guard, Arlington, Va.
20. June 2008 - July 2009, Military Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
21. July 2009 - February 2010, Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation Turkey, U.S. European Command, Ankara, Turkey
22. February 2010 - August 2011, Senior Defense Official and Defense Attaché, Office of Defense Cooperation Turkey, U.S. European Command, Ankara, Turkey
23. August 2011 - March 2013, Commander, 1st Air Force (AFNORTH), and Commander, Continental U.S. North American Aerospace Defense Command Region, Tyndall AFB, Fla.
24. March 2013 - present, Director, Air National Guard, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

1. July 2009 - February 2010, Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation Turkey, U.S. European Command, Ankara, Turkey, as a major general
2. February 2010 - August 2011, Senior Defense Official and Defense Attaché, Office of Defense Cooperation Turkey, U.S. European Command, Ankara, Turkey, as a major general

FLIGHT INFORMATION

Rating: Command pilot

Flight hours: More than 4,000, including more than 100 combat hours

Aircraft flown: T-38, C-26, A-10 and F-16

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Distinguished Service Medal

Defense Superior Service Medal

Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster

Bronze Star Medal

Meritorious Service Medal

Air Medal

Aerial Achievement Medal
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster
Air Force Achievement Medal
Joint Meritorious Unit Award
Air Force Outstanding Unit Award with "V" device and silver oak leaf cluster
Combat Readiness Medal with two silver oak leaf clusters
National Defense Service Medal with bronze star
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
Southwest Asia Service Medal with bronze star
Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Air Force Expeditionary Service Ribbon with Gold Border
Air Force Longevity Service Award with silver and bronze oak leaf clusters
Small Arms Expert Marksmanship Ribbon with oak leaf cluster
Air Force Training Ribbon
Alabama Faithful Service Ribbon

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS

Multiple civilian pilot ratings, including Airline Transport Pilot
Deputy Chief of Staff for IPT-2, 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Second Lieutenant June 13, 1981
First Lieutenant Sept. 30, 1983
Captain Sept. 30, 1985
Major March 7, 1991
Lieutenant Colonel Nov. 4, 1995
Colonel May 1, 2001
Brigadier General Dec. 1, 2005
Major General Nov. 26, 2008
Lieutenant General Aug. 31, 2011

(Current as of March 2013)




BIOGRAPHY

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD S. "BEEF" HADDAD

Maj. Gen. Richard S. "Beef" Haddad is Deputy to the Chief of Air Force Reserve, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. He assists the Chief of Air Force Reserve who serves as the principal advisor on Reserve matters to the Air Force Chief of Staff.

General Haddad was commissioned through the U.S. Air Force Academy and entered active duty in 1981. He has served in a variety of flying and command positions during his career in the Air Force and Air Force Reserve. He has hundreds of hours of combat flying time in operations Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom and Desert Storm. The general was in command of the first gunship over Port-au Prince, Haiti, in support of Operation Uphold Democracy. His flying career includes operations throughout the United States, Canada, the Caribbean, Central America, South America, Southeast Asia and Southwest Asia. After the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, General Haddad commanded the 711th Special Operations Squadron through operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, during which the unit compiled more than 5,000 combat hours of accident-free flying and was recognized as the most decorated Reserve flying unit.



Prior to his current assignment, General Haddad was Director of Plans and Programs, Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command, Robins Air Force Base, Ga. In his civilian job, he is an airline pilot with a major U.S. carrier.

EDUCATION

1981 Bachelor of Science degree in management, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.
 1985 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
 1997 Air Command and Staff College, by correspondence
 2003 Air War College, by correspondence
 2006 Master of Business Administration degree, Touro University International
 2007 Joint Forces Reserve Orientation Course, Norfolk, Va.
 2008 Capstone General and Flag Officer Course, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
 2009 U.S.-Russia Security Program, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
 2011 Leadership Decision Making Course, Harvard Kennedy School of Executive Education

ASSIGNMENTS

1. June 1981 - June 1982, Student, undergraduate pilot training, Williams AFB, Ariz.
2. July 1982 - October 1982, Student, C-130 training, Little Rock AFB, Ark.
3. November 1982 - October 1985, C-130E/H pilot and aircraft commander, 345th Tactical Airlift Squadron,

Yokota Air Base, Japan
 4. October 1985 - September 1988, AC-130H Instructor and Evaluator Pilot, 16th Special Operations Wing, Hurlburt Field, Fla.
 5. September 1988 - June 1995, AC-130A/C-130A Instructor Pilot and Life Support officer, 711th Special Operations Squadron, Eglin AFB, Fla.
 6. June 1995 - November 2000, MC-130E Instructor Pilot, Assistant Operations Officer, Chief Pilot and Life Support Officer, 711th Special Operations Squadron, Eglin AFB, Fla.
 7. November 2000 - June 2003, Commander, 711th Special Operations Squadron, Eglin AFB, Fla.
 8. June 2003 - September 2003, Flight Safety Officer, 919th Special Operations Wing, Eglin AFB, Fla.
 9. September 2003 - October 2005, Deputy and Battle Staff Director, Tanker Airlift Control Center, Headquarters Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, Ill.
 10. October 2005 - January 2007, Vice Commander, 403rd Wing, Keesler AFB, Miss.
 11. January 2007 - February 2009, mobilization assistant to the Commander, 23rd Air Force, and the Director, Air, Space and Information Operations, Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Fla.
 12. February 2009 - April 2009, Commander, 23rd Air Force, and the Director of Operations, Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Fla.
 13. April 2009 - October 2010, Commander, Special Operations Command Korea, U.S. Forces Korea and United Nations Command Special Operations Component; and Deputy Commanding General, Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Yongsan Army Garrison, South Korea
 14. October 2010 - January 2011, Special Assistant to the Commander, Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command, Robins AFB, Ga.
 15. January 2011 - August 2012, Director of Plans and Programs, Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command, Robins AFB, Ga.
 16. August 2012 - Present, Deputy to the Chief of Air Force Reserve, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

April 2009 - October 2010, Commander, Special Operations Command Korea, U.S. Forces Korea and United Nations Command Special Operations Component; and Deputy Commanding General, Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Yongsan Army Garrison, South Korea, as a brigadier general

FLIGHT INFORMATION

Rating: Command pilot
 Flight hours: More than 5,000 military hours
 Aircraft flown: C-130E/H, AC-130H, C-130A, AC-130A, MC130E and C-130J

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Defense Superior Service Medal
 Legion of Merit
 Distinguished Flying Cross with "V" device and two oak leaf clusters
 Bronze Star Medal with three oak leaf clusters
 Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
 Air Medal with four oak leaf clusters
 Aerial Achievement Medal
 Air Force Commendation Medal
 Air Force Combat Action Medal
 Air Force Outstanding Unit Award with "V" device and silver and three bronze oak leaf clusters
 Combat Readiness Medal with silver and two bronze oak leaf clusters
 Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with two bronze stars
 Southwest Asia Service Medal with two bronze stars
 Afghanistan Campaign Medal with bronze star
 Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal
 Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
 Humanitarian Service Medal
 Kuwait Liberation Medal (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)
 Kuwait Liberation Medal (Government of Kuwait)

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Second Lieutenant May 27, 1981
First Lieutenant May 27, 1983
Captain May 27, 1985
Major May 27, 1995
Lieutenant Colonel Sept. 29, 2000
Colonel May 1, 2005
Brigadier General Oct. 13, 2008
Major General Feb. 17, 2012

(Current as of December 2012)

**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING**

APRIL 24, 2013

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ENYART

General FEDDER. The ability to use alternative fuels in Air Force aircraft provides expanded fuel options for freedom of action in total operations. To expand our options, the Air Force has been focused on the testing and certification of the most promising alternative fuels to retain DOD influence on commercial fuel specifications. Based on an evaluation of market conditions and discussion with commercial partners, the three processes evaluated to date have been 50/50 blends of traditional JP-8 and either Fischer-Tropsch synthetic fuel (FT), hydro-processed renewable jet (HRJ), or alcohol-to-jet fuel (ATJ). Both HRJ and ATJ are biofuels. We have certified our entire aviation fleet for unrestricted operations on both the FT and HRJ blends. Moving forward, the Air Force is looking to increase its use of alternative aviation fuels, provided those fuels are drop-in fuels that are cost competitive with traditional petroleum-based jet fuels.

With regard to the Military Construction projects, the Air Force is making every attempt to place our most urgent military construction requirements in the Future Year's Defense Program. While there is obviously a need for the projects in question at Scott Air Force Base, there simply is not enough funding to accommodate all of the Air Force's most urgent requirements within the current Air Force Budget. We will make every effort to include these projects in a future President's Budget if funds are available. We look forward to your continued support for military construction projects and other critical Air Force priorities through the fiscal year 14 budget cycle. [See page 21.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

APRIL 24, 2013

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO

Mr. LOBIONDO. I would like to focus on a subject that we don't bring up all too often: aviation demo teams, and in particular the Thunderbirds.

I know they have been grounded for cost-savings measures due to sequestration. However, in the event that order is lifted and they start to participate in airshows again, I think it is important for them to focus on airshows here at home.

It is not in the best interest of our fiscal challenges to allow defense demo teams to perform abroad, which the Thunderbirds were scheduled for an August 22nd through September 30th Pacific-Asia Tour. That schedule would prevent local communities during prime summer weeks to benefit from the associated economic benefits these demo teams bring with their scheduled appearances.

With that said, can you please tell me:

a) What is the entire budget, including airlift, for the Thunderbirds in the FY14 PB request?

b) Does that reflect the pre-sequestration schedule, which included Aug 22–Sep 30 Pacific/Asia?

c) Can you tell us how much was budgeted specifically for those Pacific/Asia stops?

d) Assuming the Thunderbirds resume participating in airshows, will they still do a Pacific/Asia tour?

e) Finally, how many U.S. shows would the Thunderbirds be able to do in lieu of that Pacific/Asia trip?

General MOELLER and General FIELD. a) In Fiscal Year (FY) 2014, the entire budget for the USAF Air Demonstration Team (“Thunderbirds”) is \$35.5 million. This includes unique expenses associated with team practice, travel to demonstration events, and the demonstrations themselves.

b) No. FY2014, which begins after the end of the planned Pacific tour, was a domestic tour schedule and the Thunderbirds' funding request reflects the cost of a U.S. show season.

c) For FY2013, the flying hours, airlift and travel/lodging costs for the 2013 Pacific tour are extrapolated from what the team did during their 2009 Pacific tour; actual 2013 Pacific tour locations and dates were still tentative when the season was cut-short by sequestration. The cost differential between performing the six-week Pacific tour and performing seven weekend events in the United States has been estimated by Air Combat Command as \$2.5 million.

d) In response to DOD sequestration guidance, the Air Force has canceled aerial demonstration team performances including the U.S. Air Force Thunderbirds for the remainder of the show season. This decision enabled the Air Force to reallocate flying hours to combat readiness training and deployment commitments. Due to this decision, the U.S. Air Force Thunderbirds halted their practice, have lost currency and qualifications and will have no capability to perform any shows this season, including the proposed tour to the Pacific region.

Although this year the demonstration team will not be able to participate in an overseas event, there has been no determination about what will happen in future years as these international events are important to the Air Force. U.S. participation in international aviation trade shows serves to further our engagement with partner nations and their militaries by developing mutual trust and confidence. Until the recent decision to cancel air show participation due to sequestration, the U.S. Air Force Thunderbirds, supported this overall effort in one of the most recognizable and inspiring ways. The Air Force premier demonstration team's participation in international air shows is part of our international and public diplomacy and demonstrates to nations around the world the precision capabilities of our world class air force. The display of U.S. aircraft, and the Airmen that operate them, speaks volumes about U.S. technology, training, and our professional military ethic. Together these serve to inspire partner Air Forces to develop and/or strengthen their relationship with the U.S. Air Force. They also seek to develop their own capabilities through acquisition of platforms and the requisite training and sustainment to achieve high levels of proficiency and professionalism and most importantly contribute to global security. The results can be measured in real terms as partners

acquire U.S. systems through Air Force Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) programs contributing \$22.9 Billion per year to the U.S. economy and supporting 276,800 jobs in as many as 46 states, and contribute to coalition operations.

e) Due to the cancellation of the 2013 Thunderbird schedule, the team has halted their practice, have lost currency and qualifications and will have no capability to perform any shows this season. Therefore, regardless of the fate of the Pacific/Asia trip this year, no additional shows would be added to the Thunderbird schedule in 2013. As for the future, the Thunderbirds normally support one show a weekend during their prime flying season of mid-March through mid-November. In 2013, the Thunderbirds were scheduled to support 25 airshows and three flyovers in addition to a 5 week tour overseas. The Thunderbirds perform overseas trips every other year and these trips are scheduled strategically to fall during the second year of the Thunderbird Commander's tour with the team, therefore, they would not have another proposed overseas trip until 2015. The exact dates of an overseas tour are dependent upon the location of the tour. Each geographic area schedules their key events during different times of the year, therefore the Thunderbirds are typically not gone the same months each show season and are normally never gone for more than 5 weeks.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK

Mr. LOEBSACK. Given that many of the force structure changes—especially those in the Air National Guard and Reserve—that are slated for FY 2013 will take multiple years to carry out, does the FY 2014 budget request fully support the mission changes and transfer of Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve missions, including all budgetary costs, that will begin in FY 2013? Are there costs associated with the transfer of missions that are not budgeted for in the FY 2014 budget submission? If so, what are those costs, what will the impact of them be, and will it affect Air Force and unit readiness as well as individual airmen?

General MOELLER, General FIELD, General FEDDER, and General HADDAD. For the Air National Guard (ANG), the FY 2014 budget does not fully support mission changes and transfers of Air National Guard (ANG) missions that began in FY 2013. Funding for these changes had been requested in the FY 2013 Total Force Proposal (TFP), however, the FY 2013 Appropriations Act did not fund the FY 2013 National Defense Authorization Act's (NDAA) Air National Guard (ANG) equipment authorization. Due to timing issues with FY 2013 Appropriations Act not being passed and signed into law until shortly before delivery of the FY 2014 President's Budget (PB), the PB could not be changed prior to submission. The Air Force included two unfunded ANG requirements in the FY 2014 Unfunded Priority List (UPL) submitted to Congress. These include mission equipment for three of five ANG MQ-9 Remote Split Operations (RSO) Squadrons (\$28.8M) and mission equipment for three ANG Targeting Units (\$6.9M), for a total unfunded requirement of \$35.7M. The mission equipment for the remaining two ANG MQ-9 RSO Squadrons (\$19.8M) will be submitted for consideration in future budget requests. If the FY 2014 and FY 2015 authorization and appropriation legislation fully fund this required mission equipment there will be no impact to readiness or Airmen. However, if the FY 2014 and FY 2015 legislation do not include these unfunded requirements, MQ-9 RSO Squadrons in Iowa, Pennsylvania, Michigan, New York and Arkansas will face a delay of one year or greater in achieving initial operating capability (IOC), and Targeting Units in North Dakota, Iowa, and Arkansas will face a delay of two years or greater in achieving IOC.

Offensive Space Control (OSC) mission conversions in California (216 OSS) and Florida (114 ROPS) are currently not programmed in FY 2014 and would require Counter-Communication System (CCS) mission equipment to achieve IOC. However, due to significantly higher than anticipated procurement costs, the type of conversion and desired timelines are under review. Initial Implementation Plans capturing FY 2013 NDAA conversion details show both units achieving IOC in FY 2016Q1. These initial IOC dates are likely to be delayed. After further internal coordination, IOC timelines will be revised, however, any delays will be mitigated by the units maintaining their legacy missions until conversion details are finalized.

Regarding facility funding for FY 2013 NDAA force structure changes, the HAC-MILCON Subcommittee FY 2014 Mark removed funding for an ANG Network Warfare and Cyber ISR project in Martin State, MD. Operational requirements dictate NSA-accredited Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) and NSANet workstations. Absent MILCON funding to accommodate the SCIF and workstations, Martin State will not achieve IOC. Additional MILCON projects to address remain-

ing ANG mission changes due to the FY 2013 NDAA force structure changes await further requirements definition through Site Activation Task Force (SATAF) visits. These include the MQ-9 RSO and Targeting units mentioned above, a C-130 conversion in Connecticut, and bed-down of component Numbered Air Force units which may require MILCON to achieve final operating capability (FOC). Based on the results of these SATAFs, unit stand-up costs will be integrated into the Air Force programming and budgeting process.

Regarding the Air Force Reserve, we appreciate your continued support as the National Commission and Total Force leadership accomplish the difficult work to appropriately balance the Active Component and Reserve Component strategic and tactical airlift assets. Yes, there are costs associated with mission transfers that are not budgeted in the Air Force Reserve's budget submission. Our shortfall in tactical airlift mission capabilities includes 10 C-130Hs, 109 Air Reserve Technicians (ARTs), 370 traditional drilling reservists, \$32.1M in Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding, and \$8.1 in Reserve Personnel Appropriation (RPA) funding in FY 2014. Concerning the Air Force Reserve's strategic capabilities, the FY 2013 NDAA requires the Reserve to maintain C-5A aircraft in flyable condition at Lackland Air Force Base until the study requirements defined in the FY 2013 NDAA are complied with. This requirement has the potential to drive millions of dollars in annual O&M and RPA costs. Any marks to our FY 2014 end-strength will also impact additional manpower needed for growing and emerging mission sets such as Cyber, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance, and Space.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Given that many of the force structure changes—especially those in the Air National Guard and Reserve—that are slated for FY 2013 will take multiple years to carry out, does the FY 2014 budget request fully support the mission changes and transfer of Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve missions, including all budgetary costs, that will begin in FY 2013? Are there costs associated with the transfer of missions that are not budgeted for in the FY 2014 budget submission? If so, what are those costs, what will the impact of them be, and will it affect Air Force and unit readiness as well as individual airmen?

General CLARKE. No, the FY 2014 budget does not fully support mission changes and transfer of Air National Guard (ANG) missions. Two combined unfunded requirements were included in the FY 2014 Unfunded Priority List (UPL) submitted to Congress. These include mission equipment for three of five ANG MQ-9 Remote Split Operations (RSO) Squadrons (\$28.8M), and mission equipment for three ANG Targeting Units (\$6.9M) for a total unfunded requirement of \$35.7M. The mission equipment for the remaining two ANG MQ-9 RSO Squadrons (\$19.8M) will be submitted for consideration in future budgets. If required mission equipment is fully funded in FY 2014 and FY 2015 authorization and appropriation legislation, there will be no impact to readiness or Airmen. However, if the unfunded requirements are not included in FY 2014 and FY 2015 legislation, MQ-9 RSO Squadrons in Iowa, Pennsylvania, Michigan, New York and Arkansas will face a one year or greater delay in achieving initial operating capability (IOC), and Targeting Units in North Dakota, Iowa, and Arkansas will face a two year or greater delay in achieving IOC.

Offensive Space Control (OSC) mission conversions in California (216 OSS) and Florida (114 ROPS) are currently unfunded in FY14 and require Counter-Communication System (CCS) mission equipment to achieve IOC. Initial Implementation Plans capturing FY13 NDAA conversion details show both units achieving IOC in FY16Q1. These initial IOC dates assumed funding to procure required equipment, which is not the case. With current projected funding, the earliest IOC for the California OSC mission is FY17Q3, and Florida is FY18Q3. The cost of the CCS equipment per unit is \$44M (2 CCS per unit). Regarding unit readiness, this will result in a 3½-year conversion for California (1½ years later than planned) and a 4½-year conversion timeline for Florida (2½ years later than planned). This will likely impact unit retention and individual Airmen, although to what degree is unknown.

Regarding facility funding for FY13 NDAA force structure changes, the HAC-MILCON Subcommittee FY14 Mark removed funding for an ANG Network Warfare and Cyber ISR project in Martin State, MD. Operational requirements dictate NSA-accredited Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) and NSANet workstations. Absent MILCON funding to accommodate the SCIF and workstations, Martin State will not achieve IOC. Additional MILCON projects to address remaining ANG mission changes due to the FY13 NDAA force structure changes await future Air Force budget deliberation. These include the MQ-9 RSO and Targeting units mentioned above, a C-130 conversion in Connecticut, and bed-down of component Numbered Air Force units which may require MILCON to achieve final oper-

ating capability (FOC). Further requirements definition for these potential MILCON projects is ongoing as units host Site Activation Task Force visits this summer.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SHEA-PORTER

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. The Air Force is uniquely situated to support cyber-related missions. This capability is critical to ensuring national security interests. What is the AF doing to recruit and train airmen with cyber skills? How are you retaining these airmen after such training? How are you ensuring that these airmen will have opportunities to advance in their career?

General MOELLER. Air Force cyberspace training programs develop Total Force cyberspace professionals from numerous career fields. Core training includes Undergraduate Cyberspace Training and Cyberspace Defense Operations at Keesler AFB, Mississippi, and Intermediate Network Warfare Training at Hurlburt AFB, Florida. We have also developed an Intelligence Cyber Analyst course at Goodfellow AFB, Texas, to train our digital network analysts. This analyst training is complemented with a 6-month follow on Joint Cyber Analysis Course at Pensacola Naval Air Station, Florida. Cyber personnel attend further Joint cyberspace & related courses based upon positional requirements and work roles. In addition, the Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, conducts graduate-level cyber curricula and Professional Continuing Education as well. Growth and change is constant in the cyberspace domain, and these schools adjust as technology and tactics evolve.

At this time, retention for Airmen in most cyberspace career fields is healthy. Where we have challenges (e.g., Digital Network Analysts), we have increased the use of Assignment Availability Codes to ensure mission continuity and tour stability. We have also established Active Duty Service Commitments to ensure a return on training investments. Furthermore, the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program is one of the AF's most flexible and responsive force management tools. It provides monetary incentive to retain existing members in critical skills that have low retention and/or low manning, as well as entices Airmen from less critical skills to retrain into critical career fields receiving SRBs. Cyberspace Airmen have multiple opportunities to advance in their careers. They are deliberately force managed to acquire breadth in their career fields and depth in the cyberspace field. For example, certain specialties will serve consecutive operations tours in cyberspace positions at different locations to build depth as they progress through their career. This experience is coupled with continuing professional cyberspace education to build cyberspace experts.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. The Air Force is uniquely situated to support cyber-related missions. This capability is critical to ensuring national security interests. What is the AF doing to recruit and train airmen with cyber skills? How are you retaining these airmen after such training? How are you ensuring that these airmen will have opportunities to advance in their career?

General CLARKE. While the ANG cannot speak to the overall AF efforts, we can outline ANG efforts in recruiting Cyber skillsets. The Marketing and Advertising sections within Air National Guard Recruiting and Retention have made robust improvements to target highly specialized career fields, including Cyber-skill specialties for 2013. The ANG does have an incentive program to attract and retain high quality Airmen to include those with cyber skills. We will continue to attract non-prior service members and prior service members to value-added missions the ANG conducts. One of the great attributes found in the cyber mission area, for the ANG, is the common affiliation personnel have in their civilian careers with their military careers. The opportunity to serve in uniform performing similar skill sets that are performed in their civilian career is a recruiting and retention virtue in and of itself.