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HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED
PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
**THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. NORTHERN
COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN
COMMAND**

HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 26, 2014



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[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

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THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 26, 2014.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. "Buck" McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. "BUCK" MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COM- MITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Good morning.

The committee meets today to receive testimony on the posture of Northern Command and Southern Command. I am pleased to welcome General Charles Jacoby, commander of NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] and NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command], and General John Kelly, commander of SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command].

Gentlemen, thank you very much for your service to this nation and for being here with us today.

This is the committee's first posture hearing on the fiscal year 2015 defense authorization cycle.

However, with the delayed release of the President's budget request, we are at a disadvantage in assessing whether your priorities and requirements are addressed in the budget and the Quadrennial Defense Review. To this end, I have requested a list of unfunded requirements from each of your commands.

It is clear that continued cuts to defense are driving cuts in personnel, readiness, and modernization. These have real consequences in your areas of responsibility, and I hope you will discuss that here with us today.

As the Department continues to face tight budgets and reallocation of resources, we must be diligent in keeping our hemisphere safe. There is anticipation that homeland defense will continue to receive priority in the upcoming budget request and important missions such as missile defense will receive increased resources.

I am concerned, however, that certain NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM exercises and training priorities have been cut in past years due to budget shortfalls. I hope you will both discuss what you have been able to put back into place and what gaps still remain following the conclusion of the budget deal last December.

General Jacoby, looking to our own border, we are witnessing a surge of self-defense vigilante forces in Mexico, as citizens don't

trust state and military police forces to address internal security threats.

I look forward to your thoughts about whether legitimizing these forces is the correct path for Mexican security and what the implications are for U.S.-Mexico defense cooperation.

General Kelly, I had the great pleasure of visiting several countries in your area of responsibility last week. I was struck by Colombia's progress from an almost failed state to a nation of continued stability and economic growth.

In contrast, Venezuela's violent unrest and unstable economic situation make it a dangerous place.

It was kind of a paradox. I traveled to some of these same countries about 16 to 18 years ago, with Chairman Spence. And in that time, we went to Venezuela, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Panama.

This time, we couldn't go to Argentina or Venezuela, but we were able to go to Colombia because of their huge turnaround. That was a real positive.

And then the other ones have caused some unrest and some problems.

But it was good to see that Brazil and Chile keep moving a little bit better up the ladder.

I hope that you can discuss with us your lessons that your command has learned about combating illicit networking that poses a threat to our national security interests, while also encouraging Latin American countries to build the capacities to tackle their own internal threats.

Gentlemen, I look forward to your testimonies today, and I thank you again for being here with us.

Mr. Smith.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 47.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And welcome. General Jacoby, it is good to see you again. Fond memories of your time commanding out at Fort Lewis.

And, General Kelly, fond memories of traveling with you when you were with the Marine Corps' Liaison's Office, and seeing you in Iraq after that.

So it is good to see both of you. Really appreciate your leadership throughout your careers and in your current position.

I think the chairman identified, you know, the top issue for all of us in dealing with the budget. And, you know, it is sort of like from bad to worse.

I mean, it is bad enough dealing with the budget environment we have now. You know, we did sort of the soft opening for the defense budget a couple days ago, and, you know, we are alarmed at some of the cuts that were contained in it, which is understandable.

But that is for the next 2 years, where we have relative stability, at least by congressional standards. We passed a budget. We have an idea of what the appropriations levels are going to be.

And remind the committee that there are still on the books now, 8 years of sequestration after that. And if you are alarmed about what the numbers looked like that we saw 2 days ago, and then we really need to step up and do something about sequestration, sooner rather than later, to, number one, take away the uncertainty that that gives to our, you know, planning apparatus over at DOD [Department of Defense], but, number two, to stop those bad things from happening. And you know, the longer we wait, the worse it is.

So I am curious, to the extent you know how those budgets will affect your two commands.

On NORTHCOM, you know, your first and chief mission is to protect the homeland. We met yesterday, talked a little bit about that. Missile defense is a key part of that, so I am curious on your update on the status of that, on our national missile defense system.

Also very interested in our ongoing relationship with Mexico. As the chairman mentioned, it continues to be a troublesome area. But it is evolving and changing. And I know we have worked fairly closely with our Mexican partners in a way that is helpful. Because, obviously, that is a threat to our homeland as well, being right across the border.

Leading into that, SOUTHCOM leads into Mexico. And obviously one of the foremost challenges in SOUTHCOM is dealing with the drug trade and all the different points of entry that it comes from.

So curious to get an update on how that is going and in particular the interagency piece, because, obviously, I think as much as any of our combatant commanders, General Kelly, you work with other agencies to combat the drug problems that come out of Latin America. So curious about that.

And also, of course, curious to get an update on Guantanamo, on the cost issues, the health issues for the prisoners down there, how it is going and what you see the future of our presence in Guantanamo and the inmates who are there.

Obviously, there are a ton of other issues, but we will get to them in the questions and answering.

It is great to see both of you. Appreciate your leadership. Look forward to your testimony.

I yield back. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 49.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General Jacoby.

STATEMENT OF GEN CHARLES H. JACOBY, JR., USA, COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

General JACOBY. Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

It is a pleasure to be here once again with my friend and fellow combatant commander, General John Kelly of the U.S. Southern Command.

On behalf of the men and women of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, I appreciate this committee's continuing support of our unique and important missions.

As the world grows increasingly volatile and complex, threats to our national security are becoming more diffuse and less attributable, while a crisis originating elsewhere in the world can rapidly manifest themselves here at home.

This evolution combined with fiscal constraints demands continuous innovation and transformation within the Armed Forces, the national security architecture, and in our two commands.

And while we must deal realistically with limited budgets, the homeland must be appropriately resourced. Security of our citizens cannot be compromised.

We must continue to enhance international partnerships, provide defense support to civil authorities, and ensure the defense of the Nation and North America.

USNORTHCOM and NORAD, as the operational commands in North America, are critical components of a layered defense of the homeland, deterring and responding to threats before they reach our shores, threats ranging from aircraft, ballistic missiles, terrorism, transnational criminal organizations, advance submarine technologies, and cyber-attacks on our critical infrastructure and all the time being prepared to respond in support of our citizens in times of their greatest need.

In the performance of our aerospace missions, including Operation Noble Eagle, NORAD, a unique and proven binational command of Canada and the United States, defends North American airspace and safeguards national key terrain by employing a variety of capabilities.

Now, over the last year, NORAD's ability to execute its primary missions have been subject to increased risk, given the degradation of U.S. combat Air Force readiness.

Now, with vigilance and the support of the Air Force, we have been able to sustain our effective day-to-day posture but we remain concerned about mid- and long-term readiness challenges.

With regards to missile defense, tangible evidence of North Korean and Iranian ambitions confirms that the limited ballistic missile threat to the homeland has matured from a theoretical to a practical consideration.

Moreover, we are concerned about the potential for these lethal technologies to proliferate to other actors. We are also working with the Missile Defense Agency to invest in tailored solution to address the challenges that advancing missile technologies impose on our current ballistic missile defense system architecture.

With the decreasing seasonal ice, the Arctic is evolving into a true strategic approach to the homeland. As such, we work with our premier partner, Canada, and other stakeholders to develop our communications, domain awareness, infrastructure, and presence in order to protect economic interest, maritime safety, and our freedom of action.

Defending the homeland in depth requires partnerships with our neighbors, Canada, Mexico, and the Bahamas. Our futures are in-

extricably bound together and this needs to be a good thing in the security context.

The stronger and safer they are, the stronger our partnerships, the safer we all are collectively. And this creates our common competitive security advantage for North America.

For civil support, USNORTHCOM stands ready to respond to national security events and provides support as a DOD core task to lead Federal agencies for manmade or natural disasters and our challenge remains to not be late to need.

Men and women of the USNORTHCOM and NORAD proudly remain vigilant and ready as we stand watch over North America and adapt to the uncertainty of the global security environment and fiscal realities.

I am honored to serve as their commander and thank this committee for your support of our important missions. I look forward to your questions.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Jacoby can be found in the Appendix on page 51.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. General Kelly.

**STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN F. KELLY, USMC, COMMANDER,
U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND**

General KELLY. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Smith, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear here today and speak to you—

The CHAIRMAN. General, can you get that mic right up to you?

General KELLY. Thanks for the opportunity to speak with you today and talk about the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines of SOUTHCOM but also included in that is a tremendous civilian work force that I have there, and that includes contractors.

I am pleased to be here, of course, with Chuck Jacoby again. I want to assure you, as Chuck just did, that there are no seams between NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM. We talk all the time, we coordinate all the time, we have exchanged liaison officers. There is no seam. And I know that tends to be a concern sometimes here on the Hill.

I consider myself very, very fortunate, Mr. Chairman, to work in this part of the world. Latin America and the Caribbean are some of our staunchest allies and willing partners across a broad range of issues.

Most of the countries in Latin America want to work with us, they want to be our partners, they want our friendship, they want our support, they want to work with us. They want to engage to address a broad range of shared concerns.

For more than 50 years the U.S. Southern Command has done exactly that, and that is engage with our partners across the region. We have helped build strong capable military and security forces that respect human rights and contribute to regional security.

We have worked with the interagency and international community to secure the southern approaches of the United States. We have accomplished a lot even with minimal and limited resources.

But severe budget cuts are now reversing this project, I believe, and forcing us to accept significant risk.

Last year we had to cancel more than 200 engagement activities and numerous multilateral exercises in Latin America. Because of asset shortfalls we are unable to get after 74 percent of suspected maritime drug trafficking contacts.

And because of service cuts, we won't be able to immediately respond to humanitarian crises or disasters in the region without significant time lost in augmentation required.

Ultimately, the cumulative effect impact of our reduced engagement won't be measured in the number of canceled activities and reduced deployments, it will be measured in terms of U.S. influence, leadership, relationships in a part of the world where our engagement has made a real and lasting difference over the decades.

And in the maritime domain, drug traffickers, criminal networks, and other actors unburdened by budget cuts or any canceled activities or any employee furloughs will have the opportunity to exploit the partnership vacuum left by reduced U.S. military engagement.

Mr. Chairman, members, I look forward to discussing these and many other issues with you this morning. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Kelly can be found in the Appendix on page 76.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

On Monday, Secretary Hagel and Chairman Dempsey announced the updated defense strategy that builds on the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] that we will be receiving and the new budget.

I recognize that you are not at liberty yet to discuss the details on that. But it is my expectation that combatant commanders should be active participants in the QDR and the budget process.

With that in mind, what I would like is if you could relate to us how you think the new strategy will affect your particular commands?

General JACOBY. Thank you Chairman. You saw in the Secretary's soft rollout, he went through some of his critical priorities and I was happy to see, as I am sure everybody was, that homeland defenses is articulated as the top priority.

I think, specifically during the last 4 or 5 months working together as a team with the Secretary, the chairman and their staffs, the homeland has been recognized and has received a high priority in the evolution of our strategic thinking now.

And so, that phrase, "The homeland is defended" is critical and so, you know, I think we should all be heartened by that.

I have felt that priority during this very difficult budget years where the services have turned themselves inside out to provide ready forces for NORAD and for NORTHCOM, but I am mindful that that comes at the expense of readiness of other formations well into the depth of the service capacities and capabilities.

So to put it more succinctly, Air Combat Command that provides the fighter planes for my Noble Eagle has done its best to give me top readiness for those capabilities, but it has come at the expense of increased unreadiness across over 50 percent of our combat aircraft fleets.

So the homeland has received priority. But this is a zero-sum game in readiness capabilities.

The Army has done the same thing. They have paid particular attention to our chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response capability. But again, that has come at the expense of other formations that—they are not on the patch chart to finish up the work in Afghanistan, their readiness has plummeted.

So, this has been a tough year for the services. They have tried very hard to meet this combatant commander's requirements. But I know it is a tremendous challenge for them.

We appreciate the bipartisan budget agreement in terms of providing tactical relief, particularly in the readiness categories. But that is still inadequate to remove the shadow of sequestration which starts back up again and proceeds for another 8 years if something is not done. And that will make it near impossible to make the quality strategic decisions that will be required for the future.

General KELLY. Sir, of the six combatant commanders, SOUTHCOM for at least a couple of decades has really been the economy of force combatant command, that is to say it has received the least in terms of budget in available assets and things like that.

And frankly, that is okay in the sense that what goes a long way in South America, Latin America, the Caribbean, is a little bit. The problem with that, however, is if you only get a little bit, and that is a lot in terms of what I do, but if you only get a little bit and you lose even a little bit of that, it really does severely impact you, and I think if all of the combatant commanders, all of us, our responsibility is to protect the homeland—ultimately to protect the homeland, I think the last place you want to do that is where Chuck Jacoby lives, on the borders.

Chuck oftentimes talks of winning the away game and we do that very, very well. The U.S. military, the interagency I think has won the away game consistently in the last 10 or 12 years.

But in my part of the world, because it is the economy of force effort, and as we pivot to other parts of the world that are deemed more important to the defense of the United States, as I lose a little, I really do lose a lot.

Hopefully that answers your question, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. General Kelly, when you talk about losing a little bit of a little bit, one of the big concerns I have is the amount of drugs that you have been able to interdict with a little bit. And then when you take away some of that capacity, what do you see ahead of us if—I know the percentage of drugs that you have been able to interdict versus what law enforcement that spends a whole lot more money within our borders is able to interdict, that is a pitance compared to how much you have been able to stop before it gets to our shores or across our borders.

If you lose the ability to interdict there, don't we see a flood of drugs coming into this nation?

General KELLY. You know, the short answer to that, yes sir, we do, we will. The drug effort in—the vast majority of all drugs that are imported into the United States come up through Latin America and—or are produced in Latin American and then flow into Mexico and across the border somewhere along the line.

The key is, we have tremendous intelligence in terms of the production and the flow of drugs. I will use cocaine, as an example, of cocaine out of Colombia. And they do—the Colombians, heroic amounts of work in taking cocaine off of the market or eradicating the growth of cocoa, arresting criminals. Tremendous work. I can't give them enough credit.

Panama, very similar. But we have very, very good clarity on the movement when it leaves continental Latin America and as it flows up the isthmus, which is the traffic pattern of choice.

But if you don't have airborne ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] to pick it up as it is moving across the ocean, and if you then don't have legal enforcement—police enforcement, law enforcement to do the end game thing, you simply don't get it.

So the example I would give you, in 2011 we got 172 metric tons of cocaine, tons of cocaine, before it ever reached shore in Honduras or in Latin America. Last year, 2012, because of a lack of assets, 152 tons. That is 20 tons that got by us—20 more tons. This year they just finished 132 tons. It is all about ships, ISR—and not many ships.

Typically, today we have on station four ships. One of which is a British oiler. A key point that can fly a helicopter. That British oiler, in 6 months, will get 20 tons or 30 tons of cocaine that is flowing into the United States. But, sir it is almost a scientific equation: Less ships, less cocaine off the market.

By the way, when I get it, I get it—and it is an interagency process, DEA [Drug Enforcement Administration], DOJ [Department of Justice], I mean, it is just not DOD doing this. In fact, we are to a large degree in support of the effort. But, at the end of the day, we get all of this tonnage, we spend 1.5 percent of the counter-narcotics budget we get—again this year or last year we got 132 metric tons, zero violence, we get them 2 to 5 tons at a time.

Once it is ashore and on its way up through Mexico, it is virtually in the United States, and no matter how hard our very, very heroic border patrol and law enforcement people in the United States work, best case, they will get 30 tons in the course of a year with unbelievable violence—as you well know—done against our country, our citizens.

And, at the end of the day—the end of the year, year after year, 40,000 Americans die from these drugs, every year. It costs America \$26 billion a year to go after these drugs from a law enforcement point of view. It costs America \$200 billion in primarily healthcare costs—for a fraction of that, in fact, for 1.6 percent of that, I can get the vast majority of drugs—cocaine, to use the example, flowing up from Latin America.

General JACOBY. Mr. Chairman, if John doesn't get it—if he doesn't catch it in the transit zone, and we know that the transit zone is not the only place to work, it is just a place to work—but he gets it in bulk. If it hits the shore in Mexico or into the upper portions of Central America and then crosses into Mexico it is broken into very small loads and it is almost impossible to do effective interdiction.

Nonetheless, our partners on the border have intercepted—interdicted 39 percent more drugs over the last 3 years. So they are doing their job, it is just an incredibly difficult job. And that is why

so much of our effort now together is thinking about, how do we put pressure on the networks, how do we put pressure on the organization and the men and women that are trafficking these materials, as well as the interdictive effect.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, both, for the efforts you are making, and I want to make sure the committee as we go through the process really focuses in on this and makes sure that all we can do to make sure that the resources are there to cut this as close to the source and as far from our borders as we can.

So just one other thing that I want to mention. I know there has been a lot of focus since the Secretary and General Dempsey did this rollout and there has been a lot of focus on the Army end strength of 440,000 and people have been very, very concerned about that, because the feeling that it is the smallest Army since just before World War II.

I want to just make one thing very clear, that 440,000 is a number if sequestration goes away. And I don't know any way that that is going to happen. But, what we are really looking it is 420,000 when sequestration comes back in at the end of the budget agreement that was just worked out.

So thank you very much.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Jacoby, can you tell us a little more about what is going on with the Mexican drug war. We just had a high-profile capture of Joaquin Guzman as a positive success. I think you mentioned there has been a significant increase in vigilante groups, you know, trying to combat the drug trade, you know, I guess a relatively new government in Mexico.

What is the update on how that is going in your view? And then, specifically the cooperation between your folks and the Mexican authorities?

General JACOBY. Thank you, sir.

I think the Chapo capture really illustrates the commitment this administration—this Mexican administration to continuing the fight against the cartels themselves. And so this is very important. We talked about—just now talked about the difficulties of doing this by interdiction alone. We have got to find ways to put pressure on these networks. As the President rightly said in July of 2011, you know, this is a national security threat to us, and it is exceeding the capacity of all of our partner law enforcement agencies. And that is why you see so many militaries in the region—to include the Mexican militaries—committed to this fight.

To that end, the Peña Nieto administration has been able to take Chapo off the street, the Sinaloa Gulf Cartel leader or the Gulf Cartel leader and the Zeta Cartel leader. So that is—the top three organizations have lost their top leadership over the last year.

That is significant, and it is necessary. It is not sufficient though. We have to continue to pressure the rest of the networks, because they have a resilience and a depth to those organizations that allow the next-leader-up capacity within them.

But I am heartened and applaud their efforts and the contributions that the Mexican military has made in this important fight.

Our relationship with the Mexican military has continued to improve. They have asked for—we have worked with them and provided training, all kinds of partnering, things that we do together that really are as broad and rich as any of our strategic security partners.

So we have trained with over 5,000 Mexican soldiers and marines in the last year, and over the last 3 years it has been almost a 500 percent increase in the number of things that we do together that they have asked for us to do with them.

And it is a rich exchange and we are benefiting from it as much as they are. So there is a lot of work to be done. The threat is adaptable. It is empowered by its wealth and the violence that they are willing to commit on their own people. And so this is a long tough fight, and in the end it is a law enforcement solution at the very end of this effort.

And so we are going to continue partnering with them. These are common security concerns. But, I think the Chapo capture just highlights the continued commitment—that is the important part—the continued commitment to a very, very tough fight and a very expensive fight.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

And, General Kelly, on Guantanamo. Do you have an estimate right now what the per prisoner cost is maintaining the Guantanamo prison facility?

General KELLY. Yes sir, based on what I spend down there—about \$130 million a year, that comes out to—we got 155 detainees now. That is probably \$750,000 a year. There is another figure out there that is bigger than what I spend that takes in every single kind of penny that is spent at Guantanamo, but that is more of a—I won't speak to that figure. It is larger, it is about \$400 million. But, in terms of what I spend down there to detain 155 prisoners right now and take care of them medically and all of that, it is about \$750,000 a piece.

Mr. SMITH. And as that population ages, can you talk a little more about the medical challenges?

Now, as I understand it, you provide the best care you can within, you know, what is available in Guantanamo, which is quite a bit, but there is still limitation given where it is at, but to bring in outside specialists—you can't take any of the prisoners off of the base, so you would have to bring them in.

So, as the population is aging, how are the costs being affected? And how do you handle some of those medical challenges in dealing with the inmates' medical needs?

General KELLY. Sir, any medical care that is not available on the island—we have done this now since we have had detention operations down there—we bring in medical folks—military medical folks, typically from Norfolk or Charleston, fly them down there, and we do it routinely.

If, as time goes by, these men start having some of the—you know, the typical things associated with getting older and they are more chronic, we would do the same thing, but it does take a while to get them down there. So as time goes on I am not so sure the medical care will increase, but the medical care beyond what is on the island would not be available to them.

Mr. SMITH. Yes, more problematic.
Okay, thank you, that is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you both for being here.

I would like to get y'all's views on two issues during the limited time I have.

First is, Secretary Hagel and Chairman McKeon have both announced efforts to reduce bureaucracy and overhead both at the Pentagon and at combatant commands. And so I would be interested in y'all's view about what should guide us as we look at having more efficiency, more agility, lower costs at all of the combatant commands, from your perspective?

General JACOBY. Thanks, Congressman.

That was really the opening round of ways to make savings in order to be in compliance with the law. And so first thing out of the chute, it was a stretch goal and we were directed to reduce—over 5 years—20 percent in our combatant commands. And so we understood that, that was our share of the load and we have proceeded on that path. We have all submitted plans on how we are going to do that, and we are committed to making those reductions and those efficiencies.

Now, I want to say, sir, that, you know, it was a very difficult year for us, it was a difficult year especially for our civilians who we furloughed and then who bore the brunt of the government shutdown. And, you know, we have worked tirelessly for decades to build an effective team with our civilians. And so they had a tough year.

And so this first year or so we are committed to not removing civilians from the workforce any more than attrition and not filling positions that have remained empty. And that is our commitment to them and we are going to try to keep that commitment.

We have done some minor reorganizations in the command. To a large extent, we have passed missions and requirements to components. But I will tell you that our components also took drastic cuts.

So there is quite a bit of work being done to gain efficiencies, to do it logically, to do it in a manner that allows us to continue accomplishing our missions. Because for a combatant commander, our guiding light is what is our mission, what are we expected to accomplish, and how do we continue to accomplish those missions in the best way possible.

One of the things I do is I write plans. I write major plans that are directed by the President and by the Secretary of Defense and that takes staff work. And that takes manpower. And so, you know, this is—you don't do, you know, more with less. You do less. And you do it slower and you don't get it done on time.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, sir.

General Kelly, do you have something to add? And I want to get to the other issues.

General KELLY. I just want to echo Chuck's comments about the workforce and what, you know, the knothole we pulled them through last year. No one deserves to go through that and I pray

that we don't ever do that again. They are hardworking people. I don't have a lot of extra people working at SOUTHCOM. They come early. They stay late. They do a lot of great work.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. Thank you.

General Kelly, let me start with you on the second issue. There was a change in the appropriations bill on human rights vetting for the current year, which basically expands it from just those retrained to those who retrain, equip, or provide other assistance. There is concern that there is not enough people at the State Department to vet these people; that it is all going to get balled up. The default position is going to be to deny.

I would be interested in your thoughts, if your folks have had a chance to look at the effect of this change on your ability to help train, equip, assist our partners in your region.

General KELLY. Let me start, Congressman, by saying this, that the human rights record, and I meet with human rights groups here in Washington frequently and every time I go into a Latin American country, in almost every case I will meet with human rights groups. Some of them are very hostile; some of them less hostile, if you will. So I have got an open door to human rights.

Generally speaking, what they tell me is today the people we work with are generally following the human rights rule. And I would tell you, a lot of people talk about human rights in the world. The U.S. military does human rights. We will not work with someone who violates human rights in Latin America. And I think that goes around the world. So that is the first point.

The second point is we are already very, very restricted in who we work with. I look to human rights all of the time, but I will tell you the reason why the human rights record is getting better and better and better in Latin American countries, and in some cases very, very good, is because of the effect the U.S. military has had in working with them over the last few decades.

To your point about the new legislation, we don't know what it means yet. We are literally standing by to let the lawyers then tell us what it means. So, I have got to think it was written to be more restrictive, so I am assuming it will be more restrictive for us, but we are waiting for the general counsel in the Department of Defense, I am sure are working with the Congress, to figure out what exactly the words mean and what we can do in the future.

General JACOBY. Mr. Chairman—I am sorry, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Gallego.

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There is a time in the life of every problem where it is already big enough to see, but it is still small enough to solve. And it seems to me that what I understood you all to say is that an investment early-on, closer to the source in South America, before any of the drugs or before they hit Mexico in particular, is the best investment of our money.

Is there some data that you all can share with the committee that would back that up?

General JACOBY. Thank you, sir.

Particularly in the distribution part of the enterprise, I think that is exactly the case. But there is more than the distribution

side of the drug problem. There is the production side, but there is also the finance side and the leadership side and the consumption side. And so I think that our point, one of our larger points to make on this is that this is a series of threat networks that are dealing in illicit activity. And the primary money winner for them right now is drugs. But when you put pressure on the drug piece, they go into kidnapping and extortion and the transit of illegals.

And so these are powerful and rich organizations, which I think we need to make a concerted effort across those networks. But on the distribution side, it is very much better to work the distribution portion of the criminal enterprise early in the chain. But I think it is a larger issue than that, sir.

Mr. GALLEGO. General Kelly.

General KELLY. Yes, Congressman. This network that brings things to the United States, it is incredibly efficient. It is more efficient than FedEx [Federal Express] could ever hope to be. And anything can travel on it. Most of what travels on it is drugs—heroin, methamphetamines, cocaine. But people travel on it, all sorts of guns travel on it, money travels on it. It is incredibly effective. It is just now drugs are the big money-maker for them.

As I mentioned a little earlier, I spend 1.5 percent of the counternarcotic budget—1.5 percent. I get the vast majority of cocaine with no violence in large amounts. And we capture these traffickers, bring them to the U.S. court system, and they cooperate to a man. And we gain a great deal of intelligence from them.

I can see, when I say “I,” SOUTHCOM and Joint Interagency Task Force South in Key West, we can see it with amazing clarity, this drug movement. But 74 percent of it, I watch go by. I can’t touch it. And when I say I watch it go by, in the maritime domain to Honduras primarily, because I don’t have the assets to stop it.

Mr. GALLEGO. The district that I represent in Texas is a little over two-thirds, I think, of the Texas border with Mexico. So this is a huge issue for me at home. And I wonder, are you—can you tell me, if you were to compare, for example, how many tons of drugs were caught by law enforcement in the U.S. side versus how much was caught in Mexico versus how much was caught before, how would those numbers compare? You know, drugs caught before they land in Mexico; drugs caught in Mexico; and drugs caught in the U.S., how would those numbers compare?

General KELLY. I got 132 tons last year. Let me start at the beginning.

The Colombians, again, just can’t give them enough credit; 200 tons and eradicated 40,000 acres of coca before it was ever harvested. I got 132 tons in the transit zone before it got to Honduras. Almost nothing is taken off the flow between Honduras and the Mexican border. You know—a handful of tons.

Last year, and it is up big-time, but our border officials on both sides of the border, we think that about—we got about, all around the country, we got about 30 tons. So—

Mr. GALLEGO. Their 30 tons all around the country, in comparison to your 132 tons.

General KELLY. 132 tons. And again, the cost is I get it for 1.6 percent of the budget; zero violence. And you have to keep thinking about the violence, because once it gets ashore, it is—you can use

Honduras as an example—it is the most dangerous country on the planet. Guatemala is almost as dangerous; 70,000 Mexican deaths in the last 7 years I think in their drug fight. And then when it gets into the United States, just the local violence of distribution, dealing this stuff, it is just incredibly violent.

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you so much. I want to thank each of you for what you do.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here, for your testimony.

I want to pick up a little bit where I think Mr. Smith was. I had to step out for a few minutes to talk to some disabled American veterans, which we also need to keep in mind, as well as those still serving.

I think probably both of you know, it has been in my mind, and I have spoken in hearings before and tried to move some legislation looking at ways that we might be able to combine or eliminate some of the COCOMs [combatant commands], frankly.

So let me, with that sort of thinking in mind, let me address both of you for just a minute. I look here at NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM particularly. NORTHCOM has responsibility for support for domestic disaster relief efforts; support for counterdrug and counterterrorism efforts; support for domestic WMD [weapons of mass destruction] incident response, and consequence management support, too; and DOD liaison with law enforcement agencies, and support for events of national significance.

All important, no doubt. None of those are what we would call traditional warfighting.

SOUTHCOM, General, with all respect, there is sort of no potentially state-on-state conflict down there, although we obviously watch Venezuela pretty closely. One never knows. But you have got countering transnational organized crime, building partner capacity, planning for contingencies—always a good thing I guess—including responding to a natural disaster, mass migration event, attack on the Panama Canal, or evacuating American citizens.

So, as General Jacoby says, he does a lot of planning. And I assume, General Kelly, that you do as well, and that you are able to keep those plans secret. But I am wondering, it does seem to me that in these times when we are talking about, as advertised, shrinking the Army back to pre-World War II levels. And General Kelly, I know you have got your purple suit on, but if I can sort of see the green suit through there, you know what is happening to the Marine Corps and how it is shrinking in size. That we ought to be giving serious consideration to combining or consolidating some of these commands. We have two four-stars sitting here. You undoubtedly have some two- or three-stars in the organization. You have got a lot of SES's [Senior Executive Service] and all of those things that it sure seems to me would make sense to seriously consider combining some COCOMs.

And so I know neither one of you wants to rat out your COCOM here, but why couldn't we, if not specifically for you, generically do some combining of these major commands? And I don't care—we can start with either one of you.

General JACOBY. Thank you, sir.

I think we are in an environment where we have to take all of these potential efficiencies seriously. This particular idea has been examined at least three times in major ways by the GAO [Government Accountability Office] and others, and by the Department of Defense since the early 2000s. It was reexamined again.

But I think that you have to look beyond just the question of how can I gain efficiencies. It really has to do with your strategy, and how do you execute your strategy. And so it is part of the U.S. strategy to continue to engage the world and to defend our interests and deter and address instability around the world with our global—our geographic combatant commanders.

In the homeland, we have looked at this closely. My most important relationships on a day-to-day basis are 50 governors and then throw in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

And so that is a wide audience and number of folks that we are working with across all the defense support, the civil authority tasks that we do.

But I also have a very, very intensive homeland defense task which I think is growing because of the growing threats and vulnerability to our countries. And so my responsibilities range all the way from nuclear command and control to ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] missile defense requirements, cruise missile requirements and all those are going up, they are not going down.

And then there is something different and important about the partnerships that we have on the approaches to the homeland. The Arctic is going to be more of an approach to the homeland, it is going to be a strategic approach to the homeland and is going to require the same Defense Department interest and engagement and activity that any of the approaches to the homeland have and any of the bodies of water in which we want to have a safe, competitive advantage.

Canada and Mexico are not just partners, they are neighbors and they are integral to the defense of our homeland, and I think that that makes it a special case and not just another couple of countries for us to engage with.

So I think that it is important to examine these things. It was examined. We are not making a major strategic shift. And so I think that that is off the table for now.

But if sequestration comes, if it continues, we are going to have to go back to the well across all of the dimensions of the strategy.

Thank you sir.

Mr. KLINE. All right. I see my time has expired. Mr. Chairman, sequestration is here so it is important that you added the—if it continues and General Kelly you don't get a chance to defend SOUTHCOM, but I assume that you would tell us that it couldn't be consolidated either.

If that is not right, start shaking your head and I will find a way to get back to you.

Okay.

General KELLY. I should—I think there should be a SOUTHCOM, even if there was only the combatant commander.

[Laughter.]

Mr. KLINE. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Enyart.

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Kelly, I am sure you are familiar with the great successes of the National Guard State Partnership Program in Central Europe and incorporating the former Warsaw Pact nations. Many—most of them now into NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and of the great contributions those nations have made in our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

And I know that Colombia now has a State Partnership Program and I am wondering what future nations may adopt a State Partnership Program? And how you see the future of that impacting your operations in SOUTHCOM?

General KELLY. State Partnership Programs, I think I have 24 of them in the region. They are important to me, that is exactly the kind of—particularly I think for my part of the world, a little bit goes a long, long way.

So to have some great National Guard folks come down and work for a short period of time with one of the—you know, one of the host countries in some way. And these are small—as you know, these are small contact points. But it really does go a long way to tie the United States in general to these countries.

So they are pretty important to me in—right now that I don't think we have anyone that is expanding. In fact, unfortunately, I think it is Kentucky and Ecuador—the Ecuadorians are kind of—somewhat cool to our presence right now, so they are not having the opportunity to do very much.

But certainly I would be open to any country in the region wanting to have a relationship with one of our National Guard States.

Mr. ENYART. Generally, I know we have seen a lot of headlines recently about the instability in Venezuela. And I am wondering how you view that as impacting the wider relationships in South America?

General KELLY. I mean, I think, you know, as we watch what is happening in Venezuela, the economy is, to say the least, in trouble and there is obviously discontent there.

But they are not having an awful lot of political impact, I don't believe, with the countries that surround them. Generally speaking, there are a few countries, the ALBA [Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas] countries that are somewhat associated with them. One of the concerns I do have though is that the Venezuelans traditionally have given a great deal of petroleum, oil to a number of countries, Cuba as a example, Nicaragua, some other countries, at almost give-away—at literally give-away prices.

If they can't continue that and they are already talking about perhaps not being able to continue it, these countries could not get by with buying fuel, you know, in kind of the global rates. So we would see some issues there. And again, a lot of these countries, Cuba's economy is kind of close to the edge.

If they were to have to start spending a significantly large amount of money for fossil fuels, that would have an impact on their economy.

And when countries in Latin America—I think almost in countries anywhere, when the economies start to go south, the migrants start to move north, if you will. And that would be my concern.

Other countries like Haiti that get virtually all of their fuel from Venezuela, an economy that is teetering on the edge, they just couldn't afford it. And there are a number of other countries like that that depend on the petroleum products that they get from Venezuela at, as I say, almost give-away prices.

So I am concerned about that because the migration piece is part of the one of the things I have to think about.

Mr. ENYART. General Jacoby, I don't want to give you a free ride. So I will drop down and I have some more for General Kelly.

But General, as the Army draws down from the winding down of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, do you believe that it is necessary for the security of NORTHCOM and for the homeland that the Army have a rapidly expandable capability, that is that it could grow back rapidly in the event that we need to?

General JACOBY. Thanks, Congressman.

I think that historically, expandable Army has been part of how we have approached defense. I think the requirements today for readiness and for deployability are higher than they ever have been historically.

So I think there is a different construct. But I think that having the ability to expand the force in times of crisis has been a historical mechanism that we have always sought to have.

Mr. ENYART. I am sure, General, that the 50 governors that you referenced before as well as the governors of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands would support you in that—support you in maintaining a strong and ready National Guard.

General JACOBY. Yes, sir. Thank you.

Mr. ENYART. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to point out that we have a former chairman in the room, Chairman Hunter, want to really make it welcoming for former chairmen around here.

[Laughter.]

[Applause.]

Dr. Heck.

Dr. HECK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To General Jacoby, first, thanks for what you are doing at NORTHCOM and keeping the homeland safe. I had the great honor of being able to serve at NORTHCOM, first under General Eberhart and then under Admiral Keating, way back before we actually hit FOC [full operational capability].

My question has to do with the dual status commander program. Can you give me an update on how well that is working, progress, how it is functioning, any obstacles and any cases where it has been utilized and whether it was a success or not?

General JACOBY. Doctor, thanks, thanks for that question.

You know, the dual status commander was a very, very positive step forward that the Council of Governors and the Department worked together on and the Congress enabled for us.

And we have used it over 16 times since I have been in command and 4 times over the last year to great effect.

And what I find so exciting about it actually is how much flexibility and adaptability it gives me and it gives the governors and the adjutants general in providing support and are—a vast array of civil support tasks from national specialist security events like

the Super Bowl to an emergent disaster like Colorado flooding and wildfires.

And we have been successful using dual status commanders, who have actually this year incorporated title 10 forces right next to guardsman and State Active Duty in title 32 to great success.

So it is a super program. Right now, this year we trained over 200—we have trained over 200 now, dual status commanders and every State has multiple dual status commanders and we have begun training some title 10 senior leaders so that we can provide title 10 deputies or title 10 dual status commanders tremendous flexibility.

Another thing that we have done is we have instituted training update programs for as things evolve and change. So it is a very positive program and I think it has built great trust and confidence amongst the States and NORTHCOM.

Dr. HECK. During the time it has been used, have there been both title 10 and title 32 commanders, or has it all been title 32 functioning in dual status?

General JACOBY. It has all been title 32, except for on a couple of occasions we have had a title 10. And historically it has been a title 10 for the Boy Scout Jamboree.

But the vast majority, as is the direction of the statute, is the customary and usual way that we command it is with a National Guards commander.

Dr. HECK. Thank you. And General Kelly, likewise, for everything that you are doing in trying to keep illicit drugs from hitting our shores.

You know there has been a lot of discussion about whether or not we should start changing our focus from drugs that are being produced in other countries, to more of the prescription drug abuse problem that we see here in the United States.

More people are dying from prescription drugs than they are from cocaine and heroin, combined.

If that argument takes hold, how do you see—I mean, and you are doing this at a very small cost to the overall drug control budget. If you start seeing a shifting of focus to perhaps more prescription drug abuse problems, how do you see that impacting your ability to do the work that you are doing?

General KELLY. You are spot-on with the abuse of prescription drugs. But that is actually reversing now because of the various regulations and what-not that the government has put in place to control the amount of drugs that are prescribed.

They have done some things to the drugs to make sure that they are not injectable, things like that. So we actually see the use of prescription drugs going, for a lot of reasons as I say. And it is very, very expensive and so what we see replacing prescription drugs is heroin.

Infinitely cheaper. A single OxyContin pill in an upscale neighborhood in the United States could cost \$80 to \$100. In an inner city neighborhood, the same pill could cost maybe \$60. A bag of cocaine—a bag of heroin, \$7 or \$8.

So we are seeing more and more heroin—in fact there is a, I think, been a 60 percent increase in the use of heroin in the country in just the last couple of years. So the good news is prescription

drugs are going down in terms of abuse. The very, very bad news is heroin is going up and unlike in the past, upscale neighborhoods—and if you just read recently the kind of deaths we have seen, it is really tragic to me that it has to be some high public face individual, usually, you know, an actor or something to die—I mean, it is tens of thousands of young kids from the cities that have been dying from heroin and drugs in general. And no one seems to have cared very much.

So I guess it is good that we have had a couple high publicity deaths so that now people are starting to take notice. But all of that heroin comes out of Latin America, up through Mexico. The poppies are grown in Latin America. We don't get heroin from overseas anymore; it is all done.

These drug networks that we are talking about, and Chuck has referenced, are so good at what they do—they are just international businessmen, the worst kind though, and they are just—they diversify, they go after whatever they make a profit.

Dr. HECK. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Langevin.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Jacoby, General Kelly thank you for being here today, and for your service to our Nation. And I hope you will express our appreciation to all those who are under your command for the work that they do every day to keep our country safe.

General Jacoby, if I could start with you, we are all aware of the growing challenges of maintaining security in cyberspace. Which is a—obviously a recurring theme that we have been talking about quite a bit.

A 2013 report from the Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation concluded that, and I quote—“Network defenses are insufficient to protect against a determined or well-resourced cyber adversary and war fighter missions should be considered at moderate to high risk until they can be demonstrated to be resilient in a contested cyber environment,” end quote.

General, could you share your perspective on the cyber threat to domestic security operations and also to elaborate on how the NORAD–NORTHCOM Joint Cyber Center is collaborating with civilian and military partners in cyberspace?

General JACOBY. Thanks, Congressman. I thought Director Clapper's testimony was really helpful on this in highlighting his concerns about the cyber threat, and those are echoed here in the homeland.

I mean, the cyber nets that are most vulnerable and most important to us are the ones that reside in the homeland. In our case, we have our mission nets which are critical for the defense of the Nation. So their defense is essential and to address that, we have received and are standing up our first Cyber Protect Team, 28 trained soldiers and airmen with NSA [National Security Agency] training, CYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command] training.

And so we also work hard to try to exercise in a cyber-challenged environment with specially trained red teams. So it is understanding our own vulnerabilities as well as understanding the

threat at the same time. We are working hard. There are a lot of legacy systems out there that didn't have the cyber mission assurance that we might have put in today in the past so there is some catch-up to do as well.

And we are busily working on that.

I would say it is critical in our country that we develop relationships and partnerships that the President has laid out in his recent executive order on cybersecurity, to ensure that we understand the interdependencies between private, commercial, and government systems and we understand how to share information in a way that doesn't disadvantage our civilian—commercial partners. And to that end we have a very close working relationship with DHS [Department of Homeland Security], which really has the bulk of our cybersecurity partnerships and concerns and also with the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] as we have concerns with what is illegal activity.

I think, in the future, we are building structure total force solutions to this in keeping with the blueprint from CYBERCOM on what we think the requirements are in the future. I believe that we are going to require legislation, policy, and regulations that help us understand the mission space and that brighten up the lines in the road for the Department of Defense, but we are making progress to that end in terms of understanding our vulnerabilities and developing our requirements.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you for your focus on this, General. It is obviously important.

The same DOT&E [Director of Operational Test and Evaluation] report observed that, and I quote—"Less than one-third of all fielded systems observed in assessments over the past 5 years have had a current inter-operability certifications," end quote.

What has NORTHCOM been doing to improve operability and information sharing about cybersecurity threats and network system defenses?

General JACOBY. We really are looking at ways to improve within the command, and then between our partners.

I will tell you that one of the important challenges is to ensure we are interoperable in the NORAD realm with Canada. That relationship with Canada allows us to highlight really the interdependencies and relationships between countries in our networks, between systems in our networks like energy systems and transportation systems. And so, you know, we are doing work as NORAD with our Canadian partners to make sure we understand those linkages and vulnerabilities.

Really, the lead agency for the Department is CYBERCOM in terms of ensuring the standards in which we secure. And I think that they are doing a good job in getting that word out, and by helping us stand up our Joint Cyber Center and helping us with key subject matter experts we are going to continue to work to meet those standards.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Time expired.

Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you. If you have already answered this question, I apologize, but General Kelly let me get your thoughts on extremist elements within Central America—within South and Central America, particularly Venezuela, and what foothold they might or might not be getting.

Islamic jihadists.

General KELLY. Yes, there is some activity.

There is an awful lot of proselytizing and missionary work if you will, but Iran has expanded—I think we addressed this last year in the hearing—expanding their presence in Latin America. Don't really know what they are up to. Not really well received by many governments with the exception of Venezuela.

So we watch it, but no real threat right now from that vector. But, something obviously to watch.

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. I apologize for not being here. I will re-plow any new ground, but again thank you very much for both your service.

And I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And General Jacoby and General Kelly, thank you very much for your service.

There has been a lot of talk about interdiction today and I wanted to focus on Secretary of Defense Hagel's announcement—discussion on Tuesday about the curtailment of the Navy's planned LCS [littoral combat ship] purchases from 52 to 32.

Obviously, we are not anywhere near that right now, but in light of all that we have talked about this morning and the fact that South American drug traffickers are increasingly using semi-submersibles to traffic drugs into the U.S.—NORTHCOM area of operations, how do you think that this cutback if you will in terms of purchases would effect the effort?

Is that part of what you are talking about of needing resources to fight this?

General KELLY. Congresswoman, you know, I don't own a lot of forces. Decisions made in the Pentagon as to where, in this case, ships would flow—to pivot the Pacific as an example, or to the Persian Gulf—so those decisions made inside the Pentagon. I get what I get. And I would just say, you know, more ships are better. Less ships are worse.

I need a platform—I do my best work—the interagency does its best work in terms of getting massive amounts of cocaine out of the network flowing, I need a helicopter and I need a ship that the helicopter can land on.

I don't need an aircraft carrier; in fact, I will take an oiler if it has a helipad where a helicopter can operate from or a Coast Guard cutter, they do magnificent work and really are the lead agency in my part of the world in terms of law enforcement aspect of this thing.

But I need some kind of platforms and the decision is made, it has been made now for a number of years, that SOUTHCOM doesn't get what it has asked for. That is a decision I won't criticize.

But, if you are asking, could I use more ships and take out more product off the network, I would say yes.

Mrs. DAVIS. But I guess, just generally though, I mean, if there are a number of platforms perhaps—are you suggesting that maybe the LCS isn't as critical perhaps or that even the number of 52 would not have—would be more than or—is there—

General KELLY. Again, not to speak about LCS, I need a ship that can land a helicopter on it. Right now, one of the things—one of the ships in my part of the world that is just doing yeoman work is a British oiler; doesn't have a gun on it, but it has got a helipad and the helicopter can refuel there. And it is doing—and that helicopter is doing great work.

Mrs. DAVIS. All right, thank you.

General Jacoby, also talking about some of the concerns that we have had about expandability. There is a potential reorganization of the National Guard's aviation units and I am wondering how you feel that that would effect the ability that you have as the USNORTHCOM commander.

Would it make a difference in your ability to fulfill the defense and support of civil authorities—

General JACOBY. Yes, I am aware of the initiatives that the Army has been forced to take, and I know that these are, you know, tremendously difficult decisions that the chief and the Secretary had to make. And I have great respect for the challenge they have had trying to navigate that.

In particular, I think that the—from the NORTHCOM commander perspective, I am a requirements guy, and so I don't have the need for an armed Apache in the homeland, but I will take more Black Hawks. And I will take more LUHs [light utility helicopters] and I think the Army plan gives more Black Hawks and more LUHs so that supports the homeland. And I don't need armed attack aviation in the homeland.

But it is not as simple as that. I know that. And so my hat goes off to the Army for being able to manage scarce resources in order to create the most combat-effective total force.

But my requirement? I will pick Black Hawks.

Mrs. DAVIS. Do you feel that your voice is heard in that?

General JACOBY. Sure.

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay.

General JACOBY. Thank you.

Mrs. DAVIS. Yes, I want to be sure that you are having the input and that it is making a difference.

Thank you.

General JACOBY. Well, yes, ma'am.

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. And also just, General Kelly, there is talk about the USS *Comfort* not deploying this year. How will that affect your priorities and the humanitarian efforts?

General KELLY. Very briefly. I know we are running out of time. But the *Comfort* is a really, really big engagement deal in Latin America. They look forward to it. It has huge impact on the local communities that it visits. And it really does—it really is appreciated. And it is a great image of what the United States does for the world—a big American flag but no guns. And that is—the

places it visits, it has huge impact. And to have lost that this year was very, very disappointing.

Mrs. DAVIS. All right.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, both of you made comments about our civilian workforce. I want to thank you for those comments and your commitment to that workforce. I represent Robins Air Force Base and Moody Air Force Base. And I can tell you when you talk with that workforce that is out there supporting the warfighter, they feel exactly the way your comments—your written comments reflect. And we need to make sure that we are taking care of them. So I appreciate your comments in recognizing them, and your commitment to them.

Moody Air Force Base, I can't go without saying that is home of the A-10. I do a few Wounded Warrior hunts a year, and any of the men that I have talked about that have been in contact with the enemy are very proud of that weapon system and don't think there is another system that has done as much to protect our troops in contact as that weapons system has proven to be capable of.

With that said, I want to move to, General Kelly, your comment about insufficient maritime surface vessels and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance platform impairing your primary mission. I traveled with the chairman to Colombia. It is very clear that they are capable of handling the ground game there. But it is also very clear that we are the country that has to provide the intelligence, the ISR platforms to tell them where the mission is.

The JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System] fly out of Robins Air Force Base. It is a battle management platform. There have been a lot of proposals to improve that platform. And I would just like for both of you to describe the ways in which the JSTAR asset has been used in your areas of operation.

General JACOBY. JSTARS is one of those assets, Congressman, that really defines, you know, high-value, low-number asset. And so, I have used it my whole career, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, usually along borders; you know, usually to great effect. It has been adapted over and over again. It is one of those great pieces of kit that has proved its worth over time.

And we have been able to take advantage of it in support of law enforcement when asked for that type of capability. We have been occasionally able to get it to support law enforcement around the southwest border and they have done a terrific job.

General KELLY. Congressman, my organization when we are going to get a JSTARS, there is glee. It is a game-changer over the Caribbean. We only get JSTARS as training missions. So they are flying to just simply train. The airplane, of course, doesn't know where it is flying over, so they come down to the Caribbean. We put them into the drug fight. We see everything when the JSTARS are on station.

Frankly, we do the same thing on other training missions with bombers—B-52 bombers and B-1 bombers, with pods on them. So

I will take anything I can get, but if I can get a JSTARS, it is a game-changer.

Mr. SCOTT. Well, thank you for those comments. And it is a big ocean out there and the radar on that JSTAR platform gives you the ability to look at an awful lot of it in one pass.

With that, I will just say thank you. I do think that the mission that is going on in getting the drugs, stopping the drugs before they ever get to America is an extremely important one, and I am glad that your men have been as effective in doing that as they have been.

And with that, I will yield the remainder of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I just want to point out, on that trip, we were able to see the submersibles that they bring a lot of the drugs in. And I remember as they were talking to us, they talked about having two frigates that were just several hundred meters apart and a submersible in between that they couldn't see.

So it does take a helicopter or JSTAR, other means coordinated with the ships that are there to interdict. So all of these are very important items.

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Kelly, I want to ask you some additional questions about illegal drugs. You know, one of the drugs that oftentimes comes in from borders is marijuana. And several States now have taken initiatives to legalize marijuana or decriminalize marijuana. And I wanted to know what effect do you think that is going to have on the war on drugs?

General KELLY. Thanks for that question, Congressman.

I think the first thing you have to take note of is countries that have decriminalized or legalized drugs are all now trying to figure out ways to turn back the clock. Legal or decriminalized drugs bring crime, bring higher addiction rates, bring higher, you know, substance abuse problems. And they are all trying to turn back the clock.

As far as Latin America goes, we have been encouraging these countries to be in the drug fight for 25 years. The levels of violence that our drug problem has caused in many of these countries is just astronomical. And so, when we talk about decriminalizing, the example I would give you is the two States that voted to decriminalize marijuana, or legalize marijuana.

Most of the states—countries I deal with were in utter disbelief that we would, in their opinion, be going in that direction, particularly after 25 years of encouraging them to fight our drug problem in their countries and, you know, in their littorals.

So that is kind of where they are on it. They are very polite to me, but every now and again when they are not so polite, the term "hypocrite" gets into the discussion. But frankly, the crime rate is so high in many of these countries and the fact that they see us turning away from the drug fight, that—they are starting to chatter a lot about, "Well, why don't we just step back and let it flow." We do a lot on the high seas, but Mexico, Panama, Honduras, Guatemala, they are in—Colombia—they are in this fight big time with us. But at the end of the day, it is really our problem. And I think it is a false choice on their part, and I tell them this, to step back

and let it flow will continue to bring you high crime problems. To stay in the fight is the way to go.

But to answer your question, I guess, it is hard for me to look them in the eye and tell them "You really need to, you know, stay shoulder to shoulder with us," because they see us in a sense giving in.

I don't know if that answers your question, Congressman.

Mr. VEASEY. Are the cartels that deal with moving marijuana, are they starting to look at moving to another product? I mean, to shift—move the marijuana into the United States? Are they starting to consider moving to another product or is it just not having any effect, as you can tell right now?

General KELLY. They are already completely diversified. They move cocaine, heroin—they make heroin. They make methamphetamines. They make cocaine, and they transport it. They also do the same thing with illegal aliens, sex slaves—something to the tune of 18,000 sex slaves a year, mostly adolescent young women, move through this network into the United States every year. Anything can move on this network.

They are already diversified. They are now starting to diversify into illegal mining, illegal logging for certain types of wood—anything to make a buck. And the profits that come out, just the drug profits that come out of the United States is something to the tune of \$85 billion a year, of which only \$1 billion is required to keep the drug flow going. The rest of it is just profit.

Their biggest problem, frankly, in our interagency, the Department of Treasury, FBI, Department of Justice—is getting after this. But their biggest problem is taking \$85 billion worth of U.S. currency and laundering it.

Mr. VEASEY. So even—just let me get your opinion on this—so even if you were to see this trend of legalization or decriminalization here in America take effect, because of this diversification, can we not expect to save any money on the war on drugs from the, you know, Pentagon's point of view?

General KELLY. The more we decriminalize or legalize drugs, God forbid, the more we do that, the social price of dealing with the additional crime, because there will be additional crime, the additional health care and all of that will go up exponentially. This costs a lot of money. It is astounding to me that we are—we have just kicked off—the Federal Government has just kicked off a \$100 million program to try to get people to stop smoking tobacco, yet we are opening up other areas of substance abuse. It is just astounding to me we are doing this, but—

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I truly do appreciate both your gentleman's service to our country. It means a lot.

And when you talk about the drug flow, I will concur with you, after 38 years in law enforcement. You know, we would get a small, small smidgen of the drugs off the street; cost a lot of money to do that. It is much more cost-effective, I would think, to do it the way we have been doing it, and particularly out in South America.

But I wonder, you know, last year, I believe, General Kelly, you may have testified to the fact, the amount of dollars that are clearing the profit. Do we have any ideas as to where those dollars are going? Obviously, going back to the cartels, but is that money being utilized for anything other than furthering their criminal activities or others? Do we have any idea?

General KELLY. It all goes back into some type of criminal activity. As I say, their biggest problem is laundering the money. There is so much of it. And they have ways to do that. And as I said, the FBI, the DEA, the DOJ, and the Treasury are really working that hard and increasing their efforts to do that.

But as an example, we know some of that money and as it goes through the laundering process, we know that elements of some Islamic radical organizations, both Shia and Sunni are involved in that, and take, we are estimating tens of millions of dollars into their organizations.

Cocaine that moves into Africa—the vast majority of cocaine that is produced, and virtually all of it that is produced in Peru and the other two big producers, Peru, number one, Bolivia, number two, that cocaine moves through Latin America to Africa and then up into Western Europe and the Middle East.

We know that Al Qaeda affiliate organizations have taken money out of that as it moves, kind of as a whole. So it is going into every imaginable nefarious kind of activity to include Islamic radicalism.

I don't know if that answers it, but—

Mr. NUGENT. It does. And my concern is obviously, it seems like this is sort of an afterthought in regards to the Pentagon's decision in regards to giving you the assets that you need to have.

Now, understand it is, you know, in war time, those assets are going to be placed in other locations but this is really—and you have talked about it, the commitment of our allies in this fight.

It seems like we have a very small commitment at the end of the day where we could have greater returns if we just up that commitment just a—even a small amount, versus trying to wait until it gets back in the United States, where once it gets diffused into our criminal justice system or what we have to go through to get it, becomes really difficult.

You know, I would like to see more assets, obviously, provided to you within that combat command. But in particular, as it relates to just what you talked about, doesn't have to be, you know, a multi-billion dollar aircraft carrier, it can be something as simple as refitting some—you know, a ship, a platform to give you the assets, the helicopter assets. And General Jacoby, the question was—or a statement was made in reference to, you know, the National Guard and the Army's look at how they are going to refit or take away the attack assets of the National Guard.

And then I understand the National Guard's reluctance to give that up because they are kind of a mirror image of the big Army. But I will agree with you from this aspect that it would be more important at least from the State aspect to have more Black Hawks.

General JACOBY. Right. So I want to make clear, Congressman, thanks for bringing that back up that you know, I am looking at it from the NORTHCOM commanders' requirement.

Mr. NUGENT. Right.

General JACOBY. I would love for our governors and our adjutants general to have that kind of capability to meet the needs of their people.

I understand it is a more complicated question that—but I really think the Army is being driven to this, you know, by the Budget Control Act and by the realities of the fiscal environment and they have to manage these shortages in order to put the best total force together to meet all of the missions sets of the combatant commanders.

Mr. NUGENT. One last thing, in reference to the Black Hawks, in particular, as it relates to the Army National Guard, but we have an Army Reserve out there with a number of Black Hawk assets that really don't ever get called into play to support the State mission.

General JACOBY. Thanks, and I want to thank Congress for making that possible and NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] 2012 that allowed us to use title 10 Reserves for the very first time. Used to be against the law, now we can use them.

And so, I am working very closely with General Grass and with the directors of the different Reserve forces to ensure that we come up with methodologies and mechanisms to get them effectively employed.

Mr. NUGENT. I thank you for your time.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Bridenstine.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you General Jacoby and General Kelly for your testimony today.

I am a Navy pilot. I have spent a lot of my time deployed to the Southern Command, the forward operating locations that we have—in El Salvador, Colombia, Curaçao. I have spent many months on watch at the Joint Interagency Task Force South. I have seen, first hand, how wonderful the intelligence that we get coming from SOUTHCOM is.

I have also been excessively frustrated when we get such great intelligence from people who are taking great risk upon themselves, we get phenomenal intelligence and this is not—it doesn't come easy, but it comes. And when it comes, I fly an aircraft called an E-2 Hawkeye, it is one of those intelligence surveillance—that reconnaissance aircraft that you talked about, General Kelly, that we don't have enough of.

Interestingly, my squadron has been cut in March of 2013, and so it doesn't exist as an asset or resource in this fight.

But even when it did exist, we would get the intelligence, we would see the target, we would make every effort to track and interdict the target, and over, and over, and over again, the end-game assets were not available.

The Coast Guard cutters that you talked about, the Navy cruisers that could, you know, carry helicopters, put a Coast Guard law enforcement detachment on those ships, even though they are DOD assets, you can put law enforcement detachments on those assets to avoid, you know, the Posse Comitatus challenges.

The question I have for you, General Kelly, when you think about the national security of the United States and this is one of the challenges I have, quite frankly, on Capitol Hill. We have a real national security threat to the United States of America, that SOUTHCOM is specifically designed to deal with.

And I have just heard today, even, as a matter of fact, people talking about combining NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM. SOUTHCOM is already one of the regions in the world that is the most disregarded by the United States of America and it needs—that needs to change.

When you talk about the integration of transnational criminal organizations with leftist, totalitarian government, and now the integration of terrorist organizations in the Middle East, this is a real national security threat for the United States of America.

General Kelly, I was wondering if you could take a minute and talk about some of these challenges?

General KELLY. I don't guess I could say it any better than you just said it, Congressman. But specifically on the integration, in the end-game piece, you are right.

We have phenomenally good intelligence we watch come out of all over Latin America. The good news is now more and more and more, we have partners—and again, I would say Colombia, Panama, and some of the other countries that are in real crisis, by the way, in the northern part of Central America that are in the fight with us. So they are getting more and more. But the frustrating thing is, you are right, I mean, about 75 percent of it that we watch, we can't touch. We only really engage about 25 percent of it.

I keep saying this but it is very, very important—no violence to speak of. They stop, we board, we get 5 tons, and we take them and arrest them and they go into the U.S. legal justice system.

When it gets ashore and comes into the United States, the distribution system is just an amazing thing. And these cartels are just not, you know, south of the border. They deal—manage the distribution within the United States.

We estimate it is about 1,200 retail outlets, if you will, that these cartels control all over the United States. And then of course, it is then distributed down.

So there is not much you can do in spite of all the amazing heroic deeds of our law enforcement people at the border and all over America. Once it is in it is just part of this distribution network that it is almost impossible to touch.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Sorry about that. When you talk about the pivot to the Pacific. A lot of us on this committee, we have heard a lot of testimony about the pivot to the Pacific.

And it is pretty clear to me that in many cases, unless we plus-up the Navy significantly, the pivot to the Pacific looks very hollow.

And the threats to America see it that way, quite frankly. I understand the Straits of Malacca, they need to be secured. We have got to protect the seas, we have got to protect freedom of movement. We all agree with that.

But this massive pivot to the Pacific, you were mentioning earlier, economies of force, which is a critical thing that I think Congress needs to understand which is a very small investment in the

Caribbean, a very small investment in SOUTHCOM, the eastern Pacific.

These investments can yield a tremendous amount of benefit to the United States of America from the national security threat that is very real coming from Central and South America.

And yet, you can take this enormous region of the Pacific and do a pivot to the Pacific with a small force and it actually hollows us out and makes us look weak.

If you could just share a testimony real quickly, if you had all the resources you needed—

Mr. CONAWAY [presiding]. Gentleman's time is expired. We have got other folks who want to ask questions, Jim.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Roger that, Chairman. We will talk later.

Mr. CONAWAY. Now, Mr. Garamendi, for 5 minutes.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. I am almost wanting to yield my time to Mr. Bridenstine, because he is talking exactly where I wanted to go. But I won't do that.

Instead I would have a—just one of the sentences in your testimony, General Kelly, “As the lowest priority, geographic combat command, USSOUTHCOM will likely receive little if any trickle down of the restored funding.”

And just following on what my colleague was talking about, there are threats and then there are immediate threats, and clearly the issue we are talking about here of the Caribbean and the drug issues are immediate threats.

I am also the ranking member of the Coast Guard Subcommittee, and so the integration of the military with the Coast Guard is critical. Both of them have suffered with the sequestration and with attention going elsewhere.

So this really for my colleagues as well is that we really need to pay attention to the funding for these two commands, for the SOUTHCOM command as well as for the Coast Guard and the interrelationship.

Specifically, General, the ISR platforms, the unmanned platforms, we covered some of this a moment ago but not the unmanned piece of it. Are they sufficient? What is it going to take? What are the best platforms available on the unmanned vehicles?

General Kelly.

General KELLY. I mean, the—yes, sir. The unmanned drones, ISR, we don't get—we don't see that very much where we are. I mean, that is one of those assets that is probably in more demand than JSTARS. So we don't see those very much.

But interesting enough, the Colombians have purchased their own, now. We used to provide them some help in this regard. The Colombians—they are not armed right now, but they have produced them or bought them from the Israelis.

They are doing great work over Colombia and in their littorals. But we don't see an awful lot of the unmanned ISR capability, it is almost all manned is what we work with.

And some of this now is contract. I have got some contract airplanes that do great work for us because we simply can't get access to the E-2s and some of the other things we have talked about here this morning

Mr. GARAMENDI. I was in Colombia last week and we visited with President Santos on these issues. Also happened to have been in Cartagena when the LCS *Coronado* was there. Talk about a very expensive platform, and I was struck by your description of a tanker—an oil tanker—with a platform for a helicopter being very useful, probably 100th of the cost of that LCS, which is quite a ship.

I think the bottom line here is that we have an immediate threat, and we are simply not providing the resources to deal with it, either the Coast Guard, the issue of new cutters—offshore cutters and the like.

I want to just take my last couple of minutes here and really shift to the north and the Arctic, again, the interrelationship between the military and the Coast Guard. And General Jacoby, if you could just discuss this relationship or the interrelationship of them.

General JACOBY. Thanks, Congressman.

We have a great relationship with the Coast Guard and, along with the Canadians, they are the premier—

Mr. GARAMENDI. Let's talk assets for a moment. You came out with a report last fall about the Arctic—the role of the Arctic, and if you could just pick that up, what do we need from the military side, and from the Coast Guard side in the Arctic?

General JACOBY. So the question is, what do we need and when do we need it?

You know, the Arctic is a harsh environment, it is melting and it is going to become more navigable and there is going to be increased human activity. We just don't know the pace of it. So it is a very difficult question, what do we need and when.

We are going to need icebreakers. We are going to need ISR. We are going to need communications above 60. We are going to need better mapping of the littorals in the Arctic.

So those things are going to be required in the future. The next 5 years, and in the next 10 years are real challenges. What should our investments be for 15 years out when it really is—

Mr. GARAMENDI. I would appreciate more specificity.

We understand the word, more, around here. But we need specificity—more specificity.

With regard to the cutter in the Coast Guard reauthorization there is money for a cutter, about one-fifth of what would be needed. Where we would find the other money is going to be unknown.

Revamping, we have got some questions about rebuilding, revamping an existing Coast Guard cutter to serve the purposes in the Arctic, but I would appreciate specific information about the assets that are going to be needed for the Arctic, as well as for SOUTHCOM.

Thank you very much. I am out of time.

I yield back.

Mr. CONAWAY. Mr. Garamendi's time has expired.

Mr. TURNER, 5 minutes.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Jacoby, thank you for being here today and for all of your leadership.

One of the issues that we struggle with in this committee is the issue of missile defense. As you know, the threat is proliferating

both of weapons of mass destruction and with specific missile technology that can place mainland United States at risk.

The President has now canceled two missile defense systems that were intended to protect mainland United States, both the—what was known as the third site, which the Bush administration had proposed, and even phase four now of the Phased Adaptive Approach, which was intended to provide that mainland coverage.

This committee and Congress, through the National Defense Authorization Act, has continued to advance a, what the administration would have called a hedging strategy, but we actually consider to be a sound strategy of locating a missile defense site on the East Coast that would give us that additional ability that has been lost with the third site and with the Phased Adaptive Approach, and also would give us greater ability to protect that site with it being within our homeland.

In fiscal year 2014, the NDAA, we included a requirement and funding for the Missile Defense Agency to update its plans and required documentation for this potential East Coast missile defense site. We are obviously looking for your insight and support for that effort. We both authorized and appropriated—which means, Congress had to do a great deal of deliberation in deciding to move forward with the East Coast missile defense site.

We want to reduce the deployment timeframe when the United States decides to deploy the site. Waltwood, a third interceptor site on the East Coast of the United States, provide for missile defense coverage to the United States.

Would it be prudent if all the appropriate required documentation was completed to deploy the site sooner than later, and although there are those who have said at times it is not presently needed, we know that the future development of threats pose an environment in which that would be incredibly helpful.

We would like your words on that, sir.

General JACOBY. Congressman, thank you.

A third site, if you built it, would give us better weapons access, it would give us increased inventory and increased battlespace with regards to a threat coming from the direction of the Middle East.

So those are just facts. And that is what it would give to the combatant commander—and that is me—the one that is accountable for the defense of the homeland from the ICBM threats.

Currently, we know that, in the Middle East, Iran continues to—while we are doing the “Five plus One,” and we are all hopeful that “Five plus One” contributes to safety and security in the Middle East and our own country. They have not stopped aspirational goals towards ICBM technologies. They have successfully put a missile—space vehicle into orbit, and that demonstrates the types of technologies that you need to develop an ICBM.

So we are watching closely.

I think it was very prudent to direct us—or the Missile Defense Agency—to do a site selection. There were four sites that were determined. We were close partners with Admiral Syring every step of the way, to include final say on what were going to be the top four sites, and what were the characteristics and criteria used for selecting.

Those have been selected and according to the directions we received, we are moving forward on the EIS [Environmental Impact Statement] for all four sites, which should put us in a position to have those completed in the next 2 years.

So I think we are on the right path to provide options in continuing development for a third site and the ability to outpace a threat from the Middle East.

Mr. TURNER. Well, sir I want to thank you for those comments, because I have always said that everyone who questions this site is just three classified briefings away from being a real great fan of it. And everyone not having access to those briefings and everyone not availing themselves of that, your statements of support in this hearing of support of that third site are certainly important, because it shows in your judgment, the importance of our making certain that we rise to the threat.

So I appreciate those—

General JACOBY. Congressman, I want to clarify that, I think it is going to put us in a position to make a good decision in a timely fashion.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, General.

Mr. CONAWAY. Ms. Speier, 5 minutes.

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

I have just returned from a week in Colombia, where there was a lot of good news in terms of the civility there and the rule of law. We met with the President.

It appears though that Venezuela is a powder keg. And we heard also that Central America is in grave condition and I recognize in your statement, General Kelly, that you pointed to the fact that Latin America remains the most unequal and insecure region in the world, and I would probably suggest Honduras has got to be at the core of that.

What more should we be doing?

It seems like we move into one area, it becomes secure, and the trafficking just moves to other areas within Latin America.

General KELLY. You know, it is really a whole-of-government—whole-of-world approach. You are right. If we—recently we have had great successes—declining success, but great successes interdicting the drugs as it moves up into Central America.

And we have seen drug traffickers start to move product now—up to 14 percent of it now we think is moving back to the old network up the Antilles into the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico or directly into the United States.

So they are pretty adaptive people.

So to deal with this drug problem, obviously, starts kind of in kindergartens and in grade schools and all of those kind of—those programs to keep kids off drugs. And then, to fund properly law enforcement inside the United States. And then to pick up as much of this stuff as it moves along the so-called transit zone into these Latin American countries. And then, the source zones, that is to say who produces it, Colombia and countries like that. And they are doing as I say a tremendous job.

So it is really a whole-of-government—whole-of-the-world—whole-of-world approach. There is not one single answer to it. At

the end of the day, in my part of the world, more engagement—not necessarily money, but more opportunity to advise these countries and to help these countries help themselves.

So I am not asking for, you know, heavy brigades and Apache helicopters and Marine amphibious forces. I am asking for the ability to deal with countries that I am somewhat restricted in dealing with right now, small engagements to teach human rights, to teach how you interact and get at these problems.

So that would be my answer to you.

Ms. SPEIER. All right, thank you.

It is my understanding that we have not had a missile defense test succeed since 2008, in that, we have had three back-to-back test failures. So my question is are you confident that we can test accurately and safely without failure.

General JACOBY. Thanks for the question.

I have now confidence that we are going to test. That is the most important thing. And so there is budgeted money now for a good steady test cadence that will allow us to understand problems that might exist with the various systems, to fix them, to develop new capabilities. I mean, I think that is critical.

And so Admiral Syring and the Department have committed to a very firm and robust testing schedule. We did have a successful CE2 [Commander's Exercise Engagement] flight last year. It wasn't an intercept flight, but it was a successful flight. But I think it is really important when you are making upwards of dozens of modifications on boosters and EKV's [exoatmospheric kill vehicles] that we test.

There are countries that don't test. We are not one of them. We test and make sure that what we have is a real system, a credible system.

Ms. SPEIER. But, General, our tests have been test failures, so—

General JACOBY. Well, in part. Yes, ma'am, I think we have had a number of intercept failures. But if you look—it was a 5-year gap in the last intercept test.

So I think it is important to get back on a testing regime and make sure that we determine and achieve reliability in the system.

Those challenges are accounted for in our shot doctrine. They are accounted for in our battle management. And the fact is, that right now, the threat is a very limited threat.

But you bring up a great point. And as the combatant commander, I insist that we continue testing and make the modifications and make the improvement in the systems that not just give us reliable—or a sense of confidence in the current system, but also in the ability of the system to adapt and become more effective over time, as we pace the threat.

Mr. CONAWAY. The gentlelady's time has expired.

Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Jacoby, General Kelly, thank you so much for joining us today, and thank you for your service.

General Kelly, I want to begin with you. Can you give me an indication—I noted last year there were a number of Navy ship deployments in your AOR [area of responsibility] that were canceled.

Can you tell me about the impact of that, and what you did to mitigate those canceled ship deployments?

General KELLY. Yes, sir.

First, we didn't have—we weren't going to get that many ships, so we didn't, you know, lose much.

But in my AO [area of operations], not—you know, losing a little is losing a lot.

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes.

General KELLY. How we mitigated it. Just more work with our partners, providing intelligence. One of the—kind of a breakthrough we had last year is we found a way legally to share information with our partners, not tell them how we get the information, but to share information with our partners.

And I can't say enough about the interagency aspect of this fight. I mean, at many of our embassies, we have FBI, we have DEA, we have DEA FAST [Foreign-Deployed Advisory and Support Team] teams. These are really heroic men and women that work with some of our partners, Honduras, Guatemala, people like that. Amazingly effective people.

So we really started to work closer with our allies. And, as I say, the breakthrough, the ability to start what we call spot-on-the-map information, where we can tell them, "If you go here," you know, "you will find something worth finding."

And, again, we don't tell them how. And it is protected. And then we have liaison officers out of my headquarters in—or my JIATF [Joint Interagency Task Force] South headquarters in Key West in which we have law enforcement liaisons in many of the production countries we are talking about, or the countries that do the most with us to go after this drug flow.

So that is how we have mitigated it. Because we have just—I think we had on station last year one Navy ship. As a requirement, it is for, well, a lot more than that. I won't go into it.

A couple—two or three Coast Guard cutters. I mean, to the gentleman's comments a few minutes ago, I mean, the lion's share of the effort really is done by Coast Guard cutters and DEA and FBI. Just really, really good people.

And, for that matter, Customs and Border Patrol, Border Protection folks.

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good.

Let me ask an—other element of concern within the SOUTHCOM AOR. As you heard alluded to earlier, an increased Iranian influence in the area, more Islamic extremism, efforts being projected in that particular area, can you tell me, what are you doing in response to that, especially as it relates to our embassies?

Can you kind of give us your overview about that?

General KELLY. We are keeping an eye on it. You know, we don't know what they are up to. Generally, I would offer that the Iranians need to be watched pretty closely. They—no revelation here. They don't like us. No—you know, in terms of what is in Latin America for the Iranians, I mean there are two entirely different cultures, ways of looking at life, ways of looking at God and everything else. So why are they so active?

They are active in a couple countries that receive them. But, for the most part, what they have done is opened up a number of embassies; certainly their right to do it. I think they have opened 11 additional embassies in Latin America.

They have also opened what they call cultural centers, 33 of them, I think, throughout the area. These can be used for a lot of different reasons, and we are just keeping an eye on that.

But they are fairly active, again.

Mr. WITTMAN. I would like to ask both you gentlemen the concerns and challenges that you see as far as military readiness going forward. One of the areas that we have defined as I think the biggest challenge going forward is how do we make sure in this resource-challenged environment that we keep a steady and consistent effort on maintaining readiness.

And, as you know, sequester made that extraordinarily hard. In fact, I would argue, in some areas, it actually took away readiness from the military.

So I would like to get your perspective.

General Jacoby, I will begin with you.

General JACOBY. Thank you, Congressman.

We consume service readiness. We are combatant commanders; we consume service readiness.

The homeland has received a good healthy support as a priority, so we are consuming readiness.

Now, I will tell you, that in the homeland, I don't have the same readiness requirements as others do, because it is not a deployment, an overseas deployment.

Mr. WITTMAN. Right.

General JACOBY. John Kelly is not getting that priority. And he requires a little bit different kind of readiness in order to get folks deployed.

And so, you know, the bipartisan budget agreement, it bought us some time, bought us some breathing space. But every force that is made ready for current use is just contributing to a bathtub effect that will be accelerated if we continue on with the law and sequestration numbers start up again in 2016.

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay.

General Kelly.

General KELLY. I can't add anything to that, but I would like to add something, and that is the readiness of our people.

And, generally speaking, those of us in uniform get credit for serving the Nation. Those of us in uniform are pretty well taken care of.

But, frankly, there is a big aspect to our readiness in terms of personnel, and that is our civilian workforce. And that includes, in my opinion, contractors.

These are very, very dedicated men and women who we haven't really been very nice to in the last year or so. It is amazing to me that the morale I have in SOUTHCOM, in my headquarters and throughout the region, in terms of my civilian morale, is as high as it is.

They have a lot of confidence in me. We do the best we can to share the good news and the bad news with them.

But our civilian workforce across the Federal Government is just as important to us as those of us in uniform. So we need to keep an eye on their morale and take care of them as well.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CONAWAY. The gentleman's time is expired.

Mr. Smith, 5 minutes?

Mr. SMITH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to echo that last point on, you know, the importance of the civilian workforce. The furloughs, the uncertainty, it has been devastating.

And, you know, that is moving. It also makes it more difficult to get the people that we need into that—you know, that line of work. They have other options, and it makes it more and more difficult.

I follow up on the missile defense issue. And this is something you and I talked about last night.

Mr. Chairman makes the point about, you know, the importance of an East Coast missile defense system. And, by and large, he is right. You know, the more missile defense we have to protect the homeland, the more we can discourage potential threats, you know. And that is not even really classified. I mean, we hit North Korea, we have hit Iran, we hit a whole bunch of other places, and what could potentially happen out there.

The concern that I have is sort of following up on Ms. Speier's point, and that is that the system that we have right now isn't working particularly well.

I want to spend money on missile defense. I think it is critically important.

But to spend money on developing a new site so we can put missiles and radars and sensors and spend \$4 billion on a system that can't hit a target in a test strikes me as unintelligent would be the polite way to put it.

I would rather spend that money on what you just said, test the existing system; get it to work. Get us to that point.

I am worried about even deploying more missiles, you know, in our two existing sites, when they can't hit a target.

Why don't we spend money on radars and sensors and tests to get to the point where we actually have a system that works?

Now, I suppose we could—of course, public hearings like this undermine what I am about to say here—I suppose we could just bluff. You know, we could convince our adversaries, oh, we have got these missiles. They could work.

But unfortunately we are in an open society, so we can't do that very successfully. They know even before I, you know, said this, that those tests failed, because it is a matter of public record.

So shouldn't we be wiser about how we spend that money, to spend it on getting our missile defense system to the point where it actually works, instead of just feeling good about having it deployed?

General JACOBY. Congressman, I think we all want the same thing. We want—

Mr. SMITH. That is not entirely true.

If you sat here on the nights when we do the NDAA and we argue about this stuff on this committee, I can assure you, we do not all want the same thing.

But go ahead.

General JACOBY. Well, based on our conversation last night, I think you and I want the same thing, which is—

Mr. SMITH. That I will agree with.

General JACOBY [continuing]. Effective missile defense for the people of the United States. And they deserve it. And they have spent a lot of money and we have made a lot of effort.

You know, I believe that a lot of this has been theoretical—a theoretical threat and a theoretical capability, that the threat—the pace of the threat has become real. And the threat is real, and it is practical. And we have got some work to do to continue making sure that we have a practical system in place.

But we are infinitely better off with the system that we have, and I believe it does have the capability. It gives me confidence against the current limited threat.

The question is, what is the right path to improve that system, to outpace the threats, both from North Korea and any others that could now a highly sought and proliferated technology out there around the world.

Mr. SMITH. And I would submit, just for the record, that the wisest way to do that is not to spend money developing a new site until we set the system that we need to rely on working. Spend the money on that.

General JACOBY. Congressman, I hope that in my answer to that question, I tried to indicate that I believe that it was important that we do things simultaneously.

And so, there are things that we can do to be prepared to make a decision on whether we need a third site or not in the future.

But if you start everything from scratch on the day that you decide you need something, then we are always behind.

And so, I think that we have taken—we have been directed to take prudent steps. I don't think we are at a decision point for a third site, but I think we have set ourselves up to make a decision in a timely fashion. And I think that is smart to do.

Mr. SMITH. Yes. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General JACOBY. Yes, sir.

Mr. CONAWAY. Gentleman yields back.

Back to Mr. Lamborn for 5 minutes.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you both for your service.

And, General Jacoby, I want to thank you in particular for the great things that your team has done, helping our homeland and helping locally in Colorado Springs for some of the wildfires that we had. The assistance that your people gave was tremendous. So thank you for that.

We have had some discussion about missile defense. And I have to point out that there have been some budget cuts in the last few years, last 4 or 5 years, that I don't think were helpful.

The purpose of testing is to find out what is wrong and to isolate those flaws and make improvements and—so that there is success afterwards.

So, I am glad to see that we are finally, with this administration, getting some further funding to reverse some of that.

Do you feel confident that we have a good system in place, not that it can't do better at testing and not that we can't continue to make improvements, which I believe we are, but are you confident that we have a good system right now?

General JACOBY. I am confident that the system in place right now can handle the threat that exists right now. I think that what we have learned now is that there has to be continued smart investment that outpaces the threat.

And Congressman, one of the things we haven't talked about yet. My first dollar would go to intel. So that, you know, if your measure of effectiveness is that you are outpacing threat, you need to know a lot about the threat. And so we need to do more in understanding everything there is to know about North Korean missile capabilities; everything there is to know about Iranian programs, to make sure that we can make threat-informed decisions, not just resource-informed decisions.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. I appreciate that perspective. And you did mention North Korea, and I think Iran would be in that same list.

On a slightly different list, cruise missiles. What nations now have the ability to send strategic ballistic cruise missiles to the U.S. from great distances?

General JACOBY. Thanks, Congressman.

Cruise missiles are proliferating as well. But the nation that has the highest level of sophistication and can pose the greatest threat to North America is Russia. And they continue to make very, very important advances in both conventional and nuclear cruise missiles, both aerial-delivered and submarine-delivered. The first of the 12 projected *Severodvinsk* cruise missile-firing submarines—nuclear submarines is at sea and being worked up. And the missile that it uses has already demonstrated its effectiveness.

So, this is a capabilities question. And we have always believed that having a capability and an intention to defend the country against aerospace threats is a capabilities issue, not just an intent issue. And so, we have been directed by the Secretary to ensure that we are also looking at how to provide effective defense against cruise missiles in a way that outpaces any threats, to include Russians.

Mr. LAMBORN. And what do you believe, General, should be the way forward on that?

General JACOBY. Well, we have a way forward right now, Congressman, and that is a three-phased approach that has been approved by the Pentagon. And it starts with getting the National Capital Region right. And right now, we are going through a test phase where two things have been added or are being added to the National Capital Region—the Stateside Affordable Radar, in conjunction with a joint elevated net sensor, the JLENS [Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System] balloons.

And what they are trying to accomplish is integrating that into an overall defensive plan that allows us to see, detect, track, warn, and in the future hopefully engage cruise missiles that could pose a threat to the National Capital Region.

Then the issue will be if the cruise missile threat continues to evolve, how do we then take and export that capability where we think we might need it to defend other strategically or critical infrastructure locations in the United States and Canada.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you very much.

And lastly, funding for an improved kill vehicle. That is something that we did include in the fiscal year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act. I think it is valuable. What is your perspective on that?

General JACOBY. The budget hasn't been released and missile defense wasn't addressed in the rollout that the Secretary made earlier in the week. I would be very happy to have funding against an improved kill vehicle and I am hopeful that we will see the ability to do that sometime in the future.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you very much.

Mr. CONAWAY. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE for one more round?

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted to ask, General Kelly, when you think about economies of force and the asset layout that we currently have, obviously the more hardware you get, there is diminishing marginal return for every additional piece of hardware. But clearly, we are not anywhere near diminishing marginal returns at this point, given your lack of resources.

If you could have the order of battle that you most desired to be as effective as possible, can you share what that might look like? And let's just pretend for a second that we had maybe a 2-year period of time when we were going to do a surge operation in the eastern Pacific and into the Caribbean.

What would that order of battle look like, in your best judgment?

General KELLY. Yes, sir. Our best estimates are if we had 16 helicopter-capable platforms—again, they don't have to be warships necessarily—but 16 helicopter-capable vessels of some kind, to include Coast Guard cutters, and sufficient ISR. And as you know, actually you pointed it out before, intel is very, very good. The tracking across the oceans, it is hit or miss because our—of the isthmus in particular—is hit or miss just because of the lack of ISR. But we need more ISR.

But at the end of the day, a vessel with a helicopter on it, our requirement is for 16, but you can see by some of the things we have talked about, when I had 5 or 6, we were taking huge amounts of cocaine out of the flow. But 16 is the number.

And I have to say—I have to mention our—in addition to our Latin American partners that work so closely with us, the Dutch out of Curaçao, they oftentimes will have a vessel in the Caribbean. The Brits have one there now. The French will oftentimes have one. And the Canadians have one. And they are as valuable to me as a U.S. vessel.

In fact, last year, 67 percent of the seizures, they were involved in. So you could make the argument in 67 percent of the cases, we may not have gotten the drugs. That translates, by the way, to 80 tons of cocaine. A helicopter flying off of a Dutch buoy tender or oiler, or a French small boat—you know, frigate-type thing, or a

Canadian frigate, is just as valuable to me as an American ship or Coast Guard cutter.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. The squadron I used to fly in, we—on average, on an annual basis, we would bust about \$2 billion worth of cocaine. We were involved in that operation. And, of course, the squadron has been eliminated, which means a lot of that cocaine—I am not saying that we can't get some of it at certain steps along the process—but a lot of it will be coming into the United States. And of course, that is devastating for our country and the children in this country.

General KELLY. One of the—yes, sir. One of the—maybe the Congresslady made the point. You know, the consumption of cocaine actually in the United States is down. The war on drugs, if you will, if you look at the last 30 years, some people declare surrender here in DC [District of Columbia], but the fact is there is a lot more—there is a lot fewer kids starting drugs. So there has been great success in the so-called war on drugs.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Right.

General KELLY. Well, I will point out that we have tried to fight it in exactly the wrong place. And that is, in the United States. It is just not cost effective to do it here. But the use of cocaine is down, but guess what is up? Methamphetamines. The use of prescription drugs is down, but what is up is heroin.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Right.

General KELLY. So, we are not addressing it, in my opinion, nearly as much here in the States in the same way that we are trying to address, say, the reduction of tobacco use. So it would start here as much an education for particularly young kids, but it starts with education. There is a medical aspect to this. There is a law enforcement aspect to this.

But just like in any war, the worst place to fight it is in the homeland.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Right. We have got about 45 seconds left. I will ask a question; answer it the best you can. If you don't finish, then maybe we can get it on record in the future.

Which is Venezuela—obviously, we have a very leftist government. We are seeing that the more power is centralized in these governments in Central and South America, the people ultimately rebel and it creates tremendous instability.

As a nation, maybe you could provide for the record what we can do as a country to ensure that these efforts that are destabilizing the region, of course, a region that we need stability in for our own national security, what we can do as a nation to prevent this kind of thing in the future.

General KELLY. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman, just engagement, more engagement is better. And some level of understanding for many of the countries that are struggling so terribly with internal violence and crime brought on to a large degree by our drug problem; a little bit of understanding as we work with them to clean up things like human rights; to get their police cleaned up—not cleaned up, but improved so that the police can go back to being policemen and the military can go back to defending the borders. So just a little bit more understanding.

Venezuela is Venezuela. We watch it closely. Who knows what will happen. But there are others down there that are struggling mightily, that look to us for just a little understanding and a little bit of assistance. And I am not talking a lot of money. Frankly, in some cases, I am not talking money at all—just some advice and some training tips, if you will.

Mr. CONAWAY. The gentleman's time has expired.

General Jacoby and General Kelly, thank you both for your long, distinguished service. And we appreciate your attention. And thank you very much for coming today.

The hearing is adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:11 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

FEBRUARY 26, 2014

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

FEBRUARY 26, 2014

**Opening Statement of Chairman Howard P. “Buck” McKeon
House Committee on Armed Services
“The Posture of the U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command”
February 26, 2014**

Good morning. The committee meets today to receive testimony on the posture of Northern Command and Southern Command. I am pleased to welcome General Charles Jacoby, commander of NORTHCOM and NORAD and General John Kelly, commander of SOUTHCOM. Gentlemen, thank you for your long and distinguished service to our nation and for joining us today.

This is the committee’s first posture hearing of the Fiscal Year 2015 defense authorization cycle. However, with the delayed release of the President’s budget request, we’re at a disadvantage in assessing whether your priorities and requirements are addressed in the budget and the Quadrennial Defense Review. To this end, I have requested a list of unfunded requirements from each of your commands.

It is clear that continued cuts to defense are driving cuts in personnel, readiness, and modernization. These have real consequences in your areas of responsibility that I hope you will discuss here today.

As the Department continues to face tight budgets and reallocation of resources, we must be diligent in keeping our hemisphere safe. There is anticipation that Homeland Defense will continue to receive priority in the upcoming budget request, and important missions such as missile defense will receive increased resources. I am concerned, however, that certain NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM exercises and training priorities have been cut in past years due to budget shortfalls. I hope you will both discuss what you have been able to put back into place, and what gaps still remain, following the conclusion of the budget deal last December?

General Jacoby, looking to our own border, we’re witnessing a surge of self-defense vigilante forces in Mexico as citizens don’t trust state and military police

forces to address internal security threats. I look forward to your thoughts about whether legitimizing these forces is the correct path for Mexican security and what the implications are for U.S. - Mexico defense cooperation.

General Kelly, I had the great pleasure of visiting several countries in your area of responsibility last week. I was struck by Colombia's progress from an almost failed-state to a nation of continued stability and economic growth. In contrast, Venezuela's violent unrest and unstable economic situation make it a dangerous place. In my mind, building partnership capacity in places like Colombia over the past 10 years has paid its worth in dividends, and we must continue in to promote stability and military and police professionalization in the region.

I hope you can discuss the lessons that your command has learned about combating illicit networking that poses a threat to our national security interests, while also encouraging Latin American countries to build the capacity to tackle their own internal threats. Gentlemen, I look forward to your testimony, and thank you again for appearing before us today.

Ranking Member Adam Smith Statement

HEARING ON:

“The Posture of the U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command”

February 26, 2014

I would like to join Chairman McKeon in welcoming General Kelly and General Jacoby. We appreciate your time and look forward to hearing your thoughts.

General Kelly, I am interested in your thoughts on the important issues in your portfolio, such as rising violence and instability in Central America, our military to military cooperation in the area, countering transnational organized crime, building partner capacity, planning for contingencies and counter narcotics. While SOUTHCOM may not always get the headlines, you have a lot on your plate and our investments in the region certainly translate to tangible successes.

SOUTHCOM continues to lack traditional military threats, and the primary challenges often require an interagency approach to address. I am interested in hearing more about how you work with other U.S. government agencies and partner nations to accomplish your goals in Latin America, especially as resources have diminished. In countries like Colombia, our partnership is becoming more mature, with the Colombians beginning to export capabilities and lessons learned throughout the region. Our success in Colombia has helped establish a growing partner in the region, and I'm interested in hearing how that relationship is progressing.

While most of the region is fairly stable, we continue to see instability in places such as Venezuela and Honduras. I am concerned that instability in these countries could have a ripple effect on other countries in the region and I am interested in hearing your perspective on this point.

General Jacoby, NORTHCOM and NORAD continue to face challenges that seem to grow each year. Your homeland defense mission remains synonymous with national security with all its myriad aspects, and is complicated by the troubles facing Mexico to the south and increasing access to the Arctic in the North. The

support your command provides to civil authorities remains critical to how we deal with natural and man-made disasters and it is imperative that that complex system works smoothly in a crisis.

In NORTHCOM's area of responsibility, missile defense remains an important element of our defense against the growing missile threats from North Korea and Iran. Most recently the last interceptor tests have been back-to-back failures, raising serious questions about the reliability and credibility of the current missile defense system. We cannot continue to spend billions of dollars on a system that does not work. But I believe we can agree that the focus should instead shift to much-needed improvements to discrimination, reliability, acquisition processes and cost-effectiveness to make sure we have a workable system. In support of NORTHCOM's mission in this area, we need better sensors and better kill vehicles as an effective foundation to counter a limited missile threat.

In addition to investments in missile defense, we must also support intelligence capabilities to increase our options to prevent missile attacks, so as not to rely disproportionately on our last line of defense.

On a topic that touches both of your commands, I'd be interested in how the recent capture of drug lord Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman will impact your work moving forward. The capture is a good example of our cooperation with Mexico and represents a serious hit to one of the most notorious drug cartels in the region.

Again, thank you all for your time.

**STATEMENT OF
GENERAL CHARLES H. JACOBY, JR., UNITED STATES ARMY
COMMANDER
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND
AND
NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
FEBRUARY 26, 2014**



Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to report on the posture and future direction of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Our integrated staffs carry on a legacy of over 55 years of continental defense under NORAD, and USNORTHCOM's 11 years of safeguarding the homeland through innovative programs, robust partnerships, and continual improvement. The nation is well served by the commands' professionals who are focused on deterring, preventing, and if necessary, defeating threats to our security.

INTRODUCTION

This is a time of dynamic unpredictability for the Department of Defense (DOD). As the world grows increasingly volatile and complex, threats to our national security are becoming more diffuse and less attributable. This evolution demands continuous innovation and transformation within the armed forces and the national security architecture. Meanwhile, fiscal constraints have further compelled us to rethink our strategies, reorient the force, rebalance risk across competing missions, and take uncommon actions to achieve spending reductions. Particularly troubling, in dealing with sequestration last year, we broke faith with our civilian workforce. Implementing furloughs as a cost-cutting measure compromised morale, unsettled families, and understandably caused many DOD civilians to reevaluate their commitment to civil service by undermining one of the most significant competitive advantages the DOD offers its civilian workforce, stability.

While we must deal realistically with limited budgets, the homeland must be appropriately resourced to protect our sovereignty, secure critical infrastructure, offer sanctuary to our citizens, and provide a secure base from which we project our national power. As a

desired target of our adversaries, the homeland is increasingly vulnerable to an array of evolving threats. Thus, we should not give ground when it comes to defense of the nation and the protection of North America. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are priority investments in national security that should not be compromised as a consequence of the budget environment. When Canada was confronted with similar fiscal pressures to those encountered here, they fully resourced NORAD. Holding up our end of shared defense through NORAD honors Canada's commitment, and is a key element of our nation's competitive advantage across an uncertain global landscape.

The USNORTHCOM geographic area of responsibility encompasses North America. It includes the Gulf of Mexico, the Straits of Florida, much of the Caribbean region (U.S. Virgin Islands, British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, Puerto Rico, The Bahamas, and Turks and Caicos Islands), and the approaches to the continent, including significant portions of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic Oceans.

Homeland defense depends on readiness and preparedness. The dedicated professionals from the Intelligence community, including the National Security Agency (NSA) and other organizations, provide vital indications and warnings enabling the continued security and defense of our nation. The recent and potential future compromises of intelligence information, including the capabilities of the NSA, an agency with which NORAD/USNORTHCOM relies on with an effective operational partnership, profoundly disrupts and impacts how we deter terrorists and defend the homeland.

Further, although I am encouraged by the short-term stability obtained by recent passage of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, the shadow of sequestration still looms over key strategic decisions concerning how we defend the nation over the next two decades. Should sequestration return in 2016, it would lead to a situation where combat readiness and modernization could not fully support current and projected requirements to defend the homeland. Underinvestment in

capabilities which sustain readiness increases our vulnerability and risk. The nation deserves better than a hollow force lacking the capability or capacity to confront threats.

My priorities:

- Expand and strengthen our trusted partnerships
- Advance and sustain the bi-national military command
- Gain and maintain all-domain situational awareness
- Advocate and develop capabilities in our core mission areas to outpace all threats
- Take care of our people; they are our foundation

Distinct from other geographic combatant commands, we must observe and comply with domestic legal and policy requirements as a condition of operating in the homeland. Under the direction of the President and Secretary of Defense, USNORTHCOM and NORAD deliver effective, timely DOD support to a wide variety of tasks in the homeland and ultimately defend our citizens and property from attack. Our commands work in an environment governed by domestic laws, and guided by the policies, traditions, and customs our country has developed over centuries in the use and roles of armed forces at home. We also hold the obligation of serving citizens with deservedly high expectations for decisive action from the military in times of need. In this environment, it is imperative we retain the ability to outpace threats and maintain all-domain situational awareness to allow greater decision space for strategic leaders. The commands' approach is to defend the homeland "forward" and in-depth through trusted partnerships with fellow combatant commands, our hemispheric neighbors, and the interagency community. We carry out our primary missions of homeland defense, security cooperation, and civil support with a focus on preparation, partnerships, and vigilance.

HOMELAND DEFENSE

USNORTHCOM and NORAD are part of a layered defense of the homeland designed to respond to threats before they reach our shores. Our national security architecture must be

capable of deterring and defeating traditional and asymmetric threats including aircraft, ballistic missiles, terrorism, and cyber-attacks on economic systems and critical infrastructure. In the maritime domain, advances in submarine-launched cruise missiles and submarine technologies challenge our homeland defense efforts, as does our aging undersea surveillance infrastructure. Additionally, we recognize the Arctic as an approach to the homeland and must account for emerging concerns and opportunities related to greater accessibility and human activity in the region. We support the federal response to many threats facing the nation which are primarily security or law enforcement related, while ultimate responsibility for defending against and defeating direct attacks by state and non-state actors rests with DOD

NORAD Mission: North American Aerospace Defense Command conducts aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning in the defense of North America.

Aerospace Warning and Control

In the performance of our aerospace missions, including Operation NOBLE EAGLE, NORAD defends North American airspace and safeguards key national terrain by employing a combination of armed fighters, aerial refueling, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) surveillance platforms, the National Capital Region Integrated Air Defense System, and ground-based Air Defense Sector surveillance detection capabilities. We regularly exercise our three NORAD Regions and USNORTHCOM Components through Exercise VIGILANT SHIELD.

Over the past year, we launched fighters, AWACS, and tankers from the Alaskan and Canadian NORAD Regions in response to Russian Long-Range Aviation. These sorties, as in the past, were not identified on international flight plans and penetrated the North American Air Defense Identification Zone. Detect and intercept operations demonstrated our ability and intent

to defend the northern reaches of our homelands and contribute to our strategic deterrence of aerospace threats to the homeland.

NORAD regions are an integral part of our homeland defense mission. Their capability to provide mission-ready aircraft and pilots across all platforms plays a critical role in our common defense with Canada. The ability of NORAD to execute our primary mission is placed at significant risk given the degradation of U.S. Combat Air Force readiness, which hovers at 50 percent. The lack of ready forces is directly attributable to the fiscal pressure placed on readiness accounts and the subsequent challenges our Air Force Service Provider faces to execute modernization and recapitalization programs.

We are partnering with the Air Force to take decisive steps to restructure forces and regain readiness by innovatively making every training sortie count. However, I am concerned about our mid- and long-term capability to deliver the deterrent effects required of NORAD. If the Budget Control Act persists beyond fiscal year 2015, the extraordinary measures being undertaken by the Air Force to preserve readiness may not be enough to assure that combat forces can satisfy NORAD requirements. Reversing current negative readiness trends will require considerable time and expense to return squadrons to mission-ready status. For example, one of only two annual Air Force Weapons Instructor Courses, and two RED FLAG exercises, were cancelled this past year which will have an enduring impact on the readiness, training, and preparedness of our Air Force. Now more than ever, the Air Force's efforts to seek an appropriate balance between readiness today and tomorrow will have a key impact on NORAD's current and future success.

USNORTHCOM Mission: United States Northern Command partners to conduct homeland defense, security cooperation, and civil support, to defend and secure the United States and its interests.

Missile Defense

We remain vigilant to nations developing the capability to threaten our homeland with ballistic missiles. While tensions have subsided for the time being, North Korea continues to ignore United Nations resolutions and seeks international recognition as a nuclear-armed state, which we oppose. North Korea again showcased its new road-mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) during a military parade this past July. Similarly, while Iran does not yet possess a nuclear weapon and professes not to seek one, it is developing advanced missile capabilities faster than previously assessed. Iran has successfully orbited satellites, demonstrating technologies directly relevant to the development of an ICBM. Tangible evidence of North Korean and Iranian ambitions reinforces our understanding of how the ballistic missile threat to the homeland has matured from a theoretical to a practical consideration. Moreover, we are concerned about the potential for these lethal technologies to proliferate to other actors.

I remain confident in our current ability to defend the United States against ballistic missile threats from North Korea or Iran. However, advancing missile technologies demand improvement to the Ballistic Missile Defense System architecture in order to maintain our strategic advantage. We are working with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) on a holistic approach to programmatically invest in tailored solutions. A steady-testing schedule and continued investment are needed to increase reliability and resilience across the missile defense enterprise. We are pursuing a more robust sensor architecture capable of providing kill assessment information and more reliable Ground-based Interceptors (GBIs). Additionally, we are deliberately assessing improvements to the nation's intelligence collection and surveillance capability in order to improve our understanding of adversary capability and intent. Finally, we recognize the proliferation of threats that will challenge BMD inventories. Over time, missile

defense must become an integral part of new deterrence strategies towards rogue states that balance offensive as well as defensive capabilities.

In March 2013, the Secretary of Defense announced plans to strengthen homeland ballistic missile defense by increasing the number of GBIs from 30 to 44, and deploying a second TPY-2 radar to Japan. USNORTHCOM is actively working with our mission partners to see that these activities are completed as soon as possible. We are supporting MDA's study evaluating possible locations in the U.S., should we require an additional missile defense interceptor site. When required based upon maturity of the threat, a third site will enable greater weapons access, increased GBI inventory, and increased battlespace against threats, such as those from North Korea and Iran. Choosing a third site is dependent on numerous factors including battlespace geometry, sensors, command and control, and interceptor improvements. Finally, with the support of Congress, we are making plans for deployment of a new long-range discriminating radar and assessing options for future sensor architecture.

Our ability to detect, track and engage airborne threats, including emerging cruise missile technology, was the principal focus of our recently completed Defense Design for the National Capital Region. Next winter we will begin a three-year Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor (JLENS) operational exercise at Aberdeen Proving Ground, establishing a new capability to detect and engage cruise missiles at range before they threaten the Washington D.C. area. NORAD will combine JLENS capabilities with the Stateside Affordable Radar System into the existing air defense structure. These capabilities can point to a next generation air surveillance capability for homeland cruise missile defense.

Maritime

NORAD conducts its maritime warning mission on a global scale through an extensive network of information sharing on potential maritime threats to the U.S. and Canada. Our execution of this mission continues to mature—we issued 14 maritime warnings or advisories in 2013, six more than the previous year. Through USNORTHCOM’s cooperative maritime defense, we gain and maintain situational awareness to detect, warn of, deter, and defeat threats within the domain.

In 2013, to improve capability and enhance homeland command and control relationships in the maritime domain, U.S. Fleet Forces Command was designated U.S. Naval Forces North, providing USNORTHCOM with an assigned naval component on the East Coast. We are also working in parallel with U.S. Pacific Command to close seams for command and control on the West Coast. These initiatives support DOD’s strategic pivot to the Asia-Pacific and account for the increased pace of Russian and Chinese maritime activity in our Area of Responsibility (AOR), including their forays into the Arctic.

NORAD Strategic Review

Consistent with my priority to advance and sustain the bi-national military command, at the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Canada’s Chief of the Defence Staff, we recently initiated a NORAD Strategic Review. The Review intends to capitalize on existing synergies and identify opportunities to evolve NORAD into an agile, modernized command capable of outpacing the full spectrum of threats. The review identified promising opportunities to improve operational effectiveness, several of which can be implemented immediately. For example, we can realize benefits from aligning the U.S. and Canadian

readiness reporting processes and by collaborating closely on continental threat assessment and capability development processes.

The Arctic

The Arctic, part of the NORAD area of operations and USNORTHCOM AOR, is historic key terrain for DOD in defense of North America. With decreasing seasonal ice, the Arctic is evolving into a true strategic approach to the homeland. Arctic and non-Arctic nations are updating their strategies and positions on the future of the region through a variety of international forums and observable activities. Russia, after decades of limited surface activity, significantly increased its naval operations in the high north. This activity included multi-ship exercises as well as an unprecedented amphibious landing and reestablishment of a long-closed airbase in the New Siberian Islands. Also, China recently achieved formal observer status on the Arctic Council; continues diplomatic, scientific, and trade initiatives with Nordic nations; and is making progress on a second polar icebreaker. While potential for friction exists, the opening of the Arctic presents an historic opportunity to solidify and expand strategic partnerships and cooperation.

We fulfill our responsibilities as the DOD's advocate for Arctic capabilities by working with stakeholders to develop military capabilities to protect U.S. economic interests, maritime safety, and freedom of maneuver. We prepare for attendant security and defense considerations should countries and commercial entities disagree over sea-transit routes and lucrative natural resources. Secretary Hagel's comments on this subject are pertinent, "Throughout human history, mankind has raced to discover the next frontier. And time after time, discovery was swiftly followed by conflict. We cannot erase this history. But we can assure that history does not repeat itself in the Arctic." To this end, we are pursuing advancements in communications,

domain awareness, infrastructure, and presence to outpace the potential challenges that accompany increased human activity.

The Department's desired end state for the Arctic is a secure and stable region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is protected, and nations work cooperatively. With Canada as our premier partner in the Arctic, NORAD and USNORTHCOM seek to improve our bi-national and bi-lateral abilities to provide for defense, safety, security, and cooperative partnerships in the Arctic. To enhance these endeavors, I continue to support accession to the Law of the Sea Convention, which would give the U.S. a legitimate voice within the Convention's framework.

Exercises/Lessons Learned

To ensure our readiness for homeland defense missions, we rely on a robust joint training and exercise program to develop and refine key capabilities. In the last two years, we incorporated other combatant command and multinational participation in our major exercises like VIGILANT SHIELD, which more closely approximates how we expect to respond to real-world contingencies or crises. An integrated approach also ensures we work in unison with our domestic and international partners to reinforce mutual response capabilities and sustain our ability to project power.

Additionally, USNORTHCOM and NORAD, while postured to respond to unwanted Russian aerospace activity, conducted a successful annual Air Control exercise with the armed forces of the Russian Federation. Known as VIGILANT EAGLE, this exercise simulated fighter aircraft from the U.S., Canada, and Russia working cooperatively to intercept a hijacked passenger aircraft traveling between the three nations. Once intercepted, we transferred control of the aircraft to Russia to escort the plane as it landed in their territory. This combined exercise

expanded dialogue and cooperation, sustained defense contacts, and fostered understanding among our governments and militaries.

SECURITY COOPERATION

Defending the homeland in depth requires partnership with our neighbors—Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas—to confront shared security concerns and guard the approaches to the continent and the region.

The U.S.-Canada NORAD Agreement is the gold standard for cooperation between nations on common defense. Our security partnership with Canada has pushed out the protected perimeter of our homelands to the furthest extents of the continent. Their meaningful contributions to the defense of North America through NORAD, and globally through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, make Canada an indispensable ally. Defending together is the principal competitive advantage we enjoy in defending our homelands.

In the rest of our AOR, theater security cooperation activities focus on being the defense partner of choice in working on common regional security issues. The proliferation and influence of Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) pose social, economic, and security challenges for the U.S., Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas. A related threat is the potential for Middle Eastern and other terrorist organizations to exploit pathways into the U.S. by using their increased presence in Latin America and exploiting the destabilizing influence of organized crime networks. Our efforts to counter transnational organized crime focus on providing support to our U.S. law enforcement partners, other U.S. government agencies, and our military partners in the AOR. Theater security cooperation activities involve detailed and collaborative planning with our partners' militaries and federal agencies. Throughout the process, we remain respectful of our partners' national sovereignty and frame our initiatives with that in mind.

Canada

In addition to ongoing activities in NORAD, our security cooperation with Canada includes all-domain awareness; regional partner engagement; cross-border mitigation support of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents; and combined training and exercises. Over the past year, we began discussing cooperative efforts in cyber and concluded an action plan for further cooperation in the Arctic.

Last June, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff hosted Canada's Chief of the Defence Staff in a first-ever Defense Chiefs Strategic Dialogue. The Chairman and Chief agreed to pursue several initiatives over the next year, including the NORAD Strategic Review, ongoing USNORTHCOM and NORAD cooperative efforts on regional engagement, cyber, and combined training; our relationship has never been stronger.

Mexico

A strong security relationship with Mexico is a critical strategic imperative reflecting the power of our shared economic, demographic, geographic, and democratic interests. An enduring partnership with a secure and prosperous Mexico is a necessary precondition to the long-term security and prosperity of the U.S. and the Western Hemisphere. Our nations share responsibility for disabling and dismantling the illicit criminal networks that traffic narcotics and other contraband into the U.S., and illegal weapons and illicit revenues into Mexico. TCOs continue to establish support zones, distribute narcotics, and conduct a wide variety of illicit activities within the U.S., corrupting our institutions, threatening our economic system, and compromising our security. International and interagency pressure on these networks is essential to reduce the threat posed to our citizens and allow for the strengthening of rule of law institutions for hemispheric partners.

At the request of the Government of Mexico, while being mindful of Mexican sovereignty, we partner with the Mexican Army (SEDENA) and Navy (SEMAR) on security issues of mutual interest. USNORTHCOM provides focused engagements, professional exchanges, military equipment, and related support that advance common goals. Our engagements further mutual trust, enhance collaboration, and increase mutual capability to counter transnational threats and meet our many common security concerns. Recent successes include QUICKDRAW, a tactical-level exercise that tested the capabilities of U.S., Canadian, and Mexican maritime forces in joint response to illicit activities; subject matter expert exchanges enabling participants to learn and refine best military practices; and bilateral and multilateral conferences achieving broader coordination on issues such as natural disasters, pandemics, and search and rescue.

USNORTHCOM continues to grow our relationship with SEDENA and SEMAR with their participation in exercises. Mexico is a partner in Exercise ARDENT SENTRY, our joint-field exercise focused on civil support and disaster assistance. Additionally, Exercise AMALGAM EAGLE was conceived around a coordinated U.S.-Mexico response to a simulated hijacking situation—similar to exercise VIGILANT EAGLE mentioned earlier.

The Bahamas

The Royal Bahamas Defence Force is a trusted partner on our “third border” and our cooperative engagement with them continues to grow. The Bahamas provides a historic route for human smuggling and the smuggling of drugs and contraband into the U.S. due to its extensive size, small population, inadequate surveillance capability, and limited defense and police forces. This presents a pointed vulnerability to U.S. security and defense.

Our security cooperation efforts in The Bahamas are aimed specifically at better detection of human smuggling and the smuggling of drugs and contraband, improved communications interoperability, and increased disaster response capabilities. We recently completed air and maritime sensor deployments to the southern islands. These deployments confirmed the presence of illegal traffic flow through the Windward Passage. We secured funding for a permanent radar to assist with detection and tracking of suspect platforms in an effort to stem the flow of drugs, illegal migrants, and illicit materials. Our challenge is to prevent The Bahamas from returning to the TCO corridor it was in the 1980s and 1990s.

Due to the susceptibility of The Bahamas to natural disasters such as hurricanes and flooding, USNORTHCOM is collaborating with the National Emergency Management Agency of The Bahamas to enhance targeted disaster preparedness and response capacities. In December 2013, we completed construction and transferred possession of an Emergency Relief Warehouse to augment the warehouse previously donated by U.S. Southern Command. Additionally, we provided training and equipment to outfit the warehouses and enhance operational capacities. These facilities serve not only to assist our partner nation, but also to support the safety and security of the 35,000 American residents and more than five million U.S. tourists who visit The Bahamas annually.

Human Rights

USNORTHCOM is committed to promoting an institutional culture of respect throughout the command and the AOR. Human rights considerations are factored into all our policies, plans, and activities and are an important component in our strategic engagement with partner nations and interagency relationships. The USNORTHCOM human rights program is working

with partner nations to develop new programs of instruction on human rights, both in-country and at U.S.-based military education centers.

Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC)

Our regional engagement is enhanced by the efforts of WHINSEC, which continues to provide professional education and training to Latin America's future military leaders. The education offered by WHINSEC is a strategic tool for USNORTHCOM's international engagement, providing the most effective and enduring security partnering mechanism in the Department. Highlighting their commitment to the program, for the first time, Canada has detailed an instructor to WHINSEC.

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA)

USNORTHCOM stands ready to respond to national security events and to provide support, as a DOD core task, to lead federal agencies for man-made or natural disasters. Our efforts focus on mitigating the effects of disasters through timely, safe, and effective operations in accordance with the National Response Framework. Although American communities display great resiliency in the face of tragedy, the scale of some events exceed the response capacity of local first responders and state and federal resources. Through an extensive network of liaison officers embedded in our headquarters and Defense Coordinating Officers throughout the U.S., we collaborate with interagency, inter-governmental, and non-governmental partners to plan and execute the rapid, agile, and effective employment of DOD supporting resources with a mantra of not being late to need. This includes our partnership with the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization whose capabilities and expertise are of great value to us and our interagency partners.

Dual-Status Commanders (DSCs)

Last year USNORTHCOM continued to advance and refine the DSC program. Dual-Status Command is a military command arrangement to improve unity of effort with state and federal partners for DSCA missions. The Secretary of Defense, with consent of affected state governors, authorizes specially trained and certified senior military officers to serve in a federal and state status and in those separate capacities, command assigned federal and state military forces employed in support of civil authorities. In 2013, DSCs for Colorado's Black Forest fire and Front Range floods strengthened USNORTHCOM's close collaboration with the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), National Guard Bureau (NGB), and respective state National Guard Joint Force Headquarters. We continue to support the evolution and maturation of the DSC construct.

As part of the DSC Program, in collaboration with the NGB, USNORTHCOM conducts regular training for selected senior military officers through the Joint Task Force Commander Training Course and the DSC Orientation Course. We conduct state National Guard staff training and exercise programs through over 55 separate exercise events annually. Through 2013, we have trained and certified over 244 DSCs.

Council of Governors

As a designated participant of the Council of Governors, I engaged in Council meetings this past year that helped advance important initiatives of the Council's "Unity of Effort" Action Plan, including continued development and implementation of the DSC command structure and development and sharing of support to civil authority shared situational awareness capabilities. I have also supported collaboration with the States, through the Council, on DOD's cyber force structure and a framework for State-Federal unity of effort on cybersecurity. USNORTHCOM

and NORAD embrace the Council's initiatives throughout the year and incorporate them in operations, training and exercises, technical projects, and conferences. As an example, we recently hosted a conference on cyber challenges with The Adjutants General (TAGs) which provided a venue to better understand state and local cyber concerns and helped inform Service approaches to the future cyber force.

Special Security Events

We support the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) in the planning and execution of National Special Security Events (NSSEs). USNORTHCOM and NORAD partnered with USSS, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and FEMA to provide support to two NSSEs in 2013: the Presidential Inauguration and the State of the Union Address. Our support to the USSS and U.S. Capitol Police consisted of medical, communications, ceremonial, and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) response forces.

USNORTHCOM and NORAD also assisted in several other high profile events. We partnered with the FBI, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and FEMA for Super Bowl XLVII by providing aerospace warning and control, consequence management capability, CBRN planners, and liaison officers. We also coordinated with the West Virginia National Guard and Boy Scouts of America for the 2013 National Scout Jamboree by providing ground transportation, medical support, preventive medicine, and air traffic control. Lastly, we partnered with the USSS and Department of State to provide explosive ordnance disposal teams, explosive detector dog teams, aerial coverage, and communications for the United Nations General Assembly.

CBRN Response Enterprise

The continued effort by terrorists to acquire and employ CBRN weapons in the homeland is well documented. The cumulative effects of globalization allow people and products to traverse the globe quickly, and the relative anonymity offered by the internet reduces technical obstacles to obtaining and developing CBRN terror weapons. In addition to a terrorist attack, we remain concerned for a domestic accident or anomaly involving CBRN materials.

USNORTHCOM continues to expand its relationships with NGB and whole-of-government partners to make significant strides in our ability to respond to a CBRN event by increasing the overall readiness of the nation's CBRN Response Enterprise. Though the enterprise is fully operational, USNORTHCOM continues to refine its requirements to achieve operational and fiscal efficiencies. Exercises are critical in this endeavor. VIBRANT RESPONSE is our joint exercise centering on training and confirmation of CBRN Enterprise forces. Last year's exercise, held at Camp Atterbury, Indiana, was a tremendous success, maximizing opportunities for tactical lifesaving integration and synchronization at all levels of local, state, and federal response.

Wildland Firefighting

USNORTHCOM maintains the utmost readiness to support NIFC requests for suppression of wildfires that threaten lives and property throughout America. For over 40 years, as part of the national wildland firefighting (WFF) effort, DOD has provided support with C-130 aircraft equipped with the Modular Airborne Firefighting System (MAFFS) flown by the Air National Guard and U.S. Air Force Reserve. This past season, four C-130 airlift wings (three Guard and one Reserve) reinforced the national WFF effort through application of fire retardant on 46 federally mission-assigned fires.

When the Black Forest fire erupted less than 16 miles from USNORTHCOM and NORAD headquarters, we and a host of state and local partners, were well-prepared to meet the needs of our citizens. We maintained situational awareness as Fort Carson responded within two hours under Immediate Response Authority, as the Colorado National Guard engaged with helicopters and high-clearance trucks, tenders, and fire trucks. The 302nd Air Wing MAFFS quickly provided direct support from Peterson Air Force Base.

Later in the fire season, at the request of NIFC, we provided Incident Awareness and Assessment capability and MAFFS to the California Rim Fire, which threatened both the San Francisco critical power infrastructure and Yosemite National Park. Employment of a Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) provided the unique capability to see through the fire's smoke plumes to improve command and control, as well as gain situational awareness on the fire's impact area. Use of the RPA demonstrated, with proper oversight, its outstanding capability to support a domestic scenario and showcased its potential to save lives and infrastructure.

Colorado Flood Response

The 100-year flood of 2013 quickly tested the capacity of county and state resources in Colorado when rainfall inundated the Front Range, causing catastrophic flooding affecting 17 counties and resulting in disaster declarations in 14 counties. Helicopter crews from the Colorado National Guard, Wyoming National Guard, and 4th Infantry Division from Fort Carson, again acting in Immediate Response Authority, flew in difficult weather around the clock, working in parallel with ground teams to evacuate 3,233 civilians and 1,347 pets. The Colorado floods provided the first-ever opportunity to transition forces working under Immediate Response Authority by local commanders to a DSC for employment under a federal mission. This successful transition maintained unity of effort in accordance with the National Response

Framework and National Incident Management System. Alongside our federal, state, and National Guard mission partners, as well as the private sector, USNORTHCOM continues to develop and improve relationships enabling us to understand and rapidly respond to citizens in need.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities Playbooks

An earthquake along the San Andreas fault, Cascadia Subduction zone, or New Madrid fault, just to name a few, could lead to a complex catastrophe that immediately becomes a national-level challenge. Hurricane Sandy gave us a glimpse of what impact such a catastrophe could have on our nation. So as not to be late to need, we are working with key stake holders (FEMA, NGB, and TAGs), in order to script likely initial response actions. I call these scripts “playbooks,” and due to the maturity of the Southern California Catastrophic Earthquake Response Plan, USNORTHCOM is utilizing this scenario to develop the first one—with other states and regions to follow. This integrated response planning initiative will facilitate the most effective, unified, and rapid solutions; minimize the cascading effects of catastrophic incidents; and ultimately save lives.

EMERGING MISSION AREAS/INITIATIVES

Special Operations Command North (SOCNORTH)

SOCNORTH is a newly established Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) aligned as a subordinate unified command of USNORTHCOM. This TSOC organizational alignment is consistent with existing constructs established in the other geographic combatant commands, with United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) retaining responsibility for manning, training, and equipping special operations forces. We aligned special operations activities throughout North America under a single commander, providing me with a

flag officer who is operationally accountable for designated operations within our AOR. SOCNORTH also leverages USSOCOM's global network for partnerships and information collaboration in support of executing our homeland defense mission and enabling our partner nations. SOCNORTH operations conducted within the United States are in support of the appropriate federal agencies and in accordance with applicable laws and policy.

Cyber

Malicious cyber activity continues to be a serious and rapidly maturing threat to our national security. Over the past year, various actors targeted U.S. critical infrastructure, information systems, telecommunications systems, and financial institutions. As malicious cyber activities grow in sophistication and frequency, we believe an attack in the physical domain will be preceded by or coincident with cyber events. Of particular concern is the recent release of classified information.

The security breach of NSA intelligence not only created risk and enabled our adversaries in environments where forces are actively engaged in combat, it diverted attention to threat analysis and mitigation efforts which would otherwise be focused on protecting the homeland, which is ultimately the confluence and aim point of threat networks. This act informed our adversaries about risks and vulnerabilities in the U.S., and will almost certainly lead some of our most sophisticated and elusive adversaries to change their practices against us, minimizing our competitive advantage, and reducing the defense of not only the nation but also the approaches to the homeland. It also enabled the potential compromise of military capabilities and operations, further reducing the advantage held by our country. These breaches require us to acknowledge a potential vulnerability in the homeland, and question our operational security that underpins our planning and posture.

To integrate cyberspace operations for our commands and to foster an integrated operational cyberspace planning environment, we stood up a Joint Cyberspace Center. Within a year, we will begin receiving additional defensive capabilities to better protect our enterprise and missions. We are integrating defensive cyberspace operations into our concept plans, which will improve operational effectiveness and continue to increase the scope and scale of cyber play in our national-level exercises. We remain committed to strengthening our partnerships with key stakeholders—such as DHS, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Cyber Command, NSA, and the National Guard—demonstrated by our January 2014 Cyber TAG Conference.

CONCLUSION

Our nation depends on NORAD and USNORTHCOM to defend our homeland and cooperate with our partners to secure global interests. The security of our homeland is continually challenged by symmetric and asymmetric threats across all domains. Despite fiscal challenges, we must maintain our advantages and resiliency through enhancing international partnerships, providing Defense Support of Civil Authorities, and ensuring the defense of the nation and North America. The security of our citizens cannot be compromised. As the military reorganizes and reduces capacity and capability while confronting existing and emerging threats, I believe we must not “break” the things that give the military its competitive advantage: “jointness” to include training and exercises; the all-volunteer force; our national industrial capability; our time-trusted concept of defending the nation forward; and lastly our critical alliances and partnerships.

Threats facing our homeland are more diverse and less attributable than ever. Crises that originate as regional considerations elsewhere in the world can rapidly manifest themselves here at home. No combatant command operates in isolation; events outside the homeland have

cascading effects on the security of North America and its approaches. The men and women of USNORTHCOM and NORAD remain diligent and undeterred as we stand watch over North America and deliver an extraordinary return on investment to the taxpayer. I am honored to serve as their commander and thank the committee for your support of this necessary investment in our national security. I look forward to your questions.

**NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
and UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND
Biography**



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General Charles H. Jacoby, Jr.
UNITED STATES ARMY



General Charles H. Jacoby, Jr. is the Commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command, headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado.

General Jacoby hails from Detroit, MI and was commissioned a second lieutenant upon graduation from the United States Military Academy in 1978. His military education includes the Infantry Basic and Advanced courses, the Command and General Staff College, the School of Advanced Military Studies, and the National War College. He holds a master's degree in History from the University of Michigan.

His command experience includes Commander, A Company, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 325th Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina and Operation URGENT FURY, Grenada; Commander, 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Commander, Joint Task Force-Bravo, United States Southern Command, Honduras and Operation FUERTE APOYO (Strong Support), Hurricane Mitch; and Commanding General, United States Army Alaska and

Deputy Commander, United States Alaskan Command; Commanding General, 1 Corps, including a combat tour in Iraq serving as the Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq. He most recently completed his tour as Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J5); Senior Member, U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee, The Joint Staff.

Additional assignments include Rifle Platoon Leader, C Company, and later Scout Platoon Leader, then S-3 (Air), 1st Battalion (Airborne) 325th Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Instructor, later Assistant Professor, Department of History, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York; Chief, G-3 (Operations), 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; S-3 (Operations), 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; Chief, G-3 (External Evaluation Branch), 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; Staff Action Officer, Congressional Activities Division, Management Directorate, Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, D.C.; Deputy Chief of Staff, later Executive Officer to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Southern Command, Miami, Florida; Deputy Director for Global/Multilateral Issues/International-American Affairs, J-5, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC; and Assistant Division Commander (Operations), later Assistant Division Commander (Support), 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, to include duty as Deputy Commanding General, Combined Joint Task Force-76 and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan.

General Jacoby's awards and decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters), Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster), Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal (with Five Oak Leaf Clusters), Joint Service Commendation Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster), Army Commendation Medal (with Four Oak Leaf Clusters), Army Achievement Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters), Combat Infantryman Badge, Expert Infantryman Badge, Master Parachutist Badge, Air Assault Badge, Ranger Tab, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge.

(Current as of August 2011)

**POSTURE STATEMENT OF
GENERAL JOHN F. KELLY, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND**

BEFORE THE 113TH CONGRESS

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

26 FEBRUARY 2014



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Introduction

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished Members of the Committee: I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss U.S. Southern Command's efforts in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. Mr. Chairman, Members, even our significantly reduced engagement continues to yield dividends in a region of increasing importance to our national interests. While other global concerns dominate the headlines, we should not lose sight of either the challenges or opportunities closer to home. In terms of geographic proximity, trade, culture, immigration, and the environment, no other part of the world has greater impact on daily life in our country than Latin America and the Caribbean.

During my first year in command, I established four priorities for U.S. Southern Command—continuing humane and dignified detention operations at Joint Task Force Guantanamo, countering transnational organized crime, building partner capacity, and planning for contingencies—all of which I look forward to discussing with you today. I thank the Congress for recognizing U.S. Southern Command's vital role in defending our southern approaches and building enduring partnerships with the Americas. I remain concerned, however, by the impact of budget cuts on our ability to support national security interests and contribute to regional security.

Over the next ten years, the Services are reducing deployments of personnel, ships, and aircraft in the context of tightening fiscal constraints. As an economy of force Combatant Command, these reductions have a disproportionately large impact on our operations, exercises, and engagement activities. Insufficient maritime surface vessels and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms impair our primary mission

to detect threats and defend the southern approaches to the U.S. homeland. Similarly, reductions in force allocation severely limit our security cooperation activities, the primary way we engage with and influence the region. Sequestration only exacerbated these challenges, and while its near-term effects may have been mitigated, this reprieve is temporary. As the lowest priority Geographic Combatant Command, U.S. Southern Command will likely receive little, if any, “trickle down” of restored funding. Ultimately, the cumulative impact of our reduced engagement will be measured in terms of U.S. influence, leadership, and relationships in the Western Hemisphere. Severe budget constraints have serious implications for all three, at a time in which regional security issues warrant greater attention.

Overview of Regional Security Issues

Transnational Organized Crime. Mr. Chairman, Members, transnational organized crime is a national security concern for three primary reasons. First, the spread of criminal networks is having a corrosive effect on the integrity of democratic institutions and the stability of several of our partner nations. Transnational criminal organizations threaten citizen security, undermine basic human rights, cripple rule of law through corruption, erode good governance, and hinder economic development.¹ Second, illicit trafficking poses a direct threat to our nation’s public health, safety, and border security. Criminal elements make use of the multitude of illicit pathways in our hemisphere to smuggle drugs, contraband, and even humans directly into the United States. Illegal drugs are an epidemic in our country, wasting lives and fueling violence

¹ Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper. *Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community*. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 12, 2013.

between rival gangs in most of our nation's cities. The third concern is a potential one, and highlights the vulnerability to our homeland rather than an imminent threat: that terrorist organizations could seek to leverage those same smuggling routes to move operatives with intent to cause grave harm to our citizens or even quite easily bring weapons of mass destruction into the United States. I would like to briefly talk about each concern in greater detail to underscore the magnitude of the threat posed by transnational organized crime.

Destabilizing Effects in the Region. The unprecedented expansion of criminal networks and violent gangs is impacting citizen security and stability in the region. Skyrocketing criminal violence exacerbates existing challenges like weak governance; as a United Nations report recently noted, despite improvements, Latin America remains the most unequal and insecure region in the world.² In some countries, homicides are approaching crisis levels. High levels of violence are driving Central American citizens to seek refuge in other countries, including the United States. Driven by economic pressures and rising criminal violence, the number of Hondurans, Guatemalans, and Salvadorans attempting to cross the U.S. Southwest border increased 60 percent in 2013.³

This challenge, however, extends far beyond a threat to public safety; some areas of Central America are under the direct influence of drug trafficking organizations. These groups use their illegally gained wealth to buy off border agents, judges, police officers, and even entire villages. This criminal power and the enormous flow of crime-generated profits are serious threats to the stability of democratic institutions, rule of law, and the international financial system. Corruption also poses an indirect threat to U.S.

² United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). *Human Development Report for Latin America 2013-2014*.

³ Information provided by U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

national security interests, as corrupt government officials in the region can be bribed to procure official documents such as visas or citizenship papers and facilitate travel of special interest aliens. In my view, this vulnerability could be exploited by any number of actors seeking to do us harm.

Illicit Trafficking to the United States. The U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility is the distribution hub for drug trafficking destined for the United States. The majority of heroin sold in the United States comes from either Colombia or Mexico, and we are seeing a significant increase in heroin-related overdoses and deaths in our country.⁴ Additionally, opium poppy production now appears to be increasing in Guatemala. Thousands of tons of precursor chemicals are trafficked into our hemisphere from China, aiding Mexican-based drug cartels that are extending production of U.S.-bound methamphetamine into Guatemala, Nicaragua, and potentially other Central American countries. With an estimated \$84 billion in annual global sales,⁵ cocaine trafficking remains the most profitable activity for criminal networks operating in the region, as the Andean Ridge is the source of every single ounce of cocaine consumed on the planet.⁶ Upon landfall in Central America, bulk cocaine is broken down into multiple smaller shipments for transit into Mexico and the United States, making large interdictions at the U.S. border extremely difficult, despite the heroic efforts of local law enforcement, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and Immigrations and Customs Enforcement. If bulk shipments are not interdicted before making landfall, there is almost no stopping the majority of this cocaine as it moves through Central America and

⁴ U.S. Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration. *2013 National Drug Threat Assessment.*

⁵ United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC). *Estimating illicit financial flows resulting from drug trafficking and other transnational organized crime, 2011.*

Mexico and eventually lands on street corners across America, placing significant strain on our nation's health care and criminal justice systems and costing American taxpayers an estimated \$193 billion in 2007 alone, the most recent year for which data is available.^{7,8}

Cocaine trafficking remains the predominant security challenge throughout the entire region, and I am growing increasingly concerned by the situation in the Caribbean.

According to U.S. Customs and Border Protection, there was a 483% increase in cocaine washing up on Florida's shores in 2013 compared to 2012.

Due in part to counterdrug asset reductions, some old routes appear to be reviving, including ones that lead directly into Florida. In 2013, U.S.-bound cocaine flow through the Caribbean corridor increased to 14% of the overall estimated flow; this number is likely higher and will continue to grow, but we lack a clear picture of cocaine flow due to asset shortfalls. The discovery of cocaine processing lab equipment in the Dominican Republic suggests criminal organizations may be seeking to broaden production in the Caribbean. This may be an indication of an emerging trend, similar to what we saw in Central America in 2012. Additionally, the Caribbean is particularly vulnerable to the violence and insecurity that often comes with illicit trafficking and organized crime. As trafficking from the Dominican Republic into Puerto Rico has increased, so too have violence, crime, and corruption. Once cocaine successfully reaches Puerto Rico, it has reached the U.S. homeland; most of the cocaine arriving in Puerto Rico is successfully transported into the continental United States. According to

⁷ Note: Upon landfall in Central America, bulk cocaine is broken down into multiple smaller shipments for transit into Mexico and the United States, making large interdictions extremely difficult.

⁸ National Drug Intelligence Center (2011). *The Economic Impact of Illicit Drug Use on American Society*. Department of Justice.

the DEA, traffickers are also transporting Colombian heroin, often via Venezuela, to Puerto Rico for onward shipment to Miami, New York, and Houston.

Mr. Chairman, gone are the days of the “cocaine cowboys.” Instead, we and our partners are confronted with cocaine corporations that have franchises all over the world, including 1,200 American cities,⁹ as well as criminal enterprises like the violent transnational gang Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13, that specialize in extortion and human trafficking. The FBI has warned that MS-13 has a significant presence in California, North Carolina, New York, and northern Virginia, and is expanding into new areas of the United States, including Indian reservations in South Dakota.

Additionally, migrant smuggling organizations are increasingly active in the Caribbean, as new laws in Cuba and erroneous perceptions in Haiti of changes in U.S. immigration policy have led to increased migration flows. Smuggling networks are expanding in the Eastern Caribbean, as Cubans and Haitians attempt to reach the United States via Puerto Rico or the U.S. Virgin Islands. These networks are opportunistic and easily expand into other illicit activities, such as the drug trade, special interest alien smuggling, and human trafficking, including exploiting vulnerable migrants by subjecting them to forced labor, a form of modern-day slavery. In 2012, the International Labor Organization estimated that 20.9 million people are victims of forced labor worldwide.¹⁰ Foreign nationals are trafficked for sex and labor, as well as for

⁹U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration. *2011 National Drug Threat Assessment*.

¹⁰ILO Global Estimate of Forced Labour, ILO. See: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms_182004.pdf

commercial sex acts, into the United States from many countries around the world, including Central America, South America, and the Caribbean.¹¹

It has been many years since U.S. Southern Command supported a response to a mass migration event, but I am concerned by the trends we are seeing, especially in Haiti, where we have witnessed a 44-fold increase in Haitian migrants in the Mona Passage. As of February 2013, more than 2,000 Haitians had been documented trying to use this narrow passage as a migration vector, compared to less than 200 in the past eight years *combined*. Smuggling operations have a high human toll; rough seas endanger the lives of rescuers and migrants and have resulted in the death of more than 50 Haitians to date. Thankfully, the Dominican Republic is an important partner in stemming migration flows, and they are working hard to reach a solution on the issue of the roughly 200,000 Haitians residing in the Dominican Republic. However, additional increases in migration would place additional burdens on already over-stretched U.S. Coast Guard and Dominican Republic assets. Absent resource adjustments, stemming these smuggling operations and preventing future loss-of-life will pose major challenges to the United States and our Caribbean partners.

Crime-Terror Convergence. Clearly, criminal networks can move just about anything on these smuggling pipelines. My concern, Mr. Chairman, is that many of these pipelines lead directly into the United States, representing a potential vulnerability that could be exploited by terrorist groups seeking to do us harm. Supporters and sympathizers of Lebanese Hezbollah are involved in both licit and illicit activities in the

¹¹ U.S. Department of State Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. *2013 Trafficking in Persons Report*. Retrieved from: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210742.pdf>.

region, including drug trafficking. Additionally, money, like drugs and people, has become mobile; it is easier to move than ever before, and the vast global illicit economy benefits both criminal and terrorist networks alike. Clan-based, Lebanese Hezbollah-associated criminal networks exploit free trade zones and permissive areas in places like Venezuela, and the Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay Tri-Border to engage in money laundering and other illegal endeavors, as well as recruitment and radicalization efforts. The exact amount of profits generated by these illicit activities in the region is unclear, but it is likely—and at least—in the tens of millions of dollars.

External Actors: Iran and Islamic Extremist Groups. Lebanese Hezbollah has long considered the region a potential attack venue against Israeli and other Western targets, and I remain concerned that the group maintains an operational presence there. Lebanese Hezbollah's partner and sponsor, Iran, has sought closer ties with regional governments, largely to circumvent sanctions and counter U.S. influence. As a state-sponsor of terrorism, Iran's involvement in the Western Hemisphere is a matter for concern. Additionally, members, supporters, and adherents of Islamic extremist groups are present in Latin America. Islamic extremists visit the region to proselytize, recruit, establish business venues to generate funds, and expand their radical networks. Some Muslim communities in the Caribbean and South America are exhibiting increasingly extremist ideology and activities, mostly as a result from ideologues' activities and external influence from the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. Mr. Chairman, we take all these activities seriously, and we and our partners remain vigilant against an evolution in capability of *any* group with the intent to attack the United States, our interests, or our allies. I remain concerned, however, that U.S. Southern Command's limited intelligence

assets may prevent full awareness of the activities of Iranian and terrorist support networks in the region.

Other External Actors. Mr. Chairman, there has been a great deal of attention on the increased regional influence of so-called “external actors” such as China and Russia. Ultimately, we should remember that engagement is not a zero-sum game. Russia and China’s expanding relationships are not *necessarily* at our expense. However, if we want to maintain our partnerships in this hemisphere and maintain even minimal influence, we must *remain engaged* with this hemisphere. Budget cuts are having a direct and detrimental effect on our security cooperation activities, the principal way we engage and promote defense cooperation in the region. The cumulative effect of our reduced engagement is a relative but accelerated decline of trust in our reliability and commitment to the region. Our relationships, our leadership, and our influence in the Western Hemisphere are paying the price.

Russia continues to build on its existing strategic partnerships in Latin America, pursuing an increased regional presence through arm sales, counterdrug cooperation, and bilateral trade agreements. Last year marked a noticeable uptick in Russian power projection and security force personnel in the region. It has been over three decades since we last saw this type of high-profile Russian military presence: a visit by a Russian Navy Interfleet Surface Action Group to Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, and the deployment of two Russian long-range strategic bombers to Venezuela and Nicaragua as part of a training exercise.

As part of its long-term strategy for the region, China is also expanding relationships in Latin America, especially in the Caribbean. In contrast to the Russians,

Chinese engagement is focused primarily on economics, but it uses all elements of national power to achieve its goals. Major investments include potentially \$40 billion to construct an alternative to the Panama Canal in Nicaragua and \$3 billion to Costa Rica and Caribbean nations for myriad infrastructure and social development projects. China is the single biggest source of financing to Venezuela and Ecuador, due to China's thirst for natural resources and contracts for Chinese state-owned companies. Chinese companies hold notable investments in at least five major ports and are major vendors of telecommunications services to 18 nations in the region. In the defense realm, Chinese technology companies are partnering with Venezuela, Brazil, and Bolivia to launch imagery and communications satellites, and China is gradually increasing its military outreach, offering educational exchanges with many regional militaries. In 2013, the Chinese Navy conducted a goodwill visit in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina and conducted its first-ever naval exercise with the Argentine Navy.

Mr. Chairman, I am often asked if I view engagement by these “external actors” as a direct threat to the United States. Generally speaking, I see potential for greater partnership with China in areas such as humanitarian assistance and disaster response. However, I would like to see the Chinese place greater emphasis on respecting human rights—like we do—as part of their overall engagement efforts in the region. The U.S. government continues to encourage China to address shared security challenges in a positive way, such as taking concrete steps to address the massive illicit trafficking of counterfeit pharmaceuticals and precursor chemicals used for methamphetamine and heroin production in Central America and Mexico. While Russian counterdrug cooperation could potentially contribute to regional security, the sudden increase in its

military outreach merits closer attention, as Russia's motives are unclear. Given its history, the region is sensitive to any appearance of increased militarization, which is why it is important that Russia and China promote their defense cooperation in a responsible, transparent manner that helps maintain hemispheric stability and hard-won democratic gains.

Command Priorities

Mr. Chairman, the U.S. military plays an integral role in a whole-of-government approach to address many of these regional security issues. To advance the President's vision and the Department of Defense's policy for the Americas in a resource-constrained environment, U.S. Southern Command focuses our efforts on four priorities. We can accomplish quite a lot with relatively modest investment, but continued budget limitations imperil our ability to build on this progress.

Priority: Detention Operations. Mr. Chairman, I want to speak for a moment about the most important people at Guantanamo: the outstanding men and women that are part of the Joint Task Force at Guantanamo Bay. First, I want to make clear—we who wear the uniform are responsible for one thing at Joint Task Force Guantanamo: detention operations, a mission of enormous complexity and sensitivity. We do not make policy; we follow the orders of the President and Secretary of Defense with the utmost professionalism and integrity.

I have never been prouder of any troops under my command than I am of the young military professionals who stand duty day and night at Guantanamo, serving under a microscope of public scrutiny in one of the toughest and most unforgiving military

missions on the planet. These young men and women are charged with caring for detainees that can often be defiant and violent. Our guard and medical forces endure constant insults, taunts, physical assaults, and splashing of bodily fluids by detainees intent on eliciting a reaction.

And in response, each and every military member at Guantanamo exhibits professionalism, patience, and restraint. This is the story that never gets written: that our service members treat every detainee—even the most disruptive and violent among them—with respect, humanity, and dignity, in accordance with all applicable international and U.S. law. Our troops take very seriously their responsibility to provide for the detainees' safe and humane care. In my opinion, *this* story is worth telling, because our country needs to understand that the young Americans sent by the President and the Congress to do this mission are exceptional; they live and work by an unbreakable code of honor and courage and are among the best one percent of their generation.

Mr. Chairman, as you are aware, I am responsible not just for the welfare of my troops, but also for the welfare of every detainee under my care at Joint Task Force Guantanamo. Over the past year, we implemented improvements to enhance the well-being of the detainees. To adequately address the complex medical issues of the aging detainee population, we expanded and emphasized detailed reporting within our comprehensive system to monitor the health, nutrition, and wellness of every detainee. Last year, some detainees went on self-proclaimed “hunger strikes,” although many of these detainees continued to consume meals—maintaining or even gaining weight throughout the “strike”—and were at no medical risk. As you know, we have

transitioned away from publicly releasing tallies of such hunger strike claims, which in our experience had served to encourage detainee non-compliance and had left the public with a very distorted picture of the overall health of the detainee population.

We continue to support ongoing military commissions, habeas corpus proceedings, periodic review boards, and visits by Congressional and foreign government delegations and non-governmental organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross. We have taken steps to reduce costs and expenses wherever possible, while continuing to maintain the level of humane care that makes Joint Task Force Guantanamo a model for detention operations worldwide. We reduced the cost of the program supporting the detainee library by 45 percent, and reduced contract requirements and expenses in the Intelligence and Security Program, saving an estimated \$6.1 million per year. We also worked with the International Committee of the Red Cross to provide expanded Skype capability to improve detainees' regular communication with family members, at no cost to U.S. taxpayers.

Concerns. Although detention operations have not been adversely affected by budget cuts, I remain concerned by two issues at Guantanamo: advanced medical care and deteriorating infrastructure. Although Naval Station Guantanamo and detainee hospitals are capable of providing adequate care for most detainee conditions, we lack certain specialty medical capabilities necessary to treat potentially complex emergencies and various chronic diseases. In the event a detainee is in need of emergency medical treatment that exceeds on-island capacity, I cannot evacuate him to the United States, as I would a service member.

As a former commander once remarked, we have not been doing detention operations at Guantanamo for twelve years, we have been doing them for one year, twelve times. The expeditionary infrastructure put in place was intended to be temporary, and numerous facilities are showing signs of deterioration and require frequent repair. First and most urgently, some facilities are critical to ensuring the safety and welfare of our troops stationed at Joint Task Force Guantanamo and for the continued humane treatment and health of the detainees. For example, the mess hall—a temporary structure built in the 1990s to support mass migration operations—is at significant risk of structural failure and is corroding after eleven years of continuous use, with holes in the roof and structural support beams. This facility must provide food services to all detainees and over 2,000 assigned personnel on a daily basis. As another example, the High Value Detention Facility is increasingly unsustainable due to drainage and foundation issues. Additionally, I am concerned over inadequate housing for our troops. This housing has other long-term requirements even after detention operations at Guantanamo end; it will be utilized by Naval Station Guantanamo to support a full range of Title 10 missions and nationally-directed contingency requirements for disaster response or mass migration. I am working within the Office of the Secretary of Defense to find solutions to these ongoing facility issues.

Priority: Countering Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC). In response to the challenges posed by the spread of transnational organized crime, U.S.

On October 5, 2013, a U.S.-contracted aircraft carrying one U.S. service member, four DOD contractors, and a Panamanian Air National Guardsman crashed in Colombia, killing four crew members, three of whom were U.S. citizens. The crew was monitoring coastal drug trafficking lanes in the Western Caribbean in support of Operation MARTILLO.

Southern Command is working with our interagency partners to counter the threats posed by criminal networks and illicit trafficking, focusing on those networks that threaten citizen safety in the region and the security of the United States. Mr. Chairman, our contribution to this effort is relatively small but important, and comes with real sacrifice. In 2013, the crash of a counternarcotics flight in Colombia led to the tragic death of Air Force Master Sergeant Martin Gonzales, two other dedicated American contractors, and a Panamanian officer, and the serious injury of the two pilots, highlighting the true human cost of this fight. The individuals who died will be remembered for their service and their commitment to fighting drug trafficking and criminal networks whose products are killing so many of our countrymen and women every year.

Support to CTOC Efforts in Central America. Last year, we redirected our focus to Central American security institutions involved in appropriate defense missions like border and maritime security. This refinement capitalizes on minimal Department of Defense resources, while also being sensitive to perceptions of militarization of the region. We are prioritizing our support to interagency counter-threat finance efforts and expanding our focus on converging threats, including illicit trafficking via commercial shipping containers, which could be exploited to move weapons of mass destruction into the United States. By supporting the targeting of key illicit financial nodes and commercial linkages, we aim to help degrade the capacities of both criminal and terrorist groups.

Now entering its third year, Operation MARTILLO continues to demonstrate commitment by the United States, our partner nations and European allies to counter the

spread of transnational criminal organizations and protect citizens in Central America from the violence, harm, and exploitation wrought by criminal networks. However, force allocation cuts by the Services are taking their toll on operational results; in 2013, Operation MARTILLO disrupted 132 metric tons of cocaine, compared with 152 metric tons of cocaine in 2012, due to limited assets. On a positive note, the operation has led to improved interoperability and increased

partner nation contributions. Our partners helped prevent 66 metric tons of cocaine from reaching the United States last year; 50

<i>Operation MARTILLO FY 13 Disruptions</i>	
<i>Cocaine</i>	<i>132,191 kgs</i>
<i>Marijuana</i>	<i>41,232 lbs</i>
<i>Bulk cash</i>	<i>\$3.5 million</i>
<i>Conveyances</i>	<i>107</i>

percent of Joint Interagency Task Force South’s successes would not have occurred without the participation of partner nations. Limited and declining Department of Defense assets will influence the next phase of the operation, as Operation MARTILLO's original objectives may no longer be achievable. In the year ahead, we will seek to employ non-traditional solutions, within our current authorities, to partially mitigate detection and monitoring shortfalls. However, lack of assets will continue to constrain the operation's full effectiveness, and has the potential to be perceived as lack of political will on the part of the U.S. government to continue this fight.

Interagency Partnerships. Our CTOC efforts focus on providing support to our law enforcement partners. These partnerships ensure a whole of government approach to both operations and capacity building efforts. To mitigate asset shortfalls, we rely heavily on the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection, which now provide the bulk of the ships and aircraft available to disrupt drugs bound for the United States. The heroic men and women of DEA’s Foreign Deployed Advisory and Support Team

(FAST) provide critical support to partner nation interdiction operations, and we are fortunate to have nine DEA Special Investigative Units working to improve regional law enforcement capacity. In my view, DEA is a known, essential partner, and their focus on building the investigative and intelligence capacities of vetted law enforcement units complements our own efforts to professionalize regional defense and security forces.

In late 2013, U.S. Southern Command and the Treasury Department created a Counter-Threat Finance Branch, an analytical unit that will map illicit networks, combat the financial underpinnings of national security threats in the region, and support the development of targeted financial measures and U.S. law enforcement actions. As one

U.S. Southern Command has 34 representatives from 15 different federal agencies assigned and embedded in our headquarters staff.

example, we provided analytic support to the Treasury Department's financial sanctions against Los Cachiros in

Honduras. We also work with Immigration and Customs Enforcement to aggressively target criminal networks that traffic in special interest aliens and contraband throughout the region. Additionally, U.S. Southern Command and the FBI expanded their analytic partnership to include the FBI's International Operations and Criminal Investigative Divisions. This enhanced partnership helps both agencies further develop partner nation capacity in countering transnational organized crime. We also partnered with the Department of Homeland Security to provide network analysis in support of Operation CITADEL, which targeted the movements of illicit proceeds in Central America. In Colombia, we are working with the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization to assist our Colombian partners in countering the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) used by terrorist groups like the FARC. Finally, we are also

coordinating with the Department of State's Bureaus of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement and Western Hemisphere Affairs to explore the possibility of providing logistical support to regional law enforcement operations.

Impact of Budget Cuts—CTOC. Severe budget constraints are significantly degrading our ability defend the southern approaches to the United States. Sequestration merely compounds the ongoing challenge of limited and declining U.S. government maritime and air assets required for detection, monitoring, and “end-game” interdiction missions. Irrespective of sequestration cuts, we face a sharp downturn in availability of large surface assets such as U.S. Navy frigates and U.S. Coast Guard High Endurance Cutters, which face decommissioning or are approaching the end of their expected lifespan. The eighth and final U.S. Coast Guard National Security Cutter, which will be delivered in the next few years, will be a critical asset to U.S. government efforts to protect our southern approaches.

Mr. Chairman, the impact of diminishing asset allocation will continue to

In 2013, Joint Interagency Task Force South was unable to take action on 74% of actionable illicit trafficking events due to lack of assets.

impede our mission even if sequestration is reversed; our operational effectiveness is

directly proportional to the number of assets we can put against detection, monitoring, and interdiction operations. When better resourced several years ago, we were able to disrupt a significant amount—more than 240 metric tons—of cocaine heading towards the United States. Last year, 20 more metric tons of cocaine reached the United States due to reduced asset availability, a number that will increase inversely as the availability of U.S. government assets decreases.

Other Issues. Additionally, I remain concerned over the planned construction of wind farm sites in North Carolina that will interfere with our Relocatable Over-The-Horizon Radar (ROTHR) radar system in Virginia. I am also concerned over wind projects in Texas that will impact ROTHR systems in that state. These wind farms could and likely will adversely impact our ROTHR systems, the only persistent wide-area surveillance radars capable of tracking illicit aircraft in Latin America and the Caribbean. We are working within the Department of Defense and with developers and stakeholders to develop potential mitigation solutions, but I have little confidence we will succeed.

Priority: Building Partner Capacity. Having strong partners is the cornerstone of U.S. Southern Command's engagement strategy and is essential for our national security. Capable and effective partners respect human rights, share in the costs and responsibilities of ensuring regional security, and help us detect, deter, and interdict threats *before* they reach the U.S. homeland. Our persistent human rights engagement also helps encourage defense cooperation, trust, and confidence, which cannot be surged when a crisis hits, and cannot be achieved through episodic deployments or chance contacts. Trust must be built, nurtured, and sustained through regular contact.

Engagement with Colombia. Our partner Colombia has paid the ultimate price in terms of their blood and national treasure to bring the FARC—who have been serial human rights violators for decades—to the negotiating table. The Colombians have fought heroically for a peaceful, democratic Colombia, which will be a powerful symbol of hope and prosperity, but it is far too soon to declare victory. Mr. Chairman, it is absolutely imperative we remain engaged as one

According to a Colombian NGO, between 2001 and 2009, nearly 750,000 women were victims of sexual violence, rape, and enslavement at the hands of illegally armed groups like the FARC.

of our strongest allies works to consolidate its hard-won success. To that end, U.S. Southern Command is providing advice and assistance to the Colombian military's transformation efforts, as it works to improve interoperability and transition to an appropriate role in post-conflict Colombia. With Colombia increasingly taking on the role of security exporter, we are facilitating the deployment of Colombian-led training teams and subject matter experts and attendance of Central American personnel to law enforcement and military academies in Colombia as part of the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security Cooperation. This is a clear example of a sizeable return on our relatively modest investment and sustained engagement.

Engagement in South America. In Peru, U.S. Southern Command and the DEA are working together to support Peru's ongoing efforts against the Shining Path, which are beginning to yield significant operational successes. An investment of 6 U.S. personnel, who trained combat medical instructors from Peru and El Salvador, resulted in the training of over 2,000 members of the Peruvian and Salvadoran military, including Salvadoran soldiers destined for stability operations in Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Haiti. We are working with Chile on capacity-building efforts in Central America and exploring possible future engagements in the Pacific. In Brazil, broader bilateral challenges have affected our defense relations. Our military-to-military cooperation at the operational and tactical levels, however, remains strong, and we are committed to supporting the United States' growing global partnership with Brazil. We continue to engage with Brazilian security forces in the run-up to the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics. Brazil participated in several of our multinational exercises last

In 2013, U.S. Southern Command facilitated the delivery of life-saving medicine to 140 patients in Brazil following a tragic nightclub fire.

year, including playing a leading role in PANAMAX, which focuses on the defense of the Panama Canal.

Engagement in Central America. In 2013, U.S. Southern Command provided critical infrastructure and operational support to the new Guatemalan Interagency Task Force, which has contributed to significant disruption of illicit trafficking along the Guatemalan-Mexican border and is now viewed by the Government of Guatemala as a model for future units. In collaboration with U.S. Northern Command, we are planning initiatives in Guatemala and Belize to support Mexico's new southern border strategy. I recently visited Guatemala and was struck by the government's strong commitment to work with human rights groups and strengthen its democratic institutions, while also doing its part to stem the massive flow of illicit trafficking heading to our country. Unfortunately, current legislative restrictions on provisions such as Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training, found in the FY14 Consolidated Appropriations Act, limit the United States' ability to fully engage with the Guatemalan military and security forces. In another example of successful interagency partnerships, Joint Task Force Bravo supported the Belizean Defense Force and DEA in the eradication of 100,446 marijuana plants and the seizure of 330 pounds of marijuana.

Along Panama's Pacific Coast, we constructed three key maritime facilities and are providing counternarcotics training to Panamanian coast guard and maritime security forces. Mr. Chairman, I applaud the Government of Panama in their handling of last year's smuggling incident involving Cuban military equipment aboard a North Korean vessel. We are fortunate to have partners like Panama that are committed to ensuring international security. Finally, I am particularly proud of our support to the third

Since 2003, the El Salvador Armed Forces have contributed 11 rotations in support Operation Iraqi Freedom and three rotations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

deployment of members of the El Salvador Armed Forces to Afghanistan. Augmented by the

New Hampshire National Guard, the Salvadoran unit returned this past December from serving as a Police Advisory Team that provided training to Afghan security forces. Like Panama, El Salvador is just one example of the outstanding partners we have in this part of the world—partners that are doing their part to ensure peace and security within and beyond their borders.

Engagement in the Caribbean. Throughout Central America and the Caribbean, U.S. Southern Command has constructed or improved partner nation naval and coast guard operating bases and facilities and delivered more than \$3 million in counternarcotics training and non-lethal equipment, including a total of 42 high-speed interceptor boats provided since 2008 that have supported Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF) South interdiction operations. In support of the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), we are working to improve maritime patrol and intercept capabilities of our Caribbean partners. Through CBSI, a maritime Technical Assistance Field Team—comprised of joint Coast Guard and Department of Defense personnel—provides hands-on technical assistance, in-country mentoring, and training to 13 CBSI partner nations, with the goal of helping these countries develop accountable and sustainable engineering, maintenance, and logistics and procurement systems. The TAFT program is a collaborative interagency effort funded by the U.S. Department of State, using Foreign Military Financing and INCLE funding. In Haiti, the government is committed to improving its disaster response capabilities. Haiti continues to make gradual social and

economic progress after 2010's devastating earthquake, and the Government of Haiti is committed to improving its disaster response capabilities. Led by Brazil and comprised of a multinational force that includes personnel from Uruguay, Chile, and Guatemala, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has played a critical role in Haiti's efforts to rebuild, working with the Haitian National Police to ensure security. As MINUSTAH draws down, I see a continued need for international engagement in Haiti to guarantee lasting stability.

Cooperation on Counterterrorism. We also work with the interagency, U.S. Embassy Country Teams, and our partner nations to counter the encroachment of both Sunni and Shi'a Islamic extremism, recruitment, and radicalization efforts that support terrorism activities. We conduct multiple engagement efforts—including Joint Combined Exchange Training, subject matter expert and intelligence exchanges, counterterrorism-focused exercises, and key leader engagements—here in the United States and in countries throughout the region. Sustained engagement helps build relationships, an essential tool in the fight against terrorism. Through intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation, our partners are better able to mitigate terrorist threats before they can cause mass destruction, destabilize a country, or reach the U.S. homeland.

Human Rights and Defense Professionalization. Everything we do at U.S. Southern Command begins and ends with human rights. Mr. Chairman, a lot of people talk about human rights, but the U.S. military *does* human rights. We live it. We teach it. We enforce it. U.S. Southern Command's Human Rights Initiative continued to break new ground in 2013, promoting dialogue and cooperation between regional military forces and human rights groups and strengthening institutional capacity in Guatemala and

Honduras. Since its inception, our Human Rights Initiative has helped promote reform throughout the region, and the results speak for themselves. Military forces serving democratic governments in the region understand, and take seriously, their responsibility to respect and protect human rights. Ten partner nations have formally committed to implementing the Human Rights Initiative, building an institutional culture of respect for human rights within their militaries.

U.S. Southern Command also promotes human rights through law of armed conflict programs led by the Defense Institute of Legal Studies and through academic institutions like the Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, the Western Hemisphere Institute for

In 2013, 1,417 students from the region participated in the International Military Education Training (IMET) program, an invaluable investment in future defense leaders.

Security Cooperation, and the Inter-American Air Forces Academy. Additionally, the entire premise of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program promotes an environment conducive to students learning and sharing U.S. values and democracy, with human rights portions embedded in nearly every course. Mr. Chairman, IMET is one of our most valuable engagement tools; professional military education improves how our partners work with us in a joint, interoperable world. Participants not only better understand our culture; they share our perspective, and want to work with us to advance U.S. and regional interests.

Cyber Security and Information Operations. In the region, U.S. Southern Command works to ensure the continued security of Department of Defense networks and communication infrastructure. We are also slowly making progress in strengthening regional cyber defense and information operations capabilities. In 2013, U.S. Southern

Command, working with the Perry Center, brought together strategy and policy officers from the region to share information on current cyber security threats. Colombia, Chile, and Brazil have each expressed interest in sharing “lessons learned” on building effective cyber security institutions. Through Operation SOUTHERN VOICE, 50 information operation practitioners from 11 Western Hemisphere countries shared capabilities and best practices. In the year ahead, we are partnering with Colombia to build information-related capabilities in Guatemala and Panama, and with U.S. Northern Command to do the same in Mexico.

Multinational Exercises and Humanitarian Assistance. U.S. Southern Command’s multinational exercise and humanitarian and civic assistance programs encourage collective action and demonstrate our values and commitment to the region. Last year’s UNITAS and TRADEWINDS exercises helped improve interoperability among our hemisphere’s maritime forces. During our annual humanitarian and civic assistance exercises NEW HORIZONS and BEYOND THE HORIZONS, U.S. forces improved their readiness and provided medical care to 34,677 patients in El Salvador,

In 2013, we executed 140 minimal cost projects and worked with local populations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to construct and supply schools, community shelters, clinics, and hospitals.

Panama, and Belize. These humanitarian missions are one of the most effective tools in our national security toolkit, and one that I believe warrants greater employment. In any given year, we are able to send around 700 medical professionals to the region; Cuba, in contrast, sends around 30,000, mostly to Venezuela. In 2013, our collaboration with the private sector and non-governmental organizations resulted in contributions of \$4.3 million in gifts-in-kind and services to our humanitarian activities. Mr. Chairman, I cannot overstate the importance of these types of activities by

the U.S. military, especially in terms of influence and access. As Secretary Hagel noted, our humanitarian engagement offers the next generation of global citizens direct experience with the positive impact of American values and ideals.

Perceptions of "Militarization." Mr. Chairman, I want to close this section by responding to the perception by some that our engagement is "militarizing" the region. In my view, these concerns reflect a misunderstanding of the actual role the U.S. military plays in this part of the world. As an example, our Special Operations Forces are among the most qualified, culturally sensitive, and linguistically capable trainers in the U.S. military, and above all, they excel at building trust and forging personal relationships that are essential to supporting our national interests. Whether it's a small team at the tactical level or an official engagement at my level, all our efforts are focused on *professionalizing* military and security forces, to help our partners become more accountable to civilian authority, more capable, and to above all respect the human rights of the citizens they are charged to protect. Our efforts are part of a whole-of-government approach—involving DEA, Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, and many others—to strengthen governance and foster accountable, transparent, and effective institutions throughout the Western Hemisphere.

Mr. Chairman, engagement by the U.S. military can make a real and lasting difference, especially in terms of promoting respect for human rights. Ultimately, if we want regional militaries to honor, respect, and accept civilian control and demonstrate an institutional culture of respect for human rights, that message must come from a military that lives by that code. For the U.S. military, our own training begins and ends with human rights; it is at the center of everything we do and an integral part of every

interaction with partner nations. I regularly meet with human rights groups in Washington and throughout the region, and human rights is a major theme in every engagement with my counterparts in regional militaries.

Throughout the world, the U.S. military has a unique network of alliances and partnerships, and our regional approach can provide a framework for engagement by the broader U.S. interagency. Thanks in part to our efforts, Colombia is now a beacon of hope and stability with one of the most highly professionalized militaries in the region; Central America is now the focus for numerous interagency initiatives; the Caribbean now routinely shares information in support of international counterdrug operations; and perhaps most importantly, today the hemisphere is characterized by militaries under civilian control that recognize their fundamental responsibility to respect human rights. In my mind, there is no more valuable return on engagement than that.

Impact of Budget Cuts—BPC. In FY 13, we began seeing the initial effects of sequestration, which resulted in drastic force allocation cuts by all the Services. In turn, reduced availability of forces adversely impacted our execution of plans and engagement activities. Severe budget constraints are affecting our established military-to-military relationships that took decades to establish, limiting our ability to build on the progress I just described. Mr. Chairman, let me be frank: reduced engagement risks the deterioration of U.S. leadership and influence in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean.

In FY 13, budget uncertainty caused the cancellation of four major exercises, including FUERZAS COMANDO—one of only two exercises focused on counterterrorism—and 225 engagement activities that are critical to building capable and

effective defense and security forces in the region. The Navy's cancelled deployment of CONTINUING PROMISE was felt throughout the region; it is our single most impactful humanitarian mission, demonstrating U.S. values and creating goodwill and positive views towards our country. We rely heavily on the National Guard's State Partnership Program to conduct our activities, and the cancellation of 69 events was detrimental to our efforts to maintain long-term security relationships. Reductions in force allocation also created significant gaps in persistent Civil Affairs coverage. The cancellation of Civil Affairs deployments has created a loss of credibility with our partner nations and our partners in U.S. Embassies in the region, who have questioned U.S. Southern Command's ability to fulfill our commitments. Finally, the Perry Center, which helps build capacity at the ministerial level, is facing a severe 50 percent cut in funding over the several upcoming fiscal years.

Priority: Planning for Contingencies. Lastly, planning and preparing for possible contingencies is one of U.S. Southern Command's core missions. Every year, we regularly exercise our rapid response capabilities in a variety of scenarios, including responding to a natural disaster, mass migration event, an attack on the Panama Canal, or evacuating American citizens. In 2013, we conducted our INTEGRATED ADVANCE exercise, which focuses on improving coordination with interagency partners in response to a mass migration event in the Caribbean. On this issue, we are fortunate to have an excellent exercise, operational, and planning relationship with Homeland Security Task Force Southeast, and together we work to defend the southern approaches to the United States. That mission, however, continues to be significantly impacted by force allocation cuts.

Impact of Budget Cuts—Contingency Response. Mr. Chairman, our ability to respond to regional contingencies such as a mass migration event or natural disaster was impaired in 2013, a trend that could continue in 2014. U.S. Southern Command has minimal assigned and allocated forces, and we rely on the Services—especially the Navy—to “surge” forces and assets when a crisis hits. As the Services absorb large reductions to their budgets, this will affect U.S. Southern Command’s ability to immediately respond to crises and disasters, which could lead to preventable human suffering and loss-of-life. As I mentioned earlier, I am deeply concerned by the uptick in Haitian migration in the Mona Passage and the continued scarcity of U.S. government assets in the Caribbean. As currently resourced, U.S. Southern Command faces considerable challenges to rapidly support a mass migration response.

Our People

Headquarters Budget. Mr. Chairman, as you can see, we can accomplish a lot with a relatively small portion of the Department of Defense budget. Last year, the forced furloughs of 572 civilian employees had a significant impact on our ability to conduct our missions. Fortunately, the temporary budget reprieve should spare our workforce the pain of furloughs in FY 14 and FY 15, but continued budget uncertainty will likely lead to an inevitable “talent drain” as our best and brightest civilian employees seek more stable employment opportunities. Although we appreciate the near-term budget solution, the long-term challenge of sequestration has not been resolved. It has merely been deferred.

Partial Mitigation to Budget Cuts. Per guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Southern Command must strive for a goal of 20 percent

reductions in our headquarters budget and military and civilian personnel by FY 2019.

Combined with the potential of continued sequestration, resource cuts require a

To ensure our workforce has mission-critical capabilities, our Joint Training Program offered training opportunities to 85 military and civilian joint staff officers, and also delivered cultural training to enhance our interactions in the region.

fundamental re-look at what U.S.

Southern Command will and will not be

able to do with limited resources. Due

to ongoing resource constraints, I have

directed a transformation effort at our headquarters to look holistically at our strategy and resources. Limited defense dollars must be applied wisely, and we are seeking to preserve our core military missions and functions. As we work through this process, we will continue to emphasize our partnerships with the interagency, NGOs, and private sector to help mitigate ongoing fiscal challenges. U.S. Southern Command has proven success in this area, averaging \$16 million in return on investment annually from this collaboration, all of it directly impacting our missions.

Support Services. U.S. Southern Command's most important resource is its Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsman, and civilian employees. The safety and security of our people is of utmost importance, and I am concerned by the severe funding cuts to the security force that guards our headquarters. Additionally, my assigned service members, especially junior enlisted personnel, continue to face significant financial hardships trying to make ends meet under the current Cost of Living Allowance—a mere \$28 for an E3 and just \$33 for an E9—in Miami, one of the most expensive cities in the world, especially when it comes to car and home insurance rates.¹²

¹² UBS. *Pricings and Earnings Report, Edition 2012*. Geneva: September, 2012; Center for Housing Policy. *Losing Ground: The Struggle for Middle Income Households to Afford the Rising Costs of Housing and Transportation*.

Compounding this concern is the uncertainty over military compensation and reductions in retirement benefits.

Our family support services also face significant funding strains, forcing us to breach sacred promises to our Armed Forces families. We take suicide prevention very seriously at our headquarters, and last year we delivered four separate programs aimed at preventing suicides and raising awareness. However, the Army was forced to decrement support services at nearly every installation and facility, including U.S. Army Garrison Miami. As a result, our Substance Abuse and Suicide Prevention Programs have lost the Clinical/Treatment Program and will lose both the Prevention Program Coordinator and the Suicide Program Manager/Employee Assistance Coordinator by 2015.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, in closing I would like to offer a personal observation from my first year in command. This region does not ask for much. Most nations in this part of the world *want* our partnership, our friendship, and our support. They *want* to work with us, because they recognize that we share many of the same values and interests, many of the same challenges and concerns. Some of my counterparts perceive that the United States is disengaging from the region and from the world in general. We should remember that our friends and allies are not the only ones watching our actions closely. Reduced engagement could itself become a national security problem, with long-term, detrimental effects on U.S. leadership, access, and interests in a part of the world where

October 2012. According to apartment market research firm AXOIMetrics, the average effective rent (which includes concessions) in Miami is \$1,269 per month, compared to the U.S. as a whole at \$964. According to the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University, the Miami rental market has the greatest share of severely cost-burdened renters (i.e. renters who pay more than half their income to rent) in the country.

our engagement has made a real and lasting difference. And in the meantime, drug traffickers, criminal networks, and other actors, unburdened by budget cuts, cancelled activities, and employee furloughs, will have the opportunity to exploit the partnership vacuum left by reduced U.S. military engagement. Thank you.

Annex: 2013 Component Accomplishments**U.S. Army South (ARSOUTH)****Headquarters: San Antonio, Texas**

- **Security Cooperation:** ARSOUTH conducted 166 security cooperation events in 19 countries in U.S. Southern Command's area of responsibility. These events represent 166 instances of engagement and building partner nation capabilities with the other militaries in the region.
- **Building Partner Nation Capacity to Counter Terrorism:** ARSOUTH conducted 26 Subject Matter Expert Exchanges in ten countries that included over 800 host nation soldiers. The engagements included: Medical, Mountain Operations, Search and Rescue, Logistics, Force Protection, Communications and Personal Security Detail.
- **Countering Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC):** ARSOUTH conducted training with the newly organized Guatemalan Interagency Task Force (IATF). The IATF consists of 242 personnel from the Army, Police, Customs, and Attorney General's Office. Training consisted of instruction focused on driving tactical vehicles, basic tactics, weapons qualification on all assigned systems, Harris Radio procedures, logistics, combat lifesaving, advanced maneuver, combat medic, and crowd control. The IATF is currently conducting border security operations on the Guatemala/Mexico border.
- **Civil Military Relations:** Civil Military Relations Professional Development Exchanges provide a forum for bilateral executive-level information exchanges. Participants include Partner Nation Civil Affairs Officers and Government Officials, U.S. Military and government officials, National Guard State Partnership Program representatives, and Non-Governmental and Intergovernmental Organizations. ARSOUTH conducted Civil Military Relations Professional Development Exchanges in Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, improving the ability of these countries to conduct inter-organizational coordination during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.
- **Personnel Recovery Operations:** ARSOUTH conducted seven engagements with six countries, focused on increasing partner nation capabilities and capacity to conduct search and rescue operations. This focus was a direct result of lessons learned during the Haiti earthquake. Due to budget uncertainty, ARSOUTH has significantly reduced engagement planning in FY 14 and FY 15.
- **Intelligence Security Cooperation:** The ARSOUTH Intelligence Team conducted 18 major Intelligence Security Cooperation engagement activities enabling military intelligence capacity building in support of countering transnational threats in the following countries: Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama and Peru.
- **Logistics Security Cooperation:** The ARSOUTH Logistics Team conducted 25 Security Cooperation engagements, which enabled military logistics capacity building in support of CTOC, Staff Talk Agreements, and Building Partner Nation Capacity in 10 countries.
- **Latin American Cooperation:** ARSOUTH Latin American Cooperation Funds (LACF) supported 46 engagements/activities in eight countries in support of

ARSOUTH Security Cooperation objectives. LACF support includes: Army-to-Army Staff Talks with key countries, Foreign Liaison Officers assigned to ARSOUTH, Conference of American Armies, professional development exchanges on multiple topics, Army commander and distinguished visitor program, and Joint/Combined/Multinational Exercises and Operations.

- **Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP):** HAP conducts activities to build partner nation capacity in providing essential services to its civilian population including, responding to disaster and other crises; reinforcing security; and sustaining stability in a host nation or region. ARSOUTH, the HAP construction program manager, completed ten projects in Belize, Panama and Peru, and initiated planning for 19 new construction projects in Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, and Peru.
- **Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI):** GPOI is a U.S. government-funded security assistance program to enhance international capacity to effectively conduct United Nations and regional peace support operations. ARSOUTH, the GPOI construction program manager, completed four GPOI projects in Guatemala, Paraguay, and Peru, and initiated planning for 4 new construction projects in El Salvador and Guatemala.
- **Staff Talks:** ARSOUTH, representing the Army Chief of Staff, conducted four Steering Committee Meetings and four Executive Session Staff Talks with the Armies of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and El Salvador, and one Working Group with Peru resulting in strengthened key leader relationships and more than 130 Agreed-to-Actions planned through 2018, supporting bilateral and regional goals and interests.
- **INTEGRATED ADVANCE 2013:** INTEGRATED ADVANCE 2013, a joint operational exercise, focused on conducting migrant operations in the Caribbean Sea, marked the first large scale deployment of ARSOUTH personnel and capabilities since Operation Unified Response in Haiti in 2010. Over 300 U.S. Army personnel, 100 sister service personnel, and almost 100 personnel from other governmental agencies came together in a whole-of-government response. INTEGRATED ADVANCE 2013 exercised ARSOUTH's commitment to form the core of a US Southern Command Joint Task Force, rapidly integrate other joint and interagency forces, and conduct mission command of joint operations.
- **PANAMAX 2013:** PANAMAX is a joint and combined operational exercise focused on the defense of the Panama Canal by a multi-national joint task force. USSOUTHCOM significantly de-scoped PANAMAX 2013 resulting in a small table-top exercise focused on conducting mission planning in a time-constrained environment. ARSOUTH provided mentorship to the Brazilian led Combined Forces Land Component Command, which included 38 participants from nine countries. This exercise coincided with the first major deployment of an ARSOUTH team to Panama to participate in a Government of Panama national exercise (PANAMAX – Alpha). This team of 40 U.S. personnel worked with the Government of Panama coordinating U.S. forces assistance during a simulated national disaster event to significantly increase cooperation and trust between the Governments of Panama and the United States.
- **BEYOND THE HORIZON 2013:** BEYOND THE HORIZON is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Southern Command-sponsored Joint, Interagency, and Combined Field Training Exercise. The exercise provides and incorporates

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance construction projects, Medical Readiness Exercises, and other infrastructure projects. ARSOUTH was the executive planning agent for these exercises conducted in El Salvador and Panama, which involved the deployment of approximately 2700 U.S. service members into two supported countries. BEYOND THE HORIZON 2013 resulted in the completion of 11 engineer projects including schools and clinics, 4 Medical Readiness Exercises, one Dental Readiness Exercise and one Specialty Medical Readiness Exercise that provided care to approximately 23,641 patients and approximately 6,634 animals for veterinary support. The exercises were supported by over 200 El Salvadoran and Panamanian military and interagency personnel working side-by-side with U.S. personnel.

- **Conference of the American Armies (CAA):** The Conference of the American Armies (25 countries and two International Military Organizations) contributes to peacekeeping operations and disaster relief operations through the creation and use of mechanisms and procedures that improve the collective capacities and interoperability of its members. This year, ARSOUTH represented the Army Chief of Staff at the Emerging Threats Conference in Colombia, Disaster Relief exercise in Mexico, Extraordinary Commander's Conference in Mexico, Civil-Military Cooperation Exercise in Canada, Environmental Conference in Brazil, IED Ad-Hoc meeting in Colombia, Procedures Training & Education conference in Uruguay, Communications exercise via CAA Webpage, Army commanders VTC and the Preparatory Commanders Conference in Mexico.
- **Reintegration:** ARSOUTH, as supported Commander for Personnel Recovery Phase III (Reintegration operations), executed a Reintegration Operation following the crash of an operational theater aircraft. The aircraft was operating over Colombia in support of Operation MARTILLO. Following the successful recovery of the survivors by the Colombian Army, ARSOUTH coordinated transfer and movement of the survivors to Brooke Army Medical Center, San Antonio, Texas where all aspects of the reintegration were completed.
- **Continuous Operational Intelligence Support:** The ARSOUTH Intelligence Team provided continuous intelligence reach-back support and direct support forward to Joint Task Force Bravo, Joint Interagency Task Force South, Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay, the U.S. Interagency, and partner nations in Central and South America in support of numerous named operations. Throughout the year, persistent forward intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support was maintained in Colombia, Guatemala, and Honduras. U.S. Army Force Protection Detachments also maintained permanent presence in nine countries.

**U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO)
Headquarters: Mayport, Florida**

- **Operation MARTILLO:** Six frigates, High Speed Vessel (HSV) SWIFT, four fixed-wing Maritime Patrol aircraft and two Scientific Development Squadron ONE detachments deployed to support Operation MARTILLO, conducting Countering

Transnational Organized Crime (C-TOC) Operations under the direction of Joint Interagency Task Force South.

- **Southern Partnership Station 2013:** Southern Partnership Station (SPS) is a series of Navy/Marine Corps engagements focused on Theater Security Cooperation, specifically Building Partner Capacity, through subject matter expert exchanges with partner nation militaries and civilian security forces. SPS engagements include Community Relations Projects that focus on our partnerships, shared interests, and shared values. SPS Deployments included:
 - **HSV 2013:** HSV SWIFT deployed to the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) February to May 2013 to conduct Building Partner Capacity engagements in Belize, Guatemala, and Honduras, and to participate in Operation MARTILLO.
 - **Oceanographic 2013:** Survey Ship USNS PATHFINDER conducted bilateral hydrographic surveys with Chile in the Eastern Pacific and with Panama in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific.
- **PANAMAX 2013:** Commander USNAVSO served as the Commander of Multi-National Forces South, leading a coalition of 19 partner nations in the 11th annual exercise designed to execute stability operations under the support of UN Security Council Resolutions, provide interoperability training for participating multinational staffs, and build partner nation capacity to plan and execute complex multinational operations. PANAMAX 13 was executed as a table-top exercise, and focused on multinational crisis action planning.
- **UNITAS 2013:** Commander USNAVSO planned and executed the 54th iteration of multinational maritime exercise UNITAS, which included 16 partner nations, 17 ships, one submarine, and 12 helicopters and aircraft. Conducted every year since 1960, UNITAS is the longest-running international military training exercise in the world. Colombia employed maritime forces in cooperative maritime security operations in order to maintain access, enhance interoperability, and build enduring partnerships that foster regional security in the USSOUTHCOM AOR.
- **INTEGRATED ADVANCE 2013:** USNAVSO participated in Exercise INTEGRATED ADVANCE 2013, which examined a whole-of-government response to a Caribbean Mass Migration crisis. USNAVSO provided the deputy commander for Joint Task Force Migrant Operations, while also designating Destroyer Squadron FOUR ZERO as the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander and standing up a Maritime Coordination and Control Element within the Joint Task Force construct. The highly successful exercise focused on strengthening interoperability and cooperation between DOD and Interagency organizations.
- **Continuing Promise 2013:** In lieu of CONTINUING PROMISE 2013, a team of Navy medical providers conducted medical exchanges with Peru and Honduras, working side-by-side with partner nation medical professionals to generate a baseline for future CONTINUING PROMISE Missions.
- **Navy Seabees:** 85 Seabees deployed to Naval Station Guantanamo Bay to support construction/refurbishment projects throughout the USSOUTHCOM AOR. From this detachment, Seabee details deployed in support of HSV SPS 2013 and Operation MARTILLO while also completing projects in support of Naval Station Guantanamo Bay and the Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay Commander. Additionally, Seabees

supported Naval Station Guantanamo Bay with Public Works Officer discretionary projects and clean-up/relief projects following Hurricane Sandy. Following the cancelation of Continuing Promise 2013, the Seabees still supported a Subject Matter Expert Exchange with Peruvian Engineers.

**12th Air Force (Air Forces Southern)
Headquarters: Tucson, Arizona**

- **Security Cooperation:** Air Forces Southern (AFSOUTH) conducted 19 security cooperation events in eight countries in U.S. Southern Command's area of responsibility. Engagements focused on improving partner nation communications, maintenance, intelligence, air patrol operations, space capabilities, close air support, public affairs, and flight medicine capabilities.
- **Sovereign Skies Expansion Program:** AFSOUTH used successful lessons learned from the Dominican Republic and Colombia programs to strengthen air force capabilities in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Training included helicopter maintenance; ISR; logistics; command and control; and night operations.
- **571 Mobility Support Advisory Squadron (MSAS):** MSAS completed six deployments of air adviser teams to Peru, Guatemala, Uruguay, Honduras, and two to Colombia, while training 313 partner nation military members. MSAS delivers some of the Air Force's highest return on investment in partner nation capabilities, resulting in trainee compliance with NATO, International Civil Aviation Organization and FAA standards, and enabling participation in coalition exercises and regional security initiatives. MSAS's achievements have been praised by multiple partner nation air chiefs.
- **NEW HORIZONS 2013 (Belize):** AFSOUTH trained 471 US Airmen, Soldiers, and Marine personnel in joint/combined/interagency environments, in addition to 10 Canadian Medical Personnel, 40 Belize Defense Force (BDF) Engineers, over 100 BDF Security Personnel, and five Project Hope volunteer participants. Personnel built 4 classroom buildings and hurricane shelters with 17,000 square feet for teachers and 430 students; constructed 3 playgrounds; restored 3 schools and one shelter, increasing hurricane shelter capacity by 900; and treated over 18,000 patients through eight medical operations. Subject Matter Expert Exchanges covered maternal & child health, public health and biomedical equipment topics.
- **ISR Missions:** AFSOUTH provided command and control for ISR missions in support of USSOUTHCOM priorities. Over 900 missions and 4,600 flight hours resulted in over 28,000 images, 2,000 signals intelligence reports and nearly 17,000 minutes of video resulting in the largest drug seizure in Belize history – \$12.5 million worth of marijuana. AFSOUTH also deployed a ground-based radar to Honduras for 90 days supporting Operation MARTILLO, facilitating the interdiction of 1.4 metric tons of cocaine and seven aircraft.
- **Airlift Missions:** AFSOUTH executed 95 theater airlift missions moving more than 5,000 passengers and 200 tons of cargo throughout USSOUTHCOM's area of responsibility.

- **Medical Deployments:** AFSOUTH International Health Specialists participated in global health Subject Matter Expert Exchange engagements to address Flight Medicine topics relevant to our partner nations. USAF flight medicine physicians met with Colombian counterparts to develop aerospace physiology programs addressing safety, human factors and hypobaric chambers, and focusing on aeromedical standards and aeromedical evacuation/patient movement/critical care air transport teams.

Marine Corps Forces South (MARFORSOUTH)

Headquarters: Doral, Florida

- **Building Partner Capacity:** MARFORSOUTH employed multiple assets to support partner nation and interagency efforts to counter regional threats throughout South and Central America.
 - In Central America, MARFORSOUTH developed partner nation security force ability to counter transnational organized crime. The MARFORSOUTH Security Cooperation Team is a small team of Marines from a variety of occupational specialties focused on developing, building and sustaining partnerships, and increasing regional stability through tailor-made training to fit the unique needs of partner nation forces.
 - Joint Riverine Training Teams (JRTT) composed of 10 to 15 personnel from the Marine Corps and Navy provided training support to partner nations. For approximately one month, the JRTT trained partner nation riverine and littoral security units, focusing on the interoperability of waterborne and ground units. Each JRTT team contains a task organized mix of occupational specialties tailored to the host nation requirements.
 - MARFORSOUTH employed Civil Affairs Teams in Belize and Honduras to develop partner nation ability to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and integrate appropriate government services in areas threatened by transnational organized crime. A Military Information Support Team in Colombia built the Colombian military's expertise and complemented Joint Interagency Task Force South's Operation MARTILLO by encouraging reports of illicit trafficking to appropriate authorities.
- **Southern Partnership Station – High Speed Vessel SWIFT 2013:** Southern Partnership Station (SPS) is a series of Navy/Marine Corps engagements that build partner capacity through subject matter expert exchanges with partner nation militaries and civilian security forces. SPS includes Community Relations Projects that focus on partnerships, shared interests, and shared values. A USMC detachment, embarked on HSV SWIFT, deployed to the USSOUTHCOM AOR February to May 2013 to conduct building partner capacity engagements in Belize, Guatemala, and Honduras.
- **Exercise TRADEWINDS:** TRADEWINDS is an exercise supporting the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) that facilitates cooperation to reduce illicit trafficking within the Caribbean. In 2013, MARFORSOUTH was Executive Planning Agent for over 230 personnel from the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, and 16

partner nations who exchanged knowledge and expertise in countering illicit trafficking, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and human rights. Due to funding reductions, the ground phase of TRADEWINDS was cancelled, but the Maritime Phase and the Senior Leaders Seminar were executed. The Maritime Phase, led by the U.S. Coast Guard, trained regional partner nations in maritime humanitarian assistance and counter-drug interdiction while the seminar consisted of table-top discussions on a Caribbean regional approach to countering drug trafficking in the Eastern Caribbean.

- **Exercise INTEGRATED ADVANCE:** MARFORSOUTH participated in Exercise INTEGRATED ADVANCE 2013, which examined a whole-of-government response to a Caribbean Mass Migration crisis. During this exercise, MARFORSOUTH augmented the 24 hour operations center with the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Crisis Augmentation Cell, increasing the ability of Commander, MARFORSOUTH, to command and control USMC forces in the AOR, and advising and ensuring the proper utilization of force by the ARSOUTH-led Joint Task Force.
- **Exercise NEW HORIZONS:** From June to September 2013, MARFORSOUTH provided rotations of Marine Reserve Combat Engineer Teams and Civil Affairs personnel in support of the U.S. Air Forces Southern NEW HORIZONS Humanitarian and Civic Assistance exercise. Over fifty USMC Reserve Marines conducted combat engineering/construction training in Belize supporting citizen safety and governance in under-governed areas of Belize.
- **Exercise UNITAS – Partnership of the Americas (POA):** This exercise enhances multinational operational readiness, interoperability, and security cooperation among U.S. and nine partner nation naval infantries. In 2012, the exercise focus was amphibious operations, and the demand for training in amphibious operations by Latin American navies continues to be strong. However, due to budget uncertainty, USSOUTHCOM cancelled the POA 2013 portion of Exercise UNITAS. POA 2014 is planned for execution in Chile.

Special Operations Command South Headquarters: Homestead, Florida

Building Partner Capacity: In 2013, SOCSOUTH maintained small elements in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador working with key units to improve ground and maritime interdiction, civil affairs, and intelligence capacities. In the Andean Ridge, SOCSOUTH partnered with Colombia and Peru to confront narco-terrorist insurgencies whose illicit trafficking operations extend throughout the hemisphere. Despite our fiscally constrained environment, SOCSOUTH used episodic engagements with key Southern Cone and Caribbean partners to facilitate relationships essential for maintaining future capacity building.

Civil Affairs: In 2013, 11 civil affairs teams helped eight partner nations reduce the vulnerability of key populations intimidated by transnational organized crime or violent extremism. These teams assisted with counter-recruitment programs and, in many cases, helped partner nations build civil affairs capacities.

Information Operations: SOCSOUTH maintained military information support teams (MIST) in seven key partner nations supporting the DOD Rewards Program, U.S. Government Anti-trafficking in Persons Program, partner nation counter-recruitment programs, and active tip lines in support of efforts against transnational organized criminal and violent extremist organizations. MISTs also conducted over 25 Subject Matter Expert Exchanges throughout the area of responsibility.

Intelligence Analytical Support to US Country Teams: SOCSOUTH provides intelligence and counter-threat financing support to U.S. Country Teams focusing on terrorism, human smuggling networks, and transnational organized crime. In Colombia and Peru, SOCSOUTH helped develop host nation capabilities and country team support through a number of subject matter exchanges, and mentored them in institutionalizing intelligence pipelines.

Logistics Training and Advisory Team: SOCSOUTH priority for building logistics capacity was in the Andean Ridge where they provided subject matter expertise to enable key Colombian partner units to establish a sustainable weapons-repair capability and initiate the development of an aerial delivery capability.

SOCSOUTH also assisted Peruvian units engaged in counter narco-terrorism operations in conducting a weapons inspection, which will serve as a starting point for future SOCSOUTH logistics engagement activities.

Building Intellectual Capital: SOCSOUTH, in conjunction with the Colombian Joint Staff College, conducted a Counter-terrorism Fellowship Program-funded seminar in Bogota, Colombia, September 16-20, 2013. The event featured a cross-section of U.S. and Colombian subject matter experts and speakers, and included 70 participants from 12 countries in the Western Hemisphere.

FUERZAS COMANDO 2013: FUERZAS COMANDO 2013 was cancelled due to budget uncertainty.

FUSED RESPONSE 2013: SOCSOUTH executes an annual CJCS-directed exercise to validate time sensitive crisis action planning, as well as training, readiness, interoperability and capability of Special Operations Forces in support of regional crises and contingencies. FUSED RESPONSE 2013 was a table-top exercise held at Homestead Air Reserve Base. It involved SOCSOUTH staff and lead planners from each of its components. The exercise focused on the areas of personnel planning, objectives development, and joint integration. Its aim was to improve the interoperability of the participant forces and increase the staff's capacity to confront common threats such as illicit traffic, organized crime, and terrorism.

Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

- **Safe and Humane Care and Custody:** JTF-GTMO conducted safe, humane, legal, and transparent care and custody of detainees, including those convicted by military commission. Detainees maintained family contact via mail, telephone calls and, in areas which support this service, videophone conferences coordinated by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). High quality Level II routine and

urgent medical care was provided to detainees on a 24-hour basis. General surgical care, dental care, preventative medicine, optometry and mental health services were provided, or arranged, as was targeted specialty care on a recurring basis.

- **Legal and Transparent Operations:** Assessments of detention conditions by the ICRC continued with four visits in 2013. The ICRC verifies compliance with international standards of custody (as specified in the Geneva Conventions and other international standards) and provides confidential advice for suggested improvements to the Joint Task Force Commander and U.S. Southern Command. Detainees are granted routine visits by legal representatives, and received more than 1177 Military Commissions and 350 Habeas attorney visits in 2013. JTF-GTMO, committed to transparency, hosted 126 media representatives from 83 domestic and international news organizations; supported 77 visits with a combined total of 815 visitors; and answered hundreds of media queries during the past year.
- **Military Commissions:** Smooth execution of the Military Commissions process is another priority of JTF-GTMO. Military Commissions proceedings are open to observation by the media, victim family members, and non-governmental organizations. In 2013, JTF-GTMO supported eight hearings to address pre-trial motions of the five individuals accused of coordinating the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S. (referred to in the press as “the 9/11 Five”), and motion hearings for the alleged USS COLE bomber. Additionally, the court has entered a scheduling order, setting the trial for the alleged USS COLE bomber to commence on September 2, 2014.

Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) Key West, Florida

- **Joint Interagency Task Force South** contributed to the disruption of 132 metric tons of cocaine in FY2013, worth nearly \$2.6 billion wholesale. JIATF-S employs an integrated defense forward capability for the ongoing efforts at the U.S. Southwest Border and for U.S. operations in the Western Hemisphere using tactical control (TACON) ship days, TACON flight hours, and the operating cost of Forces Surveillance Support Center relocatable over-the-horizon radar support.
- **The vast majority of JIATF-S successes came as a result of JIATF-S leadership and coordination of Operation (OP) MARTILLO**, the multi-lateral effects-based operation designed to deny the Central American littoral routes by illicit traffickers. Begun on January 15, 2012, OP MARTILLO to date results include the disruption of 272 metric tons of cocaine, the seizure of \$10.7 million in bulk cash, and the seizure of 198 vessels and aircraft. Following its two year anniversary, OP MARTILLO is beginning to show its desired effects: trafficking in the Western Caribbean and Eastern Pacific littorals is decreasing while the activity in the Eastern Pacific non-littoral route is rising.
- **Operational Results and Impact:** In the air domain, over the past year, JIATF-S documented a 34 percent decrease in illicit air tracks destined for Central America (primarily Honduras). The illicit air corridor into Hispaniola was nearly absent during FY13 with only two flights documented moving into Haiti. In the maritime domain,

during the same period, JIATF-S assessed a decrease of maritime activity in the Western Caribbean littoral and non-littoral trafficking areas of 43 percent and 45 percent for each vector respectively. In line with the goals of OP MARTILLO, JIATF-S recently documented a significant decrease in trafficking via “go fasts” boats using the littoral routes and, during the first month of FY14, an increase in go fasts bypassing the littoral routes in favor of more direct routes toward Honduras. JIATF-S continues to monitor this trend and hopes that recent success against go fasts employing these deeper routes does not push traffickers back to littoral routes. In the Eastern Pacific, the trafficking shows a steady decrease in the littorals (characterized by an overall increase of 71 percent at the end of FY12 to a 20 percent decrease in FY13), while the activity in the Eastern Pacific non-littorals appears to be increasing (from an increase of 12 percent in FY12 to an increase of 28 percent in FY13, including a recent increase in the use of routes South of the Galapagos). These changes are assessed to be a continued result of OP MARTILLO assets working in the littoral areas along the Guatemala/Mexico border, and may reflect the start of achieving the anticipated end result of the operation, driving the traffickers out of the littorals.

- **Supporting Defense of the Homeland.** Since its inception in September 2012, OP UNIFIED RESOLVE, the counter illicit trafficking operation supporting Puerto Rico, has substantially improved and formalized interoperability between JIATF-S, Coast Guard District 7, Coast Guard Sector San Juan, and the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Office of Air and Marine Caribbean Air and Marine Branch in our shared Counter Illicit Trafficking operations in the following ways. Real time information sharing between JIATF-S and operational forces from USCG District 7, CBP’s Caribbean Air and Marine Branch, and Coast Guard Sector San Juan has improved OP UNIFIED RESOLVE’s effectiveness against secondary movements of cocaine to Puerto Rico from the primary Hispaniola corridor. This collaborative orchestration enhanced the effective sharing of resources in an austere operating environment. The maturity, strategic leadership, and tactical collaboration between JIATFS, the USCG, and CBP have greatly enhanced the effectiveness of countering illicit trafficking CIT operations in the Northeastern Caribbean.
- **Role of Partner Nations:** In FY 2013, 68 percent of JIATF-S disruptions were marked by partner nation participation. The role of our Latin American partners should not be understated. Of the 147 illicit trafficking events disrupted by JIATF-S in FY 2013, 74 of these (50 percent) would not have been successful without the support of our international partners. The existing and future contributions to the Transit Zone effort by the U.K., France, the Netherlands, and Canada continue to be significant and needed.
- **Information Dominance and Innovating to Meet Converging Threats:** JIATF-S continues to innovate in the face of asset reductions, and has developed several initiatives to enhance effectiveness and efficiency with the tools under their tactical control. JIATF-S is adept at Counter Threat Finance, tying the flow of illicit proceeds to the movement of drugs and other threat streams. The Container Cell Initiative is expanding the interdiction community’s awareness of trafficking via commercial means, and their newest Network Discovery Initiative will gain insights into the highly connected and converging organizations at work in their JOA. For all of these

reasons, JIATF-S remains at the forefront of supporting the delivery of focused success against transnational organized crime in the Western Hemisphere.

Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-B)
Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras

- JTF-B supported Central American (CENTAM) countries in disrupting transnational organized crime by supporting the movement of partner nation law enforcement agencies and units in denying illicit airfields; destroying cash crops; disrupting lines of communication; providing medical evacuation support to partner nation military, law enforcement, and civilians; maintaining forward operating locations to stage and sustain Honduran and U.S. interagency operations; treating more than 8,243 medical patients, 1,754 dental patients, 1,052 immunizations, and 313 surgical patients; partnering with the Government of Honduras to build capacity for responding to natural and manmade disasters; and improving local firefighting capabilities.
- JTF-B supported the Honduran Army in destroying illicit airfields within the department of Gracias a Dios. JTF-B provided lift support for 6,350 lbs of demolitions to Forward Operating Location Mocerón for use by the Honduran 5th Infantry Battalion to crater 6 airfields being utilized by drug trafficking organizations.
- JTF-B supported the BDF by providing movement to 16 marijuana plantations for marijuana crop eradication. This assistance allowed the BDF to destroy 61,146 plants, 221 lbs of seeds, and 330 lbs processed marijuana, ultimately removing \$12.5 million from the Belizean streets where Drug Trafficking Organizations would utilize the money to disrupt law and order in Belize.
- JTF-B provided air movement support to Homeland Security Investigations and Honduras Law Enforcement along the Honduran/Guatemalan border to disrupt illicit trafficking routes and enhance regional effects against Transnational Organized Crime operations.
- JTF-B conducts medical evacuation throughout Honduras. Over the past year, JTF-B provided 29 medical evacuation missions for 6 Honduran military members and 29 U.S. personnel.
- JTF-B conducted nine Medical Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETEs) and Medical Surgical Teams (MSTs) (6 within Honduras, and 3 within CENTAM), as well as weekly MST missions to Santa Teresa Regional Hospital in Comayagua and a monthly trip to the Hospital Escuela in Tegucigalpa. Over the past year, JTF-B, with partner nation support, treated over 8,243 medical patients, 1,754 dental patients, 1,052 immunizations, and 313 surgical patients. The MEDRETEs and MSTs provide alternatives to transnational organized crime and gang patronage in isolated villages. Partner nation Military and Law Enforcement Agencies support the exercises, enabling interaction with isolated villages.
- JTF-B's CENTAM Survey and Assessment Team (C-SAT) provides a limited, but immediate, disaster response and relief capability within the region. It routinely integrates with the Government of Honduras in large-scale natural disaster exercises. JTF-B also conducted their first multinational exercise in C-SAT history with several

Belize government agencies and British forces, resulting in cooperative operations between C-SAT members, and an invite to Belize's hurricane planning conference.

- JTF-B supported more than a thousand children in several different orphanages, interacting with the children, donating much-needed supplies, and doing construction work on their buildings. For village support, JTF-B Chaplains organized 6 chapel hikes that donated and distributed 18,000 lbs of food, clothes, toys, and school supplies to approximately 3,900 community members. In October 2012, JTF-B partnered with the Se Pudo NGO to build 14 homes for families in 45 days, and, over the past year, participated in the Ajuterique Housing Project, which already helped construct 29 homes for families.
- JTF-B also provided critical support to Multi-national Search and Rescue Operations. JTF-B's unique capability to fly over water and provide recovery and extraction proved instrumental in the life-saving efforts of nine people lost at sea last July, including two U.S. personnel.



BIOGRAPHIES

UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

John F. Kelly
General, United States Marine Corps
Commander
U.S. Southern Command



General Kelly was born and raised in Boston, MA. He enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1970, and was discharged as a sergeant in 1972, after serving in an infantry company with the 2nd Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, NC. Following graduation from the University of Massachusetts in 1976, he was commissioned and returned to the 2nd Marine Division where he served as a rifle and weapons platoon commander, company executive officer, assistant operations officer, and infantry company commander. Sea duty in Mayport, FL, followed, at which time he served aboard aircraft carriers USS Forrestal and USS Independence. In 1980, then Captain Kelly transferred to the U.S. Army's Infantry Officer Advanced Course in Fort Benning, GA. After graduation, he was assigned to Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, serving there from 1981 through 1984, as an assignment monitor. Captain Kelly returned to the 2nd Marine Division in 1984, to command a rifle and weapons company. Promoted to the rank of Major in 1987, he served as the battalion's operations officer.

In 1987, Major Kelly transferred to the Basic School, Quantico, VA, serving first as the head of the Offensive Tactics Section, Tactics Group, and later assuming the duties of the Director of the Infantry Officer Course. After three years of instructing young officers, he attended the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the School for Advanced Warfare, both located at Quantico. Completing duty under instruction and selected for Lieutenant Colonel, he was assigned as Commanding Officer, 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, CA. Holding this command position for two years, Lieutenant Colonel Kelly returned to the East Coast in 1994, to attend the National War College in Washington, DC. He graduated in 1995, and was selected to serve as the Commandant's Liaison Officer to the U.S. House of Representatives, Capitol Hill, where he was promoted to the rank of Colonel.

In 1999, Colonel Kelly transferred to joint duty and served as the Special Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in Mons, Belgium. He returned to the United States in 2001, and was assigned to a third tour of duty at Camp Lejeune, now as the Assistant Chief of Staff G-3 with the 2nd Marine Division. In 2002, selected to the rank of Brigadier General, Colonel Kelly again served with the 1st Marine Division, this time as the Assistant Division Commander. Much of Brigadier General Kelly's two-year assignment was spent deployed in Iraq. He then returned to Headquarters Marine Corps as the Legislative Assistant to the Commandant from 2004 to 2007. Promoted to major general, he returned to Camp Pendleton as the Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward). The command deployed to Iraq in early 2008 for a year-long mission, replacing II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) as Multinational Force-West in Al Anbar and western Ninewa provinces. LTGen Kelly commanded Marine Forces Reserve and Marine Forces North from October 2009 to March 2011. General Kelly comes to United States Southern Command from his previous position as the Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense from March 2011 to October 2012.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

FEBRUARY 26, 2014

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH

Mr. SMITH. General Kelly, in your testimony, you stated, "To adequately address the complex medical issues of the aging detainee population, we expanded and emphasized detailed reporting within our comprehensive system to monitor the health, nutrition, and wellness of every detainee." You also stated, "Although Naval Station Guantanamo and detainee hospitals are capable of providing adequate care for most detainee conditions, we lack certain specialty medical capabilities necessary to treat potentially complex emergencies and various chronic diseases. In the event a detainee is in need of emergency medical treatment that exceeds on-island capacity, I cannot evacuate him to the United States, as I would a service member." Would you please provide the committee with a detailed list of those complex medical issues? In doing so, would you please describe: each medical issue; any necessary treatment associated with the issue; the number of detainees affected by the issue; any medical capability shortfalls associated with the issue; and the estimated cost of treating the issue on site, if such treatment or treatments would require the import of medical capabilities that exceed on-island capacities?

General KELLY. Joint Task Force Guantanamo's Joint Medical Group (JMG) offers excellent primary care medical, dental, and mental health capabilities. U.S. Naval Hospital GTMO provides the referral consultative services in general surgery, orthopedic surgery, optometry, clinical nutrition, and physical therapy. This facility currently operates at the level of a small community hospital. Further subspecialty teams are sent from military treatment facilities in the U.S. when needed. These teams diagnose and treat the more complex health care issues. At present there are no detainees who have consented to, demonstrated requisite compliance for, or have medical conditions that would require care not available on GTMO. 82% of the detainee population is in good health and cooperates with healthcare providers who care for their medical issues. However, sudden deterioration of existing conditions could create situations in which medical needs exceed current capabilities. The Joint Task Force is charged with providing detainees medical care to the extent practicable, similar to standards applied to personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces. There are several foreseeable and potentially unforeseen medical conditions for which provision of on-island care to this standard could not be achieved with current capabilities.

There are a number of detainees that have worsening chronic illnesses that will potentially exceed in-place and deployable medical capabilities. There are twelve (12) detainees with hypertension. They are offered appropriate medical therapy and clinical nutrition services to maintain a healthy weight. Four (4) refuse care. There are nine (9) detainees with diabetes. They are offered appropriate medical therapy and clinical nutrition services. Six (6) refuse care or inconsistently comply with offered care plans. There are six (6) detainees with Hepatitis. Five (5) have inactive hepatitis, while one (1) has chronic active hepatitis with resulting significant liver injury. State-of-the-art anti-viral therapy has been made available and has been refused. There are several detainees that refuse recommended medical care on a regular basis which negatively impacts their health.

Cardiovascular Disease (collectively heart disease, hypertension, and diabetes): Detainees with cardiovascular disease represent our greatest, most likely and most immediate potential need for capabilities not currently available at GTMO. There are four (4) detainees with heart disease. They are offered appropriate medical therapy and see a cardiologist routinely. All have a history of care refusal with variable current compliance with medical recommendations. Routine current medical management strategy of optimized management of blood pressure and use of medications to prevent episodes of chest pain, along with dietary therapy and weight management comprise clinically sound approaches to these detainees' conditions. Advance cardiovascular procedures, including manpower and portable facilities, would cost an estimated \$1M per episode and take up to 30 days to execute while significantly impacting beneficiary care at military treatment facilities in the U.S. If there is an emergency cardiovascular event (heart attack or stroke), emergency medical care will be taken to treat the detainee.

Malnutrition (from voluntary fasting): There are a small number of detainees at serious health risk related to their voluntary long term non-religious fasting and resulting malnutrition. They are appropriately managed medically and see an internal medicine physician routinely. All are offered clinical nutrition services to maintain an appropriate weight. No additional medical capabilities are required.

Liver Disease: One (1) detainee's chronic active hepatitis with liver injury (cirrhosis) is expected to worsen but at an unknown rate, potentially yielding end-stage liver failure. There are temporary treatment options including surgical procedures requiring a high level of post-operative intensive care that are not available at GTMO. Definitive therapy would be a liver transplantation. It is conceivable that one (1) or more detainees would eventually meet clinical criteria for organ transplantation; however, it is not clear if detainees would be eligible to participate in an organ recipient registry. The cost to construct an organ transplant center would likely measure in the hundreds of millions of dollars.

Kidney Disease: One (1) detainee has chronic kidney disease. It is conceivable that his condition could deteriorate to the extent that the detainee will require kidney dialysis. There is no dialysis capability at GTMO. Dialysis machines are available for purchase for less than \$5K. Dialysis requires near permanent access to the blood stream through a blood vessel shunt in order to perform the filtering of the blood. This shunt would be suboptimal for the detention environment. A full time dialysis team with frequent kidney subspecialty medical care supervision would be required. Nurses who specialize in dialysis are usually not active duty military and the addition of this capability would thus require at least two civilian contracted positions at an estimated \$200K each.

Cancer: Although not an immediate concern, one (1) detainee death has been attributed to colon cancer. As all detainees are men, it is a statistical likelihood that there will be prostate cancer in the detainee population. Another detainee has a thyroid nodule being investigated for cancer. He is scheduled for a diagnostic biopsy. If biopsy results indicate cancer, then surgical removal of the tumor with a subsequent long course of chemotherapy and radiation will be required if the detainee chooses such therapy. No oncology services are available; no capability to prepare chemotherapy exists on GTMO nor is there radiation therapy. While the specifics of required resources and cost for treatment may vary significantly depending on the type of cancer any given detainee has, this detainee's case points out the significant medical capability shortfalls in cancer treatment available at GTMO. Radiation therapy capability would cost an estimated \$10M to purchase or \$3M per year to rent.

Mental Health: Behavioral health providers have recognized detainee hopelessness and previous detainees have demonstrated psychosis. Currently 47 detainees are followed as active patients. Diagnoses currently managed are depression, anxiety, personality disorders, and delusional disorder. They are appropriately managed by a dedicated behavioral health team and have access to a psychiatrist routinely. Care refusal is widely variable in this population. Currently no mental health diagnoses exceed JMG care capabilities.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

Mr. LANGEVIN. General Jacoby, how satisfied are you with the current state of the responsibility chain for weapons of mass destruction? Hypothetically, a weapon could be the responsibility of numerous agencies as it was designed, created, packaged, and transported to the country's borders and onto U.S. soil. Are you satisfied with the status quo, and if not, what more should be done?

General JACOBY. I am satisfied with the current process and delineated responsibilities; however, we always look to refine and improve existing processes and procedures for dealing with this no-fail mission. For example, the newly established Special Operations Command North, under operational control of USNORTHCOM, now provides a focal point for lead federal agencies (DHS, DOJ, FBI) to request specialized active duty support to interagency operations.

Mr. LANGEVIN. General Kelly, your statement included comments on your command's efforts to ensure security of Department of Defense networks and communications infrastructure in your area of responsibility. In your view, what are the top U.S. network vulnerabilities in the region and what are the top cyber or network threats to our regional infrastructure in SOUTHCOM?

General KELLY. The integrated nature of cyberspace makes DOD networks an attractive target for a broad range of worldwide actors. USSOUTHCOM networks in the AOR are no exception. DOD computers, networks, and communications infrastructure in the USSOUTHCOM AOR are threatened by both regional and global

actors (1) who may directly or indirectly threaten our systems or the regional infrastructure (2) upon which we rely. State-sponsored actors are increasingly able to launch sophisticated attacks against the networks that control critical Department of Defense networks and infrastructure. We also do not discount concerns regarding the potential impact of insider threats either as a result of free will or coercion.(3)

We have multiple communications infrastructures supporting our Security Cooperation Offices, Joint Task Forces, and Headquarters locations—all are susceptible to these threats. The number of different networks with independent and duplicate vulnerabilities in the current theater architecture requires us to replicate security tools, as well as situational awareness, and defensive processes. From a technical perspective, we are aligned with and developing plans to migrate to the DOD Joint Information Environment (JIE) in accordance with DOD Chief Information Officer directives by the FY18–19 time frame. JIE has several components that mitigate and reduce security related vulnerabilities, the greatest of which is to reduce duplicate networks and applications, as well as to integrate security tools and processes. JIE also offers some means to reduce threats associated with the insider threat.

Much work has been done by USCYBERCOM, with the COCOMs and Services, in the areas of resources, training, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to deal with the threats and vulnerabilities of the cyber domain. Unilateral operations in this domain are by far easier—but the reality is that in our AOR, we operate in bilateral and multinational modes for the majority of our operations. Our partner nations have significant variations in resources, training, and TTPs to mitigate vulnerabilities or address threats as compared to how DOD operates and our policies limit what we can share or how we can assist them.

(1) External threat actors include nation states, as well as non-state actors. (2) The term infrastructure here is not limited to regional commercial telecommunications networks. The cyber threat also threatens regional power grids, supply chains, transportation networks and financial systems of nations in the AOR which would not only impact the USSOUTHCOM mission, but could cause economic and other disruptions for affected countries. (3) Malicious insiders may exploit their access at the behest of foreign governments, terrorist groups, criminal elements, unscrupulous associates, or on their own initiative.

Mr. LANGEVIN. General Kelly: what advanced technologies, now in the research and development phase, do you foresee would be most beneficial to our mission in the SOUTHCOM AOR?

General KELLY. My specific priorities for advanced technologies in the Research & Development phase that are most beneficial to our mission include: advanced radio and laser detection and ranging (RADAR/LIDAR) concepts to help our forces and our partners deny the enemy the camouflage, concealment and deception afforded by the dense jungles in the SOUTHCOM AOR; innovative technologies to enable the Afloat Forward Staging Base for use by our interagency and partner nation forces; and technologies that strengthen our operational capabilities in the cyber domain.

My general priorities lie in technology areas that would mitigate our limitations in capacity and resources. These include: persistent Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) technologies that enable innovative uses of new platforms to improve wide area detection and monitoring, as well as ISR systems that target the vast littorals and extensive riverine basins in theater; non-lethal technologies that enable more effective interdiction of targets such as go-fast boats, Self-Propelled Semi-Submersibles (SPSSs), and Fully Submersible Vessels (FSVs); operational energy initiatives that increase efficiency and decrease logistical burdens for remote locations; information sharing technologies that enable us to more effectively operate with our partners, both international and interagency; and technologies to counter the ever-evolving and growing use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in the region, as experienced by Colombia, which has the second highest rate of IED incidents in the world.

We also actively participate in a broad array of technology development projects, primarily from OSD's Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTDs), one of the few formal programs designed to directly support COCOM capability gaps. Additionally, we maintain close ties with defense agencies such as DARPA and DTRA, as well as with the National Laboratories, to continually assess the current state of technology, and provide operator insight into future development. While it is important to maintain a technical edge across the full spectrum of military operations, we must be cognizant of the technology gap that exists when working with our partners, both at home and abroad. Building our partners' capacity to improve regional security is a critical aspect of our technology development goals.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS

Mr. ROGERS. Please describe your plans for cruise missile defense of the United States. Why is this threat getting your attention now?

General JACOBY. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the committee files.]

Mr. ROGERS. Can you describe which states have cruise missiles capable of ranging the United States?

General JACOBY. Cruise missile technology has continued to advance at a high pace as a lower-cost alternative to manned strike platforms. Today, Russia is the only nation-state assessed to possess cruise missiles capable of ranging the United States, and is a known proliferator of cruise missile capability. China likely has the technical expertise to develop this capability in the future, but to date we have not seen a Chinese intent to do so.

Mr. ROGERS. Are we developing a cruise missile defense capable of defending the national capital region from Russian cruise missiles?

General JACOBY. Yes, we have a three-phased approach to cruise missile defense that Department has fully endorsed. The first phase looks at our existing structure in the National Capital Region and adds new surveillance and fire control systems. From there we plan to move to a second phase—our objective Defense Design—which provides a steady-state integrated air defense system capable of protecting our nation's capital from threats, such as emerging Russian cruise missile programs. As our newer systems mature and are integrated into our existing force structure, my goal is to outpace the threat by leveraging improved sensors, command and control networks, and adaptable deployable capabilities to expand beyond the National Capital Region.

Mr. ROGERS. In the FY14 NDAA, we included a provision and funding for the Missile Defense Agency to develop and deploy a next-generation kill vehicle. Why is that important to you?

Do you support that provision? Why? We have, as you know, a large and capable radar originally developed for deployment in the Czech Republic. What are the pros and cons of deploying that radar as an additional long-range discriminating radar?

General JACOBY. I strongly support the provision to redesign the Exo-Atmospheric Kill Vehicle. From a warfighter perspective, this redesign will significantly improve system reliability by taking advantage of new and proven technologies, such as Iron Dome, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and the Navy's standard missile system.

I believe the Missile Defense Agency is best-suited to answer your additional long-range discriminating radar question due to the technical nature of the pros and cons.

Mr. ROGERS. Why is Cobra Dane important to you as the NORTHCOM commander? Are you comfortable that there is a plan to ensure its long-term availability to you?

General JACOBY. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the committee files.]

Mr. ROGERS. Have you examined whether Cobra Judy is an attractive option for additional missile defense radar capability?

General JACOBY. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the committee files.]

Mr. ROGERS. How closely have you examined the suitability of SBIRS and other on-orbit space assets for providing additional missile defense capability?

General JACOBY. We are supporting USSTRATCOM in their efforts to prepare the FY14 NDAA-directed evaluation of options to improve ballistic missile defense capabilities. This evaluation will consider current Federal Government capabilities, as well as future systems, including a full review of on-orbit assets, such as the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS).

Mr. ROGERS. The President's EPAA originally supported forward-based homeland missile defense capability in Europe, as did the previous administration. Can you tell me what did a forward-based missile defense capability provide for the security of the United States? What defensive capability are we still missing now that those sites are no longer in the program of record?

General JACOBY. The purpose of the forward-based homeland missile defense capability was to add to the protection of the U.S. homeland, which is defended by our current Ground-based Interceptors (GBIs) against missile threats from the Middle East. By shifting resources from the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) capability, DOD was able to fund an additional 14 GBIs being deployed to Fort Greely, AK, as well as advanced-kill vehicle technology that will improve the performance of our GBIs against threats from the Middle East faster than could

have been achieved by EPAA Phase IV. I believe these improvements will provide better capability than previous forward-based capabilities.

Mr. ROGERS. In the FY14 NDAA, we included a requirement and funding for MDA to update its plans and required documentation to a potential East Coast missile defense site. Do you support this effort which we authorized and appropriated funding for to reduce the deployment timeframe when the United States decides to deploy this site?

a. What would a third interceptor site on the East Coast of the U.S. provide for missile defense coverage of the United States?

b. Would it be prudent, in your opinion, if all of the appropriate required documentation was completed, to deploy this site sooner rather than later?

General JACOBY. I believe planning for a third site is prudent and places us in a position to make an informed deployment decision in a timely fashion. If built, a third site would give us better weapons access, increased inventory, and increased battlespace for threats coming from the direction of the Middle East. However, even after the Environmental Impact Statement process is completed, any future deployment decision to build a third site should still be based upon known and anticipated threats.

Mr. ROGERS. Please describe the Iranian ballistic missile threat. Have you seen it abate in any way over the past year?

General JACOBY. Iran possesses a substantial force of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles capable of striking targets throughout the Middle East and parts of Europe. To date, Iran has not demonstrated a ballistic missile capable of reaching intercontinental distances. However, it has an organic engineering capability that may result in a more sophisticated ICBM threat, to include more advanced decoys and countermeasures technology. Thus, while the Iranian missile program has experienced some setbacks in recent years, Iranian engineers continue their efforts to improve the country's ballistic missile capabilities and are on track to flight test an ICBM range capability as early as 2015. Iran will not likely remain a simple, unsophisticated threat in the future, and we will need to keep pace with them.

Mr. ROGERS. The 2012 Iran military power report of the DOD stated Iran may be technically capable of testing an ICBM by 2015, which is next year. Do you have any reason to believe that that estimate is incorrect?

a. Have you seen evidence of Iran flight testing space launch vehicles in the recent years?

b. Is space launch technology applicable to Iran's ballistic missile program?

c. Are Iran and North Korea rekindling their past ballistic missile and nuclear weapon cooperation?

d. Can you explain the significance of North Korea assisting Iran with ballistic missile development?

General JACOBY. We continue to assess that Iran may be technically capable of testing an ICBM by 2015, though we do not know if Tehran has the intent to do so. Iran continues its attempts to place satellites into orbit using boosters that incorporate ballistic missile technologies.

The current extent of the North Korean-Iranian ballistic missile and nuclear cooperation is unclear. However, following North Korea's successful demonstration of long-range missile technologies during the country's December 2012 satellite launch, there may be the potential for North Korean engineers sharing lessons learned with their Iranian counterparts as they have done in the past—we are watching this closely.

Mr. ROGERS. It has been reported in the press and publicly proclaimed by the Chinese themselves that they are deploying a new submarine-based ballistic missile capability. Are you comfortable that you are well-postured today to deal with an unauthorized launch by a Chinese ballistic missile submarine?

For that matter, are you well-postured to appropriately defend against an unauthorized launch from either China or Russia?

General JACOBY. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS

Ms. TSONGAS. How is the operational effectiveness and efficiency of the National Capital Defense structure expected to be improved with the integration of JLENS? Are there criteria for mission impact parameters such as improvement of response time for decision making and management of available assets for response?

General JACOBY. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI

Mr. GARAMENDI. Please provide specific details that your command's need regarding ISR support and Coast Guard assets. Your testimonies highlighted that your AORs require additional resources to support drug interdiction and that more Coast Guard and ISR capability would be needed as we further develop Arctic strategy.

General JACOBY. For drug interdiction: USNORTHCOM has validated ISR requirements to support interdiction by our law enforcement partners, to include the U.S. Coast Guard. The capabilities we require include full motion video, forward-looking infrared and moving target indicator at the medium to high-altitude range. These requirements may be met by manned and unmanned platforms. I view our required and authorized support of law enforcement partners to find and fix illicit traffickers entering the United States or its territorial waters as also having Homeland Defense dimensions because of the threat to national security posed by illicit traffickers.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Please provide specific details that your command's need regarding ISR support and Coast Guard assets. Your testimonies highlighted that your AORs require additional resources to support drug interdiction and that more Coast Guard and ISR capability would be needed as we further develop Arctic strategy.

General KELLY. Historically, SOUTHCOM has been undersourced on DOD naval surface asset allocation and that allocation has continued to decline due to budget cuts being borne by the Services. In order to remain effective at countering illicit traffic (CIT) we require additional surface assets, either DOD or USCG, and DOD ISR systems to respectively (1) partially fill the naval surface force gap and (2) increase the effectiveness of allocated resources.

For FY15, SOUTHCOM has been allocated 24% of its total drug interdiction surface force out of a 22 total ship presence requirement. This total surface force allocation is well below that required to either achieve the national illicit traffic interdiction goal of 40% or put effective pressure on transnational criminal networks. But successful and efficient interdiction of illicit narco-traffic in the maritime domain is not only predicated upon surface force allocation; ideally it requires a complementary package that includes flight-deck equipped surface assets with embarked Airborne Use of Force (AUF)-capable rotary wing air asset(s), robust intel capability, persistent Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), and a high speed Over the Horizon (OTH) smallboat with an embarked Coast Guard boarding team.

USSOUTHCOM's airborne ISR requirements have historically been sourced at 5%, which represents a fraction of the total DOD globally allocated airborne ISR assets. This limited airborne ISR allocation does not provide USSOUTHCOM with sufficient ISR capacity to support partner nation efforts to disrupt threat networks in Central America while maintaining our enduring support to Colombia. Persistent ISR capabilities are critical to boost our surface asset efficiency—our historical data shows that a ship alone has a 9% detection rate, but when we add a rotary element and ISR (MPA) to the mix we increase that detection rate to 70% thus increasing that ship's overall effectiveness within the Interdiction Continuum. In FY2013, whenever this ship-helo-MPA package detected an illicit event that event ended in disruption 86 percent of the time—an impressive probability of interdiction approaching 90 percent. Although it will not eliminate the gap, any ISR efficiency boost can help us deal with lower than required surface presence in our 42 million square mile Joint Operating Area. This could include deploying systems such as the Navy's P-3 or follow-on P-8, and the Air Force's E-8, E-3, or MQ-9.

We rely heavily on the USCG allocation to provide the majority of our assets, and therefore look to the Department of Homeland Security to help us meet our CIT mission by increasing its allocation of USCG surface assets. To date, the Coast Guard has been extremely proactive and flexible in their efforts to help in this fight, which includes their deploying Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron (HITRON) helicopters aboard surface assets other than their service's cutters. Any resource action that directs more flight-deck equipped cutters (USCG) and surface combatants (USN, Allied) to the AOR with embarked AUF helicopters, exponentially increases opportunities for successful Interdiction and Apprehension (I&A).