[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY, ISRAEL AND THE PEACE PROCESS: WHAT'S NEXT?
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 8, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-146
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida--resigned 1/27/ GRACE MENG, New York
14 deg. LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JUAN VARGAS, California
TREY RADEL, Florida--resigned 1/27/ BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
14 deg. JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia Massachusetts
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina GRACE MENG, New York
TED S. YOHO, Florida LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Jonathan Schanzer, Ph.D., vice president for research, Foundation
for Defense of Democracies..................................... 10
Mr. James Prince, co-founder and president, The Democracy Council 25
The Honorable Robert Wexler, president, S. Daniel Abraham Center
for Middle East Peace (former Member of Congress).............. 38
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Jonathan Schanzer, Ph.D.: Prepared statement..................... 13
Mr. James Prince: Prepared statement............................. 28
The Honorable Robert Wexler: Prepared statement.................. 40
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 64
Hearing minutes.................................................. 65
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 67
THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY, ISRAEL AND THE PEACE PROCESS: WHAT'S NEXT?
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THURSDAY, MAY 8, 2014
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:47 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come to order.
After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5
minutes each for our opening statements, I will then recognize
other members seeking recognition for 1 minute. We will then
hear from our witnesses.
And, without objection, the witnesses' prepared statements
will be made a part of the record and members may have 5 days
to insert statements and questions for the record, subject to
the length limitation in the rules.
The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes.
Last July, Secretary Kerry, together with negotiators from
Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, PLO,
announced that the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations had
restarted.
Here we are now, 9 months later, and what do we have? We
have a peace process that fell apart, yielding no positive
results, leaving both parties with an even greater distrust of
one another.
In fact, the legacy of this failed round of talks could be
that it ended up causing more harm than good, as it seemed to
have moved Fatah and Hamas closer to reconciliation while Abu
Mazen continues his push for de facto recognition at the U.N.,
both of which will have serious repercussions for U.S. policy
toward the Palestinians.
There are laws on the books that prohibit U.S. assistance
to any U.N. Agency that accepts a nonexisting state of
Palestine amongst its ranks. And though the administration
continues to seek a waiver in order to give the funding, I will
continue to do everything in my power to ensure that it does
not get this authority.
And then there is the Palestinian Anti-Terror Act, a bill
that I authored that eventually became law that prohibits U.S.
assistance to a Palestinian Government that would have Hamas--
any members of Hamas amongst its ranks.
Should reconciliation happen and Hamas become a part of the
Palestinian Government, I fully expect Secretary Kerry and the
administration to enforce the letter of the law.
I don't doubt Secretary Kerry's earnestness in wanting a
mutually beneficial deal between the parties. I share that
earnestness. I don't think anyone in this subcommittee would
disagree.
But from the beginning, I questioned the prioritization of
this endeavor in light of so many other pressing matters in the
Middle East and the North African region. To say that this task
was one better suited for Sisyphus would be an understatement,
forever pulling that rock up the hill.
Secretary Kerry's faith that Abu Mazen and the PLO could
sit down with Israel this time and somehow come to the table
with a new-found desire to actually achieve peace with Israel
was misplaced.
The P.A. and Abu Mazen have shown time and time again that
it is a corrupt entity, incapable of governing the territories,
unwilling to see a two-state solution in which two Nations
could exist side by side in peace.
And so one has to question the amount of time, effort, and
resources spent chasing the unobtainable, at least under the
present conditions, when there is one of the worst humanitarian
disasters in recent history occurring in Syria, transition to
democracy impediments in Egypt, and Iran continues its support
for terrorism worldwide and its nuclear ambition have not
waned.
Over 150,000 people in Syria have been killed while
millions have fled to neighboring countries or have been
internally displaced, and the administration's policies,
undefined and indecisive, have failed to adequately address
this issue.
According to the State Department's recently released
global terrorism report, Al Qaeda and its affiliates are on the
rise and becoming more aggressive in places like Iraq, Syria,
Yemen, and North Africa.
Iran continues to be the world's foremost state sponsor of
terrorism, actively targeting Israeli and U.S. interests,
increasing its presence in our own hemisphere and Africa, and,
of course, it is still propping up the Assad regime in Syria,
all of this while the administration continues to negotiate
with the regime in Tehran over its nuclear ambitions, even
though State's own assessment is that Iran continues to refuse
to prove its nuclear program is indeed for peaceful purposes.
And these are just a few of the fires that need to be put
out in the Middle East and North Africa region. Yet, the failed
peace talks have managed to fan the flames.
The signed reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas
signifies that Abu Mazen is more interested in making peace
with terrorists than it is with Israel, but it reveals who Abu
Mazen really is. He is a man who has never been a true partner
for peace, but, rather, an obstacle toward peace.
Abu Mazen is a man more interested in taking U.S. taxpayer
money and using it to pay salaries of convicted Palestinian
terrorists with Israeli and American blood on their hands than
he is in running an effective government that could lay the
foundation for an independent state.
Abu Mazen is a man who is corrupt and uses cronyism to
maintain his position as the head of the PLO and the P.A. and
fears losing that control and, thus, will never make the hard
decisions for the benefit of the Palestinian people at his
expense.
This hearing is important to understand how and why this
latest attempt at peace between Israelis and Palestinians
failed and allows us to take a closer look at the real
obstacles to peace in order to better formulate U.S. policies
as it relates to the P.A.
And I am now very pleased to yield to my ranking member and
good friend, Mr. Deutch of Florida.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Thanks to our witnesses for being here today.
It is a special honor for me to welcome Congressman and
former chairman of the Europe Subcommittee, Robert Wexler, back
to this committee. I will have more to say about him in a
couple of minutes.
Earlier this week marked Yom Ha'atzmaut, the 66th
anniversary of the independence of the State of Israel. Since
her independence in 1948, Israel has defended herself on every
single one of her borders.
Despite facing continued, even existential, security
threats, Israel has become a vibrant democracy, one that,
unlike so many of Israel's neighbors, respects human rights and
religious minorities, all while an innovative, high-tech
economy flourishes.
We must acknowledge that the Palestinian Authority under
President Abbas has made tremendous strides in working to build
state institutions and establish security forces that have
dramatically reduced violence in the West Bank. The United
States Congress has committed a great deal of resources to
strengthening the Palestinian Authority, to the tune of $400
million per year.
At the outset of peace talks last August, Secretary Kerry
worked with the international community on a $4-billion
economic package that would help jump-start the Palestinian
economy, because we all know that a stable state starts with a
strong, thriving economy that provides greater opportunity and
prosperity for the Palestinian people.
For the past 9 months, the world watched as Secretary of
State Kerry and his team worked feverishly to restart direct
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.
Now the April 29th deadline has come and gone without any
agreed-upon framework or extension of talks, which leads to the
obvious question: What happens next? What role should the
United States play going forward? And what are the consequences
if Fatah reconciles with Hamas?
We hope to see progress in the talks. We hope to see two
States or two peoples arising out of direct negotiations and
without the imposition of any third-party plans.
But we cannot expect Israel to continue to negotiate with a
partner who has chosen to reconcile with a terrorist
organization that refuses even to recognize Israel's right to
exist, one that targets innocent Israeli civilians with rockets
and suicide attacks.
President Abbas claims that any interim government will
abide by the same principles the PLO adheres to, which have
been stipulated by the international community: Renouncement of
violence, recognition of Israel's right to exist, and the
acceptance of all previous diplomatic agreements.
Let's be clear. Israel will not negotiate with any
Palestinian Government that is backed by Hamas terrorists and
refuses to accept the Quartet Principles.
Any government that includes Hamas terrorists will not
receive U.S. assistance. The law is clear. And this Congress
will not allow U.S. Funding to flow to any government that
includes terrorist members of Hamas.
I hope this message has been received in Ramallah because,
like so many of my colleagues here, I believe in U.S.
assistance to the Palestinians.
If we want to see a thriving, stable state for all
Palestinians, economic support and foreign investment is the
best way to promote peace and stability.
Why would President Abbas jeopardize the world's support by
partnering with terrorists? It is easy to sit back and say we
have seen this before. As we know, there have been similar
failed reconciliation attempts in 2007, 2011, 2012.
But the damage the Palestinians do in trying to unify with
a terrorist group is that the Palestinians aren't using their
time to build their institutions and to prepare their people
for peace and for the recognition of the State of Israel.
Aid dollars are needed for all of those things, whether it
is for security, institution-building, education, or economic
growth.
So the bigger question is: What is Abbas doing to really
make a Palestinian state viable? What is he doing to make a
Palestinian state that can be stable?
Instead of unifying with a terrorist organization, why not
take a very positive and concrete step? Condemn violent acts of
incitement.
He can also prevent incitement and prepare for peace by
taking a small, but very significant, step: Put Israel on the
map, his map. Official Palestinian Government maps must show
Israel.
That will communicate to the Palestinian people that Israel
is here to stay and that those who envision a Palestinian
state, as they put it, from the river to the sea, whether they
are members of Hamas or whether they are anti-Israel members of
BDS groups, do not support a two-state solution, a Jewish and a
Palestinian state. By changing the maps, President Abbas can
show that he is committed to peace even while they are not.
Now, we know the only path to a peaceful two-state solution
is through negotiations between both parties. Unilateral
actions will never achieve this goal. I hope that there is
still space for negotiations to continue without this unity
deal.
And so, as Abbas stands at this very critical juncture, I
urge him to choose the real partner in peace.
And I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much for that opening
statement.
I now would like to yield to our members for their opening
statement.
And we will start with Mr. Chabot, subcommittee chairman.
Thank you.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Unfortunately, I have another hearing that I have to attend
here shortly. So I will read the testimony of all the panel
members here following the hearing.
But I did want to come over to personally recognize and
acknowledge the presence of our former colleague, Congressman
Wexler, who served this institution so honorably for so many
years.
And we actually served not only on Foreign Affairs
Committee together, but, also, Judiciary Committee, and we
participated in such things as the impeachment of a President.
We were on opposite sides on that one.
Mr. Wexler. On everything.
Mr. Chabot. Well, on everything. I stand corrected.
Although we were two of the co-founders of the
Congressional Taiwan caucus. So we generally agreed on issues
with respect to Taiwan.
And I remember a number of codels that we were involved in
and did, I believe, good work in various parts of the world.
We went to The Hague together when Israel was under such
attack around the world for trying to defend itself in building
a security fence in some areas, walled in other areas. And they
were getting much criticism, and we were there speaking out on
their behalf.
I remember meeting with President Mubarak in his office
when he was still in power in Egypt, and we were urging him to
hold free and open and fair elections. And perhaps, had he
followed our advice back there, he would find himself under
different circumstances today.
But, in any event, I appreciated his service to this
institution, and we appreciate his good work on behalf of this
Nation at this point in his capacity.
And we welcome you back.
And thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Higgins of New York is recognized.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I just wanted to also welcome the panelists here. And just
to take this in a little bit different direction, if you look
at public polling, both the Palestinians and the Israelis in
equal numbers, 70, 80 percent, believe in a two-state solution.
But, at the same time, by those same percentages, they
don't think that a two-state solution is possible; so, what you
have is a context of disbelief.
And, you know, unilateralism, one side taking a move,
doesn't move us closer to any kind of solution. What you need
is mutual steps here.
What could the Israelis do to demonstrate to the
Palestinians that they believe that the West Bank, or most of
it, should be part of their state? Well, don't build outside of
the blocks.
You know, the blocks represent about 8 percent of the West
Bank. You would be saying to the Palestinians, ``We are only
going to build in the area that we think should be our state,
not the area that should be your state.''
If a parallel move is made on the Palestinian side, what
could the Palestinians do? As my colleague Ted Deutch had said,
put Israel on a map.
You know, if you ask the Palestinian leaders why Israel
isn't on a map, they say they don't know what the borders are.
Well, you know what they want them to be.
So, you know, there is no Web site, there is no textbook,
that talks about, you know, the existence of Israel in a two-
state scenario.
The other is, as Ted also said, stop the incitement, you
know, stop treating Palestinians that kill Israelis as martyrs.
This creates a cycle of violence that transcends generations.
You know, in my tradition, in the peace process in Northern
Ireland, you know, both sides that had committed themselves for
30 years to violence, on the Catholic side and the Protestant
side--before they were admitted to the negotiating table, both
sides had to renounce violence. Both sides had to participate
in the destruction of their arms to demonstrate that they were
truly committed to a peaceful coexistence.
And I think what we have to accept here is that you can do
all kinds of negotiations. You can try to bring the leaders
together to push them in a direction that they don't want to
be. But a settlement to this long-standing issue has to come
from within. It is not going to come from without.
And, you know, the two sides--you know, the United States
can push Israel, push the Palestinians, together, but both have
to come to the conclusion that, you know, their disdain for
each other historically is not nearly as important as their
love for their own children and the future of a two-state
solution between the Palestinians and the Israelis.
With that, I will yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
And if the subcommittee would indulge me for just a minute,
Mr. Rohrabacher, I am going to turn to Mr. Deutch, who is going
to say--I would like for him to say a few words about Mr.
Wexler. And I know you have some other commitments.
And I do as well, but I know that Mr. DeSantis is going to
take over for me. We have got a meeting with the Syrian
opposition group.
So Mr. Deutch is recognized, Mr. DeSantis and then----
Mr. Deutch. I am sorry that we both need to head off to
other commitments. And, as our witnesses know, we will pay
close attention to the testimony today both as you deliver it
and written.
I just wanted to take a moment to welcome my friend and my
former congressman, Robert Wexler, back to this committee on
which he so ably served for so many years.
It is Congressman Wexler's commitment to these issues, his
expertise about these issues, his deep passion not just for
what happens in Washington, but for the constituents that he
represented that I now have the good fortune to represent--it
is all of these things that made him a tremendous Member of
this body.
And the way that he forged relationships with members on
both sides of the aisle, as we have already seen here today, is
a high bar that he set that I have spent the past number of
years trying to reach.
So it is wonderful to have you have here. You are doing
great work, Robert, in your current capacity at the S. Daniel
Abraham Center. I wanted to thank you for all that you have
done while you were here, all the great work that you continue
to do. It is an honor for us to have you here.
And I also wanted to acknowledge Danny Abraham, who is also
here, who is a World War II veteran, a great American
entrepreneur, and someone who has dedicated so much of his life
to making peace as well.
Robert, it is a pleasure to welcome you back.
Danny, it is a pleasure to welcome you to the committee.
And, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back to you.
Mr. DeSantis [presiding]. Thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, recognized.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes. I would like to associate myself with
the remarks that were just given us about our former colleague
and friend.
I have been following this, as many Americans have, the
possibility of having peace in the Middle East for, well,
almost my whole life now. I was born in 1947, and I guess
Israel was born in 1948.
I do not believe that this is a problem where--at least it
isn't anymore--where you have two sides that are unwilling to
try to reach out to one another.
What we have is Israel in the last 20 years has given up
territory, has reached out, has, in fact, given up the West
Bank and has permitted a total of the Gaza Strip to go under
the jurisdiction of the Palestinians.
And I see that, in the last 20 years, 30 years, we have
seen Israel give up a lot and I haven't seen the Palestinians
give up anything. What have they given up in the last 20 years?
The only thing that stands today between peace in the
Middle East, as far as I can see--and I will be anxious to hear
your reaction to this--the only real thing that stands between
peace is a Palestinian willingness to say, ``We don't have the
right to return to the pre-1967 borders. Thus, we do recognize
Israel has a right to exist as a separate state and we will
have the two-state solution.''
But every time I ask a Palestinian--and I have lots of
Palestinian friends--``Well, that means that you agree that
this right of return doesn't exist. Because if you say the
right of return, you are saying Israel doesn't have a right to
exist as an Israeli--as a Jewish state. Right?''
And so they never will say that. To me, that is the only
thing that is a roadblock. The Israelis have already made
concessions. What concessions have the Palestinians made? They
are not even willing to make that.
I am for peace. I really am. I am not--I don't think of
myself as someone in favor of Israel over the Palestinians. No.
They are both groups of people who deserve to have their own
country and deserve to live in peace.
But I would hope that, as we go through the testimony
today, that we get to the heart of the matter. And I believe
that that is the heart of the matter: The Palestinians have to
agree that Israel will be able to exist and they haven't
honestly done that yet.
Please feel free to contradict that in your testimony.
Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr.
Schneider.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
As we will soon hear from our witnesses, Secretary of State
Kerry's efforts to broker a peace agreement between the
Israelis and Palestinians took place in the context of great
regional turmoil. History will determine whether or not the
efforts were worth the effort.
Our challenge in the present, however, is to assess what
policies we can pursue now that will help move the prospects
for peace forward and, perhaps, more immediate, what policies
will help ensure that the region is not moved backwards.
Much has been said lately of the decisions Israel must
consider, particularly regarding borders, the security
arrangements in the Jordan Valley, and prisoner releases. I
believe the focus is my outlook.
Dr. Schanzer, I hope you will take the time today to
elaborate on your prepared testimony on the need for
Palestinians to focus, in your words, on good governance,
economic reform, and institution-building.
Finally, I would like to touch briefly on the recent
comments of Secretary Kerry and his reference to the specter of
apartheid relative to the conflict.
As the Secretary later noted, he wished he would have used
a different word. I appreciate his quick retraction and his
candor.
While Israel, like any society, is not perfect, one need
only look at the Arab members of the Knesset, or Salim Joubran,
an Arab-Israeli judge sitting on the Supreme Court, to know
that the term ``apartheid'' does not apply here.
The State of Israel grants full rights and security to its
Arab citizens living within Israel. Full enfranchisement, full
employment, full housing, and full participation in the
political process are a staple of Israeli democracy.
But, more important, though unintended, the use of the word
``apartheid'' gives support to those who seek to delegitimize
Israel and those who promote divestment and sanctions against
Israel. I hope that we can count on the Secretary and others to
avoid such linkage in the future.
I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses.
And I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. DeSantis. Gentleman yields back.
The Chair recognizes himself for 1 minute.
I want to thank the witnesses for coming. This is a very
important issue and near and dear to many of our hearts.
It seems to me, especially with the unity government now
with Hamas and Fatah, that the single biggest obstacle--and I
will echo my colleague from California--to having a peace in
this region has been a refusal to the Arabs in the region to
recognize Israel as a Jewish state.
There have been multiple opportunities where you could have
had a Palestinian state. The original U.N. Partition plan in
the late 1940s, that was way more generous to the Arab
population than to the Israelis. The Israelis accepted it. The
Arabs fought it.
And, of course, we have had multiple conflicts since then.
There have been multiple opportunities for there to be a true
two-state solution where Israel is existing as a Jewish state.
And so, until that changes, I don't see how we are going to
be able to have a resolution of this in a way that benefits
Israel's security, and I do not think that we can continue in
good faith to be sending U.S. taxpayer dollars over to the
Palestinians if they are allied with Hamas.
I mean, Hamas--forget about recognizing Israel. I mean,
they want to destroy Israel. They are not even bashful about
their support of terrorism. And so I don't see how this is
something that could be viewed as a positive step.
And I think we need to act in the Congress--good behavior
can be rewarded, but I think you got to penalize bad behavior.
And I will now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts,
Mr. Kennedy.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the
chairman and ranking member of the committee for calling an
important hearing.
To our witnesses, thank you very much.
And to Congressman Wexler, it is great to see you again.
Thank you for being here.
Gentlemen, I will be brief. I think my colleagues have
framed the debate about as well as you possibly can. Just to
add my voice to it, I look forward to your testimony. I look
forward to the opportunity for us to ask you some questions.
I myself am particularly interested, to the extent that you
can speculate, as to Abbas's decision as--to approach Hamas and
the decision to reconcile, what the--prospects for a true
reconciliation there actually are and what that means in the
immediate term as that process continues to unfold for U.S.
policy in the region.
So thank you very much again and look forward for your
testimony.
Mr. DeSantis. Gentleman yields back. And the Chair will now
recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Vargas.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
the opportunity.
I, too, would like to welcome the witnesses.
What I would say is that Israel has done more than any
nation should have to do to try to achieve peace. They have
given up their land. They have released terrorists. They have
done everything they could to try to achieve peace, and the
Palestinians have done nothing.
One thing I would correct for the record, I think it says
Israel was born in 1948. That is modern Israel. Remember,
Israel has been around since, you know, 1200 B.C. So Israel has
been around for a very, very long time. Hope we recall that.
Again, I look forward to the testimony. Thank you.
Mr. DeSantis. Want to thank the gentleman.
So I am pleased now to welcome our witnesses. Thank you for
coming. Welcome back.
First, Dr. Jonathan Schanzer is vice president of research
for the Foundation of Defense of Democracies. Prior to this,
Dr. Schanzer served as a counterterrorism analyst at the U.S.
Department of Treasury, where he took part in designating
numerous terrorism financiers. So welcome.
We also have with us Mr. James Prince, who is co-founder
and president of the Democracy Council. Prior to this, Mr.
Prince was at PricewaterhouseCoopers, where he was engaged in
the Middle East, including through an investigation of
corruption at the Palestine Investment Bank.
Mr. Prince was also a senior professional staff member for
this committee and helped to establish a Public Policy
Institute at a university in northern Iraq.
Welcome, Mr. Prince.
And last, but certainly not least, we welcome back Mr.
Robert Wexler, a former member of the Florida delegation, who
is now president of the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle
East Peace.
During his time in Congress and now at the center, Mr.
Wexler has traveled extensively in the Middle East and was also
chair of the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee and served on the Middle East Subcommittee as
well.
So, welcome, Congressman Wexler.
Mr. DeSantis. At this point, I will recognize Dr. Schanzer.
You guys have 5 minutes for opening statements.
And you may begin.
STATEMENT OF JONATHAN SCHANZER, PH.D., VICE PRESIDENT FOR
RESEARCH, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
Mr. Schanzer. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member,
distinguished members of this committee, on behalf of the
Foundation for Defense of Democracies, I thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the recent U.S. efforts to broker peace
between the Palestinians and Israelis.
I highlight four major issues of concern today.
The first is the timing of the recent initiative,
particularly from Israel's perspective. The existential threat
posed by Iran's nuclear program, coupled with the very serious
concerns over the White House's recent decision to offer
sanctions relief for a mere pause in that program, has cast a
pall over every other Israeli strategic decision right now.
Of course, this threat should not stop America from
pursuing peace, nor does it let the Israelis off the hook on
its commitments for peacemaking. But I believe it was
unrealistic to ask the Israelis to make meaningful security
compromises until this crisis passes.
For that matter, it may have been unrealistic to expect the
Palestinians to deliver while so many of their influential
Sunni allies also express misgivings about Washington's
judgment. They, too, are consumed with fear of an Iranian
nuclear program.
The second area of concern is Palestinian governance. For
too long, Washington has turned a blind eye to the corrupt and
ossified nature of the Palestinian Authority. Given the P.A.'s
20-year track record of mishandling public funds, we might as
well light a $600-million bonfire each year.
Should our assistance to the Palestinian Authority
continue--and there are some good arguments for this--it must
be performance-based. To be clear, this approach is both pro-
Palestinian and pro-peace.
Corruption erodes the public's trust in government, and
that undermines whatever deal may be reached. Conversely, a
government that commands the respect of its people will earn
the public's confidence to negotiate a viable solution to this
conflict.
A good first step would be a plan for the departure of
Mahmoud Abbas. At the age of 80, he is now 9 years into a 4-
year Presidential term.
Leader for life of the Fatah faction and the PLO, Abbas
crushes political opposition and silences criticism of his
leadership by arresting journalists and even Facebook users. In
other words, he is an autocrat.
Why our peacemakers pinned their hopes on his leadership is
still unclear to me. If we want change, it is time for new
leadership.
The third area of concern is the recent reconciliation
agreement between the Fatah faction and Hamas. Admittedly,
these two factions have tried and failed several times in the
past to cement a unity deal.
There is good reason to be skeptical again. But if Hamas
does join either the P.A. or the PLO, it is a sign that
Islamist terror is officially welcome.
The fact that Abbas sees Hamas as even a possible partner
raises troubling questions about the trajectory of the
Palestinian nationalists' movement today.
Of course, a unity deal could also cause a complete rupture
in U.S.- Palestinian ties. The inclusion in the Palestinian
Authority of Hamas, a designated terrorist organization, is
obviously a legal trigger for a full cut in funding.
Similarly, the inclusion of Hamas in the PLO might prompt a
re-designation of the PLO as a terrorist organization, and that
could lead to asset freezes at home and abroad.
On another note on Hamas, if we are serious about weakening
this group, then pressure must be placed on two U.S. allies,
Turkey and Qatar. They are among the terrorist factions' top
financial and political sponsors.
How they remain allies of the United States while
supporting terrorist groups--and there are others beyond
Hamas--might actually be a good topic for future hearings.
Finally, I am troubled about the U.S. Government's apparent
lack of readiness to confront the so-called Palestine 194
campaign.
The Palestinians have renewed their initiative at the
United Nations for recognition. Never mind that the campaign is
designed to spurn the U.S.-led peace process and isolate the
Israelis through diplomatic lawfare.
Our laws stipulate a cut in funding to any agency that
accepts the PLO. This was the case of UNESCO in 2011. Will
Palestinian unilateralism prompt us to cut funding to a host of
multilateral organizations?
If this is not our preferred outcome, should we not have a
strategy to prevent this? If it is our preferred outcome, the
process should not be predicated upon Mahmoud Abbas's
diplomatic maneuvers.
In my written testimony, I note that the PLO subsidiary,
the Palestine National Fund, could be funding these unilateral
efforts. Some U.S. tax dollars may be allocated to the PNF
through the P.A., and this could be a worthy investigation.
On behalf of FDD, I thank you again for inviting me to
testify today. I look forward to your questions.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Dr. Schanzer.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schanzer follows:]
----------
Mr. DeSantis. And the Chair now recognizes Mr. Prince for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. JAMES PRINCE, CO-FOUNDER AND PRESIDENT, THE
DEMOCRACY COUNCIL
Mr. Prince. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking member.
Despite the essential conditions for peace existing on both
sides, as distinguished members of this subcommittee noted, in
Secretary Kerry's Herculean efforts, the diplomatic effort has
failed again.
I will confine my comments to the Palestinian side of this
equation. It is not meant to ignore or diminish the unique and
tremendous hardships posed by the occupation, but, rather, to
discuss the imperative of dealing with the internal dynamics
and the corruption inherent in the Palestinian Authority.
Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, the
U.S. has vacillated in its attention to internal Palestinian
politics. Criticism of the P.A. leadership was often perceived
as a distraction or detrimental to the peace process. The
immediate need of support in peace negotiation often pushed
issues of fostering good governance, civil society to a second
tier.
Taking risks necessary to achieve peace and enhance the
quality of life in Palestine requires leaders with not only the
courage, but, also, a political mandate that will support such
risk-taking.
Even within Mr. Abbas's inner circle, there is a consensus
that Mr. Abbas does not feel he has the political mandate to
take such risks, and he is not strong enough to support any
negotiated agreement that he negotiates.
The Abbas P.A. has become a single-party police state ruled
by Presidential decree. Debate and criticism is not tolerated.
Corruption and nepotism has washed away much of the goodwill
and legitimacy conferred onto the regime after Abbas succeeded
Arafat.
The absence of national elections following the expiration
of the Presidential term in 2009 further degrades the
legitimacy of the P.A. in the eyes of its own constituents.
Abbas is likely to retire in advance of the next election.
This will signal an abrupt end to the Arafat era and older
generation.
Infighting within the Fatah Central Committee has so far
precluded emergence of a consensus legacy candidate. Polls
indicate the Fatah would still win over 40 percent of the vote,
with Hamas receiving upwards of 12 percent.
The most remarkable indicator that should be noted is that
34 percent of the eligible voters in the West Bank and Gaza are
undecided or just don't agree with any of the current
leadership.
Allegations of corruption and mismanagement have plagued
the P.A. since its inception. In 1999, I helped manage an
investigation into the Palestinian International Bank.
We presented Yasser Arafat with massive evidence of fraud,
mismanagement, and illegalities. We suggested to him that he
take the report and pass it over to the appropriate law
enforcement officials.
He replied, in very characteristic candor, ``Why? The
Palestinian people trust me more than they trust the
Palestinian Authority or any institution.'' President Abbas has
taken this rule by Presidential decree to a whole other level.
The so-called Fayyadism and a focus on institution-building
not only reduced corruption, but, importantly, stimulated
government collections, in spite of a decrease in gross
domestic product.
For the first time during Salam Fayyad's previous tenure as
finance minister, the Palestinian budget received applause.
I participated in a worldwide investigation that brought
back over $700 billion into the Treasury and helped eliminate
much of the pervasive smuggling and corruption. However, this
very intermittent, positive trend ended following the 2006
election.
The international response was to wall off the Ramallah
from the Gaza Strip. The temporary international mechanism
followed by the Pegasus system not only channeled cash
assistance and succeeded in stabilizing the P.A., but it
reinvigorated an Imperial presidency that Abbas has continued
to this day.
Except for select ministries and agencies, such as the
Palestinian Monetary Authority and Ministry of Education, few
government offices operate to international standards. The
Palestinian Investment Fund is one of the most controversial
tools used by Abbas to wield influence and direct favors.
As previous testimony to the subcommittee indicates,
beginning in 2007, the PIF has operated largely as an extension
of the presidency, directed by the chairman and CEO of the
fund, who happens also to be deputy prime minister.
In violation of its own charter, the PIF often directly
competes against the local businesses and has a way of
garnering favors with the leadership.
In my written testimony, I talk about the Hamas and Fatah
reconciliation and the challenges it posed. U.S. Law regarding
cutting off assistance to a government that includes Hamas and
the Quartet Principles for recognition are clear. Without
workarounds, this drastic measure should only be deployed as a
last resort.
I would like to skip to some of the suggestions for USG
programming that I included in my written testimony. They
include avoiding large economic projects controlled by the
Authority, gearing more toward small business in the West Bank
and Gaza, with an emphasis on underserved communities.
We should devote additional funding for rule-of-law
programming. We need to dedicate additional resources to
fostering independent life, political party development,
independent candidate training, and independent need, as to
avoid some of the missteps done by USAID and other
international organizations in preparation for the 2006
elections.
U.S. Government assistance should also include evidence of
institutional reform, such as a participatory election law that
precludes candidates that advocate violence, civil service and
pension reform, adding an office of Vice President, and
allowing the P.A. ministers the ability to appoint their own
deputies and department heads without Presidential
interference.
The Palestinian Authority remains the best vehicle by which
to bring about durable peace in the region. However, lacking a
political mandate from its own constituency, the P.A.
leadership will be unable and unwilling to make the difficult
decisions needed to move from the status quo.
Thank you again for this opportunity.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank the gentleman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Prince follows:]
----------
Mr. DeSantis. And the Chair now recognizes the gentleman
from Florida, Mr. Wexler.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT WEXLER, PRESIDENT, S. DANIEL
ABRAHAM CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE (FORMER MEMBER OF
CONGRESS)
Mr. Wexler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Schneider, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the honor
of allowing me to testify before a committee I truly cherish
and in the company of several dear friends who I respect
enormously.
Although 9 months have passed and negotiations between
Israel and the Palestinians have stalled, what was true at the
start of the talks is even truer today: Negotiations between
Israel and the Palestinians remain in both sides' respective
strategic interests.
For the Palestinians, there was and still is only one
reality: The route to an independent state runs through a
negotiated agreement with Israel. Neither seeking admission to
international institutions nor threatening to dismantle the
Palestinian Authority can achieve the dignity and justice
Palestinians deserve in a state of their own.
For Israel, there was and still is only one reality: To
secure its future as a Jewish and Democratic state, a viable
independent and, yes, demilitarized Palestinian state must be
realized.
So what do we do now? First, it is too soon to judge the
nature of the reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas.
There, in fact, have been similar reconciliation agreements
attempts in the past that were never implemented.
On Hamas, there is no debate. Hamas is a terrorist
organization, no ifs, no ands, no buts. We need to appreciate,
however, that the differences between Fatah and Hamas are as
great as the differences between Israel and the Palestinians.
Israel's actual response to the reconciliation agreement is
instructive. Prime Minister Netanyahu is no dove, but he has
been careful to suspend the talks with the Palestinians and not
cancel them outright.
And on Tuesday, Israel walked back from threats to impose
sanctions on the Palestinian Authority. The Prime Minister
knows that Israel is most secure when it is working in
cooperation with Palestinian security forces.
Just this week, Palestinian forces uncovered and arrested
four members of a terror cell in the West Bank that was
plotting to attack Israelis.
Should Congress move now to defund the Palestinian
Authority in response to the reconciliation agreement?
When I was in your shoes, I would have been quick to make a
strong political statement condemning a new Palestinian
Government that might include terrorists.
However, if Congress defunds the Palestinian Authority and
the P.A. cannot pay its security forces and other bills, we
hand a victory to Hamas.
A stated purpose of the reconciliation agreement is to
conduct an election, a desperately needed election, in the
Palestinian territories.
Should the Palestinians, in fact, return to the ballot box,
we must bolster those Palestinians who renounce violence and
recognize Israel's right to exist.
Cutting off U.S. funds now will depress the Palestinian
economy, increase unemployment, and clearly advantage the
objectives of the extremists. How does that help us? How does
that help Israel?
We already have sufficient laws that prevent funding of
terrorist organizations. Let those laws serve their purpose.
This is not the time for hasty action.
In the immediate future, we should encourage the two sides
to continue to deescalate the fraught situation and keep the
window for a two-state solution open.
Moreover, all is not lost. Progress was, in fact, achieved
on the core issues of borders and refugees during the recent
negotiations.
Additionally, for the first time, the Arab League
modernized the Arab Peace Initiative to accept the principle of
land swaps, which would allow Israel to retain the major
settlement blocs adjacent to the 1967 lines.
And after working with more than 150 experts at the
Pentagon, General John Allen presented an extraordinary
security package that, in a two-state outcome, would include
measures to make Israel's eastern border as strong as any
border in the world.
President Obama and Secretary Kerry deserve credit for
initiating a credible process. It is now up to the two sides to
build on what was achieved over the past year or that progress
will slip away.
Pope John Paul said there were two possible solutions to
the Arab-Israeli conflict, the realistic and the miraculous.
The realistic would involve divine intervention. The
miraculous, a voluntary agreement between the parties.
It is America's duty to keep pushing for the miraculous.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank the gentleman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wexler follows:]
----------
Mr. DeSantis. And we will begin the questioning.
We'll go to the gentleman from California. Mr. Rohrabacher
is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I like that, the miraculous. That is good.
All these things, like the progress that you mentioned,
Bob, when the border swaps were approved, this is all just
short term. They are meaningless unless there is this long-term
recognition of the basic principle that is necessary to have
peace.
And that is for the Palestinians to say, ``Yes. Israel will
exist.'' We are spending $400 million a year subsidizing the
Palestinians over decades while they are being intransigent the
whole time.
And, again, I am not sitting here rooting that the
Palestinians come out losers in all of this. I think the
winners are going to be Palestinians and Israelis living side
by side and respecting each other's rights in a two-state
solution.
But do you really think the United States--if there are
only--if all we are seeing is short-term gains that don't mean
anything unless you have that long-term understanding, we can't
do that forever, can we?
Yes, Bob.
Mr. Wexler. I am not the spokesman of the Palestinian
Authority. But, in 1988, the Palestinian Authority recognized
Israel's right to exist. If they didn't, you wouldn't be voting
to send money to the Palestinian Authority. That was a
condition of American engagement with the Palestinian
Authority.
So what we have here--I mean, your point, though, is well
taken, I think, in a different respect. And that is: Should the
Palestinians, in the context of the current negotiations,
recognize Israel as a Jewish state, as a state in the context
of mutuality of recognition? And the answer is absolutely
``yes.''
But we have to be fair, with all due respect. What is
President Abbas's negotiation position on borders? His position
is that he will and does recognize the State of Israel within
the 1967 lines.
And, in fact, in the last round of negotiations under
President Bush and--yet again, he offered a plan which gave
Israel, of course, all of the 67 Israel plus roughly 2 percent
of the West Bank.
So while you and I may not think that sufficiently
incorporates enough of the settlement blocs into the State of
Israel in terms of their internationally recognized borders, it
is not fair to say that President Abbas has not recognized
Israel's right to exist. He has.
The question is: Will he also deny, in effect, or give up
the right of return? And that needs to be done in the context
of a full agreement.
And, in fairness--in fairness to him, he had an interview
not too long ago. President Abbas was born in Safed--in the
Israeli holy city, the Jewish holy city, of Safed.
And he was asked, ``Do you to expect to go back to Safed?
And, if you do, under what terms?'' And he said, ``Yes. I hope
to go back. But I know I'll go back as a tourist. I'm not going
back to my home.''
Now, the next day, there were all kinds of protests and the
Palestinian Authority calling him a traitor.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right. And those people who were doing
that were not in favor of peace with Israel.
The point is the right of return is a recognition of the
right of Israel to exist. And until that right of return, that
concept, ``Well, yes. We will have an agreement and then we
will have 3 million or 4 million more of our people come within
those borders''--that is not a recognition of Israel.
And, again, I am hoping that someday you can have a
Palestine and an Israel living side by side. And when they do
say ``a Jewish state of Israel,'' let's remember that all
throughout the Middle East, you have got the Islamic state of
so-and-so.
And that doesn't mean their rights of minorities aren't
going to be protected in Israel. We all know that. When Israel
says it is the Israeli--it is going to be a Jewish state, they
are going to respect the rights of Muslims and respect the
rights of Christians as well. We know that.
But, again, my time is--of questions, I've got 30 seconds
left. Go to the other panelists.
Am I just off base in saying, until they say the right of
return is gone, that they really have not recognized Israel?
Mr. Schanzer. Look, I would just add this, Congressman
Rohrabacher.
I think, actually, one of the biggest challenges we have
right now is through the UNRWA program, the United Nations
program that is designed to help Palestinian refugees.
What they have effectively done is they have perpetuated
the refugee program. They have continued this so-called right
of return challenge that we continue to face on the Palestinian
side.
In other words, what you had after 1948 was a situation
where there were 800,000 refugees. Today, thanks to the laws in
place by UNRWA, there are more than 5 million.
Now, how is it that over the years these refugees have
grown in number? This is an impossible number to assimilate.
And so this is part of the problem that needs to be solved.
I should note that there is legislation that has been
slowly winding its way through the Senate and, I think, also in
the House, if I am not mistaken, that looks at redefining what
a Palestinian refugee is.
It is no longer--it should no longer be okay to have the
descendents of refugees, in other words, the children, the
grandchildren, the great-grandchildren. That is how you get to
5 million. And those people should not have refugee status.
They need to relinquish that.
And only the leadership of the Palestinian Authority, the
PLO, can only--I think that that is the only message that can
come from them, and that is how this is going to begin to
change. Until then, you are going to have this tinderbox that
you described.
Mr. DeSantis. Gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, 5
minutes.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am grateful for
having today's hearing.
I want to welcome our colleague, Bob Wexler, back.
I share the concerns expressed by my colleagues as well as
by supporters of both Israel and the Palestinian people.
Over the recent breakdown in the 9-month-old talks, which
have been brokered by the United States, it is disappointing to
see the dissolution--or seeming dissolution of this latest
effort to achieve progress and a peaceful resolution of a long-
standing conflict.
Achieving a two-state solution is in the best interests of
both the Israeli and Palestinian peoples and it is central to
U.S. efforts to restore stability in the region.
While there has been no shortage of finger-pointing, it
appears the collective actions of both sides perhaps
contributed to the erosion of any immediate chance to extend
the talks further.
Some characterize the Palestinian Authority's resumption of
activities to exceed the 15 multilateral treaties and
conventions, which it had initially agreed to suspend in the
midst of the peace talks, and then to announce a unity
agreement with Hamas, designated as a terrorist organization by
the United States, and, as Mr. Wexler said, no ifs, ands, or
buts about it, and its refusal to recognize Israel's legitimacy
clearly undermine the chance for real progress at least for
now.
On the other side, some point to Israel's delay of the
forced release of Palestinian prisoners, the final group of 104
who Israel agreed to release in exchange for Palestine
suspending its international recognition efforts and Israel's
continued settlement activities, as also undercutting the
process.
Knowing how such actions from both sides would be
negatively perceived by the other, I am going to be very
curious as to the panel's views on whether the U.S. did all it
could to manage the process.
And I have a full statement I put into the record. With
unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. DeSantis. It will be so put in the record.
Mr. Connolly. I thank you.
And I would like to give the opportunity to the panel on
that last question.
Not for the purpose of finger-pointing or blame, but what
could have, should have, the United States done differently or
in addition or more of or less of that might have made a
difference?
Dr. Schanzer.
Mr. Schanzer. Thank you, Congressman Connolly.
I think that there is a lot of finger-pointing that is
going on right now, and I think you are right to try to stay
away from that.
I think it is instructive to look at the United States and
its strategy and peacemaking. And I included this in my written
remarks as well as my spoken remarks.
I think that the Iran issue casts a pall over the entire
Middle East right now. It is the number one challenge. And I
think that--but I should even note that it is not the only
challenge. You have got a civil war in Syria. You have got a
very unstable Egypt. You have got Arab Spring issues.
There are only so many issues that we can solve. And I say
that as the United States appears to be retreating from the
Middle East, not looking to engage even more. And so how we
decided that we would be able to take on all of these issues
and do them successfully is still very unclear to me.
My approach would have been to be somewhat more modest with
the objectives, to have a quiet approach to diplomacy, not to
set a 9-month window with an expiration date at the end, you
know, first proclaiming that you are going to end the conflict,
well, then, you know, have to downgrade and start to talk about
having a framework agreement.
I think it was all ill-advised. I think we bit off more
than we could chew. I think that, if we do get back into the
business of peacemaking, I think it needs to be done more
quietly. And I suspect, by the way, it is happening right now
anyway.
And, in the process, as Mr. Prince and I both discussed in
our testimonies, there needs to be a focus on the change in
leadership inside the Palestinian Authority for a more
legitimate government.
Mr. Connolly. I couldn't agree with you more, everything
you said.
Congressman Wexler, did you want to comment?
Mr. Wexler. Yes, please.
First, I will agree, there is no reason to go back and
assign blame. One of the things that I think Secretary Kerry,
though, did right was that he effectively kept the talks secret
for a great period of time, and I think that assisted both
sides.
But there is a misnomer here that needs to be recognized.
Secretary Kerry, President Obama didn't drag anybody to a peace
table. The Israelis and the Palestinians both wanted to be
there from the beginning. For separate reasons, it was in their
interests. And then we became, obviously, the facilitator.
But let me take up on a point that the two gentlemen
raised, and that is a change of Palestinian leadership. Well,
in order to have a change that I think all of us would be
comfortable with, you need to have a democratic process, and we
need to be pragmatic about how a democratic process comes about
in the context of the Palestinian Authority or the Palestinian
territories.
In order to hold it in the West Bank, you need Fatah to
agree. In order to hold it in Gaza, you need Hamas to agree. In
order to hold it in East Jerusalem, you need the Israelis to
agree.
Well, how are you going to get Fatah and Hamas to agree to
an election unless you have a reconciliation, understanding of
some sort?
So we just need to be honest amongst ourselves. If we are
going to demand a change in leadership--and we certainly want
that leadership change to be democratic--then we need to
understand there needs to be some accommodation with groups
that we label as a terrorist. Otherwise, you are not going to
have an election.
So we at least need to be honest with ourselves. And the
Israelis have to agree to have it in East Jerusalem, along with
the two Palestinian sides.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you so much.
And, Mr. Chairman, I wonder if you would just indulge Mr.
Prince an opportunity to respond. My questioning is over. And I
thank both the chairman and my friend----
Mr. DeSantis. Gentleman will have 1 minute to respond.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair.
Mr. Prince. Thank you, Congressman Connolly.
I would agree with both the previous comments. One, there
needs to be a democratic process, there needs to be elections.
And, two, I think we did bite off more than we can chew in the
recent go-around.
The basic points of a departure in a deal is that both
sides feel a benefit and really want to reach the end of a
deal. I would argue that President Abbas, from the start of 9
months ago, was not--was more interested in the process than he
was a final status agreement.
I do believe there were modest steps that could have been
taken, could have been agreed upon, that would have pushed both
sides together, but President Abbas did not believe from the
very beginning that he had the right or ability to reach a
final status agreement. And, therefore, the gamesmanship--not
to mention the Israeli side--the gamesmanship continued on.
There needs to be, as Congressman Wexler mentioned, some
sort of democratic process to restore some sort of unity,
cohesion within the Palestinian community. Right now, it is
dysfunctional.
And I don't believe any Palestinian leader that would
emerge from the Fatah leadership will be brave enough, either
from a security standpoint or a political standpoint, to reach
a final status agreement.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank the gentleman. Time has expired.
The Chair will recognize himself for 5 minutes.
You know, in terms of this recognizing Israel, I mean, it
is crucial. Yes. I acknowledge they are willing to recognize
some geographic entity called Israel.
But if you don't recognize Israel's right to exist as a
Jewish state, then we are not in a situation where you are
going to have a long-term peaceful resolution.
I mean, the whole purpose of Israel being a refuge is that
it would be a Jewish state. And they have consistently refused
to recognize that.
And I will give some of the witnesses a chance. I don't
know if that represents the broad view of the Palestinian Arabs
in the area.
I certainly believe that most people in Gaza do not believe
Israel has a right to exist as a Jewish state. But that has
been the biggest roadblock.
There have been opportunities to have an Arab state
throughout history. It seems like the desire to not have a
Jewish state always trumped the desire to have a Palestinian
state, and I don't see evidence that we have gotten beyond
that.
So let me ask you, Congressman Wexler. You talked about you
would not move to defund it because, you know, you acknowledge
Hamas as a terrorist group, but you are just not sure how this
is going to shake out. It is true in the past there have been
kind of attempts at unity that have fizzled.
So at what point would you be willing to pull the trigger
and say that we shouldn't be rewarding this type of behavior
with Hamas?
Mr. Wexler. If Hamas, in fact, joins a unity government and
Hamas has not in the context of that government accepted the
three principles adopted by the Quartet--recognize Israel's
right to exist, renounce violence, and incorporate all of the
aggrieved understandings between the sides--then the law is
clear. There will not be funding.
But at this point----
Mr. DeSantis. But that recognition--you would not require
that to be recognizing Israel as a Jewish state, just
recognizing----
Mr. Wexler. No. There is no requirement to recognize Israel
as a Jewish state in any type of understanding that has
previously existed between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
We need to be, again, honest amongst ourselves. When you
say ``recognize Israel as a Jewish state,'' do I recognize
Israel as a Jewish state? Of course, I do. It is the Jewish
state. Israel is the Jewish state.
But where is that state? What makes it a Jewish state? It
is a Jewish state because it is a majority made up of Jewish
residents.
Well, is that state the 1967 lines incorporating the
settlement blocs, incorporating the settlements, or is it the
67 lines plus the West Bank and Gaza?
So we need to be honest. When you talk about recognizing
Israel as a Jewish state, which I am all in favor of--don't get
me wrong--it is not so simple on the other side.
And I think we ought to take a look at the language of the
Arab Peace Initiative, which is quite forthcoming. While it
doesn't say Israel is a Jewish state and it doesn't talk
directly about the right of return, what it says is the right
of return will have an agreed-upon resolution.
Every Arab country in the world has put that forward. When
they say ``agreed-upon resolution,'' that means Israel must
agree. Well, they know Israel will never agree to take back 5
million refugees or even 800,000 refugees. So there has been
movement.
Mr. DeSantis. And let me go to Dr. Schanzer.
What is your view? I mean, do you think, one, that moving
to defund the aid, if this unity movement continues? And do you
think people in Congress should be conditioning tax dollars?
I mean, should we demand that there be a recognition that
Israel has a right to exist as a Jewish state, given that that
seems to be a precondition certainly for Prime Minister
Netanyahu and I know many of us in this body.
Mr. Schanzer. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Look, I would say that the difference between a Jewish
state and just a state that deserves to exist--in my mind,
there is really no difference.
And my problem has always been with the Palestinian
Nationalist movement, that it has been more based on
destruction of the State of Israel than the creation of
something, i.e., a Palestinian state.
We know more about what they don't like and how angry they
are than about what it is that they want to create. And so that
has been my approach to this problem all along.
Would it help if the Palestinians acknowledged that and put
the Israelis' minds at ease? Absolutely. Should it be one of
our preconditions? Look, I will leave that to you.
But let me just answer to one thing that Congressman Wexler
said. The idea of acknowledging a technocratic government that
includes figures approved by Hamas is a slippery slope.
The idea that you could allow the technocratic government
to take place just because you want to see elections happen,
that is basically acknowledging Hamas and it is opening the
door to allow Hamas to come in as a legitimate player in the
next elections, which is something that we have to avoid at all
costs.
Mr. Prince. I would definitely agree that the distinction
between recognition of a Jewish state and recognizing the
existence and the independence of the State of Israel is very
nuanced and something that I think shouldn't preclude the
United States from enforcing the law right now.
Privately, Palestinians do--and including in Gaza, they do
talk of the right of return. As Congressman Wexler says, it is
sort of pie in the sky to say that Israel is going to accept
millions of refugees. And they also talk about Israel as a
Jewish state in Gaza City as well as Ramallah.
What they don't say so is publicly. The leadership--and the
Palestinian papers released a few years ago by Al Jazeera also
reinforced this concept.
We are talking about the Palestinian community as a unified
group, and that doesn't exist today. The right of return and
recognizing Israel, I would argue, is a non-issue privately. No
Palestinian leadership worth its salt on any side really says
that those issues still exist today.
Mr. DeSantis. I thank the gentleman. My time is expired. So
I thank you for that.
And the Chair will now recognize the gentleman from
Illinois, Mr. Schneider, 5 minutes.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Again, thank you to the witnesses for being here.
Congressman Wexler, with all due respect, I think Israel
was created as a Jewish state. We celebrated the 66th
anniversary of its creation this past Monday.
It had its foundation on November 29th, 1947, in U.N.
Resolution 181, a Jewish state and an Arab state. The Jews
accepted that. The Arabs did not. And that is the battle that
is being fought today.
So I think the question really is: When will the
Palestinians not recognize, but accept, that Israel is a Jewish
state and accept that the right of return is a non-starter, as
was discussed?
I think it is also important to emphasize that, as you
said, Dr. Schanzer, any P.A. reconciliation between Fatah and
Hamas that includes a Hamas, that doesn't recognize the Quartet
conditions, the three conditions as you noted, is unacceptable
and cannot continue to have U.S. support.
But the purpose of this meeting is really about what is
next. It was in the title. And I would like to focus on what is
next.
A year ago--exactly a year ago Salaam Fayyad stepped down
as Prime Minister. For many years, I think the conversations in
this committee, around the country, were that the future
prospects for a Palestinian state depended on the aspirations
of Fayyad of building the institutions. He is no longer there.
He was forced out. Hamdallah was put in replacement for Fayyad.
We don't hear about him at all.
What does the future of a Palestinian Authority,
Palestinian Government, look like without people committed to
building the institutions? And who might there be that would
build those institutions? Dr. Schanzer?
Mr. Schanzer. Thank you, Congressman Schneider.
I would just concur that we have a real problem, that the
exit of the Fayyad--look it, in many ways, this was the
deflation of the Palestinian Nationalist project, at least one
that had a direction and a vision.
The defeat of Fayyad was a victory for the corruption and
the ossified approach to government that Mr. Abbas has embraced
over these years.
Rami Hamdallah, the new Prime Minister, is a neophyte and
really does not serve in that role of checks and balances
against the presidency, which was always the intended role of
the Prime Minister, was to check that absolute power over the
Palestinian presidency.
And on top of that, what we have is a very troubling
development where the new Deputy Prime Minister, Mohammed
Mustafa, who also happens to be the head of the PIF, has become
a very powerful guy. You see this centralization of power
again, and that is the concern.
The other concern is that there is just no political space
for new parties, new figures, to emerge. And so you have this
monopoly over power without even allowing for new voices to
come onto the scene, to debate, to get into that clash of ideas
that is so necessary for democratic reform.
And so we have got a real problem on our hands, and I have
to say that American policy has reinforced this, that we
continue to look at Mr. Abbas as the only one who can deliver
and, therefore, continue to give him whatever he needs. And so
it has compounded these problems over time.
When Abbas goes, there is no plan for what happens next.
There is no leadership. There is no succession. It is going to
be a vacuum, and it will be on our heads for failing to have
planned for that moment.
Mr. Schneider. Mr. Prince, I will turn to you, but let me
just interject.
Dr. Schanzer talked about Mr. Mustafa rising, and I think
that was somewhat predictable. Mustafa was the first choice,
but I think, because of his engagement with PIF, he was not
palatable, if you will. So Hamdallah kind of fills the titular
role, but Mustafa has the power.
Now we are looking forward. Abbas is 79 years old. There
needs to be some commitment from the Israelis to move toward
peace. They are going to have a partner on the other side who
will be there for a long term. What are the prospects?
And, Mr. Prince, Congressman Wexler, I would like both of
your comments.
Mr. Prince. Well, first of all, as members of the committee
noted, there is a significant constituency that remains for
peace in both West Bank and Gaza.
The problem is they are not currently represented. With
Abbas leaving office prior to the next election, there will be
a significant vacuum. There will be infighting and there will
be debate between the older generation and the newer
generation.
The question is whether the newer generation, as Dr.
Schanzer mentioned, has the political space to actually
represent themselves and be part of the process.
I believe that that is something that we should start
preparing for now. If we don't, there will be a resumption of
not only infighting, but probably some of the violence that
happened in 2007 in Gaza will definitely go to the West Bank.
There is not going to be an L--PLO, Tunisian--they call
them the Abus--that are going to run the Palestinian Authority
in the next time around. To be a partner for peace, we need to
look to this peace constituency and the vast population.
Mr. Schneider. If I may give Congressman Wexler a minute.
Mr. DeSantis. Yep.
Mr. Wexler. Very quickly, another aspect of what Secretary
Kerry, of course, was attempting to do is, while economics are
not a replacement for political achievements, a very important
part of his diplomatic initiative was attracting investment to
the West Bank.
And, in fact, extraordinary commitments were made mostly by
American but, also, by some European companies to engage in the
West Bank.
If you go to Ramallah today, if you go to Jenin today, if
you go to other population centers today in the West Bank, they
are by and large far more law abiding, peaceful, and successful
than they were, say, 10 years ago.
What I think needs to happen in the future--Israel,
thankfully, has had some extraordinary energy finds. Those
energy finds, particularly in certain areas, ought to be talked
about in terms of sharing with the Palestinians.
You are going to need to build a port, an air facility to
allow transport in and out of an emerging Palestinian economy.
But these things are very difficult to do when the
Palestinians don't have their own government in effect to
exercise the authority to do it.
And if I may just respond to Mr. Schneider, respectfully, I
would be careful when referring to the U.N. Partition Plan in
support of Israel as a Jewish state.
Again, you consider Israel a Jewish state. I consider
Israel a Jewish state. But the Jewish state of Israel that was
created in the United National Partition Plan in terms of the
boundaries is not a boundaries plan that Israel would accept
today, and you wouldn't and I wouldn't.
So we have to be careful in terms of--I would respectfully
suggest, when we are talking about what is a Jewish state, it
is not so simple.
Mr. Schneider. I appreciate that.
But when David Ben Gurion declared independence on May 14,
he declared the Jewish state of Israel.
Mr. Wexler. Yes.
Mr. Schneider. It has stayed that. It will remain that. And
any negotiated peace between the Palestinians must assure that.
Mr. Wexler. I agree.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you very much.
Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman's time is expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina,
Mr. Meadows, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank each of you for your testimony.
Mr. Schanzer, I want to go to you. I saw, I guess, reaction
to Mr. Wexler's response just in your face. So I will give you
a few minutes to respond.
Mr. Schanzer. Sure. Thank you, Congressman Meadows.
Look it, I would just say this to Congressman Wexler. The
idea of ensuring continued financial assistance or financial
incentives to the Palestinian Authority right now is putting
the cart before the horse.
Without the reform that is necessary, the $4 billion that
the United States promised the Palestinians, should an
agreement be struck, would have been wasted.
In many ways, this was actually a helpful step by not
allowing the peace process to go through before the reform
process could take place. It would have been a sinkhole.
We have seen what has happened before where hundreds of
millions, in fact, billions, of dollars have been plowed into
the Palestinian Authority over the last 20 years.
Since 1994, we have provided billions of dollars. The
Europeans have provided billions of dollars. The Arab Gulf
States have provided billions of dollars.
And we do not see a Palestinian Authority that is in much
better shape today to perform the tasks of governance in a way
that they would be respected in the Palestinian Authority or
internationally.
And so, again, this underscores the same problem that I
have been focusing on here at this subcommittee, at the
committee level as well, that there is a huge problem of
legitimacy, a huge problem of corruption, inside the
Palestinian Authority that must be tackled if we are going to
be able to move forward.
Mr. Meadows. All right. Let me go a little bit further,
because I just returned from the region and three things
concern me greatly.
One, we continue to spend money. And it is a complex
situation. Everybody knows that. If it was easy, it would have
been solved long ago.
However, I went into a terror tunnel that had just been
constructed with moneys that we probably sent to folks in Gaza.
A mile and a half long, concrete floors, concrete walls,
concrete ceilings, communication, rail, lights.
And, yet, here we are talking about economic development
and, yet, this mile-and-a-half-long tunnel, probably built with
American taxpayers' moneys, with the sole purpose of coming up
in the middle of a field so they could abduct Jewish settlers
at a--not settlers--Jewish folks in a kibbutz troubled me.
At what point do we say enough is enough?
Mr. Schanzer. Well, Congressman Meadows, I would just add
this. The money has been cut off largely to the Palestinian
territory of Gaza. We have done a pretty good job of bottling
that up.
There are some things--and, actually, Mr. Prince can speak
to this--where there is money that has been going through to
the power plant inside the Gaza Strip that is coming from the
Palestinian Authority, which, of course, we fund.
Mr. Meadows. Right.
Mr. Schanzer. And so there are some millions of dollars
that are still leaking through. There is also the pressure that
is placed on the Israelis to ensure that the cement and other
goods get through to the Gaza Strip and, if it doesn't, then,
of course, the Israelis get blamed for humanitarian----
Mr. Meadows. But therein is the thing. It is meant that we
are getting there and it is being built in tunnels to come back
at the very people who are providing it.
Mr. Schanzer. That is right. That is right.
But I would actually just add one more thought, and that is
that the top sponsors of Hamas right now are two U.S. allies.
And this needs to be addressed.
You have Qatar and Turkey. They are now the two top
sponsors and financiers of the Hamas organization. These are
not allies any longer if this is what they are doing, and we
have yet to address that. I think it is a serious problem.
Mr. Meadows. So, Mr. Prince, you would agree we need to
address that in terms of Qatar and Turkey?
Mr. Prince. I agree. I think Qatar is one of the most
pressing issues today. I happened to be in Gaza when the Royal
Family visited some time ago.
With the change in relationship with the Egyptian
Government, Qatar remains--to a lesser extent, the Iranian
money--Qatar remains the largest financier of society in Gaza.
I would--just to go back to the question of tunnels and
economic developments--or assistance, cutting off U.S.
assistance leads people to increased dependency. We have the
humanitarian issue, and we end up spending money in many
different ways indirectly.
The question of the large economic development program
proposed by Secretary Kerry, I don't believe, as Dr. Schanzer
said, would have a positive impact on Palestinian society.
From an economic development standpoint, I spent years
going through almost every commercial enterprise in West Bank
and Gaza. The region can't absorb that amount of money.
Large infrastructure projects, like Congressman Wexler
mentioned, look nice. They help the leadership. But they are
not filtering down to providing durable jobs to local
Palestinians.
And until we focus on that, we are not going to solve the
problem. So the question of assistance is not cutting it off,
but doing it smarter.
Mr. Meadows. Okay. And my time is expired.
So I would ask for the record if you would respond in
writing in terms of what can we do about the incitement that is
going on each and every day within that group. Because it is
hard to get a negotiated deal when you are adding fuel to the
fire, so to speak.
I will yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman's time is expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Vargas, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
for the opportunity to speak.
I want to thank the witnesses.
And, in particular, I want to thank Congressman Wexler.
Thank you for being here. And, in particular, I would like to
thank you for the quote of Pope Francis.
I am a former Jesuit myself in an ocean that the realistic
is the divine intervention. I like that. It is probably true.
The miraculous would be the voluntary agreement.
And you have been somewhat of a stickler here for details;
so, I am going to be a little bit of a stickler with you, if
you don't mind.
You have been using the date 1967 and 67 interchangeably.
It is not. Israel is one of the few nations where both of those
dates make sense. You can talk about the Israel of 1967, and
you can talk about the Israel of 67. The Israel of 67 is much,
much, much larger. Remember, it was a country in 67. So you do
have to be careful when you use it.
I hear the President and others talking about the 67 lines.
Well, the 67 lines would really tick off the neighbors because
that would be a very, very large Israel today, the Northern
Kingdom and the Southern Kingdom.
But, anyway, all of that aside, I do want to talk about
this within the context of Iran because, you know, to me, it
almost seems trite that we are arguing about this.
The reality is that Israel can take care of itself and,
interestingly, Israel can also secure the Palestinians. One of
the things that people don't talk about, but--you know, a lot
of the Palestinians have it pretty darn good because Israel
supports them.
You don't think that they would need to be protected from
their neighbors, just ask Syrians, you know, ``How do you do
out there by yourself?'' You know, it is a pretty mean
neighborhood.
So we are trying to get to a peace. And you say it is in
the interest of both, but it almost seems trite within the
context of this existential threat that Iran poses to Israel
and, ultimately, the threat it poses to ourselves.
Would you comment on that, Congressman, in particular.
Mr. Wexler. The threat of a nuclear-armed Iran is in and of
itself, in my humble estimation, the most important endeavor
that we must seek to defang, to defeat.
And while, yes, in any sense of reality, an Israeli Prime
Minister, as would an American President, in the context of a
region must consider all of these facts.
But we have been very careful--when I say ``we,'' I think
most of us on the American side that hold Israel's security
very dear--we have been very careful never to mix the two.
The fact of the matter is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
the resolution of that conflict is in the interest of both the
Israelis and the Palestinians and on the merits of the conflict
itself.
Because if we have learned anything from the Arab Spring,
it should be that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not the
cause of all of the root of evil in the region. It is one
distinct set of circumstances that respectfully should be
handled on its own based on its own merits.
Now, in reality, an Israeli Prime Minister certainly will
consider the range of options in terms of what progress or non-
progress is made with Iran. Clearly, that is the case.
And, unfortunately, it seems we were unable to make great
progress on the Israel-Palestinian front prior to the
culmination or the non-culmination of the talks with Iran.
But I think it would be a mistake if we joined the two
together, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Iranian
nuclear program, in a way in which both had to be dealt with in
some type of simultaneous or comparable way. I don't think that
would benefit either the Israelis or the Palestinians.
Mr. Vargas. Dr. Schanzer?
Mr. Schanzer. Thank you.
I would just respond in this way, that the United States
has had the ability to impose its will on the Israelis and
Palestinians only at times when it has been able to demonstrate
strength.
I think about the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War and how,
at that point, the United States looked invincible. And it was
at that point also that the Arab states, the Palestinians and
Israelis, got in line and began to work through this--what is
now known as the Oslo Process.
We have a problem now that we look weaker than we have in
recent memory. We do not appear to be able to have our way,
which, really, when you think about the Iraq war, you think
about Afghanistan, the war on terror, we have not enforced our
own red lines in Syria. We can't seem to be able to solve this
Iranian problem. We have a credibility problem right now. We
need some wins.
My sincere belief is that, if we begin to take care of some
of these problems--look it, whether it is the Iran problem,
whether it is the Syria problem, whether it is bringing some
order back to the Arab world after the Arab Spring, whatever it
is, if we begin to do that, I believe it will become that much
easier to start to get the Palestinians and Israelis to take
this peace process seriously.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you.
Mr. Prince, I apologize. My time has expired, but I was
going to go to you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman's time is expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Yoho, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I appreciate you being here.
Let me start with the money that we have invested in the
Palestinian Authority since 1988, roughly $5 billion. Last year
approximately $500 million was given to the Palestinian
Authority in the name of peace, is what I like to think, you
know.
The people back home don't want us sending any money
overseas, especially in this economic crisis that we are having
here.
Yet, in this room, a couple--about a month ago, in this
very room, sitting right where you guys are, there was a
gentleman talking about Resolution 21 and 23 in the Palestinian
Authority loosely knit government laws that pays criminals that
have created crimes of terrorism against Americans and Israeli
citizens that are sitting in Israeli prisons.
The larger the act of terrorism, the larger the stipend
they get. I think the average was $3,600. I have heard rumors
of up to $10,000 a month when the average income in that area
is around $5,000.
So we put in a resolution that says all funding to the
Palestinian Authority gets cut until they remove Resolution 21
and 23.
Starting with you, Dr. Schanzer, I would like to hear your
thoughts, and Mr. Prince, and Congressman Wexler. What effect
would that have?
Mr. Schanzer. The cutting of funding?
Mr. Yoho. To stop it.
If we are giving this money in the name of peace and they
are promoting terrorism--you know, if you steal a loaf of
bread, you go to prison. But if you commit a crime of terrorism
and kill somebody, you go to prison and get a check.
And I think that is just reprehensible, that the American
taxpayers are flipping the bill. And I know it goes into a
fungible pot and they say, ``We are not using your money.'' I
don't buy it. If you want our money, you need to stop promoting
that kind of activity.
Mr. Schanzer. Congressman Yoho, you are absolutely correct.
Here is the problem. And, I mean, there are a couple of
problems here.
Number one, what Mr. Abbas has done is he has actually
delivered on peace. In other words, he brought an end to the
Intifada in 2005. From 2000 to 2005, there was violence raging
everywhere, and he was the leader.
After Yasser Arafat died, he was able to bring all of those
different militias under the control of the Palestinian
Authority. He, you know, made sure to disarm them.
And so, in that sense, the Israelis are much happier with
his leadership and--as are we, I think, you know, generally
speaking.
The problem is that, even though he has brought an end to
the violence, he has maintained a culture of violence,
nevertheless. And so that means paying off the terrorists who
are in jail. It means the incitement that we see in mosque
sermons and on television.
And so there is a baseline of hatred that Mahmoud Abbas has
maintained and we have, to a certain extent, underwritten this.
The problem now moving forward is what do you do about it.
You know, if we zero out Palestinian funding, then here is
the big problem. You are going to have someone else come in and
they are going to be worse.
More than likely, you are going to see the Saudis, the
Iranians, the Qataris, the Turks. They are all going to come in
and they are not even going to hold the Palestinians to account
at all.
The important thing from my perspective, if we are going to
keep the funding going, we need to make sure that we have
tighter controls. We need to demand performance. And, in my
opinion, we have just simply failed to do so.
Mr. Yoho. Mr. Prince.
Mr. Prince. I would definitely agree. The issue of
prisoners is extremely dicey. Mahmoud Abbas has basically
guaranteed security through the old-time-mafia type of way of
delivering brown bags of cash to people, and that includes
families of political prisoners.
Mr. Yoho. Right. We have read about those.
Mr. Prince. And that has continued today. At least Arafat
demanded something in return. Mahmoud Abbas, usually it is just
to support acquiescence to his leadership.
The wholesale cutoff, as Dr. Schanzer said, presents a wide
variety of problems. It is diminished leverage. It leaves a
void.
The degree of dependency right now on international
assistance doesn't really allow for a wholesale cutoff because
aid agencies or extremists groups will come in to serve them.
I would argue, though, that there are a significant amount
of conditions we should be putting on aid so that it is not
fungible.
Mr. Yoho. I agree. I think get rid of Resolution 21 and 23
and we will get along fine. But until you stop promoting
terrorism, I don't see how you are going to get peace.
And, you know, you had touched on something else--and I
think you are right on--is we see a weakened America and we see
an emboldened other part of the world, and they are stepping
up.
And what effect do you think the Iran negotiations over the
nuclear weapons and--right where we are at right now--what
effect does that have on the security of the Israel and
Palestinian area?
Go ahead, Congressman Wexler. You haven't had a chance.
Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman's time is expired.
Mr. Yoho. I am sorry. My time is expired.
Mr. DeSantis. Go ahead and take 30 seconds.
Mr. Wexler. Well, first, I would agree that no American
taxpayer's money should be going to fund terrorist families
directly or indirectly, and any way in which you can go about
to prevent that is an admirable attempt.
But I would also respectfully suggest you vote for this--I
don't want to mischaracterize you. You say you vote for this
because you are about achieving peace.
Well, I would suggest it really should be more than just
peace at this point. It should be peace and, when not peace, at
least security.
And we need to be realistic that there are forces within
the Palestinian society that, in fact, support violence in a
very overt way and there are those that oppose it in an overt
way.
And those that oppose it are not necessarily Boy Scouts and
they are not necessarily people you and I would vote for, but
they oppose violence. And that is what President Abbas has
done.
And so, when given the choice of the two teams that
unfortunately we have at this point, if there becomes a third
team or a fourth, then let's go for it.
But now we have got the Hamas team, and there is nothing
good about that team. And then you got the Fatah team, which
has all kinds of warts and all sorts of problems, but they
oppose violence.
Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman's time is expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from New York, Ms.
Meng, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Meng. Thank you to our speakers for being here and to
Congressman Wexler. It is an honor to hear from all of you.
While we are on the topic of aid, I am just curious. How
much--are the Palestinian people aware of the aid that the
United States gives them and how much do we give them?
Mr. Schanzer. Congresswoman Meng, they are very aware. And
they are also very aware of how little of it trickles down to
them, and that is ultimately, I think, one of the greatest
challenges that we face.
So here you have a Palestinian leadership that has brought
in this $5 billion that we have heard about throughout the
afternoon.
There has been a significant investment on the part of the
Europeans, Arab states, et cetera, and it has been a sinkhole.
The middle class has not found a way to benefit from it.
The lower class has been kept in refugee camps and in squalor.
And so the problem is creating a system whereby these funds
can actually find their way to the right people. And under this
leadership--and Congressman Wexler mentioned that the Fatah
faction has warts. That is an understatement.
In other words, as long as the Fatah faction holds sway,
they are going to withhold these funds. They are going to
prevent these funds from reaching the middle and lower classes.
And that, in turn, perpetuates conflict. That is something
that needs to stop. And, again, that is all about leadership.
It is about preparing for that next generation of Palestinian
leaders.
We should be making sure that they have the oxygen, the
ability now, to present their ideas, and that is something that
we have failed to deliver on for the Palestinian people.
And it is for that reason that, despite the billions of
dollars that we have provided to the Palestinians, they still
resent us. They think that we are on the side of Abbas.
Mr. Prince. If I may, Congresswoman Meng, I agree
wholeheartedly. Every Palestinian is aware of the assistance
provided by the United States, whether it is direct, indirect,
through the United Nations or any other agency.
The question of whether it is viewed positively--and that
is something that you can trace back from the inception of the
P.A., that the general population has viewed these assistance
programs less and less positively since the time of Arafat.
If you go back to the 2006 elections in which Hamas emerged
victoriously, there was a USAID program to announce new
projects very close--during the campaign period close to the
elections.
It was a relatively thinly veiled attempt to inform the
voters of the value of the assistance and the relationship with
the United States. You could track the polls when those
programs were announced, the decrease in support for Mahmoud
Abbas and old-time Fatah.
The belief is that our assistance programs on security,
environmental and health are central, critical, useful. Our
assistance on democracy and governance and economic development
has largely been siphoned off or used to support the powers
that be and have not filtered down to the local population.
Mr. Wexler. If I may?
Mr. DeSantis. Sure.
Mr. Wexler. Secretary Kerry's approach, the diplomatic
effort that he just led, was a multifaceted approach. He took
on the political issues, he took on the diplomatic-related
political issues, he took on the economic issues, and he took
on civil society often in partnership with our European allies.
And under ideal circumstances, you address every aspect of
Palestinian Authority simultaneously to build the kind of
society that we have been talking about. The problem is, at
least for the time being, that has broken down.
So the question is: How can you salvage as much positive
results as humanly possible? And the reality is, unfortunately,
that Hamas plays a role within Gaza that is completely
unacceptable to us, to the Europeans and, of course, to the
Israelis and, in many respects, unacceptable to President Abbas
himself.
So the question is: How do we devise a strategy where we
get to the point--the type of accountability that these
gentlemen rightfully are highlighting? And, unfortunately, it
is very difficult to do in a non-democratic atmosphere.
Ms. Meng. Thank you.
What steps has President Abbas taken over the past 9 months
to prepare the Palestinian people for peace? And is there--how
much support is there amongst these people for a peace deal?
Mr. DeSantis. The gentlewoman's time is expired.
I know we just called the vote. So I am going to
recognize----
Ms. Meng. We are not coming back?
Mr. DeSantis. No. No. No. We are going to continue. But I
want to make sure. I don't think that we will reconvene after
the votes.
So I will recognize the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr.
Cotton, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cotton. Thank you. Dr. Schanzer, I noticed that you
were shaking your head in apparent disagreement with Mr.
Wexler's comments on Secretary Kerry's actions.
Do you care to elaborate on your head-shaking?
Mr. Schanzer. Apparently, I have been somewhat expressive
this afternoon.
Thank you, Congressman Cotton.
Look it, this is where I would disagree. I don't believe
that Secretary Kerry's approach was multifaceted. I think that
Secretary Kerry, while I believe that he was absolutely earnest
in his attempts at peacemaking, fell into a familiar trap.
I recently wrote a book where I went around and I
interviewed former peacemakers, from Dennis Ross, to Aaron
David Miller, to Elliott Abrams, and they all basically said
the same thing. And I believe we saw a reprise of that with
Secretary Kerry, and that is the emphasis of the transaction
over the transformation.
What do I mean by that? We continue to aim for that
handshake on the White House lawn. Right? You think about these
grand--you know, maybe winning that Nobel Prize, redrawing the
map. And in the process, you don't get down to that less-than-
sexy approach of state-building on the Palestinian side.
We continue to ignore the fact that these are basically
autocrats, that these are kleptocrats. And, look it, if you
really think that this was a multifaceted approach, ask
yourself: Why was it that we didn't talk about preparing for
new elections? Why was it that we didn't talk about preparing
for the exit of Mahmoud Abbas, who is now so many years past
the end of his term?
I mean, we pinned our hopes on one guy who had already
passed his expiration date. That is not about reform. It is not
about state-building.
And so we ignored the transformation again in order to get
that transaction done. We need to learn how to walk and chew
gum, and I don't believe that this administration did that this
time around.
Mr. Wexler. If I may.
Mr. Cotton. Yes, you may.
Mr. Wexler. Secretary Kerry didn't talk about a full-
fledged election because, in order to have a full-fledged
election in the Palestinian territories, you need to have
Hamas's agreement and we don't deal, rightfully so, with Hamas.
Now, we could redo--or attempt to try to redo what was
done. And I do not say this in a critical fashion toward
President Bush.
But President Abbas came to President Bush the first time
around and said, ``Should I include Hamas in the election?''
And President Bush, for all the right reasons--I am not
criticizing--said, ``Yeah. Go out and beat them. That is the
best way to get this scenario in order.''
Well, lo and behold, probably because the people felt Fatah
was corrupt and a whole lot of misdirection on politics and so
forth, Hamas beat Fatah.
But to criticize the United States for not pushing an
election in the Palestinian Authority when half of the
Palestinian territory is controlled by a terrorist organization
I think is somewhat duplicitous.
Mr. Cotton. Mr. Wexler, we didn't have the opportunity to
overlap. I know your record on these issues. That was long and
distinguished.
Can we talk briefly about more fundamental matters? It
seems to me, as I have observed for years, first as a civilian,
then a soldier, and now a Member of Congress, the fundamental
problem is Palestinian rejectionism.
Why is it that Mr. Abbas and Palestinian leadership can't
recognize Israel as a Jewish state, in your opinion? Why can't
they give up the right to return?
You know, you have a much longer professional experience
with these matters and have dealt directly with many of the
people involved. I would appreciate your perspective.
Mr. Wexler. What we have here is nothing less than two
competing historical narratives--two peoples, two competing
historical narratives. And, unfortunately, the manner in which
the Palestinian side thus far--the Arab side, to a large
degree, for many decades, essentially viewed this as a zero-sum
game. ``If we recognize the Jewish national peoples' historical
narrative, then our side somehow gets slighted.''
And until that is overcome, Prime Minister Netanyahu was
right. We are not going to have full peace. That is why it is
so important, I believe, for the Palestinians to recognize
Israel in the context of being a Jewish state. But we also need
to be fair.
If you are going to do that, you have got to tell them
where the borders are. Where is the border? Where are the lines
of that state?
And we also need to be fair to Prime Minister Netanyahu. He
has not asked for recognition of a Jewish state as a
precondition. He has said that it should be a part of the
complexity of a comprehensive agreement.
And, in that context, if you have a resolution on
Jerusalem, if you have a resolution on borders, I am actually
confident that the Palestinians, in theory, might be closer to
accepting that position.
Mr. Cotton. Yeah. I mean, the fight over narratives goes
back beyond just where we are today. I mean, it was treated as
great news that Mr. Abbas recognized the Holocaust to have
existed and you still have temple denialism as well.
A lot of the issues you raise, though, Yasser Arafat had a
chance to accept in 2000, did he not, and he declined it to
Bill Clinton and Bill Clinton said that he had made Bill
Clinton a failure?
Mr. Wexler. You are right.
Mr. Cotton. I regret that I am. Thank you.
Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman's time is expired.
The votes have been called, but we do have time. So I will
recognize my colleague from Florida, Ms. Frankel, for 5
minutes.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And, first, I want to say welcome to my former colleague in
the state legislature and distinguished member of this
committee, Mr. Wexler, and recognize also that I have an
extraordinary constituent in the audience today who is a dear
friend, a remarkable patriot who served us during World War II.
He is a great American entrepreneur and an unyielding advocate
for Israel for Peace.
Danny Abraham, welcome to you.
Two days ago some of our colleagues here--we went to the
floor. We celebrated Israel's 66th Independence Day, its
birthday, praised the relationship of the United States and
Israel.
And we also noted that the day prior Israelis commemorated
Memorial Day to pay tribute to the 24,000-plus Israeli men,
women, and children who have lost their lives to the war on
terror.
And, you know, we have been to Israel. We know it is
beautiful. It is modern and people live good lives, but Israel
has never really known real long-lasting peace. There has been
intermittent wars, periods of terrorism and so forth.
So there have been a lot of questions and answers today. I
will leave you with a real softball question because sometimes
we just talk to ourselves.
And for myself and, I know, everyone on the panel, we are
true believers in the importance of Israel as our ally and best
friend in the Middle East. But I am going to give you each an
opportunity to answer the question for the American public.
Why is it so important for Israel to reach a peace
agreement with the Palestinians? Why is it important for our
country, for the world and, of course, it goes without saying,
for Israel?
Mr. Wexler. I will be happy to start.
Quickly, if you are a Zionist and you believe in the
Zionist dream, then Israel needs to figure out a way to
separate from the 4- to 5 million Palestinians that live on the
West Bank and Gaza.
If Israel is to remain a Jewish and democratic state--a
secure Jewish and democratic state, it has got to figure out a
way to separate from the Palestinian people.
And the only way to separate, ultimately, that ensures
Israel's security is a viable Palestinian state, demilitarized
Palestinian state, that is independent and can go on its own.
And in terms of the Palestinians, which is not the purpose
of your question, though, for those of us who are Zionists, we
must be very careful to recognize also that the Palestinian
people have their legitimate rights and also have a historical
narrative. And to not do so, I believe, in many ways, morally
and ethically, is not consistent with Zionism.
Mr. Prince. I would agree with Congressman Wexler's
eloquent presentation of why we need to solve this problem, but
we do have to take into account that negotiations don't occur
in a vacuum.
The equation has to include the Palestinian people, not
only their national aspirations, not only the aspirations of
the Palestinians in the diaspora and around the world, but also
in the West Bank and Gaza.
If you walk into a coffee shop anywhere in the West Bank or
in Gaza, Palestinians will talk about national aspirations, but
then they will spend 30 minutes talking about how their day-to-
day life and the troubles, feeding their family, getting a job,
getting the sewage out of their house, getting medical
treatments, getting antibiotics, getting adequate care, sending
their kids abroad for college.
If there is one thing that the Arab Spring has taught us is
that we cannot support dictators in the absence of popular
support.
And the Palestinian people did not support this
negotiation, not that there wasn't a constituency for peace,
but they wanted to clean up their house first and show that
there is benefits of peace to the community at large before
reaching a final status agreement.
Mr. Schanzer. I will keep my response short.
I think, look it, Israel promotes American principles and
interests in the Middle East. It must have the peace and
security that it needs in order to do so. That is in our
interest as well as theirs.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you very much.
And I yield back my time.
Mr. DeSantis. I thank the gentlewoman.
And I thank the witnesses. I really appreciate your time,
and your comments and testimony are very well received by the
members. So thank you so much.
And this hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:29 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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