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HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED
PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
**FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS
FROM U.S. FORCES KOREA AND
U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND**

HEARING HELD
APRIL 2, 2014



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FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FROM U.S. FORCES KOREA AND U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 2, 2014.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. “BUCK” MCKEON,
A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The committee meets today to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorization budget request from U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. Strategic Command.

Joining us today are General Curtis Scaparrotti and Admiral Cecil Haney.

The commander of U.S. European Command, General Breedlove, was also scheduled to testify today. However, late last week Secretary Hagel called him back to Brussels to directly deal with the crisis with Russia. We will look to another date later this year and try to get the general to appear before the committee then.

The general’s callback is a sobering reminder about how our military presence in Europe still matters and is still needed. Yet as we have shifted focus on other threats across the globe, our readiness and force posture in Europe has declined, and we have come to find that deterring regional aggression has become more difficult.

The crisis with Russia is also a reminder that we have to be prepared for a range of scenarios, whether we think them likely or not.

Some may think a major conflict on the Korean peninsula is unlikely and therefore we don’t need to size our forces, especially our land forces, for such a scenario. However, we can look to every major land conflict we have been involved in to know that we are usually wrong.

North Korea maintains the world’s fourth largest army. It poses a grave threat to our South Korean allies and to stability in the region, and increasingly direct threat to the United States.

Yet I remain concerned that the end strength and force structure cuts contained in the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] and the budget request create significant risk for a Korean scenario, and also creates greater vulnerabilities in other parts of the world.

In a Korean scenario, General Amos has testified that the Marine Corps would be all in, with 20 of its 21 infantry battalions committed to the fight. General Odierno testified that the Army force structure in the QDR will put in doubt our ability to execute even one prolonged, multi-phased major contingency operation.

General Scaparrotti, I hope you can discuss the changing threat on the peninsula, the implications it has both for U.S. and South Korean forces and capabilities, and the implications of the QDR and budget request.

Admiral Haney, U.S. Strategic Command has a vast portfolio to include nuclear forces, missile defense, cyber operations, and space.

As you know, General Dempsey believes our Nation's top national security interest is to continue to assure the survival of the Nation. I agree with that prioritization and I support the funding in this year's base budget request that protects the nuclear triad and other nuclear deterrent capabilities.

It is imperative, Admiral, that you continue to take on those who would pretend that the United States alone among nuclear powers can continue to disarm itself.

I am increasingly troubled by the aggressive counter-space programs of China and Russia, in particular. I trust you will not hesitate to tell this committee what you need to accomplish that mission.

At the conclusion of our open session today, we will move into 2216 for a closed briefing. I would encourage all Members that can, to attend that session.

Gentlemen, thank you for your leadership, for your service during this challenging period. And I look forward to your testimony.

Mr. Smith.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 39.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome to General Scaparrotti and Admiral Haney.

I particularly note, General Scaparrotti, welcome. We enjoyed your time out at Fort Lewis, really appreciated your leadership there. And I am glad that you are on the job in Korea. So it is good to see both of you and I thank you very much for your leadership.

I also want to join the chairman in noting General Breedlove's absence, given the crisis in the Ukraine and Europe that his presence is required back there. But the issues that he is involved in are critical to this committee and ones that we will continue to exercise oversight on as we deal with the situation between Russia and the Ukraine.

And in Korea, I also agree with the chairman, that continues to be one of the more, you know, dangerous parts of the world for us. North Korea is unpredictable. Another sign of that yesterday, as they attempted to I guess establish a larger border by lobbing missiles across the line in the ocean, or artillery.

And North Korea's unpredictability requires our presence. We are and have been for some time the guarantor of South Korea's

security. And that is going to continue to be the case for as far as I can see, given the way North Korea is acting.

And I share the chairman's concerns as we once again look at sequestration here in the near future and go through budget cuts, will we have sufficient forces and sufficient presence to provide that deterrent capability?

Because as bad as what North Korea has been doing for the last couple of decades, I think we don't want to imagine how much worse that would be if they thought we were not there to stop them from further aggression against South Korea.

So I would be curious about your thoughts about how you manage that declining budget and continue to maintain a credible deterrent to North Korea.

Also, to learn more about South Korea's growing capabilities. Obviously, they are a key partner in that deterrence. They have become more capable in recent years. That is obviously helpful.

And I am curious to hear how you feel our partnership with South Korea is going and how that matches up to provide that deterrent to North Korean aggression.

So thank you. I look forward to that testimony.

Admiral Haney, you have an incredibly important portfolio, as the chairman mentioned. Space is critical to literally everything we do. So curious to hear how we can maintain our leadership in that area, make sure that our assets in space continue to provide for us what we need throughout our military operations.

And also I am curious about how the triad is maintained going forward, or what is your vision for nuclear deterrence as we face some very difficult budget challenges in all pieces, all assets of the triad?

Trying to figure out what we are going to do with the future long-range strategic bomber, how we maintain our submarine fleet given a shrinking budget, and how we maintain our ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] domestically, as well. What does the triad look like?

And then, lastly, I would be interested in hearing an update from you on missile defense, on what you think our future is, where we would be most wise to spend our money.

Because I believe missile defense continues to be critically important as adversaries like Iran and North Korea develop better and better missile technology, and our ability to defend against that is going to be critical to our national security.

But I want to make sure that we are spending our money wisely as we do that to give us the best chance to have the best possible missile defense system to deter those threats.

I thank you both for being here. I look forward to your testimony and the questions and answers from the committee. And I yield back. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 41.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General Scaparrotti.

**STATEMENT OF GEN CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, USA,
COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES KOREA**

General SCAPARROTTI. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to testify today as the commander of the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea.

On behalf of the service members, civilians, contractors, and their families who serve our great Nation in Korea, thank you for your support.

After 6 months in command, I am confident that combined and joint forces of the United States and the Republic of Korea are capable and ready to deter, and if necessary, respond to the North Korean threats and actions.

We know how real the North Korean threat is, as over 4 years ago last week, North Korea fired a torpedo sinking the South Korean ship *Cheonan*, killing 46 sailors.

That terrible day is a constant reminder that standing at freedom's frontier with our Korean ally, we cannot allow ourselves to become complacent against an unpredictable totalitarian regime.

The Kim Jong-un regime is dangerous and has capability, especially with an increasing asymmetric threat to attack South Korea with little or no warning.

North Korea has the fourth largest military in the world with over 70 percent of its ground forces deployed near the DMZ [demilitarized zone].

Its long-range artillery can strike targets in the Seoul metropolitan area where over 23 million South Koreans and almost 50,000 Americans live.

In violation of multiple U.N. [United Nations] Security Council resolutions, North Korea continues to develop nuclear arms and long-range missiles. Additionally, the regime is aggressively investing in cyber warfare capabilities.

North Korea brings risk to the world's fastest growing economic region, which is responsible for 25 percent of the world's GDP [gross domestic product] and home to our largest trading partners.

Against this real threat, our Nation is committed to the security of South Korea and to our national interests.

Our presence and your support of our troops give meaning to that commitment. We are a key component of the Nation's rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region.

Together, the alliance's commitment to each other enables stability and prosperity now and into the future.

In the spirit of this commitment, we are working closely with the South Korean military to develop its capabilities and combine C4I [command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence] systems and alliance counter-missile defense strategy and the procurement of precision-guided munitions, ballistic missile defense systems, and ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] platforms.

Readiness is my top overarching priority. To ensure we are focused on the right things at the right time, I have developed five priorities: first, sustain and strengthen the alliance; second, maintain the armistice to deter and defeat aggression and to be ready to fight tonight; third, transform the alliance; fourth, sustain force

and family readiness; and my fifth priority, enhance the UNC [United Nations Command], CFC [Combined Forces Command], and USFK [U.S. Forces Korea] team.

An essential part of this is a positive command climate that focuses on the covenant between the leader and the led and our mission together.

At the core of mission success is the close relationship we share with our South Korean partners. We benefit from an important history forged on many battlefields, shared sacrifices and democratic principles.

Over the past 60 years, we have built one of the longest standing alliances in modern history. We will continue to ensure a strong and effective deterrence posture so that Pyongyang never misjudges our role, our commitment, or our capability to respond as an alliance.

I am extremely proud of our joint force and their families serving in the Republic of Korea. I sincerely appreciate your continued support for them and for our crucial alliance.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Scaparrotti can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Admiral.

STATEMENT OF ADM CECIL D. HANEY, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

Admiral HANEY. Good morning. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of this committee, with your permission, I would like to have my full statement made as part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. No objection, so ordered.

Admiral HANEY. And I am honored to join you here today as my first appearance as the commander of U.S. Strategic Command.

I am also pleased to be here with General Mike Scaparrotti, commander of U.S. Forces Korea. I would like to express my appreciation for his vision and leadership.

As you know, U.S. Strategic Command executes a diverse set of global responsibilities that directly contribute to national security. And I can say with full confidence that today, U.S. Strategic Command remains capable and ready to meet all assigned missions.

We are blessed to have a talented, dedicated, and professional military and civilian workforce to address the significant national security challenges facing the United States of America.

I thank the Congress and this committee for your support and I look forward to working with you throughout my tour of duty.

We appreciate the passage of the 2-year Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 and the 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act.

This legislation decreases near-term budgetary uncertainty, but I remain concerned that sequestration will continue to stress the human element of our capabilities as well as impacting our capability to meet the threats and challenges of the 21st century.

The current global security environment is getting more complex, dynamic, and uncertain than any time in recent history as ongoing events in Ukraine and North Korea, as mentioned, are making

abundantly clear—advances in state and non-state military capabilities across the air, sea, land, and space domains, as well as in cyberspace.

The space domain is becoming ever more congested, contested, and competitive. Worldwide cyber threats are growing in scale and sophistication.

Nuclear powers are invested in long-term and wide-ranging military modernization programs. Proliferation of weapons and nuclear technologies continues.

Weapons of mass destruction capabilities deliver—technologies are maturing and becoming more readily available. No region of the world is immune from potential chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear risks.

Terrorist threats remain a source of significant ambiguity and the threat of homegrown violent extremists remains a concern.

Against this dynamic and uncertain backdrop, U.S. Strategic Command's mission is to partner with other combatant commands and to deter and detect strategic attack against the United States of America and our allies, and to defeat those attacks if deterrence fails.

Our Unified Command Plan assigned missions are strategic in nature, global in scope, and intertwined with the capabilities of the joint force, the interagency, and the whole of government.

These attributes require linkages and synergies at all levels to bring integrated capabilities to bear through synchronized planning, simultaneous execution of missions and coherent strategic communications. And we must secure these activities by implementing a defensible joint information environment.

U.S. Strategic Command manages this diverse and challenging activity by actively executing a tailored deterrence and assurance campaign plan and by executing my five command priorities: number one, provide a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent force; two, partner with other combatant commands to win today; three, address our challenges in space; four, build cyberspace capability and capacity; and five, prepare for uncertainty.

In keeping with the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, my first number one priority is to ensure a safe, secure, effective nuclear deterrent force consisting of a synthesis of dedicated sensors, assured command and control, the triad of delivery systems, nuclear weapons and their associated infrastructure, and trained ready people.

In light of recent personnel integrity concerns associated with the intercontinental ballistic missile force, I fully support Secretary Hagel's initiatives to assemble key Department of Defense stakeholders to fully assess and understand the implications of recent events and seek long-term systematic solutions that will maintain the trust and confidence in our nuclear enterprise.

This has my utmost attention—but let me repeat: America's nuclear deterrent force remains safe, secure, and effective.

In addition to our critical deterrence and assurance work, we are engaged on a daily basis in a broader range of activities across our mission areas of space, cyberspace, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, combating weapons of mass destruction, missile defense, joint electronic warfare, global strike, and analysis and targeting.

While these diverse activities are being synchronized and integrated by an outstanding team, none of this work I have described can be accomplished without trained and ready and motivated people. They remain our most precious resource and deserve our unwavering support.

My travels to a number of U.S. Strategic Command and partner locations since I took command last November confirm my belief that we have an outstanding team in place across all of our mission areas.

I have the utmost respect for their professionalism, their dedication to duty, and sustained operational excellence.

In today's uncertain times, I am proud to lead such a focused and innovative team. We are building our force—our future on a strong and successful path.

Your continued support, together with the hard work of outstanding men and women of U.S. Strategic Command, will ensure we remain ready, agile, and effective in deterring strategic attack, assuring our allies, and defeating current and future threats.

Today, I am joined by my sister behind me, Dr. Yvonne Coates, who has worked as a DC [District of Columbia] public school teacher for many years.

While I often acknowledge the support of military families, today I salute the efforts of my sister, who represents our siblings, who many times are often left to handle family matters while we in the military service serve our Nation far away from home. We couldn't do it without their support, too.

I thank you all for your time, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Haney can be found in the Appendix on page 64.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

General Scaparrotti, while North Korea remains one of the world's largest conventional forces, your testimony also discusses its increased emphasis on asymmetric capabilities. Can you discuss these capabilities in more detail and the implications they have for U.S. forces and capabilities? And as you look at the Korean Peninsula scenarios, what are your concerns with the defense strategy in the fiscal year 2015 budget request to include Army force structure cuts to the 420,000 active and changes in the ISR programs?

General SCAPARROTTI. Chairman, thank you very much.

First of all, as stated, North Korea presents a very large force—a million—across all of its services. A good portion of that is conventional, as you know, but in recent years the North Koreans have invested in their asymmetric capabilities, as well. And those are predominantly in their missile capabilities, which have been demonstrated here since the 21st of February, most recently, a medium-range ballistic missile—two—that were fired across the peninsula into the East Sea, as well as development—at least they have displayed intermediate-range ballistic missile and an intercontinental ballistic missile, as well. Although not tested, they have displayed them, and they claim to have this capability.

They are developing, as you know, a nuclear capability, as well. And then within their navy, they have a—although not a modern submarine force, a very capable one that presents challenges in

terms of their ability to use torpedoes, mining, and also for the insertion of soft forces into South Korea.

And then finally, coupled with that is a very large soft special operations force who train for infiltration techniques by air, land, and sea, specifically, against targets that we have seen mockups in South Korea over the last winter training period.

And then finally, they have continued to develop a long-range artillery capability. Significant number of tubes of long-range artillery that can reach Seoul from their positions on the other side of the DMZ. And they are in hardened positions, so it makes it very difficult for us to detect, and then to counter.

The impact of that is, is that they present a large conventional force with some credible asymmetric capabilities, both of which they may choose to use for limited objectives, for instance, in the asymmetric capabilities. And they present us with a problem where it is very difficult for us to have indicators and warnings of their use. So, it reduces our time to detect—our ability to detect and then our time to respond. And that has created—that has caused us to change our strategy in terms of defense and our posture on the peninsula across the alliance, both South Koreans and the United States.

Finally, to your question about the present budget under consideration—Korea has—the Korean theater has enjoyed being the highest of priorities, right behind Afghanistan. So, as a result, Mr. Chairman, I have been resourced to defend the peninsula and our interests. And my forces are ready to do that. My concern, however, is in the follow-on forces, which, if there is a conflict or an escalation of crisis on the peninsula, I rely on to be there quickly and to be ready.

I am concerned that the follow-on forces, given the fiscal constraints and their impact on our forces writ large—that they are at a reduced readiness capability today. And also, the capability of moving them on the timeline that I might need them is in jeopardy.

And so, those are my concerns with the present fiscal constraints. If sequestration were to continue, I think that would become a greater concern.

With respect to the forces, my concern would be that we maintain enough depth in all of our services. That we can respond to the many global challenges that we have and commitments that we have made, as well as be able to respond to a crisis, for instance, on the Korean theater, and have enough depth to deal with that, particularly if it is one that is not of short duration.

In the Army's case, I think that if we were to reduce our force size based on the sequestration, we would probably be challenged in terms of maintaining a long duration conflict, or one that included stability operations for some time thereafter.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Admiral Haney, can you confirm that it is your position, as it is the position of the chairman and the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs that further reductions in U.S. nuclear forces be negotiated, bilateral, and verifiable? And that you would oppose unilateral U.S. nuclear force reductions?

Admiral HANEY. Chairman, I agree with the statement you have made there. Any additional reductions in nuclear weapons require it to be non-unilateral. And it has to be in a verifiable manner so that we can get the benefits, such as those we have gotten from the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction] Treaty, where we have had access and the ability to be able to verify what Russia has in a very methodical way and a very open and transparent way.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Haney, when you look at the—I guess it is sort of like three challenges here. New START—obviously, having to implement that. And then, you know, updating and maintaining the existing triad. You know, getting ready to build the new, you know, *Ohio* class, you know, submarines. Dealing with, you know, the aging ICBM fleet, and also the long-range strategic bomber.

So, as you balance New START, the cost of modernization—so it is also modernization costs for specific nuclear weapons. And then the challenge of the budget. What is sort of your vision for how we maintain, you know, our nuclear deterrent? Maintaining the full triad, meeting New START, meeting those modernization requirements in a tight budget environment? I realize that is not exactly a short answer, but just quickly, what is your vision for how to meet all those challenges and make sure we still have the nuclear deterrent that our national security plan requires?

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Smith, I thank you for that question. First and foremost, I think it is important that we as a country realize just how important and foundational our strategic deterrent is today for us and well into the future.

As you have mentioned, there is a need for modernization in a variety of areas. When you look at the credible strategic deterrent we have today, that includes everything from the indications in warning to the command and control and communication structure that goes all the way from the President down to the units, and to what frequently we talk about as the triad involving the intercontinental ballistic missiles, the submarines, and the bombers, each providing its unique aspect of deterrent.

And as stated in the Nuclear Posture Review 2010, which is still enduring, these are capabilities that our country must have for the foreseeable future, even as we work to meet those New START Treaty limits that are provided. And we are on a good course regarding those. As you look at what numbers of our stockpile was back in the 1970s to where we are today and we are going, that is a good thing—

Mr. SMITH. Yes—

Admiral HANEY [continuing]. For the United States of America.

Mr. SMITH. Admiral, if I may, I think the greater challenge is the budget piece. I mean, what if sequestration kicks in and we don't have enough money to replace the *Ohio* class? You know, or those budget constraints kick in and we can't modernize the missiles we need to keep our ICBM fleet up to snuff, or can't build a new long-range bomber?

How deep are you into contemplating what the choices are in terms of what the smartest cuts to make and still maintain a credible deterrent would be?

Admiral HANEY. Well, Congressman Smith, I would say, number one, if we continue on a journey of sequestration and have to make those kind of choices, that will be detrimental to our national defense structure. And I would make that my point, first and foremost.

Mr. SMITH. Right. That is subtly and artfully put. I think it would be devastating. I mean, it would—I think it would require us to fundamentally reexamine our nuclear deterrent strategy.

And I know many Members are very adamant that we need that nuclear deterrent strategy, we need that triad. Sequestration makes that impossible. It would require choices—it would require us to go in a different direction, and there may be a way out of it, a logical way.

But I just want to make sure that everyone understands that sequestration basically blows up that strategy, that nuclear deterrence strategy based on the triad, given all of the things that have to happen over the course of the next couple of decades to fund it.

Am I wrong about that or is that a fair assessment?

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Smith, we will have to look at all things across our national security apparatus in that view. And there will be, as we have already made and will continue to have to make, very hard choices going forward in that regard.

When you look, though, historically here, the force we have today has been really on what I call the decay heap from the investments made in particular around the 1980 timeframe. And consequently, that capability has been enduring and has lasted quite some time, even to this day, where its portion of defense funding is somewhere in order of 2.5 percent or more.

And even the business of modernizing and improving that, which again will build things that will last a long time, requiring some modernization, will still perhaps be in the doubling of that amount or more over time.

It is an investment, from my opinion, that we as a country can ill afford not to make, given the modernization that we see going on in other countries in the strategic environment today.

Mr. SMITH. I am sure. Thank you. I do have questions for General Scaparrotti, but I will save those for the classified session and let other Members get in. I yield back.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, thank you and the ranking member for holding this hearing.

General, Admiral, thank you for your service to our country. And Admiral, we are certainly appreciative of the support your sister and your entire family has given to you as you have served with the general so ably for this country.

General, we have heard words on North Korea like unpredictable, dangerous, unstable, one of the world's largest conventional forces, willingness to use their military force.

Last month, General Dempsey testified to this committee that he considers anti-personnel landmines to be an important tool in the arsenal of the Armed Forces of the United States. The chairman also made this committee aware that an assessment has been conducted by the Pentagon on the issue of landmines and the impact of signing the Ottawa Treaty.

Have you been able to review that assessment yet?

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, sir, I have.

Mr. FORBES. And can you tell us what that assessment is? Or is that something you would prefer to do when we go into the classified session?

General SCAPARROTTI. I would prefer to do it in the classified session.

Mr. FORBES. Then in this session, can you tell us not based on that assessment but in your best professional military judgment, what would your advice be to the chairman and this committee on the utility of anti-personnel landmines to your mission on the Korean Peninsula?

And particularly, let me ask you this—what will be the impact to your mission on the Korean Peninsula if such a treaty were signed? And how would the United States and the Republic of Korea provide an effective deterrent to North Korea without the use of landmines?

General SCAPARROTTI. Sir, I have provided my best military advice on this issue, as well. And it is my assessment that landmines are a critical element in the defense of the Republic of Korea and our interest there. And they are a critical element of our contingency plans, as well.

For any further response, I would ask that we refer that to the closed session.

Mr. FORBES. And with that, I will look forward to that response in that closed session.

And Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. McIntyre.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to both of you gentlemen. Having personally had opportunities to meet with you in former commands that each of you had, I greatly appreciate the work and have witnessed it personally. And I thank you for that dedication and commitment.

General Scaparrotti, particularly your time at Fort Bragg; and Admiral Haney, your time at the USS *North Carolina* commissioning that we had down at our congressional district, and also the work you did in PACOM [Pacific Command] and over in Pearl Harbor.

With regard to your testimony, Admiral Haney, on page 10 you say that “recapitalizing our sea-based strategic deterrent force is my top modernization priority and I am committed to working closely with the Navy on this program.”

And then you speak about the Trident ballistic missiles and the concerns that you have.

And you talk about, with respect to the submarine that delivers these missiles, and I quote: “the *Ohio*-class submarine has already been extended from 30 to 42 years of service—no further extension

is possible and these submarines will start leaving service in 2027. As such, the *Ohio* Replacement Program must stay on schedule. No further delay is possible,” closed quote.

And then you refer to our commitment to working with the United Kingdom on this. Would you discuss the risk and the cost savings associated with any further slippage in the schedule for the *Ohio*-class replacement submarine?

In other words, will the Navy be able to fulfill STRATCOM's [Strategic Command's] continuous at-sea deterrence requirements in future years on the current schedule? And if these replacement submarines are further delayed?

Admiral HANEY. Congressman McIntyre, thank you for your question.

As you have described here, I am fully committed to the *Ohio* replacement program due to what it provides our Nation as part of the triad. The survivable nature of our sea leg of this strategic deterrent continues to provide and will in the future provide credible both deterrence and assurance for our Nation and our allies.

We have extended the *Ohio* class, the current class, out to this 42 years, which is further than we have had any other submarine class operated before. Only one submarine, USS *Kamehameha*, was out to 36 years.

So through proper engineering assessments and what have you, by refueling that class, we were able to get it out to 42 years. But in doing so, that really puts it at significant risk of going beyond that and maintaining the presence of strategic deterrence, its survivable leg at sea, for the future.

As we look at the current plan which has been moved to the right, we won't have that new *Ohio* replacement submarine on patrol until 2031, even with the current program we have right now.

And as such, that puts our strategic deterrent at risk if we don't continue to move forward and as we work through our sequestration journey, that that has to remain a high priority.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Admiral.

General Scaparrotti, in the time I have left, I know the Army announced a rotational deployment of a combined arms battalion to Korea. We here get advice and hear consultations and testimony from other groups. And I want your reaction to this.

The Center for Strategic International Studies has recommended that the Department consider replacing U.S. ground combat units with rotations of trained and ready Army brigades as one approach to enhancing readiness.

Can you tell us what the benefits and risks of such a rotational model would be?

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, sir. Thank you.

As you know, we are rotating today on the ground force side of this, an aviation, reconnaissance aviation battalion, and as you mentioned, a combined arms battalion.

The advantages of that are that those are both additional forces in Korea. So we were able to add forces with that rotation to meet needs for posture on the peninsula. So it allowed us to add a force.

And when we do that, we can provide a force that is completely trained. It is ready. And it will be ready and in place for the dura-

tion, a 9-month rotation in this case, to provide the deterrence and, if necessary, the combat forces that we need in a crisis.

These forces are trained for that. They come into the theater ready to go. And we don't have the turbulence that we see in the remainder of our forces that are assigned on the peninsula.

As you know, we have most of our forces, particularly the soldiers, there on 1-year tours unaccompanied. And then, if they have families, which is about 20 percent, it would be a 2-year or 3-year tour.

So we have an increased rotation of personnel, which challenges us in terms of readiness.

So overall, I would say that I favor rotational forces, but we have to have a balance of those between the number that we rotate and then another grouping that is stable and on the peninsula to provide that persistence in a long-term relationship that we need with the alliance, as well. So a combination works best.

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right. Thank you, Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General, Admiral, thank you very much for your service. And I am particularly grateful to be with you in that I had the opportunity to be on a very rare delegation to North Korea. And so I have seen North Korea. I have just completed my third visit to South Korea.

There is no greater contrast on Earth as to the difference between the failure of socialism in North Korea and the dynamic success of South Korea. And I give so much of that credit to American military to make this possible. The security there, the opportunity for the people of South Korea. And I just saw it firsthand.

Additionally, I had the opportunity—it was my third visit to the DMZ. And I thought, General, Admiral, when I was going there that, gosh, third time. This is going to be boring. No. Any time you go it is, again, a chilling reminder with victory in the Cold War, there still is a remnant of the Cold War. And our military personnel are making such a difference in preserving by peace through strength in that region. So thank you for your service.

I am particularly concerned that North Korea is changing its asymmetric capabilities with deployments and development of new ballistic missile systems, nuclear tests, cyber threats, and increased emphasis on specialized light infantry special operation forces.

With that in mind, are the U.S. forces postured and capable of defending our allies given North Korea's ability to conduct limited attacks, as indicated, Admiral, with limited or even no warning?

General SCAPARROTTI. Would you like me to take it?

Mr. WILSON. Both. Yes. Thank you.

General SCAPARROTTI. Sure. As I stated, they are investing in asymmetric means. We have made adjustments to our posture as an alliance, both ROK [Republic of Korea] and U.S. as a result of their changes. We have made changes in our armistice plans day to day, as well as our contingency plans for either provocation or crisis.

So we have continued to adapt both the forces we have and the plans that we rely upon as an alliance to address that. And we are able to deter today and we can respond, as you saw this past week.

The ROK forces responded to the artillery fires in the northwest region. Thank you.

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Wilson, likewise, our forces remain postured and ready. And the planning that we do with USPACOM [United States Pacific Command] is integrated in order to look at the threats from North Korea.

But as you have stated, their provocation cycle and in particular their ability here to launch things in space, as well as parading around their various ballistic missile type capability and their nuclear test is something that we must continue to deter and provide assurance to as we go forward.

Mr. WILSON. And I am going to thank both of you because I believe you are both very convincing. And this has to be reassuring, as the general indicated, to 23 million people who live virtually within artillery range in Seoul. And again, thank you.

Additionally, with the rebalancing of the Asian Pacific, how is that affecting your ability to provide support in the region? Can you explain the adjustments that our forces are making that is different than currently postured? General.

General SCAPARROTTI. Sure. I can address that. First, it has been very positive on the Korean Peninsula and the Pacific at large, as you might imagine. But for me, the additional rotational forces that we just discussed are a part of the rebalance.

In terms of the equipment that we have, the equipment within Korea, the services are—the Army has already completed the move to give us the most modern equipment in terms of Apaches, Bradleys, tanks that are available. And that is true with the other services. They are working along the same lines.

In terms of the rebalance, I have been resourced so that I can maintain my readiness. My pilots, for instance in the Air Force, where our funds were increased this year to ensure that they could keep their skills honed to be able to respond and fight tonight. So I am pleased with that aspect of it.

If I could, one thing from your last question is that is my first need given the threat that we face is increased ISR. And I wanted to make that point because you noted the limited warning time that we have. And it is an increase in ISR that will allow me to get indicators and warnings and posture the force properly and be proactive as opposed to reactive.

Mr. WILSON. Well that is incredible, and I thank you again for your service.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And want to thank both the witnesses for being here today. General, your opening reference to the sinking of the *Cheonan*, you know, again, I think is an important reminder about the fact that, you know, the conflict over there, which again a lot of the press is focused on sort of, you know, rockets being fired and missiles being fired, but it also extends under the sea.

And that actually was, again, the most—had the biggest casualty impact and was really the most outrageous breach of the rules over there. So thank you for, you know, sort of highlighting what happened in that incident.

And Admiral, it is good to see you again. Your service at Squadron Two up in Connecticut, again, was, again, an outstanding addition to your amazing resumé. And it is good to see you in your new position.

At every hearing since the budget came out, whether it was Secretary Hagel, Secretary Mabus, Mr. Stackley, recapitalizing the ballistic submarine force has been sort of a top issue, number one in terms of the priorities of the country but also obviously the challenge it presents to shipbuilding.

I wanted to focus for a minute, in terms of CBO [Congressional Budget Office] sort of laid out some different scenarios in a recent report that talked about a fleet size of ballistic subs of 8 versus the planned 12. And again, in a very sort of strategic neutral fashion. It just sort of did it based on, you know, the impact in terms of budget numbers.

But I was wondering if you would comment in terms of what the impact of having a smaller fleet would be if 8 were the size of the fleet as opposed to the—again, the reduced size of 12 that is now presently being planned.

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Courtney, a very important question, in that through a variety of different jobs, including this one, as we have rigorously looked at the requirement, eight will not meet the requirement for the foreseeable future.

When I first entered this business, we had “41 for Freedom” in terms of the number of SSBNs [ballistic missile submarines] that were available. Today we have worked hard to get to what—just what the country needs. And as we look at this future, the 12 *Ohio* replacement platforms is the requirement now and into the future.

Mr. COURTNEY. And in terms of what eight would mean is that—you know, sometimes people might think eight would always be out there deployed at all times, but the fact is the reality doesn’t allow for that. You need to have boats in for repair availabilities that take them out of the circulation. And I mean, isn’t that sort of really the rub of a smaller fleet size?

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Courtney, we have worked over the years to refine our operational concept such that we could even get down to the 14 ballistic missile submarines we have today. Those submarines have an operational tempo of 70 percent and we keep them with the two-crew concept out at sea more so than our other platforms.

As a result, you couldn’t do the same thing with eight today. That would be a significant reduction from the requirement that is necessary in order to have that survivable sea leg capability providing our deterrence day in and day out.

Mr. COURTNEY. And last year during, again, some of the budget deliberations, again, there was an attempt again to sort of reduce the design budget and, again, push the schedule off to the right, which there was a fairly strong bipartisan vote rejecting that proposal.

Again, I just wondered if you could sort of talk a little bit about the impact of another delay if that were ever to be approved by Congress.

Admiral HANEY. Well, first I would like to thank the Congress for keeping us on course here. Because as I mentioned both in writ-

ten testimony and verbally here, it is just so important that we not delay any further because we will take a detriment in having that strategic deterrent, that survivable leg capability that has been providing our deterrence for years and will continue to be a foundation of our national security for years to come.

Mr. COURTNEY. Great. Thank you.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Haney, I want to thank you for your very clear description of the need for us to take very seriously the investment in our strategic forces. Your statement of the investments that were largely being carried on occurred in the 1980s—the need to make certain that we have a credible and quality valid nuclear deterrent is incredibly important.

Putin has allowed us in his most recent actions to understand that we have been pursuing a false narrative with respect to Russia, both with respect to our conventional forces in Europe and our strategic forces. We now see that there have been some actions that Russia has been taking, specifically under the leadership of Putin, that perhaps we have ignored or that we have diminished in importance.

As we review those issues again, certainly our nuclear deterrent comes to mind as an issue that needs to be reviewed in light of Russia's actions and Russia's doctrine. So, my question to you is twofold with respect to Russia's actions and doctrine with respect to its nuclear deterrent.

Recently in the Global Security News wire, there was a statement that this weekend there was a massive nuclear force exercise in Russia that was under way, that, obviously having a great concern, if that is accurate, that that occur in context of the significant conventional mobilization that is happening of Russia on the border of Ukraine.

So, I wonder if you might speak for a moment about Russia's nuclear doctrine as we try to look to what narrative we should see Russia in. Could you tell us about this exercise and about Russia's nuclear doctrine in general? And also, how does Russia integrate the use of its nuclear weapons into its conventional war plans, as we look to, obviously, a Russia that is mobilizing for war, specifically as we looked at Crimea and the prospects of Ukraine?

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Turner, first and foremost, I would like to make sure I understand—we are clear that I know of no massive nuclear exercise that is ongoing right now. I will say in 2013—

Mr. TURNER. But let me just read what this says. It says, "According to the Russian Daily, on Thursday, Russia's strategic missile forces began a massive 3-day exercise involving 10,000 soldiers and 1,000 pieces of equipment for more than 30 units. The major purpose of this drill, according to the report, which cites multiple senior Russian military officers, is to ensure Russia's strategic missile forces have sufficient readiness to conduct offensive operations involving the massive and simultaneous use of nuclear missiles."

Now, even if that—if you are not familiar with it, and even if it is not occurring, it certainly gives us the light of their concept—which is where my question goes—of the use of strategic weapons in context of their offensive or conventional movements.

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Turner, Russia has maintained and continues to modernize their strategic deterrent capability, and also, periodically, exercises both their command and control capability through their communications, as well as as we saw in 2013, quite frankly, Russia put a YouTube video out on one of their strategic operational nuclear force exercises, where they demonstrated back in September, October timeframe every aspect of their capability. It did not make as much news as you described here today. But on a day-to-day basis, they exercise and have a readiness posture of their capability, which we monitor very closely.

Mr. TURNER. Could you talk a moment about the issue in their doctrine about de-escalation? Because we have heard in front of this committee testimony about their use of nuclear weapons to de-escalate a conflict, which we would consider to be an escalation of it.

Admiral HANEY. Well, Congressman Turner, I think it would be much more appropriate to have that kind of conversation in a closed hearing.

Mr. TURNER. Well, my point being, if—whatever you can say on the record, this certainly requires a public discussion of what our deterrent may be looking to. What can you tell us about Russia's view versus our view?

Admiral HANEY. Well, Russia has, as I mentioned, been on a continuous modernization program of their capability. Not just fixed ICBM—intercontinental ballistic missile sites. For example, they have mobile ICBM missiles. They have been developing a new class of SSBN, as well. And they have exercised their strategic bomber capability frequently over the years, and continue to do so.

I would be remiss if I was to go deeper into their strategy and what we think in that regards. But, as noted, through our various arms control deliberations, and even in his public statements that have been made by President Putin, he has always stated the importance of his strategic capabilities for the country of Russia.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Enyart.

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This—all the way stage right. This question is in follow-up really to Mr. Wilson's questioning and Mr. Turner's questioning.

We have seen several incidents of the North Koreans launching short-range and medium-range ballistic missile testing. We have seen several provocations of artillery firing on the part of the North Koreans, with some response with South Koreans.

In light of what we have seen in Ukraine, and especially Crimea, do you detect any further provocations on the part of North Korea? I realize that North Korea has had a history of provocation—de-escalation, provocation, de-escalation. But do you see any linkages here between the North Koreans' recent activities and with the Russian actions in Crimea?

General SCAPARROTTI. Congressman, no, I don't. I have got to believe that Kim Jong-un and his regime obviously watches what

goes on in—globally and our responses to it. But in terms of this—the recent missile launches, the live fire event the other night, this is a common strategy with North Korea, to come out of a period of calm and to use these types of actions to message to both the United States, the international community, and South Korea.

And also to demonstrate capability. And I personally believe that he is in a period now, particularly coming out of winter training cycle, and having had the alliance demonstrate our capabilities and our training period here over the last 2 months, that that is what this is about. It is the normal pattern of messaging his displeasure with our training. Messaging their capabilities. And just recently, their rhetoric has begun to pick up, as well, particularly in the last 2 or 3 days.

So, I think it is something that I expected, particularly at about the March-April timeframe.

Mr. ENYART. Do you anticipate that this is sending the message also to China?

General SCAPARROTTI. I think it could be. You know, China is—we would hope, have some influence. They certainly have every opportunity to influence Kim Jong-un and his regime. We would hope they would continue to put some pressure on him to abide by international norms and the United Nation's Security Council Resolutions.

Mr. ENYART. And one final question. What impact has the execution of his uncle had on the military command and control structure in North Korea?

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, sir.

That is a difficult question to answer in the sense that, you know, the regime is closed. They are very good at control of information, et cetera. And it is difficult for us to have a real clear picture of impact and intent.

However, I think from what we do know, the fact that Kim Jong-un executed his uncle—that it was his uncle, that it was an elder, and in the fashion that he did it—the public nature of it—and that he announced the reasons for it in the way he did, obviously, had an impact on the regime, as well. Because it really changed the rules, if I can put it that way. And I believe they probably are unsure of what the rules are today.

So we believe it probably did have an impact on the regime. It probably was unsettling.

From Kim Jong-un's point of view, though, I would say that he has successfully controlled that situation, has gained power as a result of that.

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, General.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I thank both of you for being here and for your service to our country.

Admiral Haney, I was listening to your interaction with Ranking Member Smith and talking about sequestration and its effects on us. And I know from our conversations and your reference in his questioning that modernization is a top priority for you.

And your belief that sequestration is going to have a seriously detrimental effect on our ability to modernize. But when you were answering Congressman Turner, you made this quote, this statement: "Russia has been under continuous modernization process."

Can you tell us more about that continuous modernization process?

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Rogers, as Russia has articulated their value in having strategic capability, and as such, each area they have invested in both in terms of nuclear strategic capability, as well as space capability and cyberspace capability, in terms of things.

And as a result, we have seen them demonstrate their capability through a variety of exercises and operations. They maintain their readiness of that capability on a continuous fashion. And it is a capability I don't see them backing away from.

Mr. ROGERS. Over how long a period of time would you say they have been under this continuous process?

Admiral HANEY. I would say, as a minimum, as the Russian capability drew down, the one area that they maintained was their strategic capability.

Then their modernization has been occurring over the last decade or so.

Mr. ROGERS. And how does it compare to our modernization effort over that same 10-year period of time? And what you see going forward?

Are they as vigorous or more vigorous or less vigorous than we are at modernization?

Admiral HANEY. I would say, at this point, over the last decade, they have put in place new programs, where in our case we have sustained existing programs. So I want to be careful in terms of comparing apples to oranges.

It is just as we look to our future, you can only sustain what we have for so long. For example—

Mr. ROGERS. I guess what I am getting at is, would you say our modernization effort is inadequate?

Admiral HANEY. I would say we have plans for our modernization that we must continue to work through. And if—as long as we stay on course on those plans, we will be fine.

Mr. ROGERS. And will sequestration allow you to stay on course on those plans?

Admiral HANEY. Sequestration, as written today, puts uncertainty in those plans, in terms of what will be funded into the future.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you.

Now I want to turn to the B-61 LEP [Life Extension Program]. Do you think our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies should help share the cost of our B-61 Life Extension Program?

Admiral HANEY. I believe the B-61 Life Extension Program is a United States of America program and that is where it should be in terms of things.

Mr. ROGERS. But do they currently shoulder part of those expenses by sharing the basing of them?

Admiral HANEY. The expenses that our NATO partners expend on is associated with the storage and security of our storage areas.

Mr. ROGERS. So in fact they are sharing a part of the cost at present.

Admiral HANEY. They are sharing that part of the cost.

Mr. ROGERS. Which is a part of the cost. If they didn't do it, we would have to do it, wouldn't we?

Admiral HANEY. That is correct.

Mr. ROGERS. Do you think that having them share part of these costs is in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty?

Admiral HANEY. The way they are paying for the security and storage is not in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Mr. ROGERS. Great.

And I want to make sure we are clear—you restate your position on the importance of the B-61 LEP.

Admiral HANEY. It is very important as we go forward here with what we have been calling our "3+2" strategy for weapons modernization that we life-extend the B-61 program. And that program has started and it provides the capability for our air leg to continue to be a viable part of our credible strategic—

Mr. ROGERS. There are those in the Congress who want to—who are calling for termination. Do you think that would be a responsible position to take?

Admiral HANEY. No. I would urge the Congress to support the B-61 Life Extension Program.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, sir.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Langevin.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Scaparrotti, Admiral Haney, thank you very much for your testimony and for your service to our Nation. I congratulate you and wish you well in your respective positions. Thank you for all you are doing.

General—actually Admiral, if I could start with you, since we have discussed New START this morning already a bit. I want to dive into that just a little more and talk about what STRATCOM's view is as the best path for meeting New START levels while maintaining a nuclear deterrent and why.

Admiral HANEY. We are, Congressman Langevin, on our journey in terms of meeting the requirements of the New START Treaty that goes fully in effect on the 5th of February in 2018.

This involves where we will end up with 1,550 operational warheads that are also associated with 700 deployed launchers that are spread around the intercontinental ballistic force, the sea base, submarines, and the bombers.

We are working our way through that journey and then there is another number, the 800 total launchers, meaning that you have about 100 that are non-deployed, meaning that they are not operationally with a—in the case of an ICBM or a submarine physically with a missile in the tube in that type of a configuration. More of a warm status.

We are working our way through that cycle so that we will be there in 2018.

Mr. LANGEVIN. And the thoughts on the balance in terms of the missiles that are warm in the silos? Is that going to come at the

expense of what is our most survivable nuclear deterrent, that is our SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic missiles] in the tubes?

Admiral HANEY. Congressman, the work is ongoing with U.S. Strategic Command, Office of the Secretary of Defense. And in terms of looking very—in detail with the attributes that each of those legs provide as we look at which will be kept in the warm status and I think the results of that will be coming out soon.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Thank you, Admiral.

General, if I could turn to you, and I thank you both for identifying the cyber threat as one of our top concerns. And I have been working on this issue for years. When I first did a deep dive on this in 2007, I can tell you pretty much nobody was talking about it. Now it seems that everyone gets how important and challenged we are in securing our Nation's cyberspace.

So General, if I could just start with you, what does the cyber threat landscape look like in your AOR [area of responsibility]? What trends concern you most? And I will see if I have time for a follow-up after that.

General SCAPARROTTI. Congressman, thank you. I was remiss in not noting cyber as one of the asymmetric threats that North Korea is developing. And they are developing a cyber threat, as well.

Theirs is not as advanced as some others, globally challenges. But they have demonstrated the ability to do denial of service, as well as disruption of web faces, et cetera. They had an impact on the South Korean banking and media industry here in the spring and summer of 2013, for example.

And we know that they are working hard to develop a greater capability in cyber.

And then also within our area, as you know, China presents a cyber challenge, as well, in the Pacific region.

Mr. LANGEVIN. And on that point, General, do you assess any security risk to U.S. forces from Seoul's interest in China's Huawei communications and networking equipment?

General SCAPARROTTI. I am sorry, sir, on the last part, China's—

Mr. LANGEVIN. China's Huawei communications and networking equipment?

General SCAPARROTTI. Sir, I can't comment on that. I don't have the knowledge on that particular issue.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. I would like to circle back with you. As you know, the Intelligence Committee on which I sit, as well, has done a deep dive on the Huawei issue and it is of great concern to us to the point that we have blocked Huawei from doing business here in the United States.

But that is an ongoing and evolving concern that we have. So, we should talk more about that.

General SCAPARROTTI. Thank you, sir.

Mr. LANGEVIN. With that, I will have more questions in the classified session.

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back.

Mr. Lamborn.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you both for your service to our country.

Admiral Haney, is it true that according to the latest New START Treaty declaration, we have actually cut our nuclear warheads by 103 while Russia has increased its deployed warheads?

Admiral HANEY. Congressman, I would put it a different way in that we are all working toward our strategic deterrent limit numbers as I described here relative to the 1,550 warheads for the United States of America, as well as for Russia in this arms control agreement.

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, I can't dispute what you are saying. But to me, it is a remarkable situation that we are decreasing and they are increasing.

You don't have to comment on that, but let me ask you this—what is the ratio of imbalance of nuclear forces not covered by the treaty, like tactical weapons?

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Lamborn, as you know, Russia has a sizable quantity of tactical nuclear weapons.

The agreements we have had thus far have been focused on the strategic nuclear weapons. And when you look at those stockpile reductions, we have come down quite significantly as appropriately, in my opinion.

And at the same time, through agreements ensuring that we have strategic stability as part of that process—and the verification piece that provides us that transparency; for example, 18 inspections on each side is a critical part of that agreement.

Mr. LAMBORN. But is the imbalance roughly 10 to 1 when it comes to tactical warheads and weapons?

Admiral HANEY. I would rather not put a number to it in this open forum, sir.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you.

Admiral Haney, your predecessor testified that B-61 nuclear weapons stationed in Europe provide the President with important options and therefore have military value.

Would you agree with that assessment?

Admiral HANEY. I would agree with that assessment.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you very much.

And now, for either one of you, how dangerous are North Korea's KN-08 missiles? Are they different from what we have seen in the past?

General SCAPARROTTI. The KN-08 is their developmental intercontinental ballistic missile. They have not tested it. They have displayed it.

We believe that they have the technical capabilities and the skill to produce an ICBM. They claim that they have done so.

And so, because of that, I think it is dangerous and we have to assume that they can employ one.

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, with that in mind, are we adequately prepared to defend against North Korean missiles—either the KN-08 we just discussed or the shorter range weapons that could hit our forces in the region?

General SCAPARROTTI. Congressman, I will take the Korean theater portion of that. We and the Republic of Korea forces have a missile defense system that is in place which does provide the fence for the Korean theater and the forces therein and the populace there.

As noted in my testimony, it is one area, though, that we do need to continue to focus on. And it is one of the areas for improvement on both the ROK and U.S. side, in terms of the alliance. We can be better, is what I am saying.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay.

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Lamborn, our missile defense system which we have developed and continue to work on improving is designed specifically for a threat such as from North Korea.

This is an area that we continue to work on investments, particularly in our sensing capability, discrimination, and working to improve the kill vehicle aspect of that capability are our top priorities.

Mr. LAMBORN. And lastly, does the North Korean regime continue to put an emphasis on developing weapons of mass destruction as well as ballistic missiles?

General SCAPARROTTI. Congressman, yes they do. They are working on it steadily.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you both.

And Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Duckworth.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I would like to address a little bit more about the Republic of Korea's military's capabilities.

You know, I know that historically, DOD [Department of Defense] was really looking at varied options to improve their readiness and also to look at the transfer of wartime operational controls back to the South Koreans—and that has been delayed until 2015 for a number of reasons.

So, I would be really interested in hearing about the current status of those efforts and what some of the biggest impediments to the transfer might be right now.

There have also been some reports that have expressed concerns about the South Koreans' abilities to assume control—whether they have demonstrated capabilities in place, or especially when they don't have certain capabilities such as landing crafts.

I am just very concerned about the range of security issues in the region and would like for you to perhaps comment on the current combat deficiencies with the ROK—beyond F-35, which you have already mentioned—that may further delay transferring operational control.

And could you also identify capabilities that they should be pursuing that they currently don't have or aren't and if that is anything that can be addressed with the FMS [Foreign Military Sales] program?

General SCAPARROTTI. Congresswoman, thank you for the question.

We are presently—and I say we—it is the Minister of Defense and the Secretary of Defense; the Department of Defense here last October agreed that they would form a working group to review the OPCON [operational control] transition of control in wartime of the alliance forces; they would review that throughout this year with an end date of reporting back at the next military committee this coming October.

That review is underway. And really, what they are looking at is, is it appropriate? What is the right timing of the transition? It is scheduled for December of 2015 at this point.

And then also looking at what are the conditions that have to be met—because the transfer—Strategic Alliance 2015, as it is called—is a conditions-based process. It is not set on a date alone; it is on the condition.

So, those are being reviewed today. What I would say to you is that the Republic of Korea leadership that I work with daily has stated that they are not prepared to take control of alliance forces in crisis at this point, and don't believe they will be by 2015.

Having said that, and to respond to the areas where I believe that we need to work—and these are areas that within the alliance, we need to work, but also ones that the Republic of Korean forces are focused on—is, first, ISR, the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems that enable us as an alliance to provide indicators and warnings and to know what happened if there is an instant to determine what needs to be done next.

Secondly, C4I, which is our computers, communications systems that allow command and control. An area there that is sufficient today; but given technology, can be much better—internally for each of our forces, but specifically for the alliance and something that I think for transition needs to be improved.

The third is the ballistic missile defense system. As an alliance, we prefer an interoperable, layered, integrated system that works together—it is a much stronger system that way. There are things that need to be done in order to attain that objective.

On the part of the Republic of Korea, that is one of their central priorities within the Ministry of Defense. And they are working what is known as the Korean Air Missile Defense System, and they have established a cell on a procedure to get to that point.

And then finally, munitions. Within the alliance, we don't have the right stockage of munitions and the numbers that we need to sustain us for a crisis of 30 days or more, for example. And we are working closely with the Republic of Korea to resolve that.

I would finally close by saying that the ROK Government this year has budgeted within their budget against each of these areas and they are also focused on the areas that we believe as an alliance need to improve as we work toward OPCON transition.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. Are their priorities the same as yours—you know, the ones that you have addressed?

You talked about the ISR, C4I, the ballistic missile defense, munitions—would you say that there would be concurrence on the South Korean defense minister's part, as well, or do you think he has slightly different priorities?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, he may have other priorities as well, but they agree with these priorities with the alliance. They have been agreed upon bilaterally. And as I said in the budget for instance, ISR, they recently budgeted to purchase Global Hawk, which is very important.

They also put funds against munitions, et cetera. So we are working now on exactly—for instance munitions, which ones are—we do we agree upon that we need, et cetera.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. All right. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. FRANKS.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank both of you and those with you. Always very grateful to those who wear the uniform. I have 5-year-old twins, and I know that they have a much better chance of walking in the light of freedom because of the commitment that you have shown your entire lives, and I am very grateful to you.

With that, if it is all right General Scaparrotti, I will start with you. President Obama recently told leaders of Japan and South Korea that he has succeeded in “changing the game” over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

And yet last month, North Korea launched two mid-range ballistic missiles, and earlier this week they released a statement saying they would not rule out a new form of nuclear test for bolstering nuclear deterrence.

And from your perspective, what is our Defense Department doing or able to do to change the game in our favor, and how are our missile defenses postured to support and protect our allies in the region from potential North Korean missile threats?

General SCAPARROTTI. Sir, in terms of the Defense Department strategy, it is really a whole-of-government approach that includes diplomatic, economic information, as well as military responses.

In terms of the military, it is our posture. The exercises that we do for instance are a part of this deterrent strategy we have in terms of Kim Jong-un’s view of his missile and nuclear capabilities and what capability he may have and what it may cost him. So we look across the whole of government to respond to this.

And actually just as with the occurrences that we have had here since the 21st of February and over the last few days, we are continually working that and changing our posture in order to have influence.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you. Admiral Haney, STRATCOM mission is to “deter and detect strategic attacks and defeat attacks if deterrence fails.”

And I have to say to you, having the privilege of serving on the Strategic Forces Committee here, I believe that the dollars spent under your command are the most important dollars in our entire military because our diplomacy is always seen in the shadow of our military capability. And I just can’t express to you how deeply convinced I am that your leadership and the work that you do is vital to this country.

You have stated that our spending on nuclear forces was only 2.5 percent of DOD spending in 2013. And I am not sure that upper echelons of leadership are really giving you the resources that you need. And I hear now of further reductions even beyond the New START Treaty levels. And I have to express to you, the low spending and even the further reductions in our New START concerns me greatly.

Does it affect your mission to deter, detect, or defeat while potential adversaries around the world are pursuing greater capability in light of some of these moves in the direction of where it would reduce your overall response or throw-weight capability? Tell me, how is that affecting your mission?

Admiral HANEY. Congressman, first and foremost, you know, the forces that I lead and have at our country's disposal today is in fact ensuring we have a credible, secure, and effective deterrent capability. And it is run and operated by very capable people day in and day out.

But to your point here, we cannot just assume that that will continue without proper investments, modernizations, support for our laboratory infrastructure and what have you that supports that capability now and into the future. It will continue to require investment.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I know—you know, there is no one that can tell you about anything about deterrent. You are the—I think one of the most well-qualified leaders of this particular part of our military that we have ever had.

But having said that, you know, the deterrent is always in the mind of the enemy or the potential enemy. And my concern is that when they see us moving toward reduction and lower spending, that they may begin to be a little bit more—maybe question that deterrent more than they should, especially as we get that umbrella broadened out.

And do you have any thoughts for this committee about what our future mindset should be toward the deterrence spending?

Admiral HANEY. Well, I would hope this committee would support the modernization programs that support our credible, secure, and effective deterrent. And that extends all the way from the indications and warning sensors, the command and control piece, as well as the modernization of the platforms that are required, all the way to the weapon, the warhead itself. And we have to stay on course in that regard.

As mentioned earlier, these modernization programs such as—from the weapons side, the warhead such as the B-61 program, very important to our Nation going forward. And in its future, the replacement for the air-launched cruise missile will be just as critical.

Similarly, as we look at platforms, the *Ohio* replacement platform, the long-range strike bomber, support for those programs are critical to the future of our deterrent. As we do reduce in numbers to the New START Treaty, you should know that those numbers support the warfighting capability we need to have, the deterrence and assurance capability we need to have.

And that has been looked at very, very hard. And having seen that process before when I was deputy commander and in other jobs in the Pentagon to seeing where we are now, we are on the right course. But that really makes every leg of the triad very important for the future.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Admiral. Thank you both for your service.

Mr. SCOTT [presiding]. Gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Barber.

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you both, gentlemen, for being with us this morning. And as my colleagues have said, thank you for your service and your leadership to our men and women in uniform.

I want to talk first of all with you, Admiral Haney, about cyber threats in the United States. I think Secretary Hagel said it well, that this is in the future in many ways of our defense posture and we must make sure it is robust.

I believe we have to expand our cyber warfare capabilities to confront what we know are the evolving and ever-growing cyber threats against the United States. And as you know, Admiral, innovations in technology are moving very rapidly. And there is convergence between various disciplines with network systems and tactics.

And this convergence of technology I believe calls for a diverse cyber workforce with capabilities from various disciplines. As you may know, Admiral, I have an outstanding garrison, Fort Huachuca, in my district with its electronic proving grounds, which is I believe an important partner in this evolving mission of cybersecurity.

Not only does the installation have one of the most pristine environments in the world for C5ISR [command, control, communications, computers, combat systems, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] testing in the United States, but also has a training facility right at its back door. Admiral, could you comment on this?

As cyber warfare increasingly becomes a high priority in our national defense strategy, how do you see STRATCOM or more specifically USCYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command] diversifying its cyber capabilities with existing infrastructures like Fort Huachuca and the electronic proving grounds?

And do you see the Nation's ranges playing an increasingly important role in the testing of future cyber and electronic magnet—electromagnetic technology? Please respond, Admiral.

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Barber, I thank you for that question. Your concerns for cybersecurity and our cyber capabilities are spot on.

This is an area that is very important to me, and as I get to have this focus in my command as a priority of building cyberspace capability and capacity in working with our services and the joint staff and of course with U.S. Cyber Command in order to look at the threats of the day and the threats of the future and ensuring that we man, train, and equip to be able to address those threats, and also to integrate that capability into our tool bag for the future.

So there is a lot of work going on. Your discussion of ranges is also important. And that interface between the electronic warfare environment and the cyber environment is one that we are continually working on now and into the future.

Mr. BARBER. Well, I definitely commend the installation at—in Cochise County in my district, Fort Huachuca, and the range that as I mentioned is right there, the Goldwater Range, and great capabilities.

Let me have a follow-up question with you on this, Admiral, too. And that has to do with how the fiscal restraints and the budget cuts are impacting on this important asset that we must have going forward.

How does the Department of Defense diversify and build a cyber workforce during a time of pretty significant personnel reductions and budget constraints?

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Barber, that work is under way and ongoing, and I am very pleased that the commitment from the services and through the joint force apparatus—Office of Secretary of Defense support. In terms of working to build up that capability, even in this environment of sequestration, we have been supported to build up a number of teams associated with our cyber workforce. From a protection standpoint, national mission teams. And they are working hand in hand at U.S. Cyber Command—they are—day in and day out, and improving that capability.

I think as we go forward, we will still need some work outside of what was already discussed in terms of policies, authorities, and those to support this workforce that we continue to train and develop and grow.

Mr. BARBER. Let me turn—thank you, Admiral. I will turn to General. This has to do with South Korea and the protection of our ally there, the treaty that we have.

The A-10s, as you know, have played an important role in providing close air support, should we have a conflict with North Korea. And you never know—tomorrow it could happen. I mean, I can ask your comment—for you to comment on the A-10's presence, its importance, and about what might happen if we no longer have it in the air and flying in protection of our troops.

General SCAPARROTTI. Thank you, sir.

As you know, the A-10 is a unique platform that provides exceptional close air support to our troops. I'm an infantryman; it has been employed on my behalf in combat. And the pilots that fly them—it is an exceptional platform.

On the peninsula, I think it is an important part of our defense there in the sense that you have the kind of terrain that an airplane like that can be helpful. However, I also know in this case, the Air Force's difficulties with the physical constraints that they have, and an aging platform, that they have got to make some tough decisions. And I believe that if the A-10 does not remain in the inventory, that we can be provided support from F-15, F-16, and the other platforms, as we have done in Afghanistan successfully.

So, within the peninsula, my concern is, is that I have an aircraft that will replace that A-10 if, in fact, it leaves the inventory.

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, General.

I yield back.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General Scaparrotti, Admiral Haney, thank you so much for joining us today. We appreciate your service to our Nation.

General Scaparrotti, in August of 2013, the Deputy Secretary of Defense denied the Army's request to increase the overseas housing allowance in support of the Humphreys Housing Opportunity program, stating that there were some issues there. And what they did was to direct the Army to look at alternatives to that housing opportunity program there that would meet the readiness requirement set forth by U.S. Forces Korea's commander.

Let me ask this. Do you believe that the readiness requirements for Camp Humphreys housing is still valid? Are you reevaluating those requirements? And what are you doing currently in working with the Army to address the projected housing deficits there at Camp Humphreys?

General SCAPARROTTI. Sir, thank you.

As I came into command, one of my first priorities was to really review very closely our posture of our forces, and in particular, our ability to take care of our forces in barracks and families in quarters. And I have done that in the time that I have been in command. And, actually, I have established my requirement at 40 percent of our command sponsorship program families, which is also General Thurman's prior requirement. I believe that is accurate.

And I have—the Army is aware of that requirement, as well. Now, I have worked with the Army since I have been in command on this issue. In fact, spoke to Ms. Hammack this week. And then about 10 days ago, the Army held a conference in Korea, targeted at determining the market off post, and the availability off post—the availability of building.

So, having said that, it is an Army issue. As a commander, I do need a solution. As you know, the majority of our forces are moving in 2016. I am really inside of the window for being able to provide for the families that will be moving. And so I look to the Army to find a solution, and it will probably be a combination of both on- and off-post capability in order to meet our requirements.

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good.

If you would give me your assessment of U.S. Forces Korea readiness, and how you look at the other challenges that are out there that may have an impact on your state of readiness, and that is, the effect of other COCOMs [combatant commands] and the other service branches as far as the current readiness states.

And what are your thoughts and concerns about PACOM's pre-positioned stocks, including operational stocks? And is there a challenge there with those stocks being deficient? And if so, what would you propose be done in relation to your efforts with PACOM to address that?

General SCAPARROTTI. Congressman, we are in close working relationship with PACOM. We have an excellent relationship in terms of our staffs. I do have concerns about pre-positioned stocks, primarily with the fiscal constraints, and perhaps some decisions that Army may make with respect to the available stocks for us, which we rely upon if we go into crisis.

I also have concerns about munitions. Having the stockage that I need. I am short right now in some specific categories—precision munitions and ballistic missile defense, in particular. And also, the location of those so that they match my deployment schedule in the places that I need them as I flow forces.

Mr. WITTMAN. Give me your perspective on the current state of readiness there. If you would put that in perspective. Obviously, we talked about the operational and pre-positioned stocks, but give me your perspective on where you are from a readiness standpoint.

General SCAPARROTTI. I think today, Congressman, I am in good shape in terms of readiness for deterrence, and for actions in armi-

stice or provocation. My concern with readiness has to do with development where provocation escalates to a crisis. And at that point in time, I will immediately need follow-on forces.

The initial forces from PACOM, I am confident, given my discussions with the PACOM commander and his subordinate commanders that they are focused on my immediate needs, and they track that daily. But as we get into a greater conflict, and we begin to flow forces from all the services, you know today that they are at a reduced readiness rate. And so, I am concerned that they would be—they would come in a ready state that I need them for what will be a high-intensity conflict. Not like Afghanistan or Iraq, but a high-intensity conflict. And also, that they can be delivered by TRANSCOM [Transportation Command] in the timeline that I need them. And I believe today that TRANSCOM could not meet that schedule, given the fiscal constraints that they have.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you.

General, you spoke earlier to the ISR on the battle management platforms and the importance of them. The JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System] fly out of Robins Air Force Base that I represent. And there is a proposal currently to recapitalize that fleet. I have a tremendous amount of respect for General Welsh. Agree with him that we need to move to that next generation platform.

In moving to that platform, we are going to be pulling down some of the current aircraft that are flying and providing that intel and that battle management platform.

My question for both of you is, as we draw down those units when they go in for depot maintenance, to recapitalize the fleet, my concern is that it leaves us with a gap in that ISR and battle management platform. Could you discuss the importance of the JSTARS, the recapitalization, and any potential gap that may be there as we recapitalize that fleet?

General SCAPARROTTI. In my case, sir, I—the environment in Korea—the JSTARS provides me some critical intelligence in terms of change management, et cetera. And I would prefer not to go into too much more detail here, but it is very important to us. And when that transition takes place, for me, it is important that it is done so that I don't have a loss in capability as we transition to, and make available, a new airframe that will provide the same intelligence capabilities.

Mr. SCOTT. I think that—obviously, our goal is to get you more intelligence from the JSTAR unit. But we will speak further about it when we go into the classified meeting. But thank you for your comments.

And, Admiral, do you have anything to add to the JSTARS?

Admiral HANEY. Congressman, I would say at large, in terms of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and our assets, they are at high demand and in total.

And the business of being able to have that unblinking eye is a critical mission area that we are all—work together at.

So, when we get to this point here of JSTARS management, that is going to require careful management to ensure that we don't lose capability where we need to have it.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you.

Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to thank both of our—General and Admiral, for your time here today and briefing us.

I had an opportunity to go to South Korea back in 2006 before I got involved in this crazy place. I went there to visit my son, who was up at Camp Casey, Camp Humphrey—two garden spots, I would say.

But I was always concerned about our ability to defend ourselves and the South Korean Peninsula.

And there have been a number of changes in force—he was heavy armor, then went to Bradleys.

So, I hear some reluctance in your statements, General, in regards to pre-positioning of our assets. You know, everything that I have heard and read about North Korea—it doesn't bode real well for us in the short-term for those forces that we have there.

Can you give me assurances as a father of three soldiers that currently serve—two Active Duty, one National Guard—that we are capable of defending not only South Korea, but our own men and women that are stationed there?

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, Congressman, I can. The Republic of Korean forces, which have the—provide the predominance of the ground force today and the defense along the DMZ—which has changed, you know, since 2006. There has been a transition there within the alliance.

They are a capable, modern force. Their officerships are well-trained and they are getting stronger every day.

Our posture there, I think, is sufficient now. To your point, in terms daily, I believe, yes—we can defend the peninsula.

But what I would say is, is that this is a different environment than we have—you know, it is a different—the nature of this conflict will be different.

And it will be high intensity; there will be higher casualties than we have seen in the recent conflicts that we have been in because of the, one, the capability of both sides; but also, the number of forces that are involved here and the limited warning.

So, there is no doubt that we can defend the peninsula. But this will be a high-intensity, tough conflict, and it will have potentially some high casualties, as well—that is, if we go to a full crisis.

In short, in terms of provocation, I assure you that we can deal with provocation.

Mr. NUGENT. And I know from the intel side of it, very difficult to judge where Kim Jong-un—his regime is at any given time, particularly he obviously has no problem in taking out those that he feels are a threat to him in any way at all.

But changing just a little bit—as it relates to the National Guard and the Reserve forces, there is a lot of discussion about, A, keeping them operational. What, if any, mission do you see with the National Guard or Reserve forces to supplement the forces—Active Duty forces that are currently in Republic of South Korea?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, sir, in terms of our forces, the Guard is—you know, over the years, particularly through the conflict in

the last decade, they have served side by side with us. We have been a total force.

As a commander in Afghanistan, I averaged between 11 and 14 percent Guard and Reserve with every unit that I commanded in Afghanistan or Iraq.

And in terms of the peninsula, I think they are an integral part of what we do day to day in armistice and as well as if we go to conflict.

Mr. NUGENT. Are you planning National Guard rotations or Reserve rotations through the peninsula?

General SCAPARROTTI. Sir, I don't necessarily specify the type of element. I have a requirement as a commander—

Mr. NUGENT. Okay.

General SCAPARROTTI. And then it is the forces' determination as to who they provide. My requirement is they provide a force that is capable to do the mission and is ready.

Mr. NUGENT. Okay.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you very much.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Bridenstine.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Haney, our QDR states that, quote: "We will pursue further negotiated reductions with Russia"—talking about nuclear arms reductions.

Given Russia's annexation of Crimea and the mass amount of troops that they are putting on the border of Ukraine, do you support negotiated reductions with Russia?

Admiral HANEY. Congressman, as I have stated both in a variety of statements publicly, any further reductions with Russia requires that it is done in a verifiable manner. It also has to be negotiated—not unilateral; bilaterally. And it has to be in full context of their world events, as well as in context of all of their capability.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So, if the QDR, for example, was written prior to the invasion of Crimea, then that might change the calculation of whether or not we need to reduce nuclear weapons with Russia?

Admiral HANEY. It has the possibility.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. It is public knowledge that the State Department has confronted Russia about its violation of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. And media reports indicate that the U.S. has known about these likely violations for years.

Did this factor into these statements in the QDR about new negotiations for treaties with Russia that you know of?

Admiral HANEY. The comment in the QDR associated with negotiations with Russia has been a comment that has been reinforced, both from Nuclear Posture Review 2010, the President's Berlin speech.

This has been a continual goal—the goal of continuing to reduce nuclear weapons in the world in general. But along with that goal has been a statement that as long as other nations have that capability, we will have a safe, secure, and effective capability, as well.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Do you believe Russia should be in compliance with its existing nuclear arms control treaties before we negotiate new ones?

Admiral HANEY. I believe that treaties are an agreement that has to be dealt with seriously and that—no different than our exe-

cution of New START Treaty today, that we are able to carry out what we signed up to do.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So, if they would be in violation of old treaties, maybe we shouldn't enter into new treaties?

Admiral HANEY. I would rather not talk about a hypothetical case. I would rather this issue, which I think is being taken seriously—it is being looked at by our interagency, particularly State Department—and I think that piece needs to come to conclusion as we look forward at further treaties.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you very much, Admiral.

I yield back.

Mr. SCOTT. Dr. Wenstrup.

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, what type of strategic adjustments have you had to make in light of what Mr. Snowden has taken from us as far as intelligence and how we go about business? How do you prepare for somewhat the unknown?

I guess we do have some idea of what was taken and what information may be shared. But how do you prepare for the downfall of that?

Admiral HANEY. Congressman, I think that first and foremost, the approach has been to take a hard look at what is all the material that has been potentially leaked—classified material leaked by Mr. Snowden.

And then looking at that and adjusting based on those—on the categories and the specificity—the specifics of the associated material. I couldn't go into more detail than that in this open forum.

Dr. WENSTRUP. But that process is taking place and analyzing what we may need to change in order to keep up with what they may now know?

Admiral HANEY. It is a process that is ongoing. It has specific attention, I think, of components to our Department of Defense and country at large, and that this is an ongoing assessment and evaluation.

Dr. WENSTRUP. Yes, I imagine it is pretty extensive. Because so much material was taken to figure out what we know they know. And then how do we adjust? And so, I appreciate your efforts in that regard. I am encouraged to know that it is ongoing. And I want to thank you both for your service.

And, General, I don't know if you have anything to add to that.

General SCAPARROTTI. Only that just 2 days ago, I sat down with individuals who are analyzing all of this data to specifically come back for another time with me in terms of how it impacts my forces in Korea and what we do. So, they are constantly working this issue, and we are continuing to exchange as time goes on to determine what changes we need to make, what impacts it will have.

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you both very much. Appreciate it.

I yield back.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you.

Gentlemen, that concludes the meeting in this room. We will adjourn to 2216 at this time. If you need a little break—say 12:00 p.m., does that work for you?

[Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

APRIL 2, 2014

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

APRIL 2, 2014

Opening Statement of Chairman Howard P. "Buck" McKeon

HEARING ON

**Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Budget Requests from U.S.
Forces Korea and U.S. Strategic Command**

April 2, 2014

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The committee meets today to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. Strategic Command.

Joining us today are General Curtis Scaparrotti and Admiral Cecil Haney.

The commander of U.S. European Command, General Breedlove, was also scheduled to testify today. However, late last week Secretary Hagel called him back to Brussels to directly deal with the crisis with Russia. We will look to another date later this year and try to get the General to appear before the committee then.

The general's callback is a sobering reminder about how our military presence in Europe still matters and is still needed. Yet as we have shifted focus on other threats across the globe, our readiness and force posture in Europe has declined, and we have come to find that deterring regional aggression has become more difficult.

The crisis with Russia is also a reminder that we have to be prepared for a range of scenarios, whether we think them likely or not.

Some may think a major conflict on the Korean peninsula is unlikely and therefore we don't need to size our forces, especially our land forces, for such a scenario. However, we can look to every major land conflict we have been involved in to know that we are usually wrong.

North Korea maintains the world's fourth largest army. It poses a grave threat to our South Korean allies and to stability in the region, and increasingly direct threat to the United States.

Yet I remain concerned that the end strength and force structure cuts contained in the QDR (Quadrennial Defense Review) and the budget request create

significant risk for a Korean scenario, and also creates greater vulnerabilities in other parts of the world.

In a Korean scenario, General Amos has testified that the Marine Corps would be all in, with 20 of its 21 infantry battalions committed to the fight. General Odierno testified that the Army force structure in the QDR will put in doubt our ability to execute even one prolonged, multi-phased major contingency operation.

General Scaparrotti, I hope you can discuss the changing threat on the peninsula, the implications it has both for U.S. and South Korean forces and capabilities, and the implications of the QDR and budget request.

Admiral Haney, U.S. Strategic Command has a vast portfolio to include nuclear forces, missile defense, cyber operations, and space.

As you know, General Dempsey believes our Nation's top national security interest is to continue to assure the survival of the Nation. I agree with that prioritization and I support the funding in this year's base budget request that protects the nuclear triad and other nuclear deterrent capabilities.

It is imperative, Admiral, that you continue to take on those who would pretend that the United States alone among nuclear powers can continue to disarm itself.

I am increasingly troubled by the aggressive counter-space programs of China and Russia, in particular. I trust you will not hesitate to tell this Committee what you need to accomplish that mission.

At the conclusion of our open session today, we will move into 2216 for a closed briefing. I would encourage all members that can to attend that session.

Gentlemen, thank you for your leadership, for your service during this challenging period. And I look forward to your testimony.

Opening Statement of Ranking Member Adam Smith

HEARING ON

**Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Budget Requests from U.S.
Forces Korea and U.S. Strategic Command**

April 2, 2014

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome to General Scaparrotti and Admiral Haney.

I particularly note, General Scaparrotti, welcome. We enjoyed your time out at Fort Lewis, really appreciated your leadership there. And I am glad that you are on the job in Korea. So it is good to see both of you and I thank you very much for your leadership.

I also want to join the Chairman in noting General Breedlove's absence, given the crisis in the Ukraine and Europe that his presence is required back there. But the issues that he is involved in are critical to this Committee and ones that we will continue to exercise oversight on as we deal with the situation between Russia and the Ukraine.

And in Korea, I also agree with the Chairman, that continues to be one of the more, you know, dangerous parts of the world for us. North Korea is unpredictable. Another sign of that yesterday, as they attempted to I guess establish a larger border by lobbing missiles across the line in the ocean, or artillery.

And North Korea's unpredictability requires our presence. We are and have been for some time the guarantor of South Korea's security. And that is going to continue to be the case for as far as I can see, given the way North Korea is acting.

And I share the Chairman's concerns as we once again look at sequestration here in the near future and go through budget cuts, will we have sufficient forces and sufficient presence to provide that deterrent capability?

Because as bad as what North Korea has been doing for the last couple of decades, I think we don't want to imagine how much worse that would be if they thought we were not there to stop them from further aggression against South Korea.

So I would be curious about your thoughts about how you manage that declining budget and continue to maintain a credible deterrent to North Korea.

Also, to learn more about South Korea's growing capabilities. Obviously, they are a key partner in that deterrence. They have become more capable in recent years. That is obviously helpful.

And I am curious to hear how you feel our partnership with South Korea is going and how that matches up to provide that deterrent to North Korean aggression.

So thank you. I look forward to that testimony.

Admiral Haney, you have an incredibly important portfolio, as the Chairman mentioned. Space is critical to literally everything we do. So curious to hear how we can maintain our leadership in that area, make sure that our assets in space continue to provide for us what we need throughout our military operations.

And also I am curious about how the triad is maintained going forward, or what is your vision for nuclear deterrence as we face some very difficult budget challenges in all pieces, all assets of the triad?

Trying to figure out what we are going to do with the future long-range strategic bomber, how we maintain our submarine fleet given a shrinking budget, and how we maintain our ICBMs domestically, as well. What does the triad look like?

And then, lastly, I would be interested in hearing an update from you on missile defense, on what you think our future is, where we would be most wise to spend our money.

Because I believe missile defense continues to be critically important as adversaries like Iran and North Korea develop better and better missile technology, and our ability to defend against that is going to be critical to our national security.

But I want to make sure that we are spending our money wisely as we do that to give us the best chance to have the best possible missile defense system to deter those threats.

I thank you both for being here. I look forward to your testimony and the questions and answers from the committee.

**STATEMENT OF
GENERAL CURTIS M. SCAPAROTTI
COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND;
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA COMBINED FORCES
COMMAND;
AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE**

April 2, 2014



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1. INTRODUCTION.

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, I am honored to testify as the Commander of the United Nations Command (UNC), United States–Republic of Korea (ROK) Combined Forces Command (CFC), and United States Forces Korea (USFK). On behalf of the Service Members, Civilians, Contractors, and their Families who serve our great nation in Korea, I thank you for your support. Our enduring military presence in Korea prevents war and preserves stability in a region critical to U.S. security. The U.S.-ROK Alliance protects both of our nations' vital interests by protecting our citizens, advancing our values, and enabling prosperity.

In 2013, we marked the 60th anniversaries of the Armistice Agreement that suspended the Korean War and the signing of the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. The U.S.-ROK Alliance is among history's most successful partnerships, providing the foundation for regional stability and prosperity. For 60 years, our Alliance has succeeded in preserving the Armistice Agreement, promoting democracy, and providing stability for the people of South Korea and the region. The Alliance is strong, but we will not allow ourselves to be complacent – we are and will remain ready. In the year ahead, we will face challenges and opportunities particularly in adapting the Alliance to changes in the North Korean threat.

North Korea remains a threat that is continually increasing its asymmetric capabilities amid a declining, yet large conventional force. Kim Jong-un is firmly in control despite his family's legacy of failure and the suffering of the North Korean people. The Kim regime threatens the United States and South Korea, where more than 114,000 Americans reside. North Korea's actions hold at risk a regional trade network that supports 2.8 million U.S. jobs and \$555 billion in U.S. exports.

Thanks to the support of our national leaders and the American people, USFK's presence is a strong commitment to South Korea and preserves stability and prosperity. USFK, a modern, capable, and forward-deployed force, stands ready to support our Nation's interests and defend our ally.

2. STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT.

U.S. security and prosperity depend on stable relationships with regional partners and allies, and regional stability depends on enduring U.S. presence and leadership. The Asia-Pacific region produces a quarter of the world's gross domestic product and is home to a quarter of the world's population, as well as the world's largest military and economic powers. These nations face the challenge of interdependence, relying on the U.S. for stability while increasingly relying on China economically. In the face of strategic change and military threats, the U.S. is the constant that provides stability and a framework for conflict avoidance and resolution.

Security Developments. Northeast Asia contains four of the world's six largest militaries. Regionally, China has heightened regional influence while pursuing a comprehensive military modernization program. This development is taking place against a backdrop of historical antagonism and growing territorial claims.

Economic Center of Gravity. The Asia-Pacific region is an economic center of gravity indispensable to the U.S. economy and our ability to maintain global leadership. In 2013, the region was responsible for 40% of global economic growth, with U.S. trade increasing by 22% between 2008 and 2012. In 2012, exports reached \$555 billion, a 31% increase since 2008 supporting 2.8 million American jobs. The region invested \$422 billion in the U.S. by the end of 2012, up 31% since 2008. The Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement is providing tangible benefits and is expanding a critical U.S. trading relationship, one that topped \$130 billion in goods and services in 2012. The region's economic prosperity, in turn, relies on the stability that enduring U.S. leadership and military presence provide.

The China Factor. China's reshaping of the region's strategic landscape impacts the security of both Koreas. While concerned about China's growing assertiveness and lack of transparency, South Korea is committed to deepening relations with China, its largest trading partner, in a manner that does

not compromise the health of the U.S.-ROK Alliance. South Korea sees China as playing a critical role in shaping North Korean behavior. However, China's near-term focus on stability and concerns about the future of the U.S.-ROK Alliance render it unlikely to take measures that could destabilize North Korea. Despite strains in the Sino-North Korean relationship, the Kim regime continues to rely on China for resources, as well as diplomatic cover to constrain international efforts to pressure North Korea to denuclearize and alter its aggressive behavior.

3. NORTH KOREA.

North Korea remains a significant threat to United States' interests, the security of South Korea, and the international community due to its willingness to use force, its continued development and proliferation of nuclear weapon and long-range ballistic missile programs, and its abuse of its citizens' human rights, as well as the legitimate interests of its neighbors and the international community. Last year at this time, North Korea embarked on a series of provocations including a satellite launch, nuclear test, and the deployment of a road mobile intermediate range ballistic missile, all in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. Recently, the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on North Korean Human Rights detailed North Korean abuses, assessed their impact, and made recommendations. North Korea's growing asymmetric capabilities present the U.S.-ROK Alliance with a challenging and complex threat.

Coercive Strategy. The Kim Jong-un regime's overriding interest is ensuring its survival. To achieve this, North Korea employs a coercive strategy, using force or the threat of force in an attempt to influence the United States and South Korea. The Kim regime seeks to maintain internal security, develop a strong military deterrent, and pursue coercive diplomacy to compel acceptance of its nuclear program. Rather than seeking rapprochement with the international community, North Korea deliberately isolates itself.

The Kim regime's strategic campaign is calculated, but risky. Escalatory acts involving nuclear development, missile tests, and military posture changes near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) carry with them elements of uncertainty and the potential for miscalculation, and rapid and unintended escalation.

Conventional Capabilities. North Korea continues to place priority on its military readiness. The Korean People's Army (KPA) – an umbrella organization comprising all military services – is the fourth largest military in the world. It fields approximately one million troops; 4,100 tanks; 2,100 armored vehicles; and 8,500 pieces of field artillery in addition to over 700 combat aircraft, 420 patrol combatants at sea, and 70 submarines. Over the past three decades, the regime has incrementally positioned the majority of this force within 90 miles of the DMZ, where they are postured for offensive or defensive operations. This means that they can strike targets within the Seoul Metropolitan Area where over 23 million South Koreans and almost 50,000 American citizens live.

Asymmetric Capabilities. While North Korea's massive conventional forces have been declining due to aging and lack of resources, and likely realizing that it cannot counter the Alliance head on, North Korea is emphasizing the development of its asymmetric capabilities. North Korea's asymmetric arsenal includes several hundred ballistic missiles, a large chemical weapons stockpile, a biological weapons research program, the world's largest special operations forces, and an active cyber warfare capability.

- **Nuclear arms and ballistic missiles.** North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in violation of multiple United Nations Security Council Resolutions. Today, it fields SCUD and Nodong missiles that are able to strike the entire Korean Peninsula and U.S. bases in Japan that also support UNC forces should they be called upon to defend the ROK. It is investing heavily in longer-range missiles with the potential to target the U.S. homeland. North Korea shows little regard for the fact that the possession of, pursuit of, and threat to use nuclear weapons and their means of delivery

are the primary barriers to its inclusion in the international community and productive economic integration.

- **Cyber capability.** North Korea employs computer hackers capable of conducting open-source intelligence collection, cyber-espionage, and disruptive cyber-attacks. Several attacks on South Korea's banking institutions over the past few years have been attributed to North Korea. Cyber warfare is an important asymmetric dimension of conflict that North Korea will probably continue to emphasize — in part because of its deniability and low relative costs.

Internal Situation. North Korea is a dictatorship under Kim Jong-un. He demonstrated his willingness to use his internal security agencies last year by arresting and very publicly purging Jang Song-taek, his uncle by marriage and a powerful member of the regime's inner circle. Though this event inspired wide speculation in the press, we do not believe it is a sign of instability — it was a calculated and deliberate action by Kim Jong-un to demonstrate his control of the regime.

Nevertheless, long-term trends continue to challenge the regime's internal stability. The level of military readiness places a tremendous economic burden on North Korea's population. North Korea's economy shows little improvement, and South Korea has declared that it will no longer provide substantial aid without first re-establishing trust. Additionally, in spite of the regime's efforts to control it, the influx of external information continues to grow. The regime will face increasing challenges to the control of information, which could gradually weaken the effectiveness of its internal propaganda.

Outlook. For the foreseeable future, North Korea will remain an isolated and unpredictable state willing to use violent behavior to advance its interests, attempt to gain recognition as a nuclear power, and secure the regime's continuation. The regime needs to portray the U.S. as an enemy to distract its population from economic hardship, government brutality, and systemic incompetence. Therefore, a shift to a truly conciliatory posture toward the U.S. is unlikely.

We remain concerned about the potential for a localized, violent act against South Korea, which could start a cycle of response and counter-response, leading to an unintended, uncontrolled escalation and a wider conflict. Also, we assess that North Korea has already taken initial steps towards fielding a road-mobile ICBM, although it remains untested. North Korea is committed to developing long-range missile technology that is capable of posing a direct threat to the U.S. Our Alliance with South Korea continues to be the critical linchpin required to deter North Korean aggression and to maintain stability.

4. REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

South Korea is a modern, prosperous democracy empowered by the creative drive and hard working spirit of its people. South Korea is poised to increase its regional and global influence to the benefit of both our nations. Against this backdrop in February 2013, President Park Geun-hye took office with a four-dimensional strategy focusing on Economic Democratization (domestic reforms to enable sustainable economic growth), the Trust-Building Process or *Trustpolitik* (North-South relations), the Northeast Asia Peace Initiative or Seoul Process (increase ROK regional influence and leadership), and Active Defense and Military Reform (counter North Korean provocations and threat). She committed significant time and energy in recalibrating South Korean policy toward North Korea, while she strengthened the ROK's international influence and leadership as a rising middle power across the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic spectrum. President Park is a staunch supporter of our Alliance, and she is committed to enhancing South Korea's ability to respond to provocation, and deter or defeat North Korean aggression.

Inter-Korean and Foreign Relations. President Park deftly managed relations with North Korea in the face of North Korean aggressiveness and leadership turbulence. The ROK deterred provocations (with visible U.S. support) and resisted acceding to North Korean demands. South Korea's management of North-South relations and *Trustpolitik* are moving ahead in a manner that seeks to avoid creating new

vulnerabilities. In February, the Koreas conducted their first family reunions since 2010. This was a positive, humanitarian event for the families of both countries who remain separated since the Korean War. Through the Seoul Process, South Korea seeks to increase its international influence and leadership, and President Park held 37 meetings with other heads of state, including President Obama.

Concerns About U.S. Commitment. We are committed to the defense of South Korea, and continue to demonstrate that commitment with additive rotational units to Korea, extended deterrence, and priority in defense resources and emphasis – second only to Afghanistan. However, due to a history of foreign invasions and the continuing North Korean threat, South Korea is concerned about adjustments in U.S. security strategy, particularly about reduction of U.S. commitment or resources. Confidence in U.S. commitment will play an important role in how South Korea designs and executes its defense strategy, and postures and structures its military.

Republic of Korea Military. The South Korean military is a capable, modern force operating in an effective partnership with U.S. forces. The North Korean threat remains its primary focus, but Seoul is increasing its ability to contribute to international security. Beginning with the Vietnam War, Seoul has contributed to several U.S. and U.S.-led international coalitions, most recently with combat service and civilian reconstruction support in Iraq, Afghanistan, and South Sudan, as well as deployments to support multinational anti-piracy and non-proliferation operations. More than 1,100 South Korean military members are deployed to 12 U.S.-led or UN-mandated missions.

- **Military Strategy.** South Korean military strategy calls for a rapid and robust response to North Korean provocations. The South Korean military is focused on protecting its people, believing that a commitment to a firm and immediate response to North Korean violence is essential to deterrence and self-defense. I am concerned about the potential for miscalculation and escalation, and I believe that both our nations are best served through an Alliance response based on seamless and rapid consultation

through mutually agreed-upon processes. To mitigate these concerns, we are enhancing our crisis management and escalation control measures through exercises and the bilateral Counter Provocation Plan we signed last year.

- **Manning and Budget.** The South Korean military has an active duty force of 639,000 personnel augmented by 2.9 million reservists. Demographics are driving its military to reduce manning to 517,000 active duty service members at some point in the 2020s. South Korea plans to offset this reduction in force with capability enhancements, including high technology weapons. South Korea has the 12th largest defense budget in the world with a 2014 budget of \$32.7 billion. Although Seoul continues to expand defense spending – this year’s defense budget represents a 4% increase over 2013, 14.5% of the overall national budget, and 2.49% of Gross Domestic Product – it still has not been able to meet the ambitious defense spending objectives of its current long-range defense plan, prompting a re-evaluation and re-prioritization of defense acquisition priorities and future force posture.

- **Capabilities and Force Improvement.** The Republic of Korea is making tough choices on military capabilities, attempting to achieve a number of security objectives. While the North Korean threat remains its priority, South Korea is also factoring the defense of sea lines of communication and maritime exclusive economic zones, balancing other regional powers, and building its domestic defense industries. South Korea has acquired impressive new capabilities that enhance the Alliance’s qualitative edge over North Korea, including F-15K fighters and AH-64E Apache heavy attack helicopters. It could further increase its edge by following through with its commitments to procure Patriot PAC-3 ballistic missile defense systems and Global Hawk, and pending procurement decisions on F-35 Joint Strike Fighters.

Combined Forces Command (CFC) continues to encourage South Korea to develop and implement new joint and combined command, control, communications, computers and intelligence, surveillance

and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities that are fully interoperable with the U.S. This includes a balanced approach that accounts for systems, networks, organizations, and human capital. CFC is placing special emphasis on missile defense, not only in terms of systems and capabilities, but also with regard to implementing an Alliance counter-missile strategy required for our combined defense.

5. THREE COMMANDS.

As the senior U.S. military officer in Korea, I lead three Commands: the United Nations Command (UNC), Combined Forces Command (CFC), and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). Each Command has distinct, but mutually supporting missions and authorities.

United Nations Command. As the UNC Commander, I am charged with leading an 18-nation coalition in maintaining the Armistice to ensure a cessation of hostilities until a final peace settlement is achieved. UNC maintains the Armistice by reducing the prospect of inadvertent clashes and miscalculations particularly within the DMZ and along the Northern Limit Line. This requires that I carefully balance the UNC Armistice maintenance responsibilities with the CFC responsibilities to defend South Korea. Should conflict resume and require an international response, as the UNC Commander, I am responsible for the operational control and combat operations of UNC member nation forces. We leverage our UNC Rear Headquarters ties with Japan to promote ROK-U.S.-Japan military engagements by educating military and civilian leaders about the criticality of Japan's support to the Alliance in times of conflict. Last year saw the return of Italy to UNC, and other Sending States are increasing their participation in exercises and in our permanent UNC staff. UNC remains as vibrant today as when it was originally chartered.

U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command. As the Commander of CFC, I am responsible for deterring North Korean aggression and, if deterrence fails, leading combined U.S.-ROK forces in the defense of the Republic of Korea. CFC enables us to organize, plan, and exercise U.S. and ROK forces to ensure

that CFC is ready to “Fight Tonight” – not just a slogan, but a mindset. CFC serves a purpose beyond that of other military commands; it embodies the military dimension of the Alliance that enables Americans and Koreans to fight as a unified force.

United States Forces Korea. As the Commander of USFK, I am responsible for organizing, training, and equipping U.S. forces on the Peninsula to be agile, adaptable, and ready to support CFC and UNC, as well as U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). USFK continues to support the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty and serves as a stabilizing force and a visible manifestation of the U.S. commitment to South Korea. As a joint, sub-unified command of PACOM, USFK is responsible for supporting the Combatant Command’s pursuit of U.S. theater and national level objectives. USFK is a member of the broader U.S. team that synchronizes and works Korea issues, including PACOM, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Embassy, the Interagency, and the Intelligence Community.

- **Ground Forces.** As USFK’s ground component force, Eighth Army (8A) uses modernized ground combat power to deter threats to U.S. interests in Korea in full partnership with the South Korean Army. In 2013, U.S. Army Pacific established a Coordination Element on the Peninsula to provide additional synchronization. The new Army Regionally Aligned Force effort ensures CONUS-based forces are better prepared to respond to regional requirements. In late 2013 and early 2014, the Army dispatched additive rotational forces to Korea as a means to strengthen combat readiness. These rotational forces arrive in Korea fully manned and trained, and they minimize transportation costs by leaving their equipment in Korea for the next unit in the rotation. Eighth Army’s enhanced readiness and presence in Korea represent a powerful U.S. commitment to deterrence and warfighting capability.

- **Air Forces.** The 7th Air Force is stationed in the Republic of Korea to apply air and space power in the Korean Theater of Operations (KTO). In 2013, 7th Air Force made advancements in command and control systems, fielding an improved version of the Theater Battle Management Core System. This

new system enhances our ability to command and control thousands of coalition sorties in one of the world's most complex battle spaces. In August, the 7th Air Force Commander assumed the role of Area Air Defense Commander for the KTO. Despite resource constraints in 2013, 7th Air Force made progress in enhancing deterrence and defense through Theater Support Packages (TSP), exercises, training, and command and control enhancements. Last year, 7th Air Force hosted three TSPs augmenting our capabilities and demonstrating U.S. resolve. They continued to improve combined airpower capabilities by executing two MAX THUNDER exercises, and trained the ROK Air Force for its first-ever deployment out of country to integrate with U.S. and multinational forces.

- **Naval Forces.** The deployment and presence of the U.S. Navy's most modern combat platforms in the Pacific Region provides enhanced capabilities (air, surface, undersea) in the maritime domain. The U.S. Navy is committed to sending our most modern platforms to the Pacific Region. The routine presence in the KTO of carrier strike groups demonstrates U.S. commitment and staying power, reassures allies, and deters adversaries. The routine deployment of expeditionary strike groups allows us to conduct combined amphibious operations and advance the command and control capabilities of the ROK and U.S. Marine Air-Ground Task Force.

- **Marine Forces.** U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Korea (MARFOR-K) is a service component headquarters assigned to USFK. It coordinates support from U.S. Marine units that come primarily from the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) located in Japan. MARFOR-K maintains a close relationship with the ROK Marine Corps and helps ensure that combined planning and training events are of optimal benefit to both countries. In 2013, we conducted 11 combined Korea Marine Exercise Program events that ranged from platoon to battalion size and spanned the gamut of military operations. U.S. and ROK Marine combined training includes Exercise SSANG YONG, one of the most comprehensive amphibious exercises in the world. MARFOR-K ensures that USFK remains ready to integrate forward-

based U.S. Marine forces that would be critical in the early hours and days of a crisis.

- **Special Operations Forces.** Special Operations Command, Korea (SOCKOR) serves as our Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) for Korea, providing command and control for all U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) in Korea. SOCKOR maintains continual engagement with the South Korean Army Special Warfare Command, its Naval Special Warfare Flotilla's SEALs, its Air Force SOF fixed wing, and its Army rotary wing SOF units. SOCKOR also serves as the UNC's subordinate headquarters that commands and controls all UN SOF during training exercises and in the event of crises or war.

6. U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE.

For over 60 years, we have stood together with the Republic of Korea in an Alliance for our common defense and increasingly rooted in mutual prosperity. We benefit from a rich combined military history and shared sacrifices. Our South Korean ally appreciates that the U.S. provided the security and assistance that enabled South Korea's hard earned success and liberty. Today, the Alliance stands as one of history's strongest and most effective military partnerships, one that has evolved to include regional and global security interests. In the coming year, we will continue to collaborate in addressing the challenges of Alliance transformation, enhancing counter-provocation capability, and implementing the counter missile strategy consistent with the Revised Missile Guidelines (RMG) and the bilateral Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS).

Strong Relationships. Our greatest strength rests in our close, daily cooperation built on trust. We have transparent and candid relationships that enable our ability to address tough warfighting and interoperability issues. We will continue to nurture the strong relationships that provide us with the mutual understanding, respect, and habits of cooperation required to preserve decision space and options during provocations or crisis.

Alliance Transformation. The U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense and ROK Ministry of National Defense are holding working group meetings to clarify South Korea's proposed conditions and prerequisites for wartime operational control (OPCON) transition and to review the bilaterally agreed upon pathway to OPCON transition in Strategic Alliance 2015. As the bilateral group continues its work, I remain focused on our combined readiness, and especially on enhancing the critical South Korean military capabilities identified in Strategic Alliance 2015. As they deliberate, we remain committed to preserving the benefits and advantages of being combined while ensuring that we are positioning the Alliance for long-term sustainability and operational effectiveness, and that we are doing so in a fiscally-sound manner.

Authorities and Consultation. Our consultative procedures remain robust and through these mechanisms, including the annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) and Military Committee Meeting (MCM), we continue to deepen our relationships and ensure that our military receives synchronized national-level direction. Our bilateral strategic documents define U.S. authorities within the Alliance and codify authorities for the Command to plan, train, and maintain readiness, as well as assume command should South Korea request that we do so in times of crises or war. These ensure the U.S. retains a voice and a stake in decisions and actions taken on the Korean Peninsula.

Burden Sharing. Earlier this year, the Alliance concluded a new cost sharing agreement called the Special Measures Agreement (SMA), which will be in effect through 2018. Under the SMA, South Korea will help offset the costs of stationing U.S. forces in Korea by providing support for labor, supplies, services, and construction. For 2014, Seoul will provide \$867 million in cost sharing support. SMA contributions also stimulate the South Korean economy through salaries and benefits to host nation workers, supply and service contracts, and local construction work. SMA support plays a critical role in developing and maintaining force readiness.

Counter Missile Capabilities. The United States and South Korea are implementing a comprehensive Alliance counter missile strategy based on detecting, defending, disrupting, and destroying North Korean missile threats. The strategy calls for the development of new South Korean ballistic missiles with increased ranges as well as enhanced ISR capabilities, including unmanned aerial vehicles. South Korea continues to implement the Revised Missile Guidelines (RMG), an important element in increasing Alliance capabilities to defend both South Korea and the United States. While we are making progress in implementing the RMG and countering the North Korean missile threat, we must continue to work toward enacting combined command and control processes to integrate our respective capabilities.

Tailored Deterrence. In October 2013, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK Minister of National Defense signed the bilateral Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS). The TDS is a significant milestone in the U.S.-ROK security relationship, and establishes an Alliance framework for ensuring deterrence against North Korean nuclear and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat scenarios. The TDS is not an operational plan, nor does it call for preemptive strikes or specific responses to North Korean actions. The TDS identifies a variety of capabilities that allow the Alliance to explore and implement options to enhance deterrence.

Operationalizing Deterrence. In 2013, U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Strategic Command dispatched strategic platforms to the KTO, including Carrier Strike Groups, Ohio Class guided-missile and Los Angeles Class attack submarines, F-22 fighters, and B-52 and B-2 bombers. These operations reassured the South Korean people of our commitment and provided a tangible demonstration of extended deterrence.

Exercises. Exercising our joint, combined, and multinational forces is an important component of readiness and is fundamental to sustaining and strengthening the Alliance. CFC and the ROK Joint

Chiefs of Staff conduct three major annual exercises. Exercises KEY RESOLVE and FOAL EAGLE (Feb/Mar) and ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN (Aug) provide the primary and most effective means to ensure combined readiness and deterrence – we must sustain them despite budget and resource constraints. Our exercises are a key opportunity to work through warfighting and interoperability issues, and enable the Alliance to adapt to the changing strategic environment, including progressing toward South Korean leadership in the defense of the Peninsula.

Readiness and Challenges. As a global military priority – second only to Afghanistan – and despite fiscal and resource limitations, we have maintained a high state of readiness. However, I am concerned about shortfalls in critical areas including C4ISR, missile defense, critical munitions, and the readiness of follow-on forces. North Korea’s forward deployed posture and demonstrated expertise in denial and deception present significant challenges. We can meet these challenges better by increasing ISR assets and analytic capability, and we are working to do so both with our on-Peninsula U.S. forces and ROK forces. I am encouraged by South Korean efforts to address missile defense limitations; however, effective solutions require a composite of integrated systems and capabilities. Next, we do not have sufficient stocks of some critical munitions and thus need to increase and maintain our on-Peninsula stock. Finally, fiscal limitations will impact the training and readiness of follow-on forces. Any delay in the arrival or reduction in readiness of these forces would lengthen the time required to accomplish key missions in crisis or war, likely resulting in higher civilian and military casualties.

A Bright Future Together. President Obama and President Park reaffirmed last year the “2009 Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea.” This landmark vision lays out an ambitious Alliance expansion. We will continue to encourage South Korea to develop stronger military-to-military relations with our other key allies and partners in the region. The Republic of Korea, as the 12th largest economy in the world with a modern military, is seeking to expand its role

in regional and international security, and we look forward to increasing our global partnership as outlined in the 2009 Joint Vision statement.

7. VISION 2014 AND PRIORITIES.

The Command will work to implement my priorities of strengthening the Alliance, maintaining the Armistice, and taking care of our people. We will remain vigilant against the North Korean threat, and we will strive to create enduring regional and global stability and prosperity.

My priorities are straightforward: Sustain and Strengthen the Alliance; Maintain the Armistice; Deter and Defeat Aggression – Be Ready to “Fight Tonight”; Transform the Alliance; Sustain Force and Family Readiness; and Enhance the UNC, CFC, and USFK Team.

Sustain and Strengthen the Alliance. America is fortunate to have committed and capable friends, and I have had the privilege of working alongside many of our Allies across a range of circumstances. This is my first time serving in South Korea. The South Korean military is impressive and is one of the most capable and best trained militaries in the world. South Korea is a true ally, willing to share burdens and make sacrifices in pursuit of our common values and interests. The coming year will provide an opportunity to strengthen our Alliance. Together, our Alliance can ensure a strong and effective deterrence posture so that Pyongyang never misjudges our role, our commitment, or our capability to respond to aggression. We are also working to expand the scope of trilateral security cooperation between the United States, South Korea, and Japan, thereby sending a strong message to Pyongyang. Relationships matter, and it is our people who more than anything else make possible our unity of purpose and action. So, we will reinforce the principle of working toward Alliance solutions to Alliance issues, and in the spirit of the Alliance, we will move “Forward Together.”

Maintain the Armistice: Deter and Defeat Aggression – Be Ready to “Fight Tonight.” Tightly linked to strengthening the Alliance is the imperative of maintaining the Armistice and deterring

aggression. Being ready to “Fight Tonight” means that if deterrence fails, the Alliance is ready to defeat aggression. The key to readiness is ensuring that U.S. and ROK forces are properly trained and equipped, and that follow-on forces are fully trained and capable of deploying on a tight timeline. Failure to maintain a high level of readiness leads to strategic risk against a well-armed North Korea possessing asymmetric capabilities. Despite fiscal and resource limitations, the forces in Korea maintain a high state of readiness.

Alliance Transformation. We will continue to press forward on Alliance transformation, focusing on achieving the goals set forth in Strategic Alliance 2015 (SA 2015), the roadmap for Alliance transformation into a ROK-led command structure. We designed SA 2015 to set conditions for a successful, enduring, and stronger Alliance. We must modernize our force posture and command and control to adapt to the changing NK threat in a manner that is sustainable and operationally effective. We will place increased emphasis on enhancing our cyber and special operations capabilities and will study lessons learned and technological advancements for application in the Korean Theater.

Sustain Force and Family Readiness. My final two priorities are linked -- sustaining force and family readiness is enabled by our efforts to enhance the team. The challenge of limited warning and decision space increases the criticality of training and readiness. Readiness applies not only to our combat forces but our families as well. Our people are most effective when their families are cared for and in balance. The personnel turbulence caused by one-year tours and our nation’s fiscal issues compound the magnitude of this challenge. We are working to address the issue of personnel turbulence by being very discerning with how we allocate command-sponsored tours and in the use of rotational forces. I ask for your assistance in supporting the best force we can sustain in Korea and the corresponding support for our families.

Enhance the UNC, CFC, and USFK Team. I am instilling a command climate based on valued

team members, teamwork, standards, discipline, and balanced lives. This includes encouraging spiritual, family, physical, professional, and personal balance and resilience. My vision for our command climate is upholding the covenant between the leader and the led. And one of the most important aspects of leading and taking care of our Service Members is my commitment to combating sexual assault and sexual harassment. We are unwavering in our commitment to doing so, and I know this resonates at every level of our Command. In and of itself, sexual assault is deplorable and unacceptable, and undermines the trust that is required to operate effectively as a team.

8. CLOSING.

The U.S.-ROK Alliance remains strong with an important future. The UNC/CFC/USFK Command and its dedicated men and women are ready every day to deter the North Korean threat, and if necessary, they are ready to fight and win. I am honored to have the opportunity to lead this dedicated joint, combined, and multinational force in one of the most vital regions of the world. We have a serious mission against a real threat, and as the USFK Commander, I deeply appreciate each American who has volunteered to serve far from home to support a close ally, protect American interests, and demonstrate American leadership and willingness to stand up to those who would threaten our way of life. Mr. Chairman, again, thank you for this chance to meet with you and your Committee, and I look forward to working together.

GEN Curtis M Scaparrotti

Commander

United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, U.S. Forces Korea



General Curtis M. Scaparrotti is a native of Logan, Ohio, graduated from the United States Military Academy, West Point, in 1978, and was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the U.S. Army.

A career infantry officer, General Scaparrotti is the Commander, United Nations Command / Combined Forces Command / United States Forces Korea. He most recently served as the Director, Joint Staff. Prior to his tour with the Joint Staff, General Scaparrotti served as Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command and Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces – Afghanistan, the Commanding General of I Corps and Joint Base Lewis-McChord, and the Commanding General of the 82nd Airborne Division.

In addition, General Scaparrotti has served in key leadership positions at the tactical, operational, and strategic level of the United States military to include Director of Operations, United States Central Command and as the 69th Commandant of Cadets at the United States Military Academy. He has commanded forces during Operations IRAQI FREEDOM, ENDURING FREEDOM (Afghanistan), SUPPORT HOPE (Zaire/Rwanda), JOINT ENDEAVOR (Bosnia-Herzegovina), and ASSURED RESPONSE (Liberia).

His military education includes the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Command and General Staff College, and the United States Army War College. He holds a Master's Degree in Administrative Education from the University of South Carolina.

His awards and decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, and the Army Meritorious Service Medal. He has earned the Combat Action Badge, Expert Infantryman Badge, Master Parachutist Badge, and Ranger Tab.

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL C. D. HANEY
COMMANDER
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
BEFORE THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
4 MARCH 2014

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to join you today. This is my first appearance before you as the Commander of United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and I appreciate the opportunity to testify about the importance of strategic deterrence in the 21st century and on how USSTRATCOM is responding to today's complex global security environment. Following my confirmation late last year, I reviewed USSTRATCOM's missions, priorities, and capabilities. I found an organization executing a diverse set of global responsibilities that directly contribute to national security, and I am pleased to report that today USSTRATCOM remains capable and ready to meet our assigned missions. We are blessed to have a talented, dedicated, and professional cadre of military and civilian men and women to address the significant national security challenges facing our nation. I thank Congress and this committee for your support and I look forward to working alongside you throughout my tour of duty.

USSTRATCOM carries responsibility for nine mission areas as assigned by the Unified Command Plan (UCP). These mission areas are critical to national security and strategic stability. The more significant challenge to sustaining excellence in these mission areas for the foreseeable future remains how we balance national priorities and fiscal realities given the outlook for future Department of Defense (DOD) budgets under current law spending constraints. This requires that we take a strategic approach to understanding and prioritizing near term and future threats in a systematic manner that ultimately involves balancing risks. My USSTRATCOM team and I are fully engaged in this work helping to not only execute missions and conduct detailed planning, but providing insight to inform our national decision making process regarding these critical strategic national security issues. Even in the current fiscal

environment, and given the complex strategic security environment, we must ensure the necessary strategic capabilities are adequately resourced.

GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The current security environment is more complex, dynamic and uncertain than at any time in recent history. Advances of significant nation state and non-state military capabilities continue across all air, sea, land, and space domains—as well as in cyberspace. This trend has the potential to adversely impact strategic stability. Nation states such as Russia and China are investing in long-term and wide-ranging military modernization programs to include extensive modernization of their strategic capabilities. Nuclear weapons ambitions and the proliferation of weapon and nuclear technologies continues, increasing risk that countries will resort to nuclear coercion in regional crises or nuclear use in future conflicts. A number of actors are improving their existing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capabilities while others are pursuing new capabilities along with the technologies to deliver deadly agents against targets of their choice. These include nations as well as non-state Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs).

While we have increased our own cyber capabilities, the worldwide cyber threat is growing in scale and sophistication, with an increasing number of state and non-state actors targeting U.S. networks on a daily basis. Due to cyberspace's relatively low cost of entry, cyber threats range from state-sponsored offensive military operations and espionage activities, to VEOs intent on disrupting our way of life, to cyber criminals and recreational hackers seeking financial gain and notoriety. Additionally, the U.S. supply chain and critical infrastructure remains vulnerable to cyber attack, and even as we detect and defeat attacks, attribution remains a significant challenge.

Developed nations rely heavily on space systems to enable a wide range of services which provide vital national, military, civil, scientific and economic benefits. The space domain is becoming ever more congested, contested and competitive but the number of space-faring nations continues to grow. The U.S. still retains a strategic advantage in space as other nations are investing significant resources—including developing counterspace capabilities—to counter that advantage. These threats will continue to grow over the next decade.

Finally, uncertainty continues to manifest in a number of other ways such as terrorist threats, social unrest and turmoil, and regional competition for scarce resources and economic opportunities.

PRINCIPLES OF OUR DETERRENT

In the broadest sense, **USSTRATCOM's mission is to deter and detect strategic attacks against the U.S. and our allies, and to defeat those attacks if deterrence fails.**

Strategic attacks are those which have decisive negative outcomes—and they are not all nuclear in nature. They may impact many people or systems, affect large physical areas, act across great distances, persist over long periods of time, disrupt economic and social systems, or change the status quo in a fundamental way. While nuclear attack will always remain unique in its potential for devastation, today's strategic attacks can occur through a variety of mechanisms across multiple domains and are defined by the magnitude of their effect versus a specific weapon or means of delivery. As a nation, we must continue our efforts toward deterring both nuclear and non-nuclear strategic threats to global security.

Although the likelihood of major conflict with other nuclear powers is remote today, the existential threat posed by a nuclear attack requires the U.S. to maintain a credible and capable deterrent force. While total deterrence against any particular adversary is never guaranteed, I am

confident in our ability to deter nuclear attack. Arms control treaties have and continue to reduce the likelihood of nuclear conflict with Russia, but the possibility of regional nuclear conflict strains U.S. alliances and global security commitments.

USSTRATCOM is taking appropriate steps to mitigate these strategic risks by actively executing a tailored deterrence and assurance campaign plan against specific strategic threats on a daily basis and by updating contingency plans that account for deterrence failure. Our campaign and contingency plans employ the breadth of USSTRATCOM capabilities in concert with other U.S. capabilities and the regional combatant commands.

Increased interdependence between organizations (to include other combatant commands, the interagency, and allies and partners) and across domains will be a hallmark of future military operations. Our military forces must exercise the ability to operate in degraded environments, and future conflicts are not likely to be limited to a single domain or by geographic boundaries. Our planning leverages robust integration with other combatant commands and applies the breadth of USSTRATCOM capabilities to pursue national objectives. Combatant commands, the whole of the U.S. government, and allies and partners will need to train, exercise and operate together using all the instruments of national power. This will require increased linkages and synergies at all levels to bring the appropriate integrated capabilities to bear through synchronized planning, simultaneous execution of plans, and coherent strategic communications. The Combatant Command Exercise and Engagement Fund supports USSTRATCOM's needs by addressing our joint training requirements and is integral to improving joint context and enabling capabilities that enrich our training environment. Adequate funding is essential to maintaining USSTRATCOM's ability to train, exercise and operate together.

USSTRATCOM MISSION & PRIORITIES

USSTRATCOM provides an array of global strategic capabilities to the Joint Force through its nine UCP assigned missions: **Strategic Deterrence; Space Operations; Cyberspace Operations; Joint Electronic Warfare; Global Strike; Missile Defense; Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance; Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction; and Analysis and Targeting**. These diverse missions are strategic in nature, global in scope, and intertwined with capabilities of the Joint Force, the interagency and the whole of government.

While executing our UCP missions, USSTRATCOM efforts are guided by my five overarching priorities. **My number one priority is to provide a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent force** as directed by the 2010 *Nuclear Posture Review* (NPR). It is my responsibility to ensure our nuclear deterrent force remains viable and credible now and as long as nuclear weapons exist.

Second, we will partner with other combatant commands to win today. Future conflicts are not likely to be limited by conventional constraints characteristic of 20th century warfare or by geographic boundaries; thus our planning leverages robust integration with other combatant commands and applies the breadth of USSTRATCOM capabilities to synchronize efforts in pursuit of national objectives. Toward this end, we are shifting from geography-based to adversary-based thinking and are reevaluating our planning assumptions to more accurately reflect the threats, our goals, partner capacity, and both adversary and ally military capabilities.

Third, we must continue to address challenges in space. The National Security Space Strategy identifies space as contested, congested and competitive. The space domain, along with cyberspace, is simultaneously more critical to all U.S. operations yet more vulnerable than ever to hostile actions. Today, the U.S. continues to hold an advantage in space. We must maintain

that advantage as we move deeper into the 21st century and other nations continue to invest heavily in offensive, defensive, and commercial space capabilities. Key to these efforts will be securing assured access to space and developing a robust situational awareness of the space environment across the dimensions of time, space, and spectrum.

Fourth, we must continue to build cyberspace capability and capacity. Cyberspace operations extensively support all of my other mission areas and there are significant negative impacts if that support becomes uncertain. Along with the need to protect U.S. critical infrastructure and intellectual property, information assurance is a critical facet of national power that underpins our ability to identify national security risks and to hold those threats in check. This means we must simultaneously strengthen our internal information security safeguards and protect against a maturing set of external cyber threats.

Finally, geopolitical and fiscal realities demand that we prepare for uncertainty. We need the right information in the right hands at the right time to make correct assessments and decisions. We are critically dependent on the Intelligence Community's (IC) foundational, data-based intelligence on adversary underground facilities, physical vulnerabilities, command and control, military force analysis, defense resources and infrastructure, and WMD facilities. We also rely on the IC's in-depth analysis of adversary national defense strategy doctrine and military leadership. Decision-making will also require predictive analysis to prioritize our activities along with flexible, agile, adaptable thinking and systems. Since predictive analysis of the future will never be error free, we must maintain adequate readiness to address uncertainty. We must align our posture to the threat while acknowledging that the threat itself will continue to evolve. Uncertainty also requires us to conduct a penetrating analysis of our capabilities and resources to clearly identify where we are taking risk and where we cannot accept further risk.

MISSION AREA CAPABILITIES & REQUIREMENTS

Prioritizing resources to meet our goals requires a thoughtful assessment of national priorities in the context of fiscal realities. Today's budget environment remains a concern as we look to sustain and modernize our military forces. We appreciate the passage of the two-year Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 and the 2014 omnibus appropriations, as they reduce near-term budget uncertainty.

Although these recent actions provide us with some relief, the sequestration-level reductions in FY 2013 have impacted our readiness and have the potential to impact our capabilities in the future. While our Service components realigned limited resources toward strategic missions to preserve our strategic deterrence capabilities in the short term, those same organizations took on significant additional risk in our ability to address long term requirements. Many procurement and research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) investment accounts have experienced delays and we anticipate future programmatic challenges as a result. At this point it is also difficult to fully discern the impact of sequestration in FY 2013 on our people, but the combined effects of a hiring freeze, furlough, and other force reduction measures continue to stress the human element of USSTRATCOM's capabilities.

Nuclear Deterrent Forces

America's nuclear deterrent force provides enduring value to the nation. It has been a constant thread in the geopolitical fabric of an uncertain world, providing a moderating influence on generations of world leaders. Today, our strategic nuclear capabilities—a synthesis of dedicated sensors, assured command and control, the triad of delivery systems, nuclear weapons and their associated infrastructure, and trained ready people—remain foundational to our national security apparatus. As stated in the 2010 NPR, "as long as nuclear weapons exist, the

United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal, both to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America's security commitments." We are working across the Department to implement the President's new guidance for aligning U.S. policies to the 21st century security environment. This includes revising Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff guidance as well as updating our own plans.

Although our nuclear arsenal is smaller than it has been since the late 1950s, today's nuclear weapon systems remain capable and will serve the U.S. well into their fourth decade. In recent years the percentage of spending on nuclear forces has gradually declined to only 2.5% of total DOD spending in 2013—a figure near historic lows.

Today's nuclear forces remain safe, secure and effective despite operating well beyond their original life expectancies. The nation faces a substantive, multi-decade recapitalization challenge, and we must continue investing resources toward that effort. Our planned investments are significant, but are commensurate with the magnitude of the national resource that is our strategic deterrent. If we do not commit to these investments, we risk degrading the deterrent and stabilizing effect of a strong and capable nuclear force. I fully support planned and future sensor improvements, upgrades for nuclear command, control and communications (NC3) capabilities, strategic delivery system recapitalization efforts, weapon life extension programs, stockpile surveillance activities, and nuclear complex infrastructure modernization. Together these efforts provide the necessary investments to ensure our triad of nuclear forces remains viable and credible.

Sensors. Our Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) network of sensors and processing facilities provides critical early warning and allows us to select the most

suitable course of action in rapidly developing situations. While the Defense Support Program (DSP) is approaching the end of its life, the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) program is on track to provide continued on-orbit capability. The survivable and endurable segments of these systems, along with Early Warning Radars, are being recapitalized and are vital to maintaining a credible deterrent. I fully support continued investment in this critical area.

Nuclear Command, Control and Communications. Assured and reliable NC3 is critical to the credibility of our nuclear deterrent. The aging NC3 system continues to meet its intended purpose, but risk to mission success is increasing. Our challenges include operating aging legacy systems and addressing risks associated with today's digital security environment. Many NC3 systems require modernization, but it is not enough to simply build a new version of the old system—rather; we must optimize the current architecture while leveraging new technologies so that our NC3 systems interoperate as the core of a broader, national command and control system. We are working to shift from point-to-point hardwired systems to a networked IP-based national C3 architecture that will balance survivability and durability against a diverse range of threats, deliver relevant capabilities across the range of interdependent national missions, and ultimately enhance Presidential decision time and space. Specific programs now in work include the Family of Beyond-line-of-sight Terminals (FAB-T), Presidential National Voice Conferencing (PNVC), the Multi-Role Tactical Common Data Link (MR-TCDL), Phoenix Air-to-Ground Communications Network (PAGCN), the E-4B Low Frequency communications upgrade, the B-2 Common Very Low Frequency Receiver communications upgrade, and the E-6B service life extension program.

Nuclear Triad. Per the 2010 NPR, “retaining all three Triad legs will best maintain strategic stability at reasonable cost, while hedging against potential technical problems or

vulnerabilities.” The commitment to the triad was reinforced in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Employment Planning guidance the President issued in June 2013. USSTRATCOM executes strategic deterrence and assurance operations with Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Ballistic Missile Submarines, and nuclear capable heavy bombers. Each element of the nuclear triad provides unique and complimentary attributes of strategic deterrence, and the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Our ICBM force promotes deterrence and stability by fielding a responsive and resilient capability that imposes costs and denies benefits to those who would threaten our security. Though fielded in 1970, the Minuteman III ICBM is sustainable through 2030 with smart modernization and recapitalization investments. USSTRATCOM continues to work with the Air Force on initiatives to modernize safety and security capabilities and to address age-related ground support system concerns such as Transporter-Erector vehicles and re-entry system test equipment. The Ground Based Strategic Deterrent Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) is studying a full range of ICBM concepts which will shape our land-based deterrent force well beyond 2030.

Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs). Recapitalizing our sea-based strategic deterrent force is my top modernization priority and I am committed to working closely with the Navy on this program. The Navy's SSBNs and Trident II D5 ballistic missiles constitute the Triad's most survivable leg and the assured response they provide underpins our nuclear deterrent. This stealthy and highly capable force is composed of two major elements, the missile and the delivery system. Both are undergoing needed modernization. With respect to the missile, we are extending the life of the D5 missile to be capable until after 2040. With respect to the submarine that delivers these missiles, the OHIO class submarine has already been extended from 30 to 42

years of service—no further extension is possible and these submarines will start leaving service in 2027. As such, the Ohio Replacement Program (ORP) must stay on schedule. No further delay is possible. Continued and stable funding for the Ohio Replacement SSBN also supports our commitment to the United Kingdom to provide a Common Missile Compartment design and will ensure both their and our new SSBNs achieve operational capability on schedule.

Heavy Bombers. While the nation relies on the long-range conventional strike capability of our heavy bombers, the nuclear capability of B-52 and B-2 bombers continues to provide us with flexibility, visibility and a rapid hedge against technical challenges in other legs of the Triad. Last March, for example, the U.S. carried out training flights of B-52 and B-2 bombers over the Korean Peninsula to assure partners and allies and underscore our security commitment to extended deterrence in the Asia-Pacific region. Maintaining an effective air-delivered standoff capability is vital to meet our strategic and extended deterrence commitments and to effectively conduct global strike operations in anti-access and area-denial (A2AD) environments. Planned sustainment and modernization activities, to include associated NC3, will ensure a credible nuclear bomber capability through 2040.

Looking forward, a new highly survivable penetrating bomber is required to credibly sustain our broad range of deterrence and strike options beyond the lifespan of today's platforms. The Long Range Standoff AoA was completed in 2012 and concluded that a follow-on nuclear cruise missile was necessary to replace the aging Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM).

Weapons and Infrastructure. Nuclear weapons and their supporting infrastructure underpin our nuclear triad. All warheads today are on average nearly 30 years old. Surveillance activities are essential to monitoring the health of our nuclear warheads. Life Extension Programs (LEPs) are key to sustaining our nuclear arsenal into the future, mitigating age-related

effects and incorporating improved safety and security features. Our robust science-based Stockpile Stewardship provides us confidence in sustaining our nuclear forces without a return to nuclear testing, which the United States halted in 1992.

The DOD and the Department of Energy (DOE) have worked together to develop a synchronized, multi-decade plan for a modern, safe, secure and effective nuclear stockpile. The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) approved what has been referred to as the “3+2” plan—so named because the long term result is three ballistic missile and two air-delivered warheads. This framework sustains a nuclear force that addresses both near term technical needs and future triad capability requirements. The W76-1 LEP is in progress to support the submarine leg of the triad. This is particularly important as the W76-1 represents the majority of our survivable deterrent force. The Air Force and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) continue to make progress on a full life extension for the B61 gravity bomb that includes both nuclear and non-nuclear components, critical to our strategic capabilities and extended deterrent commitments. Both LEPs are necessary to maintain confidence in the reliability, safety and intrinsic security of our nuclear weapons. Looking to the future, we continue to work with NNSA on the feasibility of an interoperable nuclear package for our ballistic missile warheads and options for sustaining our air-delivered standoff capabilities.

Sustaining and modernizing the nuclear enterprise’s infrastructure is crucial to our long term strategy. A new uranium facility at Y-12 in Oak Ridge, Tennessee will address deteriorating conditions in our Manhattan Project era facilities, while our interim plutonium strategy will meet stockpile requirements over the next decade as we explore long term production alternatives. Continued investment in the nuclear enterprise infrastructure is needed to provide critical capabilities that meet our stockpile requirements.

In the wake of recent unfortunate personnel incidents within the ICBM force involving integrity issues, I fully support the Secretary's initiative to assemble key stakeholders within the DOD to fully digest the implications and to seek long-term systemic solutions that will maintain trust and confidence in the nuclear enterprise. This has my utmost attention.

New START Implementation. USSTRATCOM continues to work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Services to effectively and efficiently implement the reductions called for in New START. Now more than three years old, New START has continued to contribute to the U.S.' insight into Russia's nuclear forces and has contributed to increased transparency and predictability between our two nations. Since the treaty's entry into force in 2011, the U.S. and Russia have each conducted over 54 inspections and have exchanged over 5,500 New START message notifications. To date, the U.S. has eliminated 39 B-52Gs and 50 Peacekeeper ICBM silos, thus removing them from accountability under New START. The U.S. also made substantial progress toward de-MIRVing MM III ICBMs on alert, thereby reducing the number of warheads in a deployed status. This year, we will finalize our preferred New START force structure and we are on track to achieve New START's limits of 1,550 deployed warheads, 700 deployed delivery systems, and 800 deployed and non-deployed delivery systems by February 2018.

Space Operations

Our national space capabilities provide us with the ability to globally navigate, communicate and observe natural and man-made events in areas where non-space sensors are either not available or not feasible. Space capabilities are also a key component of strategic deterrence. Our space sensors, command and control systems, and space situational awareness

capabilities are critical in supporting both our deployed nuclear forces and our national decision making processes.

As highlighted in the President's 2010 National Space Policy, these capabilities "allow people and governments around the world to see with clarity, communicate with certainty, navigate with accuracy and operate with assurance." Determined adversaries who understand the military and economic advantages provided by space, along with an expanding debris population on orbit, increase the challenges of operating in this critical domain. Space continues to be increasingly congested, contested and competitive. The National Security Space Strategy offers a set of approaches to mitigating those characteristics: partnering with responsible nations, international organizations and commercial firms to promote responsible, peaceful and safe use of space; maximizing the advantages provided by improved space capabilities while reducing vulnerabilities; and preventing, deterring, defeating and operating through attacks on our space capabilities.

Key to all of these efforts is sufficient Space Situational Awareness (SSA)—the data that allows us to understand what is on orbit, where it is, and how it is being used. Our goal is to ensure space remains an open domain for all legitimate users. Sharing SSA information with other nations and commercial firms promotes safe and responsible space operations, reduces the potential for debris-making collisions, builds international confidence in U.S. space systems, fosters U.S. space leadership, and improves our own SSA through knowledge of other owner/operator satellite positional data.

For all its advantages, there is concern that SSA data sharing might aid potential adversaries, therefore we are taking positive steps to ensure that does not occur. In accordance with U.S. law, USSTRATCOM has negotiated SSA Sharing Agreements with 41 commercial

entities and five nations (France, Italy, Japan, Australia, and Canada) and is in the process of negotiating agreements with five additional nations (Germany, Great Britain, Israel, South Korea, and Brazil). Through these sharing agreements, USSTRATCOM assists partners with activities such as launch support; maneuver planning; support for on-orbit anomaly resolution, electromagnetic interference reporting and investigation; support for launch anomalies and de-commissioning activities; and on-orbit conjunction assessments.

USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC-Space), located at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, leads the efforts to ensure continuous and integrated space operations and routinely track tens of thousands of space objects in orbit around the Earth. This includes over 1,100 active satellites owned and operated by approximately 74 nations and government consortia, plus hundreds of small commercial and academic satellites.

We must sustain judicious and stable investments to preserve the advantages we hold in this dynamic and increasingly complex environment while continuing to seek out innovative and cooperative solutions with allies and partners to ensure the products and services we derive from operating from space remain available, even when threatened by natural events or the actions of a determined adversary. These include both active and passive protection measures for individual systems and constellations and a critical examination of the architectural path we will follow to ensure resilience and affordability in space. We are exploring options such as disaggregation as a method to achieve affordable resilience but additional analysis is necessary in this area.

Cyberspace Operations

Today, we conduct our UCP assigned cyberspace missions through our assigned sub-unified command, US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) located at Ft. Meade, Maryland. I have delegated the authority to USCYBERCOM to conduct the day-to-day business of directing

DOD information network operations and defense, planning against cyber threats, coordinating with other combatant commands and appropriate U.S. government agencies, providing military representation for cyber matters, planning and executing operational preparation of the environment, and executing cyber operations as directed. USSTRATCOM retains authority for oversight of advocacy and theater security cooperation.

This alignment allows USSTRATCOM to manage the integration of all our capabilities to deter or defeat attacks in multiple scenarios while taking full account of the interdependencies and interactions among combatant commands and across the air, sea, land, and space domains, and in cyberspace—all tied together through the electromagnetic spectrum.

USSTRATCOM, through USCYBERCOM, is working with Joint Staff and the DOD Chief Information Officer (DOD CIO) to implement the Joint Information Environment framework (JIE). The JIE provides a foundational framework to enable improvements in our ability to see and defend the DoD Information Network. Furthermore, the JIE framework is intended to enable timely and secure information sharing in the joint environment, improving warfighters ability to access critical data and information for mission command. Alignment of the JIE with the equivalent IC information technology enterprise is a key component required to achieve this goal.

Our primary obstacles to cyberspace operations within DOD are issues of capacity and capability. None of these activities can occur without a right-sized and well-trained cadre of cyber professionals. The Cyber Mission Force (CMF) construct will address the significant challenges of recruiting, training, and retaining the people, facilities and equipment necessary to generate the human capital required for successful cyberspace operations. Our plans call for the creation of 133 cyber mission teams manned by over 6,000 highly trained personnel by the end

of FY16. To date, 17 of those teams are fielded and engaged in a variety of missions. The majority of these teams will support the combatant commands with the remainder supporting national missions. Budget stability is the key to achieving this vision, as every training day we lose to fiscal constraints will cause further delays in fielding the CMF.

Missile Defense

I believe that effective missile defense is an essential element of the U.S. commitment to strengthen strategic and regional deterrence against states of concern—continued investments in this area are essential to national defense. Today, 30 operational Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) protect the U.S. against a limited ICBM attack from potential regional threats such as North Korea. In March of 2013, Secretary Hagel announced the decision to add 14 GBIs in Alaska and a second Army/Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance-2 (AN/TPY-2) radar in Japan, study a potential third CONUS GBI site, and restructure the SM-3 IIB interceptor into a common kill vehicle technology effort. These decisions will hedge against a growing North Korean threat, add additional sensor capability to improve coverage, introduce needed Exo-atmosphere Kill Vehicle (EKV) improvements, and will facilitate quickly adding a third CONUS GBI site if needed. We continue to examine new threats and consider alternative ways and means for a future architecture to improve sensors and discrimination for greater Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) effectiveness.

USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD) is located in Colorado Springs, Colorado and continues to conduct a variety of activities aimed at maturing our missile defense capabilities. First, they are working to operationalize developmental missile defense capabilities in coordination with other combatant commands and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). These efforts serve to integrate sensors across mission domains and geographical areas, synchronize and manage the availability of

missile defense assets, and hedge against the possibility of threats developing faster than originally anticipated. Second, they are working to develop and implement joint training to enable integration and synchronization with other combatant commands, and host and orchestrate international missile defense wargaming scenarios. These efforts identify and recommend sourcing solutions to ensure appropriate forces are employed; synchronize global missile defense planning at all levels to ensure unity of effort across our geographically distributed network of sensors and shooters, across multiple organizations, and across multiple domains; and collaborate with key allies and partners. Finally, they are integrating warfighters into missile defense testing and evaluation.

The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) protecting our NATO allies is on schedule with Phase I becoming operational in Dec 2011 using a command and control node, a forward-based AN/TY-2 radar and Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) ships. Phase II is on track for completion in 2015 and will add an Aegis Ashore system in Romania, SM-3 IB interceptors, and additional Aegis BMD ships. Phase III planned for 2018 will add an Aegis Ashore in Poland and a more capable SM-3 IIA interceptor both on land and at sea. Steady progress was made in 2013 as we continued development and testing of Aegis BMD software, construction of Aegis Ashore test and operational facilities, SM-3 Block IIA system design, and successful SM-3 operational and developmental flight tests.

The Cobra Dane radar located at Eareckson AFS, Alaska is critical to homeland defense and must be sustained. This unique asset provides unmatched coverage against long range threats from northeast Asia as well as helping to catalogue many thousands of space objects. Cobra Dane is an aging system and requires continued investment. Additionally, the deployment

of an operational THAAD missile defense system to Guam provides vital protection against North Korean provocations toward one of our key Territories.

Global Strike

USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command for Global Strike (JFCC-GS) operates from Offutt AFB, Nebraska with headquarters at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. JFCC-GS provides a unique ability to command and control our global strike capabilities and build plans that rapidly integrate into theater operations. This includes integration of combat capability including those associated with kinetic and non-kinetic effects. The following key capabilities are integral to supporting my Global Strike mission.

USSTRATCOM's Joint Warfare and Analysis Center (JWAC) in Dahlgren, Virginia enhances our Strategic Deterrence and Global Strike missions by providing unique and valuable insight into selected adversary networks. JWAC's ability to solve complex challenges for our nation's warfighters—using a combination of social and physical science techniques and engineering expertise—is invaluable to protecting the nation and helping the Joint Force accomplish its missions.

Our Mission Planning and Analysis System (MPAS) is the nation's only comprehensive planning system for developing nuclear options. MPAS supports my responsibilities for Strategic Deterrence and Global Strike through the development of nuclear options for the President, as well as holding time-sensitive targets at risk through crisis action planning. Continued modernization of MPAS is essential to our ability to conduct global strike operations.

Conventional prompt strike (CPS) capability offers the opportunity to rapidly engage high-value targets without resorting to nuclear options. CPS could provide precision and responsiveness in A2AD environments while simultaneously minimizing unintended military,

political, environmental, economic or cultural consequences. I support continuing research and development of these important capabilities.

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)

A WMD-armed terrorist is one of the greatest potential threats we face today, and no region of the world is immune from potential chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear risks. USSTRATCOM is DOD's global synchronizer for CWMD planning efforts, leveraging the expertise resident in our Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (SCC-WMD) and our partners at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)—both located at Ft. Belvoir, Virginia. Together, our organizations conduct real-world and exercise CWMD activities with the other combatant commands to identify, prioritize, and mitigate WMD risks posed by proliferation of WMD technology and expertise to nation states and non-state actors. We have been successful so far, but given the magnitude of the WMD threat, we can ill afford to short-change these efforts.

The Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination (SJFHQ-E) was certified for initial operating capability in September 2012. SJFHQ-E provides a full time, trained joint command and control element that can quickly integrate into strategic- to operational-level headquarters to provide WMD elimination planning, intelligence, and operational expertise for a Joint Force Commander. Additionally, the SJFHQ-E recently completed its relocation from Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD to Ft Belvoir, VA to better leverage DTRA's expertise and manpower.

USSTRATCOM has and continues to support United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), United States European Command (USEUCOM) and DTRA as part of the international effort to eliminate Syria's chemical weapons program. Our personnel are providing

direct support to USEUCOM in preparation for the removal and destruction of chemical materials from Syria and will remain engaged until elimination of Syria's program is complete.

Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance (ISR)

The demand for ISR will always outpace our ability to fully satisfy all requirements. At the same time, we are focused on the goal of reducing the "cost of doing business" as articulated in *Sustaining U. S. Global Leadership Priorities for 21st Century Defense*. Located at Bolling AFB, Maryland, USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command for ISR (JFCC-ISR) is working with our headquarters, the Joint Staff, the Services, the combatant commands and the IC to improve the management of the DOD's existing ISR capabilities. I fully support this initiative which focuses on maximizing effectiveness of the capabilities we have, while minimizing duplication of effort between DOD and the IC.

Joint Electronic Warfare

Given the importance and need of Joint Electronic Warfare, USSTRATCOM, in collaboration with the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, continues to drive the development of comprehensive Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO) policy and doctrine that consolidates the activities of Electronic Warfare (EW) and Spectrum Management. The National Military Strategic Plan for EW (NMSP-EW) was approved in late 2013, providing a framework for EW operations, articulating threats and vulnerabilities, and clarifying risks and strategic imperatives for electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) control. The joint architecture plan for Electromagnetic Battle Management (EMBM) is currently under development—the preliminary work done so far will identify applicable architectures in order to better refine requirements.

USSTRATCOM assesses systems to determine vulnerabilities to jamming, orchestrates events to evaluate the ability to detect jamming and operate in such an environment, coordinates

with the combatant commands to determine impacts to plan execution, and sponsors initiatives to combat jamming and generate requirements. These assessments and initiatives greatly improve the DOD's understanding and mitigation of JEMSO capability gaps and vulnerabilities.

We seek to use the EMS more efficiently by investing in time and technology sharing and fully investigating spectrum re-use opportunities. There are a number of ongoing spectrum reallocation efforts with potential adverse impacts to DOD operations. We will continue to work closely with DOD CIO, Joint Staff, and National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to ensure warfighter requirements are adequately considered prior to any decision.

Command and Control (C2) Facility

In 2012, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) broke ground on a C2 Facility for USSTRATCOM. This project will replace a C2 Facility that is over 57 years old, plagued with numerous heating, cooling, and power infrastructure deficiencies and will provide the necessary information technology infrastructure to support USSTRATCOM in the digital age. The construction team is working hard to keep the project on schedule, to ensure that we are optimizing resources, and to create an infrastructure that has a lower cost of ownership than our current facility. When complete, the new C2 Facility will play an effective and integral part of our strategic deterrent as well as USSTRATCOM's other assigned missions for decades to come. I appreciate the steadfast support that Congress continues to provide for this effort.

OUR PEOPLE

People remain our most precious resource and deserve our most robust support. The critical bonds of trust, teamwork and professionalism unite the USSTRATCOM family. Last year we created a Resilience Coordination Office, an effort that has been noted as a potential

benchmark program for the DOD. Resilience coordinators provide training, information, resources and other tools to present healthy behavior options in response to life stressors. Sexual assault, workplace violence, breaches of integrity, alcohol abuse and associated behaviors have my strongest personal condemnation, and my entire staff understands my expectation to report and denounce inappropriate behavior whenever and wherever it occurs.

My travels to a number of USSTRATCOM and partner locations since I took command in November 2013 confirm my belief that we have an outstanding team in place across all our mission areas. I am proud to serve alongside the men and women of USSTRATCOM and have the utmost respect for their professionalism, dedication to our missions and sustained operational excellence even through difficult times. These great Americans will do all they can for their nation, but are rightly concerned about their futures given last year's furloughs and planned manpower reductions over the next several years. These reductions are not inconsequential—we believe we can achieve the Department's goals but not without a commensurate loss of organizational agility and responsiveness.

CONCLUSION

We are experiencing dynamic changes within the DOD as we transition toward a different force posture and a reduced defense budget. In spite of this environment, our UCP missions remain unchanged as we partner with our fellow combatant commands to deter adversaries, assure allies, protect critical infrastructure, preserve freedom of movement, and respond to crises.

In today's uncertain times, I am proud to lead such a focused, innovative and professional group dedicated to delivering critical warfighting capabilities to the nation. We are building our future on a strong and successful past, and your support, together with the hard work of the

outstanding men and women of the United States Strategic Command, will ensure that we remain ready, agile and effective in deterring strategic attack, assuring our allies, and defeating current and future threats.



United States Navy
Biography

Admiral Cecil D. Haney
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command

Adm. Haney, a native of Washington, D.C., is a 1978 graduate of the United States Naval Academy.

His career as a submariner includes assignments in USS John C. Calhoun (SSBN 630), USS Frank Cable (AS 40), USS Hyman G. Rickover (SSN 709), USS Asheville (SSN 758), and Submarine Squadron 8, culminating in command of USS Honolulu (SSN 718).

Subsequent fleet command assignments include Submarine Squadron One from June 2002 to July 2004, and Submarine Group Two from October 2006 to March 2008.

Haney's shore duty tours include administrative assistant for enlisted affairs at Naval Reactors; congressional appropriations liaison officer for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); Deputy Chief of Staff of Plans, Policies and Requirements, U.S. Pacific Fleet (N5N8); Director, Submarine Warfare Division (N87); Director, Naval Warfare Integration Group (N00X); Deputy Commander, U.S. Strategic Command and Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet.



Haney holds master's degrees in Engineering Acoustics and System Technology from the Naval Post Graduate School, and a master's degree in National Security Strategy from the National Defense University.

Haney's decorations include the Navy Distinguished Service Medal (two awards), Defense Superior Service Medal (two awards), Legion of Merit (four awards), Navy Commendation Medal (three awards), Navy Achievement Medal (two awards), and various campaign and unit awards. In addition, he was the 1998 Vice Admiral James Bond Stockdale Leadership Award recipient.

Updated: 19 November 2013

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

APRIL 2, 2014

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

Mr. LANGEVIN. There are various efforts in the Department, namely Air Force, Army, and DARPA, to provide rapid low cost launch solutions. How would this type of launch capability be a benefit to the warfighter, and in light of China's advances in counterspace, how important is it that we prioritize these efforts?

Admiral HANEY. Rapid low cost launch solutions could enable the warfighter to add, maintain or replenish capability should the need arise. Rapid launch may also help supply short-term niche space-based products and services in support of specific operational needs that may be beyond the scope or timeline of on-going programs. The current level of development priority for these capabilities is appropriate. While rapid launch will likely be a contributor in supporting response options to threats to our space systems, it is premature to determine if this path will provide our sole or most significant contribution.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER

Mr. COOPER. What would it take to fully implement the nuclear deterrent modernization plan laid out in FY14? Please provide any available analysis or charts showing what would be required to fully execute this plan.

Admiral HANEY. The FY2015 Section 1043 Report (10 USC, Sec 495) is in final development for submission to the President and forwarding to Congress. The report outlines the plans and resource requirements to ensure the U.S. continues to meet its strategic deterrence objectives and extended deterrence commitments to our allies and partners. These resource requirements are reflected in the President's FY2015 Budget submission. The total estimated budget requirement for Fiscal Years 2015 through 2019 is nearly \$125B—\$45.6B for the DOE, NNSA; \$61.2B for the DOD nuclear weapons delivery systems capability sustainment; and \$17.9B for the DOD nuclear command and control capability sustainment.

Mr. COOPER. The Defense Science Board in a recent report, "Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technologies," concluded that monitoring for nuclear proliferation should be a top national security objective, but one for which "the nation is not yet organized or fully equipped to address." Do you agree? Why is verification important for strategic stability?

Admiral HANEY. I agree monitoring for nuclear proliferation should be a top national priority. Monitoring and verification are important components in our strategy to reduce nuclear threats to United States' vital interests. As the report points out, today's complex security environment presents new and evolving challenges in the early identification of clandestine nuclear weapon programs. New technologies and approaches are required as part of a comprehensive strategy to mitigate these threats. Many of these same technologies are also necessary to enhance verification of compliance of current and future arms control agreements that seek to reduce nuclear stockpiles as well as delivery systems.

Mr. COOPER. Why is Russia concerned about U.S. missile defense and conventional prompt global strike efforts? How is this affecting their nuclear deterrent force posture and doctrine?

Admiral HANEY. Despite the fact the U.S. continues to assure Russia that European BMD is not sized, positioned, nor capable of offsetting Russian ICBMs, the Russians continue to publicly oppose U.S. missile defense in Europe, stating they believe these interceptors to be a threat to their nuclear strategic deterrent. Publicly, Russia has expressed concerns about the survivability of its future nuclear deterrent in the face of U.S. and allied ballistic missile defenses and conventional strategic arms. Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov may have best summarized these Russian concerns when he spoke at an October 2007 NATO-Russia Council Meeting:

"...Global missile defense cannot be discussed apart from strategic offensive weapons. The undeniable link between U.S. missile defense and its strategic offensive weapons is axiomatic. Taken together they become a strategic complex capable of delivering a "disarming first strike" ... Furthermore, we see a direct

link between U.S. plans for global missile defense and the prompt global strike concept which means the ability to strike any point on the globe within an hour of the relevant decision. This concept, when combined with global missile defense, becomes a means for world domination, politically and strategically. This is a rather serious factor which undermines the principles of mutual deterrence and mutual security and erodes the architecture of strategic stability . . .”

From our perspective, their concern is unwarranted as the planned number of interceptors is insignificant compared to the total number of ballistic missiles they have available.

The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review states that, “While the GMD system would be employed to defend the United States against limited missile launches from any source, it does not have the capacity to cope with large scale Russian or Chinese missile attacks, and is not intended to affect the strategic balance with those countries.” We continue to follow this policy in our acquisition and procurement decisions.

We continue to monitor Russia’s upward trajectory to modernize its nuclear triad by 2021 that interestingly includes its own precision-guided weapons development program as well as the fielding of missile defense systems. The last two Russian strategic nuclear forces exercises have included media coverage of precision guided cruise missile strikes as well as launches of anti-ballistic missiles in response to an incoming ICBM strike. Russia’s nuclear forces are undergoing a substantial modernization in the face of this new generation of missile defense capabilities. During the most recent Russian nuclear forces exercise (8 May 2014), Russian Defense Minister Shoygu informed President Putin that new ICBMs and SLBMs were entering the active force in large numbers. Shoygu also noted that the new Yars Intercontinental Ballistic Missile and the Bulava Sea Launched Ballistic Missile systems that were being put in service contained, among other improvements, enhanced capabilities to overcome missile-defense systems.

Mr. COOPER. What is STRATCOM’s advice on avoiding an arms race with Russia? What is the value of verifiable nuclear weapons reductions?

Admiral HANEY. An arms race is not in our mutual interests. Therefore, as outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review, the U.S. should continue talks and cooperation with Russia on strategic stability issues to enhance confidence, improve transparency, and reduce mistrust. Verifiable strategic nuclear arms reductions under the New START Treaty support these goals reducing the potential for misperception that could lead to unhealthy nuclear competition.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO

Ms. BORDALLO. The United States Government signed agreements with the Republic of Korea to relocate United States military forces from Seoul and other bases to Camp Humphreys. While the majority of the relocation costs are being paid by the Republic of Korea, the Department of the Army is solely responsible for ensuring that adequate family housing meeting applicable U.S. standards is available, both on-post and off-post. I am concerned about the impact that a lack of adequate housing may have on the relocation effort.

A. Can you please briefly provide an update on the status of the relocation?

B. In addition, can you please provide an update on your requirement regarding the percentage and number of military families that need to be housed on Camp Humphreys and a discussion for when you need to have family housing available for the relocation to stay on schedule?

C. Do you see any viable short-term solutions to any assessed lack of adequate housing?

D. Can you elaborate on the anti-terrorism and force protection measures that will be implemented to ensure the safety of the large number of military members and their families stationed in Korea?

General SCAPARROTTI. A: The Yongsan Relocation Plan and Land Partnership Plan relocation to U.S. Army Garrison (USAG) Humphreys remain on schedule to meet U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) objectives. B: USFK requires an additional 425 family housing units by mid-2016 for 40% of the command sponsored families at USAG Humphreys. C: The Department of the Army is working to find housing solutions to meet our operational requirements in Korea. D: Currently, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) terrorism threat level in the Republic of Korea (ROK) is “Moderate,” and the overall criminal threat within the ROK is “Low.” USFK military housing offices work closely with local realtors to provide safe, high quality housing for military members. Although the Unified Facilities Criteria anti-terrorism standards do not apply to private off-post housing (in Korea or the United States), our

housing offices provide information sheets on features to look for to enhance force protection when selecting a rental unit.

Additionally, ROK government agencies have very effective surveillance and counter-intelligence systems to identify individuals with possible ties to terrorist organizations or activities and swiftly take action to prevent incidents. The Command works closely with these ROK agencies to identify and mitigate any potential threats against USFK installations and personnel.

