

**TIANANMEN AT 25: ENDURING INFLUENCE ON  
U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS AND CHINA'S POLITICAL  
DEVELOPMENT**

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**HEARING**  
BEFORE THE  
**CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE  
COMMISSION ON CHINA**  
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS  
SECOND SESSION

MAY 20, 2014

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**TIANANMEN AT 25: ENDURING INFLUENCE  
ON U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS AND CHINA'S PO-  
LITICAL DEVELOPMENT**

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**FRIDAY, MAY 20, 2014**

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE  
COMMISSION ON CHINA,  
*Washington, DC.*

The hearing was convened, pursuant to notice, at 3:36 p.m., in room 562 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Sherrod Brown, Chairman, presiding.

Present: Representative Christopher Smith, Cochairman; and Representatives Tim Walz and Mark Meadows.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SHERROD BROWN, A U.S. SEN-  
ATOR FROM OHIO; CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECU-  
TIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA**

Chairman BROWN. The China Commission will come to order.

Thank you for joining us, Congressman Walz, and especially Co-chair Congressman Smith from New Jersey. Nice to see you. Ambassador Roy, Ambassador Lord, we particularly welcome you. There will be a second panel also.

I'll make a brief opening statement and then turn it over to Congressman Smith and Congressman Walz, then we'll hear from the witnesses.

We remember an event that occurred 25 years ago next month but continues to resonate in so many ways. Millions of people across China, not just in Beijing's Tiananmen Square, rallied in support of democracy and human rights and an end to corruption.

Like many Americans of the time, I was inspired and moved by the courage in their pursuit of those fundamental freedoms, freedoms that we hold dear universally—internationally recognized rights—freedoms and rights that we sometimes take for granted.

I recall the optimism of the moment, how it was crushed when troops and tanks rolled in. Today we assess what the last 25 years have meant and what our policies should be toward China. In my view, opportunities were missed after Tiananmen.

We missed an opportunity to integrate China into the global community while ensuring that our economic interests were protected and that China moved in the right direction on political reform not, of course, an easy task to be sure, but 25 years later China is still a fundamentally undemocratic country, one that stubbornly refuses to play by international rules of law.

In many respects, China reaped the benefits of open trade with the rest of the world while avoiding many of its obligations. In China, 800 million people still don't enjoy the basic right to vote. Chinese citizens, including those who in recent weeks have bravely tried to commemorate those events of a quarter century ago, are in prison simply for peacefully exercising their right to free speech, to assembly, to religion. These include human rights lawyers Pu Zhiqiang and Hu Shigen.

A generation of people inside and outside China knows little about the events that transpired back then, other than the government's official line. Emboldened by growing economic clout that we in many ways supported, Chinese Communist leaders are sowing instability through alarming and increasingly risky attempts to exert territorial claims in the region.

Just yesterday we were reminded of the lengths China will go to gain an unfair advantage for its state-owned enterprises and industries. Our Department of Justice charged five members of China's People's Liberation Army with hacking into computer networks of the United Steelworkers Union and major U.S. companies like U.S. Steel, ALCOA, and Allegheny Technologies.

This, we think, is just the tip of the iceberg. In 1989, our trade deficit with China stood at \$6 billion. The trade deficit has grown by a multiple of 50, to \$318 billion, the highest ever. That trade deficit and China's currency manipulation have cost Americans millions of jobs, and has had a major impact on our trade deficit.

In the end, we compromised too much and bought into the myth that China's economic integration after Tiananmen would inevitably bring about human rights and respect for international law. Congressman Smith has talked about this for the 20 years that I have known him. That is not what happened.

The question now is, how do we fashion a better policy toward China? Through this commission we have tried to honor the memory of Tiananmen Square by making sure China's human rights and rule of law are not forgotten in our discussions over China.

Over the past year we have highlighted many concerns: Cyber theft, threats to democracy in Hong Kong, illegal and unfair trade practices, denial of visas to foreign journalists, food safety, environment and public health concerns, and a crackdown on human rights activists, including advocates for the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, in that part of China.

In the Senate, I have pushed a bipartisan bill on currency manipulation which has passed the Senate overwhelmingly. It is my hope that we have an open and transparent debate about China policy, whether it be on trade agreements that relate to China or in growing Chinese foreign investments in this country. Our debate should give proper weight to—rather than ignore our concerns over—human rights, the rule of law, labor, public health, and the environment.

Above all, the debate must include all segments of our society, from our workers in small businesses to non-governmental organizations and human rights groups instead of just being led by powerful interest groups such as large corporations, some of which themselves have a checkered history in China.

Only in doing so and continuing to work for improvements in China's human rights and rule of law record that we can faithfully honor the memory of Tiananmen Square and ensure that the sacrifices were not made in vain.

Chairman Smith?

**STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER SMITH, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY; COCHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA**

Representative SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, most importantly for calling this vitally important hearing and for inviting such distinguished witnesses as we will hear from momentarily on both panels, but including two highly distinguished diplomats who tried to ameliorate the abuses that were occurring in the lead-up to, and then during, Tiananmen Square, and for their work using every diplomatic means available to them to promote democracy and freedom and trade that was principled, free, and fair.

I want to thank them for their extraordinary service to our country and to the Chinese people as well who benefited from your stewardship as diplomat and Ambassador to the People's Republic of China. Thank you very much, both of you.

Twenty-five years ago, the world watched as millions of Chinese gathered all across China to peacefully demand political reform and democratic openness. The hopes and promises of those heady days ended with wanton violence, tears, bloodshed, arrests, and exile. We must continue to honor the sacrifices endured by the pro-democracy movement, by advocates for independent labor unions, and those demanding fundamental human rights for all Chinese.

Mothers lost sons, fathers lost daughters, and China lost an idealistic generation to the tanks that rolled down Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989. Tiananmen Square has come to symbolize the brutal length the Chinese Communist Party will go to remain in power. We remember Tiananmen annually here in Congress because of its enduring impact on U.S.-China relations.

We remember it also because an unknown number of people died, were arrested, and exiled for simply seeking universally recognized freedoms. We will continue to remember Tiananmen until the Chinese people are free to discuss openly the tragic events of June 3-4, 1989, without censorship, harassment, or arrest.

We in Congress remain committed to the people of China struggling peacefully for human rights and the rule of law. The prospects for greater civil and political rights in China seems as remote today as it did the day after the tanks rolled through the square.

In 1989, the Chinese Government used guns and tanks to suppress the people's demands for freedom and transparency. In 2014, they use arrests, discrimination, torture, and censorship to discourage those who seek basic freedoms and human rights. The names may change, but the ends remain the same: Crush dissent at all costs because it challenges the authority of the Communist Party.

This has been one of the worst years in recent memory for the suppression of human rights activists in civil society. Xi Jinping's tenure as president, which started with so much promise of a new beginning, has proven that the old tactics of repression will be used

liberally against dissent. Top Communist Party officials regularly unleash bellicose statements on universal values and Western ideals.

In the past year, over 220 people have been detained for their defense of human rights. The more things change in China the more they stay the same. While the hopes of Tiananmen Square demonstrators may have not been realized, their demands for freedom of speech, basic human rights, political reforms, and the end of government abuse and corruption continue to inspire the Chinese people today. These are universal desires not limited by culture, language, or by history.

There is an impressive and inspiring drive in Chinese society to keep fighting for freedom under very difficult and dangerous conditions. This drive is the most important asset in promoting human rights and democratization in the country. If democratic change comes to China it will come from within, not because of outside pressure, although that pressure is needed.

U.S. policy, both short- and long-term, must be and must be seen to be supportive of advocates for peaceful change, supportive of the champions of liberty and civil society in China seeking to promote human rights and freedoms for everyone, not only to pad the economic bottom line.

Our strategic and moral interests coincide when we seek to promote human rights and democratic openness in China. A more democratic China, one that respects human rights and is governed by the rule of law is more likely to be a productive and peaceful partner rather than a strategic and hostile competitor.

This future should also be in China's interests because the most prosperous and stable societies are those that protect religious freedom, freedom of speech, and the rule of law. We in Congress remain committed to the people of China struggling for universal freedoms.

There is no partisan divide on this, to move the Chinese Government away from the past and embrace the greater openness, democracy, and respect for human rights that its people called for 25 years ago and continue to call for today.

Mr. Chairman, I do regret that I have a bill on the floor of the House probably in 10 minutes called International Megan's Law, but I will read the transcript and, of course, the submissions by our distinguished witnesses.

I thank you again for calling this very timely and important hearing.

Chairman BROWN. Thank you very much for your comments and your service.

Congressman Walz?

**STATEMENT OF HON. TIM WALZ, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM MINNESOTA; RANKING MEMBER, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA**

Representative WALZ. Thank you, Chairman. Thanks to my colleague, Mr. Smith, for his longstanding support of human rights around the globe. I, too, am thankful for our witnesses on both panels. It's a great opportunity for us to hear. I would echo both

my colleagues' statements that this is an important conversation to have.

I'm looking at the title of this, "Tiananmen at 25: the Enduring Influence on U.S.-China Relations on China's Political Development." I think that may be true to a certain level, but I'm also very cognizant there's an entire generation of Americans who don't understand what happened there, they don't understand what the impact of it was.

I think many of them, once they knew, would stand proudly with those fighters of human rights. I think for all of us if we do not commemorate and we do not remember those who were willing to risk all, it puts all of us at risk of history forgetting the lessons that were there. For me, it certainly had enduring influence on me. As a young man I was just going to teach high school in Foshan in Guangdong province and was in Hong Kong in May 1989. As the events were unfolding, several of us went in. I still remember the train station in Hong Kong.

There was a large number of people—especially Europeans, I think—very angry that we would still go after what had happened. But it was my belief at that time that the diplomacy was going to happen on many levels, certainly people to people, and the opportunity to be in a Chinese high school at that critical time seemed to me to be really important.

It was a very interesting summer to say the least, because if you recall as we moved in that summer and further on, and the news blackouts and things that went on, you certainly can't black out news from people if they want to get it. I can still clearly remember when the Berlin Wall fell and what was happening. So I think it's important to put it in historical context of what was happening.

For me, the conversations were fascinating. It was interesting to watch many of those Chinese who so recently had come through the Cultural Revolution, express concerns about what would happen if you upset the fruit basket, if you will, type of thing. I think it's important for many to understand here why maybe there wasn't a broader societal response to what had happened.

The lesson to me, though, was when you watch these things happen you can justify and make up in your mind any reason possible that you didn't stand up or that something didn't happen or that no one remembered. So, as being part of this commission, I take the charge very seriously, both looking at the human rights records, looking at all those things, but clearly understanding the human rights and the friendships and the people that I know. It's critical to get this right. It's critical for us to understand and it's certainly critical for us as Americans to do soul-searching of our own.

No one is under the belief that we have reached that perfect union. It's toward a more perfect union, but I think as we watch and as this commemoration comes forward, I think it's critically important globally that we mark this in the right tone, we listen to the experts who were there before and after, the witnesses who were there, and then understand what the implications of this are because I think many of us, as you know, for many people it would just be convenient to just pretend it didn't happen, just pretend we moved on, just pretend for all involved. But that's not what we can

do. That's not what the memory of those people that stood there deserve. So I, for one, am again thankful for this commission, thankful for the folks who are standing here, and look forward to the testimony.

I yield back.

Chairman BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Walz.

We are joined by Congressman Meadows from North Carolina, too. Thank you.

Welcome to the two witnesses. Ambassador Stapleton Roy was born in Nanjing and went on to a career in the Foreign Service, spanning some 45 years. He was Ambassador to the People's Republic of China from 1991 to 1995, and also served our country as Ambassador to Singapore and Indonesia. He participated in the secret negotiations to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. Ambassador Roy is at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars here in Washington.

Ambassador Winston Lord's career in U.S.-China relations has spanned the last four decades. In the 1970s, he accompanied Henry Kissinger and Presidents Nixon and Ford on all nine of their trips to China. He served as Ambassador to China under Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush. He was Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs under President Clinton. Ambassador Lord has served as President of the Council on Foreign Relations. He is currently the Chairman Emeritus at the International Rescue Committee.

We will begin with five-minute opening statements from Ambassador Roy, thank you, and from Ambassador Lord.

**STATEMENT OF HON. STAPLETON ROY, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1991-1995**

Ambassador ROY. Mr. Chairman, distinguished commissioners, I am honored to have this opportunity to appear before this commission to discuss my experience as U.S. Ambassador in China in the aftermath of Tiananmen, the impact of that event on U.S.-China relations, and my views on the best way to pursue human rights diplomacy with China.

It is a pleasure for me to appear before this commission with my friend and colleague, former U.S. Ambassador to China Winston Lord.

My views on the human rights situation in China in the period after Tiananmen are contained in the human rights reports which the Embassy submitted annually to Washington. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State responsible for China during the latter years of the Reagan administration and briefly in the first Bush administration, I was deeply involved in Chinese affairs from October 1986 through President George Herbert Walker Bush's visit to China in February 1989.

Beginning in March 1989, I was the Executive Secretary of the State Department for the next two years and no longer had any policy responsibilities for China until I arrived in Beijing as the U.S. Ambassador in August 1991.

Three impressions struck me immediately on my return to China in 1991. First, was the widespread availability of consumer goods that had been in short supply during my first assignment in Bei-

jing from 1978 to 1981. This was a direct result of the price reforms that had been introduced in the mid-1980s.

Second, was the shift in attitude on the part of the Chinese who had been sympathetic to the goals of the student demonstrators in Tiananmen in the spring of 1989. Overwhelmingly, I encountered the view based on their hindsight that the demonstrators had been too uncompromising in their approach and had set back the cause of political reform in China.

This is quite separate from the question of whether the Chinese Government had been justified in using force to quell the demonstrators. While the Chinese Government strongly defended the position that it had acted appropriately in June 1989, I did not encounter this view in non-official circles.

Third, I was struck by the degree to which images of China in the United States were out of touch with realities on the ground. This was less evident during my first year in Beijing, but it became glaringly obvious during the summer and fall of 1992 when the economic reform forces in China strengthened their position and strongly reaffirmed China's pre-Tiananmen reform and openness policies at the 14th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 1992.

By the spring of 1993, Americans were flocking back to China in growing numbers. Without exception, those who met with me expressed shock and amazement that conditions in China were so much better than they had been led to believe by the U.S. media. Never before or since in my Foreign Service career did I encounter such a large gap between perception and reality.

This perception gap related to conditions of life in China in terms of the rising levels of prosperity, the openness of society, the freedom of movement, and the access to information. It did not relate to the human rights situation in China, which remained oppressive.

During my assignment as U.S. Ambassador in Beijing, the Chinese Government was no more willing to accommodate political dissent than before and moved quickly to suppress any forms of political or social organization that did not have government authorization.

This had a negative impact on organizations such as the Falun Gong and on the house churches which operated outside the government-approved framework for organized religion. Within that framework, however, membership in religious organizations was rapidly expanding and churches were overflowing with worshippers of all ages.

As regards prospects for political change in China, some clues were contained in the communiqué of the Third Plenum of the Central Committee last November. The plenum communiqué was notable for its stress on strengthening market forces in the Chinese economy, affirming Party leadership, enhancing rule by law—no rule of law—and maintaining stability.

As expected, the plenum did not introduce any bold political reforms. The communiqué continued to talk of developing "primary level democracy," suggesting that the Xi regime is not in any rush to expand representative governance above the primary level.

That said, the communiqué was noteworthy for the emphasis put on “governing the country in accordance with the law, strengthening a system of restraining and supervising the use of power, and ensuring that judicial and procuratorial bodies independently and impartially exercise their respective powers pursuant to law.”

Expanding on this concept of putting checks on power, the communiqué pointed out that “to ensure proper exercise of power it is important to put power, Party, and government operations and personnel management under institutional checks.”

To drive these points home, the communiqué added the assertion that “letting the people exercise supervision over power and letting power be exercised in broad daylight is the fundamental way to keep power within the cage of regulations.”

While one should not read too much into these statements, they certainly constitute building blocks for gradually moving toward greater institutional checks on the exercise of power, something that has been sadly lacking in Chinese practice to date.

My point is: the language of discourse in China on political reform issues is changing. I do not recall before language referring to the need for checks on the exercise of power, and that is beginning to enter into the domestic dialogue in China.

Mr. Chairman, I hope we can explore these issues in greater detail during the question and answer period. Thank you.

Chairman BROWN. Thank you very much, Ambassador.  
Ambassador Lord?

**STATEMENT OF HON. WINSTON LORD, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1985–1989**

Ambassador LORD. Well, I pay tribute to this commission for its meticulous survey of the Chinese landscape over the years and U.S.-China relations. It is my pleasure appearing with Ambassador Roy. We have worked closely in and out of government. I will say here what I say behind his back: he’s one of the top three or four diplomats in our generation.

Cochairmen and members of the commission, I am honored to appear once again before this commission. I am inspired by your renewed commemoration of events that will be enshrined in history. In the words of Lu Xun, “Lies written in ink cannot disguise facts written in blood.”

We gather at a melancholy time. The Chinese authorities continue to distort and erase the spring of 1989. They continue to withhold answers from the mothers of the fallen, and they seem more determined than ever to squash basic freedoms.

In five minutes I can only employ brush strokes to evoke the China scene and the implications for American policy. Please bear in mind, as I speak with the candor I use with my Chinese friends, that I have worked to promote relations with China ever since the Kissinger secret trip of 1971, and I will continue to do so. It’s in our national interest.

My three principal conclusions up front: (1) The political system in China is unjust and inhumane. It is getting worse; (2) American efforts to promote freedom have yielded slight results but should endure; and (3) the near term prospects are bleak, but in the longer run change from within will open China.

Now, certainly the landscape has radically changed since the disastrous 1950s and 1960s whenever the freedom of silence was not allowed and in certain important areas China continues to improve. Chinese can compete for college, choose their work, change their residence, and travel. They can grouse loudly among friends, selectively in social media.

Awesome economic progress has lifted the horizons of hundreds of millions. But in certain key domains, the screws have been tightened, especially in recent years. The weekly salons for officials, academics, artists, and dissidents that my wife and I hosted in the late 1980s at our official residence can no longer take place.

The Party persecutes not only a blind activist, but also his relatives. It locks up not only a Nobel Prize winner, but his ill wife. It rounds up not only reformers, but those who defend them. It not only jails the troublesome, but forces them to confess on television. It not only mistreats Tibetans, but punishes governments that host the Dalai Lama. It not only smothers the domestic Internet and media, but threatens foreign journalists and spurs self-censorship from Bloomberg to Hollywood.

U.S. administrations of both parties have tried through a variety of means to encourage greater freedom, from selective sanctions to trade conditions to private dialogues and public shaming, all to scant avail.

Other players undercut our official efforts. Few governments will even raise the subject of human rights. In America, contract-hungry business bosses, visa-anxious scholars, and access-seeking former government officials ignore, tiptoe around, even rationalize Chinese suppression. Should we therefore bury this issue? No.

Certainly it cannot dominate our agenda, which features critical security, economic, and political stakes. We derive enormous benefits from our economic relations and our bilateral exchanges. On many global problems we share common concerns and the Chinese can be helpful: The curses of terrorism and nuclear weapons; shipping lanes and piracy; climate change and clean energy; health and food safety; and drugs and crime.

There are also many serious problems with China that I do not have time to elaborate. We have just seen a new one this week that Senator Brown, Congressman Smith, and Congressman Walz have outlined.

On regional issues, the Chinese posture varies: helpful on Afghanistan and Sudan, unhelpful on Syria, mixed on Iran and North Korea. Beijing has become downright provocative and dangerous with its probes in the East China Sea, its bullying in the South China Sea, and its unilateral declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone.

Indeed, in its maritime encroachments Beijing evokes Moscow's policy toward its neighbors. It also has great unease about Moscow's policy. The Chinese don't like minorities appealing to outside powers that come in, obviously. But in many ways—and I can list at least 10—there are similarities.

Despite this daunting agenda, we should continue to advocate for human dignity in China. This reflects our values and international norms, it maintains public and congressional support for our overall policy, it heartens Chinese reformers, and it serves concrete na-

tional interests. Free societies do not go to war against each other, harbor terrorists, hide natural and man-made disasters, or spawn refugees.

We should proceed, however, without arrogance. Above all, we should progress here at home. Gridlock and polarization in this city sabotages our champion of democratic values abroad.

Many avenues exist to nourish liberty: Private dialogue; public stances; and exchanges between non-governmental organizations on topics like civil society, rule of law, and the environment. Expand Voice of America and Radio Free Asia; increase funding for new technology to break the Chinese firewall; pursue the U.N. Commission's indictment of China's abetting North Korean crimes against humanity; retaliate against Chinese harassment of foreign journalists; and support free elections in Hong Kong.

We should thus persist across a broad front. But change in China will not result from outside encouragement or pressures. It must come from the Chinese themselves. We must appeal to China's own interests: The rule of law, freedom of the press, an independent judiciary, a flourishing civil society, and accountable officials would promote all of China's primary goals: economic progress, political stability, reconciliation with Taiwan, good relations with America, international stature and influence.

Members of the Commission, given the dark clouds, it is tempting to be pessimistic about the future of freedom for one-fifth of humanity. I do believe, however, that a more open society will emerge, impelled by universal aspirations, self-interest, a rising middle class, the return of students, and the explosive impact of social media.

No one can predict the pace or the contours of the process. We might as well consult fortune cookies. Nevertheless, one day mothers will have answers, Chinese history books will record heroes not hooligans, and the promise of the Chinese Spring will finally shape the destinies of a great people and a great nation.

Thank you.

Chairman BROWN. Thank you, Ambassador Lord.

For both of you, take yourselves back a decade and a half, 1999, President Clinton asked the Senate and the House—I was a Member of the House then—for permanent normal trade relations [PNTR] with China, talking about jobs. U.S. CEOs came to Washington and spoke about wanting access to a billion Chinese consumers.

Others said that what they really want is access to a billion Chinese workers. Both President Clinton, CEOs, and newspaper editors were almost unanimous in their support for PNTR in those days. Virtually all the major liberal and conservative newspapers argued that PNTR would open up trade and bring sweeping changes to China: Human rights, respect for the rule of law, democracy. The promise of PNTR was all of that. Your comments, especially Ambassador Lord's, but the comments of both of you suggest movement in the opposite direction in many ways.

So my first question is addressed to Ambassador Lord. What did we learn, perhaps in the first decade after Tiananmen Square, but especially since PNTR in 1999–2000, about the actual relationship

between trade, human rights, and how that should inform our policy going forward?

Ambassador LORD. I was in the middle of this issue and I negotiated conditional MFN [most-favored nation] with Congresswoman Pelosi and Senator Mitchell. What we did was to establish conditions for renewing trade privileges, but moderate conditions. Meaningful ones, but ones we thought the Chinese could meet.

To tell you a little secret, we were making some progress but the economic agencies undercut us. We have huge economic stakes with China—they were not enthusiastic and undercut our policy. President Clinton did not back up the State Department to carry out his own policy. We had a split administration. The Chinese took advantage of that and therefore didn't move on human rights in a significant way and we had to reverse policy and pursue human rights in other ways. So it was a failed experiment.

I think reasonable people can disagree. I was reluctant to have any conditions for a long while, but I finally decided moderate conditions were the way to go. I respect those who felt that this was not going to move the Chinese. Regime stability was their number-one goal then and it remains that today.

Now, I do think expanding trade and investment are in our national interest. It helps American workers and jobs and exports. There are some serious economic frictions with China, like intellectual property rights, cyber warfare, currency manipulation, their favoring through subsidies of their state enterprises. We have to negotiate and be firm on all of these.

But despite the deficit and despite other problems, I think we should continue our deep economic engagement. It's not going to bring about—to get to your question—a free China in and of itself. I do think it helps the general conditions of the Chinese people, it helps our economy. In any event, we need to pursue promoting democracy in the other ways that I mentioned.

Chairman BROWN. Okay. Thank you. We can debate what it does for our economy, but that's another day.

Ambassador Roy, talk about the role of—and partly answering his concerns and my question to Ambassador Lord about how do we go forward, talk about the role of U.S. corporations and our failure as a nation—I'm not saying only corporations' failure, but as a nation—talk about the role of U.S. companies and our failure to advance human rights in China.

There clearly has been—while the promise of PNTR was that U.S. companies would play some role in the advancing of human rights, that has fallen perhaps even more short than the U.S. Government playing a role in human rights. What are your thoughts there on their role in that for good and for bad, and especially more importantly, that looking back is looking forward on the role of U.S. companies and U.S. investment in China?

Ambassador ROY. My experience with U.S. companies is that their principal motive is to make their companies as profitable as possible, and their actions are largely geared to that objective. When they operate in foreign countries, they nevertheless can represent a positive aspect of American society insofar as they pay their workers decent wages, give them health and other protections

as desirable, and pursue what I would call good responsible business practices.

That sets a standard that, in many of the countries that I have served in, are not typical of the local business practices, so in that sense they can carry a positive aspect of what we stand for in terms of what business practices should be.

I do not find that businessmen are motivated to promote human rights at the expense of their business interests, and I think it would be a misunderstanding of how corporations function to expect them to do so. However, in certain respects—for example, in Indonesia particularly—the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was an issue.

I did not encounter hostility on the part of the business community to the fact that we had a law that made corrupt practices by American corporations abroad punishable, and I would have very frank dialogues with the members of the American business community on that question.

So I think that we should not misinterpret what business is about, but at the same time I think that we should consider ways in which we can reinforce the positive images that well-managed companies can convey to other countries where the labor practices, the wage practices, et cetera, are substandard.

Let me briefly comment on a point that Ambassador Lord touched on. There is a connection between economic development and political change, but it is not automatic. East Asia is a rare region of the world. It is the only region that I am aware of where, after 40 years of rapid economic development, without exception, authoritarian governments have given way to representative governments.

In three out of the four cases that I can cite, it was a violent transition. I was in Indonesia as Ambassador when that occurred. In only one instance, the economy of Taiwan, where Chiang Ching-kuo, the leader, prepared for the transition, it was smooth, so smooth that most Americans barely noticed what took place.

In South Korea, in Taiwan, in Thailand, and in Indonesia, political change took place on the back of sustained economic development. Two additional factors, however, are important. They were open to the outside world. These were not closed societies. Second, their economies were imbedded in the global economy.

So I do not take the position that if China continues economic development it will automatically move to a democratic government. But based on the examples in East Asia, I would rather bet that those pressures are going to become overwhelming in China than bet on the reverse, as long as China remains open and as long as the economy remains imbedded in the global economy.

So I don't think that we should argue that economic development is irrelevant to political change because political change to democratic systems of government rests on the emergence of middle classes. Indonesia had democratic elections in 1955. It lasted two years, and they went back to guided democracy, which was authoritarian rule.

When democratic elections again occurred in 1999, Indonesia has, for over 12 years now, sustained a democratic system of government, and that is on the back of the middle classes. It was the

students of the middle classes that were the moving force in the demonstrations that eventually resulted in President Suharto stepping down from power. So I think we need to look at concrete examples and not simply look at this in terms of theory.

Ambassador LORD. Could I add to that?

Chairman BROWN. Sure.

Ambassador LORD. I was going to make the same points in the sense that I think there are universal aspirations for freedom, and we've seen that in a Chinese society like Taiwan. I think the phenomenon there will come to China. I think your point is well taken. The view that in the short term economic reforms and progress are going to lead to democracy are too optimistic.

I do think there are positive elements at work. The Chinese middle class has not yet reached the point that South Korea, Taiwan, and Chile and some of the others did, but Beijing is getting to a point now where it is going to have to go change the economic policy since Deng. The Chinese are at an inflection point.

They're going to need innovation, they're going to need energy, they're going to need entrepreneurship, they're going to need a more pluralistic society. So I think in their own self-interest there's going to be forces at work for a freer system, along with whatever we can do to encourage this trend. Above all social media should promote this process.

So what I'm saying is, the decades of economic progress and reforms have not brought about immediate success, but I think over the long run they will have the impact that Ambassador Roy has said.

Chairman BROWN. Thank you. Let me ask one more question and I'll turn it over to Congressman Walz and Congressman Meadows. You said we may have been too optimistic. We were too optimistic, as we were told by people in this country lobbying for PNTR that we should be optimistic that something would happen faster, but I guess that's kind of the way it is.

One more question. PNTR provided an opportunity, for want of a better word. This perhaps was happening elsewhere, but it is so accelerated with China. For a U.S. business to begin to come up with a whole new business plan, if you will, across many, many industries, that was the incentives of PNTR—again, if that's the right word, the incentives of PNTR encouraged U.S. companies to do something that I don't know in world economic history that businesses have ever kind of followed this business plan, and that is to shut down production in Steubenville or Cleveland, Ohio, and move production to Xian or Wuhan, China, get a tax break for it—that's a whole other U.S. Tax Code issue—but then sell the products back into the home country.

I guess I'm not asking for a comment on that as much as just a recognition that that's partly what PNTR did, and when you talk about what it has meant to the U.S. economy, it has surely meant that, that companies—I've heard a major company in my State who lobbied hard for PNTR, after it passed he told me he had to move production to China because those are the rules and my competitors have done that.

So it opened up something different and you can't exactly blame the companies that made those decisions to move and then sell pro-

duction back here, except those were the same companies that were lobbying me and others in both Houses for PNTR. But that's more a comment than a question.

Mr. Walz?

Representative WALZ. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both. It is so refreshing to hear the rejection of the simplistic look at things and to get at the heart of this because we do have to figure this out. We do have to understand and I do feel a sense of responsibility, asking those concrete things we need to do. I would say for both of you, but Ambassador Lord, your opening statement and call to action, my only hope would be that all of my colleagues could hear that.

I think it was eloquent, it was on point, and it cut through that. I think your point about it here is, we can't agree it's Tuesday in this body. It's very difficult to talk about basic universal human rights and what we can do on a global economic scale on the very important issues that the Senator brought up.

One thing I'd like to ask Ambassador Roy, something you mentioned and I am interested in, you're hearing a change in the language, you said. You're hearing a change for the first time of a recognition of that, probably, as we think, most of us, predicated on this growing—I think this growing belief that as the middle class grows there's going to be this force for change in things that are happening. But what can you attest now? Why at this point do you think you're hearing it when you didn't hear it before in the language on power and the need to have that balance?

Ambassador ROY. That's an excellent question, and I've been thinking about it. The fact is that China is not simply changing economically because of its rapid development; the nature of society is changing. We now have over three decades of large numbers of Chinese going abroad. The Chinese middle class can now get passports easily, and tourism in east Asia and elsewhere, in Europe, for example, is becoming a big thing.

So the Chinese now don't simply judge their circumstances in terms of their domestic environment; they also are familiar with the situation elsewhere. Everywhere that middle class Chinese go in east Asia, almost without exception, middle classes have the right to vote in democratic elections.

You have several political systems in greater China. You have a democratic system run by Chinese in Taiwan. You have a mixed system in Hong Kong and Macau, where half of the Legislative Council is freely elected and half represents constituencies. You could say it's a more controlled process, but in both cases there's more democratic freedom in the way that those elections are handled than in the method used in China to select their leaders.

There are additional changes that are taking place in China. For example, name another authoritarian system in the world in which the leaders change every 10 years, and where their successors are always younger than they are. In China, the successor has to be under 60, because 70 is the age cutoff. This is one of the merits of democratic systems of government, in that to change policies you often need to change leaders.

Well, we have the first generation of leaders in China now, and not all the signals are positive, who spent most of their adult lives

under conditions of reform and openness as opposed to under conditions of cultural revolution and the earlier Maoist policies.

Representative WALZ. I'm fascinated by this because I see this—you mentioned something and you said never in your diplomatic career had you seen such a misnomer of the reality. I would argue—and this is more due to the fact of lack of information—that in the mid-1980s, and many of you would have this, the misinformation about us going this way.

I would say in many cases, especially amongst the youths enamored with the West for all of the right reasons but for all of the wrong reasons, I see the movement back to a very strong sense of nationalism that is coming back. So it used to be when you emigrated you were not coming back. Now there is no doubt whatsoever there are. How does that play into it, this resurgence of—and I know it's always been there. It is much more latent. But there is, to me—maybe I am misreading this. I see a strong resurgence of Chinese nationalism.

Ambassador ROY. There is a strong resurgence of Chinese nationalism, but one of the really significant changes since the period when Ambassador Lord was Ambassador in China, is everywhere you go in China now, in the government structures, in the universities, and in the business communities, you encounter people who were educated in the United States or in many cases in other countries. These people come back to China because of nationalism and patriotism, but they bring with them ideas that were not earlier part of the political dialogue in China.

Now, I have not met a single Chinese who says the American political system ought to be taken to China, but what they notice is the tools that we have available to deal with our inequities are so much stronger because we have a free press and an independent judiciary.

So the pressures in China to try to get a judiciary that is not simply under the thumb of the Party are growing stronger, and some of that is reflected in the language that I included in my opening statement where they're beginning to talk about an independent and impartial judicial process. That's not accidental when that language gets in there.

Representative WALZ. So you think it starts to move. I would ask Ambassador Lord to follow up.

Ambassador LORD. Let me comment on this.

Representative WALZ. Yes.

Ambassador LORD. Let me preface this by again reiterating my respect for Ambassador Roy. On basic policy toward China, we agree what we ought to be doing. I tend to put more emphasis on human rights than he does, but on that, reasonable people can disagree.

I agree with some of his hopeful trends, including Chinese exposure to foreign influences. By the way, the Chinese citizens spend more money abroad than any other country. Their students abroad are coming back. All these are hopeful trends.

But with due respect to my colleague, I look at the current scene much differently than he does. I think actions speak louder than words. This talk about rule of law and checks and balances—it's

just not happening. I would refer you to my opening statement of what is happening.

So the Chinese can dress it up with some nice language, and occasionally here and there they do make some nominal changes in their judicial system. But the fact is, whether it's censorship, whether it's locking people up, whether it's treatment of minorities, it's getting worse. In some respects it's worse than when I was ambassador in the late 1980s.

So I, frankly, don't put much stock in what's in these documents unless the words are carried out. And they're not carried out. The rule of law is not there. Freedom of the press, checks and balances, none of this is happening in any meaningful way.

Representative WALZ. Is this a case of—I often fall into this trap—thinking in terms of American time compression, that I want to see change by this afternoon, which I know the irony of that, being in Congress, is not missing on anyone.

My point, though, is my Chinese students, high school kids, would make the comment that in 75 years or 100 years I fully expect these things to happen here. Is it a perception of how long this is going to take? Is it happening, but it's happening at a pace that is frustrating to us but is Chinese in nature?

Ambassador ROY. Let me comment on that.

Representative WALZ. Okay.

Ambassador ROY. You used the term "time compression."

Representative WALZ. Yes.

Ambassador ROY. The term that I use is proving that grass doesn't grow. You can easily prove that grass doesn't grow. Take a chair, go out into your yard, and sit for several hours watching the grass. You have confirmation that grass isn't growing. But you wait a week, and you have confirmation that it is growing.

Representative WALZ. We do that in Minnesota, by the way.

Ambassador ROY. In other words—

Representative WALZ. Yes.

Ambassador ROY [continuing]. Ambassador Lord is asking for changes in a time frame that is unrealistic in terms of the way other societies have developed. That is why I mentioned that it takes 40 years of rapid economic development, not 40 weeks or 40 months. So it is too early to expect the types of changes that Ambassador Lord feels should be taking place in China.

But what I am trying to emphasize is that changes are taking place. They're thinking about the issues differently. The word "democracy" has become much more important in terms of the domestic dialogue in China, and they're actually beginning, in Communist Party elections, to have multiple candidates for single positions. It's still in a very restricted frame, but the possibility of change is there.

Ambassador LORD. I have to rejoin on that. A lot of things can be true at the same time. China is so complex, it's moving so quickly, it's so big. I agree with some of these hopeful trends but I stand by my position that during the last few years China is going backward in key areas.

I'm not saying this will happen overnight, but I do think there are positive steps, as I said, that are in Chinese self-interest that could develop more quickly, I would hope.

Some tend to equate democracy with free elections. Now, there's a big case to be made that you'd better build up civil society before you have those elections. You have seen what's been happening around the world. Democracy isn't just elections—it's freedom of the press, which can get at corruption, which is a key issue for China. It is the role of an independent judiciary and fair courts so you're not guilty until proven innocent.

Moreover, civil society and non-governmental organizations must be built up, all of which are suffering now. The censorship is worse than ever. And by the way, watch Hong Kong. They're going to have some problems there.

So I do agree there are some hopeful trends. I do agree you can't expect the lawn to sprout overnight. But I do not agree with the assessment of where they are right now. I think they are going backward in some areas, as well as going forward in others. I think in their own self-interest they can move in some of these areas.

Representative WALZ. Thank you.

Chairman BROWN. Thank you, Congressman Walz.

In the mid-1970s, Zhou Enlai reportedly was asked what he thought of the French Revolution, and he said it was too early to tell.

[Laughter].

Representative WALZ. That really happened? All right. Yes.

Chairman BROWN. Congressman Meadows? Actually, you may have taken notes but I suggested the line to you.

[Laughter].

Ambassador ROY. Mr. Chairman, I hate to correct the record, but Zhou Enlai was referring to the student revolution in France in 1968.

Chairman BROWN. Oh, he's trying to ruin a good story here.

[Laughter].

Ambassador ROY. Sorry. Sorry.

Chairman BROWN. That record is not correct. Sorry.

Congressman Meadows?

Representative MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank each of you for your testimony. I must confess, I'm here very perplexed to see the different dynamics of two very distinguished and very accomplished diplomats disagreeing on some of these issues.

I guess, Ambassador Roy, let me start with you. Are you suggesting that, with another 15 years, that this 40-year window will magically be met and that we will see human rights abuses happen? I don't think you're suggesting that.

Ambassador ROY. No, I'm not suggesting that at all. But let me reverse the question, if you will.

Representative MEADOWS. I get to ask the questions, you get to give me answers.

[Laughter].

Ambassador ROY. Okay. Here's my answer: China is growing at a 7-percent-plus rate.

Representative MEADOWS. Right.

Ambassador ROY. The standard of living is rising. Chinese are getting a lot of access to the outside world. A change in China's leadership will take place in 2022, when a new generation of people

who were born and grew up under conditions of reform and openness and with ready access to the outside world will take charge.

Do you expect that new generation of leaders to have the same attitudes as the leaders who grew up under revolution and the Maoist policies from 1949 until 1979?

Representative MEADOWS. One would hope not.

Ambassador ROY. I would go beyond that.

Representative MEADOWS. Yes.

Ambassador ROY. I would say it defies imagination to think that people with that different perspective on the world will address the types of problems generated by change in the way that their predecessors would have.

So if you look at China's leadership changes, the generation that was in power when Ambassador Lord was ambassador there were Soviet educated during the 1950s. The next generation that came in had no opportunity for education outside of China because they grew up during the Cultural Revolution.

We now have the first generation that has had the opportunity to travel abroad in their formative years, and in 2022 we will get a new set of leaders whose only experience is of a China that has been largely open to the outside world. So I'm not saying there's any automatic process in terms of how China will change: That you wait 40 years, look at your watch, and they suddenly embrace democracy.

But I am saying that the pressures in China to open up the political system and to learn from the best features of the societies that Chinese now have ready access to will alter the way that China looks at the question of political reform.

Representative MEADOWS. Fair enough. But let me ask you this.

Ambassador LORD. Could I comment? I'm sorry to interrupt.

Representative MEADOWS. Sure.

Ambassador LORD. This is a very important topic. To sum up our joint positions, I think we both see a lot of hopeful trends. We both think this is going to lead someday to a much more open China, and we agree it's going to have to come primarily from within, from the Chinese people and also out of their self-interest, as well as from universal values and the impact of other trends.

Where we disagree, frankly, is the picture of the scene today, which I think is very gloomy. I think Xi so far, and the leadership, is tightening up. So even if these long-term trends work out in a more hopeful way, I just disagree on where we are today. I think it is a very grim situation. I indicated in my opening statement why I think so.

Representative MEADOWS. I have been in hearings, both in this commission and on Foreign Affairs where we have seen very disturbing trends. In this commission we've talked about the freedom of the press and the fact that that is not a common occurrence necessarily, regardless of where the trend may lead. It's very troubling because that message of freedom does not get out if there is not a freedom of the press, or of the Internet, or bypassing firewalls, et cetera. So that trend is very troubling.

I have been in Foreign Affairs Committee hearings where I've had girls who can't see their fathers that brought tears to my eyes when you start to hear the disturbing human rights abuses. If the

very existence of this commission is one to help augment, support, and encourage human rights and those values that we all hold dear, how then—and my question to both of you is this—do we best incentivize, recognizing that—I think, Ambassador Lord, you said my friends in China, recognizing that your Chinese friends.

Ambassador Roy, I think you would say the same thing. How do we recognize the sovereignty of a country and recognize the relationship thereof, but also support human rights and where there is not the violations that we see every day? How do we best do that with either incentives or punishment that is out there and available to us? Either one of you can comment.

Ambassador LORD. There are various tools, and I did mention some in my opening statement, always recognizing the fact that the regime in China puts its own preservation, the political party as number one priority. By the way, whenever they talk about political reform the most they're talking about is reform within the Party, not a multi-party system.

But I think we can continue through our private efforts and our public stances. I think we should pursue exchanges, for example, on the rule of law and the environment, some of these “safer” subjects which promote a more pluralistic society. We should encourage the most Chinese visitors and young future leaders we can get over here. We have to work on all these fronts, but recognize ultimately freedom will come from the kind of forces that both of us have been pointing to, from the Chinese people themselves, and from the Chinese leaders eventually realizing it's in their self-interest.

For example, I don't know how long China can go on censoring in the age of information and yet progress with its economy. I don't know how long you can have political stability if people can't go to the courts or they can't go to the free press and they have to go to the streets. I don't know how Beijing thinks it's going to get Taiwan to get close to China when there are these contrasting political systems.

So I think there are forces at work, and not just for elections, as I said. Someday the Chinese must see that the rule of law and a free press and independent courts are needed to promote some of their own concrete interests, economic and political.

Representative MEADOWS. And I am out of time. But with the patience and indulgence of the Chair, I'll let you answer, Ambassador Roy.

Ambassador ROY. I will answer briefly. Ambassador Lord makes very important points. I hope you do not think that I am trying to gild the lily on conditions in China. That is not my purpose. But I served three-and-a-half years in the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War, and for three-and-a-half years I saw only negative aspects of my country presented to the Soviet people.

It was a totally distorted picture, and yet most of the information presented to them was accurate. We do have problems in the United States, we do have police brutality affecting ethnic minorities, et cetera.

But this was the only picture presented of the United States, and it was a completely unbalanced picture. I think it is wrong to only focus on the fact that China's institutions and its political system

have not yet been modernized. In my judgment, modern political systems are all based on the concept that power corrupts and it must be checked and balanced.

So China, in a sense, has a pre-modern political system. They're trying to modernize the country. The more they succeed in modernizing the country without modernizing the political system, the worse the internal contradictions in China are going to become because modern societies—look around the world—modern societies, by and large, have political systems based on the concept of checking and balancing abuses of power by governments.

So I think that's the trend that is going to happen, but it takes, unfortunately, in some cases generations to produce these changes, or let's say decades. I would share Ambassador Lord's desire that it take place tomorrow or the next day, but I don't know any societies that develop that way.

Look at U.S. history. How long did it take us to deal with slavery? We couldn't solve it through the political process. We had to fight a civil war. Then it took us 100 years to deal with the problem of the civil rights of our black minority. So in other words, could foreign intervention have caused us to shorten that to a decade or two? No. We had to change the nature of our society, we had to change our attitudes on these questions.

Look at the issue of votes for women. It took 50 years of suffragette struggle before we were even prepared to recognize that women had the right to vote. You don't produce those changes overnight, and in China the concerns have been stability, clothing, housing, a full stomach. They now have those things, and it's not enough for middle classes.

Middle classes are usually property owning. They don't like political systems that can arbitrarily dispose of their property without having some say in it. So it's not accidental that democracies worldwide are based basically on middle classes. Those middle classes are emerging faster in China than they have anywhere else in the world in a more compressed timeframe.

So I simply say, let's watch the odds. But it is important that China stay open to the outside world because these are the forces that are causing the middle classes of China to think differently about the way that China ought to be ruled.

Chairman BROWN. Thank you, Ambassador Roy, and thank you, Ambassador Lord, very much for joining us. We all really appreciate your involvement.

I'd like to call up the second panel. Liane Lee lives in Cleveland, Ohio, and was part of a delegation from the Hong Kong Federation of Students who twice traveled to Tiananmen Square in 1989, providing tents and medical supplies to the student movement. She witnessed the military crackdown. She was rescued by local citizens leaving Beijing on an evacuation flight sent from Hong Kong on June 5, 1989. Ms. Lee, if you would join us.

Dr. Rowena He is a lecturer at Harvard, where she teaches a popular seminar on the 1989 Tiananmen movement and its aftermath. Her research interests focus on political socialization, citizenship education, human rights, and democratization in China. She released her book last month titled, "Tiananmen Exiles: Voices in the Struggle for Democracy in China." Her writings have appeared

in the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post. Welcome, Dr. He.

Professor Jeffery Wasserstrom is the Chancellor's Professor of History at the University of California-Irvine, whose president is leaving to come to Ohio State University in about a month, where he also holds a courtesy appointment in the law school and serves as editor of the Journal of Asian Studies. He is the author of four books, co-author of six other books. Thanks to all three of you for joining us.

Ms. Lee, if you would begin your five-minute statement. Thank you.

**STATEMENT OF LIANE LEE, EYEWITNESS TO JUNE 4TH  
EVENTS AS PART OF HONG KONG FEDERATION OF STUDENTS  
DELEGATION**

Ms. LEE. Over the years, as an eyewitness of the June 4 crack-down, I have been confronted by many Chinese who chose to believe the version of history distorted by the Chinese Government. They accused me of being a liar. Today, persistent for 25 years, I have to tell what I witnessed. I don't have a choice, because I was protected to leave the Tiananmen Square.

It was after 10:30 p.m. on June 3, we three Hong Kong students were in the students headquarter close to the monument. An urgent broadcast from a student's radio burst in. A young boy cried "It is for real; real killings, fellow students! They shot at us! Opened fire at peaceful people with machine guns. Held in my hand is the a blood-stained shirt of my classmate. What are we going to do now?"

Immediately, some students voluntarily formed a group to continue to block soldiers. We Hong Kong students decided to join them. When we arrived at the National History Museum, a league of soldiers, hundreds of them with machine guns, came out from the subway. We, about 50 of us, students, workers, and citizens formed a human wall to confront them calmly and peacefully.

When time came to midnight, that's in the early morning of June 4, horrible military signals fired up across the sky. Within minutes, we heard shootings from far away. Some young workers started to pick up sticks and rocks to protect students. But students told them to put down their weapons. One of them said "Peaceful protest. No weapons allowed or you knock me down first." An old worker came up with heavy tears and talked to young workers, "Listen to the students. We have to be peaceful."

After another round of shooting, badly injured people were carried from behind the building to a first aid station nearby. One of them, a college student, the back of his neck was shot. His body was paralyzed. But he was still shouting, "Don't give up, don't give up." Since the troops in front of us hadn't taking any action yet, I got some courage and crossed the warning line to talk to a high ranking officer. I said to him "I am a Hong Kong student. We are just doing petition here peacefully. Please do not hurt the students, they are all your children, the future of China." The officer looked at me coldly like a piece of stone, but tears were welling in his eyes. I broke down and knelt before him to cry. Then, fellow Hong Kong students dragged me back to where we were.

It's about one hour past midnight, intensive gun shootings were approaching, we could hear people screaming somewhere. A group of people carried more bloodied bodies to the first aid station. Along with them was a little boy, holding a rock in his hand, hysterically running toward the soldiers in front of us. I held him back with all my strength in my arm. He cried "They killed my brother. I'm going to fight until I die." I wouldn't let go, then he lay his head on my shoulder and cried like an old man in despair! Then, an loud siren ambulance was leaving. The boy got loose of my arms, chasing after the ambulance and crying "brother, my brother" and then disappeared at the end of the street. Later, I was told, this boy's body, covered with blood, was carried back to the first aid station.

I felt so sick! I didn't think I was able to sustain myself any more. So people took me to the first aid station. When I recovered, an ambulance arrived. People shouted, "Hong Kong students get in the ambulance first." Of course I refused. "I am fine. Please help the injured first," I said. Not long after, another ambulance arrived. Again, people, many of them, shouted "Hong Kong students get in the ambulance first." I strongly refused. Then, a female doctor held my hand, looked into my eyes, and said to me "My child, please get in the ambulance, you must leave the Square safely. You must go back to Hong Kong. We need you to tell the world what happened here. What our government did to us tonight!"

Today, I am here to tell the world, not mainly about the brutal military crackdown, rather, I want you all to remember the people. They are good people. They believe in the power of peace, they believe in hope, they believe in the virtue of human nature, and they even believed in their government.

For those good people I met in the Square, I do really want to know their name. But I can only remember their noble faces. Do they have a name? In China, their only name is given by the Chinese Government! They call them mobs, in the name of China!

Chairman BROWN. Thank you, Ms. Lee, very much.

Dr. He?

**STATEMENT OF ROWENA HE, LECTURER, HARVARD  
UNIVERSITY**

Ms. HE. Thanks so much, Liane, for the moving testimony. "To tell the world what our government did to us" that night has been a cross that many of us have been carrying ever since that night when we were violently silenced. I told Liane's story every time I took my students to the Tiananmen Archive at the Harvard Yenching Library. The Archive contains 28 boxes of artifacts from the 1989 Tiananmen movement, including a pair of pants stained with blood.

The pants were kept in an old dusty plastic bag. All of those boxes have been collecting dust for the past quarter century. They should be kept in a national museum in China, like the one where Liane was on June 3, 1989, but instead they are kept in a basement. The pants came with a note, a handwritten note, explaining that the blood was from a graduate student of Beijing University who was shot at Muxidi.

My students often asked if the wounded student survived. I don't know. I only know that the person who smuggled the pants out ran

a great risk hoping that sometime, somewhere, someone would take this seriously and to get to know the stories behind the pants so that Chinese people's blood would not be shed in vain.

On the surface, Tiananmen seems to be remote and irrelevant to the reality of the "rising China," but every year on its anniversary, the government clamps down with intense security and meticulous surveillance. The recent detention of scholars and rights defenders is just another reminder that Tiananmen did not end in 1989.

A quarter century later, the Tiananmen Mothers are still prohibited from openly mourning their family members, exiles are still turned away when they try to return home to visit a sick parent or to attend a loved one's funeral, and scholars working on the topic are regularly denied visas. Even today the number of deaths and injuries on that fateful night remains unknown. But we now know that at least 200,000 soldiers participated in the lethal action. While memory can be manipulated and voices can be silenced by those in power, repression of memory and history is accompanied by political, social, and psychological distortions. Indeed, it is not possible to understand today's China and its relationship with the world without understanding the spring of 1989.

In 2011, China's state-sponsored English newspaper China Daily published a story headlined "Tiananmen Massacre a Myth." Citing the release of WikiLeaks diplomatic cables indicating that there was no bloodshed in the square itself, the article claimed that "Tiananmen remains the classic example of the shallowness and bias in most Western media reporting, and of governmental black information operations seeking to control those media. China is too important to be a victim of this nonsense."

While there is nothing extraordinary here—this has been the official version from the start. The state-sponsored myth is poignantly challenged by the victim list collected by Professor Ding Zilin, representative of the Tiananmen Mothers, who lost her teenaged son during the massacre. Despite escalating government repression, Ding has been carrying out a one-woman campaign to collect information about the victims.

Ding's list clearly documented the deaths of students killed in Tiananmen Square, among them, Cheng Renxing, a graduate of the People's University of China. Cheng, age 25, was shot and killed by the flag pole in Tiananmen Square while withdrawing with other students in the morning of June 4. Cheng's father, a farmer from Hubei province, was devastated and died in 1995. Cheng's mother tried to hang herself at home but was saved by her 10-year-old grandson, who used his little body to hold up his grandmother for an hour until the adults came for rescue.

But whether people were killed in the square itself is not, in any case, the central question. Maps created based on information provided by the Tiananmen Mothers, that pinpoint the locations of documented killings and of hospitals where victims died, show that state violence was widespread across central Beijing.

Through Ding's list, we got to know victims such as Xiao Bo, a Beijing University lecturer, who was killed on his 27th birthday, leaving behind twin sons who were born just 70 days before he died.

The victims' list is not arranged alphabetically but by the date when information about a victim came to light. For example, according to Ding's account, the authorities told Xiao's wife to remain silent about her husband's death—otherwise they would not allow her to stay in their campus housing. This young mother felt that she could not afford to be homeless with her babies, so she was invisible until Ding eventually reached her in 1993 and added her husband as number 008 on the list.

Ding's work has truly been a mission impossible, with no end in sight—the total of 16 names that she had collected by 1993 had grown to 202 by 2013, and it is still far from complete. The true number is buried under years of coverup, deception, suppression, and repression.

The fear created by the massacre is illustrated by a story told by Professor Cui Weiping, Chinese translator of Vaclav Havel's work. After the elder son of one family was killed, his sister had two boyfriends, each of whom broke up with her after learning about her brother. The sister and the mother decided that she would not mention her brother again to whomever she planned to date. Now she is married with a daughter, and her husband still has no idea about the death or even the existence of his brother-in-law.

In 2013, a few days before the Tiananmen anniversary, a Tiananmen father, Ya Weilin, hanged himself in an empty parking lot in Beijing. I had watched him in the video, he looked sad but determined. Did he give up hope, or did he think he had nothing but his own life to remind us about the massacre? We don't know. But we know that this is not just about then, but also about now; not just about them, but about us. If we can watch such a tragic event with folded arms, it reflects who we are as human beings and world citizens.

When the world's criteria for a great country are downgraded to one exclusively about GDP [gross domestic product], when world citizens bow to a regime that enforces false values because of its wealth, we have abandoned our values and downgraded our own institutions—we also become victims of the Tiananmen crackdown.

Tiananmen can remind us of repression, but it also symbolizes people's power and human spirit. As the desire for freedom is deeply human and human beings' longing for basic rights is universal, history will witness the Tiananmen spirit, as the power of the powerless, again and again. History is on our side. China has to face its past in order to have a future. Thank you.

Chairman BROWN. Thank you, Dr. He, very much.  
Professor Wasserstrom?

**STATEMENT OF JEFFERY WASSERSTROM, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-IRVINE**

Mr. WASSERSTROM. I want to thank the Cochairs and members of the commission for inviting me to speak, and I hope that I can show that it is valuable to have a historian's view here along with those of other kinds of experts and these powerful eyewitness accounts.

In a 1990 interview with Barbara Walters, Communist Party Leader Jiang Zemin made a startling comment. Asking about the previous year's protests and the Beijing massacre that cost so

many people their lives, he said the best term for all of this was “much ado about nothing.”

In this sweeping rhetorical gesture he dismissed as unimportant the massive rallies for change that had swept through Chinese cities, scores of them, and the suffering of the workers, students, and others who were shot in Beijing and also in Chengdu, where a second massacre occurred that is discussed well in Louisa Lim’s important new book, “The People’s Republic of Amnesia.”

Jiang’s comment implied that it was also unimportant that after the massacres the government jailed activists and launched an intensive propaganda campaign to convince a justly skeptical population that a home-grown, non-violent popular movement had actually been a “counter-revolutionary riot spearheaded by troublemakers backed by foreign powers.”

Jiang’s “much ado about nothing” comment is deeply objectionable. It belittles the bravery of those who demanded an end to corruption and an increase in personal and political freedoms. It belittles their patriotism as well. This is a crucial point, as a key theme of the protests was that a beloved country deserved to be governed by better people.

Jiang’s comment also misleadingly implied that China’s leaders were not worried by the protests. They were. This had a lot to do with history. Via their slogans and writings, 1989’s students put forward a view of the past and its ties to the present that differed radically from the stories Deng Xiaoping and his allies told to legitimate their rule. Workers and others joined students on the streets in massive numbers, in part because they found this alternative view of history compelling.

The Party prided itself, for example, on claiming that corruption was a thing of the pre-1949 past of Chiang Kai-shek, but 1989’s protesters countered that corruption and nepotism continued to plague China, as many protesters continue to claim now.

The Party bragged that it embodied the patriotic values of 1919’s May 4th Movement, a student-led heroic struggle celebrated in Chinese schoolbooks much as the Boston Tea Party is in ours, though there, as here, people fight over who can claim the mantle of that heroic event.

1989’s protesters countered that they, not the government, had the best right to speak in the name of that hallowed historic spirit. Whereas Deng and company argued that those taking to the streets were like the Red Guards and threatened to send China hurtling back to the chaos of Mao’s final years that no one wanted to return to, the protesters pointed to things Deng was doing that brought to mind Mao’s dangerous late-in-life actions.

It is also clear that China’s current leaders do not really think 1989 was “much ado about nothing.” The Party has long since abandoned its strategy of talking a lot about 1989 and trying to distort its meaning, but it still devotes great energy to imposing on the populace what Lim and others aptly call a state of amnesia about the year.

Many recent official actions can be best understood as motivated in part by a desire to minimize the chances of facing another 1989. For example, without acknowledging doing this, of course, China’s leaders have given today’s students certain things that 1989’s pred-

ecessors of these students clamored for, such as more freedom in private life, choosing who they can date, what kind of music they can listen to, and many other things that we take for granted. These are not enough. There are many things that 1989's students wanted that they have not gotten on the political front, but it is important to remember small victories even amidst defeat.

The government has also done many things since 1989 relating to protests that are colored by a desire to not have to deal with 1989 again. The government now deals harshly with outbursts that show: (A) any degree of organization; (B) link up people of different social groups; and (C) connect people in different locales. These were all key features of the 1989 struggle, as well as of Poland's contemporaneous Solidarity struggle.

When protests with none of these characteristics occur, the government now is sometimes willing to compromise with protesters or take moderate steps to end protests. But when one, two, or especially all three of the factors just mentioned come into play, the response is swift and can be brutal.

I am happy to answer questions not just about what I've had time to say, but also about how the grievances behind, and methods of, today's protests have changed since 1989 and I am happy also to reflect on some of the issues you've raised with the two ambassadors.

All I hope to have shown in this brief statement is that far from being "much ado about nothing," 1989's events were something much more, and that we can't fully appreciate 1989's significance or China's complex current situation without paying attention to that history.

Thank you.

Chairman BROWN. Thank you, Professor Wasserstrom.

Ms. Lee, thank you for your moving testimony and your courage and your being an eyewitness to history. How have witnesses and participants kept alive the memory of the 1989 demonstrations? How have you done that, and others whom I'm sure you're in touch with in some cases? What does Tiananmen mean to them 25 years later?

Ms. LEE. It's hard; really, really hard. I do really want to forget it, but they pushed me into the ambulance and they told me, you know, to tell the world. So every year in Toronto, in Hong Kong, everywhere, whenever I was interviewed by reporters and do the testimony at every event, and I would force myself to tell what I saw and what I experienced.

Every time I have to dig into the details, remembering it and imprinted in my mind. Twenty years later, maybe, I do really believe that—maybe it's already been long enough for me to be detached from the painful memory—but every time it is pretty emotional because I couldn't really forget, you know, the people there. It's not just a political crackdown, it's the contrast. There's a big contrast between people and the government. People, they are so peaceful, they are so noble, and they do believe in the power of peace.

The government, you know, who used heavy weapons to kill their people—to kill—you know, there were grandpas, grandmas, fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers, and kids. Just me—you know,

from what I saw that night, I mentioned several kids. Yes. Thank you.

Chairman BROWN. Thank you. There are few people who many of us meet who have seen and survived such a brutal event, so your talking about it is helpful to us and I think to so many with whom you come into contact. Thank you.

Dr. He and Professor Wasserstrom, this commission sort of struggles with what we talk about, the light we try to shine on human rights abuses. We sometimes think, does it undercut the safety of people whom we talk about sometimes? Does it help the situation? Does it shine lights on other parts of Chinese society? Is it a bunch of Americans preaching to another country and to the people of that other country what they should do differently? It's perhaps all those things.

Both of you, if you would—I would start with you, Dr. He. Give us your view in the historical context, what is the most important way that we should be talking about human rights and encouraging people with the courage of Ms. Lee to stand up and combat some of these issues of human rights abuse?

Ms. HE. I think very often when we talk about Tiananmen, people think that's something political, but Tiananmen is not just about politics. It is also about human beings. The personal is connected with the political, the social, and the historical. Let's not talk about abstract ideas—about whether China should have human rights, whether we want democracy. Just ask some simple questions: Should the Tiananmen Mothers have justice for their family members?

The fact that Liane and I are speaking our second language in this foreign land, telling the world what happened in our country while those voices about this central event in contemporary Chinese history are not allowed—it is strictly taboo in China, is already telling.

What are the implications for China and the world when history and memory are forbidden, erased, and twisted; when people who speak truth to power are exiled from their home, from their land, from their people?

To get back to your question about how that affected the Chinese society, the moment the government ordered its army to fire on its people in the name of national pride and economic development, it sent the message that any principle can be compromised to “become rich” and to accomplish “the rise of China.” Such mentality has become the root of major social and political problems in post-Tiananmen China.

Deng Xiaoping's clear signals to the Chinese people in the 1990s—make money any way you like but forget about all unapproved politics, religion, and related matters—grew out of the crisis of 1989. Deng's policies over the years have led to a booming economy, higher average living standards, and a more prominent place for China in the world, but have also engendered enormous wealth inequality, massive corruption, growing environmental problems, profound popular cynicism, an erosion of public trust, massive expenditures on “stability maintenance,” and new signs of belligerence on the international stage.

Chairman BROWN. Thank you.

Dr. Wasserstrom?

Mr. WASSERSTROM. I think the more that we can frame the desire for things that we want to have happen in China around the ideals that the Chinese revolution was about and that the Chinese Communist Party itself claims is central, the more effective it's going to be. To say what we're calling on the government to do, which is actually what the students in 1989 did, is to live up to their own professed ideals.

The more we can present it that way, the better—and China now has a long tradition, a 100-year-long tradition, of debating the place of what we think of as liberal rights within China. It is not a new thing to call for a free press as a way to modernize a country, it is not just something that comes from outside. There are Chinese thinkers from 100 years ago who are some of the ones, the founders, the Communist Party admired who can be quoted. This is one of the ways that I think history matters.

I think in other ways it is also important to be candid in the way that Ambassador Roy was, to acknowledge the difficulty of reaching some of these goals—the things we now take for granted were achieved through struggle and effort within the United States. They weren't things that were instantly arrived at. That's not a reason to think that it will necessarily take a very long time to achieve them in China, but rather to suggest there's a value in talking about how these things can be hard to achieve, but that countries can get there.

The Chinese Government now wants to be seen as a full player in the international arena, and you can see some ways in which it is modifying its system of rule to fit in there, but other ways that it's not, and I think there is value in calling on it to do more in that direction as well.

But also I think one point that Ambassador Lord made is crucial. There are changes over time, moves in positive and moves in negative directions. It seems too often that our position seems to be that as long as China is ruled by a Communist Party it will be flawed in exactly the same way, when in fact it does change over time.

We need to be able to have a way of talking about human rights that acknowledges shifts, so that when there is a repressive turn, as I agree there has been recently, we can put special pressure at that moment that doesn't just seem to be a continual hectoring about things in a steady fashion. So we need to have a sense of change over time.

I think things were moving in a slow, yet often positive, direction, a two steps forward/one step back one, until about 2008. Since then, for various reasons, we keep waiting for periods of tightening to be followed by periods of loosening. It seems to be that there is this kind of consistent tightening. We need to have a way of talking about that.

I think the main basis for hopefulness is that there are some ways in which potential for change can come in—some of the things that the Chinese Government has done since 1989 to sort of reposition itself in a position to stay in power has been to say, just leave us in charge and life will get better and better in ways other than the political.

When it comes to daily life matters, for a time at least it seemed that things were getting better, and many people felt they had more opportunities than their parents had. Many people in the late 1990s and early 2000s would have probably said in China, if you asked them “Do you think your life is better than that of your parents’ and do you think your children’s lives will be better than yours,” many people would have said, whatever they felt about political freedoms, that that was probably a fair assessment of things.

I think that kind of bargain is fraying, in part because of the increased worries over daily life concerns, food scares, pollution, and things like that. So I think if change is going to come from within, one possible way in which change can be—and to some extent has been—restarted, has been a shift from protesters saying, without changes we will not become a modern country to saying we’ve now become a country that in many ways is modern; without change though, modernity won’t continue to improve life but in fact is starting to damage some things. It’s not clear that our children will live a better life in this country we love than we did.

Chairman BROWN. Thank you. Thank you. Dr. Wasserstrom.  
Congressman Walz?

Representative WALZ. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you all for your testimony. I think we’re getting at the heart of this because this historical event, and obviously for Ms. Lee the personal nature of it, and the Professor, but in the broader context of what it means for us, what it means going forward. I think there’s been some very great points brought up.

My concern has always been that there are certain seminal events that, if they are not addressed, will continue to fester and will not allow some of that to happen. My belief was this was one of those. I say that being very cautious of being in the vicinity of it and of an age to kind of second-hand be there, putting an over-emphasis on it because it was partially me viewing it.

I’m very careful about that, but I think here watching this I can hear it, I can still feel it. The thing that troubled me most was how quickly—and I understand this from the history perspective—of the fear of the Cultural Revolution and again the disruptive nature of that.

People were so—I heard from people that shocked me in the summer of 1989 that the students, while it was horrible, what happened, and they were not denying it happened, they were asking too much and brought some of it on themselves. For me, it was most troubling on that because I watched this and saw that this was a critical moment. It was pivotal in human rights.

So my question is, this is not going to be commemorated at the magnitude it probably should. I would ask the question, what’s going to happen up here in Washington other than in this room on the 25th anniversary? Do either of you know? Do you know what’s going to happen, or how is this going to be viewed? Because my belief is—and Professor, you may be able to speak to this, as well as Ms. Lee. Again, do Americans know the story? Do Americans know what happened on June 3 and June 4, 1989, in your opinion?

Ms. LEE. So have you seen the candlelight vigils every year in Hong Kong at Victoria Park?

Representative WALZ. Yes.

Ms. LEE. What do you think?

Representative WALZ. Well, for me personally, I see it. But I have to tell you, I taught American high school and college students. They don't know this story. They don't know what's happening, they don't know what's there. So my question is, if this is a historical event, not to be remembered in the context of it, we don't remember major historical events just for the sake of remembering them.

The purpose of focusing on high school education, say on the Holocaust, is to ensure that it doesn't happen again by predicating what led up to it. So this issue, while talking about the deaths or whatever, has never been discussed in this broader nature. So my question is, is it our responsibility to do more on that? Because I do not deny, and in Hong Kong—but those protests or those commemorations aren't going to be widely seen here, and they're certainly not going to be widely seen, at least openly, in China. People know they're going on.

So my question to you is, what do we need to do? Because it is about the personal, it is about remembering those names, it is about remembering the people you saw, it is about remembering the grandmother. It is important. But in a broader scale, if we don't get this out there, I don't think we'll ever heal from it. I don't think it ever goes forward.

Ms. HE. Yes, of course. The Chinese society has been carrying such an open unhealed wound for the past 25 years. Citizens understand their responsibilities for a country's future by debating the moral meaning of history. Because public opinion pertaining to nationalism and democratization is inseparable from a collective memory of the nation's most immediate past, Tiananmen as a forbidden memory has profound impact on the Chinese society today.

Representative WALZ. Right.

Ms. HE. One thing the regime learned is that they need to make sure the younger generation does not repeat what the students did in 1989. I often use the metaphor of locking the doors and locking the mind. In 1989, the government locked all the doors of major campuses to prevent students from taking to the streets. But now, even though the doors are wide open, students do not take to the streets to push for political reform.

Representative WALZ. What about 30-year-old and younger Chinese?

Ms. HE. You mean—

Representative WALZ. Today. A 30-year-old living in—

Ms. HE. The immediate effect of the military crackdown was profound cynicism in Chinese society, compounded with nationalism and materialism. These "isms" are consequences of the 1989 crackdown. People would say even if you do something you are not going to change anything. Why bother?

Also, immediately after the military crackdown, after the mass arrests and purges, the government launched an elaborate campaign to re-establish its legitimacy. A patriotic education campaign was initiated.

Another thing is, in the post-1989 period, they implemented this—education campaign. Textbooks for history and politics were significantly revised to underscore the patriotic themes and put

great emphasis on China's historical victimhood at the hands of the West and Japan. But major atrocities caused by the Communist Party were not mentioned. Nationalism became increasingly evident in popular discourse.

Democratic mechanism can happen overnight, but it takes a generation to change people's minds. Without essential elements such as free speech, a free press, and free access to information, all of which students demanded in 1989, the development of the forces of a nascent civil society in China will continue to face many obstacles.

Representative WALZ. None of those things can happen if we don't talk about them.

Ms. HE. There can be citizenship without democracy, but there cannot be democracy without citizenship participation. But the regime has been punishing those who are politically active.

Mr. WASSERSTROM. When you asked if Americans know about it, I think one problem is that sometimes we remember it in a very reduced form that strips it of some of its power and its meaning. What is remembered is students in Beijing. There were protests in scores of Chinese cities, very large crowds.

By the end of the movement there were many people other than students who had followed the students onto the streets. I think we forget that there were killings in places other than Beijing. That's why I brought up the Chengdu massacre.

Also, I think we forget the themes that were involved in this, including an effort to express patriotism. Now, when we think of a complete difference, there's been a warping of nationalism. It isn't that there wasn't patriotism in 1989.

I think the government, even though it uses nationalistic protests, it tries to get people off the streets quite quickly because it knows that it's a short step from saying look at how other countries are behaving to let's talk about how our country that we love could be better governed. So there are a lot of things about it that there could be a richer understanding.

Representative WALZ. And patriotism and nationalism were not synonymous.

Mr. WASSERSTROM. Not synonymous, but they're connected.

Representative WALZ. Yes. Fair enough.

Mr. WASSERSTROM. And there are efforts to try to draw attention to the events of 1989 beyond this room, including something called the Tiananmen Initiative that some scholars have started, one of whom, Steve Levine, was here earlier and may still be here, that's available online and that is starting open letters and also just keeping track of events being held at campuses around the country to try to get to this.

Representative WALZ. Good.

Mr. WASSERSTROM. But this is a prime example of how we can use things that the Chinese Government talks about and cares about significantly itself. There's been a lot of attention lately, including just now, to call on Japan to come to terms with historical mistakes. I think to talk about this, let's come to terms with historical mistakes. Let's have more discussion in that same spirit, such as the Great Leap and things such as these.

Chairman BROWN. Thank you. Thank you, Professor. Thank you, Mr. Walz.

Mr. Meadows?

Representative MEADOWS. I just want to thank each of you for your testimony. Ms. Lee, thank you for your moving testimony. Truly, voices like yours will not be drowned out, not in 25 years, not in 50 years, if we continue to make sure that the truth is known.

Thank you for putting this in context from a historical perspective. I think it is critical for all of us to understand that if we pay attention to the true story of what happened, the magnitude as you were saying just a few minutes ago of what happened, that hopefully we will be a free society that will not repeat those things and that we will welcome our Chinese brothers and sisters in a spirit of friendship, and really, freedom.

To that end, I am committed to continuing to work for Internet freedom, for the ability to make sure that when firewalls are circumvented, that they stay circumvented where we can truly have the Chinese people speaking for the Chinese people and that that is not thwarted. I thank each of you. There's really no questions.

Mr. Chairman, I will yield back to you. I thank you for holding this hearing.

Chairman BROWN. Thank you, Congressman Meadows.

Thanks to all three of you for your passion and your commitment to justice and your work on human rights, particularly those of you that suffered doing it and all about your country.

So thanks to all three of you. Anyone on the commission may have written questions, if you would get the answers back to us as quickly as possible. Certainly Congressman Meadows and Congressman Walz and others can submit anything they want for the record, too.

The Commission is adjourned. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.]

## **A P P E N D I X**

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## PREPARED STATEMENTS

## PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR WINSTON LORD

MAY 20, 2014

Co-Chairmen, Members of the Commission:

I am honored to appear once again before this Committee. I am inspired by your renewed commemoration of events that will be enshrined in history. In the words of Lu Xun, "Lies written in ink cannot disguise facts written in blood."

We gather at a melancholy time. The Chinese authorities continue to distort and erase the Spring of 1989. They continue to withhold answers from the mothers of the fallen. And they seem more determined than ever to squash basic freedoms.

In five minutes I can only employ brush strokes to evoke the China scene and the implications for American policy. Please bear in mind, as I speak with the candor I use with my Chinese friends, that I have worked to promote relations with China ever since the Kissinger secret trip of 1971. I will continue to do so.

My three principal conclusions up front:

- The political system in China is unjust and inhumane. It is getting worse.
- American efforts to promote freedom have yielded slight results but should endure.
- The near term prospects are bleak, but in the longer run change from within will open China.

Certainly the landscape has radically changed since the disastrous 50s and 60s when even the freedom of silence was not allowed. And in certain important areas China continues to improve. Chinese can compete for college, choose their work, change their residence and travel. They can grouse loudly among friends, selectively in social media. Awesome economic progress has lifted the horizons of hundreds of millions.

But in certain key domains the screws have tightened, especially in recent years. The weekly salons for officials, academics, artists and dissidents that my wife and I hosted in the late 80's at our official residence can no longer take place. The Party persecutes not only a blind activist but also his relatives. It locks up not only a Nobel Prize winner but his ill wife. It rounds up not only reformers but those who defend them. It not only jails the troublesome but forces them to confess on television. It not only mistreats Tibetans but punishes governments that host the Dalai Lama. It not only smothers the domestic internet and media but threatens foreign journalists and spurs self-censorship from Bloomberg to Hollywood.

U.S. Administrations of both parties have tried through a variety of means to encourage greater freedom—from selective sanctions to trade conditions to private dialogues and public shaming. All to scant avail.

Other players undercut our official efforts. Few governments will even raise the subject of human rights. In America, contract-hungry business bosses, visa-anxious scholars, and access-seeking former government officials ignore, tiptoe around, even rationalize Chinese suppression.

Should we therefore bury this issue? No.

Certainly it cannot dominate our agenda, which features critical security, economic and political stakes. We derive enormous benefits from our economic relations and our bilateral exchanges. On many global problems we share common concerns and the Chinese can be helpful: The curses of terrorism and nuclear weapons. Shipping lanes and piracy. Climate change and clean energy. Health and food safety, drugs and crime.

On regional issues the Chinese posture varies—helpful on Afghanistan and Sudan, unhelpful on Syria, mixed on Iran and North Korea. And Beijing has become downright provocative and dangerous with its probes in the East China Sea, its bullying in the South China Sea, and its unilateral declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone. Indeed in its maritime encroachments it evokes Moscow's policy towards its neighbors. I can list about ten similarities.

Despite this daunting agenda, we should continue to advocate human dignity in China. This reflects our values and international norms. It maintains public and Congressional support for our overall policy. It heartens Chinese reformers. And it serves concrete national interests: free societies do not go to war against each other, harbor terrorists, hide natural and man-made disasters, or spawn refugees.

We should proceed without arrogance. Above all, we should progress at home. Gridlock and polarization in this city sabotages our championing of democratic values abroad.

Many avenues exist to nourish liberty. Private dialogue. Public stances. Exchanges between non-governmental organizations on topics like civil society, rule of law and the environment. Expand Voice of America and Radio Free Asia. Increase funding for new technology to breach the Chinese Firewall. Pursue the UN Commission's indictment of China's abetting North Korean crimes against humanity. Retaliate against the harassment of foreign journalists. Support free elections in Hong Kong.

We should thus persist across a broad front. But change in China will not result from outside encouragement or pressures. It must come from the Chinese themselves. We must appeal to China's interests. The rule of law, freedom of the press, an independent judiciary, a flourishing civil society and accountable officials would promote all of China's primary goals—economic progress, political stability, reconciliation with Taiwan, good relations with America, international stature and influence.

Members of the Commission, given the dark clouds, it is tempting to be pessimistic about the future of freedom for one-fifth of humanity. I do believe, however, that a more open society will emerge, impelled by universal aspirations, self-interest, a rising middle class, the return of students and the explosive impact of social media. No one can predict the pace or the contours of the process. We might as well consult fortune cookies.

Nevertheless, one day mothers will have answers, Chinese history books will record heroes not hooligans, and the promise of the Chinese Spring will finally shape the destinies of a great people and a great nation.

Thank You.

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF JEFFREY WASSERSTROM

MAY 20, 2014

HISTORY AND CHINA'S 1989

In May of 1990, less than a year after television audiences around the world had been stunned by images of the People's Liberation Army using brutal force to quell popular protests in China, Barbara Walters interviewed Communist Party leader Jiang Zemin for the "20/20" news program. When she asked him to comment on the chain of events of the previous year, including a massacre in the nation's capital that left at least several hundred workers, students and members of other social groups dead, Jiang made a stunning statement. He said that "much ado about nothing" was the best description for all that had happened. In this sweeping rhetorical gesture, he dismissed as unimportant the Beijing killings—killing that are known in Chinese as the "June 4th Massacre," since it was early on the morning of that day that the largest number of unarmed civilians were shot by soldiers.

Jiang's "much ado about nothing" statement also suggested that many other things that happened in 1989 were insignificant. The massive rallies calling for change, for example, that had been held in cities across China in April and May, and a second massacre that had occurred in Chengdu after the Beijing killings—one of many events germane to these hearings that is handled well in NPR correspondent Louisa Lim's powerful new book, *The People's Republic of Amnesia: Tiananmen Revisited*. His comment also implied that he thought it unimportant that, after the massacres, the government had arrested and sentenced, in some cases to very long prison terms, many activists accused of fomenting "turmoil"—a highly charged negative code word for the chaos that had beset the country during the Cultural Revolution decade of 1966 through 1976—and laying the groundwork for what an official propaganda campaign dubbed a "counter-revolutionary rebellion" that had endangered the nation. His words suggested as well that it was a small matter that, just before the massacres, the government had imposed on the nation's capital a state of martial law similar to that it had imposed on Tibet earlier in 1989 after protests there. And that it was minor thing that Zhao Ziyang—who had been elevated to the status of Deng Xiaoping's presumed heir apparent when Hu Yaobang was removed from that position in 1987, due largely to his having taken a lenient line on an earlier wave of student protests that began late in 1986 and served as a dress rehearsal of sorts for the popular struggle of 1989—had been purged and placed under house arrest.

Jiang's phrasing was deeply objectionable on many levels. It belittled the bravery of all those who gathered at Tiananmen Square and urban plazas across China in 1989 to call for an end to corruption and increased personal and political freedoms. It also belittled their patriotism—a crucial point as key themes of the protests were

that a beloved country deserved to be run by better people and that the Communist Party should do more to live up to its own professed ideals. And his statement belittled the suffering of the many protesters and bystanders slain in Beijing and Chengdu—and that of the family members of these victims.

As someone who writes and teaches about China's past for a living, I also see Jiang's comment on the events of the spring of 1989, which are known collectively in Chinese as the "June 4th Movement," as problematic in additional ways that have to do with history. Calling the demonstrations and massacres of 1989 "much ado about nothing" distorts their important place in the history of Chinese protest and repression and keeps us from appreciating the way that struggles of the past can affect new efforts to transform a society. Using this terminology also implies, in a seriously misleading way, that China's leaders were not concerned at the time by the challenge that protesters posed to their legitimacy and have not been anxious since about the legacy of 1989.

China's rulers were, in fact, deeply worried twenty-five years ago by what was happening, particularly by the mass gatherings of first students and then others as well at Tiananmen Square, a symbolically significant site where official ceremonies are often held and buildings and monuments stand that the government relies on to tell stories about the past that make Communist Party rule seem justified. And there is ample evidence that they remain worried to this day by 1989's legacy. Despite all the ways that China has changed, after all, while the Party has given up its initial strategy of talking a lot about 1989 and trying to persuade the populace to accept its skewed version of events, it has for more than two decades now devoted considerable energy to imposing what Lim and others have aptly called a state of "amnesia" about the year on the populace at large. In addition, many other things that the government has done in recent years are best understood as shaped in part by a determination to avoid facing a situation like 1989 again.

Historians like me are prone to stress with many phenomena that paying attention to the past can help place the present into a clearer perspective, but history is relevant to 1989 in particularly striking and complex ways. One reason is that protesters and their opponents both made important uses of historical analogies twenty-five years ago. Before the battle in which troops of the People's Liberation Army were deployed, there were crucial battles of words and symbols, in which both sides often invoked the past. The degree to which students did better than the government in using historical arguments and symbols in April and May of 1989 helps explain why the latter made such desperate, brutal moves that June. Much Western commentary at the time and since has referred to parallels and connections between Chinese events and things taking place in or associated with other parts of the world. Many international factors were important twenty-five years ago, when inspiring protests were unfolding in Eastern and Central Europe, when some Chinese protesters expressed admiration for Mikhail Gorbachev (whose summit trip to Beijing brought foreign camera crews to the country who would end up covering demonstrations more than meetings between officials), and when some demonstrators nodded to American symbols (such as the Statue of Liberty) and slogans (from "Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death" to "We Shall Overcome"). Ultimately, though, it is the centrality of debates, arguments and symbols rooted in China's own past that stand out as especially pertinent.

How exactly did students invoke history? They made two basic historical claims—and were joined on the streets by workers, intellectuals, journalists and others in part because these appeals to history resonated, as did the general criticism the students made of the economic fruits of reform seeming to benefit disproportionately officials and their kith and kin. The students insisted that they were following in the footsteps of the patriotic heroes of 1919's May 4th Movement, a student-led mass struggle as well known in China as the Boston Tea Party is in the U.S., and something that, similarly, is assumed by all sides to be worthy of celebrating, even as there are battles over who has the best right to claim its mantle. The students also presented Deng Xiaoping and his allies as behaving in ways that brought to mind the irrationality of the Cultural Revolution era, which so many Chinese looked on as a benighted time whose mistakes should never be repeated.

The Chinese authorities countered these two claims by insisting that they, not the students, were inheritors of the May 4th tradition and that the protests threatened to hurtle the country back into a state of Cultural Revolution-like "turmoil." They had made moves like that latter one during the protest wave of 1986–1987 that began in Hefei and peaked in Shanghai (I was an eyewitness observer of those events, though I was not in China in 1989), and this sort of rhetoric had helped convince students to return to classes. In 1989, though, the government's invocations of history largely fell flat. It was far from insignificant to China's rulers that students were being seen in 1989 as coming closer than they did to embodying cher-

ished national ideals. A pivotal symbolic moment came when the government's annual efforts to commemorate the May 4th Movement as part of "their" legacy were upstaged by student actions. On the seventieth anniversary of the 1919 struggle, the most notable gathering was one by students in Tiananmen Square. Standing near a marble frieze showing patriotic students of the May 4th generation calling on workers to join them in helping their country stand up to foreign bullying and domestic misrule, members of the Tiananmen generation read out a "New May 4th Manifesto," a rousing document demanding change.

China's leaders cared deeply that the protests were calling into questions core old and important new stories they liked to tell and needed to tell to legitimate their rule, from the notion that official corruption and authoritarianism were problems of the pre-1949 past as opposed to the present, to the idea that the Communist Party had begun to move in a dramatically new direction since Mao Zedong's death in 1976. Interestingly, as Wang Chaohua, a leader of the 1989 protests who went on to earn her doctorate in the United States and is now a Southern California-based public intellectual, pointed out at a recent UCLA forum, one thing that added force to the student charge that Deng Xiaoping and company were replaying Cultural Revolution patterns was a series of shifts in the top echelons of the Communist Party. A worrying hallmark of the last years of Mao's rule was that he periodically launched attacks on those closest to him, including two successive heirs apparent, Liu Shaoqi and then Lin Biao. Many Chinese viscerally experienced these attacks because criticism of Liu and Lin was combined in each case with mass campaigns to promote ideological purity. It seemed by the early 1980s that, to the relief of many, this combination of high party politics and public campaigns had ended, but that hope was undermined in 1987 when Hu Yaobang was stripped of his highest post, that of General Secretary of the Communist Party (even though allowed to retain a largely honorific position within the government), and an "Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization" drive was launched.

This pattern was then repeated during 1989, when Hu's successor Zhao Ziyang, who had been targeted in some early student posters as one of the many top officials whose family members were benefitting unfairly from the economic reforms, ended up becoming the second heir in a row to fall for taking too "soft" a line toward a protest wave. Once again, though in a way far more devastating than the drive against "bourgeois liberalization" of 1987, this shift in heirs was linked to a broad campaign, in this case to rid the country of "counter-revolutionary" elements, such as 2010 Nobel Peace Prize recipient Liu Xiaobo and other alleged "black hands" behind the protests.

Turning from historical argument during 1989 to China's more recent political history, two things are particularly important to note. One is that, while the June 4th Movement was crushed, the Communist Party, in seeking to avoid future large scale protests of a similar sort, has, in a sense, given in to some student demands of the time while refusing to budge on others. Among the many wishes of 1989's youths was to see the Party back off from micromanaging their private lives, allowing them more freedom to do things such as listen to music they liked, socialize on campuses as they wanted, and read more widely in international literature. With some important exceptions (such as tight censorship of foreign publications dealing with hot button issues, from Tibet and the Dalai Lama to the events of 1989 themselves), later generations of Chinese students have been able to have private lives of the sort their predecessors dreamed of. It is easy to check off areas where the government has not budged, of course, including not only regarding calls for political liberalization and more democracy, but also the demand that the authorities admit that 1989's protesters were patriots acting to improve the country, not hooligans trying to destroy it. Still, partial victories in amid defeat should be acknowledged.

The second way in which the government's desire to avoid facing another challenge like that of 1989 matters is it helps us make sense of officials' responses to protests in the 1990s and in the opening years of the 21st century. International currents certainly matter here. China's rulers have spent a lot of time trying to figure out how best to prevent local variants of Poland's Solidarity or Arab Spring uprisings from taking place. There are also special factors involved in the harsh ways that the Communist Party has dealt with unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang. Still, a concern with trying to avoid what top officials see as mistakes they made in 1989—the main error in their minds, I think, not the use of force but allowing the struggle to grow as large as it did before that point—has influenced government responses to many outbursts. And in a sense, even the fear of Solidarity, Arab Spring, Color Revolutions and the like, as well as policies toward Tibet and Xinjiang, are inflected a degree by concern with what happened in April-June 1989.

I've written extensively about this topic elsewhere, as have others, but in a nutshell, the government's approach to protest since 1989 has been to take particularly

strong lines against outbursts that show (a) any degree of organization, (b) draw together people of different social groups, and (c) link people in different parts of the country. These were all key features of the June 4th Movement. When protests take place that do not have any of these characteristics, the government is sometimes willing to deal with them gently, perhaps give in to some specific demands made by those who take to the streets, and see them as a way that people can let off steam. Some leaders may be punished, some concessions given are then taken back, and so on, but a flexible and measured approach is common. On the other hand, when one, two or especially all three of the factors just listed come into play, even something that is totally unlike the 1989 protests in terms of specifics will be dealt with severely. The classic example here is the harsh crackdown on Falun Gong after the organization staged a large-scale sit-in in central Beijing in April 1999. But, more recently, it also seems fair to say that one of the reasons for the brutal means used against activists in Tibet and Xinjiang is the government's concern that protests there quickly connect people of different social groups and disparate locals within the large regions that have significant Tibetan or Uighur populations.

Much more could be said not just about the issues raised above, but also about the kinds of grievances that agitate people in China now and bring them to the streets in tens of thousands of protests a year, and about how the concerns expressed in current outbursts at times echo and at times diverge from those that exercised 1989's demonstrators. And I would certainly be happy to answer questions about current protests as well as about 1989 and its legacy during the May 20 CECC Hearing. What I hope at least to have demonstrated in this short statement is that the events of April-June 1989 were very far from being "much ado about nothing" and that placing them into historical perspective is not just of some use but crucial to understanding China's recent past and China's complicated present.

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. SHERROD BROWN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO;  
CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

MAY 20, 2014

Today, we remember an event that occurred 25 years ago, but that continues to resonate in so many ways.

Twenty-five years ago, millions of people across China—not just in Beijing's Tiananmen Square, but across China—rallied in support of democracy, human rights, and an end to corruption.

Like many Americans at the time, I was inspired and moved by their courage and their pursuit of those fundamental freedoms—freedoms that we hold dear—and at times—take for granted.

I recall the optimism of that moment and how it was crushed when the troops and the tanks rolled in.

Today, we assess what the last 25 years have meant and what our policy toward China should be going forward.

In my view, opportunities were missed after Tiananmen.

We missed an opportunity to integrate China into the global community, while also ensuring that our economic interests were protected and that China moved in the right direction on political reform.

Not an easy task, to be sure, but 25 years later, China is still a fundamentally undemocratic country and one that stubbornly refuses to play by the international rule of law.

In many respects, China reaped the benefits of open trade with the rest of the world, while avoiding many of its obligations.

Today, 800 million Chinese people still do not enjoy the basic right to vote.

Chinese citizens, including those who in recent weeks have bravely tried to commemorate Tiananmen, are imprisoned—simply for peacefully exercising their rights to free speech, assembly, and religion. These include human rights lawyer Pu Zhiqiang and writer Hu Shigen.

A generation of people—inside and outside China—knows little about the events that transpired 25 years ago, other than the government's official line.

Emboldened by growing economic clout that we in many ways supported, China's Communist leaders are sowing instability through alarming and increasingly risky attempts to exert its territorial claims in the region.

And just yesterday we were reminded of the lengths China will go to gain an unfair advantage for its state-owned enterprises and industries. The Department of Justice charged five members of China's People's Liberation Army with hacking into the computers networks of the United Steelworkers Union and major U.S. compa-

nies like U.S. Steel, Alcoa, and Allegheny Technologies. And this is just the tip of the iceberg.

In 1989, our trade deficit with China stood at \$6 billion.

By 2013, the trade deficit had grown more than 50 times to \$318 billion—the highest ever. That trade deficit and China’s currency manipulation has cost Americans millions of jobs.

In the end, we compromised too much and bought into the myth that China’s economic integration after Tiananmen would inevitably bring about human rights and respect for international rules.

In my view, that’s not what happened.

The question now is, how do we fashion a better policy toward China?

Through this Commission, we have tried to honor the memory of Tiananmen by making sure China’s human rights and rule of law record is not forgotten in our discussions over China.

Over the past year, we have highlighted many concerns—cybertheft, threats to democracy in Hong Kong, illegal and unfair trade practices, denials of visas to foreign journalists, food safety, environmental, and public health concerns, and a crackdown on human rights activists, including Ilham Tohti, a peaceful advocate for the Uyghur minority group.

In the Senate, I have pushed a bipartisan bill to combat China’s currency manipulation.

It is my hope that we have an open and transparent debate about our China policy—whether it be on trade agreements that relate to China or on growing Chinese foreign investment in this country.

Our debate must give proper weight, rather than ignore our concerns over human rights, the rule of law, labor, public health, and the environment.

Above all, the debate must include all segments of our society, from our workers and small businesses, to NGOs and human rights groups, instead of just being led by powerful interest groups such as large corporations, some of which have a checkered history with China.

It is only in doing so, and continuing to work for improvements on China’s human rights and rule of law record, that we can faithfully honor the memory of Tiananmen and ensure that the sacrifices were not made in vain.

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER SMITH, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM  
NEW JERSEY; COCHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

MAY 20, 2014

Twenty-five years ago the world watched as millions of Chinese gathered, all across China, to peacefully demand political reform and democratic openness. The hopes and promises of those heady days ended with needless violence—tears, bloodshed, arrests and exile.

We must continue to honor the sacrifices endured by the pro-democracy movement, by advocates for independent labor unions, and those demanding fundamental human rights for all Chinese. Mothers lost sons, fathers lost daughters, and China lost an idealistic generation to the tanks that rolled down Tiananmen Square on June 4th, 1989.

Tiananmen Square has come to symbolize the brutal lengths the Chinese Communist Party will go to remain in power.

We remember Tiananmen annually here in Congress because of its enduring impact on U.S.-China relations. We remember it also because an unknown number of people died, were arrested, and exiled for simply seeking universally-recognized freedoms. And we will continue to remember Tiananmen until the Chinese people are free to discuss openly the tragic events of June 3–4, 1989, without censorship, harassment, or arrest. We in Congress remain committed to the people of China struggling peacefully for human rights and the rule of law.

The prospects for greater civil and political rights in China seems as remote today as it did the day after the tanks rolled through the Square. In 1989 the Chinese government used guns and tanks to suppress the people’s demands for freedom and transparency. In 2014 they use arrests, discrimination, torture, and censorship to discourage those who seek basic freedoms and human rights.

The means may change, but the ends remain the same—crush dissent at all costs because it challenges the authority of the Communist Party.

This has been one of the worst years, in the recent memory, for the suppression of human rights activists and civil society. Xi Jinping’s tenure as President, which

started with so much promise of new beginnings, has proven that the old tactics of repression will be used liberally against dissent.

Top Communist Party leaders regularly unleash bellicose attacks on “universal values” and “Western ideals.” In the past year, over 220 people have been detained for their defense of human rights.

The more things change in China, the more they stay the same.

While the hopes of the Tiananmen Square demonstrators have not yet been realized, their demands for freedom of speech, basic human rights, political reforms and the end of government abuse and corruption, continue to inspire the Chinese people today. These are universal desires, not limited by culture or language or history.

There is an impressive and inspiring drive in Chinese civil society to keep fighting for freedom under very difficult and dangerous conditions. This drive is the most important asset in promoting human rights and democratization in the country. If democratic change comes to China, it will come from within, not because of outside pressure.

U.S. policy, in both the short and long-term, must be, and be seen to be, supportive of advocates for peaceful change; supportive of the champions of liberty, and of those Chinese civil society seeking to promote rights and freedoms for everyone, not only to pad the economic bottom-line.

Our strategic and moral interests coincide when we seek to promote human rights and democratic openness in China. A more democratic China, one that respects human rights, and is governed by the rule of law, is more likely to be a productive and peaceful partner rather than strategic and hostile competitor.

This future should also be in China’s interests, because the most prosperous and stable societies are those that protect religious freedom, the freedom of speech, and the rule of law.

We in Congress remain committed to the people of China struggling for universal freedoms and we urge the Chinese government to learn from the past and embrace the greater openness, democracy, and respect for human rights that its people called for 25 years ago, and continue to call for today.

