[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
IRAN NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS: FROM EXTENSION TO FINAL AGREEMENT?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 29, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-201
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida--resigned 1/27/ GRACE MENG, New York
14 deg. LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida
LUKE MESSER, Indiana--resigned 5/
20/14 noon deg.
SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin--
added 5/29/14 noon
CURT CLAWSON, Florida
added 7/9/14 noon
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Wendy R. Sherman, Under Secretary for Political
Affairs, U.S. Department of State.............................. 5
The Honorable David S. Cohen, Under Secretary for Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence, U.S. Department of the Treasury........ 14
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Wendy R. Sherman: Prepared statement............... 8
The Honorable David S. Cohen: Prepared statement................. 16
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 60
Hearing minutes.................................................. 61
IRAN NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS: FROM EXTENSION TO FINAL AGREEMENT?
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TUESDAY, JULY 29, 2014
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:08 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Royce
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Mr. Royce. This hearing will come to order.
This afternoon we assess the past 6 months of nuclear
diplomacy with Iran and ask if a viable agreement is achievable
by November 24th.
The administration, along with the United Kingdom, France,
Russia, China, and Germany, has been seeking to negotiate a
long-term comprehensive solution to Iran's nuclear program
since last fall. With these negotiations, Iran has agreed to
limit its nuclear program in return for some sanctions relief.
Should a final agreement be reached, it would permit Iran to
maintain a mutually defined enrichment program and be treated
like any other nonnuclear weapons state party to the
nonproliferation treaty.
At the outset of these negotiations, the administration
aggressively pushed back on Congressional attempts to give our
negotiators more leverage with added sanctions to go into force
should negotiations fail. The legislation that Ranking Member
Engel and I authored and, frankly, was passed with 400 votes
out of the House of Representatives would have given Iran's
leadership a choice between compromise and economic collapse.
We will never know if that prospect would have made a
difference over the past 6 months. But we do know that talks
haven't accomplished much to date without this pressure.
Indeed, just days before the recent deadline, the Iranian
foreign minister was offering an Iranian freeze of its current
19,000 centrifuges for several years. Is the status quo the
best Iran is offering after 6 months of negotiations, a status
quo, by the way, that has Iran enriching more uranium?
The committee has continued its intense focus on Iran,
holding a series of hearings. And, among the challenges,
nonproliferation specialists told us that, even if the number
of Iran's centrifuges were drastically cut to 4,000, Iran would
still have a breakout capacity of just 3 months. Of course,
Iran's Supreme Leader is pushing for some 190,000 centrifuges.
Experts stressed that an effective verification regime
would require measures that go well beyond those in the
standard safeguards agreement and the additional protocol.
Former U.S. and IAEA officials noted that failing to
understand the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear
program would make it impossible to verify that Iran's nuclear
program is completely peaceful in nature. It took 17 years for
the IAEA to conclude that South Africa's nuclear program was
entirely peaceful, and that was with the cooperation of its new
government. Iran is mightily resisting this critical
transparency.
Former Secretary of State Clinton warned this weekend that
any enrichment inside Iran will trigger an arms race in the
Middle East. Also, many don't realize that any limits placed on
Iran's nuclear program as part of the comprehensive solution
will expire. In this respect, the final agreement is just
another interim step with the real final step being the
treatment of Iran as any other nonnuclear weapon NPT state.
That means no sanctions, no restrictions on procurement of
nuclear items, and certainly no restrictions on the number of
centrifuges it can spin or the level to which it may enrich
uranium. With such status, Iran could enrich on an industrial
scale, claiming the desire to sell enriched uranium on the
international market, as does France. Iran could also enrich
uranium to levels near the weapons grade, claiming the desire
to power a nuclear navy. That is what Brazil is doing.
Of course, Iran isn't France or Brazil. That was evident
when the committee examined Iran's behavior across the board.
We heard from one former Iranian political protester and
former prisoner that at least 750 people have been executed in
Iran without due process in the past year.
Today Iran's work--work of the regime is on full display,
as hundreds of rockets and missiles have rained down on
southern Israel, from 2,500 in total. It is Iran that provides
the weapons, provides funding, provides training to Hamas and
other Palestinian terror groups. As one former intelligence
official testified, ``Iran's nuclear program is just the tip of
a revolutionary spear that extends across the world and
threatens key U.S. interests.''
Ambassador Sherman, you have your work cut out for you. I
am not sure how we reach an agreement that advances U.S.
national security, given Iran's deep commitment to an extremely
dangerous nuclear program. But one thing is clear. Come
November there will be additional sanctions if there is no deal
that is struck.
But as the administration charts its course, I trust that
you will be in close touch with this committee. That is
especially important, given the significant changes to our Iran
sanctions policy that are to be considered.
And, as you know, Mr. Engel and I recently sent a letter to
the President signed by 342 of our colleagues expecting such
close coordination. America is stronger when we work together.
And I now recognize the ranking member for any opening
comments he may have.
Mr. Engel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding
this important hearing.
Let me thank our witnesses for appearing today, Ambassador
Sherman, Under Secretary Cohen. We have met with you many
times, and America thanks you for the good work both of you
have done and continue to do.
After 6 months of talks between the P5+1 and Iran under the
Joint Plan of Action, the parties have agreed to an extension
for 4 months. I support this extension, but not indefinitely.
Over the next 4 months, Iran will continue to abide by all
the restrictions in the JPOA and undertake two new commitments.
First, converting its 20 percent enriched uranium oxide into
nuclear fuel rods--these rods are very difficult to convert
back into a form that could be used for a nuclear weapon.
Secondly, diluting its up to 2 percent stockpile. In exchange,
Iran will have access to an additional 2.8 billion in frozen
assets.
The JPOA has led to some positive outcomes. Iran's economy
continues to feel the pressure of international sanctions.
Limitations on enrichment have lengthened the period of time to
Iran's nuclear breakout point.
If the United States and our allies think there may be a
light at the end of the tunnel, then it is worth pursuing this
track for a little bit longer. But, as we move forward, I am
reminded of what Secretary Kerry said at the start of the
process: ``No deal is better than a bad deal.''
What was true 6 months ago is true now. So today I hope we
can take a hard look at some of the remaining concerns. No deal
is better than a bad deal. I hope, though, that we will all
agree on what a bad deal is and what is good deal is.
First, I want to reiterate my disappointment that Iran has
been allowed to continue enriching under the JPOA. Especially
after negotiating the nuclear gold standard deal with the
United Arab Emirates, Iran doesn't seem like the best candidate
for even a civil nuclear program. I am curious what we would
need to see from the Iranians in order for them to prove that
their nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.
In addition, the JPOA deals with declared facilities. What
concerns me more is the possibility that there are undeclared
facilities. We all know that Iran excels in keeping its nuclear
program under a cloak of secrecy.
They built their Fordow Enrichment Facility into the side
of a mountain. So while Iran has given the IAEA access to their
declared facilities, I worry that there are other facilities
that we don't know about. They have done it before, and they
could do it again.
Looking down the line, I am also concerned about what Iran
could get in return for a comprehensive deal. Iran currently
has over a $100 billion in frozen assets abroad and that
doesn't even include the money that Iran could make if oil
sanctions were lifted and business life were to return to
normal. Money could still be used to finance Iran's
destabilizing activities across the region, even if sanctions
relief were to come in phases.
You know, you look at the Israeli-Gaza war, the Israeli-
Hamas war right now and--Hamas being a terrorist organization,
they have gotten nearly all of their weapons and missiles from
Iran. So it is not only a matter of Iran's nuclear problems, it
is a matter that Iran continues to be the largest supporter of
terrorism around the world.
Iran continues to be the leading state sponsor of
terrorism, providing support to Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran
continues to prop up the murderous Assad regime and continues
to oppress its own people. We will need assurances that
sanctions relief doesn't just mean funneling more money into
the hands of terrorists.
I would be delighted if the Iranians agreed to a deal that
foreclosed any pathway to a nuclear bomb. But just as President
Obama put the chance of success at 50/50, I too remain
skeptical. We can't afford a bad deal that will threaten our
allies and our interests, and we must be prepared to walk away,
if necessary. And if negotiations go south, we must be prepared
to level additional sanctions to squeeze Iran's economy. Iran
must understand that all their actions have consequences.
As the chairman just pointed out, the bill that both of us
authored passed with over 400 votes--or 400 votes, the entire
House, and passed unanimously out of this committee. All
Democrats and all Republicans voted for the bill. The Congress
feels very, very strongly that sanctions should be right there
so that Iran will understand what it faces if it doesn't
negotiate in good faith.
And, of course, when we look at the bottom line for these
negotiations, we want to see the timetable pushed back so it
will take Iran a longer time to have breakout in producing a
bomb. Obviously, that is something that we are all concerned
with and must be ironclad into the negotiations--into the final
agreement.
So, Mr. Chairman, let me say this. There is no difference
between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. We understand
that Iran is a bad player. We understand that Iran doesn't
negotiate in good faith. And we understand that Iran must
understand that all options remain on the table and that those
are not mere words, that those words have teeth.
If the Iranians believe all options are on the table,
perhaps they will begin to negotiate in good faith. If they
really don't believe that, there is little incentiveness for
them to negotiate in good faith.
So, again, I thank our witnesses for being here today, and
I look forward to their testimony.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Engel.
This afternoon we are pleased to be joined by senior
representatives from the Department of State and the Department
of Treasury.
It is good to have Under Secretary Wendy Sherman with us.
And she has held numerous positions throughout the years in the
Department of State, and Ambassador Sherman served as vice
chair of the Albright Stonebridge Group prior to that.
David Cohen is the Treasury Department's Under Secretary.
He is focused on fighting money laundering and the financing of
terrorism. And prior to his Senate confirmation in 2011, he
served as the assistant secretary for terrorist financing. And
he practiced law prior to that in Washington.
So we welcome you back. And, without objection, your full
prepared statements will be made part of the record.
And members here will have 5 calendar days to submit
statements or questions or extraneous material for the record.
And, of course, we will begin with Ambassador Wendy
Sherman.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WENDY R. SHERMAN, UNDER SECRETARY
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Sherman. Thank you very much, Chairman Royce,
Ranking Member Engel, and distinguished members of the
committee.
I am very pleased to be here this afternoon along with
Under Secretary Cohen to discuss the status of negotiations
related to Iran's nuclear program. You have my written
statement; so, I will summarize some key points.
Mr. Chairman and members, our goal all--of our goal is to
prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. The diplomatic
process in which we are currently engaged was designed to
achieve that goal peacefully and durably.
We have a basic metric for a good agreement, one that cuts
off all of Iran's potential paths to a nuclear weapon, the
plutonium path with the current Arak reactor, the path through
the underground facility at Fordow, the path through swift
breakout at the Natanz enrichment plant, and the path that
would occur in secret, which we will deal with through
intrusive monitoring and transparency measures.
And we will tie our sanctions relief to Iran's performance,
only providing relief to Iran after it has taken verifiable
steps as part of a comprehensive agreement and maintain the
capacity to tighten the pressure if Iran fails to comply.
I cannot tell you today that our diplomacy will succeed
because I am not sure that it will. I can tell you that, in the
past 6 months, we have made significant and steady progress. We
have exchanged ideas, narrowed gaps on key issues, and
identified areas where more hard work is required.
For instance, we have had productive discussions about how
to reduce the dangers posed by the facilities at Iraq and
Fordow, about the protocols necessary for transparency, and
about the disposition of Iran's stockpiles of enriched uranium.
No issues have been neglected, but none have been finally
decided, because nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.
And, on some, we still have substantial differences, including
the overall question of enrichment capacity.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, there is some limit to how
detailed I can be in this open session and still preserve the
leverage we need in support of the goal we seek. However, the
bottom line is that all serious obstacles remain. We have been
moving in the right direction.
For that reason, roughly 2 weeks ago, the parties to the
negotiation agreed to extend our deliberations for 4 additional
months. We agreed to this extension because we had seen
significant progress in the negotiating room and because we can
see a path forward, however difficult, to get to a
comprehensive plan of action.
We will use this time to continue working toward that
comprehensive plan for ensuring that Iran does not obtain a
nuclear weapon and that its nuclear program is exclusively
peaceful.
I note that a year ago Iran's nuclear program was growing
and becoming more dangerous with each passing day. That is no
longer the case. Last November, as the first step in this
negotiation, we reached consensus on a Joint Plan of Action.
In return for limited and targeted sanctions relief, Iran
agree to freeze and even roll back key elements of its nuclear
activities. In fact, the JPOA has temporarily blocked each of
the paths Iran would need to go down to build a nuclear weapon.
Many observers openly doubted whether Iran would keep its
commitments under the Joint Plan of Action. But according to
the IAEA, Iran has done what it promised to do during these
past 6 months. The result is a nuclear program that is more
constrained, more transparent, and better understood than it
was a year ago, a program that has been frozen for the first
time in almost a decade.
Meanwhile, as Under Secretary Cohen will make clear,
sanctions relief for Iran will remain limited to amounts that
will do little, if anything, to heal Iran's deep-seated
economic problems. Over the next 4 months, the valuable
safeguards that freeze Iran's nuclear program will remain in
place as we strive to negotiate a comprehensive and longer-term
plan.
I will be blunt and say that we will never rely on words
alone when it comes to Iran. We have and we will insist that
commitments be monitored and verified and that the terms of
access and inspection be thoroughly spelled out. Our goal is to
structure an agreement that would make any attempt to break out
so visible and so time-consuming that Iran would either be
deterred from trying or stopped before it could succeed.
Speaking more generally, I want to emphasize that
engagement on one issue does not require and will not lead to
silence on others. The United States will not hesitate to
express its views and to put pressure on Iran when that is
warranted, whether in relation to the government's abysmal
human rights record, its support for terrorism, its hostility
toward Israel, its defense of political prisoners, journalists,
and American citizens.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, on this issue,
we are united in our goals. We are determined that Iran not
obtain a nuclear weapon. It is only because of the leverage,
created by the executive and legislative branches of this
government, by our allies and partners and by the United
Nations Security Council, that Iran has come to the negotiating
table in what we believe to be a serious way.
But we all know that sanctions are a means, not an end. We
are now in the process of determining whether the end we seek
can be achieved through a diplomatic process. That effort is
worthwhile because a positive outcome would be preferable to
any alternative.
A comprehensive agreement would ease anxiety and enhance
stability throughout the Middle East. It would reduce the
likelihood of a regional nuclear arms race. It would eliminate
the potential threat of nuclear blackmail. It would contribute
to the security of Israel and our partners throughout the
region. And it would make our own citizens safer.
Between now and November, we will continue our pursuit of
these welcome ends, and it is with those high purposes in mind
that I respectfully ask your continued support.
Thank you, once again, for the opportunity to be here. And
I will be pleased to respond to questions in as much detail as
I possibly can in this open session.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Sherman follows:]
----------
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Ambassador Sherman.
We go now to Mr. Cohen.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAVID S. COHEN, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
TERRORISM AND FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel,
and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for your
invitation to appear before you today alongside my colleague,
Ambassador Sherman, to discuss the extended Joint Plan of
Action.
I will focus my oral testimony this afternoon on our
efforts to maintain intense pressure on Iran to help achieve a
successful outcome in the negotiations over its nuclear program
and the ever-mounting pressure that Iran will continue to face
during the extended Joint Plan of Action period as the P5+1
seeks the comprehensive and long-term resolution to the
international community's concerns over Iran's nuclear program.
When we announced the Joint Plan last November, we said
that we did not expect the relief package in the Joint Plan of
Action to materially improve the Iranian economy. And it
hasn't. The depths of Iran's economic distress, distress that
resulted, in large measure, from the collaborative efforts of
Congress, the administration, and our international partners,
dwarf the limited relief in the Joint Plan of Action.
And so today, as we start to implement the extended Joint
Plan of Action, Iran remains in a deep economic hole. The value
of Iran's currency, the rial, has declined by about 7 percent
since the Joint Plan of Action was announced last November.
Since 2011, Iran has lost about $120 billion in oil
revenues. It lost $20 billion in revenues in the first 6 months
of the Joint Plan of Action and stands to lose an additional
$15 billion in oil revenues during the next 4 months alone. And
Iran's economy today is 25 percent smaller than it would have
been had it remained on its pre-2011 growth trajectory.
Now, when we entered into the Joint Plan of Action, some
predicted that our sanctions regime would crumble, and some
also argued that Iran's economy would rebound dramatically.
Neither occurred. The fact is, as we enter the 4-month
extension of the Joint Plan, our sanction regime remains robust
and Iran's economy continues to struggle. And we remain
confident that 4 months from now our sanctions will continue to
bite and Iran's economy will remain under great stress.
The $3 billion to $4 billion worth of relief that the
extended Joint Plan of Action may provide Iran pales in
comparison to what Iran needs to dig itself out of its deep
economic hole. And we expect that firms will continue to shun
Iran, as was the case during the first 6 months of the Joint
Plan of Action. Firms have good reason to remain reluctant
about doing business in Iran.
The overwhelming majority of our sanctions remain in place.
Iran continues to be cut off from the international financial
system and is largely unable to attract foreign investments.
Iran is still shut out of the United States, the world's
largest and most vibrant economy, and precluded from
transacting in the dollar.
And our sweeping set of nearly 680 Iran-related sanctions
designations, developed in concert with partners around the
world, remains in place.
Throughout the Joint Plan of Action period, we have also
vigorously enforced our sanctions, recognizing the essential
role that financial pressure played in the lead-up to and now
during the Joint Plan of Action, and how important maintaining
that pressure will continue to be during this extended JPOA
period.
Indeed, since the joint plan was negotiated, we have
imposed sanctions on more than 60 entities and individuals
around the world for evading U.S. sanctions against Iran,
aiding Iranian nuclear and missile proliferation, supporting
terrorism, and for abusing human rights.
Throughout this short-term extension of the Joint Plan of
Action, I can assure you that we will continue to make certain
through word and deed that banks, businesses, brokers, and
others around the world understand that Iran is not open for
business and Iran will not be open for business unless and
until it assures the international community of the exclusively
peaceful nature of its nuclear program.
While this 4-month extension will provide additional time
and space for the negotiations to proceed, it will not change
the basic fact that Iran's sanctions-induced economic distress
has not receded.
And over the next 4 months, my colleagues and I within
Treasury and throughout the administration will continue to
echo President Obama's clear message, namely, that we will come
down like a ton of bricks on those who seek to evade our
sanctions. That will help provide our negotiators leverage as
we explore the possibility of a comprehensive and long-term
resolution to the international community's concerns over
Iran's nuclear program.
I am happy to answer any questions the committee may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen follows:]
----------
Mr. Royce. Thank you. Thank you.
I had a couple of questions, and one I was going to start
with is this sunset clause. I am very concerned about the way
this clause would work.
Once this agreement expires, Iran's nuclear program would
be treated just like Japan's or just like Germany's. With such
status, it would be very easy for Iran to produce material for
many nuclear weapons.
One witness we had before this committee characterized this
provision as ``converting Iran from a nuclear pariah,'' in his
words, ``to a nuclear partner, a giant get-out-of-jail-free
card for Iran,'' in his words.
Do you dispute this characterization?
Ambassador Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I believe that any comprehensive agreement with Iran must
have an extremely long duration. It has been decades that the
international community has had concerns about Iran's nuclear
program.
The United States had a public National Intelligence
Estimate that said, until 2003, Iran was attempting to build a
nuclear weapon and had such a program. We have maintained our
concerns about Iran's program even since 2003, and that is the
whole reason for this negotiation.
So I believe that any comprehensive agreement must have a
very long duration before Iran would, in fact, meet the
standards required under the U.N. Security Council resolutions
to be treated as a nonnuclear weapons NPT state.
Along that road, they would be the subject of quite
intrusive monitoring, transparency, and verification measures
carried out by the IAEA. During that time, they would have, if
they end up with an indigenous enrichment program, very small,
very limited, to practical needs, very focused on intrusive
monitoring, to ensure that there were no covert operations.
Their issues concerning possible military dimensions would have
to be addressed. Their research and development would have to
be constrained in quite significant ways.
So we would, in essence, be slowing down their ability to
get to that kind of industrial-scale capacity that the Supreme
Leader spoke of in his aspirational speech.
Mr. Royce. And the Ayatollah--his views may evolve over
time, but he just called again for the end of Israel. And I saw
that, on Friday, they orchestrated and the government printed
out these ``Death to Israel'' placards and ``Death to America''
placards.
And from--converging in nine different parts of the city,
you had this group meet at the city center. 700 towns and
cities. The government orchestrated this rally--``Death to
Israel'' rally.
So, clearly, we are up against an attitude here that is
pretty pronounced. And you have heard me comment before about
some of the Ayatollah's statements about the ICBM ballistic
missiles.
A central component of a nuclear program is that delivery
capability. He is talking about mass-producing these, the basic
duty of every military man to be involved in this.
Will a long-term agreement include limitations on their
ballistic missile production? And will it include robust
monitoring and verification on that front?
And why did the interim agreement not explicitly require
Iran to follow U.N. Security Council resolutions to stop its
effort to develop a nuclear-capable ballistic missile, which,
as we know, they are testing?
Ambassador Sherman. What we have said in this negotiation
and what is under discussion is that Iran must address all the
provisions of U.N. Security Council resolutions.
And, in 1929, there is a specific reference to any kind of
delivery mechanism, long-range ballistic missile, for delivery
of nuclear weapons. And so that has to be addressed in some way
in this agreement. And it is under discussion, but not yet
resolved.
Chairman Royce. Thank you.
I am going to forgo the rest of my time. We are going to
hold everybody to 5 minutes and get down to some of our junior
members for their questioning.
Mr. Engel, you are next.
Mr. Engel. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
What do we estimate the time for Iran for achieve breakout
now? And what would we consider a good deal? How far would we
have to push them back to have this considered a good deal?
Ambassador Sherman. I think, Mr. Engel, that it would be
best to discuss breakout times with the intelligence community
in a classified briefing.
But I will tell you that most analysts out in the public
say that right now Iran's breakout time is about 2 months. And,
by that, I mean how much time, if they decided to go for it,
they could produce enough highly enriched uranium for one
nuclear weapon.
There are two paths to a nuclear weapon in terms of fissile
material, which I know you well know. But for all members, one
is highly enriched uranium. That is Natanz and Fordow. And one
is plutonium. That is the current configuration of the Arak
reactor. And we want to stop and block both of those pathways
as well as the covert pathway.
I have said publicly that we believe that we need to go
many months beyond that to achieve the kind of assurance that
we are looking for that Iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon.
Mr. Engel. We voted on an agreement with the United Arab
Emirates, which for a long time was considered the gold
standard in civil nuclear cooperation, in which we agreed to
allow them to have nuclear power for peaceful purposes in
exchange for not enriching on their soil.
If we are indeed going to have an agreement with Iran which
allows them to enrich on their soil, how can we ever get
countries that come after Iran to agree to an agreement--a one-
two-three agreement similar to the one that the UAE agreed to?
Ambassador Sherman. This is obviously an area of concern,
as you point out, Congressman. We have discussed this with UAE
and many other countries, in fact.
But what we are looking at here, if we are able to achieve
a comprehensive agreement--and, as I said, I don't know whether
we will or not because Iran has to make some very difficult
decisions, and I am not sure whether they will or not--is that
it will be a very small, highly constrained, intrusively
monitored program.
And they will have years of that kind of intrusive
monitoring. I don't think that is a road that will be
attractive to anyone else to go down, but it is something on
which we are having continuing conversations.
We believe, quite frankly, as you know, that Iran would be
better off without any enrichment program. You can get fuel on
the open market. They have argued, in fact, that they should be
able to fuel Bushehr, which the Russians currently fuel and
have made a guarantee for life. We believe that Russia should
continue to fuel Bushehr and Iran has no need to do so.
So anything that ends up in this agreement, if it does, on
the enrichment side will be very small, very limited to a
practical need, intrusively monitored, and not a path that we
think will be attractive to anyone else.
Mr. Engel. You mentioned that Iran has been keeping some of
its promises and has shown some flexibility, but in terms of
the question of their enrichment capacity, there has been less
flexibility.
Can you elaborate on that at all? Or, if you can't, what
would make us think that they would suddenly see the light and
have some flexibility?
Ambassador Sherman. Well, what I would say is that we have
said that their current capacity has to be severely limited and
that where their program would begin in any agreement would
have to be much smaller than what they currently have.
We are approaching this in quite a holistic way. We are
looking at all the ways in which Iranian enrichment capacity
could be misused. Any arrangement in which we reach will be
designed to address any problem that might come along the way.
So we will look at capacity. We will look at advanced
centrifuges, which could increase their capacity over time. We
will deal with R&D. We will deal with their separate work
units, which is the measure of the energy in their production.
We will deal with stockpiles. We will deal with facilities. We
will deal with the monitoring quite intrusively.
And any arrangement that we might get to an agreement on
will ensure that, if we close the front door, that Iran cannot
enter through a back door. It is very complicated. It is highly
technical.
Some of my colleagues who are part of our expert team sit
behind me. Quite frankly, it is a whole-of-government effort.
The Department of Energy has been a tremendous partner, as have
our labs, to make sure that, should we get to an agreement, we
know exactly what we are getting down to the finest technical
detail.
Mr. Engel. Under Secretary Cohen, let me just ask you a
very quick question.
The sanctions relief would be based on a phased system,
including waivers. Will the Iranians, do you believe, accept a
deal that relies on waivers, not permanent relief? And how
would you think that Congress--anticipate Congress' involvement
in this?
Mr. Cohen. Congressman, I am not going to venture a guess
on whether the Iranians will accept a deal based on waivers.
Perhaps Under Secretary Sherman wants to address that.
In terms of Congress' role, as you say, the notion for a
comprehensive deal is one where whatever relief is offered to
Iran is phased in over time and is tied to Iran taking
verifiable steps along the way.
It is very important that we maintain pressure during the
course of that period so that, initially, what we have is
sanctions that are suspended, not lifted, and then eventually,
perhaps, move to lifting the sanctions.
But in the near term, the notion would be that we would
suspend sanctions through the exercise of our authorities.
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I would just reiterate what the chairman said before.
Our letter to the President signed by three-quarters of
Congress, we feel very strongly that Congress must be involved.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Engel.
We go now to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chairman of the Middle
East Subcommittee and a leader on Iran sanctions efforts.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Sherman, last year, before this committee, you
testified that, ``The ultimate goal of any negotiations is that
Iran come into full compliance with U.N. Security Council
resolutions.''
Those Security Council resolutions demanded that Iran
suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and
that Iran ratify and implement the IAEA's additional protocols
to strengthen safeguard measures.
This morning, in front of the Senate Foreign Relations, you
said that the administration's preference is that Iran not have
enrichment capabilities but then conceded that President Obama
and your team have admitted that there is likely going to be an
enrichment program.
Has Iran come into compliance with the U.N. Security
Council resolutions, including the implementation of the
additional protocols? Will it be in compliance when a
comprehensive agreement is reached? If they don't, have U.S.
negotiators failed to meet our goal, as you stated it was last
year?
You also said that this was also about verification,
monitoring, and assurances to the international community. Of
course, this is all based on the assumption that Iran has fully
disclosed its program, a program that it kept covert for 2
decades, and that it is what will likely be proven to be the
fatal and faulty assumption in these talks.
DOD has assessed earlier this year that the U.S. isn't able
to detect or locate undeclared or covert nuclear activities.
So how confident can we be that this regime, that has
operated a covert nuclear program for decades, that has ignored
U.N. Security Council resolutions, that has openly bragged
about deceiving the West while in nuclear negotiations, has
declared all of its facilities, activities, and programs to us,
specifically its suspected military programs?
And would any potential comprehensive agreement encompass
anything that may be disclosed or detected after an agreement
is signed or are we just dealing with these very specific
facilities?
As part of the extension agreement, we have agreed to
another $2.8 billion in sanctions relief for Iran as well as
allowing Iran to continue to export oil at a restricted level.
And at our subcommittee hearing last month with Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Energy Diplomacy, Amos Hochstein, I had
asked him about reports that Iran was sending hundreds of
thousands of barrels of oil to Assad to keep that thug and his
war running; yet we are not counting this against Iran's
restricted levels.
We were all shocked to hear that we don't count that
against Iran's limits because Syria isn't actually paying for
the oil. And you repeated that this morning in the Senate.
But what I had suggested to Mr. Hochstein was that this
issue was bigger than just Iran sending soil to Assad and us
not counting it for the JPOA. It goes to the heart of our
policies as they relate to Iran and Syria, and it is about our
U.S. national security interests.
How much is Iran sending? How do we allow this to continue
while we still negotiate a comprehensive agreement? How do we
justify allowing Iran to send oil to Assad to keep his brutal
regime afloat? And what else is Iran sending that we are
ignoring? And if this were against the terms and Iran was
caught in violation, who is in charge and what mechanism do we
have to enforce the terms?
Ambassador Sherman. Thank you, Congresswoman.
Indeed, all of the U.N. Security Council resolutions will
have to be addressed if we are to get to a comprehensive
agreement.
Indeed, Iran would have to agree to the additional
protocol--and I believe that they will--as well as modified
code 3.1 and, in addition, specific enhanced monitoring and
verification mechanisms that will be attached to each of the
elements as they get agreed to in a comprehensive agreement.
Part of the reason for the additional protocol and for
enhanced monitoring even beyond that is to deal with the covert
path, to make sure that there aren't undeclared facilities.
And, in fact, one of the things the IAEA does after a
country signs onto the additional protocol--and it takes some
time to do--is to create what is called the broader conclusions
that, in fact, there are no undeclared sites.
That will take the IAEA some time to do. And some of our
sanctions relief will be tied to reaching that benchmark, among
other benchmarks, as we put together a comprehensive agreement.
So we are quite concerned to make sure that we cut off the
covert pathway.
There is no way, 100 percent, to ensure that any country in
the world doesn't have a covert site. But what we can do is put
the mechanisms in place to do two things: One, detect it if
it's happening, and, two, stop it before it can become a
problem to us and to our national security.
In terms of the $2.8 billion, let me make one comment and
then let Under Secretary Cohen mention this.
The 4-month extension was really just a continuation of the
JPOA. And, as such, the prorated amount for those 4 months is
$2.8 billion in their restricted funds. It is not U.S. taxpayer
money. It is restricted money that is frozen in accounts that
Iran has that they will now have access to. So it was simply a
straight piece of arithmetic.
However, because we have such great concerns, we did get
Iran to agree to take two additional steps that go beyond the
JPOA. That is to take some of their 20 percent oxidized
enriched uranium, which was part of the JPOA, and take 25
kilograms of it, which is about the amount they can get done
during this 4-month period, and turn them into metal plates for
the Tehran research reactor, which make it virtually impossible
for that to be converted back into enriched uranium.
And we got them to agree to dilute all of their up to 2
percent enriched uranium stockpile, which is over 3 metric tons
of up to 2 percent enriched uranium. So these are two important
steps that we got in addition to this as well.
As for Syria, I will be glad to come back to that in
someone else's question.
Chairman Royce. Very good. Very good.
We go now to Mr. Brad Sherman, ranking member of the
Terrorism and Nonproliferation Subcommittee.
Mr. Sherman of California. I will start with some comments,
and I will ask our witnesses to respond for the record as they
would like to these comments.
Iran's economy may not have grown as fast as China's since
2011. Mr. Cohen pointed out that it would be 25 percent smaller
if it had kept growing at that rate.
Keep in mind--it is 2011--that we in Congress passed the
banking sanctions over the objection of the administration, and
that point correlates with the decline in the growth of the
Iranian economy.
But the Iranian economy doesn't have to grow at China's
rate in order to avoid regime endangerment. The fact is their
economy is growing at 2 percent now. In America, we call that a
recovery, not a regime endangerment.
As the--I believe, the chairman brought up, we have this
sunset clause so that, even if you are able to negotiate for
really good controls, they all fade away in a decade and, at
that point, Iran becomes unsanctioned and unlimited. Not sure
that is a good deal.
Mr. Cohen, you have talked about coming down like a ton of
bricks. I think you need more bricks.
In the first half of 2013, we had 83 companies sanctioned.
Since Rouhani's election, when the Iranians went from
Ahmadinejad, who was honest enough to tell us what he was
thinking, to Rouhani, who is very sneaky, we have had only 61,
which means we have been going at one-quarter the rate, half
the companies sanctioned in double the amount of time.
Now, I don't think we are going to negotiate a good enough
deal, not because Ambassador Sherman is a bad negotiator, but
because I don't think you have enough leverage. We should pass
sanctions now that go into effect in January or February.
And I know that Secretary Kerry is reported in the press to
have thought that that was a good idea, but needed to check
with the White House. He checked with the White House, and then
the reports in the press was that he never said it to begin
with. In any case, you need that additional leverage.
The other additional leverage you need is for Israel not to
just have 2,000- to 5,000-pound bunker-buster bombs, but the
truly massive 30,000-pound bombs and the B-52s, which we have
in our boneyard necessary to deliver them.
I am not saying you make that transfer immediately, but you
begin efforts toward that transfer and I think you will see a
much better response between now and November.
All options need to be on the table. And, frankly, the
military option comes more out of Jerusalem than it comes out
of Washington.
I want to pick up on Mr. Engel's comments about how
Congress needs to be involved.
Mr. Cohen, is it your interpretation of existing law that
the administration, without Congress, can use the power we have
given you to waive individual transactions and, instead, waive
whole classes of transactions? Do you need Congress or can you
just stretch the existing law so as to give the Iranians the
ability to operate sanction-free? Mr. Cohen?
This is a legal interpretation question.
Mr. Cohen. And let me answer that question in two parts.
First of all, I am not a lawyer--at least not a practicing
lawyer. So I will defer on the legal interpretation to those
who are charged with----
Mr. Sherman of California. What is the position of the
administration on the amount of power it has?
Mr. Cohen. The position of the administration is, as we
look forward, in a comprehensive agreement, if one is to be
had, to involve Congress in every step of the way, close
consultation----
Mr. Sherman of California. Look, you are going to talk to
us all we want. Let's say we say ``no'' to this deal.
Are you going to be able to implement it anyway by
stretching the statutes and using your case-by-case waiver to
make blanket waivers that deliver to the Iranians? And do you
realize, and do the Iranians realize, that the next President
my be elected on a platform of no more waivers?
Mr. Cohen. Congressman, I am reluctant to predict what the
position might be in a circumstance where Congress has
expressed disapproval for an agreement.
I can tell you that, under the existing legislation, the
way we are approaching this is that we can proceed in close
consultation with Congress to suspend and waive certain
provisions of law----
Mr. Sherman of California. ``Consultation'' means we will
tell you ``no'' and you will do it anyway. Let's say we say
``no'' in every meeting and every vote on the floor.
Are you going to do it anyway or do you have the right to
do it anyway.
Mr. Cohen. Congressman, I am not in a position to answer
that question.
Mr. Sherman of California. In other words, the imperial
presidency grows further.
Finally--and I realize I am out of time--we were told with
the original deal that, once you take uranium and make it
uranium oxide, it was effectively neutralized. And we gave the
Iranians $4.2 billion for that.
Now we are being told that oxidizing the uranium does not
neutralize it, but it will be really neutralized if we give
them another $2.8 billion to turn it into fuel.
The fact is I don't think it is neutralized either way, but
we are paying for it twice and they still have it in their
hand.
Ambassador Sherman. Congressman, if I may, we did not give
Iran $4.2 billion and now $2.8 billion to dilute or to oxidize
their stockpile. That was part of an entire package.
And that package is a list of about 15 or 20 commitments
that Iran made, including stopping enriching up to 20 percent
enriched uranium, diluting and oxidizing that stockpile.
It did, indeed, because they don't have the conversion
facilities to turn it back, put it in a state that made it
quite difficult, if not impossible, for them to enrich it to
highly enriched uranium.
But, that said, we did not pay $4.2 billion for just one
item. It was for an entire package of items that the IAEA has
said they have, in fact, carried out.
Mr. Sherman of California. Well, we are paying twice,
whatever the amount is.
I yield back.
Mr. Royce. We need to go to Mr. Smith of New Jersey,
chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global
Human Rights, and International Organizations.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling
this very timely and important hearing.
And welcome to our witnesses.
Let me ask you a couple of questions beginning first with:
What happens at midnight, November 25th, if there is no
agreement? How firm is the 25th deadline? Are you contemplating
scenarios if that deadline slips?
Secondly, has the gap between the two sides on centrifuges
actually widened with Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei's recent
statements that Tehran needs 190,000 centrifuges over the long
term and that the P5+1 objectives, as he put it, are not
realistic?
Khamenei has also characterized the requirement that, as
part of a final agreement, Iran end its ballistic missile
program as ``stupid, idiotic expectation'' on our part.
Thirdly, let me ask you--Khamenei, on Reuters--it is on the
wire right now--has called Israel a rabid dog and has urged
more arms to Hamas.
Now, are the Iranians in a better position to provide arms
to Hamas as a result of the easing of the sanctions, especially
the $2.8 billion that they will get as a result of the July
18th extension?
And, finally, number 4, if I could, Andrew Natsios
testified here at my subcommittee on North Korea, and we were
talking about human rights and the ever-deteriorating situation
in North Korea.
He made a very important point. And, as you know, he is a
very accomplished diplomat, having been U.S. Special Envoy to
Sudan, head of USAID in the past, and now he is working on
behalf of human rights in North Korea.
He said de-linking human rights with the Six-Party Talks
was a colossal mistake because, when the collapse of those
talks happened, certainly the deterioration that we have seen
on human rights just continued. There was no stoppage. There
was nothing that was gained during those talks.
I and many others have urged that human rights be
integrated with the talks on the nuclear issue with Iran and
especially now with Abedini. Yesterday was the 2-year
anniversary, July 28th, of Pastor Abedini being brought to
prison, and his enduring of torture began on that day.
Hekmati, Levinson, and now a Washington Post reporter that
we are all very concerned about. You mentioned it, Madam
Ambassador. Jason Rezaian continues to be a concern. We don't
know much about him.
Since negotiations began and extensions in monies have been
given to Iran by way of an easement on their sanctions, have
human rights in Iran improved, stayed the same, or
deteriorated?
Ambassador Sherman. Thank you, Congressman.
First of all, I want to bear witness, Congressman, to your
leadership on human rights issues. You have been a long-
standing leader in that regard for many years, all the way back
to when I worked up here on Capitol Hill, which, looking at my
hair, was quite some time ago. So I know of your passion and I
share it, as does this administration.
As I said in my opening remarks--and let me elaborate--
where Iran's human rights record is concerned, where--its acts
of terrorism and instability, it is putting Israel's security
at risk on a daily basis. And certainly many of the original
rockets that Hamas had came from Iran. They now make many of
their rockets, if not most of them, themselves. But there is no
doubt Iran played a part.
We condemn Hamas' actions of raining rockets down on
Israel. We condemn Iran's support for state-sponsored terrorism
for acts of human rights. Indeed, our own human rights report,
our own religious freedom report, shows that, indeed, there
have been summary executions in Iran. And there is no doubt.
I have met with all of the families--Pastor Abedini, Amir
Hekmati, Christine Levinson--and I spend--every time that I
meet with the Iranians, I have a session separately on
Americans of concern to us and certainly have added the
journalist to that list. There is absolutely no reason for such
detentions whatsoever, and they do nothing, of course, to help
create a climate that would make a nuclear negotiation
successful.
As to the Supreme Leader's comments about 190,000 SWU, or
centrifuges, this doesn't help the negotiation climate either.
I realize that he said this was aspirational and nothing that
would happen today.
But there is no question right now Iran has 9,000
centrifuges that are enriching, another 10,000 that are
installed. We believe that, if there is an enrichment program,
it needs to be a fraction of that.
Mr. Smith. What happens if that deadline slips?
Ambassador Sherman. What I said this morning--and I know
this will get asked by many--our intention is that November
24th is the end of this negotiation. It could have gone for 6
months. We decided only to do 4. We don't want to talk for
talk's sake.
That said, I try to be very straightforward with Members of
Congress. I think that kind of clarity is important. I know
from negotiations, you know from your own negotiations up here
on the Hill, you never know where things are going to turn out.
So I cannot tell you for an absolute certainty on the 24th we
will end, but that is certainly our intention.
Mr. Royce. So we go now to Mr. Gerry Connolly of Virginia.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Ms. Sherman, I believe your career began here on the
Hill on the Senate side. I hope my friend Ileana----
Ambassador Sherman. On the House side. On the House side,
Mr. Connally.
Mr. Connolly. Oh.
Ambassador Sherman. I never worked in the United States
Senate. I only worked in the House.
Mr. Connolly. Oh. All right.
Ambassador Sherman. I did help elect a congresswoman----
Mr. Connolly. Mikulski.
Ambassador Sherman [continuing]. To the United States
Senate.
Mr. Connolly. Yes. All right.
Ambassador Sherman. I never worked in the Senate.
Mr. Connolly. Well, she sends the best over there. All
right.
Thank you so much for being here and correcting the record.
I was listening to my friend from California, Mr. Sherman,
and I must say I am a little fearful that we may be making
perfect be the enemy of the good and--especially when we talk
about a military response from Israel as if that is the only
solution.
I am sure my friend didn't mean that. But when we talk
about 30,000-pound bunker busters----
Mr. Sherman of California. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Connolly [continuing]. And taking airplanes out the
boneyard to deliver them, that certainly sounds like we favor a
military option before we have completed the diplomatic
process.
Mr. Sherman of California. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Connolly. Of course.
Mr. Sherman of California. Just for the record, I said no
actual transfer, just begin the process until after November.
Mr. Connolly. Yeah. I appreciate my friend. Thank you.
But I would just caution that we are in the middle of a
diplomatic process and, if Congress decides to intervene that
way, it sends a clear signal that we have given up on the
diplomatic process. And at least this Member of Congress--and I
believe there are others--is not quite ready to make that
judgment just yet.
Ambassador Sherman, in your opinion, is Iran sincere in the
negotiation process to stand down with respect to the
development of its nuclear weapons?
And you are going to have to be real succinct, but having
come from the House, I know you know how to do that.
Ambassador Sherman. Congressman, I believe Iran has come to
these negotiations seriously. I believe they intend to get to a
comprehensive agreement. But I do not yet know whether they can
take the decisions they must to reach a comprehensive agreement
to which we would agree.
Mr. Connolly. Have you--you cited the IAEA.
Is there any evidence of the Iranians having cheated on the
Phase 1 interim agreement?
Ambassador Sherman. The IAEA says they have completely
complied with their obligations, as have the P5+1.
Mr. Connolly. Do we sense tension or disagreement or even
game-playing between the Supreme Leader and the new President
Rouhani?
Ambassador Sherman. You know, I think I would ask in a
closed session for our intelligence community to give you their
assessment of what the internal dynamics of----
Mr. Connolly. I am only referring to public statements. I
have seen public statements that seem to contradict each other.
Ambassador Sherman. I have seen those public statements as
well, but I think it is very hard for us to know what happens
in such an opaque system.
Mr. Connolly. So we don't know, really----
Ambassador Sherman. I don't think we actually know.
Mr. Connolly. All right. Have sanctions degraded because of
the interim agreement--Phase 1 interim agreement?
Ambassador Sherman. I don't believe they have at all. And I
defer to Under Secretary Cohen on that.
Mr. Cohen. I agree with Under Secretary Sherman. I don't
think we have seen the sanctions architecture degrade at all in
the course of the----
Mr. Connolly. I think that is really important testimony
because we have heard members assert otherwise.
And it is really important for the administration, if that
is true, Mr. Cohen, to be crystal clear and to have documentary
evidence to counter it. Because, otherwise, it gets out there
unchallenged, that somehow the sanctions have just all gone
away and we are letting them off easy and Iran can now return
to happy days again because they have just extended this
agreement, and we have been played for fools.
Mr. Cohen. The sanctions architecture, which includes our
financial sanctions, our banking sanctions, our oil sanctions,
as well as a host of other ancillary sanctions, that are not
suspended in a Joint Plan of Action, haven't been carried
forward into the extended Joint Plan of Action, remain in
place.
We have been enforcing them. And what we have seen in the
marketplace is not that the sanctions architecture is
crumbling, but it is holding firm. We have seen--and I am sure
members of this committee are aware of trade delegations and
others who have gone to Iran and sort of tested the waters.
But what we have not seen are deals getting consummated, of
people taking actions to defy the sanctions or to test our
willingness to enforce. And, in fact, where we have seen
actions that violate the sanctions we have responded.
Mr. Connolly. Good.
Final question, Ambassador Sherman. Why the extension? Why
couldn't we consummate the final deal or the next phase in the
deadline we set for ourselves and the Iranians? And would you
address, in answering that, are they just playing for time?
Because that is the other implied and sometimes explicit
criticism, they are just playing for time here while they
proceed with their development.
Ambassador Sherman. I understand that concern, and we don't
want talk for talk's sake. As I said, we could have gone for
all 6 months. We thought that was not useful. They would wait
until month 5.
We think, quite frankly, with the U.N. General Assembly
meeting in September and people convening in New York, it will
create a fulcrum for some of the decisions that need to get
taken here.
As to why we didn't get there in 6 months, this is a highly
technical agreement. I rely on all of these fine experts and
many, many more because all of the devil is in the details. And
each commitment that is made has to be detailed in quite
extensive annexes, and it just takes an enormous amount of
time.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Connolly.
We now go to Steve Chabot of Ohio, chairman of the Asia
Subcommittee.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
Madam Ambassador, first of all, let me just make this
point. I think some would argue that it is logical to assume
that, if we were unable to reach an agreement in the first 6
months, that it is not very likely that we are going to be able
to reach an agreement just giving us 4 more months.
Would you comment on that.
Ambassador Sherman. I can understand that because it is
hard when you are not inside the room to know whether, in fact,
there is any reality to the extension.
Secretary Kerry came to Vienna, as did some of the other
foreign ministers, had very extensive and quite direct
conversations with Foreign Minister Zarif and all of the
members of the Iranian team. So he could assess for himself
whether there was any ``there'' there. He had gotten daily
reports, as had the President, of what was occurring in the
negotiation.
And, in fact, we were making tangible progress on some of
the key elements on how to deal with Iraq; how to deal with
Fordow, that it not be an enrichment facility, which was agreed
to; what kind of transparency measures; the additional
protocol, as I mentioned, in 3.1; what should happen at Natanz;
what should--some of the other transparency measures should be.
We have other issues we still have to resolve, and we
obviously have a gap that is significant on enrichment
capacity. But the trajectory was in the right direction. The
talks were quite detailed, quite specific, and, really, so he--
--
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Let me cut you off there, if I can.
Ambassador Sherman [continuing]. Go back and make some
political decisions.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
Former Secretary of State and maybe future President,
Hillary Clinton, was recently quoted as saying something along
the lines that no deal is better than a bad deal. I think Prime
Minister Netanyahu and others have made basically the same
point.
Would you agree with that comment?
Ambassador Sherman. I would. The President of the United
States has made that statement----
Mr. Chabot. He said the same thing, too.
Ambassador Sherman [continuing]. As has Secretary Kerry.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Let me ask you this: Would you describe
the deal that we are ultimately likely to end up with here, if
there is a deal reached--I think a lot of people are skeptical
for good reason that any good deal would ever be reached--but
that the deal will be closer to Iran continuing or having a
nuclear capability with inspections or dismantle and remove?
What do you think it is more likely that we will come up with?
Ambassador Sherman. I don't know the answer to that
question, Congressman, because this agreement is not about any
one element. It is how all the elements come together in a
package that cut off all of the pathways to a nuclear weapon.
Mr. Chabot. Would we agree with something less than
dismantle and remove?
Ambassador Sherman. We will only agree to an agreement that
cuts off all of the pathways to a nuclear weapon. We will only
agree to an agreement that assures us that Iran will not obtain
a nuclear weapon. There are many ways to get there.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Well, let me go back again one more time.
As far as that specific terminology, dismantle and remove,
are you suggesting that something less than that would be
acceptable to this administration?
Ambassador Sherman. Congressman, with all due respect, we
would have to talk about each element of the program and what
of that you would want to see dismantled, what of that you
would want to see removed.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Thank you.
The U.S. has committed to refrain from further reductions
of Iran's crude oil exports. However, China has been
consistently violating the limit.
What efforts has the U.S. made to curb China's Iranian oil
imports? And will there be any repercussions for China
exceeding the acceptable limit over the last 6 months? And is
the administration working to place sanctions on China if the
limits are again exceeded over the next 4 months?
Ambassador Sherman. Congressman, what we told the Congress
and what we set out to do in the Joint Plan of Action was to
set an aggregate range of 1 billion to 1.1 billion barrels per
day of the five remaining countries plus a small amount to
Taiwan that is still allowed to be imported from Iran. We
believe in looking at the data that we will meet that
aggregate.
In terms of China, there have been some months where they
have stayed pretty much at where we had hoped they would be and
some months they have gone a little up and some months they
have gone a little bit down.
President Obama has had direct conversations with President
Xi about keeping the sanctions in place and China, particularly
since they are a member of the P5+1 negotiating group, keep to
the commitments that we made in the Joint Plan of Action.
Secretary Kerry raised this himself during the strategic
and economic dialogue just a couple of weeks ago. I have raised
it constantly with my interlocutors.
China has made a commitment to keep to an average rein--
these tend to fluctuate up and down over the months--that will
be in keeping with the commitments that were made in the Joint
Plan of Action. Obviously, if that does not occur, we will have
to decide how to address it.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
My time has expired.
Mr. Royce. Mr. Deutch of Florida, ranking member of the
Subcommittee on Middle East and North Africa.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thanks to Under Secretary Sherman and Cohen for
appearing today. We do appreciate your willingness to consult
with Congress in the weeks leading up to the July 20th
extension. We appreciate you being here as well.
Mr. Smith referred to the case of Hekmati, Abedini, and
Levinson. Today marks 2,699 days that Bob Levinson has not been
with his family, and I want to raise it because, as the
negotiations started and then an extension came, he remains
still in captivity.
I appreciate your efforts, Ambassador Sherman. I know you
raise this issue every time, and I encourage you to continue
doing so on behalf of my constituent, Bob Levinson, and his
family.
Now, at the outset of these negotiations, we heard a lot
from our partners in the region about concerns about the P5+1
sitting down with Iran. And when the JPOA was announced, we
heard again that our allies were unhappy that the interim deal
may have blindsided them.
And, Secretary Sherman, I know that you spent a lot of time
traveling throughout the region to try to allay those concerns.
Now, this weekend we heard similar complaints after
Secretary Kerry met with Turkey and Qatar on a potential cease
fire in Gaza. And I understand the need to work with those who
can exert leverage on Hamas, but to do it without including
Israel, the PA, and other regional partners can give those
partners a reason for concern. Now, taken together, these two
instances raise some concerns.
And I want to put aside this weekend's back-and-forth about
cease-fire offers and the details. But I would like to focus on
what my constituents reach out to me about, what they want,
which is the same thing that our allies want, which is the same
thing that Congress wants and it is the same thing the world
expects, and that is clarity on these issues.
In the case of Gaza, that means being unmistakably clear
and without reservation why Israel has taken the action that it
has taken. The footage of civilians that have been killed is
horrific, and we mourn the loss of any innocent life.
But we have to recognize the threat that Israeli faces, why
they are responding, why, if you believe in human rights, you
must condemn Hamas' use of civilians as human shields, and why
any cease-fire agreement must include the issue of tunnels,
destruction of the tunnels, and the demilitarization of Gaza.
And anything that detracts from that clarity, in word or in
deed, in statement or in video, can invite questions. Clarity
avoids those questions.
Likewise, in these negotiations with Iran, the clarity that
we are looking for is to remind people that this is not just
about getting to a deal with Iran. It is a reminder that seven
times the United Nations said no enrichment for Iran. That went
for years.
The IAEA and others have pointed to military dimensions of
Iran's program when Iran continues to be the largest sponsor of
terrorism, including Iran's claims just this weekend that it is
responsible for helping to build Hamas' rockets, that the
United States remains committed to these core principles in
negotiations--stopping Iran's nuclear program--because,
ultimately, Iran with a nuclear weapon capability is the
biggest threat to international security.
It is not just about making a deal, as I said. And I
commend you for all that you have said already to make that
clear. It is about a historic opportunity and obligation that
we have to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Our
national security interest is at stake. Everyone is just
looking for clarity.
The countries that raise concerns about the current crisis
in Gaza are the same countries that are most concerned about
Iran with a nuclear weapons capability: Israel, Egypt, Jordan,
and the Gulf States.
And let me be clear. I am not questioning the United
States' commitment to stopping a nuclear-armed Iran. I am not
questioning the United States' commitment to Israel. As
Ambassador Rice reminded the world yesterday, there is one
thing that you never have to worry about. That is America's
support for the State of Israel.
But I am simply raising perceptions that sometimes arise to
ensure that perceptions never become reality. This hearing
gives you--gives us the opportunity to provide the world with
that clarity on the issue of Iran.
Now, with all of that said, I would ask the question just
about the military dimensions of the program. There are lots of
issues that remain to be in--remain to be resolved, including
what Iran did at Parchin.
And the question is: Will Iran have to come clean on its
past activities in order for the P5+1 to reach a final
agreement with Iran? And, if not, how do we have a baseline to
know how close Iran ever is to achieving that military
capability?
Ambassador Sherman. Thank you very much, Congressman.
Let me say with absolute clarity what Ambassador Dermer,
Israel's Ambassador to the United States, said. And that is
that he knows that there is no better friend to Israel than the
United States, that any of the attacks that have been made in
any of the newspapers on Secretary Kerry are ``completely,'' to
use his words, ``unwarranted.'' And Ambassador Dermer said he
was speaking on behalf of the Prime Minister of Israel.
I and all of my colleagues and the President of the United
States and Ambassador Rice are immensely proud of Secretary
Kerry. He went to the Middle East and he went to the region
because he believes wholeheartedly in the need to do everything
he possibly can as Secretary of State on behalf of the
President and the interests of our country to protect the
security of the Israel, to stop the rockets from raining down
on Israel, to allow Israel to make sure that no tunnels can
come into the State of Israel with terrorists and kidnappers
and people who would do harm.
And the Secretary obviously saw that there were civilian
deaths that were happening all over the place, and there is not
a person in this room who, as you said yourself, is not just
heartbroken to watch children die, to watch people die, in any
country anywhere in the world, in any territory anywhere in the
world.
But the Secretary of State's commitment to Israel's
security, the President of the United States' commitment to
Israel's security, my commitment to Israel's security, could
not be stronger.
While I was in Vienna, I consulted on a regular basis with
both the National Security Advisor and the Minister for
Intelligence in Israel and will continue to do so, as I also
consult with Gulf partners, with partners in Europe, with
Australians, with everyone throughout the world, but, most
particularly, because we understand, from Israel's perspective,
Iran's actions are existential for them. And we do understand
and appreciate that.
Where the Iran negotiation is concerned, we have only one
objective, and that is that Iran not obtain a nuclear weapon.
The President of the United States got a Nobel Peace Prize
because he believed that this world should not have nuclear
weapons.
And he was going to make that a commitment of his
administration, and he has done that at every turn, which is
why we are engaged in this negotiation as well. As he said, we
may not see that in certainly my lifetime--perhaps yours,
Congressman, but not in mine--but it is an effort that we all
must make to keep our country secure.
So I thank you for offering this moment of clarity. I don't
think there should be any doubt whatsoever about it.
Mr. Royce. We go now to Mike McCaul of Texas, chairman of
the Committee on Homeland Security.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Ambassador, thank you so much for being here today. I
certainly don't envy your position, and it must be a very
challenging job, to say the least, and we wish you the best.
I have always had some fundamental concerns about the
premise, in general, and that is that we could ever negotiate
with the Supreme Leader, the Ayatollah, in good faith to give
up his nuclear weapons program.
Call me a skeptic, but I think we have to have a healthy
amount of skepticism going into this process, as I am sure you
do. They are a state-sponsor of terrorism.
The right to enrich uranium violates six U.N. Security
Council resolutions. The Ayatollah is now demanding, I think,
190,000 centrifuges. That is 10 times the number that Tehran
currently possesses. I don't understand that.
We don't address the military dimensions with respect to
ICBM capabilities, which we have been told they could have by
the year 2015. And so I just have several concerns.
I mean, I think--I asked Secretary Kerry this question. I
mean, I think, fundamentally, what you want is for them to give
up their enrichment program altogether and then we could
provide that to them if it is truly a peaceful nuclear program.
What are the chances of that?
Ambassador Sherman. Well, thank you, Congressman.
I agree that the best road for Iran, from our perspective,
is that they have no enrichment program whatsoever. They will
never get rid of their capability because they have already
mastered the nuclear fuel cycle and, once someone has learned
how to do something, you can't sort of take it out of their
brain.
So, quite frankly, even if we, you know, took military
action, got rid of all of their facilities, dismantled
everything, got rid of everything, they could rebuild it again
because they know how to do so.
So what we have to do is figure out a way to ensure that
they have no pathway to a nuclear weapon, so no way to get
highly enriched uranium to then turn it into a bomb and then
put it on a delivery mechanism and deliver it, no way to have a
plutonium pathway, no way to have a covert facility. And that
is what we are attempting to do here.
Part of that is, indeed, addressing the possible military
dimensions of their program, to have access by the IAEA to
those sites where we want to make sure there aren't undeclared
facilities. All of that will have to be part of this agreement.
And, finally, you are right to be skeptical. I am
skeptical. The President is skeptical. He has said 50/50. The
Secretary has said, others have said, as was mentioned earlier,
no deal is better than a bad deal.
Mr. McCaul. I certainly agree with that.
Ambassador Sherman. That is what we are trying to do here.
Mr. McCaul. And I think everyone agrees with that
assumption.
I don't see--there is not one single centrifuge dismantled,
not 1 single kilogram of enriched uranium being stopped, and
they--nothing to dismantle the heavy-water reactor, which a
former administration official called it a plutonium bomb
factory.
This question has been asked twice, and I don't know--well,
there are two questions I have in the limited time I have.
One is: I know you want to be optimistic. But if November
comes and goes and there is no agreement, what will this
administration do?
Ambassador Sherman. This administration will have had
ongoing consultations with the United States Congress, with our
partners around the world, and we will all make the best
judgment we can about what we need to do next.
Mr. McCaul. I would argue, Mr. Chairman, that sanctions
would be certainly appropriate, the ones that we passed out of
the House.
And then the second one: What assurances--we have lifted,
in terms of the sanctions, between $6 billion to $7 billion in
frozen assets, and the extension of this negotiation frees up
another $2.8 billion.
What assurances do we have that this freed-up money is not
going to fund the rockets that Hamas is firing into Israel?
Mr. Cohen. Congressman, Iran, as others have noted, is the
leading state sponsor of terrorism in the world today and has
been for quite some time. It has supported Hezbollah. It has
supported Hamas. It did so long before we entered into the
negotiations that led to the Joint Plan of Action. It has
continued to do so.
The funds that are being made available to Iran in the
course of the Joint Plan of Action, now in the extended Joint
Plan of Action--their assets--there are no safe harbors
regarding that money. The sanctions that we have, the efforts
that we have, to disrupt Iran's provision of material support
to Hezbollah, to Hamas, remain as intense as ever.
And so we will not ease off one iota in trying to ensure
that Iran does not----
Mr. McCaul. So none of the money freed up by the lifting of
sanctions are going to fund rockets to go into Israel?
Mr. Cohen. Congressman, I cannot give you that guarantee.
What I can guarantee you, however, is that we will do
everything in our power to disrupt Iran's support for terrorism
around the world and continue to do so.
Mr. McCaul. I hope we all know what we are dealing with
here.
Thank you.
Mr. Royce. Brian Higgins of New York.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Last year, when Hassan Rouhani was running for President,
he was one of six candidates. He was viewed as the reform
candidate. He ran against the policies that created for Iran
international isolation. He ran against the policies that
impose sanctions on Iran.
And he won, and he won with over 50 percent of the vote,
meaning that there would be no runoff. And the only way he
could have done that is with the support of the Supreme Leader,
Ayatollah Khamenei.
Khamenei used to say that, you know, ``The sanctions don't
hurt Iran. They make us stronger. They make us self-
sufficient.'' Well, last year Khamenei was saying that the
sanctions are brutal. He characterized them as economic
warfare.
And when you look at sanctions, what you are trying to do
is impose economic sanctions toward having a psychological
impact. And last July the Iranian economy was a mess.
You had 45 percent inflation, meaning that whatever you had
prior to--or whatever you purchased prior to the inflation
surge you were paying double within a couple of months.
The Iranian currency had lost half of its value. Iranian
officials were pointing fingers not at the United States, but
at each other, as to who was to blame for all of this. You
couldn't get chickens during Ramadan because there was no money
to buy chicken feed.
And then the International Monetary Fund said in February
2014 in a report that the temporary agreement to ease sanctions
have helped to stabilize the American economy. It seems as
though we took away our own leverage. We took away our own
leverage when we had the Iranians on the run.
When you look at the context of this negotiation with the
P5+1, we want to reduce Iran's centrifuges, which are the
machines that mix at supersonic speeds to enrich uranium, to
weapons grade while Iran currently has 19,000, up from 163 10
years ago, to 50,000.
You know, I don't know that we got a good deal here. By
weakening the sanctions, albeit temporarily, albeit a small
percentage overall, it seems like the Iranians are moving and
are committed to moving an entirely different direction. You
have next-generation centrifuges. You have knowledge that you
can't destroy.
I mean, they have tremendous leverage here, and the
leverage that we have, seemingly, given the deplorable economic
conditions in Iran last summer, we gave into in a process where
it seems as though the two sides aren't maybe in agreement, but
not even narrowing the differences. They are going two entirely
different directions.
I would ask you to comment.
Mr. Cohen. Congressman, the Iranian economy is still a
mess. The rial is still highly devalued. It has lost value
during the course of the Joint Plan of Action.
Iran's inflation is still among the highest, if not the
highest, in the world. It still does not have access to almost
all of its foreign reserves. Its economy, as I noted in my oral
testimony, is 25 percent smaller today than it would have been
had we not imposed the sanctions that you spoke of.
The Joint Plan of Action did not fix the Iranian economy,
won't fix the Iranian economy, and there is no sense in which--
looking out over the next 4 months, that Iran will be, you
know, at the end of this period, I think thinking that their
economy has rebounded.
The pressure that comes from the sanctions, sanctions
developed with Congress, with the administration, with our
partners around the world, remains quite robust, and the impact
on Iran's economy continues to bite. That provides leverage to
our negotiating team to try and pursue the comprehensive
agreement.
And, with that, I will turn it over to Under Secretary
Sherman to follow up.
Ambassador Sherman. Congressman, the Joint Plan of Action
for the first time in a decade froze Iran's nuclear program and
rolled it back in specific ways.
Iran halted all of its near 20 percent enriched uranium and
halted, disabled, the configuration of centrifuge cascades that
they have been using to produce it. They have diluted and
oxidized that stockpile of 20 percent.
They have not enriched uranium in roughly half of the
installed centrifuges at Natanz and three-quarters of the
installed centrifuges at Fordow, including all next-generation
centrifuges.
They have limited centrifuge production to those needed to
replace damaged machines. So they cannot stockpile centrifuges
during these months, including these 4 months of an extension.
They have not constructed any additional facilities. They
have not gone beyond its current enrichment R&D practices, as
described in the IAEA report of November 14, 2013.
They have not proceeded in any way, shape, or form on the
Arak reactor. It is frozen in place. They have halted the
production and additional testing of fuel for the Arak reactor.
They have not installed any additional components at Arak.
They have not transferred fuel or heavy water at the Arak
reactor site. They have not constructed a facility capable of
reprocessing and, without reprocessing, Iran cannot separate
plutonium from spent fuel.
And I could go on and on. Those are the highlights of what
came out of the Joint Plan of Action. For the first time in a
decade we are in a better place than we were.
We have much further to go, and I don't know if we will get
there, but it was a worthwhile thing to freeze their program.
Mr. Royce. The gentleman is out of time.
And so we have to go to Mr. Tom Cotton of Arkansas.
Mr. Cotton. And I would simply say that perhaps we would be
in an even better place if we had not relaxed the sanctions in
November, but increased them, as this committee attempted to do
last summer, followed by House action, or perhaps if we had
taken a different course in 2009 during the green movement, but
that is neither here nor there.
Some of you may know the parable of the frog and the
scorpion. The frog is at the river. The scorpion approaches him
and asks for a ride across the river.
And the frog says to the scorpion, ``But you will sting me
and kill me.''
The scorpion says, ``I would not do that because then we
would both drown.''
And the frog says, ``That is a good point.''
So the frog gives the scorpion a ride across the river, and
halfway across the scorpion stings the frog.
And the frog looks to the scorpion and says, ``Why did you
sting me? Now we will both drown.''
And the scorpion said, ``Because it's my nature.''
The problem here is not the nature of the weapon, but it is
the nature of the Iranian regime. They continue to be the
world's number one sponsor of state terrorism, whether it is
Hezbollah or Hamas, that not just attacks our allies, like
Israel, but tries to launch attacks on the United States,
assassinating Ambassadors, if they could have executed their
plan of friendly countries in restaurants just a few miles from
here, or killing soldiers with whom I served in Iraq in 2006 by
importing fighters and bombs and other material.
I am deeply skeptical, as are my colleagues here on this
committee, that any of this will ever change, no matter how
skillful our negotiations, unless the regime in Iran changes.
It has been like this for over 30 years. And, unfortunately, I
think it will continue to be like this until the people of Iran
have a legitimate, democratic representative government.
Now, all that said, there are issues related to Iran
besides this nuclear negotiation, such as their meddling in
Iraq or their support for Bashar al-Assad in Syria, their
ongoing support for Hezbollah and Hamas.
One of our negotiating partners, Russia, has ongoing issues
as well, such as their invasion of Ukraine and supplying thugs
that shot down the civilian airliner and their support for the
Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria.
So I would like your brief assessment on whether they bring
those issues to the negotiating table on this and, if so, how.
Ambassador Sherman. Thank you, Congressman.
So far, everyone has been focused on what goes on in the
negotiating room around this comprehensive Plan of Action or
the possibility of a comprehensive Joint Plan of Action.
And although we were in Vienna at the time of the horrific
events in Ukraine, my Russian colleague, Sergei Ryabkov, who is
a long-time professional diplomat in Russia, stayed very
focused on what could be done to try to move this comprehensive
negotiation forward.
I cannot tell you that all of these issues won't come into
the room at some point, and it certainly does create strains
around the margin. We are all human beings. And that was just
beyond deplorable and shocking and, you know, we were all just
completely stunned at what was occurring.
Similarly, I think that what is happening in Iraq with
ISIL, or ISIS, if one looks at it in Syria, is something of
concern and, in that instance, ironically, Iran is probably as
interested as we are in getting rid of ISIL.
But it is not something on which we make common calls
because there are so many other areas in which we have vast and
unbridgeable disagreements in terms of their state sponsorship
of terrorism, their human rights record, and what they do to
foment instability around the world and, as you say, their
relationship with Iraq is a long and complicated one.
And I thank you for your service to our country not only
here, but in Iraq, in what is now a very difficult circumstance
for that country.
So right now everyone stays focused. It is a constructive,
serious negotiation. I hope it remains that way, but I can't
tell you for sure that it will. The world is a pretty
complicated place at the moment.
Mr. Cotton. Well, thank you.
Again, I remain deeply skeptical of the Joint Plan of
Action, but I do wish you the best of success that we can reach
an agreement that completely eliminates Iran's nuclear weapons
program and ancillary programs not just for our sake, but for
the sake of peace and safety around the world.
Mr. Royce. We go to Mr. Juan Vargas of California.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank
you very much for bringing this item before us once again and,
also, the ranking member.
As you know, I have been very skeptical of this process
from the beginning. I think that we are negotiating with a
regime that has no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons
program. It only wants to go dormant for a few years, then
restart. And, so far, everything that they have done confirms
that, in my mind. They haven't destroyed their centrifuges.
They haven't given up enrichment, even though they can buy the
fuel, as you know, on the open market.
And I don't think they want to in any way bar themselves
from having a nuclear program. I think they are trying to
figure out a way to get around the world. The world has spoken
through the U.N. that they shouldn't have enrichment, they
shouldn't have those capabilities. And, in this process, I
think they are trying to earn that.
I also have to say that I remember 1979, when the regime
came into power. That is 35 years ago. I think that they are
trying to wait us out. I think that they want a--we call it a
final agreement, a long-term agreement. The reality is I think
they only want the shortest time possible, not one that bars
them forever.
So I have been very, very skeptical. I thought that the
better way was to continue to ratchet down the sanctions. And I
have to say again kudos to the administration. This is the
first administration that took the sanctions seriously, for
God's sake. Before we hadn't and, thank God, this
administration did. But then we let them off the hook when I
think we should have ratcheted it down. And so here we are now.
I also remember very clearly saying I thought that they
were going to skip the 6 months, that it was going to slide,
and it has slid. And, again, I hear today that it won't slide--
more likely, it won't slide. It could slide.
But, so far, everything that they have done has confirmed,
in my mind, they don't really want to stop their nuclear
program. They just want to waste some time.
Convince me that that is not the case.
Ambassador Sherman. Congressman, the only thing that will
convince you is what will convince me and what will convince
the administration and our country, and that is if Iran takes
the steps that it must to ensure that all of its pathways to a
nuclear weapon are cut off and that their program is
exclusively peaceful.
And that means a comprehensive agreement that, as a
package, accomplishes those metrics. And I don't know whether
we will get there or not. But the only way I will be convinced
is if Iran takes the difficult decisions that it must to do
exactly that.
Mr. Vargas. But two of the most important pathways is
enrichment. I mean, enrichment is a way, obviously, to get a
weapon. We are allowing them, it sounds like--and, again, I
don't know this, but it seems to me that we haven't said they
will have absolutely no enrichment. We haven't said that. That
is a pathway.
Ambassador Sherman. It is a pathway. But what we are
talking about, if we get to this comprehensive agreement, would
be an incredibly small and limited enrichment program under
intrusive monitoring such that they would not have a pathway to
highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon. If we cannot do
that, then we will not have a comprehensive agreement.
Mr. Vargas. The second pathway that I believe is very
dangerous is the issue of time. If this final agreement is 5,
7, 10, even 20, years--it was 35 years ago when they came into
power. I mean, I still think they will have the same desire.
I mean, I don't think that their nature is going to change.
I kind of believe in that same issue of this frog and the
scorpion. I think that they do want to sting. I don't think
their nature is going to change.
And what can you tell us--if you can't tell us in open
session, I understand. But what can you tell us about the
duration?
Ambassador Sherman. Duration is a critical element and, in
our view, it has to be quite a long time for the very reason
you said. It has been decades that the international community
has had no confidence in what Iran is doing.
And so it is going to take a considerable period of time
for us to gain that assurance and that confidence. And I am
happy to discuss specific numbers with you in a closed session.
Certainly double digits.
Mr. Vargas. Okay. I look forward to that, because that is a
great concern of mine.
And, lastly, I guess I would say this, that I really
appreciate the statement that you gave about Israel. And many
of us who are devote Christians have a very strong feeling for
the State of Israel and its people and an unequivocal statement
of support for Israel. Especially during this time it was very
important. I appreciate it.
Thank you.
Mr. Royce. We are going to go to Mr. George Holding of
North Carolina.
Thank you, Mr. Vargas.
Mr. Holding. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cohen, you mentioned in your testimony that additional
sanctions relief under the extension of the interim agreement
includes keeping Iran's crude oil exports to current purchasers
at current average levels.
So if you could just answer succinctly, have Iran's crude
oil buyers kept their purchases or acquisitions of Iranian
crude oil to December 2013 levels at present?
Mr. Cohen. Congressman, the best information that we have,
which is current to within the beginning of July--so we don't
have the last 20 days of the Joint Plan of Action period--
indicates that the aggregate amount of oil going to the five
purchasers of Iranian oil is within the limits that we set out
in the Joint Plan of Action of the 1 million to 1.1 million
barrels per day.
Mr. Holding. So is that at the levels of December 2013?
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Holding. And do you agree with that, Ambassador
Sherman?
Ambassador Sherman. Yes. Within that range, yes.
Mr. Holding. All right. The administration has committed to
comprehensively lifting nuclear-related sanctions as part of
the final P5+1 agreement with Tehran.
So my question, Ambassador Sherman, to you: What sanctions
in the current law specifically, which provisions of the
current law, does the administration consider nuclear related?
And why?
Ambassador Sherman. Congressman, as I think you know--
because you have asked this question--our laws are very
complicated, and several of our laws cover a number of things
all in the same law.
We believe that there is a way to address the portions of
the laws that relate to nuclear-related sanctions, and I am
very glad to have our staff come up to sit with you or your
staff and brief you in detail law by law what we are thinking
about.
I would prefer not to do that in an open session because
how we are thinking about suspending and then, ultimately, if
Iran complies with all of the things that they would need to
comply with, coming to you to lift those sanctions, is part of
our negotiations. And so I would rather discuss that in a
closed setting than in an open setting.
Mr. Holding. I appreciate that.
You know, many of these sanctions that are imposed are for
things including, you know, not only, you know, their nuclear
program, but for all the other bad acts.
I mean sanctions aimed at preventing Iranian banks involved
in proliferation, terrorism, money laundering, any other
activities, you know, the state-sponsored terrorism, you know,
ballistic missile programs. It is a myriad of things, and the
sanctions are all intertwined.
And so, even if you come to an agreement, you know, on the
nuclear program, you know, it doesn't ameliorate--or, you know,
it doesn't alleviate nor does it come close to ameliorating the
fact that Iran is quite a bad actor, and these sanctions have
other purposes as well.
Ambassador Sherman. Absolutely. And we believe there is a
way to proceed forward so that our sanctions enforcement on
terrorism, on human rights, on other issues not covered by a
comprehensive agreement, should we get to one, remain in place.
And we are happy to come up and delineate that in the best way
we possibly can.
Mr. Holding. All right.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Royce. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Holding.
We are now going to go to Brad Schneider of Illinois.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you again
for calling this hearing, for you and the ranking member for
staying vigilant in all you have done to make sure that we do
all we can to make sure Iran cannot acquire--not just acquire a
nuclear weapon, that they cannot acquire the capacity or
capability.
I want to thank the witnesses for coming here today and
sharing their perspectives.
As you have heard today, there is a--on both sides of the
aisle a lot of skepticism. I think there is great concern about
the negotiations from the start, great concerns about the
sanctions relief provided to Iran, and the path that we are
headed down.
It is imperative--and I will repeat myself because I think
it bears repeating--that Iran cannot be allowed to have the
capability to get a nuclear weapon.
Ambassador Sherman, you have used the language in your
written testimony and in some of the answers that we want to
cut the paths for Iran's nuclear programs. My concern is it is
not just that we cut the path, but that we close that path and
eliminate it permanently.
Can you tell me the distinction here. Because they have cut
the pathways, for example, to cascades on the centrifuges, but
there are still 19,000 installed centrifuges. That path may be
cut, but it is not closed.
Ambassador Sherman. Yes. I think we are talking pretty much
about the same thing, Congressman. I do want to make a
distinction, though--and it is hard for all of us to have all
of the detail on all of this, particularly in this open
session.
We can never get rid of Iran's capability. They have
already mastered the nuclear fuel cycle. They can't unlearn it.
As I said previously, we could destroy every facility they have
and they could reconstitute them all.
Mr. Schneider. But with all due respect, that is know-how,
and know-how is one piece. Capability and having the assets in
place is a different thing.
Ambassador Sherman. Correct. So their centrifuge capacity
can be attacked in a myriad of ways. Their centrifuges, their
facilities, their stockpiles, how they are installed, how they
are taken apart or not taken apart--all of those are elements
of a package that would give us the confidence that, in fact,
they did not have a pathway to highly enriched uranium where
Natanz and Fordow are concerned, that they would not have a
pathway to plutonium where Arak is concerned. There are a
number of ways to get to that metric. That is the metric that
matters. And I think we are in agreement.
Mr. Schneider. And I know that some of these details like
the specifics on Arak and specifics at Fordow would have to be
in a closed session. I would like to have that closed session
as soon as possible.
Let me take it another direction. We are looking at
November 24th, not that far away at this point----
Ambassador Sherman. No.
Mr. Schneide [continuing]. 3 months, 4 months.
What are you telling Iran in the negotiations will happen
if we don't have a satisfactory negotiated settlement by
November 24th?
Ambassador Sherman. Iran is quite well aware that all of
our options and the world's options are on the table. Iran is
quite well aware that, if we cannot get to a comprehensive
agreement, that they will likely face even more sanctions than
they are currently facing and that----
Mr. Schneider. But are we making clear the magnitude of
those sanctions? We can't go back to the sanctions regime of
November 24, 2013. It has to be orders of magnitude greater
than what we had, even greater than what we passed last summer.
Ambassador Sherman. They are very well aware.
Mr. Schneider. What do you think they believe?
Ambassador Sherman. I think they believe that, if we do
that, they have a lot of things they can do in return.
Mr. Schneider. Do you think that they believe we actually
will raise the sanctions, that we have the capacity?
Ambassador Sherman. Oh, I think----
Mr. Schneider. What do they think our partners believe? And
what do our partners believe will happen?
Ambassador Sherman. There is no doubt in my mind that Iran
understands the power and prerogatives of the United States
Congress, the actions that you have taken, and the actions that
you would take.
And if, in fact, we could not reach a comprehensive
agreement and we are sure that we cannot reach a comprehensive
agreement, we have stated publicly as an administration that we
would expect there to be more sanctions.
Mr. Schneider. Would the administration support Congress
taking action and stating very clearly in a resolution or in a
law that, if there is not an agreement by November 24th, these
are the sanctions they will face, so there is no doubt. That
clarity that my colleague talked about earlier is so important.
Ambassador Sherman. We actually do not support such action,
Congressman, and the reason is very simple. We believe that, if
this comprehensive agreement does not work, it should be
because Iran cannot make the commitments that it needs to.
We don't want there to be any other basis, any other
excuse. We don't want them to say, ``We couldn't get there
because Congress, you know, pushed our hardliners to the
wall,'' whatever kind of narrative they put on the table.
We want it to be crystal clear to the world that we tried
diplomacy as far as we could take it and Iran could not do what
it needed to do. Because, if we do that, then the entire world
will stay together in the enforcement not only of the existing
sanctions, but sanctions to come.
Mr. Schneider. Well, I am out of time. But let me just
close by saying I disagree, respectfully, but I think we need
to be clear. And I think, if we do tell Iran what their options
are so there is no doubt, we have a better chance of getting to
a successful resolution on negotiations.
And let me also say that that successful resolution can't
be for a few years. It shouldn't even be measured in years. It
should be measured in generations. Because, as you said, it is
an existential threat not just for Israeli, but for many
countries around the region, and a threat to the world. Thank
you.
And I yield back.
Mr. Holding [presiding]. Thank you.
Go next to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Weber. Recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Weber. Ambassador Sherman, do you consider all of those
involved in these negotiations reasonable people?
Ambassador Sherman. That is a hard question to answer.
I believe that everybody who sits around this negotiating
table is serious. I think they want to try to achieve a
comprehensive agreement. But it is hard to use the word
``reasonable'' for all of the actions that are occurring in
this world.
Mr. Weber. Do you consider me reasonable?
Ambassador Sherman. I don't know you, but I am sure you
are.
Mr. Weber. How about do you consider yourself reasonable?
Ambassador Sherman. I hope so. My husband and my daughter
may not from time to time.
Mr. Weber. Is it reasonable for terrorists to strap on
themselves dynamite and go blow up innocent women and children?
Ambassador Sherman. Of course not.
Mr. Weber. Is it reasonable for terrorists to have 12-year-
old kids strapped-on dynamite and go blown up----
Ambassador Sherman. Of course not.
Mr. Weber. Is that a blatant disregard for human life?
Ambassador Sherman. Of course.
Mr. Weber. Is it reasonable for Iran--the leadership of
Iran to espouse the need for the complete destruction of
Israel?
Ambassador Sherman. Of course not. And, as I said in my
opening statement, where it comes to the destruction of Israel,
which they have espoused, the human rights abuses, the summary
executions that take place, the detention of journalists and
American citizens, their disregard for human rights, the
fomenting of instability around the world, none of this is
reasonable, of course, Congressman.
Mr. Weber. See if you agree with this following statement:
You cannot reason someone out of a position that they didn't
use reason to get into.
Ambassador Sherman. You know----
Mr. Weber. That is ``yes'' or ``no.''
Ambassador Sherman. It is actually not, with all due
respect, Congressman. I don't think their positions are
reasonable, and I don't think they have come----
Mr. Weber. You have----
Ambassador Sherman. Let me finish.
I don't think their positions are reasonable in any regard
on all of those scores----
Mr. Weber. I am talking about killing women and children
and the complete destruction of Israel.
You don't think that is an unreasonable position?
Ambassador Sherman. Of course not.
Mr. Weber. And so we can't--you think we can reason them
out of that position, do you?
Ambassador Sherman. Of course not.
Mr. Weber. Okay. Let me ask you: Is it reasonable, as
reasonable people--let's just assume for argument's sake that
we on our side are reasonable. That may be a stretch for some
of us, but let's just assume that it is. I am talking about me.
Is it reasonable to assume that Iran, with a blatant
disregard for life, will continue to mislead us and the
international community at every step of the way, at every
chance they get, in order to concentrate on destroying Israel
and, I might add, the United States? Is that reasonable to
assume?
Ambassador Sherman. Congressman, our negotiation with Iran
is not based on trust.
Mr. Weber. It is not based on reason.
Ambassador Sherman. It is not based on trust. It is not
based on the reason in way that you are describing it. It is
based on understanding that, if they want the economy they want
in the future, if they want to end their isolation in the
world, if they want to rejoin the community of nations, then
they have to take specific steps that will be monitored and
verified to give the international community----
Mr. Weber. Then, under that scenario, is it reasonable to
assume that, if they get the economy that they want, that they
will cease to seek the destruction of Israel? Is that
reasonable?
Ambassador Sherman. What I can say to you, Congressman, is
that the United States of America under this President, I
believe under any President of the United States, will do
whatever we need to do to ensure the security of Israel in the
Middle East. It is a solemn responsibility that I think we all
feel.
Mr. Weber. I am going to ask you one more time.
Do you believe that you can reason people out of a position
that they did not use reason to get into?
Ambassador Sherman. Congressman, I think what you are
trying to lead me to is how can we sit down with Iran and have
this negotiation and expect that we will get to any good end.
Mr. Weber. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Holding. The gentleman yields back.
We now go to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. Meeks is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Engel for
facilitating this important hearing.
Let me just state at the outset that I supported the
interim agreement that allowed the Joint Plan of Action to move
forward, but I also support the extension that would allow the
negotiations to continue.
Many critics have said that these negotiations are risky,
we can't trust Iran, and we didn't get enough in the interim
agreement. Well, you know what. Many of those things in some
way are true. Many of those things in some ways are true.
And I believe strongly that it is even--but more risky--it
would be more risky for us if we did not negotiate. We would be
worse off without concessions gained in the interim agreement.
Much work remains. No question about it. And there are
certainly many political pitfalls.
But taking on one of our Nation's largest foreign policy
and security issues could never be easy. No one said this would
be easy. No one said there would be no risks. There has to be.
In any foreign policy, there are risks. There are dangers. But
to not sit down, the risk is even greater to all of us.
Six months have gone by, and I consider the framework where
we are--I consider it a success--a multilateral success
achieved in close collaboration with our allies, which I
believe is extremely important.
Because if you look at sanctions, we have had sanctions on
Iran for a long time on a unilateral basis. That did not
cripple their economy. That did not hurt their economy.
Their economy began to hurt and we crippled them when we
were able do it collectively with our allies. And that is why
the P5+1 is together, because that is the only way that we
could inflict the kind of sanctions that would hurt their
economy.
If that goes away and the United States is doing it only by
themselves, that is not going to bring down the Iranian
economy. That is not going to be successful. That is not going
to cause the kind of hurt that people are talking about.
It is only going to happen if we do it collectively. And I
think where the administration should take strong credit is
that they were able to get this coalition together to implement
these sanctions and keep them together.
And the biggest threat to Iran is knowing that we are
together because, if they could divide us, they would. They
would. That would be to their benefit. They could then resume
their economy and say, ``Forget the United States by
themselves.''
What makes the sanctions work is that they are multilateral
sanctions with our allies. Tremendously important. Nobody just
says you automatically trust when you get into these
negotiations.
So I think that we have to utilize and take advantage of
everything. And I would say, in short, that better access that
we now have to Iran's nuclear facilities is a huge plus for us.
I wouldn't want them running around without us having any
access to their facilities.
Its dilution of medium-enriched uranium is a huge plus for
us. We want them out there in the blind or we don't want to be
working with our allies, you know, let them run around. That
puts us all in danger.
Now, I don't trust--you know, they say--I think--but I
think that we have got to do the hard work. It is easy to go
the other way. You know, we say--talk about kids all the time
that, you know, it is easier to fight than try to at least
negotiate something.
If you have to fight, then you will. I know that is how I
was raised. If I had to fight, I will. But, first, let's try
and--and we have got something, a leverage. Talk about losing
leverage? We would lose the leverage that we currently have in
Iran if we lose our partners. That is part of what our leverage
is.
So I didn't mean to go off on that tangent, but I just felt
that that was just important to say.
In regards to--and I am out of time. So I don't even have
time for a question because you wouldn't have any time to
answer it. But I would love to have a closed-door session so
that we can have more talk.
But I just want to say I thank the administration for
keeping us together, keeping the world together. It is not--so
it can be all of us together--not just the United States
against Iran, but all of us together--to try to make sure that
we force them to conform. We will see what the results will be.
We don't know. But we have got to try.
I yield back.
Mr. Holding. Gentleman's time has expired.
The chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr.
Kinzinger, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here, and thank you for your
service to your country. And sometimes I am sure it is not
always fun to be sitting where you are sitting.
I am also sure that some of the things I am going to ask
you and say probably have already been done. And so I apologize
for beating a dead horse if, in fact, that is what I do.
Just to respond to my colleague on the other side of the
aisle, the point is made that if--you know, we can't do this by
ourselves, we have to bring our allies with us. And I agree
with that, that it exists in what we see in Ukraine and other
places.
But I would just remind folks that we have the lead on
this. And when the United States entered some pretty strict and
pretty tough sanctions against Iran, the rest of the world
followed. When we decided that we were going to do an interim
agreement, the rest of the world follows. We are uniquely
capable in terms of who we are to be able to lead the world to
this.
So, you know, this idea that, if we don't extend another 6
months, the coalition is going to fall apart, maybe that is
true. I don't think it is. But if it is true, it is probably
because we entered this interim agreement in the first place.
And I will mention that I remember, as I am sure others
have said, that 6 months ago, you know, we were told, ``Just
trust us on this. We are going to have this interim agreement,
and we are going to get where we need to be. You are going to
be really proud of the result. And if you aren't, we are going
to be the first ones back here asking for tougher sanctions and
to re-implement the sanctions.''
I promise you I could have told you 6 months ago we would
be right here where we are, looking for another extension. It
is like we are repeating itself.
I worry about the message to our allies in Korea, to the
United Arab Emirates, who are asking for the right to enrich
and we say, ``Well, look, we are committed to a nuclear-free
Korean Peninsula. We are committed to a nuclear-free Middle
East,'' but, yet, we will give this. I mean, the final
agreement is going to have some enrichment. We know that. We
are going to give this to our worst enemy.
So the message we send is, ``If you are the worst enemy of
the United States, you can pretty much do what you want with
agreement. If you are our best friend, we are going to keep our
thumb on you and control what we want.''
Let me just ask, Ambassador, what are we going to be able
to solve in 6 months that we haven't been able to in the first
6? So there are these gaps that still exist between the two
countries in terms of what we want in the final agreement.
If we couldn't get them there in 6 months, what's the next
6 months going to do, especially after getting $2.8 billion
released into their economy to buy their continued cooperation,
which I think is bad negotiating, but whatever.
What is another 6 months going to do that we couldn't do in
the first 6? I don't think it is a lack of time. It is
something else.
Ambassador Sherman. Thank you, Congressman.
Let me make a couple points.
First of all, I agree that the United States of America is
uniquely positioned on most things in the world and, because we
have the finest military in the world, we bear and, in
particular, both--burden and opportunity in the world to lead.
That is not always an easy thing to do, and it is best done
when we can do it collectively so that the world shares some of
the burden, both in cost and treasure and in our people.
In the case of sanctions, Under Secretary Cohen may want to
comment as well.
But, quite frankly, the European Union sanctions were also
quite critical to the collective effort here, as were the U.N.
Security Council sanctions. It was all of them coming together
that really created the collective that was necessary to really
bring Iran to the table.
Mr. Kinzinger. If I might interrupt, I agree. But I believe
the interim agreement broke that bond we had and it kind of was
the hole in the dam now to where, if we want to go back to
where we were, it is going to be very difficult. Maybe I am
wrong, but it seems to me that way.
Ambassador Sherman. Well, I'll let--why don't you----
Mr. Kinzinger. And if you could be really quick because I
have another----
Ambassador Sherman. Then I will come back to the other
points you made.
Mr. Kinzinger. Okay. Very quickly, sir.
Mr. Cohen. Congressman, it is just the contrary. The fact
that we have proceeded with our close partners in both imposing
sanctions on Iran and in agreeing in the Joint Plan of Action
to the very limited, very targeted, sanctions relief that we
agreed to I think makes it all the more likely that, if Iran is
not prepared to take the steps it needs to take to get a
comprehensive agreement, we will have our partners with us not
just to reinstate, but to ramp up.
Mr. Kinzinger. But why couldn't we have tested that now? I
mean, it has been 6 months. Now is the time when we say the
sanctions are back on. And now all of a sudden Iran gets
religion and says, ``Okay. You know what. Whoa, whoa, who. The
places we are apart we want to be with you because you did
that.''
One last thing. And I apologize. Deterrence is will plus
capability. I think we have the capability to deter. Right now
I think what is in question is the will, and that is important
for the negotiations.
Last question: How important is it to the administration
that a final nuclear agreement with Iran restricts Iran's
ballistic missile program?
Ambassador Sherman. So couple of points to what you have
said.
We are going to negotiate for 4 additional months, not 6.
Mr. Kinzinger. Okay.
Ambassador Sherman. We decided not to do all 6. We don't
want to talk just for talk's sake.
November 24th was 1 year from when the Joint Plan of Action
was negotiated. So we decided to make that the time and to
actually use the fact that many players will be in New York for
the U.N. General Assembly as to fulcrum to try to move this
along at a rapid rate.
We would not have agreed to an extension if we didn't
believe we had made tangible progress and we did not see a path
to a----
Mr. Kinzinger. And I don't mean to interrupt, but I am over
my time.
Just how important is the restriction of ballistic
missiles?
Ambassador Sherman. We have said that the U.N. Security
Council resolutions must be addressed. And in that it says that
somehow we must address long-range ballistic missiles capable
of carrying nuclear warheads.
So it is not ballistic missiles, per se. It is about when a
missile is combined with a nuclear warhead. That is the issue
here.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you.
Yield back.
Mr. Holding. Gentleman's time has expired.
We go now to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry.
Recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Sherman, are you familiar with the CRS report
that cites substantial information regarding the collaborative
programs with Iran and Syria and North Korea aimed at producing
nuclear weapons?
Ambassador Sherman. I am not familiar with that specific
report. But I have certainly seen reports about potential
collaboration.
Mr. Perry. So, then, you would agree that there has been
collaboration with North Korea and----
Ambassador Sherman. I would agree I have seen those
reports. And I think any future discussion of that probably
should take place in a closed session.
Mr. Perry. Fine.
Based on that, how--if that were true, and getting away
from the closed-session stuff, how does this current
arrangement ensure compliance such that Iran doesn't just
comply with an agreement on their own soil while outsourcing to
North Korea various components and then assembling back in Iran
or what have you? How does this address that?
Ambassador Sherman. We agree that that issue of what they
are doing, what they are trying do, whether they do it by
themselves or with others, is all part of ensuring that they do
not have a pathway to a nuclear weapon.
So I would agree with you that, in some way or other, in a
comprehensive agreement that issue has to be under discussion
as well.
Mr. Perry. It has to be or it is--it is part of it now?
Ambassador Sherman. It is and it has to be.
Mr. Perry. Okay. Would you--how would you characterize the
outcome of your negotiations with North Korea? Would you
characterize them as a success?
Ambassador Sherman. We could spend an entire day discussing
those negotiations.
Mr. Perry. Sure.
Ambassador Sherman. I think we will never know.
What I will say is, during the Clinton administration,
Congressman, not 1 additional ounce of plutonium was produced
and the only plutonium that existed for nuclear weapons took
place before President Clinton ever became President. And
during his entire administration, not 1 additional ounce of
plutonium was created.
Mr. Perry. That is fine. But we are where we are now.
And I am reading some of your comments where you
recommended that the only way the U.S. could deal with North
Korea's disputed programs and prevent--and it is important to
use the word ``prevent''--you did--prevent them from achieving
a nuclear capability was through diplomacy.
So that having been said--you were the lead negotiator,
right, 2001?
Ambassador Sherman. I was the Special Envoy. Yes.
Mr. Perry. Yes.
So based on that, I mean, the goals as I understand them,
were to bring North Korea back into NPT compliance and freeze
their nuclear weapons program, which is--permanently, which is
essentially prevention. But, yet, in 2003, as we all know, they
declared that they had nuclear weapons.
So based on the close relationship currently with Iran and
North Korea and the negotiations you personally led, knowing
that you are leading negotiations now with Iran and that Korea,
you know, announced in 2003 that they had nuclear weapons, when
our job, your job, was to prevent them from getting them, most
Americans throughout the course of that saw it as appeasement.
I think most Americans see what is currently happening as
appeasement. I think most Americans would agree, if they are
educated about what the history is and what happened, that we
failed. North Korea has nuclear weapons, as far as we know.
I mean, why should Americans consider these negotiations to
be anything but appeasement and have any confidence that this
is going to end up any different than North Korea?
Mr. Sherman. Congressman, as I said, we could spend an
entire day discussing what happened in North Korea and at what
point and for what reasons North Korea, in fact, did obtain a
nuclear weapon. That did not occur on President Clinton's watch
when I was responsible for that negotiation.
That said, this is an entirely different situation. The
only metric should be whether, in fact, the pathways to a
nuclear weapon are closed off to Iran, including the potential
for a covert program such that we would know either in time to
stop it or to deter it, as well as their current uranium
enrichment and plutonium pathways to a nuclear weapon.
And you will be able to judge that on its own merits should
we get to a comprehensive agreement. And, as I have said, I
don't know that we will.
Mr. Perry. Listen, I appreciate your passion for it, and I
appreciate the verbiage, this pathway and cutting off their
pathways and so on and so forth.
But it seems to me we were doing the same thing with North
Korea. And pathway or not, at the end of the day--you know, we
hear this, ``Well, let's not make the perfect the enemy of the
good.'' But at the end of the day, North Korea has got nuclear
weapons and we can't do a darn thing about it. And when Iran
gets them, we don't have many options then either.
There can be--there is no way--there is no place for
failure here. And I am afraid that, once we look back in
hindsight and say, ``Well, we tried this'' and, ``We thought
that,'' it is going to be too darn late when they have got them
and we have got a nuclear arms race going in the Middle East.
With that, I yield back.
Ambassador Sherman. Congressman, I appreciate the concern.
I will say this: Sanctions did not stop Iran's nuclear
program. Sanctions brought Iran to the negotiating table. But
they continue to build their nuclear program even with all the
sanctions in place.
Mr. Holding. The gentleman's time has expired.
We have a few more members here to ask questions. We have
votes approaching quickly on the floor. I understand our
witnesses need to leave no later than 4:30.
So, with that, I will recognize the gentleman from Florida,
Mr. Clawson, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Clawson. I will be brief.
Thank you for coming and thank you for your service. You
clearly understand the details of what is going on here, and I
appreciate what you all are--what you all are doing. And I know
it is not easy.
Barring military force, it seems to me the success in these
negotiations depends on leverage, not reasonableness. And
leverage in my world is always dependent on money. Money
creates leverage.
Tell me a little bit whether you think the extension of
these talks gives the Iranians a chance to break the
international coalition with respect to economic sanctions that
really creates our leverage.
Mr. Cohen. Congressman, I don't believe so. Quite the
contrary. I think the fact that we are giving negotiations an
honest effort and exploring the possibility of a comprehensive
agreement with our partners helps to hold together the
international coalition that put very significant economic
pressure on Iran and continues to put very significant economic
pressure on Iran, and that creates the leverage that you speak
of.
And that is critically important to the potential success
of these negotiations that we hold that international sanctions
coalition together. And we are doing so. And it is held
together throughout the course of this Joint Plan of Action.
And, as I said in response to a question earlier, we do not see
any indication of our sanctions architecture weakening.
Mr. Clawson. And folks like Russia or China that don't--
aren't normally part of our coalitions, do they create holes in
the fence that let the cattle out?
Mr. Cohen. The short answer to that question is ``no.''
Mr. Clawson. Really?
Mr. Cohen. In the work that we have done on imposing
sanctions on Iran: I am not going to sugarcoat and say
everything has been absolutely perfect.
But with respect to Russia and China and our other partners
around the world, the sanctions have held together very well.
There--you know, there are reports of, you know, this potential
Russia deal with Iran and all the rest.
Mr. Clawson. Right. Right.
Mr. Cohen. That has not been consummated. We have been very
clear with the Russians that we would regard any follow-through
on that deal as being inimical to the negotiations, and it has
not--it has not come to fruition.
So I think what we have seen with all of our P5+1 partners,
as well as many others around the world--the Japanese, the
Australians, the South Koreans, the others--is a cohesive
effort to put real pressure on Iran.
Mr. Clawson. Good.
Well, I have read that even some of our European friends
continue to trade with Iran. And I see you smiling. And so it
has always kind of struck me as making your life a lot more
difficult if you want to create leverage when our own--when our
very friends continue to trade with the people that we are
trying to--to--to put a little leverage on.
Mr. Cohen. Well, Congressman, our sanctions on Iran are not
a complete trade embargo.
Mr. Clawson. Correct.
Mr. Cohen. There is some trade that is permissible with
Iran----
Mr. Clawson. Right.
Mr. Cohen [continuing]. And not for the United States----
Mr. Clawson. Right.
Mr. Cohen [continuing]. But for others around the world.
And we have obviously seen that continued trade over the course
of the years.
That does not mean, however, that the sanctions that we
have put in place that are extraordinarily powerful, that go
after Iran's oil sales, go after its access to the
institutional financial system, have, as you say, holes in the
fence. Those sanctions are staying.
Mr. Clawson. Okay. Good. I always wondered how it worked
when so much of the world was not part of the official
coalition.
The last point that I make today is I am guessing as part
of a final deal, if you look down the road, Ambassador, 5 years
from now and we have an optimistic outcome, that part of that
optimistic outcome would be safety for Israel and that Iran
would sign up.
So, in other words, the final deal wouldn't be no nukes,
but everything else is okay, but, rather, we would have fences
of defense for our most important ally in the region, of
course, Israel.
Ambassador Sherman. As I have said, all of the sanctions
that go to their acts of terrorism, their human rights abuses,
their fomenting instability around the world, will remain in
place and our commitment to Israel's security will continue.
What I think it is important for all of us to remember--and
I remind myself of this every day--is the reason that we are
doing this is because, as unstable as the Middle East is today,
an Iran with a nuclear weapon would be truly horrific and would
really change the entire strategic framework of the Middle East
in ways that none of us can even imagine or want to imagine.
Mr. Clawson. Walking away is not an option. I understand.
And I thank both of you for your service.
Ambassador Sherman. Thank you.
Mr. Holding. Gentleman's time has expired.
Now turn to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. DeSantis.
Recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to the witnesses.
In terms of--Ambassador Sherman, you talked about how it
would be very bad if Iran had a nuclear weapon.
How does the administration view Iran's posture?
We have had a hearing recently where one witness was trying
to apprise how--the Israelis' view, and he said there is a
significant number, maybe not a majority, who believe, ``Well,
you know, maybe they actually could be contained with a nuclear
weapon.''
And then I--I look at people like Bernard Lewis, the
historian, who said, ``Look, given the viewpoint and ideology
of the mullahs who run the country, mutually assured
destruction is not something that is--that scares them. It
actually would induce them to want to develop weapons and even
use them,'' thinking, ``Hey, if we can inflict more damage to
Israel or to United States, we will deal with millions of our
own people being killed.''
So does the administration believe that Iran with a nuclear
weapon and an apocalyptic ideology--that a mutually assured
destruction scenario would not apply?
Ambassador Sherman. The administration believes that Iran
cannot be permitted to obtain a nuclear weapon, period.
Mr. DeSantis. And is one of the reasons for that because of
the world view that they bring to the table with a nuclear
weapon?
Ambassador Sherman. It is the world view that they bring to
the nuclear--we don't believe anybody else needs to have a
nuclear weapon, period, in the world.
And certainly, given some of the other things that Iran
does in the world that many members have discussed today, Iran
with a nuclear weapon would allow them to project further power
into the region, would be a deterrent to others in the region,
and would confer on them a place in the world that they should
not have.
Mr. DeSantis. So since the administration has been dealing
with Iran about this issue--I am going to guess it has been
months and months now--has there been any change in Iran's
sponsorship of terrorism worldwide?
Ambassador Sherman. I would want to have our intelligence
community give you their assessment. But from an outsider's
point of view who isn't an intelligence analyst, I would say
that they have not stopped.
Mr. DeSantis. And I guess--I understand--I have talked with
folks who have been involved in arms deals who say, ``Look, we
don't deal with these side issues. We just try to focus on
that. It is tough enough.''
And I understand that generally, and I understand that--why
you would deal with that with the Soviet Union or some of the
other countries that we have done.
But given that Iran--they are fomenting jihad with
Hezbollah and Syria and Iraq now, and, of course, they are one
of the main suppliers of the missiles in the Gaza Strip to
Hamas. Don't we need to put terrorism and their terrorist
activities on the table?
I mean, I think it is really difficult to see how we would
have a successful agreement where we didn't believe they would
be able to have a nuclear weapon, but somehow they would
continue on fomenting jihad the way that they are doing.
Ambassador Sherman. Well, I understand the impulse to want
to do that. Quite frankly, it would be an overwhelming
negotiation that would make this all even more difficult than
it already is.
The reason that we are focused first and foremost on them
not obtaining a nuclear weapon is for the reasons I said. Their
ability to, in fact, do more with their state sponsorship of
terrorism would be much greater if they indeed had a nuclear
weapon.
So we believe that first and foremost what must come off
the field is their ability to gain a nuclear weapon. And we
have--will not for one moment stop all of our other efforts in
all of the other areas in which we have profound disagreement.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you.
I think that, for me--as I look at it, I think, initially,
it was a mistake to let off on the sanctions. I think that
Iran--a regime like that, they are going to respond to
strength.
And my fear is that, by giving them more time, you know,
they see that as, ``Well, gee, you know, we got this time,''
you know, ``They don't want to put the screws to us yet.''
And so I think stronger sanctions combined with--I mean, I
think that they have to fear that there could potentially be a
use of force, whether it is by us, whether it is by the
Israelis or whatnot.
And, if not, I just don't think that they are going to have
an incentive to really want to disarm and not create--and not
acquire nuclear weapons.
But I appreciate you guys for being here.
And I will yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Holding. Gentleman yields back.
Recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Collins, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know we are getting
to the end; so, I will get to my questions.
Under the terms of the July 18th extension, the United
States and its negotiating partners will further release
sanctions and give Iran access to the $2.8 billion in blocked
assets.
In return, Iran's main obligation will be to keep observing
the interim agreement and to convert 25 kilograms of 20 percent
highly enriched uranium from an oxidized form into fuel and
directly usable research nuclear reactor by November 24, if
that is correct.
I would like to know from you--is--did U.S. get--officials
get any assurances from the Iranian Government that they will
not use any of the 2.8 in new sanctions relief either, A, to
support international terrorism from other state sponsors, like
the Assad regime, to advance the nuclear ballistic missile or
advance conventional weapons program of Iran or any other state
or to violate the Iranian people's human rights?
Mr. Cohen. Congressman, as has been discussed in this
hearing, Iran is involved in a whole variety of destabilizing
activity, including some of the activities you just described.
They have been engaged in that activity for years now and have
used their increasingly constrained funds to continue to pursue
those objectives.
There is no reason to believe that the funds that they will
be provided access to under this Joint Plan of Action will go
to the activity and no reason to believe that it necessarily
won't. I can't guarantee you that either way.
What I can tell you, though, is that our sanctions and our
efforts to disrupt Iran's support to Hezbollah, support to
Hamas, violation of human rights, will continue unabated during
this period.
Mr. Collins. Well, the only thing that concerns me there--
and I was going to a different question at this point.
But the defeatist--and I understand you are looking and you
are being a realist. You know, I may call it defeatist-
sounding. But if we basically say that, ``Well, Iran may. They
may not. They have been doing this for years,'' then shouldn't
there have been at least some discussion about, ``Okay. If you
do this. You thought sanctions were bad last time. Get ready''?
I mean, I--there is a lot of us--I am not going to go into
this--there is many on this committee and many on this Hill
that believe that this was just a total disaster to start with.
Okay?
And now we are just basically saying, ``Well, they have
been doing it for a long time. They have not been doing it for
a long time. We got the same kind of commitments last time.''
Frankly, especially from the folks in my district, they
just don't buy the line anymore. The corporate line is just not
real good. And the tone of your voice not being--and I agree
with you, I mean, in a realist kind of sense.
But what bothers me is we don't seem to have a hammer on
the other side to say, ``Look, you know, this has got to
happen'' because most of us believe it is just going to be--it
is funneled to different directions to start with.
Mr. Cohen. Well, with all due respect, Congressman, there
is nothing defeatist about it. We have been very actively
engaged in disrupting and attempting to disrupt Iran's support
for terrorism around the world for years now, and we are
continuing to do so.
We do it through our sanctions designations. We do it
through our work with our partners. We, as I am sure you know,
worked to intercept the Klos C, which was a vessel going from
Iran to support the--support Hamas with weapons.
There is nothing at all defeatist in our approach to
countering Iran's support for terrorism around the world. The
funds that Iran is getting access to I cannot guarantee you
will not go to this activity. And I would not presume to tell
you something that I could not in good conscience tell you is
the truth.
But I will tell you that we will continue to work as hard
as we possibly can and we will, in fact, redouble our efforts
to ensure that Iran's support for terrorism around the world is
something that we take--we take action against.
Mr. Collins. Part of the issue of the repeal--or at least
giving some of the blocked assets was to spurt growth in the
Iranian economy and just for, basically, their basic needs, not
their terroristic nature.
Has there been any reports or things that you have seen
that the Iranian economy is growing? And, if so, what could be
attributable to the unblocked assets?
Mr. Cohen. There are--we watch very closely how the Iranian
economy is performing. As I am sure you know, it has contracted
quite substantially in the last several years.
There has been, since the Rouhani administration has come
into power in Iran, better management of their economy. And
some of the decline that we have seen in the past has begun to
moderate. But Iran's economy is still in very significant
distress.
And the funds that are made available to the Iranians under
the Joint Plan of Action, the $2.8 billion in this extension
period and the $4.2 billion from the original period, do not in
any respect suffice to jump-start the Iranian economy. The
Iranian economy--the whole of the Iranian economy is so great
that those funds do not move the needle on their economy.
Mr. Collins. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Holding. Gentleman's time has expired.
We appreciate very much the time and work of our witnesses
today. I know the committee--I speak for all of the committee--
looks forward to consulting closely with you in the 4 months
ahead on these critical and difficult issues.
Ambassador Sherman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Holding. The committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, 4:32 at p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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