[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PATHWAYS TO EXPLORATION: A REVIEW OF
THE FUTURE OF HUMAN SPACE EXPLORATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 25, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-82
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair
DANA ROHRABACHER, California EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
RALPH M. HALL, Texas ZOE LOFGREN, California
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
Wisconsin DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ERIC SWALWELL, California
PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia DAN MAFFEI, New York
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOSEPH KENNEDY III, Massachusetts
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois SCOTT PETERS, California
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana DEREK KILMER, Washington
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
BILL POSEY, Florida ELIZABETH ESTY, Connecticut
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming MARC VEASEY, Texas
DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona JULIA BROWNLEY, California
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky ROBIN KELLY, Illinois
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota KATHERINE CLARK, Massachusetts
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma
RANDY WEBER, Texas
CHRIS COLLINS, New York
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio
C O N T E N T S
June 25, 2014
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Lamar S. Smith, Chairman, Committee
on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 4
Written Statement............................................ 5
Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking
Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House
of Representatives............................................. 5
Written Statement............................................ 7
Witnesses:
Governor Mitch Daniels, Report Co-Chair and President, Purdue
University
Oral Statement............................................... 8
Written Statement............................................ 11
Dr. Jonathan Lunine, Report Co-Chair and Director, Cornell
University's Center for Radiophysics and Space Research
Oral Statement............................................... 18
Written Statement............................................ 20
Discussion....................................................... 27
Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Governor Mitch Daniels, Report Co-Chair and President, Purdue
University..................................................... 48
Dr. Jonathan Lunine, Report Co-Chair and Director, Cornell
University's Center for Radiophysics and Space Research........ 55
Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record
Written statement submitted by Representative Donna F. Edwards,
Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House
of Representatives............................................. 64
PATHWAYS TO EXPLORATION: A REVIEW OF
OF THE FUTURE OF HUMAN SPACE EXPLORATION
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 25, 2014
House of Representatives,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
Washington, D.C.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in Room
2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lamar Smith
[Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Chairman Smith. The Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology will come to order.
Welcome to today's hearing entitled ``Pathways to
Exploration: A Review of the Future of Human Space
Exploration.'' I will recognize myself for an opening statement
and then the Ranking Member, the gentlewoman from Texas.
At a fundamental level, space exploration--the mission of
NASA--is about inspiration. This inspiration fuels our desire
to push the boundaries of the possible and reach beyond our own
pale blue dot.
When the President cancelled the Constellation program in
2010, our chance to explore beyond low-Earth orbit was
significantly delayed. To the dismay of the American people,
the Administration made it clear that human space exploration
was not a priority.
The first human footsteps on the Moon are a distant memory.
And with the retirement of the Space Shuttle, NASA now pays
Russia $70 million to transport an American astronaut to the
International Space Station and back. There is a sense that
America is falling behind, with our best days behind us. Today,
America's finest spaceships and largest rockets are found in
museums rather than on launch pads.
The President has proposed capturing an asteroid and
tugging it into lunar orbit for human exploration. But NASA's
own advisors said, ``it was not considered to be a serious
proposal.'' Space exploration experts have criticized this plan
before our Committee. And former NASA officials have called
into question its merits.
The Administration's continued focus on costly distractions
is harmful to our space program and does not inspire future
generations to go into innovative fields such as science and
math. However, a distinguished panel of experts has concluded
that a return to ``extended surface operations on the Moon''
would make significant contributions to landing people on Mars.
The same has not been said for the Asteroid Retrieval Mission,
which is a mission without a realistic budget, without a
destination, and without a certain launch date.
The witnesses before us today represent decades of public
policy work and scientific investigation. They co-chaired the
Committee on Human Spaceflight that recently released a report
entitled ``Pathways to Exploration: Rationales and Approaches
for a U.S. Program of Human Space Exploration.'' This report
confirmed that NASA lacks a plan for human space exploration.
The NASA Authorization Act, which recently passed the House,
requires a detailed plan for how NASA will land humans on Mars.
This report offers suggestions on the best way to reach that
goal.
Meanwhile, the Obama Administration continues to advocate
increasing climate change funding at NASA at the expense of
other priorities such as space exploration. There are 18
federal agencies that fund climate change research, but only
one does space exploration.
The future of America's exploration efforts lead to Mars.
Just as the first steps on the Moon were by Americans, the
first flag to fly on another planet in our solar system should
be that of the United States.
Great nations do great things. President Kennedy's call to
America wasn't just about reaching the Moon; it was a reminder
that we are an exceptional nation. We must rekindle within NASA
the fire that blazed the trail to the Moon.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Lamar S. Smith
At a fundamental level, space exploration-the mission of NASA-is
about inspiration. This inspiration fuels our desire to push the
boundaries of the possible and reach beyond our own pale blue dot.
When the President cancelled the Constellation program in 2010, our
chance to explore beyond low-Earth orbit was significantly delayed. To
the dismay of the American people, the Administration made it clear
that human space exploration was not a priority.
The first human footsteps on the Moon are a distant memory. And,
with the retirement of the Space Shuttle, NASA now pays Russia $70
million to transport an American astronaut to the International Space
Station and back.
There's a sense that America is falling behind, with our best days
behind us. Today, America's finest spaceships and largest rockets are
found in museums rather than on launch pads.
The President has proposed capturing an asteroid and tugging it
into lunar orbit for human exploration. But NASA's own advisors said,
``it was not considered to be a serious proposal.'' Space exploration
experts have criticized this plan before our Committee. And former NASA
officials have called into question its merits.
The Administration's continued focus on costly distractions is
harmful to our space program and does not inspire future generations to
go into innovative fields such as science and math. However, a
distinguished panel of experts has concluded that a return to
``extended surface operations on the moon'' would make significant
contributions to landing people on Mars.
The same has not been said for the Asteroid Retrieval Mission,
which is a mission without a realistic budget, without a destination
and without a certain launch date.
The witnesses before us today represent decades of public policy
work and scientific investigation. They co-chaired The Committee on
Human Spaceflight that recently released a report entitled ``Pathways
to Exploration-Rationales and Approaches for a U.S. Program of Human
Space Exploration.''
This report confirmed that NASA lacks a plan for human space
exploration. The NASA Authorization Act, which recently passed the
House, requires a detailed plan for how NASA will land humans on Mars.
This report offers suggestions on the best way to reach that goal.
Meanwhile, the Obama Administration continues to advocate
increasing climate change funding at NASA at the expense of other
priorities such as space exploration.
There are 18 federal agencies that fund climate change research,
but only one does space exploration. The future of America's
exploration efforts lead to Mars. Just as the first steps on the moon
were by Americans, the first flag to fly on another planet in our solar
system should be that of the United States.
Great nations do great things. President Kennedy's call to America
wasn't just about reaching the moon, it was a reminder that we are an
exceptional nation. We must rekindle within NASA the fire that blazed
the trail to the moon.
Chairman Smith. That concludes my opening statement.
And the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Johnson, is recognized
for hers.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and good
morning to all.
I would like also to welcome our distinguished witnesses to
today's hearing.
I make no secret of the fact that I consider National
Aeronautics and Space Administration to be a critical national
asset. NASA is a source of technological and scientific
innovation, an inspiration to generations of young people, a
catalyst for economic growth, and a very positive symbol of
American preeminence worldwide, as well as visible
demonstration of our commitment to international cooperation
and the peaceful uses of outer space. Simply put, NASA is about
the future.
Now it is a fact that NASA's human spaceflight activities
account for a significant share of the resources invested in
NASA. We need to ensure that those resources are invested
wisely. That is why this morning's hearing is so important.
At Congress' direction, the National Academies undertook a
comprehensive review of the future of human space exploration
in the United States. That review has been completed and it is
now up to Congress and the Administration to decide what we
will do in response to the findings and recommendations
contained in its final report.
This is a report that does not mince words, and for that we
should be very grateful. As I said when the report was first
released, the National Academies has provided the Nation with
an important wakeup call. Their conclusions are clear. We are
not going to have a human space exploration program worthy of
this great nation if we continue down the current path of
failing to provide the resources needed to make real progress
and failing to embrace a clear goal and pathway to achieving
that goal.
As Members of Congress, the ball is in our court and we
have choices to make. We can choose to continue to argue about
which President or who in Congress is to blame for the current
state of our human space exploration program, but I honestly
hope that we won't. We are where we are and we can't change the
past. Our focus needs to be on how we proceed from this point
forward, and I hope that our witnesses can provide some useful
counsel to us in that regard.
In addition, we can choose to continue to pretend that a
business-as-usual approach to our human space exploration
program will suffice, but I hope we won't do that either
because the report we are reviewing today makes clear that
business as usual is not a sustainable approach. Whatever
resources we are able to invest need to be invested effectively
and efficiently toward the attainment of a clearly articulated
goal. We really can't afford to do otherwise.
Finally, the National Academies' panel makes clear that we
don't have unlimited time to decide what kind of human space
exploration program we want for the Nation. It may be tempting
for some to say that we shouldn't invest necessary resources in
space exploration until we first fix Medicare or Medicaid,
eliminate the deficit, or address a host of other major policy
issues that have been identified by Members at various times.
It is tempting to use those issues as an excuse for inaction,
but the National Academies makes a compelling case that we do
not have that luxury if we want to maintain meaningful human
space exploration capability in this nation, which I strongly
believe we do. We should of course address those other issues
but that should not prevent us from investing in our future in
the meantime.
And make no mistake about it, our Nation's human space
exploration program with an ultimate goal of landing humans on
Mars is about our future and that of our children and
grandchildren. Mr. Chairman, the National Academies has done a
great service by undertaking the study that we will be hearing
about today. I hope that this morning's hearing will be the
first step in achieving a revitalized and focused exploration
program for America. I want to work with my colleagues on both
sides of the aisle to do just that.
In closing, I again want to welcome our witnesses and I
yield back the balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson
Good morning. I want to join the Chairman in welcoming our two
distinguished witnesses to today's hearing.
I make no secret of the fact that I consider the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration to be a critical national asset.
NASA is a source of technological and scientific innovation, an
inspiration to generations of young people, a catalyst for economic
growth, and a very positive symbol of American preeminence worldwide as
well as a visible demonstration of our commitment to international
cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. Simply put, NASA is
about the future.
Now it is a fact that NASA's human spaceflight activities account
for a significant share of the resources invested in NASA. We need to
ensure that those resources are invested wisely. That is why this
morning's hearing is so important. At Congress's direction, the
National Academies undertook a comprehensive review of the future of
human space exploration in the United States. That review has been
completed, and it is now up to Congress and the Administration to
decide what we will do in response to the findings and recommendations
contained in its final report.
This is a report that does not mince words, and for that we should
be grateful. As I said when the report was first released, the National
Academies has provided the nation with an important ``wake-up call.''
Their conclusions are clear. We are not going to have a human space
exploration program worthy of this great nation if we continue down the
current path of failing to provide the resources needed to make real
progress and failing to embrace a clear goal and pathway to achieving
that goal.
As Members of Congress, the ball is now in our court, and we have
choices to make. We can choose to continue to argue about which
President or who in Congress is to blame for the current state of our
human space exploration program, but I earnestly hope that we won't. We
are where we are, and we can't change the past. Our focus needs to be
on how we proceed from this point forward, and I hope that our
witnesses can provide some useful counsel to us in that regard.
In addition, we can choose to continue to pretend that a
``business-as-usual'' approach to our human space exploration program
will suffice, but I hope we won't do that either. Because the report we
are reviewing today makes clear that ``business-as-usual'' is not a
sustainable approach. Whatever resources we are able to invest need to
be invested effectively and efficiently towards the attainment of a
clearly articulated goal. We really can't afford to do otherwise.
Finally, the National Academies panel makes clear that we don't
have unlimited time to decide what kind of human space exploration
program we want for the nation. It may be tempting for some to say that
we shouldn't invest the necessary resources in space exploration until
we first ``fix'' Medicare, eliminate the deficit, or address a host of
other major policy issues that have been identified by Members at
various times. It's tempting to use those issues as an excuse for
inaction, but the National Academies makes a compelling case that we
don't have that luxury if we want to maintain a meaningful human space
exploration capability in this nation, which I strongly believe we do.
We should of course address those other issues, but that should not
prevent us from investing in our future in the meantime. And make no
mistake about it--our nation's human space exploration program, with an
ultimate goal of landing humans on Mars, is about our future and that
of our children and grandchildren.
Mr. Chairman, the National Academies has done us a great service by
undertaking the study that we will be hearing about today. I hope that
this morning's hearing will be the first step in achieving a
revitalized and focused space exploration program for America, and I
want to work with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to do just
that.
In closing, I again want to welcome our witnesses, and I yield back
the balance of my time.
Chairman Smith. Thank you, Ms. Johnson.
We will now proceed to introduce the witnesses. And to
introduce our first witness, I will recognize the gentleman
from Indiana, Dr. Bucshon.
Mr. Bucshon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Our first witness is Governor Mitch Daniels, the President
of Purdue University, which has graduated 23 astronauts,
including Neil Armstrong. Prior to this appointment, he served
two terms as the 49th Governor of my home State of Indiana. He
also served as Chief of Staff to Senator Richard Lugar, Senior
Advisor to President Ronald Reagan, and Director of the Office
of Management and Budget under President George W. Bush.
In addition to his strong record of public service, he has
served as a Senior Executive at Eli Lilly based in
Indianapolis, among other positions he has held.
President Daniels earned his bachelor's degree from the
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at
Princeton and his J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center.
Welcome, Governor Daniels.
Chairman Smith. Thank you, Dr. Bucshon. I will introduce
our second witness, who is Dr. Jonathan Lunine, the Director of
the Center for Radiophysics and Space Research and the David C.
Duncan Professor in the Physical Sciences at Cornell
University. He is co-investigator of the Juno Mission to
Jupiter and an interdisciplinary scientist for the James Webb
Space Telescope. Dr. Lunine has shared and served on committees
for NASA and the National Science Foundation. He also is a
member of the National Academy of Sciences and a Fellow of the
American Geophysical Union and American Association for the
Advancement of Science.
Dr. Lunine received his bachelor's in physics and astronomy
from the University of Rochester and his master's and Ph.D. in
planetary science from the California Institute of Technology.
We welcome you both today. It is nice to have two experts
on the subject present.
And, Governor Daniels, we will begin with you.
TESTIMONY OF GOVERNOR MITCH DANIELS,
REPORT CO-CHAIR AND PRESIDENT,
PURDUE UNIVERSITY
Gov. Daniels. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Johnson, and
Members of the Committee, we thank you for this opportunity to
be here on behalf of our Committee on Human Spaceflight
established in response to the NASA Authorization Act of 2010.
That act called on NASA to ask the National Academies to review
the goals, core capabilities, and direction of our nation's
human spaceflight program. And we released our report on June
5. Dr. Lunine and I are here to summarize it for you.
As envisioned in the 2010 act, the Committee membership was
very diverse, composed not solely or even mostly of experts
from the human spaceflight community, but instead had members
from fields as diverse as planetary science, astronomy,
political science and history, sociology, public opinion and
polling, economics, human spaceflight experience, international
peace and security, and others.
All of us came into this process with open minds and
brought to the work our divergent points of view. In the end we
came to the strong consensus that there is a convincing case to
be made for a continuation of our nation's human spaceflight
program, provided that the pathways approach and decision rules
recommended in our report are adopted.
We did so because we became convinced only after lengthy
discussion and analysis that a combination of what we labeled
the pragmatic and aspirational rationales, including the human
impulse to explore and search for new knowledge in places we
have never been, justifies the cost, the risk and the
opportunities associated with sending humans beyond low-Earth
orbit, and especially for the ``horizon goal'' we identify as
Mars.
Getting humans to the surface of Mars will be a daunting
challenge. It is immensely difficult, probably more so than
most laymen and even many experts have recognized. Succeeding
in this endeavor will require, we believe, a very different way
of doing business than the Nation has been practicing in recent
decades, particularly as it is likely to take 30 years or more
to reach the goal.
As its highest priority recommendation, the committee
recommends what we call a ``pathways approach,'' requiring the
government to come to a consensus on achieving a highly
disciplined set of objectives from which the Nation would not
deviate over time. A pathway in this scenario would involve a
predefined set of chosen destinations and milestones, each of
which would generate technical and engineering requirements
which, as much as possible, would feed forward into the next
goal and eventually the horizon goal.
The committee does not recommend any specific pathway--that
is for you and for future leadership--but we do note in our
report that any pathway that could successfully land humans on
the surface of Mars would require funding above constant
dollars.
Pursuing unwaveringly the consensus choice of a pathway
over the term of multiple decades and the sustained support of
the advances required by the resulting exploration architecture
are the keys to a sustainable approach to human spaceflight.
Mr. Chairman, I can't stress enough how critical it is the
Nation take a new approach different from the recent way of
doing business in space. Work needs to begin soon on the most
difficult and mission-critical technical challenges of any
pathway to Mars, and out of many such challenges, our committee
singles out Mars entry, descent and landing; in-space
propulsion and power; and radiation safety for very special
emphasis.
In addition, we are in total agreement that achieving the
goal of a human presence on Mars will require the United States
to expand its partnerships with other space faring nations,
including an openness to working with China, with whatever
safeguards might have to be put in place. Such international
partnerships should include much greater cost-sharing than our
partners have provided up to now, and that can only happen if
those partners are given the responsibility to provide
substantial elements to the overall architecture, which they
will help design and build.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, we ask that readers of our report
recognize that the risks of human spaceflight, including the
risks to human life, are high, and setbacks are inevitable.
Lives are likely to be lost in pursuit of such a tremendous
endeavor, and governing statutes will need to recognize that
grim fact. And while we recognize that many of our
recommendations will be seen by many as unrealistic or perhaps
even naive, we would observe that, absent changes along the
lines we are recommending, the goal of reaching Mars in any
meaningful time frame is itself unrealistic.
Our committee hopes that that our report will carry the
national conversation forward in the direction of realism,
realism about public opinion, about risk, about cost, and about
the incredibly daunting technical challenges of the horizon
goal we hope the world embraces. And most of all, we hope to
foster greater realism about the fact that if we really do want
to go to Mars, then many actors, public and private, need to
change long-standing behaviors and expectations. We are
optimistic the public will support a consensus national goal
and we believe the rationales justify its pursuit. We believe
the achievement would be monumental if it occurred, but we
think there is really one and possibly only one approach to get
there, and we have offered up our best ideas in support of that
approach.
[The prepared statement of Gov. Daniels follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Chairman Smith. Thank you, Governor Daniels.
And, Dr. Lunine.
TESTIMONY OF DR. JONATHAN LUNINE,
REPORT CO-CHAIR AND DIRECTOR,
CORNELL UNIVERSITY'S CENTER FOR
RADIOPHYSICS AND SPACE RESEARCH
Dr. Lunine. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Johnson, Members,
let me add my thanks to you all for giving us the opportunity
to talk about this report this morning.
We recognize it is a very long report with a lot of detail,
and so if you cannot or have not read the entire document,
certainly Chapter 1 is the important chapter to read. And in
particular there you will find our major findings and
recommendations on issues such as public and stakeholder
opinions about space exploration and human spaceflight in
general; an honest and detailed independent analysis of the
technical and affordability realities associated with the three
example exploration pathways that we have put together that
lead to Mars; an examination of the rationales for human
spaceflight; and most importantly, our recommendation on
adopting what we call the ``pathways approach'' that we believe
will help our Nation achieve that next giant leap for
humankind.
Anybody who reads about the history of space will come to
realize very quickly that there are many myths that surround
both public opinion and proven benefits from human spaceflight.
If the decision to pursue human spaceflight were based simply
on the available data on proven benefits that uniquely accrue
from this endeavor or were based on public opinion being in the
majority supporting a particular program in advance, then we
would likely not go. We also recognize that by these kinds of
criteria, Americans would never have set foot on the Moon, and
yet that achievement is now viewed as a source of inspiration
and great pride by many, if not most, Americans.
In fact, Mr. Chairman, it has been political leadership
that determines whether our nation will pursue major new
ventures. Our elected leaders have shown courage and vision in
the pursuit of human endeavors in space, and when those visions
are implemented--such as with Apollo or the Shuttle--the public
is retrospectively supportive of the expenditures of our tax
dollars on what are viewed as endeavors of national importance.
In the end it was the judgment of this diverse committee
that the aggregate of the aspirational and pragmatic rationales
does argue for a continuation of the Nation's human spaceflight
program. In effect, the whole was greater than the sum of the
parts. Whether to pursue human exploration beyond low-Earth
orbit in a truly sustainable way is a decision that deserves
careful consideration by our Nation's leaders, stakeholders,
and the public at large. And in making that decision it will be
paramount to ask the question, ``What would a future be like
where there were no expectation that Americans would once again
venture into space?''
But as such decisions are contemplated, we cannot ignore
the significant leaps in technical capability that will be
required to land and sustain humans on Mars. Governor Daniels
has talked about some of those key technologies. And these will
be extremely difficult to develop in terms of cost, schedule,
technical challenges, and gaps between current and needed
capabilities. Achieving these leaps was the motivation behind
our recommendation of adopting a pathways approach, since only
a sustained program that builds upon a sequence of technical
and exploration successes can buy down the risk involved in
getting to Mars in a reasonable time frame.
In one of the possible pathways analyzed in detail in the
report--and these are example pathways--we included as a
stepping stone extended human operations on the lunar surface.
Our technical panel concluded, and the committee concurred,
that extended surface operations on the Moon, not Apollo-style
sorties, but extended surface operations would make significant
contributions to reaching the horizon goal through development
and testing of key operational technologies.
Mr. Chairman, Mars really is incredibly hard. And to reach
that horizon goal will cost decades, hundreds of billions of
dollars, and human lives. To be a sustainable program, it will
require a steadfast national commitment to a consensus goal,
international collaboration, and a budget that increases by
more than the rate of inflation.
If the Nation does decide to undertake one of the greatest
of human technical endeavors it has ever attempted, and we
assert that there is not much time in which to make this
decision, we have provided in our report what we call the
Pathways Principles that will help in the choice of a consensus
pathway to that goal and decision rules that will serve as
guidelines on how to manage the pursuit of the chosen pathway
when stressors such as diminished budgets might arise.
Our committee is convinced that these principles and
decision rules provide a way for our national leadership to
decide on a given pathway, measure progress in its pursuit,
navigate off one pathway to another, or cease the endeavor
altogether.
But in the end, it is our elected leaders who will be the
critical enablers of our nation's investment in human
spaceflight that ultimately one day may put American astronauts
on the red soil of Mars.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today on
this critical national question.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Lunine follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Chairman Smith. Thank you, Dr. Lunine. And I will recognize
myself for questions.
One of the conclusions of your report is as follows: ``To
continue on the present course is to invite failure,
disillusionment, and the loss of the long-standing
international perception that human spaceflight is something
the United States does best.'' That is an incredible summary of
where we stand today and I don't know that too many people
would disagree with it.
My first question, Governor Daniels, may I direct to you,
and that is does the Obama Administration have a plan to get to
Mars, as difficult and as costly as it might be?
And, Dr. Lunine, I hope it doesn't cost lives, but
inevitably exploring new frontiers does.
But, Governor Daniels, does the Administration have a path,
have a plan to get to Mars as we sit here today?
Gov. Daniels. Mr. Chairman, I believe our committee's
statements, the one that you read and others that we made, were
meant to refer not to any one Administration but really to a
persistent pattern now. And I think we speak in terms of
decades. So to say that at the--as we do that at the present
time business as currently conducted won't get us to Mars is a
statement we could equally have made about the posture of NASA
and our program as it stood at other points in the past. And we
do believe that it will be necessary and sooner, rather than
later, for the Nation, all of it, whatever Administration is in
authority at the time, the Congress as it is constituted at the
time, NASA, and the private space community for that matter to
agree on an approach that, while it may not be everyone's
favorite, everyone will agree to sustain and support over the
lengthy time that will be necessary. And that we do not have
today.
Chairman Smith. Okay. Thank you, Governor.
And, Dr. Lunine, this next question is actually addressed
to both you and Governor Daniels, and that is were we to say
that landing astronauts onto Mars was a goal that we wanted to
achieve, what are the comparative disadvantages of the Asteroid
Retrieval Mission or the advantages of going back to the Moon
as a stepping stone to the landing of astronauts on the Moon?
Dr. Lunine. Mr. Chairman, we looked at what we called three
example exploration pathways for getting from today to the
surface of Mars.
Chairman Smith. Yes. I think I said surface of the Moon; I
meant Mars.
Dr. Lunine. Yes, actually you said Mars in the end, yes.
Chairman Smith. Right. Okay.
Dr. Lunine. So these are, again, examples only, and in the
end, should the Nation decide to do this, of course there may
be a different set of stepping stones, a different exploration
pathway. But we did look at one pathway that involved the ARM,
Asteroid Redirect Mission, another that involved initially
lunar sorties and then a lunar outpost before moving on to the
surface of Mars, and then another pathway that we called
Enhanced Exploration that involved visiting asteroids in native
orbits, the lunar surface, the Martian moons, and ultimately
the Martian surface.
The differences among these three pathways have to do
principally with the number of steps that are available in
which to develop the key technologies that will be needed to
get to the surface of Mars, a whole list of technologies that I
won't articulate in my answer to this question, but we can if
you wish.
The ARM to Mars exploration pathway in which one goes from
the Asteroid Redirect Mission to the Martian moons and then to
the Martian surface has effectively the smallest number of
stepping stones but the greatest technological leaps are
required in going beyond ARM to get to Mars. And in particular
a number of technologies that are key to landing on Mars and
getting astronauts back are not developed in the context of the
ARM mission. They have to be developed after that, but there
are no stepping stones on which to actually test them. And some
of the technologies developed for ARM are what we call dead-end
technologies that are not useful as far as the committee can
see in the succeeding steps to going toward Mars. So that is
the essential issue with respect to that particular pathway.
Chairman Smith. And going back to the Moon would be an
advantage for the opposite reasons. Is that correct?
Dr. Lunine. So in the pathway in which there were lunar
sorties and a lunar outpost, there would be an opportunity to
test technologies that would be required in partial G
environments for extended stays on the Martian surface, to
which astronauts would be committed.
Chairman Smith. Okay. Thank you.
My time has expired but I want to make one more point, and
that is to focus on the most recent proposed budget by this
Administration for NASA and to point out that the
Administration's proposed budget for NASA is $1.8 billion less
than the last budget under the Bush Administration, which seems
to me that the Administration is not making space exploration a
priority.
That concludes my time. And the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms.
Johnson, is recognized for her questions.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
It is almost comical to hear your last statement as the
kind of struggle we had for reauthorization of NASA in this
Committee. It had nothing to do with the Administration.
But I want to say to the witnesses, first of all, do both
of you stand by the report and the contents of the report?
So you feel that it really is important for the Nation to
find a way to be involved in this kind of research?
Now, Governor, I am a product of a school of Indiana, St.
Mary's at the University of Notre Dame, and I know you are not
a spendthrift and--nor is Indiana as a State. And I am from
Texas so you can take that for what it is worth. But if you
really do think from this research that this is a goal that
this Nation should achieve, do you think it is important enough
to convince the people on the other side of the aisle to help
us to get going because it seems to me that every day that we
wait we are wasting time. We have had people in the past who
had that foresight that allowed this to happen, and we are
realistically in a financial bind, but we cannot shut the door
to our future.
Tell me how you really feel about this.
Gov. Daniels. First of all, thanks for mentioning your St.
Mary's credential. Now I have got another reason to admire you,
Congresswoman, and now I know why you turned out so well.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you.
Gov. Daniels. Yes, emphatically I do agree. I want to
stress, I made mention in the short opening that I do believe
all of us brought to the committee an open mind. We spent a lot
of time asking the fundamental question that we were assigned,
should the Nation do this at all, and if so, on what basis? And
that was not a reflex judgment, I don't think by anybody, let
alone the whole group. And I do share it having listened to
those discussions, all the witnesses, all the literature that
we surveyed.
And I also would observe it is accurate to say that this is
one issue, mercifully, that I don't think divides us
particularly on partisan lines. I think there are people who
are very enthusiastic that we heard from who may disagree
strongly about other things, and people who question the value
that can be found in both camps. But we hope that our report
makes a strong case for proceeding and lays out, in the most
candid way we could, the preconditions for succeeding, which
will be much harder, I think, for folks to come to terms with
than the abstract idea of whether we should go and whether we
are enthusiastic about somehow finding resources.
Ms. Johnson. Doctor?
Dr. Lunine. Well, I agree with Governor Daniels. I want to
emphasize how broad the background of the Committee Members in
fact was. This was not a committee of astronauts or aerospace
engineers. We had historians, we had sociologists, we had
businesspeople; there were very skeptical people I have to say
right at the beginning. And I was somewhat myself skeptical
that we could come to a consensus. And in the end this very
diverse committee of experts came to a strong consensus on the
conclusions of the report, and that to me I found quite
remarkable.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Smith. Thank you, Ms. Johnson.
And the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is
recognized for his questions.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, and I want to welcome
our witnesses, especially Governor Daniels, who we have worked
together in the past on many various projects that were
successful and now we want to make sure that we look at
America's space program and see if we can give it some
direction with what we have learned.
Let me ask right off the bat, the study that we are talking
about, did it come to a conclusion as to how much money it
would cost for a Mars mission?
Dr. Lunine. Congressman Rohrabacher, we did not actually
try to total up and provide a final number to three digits on
what the Mars mission would cost, but the technical panel in
their analysis did look at the cost of various elements,
developing various elements.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Um-hum.
Dr. Lunine. And essentially then what you would see in
Chapter 4 are these sand charts that show what is required in
terms of budgets relative to today in order to accomplish these
goals.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Could you give us a little hint about what
they are?
Dr. Lunine. So I will give you two numbers. One is that in
order to accomplish this goal, the human space exploration
program would have to rise by something on the order of two or
three percent higher than inflation rate in order to meet the
rising cost in the sand chart. And the total cost, as we say in
our report, of a program that ends at Mars is on a scale of
hundreds of billions of dollars.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Hundreds of billions of dollars. And I
would just like to say that I think that eventually humankind
will get to Mars and what we really are talking about now is
making sure we get to Mars earlier than what might happen 100
years from now, correct? Okay. Hundreds of billions of dollars
to get to Mars a little earlier--now, maybe a little--maybe a
lot earlier than what we would otherwise get there.
The--so what areas do you--as far as I can see, that means
that we would have to have major international cooperation,
which you mentioned with China, as well as other nations. And
we would also perhaps have to make sure that the private sector
got involved in space and took up some of the slack of what
NASA might now be doing as part of a governmental program.
Maybe SpaceX and some of these others could come in and start
doing some of the more commercial type of activities.
In terms of China and space cooperation with countries like
China, doesn't that sort of sit with you in a--what if somebody
said in 1937 we really want to develop these rockets to go to
the Moon, and you know this guy over there in Germany has
really got a good rocket program; maybe we should cooperate
with him. Does that--the fact that China now is the world's
worst human rights abuser, isn't the fact that China now is
committing acts of aggression all along the Pacific Rim with
the Philippines, with Japan, and others, doesn't that sort of
affect our decision as to whether we are going to cooperate
with that country?
Dr. Lunine. Well, I am going to punt part of your question
over to Governor Daniels if that is okay, but I want to make
one point which is that in Chapter 4 of the report, it is
important to recognize that there is a very strong inflection
point in terms of the budget profiles. A budget profile that
only rises with inflation essentially will not get us to Mars
in any foreseeable time. The program just does not close.
With respect to collaboration, one of our pathways
principles is to seek continuously to engage new partners, and
that can be international partners, other federal agencies, and
commercial entities as well. So that is the key part of our
report.
Do you want to answer the----
Gov. Daniels. Well, the committee recognized how difficult
and complex this subject is. I mean for openers--and it is
important I think in every answer we give or every dimension in
which we think about this subject to remember the incredible
time frames over which we are talking. Countries that are
friends today might not be friends in 2040 or 2050----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Um-hum. That is a good point.
Gov. Daniels. --which might be as soon as we can get there
under the best of circumstances and vice versa. Space has
always been to some extent a place where nations that competed
vigorously have found it useful or at least possible to
collaborate. And Russia, not exactly the best actor on the
planet right now either, but they are our intimate partner with
regard to the Space Station, as the Chairman----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Of course, we are limited----
Gov. Daniels. --reminded us.
Mr. Rohrabacher. --to borrowing the money from China. If we
don't make them our partners, we are going to borrow it from
them anyway.
Gov. Daniels. Yes, well, this is relevant in many respects
to the discussion we had.
Let me just make I think a related point and it certainly
links back to the previous question, too. When we talk about
the amount of money involved here, it is a lot of money, but we
are talking about over decades. Now, this Committee knows, but
not every citizen knows, that the NASA human spaceflight budget
is a couple tenths of a percent of the federal budget, and
increases in it will be rounding errors in the larger sense. We
all know that the real issues with regard to making sure we can
meet all our national priorities on Earth or beyond have to do
with the way in which autopilot safety net programs are
devouring the discretionary funds for NASA, the FBI, the Park
Service, and so many other things that we value. So those two
pieces I think of perspective are important when we talk about
the money.
And finally, a learning point I think for me and maybe
other committee members, is that a pathways approach, the
committee believes, is a prerequisite to success. I will just
say that there is not a lot of point in spending more money
above inflation if we just spend it the way we do today.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Um-hum.
Gov. Daniels. So the sine qua non I think our report is
pretty clear on is a new disciplined, sustained approach, the
kind we try to elaborate. Given that approach, then yes, the
data does say that something above flat-line spending would be
required.
Similarly, with regard to partnerships, partnerships in the
first instance--we look at history--turn out to be more
expensive. They are not cost saving. They are the complexity,
the time that is added sometimes in getting agreement can add
costs, so you really will need--whether it is China or anybody
else, you really will need very substantial, more than the
historical levels of cost sharing first just to break even, let
alone to bring down the overall burden.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Um-hum. Thank you.
Chairman Smith. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
The gentlewoman from Oregon, Ms. Bonamici, is recognized.
Ms. Bonamici. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Governor and Doctor, for being here today and
thank you so much for leading the National Research Council
report. We on the Committee I know really appreciate it.
You are right, Governor, that we have had a lot of
discussions about spaceflight that have united this Committee
and they also have the potential to unite the country. And we
let our imaginations really be ignited by the incredible work
done by NASA. We have had a lot of discussions in this
Committee and in the Space Subcommittee about the leadership
and the long-term thinking that is involved in looking at
spaceflight.
We have had some interesting discussions here about the
strategic direction and that is why we especially appreciate
that your report--what are the benefits of going back to the
Moon or do we focus on Mars, do we have the Asteroid Retrieval
Mission? So we are really glad that we have your background and
your expertise.
And I want to follow up on the previous conversation about
international collaboration. We have talked about that a lot in
this committee and I noticed that one of the things in the
report that you mentioned is that it is evident that U.S. near-
term goals for human exploration are not aligned with those of
our traditional international partners. While most space-faring
nations and agencies are looking toward the Moon, specifically
the lunar surface, U.S. plans are focused on redirection of an
asteroid into retrograde lunar orbit, et cetera. So can you
talk a little bit about whether we should stop discussing going
back to the Moon and really focus on Mars or do we need to
continue to have those conversations about returning to the
Moon as part of international collaboration if in fact those
goals are different?
Gov. Daniels. Well, thank you. It is an excellent question.
Of course it was an observation. We had personal testimony and
a chance to question leaders of every international space
program and I think it is an accurate reflection of what we
heard from them to say that they lack enthusiasm at least at
this point for the ARM idea. They have been more interested,
and told us so, in the lunar surface, and my friend Jonathan
talked in answer to a previous question about the reason our
committee saw some advantages to that. Going to the Martian
surface, it might be extraordinarily helpful to have been on
some surface first as opposed to leaping there without benefit
of that direct experience.
I think that is part of the thinking of our international
partners or potential partners as we heard it. But again, it
wasn't in our charge and it is not part of our report to make
any specific recommendation, only to say that at some stage,
and we hope it is before long, the Nation needs to pick such a
route and stick to it.
Ms. Bonamici. Thank you. And I want to try to get another
question in.
Dr. Lunine, you talked about the myths and it was
interesting to hear you say that if we relied on public opinion
polling, things might be very, very different. I have talked a
lot in this Committee and we have had a lot of discussions
about part of the role of NASA is to inspire students to go
into science fields. I also serve on the Education Committee.
We have a lot of discussions about that. Can you talk about
whether NASA is doing enough to really share its successes, its
potential with the public because I tell you, when we are
talking with our constituents, they don't understand all the
benefits of space exploration both in the short-term and the
long-term and historically. So are they doing enough? Is there
more that can be done either through NASA or in other ways so
that we can help to shift the public opinion and see the
benefits?
Dr. Lunine. Thank you, Congresswoman, for that question.
The myth I was referring to in particular with respect to
public opinion is that during the development of Apollo there
was large-scale public support for that program, and in fact,
what our public and stakeholders outreach panel found is that
that really was not the case. But in retrospect the public
supported that program looking back on it. And the same seems
to be true now for the Shuttle.
With respect to your second question, we did not look in
detail at NASA's Education and Public Uutreach program as a
committee so I can't speak to that in the context of the
report. My personal experience with NASA is that it does an
excellent job of providing materials through the web and other
means for the public to be engaged in space exploration of all
types. And I have been a part of that to some extent and I
think that certainly a large part of what we do in space now is
immediately accessible to the public through the web.
Ms. Bonamici. That is right.
Gov. Daniels. May I add just a quick word? I think
because----
Ms. Bonamici. If the Chair will allow.
Mr. Palazzo. [Presiding] Go ahead.
Ms. Bonamici. Thank you.
Gov. Daniels. I do think it is a really important question
and I would only add that I believe if there were secret sauce
that NASA could have applied that would ignite a different
level of public excitement, it would have happened a long time
ago.
When we talk about a realism about public opinion, we are
just trying to look in a clear-eyed fashion at the data
Jonathan just talked about. And really what it says is that
this will require national leadership. Many things do. Many of
the great achievements of this nation and this government have
not been directly responsive to a public--previous public
outcry. And so what we do find in the data is that where
leadership occurs and then progress occurs, the public is proud
and the public then responds very strongly.
Ms. Bonamici. Thank you very much. And my time is expired.
I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Palazzo. Okay. The NASA Authorization Act of 2014 was
just passed the House of Representatives by a near unanimous
vote. It includes the requirement that NASA develop a roadmap
for the future of human exploration which defines key
milestones and decision points for an expanded human presence
in the solar system. Would a formal roadmap for future missions
be helpful for NASA? What types of information would you expect
should be included in such a roadmap? And how can NASA
practically incorporate your recommendations for a sustainable
program into this roadmap? That question is for both of you.
Dr. Lunine. Congressman, the central core recommendation of
our report, which is the pathways approach, essentially
consists of a very specific set of steps to a horizon goal.
Now, in the sense that a roadmap would embrace those specific
steps, yes, that would be useful, but I think that the pathways
approach goes beyond roadmaps, which often are things that have
quite a bit of flexibility or some indefinite end to them, to a
process where instead there is a definite horizon goal--and
this committee recommends Mars--there are intermediate stepping
stones and those stepping stones have specific technological
developments that are tied to them that are then needed
ultimately for a landing on Mars and also the stepping stones
prior to that, and then the ability if conditions do change to
make reasoned and rational changes in the pathway through a set
of decision rules.
So, you know, I see that as something more than a roadmap.
First of all, if the Nation decides to commit to this, it is a
very--how shall I say it? A very well-defined framework with
pathways, with stepping stones, and with decision rules that
have to be adhered to over years and decades in order to reach
the final goal. It is a substantial undertaking and it is more
than a roadmap.
Mr. Palazzo. All right. Thank you.
Governor Daniels, do you want to----
Gov. Daniels. I think that is pretty well said. I would
just emphasize that it will take a level of discipline that we
have not as a nation shown--so not picking on any one entity,
person, branch, Administration here--the discipline to adhere
to a chosen pathway, whichever it is over multiple
Administrations and a lot of turnover in Congress. It is not
the natural state of affairs. We all know and understand why
and that is why it will be difficult to do.
The discipline to abandon dead-end technologies that will
not contribute meaningfully to the technical requirements of
the next step or the step beyond, the discipline to rotate
resources out of infrastructure that doesn't fit the pathway as
soon as it is obvious that it doesn't. So these are, as I said
earlier--a lot here that people I think can agree to in the
abstract will be very, very--a call on us all to approach this
in a brand-new way, but that is--it is essential because the
qualitative difference about this goal versus almost anything
else we can think of is it takes 30 years or more to bring it
off.
Mr. Palazzo. All right. Well said.
The Administration has consistently requested less funding
for the Space Launch System and the Orion Crew Capsule than is
needed to keep the programs on schedule and reduce programmatic
risk. The funding for Earth science at NASA has increased by 63
percent since 2007 while the overall budget has been reduced.
How does your report address large priority shifts of this kind
of the agency and how can Congress ensure that there is not an
artificial need for an off-ramp simply because the
Administration starves exploration for other priorities?
Dr. Lunine. Well, I think the first step is that there has
to be a national commitment to the ultimate horizon goal, and
if there is not that strong national commitment, then it is
going to be difficult to pull off human exploration missions
into deep space at all. You know, we talk about Mars as the
horizon goal, but all of these require very strong commitment.
These off-ramps are essentially termination points for such a
program, and so again it is I think a matter not so much of
technical issues but political will to undertake a program like
this that will cover decades.
Mr. Palazzo. Governor Daniels?
Gov. Daniels. I think I would just say that I don't think
there is a lot of utility in talking about this Administration
or any one Administration if we are going to make the national
decision or sets of decisions that we think are necessary for
success here. It will be something we will all have to confront
in the years just ahead of us.
And so it was said earlier we are where we are and that is
my view, too. It won't be just the next Administration, the
next Congress, whoever makes it up, but multiple ones. We hope
there will be a culture built in which there will be a
presumption of discipline, a presumption of sustaining the
course that is chosen over all the difficulties and all the
inevitable setbacks.
Mr. Palazzo. All right. Thank you.
And lastly, I would just like to take a moment to follow up
on the questions the Chairman asked about the ARM. You know,
Dr. Lunine, you stated that in the report the committee agreed
that ARM would lead to dead-ends on the pathway approach. I
want to emphasize that statement and reiterate my thoughts that
the ARM is a costly distraction and I am hopeful that NASA will
take the recommendations of this report to heart. And that is
not just my personal opinion; that seems to be the majority
opinion in the scientific community.
At this time I would like to recognize Ms. Wilson for five
minutes.
Ms. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Palazzo and Ranking Member
Edwards. And I want to thank Governor Daniels and Dr. Lunine
for being here today and for your work as Co-Chairs of the
Committee on Human Spaceflight.
I agree with Governor Daniels' statement that human
spaceflight should remain a major national priority and I was
glad to see your committee recognize the importance of NASA and
human spaceflight. In Florida, my home State, the famous
Kennedy Space Center has a special connection with NASA. Many
of my constituents have visited the space center and were
fortunate enough to visit at least one of our Space Shuttle
launches.
One of the hallmarks of this Nation is our ability to dream
big and to achieve the impossible, and NASA has exemplified
this spirit for more than 5 decades. As Members of Congress, we
have the responsibility to keep this spirit alive. This means
ensuring NASA has both the resources and guidance to continue
reaching for new heights. To achieve NASA's far-reaching goals,
long-term planning and sustained support are required. So I say
let's keep working together in a bipartisan fashion to ensure
NASA can continue its mission of discovery, technological
innovation, and inspiration.
I have a couple of questions. The United States currently
works with Russia, Canada, and Japan, and these are the
countries that participate in the European Space Agency on an
International Space Station. In your report you discussed the
possibility of expanding international collaboration in
spaceflight, including the potential of working with China. I
recently visited China and I was concerned. What lessons are
there in our current collaboration that we can apply to future
collaboration to ensure intellectual property and that
classified information is adequately protected?
Dr. Lunine. Thank you, Congresswoman. We recognize that as
a committee as well and we are also concerned. We also
recognize that some of our traditional international partners
are interested in collaborating with China as well, and whether
the United States does or doesn't, we are likely to see
collaboration between China and some of our traditional
international partners.
Governor Daniels is prompting me to tell a story that I
think is correct. I have checked it with other committee
members and of course I was in high school at the time, but
during the Apollo-Soyuz test project when the United States and
the Soviet Union worked together to achieve the first
international docking in space of two human spacecraft, the
docking module which was the connector between the Apollo and
the Soyuz had a Russian end and an American end and it was
primarily a piece of U.S. hardware that was transported to
Russia for testing and in the context of one of those
transports, apparently it was found that it had been
disassembled and reassembled again probably in Russian customs.
So, you know, this is the sort of thing that one has to watch
for.
Ultimately, if the Nation decides that China is a partner
of value in this major human endeavor, the program would have
to be designed to safeguard our technologies. There is no
question about that.
Ms. Wilson. Okay. Thank you.
We are currently forced to rely on Russia to transport our
astronauts to the International Space Station. When there is
conflict between governments, how can we guarantee the
concerns--the safety concerns for our astronauts? Has that been
discussed or any plan in place as to what happens when there is
conflict, which is something that we are fast approaching now
with Russia?
Gov. Daniels. Well, these are excellent questions and very
legitimate concerns. We talked about them in the committee. I
guess one can only say that we did live through periods of
intense disagreement, conflict with the Soviet Union while we
collaborated. We are collaborating with Russia now at a time
when we have immense disagreements. These are very hard
questions. And the intellectual property question of course may
be even tougher.
All that can be said is as hard as those are to
contemplate, as big as those risks are, the idea of somehow
going to Mars alone is probably even less promising and raises
even bigger questions. And so that is why our committee thinks
at least we have to be open to trying to solve these problems
or properly safeguard against either property theft or maybe
safety challenges with regard to what is emerging as the other
very vigorous, disciplined, purposeful space program on the
planet.
Mr. Palazzo. I now recognize Mr. Brooks.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Challenger catastrophe, as we all well know, you had
one engine failure that had a catastrophic effect on all the
other engines and resulted in the destruction of the Challenger
Space Shuttle, including significant loss of life. Now, your
report on page 4-38 claims ``Falcon Heavy is designed to
tolerate the loss of thrust from several engines and still
complete its mission, thus enhancing mission reliability.''
Given that the Falcon Heavy requires 27 Merlin 1D rocket
engines to operate and given the Russian N1 moon rocket, a
system which failed 100 percent of the time, used almost the
same number of engines--30--please provide the analysis to back
up the claim that the number of engines improves reliability.
Isn't it likely that the SLS approach of using two proven
booster engines and four proven core stage engines with over 40
years of Space Shuttle flight heritage will be significantly
lower risk than a mission perspective given that the risk of a
catastrophic failure with six engines is less than a
catastrophic failure with 27? Please comment.
Dr. Lunine. Congressman, thank you for that question. Our
technical panel evaluated a number of different technologies
that would be needed for the early and late stages of a program
that leads us ultimately to Mars. And as you know, the analysis
was actually based on the Space Launch System, SLS, as the
baseline, and in fact all of the design--so-called design
reference missions of record that were used by our technical
panel to put together these exploration pathways, these example
pathways, they all involve the SLS as the launch vehicle.
The technical panel itself did look at other alternatives.
It did include the Falcon Heavy in a brief discussion of the
potential benefits and risks, but in fact none of the scenarios
that are actually in the document at present utilize the Falcon
Heavy as the launch vehicle.
If at some point this were to become an issue in terms of
which launch vehicle to use, all of these scenarios that we
have and Chapter 4 would have to be redone with Falcon Heavy in
there.
But beyond that, if you want more detail on how the
technical panel arrived at that particular conclusion for the
Falcon Heavy, we can certainly ask our technical panel chair to
provide you some written answers to how they reached that
conclusion.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you. Next question. NASA's Small Bodies
Assessment Group has commented on NASA's current plan to
redirect an asteroid and send astronauts to visit it. In one
report the advisory group stated, ``while the participants
found it to be very interesting and entertaining, it was not
considered to be a serious proposal because of obvious
challenges, including the practical difficulty of identifying a
target in an appropriate orbit with the necessary physical
characteristics within the required lead time using existing or
near- to long-term ground-based or space-based survey assets.''
Now, do you agree or disagree with that assessment and why? And
if you feel that expounding is beneficial, please do so.
Dr. Lunine. So I have actually not read that report in
detail so I don't want to comment on it. And again, the task
statement that we responded to in our report did not include a
detailed assessment of the ARM.
All I can say again is that in the context of the example
exploration pathway where we included ARM, that particular
mission developed several technologies that were then not
useful for subsequent stepping stones on the way to Mars, in
particular the use of the solar electric propulsion, which is
not sufficient to get humans to Mars, and the actual asteroid
retrieval robotic vehicle. But again, this was all done in the
context of that particular exploration pathway and we did not
conduct a scientific or technical assessment of the ARM
specifically.
Gov. Daniels. Yes, just to emphasize that it was not in our
statement of task. In fact, I think it would have been a
violation of the scope of our assignment if we had opined on
the merits of any specific system or proposal. The ARM we did
feature in one of the three sample pathways, and I think the
right way to think about those is that they are meant to
illuminate tradeoffs. There are potential pluses and potential
minuses to each pathway we looked at and probably any one that
might be suggested in the future. And Jonathan just specified
some of the downside risks of a pathway, including the ARM.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Palazzo. I now recognize the Ranking Member of the
Space Subcommittee, Ms. Edwards.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you to our panelists today.
You know, as I have been listening to the discussion, one
of the things that occurs to me first is that I think there is
significant alignment between the House-passed authorization
and the NRC's recommendations. I am a little troubled by the
description of the pathway as so distinct from the roadmap
because I think in this Committee, as the Chairman and I have
envisioned what NASA would provide back to us, I don't see a
lot of differences frankly in what you have outlined in your
principles. But I view that as more semantics than anything and
we could certainly be more directive to NASA in that respect in
terms of what it is going to provide back to this Committee.
I am curious as to whether you think it is appropriate for
the Committee to be prescriptive to NASA in terms of defining
launch vehicles and specifications, interim destinations, and
the like. I mean you didn't do that in your panel report of
experts and so I am curious as to whether you think that is an
appropriate role for the Congress.
Gov. Daniels. Well, it can't happen without the Congress
ultimately, but I think you make a very good point. This is
probably not the optimal place for it to originate. What I
think our committee would hope is that the Congress would unite
around the very simple question, ``do you want to go to Mars or
don't you?'' If you want to go to Mars, whether we like it or
not, certain things would have to be done very, very
differently and in a very unnatural act for any democratically
elected government where people come and go and change would
have to be sustained over this extraordinary probably uniquely
long time frame that this achievement would take. And we know
what we would be biting off to do that.
But I think that it would have to start with a Congress
that perhaps requested, demanded a set of choices from NASA,
pathway choices, embraced one hopefully on the broadest
possible basis so that it might have a chance of staying power
over the years, something that people could look back on and
say we would be violating faith with this great adventure if we
took a sudden detour, sending us off on some other direction,
the way they have been sent in the past. So I see the central
role in think would be Congress' but probably not the place
that it originates or maybe not----
Ms. Edwards. So we shouldn't get into the nitty-gritty
details of the technology and the science but we could leave
that to the experts because I think that there has been a fair
amount of unanimity on this Committee and you can see that in
the authorization that passed where I think we had only two
dissenting votes in the Congress that said we want--we have a
big vision; we share that horizon goal of Mars and we are going
to enable NASA to have the opportunity to put some teeth to
those proposals.
I want to ask you about budget because, you know, if we all
share that horizon goal, can you tell me just sort of ballpark
if you will a budget that you think would be reflective of that
goal so that we are in the 20- to 30-year range instead of the
30- to 50-year range? Because we are at roughly 4.1, $4.3
billion now for exploration, and that doesn't include the ISS,
et cetera.
Gov. Daniels. Well, Jonathan had the first go at this so
let me give it a try also. I think that quite properly the
committee didn't want to go beyond expressing bands and ranges.
The starting point is the ultimate budget would be driven very
much by the pathway chosen. There are pathways which will be
substantially more expensive, more extensive, and therefore
more destinations and so forth, more expensive than others. So
that is the first uncertainty. And then we just didn't want to
commit the sin of false precision and start producing numbers
over these long time horizons that nobody could be very
confident in.
Ms. Edwards. So I don't think we want NASA committing to
those sins either, but we do have to have a budget from the
Congress----
Gov. Daniels. Yes.
Ms. Edwards. --and an appropriation from the Congress that
reflects the kind of big horizon goal that you have identified,
isn't that right?
Gov. Daniels. Sure. And so just to recap, the committee
believes that this is a worthy endeavor, it belongs on the list
of national priorities, believes that Mars is the appropriate
horizon goal, but just to reiterate something said earlier, the
first and prerequisite step is to--is the commitment to a
pathway--maybe if roadmap means pathway, that would be great to
know because that would indicate this committee was maybe
prepared to take this vital first step.
With that in place, the best we were able to say was that
something beyond a flat-line budget, not by a huge amount
probably, but something beyond--we couldn't make the numbers
work even for the least expensive pathways with constant
dollars.
Ms. Edwards. Right. Well, thank you. I have greatly gone
over my time. I will just conclude just by saying to the
Chairman, and I hope that he understands this, is that if we
are really to commit to this goal, if the Congress is, this is
not about nickeling and diming other programmatic missions
within NASA. It is really committing to it as a nation and then
putting the dollars that match the goal and the opportunity.
And with that, I conclude. Thanks.
Mr. Palazzo. I now recognize Mr. Bucshon.
Mr. Bucshon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to say
that, you know, this is one of many hearings that we have that
I attend talking about discretionary spending programs of which
NASA is one of those, and I think Governor Daniels somewhat
alluded to it but I usually say this at the opening is that the
federal government needs to address the entire pie of federal
spending. And as we know right now, 40 percent of the budget is
discretionary approximately and 60 percent is mandatory. Unless
we begin to address the known drivers of our national debt, all
of us are going to be continually talking about how we are
going to find money to do anything, including how we are going
to go to Mars.
That said, in the context of how the federal government--
how NASA currently spends its dollars, when we talk about
future budgets, I think--I do think it is important to talk
about efficiencies and effective ways to spend that money. And
it can be done at the state level. Governor Daniels has made
Indiana more effective and efficient in the way we use our
dollars when we know we have a fixed piece--a fixed amount of
money to spend. Did the committee begin to address anything as
it relates to how our current structure of the way we spend our
money can be addressed in any substantial way that might not
only allow us to have more money to spend than we already have
but in tight budgetary times maybe use that money more
effectively and efficiently?
Dr. Lunine. Congressman Bucshon, we did talk about this of
course in a general sense. We didn't talk about specific NASA
facilities and so on because again we are looking at
methodology rather than a specific pathway. But one of our
conclusions is that if we are going to embark on a pathway that
leads to Mars and do it successfully in a finite amount of
time, that in addition to developing things, other things have
to be ended in some way, divested in the human spaceflight
program.
And so one of our pathways principles essentially says
that--and I will just read it straight out; it is a decision
rule--that when--``if there are human spaceflight program
elements infrastructure and organizations that no longer
contribute to progress along the pathway, the human spaceflight
program should divest itself of them as soon as possible.'' And
I think this speaks to the need for the kind of discipline and
focus that would be required to achieve a goal as
extraordinarily difficult and expensive as ultimately a human
landing on Mars.
Mr. Bucshon. So at the end of the day, I mean obviously
Congress makes those--sometimes makes those decisions. You
know, I mean the A10, for example, is a recent example, you
know, on the DOD side where the Congress and the federal agency
may disagree on the future of certain programs. It is a very
difficult process, as all of us know.
When it comes to the private sector, I am really intrigued
about how we can leverage, you know, government dollars. The
private sector can leverage government dollars to maybe do some
things that maybe the government doesn't always do that
effectively. I mean, Governor Daniels, do you have any--maybe
any comments about how we might--you know, how do we leverage
the private industry and what do you see as maybe their role in
the future of manned spaceflight?
Gov. Daniels. I appreciate the question because I think at
least in some quarters our report has been read or misread to
not emphasize sufficiently the role the private sector might
play. We didn't mean for it to be read that way that perhaps we
just didn't say it loudly or plainly enough.
No, I think we heard a lot of testimony and we met with
leaders of that community. There are a lot of possibilities
there. And, you know, typically in this world the greatest and
most sudden unexpected breakthroughs come from private
enterprise and very, very likely will again and again over all
the decades that we have between here and the Martian surface.
I can just testify as a fortunate person who gets to hang
out with brilliant young students and graduate students
studying astronautics and working in this area, they are highly
motivated. And we talk about the aspirational aspects and
rationales for human spaceflight and it is one of those that
you can't put a number on but it doesn't mean it isn't real the
way in which young people are drawn to science and drawn to
technology often by this thrilling adventuresome area. I can
just tell you that the activity on the private side excites our
students these days probably as much as traditional NASA. And
we send a lot of bright young talent to both.
Mr. Bucshon. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Palazzo. I now recognize Mr. Posey.
Mr. Posey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank both of
you for your service, your service and your interest in space
and your testimony here today. So many questions and so little
time really to get through them.
The $64,000 question, 64 million, billion, whatever
question is how we get a consistent plan and a consistent
funding level through Congress after Congress, Administration
after Administration. You are familiar with the dozens of
missions to nowhere and we are afraid that we will see more and
more of these. You know, you remember the ISS survived just by
one vote, funding for the ISS at one time.
And another approach that bears a lot of sense is the
XPRIZE approach. And since there is really no good business
model for exploring space, the XPRIZE process gives a lot of
encouragement to that obviously, a lot of encouragement to
private investment, technology development, risk. And I wonder
if you have considered that process as well and what you might
think the dollar amounts might be or the milestones might be.
I mean we can have NASA maybe design a car to make three
laps around the horseshoe in front of this building, and by the
time they are finished it could be a $5 million car. We can say
the first person that can design a car to make five laps around
the building gets $1 million and, you know, it would be done in
five minutes by private industry and we would save a lot of
money and have always wanted develop for us already. It has
been said by experts, you know, the Wright brothers would have
never flown if they would have had to put up with FAA, and I am
afraid that goes for a lot of space entrepreneurs.
You know, this is a very difficult country to do business
in and you have to take your hat off and respect any of them
that choose to do business here with the overregulation and the
red tape that we foist upon our space industry. While other
governments subsidize theirs, we hassle ours. So your thoughts
on that?
Dr. Lunine. Thank you, Congressman.
We didn't talk about the XPRIZE or again we didn't talk
about specific commercial approaches because it wasn't part of
our task statement or charge. But I do want to point out that
we, in the approach that we developed, the pathways approach,
leave the door wide open for commercial innovation in the
stepping stones that would lead us ultimately to Mars. And
again, I will quote from the pathways principles that we
developed in our report, and number four is to ``seek
continuously to engage new partners that can solve technical
and/or programmatic impediments to pathway progress.'' And
those partners can be governmental, they can be international,
and they could be commercial as well. And without that
flexibility, certainly any pathway approach is not going to be
optimal. We have to be able to involve whatever new ideas and
creative approaches that can be brought to bear on such a
difficult problem as landing on Mars.
Now, the question of, you know, how to encourage commercial
endeavors, again, it is beyond the committee and I don't feel
particularly qualified to say anything about that. I will say,
though, that the overall problem of sending humans to Mars and
landing them on Mars, even through this stepping stone
approach, where you do this in progressive steps that are
manageable enough that there is a reasonable chance of success
for each one, is such a huge endeavor that it must involve the
U.S. Government as the primary mover of this whole endeavor
just because of the size and scope. And within the context of
that, this committee believes there is ample room for
commercial and international involvement, even it is essential
for that involvement.
Mr. Posey. Thank you. Governor?
Gov. Daniels. Nothing to add. I think that is----
Mr. Posey. Well, Governor, you have dealt--you have seen
one Administration after another, dealing with one House and
one Senate after another.
Gov. Daniels. Right.
Mr. Posey. You know, what do you think the common
denominator might be to tie this together? You know, we are all
searching for that continuity, everybody, no matter what
direction they are coming from in space. You need to have a
plan, you all need to stick to a plan, and it needs to be a
long-range plan, not plan du jour, you know. It needs to be a
long-range plan and we just can't find that glue that will tie
that together.
Gov. Daniels. You put your finger of course on the central
dilemma. I said in the opening our report says in almost the
same words that we recognize that calling for an approach like
this flies in the face of everything back to the '70s I
suppose, but we also say that if it seems unrealistic to
believe that that sort of unity and that sort of continuity
could be brought off in our system, then you might as well face
up that Mars itself is unrealistic.
Now, I am going to engage in some wild wishful thinking
here, but I do think--and it was reflected in comments that the
Ranking Member made earlier and others did--at least in theory
this could be one of those subjects that we certainly need more
of in this country in which people who disagree strongly and
sincerely about other things could agree, particularly if folks
accept the reality that if we are going there at all, it is
going to have to be on this basis. We are going to have to hold
hands not just in the first Congress that agrees to it but that
has got to be transmitted somehow to those who follow.
And, yes, that is not the natural state of affairs but this
is not like any other endeavor that I can think of that
government or the private sector for that matter attempts to
bring off. And I appreciate your question and I think it is in
some respects the ultimate question here, and forgive me for
indulging in the thought that maybe it could all start right
here.
Mr. Posey. Well, you know, we would like to see that. It
just seems like anything short of getting America out of the
mall for 15 minutes and away from Dancing with the Stars for 15
minutes and letting Neil deGrasse Tyson talk to each one of
them for 15 minutes, you know, we could probably pass a
constitutional amendment to fund that. But, you know--I see my
time is expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Palazzo. I now recognize Mr. Hultgren.
Mr. Hultgren. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you both so much
for being here. I really appreciate your work on this. This is
a very important subject.
On a personal note, Governor Daniels, just want to say
thank you for your work. I am a big fan of yours. I am from
Illinois, enough said.
I do want to thank you. I believe this is so important. As
we continue to assess a future of human spaceflight in the
United States, we need to have this discussion. It is certainly
something I want to see America leading in and it is crucial
that we get both public and international support to see this
happen.
I wonder--and I address to both of you on this--there is an
important connection between motivating students to pursue STEM
careers and having a visible active human spaceflight program.
Motivating students to pursue these fields is an important
factor in the success of certainly future space endeavors. How
did the panel factor in this need into its recommendations?
Gov. Daniels. Let me start because I think it surfaces a
really important point that hasn't come up, up to this point.
So, first of all, we talk about it at great length, agree that
like two or three other rationales for human spaceflight, it
can't be quantified--that doesn't make it any less real or
important--and came to the conclusion that when you roll
together those practical or pragmatic reasons with those
aspirational, as we called them, reasons, the totality did
justify treating this as a priority.
The point I would like to make on this count is that over
and over the idea of mission frequency, sometimes called
cadence, that is to say, what came up for at least two reasons;
one, to maintain the technical proficiency necessary for an
endeavor like this. If you are only flying every three or four
years, you are losing people, you are losing skills, you are
not developing, you are not making enough mistakes probably to
learn from, all those things. And you are probably not
sustaining public interest among either young people or their
elders. And so if you do spend some time in the report, you
will see frequent references to this matter of mission cadence
and I just wanted to use your question as an opportunity to
raise it here.
Mr. Hultgren. Thanks.
Dr. Lunine. Yes. And if I could just add briefly,
Congressman, your point is very important. This is one of the
pragmatic rationales that we talk about in the report as
stimulating and inspiring students as well as citizens in
general. And, you know, the counterfactual of what would happen
if there were no human spaceflight program in terms of what the
next generation of aerospace expertise would look like in this
country, obviously that would not be a positive change.
Mr. Hultgren. Yes. And I agree so much with you and I have
to remember back to the '60s of, you know, the inspiration that
was there but also the benefits--multiple benefits, years and
years, decades of advancement in that single decade in medicine
and other areas because of the inspiration that was there.
Governor, I agree with you as well that we need to find
some things that bring us together. This is one of those things
that can bring us together. We all agree that we want to
encourage our best and brightest to go into STEM education and
STEM fields, and this is one of the ways that we can do it at
an early age, capture their attention. I wonder if both of you,
can NASA accomplish a mission to Mars without the international
community or is that a prerequisite according to your research
and report?
Dr. Lunine. From the point of view of the committee's
deliberations, in principle the United States could do it, but
it would be extremely costly, and for a number of different
reasons. Having significant international collaboration--and
here we are talking about international collaboration on a
scale in terms of percentage contributions that we have not
even seen with the ISS, from a numbers standpoint,
international collaboration is extremely valuable, both from
the point of view of bringing new technical expertise support
on an international basis for these types of activities and the
symbolism of going forward with international partners to a new
goal. All of these things make international collaboration
highly desirable in this endeavor.
Mr. Hultgren. Let me end with this and again offer this out
to both of you. I wonder how emphasis on unfocused space
technology development in this Administration hampered NASA's
ability to focus on long-term goals of human exploration. In
particular, I am interested in J-2X and how that impacted
exploration missions in other areas, specifically kind of this
unfocused space technology development? Any thoughts on that?
Gov. Daniels. Well, no specific comment on that or any
other one technology except to say that the committee strongly
feels that an emphasis on capabilities has often led to dead-
ends or unproductive investments and that we really need to ask
the question from the other end. Where are we going? What are
the steps on the way to get there? And let that drive the
technical and engineering requirements, and therefore the
capabilities one develops.
Dr. Lunine. Well, I would only add that your question cuts
right to the heart of our report, which is a capabilities-based
approach in our view is not going to get this nation or anyone
to Mars, that we needed to have a pathways approach where
technologies are developed in the service of the ultimate goal
and the stepping stone intermediate goals to that end.
Mr. Hultgren. My time is expired. Thanks, Chairman. Thank
you again both. I really appreciate your work and look forward
to an ongoing effort here together, hopefully move this
forward.
I yield back.
Mr. Palazzo. I now recognize Mr. Veasey.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Governor Daniels, Dr. Lunine--and I apologize; I just got
here, and if this question has already been asked--but I wanted
to ask you specifically in what sequence does NASA need to
implement your recommendations in this committee's report for
everything to take place smoothly?
Gov. Daniels. Well, the sequence I think that matters most,
Congressman, is the commitment to a pathways approach and the
selection of a pathway, followed by the commitment to sustain
funding for that pathway. I would put them in that order very
purposefully because we did talk a little earlier, more money
spent in the way we have been doing for the last several
Administrations probably doesn't advance things very far.
Mr. Veasey. And also, the report recommends a pathways
approach over both a capabilities approach and the flexible
path approach, but we don't need a flexible path approach to
mission planning in order to deal with these unexpected changes
in the budget and to take advantage of technology
breakthroughs. Is that your opinion or you think that we--or it
is the opposite of that?
Dr. Lunine. Well, what the committee finds attractive about
the pathways approach is that it streamlines the development of
technologies in the sense that, again, to get to Mars as the
ultimate horizon goal is going to be extraordinarily difficult,
and so the technologies that will need to be developed are
expensive and they are difficult.
And so one wants--if one is committing as a nation to going
to Mars--to adopt an approach that minimizes the number of
additional technologies that have to be developed on the way to
Mars because they are all expensive and they all of course take
time, and that plays into the ultimate timeline of any program
that leads to Mars. So the pathways approach is the way to
minimize the total number of technologies that have to be
developed in order to achieve the ultimate horizon goal, in
this case, Mars.
Flexible path approach, you may end up developing
technologies that in the end are not useful and are not
therefore, you know, ultimately contributing to the final goal
that you want to get to.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Palazzo. I thank the witnesses for their valuable
testimony and the Members for their questions. The Members of
the Committee may have additional questions for you and we will
ask you to respond to those in writing. The record will remain
open for two weeks for additional comments and written
questions from Members.
The witnesses are excused and this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:36 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
Appendix I
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Governor Mitch Daniels
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Responses by Dr. Jonathan Lunine
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Appendix II
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Additional Material for the Record
Written statement submitted by Representative Donna F. Edwards
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]