

STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES ON PRIORITIES FOR THE QUADRENNIAL HOMELAND SECURITY REVIEW

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES ON PRIORITIES FOR THE QUADRENNIAL HOMELAND SECURITY REVIEW

Friday, June 20, 2014

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT
EFFICIENCY,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:33 a.m., in Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Jeff Duncan [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Duncan, Hudson, Barber, and Payne.

Mr. DUNCAN. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency will come to order. The purpose of this hearing today is to receive testimony from National security stakeholders on their recommendations for the Department of Homeland Security's Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. I now recognize myself for an opening statement.

Our homeland security faces a significant test. From the influx of illegal aliens, including 60,000 unaccompanied children over the last year—and what we see going on even today in the Southwest is alarming—to terrorist threats from Syrian foreign fighters and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups wreaking havoc on the Middle East, and the continued cyber attacks by China and others, this administration has failed to provide a comprehensive strategic vision to secure our Nation.

Mandated by the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, the Department of Homeland Security, or DHS, is required to conduct a Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, or QHSR, every 4 years.

The purpose of the QHSR is for DHS to assess the state of our Nation's homeland security and determine what steps, if any, are needed to shift, or enhance, our strategic focus. The QHSR is meant to outline DHS's mission, and the Department's vision and strategy to effectively implement its mission. While the report was released only hours before this hearing, it was due no later than December 31, 2013. As a result, it is 6 months late. Although I understand part of the delay was due to the need for Secretary Johnson to review the report, we need a cohesive strategy to combat the threats that we face.

Until we have a focused, achievable, and affordable strategy that addresses these threats, this administration is failing its duty to lead. Because of the lengthy delay, this Quadrennial Homeland Se-

curity Review was also unable to guide the President's fiscal year 2015 budget request. With our country over \$17 trillion in debt, and almost \$18 trillion today, it is imperative that we make wise and well-informed decisions when it comes to the budget. Unfortunately, without the timely issuance of the QHSR, DHS lacked the strategy necessary to help prioritize and spend taxpayer dollars wisely.

In November 2013, the committee sent a letter to Acting Secretary Beers recommending that the QHSR focus on areas such as border security, cybersecurity, terrorist threats, preparedness, transportation security, and management effectiveness. While the QHSR mentions most of these areas of interest, it does not address these threats posed by other nation-states such as Iran, China, and Russia. This is a major omission for a document intended to guide how we secure the homeland. Its failure to mention Departmental management is also a major weakness.

Year after year, DHS is ranked at or near the bottom of Federal agencies in many public-sector agency performance rankings. For this Department to be efficient and effective, proper management must be a priority. Highlighting climate change as a homeland security issue and not nation-state threats—as I mentioned earlier, Iran, China, Russia—or the management of the Department makes no sense and it raises questions about the usefulness of this strategy—climate change. However, most concerning in reviewing the QHSR is that there seems to be a lack of aligning resources with strategic priorities.

In the 9/11 Commission Act, it requires DHS to identify the budget plan required to provide sufficient resources to successfully execute the full range of missions called for in the National homeland security strategy. While the QHSR briefly mentions budget drivers in general, it does not link specific mission areas to the actual budget. The Government Accountability Office reported, after the release of the first QHSR, that there was a lack of input from 9 Federal stakeholders. For this document to be truly effective there must be interagency, State, local, and private-sector consultation.

In viewing the list of stakeholder participation, it seems DHS increased their stakeholder outreach. But it also notes direct engagement with the Executive Office of the President. DHS's strategy should be objective and fact-based, and I sincerely hope that there was no political influence in the development of this document. The production of this report should not solely be a box-checking exercise for the Department. The Nation desperately needs a strategic vision to secure our homeland. Time will tell if this document meets that need. I look forward to hearing the testimony from our stakeholders and hearing their perspectives on the latest QHSR.

With that, I will now recognize the Ranking Minority Member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Arizona, my friend, Mr. Barber, for any statement he may have.

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you to the witnesses for being with us today.

The purpose of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, or QHSR, is to conduct a comprehensive assessment that outlines the

long-term risk, strategy, and priorities for homeland security across our Nation.

Unfortunately, as the Chairman pointed out, the Department did not release its report until yesterday, despite the statutory mandate that it be delivered no later than December 31, 2013. I am very disappointed that it was released late. It makes it hard to conduct a meaningful hearing with so short a time to study the review. But I am pleased that the report is finally in our hands, and that it includes specific strategic priorities for the Department for the next 4 years.

It is now incumbent upon the Department, in coordination with its Federal, State, and local partners and other stakeholders, to carry out these strategies in an effort to keep our country secure. And, I might add, to make sure that we have a way of tracking progress, which has been sorely lacking in the Department in so many areas.

For the QHSR to be truly effective, a truly effective guide—one that ensures that all Department components are working towards the same goals—it is absolutely critical that the strategies the Department has put on paper in the QHSR actually become programs, policies, and budget requirements.

Although the Department is required by law to be included, missing from the QHSR is an assessment of the organizational alignment of the Department with a National homeland security strategy, including the Department's organizational structure, management systems, budget and accounting systems, human resource systems, procurement systems, and a physical and technical infrastructure. These missing elements make it difficult to determine whether the Department has the required capabilities to achieve the goals established in the QHSR and its ability to link its policies to planning, budget, and execution.

It is also essential that the Department do more to engage stakeholders. I represent 1 of 9 Southwest Border districts. The people who live and work, have businesses, go to school along that border should have a right to have a say in how the Department develops its strategies and carries them out. I still—I am waiting to see an active and robust effort to engage those stakeholders. I would add, the personnel, the boots on the ground have to have their voice to make sure that they are helping to form strategies and priorities for the future.

It is a sad commentary—and the Chairman also pointed this out—that when there is a review, National review, of all Federal agencies, DHS has consistently fallen very low. In fact, typically 19 out of 19 agencies studied. Then when you look inside the Department, within the Department that—looking at morale of employees, the CBP—Customs and Border Protection ranks lowest of all the employees of the Department. These must be addressed, these issues must be addressed, and should become a priority for the Department going forward. Morale is essential to effective personnel activities.

The Chairman and I recently co-sponsored H.R. 4228, the DHS Acquisition, Accountability, and Efficiency Act, which passed the House earlier this morning. This bipartisan bill will, I believe,

bring transparency, accountability, and consistency to the Department's acquisition processes, which have been sorely lacking.

We have had some outrageous examples of how acquisitions have gone wrong. The effective and efficient acquisition of technology goods and services will be vital in the Department's ability to implement the strategic approaches defined in the QHSR.

As Ranking Member of the Oversight and Management Efficiency Subcommittee, I will be joining with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle in monitoring the Department's implementation of the strategic priorities laid out in the QHSR to ultimately determine its worth. Improving the importance of DHS programs, activities, and initiatives is clearly a bipartisan process, a bipartisan priority. This committee has shown that time and time again.

But while the Department is not here today to address our specific questions, I do appreciate the willingness of these very important stakeholders and former Department employees to testify today. Their insights into the QHSR and the Department's plan forward should serve as a valuable contribution to our oversight, and I look forward to hearing from each of you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my time.

[The statement of Ranking Member Barber follows:]

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER RON BARBER

JUNE 20, 2014

The purpose of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, or QHSR, is to conduct a comprehensive assessment that outlines the long-term risks, strategy, and priorities for homeland security across the Nation.

Unfortunately, the Department did not release the QHSR until yesterday; despite the statutory mandate that it be delivered no later than December 31, 2013. While I am disappointed it was released late, I am pleased to see that the report includes very specific strategic priorities for the Department for the next 4 years.

It is now incumbent upon the Department, in coordination with its Federal, State, and local partners and other stakeholders, to carry out these strategies in an effort to keep our country secure. For the QHSR to be a truly effective guide, one that ensures all Department components are working toward the same goals, it is critical that the strategies the Department has put on paper in the QHSR actually become programs, policies, and budget requirements.

Although required by law to be included, missing from the QHSR is an assessment of the organizational alignment of the Department with the National homeland security strategy, including the Department's organizational structure, management systems, budget and accounting systems, human resources systems, procurement systems, and physical and technical infrastructure.

These missing elements make it difficult to determine whether the Department has the required capabilities to achieve the goals established in the QHSR and its ability to link its policies to planning, budget, and execution.

The Chairman and I recently co-sponsored H.R. 4228, the DHS Acquisition Accountability and Efficiency Act, which passed the House earlier this month. This bipartisan bill will bring transparency, accountability, and consistency to the Department's acquisitions process. The effective and efficient acquisition of technology, goods, and services will be vital in the Department's ability to implement the strategic approaches defined in the QHSR.

As Ranking Member of the Oversight and Management Efficiency Subcommittee, I look forward to monitoring the Department's implementation of the strategic priorities laid out in the QHSR to ultimately determine its worth.

While the Department is not here today to address our specific questions, I do appreciate the willingness of these very important stakeholders and former Department employees to testify today.

Their insight into the QHSR and the Department's plan forward should serve as a valuable contribution to our oversight. I look forward to hearing from each of you.

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman from Arizona. Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record.

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

JUNE 20, 2014

Pursuant to the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, every 4 years, the Department of Homeland Security (Department) must outline its long-term strategy and priorities for homeland security in the form of a Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, or QHSR, which was to be submitted to Congress in December 2009, and every 4 years thereafter.

This is a model that has proven to be helpful for the Department of Defense and it was anticipated that the Department, and the Nation as a whole, would equally benefit from the Department of Homeland Security's effort.

The first QHSR was not timely received and did not satisfy the requirements set forth in the statute defining what it must contain. It did, however, serve as a framework for the second QHSR, which should have been submitted to Congress by December 31, 2013.

Unfortunately, once again, the report was late. The first QHSR was submitted almost 2 months past the statutory deadline; this latest version is almost 6 months overdue.

I appreciate the need for the Department to align the QHSR with the President's budget request, which is released in March and that the transition in Departmental leadership also impacted the time line, but, the Department must do better.

Moreover, one of the fundamental purposes of the QHSR is to inform the budget and as a result the budget should align with the priorities set forth in the document. Building on this foundation as well, are the programs and policies that are implemented, which should also align with the strategies laid out in the QHSR.

For example, although I appreciate the Department's emphasis on improving our biosurveillance capabilities, it is unclear whether and how its strategy will align with Federal efforts coordinated by the White House.

The administration released the National Strategy for Biosurveillance in July 2012, and an implementation plan was due 120 days later. To date, the implementation plan has not been released, and the Department has not been able to tell the committee when the implementation plan will be released or what its role will be.

Accordingly, I will be interested in learning more about the degree to which portions of the QHSR related to biosurveillance were written in coordination with the implementation plan for the National Strategy for Biosurveillance and whether and how the Department's role will change when that document is ultimately released.

Likewise, there is an entire section devoted to immigration. Yet, unless and until we pass Comprehensive Immigration Reform, our system will remain broken. I look forward to monitoring how the Department will carry out these and other priorities set forth in the document.

Furthermore, the QHSR process does not and should exist in a vacuum. The homeland security enterprise consists of Federal, State, local, and Tribal partners, in addition to the private sector.

I therefore look forward to hearing from the stakeholders present at today's hearing to ascertain how those outside of Government were included in the process and to obtain their perspective on what the Department has identified as our Nation's priorities over the next 4 years.

Mr. DUNCAN. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this topic. Let me remind the witnesses that their entire written statement will appear in the record. I will introduce each of you first, and then recognize you individually for your testimony.

Our first witness today is Mr. Stewart Baker. He is a partner in the law office of Steptoe & Johnson in Washington, DC. Mr. Baker formerly served as the first assistant secretary for policy at the Department of Homeland Security. In this role, Mr. Baker led a staff of 250 people and was responsible for Department-wide policy analysis as well as the Department's international affairs strategic

planning and relationships with law enforcement and public advisory committees.

The second witness, Mr. Frank Cilluffo is an assistant vice president at the George Washington University, where he is the director of the Homeland Security Policy Institute. The institute is a non-partisan think tank that focuses on counterterrorism and counter-radicalization efforts, cyber threats and deterrence in the nexus between crime and terrorism. He also joined the faculty at George Washington University in 2003 from the White House, where he served as special assistant to the President for homeland security.

Dr. Henry Willis is the director of the Rand Homeland Security and Defense Center, and a professor at the Pardee Rand Graduate School. Dr. Willis has applied risk analysis tools to resource allocation and risk-management decisions in the area of public health and emergency preparedness, homeland and National security policy, energy and environmental policy, and transportation planning. Dr. Willis' recent research involved assessing the cost and benefits of terrorism security measures like the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative and evaluating the impact of public health emergency preparedness grant programs.

The Honorable Elaine Duke is the former under secretary for management at the Department of Homeland Security, a position she held from 2008 until 2010. As the under secretary, she was responsible for the management of the Department's \$47 billion budget, acted as the Department's chief acquisition officer, and led DHS's \$17 billion acquisition program. Prior to her appointment as under secretary, Ms. Duke served in a number of positions at the Department, including deputy under secretary for management, chief procurement officer, deputy assistant administrator of acquisitions at the Transportation Security Administration.

So I thank all of you for being here today. I look forward to delving into this topic.

I will now recognize Mr. Baker for your testimony, 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF STEWART A. BAKER, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. BAKER. Thank you, Chairman Duncan and Ranking Member Barber. It is really a pleasure to be here. I vividly remember launching the first QHSR in the waning days of the Bush administration with a meeting that included outside stakeholders, such as Randy Beers when he was in private life.

Effective management of the Department, achieving its goals, protecting us from terrorism and the other goals that have been set here is not a partisan exercise. Everyone wants the Department to be well-managed and effective in achieving its goals.

So I am pleased to talk about the second QHSR. There are several things that I think are praiseworthy about it. It clearly is now an institutionalized part of the Department's planning, and that is important. The QDR has been a valuable planning and management tool for the Defense Department, and the QHSR, if it continues to improve, can be the same for the Department of Homeland Security.

It stresses, the second report, the continuity of the objectives that the Department has. They have not significantly changed at the top level. I do not think they would significantly change under a different party or a different President. These are the goals that DHS is set up to achieve.

In addition, I would say that this report is better than the last. It is, in particular, a very thoughtful addressing of the challenges of terrorism, particularly nuclear, biological, and deserves to be praised for looking hard and making some difficult choices with respect to how to carry out the counterterrorism mission.

That said, there are certainly areas where significant improvement is required. It is always a temptation in producing reports, particularly reports that have been required by Congress, to move from looking out the windshield and using this tool to guide the Department to just looking in the review mirror and telling us what you see behind the Department.

That is easier because it is really—it is more of a speech than a decision-making process. There are elements of speechifying in this QHSR. If you look at the QDR and the Secretary's letter, the first sentence talks about the tough choices that the QDR makes. I don't see as many tough choices being made in this QHSR. It is a little bit more a description of a strategy. Until that strategy actually bites and produces tough budget decisions, it is not easy to say that it is really a strategy. I think more needs to be done in translating the QHSR into actual budget decisions.

There is also, frankly, a temptation on the part of other agencies or other stakeholders to say, well, if you are writing a speech be sure to name-check me. Or maybe I would like to have a turf fight. Since you have to get this out, I will hold it up until you give me some turf concessions. There is some reason to believe that this may have happened with the Department of Justice demanding name checks for all of its roles in areas where its legislative or statutory authority is a little dubious. That is unfortunate; the idea that a DHS strategy would be held hostage by other agencies strikes me as inappropriate.

More specifically, I would say the things that I found disappointing about the content of the report—I thought the cyber discussion was only adequate, not particularly strategic. The advertisement for immigration reform, we understand that that is a legislative proposal that the administration feels very strongly about. But we don't know whether it will pass, and it is hard to plan for something that has such a questionable future on the Hill. Introducing it into the QHSR is open to some question, particularly because I don't think the report acknowledges just how tough a management challenge that will be. It will be an enormous management challenge.

The Department should be planning for that challenge because of the possibility that we will get significant reforms. I did not see as much discussion of that challenge as was appropriate. Finally, I could not agree more with the remarks of both Congressmen about the deleterious effects of delay here. That makes it hard for this to have an impact. If it doesn't have an impact it is just a speech. It needs, the Department needs, more centralized management for sure.

This could be an enormously valuable tool as part of a strengthening of overall management. I would certainly support anything that achieved that goal.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Baker follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEWART A. BAKER

JUNE 20, 2014

Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, Members of the subcommittee, I am honored to testify before you today about the Department of Homeland Security's Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR). During my time as assistant secretary for policy at DHS, I was involved in launching the QHSR, as well as what was then known as the Office of Strategic Plans. As you can imagine I am a strong supporter of coordinated strategic planning in general, and of the QHSR in particular.

Our goal in starting the QHSR was to create a mechanism for the Secretary to articulate a unified set of strategies and priorities for protecting U.S. homeland security. We believed that by forcing ourselves to think strategically about the range of threats to the Nation and the tools available to the Department, we could create a unified set of priorities that could guide the components of the Department without the need for constant personal attention from the Secretary and Deputy Secretary. We also hoped that doing so would make for a better budget process, one in which some of the goals and trade-offs had already been clarified, so that budgeting was a matter of matching limited resources to an agreed set of priorities. We hoped, in short, that some of the hard choices then driven by annual budget exercises could be made with a longer perspective across all parts of the Department.

Since its inception, DHS has suffered from a lack of unity between its components. In many ways this is unsurprising. As you all know, the Department was created from the combination of several different entities, most of which brought with them a fully formed set of ideas about how to best go about protecting the Nation. Reconciling these diverse missions into something resembling a coherent set of policy goals was always going to be a challenge, even under the best of circumstances. The Department has benefited tremendously over the years from strong leadership, and when the Secretary brought personal focus to the task, the Department responded with unity and focus. But without that personal involvement it has been hard to maintain mission unity among the Department's components.

Unity has only grown more important in an era of evolving threats. The original impetus for creating DHS was to better coordinate the various entities responsible for protecting the Nation against terrorism. In certain ways this reorganization has been tremendously successful. America's enemies have been unable to replicate the destruction of 9/11 within the United States, and DHS deserves great credit for the role it has played in thwarting many post-9/11 plots. But terrorism today is a more dynamic threat than it was 10 or 15 years ago. The advances in communications technology since 2001 alone have fundamentally altered the ability of terrorists to recruit, both inside and outside of the United States, as well as to coordinate attacks. This is not to mention, of course, the many other threats beyond terrorism that the Department must guard against. Some of these threats are new or evolving. For instance, our increasing reliance on network technology has made us more vulnerable to cyber attacks. A hacker can today cause a level of damage from his living room that would have been inconceivable as recently as 10 years ago. Others are as old as the planet, as Hurricane Katrina reminded us nearly 10 years ago.

The QHSR is thus a mechanism for DHS to think carefully about the full range of threats it faces, and to prioritize them accordingly. In a world of unlimited resources this would be less important. But that is not the world we live in. We have settled into an extended period of austerity for the Department, and cuts to its budget remain a real possibility in the immediate future. Given that DHS cannot treat every threat equally, it is therefore even more imperative that the Secretary be able to prioritize threats and coordinate the Department's resources accordingly. This is what we hoped the QHSR would facilitate.

GRADING THE 2014 QHSR

DHS issued the first QHSR in 2010. The final product was, in my opinion, a good first statement of the Department's priorities. Having analyzed the range of short- and long-term threats to the United States in light of the Department's responsibilities, it synthesized these priorities into five core missions: Counterterrorism, border security, immigration enforcement, cybersecurity, and resilience to natural disasters

and attacks. I imagine you are all familiar with the previous report so I will not spend much time discussing its details, other than to say that it was, in my mind, an effective articulation of where the Department's overarching focus should be.

Thankfully, substantial progress has been made since the inaugural QHSR. The second report is better, more detailed and far-reaching in scope. It maintains the previous QHSR's five core DHS missions essentially unchanged, but it goes significantly further in analyzing the dynamic risks and challenges we face within these core areas. It is a more detailed statement of the principles that should guide individual decision making within the core framework. And it is a more comprehensive forecast of potential future threats to our homeland.

This is not to say that the report is perfect. From my perspective, it is not clear that areas like cybersecurity or nuclear terrorism were approached with the same level of care as other forms of terrorism. With respect to cybersecurity, the 2014 QHSR has little new to say about the need to recruit and develop a skilled cybersecurity workforce, for instance. It also does not appropriately prioritize the importance of protecting critical U.S. infrastructure from espionage. To be sure, there are parts of the QHSR that need work. Nonetheless, on balance the report is an improvement over its predecessor.

These improvements are not surprising to me, since this year's report has benefited from a consolidated Strategic Planning and Risk Analysis department (SPAR). As I am sure you are aware, DHS combined the Offices of Strategic Plans and Risk Management in 2012 into a single group. This was a good idea; the combination has resulted in a more methodical, efficient analysis of the relevant data. The 2014 QHSR is also the result of substantially more cooperation between DHS and stakeholders, both public and private. Accordingly, it is a more complete description of the broad range of threats we face in the United States, based on a wider range of perspectives.

The quality of this year's report is surely the product of the tremendous professionals in the Department. This begins with Secretary Jeh Johnson's stewardship. It is clear that Secretary Johnson sees the value of strategic planning for the Department. Although still relatively new to DHS, he wasted no time in quickly making the QHSR his own, apparently redrafting portions of it to better bring them into alignment with his vision. The result is a clear statement of his and the Department's priorities.

More generally, I have been pleased to see that Secretary Johnson is also committed to unifying the Department's components into something, in his words, greater than the sum of its parts. The "Unity of Effort" memo he sent to the Department's leadership in April of this year is a good example of his commitment to embrace strategic thinking beyond what is mandated by the QHSR.

I suppose it didn't hurt that Secretary Johnson was able to see how much those of us involved in starting the QHSR cribbed from the Defense Department's Quadrennial Defense Review ("QDR"). Like DHS, DoD is a group of proud, independent components with often divergent traditions and missions. Yet, DoD has often succeeded in fostering a larger sense of unity where DHS has not. Obviously, this is due in part to DoD simply having been around longer. DHS is, after all, barely 10 years old. When DoD was older than that, the Secretary of Defense reportedly asked the Navy during the missile crisis how the embargo of Cuba would be carried out; he was reportedly told that it would be done in accordance with Navy tradition and international law, and that he could retire to his quarters, secure in the knowledge that the Navy would call for his advice if and when the Navy thought that was necessary. I am confident that DHS is past that point in its drive for unity.

And so of course is DOD. We looked to the QDR as an exemplary strategic planning exercise that played an important part in fostering a culture of unity within DoD—an influence Secretary Johnson has correctly reinforced.

I would also be remiss if I did not mention Alan Cohn, assistant secretary for strategy, planning, analysis & risk. Assistant Secretary Cohn has led the QHSR process for both the 2010 and 2014 editions. His hard work and ability to find consensus is one of the principal reasons the current report is as good as it is. The only real credit I can take for the QHSR as it stands today stems from the fact that I had the wisdom to hire and then promote Assistant Secretary Cohn. I am happy I did—he has made me look brilliant ever since (and he, at least, knows how hard that is). Without question, he has turned out to be one of the important career talents for the Department in this area.

BRINGING THE DEPARTMENT'S BUDGET INTO ALIGNMENT WITH THE QHSR'S STATEMENT
OF PRIORITIES

As I mentioned before, the 2010 QHSR did a fine job stating the Department's priorities. It was less effective, however, at actually linking the budget up with these priorities. From the perspective of 2014, we can look back and see clearly that, in practice, the allocation of money within the Department did not end up tracking the QHSR all that closely. We can chalk that up, perhaps, to the learning curve, but we should expect the second QHSR to have a greater influence on funding decisions inside the Department.

But there are more fundamental issues with the way money is allocated within DHS that make it difficult for the Secretary to bring DHS's budget into alignment with his priorities as they are described in the QHSR. These issues need to be addressed if the report is to ever approach the level of efficacy we hoped it would have. For an agency like DHS, which is mainly in the business of execution rather than oversight, funding is everything. Compare DHS with oversight agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency, whose primary function is writing rules for others to follow. While those agencies obviously need to keep the lights on, their ability to perform their mandate is less tied to appropriations and more to the legislative authority they receive. DHS, in contrast, is far more often in the business of execution rather than oversight. Most of its missions are carried out directly. When you cross a border you are met by DHS employees. The same is true if you are lost at sea and need rescue, are boarding an airplane, or are caught counterfeiting funds or illegally immigrating into the United States.

How—and how well—DHS does these jobs depends largely on how it allocates its budget. Thus, while strategic planning exercises like the QHSR are useful in their own right, they can easily become sterile exercises if no one believes they will actually drive budgetary decisions. Make no mistake about it, a statement of the Department's priorities, no matter how lucid, will ultimately ring hollow if the priorities are not honored when budget decisions are made.

RECOMMENDATIONS MOVING FORWARD

This is not to say that the QHSR should be a holy writ that determines budgetary allocations for an entire 4-year period. It should not be, and it will at times be necessary to deviate from the script in order for the Department to be able to effectively respond to the dynamic range of challenges it is sure to face. While long-term strategizing is vital, so too is making sure that the Secretary and the components within DHS can fluidly make decisions to respond to threats as they emerge. The QHSR is not a substitute for judgment. Instead, the report is what I would call an auto-pilot. It is a mechanism for individuals within DHS to understand how to carry out their jobs unless and until they know the Secretary has reconsidered. And it is a way to make sure the Secretary can be confident that those within the Department are following his objectives, even when he is not personally overseeing them.

Finally, one other issue I would like to briefly address is the degree to which the Department of Justice has been given a near veto over the QHSR, presumably by the Office of Management and Budget. I simply do not understand how it is that DHS's strategic plan can be delayed by an agency that has no skin in the game. There is no reason to allow the QHSR to be delayed for so long, particularly at the instance of another Cabinet department.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you for your testimony.

I will recognize Frank next. Pronounce your name for me.

STATEMENT OF FRANK J. CILLUFFO, ASSOCIATE VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY INSTITUTE, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

Mr. CILLUFFO. SIH-LU-FO.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you so much. You are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CILLUFFO. Thank you, Chairman Duncan, and Ranking Member Barber, Congressman Payne, thanks for the opportunity to join you today. I think you guys hit it out of the park in terms of your opening remarks. I think you captured a lot of what a lot of us are struggling and thinking about in terms of the QHSR in

terms of its strengths and in terms of its weaknesses. There is nothing I disagree with my good friend and long-time co-conspirator, Stewart Baker.

But I thought I would maybe pick up on a couple of points that haven't been raised. First, talk a little bit about the threat, and then maybe focus on some of the recommendations.

I think it is important to recognize that the QHSR does come at a time of incredibly significant international instability. I think there is a feeling that we are in a safe place. The reality is, if you were to close your eyes and point to a place on the map, I can tell you, or we can tell you, what some of the challenges and concerns are. They are varied and they are many, and they come in various shapes, sizes, flavors, and forms.

I think Mr. Duncan, you were spot-on to highlight the growing nature of state-sponsored terrorism, which is back. Whether it is the government of Iran in support of Hezbollah, or some of the Shia militias, or others, others are turning to proxies, as well. If you just look at what played out in Crimea vis-à-vis Russia, you have a role of proxies. You see that in a very strong form vis-à-vis cyber, where everyone is turning to proxies to do their bidding. In terms of the non-state Islamist threat, though, we have got problems on our hands.

At the end of the day, you have got broad swaths of territory and ungoverned spaces that are providing and affording our enemies the time and space to plan and execute attacks. Obviously, when we look at Iraq in the past couple of days, it is incredibly disconcerting that some of the hard-earned gains both in terms of treasure but, more importantly, in terms of lives of our men and women in uniform are being rolled back. That is—that is unacceptable.

Why Yemen, why Iraq, why the Sahel, the Magreb, which are broad swaths of territory—why are these concerns? They are ungoverned spaces and they are under-governed, where the authority—where nations have been usurped by those that have more hostile aims.

For awhile there, we were applying enough pressure that they were spending more time looking over their shoulder and less time plotting and executing attacks. This is a big concern, and it does have ramifications in terms of our next steps in Afghanistan.

Moreover, you are seeing advances in technology that have increased the lethality of weapons, targeting systems, and means of communication used by terrorists. New and powerful avenues of recruitment and radicalization have opened up, notably through social media. I might note, even in terms of ISIS in Iraq, they now are coming out with propaganda very similar to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's *Inspire* magazine, in English, and clearly targeting, and aimed at, Westerners, including Americans.

And why is Syria and the foreign fighter flow you are seeing spill into Iraq of such concern? We are talking over 70 countries—3,000 Westerners, including over 70 Americans. At some point they return. What makes Syria unique is that unlike the foreign fighter flows we have seen in the past—whether in the AfPak region or in Yemen or in Somalia—they were primarily focused on a single diaspora.

What you are seeing in Syria is flocking from all over the world. At some point, you are gonna see new networks. You are gonna see Yemenis who have bomb-making experience meeting up with Brits who have social media experience. It is these new networks that I think are going to be of significant concern.

Don't think for a minute that al-Qaeda isn't doing talent-spotting on the battlefield and identifying individuals that they will turn back to the West. This is a big concern. That is why foreign fighters, I think, are especially significant.

In terms of the cyber threat, I do feel this is—when you look at the homeland, you can attack the United States without ever stepping foot in the country. At the high end of the threat spectrum, we are obviously talking about nation-states: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea. Some are engaged primarily in espionage, others are engaged in more computer network attack, or attacking our systems.

Again, the role that proxies play is quite significant here. Because who is behind that clickety-clack of the keyboard? Anonymity; attribution is very difficult to discern in cyber space. So I think a lot more there. I think as you start seeing the internet of things, where physical and cyber converge, you are going to see new threat vectors. I think one thing the Department deserves some credit on is recognizing the convergence of physical and cyber threats in the QHSR.

Bottom line on the QHSR, as Stewart said, we don't—I think we are all tired of speeches. At the end of the day, unless the QHSR has bite and can be aligned to budget planning and budget processes, which it didn't do the first go-around, it is merely rhetoric. Policy without resources is rhetoric.

We do have to make tough decisions. In the words of President Eisenhower, we actually need security and we need solvency. I think that is what we are struggling with here, is the need to be able to make some of those tough decisions, get the greatest return on our investment, and get the most bang for our buck. Doesn't do that thus far.

One thing I want to just highlight as I close is, I give you props and kudos for passing the acquisition legislation. I think there is a lot you can do using that model to keep your oversight functions moving, as well, in terms of some of the policy deliberations. We do need to elevate the Office of Policy to an under secretary. That will give you more oversight function. I think the committee itself can play a more significant role with authorization bills that can align to some of the budget-making.

So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to join you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cilluffo follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRANK J. CILLUFFO

JUNE 20, 2014

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.

The Department of Homeland Security has now completed its second Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), and is expected to issue its report to Congress on the results of this review shortly. My testimony today will comment on key

issues addressed in a draft version of the report, beginning with general remarks and then focusing on what I believe are the two most critical threats facing the homeland today: Terrorism threats and cyber-related threats.

This QHSR comes at a time of significant international instability. Although our homeland security posture has improved substantially in the last decade-plus, the terrorist threat climate in which the United States finds itself today is in many ways reminiscent of that prior to 9/11, sharing a number of similar attributes and characteristics. The current climate is also one marked by budget cuts as well as the roll-back of hard-earned gains that had been achieved through the investment of billions of dollars and, most importantly, the lives of thousands of our men and women in uniform.

Against this background, it is all the more disconcerting to see that in Iraq and Syria, terrorist groups have found space and time in which to maneuver, plot, and execute attacks; all while U.S. forces prepare to draw down in Afghanistan. In Africa, we see a constellation of active and skilled terrorist groups in the Maghreb and Sahel, from Boko Haram in Nigeria, to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, to Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, to Ansar al-Dine in Mali, to al-Shabaab in Somalia. At the same time, advances in technology have increased the lethality of weapons, targeting systems and means of communications used by terrorists. New and powerful avenues of recruitment and radicalization have opened up, notably through social media. These tools have in effect shrunk the globe as young, tech-savvy, and like-minded extremists are connecting in the dark corners of the web—as evidenced by the swell of foreign fighters flocking to Syria. As a result, what happens overseas has significant domestic implications, including with respect to home-grown violent Islamist extremism.

In addition to the Islamist threat posed by terrorism, the cyber domain is a permissive environment, which is made for plausible deniability, for a wide range of U.S. adversaries who need never set foot in this country in order to do us harm. Our political, military, and economic secrets including our intellectual property are being siphoned out covertly by cyber means, specifically computer network exploitation (CNE). From CNE—to include mapping of our critical infrastructure systems, to computer network attack, to cyber crime perpetrated by forces whose capabilities have grown to such an extent that some of these criminal groups are now even on par with some nation-states' abilities and capacities, the range of activities and actors with hostile intent is both wide and deep. Nation-states are investing in and building up their cyber war capabilities, as well as integrating these capacities into their broader war-fighting doctrine and operations. Moreover, nation-states are making use of proxies for both physical and cyber attacks. In these regards, China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are of abiding concern.

The ecosystem of threats facing DHS and the homeland is thus varied and seriously challenging. From physical threats to cyber threats, and the nexus between the two, DHS and the Nation must stand ready and prepared for the full gamut of these scenarios. We must position ourselves to be as nimble in prevention and response as is required to meet whatever variant or form in which the threat of today and tomorrow manifests.

OVERVIEW OF THE QHSR

Congress established the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review in law in 2007 as a mechanism to focus senior leadership attention at DHS on long-term strategic issues, enhance the strategic planning processes within the Department, and then ultimately to “strengthen the linkages between strategy and execution”,¹ particularly with respect to the Department’s operational requirements and budget decisions.

The first QHSR report, released at the end of 2009, played a valuable role with respect to defining the strategic priorities of the Department, but did not have a significant impact in terms of implementation. Very few of the initiatives outlined in the follow-on “Bottom-Up Review” were ultimately implemented, and the QHSR did not appear to have a major impact on successive budget requests within DHS.

This second QHSR has built on the positive and negative lessons of the first review, and the activities that informed the review have matured in the past 4 years. Overall, the strategic framework defined within the report is robust, and reflects hard choices about which issues are of greatest priority to the Department. Notably, it calls out biological threats as a significant homeland security priority—an area that I believe has received insufficient attention by policy makers in the last few

¹ Quoted from page 403 of H.R. 110–259, *House-Senate Conference Report for the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007*, July 25, 2007.

years, but which is likely to represent the greatest long-run catastrophic terrorist threat that we face.²

But the real verdict on this QHSR will come in the months and years ahead. It is imperative that this QHSR is used to inform key strategic decisions in the next 4 years, starting with the fiscal year 2016 budget request to Congress that will be released next February. As the primary House authorizing committee for DHS, this committee has the opportunity in the next 4 years to hold the Department accountable for implementing the strategic priorities outlined in this review.

I should note here that it is refreshing that Secretary Johnson and his leadership team are taking these strategic issues seriously, particularly with respect to the “Unity of Effort” initiative that is underway within the Department, as outlined in a memorandum by Secretary Johnson sent to his senior leadership team in April of this year.³ The issues raised by the Secretary in this memorandum are critical, particularly with respect to the integration and effectiveness of policy, management, and operational activities within the Department. I would urge the committee to consider legislation that strengthens key offices—such as the Office of Policy, which has never been authorized in statute—and holds DHS accountable for making progress on these “Unity of Effort” objectives, along the lines of what you have already done with the recently-passed legislation on DHS acquisition. I should also note that the Homeland Security Policy Institute is forming a task force that will take an independent look at these “Unity of Effort” issues, and we look forward to engaging further with the committee on this in the months ahead.

For the remainder of my testimony, I will focus on two of the five top-level homeland security missions defined within the QHSR framework: Preventing terrorism and addressing cyber threats. While my remarks center on these two areas, I would emphasize that we must also remain focused on other important DHS missions, to include emergency preparedness and disaster response, and the task of securing the Nation’s borders.

PREVENTING TERRORISM

The terrorist attacks and atrocities within the past week in Iraq by ISIS (the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), in Kenya by al-Shabaab, and in Nigeria by Boko Haram are stark reminders of the persistent Islamist terrorist threat, not only in the region, but also with respect to the threat of attacks against the homeland. They are also an example of the increasing fragmentation and diversification of terrorist threats; as the introduction to the draft QHSR report notes, “the terrorist threat is increasingly decentralized and may be harder to detect.”

Of particular concern is the foreign fighter threat in Syria, which is now also spilling over into Iraq; indeed, I would argue that the two conflicts are merging into a single regional insurgency. In Syria, we have seen the on-going civil war become a magnet for foreign fighters from no less than 74 countries around the world.⁴ Up to 3,000 Westerners have traveled to fight in Syria since the conflict began, including more than 70 Americans.⁵ Disturbingly, the Syrian conflict has given rise to new networks and new connections. For example, bomb makers are meeting up with individuals who are well-versed in media, especially social media. Armed with Kalashnikovs, laptops, and cell phones, foreign fighters are thus amassing and emerging with new and blended skill-sets and expertise, including potentially expertise with chemical weapons.

Within the past month, we have begun to see examples of the global implications of this foreign fighter threat. In late May, a French national and former Syrian foreign fighter committed a terrorist attack at a Jewish museum in Brussels, Belgium, killing 4 people. The United Kingdom and Spain both made high-profile arrests of individuals recently who had traveled to Syria to fight or who were involved in facilitating such travel. And an American citizen from Florida who was fighting in Syria carried out a suicide truck bombing attack in late May. ISIS is now issuing English-language propaganda, similar in nature to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Penin-

²See for example Nathan Myhrvold, *Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action*, The Lawfare Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 2—2013 (July 2013 Working Draft) <http://fortunedotcom.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/strategic-terrorism-myhrvold-7-3-2013.pdf>.

³Memo available at: <http://www.hlswatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/DHSUnityOfEffort.pdf>.

⁴Aaron Y. Zelin, “Up to 11,000 foreign fighters in Syria; steep rise among Western Europeans,” The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR)—Insight (Dec. 17, 2013), <http://icsr.info/2013/12/icsr-insight-11000-foreign-fighters-syria-steep-rise-among-western-europeans/>.

⁵Kimiko De Freytas-Tamura, “Foreign Jihadis Fighting in Syria Pose Risk in West,” *New York Times* (May 29, 2014), <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/world/middleeast/foreign-jihadis-fighting-in-syria-pose-risk-in-west.html>.

sula's *Inspire* magazine.⁶ These examples are likely to be leading indicators of a direct terrorist threat that the United States and other Western nations will face in the months and years ahead.

Countering the challenge posed by foreign fighters must therefore be a priority mission for DHS, and not just conceptually. The Department of Homeland Security already plays an important role in one way in mitigating potential threats to the homeland from Syrian foreign fighters: Its activities to detect and prevent terrorist travel and entry into the United States. It is critical that key activities related to terrorist travel—at CBP, TSA, ICE, US-VISIT, and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis—are maintained and strengthened even in this difficult budget environment for the Department.

Another key responsibility for DHS (along with the FBI, National Counterterrorism Center, the State Department and other agencies) has been less well-developed: Countering the ideologies of violent Islamist extremism (“CVIE”) that radicalize individuals and replenish the ranks of our terrorist adversaries. This is the biggest missing dimension of U.S. counterterrorism statecraft to date. The State Department's Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications is doing some good work overseas in this area in foreign languages, but very little is being done domestically. A systematic strategic communications effort is needed, aimed at exposing the hypocrisy of our adversaries' words versus their deeds. The goal is to knock terrorist groups off-balance; embarrass their leadership by bringing to light their seamy connections to criminal enterprises and drug trafficking organizations; and broker infighting among al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and the broader jihadi orbit in which they reside—which will damage violent extremists' capability to propagate their message and organize operations.⁷ Again, it is crucial to link priorities with budgets. A former senior White House official, Quintan Wiktorowicz, recognizes as much in recent commentary that emphasizes the need for a dedicated CVIE budget: “It is Time to Fund Domestic Counter-Radicalization.”⁸ The piece makes several solid points, including the need to invoke community engagement in this effort. While that is part of the equation, however, CVIE also needs to support the pointier end of operational counterterrorism efforts, Federally and at the State and local level.

The current conflict in Syria and Iraq is symptomatic of a broader concern: The circumstance of ungoverned or under-governed spaces that provide our adversaries with the time and space needed to recruit, train, and plot. Instead of being back on their heels, looking over their shoulders, our adversaries are benefiting from conditions that provide them with a level of freedom of action that they have not experienced in recent history. Note that ungoverned and under-governed spaces do not need to be geographically vast in order to facilitate terrorist activity; under-governed neighborhoods in large cities in countries such as Pakistan, Kenya, and Nigeria can also provide a form of safe haven to terrorist groups. Urban environments also serve to limit U.S. military options. To further cement the dilemma, these developments are taking place when our intelligence collection platforms are becoming fewer and perhaps less effective than in the past, due to the draw-down of American forces in Afghanistan and Iraq and due to the damaging revelations of critical U.S. intelligence collection activities in the past year.

For all of these reasons, the terrorist threat to the homeland is becoming increasingly grave, and it is critical that DHS and its Federal, State, and local partners remain focused on detecting and countering these threats in the months and years ahead. As threats evolve, DHS also needs to be agile and continuously evaluate the effectiveness of its various activities in countering such threats, and invest in new tools and capabilities to address emerging threats. This committee can play a significant role in ensuring that the Department does not succumb to inertia and is focused on anticipating and addressing such emerging threats.

CYBERSECURITY

The rapid growth in cyber-related threats in the last few years has led some senior Government officials to assert that cyber threats have now surpassed terrorism as the most significant National security threat to the United States. I am not yet

⁶ Rosen, Armin, “ISIS is Bragging about its ‘Brazen’ Attack on Mosul in its English Language Magazine,” *Business Insider* (June 10, 2014). <http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-is-bragging-in-its-english-language-magazine-2014-6>.

⁷ Frank J. Cilluffo and Sharon L. Cardash, “It's the Ideology, Stupid,” *The National Interest* (June 3, 2013), <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/it%E2%80%99s-the-ideology-stupid-8537>.

⁸ <http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/06/the-foreign-policy-essay-it-is-time-to-fund-domestic-counter-radicalization>.

prepared to agree with such an assessment, for all of the reasons discussed in the previous section; and would argue instead that it is not an either/or proposition—that we must be prepared to defend against both types of threats. But it is undoubtedly true that the cyber threats to U.S. National security and economic interests have significantly advanced in recent years, and taken on new dimensions, particularly in the area of cyber threats to critical infrastructure.

The cyber and physical threats to critical infrastructure have been a key focus of Executive Branch policy making in the past 2 years, through activities mandated by Executive Order 13636 and Presidential Policy Directive 21. These threats are also highlighted in the draft QHSR report, which discusses how cyber-physical convergence and interdependence has “changed the risks to critical infrastructure in sectors ranging from energy and transportation to agriculture and health care.” Vulnerabilities in these sectors could give rise to catastrophic outcomes, especially if cascading effects ensue as a result of interdependencies between and among critical sectors. The physical attack last year on the PG&E Metcalf substation is an example of this convergence and interdependence of threats; if that attack had been slightly more damaging, it could have had a severe impact on the power grid in Silicon Valley.

DHS plays a critical role in addressing and mitigating these cyber threats, working with other Federal, State, and local government partners on threats to government networks, and of equal importance, forming strong partnerships with the private sector. These public-private partnerships are critical given that the predominant share of the relevant cyber infrastructure and expertise is located within the private sector—in Silicon Valley, and in our key economic sectors, including defense, energy, finance, and telecommunications. DHS has made significant progress in building its relationships with the private sector on cybersecurity in recent years, particularly with respect to its incident response activities at the National Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) and Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT). But it still needs to improve, particularly with respect to its analytic activities on cyber threats and risks. Currently responsibility for cyber analysis is split between the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), and the National Protection and Programs Directorate. These two parts of DHS need to become better synchronized in their analytic efforts and work together to best support critical infrastructure stakeholders in the private sector.

FINAL THOUGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The QHSR is an important deliberative process for the Department of Homeland Security. Unless we define our priorities clearly and fund them accordingly, we will not be optimizing our efforts to address these critical threats to the homeland.

But such a review cannot simply be an exercise that takes place every 4 years; the threats that we face are evolving too rapidly for such widely-spaced reviews. Instead, this process of review and assessment needs to be fully embedded into the day-to-day decision-making processes of the Department. One proposal that would promote this is the establishment of an Office of Net Assessment (ONA) within DHS, similar to the office of the same name at the Department of Defense. The ONA would produce comprehensive long-term analysis of future homeland threats and the capabilities needed to meet those threats. I would urge this committee to consider establishing the ONA in law, building on the existing capabilities of the Office of Strategy, Planning, Analysis, and Risk within the DHS Office of Policy. This is not a new idea, but rather one that Congressman Lee Hamilton and I first put forward back in January 2007, in the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) Report of The Future of Terrorism Task Force.⁹

In closing and as detailed above, I would recommend the following actions for your consideration:

- The ultimate value of the QHSR will be determined by the influence that it has on budgets, plans, and operational requirements. This committee can use its oversight function to determine whether this is being done. Otherwise, policies such as the QHSR are merely empty rhetoric.
- Introduce and work to pass a set of DHS authorization bills. This is a challenge given the fragmented structure of Congressional oversight of DHS, but is worth pursuing, and can be done in piece-meal manner to reduce the complications caused by this jurisdictional situation. In particular, the committee can authorize the headquarters elements of the Department and update core DHS authorities in the Homeland Security Act. Legislation can also be moved to authorize

⁹Report available at: <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac-future-terrorism-010107.pdf>.

other components of DHS, such as Customs and Border Protection, as Chairman McCaul has recently proposed.

- To support DHS authorization, the committee should work with the Department to strengthen the annual Future Years Homeland Security Program (FYHSP) reports required currently in the Homeland Security Act, so that they can be used as a critical source of information for authorization legislation, along the lines of the role played by the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) reports for annual defense authorization legislation.
- As part of authorization legislation, establish the DHS Office of Policy in law, to be led by an under secretary for policy. This idea was originally proposed by Secretary Chertoff nearly 9 years ago, but has stalled because of resistance by Congressional committees that have secondary jurisdiction over parts of DHS. It is time to elevate and strengthen the Office of Policy by the finally establishing it in law, a step that will also give Congress greater influence over its priorities and functions.
- Establish an Office of Net Assessment (ONA) within DHS to provide the Secretary with comprehensive analysis of future threats and U.S. capabilities to meet those threats.
- Prioritize the challenge posed by foreign fighters, particularly those fighting in Syria and Iraq. In part this means maintaining and strengthening key DHS activities related to terrorist travel, even in this difficult budget environment. It also means placing greater priority and increasing funding for programs and activities intended to counter violent Islamist extremism.
- Better synchronize I&A and NPPD in terms of their cyber analytic activities and private-sector stakeholder outreach.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you today. I look forward to trying to answer any questions that you may have.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you for that. Very refreshing. I think you are right. The acquisition bill gives us at least some oversight and gives us some leverage. One thing I will say about Chairman McCaul, with the authorization bill that where we finally authorize the Department, I think is the right thing to do, as well. So I thank you for that.

The Chairman will now recognize Dr. Willis for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF HENRY H. WILLIS, DIRECTOR, RAND HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE CENTER, THE RAND CORPORATION

Mr. WILLIS. Thank you, Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to testify at this hearing.

Yesterday, the Department of Homeland Security released the second Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. Converging trends of the evolving threats, increasingly constrained budgets and new leadership make now an opportune time for DHS to prioritize the Department's goals and ensure its programs are best aligned to meet them.

Today, I will highlight three important ways Congress and DHS could work together to build on the results of this second quadrennial review. First, align DHS budgets with Department strategic guidance. Second, establish more effective oversight of DHS programs. Third, seek ways to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the DHS by leveraging Department of Defense capabilities.

Regarding my first point, aligning budgets with strategic guidance and risk management will make the Department more effective. The analysis behind the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review provides a basis for reasoned discussion of risk management priorities. Secretary Johnson has proposed new initiatives that could build on this progress.

Specifically, in a memorandum to DHS leadership, Security Johnson proposed three initiatives: A Department leadership forum, Departmental management processes to review and implement joint requirements and oversight, an enhancement of headquarters strategy for planning and analysis capabilities. I encourage Congress to consider supporting each of these initiatives.

Second, establishing effective oversight of programs will make the Department more efficient. Several GAO studies point out cases where effectiveness of DHS is either poor or undocumented, costs are uncontrolled, or oversight is lacking. While the Department continues to remedy these situations, there remains plenty of room for improvement.

For example, a Rand paper published last year included a number of recommendations that could improve acquisition at DHS, including ensuring every major acquisition program has an approved acquisition program baseline document; not delegating decision-making authority for components until key planning requirements are met; conducting careful analysis of cost or schedule breaches to improve further acquisitions; and establishing more professional development opportunities for DHS acquisition officials.

Congress has already helped DHS with these types of problems, through passing the H.R. 4228, and can continue to help DHS improve oversight by reinforcing and funding initiatives that allow DHS headquarters to implement recommendations like these.

Finally, the homeland security enterprise will be stronger if DHS seeks ways to improve effectiveness and efficiency by leveraging DOD capabilities. The department of—many of the priorities identified in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review require a whole-of-Government approach. Disaster management, border security, cybersecurity are just a few examples. The Department of Defense has also recognized the importance of these missions and the opportunity for collaboration.

For example, defending the homeland was identified as the first pillar of National security in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. There are many ways DOD capabilities may be used to support DHS missions. Examples include leveraging DOD technology demonstrations, learning from DOD experiences with cloud computing, and using DOD technologies to improve land, air, and maritime demand awareness.

However, before implementing any of these or other solutions, Congress, DHS, and DOD should together ensure that the full acquisition and sustainment costs are known. That any transfer of technology has been coordinated with existing DHS acquisition strategies. That the use of DOD capabilities reflects the desired use of the military and civilian missions. That it is clear which organizations should bear the costs of these technologies and that, then, budgets reflect that.

In closing, we all certainly want more effective protection from terrorism, better preparedness for disasters, and more resilient communities. The multiplicity and complexity of current homeland security threats, uncertainty surrounding what new threats could emerge or how known threats might evolve, and constraints in budget make it difficult to achieve these goals.

However, if DHS is to overcome these challenges three things are required. Strategy focus to direct resources where they are most needed, strong oversight to assure that resources are used effectively and, finally, cooperation across Government to improve efficiency.

Again, Chairman Duncan and Ranking Member Barber and Members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify before you today on this very important opportunity for DHS.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Willis follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HENRY H. WILLIS^{1 2}

JUNE 20, 2014

Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and Members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify at this hearing.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will soon release its report on the second Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR). The convergence of several trends makes this an opportune moment for the Department to step back and assess what are the most pressing current and emerging homeland security challenges and decide how they should be addressed. Let me briefly mention five such trends:

- First, onset of terrorism fatigue—When DHS celebrated its 10-year anniversary, some questioned whether law enforcement and domestic security operations had become too focused on terrorism at the cost of addressing other public safety issues such as drug violence, public health, or crime.
- Second, persistence of terrorism as a real threat—The Boston Marathon bombing reminded us that attacks can happen anywhere, anytime. Destabilization of governments that followed the Arab Spring raises the prospect of new safe havens for terrorism emerging. The recent al-Qaeda summit held in April by Nasir al-Wuhayshi in Yemen demonstrates that al-Qaeda continues to pursue global jihad.
- Third, increasing threats from natural disasters—The effects of Super Storm Sandy emphasized the consequences for coastal communities of the combined impacts of continued population growth and sea-level rise, and the need for incorporating planning for community and infrastructure resilience into economic development.
- Fourth, cyber threats outpacing cyber defense—Last month's indictment of five officers in the Chinese People's Liberation Army for stealing information from six U.S. firms, along with revelations of Operation Olympic Games, reveal the scope of cyber crime and potential for malicious cyber attacks against critical infrastructure.
- Fifth, increasingly constrained Government budgets—Federal, State, local, and Tribal governments have fewer resources to address this expanding list of concerns.

In short, when Secretary Johnson took the reins at DHS, he stepped into a deeply uncertain, utterly complex, and continuously dynamic environment with more constraints on the resources at his disposal. These converging trends, combined with new leadership and new guidance expected to arise from the QHSR, make now an opportune time for DHS to prioritize the Department's goals and assure its programs are best aligned to achieve them.

The first QHSR brought DHS together to develop a collective list of all missions for components across the Department.³ Though comprehensive—the list spanned

¹The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates to Federal, State, or local legislative committees; Government-appointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a non-profit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.

²This testimony is available for free download at <http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT412.html>.

³Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland, Department of Homeland Security, February 2010.

issues of terrorism, border control, immigration, cyber space, disaster management, and governance—the first review did not set priorities.

The second QHSR will now set the stage for improving both the effectiveness and efficiency of DHS. The review includes a strategic assessment of the current and emerging homeland security threats, focused analysis on selected priority topics, and guidance on management priorities for the Department. I'd like to highlight three important ways Congress and DHS could work together to build on the second QHSR:

- First, improve the linkages between budgets of DHS's component agencies and strategic directions of the Department as a whole on risk management;
- Second, establish more effective oversight of programs once initiated;
- Third, seek ways to improve effectiveness and efficiency by leveraging Department of Defense (DoD) capabilities, especially for Defense Support of Civilian Authorities.

IMPROVE LINKAGES BETWEEN BUDGETS AND STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS ON RISK MANAGEMENT

The Homeland Security Strategic Environment Assessment marks a significant accomplishment for DHS and reflects well the trends that are changing the homeland security landscape. The review covers persistent threats to the Nation from problems such as smuggling, illegal migration, and maritime safety. It also addresses catastrophic events such as hurricanes, earthquakes, pandemics, and terrorism. The strategic environment assessment describes all of these events in a common way, allowing for the first time an informed discussion of priorities based on risk.

Knowing the facts about homeland security risks is important because the public's fear of terrorism and disasters can be out of alignment with the risks the events pose. The unpredictability of terrorism, individuals' uncertainty about how to protect themselves, and the realization that attacks are purposeful and not random all contribute to increased fear about terrorism.⁴ As an example of how fear can affect behavior, John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo (the Beltway Snipers) paralyzed communities and closed schools as the public and Government officials tried to understand what was happening and how to protect themselves. Fear of terrorism is further magnified by evocative images of suicide bombings that are replayed on TV and the internet.

Fear of terrorism matters. Numerous studies—many supported by the DHS Science and Technology Directorate—demonstrate that even if other hazards threaten the same number of lives or economic activity, people are more concerned about terrorism events than other events, support spending more for terrorism security, and are willing to cede more liberties in the name of terrorism security.⁵ However, in reality, all terrorist events do not pose the same risks as other hazards.

When assessed side-by-side, there are many disasters, accidents, and crimes that have historically threatened more lives, caused more economic damage, and led to more societal disruption than terrorism. When presented with this evidence, people with different and competing interests often can agree on what problems are most serious and make judgments that are consistent with what is known about risks.⁶

The analysis behind the QHSR will provide a basis for this type of reasoned discussion of risk management priorities. Secretary Johnson has proposed new initiatives that will build on the current progress. Specifically, in a memorandum to DHS leadership in April, Secretary Johnson proposed three initiatives:

- First, a Departmental Leadership Forum for the “most senior leadership . . . to gather regularly . . . in an environment of trust, and openly place on the table issues, arguments, and disagreements concerning [DHS's] most challenging issues.” This forum could provide means for coordinated implementation of leadership guidance and management initiatives.
- Second, the establishment of Departmental management processes to review and implement processes to develop joint requirements for programs across DHS and improve oversight of programs once implemented.

⁴ Cass R. Sunstein (2003). Terrorism and Probability Neglect. *The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty* 26:2/3 121–136.

⁵ For example see, W. J. Burns (2007) *Risk Perception: A Review*, CREATE Report, May 22, 2007.

⁶ Russell Lundberg (2013) *Comparing Homeland Security Risks Using a Deliberative Risk Ranking Methodology*. RGSD-319, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.

- Third, the enhancement of headquarters strategy, planning, and analytic capability to build and maintain the organizations required to support the leadership and management initiatives being proposed.⁷
- I urge Congress to consider supporting each of these important initiatives.

ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT OF PROGRAMS ONCE INITIATED

DHS programs are notorious for lacking appropriate oversight. Several Government Accountability Office (GAO) studies point out cases where effectiveness of DHS programs is either poor or undocumented, costs are uncontrolled, or oversight is lacking. While the Department has made progress and continues to remedy these situations, plenty of room for improvement remains.

A review by GAO in 2011 suggested that more than half of the 77 major acquisitions programs at DHS are over budget or behind schedule.⁸ In July 2013, DHS reported that 63 percent of its acquisitions programs had cost growth, and one-third of these programs had cost growth over 10 percent.⁹

A RAND paper published last year, *Reducing the Cost and Risk of Major Acquisitions at the Department of Homeland Security*, included a number of recommendations that could be expected to improve acquisition management at DHS based on experience with acquisition management in other contexts.¹⁰ For example:

- Every major acquisition program should have an approved acquisition program baseline document defining milestones and requirements to which programs are held accountable for demonstrating their readiness before progressing to new phases.
- Decision-making authority, given to the DHS Office of Management, should not be delegated to components until key planning requirements are met.
- Careful analysis of acquisition cost or schedule breaches should be conducted to help the Department identify root causes for these failures and incorporate lessons to improve future acquisitions.
- The Department should establish mechanisms for more professional development opportunities for DHS acquisition officials.

Congress can help DHS improve oversight by reinforcing and funding initiatives that allow DHS headquarters to implement recommendations like these. And in fact, this committee has already proposed legislation, H.R. 4228, the DHS Acquisition Accountability and Efficiency Act, to improve acquisition management. Cooperation between Congress and DHS on improving oversight should continue.

SEEK WAYS TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY BY LEVERAGING DOD CAPABILITIES

Many DHS priorities require a whole-of-Government approach.

- Disaster management and pandemic preparedness to improve community resilience requires cooperation among FEMA, DHHS, DoD, HUD, local response organizations, private firms, and NGOs.
- Border security requires coordination of Federal and local law enforcement agencies across several bureaucratic and geographic jurisdictions to counter smuggling networks that span several continents.
- Cybersecurity must protect Government and private systems from both State-sponsored and criminally-aligned threat networks, potentially using capabilities that exist in several departments, while balancing dynamic norms for privacy.

At the same time DHS is deciding how best to address these challenges, the Department of Defense is scaling back use of its assets in theater operations (making them potentially available for other uses) and the Federal Government as a whole is wrestling with the realities of reduced budgets. The confluence of these events creates potential opportunities to identify ways to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of homeland security, especially in the areas of disaster management and border security.

The Department of Defense has also recognized the importance of these missions and the opportunity for collaboration. Defending the homeland was identified as the

⁷ Secretary Jeh Johnson (2014). *Strengthening Departmental Unity*. Memorandum for DHS Leadership, April 22, 2014.

⁸ GAO, *Homeland Security: DHS Requires More Disciplined Investment Management to Help Meet Mission Needs*, Washington, DC, GAO-12-833, September 18, 2012.

⁹ GAO, *Homeland Security: Observations on DHS Oversight of Major Acquisitions and Efforts to Match Resources to Needs*. GAO-13-846T, September 10, 2013.

¹⁰ Jeffrey A. Drezner and Andrew R. Morral (2013). *Reducing the Cost and Risk of Major Acquisitions at the Department of Homeland Security*. PE-105, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.

first pillar of National security in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. Defense Support for Civilian Authorities remains a critical responsibility.

Motivated by this synergy, RAND studies have identified several opportunities worth consideration:

- On-going DoD technology demonstration efforts could be leveraged to provide additional support to on-going DHS operations.¹¹
- Information sharing among local law enforcement and response agencies and Federal agencies could be improved using DoD lessons about how to design and operate cloud networks to improve both disaster management and border security.¹²
- Advanced Navy platforms and surveillance technologies could improve maritime domain awareness for counter-narcotic operations.¹³

These are just a few of the many ways DoD capabilities might be used to support DHS missions. However, before implementing any of them, Congress, DHS, and DoD should work together to:

- Demonstrate how the new uses improve capability, and estimate the associated acquisition and sustainment costs.
- Coordinate transfer and use of DoD systems with existing DHS acquisition strategies.
- Ensure use of DoD capabilities for homeland security missions is consistent with existing legal authorities and policies and reflects the desired use of the military in civilian operations.
- Review policies associated with using DoD capabilities for homeland security missions and address any policies that should be streamlined or reinforced.
- Clarify which organizations should bear the costs of operating the technologies and adjust budgets accordingly.

MAKING THE NATION SAFER AND MORE RESILIENT

The second QHSR should reflect continued maturation of governance at DHS and provide a stepping-off point for further improvements. We all certainly want more effective protection from terrorism, better preparation for disasters, and more resilient communities. The multiplicity and complexity of current homeland security threats, uncertainty surrounding what new threats could emerge or how known trends might evolve, and constraints on budgets, make achieving these goals difficult. If DHS is to overcome all of these challenges, three things will be required: Strategic focus to direct resources where they are most needed, strong oversight to assure that resources are used effectively, and finally, cooperation across Government to improve efficiency.

Again, Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and Members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify before you today on this very important opportunity for DHS. I look forward to taking your questions.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Dr. Willis.

The Chairman will now recognize Ms. Duke for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF ELAINE C. DUKE, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Ms. DUKE. Good morning, Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and Members of the committee. I appreciate being here, and thank you for your efforts in overseeing the Department with the goal of improving mission effectiveness. To my fellow panel members, who have already covered most of the key points of the hearing this morning.

¹¹Daniel Gonzales, Sarah Harting, Jason Mastbaum, Carolyn Wong (2104). *Improving Inter-agency Information Sharing Using Technology Demonstrations: The Legal Basis for Using New Sensor Technologies for Counterdrug Operations Along the U.S. Border*. RR-551-OSD, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.

¹²Isaac R. Porche III, Bradley Wilson, Erin-Elizabeth Johnson, Shane Tierney, Evan Saltzman (2104). *Data Flood Helping the Navy Address the Rising Tide of Sensor Information*. RR-315-NAVY, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.

¹³Scott Savitz, Irv Blickstein, Peter Buryk, et al. (2014). *U.S. Navy Employment Options for Unmanned Surface Vehicles*. RR-384-NAVY, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.

I do agree with both of you in your opening statements that the improvement of the management of DHS is key and essential to delivering the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review mission stats. I do support H.R. 4228 and its effects to improve management. I would like to state that in addition to being bipartisan, it also, in a large part, is policy-agnostic. It will succeed despite policy changes and changes in the threat environment. So to do this is really an investment of our future of homeland security.

In the statements announcing this hearing, the Chairman mentioned that DHS must prioritize and make trade-offs on how to best keep us safe. Having a focused and affordable and achievable strategy is critical to reining in DHS's massive bureaucracy. I would like to focus my comments this morning on the piece of that statement about being achievable. I do believe that the efforts we have talked about here in terms of building the management and the operational infrastructure is essential to achieving this QHSR and future policy and strategy initiatives.

In setting up the legislation to require the QHSR, the lawmakers recognized this. They mandated that the QHSR include an assessment of the organizational alignment of the Department with the National homeland security strategy and mission areas. That is really where the challenge lies. The management infrastructure, including the right people with the right policy, processes, allocation of resources and systems under united leadership, empowered with the data and analytics to make sound operational decisions. One sentence, a lot of work and a lot of effort.

This is necessary, though—however, to transform the QHSR from a policy document into the living reality actually used to more effectively deliver the homeland security mission to our Nation.

In the first years of DHS, we put the building blocks of management into place. Those building blocks included developing a budget process, developing a program and analysis PA&E capability, developing an acquisition system, logistics, and human capital. The challenge to achieving the QHSR mission objectives is to first continuing maturing those building blocks that were initially put in place during the first years of the Department. More importantly, integrating those building blocks into a system.

The integrated model has to have policy- and strategy-informing capabilities, which will be followed by requirements driving into programming and budgeting, acquisition, and life-cycle management of the individual programs in the entire mission. Strategy has to be analytical, integrated, focused, and collaborative.

I would like to point out, as Dr. Willis did, that Secretary Johnson's strengthening Department Unity of Effort memo dated April 22, 2014 outlines a strategy to accomplish this. That memo is packed with processes not only for policy, but for management, that I believe, if executed, would be key to further maturing the Department in the areas of management and supporting the policy of the QHSR.

Several key tenets are in that memo. One is the senior leadership engagement, not only at the headquarters level but with the component, on a regular both strategic and tactical basis. That is essential to driving forward the Unity of Effort memo and accomplishing the QHSR.

Second, the system must recognize the interfaces and interdependencies of the individual pieces of the management system from policy through execution and sustainment, as I said earlier. The imperative for a sound system also includes having the interdependencies of mission, as the QHSR shows.

Moving forward to more of a risk-based approach must ensure that both the policy and the execution of the policies are inter-related and show those dependencies that, as we move towards a risk-based approach, we actually recognize the risk appropriately. It is critical that this initiative be carried through by the Department and sustained so that we can deliver that mission set to our country. The framework will continue to drive the Department towards maturity. Otherwise, the QHSR cannot be achieved effectively and efficiently, and it does become just another policy document on the shelf.

I thank the committee for this opportunity and look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Duke follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ELAINE C. DUKE

Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and Members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify this morning. Though I retired from Federal service, I still have a passion for the homeland security mission, and remain committed to the success of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). I thank you for your efforts in overseeing the Department with the goal of improving mission effectiveness.

DHS completed its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) in 2010. Soon, it will issue the second QHSR, legislatively mandated by Section 707 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended. It is important that the QSHR be sound in terms of strategy and missions. Based on my experience with the first QHSR, DHS is spending considerable planning effort on updating the strategy and missions. It is updating the five basic homeland security missions:

- Prevent Terrorism and Enhance Security,
- Secure and Manage Our Borders,
- Enforce and Administer our Immigration Laws,
- Safeguard and Secure Cyberspace,
- Strengthen National Preparedness and Resilience,

and ensuring the Department has the right mission set and strategy. I am certain my colleagues on this panel will provide that policy stakeholder perspective.

However with my background and experience, most recently as the DHS under secretary for management, I'd like to provide the execution perspective, on behalf of the stakeholders responsible for developing the management infrastructure that turns the strategy and policy of the QHSR into successful mission operations.

Therefore, I am focusing my comments today on that lesser discussed, but in my opinion an equally or more important aspect, of the QHSR. The Chairman, in his comments announcing this hearing stated that "DHS must prioritize and make tradeoffs on how best to keep us safe. Having a focused, affordable, and achievable strategy is critical to reining in DHS's massive bureaucracy." Mr. Duncan's point that the strategy must be achievable is the critical issue, in my opinion. And the strategy is only achievable if DHS continues to build the management and operational infrastructure to execute it effectively and efficiently.

Lawmakers recognized that fact when legislating that DHS must complete a Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. They mandated that the QHSR include an assessment of the organizational alignment of the Department with the National homeland security strategy and mission areas.

The QHSR is to include recommendations not only regarding the long-term strategy and priorities of the Nation for homeland security, but also guidance on the programs, assets, capabilities, budget, policies, and authorities of the Department. It must review and assess the effectiveness of the mechanisms of the Department for executing the process of turning the requirements developed in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review into an acquisition strategy and expenditure plan within the Department. Additionally, it is to identify the budget plan required to provide

sufficient resources to successfully execute the full range of missions called for in the review.

This is where the challenges lie. The management infrastructure, including the right policy, people, process, allocation of resources, and systems; under united leadership empowered with the data and analytics to make sound operational decisions. This is necessary to transform the QHSR from a document to a living reality, actually used to more effectively deliver homeland security to our Nation.

In the first 10 years of DHS, we put building blocks of the management structure into place to enable DHS to deliver the homeland security strategy and mission. Those building blocks included a budget process, program analysis and evaluation, acquisition, logistics, and human capital. The challenge to successfully achieving the QHSR is to continue maturing those building blocks. And even more importantly, integrating the building blocks into a system. In an integrated model, policy and strategy inform capabilities, followed by requirements, driving into the programming and budgeting processes, and acquisition and life-cycle management. Strategy must be analytical and integrated, focused, and collaborative. The strategic guidance must drive a joint capabilities-based analysis that identifies gaps and overlaps, analyzes alternatives to close those gaps and eliminate the overlaps, and develops requirements to fill them. And to ensure the capabilities are effectively delivered, there must be coordinated operational planning with scenarios against the DHS strategy. All aspects of the system must be driven by the most senior DHS leadership at both headquarters and the operating components, and executed with optimum unity. And it must be continually monitored against goals to ensure stated objectives are met.

DHS Secretary Johnson's direction to continue maturing this system is set for in his "Strengthening Departmental Unity of Effort" memo dated April 22, 2014. This memo outlines the further development of DHS planning, management, and operations to deliver the DHS missions enumerated in the QHSR. It describes an integrated model designed to ensure that strategic and analytically-based decisions optimize mission performance.

Several key tenants of the Secretary's Unity of Effort are critical to successful implementation of the QHSR. The establishment of regular meetings and engagement by the Secretary, deputy secretary, and operating component head leaders is critical to the Unity initiative. It must provide unified leadership that results in the optimum allocation of resources, while improving the management process for planning and investments. It must develop planning, programs, budgets, acquisition, that are currently effective, and also sustainable throughout the life cycle of the program and mission.

This system must recognize interfaces and interdependencies and be based on good data and sound analytics. That will position DHS headquarters and operating component leadership to make the right decisions to execute the QHSR missions and strategies. DHS must have the infrastructure in place, then it can execute the evolving homeland security mission to be updated in the QHSR; it can achieve the strategy.

The imperative for a unified, sound system is even stronger as DHS moves away from a one-size-fits-all security approach to a risk-based security model. A risk-based approach to security must be intelligence driven with complete situational awareness from integrated data. This requires Unity of Effort. The ability to perform effective case management and data-driven risk analysis is essential to the risk-based approach, and that data must be timely and accurate, and part of a unified effort.

It is critical that once the QHSR is finalized, the initiative to strengthen delivery of the mission set is continued. The framework outlined in the memo must be brought to maturity. Otherwise, the QHSR cannot be achieved effectively and becomes just another policy document in the library.

Again I thank the committee for this opportunity, and look forward to answering your questions today.

Mr. DUNCAN. I want to thank you for that, and thank you for all the opening statements.

I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions. Before I get started, I just want to give sort of a shout-out to one of my staff members who has helped this committee as a shared employee. Rebecca Ulrich will get her master's degree today from the Naval War College. We are proud of her and she has helped the

committee on both sides. We thank her for her hard work and congratulate her for her master's degree.

I come from the private sector, and in business we did a 5-year plan. I think that is important to set focus for the company, to steer the ship in a certain direction and try to put pieces in place to make your vision and your goals. So whether it is sales goals or performance goals or income goals, return on investment issues to make those happen. So I hope this plan isn't just eyewash for America. I hope it is not done just to meet a requirement of the United States Congress. I hope it is actually a vision for the Department going forward.

I think that is the intent of Congress when they passed this, is to make DHS actually stop and focus on: What are the strategic threats to this country, where do we need to place our resources, where do we need to spend our money, and what do we need to do to ensure America is safe? So I hope that that is what has taken place.

I do want to point out that in the strategic priorities for homeland security it says this: "Continue to evolve immigration policies and processes in order to respond to new trends in illegal migration and further align our enforcement policies with our goal of sound law enforcement practice that prioritizes public safety."

In case you haven't noticed, we have a crisis situation on our Southern Border today. Regardless of how you feel about immigration reform in this country, you cannot sit idly by and watch this blatant invasion of our Southern Border and our rule of law by folks that are illegal crossing this country.

Chain migration is a real thing. If the children enter this country, what happens with their families? Do they also come at a later day? I am concerned that we have CBP officers changing diapers and warming formula for these children. This is a humanitarian crisis, and I am very sympathetic to the humanitarian aspect of this.

But I am also very cognizant of the fact that OTMs—other than Mexicans—a DHS term that says anyone other than a Mexico or nationality person that crosses in this country is an OTM. These are Guatemalans and El Salvadorians and Hondurans. I get that. But I am worried about the Asian, the Middle Eastern, and the African folks that are coming into this country and could possibly cross our Southern Border while we have CBP officers warming formula. What would they come here for? Would they come here to seek a job? Possibly.

But we see what is going on in North Africa, and we talked about the foreign fighters in Syria. I am concerned that there are real threats that could possibly exploit this situation and enter my country, the sovereign Nation of the United States of America across our Southern Border because we are looking somewhere else, and we are dealing with something else.

I am going to let my blood pressure calm down for just a second. Think about the world that we are living in today. We have got our border situation I just talked about. We have got Iraq and ISIS. We have got Syria and foreign fighters. We talked about foreign fighters a minute ago, and I appreciate that.

We went overseas to actually look at this issue. While we were there, a foreign fighter came from Syria, came from the battlefield. He was European, he was battle-hardened, he was radicalized. He came to Belgium and he shot up a Jewish museum where four or five people were killed, while we were there. The French got lucky and caught him at a bus stop.

He was in an open border Schengen area. With a visa waiver program, could that European nationality have flown into the United States? Because he didn't have to go to the consulate or the embassy to get a visa. He could have gotten on an airplane. If he wasn't on a terrorist watch list or a no-fly list, guess what? He flies into the United States of America to do what? This is a real issue with foreign fighters that are getting battle-hardened in Syria and now Iraq.

We have got Iran continually to pursue a nuclear weapons program, Russia, the Crimea and Ukraine, Hezbollah, Hamas, what we see with the kidnapping of Israeli children by the Palestinian folks.

We see Boko Haram in Libya and North Africa. What is going on in Egypt and the Sinai. China, the South China Sea, threatening Japan. Cybersecurity. China, Russia, North Korea. I could go on and on and on. There are a lot of problems going on in the world. That is why I think it is so important that DHS has a very, very, very clear message and plan in this report. So I will ask the witnesses a question.

Frank, the QHSR, by statute, is supposed to not only be a comprehensive examination of the homeland security strategy of the Nation. It is also supposed to include recommendations regarding the long-term strategy and priorities of the Nation for homeland security. Part of long-term strategic planning requires anticipating future threats and events. So I ask you this: Is planning for unseen changes in the Western Hemisphere, such as in Mexico or Central America resulting in mass migration an issue that should be addressed in a National strategy? Was this issue adequately addressed in the newly-released QHSR?

Mr. CILLUFFO. Mr. Chairman, I think you do hit an important question. At the end of the day, smuggling is smuggling; whether it is drugs, whether it is people, whether it is weapons they are gonna use the same route. So this is a significant area for the Department. I don't think it was addressed in as much detail as the threat warrants. Because at the end of the day, you are looking at the convergence of cartels meeting up with other actors. Obviously, that is a primary concern for not only border security but, as you mentioned, some of the P&R issues. The terror travel issues, more strategically where CBP, ICE, VISIT, TSA, and others play a significant role.

I do think that the Department has made yeoman's progress in some of the terror travel-related issues. But to your point, it doesn't have to be via air. It can come through any kind of mode that the adversary chooses.

So bottom line, I think that clearly that is a National security challenge. It is not just a—it does affect our National security, and something that warrants, I think, greater attention, going forward. Let me just underscore one thing. We can't wait 4 years for strate-

gies. What we need to be able to do is identify what the goals are, what the objectives are in a long-term planning kind of sense.

But you need a Department that is agile. I recommended an office of net assessment, along the lines of what DOD has, to be able to align some of these efforts. That has played a significant role in protecting our country from a defense perspective. I think DHS would be well-served if it had something that was nimble, agile, and doesn't have to wait 4 years to put together a strategy, when the world changes so dramatically overnight. So we need to get to where we have the long-term goals, but we also need to get out tactics that are much quicker and much more rapid.

Mr. DUNCAN. I agree with you. I think it should be a very fluid process. I am concerned that—and I had this conversation with staff this morning—that DHS was created, brought 22 different components together. Have we created such a large agency—the third-largest in the Government—that it can't respond in that fluid manner? Responding to crisis as they come up, or needs, shifting assets, as needed. So I appreciate your saying that. We are gonna have several rounds of questions, I hope.

With this, I will yield back—I will yield over to Mr. Barber for 5 minutes.

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It has been a very important discussion, especially as we are talking about the ability of the Department to be quick in response to emerging risks and problems. The drug cartels are very nimble. Their strategies change by the day, by the hour, by the week depending upon what they see us doing and where they see weaknesses in our border security structure.

Mr. Baker, I would like to pursue this a little bit with you if I could. As you know, one of the QHSR strategic priorities is for the Department to adopt a risk segmentation approach to securing and managing the flows of people and goods into the United States. Last week, the House Committee on Homeland Security unanimously approved an authorization bill for CBP. In that discussion, I offered an amendment which was adopted by the committee requiring the commissioner of CBP to, within 6 months, develop and implement credible ways to measure border security and its effectiveness and its use of resources and allocations.

We have, for way too long, had a lack of credibility of the information provided by the Department as to how it is doing. We have actually provided billions of dollars over the life of this Department, and we have way too little accountability.

Two years ago, the Department moved to adopt a risk-based strategy for securing the borders. When the GAO, at the request of the Ranking Member and myself, looked at that it found a plan that was absent goals, absent measurements, no way to determine progress. The people that I represent have incredible information about the risks and the changing strategies of the cartels. I call the cartels narcoterrorists because I think it is a much more apt description of their goals and their practices.

There is no doubt that we have made some improvements in securing the border. But I can tell you this. That where I live, the people I represent, they still are not safe in their homes, still don't

feel that the Department has been quick enough. So how do we move in this direction?

So, Mr. Baker, I want to ask you, as someone who has worked in the Department, what steps you believe the Department can take not just to talk about risk assessment and moving resources in accordance with that, but how it can actually affect that and begin to have better credibility with the stakeholders who live and work across the border?

Mr. BAKER. Thank you, Representative Barber. I am deeply familiar with this. Since I left the Department, I have worked closely with ranchers in exactly that area; very remote areas, where they are at risk every day from smugglers of drugs or people. They genuinely feel under siege. The—coming up with a measurement or a single measurement for success on the border and achievement of secure borders I think is almost impossible to do. Partly because while we can get a general sense, it is almost impossible to turn any of those measures into something that is the be-all and end-all.

If you ask people today how many—like if you ask Border Patrol Agents how many people crossed the border or how many got away, how many did you catch, they will give you a pretty good estimate. But if you started making their bonuses depend on achieving those numbers, you would not be able to rely on those numbers for very long. My concern is, many of these numbers are subject, and ought to be subject, to exercise of judgment.

The other problem that we are seeing today is, you can have a breakdown overnight if conditions change. I am quite struck by the fact that the crisis that we are facing now on the border is, in many ways, almost exactly the same crisis that I saw when I showed up in 2005 when we had people that were called, other than Mexicans, showing up and saying please give me the permiso and show me the way to the bus station. Because there was no way to return them—you couldn't return them to Mexico because Mexico wouldn't take them—and we did not have enough beds to put them into detention before they could be deported, we had to release them.

Everybody was coming in greater and greater numbers when they realized that the worst thing that would happen to them is they would be given a date to show up, in 6 months, for a hearing. That is happening again. I think it would be worthwhile to look at the response that the Department took to that problem in 2005 and 2006, when we dramatically increased our ability to put people into detention and shrank, dramatically, the time it took to send them back home. So that they started to deliver the message, oh, you can take that long trip across Mexico but you will be back here in 2 weeks once you cross the border.

If they believe that they will be allowed to stay in the United States indefinitely they will keep coming, and we will spend all our time just rounding them up and giving them permisos. Meanwhile, the drug cartels have already realized if they can send 250 people across the border who all have to be fingerprinted and sent to detention, as soon as the Border Patrol is engaged in that they can begin sending their backpackers across with the drugs.

So I think this is a genuine crisis. It is a crisis of planning and management for the Department that needs to be addressed quite promptly or we will have serious, serious problems on the border.

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Baker. Mr. Chairman, I have run out of time. I will yield back, and hope for questions in the second round.

Thank you.

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman from Arizona. Mr. Baker, thank you for that, as well. Just a side comment. I think Mexico needs to be appealed to by this administration. It is their Southern Border with Guatemala that these folks are transiting, as well. They could be stopped there. Historically, Mexico has had a very, very strong policy of border crossings right there. But apparently, something—somewhere along the way something is not being done. Whether it is on the Guatemala and Mexico border, or whether it is on our border.

So I yield to the gentleman, for 5 minutes, from North Carolina, Mr. Hudson.

Mr. HUDSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank all the witnesses for your time here today. I thank the Chairman for having this hearing. This is really important.

Mr. Baker, I want to start with you. In your written testimony, you addressed the delay of the QHSR by the Department of Justice and the near-veto power that Justice enjoys over this Department of Homeland Security product. In your time as assistant secretary for policy, did DOJ or any other Federal department enjoy this type of veto power? Are there any other departments—like Justice or Defense or State—that have to obtain this kind of outside approval before they present their quadrennial report?

Mr. BAKER. If you let other agencies do that to you they will do it. When I first arrived at the—and we were standing up the Department's policy office, I handed out buttons that had the words "lunch money" and a big bar through it like a no-parking sign to say we were not gonna be giving our lunch money to other departments anymore. Maybe we should revive that. The Justice Department's effort to extract turf concessions from a document that needs to be released I think does not—what—it is not in the best traditions of the Department. But you have to resist or other departments will do that to you.

Mr. HUDSON. I appreciate that. I am just very concerned about that type of process, and I think there needs to be an independent report. Obviously, you know, departments can work together on issues and concern and cross-jurisdiction. But to have a report like this delayed, and to have another Department with near-veto power, I think that is a real mistake. So I appreciate—

Mr. BAKER. If I could tell one quick story? We had a very similar exercise like this when we were talking about nuclear terrorism. Where the FBI said, hey, we are in charge, we will do everything. Shortly thereafter we actually had an incident where a ship was coming with a cargo that had alarmed for plutonium. It turns out that it was not plutonium, but we thought seriously we had to send a helicopter out to investigate. We turned to the FBI and said, well, you said you were in charge. You got helicopters. They said, you

know, actually we don't know how to land a helicopter on a ship. Could the Coast Guard do it for us?

That is the difference between writing the speech where you say I am in charge, and actually carrying out the effort. Where the people who can do it end up with the responsibility. We need—the more we focus on what we are actually doing as opposed to the speech parts of this, the more likely we will have realistic assignments of responsibility.

Mr. HUDSON. Well, I think that is important. Because the American people expect us to keep them safe. If we are fighting over turf and, you know, whose helicopter are we gonna use, you know, that is a mistake. I think the American people have a right to be outraged and certainly, we have concerns here in Congress. We will continue to work on these issues. So I appreciate you highlighting that.

Shifting gears a little bit, Mr. Cilluffo, at the time of the last QHSR, ISIS was a weakened al-Qaeda affiliate in Iraq. It has since become a major force, first in the on-going Syrian conflict and, more recently, in Iraq where it has taken on several key areas and is directly fighting with the government.

Sort-of building on the theme that the Chairman raised, you know, did the QHSR mention this type of threat? If not, is ISIS a potential failure of the state of Iraq, and are other nation-states a potential threat that DHS or QHSR should include in a National homeland security strategy?

Mr. CILLUFFO. That is—I think that is an excellent question. It comes to what I think is one of these interagency challenges and dilemmas. Because you can't look at this as a home game or an away game alone. I would argue that we have neglected some our away game activities in recent years. Which has provided the time and space for our enemies to exploit. But I would also argue that you have got to look at it as being inextricably interwoven. Here is where I think you have some of that breakdown.

I think the Department does deserve credit in terms of the work it has done vis-à-vis terror travel. They have actually made significant progress. But as the Chairman had mentioned, you have also got foreign fighters by the thousands. In addition to the incident in Belgium, there was a big arrest yesterday with TATP in France where you do have a—and Syria connection. You do have a number of foreign fighters that can come to Europe and then go elsewhere. I mean, obviously, when you look at the highest concern in terms of threat, it is probably on European soil right now.

But that also does bode significantly for the United States. The reason we did—we have done a number of studies on foreign fighters in 2009, 2010. The reason we did that was this particular case where the system was blinking very red in the United States. A fellow by the name of Najibullah Zazi, he had initially went over to Afghanistan to join up with the Taliban. He was intercepted by al-Qaeda, said you are of much greater value because you are familiar with the United States, you can move in the United States. We are gonna turn you around and you are gonna start targeting U.S. targets.

In this case, he was going after the subways in New York. We had a couple of mix-ups in terms of being able to get there before

the balloon went up, but we did and we did it successfully. So it is this foreign fighter. It is these individuals that can be identified, intercepted, and turned around. That is a big problem. When you look at ISIS today, I think what is most unique is that you have got young folks who are meeting who had never met before. So when we looked at AQAP in Yemen, they are largely people who had familiarity with Yemeni society.

When you look at Somalia, it was largely American, first-, second-generation of Somali descent. When you looked at AfPak, same sort of situation, southeast Asian. What makes this different is, they are coming from everywhere. These are new networks. So you have got very significant, concerning bomb skills coming out of Yemen, for example, now meeting with others who are savvy in social media or other terrorist tactics that we need to be concerned about.

So bottom line, I don't think we will ever be able to predict the future, since the end of the Cold War threat forecasting has made, in some cases, astrology look respectable.

But I would also suggest that, in the words of Mark Twain, whereas history may not repeat itself it does tend to rhyme. I am not sure we are learning all of our lessons that we have learned the hard way. I think it is up to all of us to make sure that we try to push back as much as we can.

Mr. HUDSON. Very well put.

Mr. Chairman, my time is expired so I will yield back to you.

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman from North Carolina.

Talking about some of those issues, we just saw about 20 Somalians leave Minnesota to travel. Whether they are going to Syria or Somalia, but they are going to be jihadists. You know, do they come back to the country? These are folks that had legal permanent status here.

So I apologize earlier if I came across as angry, talking about the Southern Border. But you know what? By golly, I am angry. I am angry because I am an American and I believe in the sovereignty of our Nation. I am very chagrined—more than chagrined, angered—by what I see going on right now.

Ms. Duke, I want to shift gears to you. DHS is the third-largest Federal department, and they have got a vast mission. The Department has number of agencies, departments, directorates, offices, and programs. There are offices involved with the intelligence community. Others conduct research and development within the Federal Protective Service. They serve as uniform Federal building security. We got CBP and ICE that strive to protect this Nation's border, among other missions.

So given the size of DHS and its broad responsibility and it is vast and, at times, contradictory missions, is it appropriate to expect a QHSR of approximately 100 pages to provide an accurate, comprehensive examination of the homeland security strategy for the Nation?

Ms. DUKE. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think when you use the term "comprehensive," no. I think the QHSR really is a start document, setting forth the missions in very broad categories. I think they are noncontroversial in large part because they are so broad. It is a

motherhood and apple pie, I think everybody agrees. I think the key is gonna be moving that forward.

I do think there is unity of mission. I think the mission set of the various components of DHS does overlap more than it is being executed today. Not completely.

I think that moving forward in joint requirements and joint capabilities is key for two reasons. One is the efficiency, the dollars spent. Second is the effectiveness. I believe DHS was created to be a more effective deliverer of homeland security, and that integration of the mission is key to moving that forward. I think we will see a better alignment if we move towards those joint requirements and capabilities.

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, speaking along that, it is sort-of silent on management issues. So how concerned shall we be that it is sort-of silent on those issues, and what management infrastructure needs to be put in place to effectively implement a DHS strategy?

Ms. DUKE. It is—

Mr. DUNCAN. We talked about acquisition reform earlier, so we have covered that. But any other things.

Ms. DUKE. It is silent. I think No. 1 from a management is the unity of the leadership and the regular engagement of senior leadership, both at headquarters and the components, in running the Department. By running the Department, it is a 250,000-person bureaucracy, and it needs to be run effectively. I think that is key. That is a tenet through the senior leadership council and the deputies group of the current Secretary's initiative. I think it is gonna be difficult to carry through on that because of schedules, but it has to happen. That will drive down the unity at a low level.

The second is the joint requirements and capabilities, both from a technology perspective and moving towards less platforms, less technology. You know, how many airframes do we need, those type of issues. Then also moving towards joint operations. That is going to be difficult. It needs to be tackled, but you are not gonna get that without the unity of the leadership dedicated towards that joint-ness.

Mr. DUNCAN. Right. Thank you for that.

I want to ask Dr. Willis, in this current budgetary environment that we experience, we deal with every day up here on the Hill, what are some specific examples of how DHS could operate more efficiently with less? For example, are there any areas or components that could be reduced without threatening the homeland security mission?

Mr. WILLIS. I think the answer to this comes back to—picking up some of what Ms. Duke said—on joint-ness. We need to start looking at the different mission areas that the Department has to work on. Take them as a problem to be solved, not a component to do work. If we start looking at it that way, I think some of the places where there may be ways to improve, both effectiveness or increased efficiency could emerge. I think border security is one of those.

We already have something like that for drug control. We have something called The Interdiction Committee, where ONDCP, Coast Guard and all—and others come together to figure out how

are we gonna jointly use our assets together? We could use something like that on immigration, as well.

Mr. DUNCAN. All right, thank you.

Mr. Cilluffo, am I off-base when I talk about my concern over OTMs, people of Middle Eastern, Asian, African descent, transiting somehow to South America, Western Hemisphere and making their way across our Southern Border? I preface that by saying we saw the Quds Force operative called on the Southern Border, trying to come into this country using a Mexican drug cartel operative who happened to be a DEA agent. Trying to come across through some sort of drug nexus, cartel nexus, to come to this city to assassinate the ambassador from Saudi Arabia.

That is a real example. But am I exacerbating that with a concern that foreign fighters may try to come, that Hezbollah is trying to come into the Western Hemisphere more, that Iran is continuing to send operatives into this hemisphere? That there is a possibility that with a porous border like with have that they could actually transit into the United States? Is this a concern we should have, or am I off-base?

Mr. CILLUFFO. You know, I actually testified on this issue before the subcommittee when Mr. McCaul was chairing it. I do feel that is a legitimate concern. Obviously, when you look at the numbers it is a small number business. But the reality is, is terrorism is a small numbers business. Small numbers can cause mass harm. So I do think it is a significant concern. I do think that our authorities at CBP and elsewhere are aware of this in DEA. But smuggling is smuggling.

I don't care what it is. If they are getting in, they are gonna get in. I used to tell a very bad joke. If you want to smuggle in a tactical nuclear weapon just wrap it in a bale of marijuana. Because we are not doing all that well in terms of some of our drug enforcement. Now I think it has improved. I think the likelihood would be a little more significant if you were to bring in someone that looks entirely different. I am not meaning to be pejorative, but that is the way it would work.

I think some of the cartels wouldn't necessarily risk bringing in someone if they have a sense that this is a real bad actor. But then again, you are assuming that this is a monolithic enterprise and it is not. It is decentralized. So I think the bottom line here is, is it is a concern. It is not a big numbers business. But again, small numbers can cause mass harm here, and I think that is what is important.

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes.

Mr. CILLUFFO. If I could just underscore one thing. Because I do think the Department, and Secretary Johnson, in particular deserve some credit for that Unity of Effort memo. That really was powerful. If you do get to the joint-ness, he came from the Department of Defense, where you had joint planning, where you have a structure between OSD and the combatant commanders through various means. The Department, I think at Homeland Security, you don't really have a sense of what the office of the Secretary is.

Elevate policy to an under secretary role. Get a joint operations planning kind of effort, a J-3 in the military sense. Get the under secretary for intelligence and analysis to be a true J-2 or an intel-

ligence function more along the lines of the way that relates to the under secretary of defense of intelligence in DOD. I think there are some opportunities. I think the Secretary seems to be moving in the right direction. Is it captured in the QHSR? Not really, but I think if you align those two entities there is some opportunity there. I think Congress can keep their feet to the fire to make that happen.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you for that. I will say that Secretary Johnson came and met with at least Republican Members of this committee yesterday for at least an hour. He was very engaging, and I am impressed. I would say I am a Jeh Johnson fan, and I think he is the right guy at the right time. We need to make sure he has got the right tools and the ability to do his job, given the immense challenges, all the list of things that—and that was just a partial list that I read earlier.

The last thing I will say before I turn it over to Mr. Barber is, I grew up in the Cold War, where we were nation-state versus nation-state. We were tracking tank and artillery movements and troop movements and posturing and positioning of troops. It is a different world today, where we are tracking individuals. If you think about that, we are trying to track single individuals who could commit an act of terror.

Fly an airplane into a tower or commit a Boston-style bombing that still terrorizes this country and caused tremendous moral and morality and harm to this country. So it is a different world and the challenges are immense. When we talk about the foreign fighters and other things we have mentioned today, it really raises the hair on the back of my neck.

So with that, I will turn it over to Mr. Barber for another line of questioning.

Mr. BARBER. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. Let me talk a little bit about the morale issue. Because I think it is a central problem that the Department is facing as it is trying to carry out its mission. It will be, I think, a real problem in implementing the QHSR. Secretary Johnson came to this committee and made it real clear that this was going to be one his priorities: To improve employee morale. It is rightly a top priority for him. It is for us.

Because improving employee morale means improving the effectiveness of the Department. A demoralized workforce cannot carry out a mission effectively. Let me be very specific about one area of concern that is very real to me and the people I represent. That is the work that is being done by the Border Patrol and the Customs Agents at our ports of entry.

The Border Patrol Agents, every single day, work in the most rugged environments on the border in the Southwest that you could imagine. Around the next bend, around the next canyon could be armed cartel members. We have had incidents, of course, where our agents have been harmed in those circumstances. They are very courageous people. I think they are really doing their best, under very difficult circumstances, to do their job.

The Customs Agents who work at the ports of entry also face dangers and frustration because we have tourists, we have fresh produce trucks, we have products that are made in the United States, shipped to Mexico for assembly, and brought back that wait

in long lines—2½ hours is not unusual—at our ports of entry. That is also demoralizing—it has a demoralizing impact on those employees.

So I guess my question really is, for those of you were within the Department at one time—and, Dr. Willis, can you describe from your experience and from your base of knowledge, what is it the Department is going to have to do to increase morale, particularly in the area I have talked about? Because without improved morale, as the Secretary has made a priority, we are simply not gonna get a better Department.

So let me start, if I could, with Dr. Willis, and then the other panelists perhaps can make their comments, as well.

Mr. WILLIS. I think this is a very important problem. It is not just the component you called out. If you look across morale, across the Department, the numbers are not where you would like to see them. The basic approaches to this come out of basic management, right? We need to give people a clear focus on what we are gonna do, and then we need to give them the tools to do it. I saw some things in the acquisition bill that were helping that, providing workforce training.

In the case of the Border Patrol that you were talking about, in addition to facing hostile threats there has also been news about concern about use of force guidance. So these are two in tension. So we need to give them the training in policies to help them be able to do their job effectively. So I think those two things are key, and then I will ask my other panelists to help. But—

Mr. BARBER. Ms. Duke, could you respond?

Ms. DUKE. Yes. Well, up until the very end of my career I was a career civil servant. I will say, after spending a long time in the Department of Homeland Security they are some of the most passionate civil servants that I have ever encountered in my 28-year career. I commend them. I thank you for asking questions about them.

I think, first of all, that passion could be turned into better morale, No. 1, by engagement. They have got to be engaged and valued. In terms of they know what needs to be done, and both their operations and their opinions and their vision has to be considered as we develop strategies.

It cannot be top-down. It has to be bilateral in terms of those boots on the ground know what needs to happen. Combine that with the senior leadership perspective, and have an engaged workforce.

I think second, in the Department of Homeland Security I think that civil servants—it is one of the few, if not the only Department where it is okay to criticize civil servants without merit in terms of just general their mission and their population. I think that leadership has to support their members and speak positively of them both internally and externally, where it is warranted.

Make sure that the politics around homeland security are imposed on those mid- and junior-level civil servants. That the politics is managed by the politicians and the leadership in terms of supporting the day-to-day mission. That they are enabled and supported and valued for accomplishing that mission despite the swirl around the political issues.

Mr. BARBER. Before we go to other witnesses, I just want to comment on what you said, Ms. Duke. I absolutely believe that engaging the people who are on the ground is one of the most important things that any organization can do, not just the Department of Homeland Security. That simply is not happening to the degree it needs to.

I think there is a fresh wind in the Department. The Secretary, I think, is really committed to improving morale, to transparency and accountability. He has already taken action that shows that he really means it.

But let me just cite an example. It has been a while since I have talked about this, but it illustrates the point. When the SBInet project was launched several years ago, the contract with Boeing specifically prohibited agents on the ground from advising or commenting on how this project would go forward. I can't believe that that happened. It did, the project basically failed as a result, I think, of lack of input. I would also add, and reiterate what I said earlier, not just input from the agents and the Customs Agents on the ground, but also the people who live and work on the border.

I get information from the ranchers, from the businesspeople, from the people in the cities that is, without doubt, some of the best information you could have about what is really going on.

So I couldn't agree with you more. Obviously, management has to lead. But it can't lead unless it listens to the people it is leading. So Mr. Baker, Mr. Cilluffo, could you also comment on this issue, please?

Mr. BAKER. Sure. Clarity of mission and support for the mission is crucial. Knowing that what you are doing when you get up every day is something that is valued by the country and by your leadership is the critical start. Part of that is a responsibility of Americans. You know, the most likely Federal employee any American is going to interact with in his ordinary life is a DHS employee. It won't surprise you that Americans are pretty quick to criticize and make it personal.

Really, we should be a little bit better as human beings about recognizing that the people we are dealing with are carrying out an important mission, even if it occasionally inconveniences us at the border, in the airport. We should all thank them more often than we do.

Finally, and this is a little odd and I will say it because it was my experience at DHS. Sometimes a key to improving morale is to identify the people who are not doing the job and get rid of them. Nothing makes the people who are doing the job feel more valued than the recognition by management that some people are not and actually disciplining or removing them from the workforce. It is a real drag on morale if you believe that you don't actually have to do the job to keep the job.

Mr. CILLUFFO. Just very finally briefly, because I think it was covered exceedingly well by my fellow witnesses. But keep in mind, it is also part of the mission. They can never shut down. It is exhausting. We know, when you are dealing with law enforcement you know when you arrest someone and your prosecute someone. When you are overseas you kind of know when you have gained

territory. Their mission is disproving double negatives. They can never shut down.

So you have got an exhaustion factor that I think plays in there. Because you only recognize when something goes wrong in terms of the Department's mission. That is what we will all focus on.

So do we need to improve our abilities to lessen the likelihood of things going wrong? Absolutely. But we need to also find ways to reward some of the good work that has been done. Part of that, I would suggest, it may be psychic income, it may be not in the same way we think, but visits. I don't know. When I was at the White House, President Bush would sit down and meet with my staff, who were then at the NAC—what is now the headquarters of the Department of Homeland Security.

I could be wrong, but I am not sure how many times the President has visited DHS. Members of Congress can do more. Just go to the hall, start meeting with the folks. It sounds trivial, but it actually means a lot.

Then ultimately, to your point, get to the boots on ground because that is where the action is. I would argue State and local. Homeland security is not a Federal issue alone, it is really about enabling some of our partners at the State and local level. I think there is a lot that can be done there.

So part of it is politics, and I don't mean in a Republican or a Demo kind of sense. But there is the need to be able to know that the work they are doing is appreciated. There is the need to recognize that you only realize when something goes wrong that we can maybe try to get out there when we do have some successes along those lines. Get out there, kick the tires.

Mr. BARBER. Well, thank you.

Mr. Chairman, let me just close with this comment. I couldn't agree more with all of you about what you say we need to do to improve morale. As simple as saying "thank you." I have often traveled through some of our interior checkpoints because they are in my district. Without fail, I never identify myself. I say to the agent, "Thank you for your service." They have this shocked look on their face. It is like no one ever says that. I mean, it is a tough job, and I think we need to be thankful.

Also, we need to continue to reinforce what the Secretary is doing to improve accountability and transparency. When he came here and he said he was going to be more transparent, he followed through by releasing, for the first time, the use of force policy. Controversial decision, the right decision in my mind.

He then released information about investigations involving agents. Again, controversial, but the right decision. The public has a right to know what is going on in this Department. The more it knows, I believe the more balanced it will be in praising the good things, of which there are many, and being clear about the things that don't work.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman. I want to thank you panelists for reminding us that it is a 24/7/365 day job to protect this country. It can be exhausting. I can only imagine what our CBP and Immigration and Customs Enforcement and USCIS and all the other groups that are dealing with some of the issues that we

talked about this morning are going through. So I want to just thank them for their service, on the record, here today. From Jeh Johnson all the way down to the guy that is standing at the border.

And thank them. You know, Americans get frustrated when they go through the screening at the airport. I have been there. I will be there in a little while. I will look at the number of TSA agents, and wonder why things can't go quicker. Why we can't do things in a different manner.

But I have got to temper my frustration, and understand that they are protecting this Nation, they are keeping me safe. I agree with Mr. Barber. I try to tell them, when I go through the airport, thank you for your service, thank you for what you are doing to keep us safe.

I would encourage all Americans to remember that patience is the new sign of patriotism. Because we, as a Nation, need to be safe.

So I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the Members for their questions today. I thought it was very informative and insightful. The Members of the subcommittee may have some additional questions for the panelists, and we ask that you respond to those in writing.

So without objection, the subcommittee will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:54 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN JEFF DUNCAN FOR STEWART A. BAKER

Question 1. What are the potential resource implications for the Department of Homeland Security from implanting priorities in the latest Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

Question 2. In an era of likely flat budgets, to what extent will the Department of Homeland Security need to reduce funding in some mission areas to free up resources to implement priority areas such as biological threats and cybersecurity?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR STEWART A. BAKER

Question 1. Mr. Baker, policy has been organizationally challenged since the inception of DHS; in hindsight, what lessons or best practices do you have for management of the policy process and maturing the policy organization at the Department so that it ultimately produces actionable reports, guidance, and policy, as opposed to “think tank” policies and guidance?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

Question 2. The QHSR specifically tasks the Department with assessing its organizational structure, including its “management systems, budget and accounting systems, human resources systems, procurement systems, physical and technical infrastructure.” This was not included in the QHSR. Please expand on why you believe the Department did not include these elements. Would doing so in a public document expose the country to risk?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

Question 3. The 9/11 Act requires the Department to conduct the QHSR every 4 years, consistent with the Presidential election. During the preparation of the first QHSR, the Department was simultaneously going through the process of an administration and political party change. This time, the administration and political party stayed the same. As a result, the Department has had an opportunity to prepare a QHSR during two different election outcomes. How could each outcome—new administration and party and same—affect the QHSR process and should Congress reconsider the timing to the QHSR so that it does not occur during the same year as the Presidential election?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

Question 4. The purpose of the QHSR is to inform the budget. How could the Department mature the QHSR process so it will bear some relationship to the budget request?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

Question 5. When examining the statutory requirements for what should be included in the QHSR, with the evolution of time and the changing homeland security environment, are these still the best requirements, in your opinion, or should there be any legislative additions or deletions to the requirements?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

Question 6. Many of the documents submitted to DHS by stakeholders were not made public. In your opinion could the process have been more open and transparent?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

Question 7. The Secretary’s Unity of Effort memo, in addition to the numerous cross-cutting strategies laid out in the QHSR, envisions a unified cohesive DHS; yet, its component agencies and high-level officials remain spread out in various offices across the National Capital Region. And yet, from some Members, there remains a lack of support for the consolidated headquarters at St. Elizabeths. How would a consolidated headquarters assist the Department in carrying out its mission? And

do you believe that consolidating DHS's physical infrastructure supports the Secretary's Unity of Effort?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN JEFF DUNCAN FOR FRANK J. CILLUFFO

Question 1. To what extent did DHS provide a clear strategy for securing cyberspace in the QHSR? Did the QHSR provide an opportunity to guide a coordinated cybersecurity effort across Federal departments or did it remain a DHS-focused strategy?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

Question 2. Given the increasing prevalence of nation-state-supported cyber attacks and espionage, such as the recently indicted members of an elite Chinese military unit who targeted U.S. networks for the Chinese government, should the Departments of State and/or Defense have more of a role in cyber protection?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR FRANK J. CILLUFFO

Question 1. The QHSR specifically tasks the Department with assessing its organizational structure, including its "management systems, budget and accounting systems, human resources systems, procurement systems, physical and technical infrastructure." This was not included in the QHSR. Please expand on why you believe the Department did not include these elements. Would doing so in a public document expose the country to risk?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

Question 2. The 9/11 Act requires the Department to conduct the QHSR every 4 years, consistent with the Presidential election. During the preparation of the first QHSR, the Department was simultaneously going through the process of an administration and political party change. This time, the administration and political party stayed the same. As a result, the Department has had an opportunity to prepare a QHSR during two different election outcomes. How could each outcome—new administration and party and same—affect the QHSR process and should Congress reconsider the timing to the QHSR so that it does not occur during the same year as the Presidential election?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

Question 3. The purpose of the QHSR is to inform the budget. How could the Department mature the QHSR process so it will bear some relationship to the budget request?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

Question 4. When examining the statutory requirements for what should be included in the QHSR, with the evolution of time and the changing homeland security environment, are these still the best requirements, in your opinion, or should there be any legislative additions or deletions to the requirements?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

Question 5. Many of the documents submitted to DHS by stakeholders were not made public. In your opinion could the process have been more open and transparent?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

Question 6. The Secretary's Unity of Effort memo, in addition to the numerous cross-cutting strategies laid out in the QHSR envisions a unified cohesive DHS; yet, its component agencies and high-level officials remain spread out in various offices across the National Capital Region. And yet, from some Members, there remains a lack of support for the consolidated headquarters at St. Elizabeths. How would a consolidated headquarters assist the Department in carrying out its mission? And do you believe that consolidating DHS's physical infrastructure supports the Secretary's Unity of Effort?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN JEFF DUNCAN FOR HENRY H. WILLIS^{1 2}

Question 1a. Components, such as TSA and CBP, are ultimately responsible for implementing DHS's strategic plan. While the QHSR developed a strategic framework, it remains unclear to what extent these efforts are impacting specific programs and operations at the component level.

Do you know of any component-level programs or operations that have changed, or been cancelled or initiated as a result of the prior QHSR or the current QHSR?

Question 1b. To what extent have/will components adjust their own strategies to be in line with the QHSR?

Answer. One of the results of the first QHSR was the recognition of the importance of having a valid National risk assessment. The methods for National risk assessment developed through the first QHSR were then applied in this second QHSR. However, as I stated in my testimony, the next challenge for DHS is to connect the strategic planning based on this assessment to decisions about budgets and program priorities. To this end, it is important that the Department complete the steps outlined in the Secretary's Unity of Effort memo that can implement budget processes and build the analytic capability that will allow components to adjust their own strategies and programs to be in line with the guidance in the second QHSR.

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR HENRY H. WILLIS

Question 1. The QHSR specifically tasks the Department with assessing its organizational structure, including its "management systems, budget and accounting systems, human resources systems, procurement systems, physical and technical infrastructure." This was not included in the QHSR. Please expand on why you believe the Department did not include these elements. Would doing so in a public document expose the country to risk?

Answer. I am not aware of the reasons why the Department decided not to address issues related to management more explicitly or in greater detail. I do not believe that doing so in a public document would have exposed the country to greater risk.

Question 2. The 9/11 Act requires the Department to conduct the QHSR every 4 years, consistent with the Presidential election. During the preparation of the first QHSR, the Department was simultaneously going through the process of an administration and political party change. This time, the administration and political party stayed the same. As a result, the Department has had an opportunity to prepare a QHSR during two different election outcomes. How could each outcome—new administration and party and same—affect the QHSR process and should Congress reconsider the timing to the QHSR so that it does not occur during the same year as the Presidential election?

Answer. As indicated in this question, both the first and second QHSRs were required to be completed as new leadership stepped into DHS. This timing led to delays in the release of the reports and limited the utility of the reports to the Department leadership Congress as a tool for strategic planning and budgeting. The QHSR would be better timed if it were initiated when new leadership came aboard (rather than completed at that time) and was developed and released in coordination with the President's budget request, so that it could serve as strategic guidance for that request.

Question 3. The purpose of the QHSR is to inform the budget. How could the Department mature the QHSR process so it will bear some relationship to the budget request?

Answer. To reiterate a few points made in my written testimony and in the responses to questions above, there are two steps that could be taken to mature the QHSR process so that it will bear a relationship to the budget request. First, the Secretary's Unity of Effort memo identifies steps to implement budget processes and build analytic capability to connect budget decision making to the strategic guidance in the QHSR. Second, the QHSR would be a more effective strategic planning tool

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²This testimony is available for free download at <http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT412z1.html>.

if it were scheduled to be initiated when new leadership comes on board at the Department and it was developed and released in coordination with the budget request.

Question 4. When examining the statutory requirements for what should be included in the QHSR, with the evolution of time and the changing homeland security environment, are these still the best requirements, in your opinion, or should there be any legislative additions or deletions to the requirements?

Answer. The statutory requirement for a QHSR reinforces the importance of strategic planning for DHS and the stated requirements are appropriate for such a review and remain relevant.

Question 5. Many of the documents submitted to DHS by stakeholders were not made public. In your opinion could the process have been more open and transparent?

Answer. I am supportive of greater transparency for the analysis and information to support strategic planning for homeland security. Ultimately, the effectiveness of DHS at countering terrorism, managing risks from disasters, and facilitating trade and travel depends on the ability of State and local governments, private companies, and non-government organizations to contribute to making the Nation safer, more secure, and more prosperous. When these organizations have more information, they are in a better position to offer solutions.

Question 6. The Secretary's Unity of Effort memo, in addition to the numerous cross-cutting strategies laid out in the QHSR envisions a unified cohesive DHS; yet, its component agencies and high-level officials remain spread out in various offices across the National Capital Region. And yet, from some Members, there remains a lack of support for the consolidated headquarters at St. Elizabeths. How would a consolidated headquarters assist the Department in carrying out its mission? And do you believe that consolidating DHS's physical infrastructure supports the Secretary's Unity of Effort?

Answer. As mentioned in my testimony, the Secretary's Unity of Effort memo includes several steps that can improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Department. I believe that close cooperation between the Secretary and Congress will greatly improve DHS's ability to implement these initiatives. I have not examined how consolidation of headquarters at St. Elizabeths would affect management of DHS. However, to the extent a convincing case can be made that a consolidated headquarters would improve management, it would deserve support by Congress.

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE JEFF DUNCAN FOR ELAINE C. DUKE

Question 1a. In your written testimony, you discuss the Secretary's "Unity of Effort" and the necessity of meetings and engagement by the Secretary, deputy secretary, and the component heads.

After 11 years of a Department more resembling a collection of independent components, how critical is Unity of Effort in protecting the Nation's homeland?

Answer. The Unity of Effort is very critical to effectively executing the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) mission to protect the Nation's homeland. The Unity of Effort will improve the effectiveness of mission operations. It will serve to close gaps in mission scope and delivery. It will position DHS to execute the missions of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) more seamlessly, with better communications, and with integrated roles and responsibilities. It will position DHS to better understand the touch points between the components' unique missions and manage those integration points for better mission execution.

Additionally, the Unity of Effort will improve the efficiency of DHS. It will drive efficient allocation of resources by eliminating redundancies in systems, services, and aligning missions. It will help position the business functions to more cohesively support mission execution in leadership, resource allocation, policy and governance, and performance measurement.

Question 1b. What are the challenges to focusing the various component efforts on a unified DHS strategy versus an individual component approach?

Answer. The challenges to focusing the various component efforts on a unified DHS strategy versus an individual component approach start with trust. Each component is passionate about its mission, and fears that joining with the other components may hinder its ability to meet its mission. That is one reason why the leadership councils formed under the Unity of Effort are so crucial. Trust must start with the most senior leaders. An additional challenge to a unified strategy is developing an optimal balance between constancy and flexibility. DHS must develop a unified, constant infrastructure to be efficient and consistent in delivery services and mission. Yet, it must maintain the flexibility to adapt to an evolving threat and be nimble and addressing the threats.

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR ELAINE C. DUKE

Question 1. Ms. Duke, a section on Maturing Management was not included in the 2009 QHSR. To some extent; however, it was included in the subsequent Bottom-up Review. The current QHSR likewise did not include the requisite assessment of the Department's management functions. As you know, many aspects of the Department management functions remain on the Government Accountability Office High-Risk List and continue to pose a challenge for DHS. What should we, as Congress, look to for management issues from the QHSR since there will not be another Bottom-up Review? Should Congress consider mandating a "Bottom-up Review" process that could be released on a quarterly basis as a companion to the QHSR?

Answer. I believe continued oversight on the implementation of the Unity of Effort would yield more positive maturation and integration of management functions than another Bottom-Up Review. DHS has matured to the level that it has a relatively comprehensive understanding of the "as is", related to its missions and how they are accomplished. The next step to maturity is the optimal unity of both management and mission delivery. I stress optimal because either maximizing or minimizing unity will not serve DHS or our Nation well. Rather than another look at the relatively consistent mission set, I recommend concentrating continued oversight on development and implementation of the Unity of Effort initiatives set for by Secretary Johnson, since they will provide the sustained progress toward executing the QHSR missions.

Question 2. The QHSR specifically tasks the Department with assessing its organizational structure, including its "management systems, budget and accounting systems, human resources systems, procurement systems, physical and technical infrastructure." This was not included in the QHSR. Please expand on why you believe the Department did not include these elements. Would doing so in a public document expose the country to risk?

Answer. I do not know why DHS did not include the QHSR requirement to assess its organizational structure, including its "management systems, budget and accounting systems, human resources systems, procurement systems, physical and technical infrastructure" in the recent QHSR. DHS's efforts to date regarding this segment of the QHSR requirement are discussed at least in part in its reports to the General Accountability Office related to its High-Risk report on Management Integration. The management system is further defined in Secretary Johnson's Unity of Effort memo. The Unity of Effort, as proposed, will align mission and management into a more cohesive, integrated system. If executed, I believe it would improve our Nation's homeland security.

Question 3. The 9/11 Act requires the Department to conduct the QHSR every 4 years, consistent with the Presidential election. During the preparation of the first QHSR, the Department was simultaneously going through the process of an administration and political party change. This time, the administration and political party stayed the same. As a result, the Department has had an opportunity to prepare a QHSR during two different election outcomes. How could each outcome—new administration and party and same—affect the QHSR process and should Congress reconsider the timing to the QHSR so that it does not occur during the same year as the Presidential election?

Answer. I believe that the majority of the DHS mission, at the strategic level, is not political. If you look at the mission sets in the recent QHSR, I think both new and old administrations and parties would believe they are the key missions, and the core of homeland security. There may be some political disparity when it comes to more detailed execution of those mission sets. For example, immigration enforcement, screening technologies and privacy implications, and border technology all may be executed differently depending on the administration and party in control of Congress. But I do think that there is danger in aligning DHS's main mission set to political events. The need to protect the homeland is a continuous, fairly constant requirement. I suggest a potential way to move forward would be to allow the QHSR to stay strategic and relatively politically neutral, done every 4 years, to provide the constancy of purpose to DHS. And then require a DHS strategic planning document, which provides more content on how those missions will be executed, at key events such as a new administration, or on a set periodic basis.

Question 4. The purpose of the QHSR is to inform the budget. How could the Department mature the QHSR process so it will bear some relationship to the budget request?

Answer. DHS could mature the QHSR so it would bear relationship to the budget request by including a section on the management of DHS, as currently required by the QSHR legislation. There is a danger in managing mission and management separately. Management only exists to enable mission, and mission can be most ef-

fectively delivered with good management. They are two pieces of a single puzzle, and setting a strategy for them individually sub-optimizes both. My recommendation is that in a future QHSR or similar document, the two are addressed simultaneously, with the mission outlining the “what” DHS will do, and the management section outlining the “how” DHS will do it, in terms of resource allocation (dollars and people), process, system, jointness, metrics, etc. I do believe the Secretary’s Unity of Effort plan does address the QHSR requirement on management, and would ultimately ensure resources are appropriately, effectively, and efficiently aligned to mission priorities.

Question 5. When examining the statutory requirements for what should be included in the QHSR, with the evolution of time and the changing homeland security environment, are these still the best requirements, in your opinion, or should there be any legislative additions or deletions to the requirements?

Answer. I think the current QHSR language is comprehensive and appropriately strategic. I do not think the language of the mandate needs to be modified, only the actual report needs to be regularly updated (as required every 4 years) to adapt to the changing homeland security environment and threats.

Question 6. Many of the documents submitted to DHS by stakeholders were not made public. In your opinion could the process have been more open and transparent?

Answer. I believe DHS, and any department, should have some ability to go through some level of deliberations within itself. This is necessary for open and honest communications in the deliberative process. One way the process could be more transparent, if that is necessary, is to include a summary discussion of some of the trade-offs and alternatives, as part of the final report supporting documentation. This provides an open and transparent look at alternatives and decisions that had to be made, while appropriately protecting the deliberative process.

Question 7. The Secretary’s Unity of Effort memo, in addition to the numerous cross-cutting strategies laid out in the QHSR envisions a unified cohesive DHS; yet, its component agencies and high-level officials remain spread out in various offices across the National Capital Region. And yet, from some Members, there remains a lack of support for the consolidated headquarters at St. Elizabeths. How would a consolidated headquarters assist the Department in carrying out its mission? And do you believe that consolidating DHS’s physical infrastructure supports the Secretary’s Unity of Effort?

Answer. The geographic dispersion of DHS’s components throughout the NCR does hinder the speed at which DHS can build its unity. The lack of consolidated headquarters is detrimental for several reasons, most importantly the fact that DHS does not have a joint operations center from which the Secretary can run incident response in conjunction with his component heads. The multiple, independent component operations centers fuel autonomous operations and hinders jointness. Additionally, the lack of consolidated headquarters hinders DHS’s ability to build a unified culture. Informal communications and professional relationship-building is difficult, and without the personal connections, trust, understanding, and cohesiveness are more difficult to establish. I do understand the investment for St. Elizabeths is substantial, and know that in the current budget situation funding the headquarters is of great concern for many parties. I think that the unity can be established with the current environment, but do think that it will take longer and may not be as complete of a unification as DHS would experience with a consolidated headquarters.

