[Senate Hearing 113-184]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-184
BENGHAZI: THE ATTACKS AND
THE LESSONS LEARNED
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JANUARY 23, 2013
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland MARCO RUBIO, Florida
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico RAND PAUL, Kentucky
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
TIM KAINE, Virginia
William C. Danvers, Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Clinton, Hon. Hillary Rodham, Secretary of State, U.S. Department
of State, Washington, DC....................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Responses to questions submitted for the record by the
following Senators:
Robert Menendez.......................................... 48
Tom Udall................................................ 52
James E. Risch........................................... 53
Marco Rubio.............................................. 56
Jeff Flake............................................... 61
John Barrasso............................................ 63
Corker, Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, opening statement...... 4
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening
statement...................................................... 1
(iii)
BENGHAZI: THE ATTACKS AND
THE LESSONS LEARNED
----------
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 23, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:03 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez
presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez, Boxer, Cardin, Casey, Shaheen,
Coons, Durbin, Udall, Murphy, Kaine, Corker, Risch, Rubio,
Johnson, Flake, McCain, Barrasso, and Paul.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. Good morning. The committee will come to
order.
Let me begin by welcoming the new members to the
committee--Senators Kaine and Murphy, Senators Johnson, McCain,
Flake, and Paul. Since the full Senate has not yet passed the
committee resolution officially seating members, I want to ask
unanimous consent of returning members to allow our prospective
members to participate in today's hearing; and if there is no
objection, so ordered.
Madam Secretary, let me welcome you and thank you for
honoring your commitment to come before the committee after the
Administrative Review Board's findings. You said you would
after the findings were completed, and you had a bit of an
intervening challenge, but we are thrilled to see you here
today doing well and taking time out of your schedule in these
final days to discuss the tragic events that occurred in
Benghazi on September the 11th and the lessons we need to learn
from that event to ensure that all American personnel are fully
protected and our embassies are fully secure wherever they are.
In your tenure as Secretary of State and your appearances
before this committee, you have always been upfront,
forthright, and energetic in defending our Foreign Service
officers and their needs, and I, for one, commend you for it.
Unfortunately, the tragic events in Benghazi are a sad reminder
of the inherent risks that come with diplomatic engagement in
parts of the world that are struggling to build new governments
from what has often been chaotic situations and underscore the
very real courage of the unsung men and women who put their
lives at risk to serve this Nation's interests abroad.
Let me say that I respect what you have done during your
tenure as Secretary of State in representing not only this
Nation, but those in our Foreign Service who are on the
diplomatic front lines in turbulent and dangerous parts of the
globe. It is a reflection of your leadership as well as your
patriotism and your abiding belief in the power of our policies
to move the world toward democracy, peace, and the preservation
of human rights.
Your candor before this committee has been a trademark of
your service as Secretary of State, and I believe that every
member has always welcomed your openness and your cooperation.
Your letter of December 18 to Chairman Kerry was appreciated by
members of both sides as another example of that openness and
cooperation.
Let me say that we share your mission and that we look
forward to a constructive dialogue today to learn from the
events that occurred in Benghazi and to devise better policies
to protect the nearly 70,000 men and women serving in
Washington, DC, and at more than 275 posts around the world.
Ambassador Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and
Glen Doherty lost their lives on September 11, 2012, during
terrorist attacks on the special mission in Benghazi. As a
committee, we honor their service to our Nation and we grieve
with their families, but we also resolve to take specific
actions to prevent future incidents.
We may not be able to prevent every single terrorist attack
in the future, but we can--and we must--make sure that our
embassies and employees, starting with those in high-risk,
high-threat posts, are capable of withstanding such an attack.
To that end, Secretary Clinton and the Department of State have
embraced and agreed to implement all 29 of the Administrative
Review Board's recommendations. Today we will hear more about
the progress that the State Department has already made toward
implementing many of these recommendations.
But I would add that Congress is not without responsibility
here. We also have an obligation to do our part to comply with
the Administrative Review Board's recommendations. It is my
intention to work with the members of the committee and the
State Department in the coming months on legislation that will
improve security and better protect our employees.
One of the first and easiest things we can do is ensure
that the State Department's contracting rules allow for
sufficient flexibility to allow them to quickly make decisions
where security is at risk and to hire local guards, not only on
the basis of the lowest price technically acceptable, but also
on a best-value basis, to ensure that we are not just checking
the box when it comes to securing our buildings and protecting
our people.
State has this authority through March in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Iraq, but value should be a priority in all
locations and particularly in high-risk environments. We are
also looking at situations where sole-source contracting may be
appropriate for certain security-related contacts.
The Administrative Review Board also supports expanding the
Marine Security Guard Program, hiring and equipping more
Diplomatic Security personnel and authorizing full funding for
the embassy construction Capital Cost-Sharing Program. The
Capital Cost-Sharing Program for embassy construction was
created in the aftermath of the 1998 bombings of the U.S.
Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam that resulted in 224
deaths, including 11 American citizens.
In its first year, it funded the construction of 13 new
facilities, followed by 11 in 2006 and 9 in 2005. Nearly every
year since, fewer facilities have been built than in the
previous year due to both decreases in funding and the fact
that the allocations to the account have never been indexed to
inflation. Costs in the construction industry worldwide have
risen tremendously.
At the current anticipated funding rate for fiscal year
2013, the Department of State estimates it will be able to
construct just three new facilities, though there are several
dozen posts that have now been designated as High Risk, High
Threat Posts that need to be replaced immediately.
But the lessons of Benghazi aren't only about adequately
resourcing our security operations. They are also about the
flow of information between the State Department and our
foreign facilities, within the Department itself, among all the
agencies engaged in international work, and between the
Department and Congress. The Department should be assessing and
regularly designating which posts it considers to be high
threat and high risk, using that information to drive decisions
about security, and reporting to Congress on the security
conditions at these posts.
The Administrative Review Board also makes it clear that
there were failures in Benghazi that resulted in an inadequate
security posture and that responsibility for these failures was
shared by Washington, by the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, and by
the inexact and nonstatus designation of the special mission.
This left unclear what the security requirements of the mission
were, or should be, and left staff in the field with limited
ability and resources to fix the situation. Clearly, that needs
to change.
There are two other crucial points made by the
Administrative Review Board that I think deserve broader
attention by members of this committee. First, the ARB
emphasized the growing challenge faced by all American
officials operating overseas of how to remain active in high-
threat environments, and how to get out beyond the fortified
walls of our facilities to conduct the direct local interaction
required for effective diplomacy. How do we remain accessible
to foreign governments, civil society, and the private sector
while still securing our embassies and protecting our people in
these environments?
Second, the Administrative Review Board correctly points
out that the Department of State has been resource-challenged
for many years, and this has constrained our missions and led
to the husbanding of resources to such a degree that
restricting the use of resources, even for security, has become
a conditioned response.
Decisions about security resources are being made more on
costs than on need and value. The answer cannot be to cut more
from other foreign affairs accounts to fund security. That
approach fails to recognize that diplomacy and foreign aid are
but downpayments that yield dividends to us in terms of good
will, open borders
for the export of American products, protection of our
intellectual property, and, most importantly, cooperation on
security and counterterrorism.
So there is a lot to discuss. Madam Secretary, welcome
again. We very much appreciate your time.
On a personal note, since this is likely to be your last
hearing before this committee--and your leadership will be
missed--I know I speak for many when I say that you have been
an outstanding Secretary of State, an exemplary representative
of American foreign policy and American values and interests to
every leader around the world. You have changed the face of
America abroad and extended the hospitable reach of our Nation
to ordinary citizens, as well as to world leaders.
During your tenure, you have steered us through economic
crises in Europe, dealt with changing relations with Asia,
regime changes in the Arab world, a momentous transition in
Libya, and a trend toward global strength based on economics
rather than arms. I personally appreciate that you have used
your office to aggressively implement sanctions against Iran.
In addition to these priorities, on nearly every trip you
have taken--I think, the most traveled Secretary in history--
you also supported, met with, and provided a voice to those
individuals that do not live in the limelight--women, children,
the LGBT community, and religious minorities. You have made a
real difference in the lives of so many people, and for that,
you have the thanks of a grateful nation.
I know you will not go gently from the world stage, and I
look forward to working closely with you in the future.
We thank you for your service here in the Senate and as
Secretary of State. We welcome you back any time to talk about
the issues of the day, recognizing that you may not care to
spend any more time in that chair than you already have, but we
certainly appreciate your incredible service.
With that, let me turn to my friend and colleague, the new
ranking member of the committee, Senator Corker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
your comments and also for following through, as we have all
discussed, to have this hearing today.
I want to welcome the new committee members, and I know
there will be a time for us to talk a little bit about the
committee going forward. In many ways, this is closing out
business from before, but I thank you very much again for
having this hearing and look forward to working with everybody
on the committee.
Madam Secretary, I want to thank you also. I know we have
had a number of conversations over the last several weeks and
actually over the last 4 years. And I want to thank you for
coming in today and honoring the commitment that you made some
time ago.
I know you have had some health issues, still ongoing, and
yet you are here today. And I think we all respect the
tremendous amount of hard work that you have put forth over the
last 4 years. You have probably traveled more than any
Secretary of State in history and came at your job in the way
we all thought you would, with hard work and diligence, and I
know all of us appreciate the transparency with which you talk
to all of us and, candidly, with irreverence from time to time,
which is much appreciated.
I do want to say that Benghazi, I think, to all of us
represents a lot of different things. In some ways, the
aftermath in particular that we saw, it represents the very
worst of Washington. The most bizarre briefing I think I ever
attended was the briefing we had on September 20, where the
intelligence community said more than nothing, and it was a
bizarre briefing at best.
It happened in the middle of a political campaign, and
obviously, there was a lot of spin from the White House and a
lot of comments made on both sides of the aisle, which
heightened a lot of the focus on Benghazi. I think it also
represented a sclerotic Department that in many ways made
decisions that were not based on what was best for those in the
field.
I think it represented in many ways a denial of the world
as it really is today. And I think, after reading the ARB, it
also represented to me a committee that has never done its
work, or at least in the 6 years that I have been here has
never done the kind of oversight that this committee ought to
do.
But I think it also represents an awakening. I know that
you have known this and I know especially many of the members
on this committee have known this: the spiking of the ball and
the thinking that when Osama bin Laden was gone that was the
end of al-Qaeda; we know nothing could be further from the
truth.
And the Arab Spring has actually ushered in a time where
al-Qaeda is on the rise. The world in many ways is even more
dangerous, as we lack a central command and instead have these
nodes that are scattered throughout North Africa and other
places. And I think this creates an opportunity for us to
develop a policy that really addresses the world as it really
is today.
And then, thirdly, Madam Secretary, I know that it was a
great personal loss to you that Chris Stevens died in the way
that he did and his three colleagues died in the way that they
did. I know that you know I was on the ground in Libya
immediately after this, and I know you have experienced this
and some of the other members of the committee have as well.
But to look at the faces of those on the ground in Libya, they
were in a state of shock. Those people that we sent there doing
expeditionary diplomacy, who felt like they were on a tether
and, candidly, did not have the support from Washington that
they needed to do the things that they needed to do.
So I think this is an opportunity for us to examine the
systemic failures. I know that you are going to be, as per our
conversation last night, as transparent as you have always
been. I think this is a great opportunity for the incoming
Secretary to learn from what has happened.
And I know that many times political appointees have great
difficulties with the bureaucracy that exists within a
department, or sometimes people feel they can wait you out
until the next person comes along. So I think this is an
opportunity for us to look at those failures.
I think it is an opportunity for us also as a committee,
but also as a country to develop a foreign policy that
reflects, again, the dynamics of the region as they really are
today.
And then, lastly, I think this is an opportunity for this
committee to finally do the work that it should have been doing
for years. When you read the ARB report you realize that we
have never done an authorization of the State Department in the
6 years that I have been here. We have never looked at how
foreign aid has been spent. We have never done a top-to-bottom
review. I know that is something that people like you, who come
to this position, look at as something that is healthy and can
be done in partnership.
I know there was some mention of cost, and I was really
disappointed with the ARB when the first thing that came out of
the mouths of two people that I respect was money, money,
money. The fact is this committee would have no idea whether
the appropriate amount of money was being spent that could have
prevented what happened in Benghazi, because we have never done
an authorization.
So I look at this as a tremendous opportunity, and I want
to close again by thanking you for your service, thanking you
for your friendship, thanking you for your transparency, and I
certainly look forward to your testimony. I know it will be
presented in a way that will be constructive and helpful to us
in the future.
Thank you.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Senator Corker.
With that, Madam Secretary, we welcome your remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, SECRETARY OF STATE,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Clinton. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the committee,
both older and new, I am very grateful for this opportunity,
and I thank you very much for your patience to give me the
chance to come and address these issues with you.
As both the chairman and the ranking member have said, the
terrorist attacks in Benghazi on September 11, 2012, that
claimed the lives of four brave Americans--Chris Stevens, Sean
Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty--are part of a broader
strategic challenge to the United States and our partners in
North Africa. Today, I want briefly to offer some context for
this challenge, share what we have learned, how we are
protecting our people, and where we can work together to not
only honor our fallen colleagues, but continue to champion
America's interests and values.
Any clear-eyed examination of this matter must begin with
this sobering fact. Since 1988, there have been 19
Accountability Review Boards investigating attacks on American
diplomats and their facilities. Benghazi joins a long list of
tragedies for our Department, for other agencies, and for
America--hostages taken in Tehran in 1979, our Embassy and
Marine barracks bombed in Beirut in 1983, Khobar Towers in
Saudi Arabia in 1996, our Embassies in East Africa in 1998,
consulate staff murdered in Jeddah in 2004, the Khost attack in
2009, and too many others. Since 1977, 65 American diplomatic
personnel have been killed by terrorists.
Now, of course, the list of attacks foiled, crises averted,
and lives saved is even longer. We should never forget that our
security professionals get it right more than 99 percent of the
time against difficult odds all over the world. That is why,
like my predecessors, I literally trust them with my life.
Let us also remember that administrations of both parties,
in partnership with Congress, have made concerted and good
faith efforts to learn from these attacks and deaths, to
implement recommendations from the review boards, to seek the
necessary resources, and to do better in protecting our people
from what has become constantly evolving threats. That is the
least that the men and women who serve our country deserve. It
is what, again, we are doing again now with your help. As
Secretary, I have no higher priority and no greater
responsibility.
As I have said many times, I take responsibility, and
nobody is more committed to getting this right. I am determined
to leave the State Department and our country safer, stronger,
and more secure.
Now, taking responsibility meant moving quickly in those
first uncertain hours and days to respond to the immediate
crisis, but also to further protect our people and posts in
high-threat areas across the region and the world. It meant
launching an independent investigation to determine exactly
what happened in Benghazi and to recommend steps for
improvement. And it meant intensifying our efforts to combat
terrorism and figure out effective ways to support the emerging
democracies in North Africa and beyond.
Let me share some of the lessons we have learned, the steps
we have taken, and the work we continue to do. First, let us
start on the night of September 11 itself and those difficult
early days.
I directed our response from the State Department, stayed
in close contact with officials from across our Government and
the Libyan Government. So I saw firsthand what Ambassador
Pickering and former Chairman Mullen called ``timely and
exceptional coordination.'' No delays in decisionmaking. No
denials of support from Washington or from our military.
And I want to echo the review board's praise for the valor
and courage of our people on the ground, especially the
security professionals in Benghazi and Tripoli. The board said
the response saved American lives in real time, and it did.
The very next morning I told the American people that
``heavily armed militants assaulted our compound,'' and I vowed
to bring them to justice. And I stood with President Obama in
the Rose Garden as he spoke of ``an act of terror.''
It is also important to recall that in that same period, we
were seeing violent attacks on our Embassies in Cairo, Sana'a,
Tunis, and Khartoum, as well as large protests outside many
other posts where thousands of our diplomats serve. So I
immediately ordered a review of our security posture around the
world, with particular scrutiny for high-threat posts.
I asked the Department of Defense to join Interagency
Security Assessment Teams and to dispatch hundreds of
additional Marine security guards. I named the first Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for High Threat Posts so missions
in dangerous places get the attention they need. And we reached
out to Congress to help address physical vulnerabilities,
including risks from fire, and to hire additional diplomatic
security personnel.
Second, even as we took these steps, I hurried to appoint
the Accountability Review Board, led by Ambassador Pickering
and Admiral Mullen, so we could more fully understand from
objective, independent examination what went wrong and how to
fix it. I have accepted every one of their recommendations. I
asked the Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources to lead
a task force to ensure that all 29 of them are implemented
quickly and completely, as well as pursuing additional steps
above and beyond the recommendations.
I also pledged in my letter to you last month that
implementation would begin, and it has. Our task force started
by translating the recommendations into 64 specific action
items. They were assigned to bureaus and offices with clear
timelines for completion.
Eighty-five percent are now on track to be completed by the
end of March. A number are already completed, and we will use
this opportunity to take a top-to-bottom look and rethink how
we make decisions on where, when, and whether people operate in
high-threat areas, and then how we respond to threats and
crises.
We are initiating an annual High Threat Post Review chaired
by the Secretary of State and ongoing reviews by the Deputy
Secretaries to ensure that pivotal questions about security do
reach the highest levels. We will regularize protocols for
sharing information with Congress. These are designed to
increase the safety of our diplomats and development experts
and reduce the chances of another Benghazi happening again.
We have also been moving forward on a third front--
addressing the broader strategic challenge in North Africa and
the wider region because, after all, Benghazi did not happen in
a vacuum. The Arab revolutions have scrambled power dynamics
and shattered security forces across the region. Instability in
Mali has created an expanding safe haven for terrorists who
look to extend their influence and plot further attacks of the
kind we saw just last week in Algeria.
And let me offer our deepest condolences to the families of
the Americans and all the people from many nations who were
killed and injured in that recent hostage crisis. We are in
close touch with the Government of Algeria. We stand ready to
provide assistance. We are seeking to gain a fuller
understanding of what took place so we can work together with
Algerians and others to prevent such terrorist attacks in the
future.
Concerns about terrorism and instability in North Africa
are, of course, not new. They have been a top priority for the
entire administration's national security team. But we have
been facing a rapidly changing threat environment, and we have
had to keep working at ways to increase pressure on Al Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb and the other terrorist groups in the
region.
In the first hours and days, I conferred with leaders--the
President of Libya, Foreign Ministers of Tunisia and Morocco--
and then I had a series of meetings at the United Nations
General Assembly, where there was a special meeting focused on
Mali and the Sahel. In October, I flew to Algeria to discuss
the fight against AQIM.
In November, I sent Deputy Secretary Bill Burns to follow
up in Algiers. And then in December, in my stead, he cochaired
an organization we started to respond to some of these threats,
the Global Counterterrorism Forum, which was meeting in Abu
Dhabi, as well as a meeting in Tunis of leaders working to
build new democracies and reform security services.
We have focused on targeting al-Qaeda's syndicate of
terror, closing safe havens, cutting off finances, countering
extremist ideology, slowing the flow of new recruits, and we
continue to hunt the terrorists responsible for the attacks in
Benghazi and are determined to bring them to justice. We are
using our diplomatic and economic tools to support these
emerging democracies and to strengthen security forces and help
provide a path away from extremism.
But let me underscore the importance of the United States
continuing to lead in the Middle East, in North Africa, and
around the world. We have come a long way in the past 4 years,
and we cannot afford to retreat now.
When America is absent, especially from unstable
environments, there are consequences. Extremism takes root. Our
interests suffer. Our security at home is threatened.
That is why I sent Chris Stevens to Benghazi in the first
place. Nobody knew the dangers better than Chris, first during
the revolution and then during the transition--a weak Libyan
Government, marauding militias, terrorist groups. A bomb
exploded in the parking lot of his hotel, but he did not waver
because he understood it was critical for America to be
represented there at that time.
Our men and women who serve overseas understand that we
accept a level of risk to protect the country we love, and they
represent the best traditions of a bold and generous nation.
They cannot work in bunkers and do their jobs. So it is our
responsibility to make sure they have the resources they need
and to do everything we can to reduce the risks.
For me, this is not just a matter of policy. It is
personal. I stood next to President Obama as the Marines
carried those flag-draped caskets off the plane at Andrews. I
put my arms around the mothers and fathers, the sisters and
brothers, the sons and daughters, and the wives left alone to
raise their children.
It has been one of the great honors of my life to lead the
men and women of the State Department and USAID. Nearly 70,000
serving here in Washington, more than 275 posts around the
world, they get up and go to work every day--often in difficult
and dangerous circumstances--because they believe, as we
believe, the United States is the most extraordinary force for
peace and progress the world has ever known.
And when we suffer tragedies overseas, as we have, the
number of Americans applying to the Foreign Service actually
increases. That tells us everything we need to know about what
kind of patriots I am talking about. They do ask what they can
do for their country, and America is stronger for it.
So, today, after 4 years in this job, traveling nearly 1
million miles, visiting 112 countries, my faith in our country
and our future is stronger than ever. Every time that blue and
white airplane carrying the words ``United States of America''
touches down in some far-off capital, I feel again the honor it
is to represent the world's indispensible nation. And I am
confident that with your help, we will keep the United States
safe, strong, and exceptional.
So I want to thank this committee for your partnership and
your support of diplomats and development experts. You know the
importance of the work they do, day in and day out. You know
that America's values and vital national security interests are
at stake.
And I appreciate what Ranking Member Corker just said. It
is absolutely critical that this committee and the State
Department, with your new Secretary and former chairman, work
together to really understand and address the resources,
support, and changes that are needed to face what are
increasingly complex threats.
I know you share my sense of responsibility and urgency.
And while we may not agree on everything, let us stay focused
on what really matters--protecting our people and the country
we love. And thank you for the support you personally have
given to me over the last 4 years.
I now would be happy to take your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Clinton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, Members of the Committee, thank you
for this opportunity.
The terrorist attacks in Benghazi on September 11, 2012, that
claimed the lives of four brave Americans--Chris Stevens, Sean Smith,
Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty--are part of a broader strategic
challenge to the United States and our partners in north Africa. Today,
I want to offer some context for this challenge and share what we've
learned, how we are protecting our people, and where we can work
together to honor our fallen colleagues and continue to champion
America's interests and values.
Any clear-eyed examination of this matter must begin with this
sobering fact: Since 1988, there have been 19 Accountability Review
Boards investigating attacks on American diplomats and their
facilities. Benghazi joins a long list of tragedies, for our Department
and for other agencies: hostages taken in Tehran in 1979, our Embassy
and Marine barracks bombed in Beirut in 1983, Khobar Towers in Saudi
Arabia in 1996, our Embassies in East Africa in 1998, consulate staff
murdered in Jeddah in 2004, the Khost attack in 2009, and too many
others.
Of course, the list of attacks foiled, crises averted, and lives
saved is even longer. We should never forget that our security
professionals get it right 99 percent of the time, against difficult
odds all over the world. That's why, like my predecessors, I trust them
with my life.
Let's also remember that administrations of both parties, in
partnership with Congress, have made concerted and good faith efforts
to learn from the tragedies that have occurred, to implement
recommendations from the Review Boards, to seek necessary resources,
and to better protect our people from constantly evolving threats.
That's what the men and women who serve our country deserve. And it's
what we are doing again now, with your help. As Secretary, I have had
no higher priority, and no greater responsibility.
As I have said many times since September 11, I take
responsibility. Nobody is more committed to getting this right. I am
determined to leave the State Department and our country safer,
stronger, and more secure.
Taking responsibility meant moving quickly in those first uncertain
hours and days to respond to the immediate crisis and further protect
our people and posts in high-threat areas across the region and the
world. It meant launching an independent investigation to determine
exactly what happened in Benghazi and to recommend steps for
improvement. And it meant intensifying our efforts to combat terrorism
and support emerging democracies in north Africa and beyond.
Let me share some of the lessons we have learned, the steps we have
taken, and the work we continue to do.
First, let's start on the night of September 11 itself and those
difficult early days. I directed our response from the State Department
and stayed in close contact with officials from across our Government
and the Libyan Government. So I saw firsthand what Ambassador Thomas
Pickering and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral
Mike Mullen, called ``timely'' and ``exceptional'' coordination. No
delays in decisionmaking. No denials of support from Washington or from
the military. And I want to echo the Review Board's praise for the
valor and courage of our people on the ground--especially the security
professionals in Benghazi and Tripoli. The Board said our response
saved American lives in real time--and it did.
The very next morning, I told the American people that ``heavily
armed militants assaulted our compound'' and vowed to bring them to
justice. And I stood with President Obama as he spoke of ``an act of
terror.''
You may recall that in that same period, we also saw violent
attacks on our Embassies in Cairo, Sanaa, Tunis, and Khartoum, as well
as large protests outside many other posts where thousands of our
diplomats serve.
So I immediately ordered a review of our security posture around
the world, with particular scrutiny for High Threat Posts. We asked the
Department of Defense to join Interagency Security Assessment Teams and
to dispatch hundreds of additional Marine Security Guards. I named the
first Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for High Threat Posts, so
missions in dangerous places get the attention they need. And we
reached out to Congress to help address physical vulnerabilities,
including risks from fire, and to hire additional Diplomatic Security
personnel.
Second, even as we took these steps, I also appointed the
Accountability Review Board led by Ambassador Pickering and Admiral
Mullen so that we could more fully understand what went wrong and how
to fix it.
I have accepted every one of their recommendations--and I asked the
Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources to lead a task force to
ensure that all 29 of them are implemented quickly and completely . . .
as well as to pursue additional steps above and beyond those in the
Board's report.
Because of the effort we began in the days after the attacks, work
is already well underway. And, as I pledged in my letter to you last
month, implementation has now begun on all 29 recommendations. Our task
force started by translating the recommendations into 64 specific
action items. All of these action items were assigned to specific
bureaus and offices, with clear timelines for completion. Fully 85
percent are on track to be completed by the end of March, with a number
completed already.
We are taking a top-to-bottom look, and rethinking how we make
decisions on where, when, and how our people operate in high threat
areas, and how we respond to threats and crises.
As part of our effort to go above and beyond the Review Board's
recommendations, we are initiating an annual High Threat Post Review
chaired by the Secretary of State, and ongoing reviews by the Deputy
Secretaries, to ensure pivotal questions about security reach the
highest levels. And we will regularize protocols for sharing
information with Congress.
All of these actions are designed to increase the safety of our
diplomats and development experts and reduce the chances of another
Benghazi happening again.
Now, in addition to the immediate action we took and the Review
Board process, we have been moving forward on a third front: addressing
the broader strategic challenge in north Africa and the wider region.
Because Benghazi didn't happen in a vacuum. The Arab revolutions
have scrambled power dynamics and shattered security forces across the
region. And instability in Mali has created an expanding safe haven for
terrorists who look to extend their influence and plot further attacks
of the kind we saw just last week in Algeria.
And let me offer my deepest condolences to the families of the
Americans and all the people from many nations who were killed and
injured in the recent hostage crisis. We remain in close touch with the
Government of Algeria and stand ready to provide assistance if needed.
We are seeking to gain a fuller understanding of what took place so
that we can work together to prevent terrorist attacks like this in the
future.
Concerns about terrorism and instability in north Africa are not
new. Indeed they have been a top priority for our entire national
security team. But after Benghazi, we accelerated a diplomatic campaign
to increase pressure on Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and other
terrorist groups across the region.
In the first hours and days, I conferred with the President of
Libya and the Foreign Ministers of Tunisia and Morocco. Two weeks
later, I met with regional leaders at the United Nations General
Assembly and held a special meeting focused on Mali and the Sahel. In
October, I flew to Algeria to discuss the fight against AQIM. In
November, I sent Deputy Secretary Bill Burns to follow up in Algiers.
And then in December, he cochaired the Global Counterterrorism Forum in
Abu Dhabi and a meeting in Tunis of leaders working to build new
democracies and reform security services.
In all these diplomatic engagements, and in near-constant contacts
at every level, we have focused on targeting al-Qaeda's syndicate of
terror--closing safe havens, cutting off finances, countering extremist
ideology, and slowing the flow of new recruits. We continue to hunt the
terrorists responsible for the attacks in Benghazi and are determined
to bring them to justice. And we're also using all our diplomatic and
economic tools to support the emerging democracies of the region,
including Libya, to strengthen security forces and provide a path away
from extremism.
The United States must continue to lead . . . in the Middle East
and all around the globe. We have come a long way in the past 4 years.
We cannot afford to retreat now. When America is absent, especially
from unstable environments, there are consequences. Extremism takes
root, our interests suffer, and our security at home is threatened.
That's why Chris Stevens went to Benghazi in the first place.
Nobody knew the dangers better than Chris, first during the revolution
and then during the transition. A weak Libyan Government, marauding
militias, even terrorist groups . . . a bomb exploded in the parking
lot of his hotel, but he didn't waver. Because he understood that it
was critical for America to be represented in that pivotal place at
that pivotal time.
Our men and women who serve overseas understand that we accept a
level of risk to protect this country we love. They represent the best
traditions of a bold and generous nation. And they cannot work in
bunkers and do their jobs.
It is our responsibility to make sure they have the resources they
need to do their jobs and to do everything we can to reduce the risks
they face.
For me, this is not just a matter of policy . . . it's personal.
I stood next to President Obama as the Marines carried those flag-
draped caskets off the plane at Andrews. I put my arms around the
mothers and fathers, sisters and brothers, sons and daughters.
It has been one of the greatest honors of my life to lead the men
and women of the State Department and USAID. Nearly 70,000 serving here
in Washington and at more than 275 posts around the world. They get up
and go to work every day--often in difficult and dangerous
circumstances thousands of miles from home--because they believe the
United States is the most extraordinary force for peace and progress
the earth has ever known.
And when we suffer tragedies overseas, the number of Americans
applying to the Foreign Service actually increases. That tells us
everything we need to know about what kind of patriots I'm talking
about. They ask what they can do for their country. And America is
stronger for it.
Today, after 4 years in this job, after traveling nearly 1 million
miles and visiting 112 countries around the world, my faith in our
country and our future is stronger than ever. Every time that blue and
white airplane carrying the words ``United States of America'' touches
down in some far-off capital, I feel again the honor it is to represent
the world's indispensible nation. And I am confident that, with your
help, we will continue to keep the United States safe, strong, and
exceptional.
So I want to thank this committee for your partnership and your
support of our diplomats and development experts around the world. You
know the importance of the work they do day in and day out, and that
America's values and vital national security interests are at stake. It
is absolutely critical that we work together to ensure they have the
resources and support they need to face increasingly complex threats.
I know that you share our sense of responsibility and urgency. And
while we all may not agree on everything, let's stay focused on what
really matters: protecting our people and the country we all love.
Now I am now happy to answer your questions.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Madam Secretary, for your
statement.
We have a full committee present. So, to give each member
an opportunity to ask questions in the timeframe that we have,
I will limit those questions to 5 minutes, and I will start
myself.
Madam Secretary, we saw some late night reporting on
discussions about the physical location of Mission Benghazi,
and I understand this information came from the production of
documents by the State Department, we appreciate your
cooperation in providing those documents.
My understanding is that the discussion of the location of
Mission Benghazi was an ongoing one and that the ultimate
conclusion of Ambassador Stevens was that we needed to be in
Benghazi, the cradle of the Libyan revolution. That, while he
was continuously reviewing other location options, it was his
conclusion--as well as that of security personnel in the State
Department--that the current mission site was the best choice
despite a higher price tag because it was more secure than
returning to the hotel where there had been a bomb and bomb
threats or moving closer to the annex because it was closer to
the road.
Can you give us your insights on the decisionmaking process
regarding the location of the Benghazi Mission? And as part of
your answer can you touch upon what actions were you and your
staff taking the night of September 11 and into September the
12th?
Secretary Clinton. Well, first, you are right, Mr.
Chairman, that there was an ongoing discussion. When Chris
first landed in Benghazi, he stayed in a hotel, along with
other representatives of different nations. There were attacks
in the vicinity, including the parking lot of the hotel.
The decision was made to move. The compound was selected as
being a much better location in terms of security than the
alternatives. But there was an ongoing discussion between Chris
and others in the Embassy in Tripoli, those going in and out of
Benghazi, about how best to situate our post there.
I did see some overnight reporting about a document. I am
not sure what it is, but I would observe that there were a lot
of ongoing efforts because it was important that we were
constantly asking what was the best place. As you said, in
general, Chris was committed to not only being in Benghazi, but
to the location. The professionals in Washington paid close
attention to Chris's judgment, based on his experience and his
firsthand knowledge.
And so, we stayed. We continued to try to upgrade the
facility that was attacked. Obviously, as the ARB has pointed
out, there were inadequacies in the response, and those are the
specific kinds of recommendations that we are currently
implementing.
Regarding what I was doing on September 11, I was at the
State Department all day and late into the night. During most
of the day prior to getting notice of the attack on our
compound at Benghazi, we were very focused on our Embassy in
Cairo. That was under assault by a group of protesters.
We were assessing the security of our Embassy, which is, as
those of you who have been there, certainly well defensed. But
there were crowds that were intent upon trying to scale the
wall, and we were in close communication with our team in
Cairo.
I was notified of the attack shortly after 4 p.m. Over the
following hours, we were in continuous meetings and
conversations, both within the Department, with our team in
Tripoli, with the interagency, and internationally. I
instructed our senior Department officials and our diplomatic
security personnel to consider every option, to just break down
the doors of the Libyan officials to get as much security
support as we possibly could, to coordinate with them.
I spoke to the National Security Adviser, Tom Donilon,
several times. I briefed him on developments. I sought all
possible support from the White House, which they quickly
provided. Tom was my first call.
I spoke with our charge in Tripoli to get situation
updates. I spoke with former CIA Director Petraeus to confer
and coordinate, given the presence of his facility, which, of
course, was not well known but was something that we knew and
wanted to make sure we were closely lashed up together. I
talked with the then-Libyan National Congress President to
press him on greater support not only in Benghazi, but also in
Tripoli.
I participated in a secure video conference of senior
officials from the intelligence community, the White House, and
DOD. We were going over every possible option, reviewing all
that was available to us, any actions we could take. We were
reaching out to everyone we could find to try to get an update
about Ambassador Chris Stevens, also our information
specialist, Sean Smith. So it was a constant, ongoing
discussion and sets of meetings.
I spoke with President Obama later in the evening to bring
him up to date, to hear his perspective. Obviously, we kept
talking with everyone during the night. Early in the morning on
the 12th, I spoke with General Dempsey, again with Tom Donilon.
The two hardest calls that I made were obviously to the
families of Ambassador Stevens and Sean Smith. And they, I have
to say, were extraordinary in their responses, in their
understanding of the pride we had in both men and gratitude we
had for their service.
I would also just quickly add, Mr. Chairman, that while
this was going on and we were trying to understand it, get on
top of it, we were continuing to face protests, demonstrations,
violence across the region and as far as India and Indonesia.
There were so many protests happening, and thousands of people
were putting our facilities at risk.
So we were certainly very determined to do whatever we
could about Benghazi. We were relieved when we finally got the
last of the Americans out of Benghazi, but then we were turning
around, dealing with the very serious threats facing so many of
our other facilities.
Senator Menendez. Thank you very much. My time has expired.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, I agree with you when people go into the
field to do the things they do, they do it knowing of the risk,
and I agree with you one of the untold stories here is that of
the heroic nature of many in Libya and what they did to save
lives. I met several of the JSOC folks and others that risked
their lives saving others.
But I also have to say, in reading all the cables and that
many of us have done, there were systemic deficiencies. And I
know you know that. And I would like for you to just speak to
that for a moment.
To my knowledge, no one has been held accountable. Our
staff had a meeting with one of the State Department officials,
and I hate to use this word again, but it was nothing short of
bizarre as they talked about the communications. These
officials were screaming out for more security, and I am just
wondering if you might mention one reform that would be helpful
so that you would have known of the needs there of security
that went undone.
Secretary Clinton. Well, obviously, I have thought about
this almost constantly since that date, Senator, because I do
feel responsible. I feel responsible for the nearly 70,000
people who work for the State Department. I take it very
seriously.
But the specific security requests pertaining to Benghazi,
you know, were handled by the security professionals in the
Department. I didn't see those requests. They did not come to
me. I did not approve them. I did not deny them. That is
obviously one of the findings that Ambassador Pickering and
Admiral Mullen made that, you know, these requests do not
ordinarily come to the Secretary of State.
Senator Corker. If we could, I respect you tremendously,
but we have a short amount of time. They did come in to folks.
Secretary Clinton. That is right.
Senator Corker. We did have SST people on the ground at no
cost to the State Department. They were asked to be extended by
the Ambassador. Someone at the State Department turned that
down. They were at no charge, 16 officers. So I just wonder
what has happened inside to make sure that never happens again?
Secretary Clinton. Well, several things. Not only are we on
the path to implement all of the ARB recommendations, but we
have gone beyond that. We did immediately do this high-threat
assessment, using DOD assets as well as our own. That had never
been done before.
We have asked the Congress to help us reallocate funds. The
Senate has given us that authority. We do not yet have it from
the House. So that we can get more Marine guards. We can get
more diplomatic security guards. We can try to put more money
into the maintenance, the upgrades, construction that is
needed.
I created the first-ever--it sounds like it should have
been done years ago--but first-ever Deputy Assistant Secretary
for High Threats. I am also recommending that there be a
regular process that includes the Secretary and the Deputies in
these decisions because nobody wants to sit where I am and have
to think now about what could have, should have, would have
happened in order to avoid this.
Now, as I said, we have had 19 ARBs. Only two have ever
been unclassified. The one coming out of the East Africa
bombings, where there was full transparency, there was a set of
recommendations, many of which have been implemented, along
with recommendations from other ARBs. But this committee never
had a public hearing about the 17 other ARBs because they were
classified.
So we are putting into action steps that we think will help
the next Secretary be able to make these decisions, be part of
these decisions, have more insight into what is going on, and
we would obviously welcome the opportunity to work closely with
a subcommittee or a set of members to make sure that that is
what is happening.
Senator Corker. Well, thank you. Many, 19 or 17, have been
done. I will say none of them have ever been fully implemented.
Secretary Clinton. Senator, that is not accurate. Because I
heard you say that when Bill Burns and Tom Nides were here,
and it shocked me. So we did--we went back. We did a full and
thorough investigation. The vast majority have been
implemented, and we will give you a report to that effect.
Because that is the kind of--to go back to your point,
Senator, if there were an authorization process, that is the
kind of information that would be shared. And I see my former
compatriot on the Armed Services Committee, there is always an
Armed Services authorization, and there needs always to be a
Foreign Relations Committee authorization.
[The written information supplied by the State Department
follows:]
There have been 18 previous ARBs, with a total of 164
recommendations. The Department has implemented 95 percent of these
past recommendations. The remainder were not implemented because they
were either not in the purview of
the State Department to implement; implementation raised alternate
safety concerns; or alternate actions that were deemed to be more
effective were taken.
As the Secretary stated during her testimony, she accepted all 29
recommendations of the Accountability Review Board (ARB). When the ARB
report was issued, the Department immediately evaluated the 29
recommendations, and developed 64 separate taskings needed for their
implementation. We formed working groups, issued guidance, and
developed a path to implementation. Some of the recommendations have
already been implemented; some are well on their way to completion; and
some will require long-term action, but we have set milestones to
achieve implementation of all of them. The Department will monitor and
track these recommendations to ensure their implementation.
It is important to note that implementing many of the
recommendations is dependent on sufficient funding. We are seeking
legislative language that would authorize us to transfer previously
appropriated funds from one of our accounts to another. We will
continue to work with Congress on funding and any needed legislative
authorities.
Senator Corker. My last question. It is my sense that, as a
nation, we were woefully unprepared for what happened in
northern Africa in general. I think you share that view.
I know you made some opening comments regarding us leading
in that area. But it seems to me that Benghazi symbolizes just
the woeful unpreparedness that our Nation had as it relates to
issues in North Africa, and I hope you will address that as you
move ahead.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, let me just briefly
address what is, I think, one of the key issues for this
committee, for the administration, for our country. When I was
here 4 years ago testifying for my confirmation, I do not think
anybody thought that Mubarak would be gone, Gaddafi would be
gone, Ben Ali would be gone. That we would have such
revolutionary change in this region.
There were hints of it. Several of us said the institutions
were sinking in the sand, as I said in Doha shortly before
Tahrir Square. So there was some feeling out there, but I do
not think any of us predicted this, least of all the people in
these countries, who then were given a chance to chart their
own futures.
This is a great opportunity, as well as a serious threat to
our country. I hope we seize the opportunity. It is not going
to be easy because these new countries have no experience with
democracy. They do not have any real experience among the
leaders in running countries, in doing security.
So, yes, we now face a spreading jihadist threat. We have
driven a lot of the AQ operatives out of the Fatah, out of
Afghanistan, Pakistan, killed a lot of them, including, of
course, bin Laden.
But we have to recognize this is a global movement. We can kill
leaders, but until we help establish strong democratic
institutions, until we do a better job communicating our values
and building relationships, we are going to be faced with this
level of instability.
And I do have a lot of thoughts about what more we can and
should do, given this new reality we face.
Senator Corker. Thank you again.
Senator Menendez. Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much.
Madam Secretary, you have represented our country with
tremendous strength and poise. You have won us friends, but you
have always spoken out forcefully where required.
I want to thank you because this is maybe the last time you
come before us as Secretary here. I want to thank you for your
advocacy on behalf of women around the globe. You will be
sorely missed, but I, for one, hope not for too long.
As you have said, you were heartbroken by those losses in
Benghazi. We saw it in your face many times, today as well. You
were heartbroken personally and professionally. But rather than
pointing to others for their deficiencies, you stepped up and
you convened an Accountability Review Board to look into this
attack in detail, and you asked them to tell it the way they
saw it.
And I want to give you my take on that Board. I want to go
to something Senator Corker said, which I agreed with. The
first report we got from the intelligence community about a
week or so after was very confusing. It was not helpful to us.
All of us, I think, felt that way.
But I want to speak for myself. The difference between that
meeting and the meeting we had with those cochairs, which was
also a classified briefing, couldn't have been more different.
They were so impressive. They were thorough. They were strong.
They did call it the way they saw it, the way you wanted them
to do.
And I am grateful that you have unequivocally committed to
ensuring that their recommendations are implemented to the
fullest extent, and this brings me to a question. As we all
know, the House of Representatives urged and voted for a cut of
$300 million for embassy security.
Now maybe it is irrelevant for some here, but I have a
message. It does cost money to pay for embassy security or
police on the beat or military personnel or police here at the
Capitol that protect us, which we are very grateful for and we
pay for. It does cost money.
So, to me, I was not disappointed to hear the cochairs say,
``Congress must do its part to meet this challenge and provide
necessary resources to the State Department to address security
risks and meet mission imperatives.'' Frankly, I think it is a
no-brainer, and the fact that we would even have a problem with
it, to me, doesn't make any sense.
I hope we can work together to get the resources that we
need for security, which brings me to a question about working
more closely with the DOD. And here it is. Have you already
engaged with DOD to provide additional Marines at U.S.
facilities to fulfill the ARB's recommendation that State and
DOD work together to provide more capabilities and capacities
at higher risk posts?
And before you answer that, could you maybe address the
issue in Mali right now? When you look at Mali, you see a
government that is weak. They do not have the best security.
Are we working on that post?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, thank you.
You have raised a lot of very important issues. I will try
to be as quick as I can in responding to them. Let me start
with the budget because this is a bipartisan issue.
Since 2007, the Department has consistently requested
greater funding for embassy construction and diplomatic
security. With the exception of 2010, Congress has consistently
enacted less than requested. Most notably, in 2012, the
Department received $340 million less than requested, close to
10 percent less than the request. And then over the last 2
years, cuts to embassy construction, security, and maintenance
budgets were almost 10 percent off as well.
Now the ARB, as you said, has recommended an increase in
facilities funding to $2.2 billion per year to restore the
construction levels called for in the 1998 ARB report, the only
other one that was ever public. And I would go back to
something the chairman said because this was a point made in
the ARB. Consistent shortfalls have required the Department to
prioritize available funding out of security accounts.
And I will be the first to say that the prioritization
process was at times imperfect, but as the ARB said, the funds
provided were inadequate. So we need to work together to
overcome that. We are asking for funding for more Marine
security guards, for refilling the capital account so that we
can begin to do the kind of upgrades and construction that is
needed.
Deputy Secretary Nides briefed House and Senate
appropriations and authorizing staff. We have sent letters to
the House and Senate leadership to ask for transfer authority
language. Not new money right now, but transfer authority
language. The Senate was good enough to put it into the Senate
version of the Sandy supplemental. It did not get into the
House side. So we are still looking for the House to act.
With respect to Mali, Senator, there was a country that had
been making progress on its democracy. Unfortunately, it
suffered a military coup by low-ranking military officers,
which threw it into a state of instability with the Tuaregs,
who, as you know, some groups of, as well as other groups, had
been in the employ of Gaddafi for years. He used them as
mercenaries.
With his fall, they came out of Libya, bringing huge
amounts of weapons from the enormous stores of weapons that
Gaddafi had that insurgents liberated, as well as the others.
And they came into northern Mali. At the same time, there was a
move by Al Qaeda in the Maghreb to establish a base in northern
Mali.
We have been working to try to upgrade security around
northern Mali among a number of the countries. Algeria is the
only one with any real ability to do that. Most of these
countries do not have the capacity to do that.
We are now trying to put together an African force from
ECOWAS so that African soldiers will be in the front of this
fight. The Malians asked the French to come in. Obviously,
France is
one of our oldest allies. We are trying to provide support to
them. But this is going to be a very serious ongoing threat
because if you look at the size of northern Mali, if you look
at the topography, it is not only desert. It is caves. Sounds
reminiscent. We are in for a struggle.
But it is a necessary struggle. We cannot permit northern
Mali to become a safe haven. People say to me all the time,
well, AQIM has not attacked the United States. Well, before 9/
11/2001, we hadn't been attacked on our homeland since I guess
the War of 1812 and Pearl Harbor. So you can not say, well,
because they haven't done something, they are not going to do
it.
This is not only a terrorist syndicate, it is a criminal
enterprise. So make no mistake about it. We have got to have a
better strategy, and I would hope we would have not only a
strategy that understands making it possible for these
governments to defend themselves better, for people to
understand and agree with us that these terrorists are not in
any way representative of their values, but that we can bolster
democracy and try to give these Arab revolutions a real chance
to succeed.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Senator Menendez. Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Madam Secretary, thank you for your service.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Risch. And thank you for the kindness you have
shown this committee over the time you have been there. I
particularly appreciate your facilitating the meetings with us
at the State Department with yourself when we have had issues.
Moving to the issues at hand, this morning the national
media is reporting that some of the--or a number of the
attackers in Algeria are people who participated in the attack
in Benghazi. Can you confirm that for us this morning?
Secretary Clinton. Senator, I cannot confirm it. I can give
you the background that I was able to obtain. This information
is coming from the Algerian Government related to their
questioning of certain of the terrorists that they took alive.
We do not have any way to confirm it as yet, but I can
certainly assure you we will do everything we can to determine
that.
You may know that Director Mueller was just in the region
meeting with leaders. He is very well aware that we have to
track every one of these connections, and this will be a new
thread that will be followed.
Senator Risch. I appreciate that. Only one person has been
arrested regarding the attack on Benghazi and was then
released. Can you tell us whether he was one of the people that
participated in the Algerian attack?
Secretary Clinton. We have no information to that effect. I
think you are referring to the Tunisian, Harzi, who appeared in
a Tunisian court. Upon his release, I called the Tunisian Prime
Minister. A few days later, Director Mueller met with the
Tunisian Prime Minister.
We have been assured that he is under the monitoring of the
court. He was released because at that time--and Director
Mueller and I spoke about this at some length--there was not an
ability for evidence to be presented yet that was capable of
being presented in an open court.
But the Tunisians have assured us that they are keeping an
eye on him. I have no reason to believe he is not still in
Tunis, but we are checking that all the time.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
You just testified in your prepared remarks that you said,
``The very next morning,'' which would have been Wednesday
morning, ``I told the American people that `heavily armed
militants assaulted our compound' and vowed to bring them to
justice.''
I am assuming that you had rock solid evidence to make such
a bold statement at that time?
Secretary Clinton. Well, we had four dead people, and we
had several injured, one seriously, who is still in Walter
Reed. And although we did not have the chance yet to meet with
any of our returnees, our team in Tripoli had received them,
gotten medical care for them, and had sent them on.
So we knew that, clearly, there was an attack, a heavily
armed attack. Who these people were, where they came from, why
they did it, that was still to be determined.
Senator Risch. I think you probably know where I am going
with this. The next sentence is, ``And I stood with President
Obama as he spoke of an act of terror.''
Secretary Clinton. Right.
Senator Risch. And, of course, there has been a lot of
debate as to the context that the word ``terror'' was used in.
But be that as it may, I want to move to the next Sunday
morning when Ambassador Rice went to the Sunday morning talk
shows. And I think we all realize this happened at a
politically charged time here in the country as we approached
an election. Notwithstanding that, the American people are
still entitled to be told the truth about this.
Did you select Ambassador Rice to deliver the message to
the American people?
Secretary Clinton. No; I did not, Senator. And let me take
this opportunity to address this because, obviously, even
though I have not had a chance to testify, I certainly have
seen the resulting debate and concerns about this.
You are right, it was a terrorist attack. I called it an
attack by heavily armed militants.
Senator Risch. Well done.
Secretary Clinton. And, you know, that is clearly what
happened. We know that. But second, the harder question is what
caused it, and that we did not know. We did not know who the
attackers were, what their motives were.
Third, as the ARB makes clear after their months of
research, the picture remains still somewhat complicated. And I
say that because in the unclassified ARB, it is, ``Key
questions surround the identity, actions, and motivations of
the perpetrators remain to be determined.'' I recommend that
all members and staff read the classified version of the ARB,
which goes into greater detail. I obviously cannot speak to it,
but it does go into greater detail because there were a variety
of potential causes and triggers for this attack.
There is evidence that the attacks were deliberate,
opportunistic, and precoordinated, but not necessarily
indicative of extensive planning. And fourth, Senator, I would
say that I personally was not focused on talking points. I was
focused on keeping our people safe because as I said, I have a
very serious threat environment in Yemen. It turned out we had
people getting over that wall in Cairo doing damage until we
got them out. We had a serious threat against our Embassy in
Tunis. I had to call the President of Tunisia and beg him to
send reinforcements, which he did, to finally save our Embassy,
which could have been disastrous. They burned and trashed our
school.
So I was pretty occupied about keeping our people safe,
doing what needed to be done in the followup to Benghazi. I
really do not think anybody in the administration was really
focused on that so much as trying to figure out, you know, what
we should be doing.
And, you know, I was not involved in the talking points
process. As I understand it, as I have been told, it was a
typical interagency process where staff, including from the
State Department, all participated to try to come up with
whatever was going to be made publicly available. And it was an
intelligence product, and it is my understanding that the
intelligence community is working with appropriate committees
to kind of explain the whole process.
Senator Risch. Well, thank you. I have some followup
questions to that, but my time is up. But I gather you still
stand by the statement you made less than 24 hours that heavily
armed militants assaulted our compound, and that you vowed to
bring them to justice. You still stand by that.
Secretary Clinton. Absolutely.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
Senator Menendez. Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Clinton,
first, congratulations, and thank you for your extraordinary
service to our country during these past 4 years as Secretary
of State. I believe the world is safer today because America is
better understood around the world. And you have been
instrumental in integrating diplomacy in our national security
agenda. And I thank you for that because I do think it has paid
off in heavy dividends for the American people.
I particularly want to acknowledge your leadership in
advancing basic rights. Senator Boxer already acknowledged the
gender equity issues that you have taken an international
leadership on. I also want to thank you for your help in
dealing with corruption, particularly with transparency in the
extractive industries and the progress that we have made in
that regard.
Benghazi was a tragedy. We have all acknowledged that, the
loss of American life. And we have also acknowledged the
bravery of those people on the ground. They did extraordinary
service and saved lives, and that is what they are trained to
do, and we want to make sure that we acknowledge that.
Also let me just point out that you have been very open
with the committee. We had a hearing on December 20 with your
Deputies, and they provided all the information. And you are
here today, and we thank you very much for that.
I want to follow up on one area of northern Africa. You
point out the risk factors that we currently have in northern
Africa. Algeria is a reminder of the global security concerns.
We do not know, as Senator Risch pointed out, the individuals
who may have been involved in Libya may have been in Algeria.
We do not know that. But we do know there are reports from the
United Nations and others that weapons have gotten from Libya
into Algeria, which points out our need, as we look at
transitions occurring in that region, Syria, Assad is not going
to be there we think much longer. There are a lot of weapons in
Syria.
Do we have a strategy to make sure as we go through
transition in countries that their weapons are--we are mindful
that these weapons could end up harming U.S. interests. And it
needs to be part of our strategy to make sure as we support
alternative governments and the rebels, that there is a strong
priority in protecting the source of these weapons not ending
up harming Americans or harming our interests.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, you are absolutely right.
One of the reasons that we and other government agencies were
present in Benghazi is exactly that. We had a concerted effort
to try to track down and find and recover as many man pads and
other very dangerous weapons as possible.
Libya was awash in weapons before the revolution. Obviously
there were additional weapons introduced. But the vast, vast
majority came out of Gaddafi warehouses and were, as they were
saying, liberated and then went on the black market, were
seized by militias, seized by other groups, and have made their
way out of Libya into other countries in the region, and have
made their way to Syria, we believe.
It is a redline for this administration with respect to
Syria concerning the use of chemical weapons. Syria, as you
probably know, in addition to having the fourth-largest army
before this revolution, has a very significant supply of
chemical and biological weapons.
Given the instability in Syria right now, what we are
trying to do is to coordinate closely with a number of like-
minded nations, neighbors, and partners to be able to work to
try to prevent those from falling into the wrong hands--
jihadist hands, Hezbollah hands--but also to try to work with
the internal opposition for them to understand the dangers that
are posed.
So this Pandora's box, if you will, of weapons coming out
of these countries in the Middle East and North Africa is the
source of one of our biggest threats. There is no doubt that
the Algerian terrorists had weapons from Libya. There is no
doubt that the Malian remnants of AQIM have weapons from Libya.
So we just have to do a much better job.
The final thing I would say about this is, you know,
AFRICOM was stood up about 10 years ago. I think a lot of
people at the time wondered why would we have another command
in the world and why in Africa. I now think we need to pay much
more attention to AFRICOM, to its capacity inside Africa. It is
based in Stuttgart, Germany, for all kinds of complicated
logistical and political reasons. Carter Ham has been a very
dedicated leader of AFRICOM during his time there.
But we are going to see more and more demands on AFRICOM,
and I think that is something else that the Senate and the
House are going to have to address.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Senator Menendez. Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you. Madam Secretary, we all wish this
had never happened so this hearing would never had to have
happened, but we are glad to see you here, and wish you all the
best.
And secondarily, I want to share the sentiments of my other
colleagues of tremendous respect for the hard work and service
that you have put in on behalf of our country, both as a Member
of this Chamber and then obviously now in the role that you
have.
One of the things that I am most interested in exploring
with you today a little bit is how information flows within the
State Department, and looking forward, how we can prevent some
of this from happening.
And so I was curious about a number of things. First of
all, were you ever asked to participate in any sort of internal
or interagency meeting before this attack with regard to the
deteriorating security situation in Libya?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, you know, again, I
appreciate your kind words, you know, and I reiterate my taking
responsibility. And as I have already said, with specific
security requests, they did not come to me. I had no knowledge
of them.
With regard to the situation in Libya, not just eastern
Libya, across Libya, there were a number of conversations and
meetings to try to see what we could do while Libya went
through this transition from transitional government, to
interim government, to elections, to try to get in there and
help them with security, because it was clear that that was
going to be one of their highest needs once they finally got
stabilized. So, you know, there were a number of meetings.
And I, personally, went to Libya in October 2011. I spoke
with the then-leadership. I met with them in international
settings. We sent teams out both civilian and military experts
to try to help them.
Until recently while they were going through their
transitions, it was a very difficult conversation because they
did not have, you know, the authority they thought. But now we
are beginning, and we have a long list of ways that we are
trying to help improve security in Libya.
Senator Rubio. For example, the October 2011 meeting, at
that meeting, did this issue come up with regards to the
inability of the Libyan Government to protect our diplomatic
institutions? Did that issue come up at all in that
conversation?
Secretary Clinton. Well, we obviously talked a great deal
about the deteriorating threat environment in Libya. One of the
reasons we had our own people on the ground, and why we were
looking to try to figure out how to better protect Benghazi,
and how to have understandings with those in the annex is
because it is a host country responsibility, but, you know,
they were not in a position to do what we would expect from an
organized country. But they did have the militias.
And, you know, the February 17 Brigade had proven to be
responsive in the past prior to 9/11. Other militias in Tripoli
had proven to be responsive. You know, when I landed in
Tripoli, I was met by the Zintan militia. That was the welcome
I had, all these guys dressed completely in black, holding
their automatic weapons. That was my welcoming party.
So we knew that we were piecing together what a host-nation
was not yet able to.
Senator Rubio. Right. And then there was another meeting on
March 2012. So just to be clear, by October 2011 and then again
in March 2012, I believe that was here with the Prime Minister.
And neither one of these meetings was there a specific
conversation between you and them with regards to concerns that
we had that of not just the deteriorating security situation,
but the inability of them as a host-country to meet their
obligations to provide security.
Secretary Clinton. Of course.
Senator Rubio. There was a conversation.
Secretary Clinton. Oh, absolutely. I mean, this was a
constant conversation, Senator. And what I found with the
Libyans was willingness, but not capacity. You know, in
Tunisia, as I told you, they had capacity, but I had to call
and just tell them we had to get that capacity out there
because, you know, they were still trying to figure out how to
be a state without being a security state. With Cairo, we had
to call and tell the Egyptians get your people out there.
So with Libya it was different. The Libyans were very
responsive, very willing, but no levers to pull. And what we
have been trying to do, and, you know, we need your help to
help us pay for what we are trying to do, we are trying to help
them build a decent security force, to try to rein in the
militias as best they can. So this was a constant conversation.
Senator Rubio. Before the attack in Benghazi, what had we
done specifically to help them build their security capacities?
Secretary Clinton. Well, there is a long list, and I will
be happy to provide that to you because it is filled with, you
know, training, with equipment, with the kind of planning that
they had not done before. And I would be happy to send you the
detail on that, Senator.
[The written information supplied by the State Department
follows:]
Libyan officials have requested U.S. advice and assistance in
rebuilding their security sector architecture and establishing control
over their land borders. Since the revolution, the United States has
provided the Government of Libya with targeted technical assistance in
a number of critical areas to help establish security sector
institutions appropriate for a democratic state, and to develop the
capacities needed to control loose weapons, counterterrorism, and
improve border security management.
During multiple visits to Libya by the Department of Defense's
Defense Institution Reform Initiative in 2012, we advised the Libyan
Ministry of Defense on establishing defense institutions and armed
forces that are unified, capable, and subject to civilian control and
the rule of law. Furthermore we are providing training for Libyan
military leaders in military officer professional development schools
and familiarization visits to the United States, and provided
assistance to develop an English learning lab to promote military-to-
military cooperation. We have also been providing counterterrorism
training to the Libyan military.
Our FY 2012 bilateral budget for Libya includes $800,000 in Anti-
Terrorism Assistance to enhance the government's control through law
enforcement, border security, and investigation capacity assistance.
This budget also includes $1.3 million in assistance to build
capability and capacity among Libya's border security agencies to
detect, interdict, investigate, and prosecute illicit weapons
transfers. This assistance awaits resolution of a hold in the House of
Representatives.
Further, we have been working with the Libyan authorities since
August 2011 to secure and disable Qadhafi-era weapons stockpiles. Our
Conventional Weapons Destruction programs have identified Libya's
ammunition storage areas and continue to inventory and control
conventional weapons and munitions with an emphasis on man-portable air
defense systems and other advanced conventional weapons with the help
of trained Libyan nationals. On September 4, 2012, we designated Libya
as a country eligible for the Global Security Contingency Fund, a joint
Department of Defense and State initiative pooling together resources
and expertise to provide security assistance.
Senator Menendez. Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Madam Secretary, thank you for being here
today to provide the assessment. I am going to ask you a
question that relates to the implementation of the
Accountability Review Board recommendations.
Before I do that, I want to express what I think is a
widely shared sentiment, both by way of gratitude and
commendation for your work. We do not have time today to do a
full listing of all the achievements that you should get credit
for, but I will mention maybe two or three in light of the work
that you have done and some of the work we have done together.
I want to thank you for your work on the terribly difficult
challenge of dealing with and reducing the flow of calcium
ammonium nitrate from Pakistan into Afghanistan. Calcium
ammonium nitrate finds its way into the roadside bombs that
kill our troops, known more popularly as IEDs.
I also want to commend you for your work that was mentioned
by Senator Boxer and others on behalf of women throughout the
world, but also women and girls particularly in Afghanistan.
Third, even though we are still in the throes of responding to
the challenge in Syria, the great work that you have done on
humanitarian assistance and other elements of that strategy
that we have worked on together.
Also I want to commend not just the approach, but the
remark you made earlier about not retrenching and not
retreating when it comes to getting that balance right between
engagement and security, both high priorities.
I am glad you were so specific on page 3 of your testimony,
about the details on implementation. Twenty-nine
recommendations by the Board have translated into a set of 64
specific action items. You said in your testimony, ``Fully 85
percent are on track to be completed by the end of March with a
number completed already.''
I will ask you one question about that and then one
followup. What, if any, impediments to implementation do you
perceive right now, and are there impediments to meeting those
deadlines that this committee and the Congress can help you
with by way of meeting that deadline and implementation?
Secretary Clinton. Well, thank you, Senator. And let me
thank you for those three topics you covered, and particularly
your very clear focus on the IED problem and the ammonium
nitrate problem in Pakistan. You and I have talked about this.
You have gone there. I have gone there and carried that
message, and I thank you for making it an issue.
Let me say that we need your help. We need your help, No.
1, to hold us accountable, you know, to keep asking whoever
sits in this chair or anybody else in the Department with any
responsibility in this area, what are you doing and how are you
doing it. And it will help to clear up misconceptions, like no
ARB recommendations have ever been fully implemented, which I
know is not the case. But it will also help to keep driving the
change.
You know, I really believe that an authorization process
will dramatically change the dynamic, and I strongly urge it be
tried. And again I go back to my Armed Services Committee
experience with Senator McCain over those years. We had
subcommittees. We took it very seriously. We held hearings. We
brought people in. We had a 3-day markup that was sacrosanct.
But we also had the Quadrennial Defense Review, the QDR, where
the Defense Department submitted that, and it helped to provide
a framework.
So when I got to the State Department, I said there is
nothing like that at the State Department, so I started the
first ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, the
first ever QDDR. You can help me continue that and make the
Department have to ask the hard questions if you legislate it
the way the QDR is legislated for the Defense Department.
Second, you can help by making sure that the needs we come
to you with, like what are the training needs, the budgetary
needs, the bureaucratic changes that are needed, that you help
support that. And certainly we have talked a little bit about
the budget, but getting that transfer authority, if you can
help us with the House. It is $1.4 billion. Marine security
guard detachment, $553 million. We have been closely
coordinating with DOD. Historically Marine security guards do
not do personal security. They only do protection of classified
materials. So we are working through what the guards will do
and how we can use more of them.
Second, more diplomatic security personnel, $130 million.
That would fund an additional 155 DS personnel and related
equipment. And then facility construction upgrades, $736
million. We are going to have periodic reviews by these teams.
I started the Defense/State interagency security assessment
teams. We are going to start a High Threat Post review by the
Secretary, which had not happened before.
We are going to strengthen the mutual security agreements
between the State Department and other government agencies when
they are not colocated. We had a very good relationship with
the annex in Benghazi. We helped them. They helped us. But
there was not anything that was--it was more on the ground
working together. It was not part of an overall template.
So there is a lot that I think we can take from this ARB
because, you know, I told Ambassador Pickering and Admiral
Mullen, put it out there, you know. I want to know more than
anybody what happened. Do not hold any punches. Tell us what
the facts are. But now we have to act on it or shame on us.
Senator Casey. Thanks very much.
Senator Menendez. Senator Johnson.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Madam
Secretary, I would like to join my colleagues in, you know,
thanking you for your service sincerely. And also I appreciate
the fact that you are here testifying, and glad that you are
looking in good health.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you.
Senator Johnson. Did you--were you fully aware in real
time--again, I realize how big your job is and everything is
erupting in the Middle East this time. Were you fully aware of
these 20 incidents reported in the ARB in real time?
Secretary Clinton. I was aware of the ones that were
brought to my attention. They were part of our ongoing
discussion about the deteriorating threat environment in
eastern Libya. We certainly were very conscious of them.
I was assured by our security professionals that repairs
were underway. Additional security upgrades had taken place.
Senator Johnson. Thank you. Did you see personally the
cable on, I believe it was August 12 specifically asking for
basically reinforcements for the security detail who was going
to be evacuating or leaving in August? Did you see that
personally?
Secretary Clinton. No, sir.
Senator Johnson. OK. When you read the ARB, it strikes me
how certain the people were that the attacks started at 9:40
Benghazi time. When was the first time you spoke to or have you
ever spoken to the returnees, the evacuees? Did you personally
speak to those folks?
Secretary Clinton. I have spoken to one of them, but I
waited until after the ARB had done its investigation because I
did not want there to be anybody raising any issue that I had
spoken to anyone before the ARB conducted its investigation.
Senator Johnson. How many people were evacuated from Libya?
Secretary Clinton. Well, the numbers are a little bit hard
to pin down because of our other friends.
Senator Johnson. Approximately.
Secretary Clinton. Approximately 25 to 30.
Senator Johnson. Did anybody in the State Department talk
to those folks very shortly afterward?
Secretary Clinton. There was discussion going on afterward,
but once the investigation started, the FBI spoke to them
before we spoke to them. And so other than our people in
Tripoli, which I think you are talking about Washington, right?
Senator Johnson. Yes.
Secretary Clinton. Yes.
Senator Johnson. The point I am making is a very simple
phone call to these individuals I think would have ascertained
immediately that there was no protest prior to this. I mean,
this attack started at 9:40 p.m. Benghazi time, and it was an
assault. And I appreciate the fact that you called it an
assault. But, I mean, I am going back to then-Ambassador Rice 5
days later going on the Sunday shows and what I would say
purposefully misleading the American public.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator--yes.
Senator Johnson. Why was that not known? And again, I
appreciate the fact of the transparency of this hearing, but
why were we not transparent to that point in time?
Secretary Clinton. Well, first of all, Senator, I would say
that once the assault happened and once we got our people
rescued and out, our most immediate concern was, No. 1, taking
care of their injuries. As I said, I still have a DS agent at
Walter Reed seriously injured. Getting them into Frankfurt,
Ramstein, to get taken care of, the FBI going over immediately
to start talking to them. We did not think it was appropriate
for us to talk to them before the FBI conducted their
interviews. And we did not--I think this is accurate, sir. I
certainly did not know of any reports that contradicted the IC
talking points at the time that Ambassador Rice went on the TV
shows.
And, you know, I just want to say that, you know, people
have accused Ambassador Rice and the administration of, you
know, misleading Americans. I can say trying to be in the
middle of this and understanding what was going on, nothing
could be further from the truth. Was information developing?
Was the situation fluid? Would we reach conclusion later that
were not reached initially? And I appreciate the----
Senator Johnson. But, Madam Secretary, do you disagree with
me that a simple phone call to those evacuees to determine what
happened would have ascertained immediately that there was no
protest? I mean, that was a piece of information that could
have been easily, easily obtained.
Secretary Clinton. Well, but, Senator, again----
Senator Johnson. Within hours if not days.
Secretary Clinton. Senator, you know, when you are in these
positions, the last thing you want to do is interfere with any
other process that is going on, No. 1.
Senator Johnson. I realize that is a good excuse.
Secretary Clinton. No. 2--well, no, it is the fact. No. 2,
I would recommend highly you read both what the ARB said about
it and the classified ARB because even today, there are
questions being raised.
Now, we have no doubt they were terrorists. They were
militants. They attacked us. They killed our people. But what
was going on and why they were doing what they were doing is
still--no.
Senator Johnson. No, no, no. Again, we were misled that
there were supposedly protests and then something sprang out of
that, and assaults sprang out of that. And that was easily
ascertained that that was not the fact. And the American people
could have known that within days, and they did not know that.
Secretary Clinton. And with all due respect, the fact is we
had four dead Americans.
Senator Johnson. I understand.
Secretary Clinton. Was it because of a protest or was it
because of guys out for a walk one night who decided they would
go kill some Americans? What difference, at this point, does it
make? It is our job to figure out what happened and do
everything we can to prevent it from ever happening again,
Senator.
Now, honestly I will do my best to answer your questions
about this. But the fact is that people were trying in real
time to get to the best information. The IC has a process, I
understand, going with the other committees to explain how
these talking points came out. But, you know, to be clear, it
is, from my perspective, less important today looking backward
as to why these militants decided they did it than to find them
and bring them to justice. And then maybe we will figure out
what was going on in the meantime.
Senator Johnson. OK. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Senator Menendez. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much, Secretary Clinton.
And I want to echo the praise from my colleagues for your
extraordinary service. And I want to thank you for your
leadership on Benghazi, for taking responsibility for what
happened there, for initiating an investigation so we would
understand what happened, for moving forward to address threats
in other high-risk areas, and for all of your efforts to
implement the recommendations of the Accountability Review
Board report. Thank you. That is the kind of leadership we want
to see across our government.
I want to first go back to what I thought you said about
still looking for the funding to be transferred, the $1.3
billion----
Secretary Clinton. Four.
Senator Shaheen. Four billion from the OCO account to
address the security threats not just in Libya, but around the
world. And do I understand that we still have not had that
money transferred, and so that means that the $553 million for
Marine security guards, the $130 million for diplomatic
security, the $691 million for security installations, that is
all on hold, and so we cannot move forward until that has been
approved by the House?
Secretary Clinton. Well, now we have to start over because
it was in the Senate version of Sandy. It was not put into the
House version of Sandy. So, no, we cannot move money we already
have to address the needs and deficiencies that the ARB has
recommended we do.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I would just echo the comments that
have been made already by this committee and by you that this
is action that we need to get moving on immediately, because we
still have people at risk around the world, and we need to take
the action that is going to ensure their security. So I would
certainly urge the chairman and the ranking member to move the
committee to do everything we can to make this happen.
I want to go back to something that Secretary Nides said at
the hearing on December 20, because I asked him about the
cooperation between the Department of Defense and State. And
what the situation was on the ground before the Benghazi attack
in terms of the placement of our military in the region, he
talked about the unprecedented cooperation between State and
Defense in response to Benghazi.
But I wonder if you could talk about how we ensure that
this is a standard way of doing business, and that we are
acting in cooperation when we are looking at the threats facing
us, particularly as we look at what is happening in northern
Africa and across the Middle East.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, that is a really
important and timely question because certainly our cooperation
around this crisis was exemplary. You know, the President told
the Secretary and the Chairman to do everything they possibly
could, to spare no effort or resource. And we had a very good
interagency response as the ARB found.
But the fact is we have to look closely now at what more
State and DOD can do together to prepare for contingencies such
as this. And I think it is a challenge that needs to be taken
up because in Iraq and now in Afghanistan, our diplomats and
our military work closely together. But as we saw in Iraq, when
the military left, you know, that was putting a lot of burdens
on our civilians in Iraq that are very difficult for us to be
able to address because we relied on our DOD colleagues for so
much.
Similarly, as we are starting to look at the drawdown in
Afghanistan, what kind of civilian presence are we going to be
able to leave there, and what can DOD do to help us to try to
determine what that can and should be?
And I think you get a sense of the challenge of this from a
statement that Admiral Mullen made. You know, he said, ``On the
night of the attacks, Benghazi, Tripoli, and Washington
communicated and coordinated effectively with each other. They
looped in the military right away. The interagency response was
timely and appropriate, but there was simply not enough time
for U.S. military forces to have made a difference. Having said
that,'' Admiral Mullen goes on, ``it is not reasonable nor
feasible to tether U.S. Forces at the ready to respond to
protect every high-risk post in the world.''
So we have to look at this from the State Department and
the Department of Defense perspective. And we do not have
assets of any significance right now on the African Continent.
We are only building that up. And so what do we need in Africa?
What countries will welcome us there, give us both our military
and civilian teams a good, safe base out of which to operate.
So if we are focusing just on Africa, and particularly, North
Africa right now, there has got to be a great deal of planning
and coordination between Department of Defense and AFRICOM and
between the State Department and the rest of the
administration.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Senator Menendez. Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Thank you, Madam Secretary. Thank you for
your testimony and also thank you, as others have said, for
your service. Traveling over a million miles and more than 100
countries, I think those of us who have not done it cannot
appreciate how difficult that is and the commitment that you
have had to it over the years. And I thank you.
With regard to the appearance of Dr. Rice on the morning
shows, you mentioned that you did not select her. Were you
consulted in that decision?
Secretary Clinton. No. No; but it would not be in any way
unusual for Ambassador Rice to represent the administration on
a foreign relations issue.
Senator Flake. Right. I do not think it was either. But
afterward, after she testified, it was clear that what she
testified to was at variance with a lot of communications from
the State Department, and a lot of the information that had
been gathered, and things that had been said by yourself and
others at the State Department.
Can you just enlighten us a bit as to discussions that went
on at the State Department after that testimony? Was there--I
mean, these are professionals that you oversee who do a lot of
hard work to give analysis and this kind of assessment. What
she said was clearly at variance with a lot of the research and
analysis that had gone on about the nature of these attacks.
Can you just enlighten us as to what discussions were had at
the State Department after this testimony?
Secretary Clinton. Well, I do not think--I cannot speak to
any conversation I specifically had because the conversations
were ongoing before and after Ambassador Rice's appearance on
the Sunday talk shows. And we did not conclude finally that
there were no protests at all until days after the attack.
So maybe it was an abundance of caution. Maybe it was
trying to make sure we did not step on anybody's toes while we
were gathering information. Maybe it was because the IC was
still looking at all of their sources and having different
threads coming in. But, you know, as the ARB said, even today
the motivations, the actions before they went onto the
compound, all of that is still not nailed down.
So I think we were trying very hard to provide information.
Maybe one of the lessons learned here is, you know, just
withhold. Do not say what you do not know for sure until it is
finally decided, but that is not part of who we are as
Americans and as public officials. We get out there. We say
here is what we think happened. It is subject to change.
And so I think we all wish that nobody had ever in any way
raised doubts, but certainly Ambassador Rice and all the other
administration officials were speaking off of what had been
determined were the most acceptable talking points.
Senator Flake. All right. Well, I think we know now that
the talking points--we do not exactly know where they were
changed or how they were changed, but they were changed or
altered. And I think that we can all concede that we were not
given a clear picture of what went on.
Secretary Clinton. Well, but, Senator, you know, we did not
have a clear picture. I wish I could sit here today and tell
you that within days, within a week, by September 20 when we
came up here we had a clear picture. We did not have a clear
picture. And that--you know, if you wish to fault the
administration, it is that we did not have a clear picture, and
we probably did not do as clear a job explaining that we did
not have a clear picture until days later, creating what I
think are legitimate questions, you know.
I understand--I have been on the other side of the table. I
understand trying to figure out what was going on, and why were
we told this, that, and the other. But I can only assure you
that as the information came to light and as people thought it
was reliable, we shared it, but that took some time.
Senator Flake. Right. Thank you. In the remaining seconds
left, you mentioned that many of the recommendations have now
been put in place. There are protocols in place to make sure
that if security is not adequate, that we move our diplomats
and others to places where they are more secure or whatever.
But let me just say there were protocols in place before
this. There were tripwires that we tripped. And the actions
that were outlined to be taken were not taken. How can we be
assured here that the new protocols that are in place with
these new recommendations being implemented will be followed or
adhered to, because they clearly were not before.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, I want to make clear that
no one in the State Department, the intelligence community, any
other agency ever recommended that we close Benghazi. We were
clear-eyed about the threats and the dangers as they were
developing in eastern Libya and in Benghazi. But there was no
decision made and nothing that prompted such a decision.
Now sitting here today, we have probably at least 20 other
posts that are under a serious threat environment as I speak to
you. We are working with the other agencies in our government,
some of whom are colocated with us, others of whom are nearby.
We are constantly assessing. And sometimes we get it wrong, but
it is rare that we get it wrong. This was one of those terrible
tragic times when, you know, there was an assessment shared by
the Ambassador, shared by others, that turned out not to take
into account the militants attacking that night.
So I can tell you there are, as you say, tripwires, but we
are going to try to do is elevate the discussion and the
decisionmaking so that there is not any doubt that everybody is
on the same page, that we are not missing information, we are
not husbanding resources, and thereby making less than optimal
decisions. That is what we are going to try to institutionalize
going forward.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Senator Menendez. Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. I want to thank Senator Menendez for
chairing this critically important hearing and to thank you,
Secretary Clinton, for testifying today. We deeply regretted
you were unable to appear before due to your illness, and I am
thrilled to see you have made a full recovery.
I want to start by just thanking you for your remarkable
leadership as Secretary of State. One of many stops in the
million miles that you have traveled and the 112 countries you
have visited was a stop we shared jointly on a trip to Liberia
for the second inauguration of Ellen Sirleaf Johnson. And it
gave me an opportunity as a freshman Senator to see up close
your remarkable skills and stamina and your determination.
Your leadership has helped restore America's credibility,
build bridges with their international partners, and you have
also built bridges here on the Hill where your leadership at
State is respected on both sides of the aisle and has been
widely praised. While your likely successor, Senator Kerry, has
my full confidence, you will be deeply missed. You said in your
opening statement you are determined to leave the State
Department and our country safer, stronger, and more secure.
And in my view, because of your leadership, they are.
Today we continue the consideration of the recommendations
of the Advisory Review Board, which found that security was,
``grossly inadequate'' to deal with the attack that took place
in Benghazi in September. The mistakes that were made are
simply unacceptable, and I am pleased that the State Department
has begun to promptly implement the Board's recommendations,
thanks to your leadership.
I know you agree that the massive security failures, such
as those witnessed in Benghazi that cost the lives of four
brave Americans, simply cannot happen again. And I look forward
to working with my colleagues on this committee in a searching
review of the resources needed and the State Department
structure to ensure that we do better to protect our diplomats
and other Americans who put their lives at risk each and every
day.
As chairman of the Africa Subcommittee, I am particularly
pleased that you have drawn, for this committee today in your
testimony, the links between this tragic incident in Benghazi,
the recent terrorist incident in Algeria, and the unfolding
challenges in Mali. I chaired a hearing on Mali on December 5,
and I have been impressed with your engaged leadership of
visits to Algeria, sort of raising the alarm about AQIM.
And I welcome your testimony today on how you see the
regional threat from AQIM, how you see the consequences of this
recent incident in Algeria, and what role you think there is
for the United States in both supporting the current actions by
the French and the Malian military and the need for our ongoing
insurance investment to restore democracy in Mali, to restore
development in some positive prospects moving forward for the
people of Mali, and how you think we can ensure that State and
Defense are coordinating through AFRICOM in West and North
Africa going forward.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, I appreciate greatly your
sustained attention to Africa, and I think it is going to be
viewed as quite prophetic because there will be, I believe, a
continuing set of challenges. You mentioned some of them. But
by no means, you know, we have got Boko Haram in Nigeria posing
the threat of instability to one of the most important oil-
producing nations in the world, something very important to our
country. We have got other unrest and challenges coming down
the West Coast of Africa.
But we also have a success story, at least a hoped-for
beginning success story in Somalia. And what did the United
States do there? You know, when I became Secretary of State, I
recommitted American money to the AMICOM forces. We worked to
train the Ugandans and the Burundis and others. We worked with
the Kenyans when they went in. We worked with the Djiboutis.
It took time. There were no shortcuts. But we had literally
the boots of our American soldiers and the boots of American
diplomats on the ground. I visited one of the training camps in
Uganda, and what we have to do is recognize we are in for a
long-term struggle here. And that means we have got to pay
attention to places that historically we have not chosen to or
had to.
So I would hope that this committee can make that case to
the rest of the Congress. We are now looking at, you know,
troops coming from other neighboring African countries. We
cannot just send them into Mali. They do not have training to
do that. We are going to have to work with other partners to
train them and equip them, and then to sustain them just like
we did with the troops in Somalia.
So, you know, 4 years ago al-Shabbab was one of the biggest
threats not only to East Africa, but to the United States. We
have a chance to really continue on a positive track there, but
it did not happen by accident. It took American money, American
know-how, American experience. And we have to make the decision
we are going to do the same in North Africa as well.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Madam Secretary. I certainly look
forward to continuing to get your advice, direction, and
encouragement as I try to work with my colleagues here to
ensure the same sort of success going forward in West Africa
that we have recently enjoyed in East Africa. Thank you for
your testimony.
Senator Menendez. Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Madam Secretary, and it is
wonderful to see you in good health and as combative as ever.
We thank you for your outstanding and dedicated service to this
Nation, and we are proud of you. All over the world where I
travel, you are viewed with admiration and respect.
Four months or months after the Benghazi tragedy--it is a
tragedy when we lose four brave Americans--there are many
questions that are unanswered. And the answers frankly that you
have given this morning are not satisfactory to me. Were you
and the President made aware of the classified cable from Chris
Stevens that said the United States consulate in Benghazi could
not survive a sustained assault? Numerous warnings, including
personally to me, about the security were unanswered or
unaddressed. It took a CNN reporter looking through the
consulate to find Chris Stevens' last warning.
When were you made aware of that cable? When were you made
aware of the attack on the British Ambassador, and the
assassination attempts, and the closing of the consulate there?
And what actions were taken? What was the President's
activities during that 7-hour period?
On the anniversary on the worst attack in American history,
September 11, we did not have Department of Defense forces
available for 7 hours. Two brave Americans died in the last
hour. With all these warnings, all these things took place. We
did not have a single Department of Defense asset apparently
available to come to the rescue.
I categorically reject your answer to Senator Johnson
about, well, we did not ask these survivors who had flown to
Ramstein the next day, that this was not a spontaneous
demonstration. To say that it was because an investigation was
going on.
The American people deserve to know answers, and they
certainly do not deserve false answers. And the answers that
were given the American people on September 15 by the
Ambassador of the United Nations were false, in fact,
contradicted by the classified information which was kept out
of the Secretary of the United Nations report, who, by the way,
in the President's words, had nothing to do with Benghazi,
which questions why she was sent out to start with.
Why is it that the administration still refuses to provide
the full text of e-mails regarding the deletion of references
to al-Qaeda and terrorism in their talking points? Why do we
care? Because if the classified information had been included,
it gives an entirely different version of events to the
American people.
Going to the American people and tell them what happened,
then you ought to have your facts straight, including the
Ambassador said, ``Al-Qaeda is decimated, and our consulates
and embassies are secure.'' So here we are 4 months later, and
we still do not have the basic information.
Now if you want to go out and tell the American people what
happened, you should at least have interviewed the people who
were there instead of saying, no, we could not talk to them
because an FBI investigation was going on. And by the way, as I
said at the time, I just happened to be on one of those talk
shows, people do not bring RPGs and mortars to spontaneous
demonstrations. That is a fundamental.
And of course, the President continued to say days
afterward--September the 12th, he made a reference to an act of
terrorist. September 12 on ``60 Minutes,'' too early to know.
September 20 on ``Univision,'' we are still doing an
investigation. September 24 on ``The View,'' we are still doing
an investigation. The President of the United States as late as
September 24, 2 weeks later, did not acknowledge that this was
an act of terror conducted by people who were at least somehow
connected to al-Qaeda.
Finally, Madam Secretary, I strongly disagree with your
depiction of what we did after Gaddafi fell. We did not provide
the security that was needed. We did not help them with border
security. We did not give them the kind of assistance that
would have been necessary to help dismantle these militias that
still to this day remain a challenge to democracy in Libya and
freedom.
You knew Chris Stevens very well. I knew him very well. I
knew him on July 7 when I went to Libya to observe the
elections, and at that time on July 7 he expressed to me his
deep and grave concerns about security, particularly in
Benghazi. And he continued to communicate with the State
Department, and I do not know who else was privy to those
cables, of his deep concern about the security there and the
need for additional assistance. And I will argue with facts
that after that event took place, after the fall of Gaddafi,
the, ``soft footprint'' was partially, to some degree,
responsible for the tragedy that took place.
The American people and the families of these four brave
Americans still have not gotten the answers that they deserve.
I hope that they will get them.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, I understand your very
strong feelings. You knew Chris. You were a friend of Chris.
You were one of the staunchest supporters of the efforts to
dislodge Gaddafi
and try to give the Libyan people a chance. And we just have a
disagreement. We have a disagreement about what did happen
and when it happened with respect to explaining the sequence of
events.
We did get to talk to the DS agents when they got back to
this country. We did so. It was not before September 15. We had
no access to the surveillance cameras for weeks, which helped
to answer a number of questions.
But with respect to helping the Libyans, and that also goes
to the question Senator Rubio asked, we will provide a list of
everything we were doing and were attempting to do. But I will
also tell you that since March 2011, congressional holds have
been placed on programs for many months for aid to Libya. We
have had frequent congressional complaints--why are we doing
anything for Libya? It is a wealthy country. It has oil.
Disagreement from some sources that we should never have been
part of any U.N. mission in Libya. Currently the House has
holds on bilateral security assistance, on other kinds of
support for antiterrorism assistance.
So we got to get our act together between the
administration and the Congress. If this is a priority and if
we are serious about trying to help this government stand up
security and deal with what is a very dangerous environment
from east to west, then we have to work together.
So I hope that we can have the kind of discussion where we
can agree on certain approaches that will make a difference.
And again, I would urge that you look and read both the
classified and unclassified versions of the ARB that tries to
deal with the very questions that you and Senator Johnson are
raising--the timing of it and the like.
But I also hope we are looking forward because right now
Libya is still dangerous. It is still in a very unstable
statute. And whatever we can do for them, we at least ought to
agree we need to do and get out there and start delivering.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Madam Secretary. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Menendez. Madam Secretary, I want to honor our
commitment to keep you within a certain timeframe, knowing you
have to also go before the House. I also want to allow every
member to ask a question. I appreciate your very thorough and
thoughtful answers, but, to some degree, you will dictate your
own timeframe.
With that, Senator Durbin.
Senator Durbin. Madam Secretary, thank you for being here.
Excuse me. It was a little more than 4 years ago that a number
of your colleagues, myself included, encouraged you to take on
this responsibility, believing you would have a profound impact
on the world and on the diplomacy of the United States; and you
have. Thank you so much for all you have done.
I also want to say a word on behalf of Ambassador Rice, an
extraordinary individual who has served this country well. I
think some of the criticism that was heaped on her was unfair
and did not reflect the fact that she was reporting the best
information she had available at the time. And as you have
said, more information became available, and it was dutifully
reported.
I do want to make one point for the record here about
whether the American people are told everything right away in
the right way so that they can be fully informed. And I would
like to refer to five words for them to reflect on: Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction. We were told by every level of
government here there were Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
that justified a war, the invasion of the United States. We are
still searching for those weapons. They did not exist.
Thousands of Americans lost their lives. We could have a
hearing on that if you would like.
The point I am trying to get to is, two extraordinarily
talented individuals, Admiral Mullen, and maybe one of the best
diplomats of our time, Ambassador Pickering, did a thorough
review here, found shortcomings in our protection of our people
overseas and reported them honestly. You not only initiated
that review, you accepted its findings in their totality--no
cover up. An attempt to be totally honest to make sure a
tragedy like this never occurs again.
The second point I would like to make is this. Some on the
committee have already criticized the notion that this is about
money. They might argue you cannot solve a problem by throwing
money at it. Madam Secretary, you cannot solve a problem by
throwing money at it unless the problem is lack of money.
And what I understand you to testify is, you have asked
this Congress for the authority to transfer existing funds to
protect ambassadors and diplomatic personnel around the world,
and you have been refused by the House of Representatives. They
will not give you the authority to even take existing funds. If
I am not mistaken in a few weeks, your Department is going to
face sequestration, and we not only will not have additional
funds, we will cut some $129 million when it comes to
construction of facilities to protect people who represent the
United States overseas, and cut money for the individuals
necessary to protect those same diplomats.
So I would like you to comment how can we keep our
commitment to be a leader in the world in the area of
diplomacy, in state craft, to avoid the necessity of war if we
do not give the most basic resources to your Department, which
commands, as I understand it, about 1\1/2\ percent of the
Federal budget.
Secretary Clinton. Actually it is less than one, but let us
not quibble.
Look, I am well aware that there are deficiencies and
inadequacies in the Department. I went about doing what I could
in the 4 years I had through the QDDR process, through creating
some additional incentives and changes in culture to try to
assist everybody in the State Department and USAID to do as
much as they could with whatever they had, you know, because we
were never going to reach parity with the Defense Department.
We were always going to be one-twelfth or less of the budget.
That was fine, but to do what we can.
But at the same time, we have asked for the funds we think
we need to be able to fulfill the mission you have described,
Senator Durbin. And we need the help of this committee. I mean,
I am one who believes that we have to both walk and chew gum at
the same time. We have to deal with our own economy and our
fiscal situation. That is a given because that is the source of
our strength and our capacity. But we also have to be smart
about making the right investments in diplomacy and development
to try to solve problems and prevent them.
So, you know, I have outlined what should be a no-brainer.
Let us have the permission to take money we already have--we
are not asking for more money--and put it to work where the ARB
told us to do. And then let us look at the budget as we move
forward.
Now sequestration will be very damaging to the State
Department and USAID if it does come to pass because it throws
the baby out with the bath. Are there programs that we could
reduce, make more efficient? Yes, that is part of what I have
been trying to do is to push that forward, and that what is the
QDDR process was about. But there are also a lot of very
essential programs, first and foremost, the security of our
personnel in dangerous places, that we cannot afford to cut
more of.
And so I hope we get the transfer authority and then have a
sensible budget discussion going forward.
Senator Durbin. Thank you.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Senator Barrasso.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary,
I want to thank you for your incredible commitment to this
country as First Lady, as a member of this body, as well as
Secretary of State. And as a doctor, I will tell you I have
seen you work yourself to exhaustion not for your own benefit,
but for the benefit of the people of this country, and the
country is grateful for that.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you.
Senator Barrasso. I, like you, agree that we need to make
sure that something like this never happens again. And I have
kind of looked at it like the Challenger explosion where we
lost those seven astronauts because of an O-ring and problems
there. And we said, well, we did not see it coming, but we
could have seen it coming and should have seen it coming.
As you said, you never saw the security request. Vice
President Biden in the Presidential debate said no one told us.
I mean, the concern is that we should have been seeing these
sorts of things. There were the attacks on the British
Ambassador. There were the attacks on the Red Cross that they
pulled out of Benghazi. There were attacks on the consulate
itself. And yet we had no evacuation plan established in spite
of the fact that months earlier in Libya we had, I think, had
to get an Italian ferryboat to be able to get people out who
were in danger who were diplomats at the time. So those are the
concerns.
We want to make sure that there is security for our
ambassadors, which gets to the issue of we talk about what
happened on the talk shows and they said the best information
was what was best available at the time. The American people
heard ``we had a substantial security presence.'' They heard
``we obviously did have a strong security presence.'' They
heard ``obviously there was a significant security presence.''
And I just believe that that was not the case.
And I would ask you today if you believe that we had a
significant, substantial, and strong security presence in Libya
at that time, because we want that for all of our ambassadors.
Secretary Clinton. Right. Well, Senator, we had a security
presence that was mutually reinforced with the annex. We had
had, as you rightly point out and others before you, previous
incidents, not only against our compound, but against the
British, the Red Cross, and others. And what we have accepted
from the ARB recommendation is that even though there was a
back and forth in the cables and discussions, you need three DS
agents or do you need five. We had five there, but we had an
unprecedented attack. As one of the former RSOs, regional
security officers, testified, an attack that truly was not
expected, even though on that night we had the requisite number
of DS agents.
So, you know, we can get mired in the back and forth, but I
believe we will be doing more to help prevent future tragedies
and attacks if we take the ARB recommendations, because after
all, they had no stake in this debate one way or the other.
They just wanted to look at the facts, which they did an
excellent job doing, and then tell all of us what we needed to
do. And that is what I think our highest responsibility is.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Madam Secretary. You know,
thinking about future attacks and trying to prevent those, on
September 12, the President vowed to, ``bring to justice the
killers who attacked our people in Benghazi.'' So we asked the
question--and Senator Risch talked about it--Were the people
that perpetrated the recent attacks in Algeria? Were they part
of this or were they made perhaps emboldened because no one has
yet paid a penalty for the attack on our facility in Benghazi?
And how can we make sure that people are actually brought to
justice there?
Secretary Clinton. Well, I believe that--well, I know that
the FBI has been briefing some committees. I assume members or
staff of this committee are included--I do not know that, but I
would assume--about the progress of their investigation. I got
the most recent update from the Director just a few days ago
when he returned from North Africa. They are following some
very promising leads and putting together cases. They would
have to speak to you directly about that in a classified
setting.
But I think what they are trying to determine is how best
to respond. And I think what the President clearly said is we
will respond, and we will bring those to justice. And I do not
think anybody should doubt this President at his word. We have
some very good examples that it may take time, but he does not
in any way divert attention from the goal of bringing them to
justice.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Madam Secretary. The President
also said al-Qaeda has been decimated. And in light of the
recent terrorist activities that we continue to see in North
Africa, around the world, would you characterize that al-Qaeda
has been decimated?
Secretary Clinton. Well, core al-Qaeda certainly has been.
I think you would hear the same from the intelligence community
or DOD. The work that has been done in Afghanistan and the
borders areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan certainly has
taken out a whole cadre of leadership.
What we are seeing now are people who have migrated back to
other parts of the world where they came from primarily, who
are, in effect, affiliates. Part of the jihadist syndicate,
some of them, like al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb, use that
name. Others use different names.
But the fact is they are terrorists. They are extremists.
They have designs on overthrowing existing governments, even
these new Islamist governments, of controlling territory. So
although there has been the decimation of core al-Qaeda in the
Afghanistan/Pakistan region, we do have to contend with the
wannabes and the affiliates going forward.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Senator Menendez. Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Madam Secretary, for being here. And it is great to see you
today. You have been, I think, a real and dedicated public
servant for this country. And your travels around the world, as
many here have talked about, and the million miles that you
have put on, and all the countries you visited. And I think you
have been to many countries where they have never had a
Secretary of State. And I have seen firsthand when I have been
to many of these countries the difference it makes to have you
there on the ground. So I, first of all, just wanted to thank
you for that, and I know it does take a toll. But you are
incredibly dedicated to that.
Second, it is great to see you here in good health----
Secretary Clinton. Thank you.
Senator Udall [continuing]. Smiling and engaging with all
of us. And I want to add to the list people--Senators going
down the line talked about some of your accomplishments. I know
previously I talked to you about cookstoves, which I know has
been one of your initiatives. And it is once again an example
of picking something where people around the world who are
living on a dollar or two a day, if you put in a technology,
like an up-to-dated cookstove, you can make a big difference on
their health and the health of their children. And you can make
a big difference on the environment. So I would add that to the
list that has been given here today of very thoughtful
policymaking on your part.
Now, one of the findings that the board made in its report
is that--and I am quoting here--``The total elimination of risk
is a nonstarter for U.S. diplomacy given the need for the U.S.
Government to be present in places where stability and security
are often most profoundly lacking, and host government support
is sometimes minimal to nonexistent.''
And this report really, as you know, Madam Secretary,
underscores the difficulty in finding the right balance between
engagement and security. And I fully support, as you have asked
here and you have made the point to our committee, the idea
that we should reprogram this $1.4 billion, get our act
together, and respond to the recommendations.
But my question here revolves around these high-risk posts.
I think the term you have used is having 20 of them. Is this
how many there are, how many high-risk posts we have around the
world?
Secretary Clinton. Well, it is a sliding scale.
Senator Udall. Yes.
Secretary Clinton. There is very high and there is high. I
mean, it is a constantly evolving threat environment.
Senator Udall. Can you give us a little bit of a range? I
mean, very high.
Secretary Clinton. Yes. You know, I would like to give you
that in a classified document because I do not think it helps
us to point out the ones that we think are most at risk, and
then the ones that would be perhaps in a secondary category.
But I think it is fair to say, Senator, we operate in
Pakistan. We operate in Iraq, in Afghan, in Yemen. We operate
in places where we know that our facilities are being
surveilled for potential attacks, where we have a steady intel
stream of plotting against us. We know that. And we make the
decision, which is a difficult decision, as to whether or not
that mission continues.
And I have to say that we really rely on our security
professionals to implement the protocols and the procedures.
And I have to say they do a tremendous job. The vast majority
of the cases--I could give you a long list of attacks averted,
of assassinations stopped, of the kinds of daily efforts that
our diplomatic security professionals are engaged in.
So I have a lot of confidence in them, but we are going to
do what we can to make sure that they get the support within
our bureaucracy that they deserve out on the ground protecting
our diplomats.
Senator Udall. And now I want to obey the time limits here
because you need to do--move over to the House, and others want
to question. But maybe you could answer this one for the
record. Does it make sense that in some of these high-risk
areas that we consolidate those particular areas with more
secure areas, and then be able to be in a situation where our
personnel would be safer? And I am not asking you really to
answer that now. My time has run out, and I want others to be
able to question. But if you could give us an answer for the
record, that would be great.
[The written information supplied by the State Department
follows:]
Presently the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), in consultation
with other agencies, assigns threat levels to each post. Six threat
categories inform the Security Environment Threat List (SETL):
terrorism, political violence, residential crime, nonresidential crime,
human intelligence, and technical threat. A rating is then assigned for
each category based on a four-level scale: Critical, High, Medium, and
Low.
The SETL assists DS management in prioritizing overseas security
programs and ensures that effective allocation of resources is applied
to meet Overseas Security Policy Board standards based on overall
threat levels. The Under Secretary for Management will be pleased to
brief you on the SETL, at your convenience, in an appropriate setting.
Secretary Clinton. I will do that, and I will say, Senator,
one of the recommendations out of the East Africa ARB was to do
that, and that is done again in the vast majority of cases
wherever it is possible to do what is called colocate. But we
are taking a look at that as well to see what more we can do.
[The written information supplied by the State Department
follows:]
The Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999
(SECCA) requires certain collocation waivers, and such waivers
currently exist for all facilities not located on compounds constructed
since the law was enacted in 1999. A database of these locations is
maintained by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security.
By February 28, 2013, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the
Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations will have an established and
cross-referenced list of noncollocated facilities that predate the
SECCA.
By March 31, 2013, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau
of Overseas Buildings Operations will develop two action plans: (1) a
prioritized list of facilities that will be required to move forward
with collocation; and (2) a list of facilities that are either unable
to collocate or legislatively authorized not to be collocated. Any
facilities in this second group that lack a waiver will be required to
submit requests for collocation waivers.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Senator Menendez. Senator Paul.
Senator Paul. Thank you for appearing, Secretary Clinton,
and I am glad to see your health is improving.
One of the things that disappointed me most about the
original 9/11 was no one was fired. We spent trillions of
dollars, but there were a lot of human errors. These are
judgment errors, and the people who make judgment errors need
to be replaced, fired, and no longer in a position of making
these judgment calls.
So we have a review board. The review board finds 64
different things we can change. A lot of them are common sense
and should be done, but the question is, it is a failure of
leadership that they were not done in advance and four lives
were lost because of this.
I am glad that you are accepting responsibility. I think
that ultimately with your leaving, you accept the culpability
for the worst tragedy since 9/11, and I really mean that. Had I
been President at the time and I found that you did not read
the cables from Benghazi, you did not read the cables from
Ambassador Stevens, I would have relieved you of your post. I
think it is inexcusable.
The thing is, is that, you know, we can understand that you
are not reading every cable. I can understand that maybe you
are not aware of the cable from the Ambassador in Vienna that
asked for $100,000 for an electrical charging station. I can
understand that maybe you are not aware that your Department
spent $100,000 on three comedians who went to India on a
promotional tour called ``Make Chai Not War.''
But I think you might be able to understand and might be
aware of the $80 million spent on a consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif
that will never be built. I think it is inexcusable that you
did not know about this and that you did not read these cables.
I would think by anybody's estimation, Libya has to have
been one of the hottest of hot spots around the world. Not to
know of the request for security really I think cost these
people their lives. Their lives could have been saved had
someone been more available, had someone been aware of these
things, more on top of the job.
And the thing is, is I do not suspect you of bad motives.
The review board said, well, these people were not willfully
negligent. I do not think you were willful. I do not suspect
your motives of wanting to serve your country.
But it was a failure of leadership not to be involved. It
was a failure of leadership not to know these things.
And so, I think it is good that you are accepting
responsibility because no one else is. And this is--there is a
certain amount of culpability to the worst tragedy since 9/11,
and I am glad you are accepting this.
Now my question is, Is the United States involved with any
procuring of weapons, transfer of weapons, buying, selling,
anyhow transferring weapons to Turkey out of Libya?
Secretary Clinton. To Turkey? I will have to take that
question for the record. Nobody has ever raised that with me. I
don't----
Senator Paul. It has been in news reports that ships have
been leaving from Libya and that they may have weapons. And
what I would like to know is the annex that was close by, were
they involved with procuring, buying, selling, obtaining
weapons, and were any of these weapons being transferred to
other countries? Any countries, Turkey included?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, you will have to direct
that question to the agency that ran the annex. I will see what
information is available and----
Senator Paul. You are saying you do not know?
Secretary Clinton. I do not know. I do not have any
information on that. And you know, with respect to personnel,
Senator, you know, first, that is why we have independent
people who review the situation as we did with the Pickering
and Mullen ARB, and all four individuals identified in the ARB
have been removed from their jobs. Second, they have been
placed on administrative leave while we step through the
personnel process to determine the next steps.
[The written information supplied by the State Department
follows:]
The United States is not involved with any transfer of weapons from
Libya to Turkey.
Secretary Clinton. Third, both Ambassador Pickering and
Admiral Mullen specifically highlighted the reason why this is
complicated because under Federal statute and regulations,
unsatisfactory leadership is not grounds for finding a breach
of duty. The ARB did not find these four individuals breached
their duty. So I have submitted legislation to this committee,
to the Congress, to fix this problem so future ARBs will not
face this situation.
Senator Paul. But here is the problem. The review board has
all these recommendations, but there is one thing they failed
to address and I think you have failed to address, and it sets
us up for another tragedy like this. They should have never
been sent in there without a military guard.
This should have been an embassy like in Baghdad in a war
zone, and it should have been under military guard, significant
military guard, Defense Department command. I do not think the
State Department is capable of being in a war zone and
protecting these people. I still do not think that.
I think another tragedy could happen. I think another
tragedy could happen in another war zone around the world. I
think someone needs to make an executive decision, someone
needs to take leadership, and with that leadership should be
you should not send them in with no Marines. You should not
send them in with Marines who are to guard records, not people.
You should not send them in with the same kind of Ambassador or
Embassy staff that you have in Paris.
I think that is inexcusable.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, the reason I am here
today is to answer questions the best I can. I am the Secretary
of State, and the ARB made very clear that the level of
responsibility for the failures that they outlined was set at
the Assistant Secretary level and below.
The administration has sent officials to the Hill more than
30 times. We have given as much information--we have been as
transparent as we can. Obviously, we will continue to brief you
and others, to answer any and all questions that you have about
going forward.
The reason we put into effect an Accountability Review
Board is to take it out of the heat of politics and
partisanship and accusations and to put it in the hands of
people who have no stake in the outcome. The reason I said make
it open, tell the world, is because I believe in transparency.
I believe in taking responsibility, and I have done so.
And I hope that we are going to be able to see a good
working relationship between the State Department and the
committee going forward.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Clinton, I approached this hearing with some
degree of sadness. It is my first and your last. But I am so
appreciative of your service. You have done such credit to this
Nation, and we will be sorry to see you go. We know that you
will continue to give us good counsel and good advice in the
coming years.
I think if some people on this committee want to call the
tragedy in Benghazi the worst since 9/11, it misunderstands the
nature of 4,000-plus Americans lost over 10 years of war in
Iraq fought under false pretenses. It was fought under false
pretenses, but it was also fought, I think, because we had a
misunderstanding of what we could do and what we could manage
in that region--what was under our control.
And I guess my question to you, Secretary Clinton, is about
what our expectations are going forward in North Africa. And I
think you referenced this in your opening remarks about
actually what is under our control.
One of the criticisms in the review board was that we did
not have a full understanding of this complicated set of
allegiances between jihadist groups that are shifting on an
almost daily basis. And I worry sometimes that when we do this
retrospective hand-wringing over a tragedy like this that we
sometimes give the impression to the American people that we
can know all and see all and control all in a region where we
certainly are just beginning to stand up the kind of presence
that we may ultimately need and want.
And so, I guess I present this as an open-ended question to
you: As we move forward, and especially for new members of this
committee who are probably going to be spending a lot more time
on Africa and North Africa than this committee has ever spent
before, what are the expectations that we should set for the
American public as to what we can control, what we can know,
and potentially what changes on the diplomatic side we need to
make in order to have a more solid footprint and relationship
with neighbors there who may be willing to help us when it
comes to intelligence and intervention with this very
complicated landscape of jihadist groups?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, you are going to make an
excellent member of this committee based on that question.
Because it is a multipart question, but it raises really the
heart of the challenge we face.
We are in a new reality. We are trying to make sense of
changes that nobody had predicted, but which we are going to
have to live with. I cannot do justice in the time I have left
here to the really important issues that you have highlighted,
but I think, first and foremost, let us be honest. Let us be
honest with ourselves. Let us avoid turning everything into a
political football.
Let us instead try to just say, look, this is
unprecedented. We do not know what is going to happen in this
new revolutionary environment across North Africa and the
Middle East, but let us see what lessons we can learn from what
worked in the past, see what is applicable, and then let us
bring people together who will really have the kind of open
discussion that used to be the hallmark of this committee and
of the Senate.
I mean, people used to have hearings where it was not to
just have administration officials come up and ask the
questions and go on from there, but really to delve into what
works and what does not work. Bring in outside experts. Let
them debate in front of you. Try to figure out what the best
information going forward is.
I mean, over the last weeks, I have pulled writings from,
you know, what you would call very conservative and very
liberal commentators who kind of reach the same conclusion
about what we should be doing in this region. We have to
approach it with humility. But we have got some real assets if
we deploy them right and helping to rebuild security is
essential.
We did it in Colombia. It took a decade. We did it directly
in Colombia. We did it as a partner with others in Somalia, and
there are a lot of other examples all the way across the world.
Let us be smart and learn from what we have done in the past
and see what can be transferred into the present and the
future, and let us be honest in trying to assess it to the best
of our abilities.
And I think with the new chairman and the new ranking
member, from my conversations with both of them, I think this
committee could play such an essential role in trying to answer
your questions and put forth a policy that would not go
lurching from administration to administration, but would be a
steady one like we did with Colombia, like we did in the cold
war.
Let us be smart about this. We have more assets than
anybody in the world, but I think we have gotten a little bit
off track in trying to figure out how best to utilize them.
Senator Murphy. I hope this committee takes up those wise
recommendations. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Madam Secretary, I also regret that our
overlap will be so brief. I think the country is at its
strongest when we balance military strength with diplomatic
strength, economic strength, and strength of our moral example,
and I cannot think of a person that exemplifies that balance in
a public service career as well as you do, and I appreciate
that.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Kaine. A few questions, sort of detailed questions
that trouble me. In the unclassified version of the ARB, there
is a comment, a brief one. In December 2011, the Under
Secretary for Management approved a 1-year continuation of the
U.S. Special Mission in Benghazi, which was never a consulate
and never formally notified to the Libyan Government.
Why wasn't this special mission notified to the Libyan
Government? Is that a common practice? Did the lack of the
notification have any connection with the weak Libyan
governmental response on the 11th, and are there any changes in
connection with the ARB recommendations to the idea of special
missions that are not notified formally to their host
governments?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, congratulations to you as
well. And welcome to this committee.
The United States notified to the Libyan Government the
specific names of people who were serving in Libya in both
Tripoli and in Benghazi. That, in no way, affected the legal
obligation of Libya under the Vienna Convention. The problem,
as I said, was not their willingness. It was their capacity.
And as you know, from the first time Chris Stevens arrived
before the fall of Gaddafi, he relied not on any Libyan
governmental security, but on the February 17th Brigade, and
then we supplemented that after Gaddafi's fall with DS agents,
with private security contractors.
So there was no affect on anything from the Libyan
Government that was related to that. However, we do think that
needs to be looked at going forward. The ARB made a very
important point that the so-called temporary nature of the
mission did prove to be confusing to people down the chain
responsible for reading those cables.
We get about, I do not know, how many millions of cables do
we get? And I have to confess I do not read all the cables that
come into the State Department. That is why we have a huge
workforce of people who are given responsibility and expected
to carry forward that responsibility.
And I think designating it as temporary, in the ARB's
findings, did cause an extra level of uncertainty, to some
extent. You know, as the chairman said at the very beginning,
quoting from the ARB, there has been an acculturation in the
State Department to husband resources, to try to be as careful
in spending money as possible. And then I think adding to that
the fact that it was ``temporary'' probably did lead to some of
the confusion that we later saw played out in the cables, but
not the status of it for the Libyan Government.
Senator Kaine. How common is it for us to rely on local
nongovernmental security, as was the case with the Blue
Mountain and February 17 Brigades in Benghazi?
Secretary Clinton. Well, it is very common. We employ
privately employed security guards in a very high number of our
posts around the world. I mean, if you go to the Embassy in
Baghdad or you go to the Embassy in Kabul or really many of our
high-threat places, you will see private security guards.
Now, because of problems with private security guard
contracts that came to light in Iraq, where, as you remember,
there were a lot of difficulties--these were private security
guards who were protecting diplomats and development experts,
other civilians--many countries have put very stringent
requirements on private security guards.
And in fact, in Libya, the transitional government
prohibited private security guards, which is why there was
this--unless they approved them. So they approved this Blue
Mountain company that was a joint Libyan-British organization.
But we use private security guards in many places because, as I
said, historically, Marine guards do not protect personnel.
Their job is to really take care of classified material and to
destroy it, if necessary.
We had no classified material at Benghazi. And it was
unfortunate that we evacuated all the Americans and
unclassified material was left behind, but we had no classified
material. So there is going to be an effort because of this
work that I have directed to really sort this out so that you
know, that everybody knows exactly what the protocols and the
rules are, and we act accordingly.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Madam Secretary, Mr. Chair.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Madam Secretary, thank you for your thorough, thoughtful,
and forthright answers. It is what we have become accustomed to
from you.
I understand we are going to be able to welcome you one
more time when you come tomorrow to introduce Senator Kerry to
the committee. We look forward to welcoming you there as well.
I think that there are several takeaways here that are
incredibly important. One is that we have to look at the
totality of the threat environment versus just looking for a
specific credible threat when we are thinking about the
protection of our Foreign Service personnel, and I see that we
are moving in that direction.
The other one is changing the State Department to have
clear lines of authority and responsibility for security
matters instead of silos looking at a horizontal level. And I
understand that is under way.
A lot has been said about resources here. Secretary Gates
used to famously argue that there are more people in military
bands than in the entire Foreign Service. It seems to me that,
surely, we can find the funds to protect our diplomats who
serve on the front lines. I am concerned when the ARB says that
the State Department has been engaged for years in a struggle
to obtain the resources necessary to carry out its work which
has conditioned the thinking of some in the State Department
that it is imperative for the State Department to be mission
driven rather than resource constrained, particularly in
increasingly risky parts of the world.
So I look forward to immediately working with the ranking
member to reach out to Chairman Royce to get that transfer
authority within the existing budget. It is not about
additional money. It is about taking money that has already
been appropriated so that you have the ability to start
working, and the next Secretary has the ability to start
working to protect our people as robustly as we can. A failure
to do so is going to be a poor judgment call on the part of
this Congress, if we cannot get, at a minimum, the transfer
authority.
Finally, I know a lot has been made about what was said and
what was not said. I think that there are lessons to be learned
there as well, in our drive to produce information about a
tragedy as quickly as possible, as we should. But I think what
we know and what we do not know is equally as important, and
maybe the admonition that we should know before we speak is
incredibly important. That would have been incredibly important
when we were told that there were weapons of mass destruction
in Iraq.
As someone who voted against the Iraq war in the House and
did not believe, based upon what I was able to review, that
there was adequate information, when we talk about tragedies--
and certainly, Benghazi was a tragedy--when we lost 4,486
American lives in Iraq, had thousands who have been injured and
had their lives changed forever, and the increased influence of
Iran, I think from my own perspective, that was truly a
tragedy.
And so, there are lessons to be learned here. There will be
questions for the committee to ask for the record by the close
of business tomorrow, since we do not expect you to be much
longer in your position.
The committee thanks you for your appearance here today and
your service. Senator Corker, a final word?
Senator Corker. I want to actually add three more
takeaways, and I know they are based not only on testimony here
today, but conversations we have had over the last several
days.
You alluded to the over-the-transom issues that the State
Department and the White House deal with on a constant basis. I
think this committee will be useful and can be useful in
setting a long-term exploration of what our national interest
is so that we look at this over a longer term context. I know
you alluded to that in your testimony.
Secondly, I know we have talked extensively about the
importance of having a full authorization. That actually would
be very helpful to people like you who come in for a very short
period of time for us to help set those priorities. That would
be something you would embrace and something this committee has
never done since I have been here.
And thirdly, that we live in a world now where we know that
al-Qaeda is going to be a threat in North Africa for years to
come, and we need to have policies that realize that and
address it.
I, too, thank you for your service. I know a lot of nice
things will be said again tomorrow when you come here, but
thank you so much. I appreciate it.
Senator Menendez. On that bipartisan note and with the
thanks of the committee, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. War of Terror: Secretary Clinton, I appreciated your
comment in the letter you sent us in December, that we cannot just play
better defense, but must do much better on offense as well. We have had
great success in degrading terrorism networks globally and specifically
the core al-Qaeda leadership; however, there has been a growth in
offshoot and extremists networks, particularly in north Africa as a
result of political turmoil on Libya and Mali. These threats make
terrorism cooperation and coordination in north Africa and in the Gulf
of primary importance.
Is the war on terrorism shifting grounds as extremists
splinter into small, more regional groups?
What is our offensive strategy for countering extremists
and al-Qaeda splinter groups?
Answer. Denying al-Qaeda and its affiliates safe havens will
continue to be a challenge, and we know that terrorists enjoy safe
haven in sparsely populated territories in Africa. While we have had
much success in combating al-Qaeda and its primary affiliates, the
threat has become more widely dispersed. We will continue to work to
disrupt, dismantle, and defeat extremists in this evolving landscape
through a range of efforts, especially those enabling partners around
the world to counter the threat within their own borders. Denying safe
havens, whether individuals in such areas enjoy membership in al-Qaeda,
or like-minded or associated smaller groups, plays a major role in
undermining terrorists' capacity to operate effectively and forms a key
element of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. Through technical
assistance, training, and the provision of equipment, we aim to improve
the capacities of partner nations. We also work to deny terrorist
groups continuing flows of recruits. The challenges we face are
considerable, but we believe that applying a comprehensive set of tools
is the best approach for achieving our counterterrorism objectives
against violent extremist groups.
A core element of our approach to the shifting terrorism networks
of today is a strategy that focuses not only on strengthening the
military, intelligence, and civilian capabilities of our partners, but
also one that supports their efforts to address the political,
economic, and social drivers of violent extremism. The U.S.
counterterrorism approach in west and north Africa, for example, has
focused on encouraging and enabling local ownership over
counterterrorism efforts in the region and building sustainable
capabilities that will ultimately deny terrorists the ability to
operate with impunity.
The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) was developed
with this comprehensive approach in mind--as was its counterpart in
East Africa, the Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism
(PREACT). TSCTP uses a multisectoral approach involving the Department
of State, USAID, and the Department of Defense to address the threat of
terrorism in west and north Africa. We are also engaging in a range of
activities to undermine violent extremists' narrative with the
establishment of the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
Communications (CSCC). Through CSCC, the U.S. Government is providing a
counternarrative to extremist propaganda and pushing back openly in
online forums in Arabic, Urdu, and Somali.
We are also working multilaterally to advance a more strategic,
long-term approach to address the terrorist threats in the region
through the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). With partners from 29
countries and the European Union, the GCTF is helping to bring together
U.S. and European CT efforts, with those of various countries in north
Africa and the Middle East--for example, Algeria, Tunisia, and the
United Arab Emirates, as well as many others--to combine international
efforts and address new challenges as terrorist networks morph and
tactics change. The Forum's Working Groups on the Sahel and on Criminal
Justice/Rule of Law are strengthening the civilian capacities of
countries in the region to prevent and respond to terrorism within a
rule of law framework and are bringing together practitioners and
policymakers to identify priorities, devise solutions, and mobilize
additional resources from the donor community to help the region
confront the terrorist threat it is facing.
Question. Preventing Tragedy: The ARB's findings indicate that were
failures on both ends--at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, as well as with
the Department here in Washington. The ARB found that the Embassy ``did
not demonstrate strong and sustained advocacy with Washington for
increased security for Special Mission Benghazi'' and that in D.C. that
``there appeared to be very real confusion over who, ultimately, was
responsible and empowered to make decisions based on both policy and
security considerations.''
Can you detail for me from start to finish how such
requests will be considered in the future, particularly from
High Risk, High Threat Posts?
Who will make the request for additional security at an
Embassy or other U.S. facility?
Who will receive the request, who will review it, who will
make the decisions about the request and in what timeframe can
we expect a request to be received, considered, and a
determination made?
Answer. The Chief of Mission is directly responsible for the
security of his or her mission. However, security is also a shared
responsibility with other Department personnel.
We will continue to balance this shared security responsibility
with U.S. interests and policy priorities, evolving security threats,
and the mitigation of security risks.
The Department is creating a mechanism for determining which posts
should be included in the High Threat Post (HTP) designation.
Diplomatic Security (DS) will perform the requisite research, conduct a
review, and prepare a recommendation for the Under Secretary for
Management's approval. The action memorandum will reflect the
circumstances and criteria that warrant the HTP designation. To lead
this effort, and in line with the ARB's recommendation, I have created
the first-ever Deputy Assistant Secretary for High Threat Posts in the
Bureau of Diplomatic Security.
Once a High Threat Post designation is approved, the regional
bureau and post will determine the size and scope of a continuing U.S.
presence based upon policy imperatives and security requirements. A
High Threat Post would be expected to perform a critical review of
staffing levels, adhere to enhanced security parameters for the
facility, and enhanced transportation security.
As with the current process, the Chief of Mission is ultimately
responsible for requesting additional security assets. When a request
for additional security is received for a High Threat Post, each
request will be carefully considered by the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security, Regional Bureau, and other Department principals in close
consultation with the Chief of Mission.
The Department is constantly assessing security protocols to
reflect rapidly changing environments and the threats they present, and
considers a range of options from mitigating steps, to reduced
presence, to closing.
Question. Host-Country Security: As our diplomats are increasingly
called to represent the United States in the world's most dangerous
places--Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, our security standards and
protocols must adapt to ensure that the facilities in which they work
and the personnel protecting these facilities are adequate to the
threats posed by the specific environment, particularly where the host
country is unable to meet its obligations under the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations and provide protection to embassies and
consulates. We must be, as the ARB states, self-reliant and
enterprising in developing security platforms, profiles and staffing
and make assessments on a case-by-case basis.
What assessments have been or are being undertaken with
regard to reliance on host-country security in High Risk, High
Threat Posts?
What alternative arrangements are you considering where
there is a need for a U.S. presence in a short timeframe that
does not allow for adherence to normal facility requirements--
as in Benghazi, but where the host country cannot provide
suitable security?
Answer. The Department has undertaken a worldwide review of our
overall security posture in light of the evolving security challenges
in the Middle East and elsewhere to identify and implement additional
measures to bolster the security of our facilities and personnel where
necessary. As part of this review, the Department assessed the host-
nation's ability to respond to an attack on our facilities.
Every attempt is made to acquire sites or facilities that meet the
physical security standards set forth in the overseas security policy
board (OSPB) standards regardless of the length of time we plan to
occupy the facility. If the OSPB standards cannot be met, the
Department takes steps to mitigate any security vulnerabilities to
ensure our staff have a safe and secure platform to conduct foreign
policy.
The Department currently has an increased security proposal pending
congressional approval. With this proposal, we will be able to increase
the Marine Security Guard Detachments, hire additional Bureau of
Diplomatic Security special agents, and build additional secure
facilities overseas.
Question. Contracting: The ARB, and in his testimony before this
committee, Under Secretary Nides stated that State may need additional
contracting authority to ensure that the Department has the ability to
quickly execute a contract where necessary to address security
concerns.
Does the Department presently have the ability to use sole-
source contracting to address urgent security needs?
Second, I understand that presently the Department
currently contracts for local guards on the basis of the lowest
price technically acceptable, which essentially means that the
focus is lowest price, but not necessarily the best value and
certainly not the best guards. Do you support a change in
contracting authority to allow the Department to let local
guards contracts based on the best value to the Department?
Answer. The Department welcomes congressional support for our
efforts to award local guard contracts to support our worldwide
missions based on best value, in lieu of the current lowest price,
technically acceptable requirement. Additionally, while there is
generally sufficient and flexible authority to accomplish the
Department's procurement goals, the Department is seeking congressional
assistance to obtain additional authority to make awards final and
unreviewable, thereby avoiding lengthy bid protests which put at risk
our ability to secure our embassies.
Question. Authorization of Resources: Members of this committee
have argued that improving embassy security doesn't require resources
or that if we need additional resources for diplomatic security and
embassy construction that it can be transferred from elsewhere in the
Department. House Republicans actually prevented the inclusion in the
Sandy supplemental of the administration's request for a transfer of
$1.1 billion in Iraqi security funds to address urgent security issues,
like enhancing the Marine Security Guard program despite the fact that
this is only a reprogramming of funds that won't be used in Iraq.
Putting aside the congressional limitations on transferring
funds between accounts, what is your response to these critics?
Do you have the resources elsewhere in the Department to
make up for the shortfalls in funding to increase the number of
diplomatic security agents, make securing upgrades and repairs
at facilities and to fund embassy construction at a pace that
reflects the urgency of the situation for about two dozen High
Risk, High Threat Posts around the world?
Answer. The Department has not received sufficient funding to
address our critical Embassy Security Construction Program. As
originally envisioned, this program was designed to support the
construction of 10 or more facilities per year. Reduced funding, both
requested and appropriated, coupled with overseas inflation has cut the
number of facilities by over 50 percent--only five were awarded in FY
2012. The Department has determined that it will take approximately
$2.2 billion per year, from all sources (which includes other agency
contributions based on their staffing presence overseas) to get back on
track.
As indicated in the question, there are limitations on the
Department's ability to transfer funding between and among state
operations appropriations, particularly for construction, which
marginalizes the ability to make the most efficient use of the funds
which have been appropriated. In an effort to make the most of the
funding the Department does receive, the Department is pursuing
additional authorities that would permit the transfer of funds
appropriated for State operations to increase security at U.S.
embassies and other overseas posts. Specifically, at the Department's
request, the Senate included in its version of the supplemental for
Hurricane Sandy, which passed at the end of the 112th Congress, a
provision that would allow the Department the flexibility to transfer
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds from FY 2012 and from the
FY 2013 Continuing Resolution between State Department operating
accounts to meet emergent and emergency construction needs.
Unfortunately, this provision was not carried in the House version of
the supplemental. Thus, the Department is seeking the next earliest
available legislative opportunity for Congress to provide the requested
authority to transfer these funds to jump-start our enhanced embassy
security proposal and related construction program.
In addition, the Department intends to work with the Office of
Management and Budget and Congress to seek ongoing transfer authority
that would permit additional flexibility to transfer operating funds to
the Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance account so that
funding can be more rapidly made available for security upgrades at
overseas facilities. Our current transfer authority limits the
Department's ability to address new requirements, particularly in High
Risk, High Threat Posts, because it places a cap on the amount of money
that may be moved.
Question. Training: One of the ARB recommendations that hasn't
received so much attention, but actually may be one of most important
things the government could do in the short term is to make sure our
people on the ground have the training to take care of themselves to
the best of their abilities, particularly folks charged with securing
our embassies and people. State currently has multiple facilities that
handle security training and I know you are hoping to bring the Foreign
Affairs Security Training Center at Fort Pickett on line as soon as
possible.
What other steps is the Department taking on the ARB
recommendation to enhance training to prepare our personnel for
leadership positions in High Risk, High Threat Posts? Are you
specifically looking to expand and improve counterthreat
training for all U.S. Government personnel operating overseas?
Answer. The Department agrees that expanded training will be a
major part of implementing the ARB recommendations.
On December 20, 2012, the Under Secretary of State for Management
made Foreign Affairs Counter Threat training mandatory for all
personnel assigned under Chief of Mission authority to High Threat
Posts, as well as third-party contractors, when appropriate. This
expansion of Foreign Affairs Counter Threat training will have resource
implications that we are working to address immediately. We look
forward to congressional support for enhancing our security and
training.
On January 3, 2013, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS)
established a panel of Supervisory Special Agents to participate in a
Program Review of the High Threat Tactical Course. This Diplomatic
Security panel will review current the High Threat Tactical Course
content, as well as review the findings of the Diplomatic Security
Training Center internal program review of the High Threat Tactical
Course. Changes to the High Threat Tactical Course will respond to the
independent Accountability Review Board recommendations. Preliminary
indications are that the High Threat Tactical Course may need to expand
beyond its current 5-week course.
Currently, DS is working to develop a training module for Locally
Employed Staff, who assist the foreign government to provide security
protection for Chiefs of Mission. This ``Protection 101'' course will
provide DS Agents assigned as regional security officers with course
materials, lesson plans, and exercises needed to present a 40-hour
block of instruction to Locally Employed Staff.
Implementing several of the ARB recommendations will also require
additional training.
For the recommendations dealing with fire safety, staff
will receive training for any new equipment issued for fire
protection.
The Department is evaluating and planning for additional
language training (for current and future staff at High Threat
Posts, including specialized training based on needs and/or
asymmetric language designated positions).
Question. Worldwide Review: You informed us in your letter in
December that you ordered a worldwide review of our overall security
posture, particularly for high-threat posts.
What are the initial results of this review?
Are there specific lessons from Benghazi that should be
implemented with respect to these posts?
Answer. All posts were directed to review their security in light
of the Benghazi ARB report. The Department also identified a number of
posts deemed to be at particular risk. The recommendations resulting
from these reviews range from increased personnel to physical security
enhancements to the introduction of new technologies.
These reviews also identified other issues, such as the importance
of carefully reviewing the overall staffing footprint, protection of
accelerants, provision of firefighting and safety equipment, adequacy
of safe havens, enhanced nonlethal area denial agents, consideration of
expanding the role and presence of Marine Security Guard detachments,
and expanded training for personnel assigned to high threat posts.
The Department has submitted an Increased Security Proposal to
Congress, including a legislative proposal to enable the transfer of
previously appropriated Overseas Contingency Operations funding. With
this proposal, we will be able to increase the number of Marine
Security Guard Detachments, hire additional Bureau of Diplomatic
Security personnel, build additional secure facilities overseas, and
supply additional security equipment to high threat posts.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator Tom Udall
Question. How would you characterize Libyan cooperation with the
investigation?
Answer. The Government of Libya has been cooperative with us on the
investigation within their limited capabilities. The Libyan people have
also demonstrated their support for the United States, with tens of
thousands marching against the militia violence shortly after the
attacks in Benghazi. However, the government's investigative capacity
on the ground is limited; security sector officials in Libya have been
the targets of frequent assassination attacks and the overall security
situation there is fragile, especially in Benghazi. We refer you to the
FBI for any details about the current status of their investigation
into the attacks on our facilities in Benghazi.
Question. What is your assessment of the capacity and intention of
Libyan authorities to bring those responsible to justice?
Answer. While the Government of Libya has demonstrated its
willingness to cooperate with the investigation, its investigative
capacity is limited. We are working with the interagency and the Libyan
authorities to help them address these limitations so as to bolster
their ability to cooperate with the FBI investigation.
Question. What support has the United States offered to Libya?
Answer. Since the revolution, the United States has provided the
Government of Libya with targeted technical assistance in a number of
critical areas to help establish security sector institutions
appropriate for a democratic state, and to develop the capacities
needed to control loose weapons, counter terrorism, and improve border
security management.
Specifically, during multiple visits to Libya by the Department of
Defense's Defense Institution Reform Initiative in 2012, we advised the
Libyan Ministry of Defense on establishing defense institutions and
armed forces that are unified, capable, and subject to civilian control
and the rule of law. Furthermore we are providing training for Libyan
military leaders in military officer professional development schools
and familiarization visits to the United States. These visits by high-
level Libyan officials are ongoing. We have also been providing
counterterrorism training to the Libyan military.
We are poised to provide further assistance to build capability and
capacity among Libya's border security agencies to detect, interdict,
investigate, and prosecute illicit weapons transfers--pending
resolution of a congressional hold--and we have been working with the
Libyan authorities since August 2011 to secure and disable Qadhafi-era
weapons stockpiles. On September 4, 2012, we designated Libya as a
country eligible for the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), a
joint Department of Defense and State initiative pooling together
resources and expertise to provide border security and Special
Operations Forces (SOF) programs.
During a December 17 meeting of senior officials in London, a
Libyan interministerial delegation worked with the U.N. Support Mission
in Libya, the United States, and other international partners to
identify and address these priorities. This meeting, which the United
States strongly encouraged and facilitated, catalyzed efforts by the
Libyan authorities to better evaluate offers of assistance. We are
working with the U.N. and other international partners to build on the
December 17 meeting and assist Libya with its articulated security
sector priorities.
Question. It is my understanding that many of the security
personnel in diplomatic security are trained to defend the embassy, its
personnel, and critical information.
In a case like Benghazi, would it have made sense to have
more security personnel trained with counterassault
capabilities to take on the militants in order to more
effectively fight back the thrust of their attack, and should
the Department of State consider placing more security
personnel with these capabilities at high-risk locations as a
deterrent to would be attackers?
Answer. The Department of State does place Diplomatic Security
personnel with enhanced training at overseas locations, including in
Tripoli. The Department has requested additional funding through the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on November 27, 2012, to permit
us to have additional security personnel both from Diplomatic Security
and the U.S. Marine Corps.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
Question. In testimony before the committee, the Accountability
Review Board (ARB) stated that our overreliance on Foreign Service
Nationals (FSNs) was a contributing factor in the Benghazi terrorist
attacks.
Would you also agree that the State Department relies too
heavily on FSNs in countries where there is a high
counterintelligence (CI) threat as well?
Answer. In its official report, the independent Accountability
Review Board determined that ``reliance'' on the quasi-governmental
February 17 militia ``for security in the event of an attack was
misplaced . . . '' This observation informed the ARB's general
recommendation, which the State Department is implementing, that, ``The
Department must strengthen security for personnel and platforms beyond
traditional reliance on host government security support in High Risk,
High Threat Posts.''
On the separate question of FSNs or ``Locally Employed Staff''--
that is, host country nationals employed by U.S. missions abroad--the
independent Accountability Review Board concluded that: ``The
Department needs to review the staffing footprints at High Risk, High
Threat Posts, with particular attention to ensuring adequate Locally
Employed Staff (LES) and management support. High Risk, High Threat
Posts must be funded and the human resources process prioritized to
hire LES interpreters and translators.'' [Italics added.] We agree that
such support is essential to advancing America's interests and keeping
our people safe, including in countries where there is a high
counterintelligence threat.
Question. What steps is the State Department currently taking to
reduce the reliance of FSNs in countries where the physical and CI
threat is elevated?
Answer. The Department of State, consistent with the
recommendations of the independent ARB, is assessing the role of
Locally Employed Staff, or Foreign Service Nationals, where
appropriate. As the ARB report states, ``The Department needs to review
the staffing footprints at High Risk, High Threat Posts, with
particular attention to ensuring adequate Locally Employed Staff (LES)
and management support. High Risk, High Threat Posts must be funded and
the human resources process prioritized to hire LES interpreters and
translators.'' But to be clear, local guards are not LES.
Question. What is your opinion of how the FBI investigation into
the Benghazi terrorist attacks is proceeding?
Answer. I spoke to this matter during the hearing and refer you to
the FBI for further details about the current status of the
investigation. The Libyan Government has been supportive of, and
cooperated with, the FBI investigation. At the same time, however, the
Libyan Government's limited investigative capacity presents serious
challenges. We are working with the Libyan authorities to help them
address these limitations and bolster their ability to cooperate with
the FBI investigation.
Question. Have we fulfilled the President's promise to bring those
perpetrators responsible to justice?
Answer. As I stated during the hearing, the FBI is following some
promising leads, and we are committed to bringing those responsible for
these attacks to justice. We defer to the FBI for any details about the
progress of their investigation into the attacks on our facilities in
Benghazi. In high-level interactions with Libyan Government officials,
we have made clear that this is a top policy priority both for the
President and for me.
Question. Could you please describe the State Department Foreign
Affairs Counter-Threat (FACT) training for RSOs going to Libya?
Answer. State Department and other U.S. Government personnel who
serve in certain high threat posts, such as Iraq, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, Yemen, and Mexican border posts
are required to receive security familiarization training, known as
Foreign Affairs Counter-Threat Training (FACT), to provide enhanced
security and life safety skills. (Certain officials who have received
more advanced security training are exempted from this requirement.)
The FACT training is a 5-day course and FACT training modules include
but are not limited to: medical first responder, personnel recovery,
firearms familiarization, surveillance detection, counterthreat
driving, and explosive countermeasures.
Instead of receiving FACT training, each of the DS Special Agents
and Regional Security Officers serving in Libya were trained in one of
two more advanced security courses: the High Threat Tactical Course
(HTTC) or the Mobile Security Deployments Green Team (MSD GT) course.
HTTC is a 5-week course that provides in-depth training on all of the
course material covered in the FACT course plus additional medical,
firearms, and tactical training. MSD GT is a 6-month advanced tactical
course given to members of DS's tactical operations unit, the Office of
Mobile Security Deployments, which covers material beyond both FACT and
HTTC. (Since 2009, DS Agents and SPS who have completed either HTTC or
MSD GT are exempt from taking the FACT course.)
Question. Were any FACT requirements waived or abbreviated for
Libya?
Answer. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security Directorate of Training
did not waive or abbreviate the FACT training course for any personnel
assigned to take the training.
Question. What other organizations in Africa is the Department of
State currently considering for designation as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization?
Answer. As a matter of general practice, the Department does not
publicly comment on prospective Foreign Terrorist Organization
designations because doing so would risk undermining the effectiveness
of the designation by alerting the potential target of the upcoming
sanctions. For example, such prenotification could result in the flight
of assets in the financial system before they could be frozen.
The Department will continue to work with other relevant U.S.
agencies and international partners in identifying ways we can further
erode the capacity of organizations carrying out terrorist attacks in
Africa, as well as to build the capacity of foreign partners to address
terrorist threats within their countries and regions.
Question. On what date was Ali Ani al-Harzi detained in Turkey?
Answer. Information regarding al-Harzi's detention in Turkey is
associated with an ongoing investigation by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. Questions regarding this matter should be directed to
the Department of Justice.
Question. On what date was Ali Ani al-Harzi transferred to Tunisia?
On what date was the FBI granted access to Ali Ani al-Harzi? On what
date did the FBI interview Ali Ani al-Harzi?
Answer. For questions related to the ongoing criminal investigation
of the Benghazi attacks, I would refer you to the Department of
Justice.
Question. On what date was Ali Ani al-Harzi released from Tunisian
custody?
Answer. Al-Harzi's lawyer announced his release from Tunisian
custody on January 7.
Question. Did the State Department make any requests on behalf of
the U.S. Government to interview Ali Ani al-Harzi while he was in
Turkish custody? If no, why not? If yes, what was the answer to our
requests?
Answer. The information on this matter is associated with an
ongoing investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Questions
regarding this matter should be directed to the Department of Justice.
Question. Once transferred to Tunisian custody it appears it took
over a month and a half for the FBI to gain access to al-Harzi.
How many formal demarche's and diplomatic notes were sent
to the Tunisians after his transfer from Turkey and before the
FBI was granted access?
Did Ambassador Walles make any calls to officials in the
Tunisian Government asking for access to al-Harzi? If yes, to
whom and on what dates? If no, why?
Did you make any calls to officials in the Tunisian
Government asking for access? If yes, to whom and on what
dates? If no, why?
Did the U.S. Government issue any formal demarche's or
diplomatic notes protesting his release?
Did Ambassador Walles make any calls to Tunisian Government
officials protesting his release? If so--to whom and on what
dates?
Answer. Bringing the perpetrators to justice is a top priority for
the U.S. Government. Since the September 14 attack on the U.S. Embassy
in Tunis, the State Department and the Justice Department have
vigorously pursued greater law enforcement cooperation with the
Government of Tunisia. Tunisian officials have responded to our request
for legal cooperation in the Benghazi attack investigation.
Senior State Department officials have raised this case with
Tunisian leadership. Most recently on December 14, Deputy Secretary
Burns traveled to Tunis on behalf of the Secretary and discussed the
issue with the Prime Minister. Between October 7 and December 21,
Ambassador Walles had numerous conversations in person and by phone
with the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Interior, the Foreign
Minister, MFA State Secretary, and the Senior Advisor to the Prime
Minister to request FBI access to an individual who was detained in
Tunisia subsequent to the Benghazi attack. He also discussed this with
the Tunisian President and Prime Minister. The Embassy transmitted
numerous diplomatic notes and letters to the Tunisian Government during
this period formally seeking access to this individual and providing
additional information.
Ali Ani al-Harzi was conditionally released from Tunisian custody
on January 7. As I noted in my testimony, we have been assured that the
Tunisian Government is monitoring his whereabouts. We have expressed
concern about his release on multiple occasions. I called Prime
Minister Jebali on January 13. Ambassador Walles, together with the FBI
Director, met with the Prime Minister and Minister of Justice on
January 17 to express concern. The Tunisian Government explained that
the investigative judge had to release al-Harzi because there was not
sufficient evidence to continue to detain him.
We will continue to work closely with the Tunisian Government on
this investigation, carrying out President Obama's directive that ``we
will not waiver in our commitment to see that justice is done for this
terrible act.''
Question. On what date did you learn that al-Harzi would be
released?
Answer. We learned of the release on January 7. We did not receive
advance notice.
Question. Was any request made or discussions had about requesting
that he be transferred to U.S. custody (either from Turkey or Tunisia)?
Answer. Information regarding al-Harzi's detention is associated
with an ongoing investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Questions regarding this matter should be directed to the Department of
Justice.
Question. Have any other individuals been detained by foreign
governments (to include Libya) who may have knowledge about the
September 11, 2012, Benghazi terrorist attacks and would be useful for
the FBI or the intelligence community to have access to? If so, who,
and in what countries are they being detained?
Answer. We defer to the FBI on the details of the investigation
into the Benghazi attacks.
Question. What actions has State Department taken to gain access to
these individuals?
Answer. We are committed to bring those who attacked our compound
to justice. Where we have been aware that another government has
detained an individual in relation to the Benghazi attacks, we have
engaged with that government to assist the FBI with gaining access to
that individual.
Question. What actions have you taken to get either the FBI or the
intelligence community access to these individuals?
Answer. We are committed to bring those who attacked our compound
to justice. Where we have been aware that another government has
detained an individual in relation to the Benghazi attacks, we have
engaged with that government to assist the FBI with gaining access to
that individual.
Question. If countries have individuals in their custody and are
not making them available to the FBI or intelligence community, would
you consider listing them with the designation of nonfully supporting
U.S. antiterrorism efforts (under section 40a of the Arms Export and
Control Act)?
Answer. We will consider all available diplomatic tools to use to
ensure that the U.S. Government has full access to any suspects related
to the Benghazi attacks.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. Did you review or were you briefed on the cables sent
from post in the months leading up to September 11 regarding the
security situation in Libya, specifically in and around Benghazi?
Answer. As I stated in my testimony before the committee, I am
responsible for the nearly 70,000 people who work for the Department of
State. Specific security requests pertaining to Benghazi were handled
by the security professionals in the Department. While I did not see
those requests, I was made aware of certain incidents in Benghazi, as
well as the deteriorating security environment in Libya more generally,
which was a topic of discussion with Libyan officials.
Question. Were you aware of post's requests in March and July 2011
for extended or additional security?
Answer. As I stated in my testimony before the committee, I had no
knowledge of specific security requests, including those in March and
July 2012. These were handled by the security professionals in the
Department.
Question. Were you aware of the more than 200 security incidents
that occurred in Benghazi in the 13 months leading up to the attack on
the U.S. compound that caused most other Western diplomats to leave the
city?
Answer. As I have stated, I was aware of the broader deterioration
of the security environment in Libya and of certain incidents that took
place in Benghazi, such as those that occurred at our facility. I would
note that other Western diplomats also did not leave Benghazi due to
the security situation prior to September 11, 2012.
Question. Can you provide a complete list of how many, if any,
internal or interagency meetings you participated in to discuss the
deteriorating security situation in Benghazi in the months that
preceded the attack?
Answer. As I stated in my testimony before the committee, there
were a number of conversations and meetings where the topic of Libya's
democratic transition and how we could assist in strengthening the
Libyan Government's security capabilities throughout the country were
discussed. We do not have a precise count of how many such meetings
occurred, particularly since Libya was one of a number of topics
discussed--such as transitions in north Africa.
Question. Secretary Clinton visited Libya in October 2011 and
Senior State Department officials visited the country in April and May
2012. Deputy Secretary Burns visited the country in July 2012.
(a) Was the deteriorating security situation in Benghazi
specifically raised in any of the meetings that took place
during those visits, either with the country team or with
Libyan officials?
Answer (a). The security situation in Libya has always been a topic
of conversation and a priority for both the United States and Libya. We
have engaged with Libyan officials at the highest levels about these
issues.
(b) Did Secretary Clinton, Deputy Secretary Burns, or other
officials visiting Libya in the months prior to the attacks
discuss either in person or through memos the role of militias
and the security situation that contributed to post's concerns?
Answer (b). Since the ouster of Qadhafi from power we have been
urging the government to consolidate control over the militias. The
militias had strong political credibility in Libya due to their service
during the revolution, and have often provided security services where
weak official security sector institutions could not, including by
providing security in some locations during the July elections. I met
with Libyan Prime Minister Abdurrahim ElKeib in Washington in March
2012 and Deputy Secretary Burns met the Libyan Deputy Prime Minister in
June 2012.
Question. If the United States had played a leading role in
accelerating the downfall of the Qaddafi regime, do you believe that we
could have helped create a more stable post-Qaddafi security
environment that would have been safer for our diplomatic personnel?
Answer. The United States was a key and critical participant in the
NATO-led operation that supported the Libyan people during the uprising
against Muammar Qadhafi's dictatorship. We have supported the new
Libyan authorities following the end of the conflict, and we were one
of the first countries on the ground following the revolution. We have
provided the new, democratically elected government with U.S.
assistance to foster a more stable security environment for the Libyan
people.
Question. Secretary Clinton met with Libyan Prime Minister
Abdurrahim ElKeib in Washington in March 2012 and Secretary Burns met
the Libyan Deputy Prime Minister in June 2012.
Did either Libyan official express any concern about the
security situation in Benghazi? If so, was this message shared
with others in the U.S. Government?
Answer. In March 2012 the security situation in Eastern Libya
remained relatively stable. The focus of the ElKeib visit was on
shepherding political support for Libya for national elections in July,
a goal that was perceived by many to be overly ambitious for the
fledgling transitional government. The visit also focused on building
commercial ties with the oil-rich country.
Question. What State Department officials involved in reviewing
Embassy Tripoli's security resources requests has resigned from
government service for their decisions to reject post's requests?
Answer. All four individuals identified in the independent
Accountability Review Board's (ARB) report have been removed from their
jobs and placed on administrative leave while we step through the
personnel process to determine next steps. The ARB did not find these
four individuals to have breached their duty, because, as the Board
highlighted, unsatisfactory leadership is not grounds for finding a
breach of duty under Federal statute and regulations. We have submitted
legislation to Congress to clarify that the Department may take
disciplinary action on the basis of unsatisfactory leadership in
relation to a security incident and to permit further leeway to future
ARBs to recommend such disciplinary action.
Question. When on the evening of September 11 were you notified of
the attacks on the Benghazi facilities?
Answer. As I stated in my testimony before the committee, I was
notified of the initial attack on our compound in Benghazi shortly
after 4 p.m. Eastern Standard time.
Question. What actions did you take to ensure that all effort was
made to assist U.S. personnel in Benghazi? Who else in the U.S.
Government did you consult about this? Were you involved in any
meetings or telephone calls with President Obama or White House
officials that evening?
Answer. As I stated during the hearing, upon learning of the attack
on September 11 we engaged in continuous conversations within the
Department, the interagency, and internationally to ensure all effort
was made to assist our personnel in Benghazi. I immediately instructed
Senior Department officials and Diplomatic Security personnel to
consider every option to seek as much security support as possible and
to coordinate with Libyan authorities.
I spoke several times with National Security Advisor Tom Donilon to
seek all possible support from the White House, which they quickly
provided. I also spoke with our Charge d'Affaires in Tripoli to receive
updates on the situation and to former CIA Director Petraeus to confer
and coordinate. I called Libyan General National Congress President
Magariaf to press him for greater support, not only in Benghazi but
also in Tripoli. I participated in a secure video conference of senior
officials from the intelligence community, the White House, and the
Department of Defense, during which we reviewed the options and the
actions we were taking. And I spoke with President Obama later in the
evening to update him on the situation. I spoke early on the morning of
September 12 with General Dempsey and again with Tom Donilon. As I told
the committee, the two hardest calls that I made were obviously to the
families of the families of Ambassador Stevens and Sean Smith.
Question. Did the Libyan Government request any security assistance
or training in the months that followed the fall of Qaddafi, during
your visit in October 2011 or during any of the visits of other State
Department officials? Were those requests approved or denied?
Answer. Libyan officials have requested U.S. advice and assistance
in rebuilding their security sector architecture and to establish
control over their land borders. Since the revolution, the United
States has provided the Government of Libya with targeted technical
assistance in a number of critical areas to help establish security
sector institutions appropriate for a democratic state, and to develop
the capacities needed to control loose weapons, counter terrorism, and
improve border security management.
During multiple visits to Libya by the Department of Defense's
Defense Institution Reform Initiative in 2012, we advised the Libyan
Ministry of Defense on establishing defense institutions and armed
forces that are unified, capable, and subject to civilian control and
the rule of law. Furthermore we are providing training for Libyan
military leaders in military officer professional development schools
and familiarization visits to the United States, and provided
assistance to develop an English learning lab to promote military-to-
military cooperation. We have also been providing counterterrorism
training to the Libyan military.
Our FY 2012 bilateral budget for Libya includes $800,000 in Anti-
Terrorism Assistance to enhance the government's control through law
enforcement, border security, and investigation capacity assistance.
This budget also includes $1.3 million in assistance to build
capability and capacity among Libya's border security agencies to
detect, interdict, investigate, and prosecute illicit weapons
transfers. This assistance awaits resolution of a hold in the House of
Representatives.
Further, we have been working with the Libyan authorities since
August 2011 to secure and disable Qadhafi-era weapons stockpiles. Our
Conventional Weapons Destruction programs have identified Libya's
ammunition storage areas and continue to inventory and control
conventional weapons and munitions with an emphasis on man-portable air
defense systems and other advanced conventional weapons with the help
of trained Libyan nationals. On September 4, 2012, we designated Libya
as a country eligible for the Global Security Contingency Fund, a joint
Department of Defense and State initiative pooling together resources
and expertise to provide security assistance.
Question. What, if any specific actions has the administration
taken since the September 11 attacks in Benghazi to assist the Libyan
Government in its efforts to dismantle militias and extend government
control throughout the country?
Answer. After Libya's Prime Minister and his cabinet were seated in
November 2012, we pressed the new government to use its mandate from
the people to articulate its security sector priorities, noting that
the United States stands ready to assist. During a December 17 meeting
of senior officials in London, a Libyan interministerial delegation
worked with the U.N. Support Mission in Libya, the United States, and
other international partners to identify and address these priorities.
This meeting, which the United States strongly encouraged and
facilitated, catalyzed efforts by the Libyan authorities to better
evaluate offers of assistance. We are working with the U.N. and other
international partners to build on the December 17 meeting and assist
Libya with its articulated security sector priorities.
Question. The New York Times reported a month after the Benghazi
attacks that the United States was increasing efforts to help Libya
build its own niche military capabilities, including Special Forces, to
combat the types of groups that were involved in the attack on our
diplomats.
Why was such assistance not a higher priority prior to
Benghazi?
Answer. Helping to grow Libya's security capabilities and capacity
has always been a high priority for both of our governments, especially
with the presence of militant groups' looking to fill any security
vacuum especially following Qadhafi's fall. Following the July 7
elections, the new democratically elected Libyan authorities felt they
had the mandate to improve the security situation and accepted a U.S.
proposal in August 2012 to help them build niche military
counterterrorism capabilities.
Question. Looking at the security situation today in Libya, what
lessons have we learned and should apply about how the United States
and our allies handle future post-conflict situations?
Answer. Every situation is unique but there are lessons to learn
from Libya. Despite overthrowing a brutal regime and organizing
successful democratic elections in July 2012, Libyans have struggled to
rebuild their country and establish a government with the necessary
capacity. The security situation remains fragile and Libyans face
numerous challenges as they seek to reform the country's institutions,
disarm and reintegrate the militias into civilian life, and provide
security throughout the country, not least for diplomatic missions.
Libya's various transitional governments have asked the United States
and its other international partners, including the United Nations
Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), to assist with technical advice,
training, and other support. We have since the fall of Qadhafi
endeavored to respond to those requests, and we need congressional
support to do so. Libya is a wealthy country, so we have looked to
provide assistance principally in areas that the government could not
support quickly or where government support is inappropriate. We
continue to examine ways to increase this support and make it more
effective. Unfortunately, progress has been slow and the Libyan
Government has not yet succeeded in restoring security throughout the
country.
There is no easy solution for ensuring post-conflict stability in
any nation. It is clear that the days and weeks immediately following a
regime change are crucial to the longer term trajectory. But limited
U.S. resources and the importance of a Libyan led reconstruction means
that it is not simply a question of more resources. It is crucial for
the United States to move quickly in the first days, to target its
assistance at specific sectors where we have a strong national
interest, demonstrated competence, and buy-in from local authorities.
Finally, it is important to coordinate closely with our allies to share
the burden of post-conflict stabilization and to ensure that our
messaging to new governments is consistent and reinforcing.
Question. On Security Resources Allocation: In testimony given on
October 10, 2012, State Department officials indicated that security
weaknesses in Benghazi did not result from a lack of security
resources.
Can you identify the pressing security needs that diverted
resources from Benghazi prior to the attacks?
Answer. The issue of resources is global, not specific, as
explained in the independent Accountability Review Board (ARB) report.
The report states, ``For many years the State Department has been
engaged in a struggle to obtain the resources necessary to carry out
its work, with varying degrees of success. This has brought about a
deep sense of the importance of husbanding resources to meet the
highest priorities, laudable in the extreme in any government
department.'' In light of the ARB report, we are reexamining how we
allocate resources to security requests and stepping up engagement with
Congress to ensure that we have adequate resources.
Question. As the Report of the Accountability Review Board on
Benghazi confirmed, security at the U.S. facilities in Benghazi was
woefully inadequate to the threat environment in the area.
What unique requirements are in place today that mandate
review and approval by higher level officials of decisions that
allocate or deny security resources to posts with extraordinary
or evolving security situations?
Answer. We are undertaking a thorough review of the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security's organization and management. A panel is being
formed to focus on operating overseas, both in the policy and security
arenas. This panel will begin its work in February and will be tasked
to provide guidance and recommendations on restructuring the
organization of Diplomatic Security to ensure effective allocation of
resources.
In addition, the Department established a new Deputy Assistant
Secretary position for High Threat Posts and has provided requisite
staff. This will focus attention and resources allocation for security
at these posts.
As a result of the ARB report, we are looking at ways to ensure
that Assistant Secretaries, Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and special
envoys who support U.S. missions abroad share responsibility with
Senior Department principals, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the
Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations--to support Chiefs of Mission
in protecting U.S. personnel and facilities, exercising judgment to
balance U.S. interests and policy priorities, evolving security
threats, and the mitigation of security risks.
We believe these steps, and others that will be identified as we
move forward implementing the ARB recommendations, will make allocating
our resources for security more effective, with appropriate scrutiny
applied at crucial decision points.
Question. Does the State Department require that officials at the
Bureau of Diplomatic Security responsible for decisions on the
allocation of security resources have a background in overseas security
operations or threat analysis? If so, what are those requirements?
Answer. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) is the security and
law enforcement arm of the U.S. Department of State. DS special agents
are Federal law enforcement officers who serve worldwide. Throughout an
agent's career, from basic training at the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center to accredited training at the Diplomatic Security
Training Center, special agents receive the necessary training for the
design, development, implementation, and review of comprehensive
security programs.
Question. In your opinion, how clearly defined were the roles of
different agencies in responding to a security threat or attack on the
installations in Benghazi on the day of the attacks?
Answer. The interagency worked quickly and collaboratively to
respond to the attack in Benghazi on September 11, and the independent
Accountability Review Board stated that ``Washington-Tripoli-Benghazi
communication, cooperation, and coordination on the night of the
attacks were effective.'' The President gave clear directions to
Secretary Panetta and Chairman Dempsey to work to mobilize all
available assets and move them into the region as rapidly as possible,
which the Department of Defense immediately set out to do.
The ARB report also weighed in on this issue: ``The Board found no
evidence of any undue delays in decisionmaking or denial of support
from Washington or from the military combatant commanders. Quite the
contrary: the safe evacuation of all U.S. Government personnel from
Benghazi 12 hours after the initial attack and subsequently to Ramstein
Air Force Base was the result of exceptional U.S. Government
coordination and military response and helped save the lives of two
severely wounded Americans.'' Still, it is important that we do more to
coordinate with the Department of Defense and other interagency
colleagues as we adjust our posture in light of the new landscape we
face today in the region. And we have already started to do just that.
Question. What steps have been taken by the State Department and
other relevant elements in the national security structure to clarify
interagency responsibilities in case of an emergency response in
similar far-flung outposts?
Answer. As the independent Accountability Review Board (ARB)
reported, ``The interagency response was timely and appropriate, but
there simply was not enough time given the speed of the attacks for
armed U.S. military assets to have made a difference. Senior-level
interagency discussions were underway soon after Washington received
initial word of the attacks and continued through the night.'' Further,
the ARB found that, ``Washington-Tripoli-Benghazi communication,
cooperation, and coordination on the night of the attacks were
effective, despite multiple channels of communication among Washington,
Tripoli, Benghazi, and AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart, as well as
multiple channels of communication within Washington itself.''
To further improve interagency cooperation on diplomatic security,
the Department has worked with Department of Defense on defining
requirements for identified high-risk posts. The Bureau of Diplomatic
Security has been engaged with the U.S. Marine Corps in discussions to
increase the number of Marine Security Guard detachments overseas.
We will also have broader discussions with the Department of
Defense to evaluate providing more capabilities and capacities at
higher risk posts.
In furtherance of these efforts, the Department submitted an
increased security funding proposal, which would include establishing
additional Marine Security Guards, to the Congress in November 2012. In
order to fully implement this increased security proposal, additional
transfer authority is essential to be able to transfer existing
Overseas Contingency Operations funds between State operations accounts
to address urgent security and construction requirements at posts
abroad.
Question. Considering the need for forward-leaning diplomatic
engagement and activities in places with evolving security conditions,
do you expect any revisions to the Security Environment Threat List
(SETL) that informs the work of the Diplomatic Security Service?
Answer. The SETL is a long-range planning tool and should not be
viewed as comprising dynamic ratings that are adjusted in relation to
constantly evolving contemporaneous threats. DS's Office of
Intelligence and Threat Analysis is the lead office within DS
responsible for compiling the SETL, which is published annually. The
very few off-cycle changes to the annual SETL ratings are coordinated
between DS headquarters and post.
While the SETL provides guidance, it is not the definitive word in
asset allocation, especially in a global society that is ever-evolving
where we must continuously evaluate risks and needs. This is especially
true in nations with fragile governments or emerging democracies where
additional security resources may be committed to posts as necessary in
response to the emergent circumstances regardless of the threat levels
assigned in the annual SETL.
Presently, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), in consultation
with other U.S. agencies, assigns threat levels to each post across six
categories: terrorism; political violence; residential crime;
nonresidential crime; human intelligence; and technical threat. These
six threat categories, and the corresponding ratings assigned to each
post, in turn inform the Department's Security Environment Threat List
(SETL). Ratings are assigned for each category based on a four-level
scale: Critical, High, Medium, and Low.
Additionally, the SETL assists DS management in determining the
needs of overseas security programs and helps advise effective
allocation of resources in order to meet Overseas Security Policy Board
(OSPB) standards.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator Jeff Flake
Question. In the wake of the attacks on our facilities in Benghazi,
I was surprised to see Susan Rice, our Ambassador to the United
Nations, as the representative chosen to speak to the press and the
American people about those attacks. And as we all now know, the
talking points she was given were inaccurate and painted a false
account of what really happened in Benghazi. I do not believe the
administration has satisfactorily explained why those talking points
were inaccurate, but I do not intend to address that here.
On November 14, President Obama excoriated some of my colleagues on
the issue of Susan Rice and Benghazi, stating that, ``for them to go
after the U.N. Ambassador, who had nothing to do with Benghazi . . . is
outrageous.'' My question for you, Secretary Clinton, is
Why was Susan Rice deputized to be the face of Benghazi for
the administration, when even the President has said that Rice
``had nothing to do with Benghazi?'' Was she the correct person
to tap for this position, in your opinion?
Answer. As I stated during my testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on January 23, it was not in any way unusual for
Ambassador Rice--a senior administration foreign policy official and
member of the Cabinet--to have represented the administration by
speaking to a full range of foreign affairs and national security
issues on the Sunday talk shows on September 16.
Just as President Obama and I said several times during the week
following the attacks, as Ambassador Rice stated in her remarks, and as
I said when I appeared before you last week: We were sharing the best,
most current information that we had at the time, making it clear that
it would likely change, as is often the case after such incidents.
Question. The gaps in security at our facility in Benghazi have
been addressed, the Accountability Review Board has given
recommendations to address them, and things have started to happen at
the State Department as a result. But several questions remain about
the Benghazi facility itself.
According to the report issued on December 30 by the Senate
Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee (HSGAC), ``despite
the inability of the Libyan Government to fulfill its duties to secure
the facility, the increasingly dangerous threat assessments, and a
particularly vulnerable facility, the Department of State officials did
not conclude the facility in Benghazi should be closed or temporarily
shut down.''
Why did the facility in Benghazi remain open despite the
security risks it faced?
The committee report also notes that colocation of the
various governmental facilities in Benghazi was being
considered in December 2011. Why was this plan never realized?
Answer. Benghazi is at the heart of a larger struggle within Libya
between those who want to build a stable and prosperous democracy, and
extremists who are pursuing a radical agenda. The new Libya was being
born in Benghazi and we had to be present to understand the post-
revolutionary conditions. We have learned again and again that when
America is absent--especially from the dangerous places--there are
consequences: extremism takes root, our interests suffer, and our
national security is threatened.
Neither staff in Libya nor in Washington recommended that the TMF
be closed. Ambassador Stevens had traveled to Benghazi on September 10
to carry out routine diplomatic business, reconnect with his contacts
from his time as special envoy in Benghazi, and to open a cultural
center to reach out to local youth.
Our security personnel at the Benghazi TMF and the security team at
the Annex maintained a close working relationship and reinforced one
another when needed. While collocation had been discussed as an option,
and was still under consideration, it was never implemented by the two
teams on the ground.
Question. In an exchange with Senator Cardin during the hearing,
you mentioned that the regime of Muammar Gaddafi had stockpiled
warehouses of weapons, many of which have made their way into the black
market and into the hands of terrorists since Gaddafi's ouster. And
questions have arisen as to whether some of the same terrorists
involved in the Benghazi attacks were also involved in the recent
attack on an oil field in Algeria.
When the decision was made that the United States would
involve itself in the military effort to oust Gaddafi, were we
aware of the stockpiled weapons inside Libya? How many were
there, and where did they initially come from?
Answer. We and our NATO partners had long been aware that Muammar
Qadhafi had amassed a vast arsenal of conventional weapons and
munitions, including man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), during
the four decades of his dictatorship.
Due to the secretive nature of the regime and Libya's relative
diplomatic isolation we are unable to determine the precise size of the
Qadhafi regime's weapons holdings.
The opaque nature of the Qadhafi regime also means we have
incomplete information about the suppliers and sources of these
conventional weapons. We know that Soviet/Warsaw Pact nations were
major suppliers, along with China and several other states.
To what degree were these weapons a factor in planning for
Libyan reconstruction?
Answer. Loose, poorly secured, and otherwise at-risk weapons and
munitions prolong instability, complicate reconstruction planning, and
delay Libya's ability in reconstruction. We recognized this threat
prior to the conflict, and began working to directly address this
threat as soon as areas were freed from Qadhafi control. Beginning even
before the fall of the Qadhafi regime, State Department-funded
contractors provided support to transitional authorities in an effort
to rapidly account for and secure MANPADS and other advanced
conventional weapons. (In the east, for instance, we began working with
the Transitional National Council to assist in securing and destroying
weapons once the fight against Qadhafi had moved further west.)
The United States, in coordination with the United Nations, the
European Union, and other international partners, continues to support
the Government of Libya as its seeks to bring peace and stability to
the country with technical assistance in the areas of disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), police training, and border
security. As the new Libyan Government continues to stabilize and make
decisions as the country's first elected government in over 40 years,
we will continue our engagement and explore opportunities to expand our
assistance in this regard. Libyan leadership is essential to success in
this area, and we remain uniquely positioned to provide assistance as
requested by the new Libyan Government.
What efforts were taken to secure these warehouses and
stockpiles?
Answer. Since April 2011, the United States has led an
international effort, in cooperation with the Government of Libya, to
account for Libya's advanced conventional weapons, including MANPADS.
Through these ongoing efforts, we have accounted for, secured, or
destroyed more than 5,000 MANPADS and components.
Once the revolution began, we funded the work of two
nongovernmental organizations operating in the eastern parts of Libya
to clear unexploded ordnance at ammunition storage areas, hospitals,
and schools. Beginning even before the fall of the Qadhafi regime,
State Department-funded contractors provided support to transitional
authorities in an effort to rapidly account for and secure MANPADS and
other advanced conventional weapons.
With the arrival of the first democratically elected Libyan
Government in over four decades on July 7, 2012, we transitioned this
program into a longer term effort to identify, inventory, and secure or
dispose of stockpiled armaments and munitions. In all, the United
States has committed approximately $40,000,000 in assistance to the
Government of Libya for this collaborative effort. As an essential
element of this approach, the United States is also cooperating closely
with the U.N., the European Union, and key international partners
including the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium, and
France, to support the Libyan Government in securing its stockpiles.
How is it that these weapons are now turning up in other
deadly attacks across north Africa?
Answer. In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, transitional
authorities in Libya were unable to track all of the weapons removed
from stockpiles during the power vacuum created by the fall of the
regime. Moreover, the new government continues to encounter various
challenges establishing control over these weapons as it works to
reconstitute the country's decimated security sector institutions. It
is still negotiating with tribal and militia forces to account for
weapons held by these groups. Militants and smugglers have taken
advantage of this protracted power vacuum for their own nefarious
interests, and have destabilized north Africa and the Sahel.
As noted above, we continue to lead an international effort to
support the Government of Libya as they identify, inventory, and secure
or dispose of stockpiled armaments and munitions. The government is
developing plans, assisted by the United States, the European Union,
Italy and other allies, to address Libya's porous borders and develop
its military and border security forces.
Libya's neighboring countries are also mobilizing to address this
threat and build needed capacities--a daunting task considering their
long and unpopulated borders, and long timelines required to develop
effective measures. We have engaged the governments of countries across
the region and coordinated with partners to build these capacities. For
example, we have assisted the Governments of Niger and Chad to mitigate
the threat of weapons proliferation, expanding assistance for their
efforts to comprehensively patrol their borders and interdict weapons
traffickers. As an essential element of this approach, the United
States is also cooperating closely with the U.N., the European Union,
and key international partners including the United Kingdom, Canada,
the Netherlands, Belgium, and France, to support these governments in
addressing these threats.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator John Barrasso
Question. In the letter dated December 18, 2012, you stated, ``We
continue to hunt the terrorists responsible for the attacks in Benghazi
and are determined to bring them to justice.'' During the hearing in
December, I asked the status of bringing those responsible to justice.
Has the United States identified the terrorists responsible
for the deaths of the four brave Americans, the injuries of two
U.S. personnel, and the destruction of U.S. facilities?
Answer. As I stated during the hearing, the FBI is following some
promising leads, and we are committed to bringing those responsible for
these attacks to justice. This is still a complex picture, and the FBI
and our intelligence community continue to piece it together. We defer
to the FBI for any details about the progress of their investigation.
In high-level interactions with Libyan Government officials, we have
made clear that this is a top policy priority both for the President
and for me.
Question. Are there any individuals currently being detained who
have information about the attacks? Is so, who are they and where are
they located? Has the U.S. been granted access to question them?
Answer. We defer to the FBI for any details about the progress of
their investigation into the attacks on our facilities in Benghazi. The
State Department is working with the interagency to explore every
opportunity to gain information to bring the perpetrators of this crime
to justice.
Question. What specific steps has the Department of State taken to
identify,
locate, and bring the terrorists to justice?
Answer. We defer to the FBI on the details of the investigation
into the Benghazi attacks. However, where we have been aware that
another government has detained an individual subsequent to the
Benghazi attack, we have aggressively engaged with that government so
the FBI can gain access to that individual.
Question. On October 4, 2012, the FBI and an investigation team
finally arrived in Benghazi, Libya, after the attack on September 11,
2012. While the investigation team was unable to make it to the
consulate, CNN had reporters on the scene and accessing unsecured
materials within 3 days of the attack.
Why did it take 23 days for the U.S. investigators to get
to Benghazi to secure information when media reporters where
there within 3 days after the attacks?
Answer. I instructed the Department to ensure that we were good
partners to the FBI. The weekend after the attack, we worked with the
Libyan Embassy to ensure that the Bureau's team had expedited visas and
that they were able to travel to Libya as soon as possible, which they
did. However, in the days and weeks following the attack the U.S.
Government did not want to send our employees back to Benghazi until we
concluded it was safe to do so. We also understood from Libyan
officials that U.S. Government officials would have been a target in
Benghazi at that time.
Question. Following the terrorist attack, what specific requests
were made by the U.S. Government to the Government of Libya? How did
the Government of Libya respond to the requests of the United States?
Answer. The security of our personnel and posts around the world is
the highest priority for me and the Department. We have requested the
cooperation of the Government of Libya at the highest levels as we work
to bring the perpetrators of the attacks on our facilities in Benghazi
to justice. We worked closely with the Libyan Government to request
additional security at our facilities in Tripoli following the attack
in Benghazi and continue to coordinate with the government based on
threat information. The Libyan authorities are challenged by the
deteriorating security situation in the area and their limited
institutional capabilities. These challenges have affected the pace of
the investigation. FBI Director Robert Mueller, Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence Michael Vickers, Deputy Secretary William
Burns, and I have all proposed U.S. security assistance to help the
Libyan Government overcome these obstacles and Libyan authorities have
welcomed these offers.
Prior to the Benghazi attack Libyan security vehicles patrolled the
area of our Embassy in Tripoli. Following the attack, additional Libyan
security personnel were provided. Subsequently, and in response to our
requests, Libyan authorities positioned security vehicles and personnel
at our Embassy. Also following the Benghazi attack, the Libyan
authorities facilitated the deployment of a U.S. Marine Corps FAST
platoon to protect our Embassy in Tripoli. The arrival of a DS Mobile
Security Deployment team to Tripoli following the attack was also
supported and facilitated by the GOL.
Question. How would you characterize the support, cooperation, and
assistance provided to the United States from the Government of Libya?
Other countries in the region?
Answer. The new, democratically elected Government of Libya has
demonstrated political will to help, but very limited investigative
capacity. I defer to the FBI on questions referring to the current
progress of the investigation into the Benghazi attacks.
Question. What efforts are being taken by the Department of State
to ensure other governments are cooperating and granting access to
vital information needed in our investigation?
Answer. We are committed to bringing those who attacked our
compound to justice. Whenever we are aware of a possible lead in this
case, we aggressively engage with the government that has that
information in order to gain access.
Question. The Secretary of State established an advisory panel on
the security of overseas facilities after the bombing of our Embassy in
Beirut in 1983. It issued an extensive report, referred to sometimes as
the Inman Report.
After the East Africa Embassy bombings in 1998, an Accountability
Review Board was established. Its extensive report cited many times to
the Inman Report.
The recent Accountability Review Board report on Benghazi cites to
both the Inman and the East Africa Embassy bombings Accountability
Review Board reports. For example, it says ``a recurring theme
throughout the Board's work was one also touched upon by the Nairobi
and Dar es Salaam [Accountability Review Boards] in 1999,'' pertaining
to stove-piped decisionmaking.''
Why has the Department of State failed to fully implement
the recommendations of these previous Boards?
Answer. There have been 18 previous ARBs, with a total of 164
recommendations. A preliminary review indicates the Department has
implemented over 90 percent of these past recommendations. The
implementation of a few recommendations remains ongoing, and less than
10 recommendations were assessed and not implemented because they were
either not in the purview of the State Department, implementation
raised alternate safety concerns, or alternate action was taken.
In order to execute most effectively the recommendations from the
most recent and previous ARBs, ongoing funding is required--and as such
it is critical there is a strong partnership between the Department of
State and the Congress. Declining funding has, as Ambassador Pickering
and Admiral Mullen noted, led to a slowdown in the Department's ability
to build new Inman facilities.
Question. How are you going to ensure that future Accountability
Review Boards are not going to cite this report as lessons told but
never implemented?
Answer. As I stated during my testimony, I accepted all 29
recommendations of the independent Accountability Review Board (ARB).
When the ARB report was issued, we immediately evaluated the 29
recommendations, and developed 64 separate taskings needed for their
implementation. We formed working groups, issued guidance, and
developed a path to implementation. Some of the recommendations have
already been implemented; some are well on their way to completion; and
some will require long-term action, but we have set milestones to
achieve implementation of all of them. The Department has been
monitoring and tracking these recommendations and the specific taskings
related to each to ensure their implementation. As I stated,
implementation of all of the recommendations will be underway, and a
number completed, by the time the next Secretary of State takes office.
It is important to note that implementing many of the
recommendations is dependent on sufficient funding and support from
Congress. We are seeking legislative language that would authorize us
to transfer previously appropriated funds from one of our accounts to
another, which would allow the Department to use the funds more
effectively to support increased security measures. We will continue to
work with Congress on funding and any needed legislative authorities.
Question. The Accountability Review Board's report recommended that
we strengthen security beyond the traditional reliance on host
government security support in High Risk, High Threat Posts.
At present, how many High Risk, High Threat Posts are there
in the world?
Answer. This is a complicated question and one that we are
constantly evaluating. Currently the newly established Deputy Assistant
Secretary for High Threat Posts oversees 28 posts in 17 nations.
Question. How many of those posts currently have security beyond
the traditional reliance on the host government's security support?
Answer. Currently, 10 of the High Threat Posts have security
programs to augment host government security support.
Question. How many posts rely on local armed militias rather than
central government forces?
Answer. Host nations generally provide additional protection for
diplomatic personnel within their borders. Libyan governmental
authorities arranged for February 17th Brigade personnel to provide us
with security in Benghazi.
Libya was unique. I will be happy to send up experts to brief you
on our security posture in high-threat locations.
Question. To what extent does the Department of State use similar
``Special Mission'' designations and what are the implications
regarding security provisions for those posts?
Answer. The Department of State officially designates overseas
posts as either an embassy, a consulate, or consulate general, an
interest section, or a mission to an international organization. As an
interim facility, there was no formal designation assigned to Benghazi.
``Special Mission'' is used informally, but is not an official
designation for facilities by the Department of State and therefore,
there are no specific implications regarding security.
Question. The report on page 11 recommends certain security
measures at what are known as non-Inman and non-SECCA facilities.
These facilities appear to not comply with the physical security
recommendations of the advisory panel on the security of overseas
facilities established after the bombing of our Embassy in Beirut in
1983, and of the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act
of 1999, passed in the wake of the 1998 East Africa Embassy bombings.
In your letter to Congress, you state there are more than 275
diplomatic posts around the world.
How many of these posts are non-Inman and non-SECCA
facilities? Why do these posts continue to be in noncompliance?
Which regions might you anticipate a need for funding that
is not in the current budget request?
Answer. To the extent the budget process allows, the Department,
with congressional support, continues to upgrade overseas facilities
and, where necessary, replace facilities to increase their safety,
security, and functionality. Since the 1999 enactment of SECCA, the
Department has completed 71 new diplomatic facilities and has 19 under
design or construction to provide a safer, more secure work environment
for U.S. Government employees and locally employed staff. Prior to
SECCA, the Department completed 19 Inman projects and 8 pre-Inman
projects that incorporated the new standards to the extent possible.
These 117 posts represent about 42.5 percent of our overseas posts.
This leaves approximately 158 posts that have facilities that may not
meet current security standards. Many of these facilities were built or
acquired prior to the establishment of the current security standards,
and others are subject to authorized waivers and/or exceptions.
Each year, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develops a list of the
80 most vulnerable posts and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings
Operations uses this list to inform the Department's Capital Security
Construction Program. These posts represent all regions of the world.
Replacement of these facilities is an ongoing and long-term program and
is driven by ever-changing terrorist threats, which result in evolving
security standards, and is affected by budgetary constraints. But one
thing is clear--we will not allow a mission to open or to remain open
if we believe that we are unable to protect our people and mitigate
risks.
Posts not scheduled for new embassy construction in the near term
receive compound security upgrades to protect our overseas staff and
facilities. In addition, as security standards change, the Department
goes back and retrofits more recently built facilities with additional
security measures.
The Accountability Review Board recommended increasing the budget
for embassy replacement to accelerate the program and counter the loss
of funding due to inflation so we can expedite the replacement of
facilities that predate the current security standards.
The Department would be pleased to provide a briefing on our
overseas construction programs.
Question. In your letter to Congress, you spoke of the diplomatic
campaign being undertaken to address strategic challenges in the
region. The 9/11 Commission specifically recommended that a
comprehensive U.S. strategy to counter terrorism should include
economic policies that encourage development and more open societies.
It noted that we had announced a goal of working toward a Middle East
Free Trade Area by 2013.
Will the MEFTA be complete this year? What is the status of
your efforts on that initiative?
Answer. We remain fully engaged with our partners in the region on
trade and investment issues and share your view that a comprehensive
U.S. economic strategy in the region is necessary. At present we have
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with five countries in the region: Israel,
which entered into force in 1985; Jordan (2001); Morocco (2006);
Bahrain (2006); and Oman (2009). These agreements have played a key
role in increasing U.S. exports and in enhancing prosperity in the
region.
Since early 2011, we have been pursuing Trade and Investment
Partnerships (TIPs) with Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Jordan. These
partnerships include reaching agreement with our partners on a Joint
Declaration on Principles of International Investment; a Joint
Declaration of Principles on Trade in Information and Communication
(ICT) Services; and a Protocol on Trade Facilitation and Customs
Procedures. We reached agreement with Morocco in December 2012 and have
concluded all except the Trade Facilitation Protocol with Jordan. Egypt
is sending a delegation in early February for bilateral discussions on
the three agreements, and we have invited a delegation from Tunisia to
Washington for discussions in the near future.
Question. The United States accepts a certain amount of risk to
operate in areas like Benghazi. The Accountability Review Board stated,
``risk mitigation involved two imperatives--engagement and security--
which require wise leadership, good intelligence and evaluation, proper
defense and strong preparedness, and at times, downsizing, indirect
access, and even withdrawal.''
What are the factors the Department of State considers when
determining whether a location is simply too dangerous to
support a diplomatic presence?
Answer. The Department of State, in coordination with other U.S.
Government agencies, considers a number of factors in making a
determination whether a particular location is permissive for a U.S.
diplomatic presence. This includes the importance to advancing the
Nation's foreign policy interests and enhancing security at home and
the capability and willingness of the host government to provide host-
nation security. Other factors include the extent and level of
instability to include political and internal violence such as crime,
uncontrolled rioting, civil war and insurgency, and ongoing military
operations. The ability to establish and maintain secure facilities
from which to operate is another factor for consideration. In
situations where it is deemed that vital U.S. interests mandate a
presence in a hostile environment, every effort is made to protect our
personnel overseas, but it is also recognized that advancing U.S.
foreign policy objectives overseas always carries with it inherent
risk.
Question. What are the conditions or triggers that require the
Department of State to evaluate whether to withdraw U.S. presence from
a country?
Answer. The specific conditions or triggers for evaluation of
continued U.S. diplomatic presence vary by country. When evaluating
whether to close a U.S. mission numerous factors are considered,
including but not limited to: the political stability of the host-
nation, the security environment, the ability to mitigate potential
threats, host-nation willingness and capability to provide security
support, and U.S. foreign policy significance and importance.
Question. The Accountability Review Board explained that the
responses from the Libyan guard forces were inadequate and reliance on
them for security in the event of an attack was misplaced.
Who was responsible for making the decision to utilize the
February 17th Martyrs Brigade?
Answer. Host-nations generally provide additional protection for
diplomatic personnel within their borders. Libyan governmental
authorities arranged for February 17th Brigade personnel to provide us
with security in Benghazi.
Question. The Accountability Review Board explained that the
responses from the Libyan guard forces were inadequate and reliance on
them for security in the event of an attack was misplaced.
What assessments of the capabilities and intentions of the
February 17th Martyrs Brigade did the State Department rely on
prior to making a decision to enter into a security arrangement
with Brigade members?
Answer. Host nations generally provide additional protection for
diplomatic personnel within their borders. Libyan governmental
authorities arranged for February 17th Brigade personnel to provide us
with security in Benghazi.
Question. U.S. Ambassadors are often put in difficult positions and
dangerous posts. However, it is not just the ambassadors but also U.S.
personnel that are put at risk.
What procedures and requirements are in place to protect
ambassadors during their travel in-country?
Answer. The size, configurations, and profile of an ambassador's
Chief of Mission (COM) protective detail are based upon a number of
factors, which are compiled and published in the Security Environment
Threat List (SETL). Additionally, other factors can include any
specific threats against an ambassador that are independent of a
country's threat rating. COM security details are tailored to the
ambassador's operational requirements, known threat, and prevailing
security conditions including the legal authority to conduct protective
operations. Protective security operations may employ armored vehicles,
follow vehicles, and bodyguards provided by host-nation, security
personnel working directly for an Embassy under the operational control
of a Regional Security Officer (RSO), a contract protective security
detail also under the RSO or a combination of the above.
Question. Are there mechanisms in place to prevent travel to areas
that place undue risk to the safety of ambassador's and U.S. personnel?
Answer. U.S. diplomatic missions maintain an Emergency Action
Committee (EAC), which is comprised of members of the country team,
chaired by the Deputy Chief of Mission and validated by the Chief of
Mission. The RSO plays a critical role in the EAC, which provides the
ambassador with guidance in preparing for and responding to threats,
emergencies, and other crises at the post or against U.S. interests
elsewhere in-country. The EAC also reviews security policies, such as
post's travel policy, which may recommend particular modes of transport
and prohibited times and/or locations of travel.
Question. How involved are U.S. Ambassadors in dictating the
security postures of the posts under their management?
Answer. Pursuant to The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-
Terrorism Act Of 1986 (Public Law 99-399 (22 U.S.C. 4801, et seq.)), as
amended, the Secretary of State and, by extension, the Chief of
Mission, is responsible for developing and implementing policies and
programs that provide for the protection of all U.S. Government
personnel on official duty abroad (except for Voice of America
correspondents on official assignment and those under the command of a
U.S. area military commander who has responsibility for personnel
security) and their accompanying dependents.
Question. Do U.S. Ambassadors have sole discretion in determining
their travel plans to various areas in the country? Do they receive
intelligence reports about the dangers in the areas tentatively
scheduled for visits?
Answer. The Chief of Mission is guided by the respective travel
policy for his/her post. The travel policy is set by post with input
from the Emergency Action Committee (EAC). The Bureau of Diplomatic
Security (DS) Regional Security Officer (RSO) at post, as part of the
EAC, provides input from a local security perspective for the
development of post's travel policy. Ultimately the ambassador is
responsible for the approval and enforcement of the policy.
A U.S. Ambassador, acting as the personal representative of the
U.S. President, is responsible for the full range of American interests
and programs in their given country of assignment and maintains a valid
security clearance. U.S. Ambassadors have access to intelligence
information from a variety of sources. U.S. Ambassadors normally
coordinate their travel plans with the RSO, who in turn determines if
the intended travel sites present security concerns. Those security
determinations can be supported by intelligence information, if any
specific information exists at the time. After the evaluation, the RSO
makes a recommendation to the ambassador, so the ambassadors can make
the final decision.
Question. Why was Ambassador Stevens in Benghazi, Libya on
September 11, 2012?
Answer. Ambassador Stevens was in Benghazi to meet with Libyan
officials and reengage with the network of contacts that he had
developed during his time there as special envoy and to reaffirm that
he and the United States recognized the importance of Libya's second
city, the cradle of its revolution.
Question. Why did he [Ambassador Stevens] and the Department of
State believe it was safe to travel there [to Benghazi] on September
11, 2012?
Answer. Ambassador Stevens was in Benghazi to meet with Libyan
officials and reengage with the network of contacts that he had
developed during his time there as special envoy, and to reaffirm that
he and the United States recognized the importance of Libya's second
city, the cradle of its revolution. Ambassador Stevens understood
Benghazi better than anyone else in the U.S. Government. He understood
that diplomacy, by its nature, must be practiced in dangerous places
because our interests suffer and our security is threatened when we are
absent.
The independent Accountability Review Board found that intelligence
provided no immediate, specific tactical warning of the September 11,
2012, attacks in Benghazi. The intelligence community has spoken to
this as well.
Question. Knowing that there was an existing Worldwide Protective
Services program (WPPS) with several prime vendors, why didn't the
Department of State's OPO (Overseas Protective Operations) or HTP (High
Threat Protection) offices utilize the WPPS vendors to secure the
Benghazi location?
Answer. As is the case in many countries around the world,
including the United States, the Libyan Government would not allow the
use of armed foreign national contractors in either a static security
or personal security capacity.
Question. There were other WPPS resources around the world with
experienced teams accustomed to working together in similar
environments that could have been reallocated to Libya without having
to train and stand up new resources on a very short timeline.
Why was this option not utilized? Was this option not
offered by the vendors?
Answer. As is the case in many countries around the world,
including the United States, the Libyan Government would not allow the
use of armed foreign national contractors in either a static security
or personal security capacity.
Question. Were the OPO and HTP criteria for appropriate levels of
security at overseas sites utilized and followed for implementing a
security plan for the Benghazi site?
Answer. The Diplomatic Security High Threat Posts Directorate did
not exist at the time of the Benghazi attack. One of the first steps I
took was creating the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary for High
Threat Posts, ensuring that there would be a security professional
whose entire purview was posts in high threat areas. We also refer you
to the findings of the independent Accountability Review Board.
Question. The Department of State contractors who work overseas
must meet several criteria to work on security details, including
medical screening, physical fitness testing, marksmanship, and about 9
weeks of mandatory training.
Were the personnel who executed the security plan for the
Benghazi site trained to WPPS's exacting standards? Were they
medically screened? Were they tested for physical fitness?
marksmanship? Were the staffing levels at the site commensurate
with WPPS program staffing at other sites in the world?
Answer. Local guard forces (typically unarmed) are employed
worldwide by the Department to provide additional protection for U.S.
Government personnel and to protect U.S. facilities from damage or loss
due to violent attack and theft. The local guards check and log visitor
identification, screen visitors and packages entering the compound, and
act as an early warning system. The local guards are also responsible
for the activation of the Imminent Danger Notification System (IDNS) in
the event of a terrorist or mob attack to notify all personnel to take
cover and await further instructions.
The local guard force in Benghazi was not required to meet a
Worldwide Protective Services standard with regard to medical screening
or physical fitness. However, Libyan contract security guards were all
required to undergo a suitability investigation. This included proof of
employment, recommendations, a police check, a credit investigation,
and a physical fitness examination. In addition to this vetting, guards
received various forms of training, including on subjects like
explosive detection, CCTV operation, emergency plans, and the use of
deadly force.
Question. Were the local nationals (LNs) who were used in the
security plan screened to the same standards as LNs at other State
Department sites designated as in a high-threat environment?
Answer. Yes. The standard policies and procedures for hiring and
vetting local guard force personnel are detailed in the Department of
State's Foreign Affairs Manual; the Overseas Security Policy Board
(OSPB) Standards; Foreign Affairs Handbook; and the Local Guard
Handbook.
The Regional Security Officer (RSO) conducts local security checks
as well as interagency database checks in the United States. In
addition, each candidate is interviewed by a local investigator. The
vetting of local guards in Benghazi included proof of successful
employment during the past 3 years and recommendations from their
respective supervisors, in addition to a police check that includes
criminal and/or subversive activities and a check of sources from their
neighborhoods. It is worth noting that while there has been some
confusion, local nationals and Locally Employed Staff are wholly
different.