[Senate Hearing 113-603]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-603
SYRIA SPILLOVER: THE GROWING THREAT OF TERRORISM AND SECTARIANISM IN
THE MIDDLE EAST AND UKRAINE UPDATE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 6, 2014
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Daniel E. O'Brien, Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Burns, Hon. William J., Deputy Secretary of State, U.S.
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 4
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Responses of Deputy Secretary William Burns to Questions
Submitted by Senator Bob Corker............................ 67
Chollet, Hon. Derek, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense,
Washington, DC................................................. 13
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Response of Assistant Secretary Derek Chollet to Question
Submitted by Senator Bob Corker............................ 69
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee.................... 3
Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed, senior fellow, Foundation For Defense
Of Democracies, Washington, DC................................. 44
Prepared statement........................................... 45
Levitt, Ph.D., Matthew, director for Stein Program on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence, The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, Washington, DC............................... 55
Prepared statement........................................... 57
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey.............. 1
Olsen, Hon. Matthew G., director, National Counterterrorism
Center, Washington, DC......................................... 16
Prepared statement........................................... 18
(iii)
SYRIA SPILLOVER: THE GROWING THREAT OF TERRORISM AND SECTARIANISM IN
THE MIDDLE EAST AND UKRAINE UPDATE
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 6, 2014
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:07 a.m,. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez, Cardin, Shaheen, Murphy, Kaine,
Markey, Corker, Risch, Johnson, Flake, Barrasso, and Paul.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. This hearing will come to order. Let me thank
Deputy Secretary of State Burns for coming. While this was
planned, obviously, well before the current state of events,
understanding the challenges of your schedule, we appreciate
your still being here today with us, as well as all of our
panelists for being here to provide their perspective on the
increasingly violent spillover from the ongoing conflict in
Syria, and to hear also from the Deputy Secretary on the
implication of Russia's military intervention in the Ukraine.
As a cautionary note, we have a vote that will be taking
place at around 11:20. So we will see where we are at in the
proceeding. We may have to recess briefly. It is one vote; to
vote and then come back. I am sure the Deputy Secretary would
be happy for us to cast that vote since it is about Rose
Gottemoeller.
As we enter year 3 of the Syria crisis, headlines coming
out of the region are no longer limited to the violence within
Syria, but to the increasing spread of violence across Syria's
borders, especially into Lebanon and Iraq. Of great concern is
the proliferation of al-Qaeda affiliates and splinter groups
and the increasing sectarian rhetoric fueling the increased
violence that offers new opportunities for al-Qaeda to gain
footholds in local communities.
It opens the door for an Iranian-sponsored terrorist
network to justify their presence as the protector of the
region's Shias, while bolstering the Assad regime and
antagonizing Arab States.
The spillover from Syria is dangerous and troubling. In
Lebanon there has been an alarming uptick in high-profile
bombings, many claimed by the al-Qaeda-affiliated Abdullah Azam
Brigades, and at the same time Hezbollah, purportedly
protecting the Lebanese Shia communities, now extending into
Syria, protecting the Assad regime.
From where I sit, the region is becoming increasingly
unstable, increasingly violent, and increasingly sectarian.
Having said that, that is a major challenge for which the
committee obviously wanted to rivet our attention, Ukraine is
the 800-pound gorilla at the moment and we cannot ignore it.
Nor can we ignore that Russia is a common element in both
countries. Russia's support for Assad in Syria and the Russian
invasion and occupation of parts of Ukraine make clear that
Putin's game is not 21st century statesmanship, but 19th
century gamesmanship.
The brave protesters in Maidan Square, having lived under
Russia's mantle for years, stood their ground because they
understood that their fight was not just with their
government's corrupt leaders, but also for the very future of
their independent nation. Putin has cast aside both
international law and his nation's own commitments to respect
the territorial integrity of the Ukraine.
We need a policy that checks and counters Russia's self-
centered, nationalistic and imperialistic, policy that adheres
to no law, not international law, nor even those commitments it
has made personally.
Today our concern is for the Ukraine. Tomorrow it again
could be for Georgia or perhaps Moldova, two nations waiting to
finalize their association agreement with the European Union, a
process that the Ukraine was engaged in, to the displeasure of
the Russian Government.
I want to note that I welcome the administration's
expeditious response to the situation in Ukraine, the pledge of
assistance in the form of loan guarantees, which this committee
intends to endorse in legislation next week, and today's
Executive order restricting visas, freezing assets, blocking
property under U.S. jurisdiction, and preventing American
companies from doing business with any individual or entity
identified by the administration that threatens the peace,
security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of
Ukraine, or contributes to the misappropriation of state assets
of the Ukraine, or purports to assert governmental authority
over any part of Ukraine without authorization from the
Ukrainian Government in Kiev.
This flexible tool will allow the United States to target
those directly responsible for the Crimean crisis and will
further put Putin and his allies on notice that Russia's
actions are not without consequence. The committee is prepared
to codify this action and potentially provide the President
with further authority to respond to the situation as it
develops.
President Putin's game of Russian roulette has pointed the
gun at the international community's head. I believe this time
he has miscalculated and I certainly believe it is essential
that we do not blink. The unity of purpose displayed at the
U.N. Security Council by the European Union and the G7 nations
in support of Ukrainian autonomy, and in opposition to Russian
authoritarianism, demonstrates the world's outrage, and I
believe serves as a call to action.
With that, I would be happy to recognize the distinguished
ranking Republican, Senator Corker, for his remarks.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
having this hearing, and thank you for allowing it to evolve
from Syria to Ukraine because of the current events. I want to
thank all of you for your public service and for being here. I
know that you do not necessarily decide what the policy is, but
you carry it out. I just want to say that I could not be more
disappointed in where we are in Syria. It is kind of amazing
how prognosticators, both here on this panel, at the dais here,
and around the world, stated what was going to happen in Syria
over time if we did not change the balance on the ground, and
unfortunately that is exactly what has happened.
It has turned into a regional conflict, destabilizing other
countries. Al-Qaeda is on the rise, not only, and other
extremists, in Syria, where our Director of National
Intelligence and others are now stating this is becoming a
threat to the homeland, but it is also a threat to the entire
region. You can witness that on the ground in Iraq now, this
incredible violence that is occurring there, and as the
chairman just mentioned, in Lebanon.
You know, we tried to help the administration by passing
something here in this committee and we did so on a 15-3 vote
to arm and really support the vetted opposition. Unfortunately,
the administration just never came around to doing the things
that it stated publicly that it would do, and it just never has
done it. So this has festered and there has never been a change
that has caused Assad to really even want to sit down and
negotiate. Obviously, what happened at Geneva 2 is what
everybody expected.
We gave the President, out of committee on a 10-7 vote, the
authorization for the use of force, and yet the President
really not only did not really make a case for it publicly, but
obviously sort of jumped in Russia's lap to help us out of this
situation in the deal with chemical weapons. Since then I know
that 30 to 40,000 people have been killed. I do not know if the
people who have been killed really care whether it was through
chemical weapons or through barrel bombs that are being
indiscriminately dropped on civilians right now. But it is a
disaster of great proportions.
It is certainly a failure on our part and many other
nations relative to foreign policy, and it is destabilizing the
region. I could not be more disappointed.
And the two are related, as the chairman just mentioned. I
do not know that we could say that Russia would not have done
what it did in Ukraine with a different approach. I do not
think we can state that. But I think that the permissive
environment that we have created through this reset, thinking
that someone like Putin reacts to warmth and charm and reach-
out, when what he really reacts to is weakness and I think he
has seen that in our foreign policy efforts over the course of
this last year.
Again, I do not think we can make a case that what happened
in Crimea would not have happened, but I certainly do not think
he has felt that there would be much of a pushback from us.
So I am thankful today that, again, there are some steps
that are being taken. As the chairman mentioned, we stand
ready, here, to enable the administration to act even more
forcefully. We had a great meeting yesterday. But I could not
be more disappointed that we are where we are. I think our
credibility very much has been on the line, is on the line, and
I do think that us having a unified and very strong reaction
and approach over a long time, not something that is just
short-term, over a long time, is very important relative to
Russia right now, as is regaining some of that credibility.
So I thank you for being here. I know you are going to talk
some about Syria. I hope you will explain more fully what you
think these sanctions that have been announced this morning are
about. I think that would be helpful to us over the next few
days in doing something that is complementary to those efforts.
So I thank you for being here, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Corker.
We will start off with Deputy Secretary Burns, who also
served as Ambassador to Russia from 2005 to 2008 and has some
obvious firsthand experience. We also are pleased to have with
us the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs, Derek Chollet. We appreciate you being here,
as well as the Director for the National Counterterrorism
Center, Matt Olsen. We thank you all.
All of your statements will be fully included in the record
without objection, and I would ask you to more or less
summarize within 5 minutes. If you go over a little bit,
obviously with the gravity of the situation we want to hear
from you. But I know that members do want to engage in a
conversation with you about their issues and concerns.
With that, Mr. Secretary, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. BURNS, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Burns. Thank you very much, Chairman Menendez,
Ranking Member Corker, members of the committee. I very much
appreciate this opportunity. I am pleased to be joined by Matt
Olsen and Derek Chollet and I appreciate your putting my
written testimony into the record.
Before addressing the issue of extremism in the Levant, let
me first offer a quick assessment of developments in Ukraine,
as you requested. A great deal is at stake in Ukraine today.
Less than 48 hours ago, in Kiev not far from the Shrine of the
Fallen, Secretary Kerry made clear America's deep and abiding
commitment to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity
in the face of Russian aggression and our determination to
ensure that the people of Ukraine get to make their own choices
about their future. That is the bedrock conviction for the
United States.
On my own visit last week, I was profoundly moved by the
bravery and selflessness of Ukrainians and profoundly impressed
by the commitment of the new interim government to reach across
ethnic and regional lines and build a stable, democratic, and
inclusive Ukraine with good relations with all of its
neighbors, including Russia.
While we and our partners worked to support Ukraine's
transition, Russia worked actively to undermine it. Russia's
military intervention in Crimea is a brazen violation of its
international obligations and no amount of Russian posturing
can obscure that fact. Ukraine's interim government, approved
by 82 percent of the Rada, including most members of
Yanukovych's party, has shown admirable restraint in the face
of massive provocation. They need and deserve our strong
support.
President Obama, Secretary Kerry, and the entire
administration have been working hard, steadily, and
methodically, to build urgent international backing for
Ukraine, counterpressure against Russia, reassurance to other
neighbors, and a path to deescalation. Our strategy has four
main elements, and we look forward to working with this
committee and with the Congress on each of them.
First, immediate support for Ukraine as it deals with
enormous economic challenges and prepares for critical national
elections at the end of May. On Tuesday Secretary Kerry
announced our intent to seek a $1 billion loan guarantee. That
will be part of a major international effort to build a strong
economic support package for Ukraine as it undertakes reform.
That effort includes the IMF and the EU, which laid out its own
substantial assistance package yesterday.
Prime Minister Yatsanyuk and his colleagues are committed
partners and understand that the Ukrainian Government has
difficult reform choices to make after inheriting an economic
mess from Yanukovych. Ukraine's considerable economic potential
has never been matched by its business environment or economic
leadership and now is the time to begin to get its financial
house in order and realize its promise.
Second, deterring further encroachment on Ukrainian
territory and pressing for an end to Russia's occupation of
Crimea. President Obama has led a broad international
condemnation of Russia's intervention with strong unified
statements from the G7 and NATO, as well as the EU, whose
leaders are meeting today in an emergency summit. We are
sending international observers from the OSCE to Crimea and
eastern Ukraine to bear witness to what is happening and make
clear that minorities are not at risk. This was never a
credible claim by Russia nor a credible pretext for military
intervention.
We are making clear that there are costs for what Russia
has already done and working with our partners to make clear
that the costs will increase significantly if intervention
expands. Today, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the President
signed an Executive order authorizing sanctions, including
asset freezes and travel bans on individuals and entities
responsible for activities undermining democratic processes or
institutions in Ukraine, threatening the peace, security,
stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine,
contributing to the misappropriation of state assets of
Ukraine, or that purport to exercise authority over any part of
Ukraine without authorization from the Ukrainian Government in
Kiev. This EO will be used in a flexible way to designate those
most directly involved in destabilizing Ukraine.
The State Department today also put in place visa
restrictions on a number of officials and individuals. We
continue to look at every aspect of our relationship with
Russia, from suspension of preparations for the Sochi G8 summit
to pausing key elements in our bilateral dialogue.
Third, bolstering Ukraine's neighbors. We are moving
immediately to reinforce our Washington Treaty commitments to
our allies. As Secretary Hagel stressed yesterday, we are
taking concrete steps to support NATO partners through
intensified joint training with our aviation detachment in
Poland and enhanced participation in NATO's air policing
mission in the Baltics.
Fourth, Secretary Kerry is working intensively to
deescalate the crisis in order to restore Ukraine's sovereignty
while creating a diplomatic offramp. We support direct dialogue
between Kiev and Moscow, facilitated by an international
contact group. The President and Secretary Kerry have
emphasized we do not seek confrontation with Russia. It is
clearly in the interest of both Ukraine and Russia to have a
healthy relationship, born of centuries of cultural, economic,
and social ties. The will for that exists among Ukraine's new
leaders, but it cannot happen if Russia continues down its
current dangerous and irresponsible path. That will only bring
greater isolation and mounting costs for Russia.
Our strategy, it seems to me, needs to be steady and
determined, mindful of what is at stake for Ukrainians as well
as for international norms. We also need to be mindful of the
enduring strengths of the United States and its partners and
the very real weaknesses sometimes obscured by Russian bluster.
Most of all, President Putin underestimates the commitment of
Ukrainians across their country to sovereignty and independence
and to writing their own future.
No one should underestimate the power of patient and
resolute counterpressure using all of the nonmilitary means at
our disposal, working with our allies, and leaving the door
open to deescalation and diplomacy if Russia is prepared to
play by international rules.
Now let me turn very briefly to the Levant. The turbulence
of the past 3 years has had many roots: rising aspirations for
dignity, political participation, and economic opportunity in a
region in which too many people, for too many years, have been
denied them, the ruthless reaction of some regimes and the
efforts of violent extremists to exploit the resulting chaos.
Nowhere have these trends converged more dangerously than in
Syria. The conflict and the Assad regime have become a magnet
for foreign fighters, many affiliated with terrorist groups
from across the region and around the world.
As Matt will describe, these fighters, mostly Sunni
extremists, represent a long-term threat to U.S. national
security interests. From the other side, Assad has recruited
thousands of foreign fighters, mostly Shia, to defend the
regime, with active Iranian support and facilitation. The hard
reality is that the grinding Syrian civil war is now an
incubator of extremism on both sides of the sectarian divide.
We face a number of serious risks to our interests as a
result: the risk to the homeland from global jihadist groups
who seek to gain long-term safe havens, the risk to the
stability of our regional partners, including Jordan, Lebanon,
and Iraq, the risk to Israel and other partners from the rise
of Iranian-backed extremist groups, especially Lebanese
Hezbollah, fighting in Syria, and the risk to the Syrian
people, whose suffering constitutes the greatest humanitarian
crisis of this new century.
These are enormous challenges. They require a steady,
comprehensive American strategy aimed at isolating extremists
and bolstering moderates both inside Syria and amongst our
regional partners. I would highlight briefly four elements of
our strategy.
First, we are working to isolate and degrade terrorist
networks in Syria. That means stepping up efforts with other
governments to stem the flow of foreign fighters into Syria and
cutting off financing and weapons to terrorist groups. It also
means stepping up efforts to strengthen the moderate
opposition, without which progress toward a negotiated
transition of leadership through the Geneva process or any
other diplomatic effort is impossible. Strengthened moderate
forces are critical both to accelerate the demise of the Assad
regime and to help Syrians build a counterweight to the
extremists who threaten both the present and the post-Assad
future of Syria and the region. None of this is easy, but the
stakes are very high.
Second, we are pushing hard against Iranian financing and
material support to its proxy groups in Syria and elsewhere. We
are also working intensively with partners in the gulf and
elsewhere to curb financing flows to extremists.
Third, we are increasing cooperation with Turkey and
intensifying our efforts to strengthen the capacity of Syria's
other endangered neighbors. In Jordan, which I visited again
last month, we are further enhancing the capacity of the
Jordanian Armed Forces to police its borders and deepening
intelligence cooperation on extremist threats. The staggering
burden of supporting 600,000 Syrian refugees has put serious
strain on Jordan's resources. We deeply appreciate Congress'
continued support for significant United States assistance for
Jordan, which has totaled about a billion dollars for each of
the past couple years, complemented by substantial loan
guarantees. I can think of no better investment in regional
stability than our efforts in Jordan.
In Lebanon, we are supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces to
help deter spillover, better monitor the border with Syria, and
help bolster the government's policy of disassociation from the
Syrian conflict. The formation of a new Cabinet last month
provides a renewed opportunity for the United States to engage,
and Secretary Kerry reaffirmed our strong commitment to
Lebanon's security and economic stability directly to President
Sleiman and to the international support group for Lebanon
ministerial meeting in Paris yesterday.
In Iraq, we are surging security assistance and
information-sharing to combat the rising threat from ISIL,
while pressing Iraqi leaders to execute a comprehensive
strategy, security, policy, and economic, to isolate
extremists, especially in Anbar. That was one of the main
purposes of my last visit to Baghdad at the end of January.
I appreciate the close consultation we have had with you,
Mr. Chairman, and with other members of the committee on these
crucial issues.
Finally, we are supporting global efforts to ease the
humanitarian crisis in Syria through the $1.7 billion we have
already contributed.
Beyond the Levant, we continue to work with our gulf
partners to enhance security cooperation, blunt the extremist
threat, and support sound economic development in transitioning
countries. This will be an important focus of the President's
visit to Saudi Arabia later this month.
Mr. Chairman, the rise of extremism in the Levant poses an
acute risk for the United States and for our regional partners.
It is essential that we intensify our efforts to isolate
extremists in Syria, limit the flow of foreign fighters,
bolster moderate opposition forces, ease the humanitarian
crisis, and help key partners like Jordan defend against
spillover.
Thank you again for your focus on these vitally important
issues and we look forward to continuing to work with you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Burns follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador William J. Burns
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, members of the committee,
thank you for inviting me to address the challenges of growing
extremism in the Levant.
My statement will discuss the nature of the extremist challenge in
the Levant, the important interests at stake for the United States, and
how we intend to advance and protect those interests over the coming
months.
the nature of the challenge
Over the past decade, aspirations for a better life have risen
among populations across the Middle East. Sixty percent of the people
in the region are under 30 years of age, and their ambitions--for
economic opportunity, political expression, and basic human rights--
ultimately burst onto the streets, from Tunisia, to Egypt, to Libya and
Yemen, Bahrain and finally to Syria. Fueled by new technologies that
enabled greater connectivity and individual political expression,
populations across the region, often for the first time, sought to hold
their leaders accountable.
There have been some successes, most notably in Tunisia, where a
new pluralistic political system has begun to emerge, anchored by a
just-ratified constitution, and in Yemen, where the first phase of a
historic level of national consultation over the direction of the
country has just been completed. But the broader trend is one of
turbulent transformation, often exacerbated by regional rivalries and
destabilizing interventions, including Iran's role in Syria. The
initial exhilaration among those pressing for change has given way to
the hard realization that lasting social and political transformation
requires arduous effort, compromise, and time.
The rapid changes in the region have created vacuums and reopened
long-dormant divisions within societies and along class, sectarian, and
ethnic fault lines. Sectarian conflicts have reemerged, and the same
technologies that facilitated peaceful popular movements have also been
used to deepen societal fissures--spreading messages of hate and
incitement against entire groups based solely on identity or
affiliation.
Nowhere have these trends converged more powerfully than in Syria.
There, 3 years ago, an authoritarian regime met peaceful protests with
violent suppression and carnage. The fateful decision by the Assad
regime to reject a meaningful political dialogue and violently suppress
popular aspirations led to open, armed conflict. That conflict
exacerbated existing ethnic, sectarian, and broader regional political
tensions, fueling the extremism that is the topic of this hearing.
Among the many consequences of the Syria conflict, one of the most
serious is the rise of extremism in the Levant. The conflict is now
attracting foreign fighters from across the region and around the
world. Many of these fighters are affiliated with designated terrorist
groups, such as the al-Qaeda affiliated al-Nusra Front, and the
formerly Iraq-based al-Qaeda affiliate now known as the Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Both of these terrorist groups have
sought to hijack the same popular aspirations the regime violently
repressed.
As my colleague from the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
will discuss in more detail, NCTC now assesses there are nearly 23,000
extremist fighters in Syria, including more than 7,000 foreign fighters
from as many as 50 countries. These fighters, mostly Sunni extremists,
could represent a long-term threat to U.S. national security interests.
Nusra and ISIL, have exploited largely ungoverned spaces in northern
and eastern Syria to carve out territory to train fighters, recruit
more of them, and plan attacks. Both groups have recently taken credit
for terrorist operations in Lebanon, including one on the Lebanese
Armed Forces. ISIL has also established camps in western Iraq and
claimed terrorist operations in Iraq.
From the other side, thousands of foreign fighters (mostly Shia)
have traveled to Syria to defend the Assad regime with active support
from Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah in recruiting and fighting. We believe
the majority of these fighters come from Lebanon and Iraq. They are
recruited on the premise of defending holy sites in Syria, but have
been observed in battle across Syria. The foreign fighters' presence
exacerbates the conflict's sectarian dimension and has led to lethal
competition with the indigenous Syrian opposition.
The grinding Syrian conflict is now an incubator of extremism--on
both sides of the sectarian divide. Controversial Sunni clerics have
called on able-bodied Sunni men to travel to Syria to fight in a
foreign war against what they brand a Shia regime. Radical Shia clerics
such as Hassan Nasrallah, the head of the high profile Shia extremist
group Hezbollah in Lebanon, have called on able-bodied Shiites to fight
those they brand ``Takfiris'' fighting on the side of the opposition.
It is important to note that the conflict in Syria is not primarily
a clash between the Shia and Sunni branches of Islam, but rather a
clash between a small minority of violent extremists against the vast
majority of moderates, whether Sunni or Shia, who seek to realize the
promise of economic and political modernization. The extremists fueling
the flames of conflict are outliers. To put that in perspective, while
there may be up to 23,000 fighters among the rebel ranks inside Syria,
the total number of opposition fighters is estimated between 75,000 and
110,000.
Despite the sectarian dimension of the Syria conflict, we also
believe that it is a mistake to describe it as simply a proxy war
between Iran and Saudi Arabia. To do so obscures the origins of the
Syria conflict, which began as a nonviolent movement for political
change. And it trivializes the sacrifice of the many Syrian men and
women who do not identify with extremists from the Sunni or Shia camps,
and who have stood up to an oppressive regime for basic political
rights. It would be a mistake to dismiss this moderate majority, who
stand against violent extremist groups on both sides of the conflict.
The United States has no interest in taking sides in a contest between
Sunni and Shia, whether in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, or anywhere else in
the region. Instead, as President Obama has stated: ``What we are
trying to do is take sides against extremists of all sorts and in favor
of people who are in favor of moderation, tolerance, representative
government, and over the long term, stability and prosperity for the
people of Syria.''
That statement encapsulates our fundamental objective, not only in
Syria--but also throughout the Levant and the broader region.
u.s. interests at stake
There are four immediate risks to U.S. interests from the Syrian
conflict and the rise of extremist groups in the Levant.
First, there is the risk of external operations by al-Qaeda
affiliated or inspired groups, such as al-Nusra and ISIL. We know that
some of these groups seek long-term safe haven from which to expand
their base of operations for attacks throughout the region and
potentially the West.
Second, there is the risk to the stability of our partners in the
region, including Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. In Lebanon, there are now
nearly 1 million refugees from Syria, roughly 20 percent of the
population prior to the Syrian conflict, and sectarian tensions are
spilling over the Syria-Lebanon border. Lebanon has experienced car
bombs in Beirut and elsewhere and gunfights in the flashpoint city of
Tripoli. Shia-populated border towns have been the target of direct
attacks by ISIL, Nusra, and its allies in the Islamic Front, and Sunni
towns by the Assad regime. In Jordan, nearly 600,000 Syrian refugees,
more than 10 percent of the population, are stressing limited
resources. Despite an unprecedented international humanitarian
response, both Jordanian and Lebanese governments are struggling to
deal with the strain. In Iraq, the two-way flow of extremist fighters--
and the rise of ISIL--has increased violent attacks to levels not seen
since 2007, with nearly 1,000 Iraqis killed in January 2014 alone.
Third, there is the risk to Israel and Arab partners in the region
from the rise of Iranian-backed extremist groups, especially Lebanese
Hezbollah, as well as the dangers when battle-seasoned Sunni fighters
return to their home countries. In the case of Yemen, we see young men
from both sides of the sectarian divide going to the fight, with plans
to return to Yemen to use those skills. Fighters from the Iranian-
backed groups are now gaining battlefield experience through regular
rotations to Syria and advanced military training, including at
training camps in Iran.
Fourth, there is the risk to the Syrian people, whose suffering
constitutes the greatest humanitarian crisis the world has seen in this
new century. Approximately 9.3 million people inside Syria are in need
of humanitarian assistance, and well over 100,000 have now been killed
since the conflict began. As in all conflicts, the suffering of the
most vulnerable population elements is the greatest. Polio has returned
to eastern Syria, where conflict disrupted vaccination programs. And we
are increasingly concerned about a potential ``lost generation'' of
Syrian children now living as refugees or internally displaced persons,
many of whom are traumatized and without access to education, medicine
or adequate food.
u.s. strategy: bolster moderates, isolate extremists, shore up
neighbors
To mitigate these risks and protect U.S. interests, our strategy
must focus both on immediate and long-term initiatives that leverage
existing security relationships with key partners. In the long-term, as
explained by the President, we face a struggle--not between Sunni and
Shia, or Iran and Saudi Arabia--but between extremists and moderates.
Our policy is to isolate extremists and bolster moderates--a critical
mass of the population--both in Syria and in the greater region. Over
the long term, this requires a steady focus on supporting economic and
political modernization. In the immediate term, we are focused on
mitigating risks stemming from the Syria conflict and the rise of
extremism and extremist groups in the Levant, and on shoring up Syria's
neighbors. We will work along four lines of effort, focused on the most
acute risks to U.S. national security interests.
First, we will work to isolate and degrade terrorist networks in
Syria. As my NCTC colleague will address in detail, it is essential
that we work with regional and international partners to police and
stem the flow of foreign fighters into and out of Syria on both sides
of the conflict. For example, we are working with Turkey on border
security, and we have robust security cooperation with Jordan. We are
encouraged by laws recently enacted by Saudi Arabia, which made it
illegal for Saudis to fight in a foreign conflict, a topic that the
President will discuss with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia later this
month in Riyadh. We are also pressing regional partners to stop the
flow of finances and weapons to terrorist groups, including designated
terrorist groups like Nusra and ISIL. Our partners are concerned about
the lure of the battlefield to their young men, and the potential for
violent extremism blowback in their own countries. We are encouraging
them to look at a range of tools to discourage flows of money and
fighters to the battlefield.
In parallel, we are working to further enhance the capacity of the
moderate Syrian opposition, both inside and outside Syria. It is
important to bear in mind that moderate insurgent groups now face a
two-front war--against the Assad regime on one side, and ISIL on the
other side. The moderate groups are an ally against ISIL, a point its
leaders repeatedly made during the international talks held recently in
Montreux and Geneva. The willingness of the moderate insurgents to
confront ISIL is an important development. The Assad regime itself,
heavily dependent on the ``shabiha'' militias and the assistance of
Hezbollah and Iran, is most responsible for introducing terrorists to
the Syrian conflict.
The success of our efforts to isolate and defeat violent extremist
networks in Syria--their leadership, weapons, and financing--depends on
negotiating a transition to a new leadership, without illusion about
how long and difficult this process is likely to be. The United States
will continue to work closely with the U.N., Russia, and the London 11
to support the Geneva process and press the regime to accept the key
elements of the June 2012 Geneva communique, including a Transitional
Governing Body. However imperfect, the Geneva process, when combined
with other measures, represents the best chance we have to negotiate an
end to this bloody conflict. And we will consider additional diplomatic
means by which to bring this about.
Second, we will work to strengthen the capacity of Syria's
neighbors, particularly Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq. As we work to
isolate and degrade the violent extremist networks in Syria, we must
work in parallel to enhance the capacity of Syria's neighbors to
mitigate the spillover effects of the conflict. Over the past 6 months,
I have visited neighboring capitals to help coordinate our efforts.
This included a visit in late January to Amman and then Baghdad, where
I met with senior officials, including King Abdullah and Prime Minister
Maliki, to discuss the Syria situation. Our relationships with these
countries are multifaceted, but the key points include:
In Jordan, we have heard King Abdullah's concerns about the risks
of extremist spillover from Syria. We are increasing assistance to the
Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) to police its sensitive borders and guard
against external threats, and are sharing information about the violent
extremist threats emanating from Syria. CENTCOM Commander General
Austin has also been consulting closely with his Jordanian
counterparts. To support Jordan, we have provided $300 million per year
in military assistance to the JAF and $360 million per year in economic
support to address long-term development. We look forward to continuing
this strong relationship in support of Jordan's economic and security
reforms. We are also committed to supporting Jordan as it contends with
the staggering costs of hosting nearly 600,000 Syrian refugees. To that
end, we have provided cash transfers totaling $300 million in the last
2 fiscal years; supported a $1.25 billion U.S.-backed loan guarantee;
and provided more than $268 million toward the humanitarian needs of
Syrian refugees in Jordan. We appreciate congressional support for
these additional needs and will continue to provide assistance to help
Jordan address challenges arising from the Syrian crisis. As you know,
King Abdullah was in the United States last month to discuss these and
other initiatives with President Obama, Secretary Kerry, Secretary
Hagel, other Cabinet Members and the Congress. Jordan is a cornerstone
of regional stability and King Abdullah, one of our closest partners in
the region, heard a staunch message of U.S. support to help protect
Jordan against violent extremist threats and maintain support for the
Jordanian economy.
In Lebanon, we are supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and
the Internal Security Forces to deter violent extremist spillover from
Syria. Since 2005, the United States has allocated nearly $1 billion to
support the LAF and Internal Security Forces, and we are engaged with
the Saudi Arabian Government to so that its recent pledge of $3 billion
is used in a manner that complements our mutual goal to build up LAF
capabilities. The U.S. commitment to a strong, independent, and
sovereign Lebanon is steadfast, particularly as the country faces
political challenges and spillover effects from Syria. During my last
visit to Beirut, I met with senior political officials and military
commanders, including President Sleiman and the LAF Commander, General
Kahwagi. The impact from the Syrian conflict was central in all of my
conversations, particularly as the LAF had just suffered casualties
during an engagement with violent extremists in Sidon, a majority Sunni
town south of Beirut. The refugee crisis has affected more than 1,600
communities across Lebanon. Secretary Kerry participated in the March 5
International Support Group for Lebanon ministerial in Paris to
demonstrate our ongoing partnership with the Lebanese people, our
support for development of the Lebanese Armed Forces, and our intention
of working with the new Cabinet to help Lebanon address its security
and economic challenges. The United States will continue to reinforce
the generous humanitarian response from the Lebanese Government,
including with the $76 million that we have contributed in humanitarian
assistance to support refugees and host communities in Lebanon just
this year, part of the $340 million we have contributed to the
humanitarian effort in Lebanon since 2011. Politically, we strongly
support efforts to ensure that upcoming elections are conducted in a
timely, transparent, and fair manner in keeping with Lebanon's
Constitution. Lebanon's leaders must meet their international
obligations; all parties must adhere to the official policy of
``dissociation'' from the Syrian conflict.
In Iraq, we are prioritizing security assistance to combat the
rising threat from ISIL, while pressing Iraqi leaders to execute a
holistic strategy comprising security, political, and economic elements
to isolate extremists over the long-term. During my recent visit to
Baghdad, I discussed with leaders from all political blocs the need to
pull together to address the ISIL threat. My conversations focused in
particular on the situation in Ramadi and Fallujah, where ISIL has
attempted to assert control and install local governance structures.
The threat from ISIL is real, with materiel and suicide bombers flowing
between Iraq and Syria, and executing a coordinated campaign meant to
overthrow the Shia-led government, in part by conducting widespread
indiscriminate attacks against Sunnis, Shia, and Kurds, and other
populations in Iraq. We are encouraged by the response in Ramadi, where
the central government is working in coordination with local leaders
and tribes to expel violent extremist fighters from populated areas.
The central government has approved approximately $128 million in
assistance to meet humanitarian and reconstruction needs as well as
support for tribes fighting ISIL. The Government of Iraq has also
established a National Crisis Cell to coordinate assistance to Iraqis
displaced by the recent sectarian violence in Anbar. We are now working
with the Iraqis to help ensure that this money is allocated as rapidly
as possible. Thanks to close cooperation from this committee and the
Congress, we also bolstering the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) with
equipment needed in the counterterrorism fight, including Hellfire
missiles. These missiles have proven effective at seriously damaging
ISIL training camps in western Iraq, and we will continue to work
closely with the ISF to ensure that they are employed with precision
and on the basis of sound intelligence. The future delivery of six
Apache helicopters, thanks again to support from this committee, will
further improve the ISF's ability to target ISIL safe havens in western
Iraq. We will work to ensure that Iraq strictly complies with its end-
use obligations for these helicopters. We will also work to ensure that
Iraq resists negative pressure from Iran, including accepting offers
from Iran for security assistance, which would be a clear violation of
international sanctions. Finally, we are pressing to ensure that Iraq's
national elections, scheduled for April 30, are held on time. Elections
and inclusive politics remain essential for isolating violent
extremists.
Third, we are pushing hard against Iranian financing and material
support to its proxy groups in Syria and elsewhere. As we work closely
with our gulf partners to enhance security cooperation, blunt the
violent extremist threat, and support sound economic development, we
are also continuing our close partnerships to identify and disrupt
Iranian support to its proxy groups. We have assisted the governments
in the region and around the world in investigating Iranian and
Lebanese Hezbollah-directed terrorist attacks and plots. Our diplomatic
efforts resulted in the Gulf Cooperation Council announcing their
intent to blacklist Hezbollah, and the EU's designation in 2013 of
Hezbollah's military wing as a terrorist organization. In parallel, we
are continuing aggressive and ongoing enforcement of counterterrorism
sanctions against Iran, including a series of designations last month
by the Department of the Treasury. Over the past few years we have also
identified the Lebanese Canadian Bank and two Lebanese exchange houses
as foreign financial institutions of ``primary money laundering
concern,'' under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act due to provision of
support to Lebanese Hezbollah.
We are also working with our gulf partners to detect and interdict
shipments of Iranian weaponry to proxies in the region. We have
repeatedly intercepted Iranian shipments of weapons to militants in
Yemen, Afghanistan, and Gaza. Earlier this year, Bahraini authorities
seized a boat filled with Iranian explosives and arrested a dozen
militants meant to receive the smuggled cargo. We are also continuing
to press the Government of Iraq to enhance its inspection of flights
traveling from Iran to Syria via Iraqi airspace. While the government
has taken some action in this regard, it has not been enough--a message
I pressed directly with Prime Minister Maliki and other key leaders
during my recent visit to Baghdad.
Fourth, we support global efforts to address the humanitarian
crisis in Syria. Violent extremist groups thrive in atmospheres of
popular grievance, human suffering, and the collapse of state
authority. Beyond the humanitarian and moral imperative, there are
hard-nosed security dimensions to our global effort to address the
human costs of the conflict inside Syria. The Syrian conflict
represents this young century's greatest humanitarian crisis, with the
largest refugee outflows in recent history. As we undertake
negotiations with Israelis and Palestinians, in which refugee right of
return is among the most contentious issues, it is not hard to see the
potential for the humanitarian aspect of Syria's conflict to further
disrupt the Middle East region for decades to come. The United States
is the largest international donor of humanitarian assistance to the
Syrian people. At the recent donor conference in Kuwait, Secretary
Kerry pledged an additional $380 million in humanitarian assistance,
bringing our total assistance to date to more than $1.7 billion. We
also continue to press through the Geneva process and the U.N. Security
Council to expand humanitarian access to Syrians. The recent adoption
of a U.N. Security Council resolution demanding safe and unhindered
humanitarian access to civilians in Syria was an important step in that
effort and we will press for its full implementation.
conclusion
The reasons for the rise of extremism in the Levant are complicated
and flow in part from the profound changes that have swept the region
in the past 3 years. The conflict in Syria and the wave of foreign
fighters it has attracted from both sides of the sectarian divide have
exacerbated extremism and sectarianism in the Levant, and represent an
acute risk to U.S. interests.
We are under no illusions that the framework I have articulated
will immediately blunt violent extremism in the Levant, but a strategy
to isolate extremist groups, bolster opposition moderates, shore up
Syria's neighbors and address the humanitarian crisis offers the best
chance in the near term to mitigate these acute risks. We look forward
to working closely with the Congress to address these challenges.
Thank you again for allowing me to address this important topic. I
look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
I would like to take in one more set of testimony, then
recess briefly for the vote and immediately come back. So, Mr.
Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. DEREK CHOLLET, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Chollet. Thanks. Mr. Chairman, Senator Corker, members
of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to speak with
you today about security threats in the Middle East and how our
regional defense policy addresses these challenges, and I will
keep my opening comments very brief.
As Deputy Secretary Burns described, sectarianism and
extremism pose grave threats to the well-being and aspirations
of the people of the Middle East, the stability and security of
our regional partners, and U.S. national security interests.
That is why our regional defense strategy is centered on
cooperating with regional partners. The historic transformation
in the region we have witnessed during the last 3 years offers
the United States both opportunities and challenges as we work
to address our core security interests, first, to combat al-
Qaeda and associated movements; second, to confront external
aggression directed at our allies; third, to ensure the free
flow of energy from the region; and fourth, to prevent the
development, proliferation, and use of weapons of mass
destruction.
As U.S. military forces have withdrawn from Iraq and now
Afghanistan, we are also addressing questions from our regional
partners about our intentions in the region and our commitments
over the long term. We are working hard to sustain and enhance
our military capabilities in the region.
As Secretary Hagel said in his speech in Manama last
December, the United States has enduring security interests in
the region and we remain fully committed to the security of our
allies and our regional partners. We have a military presence
of more than 35,000 personnel in and immediately around the
Arabian Gulf, and the Quadrennial Defense Review that the
Department released several days ago reaffirms this commitment,
and, despite budget pressures, we will maintain a robust force
posture in the region.
I would like to briefly touch on some examples of how we
are working to improve the military capabilities of our
partners, focusing on Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan. First, in
Iraq, along with our State Department colleagues, we have been
advising the Iraqi Government that the long-term strategy to
defeat ISIL and achieving stability and security must include a
political solution involving all the people of Iraq. And while
the Iraqi security forces have proven competent at conducting
counterterrorism and stability operations, the security
situation they face there is very serious.
The Iraqis also have gaps in their ability to defend
against external threats and in areas such as integrated air
defense, intelligence-sharing, and logistics. We remain very
committed to working with the Iraqi Government to develop its
military and security abilities. As this committee knows very
well, the Iraqis are also asking to acquire key capabilities
from the United States as soon as possible. We appreciate the
quick decision to proceed with the Hellfire missiles
notification associated with this urgent request. The Iraqis
have paid about $250 million toward the resupply and we have
been able to expedite the delivery of tank rounds, rockets,
small arms, and ammunition. Those articles have either been
delivered or are expected to arrive in the next few weeks.
Associated with that request, we deeply appreciate your support
to move forward with the sale and the lease of Apache
helicopters.
Turning to Lebanon, we view the Lebanese Armed Forces'
emergence as the sole legitimate defense force as a critical
component of Lebanon's long-term stability and development.
U.S. assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces and internal
security forces, which is approximately $1 billion in
assistance since 2005, strengthens Lebanese capacity and
supports its mission to secure its own borders. We work to
maintain strong ties between Lebanese and U.S. officers and
officials through IMET, and Lebanon has the fourth-largest IMET
program in the world. We are also promoting institutional
reform through a Defense Institution Reform Initiative, or
DIRI, with the LAF and efforts supporting Lebanese security
sector reform.
In Jordan, we are deeply committed to maintaining a strong
defense partnership. Today and tomorrow, I am hosting the
Jordanian Chief of Defense, General Zabban, at the Pentagon and
his entire team for a series of meetings. As Deputy Burns said,
we have no better defense partner than Jordan.
U.S. security assistance helps build the capacity of the
Jordanian Armed Forces, promotes interoperability between our
two militaries, enhances Jordan's border security and
counterterrorism capabilities, and supports military education
and training. We provide the Jordanian Government with
approximately $300 million in FMF funds per year. We have an
active joint exercise program along with a very robust officer
exchange program.
In response to the crisis in Syria, we have military forces
in Jordan manning a Patriot battery, an F-16 unit, and
assisting the Jordanians with the planning necessary to
strengthen its defense. In addition, we are providing equipment
and training that will supplement the Jordanians' border
security program and improve the capability of the Jordanian
military to detect and interdict illegal attempts to cross the
border and detect attempts to smuggle WMD along the border.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, through these
efforts in Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, and elsewhere, the Department
of Defense is keenly focused on building the capacity of our
partners to fight extremism and support U.S. national security
interests, and we remain committed to continuing to work with
this committee and the Congress on these critical issues. I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Chollet follows:]
Prepared Statement of Assistant Secretary Derek Chollet
Chairman Menendez, Senator Corker, members of the committee, I
appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today about extremism and
sectarianism in the Middle East, and how our regional defense policy
addresses these challenges.
As Deputy Secretary Burns and Director Olson described,
sectarianism and extremism pose grave threats to the well-being and
aspirations of the people of the Middle East, the stability and
security of our regional partners, and U.S. national security
interests.
That's why our regional defense strategy is centered on cooperating
with regional partners to achieve a stable, peaceful, and prosperous
Middle East, one which promotes democracy, human rights, and open
markets. The historic transformation in the region we've witnessed
during the last 3 years offers the United States both opportunities and
challenges as we work to address our core security interests: to combat
al-Qaeda and associated movements; to confront external aggression
directed at our allies; to ensure the free flow of energy from the
region; and to prevent the development, proliferation, and use of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
As U.S. military forces have withdrawn from Iraq and now
Afghanistan, we are also addressing questions from our regional
partners about our intentions in the region, and our commitments to our
long-term allies. We are working hard to sustain and enhance our
military capabilities in the region.
As Secretary Hagel reassured our regional partners in a speech in
Manama last December, the United States has enduring military interests
in this region, and we will remain fully committed to the security of
our allies and our regional partners. We have a presence of more than
35,000 military personnel in and immediately around the gulf. The U.S.
Army continues to maintain more than 10,000 forward-deployed soldiers;
we have deployed advanced fighter aircraft, including F-22s; we have
advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets; we have
fielded ballistic missile defense ships and PATRIOT batteries; and we
maintain over 40 ships in the region. Our commitment to our core
interests is absolute.
I would like to briefly touch on some examples on how we are
working to improve the military capabilities of our partners--focusing
on Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan.
In Iraq, we are deeply concerned by the Islamic State in Iraq and
the Levant's (ISIL) growing reach and lethality. Along with our State
Department colleagues, we have been advising the Iraqi Government that
the long-term strategy to defeat ISIL and achieving security and
stability must include a political solution involving all of the people
of Iraq.
While the Iraqi Security Forces have proven competent at conducting
counterterrorism and stability operations, the security situation they
face is very serious. The Iraqis also have gaps in their ability to
defend against external threats and in areas such as integrated air
defense, intelligence-sharing, and logistics. We remain very committed
to working with the Iraqi Government to develop its military and
security abilities.
As this committee knows, the Iraqis are also asking for increased
Foreign Military Sales of key capabilities as soon as possible. We
appreciate the quick decision to proceed with the Hellfire missiles
notification associated with the urgent request. The Iraqis have paid
about $250 million toward the resupply, and we have been able to
expedite the delivery of tank rounds, rocket, small arms and
ammunition. Those articles have either been delivered or are expected
to arrive in the next few weeks.
Associated with that request, we deeply appreciate your support to
move forward the sale and lease of the Apache helicopters.
Turning to Lebanon: We remain deeply concerned with Iran's
destabilizing activities in Lebanon and its partnership with Hezbollah.
We view the Lebanese Armed Forces' emergence as the sole legitimate
defense force as a critical component of Lebanon's long-term stability
and development. U.S. assistance to Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and
Internal Security Forces, approximately $1 billion in assistance since
2005, strengthens the capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces and
supports its mission to secure Lebanon's borders, defend the
sovereignty of the state, and implement U.N. Security Council
Resolutions 1559 and 1701.
Lebanon's International Military Education and Training (IMET)
program is the fourth-largest in the world. IMET builds strong ties
between the United States and Lebanon by bringing Lebanese officers and
officials to the United States to study and train alongside U.S.
troops.
In terms of supporting institutional reform, the Department of
Defense has just started a Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI)
with the LAF. DIRI complements a U.S. whole-of-government effort
supporting Lebanese security sector reform. U.S. Central Command
(USCENTCOM) continues to provide support to the training and
professionalization of the LAF while the Department of State's Bureau
of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is funding
a program to strengthen the capability and management capacity of the
Internal Security Forces (ISF).
In Jordan, we are deeply committed to maintaining a strong defense
partnership. And today and tomorrow, I am hosting the Jordanian Chief
of Defense and his senior team for intensive meetings at the Pentagon.
U.S. security assistance helps build the capacity of the Jordanian
Armed Forces; promotes interoperability between our two militaries;
enhances Jordan's border security and counterterrorism capabilities;
and supports military education and training.
We have provided the Jordanian Government with approximately $300
million in FMF funds per year. An active joint exercise program, along
with a robust exchange officer program, cements our military
relationship.
We have military forces in Jordan manning a Patriot battery and F-
16 unit, and assisting the Jordanians with the planning necessary to
strengthen its defense.
In addition, we are providing equipment and training that will
supplement the Jordan Border Security Program and improve the
capability of the Jordanian military to detect and interdict illegal
attempts to cross the border, and detect attempts to smuggle WMD along
the border.
Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, through these efforts in
Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, and elsewhere, the Department of Defense is
keenly focused on building the capacity of our partners to fight
extremism and support U.S. national security interests. And we remain
committed to continuing to work with this committee and the Congress on
these critical issues.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
What we are going to do is I am going to have the committee
go into recess, cast one vote. The Chair will come immediately
back. Those who are interested I would urge to come back as
well. We will hear from Director Olsen and then we will proceed
to questions.
The committee will be in recess subject to the call of the
Chair.
[Recess from 11:35 a.m. to 11:48 a.m.]
The Chairman. The hearing will come back to order, with
thanks and our apologies to our witnesses. You will be happy to
know, Mr. Secretary, that Ms. Gottemoeller was confirmed.
Director Olsen.
STATEMENT OF HON. MATTHEW G. OLSEN, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Olsen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of
the committee.
I think it was about a year ago I was here to talk about
threats in North Africa, so I appreciate the opportunity to be
here again to represent NCTC and to talk a little bit about the
threats we face in the Levant. I am particularly pleased to be
here with two of our key partners, Deputy Secretary of State
Burns and Assistant Secretary of Defense Chollet.
As you are aware, we continue to face terrorist threats to
the United States and to our interests overseas, particularly
in parts of South Asia and the Middle East and Africa. But it
is the current conflict in Syria and the regional instability
in the Levant that stand out for me as areas of particular
concern. I do think it is important to consider Syria in the
context of the global terrorist movement. In the face of what
has been sustained counterterrorism pressure, core al-Qaeda has
adapted. They have adapted by becoming more decentralized and
shifting away from the large-scale plotting that was
exemplified in the attacks of September 11.
Al-Qaeda has modified its tactics and look to conduct
simpler attacks that do not require the same degree of
resources and training and command and control. So today we are
facing a wider array of threats in a greater variety of
locations across the Middle East and around the world. In
comparison to the al-Qaeda plots that emanated from the tribal
areas of Pakistan a few years ago, these smaller and these less
sophisticated plots are often more difficult for us to detect
and disrupt, and that puts even greater pressure on us to work
closely with our partners here at the table, across the Federal
Government, and around the world.
Turning to Syria, Syria has become the preeminent location
for al-Qaeda-aligned groups to recruit and to train and to
equip what is now a growing number of extremists, some of whom
seek to conduct external attacks. In addition, Iran and
Hezbollah, as you pointed out, are committed to defending the
Assad regime, including sending billions of dollars in military
and economic aid, training pro-regime and Iraqi Shia militants,
and deploying their own personnel into the country.
Now, from a terrorism perspective, the most concerning
development is that al-Qaeda has declared Syria its most
critical front and has called for extremists to fight against
the regime in Syria. So what we have seen is that thousands of
fighters from around the world, including hundreds from the
West, have traveled to Syria and many of them have joined with
established terrorist groups in Syria. This raises our concern
that radicalized individuals with extremist contacts and
battlefield experience could return to their home countries to
commit violence at their own initiative or participate in al-
Qaeda-directed plots aimed at Western targets outside of Syria.
What we have seen is a coalescence in Syria of al-Qaeda
veterans from Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as extremists
from other hot spots such as Libya and Iraq. These extremists
bring a wide range of contacts and skills, as well as
battlefield experience, and they are able to exploit what has
become a permissive environment from which to plot and train.
Shifting briefly to Lebanon, one of the continuing effects
of the Syrian conflict will be the instability in Lebanon in
the upcoming year. I recently traveled to Lebanon and Jordan
and the impacts of the continuing conflict in Syria continue to
be of great concern to officials in the region.
Hezbollah publicly admitted last spring that it is fighting
for the Syrian regime and has framed the war as an act of self-
defense against Western-backed Sunni extremists. The group is
sending capable fighters for pro-regime operations and support
for pro-regime militias. In addition, Iran and Hezbollah are
using allied Iraqi Shia groups to participate in
counteropposition operations. This active support to the Assad
regime is, of course, driving increased Sunni extremist attacks
and sectarian violence.
In short, the various factors contributing to instability
in Lebanon are only exacerbated by the protracted conflict in
Syria.
Finally, I will turn to Iraq. What we have witnessed there
over the last 3 years is a resurgence by the Islamic State for
Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL, the former group known as AQI.
The group has a core cadre of veteran extremists and access to
a steady flow of weapons and fighters from Syria. So last year
ISIL suicide and car bomb attacks returned to their peak levels
from what we saw back in 2007 and 2008. At the end of last year
the group was averaging one suicide attack per day.
The situation in Fallujah is particularly disconcerting,
where hundreds of ISIL fighters have joined the ranks with
former insurgent groups to consolidate control of the inner
city and contest areas in neighboring towns.
In sum, the threat posed by ISIL to our interests in the
region is growing, not diminishing. In the period ahead we will
be working closely with our colleagues from State and Defense
to aid the Iraqi Government's counterterrorism efforts.
The last point I will make is that, in light of the large
foreign fighter component in the Syrian crisis, we are working
together to gather every piece of information we can about the
identities of these individuals. As you know, at NCTC we play a
role in supporting the effort to watch-list individuals and our
efforts support the broader aviation and border screening
efforts of our partners at the FBI and the Department of
Homeland Security, and we are engaged in a focused effort to
track the travel of any of these individuals, particularly from
the West to Syria. As the conflict in Syria continues, the
issues associated with Syrian foreign fighters and their travel
patterns will be a continued area of the highest priority for
us at NCTC.
So in closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to assure you we are
focused on the threat environment in this part of the world and
we are working to identify and disrupt threats to the United
States and particularly to our personnel serving in these
areas. We will continue to support our whole of government
effort in the region by identifying and analyzing threat-
information, sharing that information with our partners across
the government. On behalf of the men and women at NCTC, I want
to thank you for inviting me here to testify and for your focus
on these critical issues.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Olsen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Matthew G. Olsen
introduction
Thank you Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of
the committee. I appreciate this opportunity to be here today to
represent the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and discuss with
you the threat of terrorism and extremism in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon.
Intelligence Community leaders have testified over the past few
weeks on the overall counterterrorism picture, noting that we face an
enduring threat to U.S. interests overseas--particularly in parts of
South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. However, the regional
instability in the Levant and increasingly in Iraq certainly stands out
as an area of increasing concern.
The current stalemate in Syria is having a ripple effect in Iraq,
in Lebanon, and throughout the region; this is of great concern to the
United States, and impacts more than just our counterterrorism
equities. There are important defense and geopolitical considerations
as well. Therefore, I am particularly pleased to be here today with two
of NCTC's key partners--Deputy Secretary of State Burns and Assistant
Secretary of Defense Chollet.
the current state of al-qaeda
It is important to consider the current conflict and regional
instability in Iraq and the Levant region in the context of the global
terrorist movement. In the face of sustained counterterrorism pressure,
core al-Qaeda has adapted by becoming more decentralized and is
shifting away from large-scale, mass casualty plots like the attacks of
September 11. Al-Qaeda has modified its tactics, looking to conduct
simpler attacks that do not require the same degree of resources,
training, and command and control.
Instability in the Middle East and North Africa has accelerated
this decentralization of the al-Qaeda movement, which is increasingly
influenced by local and regional factors and conditions. This diffusion
has also led to the emergence of new power centers and an increase in
threats by networks of like-minded violent extremists with allegiances
to multiple groups. Ultimately, this less centralized network poses a
more diverse and geographically dispersed threat and is likely to
result in increased low-level attacks against U.S. and European
interests overseas. Put simply, we are facing a wider array of threats
in a greater variety of locations across the Middle East and around the
world. In comparison to the al-Qaeda plots that emanated from the
tribal areas of Pakistan a few years ago, these smaller, less
sophisticated plots are often more difficult to detect and disrupt,
putting even greater pressure on us to work closely with partners
around the world.
Last year, counterterrorism operations and the loss of key al-Qaeda
leaders and members further degraded al-Qaeda core's ability to lead
the global terrorist movement and to plan sophisticated attacks in the
West. While we continue to assess that al-Qaeda senior leaders remain
the recognized leader of the global terrorist movement, their
leadership and authority have not gone unchallenged, as the rift
between core al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL)
makes abundantly clear. We are still assessing the full impact of the
recent statement from Ayman al-Zawahiri publicly disassociating al-
Qaeda from ISIL.
Returning now to current terrorist threats in Iraq and the across
the Levant, these emanate from a diverse array of actors, ranging from
formal groups--such as al-Qaeda and its affiliates, Lebanese Hezbollah,
and the ISIL--to a large pool of individuals--many of them from Western
countries including the United States--only loosely affiliated or
attached to groups we are tracking.
This morning I will break down the terrorist threat from this
region as we see it in the Intelligence Community. I'll start with
Syria, then move to Lebanon and Iraq, and finally close with some of
the activities we're engaged in to identify Syrian foreign fighters.
Syria
Syria has become the preeminent location for independent or al-
Qaeda-aligned groups to recruit, train, and equip a growing number of
extremists, some of whom we assess may seek to conduct external
attacks. Hostilities between Sunni and Shia are also intensifying in
Syria and spilling into neighboring countries--particularly Lebanon--
which is increasing the likelihood of a protracted conflict in Syria as
both seek military advantage.
Both the Syrian regime and the opposition believe that they can
achieve a military victory in the ongoing conflict. President Assad
remains unwilling to negotiate himself out of power--currently an
untenable outcome for the opposition forces--and he almost certainly
intends to remain the ruler of Syria and to win a new 7-year term in
Presidential elections that might occur mid-year.
To that end, Iran and Hezbollah are committed to defending the
Assad regime, including sending billions of dollars in military and
economic aid, training pro-regime and Iraqi Shia militants, and
deploying their own personnel into the country. Iran and Hezbollah view
the Assad regime as a key partner in an ``axis of resistance'' against
Israel and are prepared to take major risks to preserve the regime as
well as their critical transshipment routes.
In terms of the opposition, the fight against the Assad Regime
includes up to 110,000 insurgents, who are organized into numerous
groups, including more than 7,000 foreign fighters from 50 countries.
European governments estimate that more than 1,000 Westerners have
traveled to join the fight against the Assad regime. Dozens of
Americans from a variety of backgrounds and locations in the United
States have traveled or attempted to travel to Syria but to date we
have not identified an organized recruitment effort targeting
Americans. The U.S. Government continues to work closely with our
foreign partners to resolve the identities of potential extremists and
identify potential threats emanating from Syria.
Al-Qaeda amir Ayman al-Zawahiri and other prominent Salafist
leaders continue to issue statements declaring Syria the most critical
front for ideologically driven terrorism today and calling for
additional fighters to support the cause. Ousting Assad in Syria has
become a top al-Qaeda priority, and some of the most militarily
effective antiregime forces are also those most closely aligned with
al-Qaeda's violent extremist ideology.
At present, several extremist groups, including the al-Qaeda-linked
al-Nusra Front and ISIL are in Syria fighting against the Assad regime.
ISIL founded al-Nusra Front in late 2011 to act as its operational arm
in Syria, although the two groups split following a public dispute in
April 2013. Al-Nusra Front has mounted suicide, explosive, and firearms
attacks against regime and security targets across the country; it has
also sought to provide limited public services and governance to the
local population in areas under its control.
Al-Nusra Front's leader, Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, in April 2013
pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, publicly
affirming the group's ties to core al-Qaeda, and al-Zawahiri named the
group al-Qaeda's recognized affiliate later last year. Many moderate
opposition groups fight alongside al-Nusra Front and other Sunni
extremists in Syria and depend on extremists for resources, including
weapons and training.
Syria has already become a significant location for extremist
groups to recruit, train, and equip a growing number of fighters. The
combination of ungoverned areas as new safe havens, the presence inside
Syria of experienced al-Qaeda terrorists and other seasoned extremists,
and the influx of Westerners and other foreign fighters creates a
fertile environment for external attack planning. Thousands of fighters
from around the world--including the United States--have traveled to
Syria to support oppositionists fighting against the Assad regime and
some have connected with extremist groups, including al-Nusra Front.
This raises concerns that radicalized individuals with extremist
contacts and battlefield experience could either return to their home
countries to commit violence at their own initiative, or participate in
an al-Qaeda directed plot aimed at Western targets outside Syria.
Lebanon
We expect that one of the continuing effects of the Syrian conflict
will be the continued erosion of Lebanese stability this year. The
primary drivers of instability in Lebanon are economic, social, and
sectarian tensions fueled by the Syrian conflict and Hezbollah's
willingness to use violence to protect its own and Iranian interests in
Syria. The influx of nearly 1 million refugees from Syria into
Lebanon--roughly 20 percent of Lebanon's population prior to the Syrian
war--is also straining the country's fragile economy and overburdening
already strained public services, particularly in the north and the
Beqaa, areas hosting the majority of the refugees.
In May 2013, Hezbollah publicly admitted that it is fighting for
the Syrian regime and its chief, Hassan Nasrallah, has framed the war
as an act of self-defense against Western-backed Sunni extremists, whom
he claimed would target all Lebanese if the Assad regime fell.
Hezbollah is sending capable fighters for pro-regime operations and
support for a pro-regime militia. Additionally, Iran and Hezbollah are
leveraging allied Iraqi Shia militant and terrorist groups to
participate in counteropposition operations. This active support to the
Assad regime is driving increased Sunni extremist attacks and sectarian
unrest in Lebanon.
Following the group's public confirmation that it was fighting in
Syria and had played a pivotal role in pro-regime operations in Al
Qusayr, Sunni extremist and terrorist elements began a violent campaign
of attacks against Hezbollah strongholds in Lebanon. There has been a
sharp rise in Sunni extremism in Lebanon over the past 2 years,
particularly in the north. Given the character and structure of these
many diverse extremist groups there is increasing concern about their
threat to Lebanon's stability. In addition there are regular reports of
the movement of fighters and trafficking of arms and explosive
materials across the Lebanese border with Syria.
May 2013--rocket attacks against Hezbollah suburbs of
Beirut;
June 2013--Supporters of Salafi leader Ahmad al-Assir attack
a LAF checkpoint near Sidon, killing three soldiers; LAF
responds by conducting operations against up to 300 al-Assir
supporters;
July-August 2013--Sunni extremist groups, the 313 Brigade
and the Aisha Mother of Believers Brigade, each conduct a VBIED
attack in Hezbollah-controlled neighborhoods in Beirut (20
dead, over 250 wounded);
October 2013--LAF seizes a VBIED with 250 kg of explosives
and a suicide belt; two soldiers and two armed men killed in
ensuing gunfire exchange;
November 2013--Sunni extremists are tied to two near-
simultaneous suicide bombings against the Iranian Embassy in
Beirut, probably motivated by revenge for Iran's support of
Hezbollah and the Assad regime (25 dead, over 150 wounded);
January/February 2014--Sunni extremists conduct several
VBIED and suicide attacks against Hezbollah and Shia interests
in Beirut and Hermel (41 dead, over 280 wounded).
Hezbollah also uses violence to intimidate and kill political
rivals, putting Lebanon's stability at further risk and undermining the
country's rule of law. The group was most likely responsible for the
December 2013 assassination of senior Lebanese official Muhammad
Chatah--a longtime critic of the group and former Ambassador to the
U.S., who was the diplomatic advisor to former Prime Minister Saad
Hariri [killed in a Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Device].
In short, the various factors contributing to instability in
Lebanon are only exacerbated by the protracted conflict in Syria,
particularly as tensions grow between Shia and Sunni groups operating
inside Lebanon.
Iraq
In Iraq, we have witnessed over the last 3 years a disturbing
resurgence by ISIL. The group has a core cadre of veteran leaders, and
access to a steady flow of both weapons and fighters from Syria. ISIL
is also able to draw from a significant pool of terrorist fighters
previously imprisoned by the Iraqi Government. The Syrian conflict has
facilitated a greater two-way sharing of Sunni extremists and resources
between Syria and Iraq that has contributed to ISIL's increased pace of
high-profile attacks.
In 2012, ISIL launched a campaign to free detained members that led
to the release of hundreds of prisoners to bolster their ranks. Last
year, ISIL's suicide and car bomb attacks returned to their peak levels
from 2007-2008. At the end of 2013, the group was averaging a suicide
attack each day. The increasingly permissive security environment has
allowed ISIL to challenge Iraqi security forces, most recently and
notably in Fallujah and Ramadi.
On January 1 of this year, convoys totaling approximately 70-100
trucks with mounted heavy weapons and antiaircraft guns entered the
central cities of Fallujah and Ramadi. They quickly secured vital
transportation nodes and destroyed most police stations. The Iraqi Army
units in the vicinity engaged some armed vehicles but chose to not get
drawn into an urban fight. A combination of military, political, and
tribal efforts in Ramadi have begun to show results, with the city
becoming increasingly secure. The situation in Fallujah, however, is
far more disconcerting.
In Fallujah, hundreds of ISIL fighters have joined ranks with
former insurgent groups to consolidate control of the inner city and
contest areas in neighboring towns. The Iraqi Army is facing
significant resistance, including well-trained snipers armed with 50-
caliber rifles. Last month approximately a dozen Iraqi soldiers were
captured near Fallujah. The next day they were executed. At the moment
it remains a tense standoff as some tribes are ready and preparing to
fight against ISIL, others are preparing to fight with ISIL, and still
others on the fence, waiting to see which side is likely to prevail in
the end.
ISIL's strength again poses the credible threat to U.S. interests
in the region that it had at its peak in 2006. It has pledged its
resources to support establishing hardline Islamic governance. And
although ISIL is primarily focused on its activities in Iraq and Syria,
it still perceives the United States as an enemy.
Early this year, ISIL publicly claimed its first attack in Lebanon
and promised more, demonstrating its aspirations go beyond Syria and
Iraq. Also in January, ISIL's leader [Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi] publicly
called for operatives in Iraq to surge attacks in Shia areas the group
wants to control to inflame to sectarian violence. In the same speech,
he threatened ``direct confrontation'' with the United States. In sum,
our concerns with the threat posed by ISIL to our interests in the
region are currently growing, not diminishing. In the period ahead, we
will be watching closely to see if the Iraqi Government's
counterterrorism efforts will gain greater traction against the
extremist threat.
addressing the specific threat from syrian foreign fighters
At NCTC, in addition to analyzing and assessing threat information,
we play an important role in supporting the effort to watchlist known
or suspected terrorists. On behalf of the Intelligence Community, NCTC
hosts and maintains the central and shared knowledge bank on known and
suspected international terrorists and international terror groups, as
well as their goals, strategies, capabilities, and networks of contacts
and support. This database of terrorism information, known as the
Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) supports the border
and aviation screening efforts of our partners at the FBI and the
Department of Homeland Security. In light of the large foreign fighter
component to the Syria crisis that I highlighted earlier, this effort
to gather every bit of available information about terrorist identities
is particularly important.
For some time we have been engaged in a focused effort--working
closely with the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and our other Intelligence Community partners--to
track the travel of any individuals that we've identified as having
traveled to Syria to participate in extremist activity. When we obtain
such information, we ensure that the individuals in question are added
to the TIDE database and that their identifying information is exported
to our partners to support their various watchlisting activities. We
also work with a wide array of foreign partners to try and learn more
about how extremists are, in fact, traveling to Syria, what routes they
are using, what facilitation networks are supporting them, and what
happens to those extremists both inside Syria and after they leave the
battlefield to return to their place of origin. As the conflict in
Syria continues, issues associated with Syrian foreign fighters and
their travel patterns will be a continued area of the highest priority
and emphasis for NCTC and the Intelligence Community.
closing
Members of the committee, the deteriorating situation in Syria,
Lebanon, and Iraq is of great concern to the United States and its
allies. The potential for further escalation of sectarian violence and
the resulting second and third order effects is of tremendous concern
to the intelligence community.
Let me assure you that we are also focused intensively on the
tactical threat environment in this volatile region and our
responsibility to identify and disrupt threats to our personnel serving
in these crisis zones. We ask much of our military members, our
intelligence service professionals, and our diplomats to operate in
such a dangerously unpredictable environment, but I think all of us
recognize that it is in our national security interests to operate in
these areas.
The National Counterterrorism Center will continue to support our
whole-of-government effort in the region by identifying and analyzing
threat information and sharing that information with our partners
across the government. In addition, we will continue to focus on
identifying individuals who might seek to return from these overseas
battlefields and do us harm so that our law enforcement and
intelligence officials can engage in the appropriate disruption
efforts. And throughout we will continue to keep the Congress fully and
currently informed of our activities, as required by the law.
On behalf of the men and women of the National Counterterrorism
Center, I want to thank you for inviting me to testify, and I look
forward to answering any of your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you all for your testimony. There is a
lot of ground to cover here, so let me start.
Mr. Secretary, while we are focused on the Ukraine, I
wonder whether the administration is of the view, as some of us
are, that the international norms that you talked about in your
opening statement and the challenge to international norms and
how we respond to that is critically important far beyond even
the Ukraine.
Senator Cardin and I were talking yesterday about the
consequences of how we respond when other countries like China
look to see what we are going to do as they consider their
options in the South China Sea, North Korea in terms of its
march to weaponization, those places like Africa and the Congo
that decide whether or not the international community is going
to be responsive or whether they are going to rearm and
continue to have millions of lives lost, even as we negotiate
with Iran, at the same time that Iran, as we have heard here,
is in the midst of promoting, still promoting vigorously,
terrorism.
So it seems to me that you need to say what you mean and
mean what you say. In that respect, do we understand that this
is a challenge in the immediacy about Ukraine, but it is also a
broader challenge as it relates to the message that we and our
Western allies send globally?
Ambassador Burns. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I agree fully with
your point. I think there is a great deal that is at stake in
Ukraine today. It is about Ukrainians and their ability to make
their own choices. It is about Europe and Eurasia. But it is
also about the wider consequences that you just described. So I
think it is very important for the United States to make clear,
as you said, that we will put actions behind our words, about
our concerns about what has happened, about the importance of
abiding by international norms, again not just for the sake of
Ukraine, important as that is, but given the wider stakes that
are involved, and it is also important that we work closely
with our allies and partners to reinforce the same point, and
that is what we have been spending a lot of time and energy
doing in recent days, and we will continue to.
The Chairman. Now, with reference to the Ukrainian
situation, I know the Secretary, Secretary Kerry, and his
European counterparts met with the Russian Foreign Minister in
Paris yesterday. The Russians, at least at this point, will not
speak directly to the Ukrainians. What do we envision as to the
willingness of Russia to find a diplomatic exit here, and what
are the necessary ingredients to deescalate the crisis?
Ambassador Burns. Mr. Chairman, you know, the essence I
think of any deescalatory political process is direct dialogue
between the Ukrainian Government and the Russian Government
which is aimed at restoration of Ukraine's sovereignty and
territorial integrity. The Russian Government has expressed
concerns about ethnic minorities, Russian-speaking minorities
in eastern Ukraine and in Crimea. We believe, as the Secretary
and the President made very clear, that those are unfounded.
There is no evidence for any persecution of those minorities.
But there are ways of addressing that concern directly with the
government in Kiev and also through organizations like the
OSCE, which is why we are supporting the sending of monitors
from the OSCE to eastern Ukraine and to Crimea to try to
establish what the facts are.
So again, as I said, the essence of any kind of diplomatic
off-ramp has to be direct dialogue between the Ukrainian
Government and the Russian.
The Chairman. They reject that, at least at this point.
Obviously, there is a purpose for the Russians trying, not that
I believe it is legitimate, but trying to undermine the
legitimacy of the present Ukrainian Government. In a series of
international forums they can make the argument, falsely, but
they can make the argument.
So my concern is that at some point, from my own
perspective, as much as we seek to deescalate this, we have
seen this picture before. We have seen what President Putin did
in Georgia, in South Ossetia, and other parts. We see him doing
it in the Crimea. How serious do we believe is his desire to go
beyond Crimea and into eastern Ukraine?
Ambassador Burns. It is difficult to predict, and we are
certainly doing everything that we can with our partners to
make clear the costs of any such move. As I said, we are trying
to establish OSCE monitors in eastern Ukraine to beat back the
false accusation that there is persecution of ethnic minorities
going on there. I think the new Ukrainian Government has done a
good job of making clear its concern about Ukrainian citizens,
west and east, across the whole country. So I think we need to
continue to push those lines of effort, and also make clear, as
we did today in the actions that the President has taken, that
there are costs, and to build patiently, persistently, and
firmly counterpressure against what the Russians have already
done and making clear that there will be costs if they escalate
further.
The Chairman. Well, I hope that as we pursue the diplomatic
course we are organizing as much as possible the international
community in joining us in the strongest possible response,
because otherwise Putin's calculations will take him to as far
as he thinks he can get away with.
Let me just turn quickly to Syria. I heard what you said,
but I question whether or not we are fully committed to
changing the battlefield equation, because unless, as this
committee voted quite some time ago in a bipartisan fashion to
arm the vetted Syrian moderate rebels, nothing will change in
Assad's equation or against Russia and their patronizing of
Assad, for him to feel that he has to do anything but to
continue to hang in there and try to win a war of attrition.
So how robustly are we ready to engage in helping to change
that battlefield equation, even though it is a lot harder now
than it was then? But listening to all the threats that the
Director talked about, I just do not see that, unless we do
that, we are going to get in a position where we have anything
but the potential of a failed state and the consequences of
what that that means to our national security, in addition to
the bloodshed that is being shed every day in Syria.
Ambassador Burns. Mr. Chairman, just as you said, there are
huge and growing risks, I think, in Syria and in the spillover
of Syria's violence into the wider region. We are looking
actively at further ways in which we can support the moderate
opposition. As you know, we are also trying to intensify
cooperation with other backers of the moderate opposition.
The Saudi Minister of Interior, Mohamed bin Nayaf, was in
Washington recently and I think we have improved the
cooperation and coordination with some of the other backers of
the moderate opposition to ensure both that they get the
support they need, but also that extremists are denied the
funding and the flow of arms that are enabling them to increase
their strength. So part of it is what we do; part of it is what
we can work with our partners to do.
The Chairman. Well, I get a sense that we are not as robust
as we should be, and, unless we are, we are not going to change
the equation in Syria, which means that we are in for a world
of hurt as we move forward.
Finally in this regard, this committee gave the President
the authorization for the use of force, which I think was a
critical element of his ability to at least pursue the chemical
weapons issues that Syria possesses. But they have missed two
deadlines already. I now see a report where they are
accelerating--allegedly accelerating--but accelerating without
actually doing anything is inconsequential. To say you are
going to accelerate on paper is one thing, but they have missed
deadlines.
How convinced are we that we are going to get the
commitment of action by the Syrians as it relates to getting
rid of their chemical weapons stash?
Ambassador Burns. Mr. Chairman, the foot-dragging by the
Syrian regime has been deeply frustrating. The last few weeks
there has, as you rightly pointed out, been an increase in
movement in the right direction. By the beginning of next week,
I understand that about 35 percent of the chemical materials
will have been removed from Syria. So I still think it is
possible to meet the 30th of June deadline that has been set
for removal and destruction. But we are going to have to keep
pushing very hard to ensure that this process continues.
As I said, there has been some accelerated movement in
recent weeks, but I do not think we can take that for granted.
We need to keep pushing very hard.
The Chairman. Well, I think we need to keep pushing, and at
some point we need to suggest that our patience is not
unlimited with constant violation of deadlines that ultimately
need to be met.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I did not hear your first questions. I hope I am not being
redundant, but I do want to talk a little bit about Syria.
The Chairman. You are never redundant.
Senator Corker. Okay, good. Thank you.
In the Syrian issue, I know that it sounds like the
chairman and you had a little discussion about that. First of
all, I appreciate the work you are doing in counterterrorism
and certainly what our Defense is doing relative to some of the
regional threats that we have that, candidly, did not need to
exist. But they now do because of our inaction and others.
But what is it that we are expecting to do to change the
equation on the ground in Syria now that it has become what it
is? I do not know if you have got policy moves. I know
Secretary Kerry, I saw him a few weeks ago in Europe. He told
me he was on the verge of announcing something. We keep hearing
that. We have private conversations with others. But there is
no balance change that we are seeing.
So what is it that the administration believes is going to
be the thing that causes Assad to want to negotiate his
leadership away from Syria?
Ambassador Burns. The reality, just as you said, Senator
Corker, is that without a change in Assad's calculation and a
change in the balance on the ground it is unlikely, in fact
impossible, that you are going to see diplomatic progress,
whether it is in Geneva or anyplace else. We are looking
actively, as Senator Kerry said to you, at ways in which we can
step up our own support for the moderate opposition, which has
had more than its share of challenges in the last couple of
years.
We are also working I think more effectively with some of
the other partners. The Saudis I mentioned earlier in response
to the chairman.
Senator Corker. So are we thinking about lethal support? We
have people dropping barrel bombs. Are we thinking about doing
something to diminish their ability to do that? I know that
there have been debates about title 10 support, having actual
military training, having actual military--not our boots on the
ground, but our ability to get weaponry and training to the
vetted moderates. Are we still looking at that?
Ambassador Burns. We certainly are still looking at a range
of options, some of which I ca not really discuss in this kind
of a setting. But we are looking--we understand the urgency of
the situation. I think all of us understand what is at stake
here, not just for Syria but for its neighborhood, and some of
our closest partners are in that neighborhood. So we are
looking at what more we can do, but also at what our partners
can do more effectively to support the moderate opposition and
begin to try to change the realities on the ground.
Senator Corker. You understand we have been hearing this
for years now. And since we first began hearing this, I would
guess 100,000 people have died since we first began hearing
this.
What is it within the administration right now that keeps
the administration from really wanting to put something forth?
I mean, do we not have the partnerships we had before in the
region? What is the factor that you think keeps our
administration from being slightly more forward? I will say
this: Things have changed. I think the options that were great
options a year ago are probably not as great today. They are
just not, because of the extremists that have moved into the
region.
But who are our partners now in this effort, our real
partners? And what is it that you think keeps the
administration from wanting to change that balance on the
ground? Have we decided now that we are better off with Assad
in place because the extremists are actually worse for our own
homeland security than Assad being there? I would just like an
explanation because we have been hearing this--100,000 people
ago we were hearing this.
Ambassador Burns. I remain firmly convinced, and the
administration does, that Assad is a magnet, as my colleagues
were talking about, not only for foreign fighters and violent
extremism, but that as long as Assad remains the civil war will
continue and get worse and the dangers of spillover get worse
as well. So I do not think either our analysis or our resolve
has changed a bit on that.
There is more that we can do with our partners. I mentioned
the Saudis earlier. The President, as you know, at the end of
March is going to be going to Saudi Arabia. We work very
effectively, as Derek was describing, with the Jordanians, and
I know King Abdullah had a chance to meet with you recently and
discuss both his concerns and his plans. We are intensifying
our cooperation with Jordan as well.
So this is going to require an all-of-the-above effort,
looking at what more we can do, but also what more our partners
can do, recognizing the urgency of the situation.
Senator Corker. Generally speaking, I just want to say it
is kind of none of the above. I know there is limited activity
that gets discussed in other settings. But I was just in Saudi
Arabia not long ago. I can tell you they are one frustrated
group of folks at us saying we are going to do something and
not doing anything. They obviously went outside the umbrella.
There has been some backlash there, I understand.
But it is very disappointing, year after year, 100,000
people later, to continue to hear the same things and yet no
action be taken, and I know the situation is much worse now.
Let me ask you this. On Russia, has there been any
discussion--and I know that people on both sides of the aisle
have discussed energy issues, and I know we are going to talk
about sanctions, and we are going to have some economic relief,
hopefully, coming next week--is there any discussion right now
about our energy policy and additional pressure that might be
placed on Russia by moving quickly with that, not again waiting
a year but moving quickly with some changes in how we deal with
some of our energy issues that might put additional economic
pressure on Russia?
Ambassador Burns. Well, Senator, as you and other members
of the committee know very well, the shale revolution and the
transformation of the global energy market gives the United
States a great deal of strategic leverage we did not have
before, and it creates opportunities for us to help the
Europeans loosen their dependence on Russian gas, and over the
long term gives us strategic assets that I think can be very
important in foreign policy.
We need to be very conscious of that as we look ahead and
very conscious of that in terms of what it means for our
relative strengths and Russia's relative weaknesses as you look
out over the next few years.
So to answer your question; yes, people are looking very
carefully at that as an element of broader strategy.
Senator Corker. I think most of the people that look at
this issue, much like we could have done some things in Syria a
year ago, 2 years ago, and things would not be the way they are
today, people look at this energy issue and I think they say,
well, if we wait a year or two to announce some things or do
some things, it is not going to have the impact that it would
have today. So I hope we do not go through the same process in
looking at energy that we have in Syria.
I will just close with this. I know my time is up. I think
our foreign policy credibility is close to shot at this time.
The series of events that have happened over this last year I
think have weakened us substantially. Again, I know you are
implementers, not setters, and I am not directing this at you.
On Iran, though, I think we all support the diplomatic
activities that are taking place there. I think many of us are
concerned about the interim deal being the final deal or having
a series of rolling interim deals. I would just say that, look,
Russia has been our partner in all of these things, and I think
us rushing to some agreement that again is not one that is
substantial enough will shoot all credibility that we have
relative to foreign policy issues.
I would just urge you to--I would urge the State
Department, I would urge those that are negotiating, to please
pause. Let us make sure that what we do there is something of
long-term significance that matters, and let us--certainly, do
not appear to be rushing into a deal just to make a deal, which
I think that has hurt us over the course of the last year.
I thank you for your service.
The Chairman. Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Well, Mr. Chairman, first of all, thank you
very much for holding this hearing.
Secretary Burns, it is always a pleasure to have you before
our committee, and the other panelists. Senator Corker and I
share many common visions on foreign policy objectives,
including in Iran and Syria and Ukraine. I disagree with your
assessment. I think this administration has shown incredible
leadership and effective coalition-building to deal with some
extremely challenging problems around the world. It is
important that we work as closely as we can together, and I
want to talk about the Ukraine specifically.
We have talked about this before, but I am just going to
underscore how dangerous this situation is and how Russia is
violating not just one, but numerous international obligations.
They are violating the OSCE core principles, the 1994 Budapest
Memorandum--signed by the United States, United Kingdom,
Russia, and Ukraine--the 1997 Ukraine-Russia bilateral treaty,
the U.N. Charter.
Russia's military invasion is a gross violation of the
Vienna Documents Confidence and Security-Building Mechanisms,
which govern military relations and arms control. I could go on
and list many, many other international agreements that are
clearly being violated by Russia in Ukraine.
Ukraine has shown remarkable restraint. I commend them for
being able to put the spotlight on who is the villain here, and
it is clearly Russia.
The OSCE has a mechanism in order to deal with it. They
have observers. Ukraine has asked those observers to go to
Crimea so that we can have objective accounts, because I think
it is clear to the world that Russia's justification for what
they are doing does not exist.
Mr. Chairman, it is very interesting that those observers
have been denied entrance into Crimea by people dressed up in
military uniforms and by others who are unidentified. Clearly,
we know who is responsible for those denials.
The OSCE media freedom representative and her staff were
temporarily blocked from leaving a hotel in Crimea where she
had meetings with journalists and civil society activists. The
U.N. special envoy was accosted by unidentified gunmen after
visiting the naval headquarters. I could go on and on and on
about how Russia is denying international institutions that are
available in order to deal with this the access they need,
which is only accelerating this problem.
As the chairman pointed out, this is an issue that goes
well beyond Ukraine and Russia. From the western Balkans to the
South China Sea, we have territorial issues in which we worry
about military force being used rather than direct bilateral
discussions.
So I am proud that the United States has taken a strong
position on this and our President has taken a strong position
on this. The Executive order that was issued I think is the
right course. We are going to have to do more, as you have
acknowledged.
But here is the challenge. What is the EU doing? What is
the United Nations doing? We have heard a little bit about
OSCE. We have heard a little bit about NATO. But I tell you, we
have not heard the strong unified voice that we hoped we would
see around the world to demand that Russia get out of Ukraine
and allow Ukraine to run its own internal affairs.
Where are we with the U.N.? Where are we with the other
international organizations and the EU?
Ambassador Burns. Thanks, Senator. On the EU, as you know,
there is an EU summit, an extraordinary EU summit that is going
on right now. The President and Secretary Kerry have been in
very close touch with EU leaders over the course of recent
days. The EU has taken some steps, both----
Senator Cardin. Are they as broad as what the President has
taken on this Executive order?
Ambassador Burns. They have taken some steps against
Ukrainian individuals which are consistent with the Executive
order, and I know they are considering today as we meet here a
range of other steps. I do believe that EU leaders understand
what is at stake here.
Senator Cardin. As I understand the President's Executive
order, it goes beyond just Ukrainians.
Ambassador Burns. Yes, sir. But as I said, I believe the EU
is considering very seriously a range of other steps that it
can take. I do agree with you; I think acting as part of a
broad international coalition on issues like this is likely to
have more significant effect on Russian behavior. So we are
going to continue to do everything we can, working with our
partners in the EU, to make clear the costs, not only of what
Russia has already done, but the increasingly significant costs
of any further escalation.
I do believe that EU leaders understand that and are going
to act on it.
Senator Cardin. How about beyond the EU?
Ambassador Burns. You mentioned the OSCE, sir, which you
know very well. OSCE has moved quickly to organize observers in
eastern Ukraine. They have run into difficulties in Crimea, but
we are going to continue to push that as hard as we can. It is
one of the most effective ways to demonstrate the falsity of
some of the claims that Russian leaders have made about what is
going on in eastern Ukraine and the false accusations about
persecution of ethnic Russian minorities there.
So in the U.N. Security Council we will continue to try to
keep a focus on the issue as well. So that we will use every
international fora that we can to not only highlight our
concerns, but build practical pressure on Russia to restore
Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Risch has deferred to Senator
Johnson.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Burns, can you tell me exactly how the
administration views Russia? I would like to think Russia is a
friendly rival as opposed to an unfriendly adversary. What is
the viewpoint of the administration right now toward Russia?
Ambassador Burns. Our relationship with Russia is a
complicated one. There are some areas in which as a practical
matter we have been able to work together in recent years.
Afghanistan is one example. It is been true in some other areas
as well. But there are also areas of obvious difference,
certainly most obviously and most seriously in Ukraine now. But
it has been true in other parts of Russia's neighborhood,
Georgia, as was mentioned earlier.
And we continue to have serious concerns about human rights
abuses within Russia itself. So the honest answer is that our
relationship is a mix of areas of obvious difference and in
some cases competition and some areas in which objectively we
can work together. But right now I think we are in a very
difficult period in our relationship with Russia because of
Russian behavior.
Senator Johnson. In areas, for example Afghanistan, maybe
there is a little bit more cooperation there. Then you look at
Syria. When we are attempting to work with them as, let us say,
partners, do you believe they are always operating with the
United States in good faith or are they being duplicitous? I
mean, it may be good faith in Afghanistan, there is maybe some
shared interests, but more duplicity in Syria?
Ambassador Burns. I think on Syria we have been frustrated
by large dimensions of Russian behavior and actions. On the
chemical weapons issue, we have managed to work together and
made at least some progress toward the destruction of Assad's
chemical weapons stockpile, which objectively, I think, is a
good thing for Syria and for the region.
But in other areas we have been frustrated by the
reluctance, the unwillingness of the Russian Government to push
harder on the Assad regime and to recognize what is at stake,
not just for Syria but for the whole region. So Afghanistan, as
you mentioned, Russia has played a role in facilitating through
the Northern Distribution Network the provision of supplies to
the coalition effort in Afghanistan, which again is in a hard-
nosed way in Russia's interest because it does not have an
interest in the spillover of instability from Afghanistan.
Senator Johnson. The Washington Post, in an editorial, said
that the administration is basing its foreign policy on a
fantasy. Then they changed it in the printed version. But have
the events in the Crimea and the Ukraine--is the administration
now looking a little more realistically long term?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, I think, and I have spent a good
bit of my own career serving in Russia and working on United
States-Russian relations, and I have always tried to be
realistic about where there are areas of cooperation, trying to
take advantage of that, but also to be honest with ourselves
about those areas of obvious difference.
So I think over the long haul we need to be mindful, as I
said in my opening remarks, of our own strengths and the
strengths of the United States and our partners and the
dilemmas that Russia is going to face over the long term.
Senator Johnson. I have heard a number of people say that
Russia's move in Crimea signals a certain level of weakness on
the part of Russia. It looks like a pretty strong move to me.
Can we just--you talked about strengths. What gives Russia the
strength to do what it did? Why did they think they can do that
with impunity?
Ambassador Burns. Well, given the geography and the
proximity of Russia to Crimea and the relative strength of the
Russian military compared to the Ukrainian military, it is
clear to see how Russia could have----
Senator Johnson. So military. But also, is it not their
oil?
Ambassador Burns. Certainly the Russian economy is largely
dependent on hydrocarbons, on oil and gas.
Senator Johnson. Is it safe to say that high oil prices,
which are sometimes driven higher by chaos for example in the
Middle East, does that give Russia strength?
Ambassador Burns. Certainly high energy prices have fueled
Russian economic growth in recent years. But that growth has
tapered off. It is now under 2 percent in the last couple
years, as I recall. As I mentioned earlier, if you look at the
way in which the global energy market is being transformed by
the shale technology revolution, over the long haul those
relative strengths of Russia I think are going to diminish. And
Russia has not taken advantage of the opportunity in the last
decade to diversify its economy.
Senator Johnson. So we are getting right to the point I
wanted to get to. You mentioned that we need to remain steady,
determined, patient, resolute. The chairman said we have to say
what we mean and mean what we say. In other words, not only
just talk ???to??? talk; walk the walk. So is this
administration going to start looking at Russia with their eyes
wide open, understand the reality of the situation, understand
the brute force, the lawlessness, the duplicity of Russia? And
are we going to start laying in a ratcheted-up level of
strategy of increasing the sanctions, increasing the costs, if
Vladimir Putin continues to do this? Or are we going to
deescalate, provide an off-ramp, and then just kind of hope for
the best again?
Do we have a well thought out or are we going to develop a
well thought out strategy, understanding the real reality of
the situation now?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, I think we have our eyes wide
open about all the realities that you just described. And as I
tried to outline in my opening comments, I think we are
developing a very careful systematic strategy for dealing with
those realities and promoting American interests and values.
Senator Johnson. Okay, thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you all very much for being here at a very
challenging time in the world. I am not sure whether this is
best directed to you, Deputy Secretary Burns, or Mr. Chollet.
But I know that Ukraine is not a member of NATO, but there have
been some meetings within our NATO allies to assess the
situation in Ukraine. Do we assume that NATO may take a more
assertive posture with respect to what has happened there,
either rhetorically or in some other ways that symbolically
might suggest support for Ukraine?
I wonder if you could talk about what actions we might be
taking with NATO to engage their support in the current
situation.
Ambassador Burns. Senator, let me start and then I will
turn to Derek. As Secretary Hagel made clear yesterday, we have
taken a number of immediate practical steps. We have an
aviation detachment in Poland. We are looking to expand
cooperation with the Poles through that detachment. There is a
NATO air policing unit that operates in the Baltics. We are
looking to enhance the contributions that we make there.
So those are steps that are not just symbolic; they are
practical and they make clear the commitment of the United
States and the entire alliance to partners who have real
concerns right now.
Mr. Chollet. Senator, if I could add, the North Atlantic
Council of NATO has been in continuous meetings over the last
week on this issue. I, a week ago today, was with Secretary
Hagel in Brussels, where we participated in a NATO Ukraine
Commission meeting that was thrown together on very short
notice to discuss this crisis, and the Deputy Defense Minister
of Ukraine was there.
Today in Brussels the Secretary General of NATO is going to
be meeting with the Ukrainian Prime Minister. At each of these
junctures, NATO has released very strong statements of support
for the Ukrainian people and for the peaceful end to this
situation. As the Deputy mentioned, the Baltic air policing
mission, which is a NATO mission, Secretary Hagel announced
yesterday that the United States, which is currently managing
that operation--we have had four F-15s there. We will be adding
six additional F-15 today, flying from the U.K. to Lithuania.
They will land today and then participate this NATO-led air
policing mission for our Baltic partners.
That is reassuring some very critical allies of ours who
are made very nervous about the events in the Ukraine and what
Russia's been doing.
Senator Shaheen. Can you speak to how those actions are
being received in Russia?
Mr. Chollet. We have been very clear with our Russian
counterparts about what we are doing. Chairman Dempsey has had
several conversations in the last 48 hours with his counterpart
in Russia. We have been very open with them. They are taking
this rather matter of factly, to be honest, which is good news.
We are not seeking to take an escalatory step vis-a-vis Russia
with these moves. We are seeking to reassure some partners who
are rightfully nervous about what is going on in Ukraine and
what this may mean for them.
So we are very determined to remain transparent. Yesterday,
in fact, in Brussels there was a NATO Russia Council meeting
that was thrown on the schedule, did not go particularly well,
as you might imagine, with the Russian representative there. So
NATO is trying to send a clear sign of support and reassurance
to NATO partners. We are also trying to be transparent as much
as we can with the Russians, so the steps we take to reassure
partners do not escalate the situation further.
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Olsen, you talked in your testimony
about the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Can you talk
about the extent to which we think there is collaboration--I do
not know if that is the right term--with al-Qaeda on their
activities, or how are they directing things that are happening
in Iraq and Syria as opposed to al-Qaeda, and how much do we
know about them?
Mr. Olsen. Sure. Senator, the group that you mentioned,
ISIL, really is a modification of a prior group, Al Qaeda in
Iraq, which was an affiliated group with al-Qaeda. They
certainly share that same ideology, although they are now
engaged in a rather public controversy about whether ISIL is
still part of al-Qaeda, core al-Qaeda under Zawahiri in
Pakistan.
But the bottom line is that ISIL is a group that has that
same ideology and has been involved in a significant amount of
violence both in Syria as well as in Iraq, and has demonstrated
really brutal tactics in both locations. As I mentioned, the
degree of violence in Iraq, in particular in Fallujah, has
risen to a level that we have not seen for several years.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
My time is up.
The Chairman. Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Thank you, and thank you all for your
service.
Deputy Secretary Burns, with regard to the sanctions
announced today, the visa restrictions, how effective do you
expect those to be unless our European partners move ahead with
some financial sanctions of its own, or sanctions on assets or
dealing with assets somehow? What can you tell us about what
Europe is doing at this point or the EU?
Ambassador Burns. Certainly, Senator, I think the steps,
both the Executive order that the President signed as well as
the visa bans that the State Department is putting into effect,
are significant steps. But you are absolutely right, we will
have more impact if we do more with our European partners. The
EU leaders are meeting right now in an extraordinary summit. I
think they are looking very seriously at concrete actions that
they can take.
They have taken some already against Ukrainian individuals
with regard to travel and asset forfeitures. But they are
looking at further serious steps that they can take. So the
more we do this in sync with our European partners, the
stronger the effect is going to be and that is why we are
working quite intensively with our European partners right now.
Senator Flake. Thank you. I think the outcry from the
United States and from Europe may stop, for the time being at
least, Russia from moving further into the Ukraine. But it
looks as if they are looking to hunker down pretty quickly in
Crimea. They are moving forward with some kind of referendum of
elections within a week, and I guess the Russian Parliament is
now looking for a way to more easily allow them to be annexed
or somehow swallowed up by Russia just in the short term.
Assuming that happens, assuming that Russia tries to give
some patina of legality to all of this that way, how long do
you think our European allies and others will hold forward with
sanctions if Russia does not incur further into the Ukraine,
but just settles for Crimea? Will the sanctions regime that we
are putting in place be effective in the long term? Will it be
held in the long term? What are your feelings there?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, I would say a couple things.
First, I do not think there is any way in which the Russians
can put a patina of legality or legitimacy on the referendum
that has been discussed. It runs directly counter to the
Ukrainian Constitution, which makes clear that any step to
alter the territory of the Ukraine has to be approved by an
all-Ukraine national referendum.
Second, I think the Europeans understand what is at stake,
as I believe we do, and are determined to not only make clear
that there are costs of what has already been done, but to
increase significantly costs if the situation escalates. I
think over the long term what Russia will face if it persists
in this is going to be not only increasing costs, but
increasing international isolation, which does have a
consequence at a moment when Russia has its share of
challenges--as I mentioned before, changes in the global energy
market, an economy which is not growing at nearly the rate it
was before, and a lot of unresolved domestic challenges as
well.
Senator Flake. I did not say they could put some kind of
patina of legality, but they are sure trying.
With regard to Russia and our cooperation with Russia in
Syria with regard to chemical weapons, what can you tell us
about how the recent events have affected that cooperation with
regard to chemical weapons? I am sorry if this is ground you
have already plowed here. I came late.
Ambassador Burns. I will be very brief, Senator. We have
been frustrated over recent months by the foot-dragging of the
Syrian regime. I believe Russia remains committed to the object
here, which is the removal and destruction of all of Syria's
chemical weapons stockpile. By the beginning of next week,
about 35 percent of that stockpile should be removed from
Syria.
It is still possible to meet the 30th of June target that
has been set and I think it is vitally important to do that.
That is an area where I believe Russia has a self-interest in
trying to ensure that that happens. It is not a favor to the
United States. It is something that Russia has committed to,
and I hope that we can accomplish that goal.
Senator Flake. Some of the sanctions that have been talked
about or contemplated by the administration and/or Congress
involve cooperation or lack thereof or stopping cooperation
with Russia on certain issues. How would that impact our
ability to carry forward the agreement that we have in Syria?
Ambassador Burns. It is hard to predict, Senator. But as I
said before, I think Russia having made a very visible and
public commitment to accomplishing the destruction of Syria's
chemical weapons stockpile, I think has a self-interest in
trying to ensure that that happens. We will certainly do
everything we can to help ensure it does.
Senator Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Johnson referenced the fact that there are many
people who believe that this is actually a sign of Russian
weakness. Count me amongst them, in the sense that only 2 weeks
ago Russia had the President of the Ukraine essentially under
their thumb both economically and politically, a country that
had reversed course and had committed into a new economic
relationship with Russia, moved away from an economic
association with Europe, and today the situation is very
different. No matter the future disposition of Crimea, there
are 43 million other Ukrainians, which represent 95 percent of
the country's population, which now have a government oriented
toward Europe, a country--Russia now faces economic sanctions
from the United States and Europe that, if not crippling, will
certainly be damaging, and he faces a future as somewhat of an
international pariah who is going to be much--have a much
lesser ability to influence the future course of democratic and
economic values.
So ultimately I guess the question is, What is his end goal
here? If this was a panicked reaction to Yanukovych's removal
from office, then what he is seeking here is not just
territorial control of Crimea, but he is still seeking to
influence events in Kiev, that he actually thinks he still has
the ability to keep the totality of Ukraine out of the EU and
still part of the Russian orbit.
That does not seem to me the direction that this is going.
I want to make sure we do everything within our ability through
the trans-Atlantic relationship to expel Russian troops out of
Crimea. But no matter his ability to cloud the future of
Crimea's legal status, I would be interested to hear your take
on whether this has anything to do--whether he has any
remaining effect on what seems to me now a predestined path of
Ukraine into the European?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, I think the effect if the
present events continue on their course is going to be largely
to solidify Ukrainians around their own commitment to their
independence and sovereignty and deepen their interest in
connections to the EU and to the West. I think that is largely
the effect. I do not think that is the intended effect of what
President Putin has tried to do. I think what he looks for is
deferential neighbors and to try to ensure that there are
governments in place that are going to be deferential to
Russian interests.
As I said in my opening remarks, it is one thing to
recognize that Russia has legitimate interests in Ukraine for
all sorts of reasons, but that does not justify illegitimate
actions. I think those illegitimate actions are over the long
haul going to isolate Russia just as you said and undermine its
ability to influence its neighbors.
Senator Murphy. There has been all sorts of loose talk on
the television news shows about the fact that just because
there are ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Ukraine, in
Crimea and eastern Ukraine, that that somehow equates to
Russian sympathizers. That frankly is simply not the case in
that part of the world, as it is also not the case in many
parts of this country that have large numbers of ethnic
Russians.
A followup on Senator Shaheen's question regarding NATO.
There have been some that have suggested that the move on
Crimea is a caution to admit Georgia and Ukraine into NATO,
because then of course we would have an article 5 obligation to
defend. The other way of looking at it is that it is an
advertisement for why we should offer membership to Georgia
now, this year, and Ukraine at the appropriate moment, because
it would insulate those countries from future Russian
encroachment.
That latter view is mine, but how does the administration
view the effect of the events of the past several weeks, maybe
most immediately on the potential roadmap for Georgia's
ascension into NATO?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, as you know, American policy
across administrations has been to support an open door for
NATO, and with regard to Georgia to support Georgia's interest
in eventual membership with the membership action plan being
the next step along the way. That is obviously a decision that
has to be taken within the alliance and there is always an
active debate about those issues. But American policy has not
changed.
Senator Murphy. Thank you. Finally, this is not a question
that needs to be answered. Let me say that I do not necessarily
share your optimism about the direction that our European
friends are going. I hope that today's summit results in a new
commitment to join us in sanctions. I am glad that the
administration took these initial steps today. But given the
fact that our economic relationship with Russia is about $40
billion in Europe's economic relationship with Russia is $460
billion, if economic sanctions are to have an effect, which I
believe they can, this clearly has to be done in conjunction.
This is a test of the trans-Atlantic relationship and we
will see what the result is from our European allies in the
coming days and weeks.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to the
witnesses.
Two comments on Russia and then I want to ask some
questions about Syria. I associate myself with the comments
suggesting that Russia's move in the Crimea is ultimately a
sign of weakness that is likely to lead to bad consequences for
Russia. I think they have overplayed their hand in a way that
it is going to have dramatically negative consequences for an
economy that already has challenges and a political system that
is sort of rotten at the top.
Second, I associate myself with the comments raised by
folks around the table that we ought to be using our energy
resources to accomplish our foreign policy objectives,
especially the support of Ukrainian independence. The energy
resources that we have give us such a good ability to provide a
backstop and help countries wean themselves away from
autocratic regimes that they need to be close to because of
energy. Whether that is folks who have to purchase from Russia
or folks who we have given a waiver to purchase from Iran, we
do have an ability now to strategically use our resources to
help pull people away from countries that they would rather not
be associated with, and we should be looking at that with
respect to Ukraine.
Moving to Syria, I recently returned from a trip to Lebanon
with Senator King to talk about Syria there, after earlier
visits to Turkey and Jordan. We had a hearing about Lebanon
that some in the room attended 10 days or so ago, and it was
shocking, the magnitude of the challenge, 4 million Lebanese
and now over a million Syrian refugees.
But what was even more shocking is as you talk to Lebanese
about any issue Syria is the dark star with its powerful center
of gravity that warps everything in Lebanon. The Syrian civil
war is ultimately the answer to every question. The kids were
running two shifts in the Lebanese schools because of Syrian
refugees. Water resources, energy resources, tourism, and the
economy.
Despite political instability, Lebanon had been somewhat
free from the kind of terrorist bombing activity that had been
the norm there during the 1980s and some parts of the 1990s.
But as soon as Hezbollah decided to go all in for Assad, then
Sunni extremists said, okay, we are going to come fight a
battle in your neighborhood. And there has been this extremist
violence. Senator King and I were heading off to a meeting in
downtown Beirut and two suicide bombers exploded themselves
outside of an Iranian cultural center.
The Hezbollah activity in Syria has brought more extremist
activity into Syria. The topic of this hearing is the spillover
effect, and the spillover effect in Lebanon is just absolutely
massive.
It strikes me that as we are grappling with what the United
States can do there are sort of at least four areas where we
can be engaged. Humanitarian aid to Syrian refugees outside
Syria, we are the top provider of humanitarian aid in the
world. Not that we cannot do more and not that we cannot be
calling on other nations to do more, but in terms of who is
providing that humanitarian aid we are No. 1 and there is not a
close second.
Second and very importantly is humanitarian aid inside
Syria. Where there are 3 to 4 million Syrian refugees outside
Saudi Arabia, there are 7 million refugees inside Syria who
have been displaced. And Russia has been that stone wall
against humanitarian aid delivery, aggressive insertion of
humanitarian aid inside Syria.
During the Winter Olympics when the light of the world was
on them and they did not want to just be the sole pariah
blocking humanitarian aid, Russia finally agreed, after vetoing
three Security Council resolutions on humanitarian aid, to a
Security Council resolution about the delivery of humanitarian
aid inside Syria. The first question I want to ask you is, that
was done in mid-February. It has not been many weeks since it
was done and I think there was like a 30-day reporting
requirement. What have you seen in terms of humanitarian aid
delivery inside Syria since the U.N. Security resolution?
Ambassador Burns. It remains a huge problem and we have not
seen huge progress since the passage of Resolution 2139. I
think it does provide a tool to try to ensure not only that the
siege--and it literally is a siege--of certain cities are
lifted, and that we can establish humanitarian access. We are
working hard at that in support not just of U.N. and other
relief agencies, but also pressing the Russians and others who
voted for this resolution to help make it a reality.
But I do not want to suggest to you, Senator, that we have
seen kind of dramatic overnight progress. But we are going to
keep trying to do everything we can to use 2139 to improve the
situation.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Chairman, my time is almost up. The
other two elements obviously where we can be helpful, that we
have to grapple with policy, is along the lines that were in
the Foreign Relations Committee's resolution we passed earlier
this year about military support, supporting military support
to vetted opposition; and finally the diplomacy. While the
Geneva talks have been a failure thus far, there is no
substitute for them.
Let me just ask you finally, Do you share DNI Clapper's
view that the current battlefield situation in Syria is
essentially a stalemate that is likely to last a long time
without either side being able to claim a decisive victory?
Ambassador Burns. I do think the civil war is a bloody
stalemate right now. The Assad regime controls some parts of
the country, but obviously does not control other swaths of the
country right now. I think the longer that bloody stalemate
continues, the greater the human cost for Syrians, obviously as
you just mentioned, but also the greater dangers to the region,
for Lebanon but also for Jordan and Iraq.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to very strongly contest this idea that massive
exportation of American energy is going to affect the Ukraine.
I want to say this because I believe our greatest strength is
our national economy. I think that is what really makes us
strong. Because we are strong at home, we are strong abroad.
So the administration has already approved five export
terminals which have the capacity to export 5 trillion feet of
natural gas. The Energy Information Agency says that just
because of that reduction of supply in the United States it
could lead to an upward of 50 percent increase in domestic
prices here. Well, that is $62 billion a year that is coming
out of consumers' pockets in America, manufacturers' pockets in
America. That is a $62 trillion tax, this policy, on Americans
every year. It would be close to $600, $700 billion over a 10-
year period.
Not only that, it is going to slow the conversion from
coal-fired plants over to natural gas plants in the United
States, because the price of natural gas is going to go so high
here. It is going to slow the conversion of oil-run buses and
trucks over to natural gas, which is domestically supplied and
is low cost, and as a result we are going to continue to import
more oil from places we should not be importing oil. It is
going to slow our economic recovery because it is a subsidy
right now, this low-cost energy into our economy, and except
for labor it is the single largest discretionary item.
And moreover, this whole idea that our natural gas is going
to the Ukraine is just completely wrong-headed. Rex Tillerson
at Exxon Mobil has a fiduciary relationship with his
shareholders. The price in China that he is going to get for
natural gas is much higher than in the Ukraine. The price he is
going to get in South America is much higher than he is going
to get in the Ukraine.
Congress and the President do not control where this
natural gas goes. It is not Russia, it is not Venezuela. We are
a capitalist country. They are going for the highest price, and
that is not from Ukraine.
So this is an illusion and we need a national debate here.
We have a tremendous economic recovery being driven by this
low-cost natural gas. If we are going to lead to a $62 billion
a year increase, a tax, I can understand what Rex Tillerson and
the American Gas Association want. Their motto is essentially
do not let a good crisis go to waste. Let us just argue for
more export of this incredibly valuable natural resource.
But I will tell you this. This is a huge price that we pay
in weakening America's economy by doing it, and that is our
greatest strength. That is what really allows us to stand
astride the world. It is our economy. That is what the rest of
the world's afraid of. They want to partner with us. That is
why the Ukraine wants to move toward the West. It is our
economy that makes us attractive to them. It is not our tanks,
it is not our jets. It is our economy. That is what those young
people want.
So all I can say to you is it is an illusion. It is a free
market out there. Our natural gas is not going to the Ukraine.
No President, no Secretary of Defense, can direct it that way.
It is not going there. We cannot compete with Russian pipelines
with high-cost liquefied natural gas that costs $6.00 just to
liquefy it, just to cryogenically freeze it.
So I just say that to you, Mr. Secretary. We need a big
debate in America, Mr. Chairman, over the economic impacts on
our own country if we decide to just disperse this natural gas
around the world, helping the Chinese, yes, helping South
Americans, yes, but having such a small impact on what is going
on in the Ukraine that people will look back and say, what were
they thinking; they had an incredible asset that they allowed
to be diffused.
Mr. Secretary.
Ambassador Burns. I guess with regard to Ukraine, I think
there is another dimension, as you know better than I do, to
helping the Ukrainians lessen their dependence on Russian
natural gas, and that is developing their own resources,
whether it is shale or in other areas. The Poles have done some
very sensible things in recent years along those lines. So I
think those are the kind of things that we are working actively
to help the Ukrainians on.
I recognize I am no expert on the global energy market, but
I recognize what you said about the very important tradeoffs
that are involved here, and that has to be a part of the
broader debate that you described.
Senator Markey. I do not think the analysis has been done.
I think people are just throwing this out as some big idea and
it does not come from an analysis of the impact on our economy.
It does not come from the incredible manufacturing renaissance
we have had in America because of low-priced oil and natural
gas.
Yes, I would like to go out into the free market and get an
extra eight or ten bucks a barrel for American oil. But what
does that do for the low-cost American manufacturers and
consumers who have access to it here? So this is a big debate
for our economy and all I can say is that if we want the
petrochemical, fertilizer, manufacturing industry to be reborn
here, decamp from China and come back here, energy is one of
the biggest single factors. Fifteen bucks an MCF in China, 5
bucks an MCF here in the United States. That is why they are
coming back. You want to double it, then you are going to lose
your competitive edge and it is really going to hurt us here in
America.
So I just want to throw that out, Mr. Chairman. We need a
big national debate over this bonanza of shale oil and gas and
see how we benefit most as a country. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. That is 37 years of experience
over in the House of Representatives speaking.
Senator Markey. By osmosis you pick up a few things.
The Chairman. I have one final question and I think Senator
Corker does.
Senator Kaine. And I do as well, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Okay.
So, Secretary Chollet, a question and a caution. The
question is, In light of what has happened here with Russia and
considering the announcements of the Secretary of Defense about
our overall plans for the future, does this give us cause to
reconsider what we are doing in Europe?
Mr. Chollet. In terms of military posture?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Chollet. Well, sir, as you know, we maintain a very
robust posture in Europe. Even though we have had to come down
since the end of the cold war, we still have many, many forces
forward-deployed. I think that the QDR that was released
several days ago makes very clear that we still, despite the
budget pressures we face, despite a commitment to implement a
rebalance toward Asia, that we are privileging the trans-
Atlantic alliance and we are going to have the necessary forces
and energy in place to continue to work very closely with our
NATO allies.
So I think that part of what we are trying to do is build
strong partners; work through strong partners. The aviation
detachment in Poland that has been mentioned several times
already is a perfect example of how the United States, with
very little investment, a matter of a few airplanes, can work
very closely with our Polish partners both to reassure them and
build up their capability to work with us to take care of our
common security.
The Chairman. I appreciate that, the aviation detachment. I
think it is a good thing. But it is not a challenge to the
Russians if they decided to move further east--further west, I
should say. So I just think that it is a moment to think about
where we are headed here, because there were some presumptions,
I think, and I am not sure that, based on current events, those
presumptions do not need to be reviewed.
My caution is that I agreed to arms sales to Iraq after a
lot of concerns and a lot of collective work to get to a point
that I thought it was propitious to do, but I read these
reports of Israelis stopping a ship with dozens of rockets,
including Syrian-made M-302s, that as I understand the reports
show ultimately came from Iran, went to Iraq, where they were
placed on a ship and hidden under cement. The Cubans use sugar.
Here they use cement to hide the missiles. And then went down
from there to the coast, along the coast of Africa, where it
was intercepted.
You know, the Iraqis must understand, whether it is
overflights by Iran into Syria or being a place where you can
send missiles and then have them boarded on a commercial ship
and then trying to evade what I think are violations of
international norms in terms of the shipment of missiles here,
that that behavior, one, is unacceptable, and two, comes with
consequences.
Every time I try to help you move forward, I get a set of
circumstances that increase my concern about the Iraqis'
commitments. So I just want to caution that as I look at this
case, which we will be reviewing, and others that our Iraqi
partners must understand that there are consequences in this
regard, consequences until we ultimately resettle all of the
MEK, to their security. There are a series of things here.
I have been willing to be helpful, but I have to be honest
with you: I get concerned when I see actions such as these.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, just on that note, here we
are. Again, I think this committee in a bipartisan way has done
everything it can to try to support and bolster things that the
administration has at least tilted at publicly. Maybe today the
fact that we are having a hearing on Syria and we have got our
counterterrorism person here because we know what has happened
and Syria is now a threat to our Nation, and our Director of
National Intelligence has said that, we have our person
involved in international defense issues working on the region
because we know the region has been destabilized because of
lack of followthrough.
I just have to tell you it is disappointing. And again, I
really respect the public service of all three of our
panelists. It is disappointing that we just continue to have
really no policy, no policy in Syria, other than dealing with
chemical weapons at a slow pace. So I am just very
disappointed. I know it is even more difficult to have a policy
because we did not take actions earlier on the that
administration itself declared were going to take place.
So anyway, I think this is a telling panel. I appreciate
you having this hearing.
I just want to close with this. I think it is an incredible
thing that in this Foreign Relations hearing we were able to
get the Senator from Massachusetts, who I respect--and I say
this with affection--to give a 7-minute oration on the
importance of fossil fuels to our economy. So I want to thank
you for that and I look forward to that being on YouTube over
and over and over again. But I thank you for that.
I would just ask----
Senator Markey. Would the gentleman yield as the ranking
member?
Senator Corker. If the chairman will let me, yes, I will.
Senator Markey. Those of us who sit down here only get 5
minutes, and it was only 3 of my minutes.
Senator Corker. Well, it was a great testament to the
importance of inexpensive fossil fuels to our economy.
I would just ask, since this is a place where debates
usually begin and since I agree we should have a debate, what
are some of the dimensions that the State Department is looking
at? We understand there are some trade issues, some WTO issues.
I realize the complexities are much more difficult than just
waving a wand and natural gas appearing in Ukraine. But what
are some of the things that are just being discussed, that are
not agreed to, relative to how energy policy in our Nation with
excesses can help and maybe cause Europeans, candidly, who as
someone mentioned earlier do not look like they are acting
extremely courageous now because of some of these energy issues
and other things--what is it we might do? What are some of the
things we might be considering relative to energy that could be
important right now relative to Ukraine?
Ambassador Burns. I think the most important thing we can
do, Senator, with regard to Ukraine is continue to help them
develop their own energy resources off the Black Sea, for
example, take advantage of shale technology, as the Poles have
done recently, I think help them to diversify their sources
beyond Russia, because there are others in Central Asia and
other energy producers to whom they can turn; to help improve
energy efficiency, because energy use is enormously inefficient
in Ukraine.
So those are all very practical things that I think we can
do, quite apart from the broader debate that you have both been
talking about, about how does the United States best use what
is going to be an enormous asset, I think, in the coming years,
already is an enormous asset as a result of the shale
revolution.
Senator Corker. But is there any discussion about that
specifically, which is I think what evoked the conversation we
had? Are there at least some considerations being made for
using this resource that we have today to cause there to be a
little change in the balance in Ukraine?
Ambassador Burns. There certainly is a lot of active
strategic consideration being given to how this huge asset
might affect strategy and foreign policy. Again, it is going to
have to flow from a national debate, which involves tradeoffs
in this country. There are a lot of other parts to the
executive branch that are going to be involved in this as well
as the Congress. But I do think it is going to provide a very
significant asset for the United States for many decades to
come, and I do think that asset and how we use it is going to
have an impact on the leverage of countries like Russia that
for many years have used an abundance of hydrocarbons as a tool
of national security.
Senator Corker. So it would be fair to say there are active
discussions at high levels within our government relative to
how we use this resource, natural gas, today to help us with
some of the issues we are dealing with in Europe right now,
both their resistance to put in place sanctions and Ukraine
itself? There is active discussions at high levels regarding
that?
Ambassador Burns. There certainly is.
Senator Corker. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Just briefly, Mr. Chair. I want to echo--
first I have great respect for my Massachusetts colleague's
understanding of these issues, and his request that we ought to
have a national debate about this I think is very appropriate.
I think when that debate is engaged we will find that the
position that we should use in a strategic and specific way are
assets to accomplish important national security objectives is
not based on an illusion or a lack of analysis.
Now, it may at the end of the day be, as the Senator
indicated, a matter of tradeoffs. We may see that there are
real advantages from it, but the advantages are outweighed by
domestic pricing or domestic economic effects. But I know from
interaction with nations that are currently in the nations that
have received waivers from Secretary Kerry to enable them to
purchase Iranian oil, for example--they get a waiver from the
sanctions regime because their economies would not allow them
to function absent Iranian oil. They are very interested in
what tradeoffs they could achieve in purchasing American energy
and weakening their reliance on Iranian oil.
That can be a very powerful lever in attempting to find the
diplomatic path that we want toward a nonnuclear weaponized
Iran. So I think a national debate is a good idea. I think
there are going to be tradeoffs. it may end up being the will
of Congress that we want to keep everything on shore and not
use it in that way. But the suggestion that the believe that
this is an asset that can accomplish a national security
objective is asserted without analysis or is an illusory one, I
think that is going to be proven to be untrue when we get into
the debate.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Markey. I have a final comment. I would like to do
it in 1 minute, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Okay.
Senator Markey. I can do it in 1 minute. I will just say
that we are a capitalist country, not a Communist country.
Venezuela, Russia, they can direct their oil, their gas,
anywhere they want. We cannot do that. We should just accept
capitalism. It is going toward the highest price. That is in
China and South America. And if we allow for a 50-percent rise
in natural gas prices here, the large bus and truck fleet is
ready to convert over to natural gas. You need a small number
of stations to do it, if it is low-priced. If you just do one-
third of that fleet, you cut back by 1 million barrels of oil
that we are importing from the Middle East right now.
To a very large extent, the more we become energy
independent the stronger the United States is. That is what
isolates us right now from any pressure from Russia, is that
sense that they do not have any control over our energy
situation. We just have to be very careful that we do not miss
the opportunity to break total dependence on imported oil. That
is what conversion of natural gas from oil-fired buses and
trucks allows to happen. It is what a reestablishment of a
strong manufacturing base in America allows to happen. It is
what--Secretary Kerry said this. Climate change is a huge
issue. It is a huge national security issue. The faster we
convert over from coal over to natural gas is the sooner we are
going to meet our greenhouse gas commitments at Copenhagen and
later in Paris.
So I just put it in all those national security contexts
and I ask for a real debate, not an illusory debate by foreign
policy experts, but economic experts objectively weighing in on
this as well.
So I thank you.
The Chairman. Well, it seems that the debate has been
started.
Let me thank this panel for a lot of insights. We may have
a little difference here on how we use our energy, but there is
no difference, I believe, between us on standing up to Russia's
aggression as it relates to the Ukraine and what we need to do
in response. I look forward for the committee coming together,
as it has so many times, to do that by early next week.
With the thanks of the committee, this panel is excused.
Let me call up our second panel. We have with us Daveed
Gartenstein-Ross with the Foundation for the Defense of
Democracies and Matthew Levitt of the Washington Institute of
Near East Policy. We welcome them as we excuse the other panel.
[Pause.]
The Chairman. Your full statements will be included in the
record without objection and we would ask you to summarize your
statements in about 5 minutes so that we can engage in the type
of dialogue you just saw us engage with our previous panel. So
Mr. Gartenstein, I think we can start with you.
STATEMENT OF DAVEED GARTENSTEIN-ROSS, SENIOR FELLOW, FOUNDATION
FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member
Corker, and distinguished members of the committee, it is an
honor to appear before you to discuss the spillover effect of
the Syria conflict. At this point the Syria war is likely to
continue for a long time. We should not altogether rule out the
possibility that Assad's regime could fall unexpectedly fast.
The regime could be seriously threatened, for example, of rebel
infighting declines and is combined with battlefield reversals
or growing defections from the government side.
But nonetheless, it is now clear that Assad's fall is not
the inevitability that many analysts believed a year ago and
the likeliest scenario is that which the U.S. intelligence
community now predicts, which is the war continuing for another
decade or more.
Assad's position has been bolstered by two primary factors.
One is that he has been heavily supported by both Iran and
Russia; and the second is his willingness, brazen willingness,
to allow jihadists and other actors viewed as problematic by
outside states to flourish relative to other rebels. The Syrian
military has not made efforts to prevent jihadist groups, like
Jibhat al-Nusra or the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham, or
ISIS, from holding territory as it has done for more moderate
factions within the opposition. This Machiavellian strategy has
served its purpose. The major role jihadists now play has
deterred Western countries and others from throwing significant
weight behind the opposition.
The war in Syria has already produced tremendous ripple
effects and they will only widen. A major ripple is foreign
fighters. The impact that the Syria war will have on this
generation of jihadists will be every bit the equal of what the
Afghan-Soviet War meant for militants who came of age in the
1980s. Both conflicts should be considered first-order
humanitarian disasters. Both conflicts have attracted a large
number of Sunni Muslim fighters and, unfortunately many foreign
fighters have joined jihadist factions.
In the Afghan-Soviet war, relationships amongst militants
forged on the battlefield endured for decades and changed the
international security environment. They gave birth to al-Qaeda
and foreign fighters' roles in many conflicts, such as the
extraordinarily bloody Algerian civil war, were significant.
Like the Afghan-Soviet war, the Syria war will also have far-
flung consequences.
Around 11,000 foreign fighters have been drawn to the
battlefield, a number that already rivals the number of Arabs
who flocked to South Asia to help the Afghan cause in the
1980s. Director Olsen highlighted European Muslims who travel
to Syria to fight Assad and concerns about their liaisons with
jihadist groups. A recent study estimates that up to 1,900 of
the foreign fighters in Syria hail from Western Europe, and
this is now seen as a top national security concern in several
western European countries.
However, the impact of foreign fighters is likely to be
felt most acutely outside the West. About 2,100 Jordanians have
joined the jihad. Over 1,000 Saudis have gone to fight in
Syria, at a time when the country is already challenged by
natural demographic trends. Put simply, given their population
explosion, their oil is buying them less and less relative to
their population, which makes it difficult for them to absorb
the foreign fighter challenge.
The Afghan-Soviet war shows that foreign fighters can
produce consequences in unanticipated places. About 1,000
Tunisians have gone over and Indonesians are for the first time
going overseas to fight, not just to train, which has given
rise to concerns that this conflict may breathe new life into
the group Jemaah Islamiya, which analysts previously considered
to be moribund.
My written testimony emphasizes the great spillover we have
already seen in two countries, in Lebanon and Iraq. Director
Olsen talked about the revitalization of the Islamic State in
Iraq and Al-Sham, which is a serious concern. Already the Syria
war is a major tragedy and it is likely to have a tragic
ending, and the United States is probably unable to avert that
even if we choose to become more deeply involved.
At a policymaking level, I would describe the United States
response to developments in Syria as confused. I share the
frustrations of this panel about our strategic drift in this
conflict. We have not defined our desired end state. We seem to
vaguely know what we do not want to happen, but have little
idea in my view how to get there.
Further, there is the risk that the more involved we choose
to be the greater the danger that we will be drawn into the
conflict in ways that we do not intend. One priority should be
ameliorating the massive humanitarian crisis in the region,
something we should do for moral reasons, but also for
strategic reasons as the refugee camps and other humanitarian
factors can serve as a potential radicalizing element.
It is at least acceptable and perhaps desirable for the
United States to provide small arms to rebel factions. It will
provide an opportunity to map those factions and also provide
the United States with both a presence and a platform. We
should, however, resist the temptation to send antitank or
antiaircraft weapons to Syrian rebels, which present
significant risks that the weaponry could end up in jihadist
hands.
An unfortunate reality of the 21st century is that we need
to deal with an environment of severely constrained resources,
and in Syria it is very difficult to achieve real strategic
gains at an acceptable coast at this point.
Thank you for inviting me to testify. I look forward to
talking to you during questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gartenstein-Ross follows:]
Prepared Statement of Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and distinguished members
of the committee, on behalf of the Foundation for Defense of
Democracies, it is an honor to appear before you to discuss the
spillover effect of the Syria conflict.
The war in Syria has already produced tremendous ripple effects
internationally, and they will only widen over time. The impact the
Syria war will have on this generation of jihadists will be every bit
the equal of what the Afghan-Soviet war meant for militants coming of
age in the 1980s. Both conflicts should be considered first-order
humanitarian disasters, justifiably inflaming passions throughout the
Muslim world and beyond. Because of the devastation wrought by both
wars, the various violent nonstate actors who showed up to defend
Muslims against their antagonists gained legitimacy from the clerical
class and popularity at the street level. Unsurprisingly, both
conflicts attracted a large number of Sunni Muslim foreign fighters
from abroad, most of whom were drawn to the battlefield by grisly
representations of what was happening and the desire to battle
repressive forces who willingly shed innocent blood.\1\ Despite the
often noble intentions for being drawn to the battlefield, many foreign
fighters joined jihadist factions.
In the Afghan-Soviet war, relationships among jihadists were forged
on the battlefield that endured for decades and profoundly changed the
security environment in many countries: Al-Qaeda (AQ) itself was, in
fact, one of the outgrowths of these relationships. But while
Communists were the enemy in the Afghan-Soviet war, the Syrian war has
taken on a more sectarian hue. Iran has steadfastly supported Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad's embattled regime, and the Quds Force, an
elite unit within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), has
deployed in support of Assad's government. Hezbollah militants and Shia
irregular fighters from multiple countries have also entered Syria to
support Assad. This dynamic has already produced sectarian ripples that
did not exist in the Afghan-Soviet war.
In addition to the foreign fighters who have been drawn to the
battlefield--estimated at as many as 11,000 by a recent International
Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) report \2\--two of
Syria's neighbors, Lebanon and Iraq, have been hit particularly hard.
The Syria conflict has bolstered Sunni jihadists in Lebanon and
reignited sectarian tensions, manifested in shootings on the streets,
bombings, and assassinations. Iraq has experienced even more
troublesome sectarian violence than Lebanon, and in addition a major
Iraq jihadist group, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS),
experienced a stunning revival due in significant part to events in
Syria. ISIS's gains are reflected in more than 7,800 civilians dying in
violent attacks in Iraq in 2013 (making it the deadliest year the
country has seen since the height of the civil war in 2006-07), and the
dramatic offensive the jihadist group launched on January 1 of this
year, in which it captured major parts of Fallujah and Ramadi.
A year or two ago it appeared that Assad's regime might collapse
quickly, but the situation in Syria can now be described as a
stalemate, and the U.S. intelligence community believes the war could
ravage the country for another decade or more.\3\ Though the
possibility of an unexpectedly fast regime collapse should not be ruled
out entirely, it is fair to say that a large part of the Assad regime's
unexpected longevity can be attributed to two factors: outside support
from Iran and Russia, and Assad's extraordinarily Machiavellian
strategy. Assad has overwhelmingly concentrated his military resources
and efforts on relatively moderate insurgent factions, which has
ensured that jihadists play an increasingly prominent role on the rebel
side. Regardless of the reprehensibility of the regime's strategy, it
has served its purpose: the major role jihadists now play in the
opposition has deterred Western countries and others from throwing
significant weight behind the rebels. As the Syria conflict continues
to rage, the problems associated with it will mount.
The U.S. has yet to match its desired outcome in Syria to the means
it is willing to employ in addressing the conflict. This testimony will
conclude by contextualizing our consistent failure to match ends to the
means we are willing to employ in Syria, and it will suggest both a
paradigmatic course and also specific policy prescriptions. The bottom
line is that there is little we can do to end or otherwise ``solve''
the Syria conflict. The best we can do, most likely, is to understand
the tremendous ripples that this war is producing, and attempt to
contain the spillover.
syria's ongoing civil war
As the respected Middle East scholar Emile Hokayem has noted,
``Syria as the world has known it for the last four decades no longer
exists.'' \4\ Yet although his country is fractured, Assad may be able
to avoid the collapse of his regime indefinitely.
As I mentioned previously, we should not rule out the possibility
that Assad's regime could fall unexpectedly fast. It suffers from the
combination of a moribund economy and a hollowed-out military that
increasingly relies on conscripts, and the regime could be seriously
threatened if rebel infighting declines and is combined with other
major trends, such as battlefield reversals or growing defections on
the government's side. Nonetheless, it is now clear that Assad's fall
is not the inevitability that many analysts believed it to be a year
ago, and the likeliest scenario is that which is now envisioned by the
U.S. intelligence community: that is, the war continuing for another
decade or more. And rather than the conflict ending with a clear winner
that controls a unified state, it is entirely possible that it will
terminate in ``fragmented sovereignty,'' where a variety of state and
nonstate actors are dominant in different areas.\5\ Such a possibility
is consistent with Director of National Intelligence James Clapper's
pronouncement in February 2014 testimony before the U.S. House of
Representatives that Syria appears destined for ``a perpetual state of
a stalemate'' in which ``neither the regime nor the opposition can
prevail.''
For context on the present shape of the Syria war, Assad's
overreactions had much to do with the early escalation of the struggle
against him. As revolutionary fervor caught hold in the Arab world,
Syria experienced a seemingly limited set of demonstrations beginning
on March 15, 2011. The Deraa demonstrations were the most destructive.
After a crowd burned down the city's Baath Party headquarters, the
regime ``responded decisively, driving straight to the heart of the
protest movement, the Omari Mosque.'' \6\ There, the 4th Armored
Division fired on unarmed protesters, killing up to 15. Images and
video of the slaughter rapidly circulated through opposition media.
This early incident is representative of the beginning of the conflict,
where the regime's overreactions prompted escalation on the other side.
The regime faced internal and external problems. Soldiers began to
defect rather than following orders to shoot protestors. On July 29,
2011, a video posted to YouTube by former Syrian Army officers
announced their defection and the formation of the Free Syrian Army.
The Syrian Government's excesses and its geopolitical position (Syria
was allied with Iran, putting it at odds with the region's Sunni
states) caused it to become increasingly isolated, and helped the
opposition find sponsors. Following a series of meetings during the
summer in Turkey and Qatar with those countries' approval, opposition
forces made a further play for legitimacy and recognition by
establishing the Syrian National Council (SNC) in October 2011. The SNC
``quickly secured Turkish, Qatari and, to a lesser extent, Saudi
political and material support.'' \7\
The Assad regime's increasing isolation was reflected in the Arab
League's decision to suspend Syria in November 2011. Other regional
leaders, including Jordan's King Abdullah and Turkish Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdoggan, called on Assad to resign.\8\
The opposition was nowhere near as organized as surface appearances
may have made it seem. It was, in fact, beset by personality clashes,
and failed to reflect Syria's diversity. Nonetheless, the combination
of defections, Assad's isolation, and an increasingly potent opposition
caused the regime to experience battlefield setbacks. As pressure
mounted, the Syrian military both lost territory and also made tactical
retreats. Analysts began to see it as inevitably doomed.
By now, however, Assad's regime is embattled and weakened, but has
grown likelier to survive--even despite having crossed a U.S.
``redline'' by using chemical weapons against the opposition in August
2013. It is worth noting three major challenges the regime now
confronts. First, Syria is about as isolated internationally as it
could be (with the noteworthy exception of the support it receives from
Iran and Russia, which will be discussed momentarily). Second, Syria's
economy has been severely damaged by the civil war, and multiple
reports have portrayed the regime as teetering on the brink of
bankruptcy. Third, the military's effectiveness has severely declined
due to both attrition produced by the conflict and also significant
numbers of defections. As a result, the regime has had trouble taking
advantage of recent rebel infighting as an opportunity to regain
territory. When it redeployed forces into Aleppo in January, for
example, the regime was forced, due to hard limitations on its reliable
manpower, ``to give up control of the southern city of Jassem and the
long-contested Ghouta neighborhood east of the capital, Damascus.'' \9\
Despite these weaknesses, Assad's position, and ability to survive,
has been bolstered by two primary factors. First, his regime has been
heavily supported by both Iran and Russia, both of which see this
course as advancing their strategic interests. Iran doesn't want to
lose its close ally, while Russia wants to maintain access to its naval
base at Tartus, which it views as important to its ability to project
power in the Mediterranean.\10\ The role both Russia and Iran are
playing feeds into the global jihadist narrative in discernible ways:
Russian support for Assad conjures the image of external powers
imposing tyrants upon the Muslim world, while Iran's role magnifies
sectarian animosities. This sectarianism is further increased by the
fact that Hezbollah has deployed combatants to support Assad's regime,
while Iran has helped to facilitate the entry of Shia irregular
fighters from countries like Afghanistan, Bahrain, and Yemen.
A second factor bolstering Assad's chances of survival is his
willingness to allow jihadists, and other factions viewed as malign by
outside states, to flourish relative to other rebel factions. As
previously alluded to, the regime has concentrated its military
resources on fighting the more moderate opposition, while allowing
extremist groups and other factions widely viewed as undesirables to
become relatively strong. While the Syrian military has fiercely fought
to recover territory controlled by the Free Syrian Army, it has not
made similar efforts to prevent the jihadist groups, Jabhat al-Nusra or
ISIS, from holding territory. Further, the regime's pattern of
releasing jihadist prisoners--but not those who might join more
moderate rebel factions--during the course of the conflict suggests
that it views making jihadists a prominent part of the rebellion as
more important at this stage than defeating them or thinning their
ranks.\11\
Assad appears to have followed a similar pattern with respect to
Kurdish groups, undertaking a tactical retreat from northern Kurdish
regions near the Turkish border. Given Turkish support for the Syrian
rebels, this retreat served a strategic purpose: Turkey has had
significant troubles with Kurdish separatism, and Kurdish control of
territory in Syria's north raises the possibility that a rebel victory
could threaten Turkish territory. Turkey viewed Assad's retreat from
Kurdish areas through this lens, as government sources told the media
that Syria ``deliberately left the three districts on the Turkish
border in northern Syria to the control of the Democratic Union of
Kurdistan (PYD), known as an affiliate of the outlawed Kurdistan
Workers' Party (PKK),'' and voiced concerns about a new PKK front
opening up inside Syria.\12\
This is extraordinarily Machiavellian strategy has served its
purpose. The major role jihadists now play in the Syrian opposition has
deterred Western countries and others from throwing significant weight
behind the opposition. Syrian democratic activist Haitham al-Maleh has
described ISIS, with some justification, as ``a mine planted by the
Assad regime in the revolution's body to warn the international
community of approaching or interfering in Syrian issues.'' \13\
foreign fighter networks in syria
One extraordinarily important aspect of the Syria conflict is the
fact that the rebel side is highly popular throughout the Muslim world,
and the jihad enjoys deep mainstream clerical support. Regional ulema
widely believe that Syria represents a legitimate jihad in support of
fellow Muslims, and the fight has been endorsed by such figures as
Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Al-Azhar's Sheikh Hassan al-Shafai, and such
organizations as Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. At a Friday sermon in
Mecca's Grand Mosque, senior cleric Shaikh Saoud al-Shuraym encouraged
congregants to support anti-Assad rebels by ``all means.'' To the
extent that the jihad is dominated by salafi jihadists, including al-
Qaeda and its fellow travelers, the conflict helps to legitimate them,
boost their manpower, and attract financial support to their cause.
The emotional resonance of the conflict and success of the call for
jihad can be seen in the enormous number of foreign fighters who have
answered the call. As I noted earlier, the number of fighters who
traveled to Syria from abroad to fight Assad's regime is estimated to
be as high as 11,000, and even that number may be conservative. They
have come from a large number of countries--around 50, according to
U.S. intelligence assessments.
Earlier, I drew a comparison between the Syria conflict and the
Afghan-Soviet war. Similar to the Syria conflict, the rebel side in
that conflict was extremely popular throughout the Muslim world, and
the anti-Soviet fight was widely endorsed by clerics as a legitimate
defensive jihad. Around 10 thousand Arabs flocked to South Asia to help
the Afghan cause.\14\ The ripple effects of that conflict were
tremendous, touching numerous countries. Al-Qaeda itself was a product
of the Afghan-Soviet war, founded in August 1988, in the waning days of
the conflict.\15\ At that time, Osama bin Laden and his mentor,
Abdullah Azzam, agreed that the organization they had built during the
course of the Afghan-Soviet war to support the fight against Russian
occupiers shouldn't simply dissolve when the war ended, but rather its
structure should be preserved to serve as ``the base'' (al qaeda) for
future mujahedin efforts.\16\ Veterans of the anti-Soviet jihad went on
to play a critical role in the Algerian civil war that claimed over
150,000 lives; and the Afghan-Soviet war left behind a wrecked country
that would serve as a safe haven for a large agglomeration of jihadist
groups. Thus, the ripples of the Afghan-Soviet war could be felt in a
large number of far-flung places: while the fact that the conflict
would have second-order consequences could have been predicted at the
time, the exact reach of the Afghan-Soviet war's ripples was
unpredictable.
Similarly, it can be said with certainty that the foreign fighters
who have been drawn to Syria will prove to be profoundly important, and
their impact on jihadism will likely reach places that analysts don't
anticipate at present. One issue worth highlighting is European Muslims
who have traveled to Syria to fight Assad's regime: the most
comprehensive open-source estimate holds that up to 1,900 of the
foreign fighters in Syria hail from Western Europe.\17\ The possibility
that these individuals could return and either carry out attacks or
otherwise foster a militant milieu has made this issue a top national-
security concern in several Western European countries.
The percentage of Western foreign fighters who might be expected to
carry out attacks against the West is relatively low. In a recent
comprehensive study examining foreign fighters in several conflicts,
Norwegian researcher Thomas Hegghammer found that ``no more than one in
nine foreign fighters returned to perpetrate attacks in the West.''
\18\ As Hegghammer details, there are two sides to this finding. First,
it is far from true that ``all foreign fighters are domestic fighters-
in-the-making.'' But conversely, though this is a low percentage of the
whole, it is nonetheless high enough to ``make foreign fighter
experience one of the strongest predictors of individual involvement in
domestic operations that we know.'' Given the large numbers who have
gone to the Syrian battlefield, there is clearly cause to view this as
a concern.
But the largest impact of foreign fighters returning to their home
countries is likely to be felt outside the West. The ICSR study names
Jordan as the largest contributor of foreign fighters to Syria, with
about 2,100 having joined the jihad.\19\ Several Jordanians serve in
prominent leadership roles within Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS. Nusra's
head sharia official is a Jordanian who holds a doctorate in Islamic
law from the University of Jordan, and young Jordanians also serve as
officials in Nusra's military wing.\20\ Combined with the significant
Syrian refugee presence in Jordan and consequent strains on the
country's economy, returning foreign fighters could have a drastic
impact on Jordan.
ICSR names Saudi Arabia as the second-largest contributor of
foreign fighters in Syria, with over a thousand. Other estimates are
even higher, ranging up to 3,000.\21\ Saudi Arabia implemented a set of
policies toward Syria early in the civil war that can only be described
as short-sighted and potentially suicidal: it offered to commute the
sentences of its prisoners on the condition that they go to Syria to
fight Assad's regime.\22\ More recently, Saudi Arabia has indicated
that it will clamp down on its citizens traveling to Syria to join the
jihad. However, the monarchy has a pattern of taking one step forward
and two steps back in fighting jihadist militancy, and also is heavily
invested in defeating Assad's regime. Thus, it is worth watching
whether Saudi Arabia ends up deviating from its announced policies
designed to stem the flow of citizens to Syria. Unfortunately for Saudi
Arabia, its foreign fighters will be returning at a time when the
country is experiencing increasing challenges based on natural
demographic trends: Put simply, as its population grows, the country's
oil wealth provides them fewer and fewer benefits. As Saudi Arabia
experiences increasing financial problems, its ability to simply throw
money at problems erodes, and thus it becomes more difficult to absorb
such challenges as large amounts of returning foreign fighters.
ICSR's study names Tunisia as the third-biggest contributor of
foreign fighters, with about 970 Tunisians traveling to Syria; there
are also higher estimates. The jihadist group Ansar al-Sharia in
Tunisia has frequently posted notices of the martyrdom of Tunisians
killed in Syria, and videos posted to YouTube are testament to the
Tunisian presence in that conflict. Tunisia is a small country, and
though the current challenge it faces from jihadist groups has been low
in intensity, it may be vulnerable if it proves unable to absorb
returnees.
As the Afghan-Soviet war demonstrates, the ripples of jihadists
being drawn to major conflicts can also occur in unanticipated places.
A recent report by the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC)
notes that, in Syria, Indonesians are for the first time ``going
overseas to fight, not just to train, as in Afghanistan in the late
1980s and 1990s, or to give moral and financial support, as in the case
of Palestine.'' \23\ Currently the number of Indonesians in Syria is
relatively small, estimated at around 50 by Indonesia's Foreign
Ministry. Nonetheless,the Indonesian presence in Syria has raised fears
that the conflict may breathe new life into Jemaah Islamiyah (JI),
which analysts previously considered moribund due to Indonesian
security forces' crackdown against it. IPAC's report notes that the
Syria war has already bolstered JI's prestige: when jihadists groups
are at the forefront of a popular conflict, they will reap the benefit.
Moreover, 20 Rana al-Sabbagh, ``Jordan Faces Growing Salafi-Jihadist
Threat,'' Al-Monitor, Feb. 4, 2014. IPAC suggests that the Syria
conflict could magnify sectarian tensions in Indonesia by increasing
anti-Shia sentiment, and also that returning mujahedin may ``bring new
life, leadership and ideas to the radical movement at home.'' \24\
growing sectarian strife in lebanon
The Syria conflict has allowed Sunni jihadists to experience
significant gains in Lebanon, and has produced a tremendous resurgence
of sectarian conflict. The major jihadist group that has gained since
the conflict began is the Abdullah Azzam Brigades (AAB), named after
bin Laden's mentor.
As the U.S. Department of State has explained, AAB's formation was
announced in a July 2009 video that claimed credit for a rocket attack
against Israel.\25\ There are two different branches of AAB. The
Lebanese branch is called the Ziad al-Jarrah Battalions, named after a
Lebanese citizen who was one of the 9/11 hijackers, and it has
primarily been known for occasional rocket strikes on Israel. Like
ISIS, AAB was focused on benefiting from the Syria conflict, and late
AAB emir Majid bin Muhammad al-Majid issued guidance regarding what
kind of attacks to avoid in Syria in order to win over the
population.\26\
AAB had low manpower prior to the onset of the Syrian conflict,
with perhaps 150 men in the group's ranks. Its growing capabilities can
be seen in recent attacks that it carried out inside Lebanon. The most
prominent attack AAB carried out was the November 19, 2013, bombing of
the Iranian Embassy in Beirut. This attack is indicative of both AAB's
growing capabilities--Iran's Embassy is not an easy target--and also
growing sectarianism in Lebanon. AAB also launched a twin suicide
attack in Beirut last month that struck an Iranian cultural center.
AAB's attacks come within the context of escalating violence in
general, and sectarian violence in particular, inside Lebanon. Some of
the early attacks following the onset of anti-Assad protests in Syria
struck at U.N. forces, including a May 2011 roadside bomb that struck a
U.N. convoy near Sidon, and a July 2011 bomb attack that injured five
French U.N. peacekeepers, also near Sidon. U.N. peacekeepers were
struck by a roadside bomb for a third time in December 2011, prompting
Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati to describe these attacks on
peacekeepers as targeting ``Lebanon's stability and security.''\27\
In addition to these anti-U.N. attacks, occasional violence broke
out between anti-Assad protesters and Tripoli's Alawite communities,
but clashes became more frequent and more sectarian over time. A
variety of incidents demonstrate the progressive growth in sectarian
strife:
The arrest and killing of prominent Lebanese Sunni figures
in May 2012 produced instability: after authorities arrested
Islamist figure, Shadi al-Mawlawi, resulting street protests
descended into violence that killed 10, and the shooting death
of Sheikh Ahmad Abdel-Wahad later that month similarly produced
rage and unrest.
In June 2012, after a Lebanese Shia was arrested for
firebombing and shooting up the offices of New TV, which was
critical of Assad's regime, Shia gunmen erected roadblocks in
Beirut, burning tires and firing automatic weapons into the
air.\28\
In July 2012, after a Damascus bombing killed several regime
figures close to Assad, celebrations in the Tripoli's Sunni
neighborhood Bab al-Tabbeneh descended into clashes with
Alawite residents of the Jabal Mohsen neighborhood, leaving one
person dead. Clashes between residents of these two
neighborhoods have proved to be an enduring feature of how the
Syria conflict is being felt in Tripoli.
In October 2012, a bomb blast in Beirut killed Lebanese
intelligence chief Wissam al-Hassan was assassinated, with
Syria strongly suspected. This raised immediate concerns about
inflaming sectarian tensions, as ``black smoke from burning
tires ignited by angry men choked the streets of a few
neighborhoods in the city'' before night fell.\29\ Al-Hassan's
assassination and the subsequent backlash of violence has had
huge repercussions in Lebanon, greatly destabilizing politics
and leading to a marked escalation in violence in 2013.
Bombings would further escalate sectarian tensions. On July 9,
2013, a car bomb exploded in Hezbollah-dominated territory in southern
Beirut, injuring over 50 people. This attack ``increased fears that the
spillover from the war in neighboring Syria was entering a dangerous
new phase.'' \30\ About a week later, gunmen assassinated Mohammad
Darra Jamo, a pro-Assad media commentator, in his Sarafand home.\31\ On
August 15, 2013, a car bomb struck a Hezbollah stronghold in southern
Beirut again, killing 20 and wounding over 100 people. A Sunni Islamist
group claimed credit, and promised to continue striking at Hezbollah.
On November 19, 2013, AAB carried out its already described bombing of
the Iranian Embassy in Beirut. The attack killed at least 22 people,
including Iran's cultural attachee, and wounded over 100. On December
4, 2013, high-ranking Hezbollah leader, Hassane Laqees, was
assassinated, shot at close range as he parked his car near a south
Beirut apartment that he used.\32\ On January 2, 2014, another bomb
struck a Hezbollah-dominated area in south Beirut, killing at least
five and injuring more than 50.
Sunnis were also targeted by bombings. On August 23, 2013, powerful
bomb blasts struck two Sunni mosques in Tripoli whose imams had ties to
Syrian rebels (the Al-Taqwa and Al-Salam mosques), killing at least 42
and wounding about 600. The level of carnage in these attacks hadn't
been seen in Lebanon since the 1980s. On December 27, 2013, former
Lebanese Finance Minister and U.S. Ambassador Mohamad Chatah (a member
of the Sunni community) was killed by a car bomb. Chatah's vocal
opposition to Hezbollah and the Assad regime made the list of possible
perpetrators rather clear.
Lebanon-based Alawites have also been the victims of sectarian
violence. On February 20, 2014, an official in the pro-Assad Arab
Democratic Party (ADP), Abdel-Rahman Diab was shot and killed by masked
gunmen on a motorcycle while driving on the coastal Mina highway. As
news of his killing spread, ADP fighters in the hotspot Jabal Mohsen
neighborhood ``began sniping at their rival neighborhoods of Mallouleh
and Mankoubin.'' \33\
The sectarian strife in Lebanon is particularly intense, but the
Syria war has also magnified sectarianism throughout the region, and
beyond. As researchers Aaron Y. Zelin and Phillip Smyth demonstrate,
the way this conflict has lined up--with Sunni salafists battling
Alawites and Iranian-backed Shias--has caused dehumanizing sectarian
language to become a more common part of discourse.\34\ Zelin and Smyth
note that ``many players are pursuing a long-term dehumanization
strategy because they view this as an existential cosmic religious
battle between salafi Sunnism and Khomeinist Shiism.'' In turn, there
have been sectarian incidents not only in the region, but in countries
further from the main battlefield, such as Australia, Azerbaijan,
Britain, and Egypt.
As for Lebanon, the spillover of the Syrian conflict can be seen on
three levels. The first is the increase in sectarianism that has
blossomed into violence within Lebanon, as I have detailed at some
length. Second, there is the increase in conflict between Syria and
Lebanon: Syria has carried out cross-border attacks against rebel
targets in Lebanon. Third, the growing presence of refugees from Syria
is putting an increasing strain on the Lebanese economy and society.
resurgent jihadism in iraq
At the time of the U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq in December
2011, ISIS, which is the successor to Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), ``was
still able to conduct attacks, but the organization was isolated,
disrupted, and did not pose an existential threat to the state,'' as
demonstrated by the fact that, ``from September 2010 to December 2011,
monthly fatalities in Iraq stabilized in the 300-400 range.'' \35\ The
group has experienced a dramatic renewal since then: in 2013, more than
7,800 civilians lost their lives in violent attacks, while ISIS was
able to launch a stunning offensive that captured large portions of
Fallujah and Ramadi in January 2014.
Factors other than Syria also played a role in ISIS's rebound, but
the Syria war has also helped bring new life to the jihadist group due
to the already explained popularity and legitimacy that the Syria jihad
enjoys. When the Syria conflict escalated, ISIS already had an existing
infrastructure that gave it one of the best ground games among rebel
factions, and which helped the group gain territory and prestige. In
turn, it also attracted additional resources and more recruits. The
symbiotic relationship between the Syria conflict and ISIS's resurgence
in Iraq is further illustrated by administration officials' belief that
``most'' suicide bombers striking inside Iraq during a recent surge in
the tactic's use ``are coming in from Syria.'' \36\
The Syria conflict has strengthened ISIS in four major ways. First,
ISIS experienced a surge in popularity by being at the forefront of a
popular jihad, though its brutal tactics could undercut this gain.
Second, the abundance of people willing to fight the Assad regime
provided the group with an easy source of recruits. Today, ISIS is
estimated to have around 7,000 fighters in its ranks.\37\ Third, the
conflict made funding easier to obtain, both from external financiers
and also through extorting ``tax'' revenues from citizens and
militarily capturing industries in Syria. (As will be discussed
subsequently, ISIS's recent expulsion from al-Qaeda likely diminishes
its external sources of funding.) And a fourth factor contributing to
ISIS's gains has been its ability to control territory in Syria and
otherwise operate from the Syrian side of the border. Iraqi Deputy
Interior Minister, Adnan al-Asadi, has explained that ISIS ``is
deployed in vast desert areas on both sides of the Iraqi-Syrian borders
that are difficult for any army to control,'' which makes Iraq's fight
against ISIS ``require a lot of time and resources.'' \38\
One of ISIS's striking achievements last year was the July 2013
prison break from the notorious high-security Abu Ghraib prison outside
of Baghdad. The tactics it employed included suicide and car bombs, an
attack against another prison in Taji as a diversion, and inside
assistance from some of the personnel charged with guarding the
prison.\39\ An Iraqi security official told Reuters that the attack was
``obviously a terrorist attack'' designed to ``free convicted
terrorists with al-Qaeda.'' \40\ The most commonly cited figure for the
number of prisoners who managed to escape is 500, and there was a
particularly high concentration of important ISIS leaders and
operatives in this group. Given the manner in which prison breaks and
prisoner releases have bolstered the jihadist movement in the past, the
Abu Ghraib incident is likely to magnify the challenges that Iraq
faces.
One issue of immediate relevance regarding the future of ISIS, al-
Qaeda, and the Syria jihad is ISIS's expulsion from the al-Qaeda
network on February 2, 2014, when al-Qaeda's senior leadership
announced it was no longer affiliated with ISIS. This separation was a
long time coming. ISIS had been fighting with other Syrian rebel
factions, and al-Qaeda's senior leadership ordered it to submit to
mediation to resolve these tensions. ISIS paid lip service to these
demands but in practice flouted the mediation orders. Though there was
a great deal of behind-the-scenes maneuvering between the two,
ultimately al-Qaeda issued a statement announcing that ISIS was no
longer part of the organization.
There was an immediate escalation in tensions in Syria following
ISIS's expulsion from AQ. After other rebel factions increasingly
targeted ISIS, it has largely retreated to its northern Syria
stronghold of Raqqa, which it believes to be the most defensible
position during a difficult and uncertain time. There will also be
implications for the shape of jihadism beyond the region. ISIS had been
in open defiance of al-Qaeda's senior leadership (AQSL) until it was
finally expelled from the organization. If it prospers despite defying
al-Qaeda's leadership, does that weaken AQSL's ability to have
influence over other affiliates? Might AQ financiers and potential
recruits throw their weight behind competing jihadist sources of power?
There are some signs of the strains being placed on the al-Qaeda
network by this separation. Jihadist forums now feature users openly
siding with ISIS, and condemning al-Qaeda's recognized branches in
Syria. Further, jihadist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda are deeply
divided over how to address the split between ISIS and al-Qaeda.
The stakes involved in this question were raised significantly at
the end of February when Abu Khalid al-Suri, a longtime leader within
al-Qaeda and one of the founding members of the Syrian rebel group
Ahrar al-Sham, was killed by a suicide bomber, with ISIS being blamed
by many jihadists, including by Ahrar al-Sham.\41\
Though the fragmentation of al-Qaeda is one possible outcome of the
ISIS-AQ split, some public sphere analysis has gotten ahead of the
facts in this regard. ISIS itself risks weakness and fragmentation.
Major clerics like Abdallah Muhammad al-Muhaysini have called for ISIS
fighters to defect to other jihadist factions.\42\ ISIS's retreat to
Raqqa--abandoning such sources of income as Deir al-Zour's grain mills
and factories in the process--is indicative of its feelings of
vulnerability in Syria. And ISIS has seen new competitors emerge even
inside Iraq. In late February, a new jihadist group called Al-Murabitin
Front in Iraq announced its formation, something that many online
jihadists believe to be a new al-Qaeda branch designed to counter
ISIS's influence.\43\ Al-Murabitin has already claimed its first
attacks in Iraq, posting statements to the Hanin jihadist web forum
claiming bomb attacks against Iraqi military vehicles.\44\
The ISIS-AQ split is an important inflection point that may have an
enormous impact on jihadism within Syria and beyond. The ramifications
warrant close attention.
conclusion
The Syria war is already a major tragedy. It is likely to have a
tragic ending, too, and the U.S. is probably unable to avert that even
if it chooses to become far more deeply involved in the country's civil
war.
At a policymaking level, the U.S.'s response to developments in
Syria can best be described as confused. We haven't defined our desired
end state: we seem to vaguely know what we don't want to happen, but
have little or no idea how to get there. Nor have we defined the kind
of means we are willing to devote in pursuit of whatever goals we think
are in our strategic interest. What do we want? What are we prepared to
do to achieve it?
It is also important to bear in mind that the more involved we
choose to be, the greater the danger that the U.S. will be further
drawn into the conflict in ways that we do not intend. I believe that
the U.S. should choose a course of limited engagement for several
reasons:
The U.S.'s strategic interests in Syria that it can
realistically achieve are relatively low.
It is obvious that the U.S. doesn't understand the players
on the ground well, and so will have great difficulty selecting
a desirable set of players to back.
Indeed, it is highly likely that U.S. aid to rebel factions
will fall into jihadist hands.
There are cognizable risks of the U.S. being drawn into the
Syria quagmire beyond what it intends.
Let us not sugarcoat what a strategy of limited engagement means. I
have noted that it's possible the Assad regime could collapse faster
than anticipate; but if the U.S. chooses a strategy of limited
engagement, we have to be prepared for the converse possibility, that
Assad may crush the rebels. It comes down to a question of tradeoffs,
and the fact that there are costs to any option the U.S. might choose.
A strategy of limited engagement is not the same as a strategy of
nonengagement. A limited-engagement strategy would recognize that the
U.S. is probably incapable of truly addressing Syria's problems--
certainly not at an acceptable cost--and so our overarching priority is
containing the spillover. One priority for this strategy should be
ameliorating the humanitarian crisis that the Syrian war has created,
focusing efforts on refugees from Syria. There are both strong moral
and humanitarian reasons for doing so, but also strategic reasons: the
potential for radicalization within the refugee problem is a real
concern.
It is at the very least acceptable, and perhaps desirable, for the
U.S. to provide small arms to rebel factions. The harm in doing so is
relatively small if these arms fall into the wrong hands, given the
large amount of light weaponry that is already in Syria; and the U.S.
can derive specific benefits from providing light arms to rebels. Those
benefits should not involve trying to lengthen or draw out the
conflict; but, if the policy is implemented right, it can provide the
U.S. with both a presence and platform. The U.S. might use this
position to gather intelligence and better map the rebel factions; and
it may be able to gain some degree of influence over the rebels,
although the potential for gaining influence should not be overstated.
There have been suggestions that the U.S. should send antitank or
antiaircraft weapons to Syrian rebels. Such a course presents
significant risks that the weaponry would end up in jihadist hands, or
the hands of others who would wish harm to the United States or its
allies. For this reason, under the approach I suggest the U.S. should
refuse to escalate by providing this more advanced weaponry, unless (a)
a clear and specific strategic interest can be advanced by the
provision of imagery, and (b) the U.S. can ensure to its satisfaction
that the weapons will not end up in jihadist hands. At present, neither
of these conditions exist.
One of the fundamental dilemmas the U.S. must confront in the 21st
century security environment is the reality of severely constrained
resources. The U.S. no longer has the luxury of living in the unipolar
world that existed a dozen years ago. Not only is the U.S. now
incapable of responding with full vigor to every perceived threat--
doing so would ensure that we lack the resources to advance our most
pressing interests--but we will also be increasingly challenged,
including by those we regard as our allies.
Just as we no longer have the luxury of living in a unipolar world,
we also no longer have the luxury of being able to muddle through with
poor foreign-policy strategy and expect that there will be no costs.
This means that we will have to carefully consider what kind of
resources and commitments we are willing to make in advance of any
potential commitment. When the U.S. drew a redline over Syrian chemical
weapons use that it was apparently unable to enforce, that resulted in
real damage to other countries' perception of what U.S. security
guarantees mean.
One sad reality of the 21st century is that lives will often be
lost in other parts of the world, and we won't be able to do anything
about it. This should give us no comfort, but we must be realistic. The
course to maintaining American power in the 21st century begins with
conserving our resources, and in Syria achieving real strategic gains
at an acceptable cost will be difficult.
Thank you again for inviting me to testify today. I look forward to
answering your questions.
----------------
Notes
\1\ This testimony focuses on Sunni foreign fighters because they
will have a profound impact on the future shape of the jihadist
movement. However, the conflict has also attracted Shia foreign
fighters to the battlefield, as well as other nonstate actors who chose
to enter the battle on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's side. For
some of the best work on this subject, it is worth following Phillip
Smyth's excellent feature ``Hizballah Cavalcade'' at the website
Jihadology (www.jihadology.net). As of the writing of this testimony,
the last foreign fighters in Syria to attract major media attention
were fighting on Assad's side: They were a couple of L.A. gang members
who swore they would fight Assad's ``enemigos.'' One of the men,
identifying himself as ``Creeper from the G'd up 13 Gang,'' explained
his role in Syria: ``I'm gangbanging, homie.'' Middle East Media
Research Institute, video clip #4170, March 1, 2014.
\2\ Aaron Zelin et al., ``Up to 11,00 Foreign Fighters in Syria;
Steep Rise Among Western Europeans,'' ICSR Insight, December 17, 2013.
\3\ Adam Entous & Siobhan Gorman, ``Behind Assad's Comeback, A
Mismatch in Commitments,'' Wall Street Journal, December 31, 2013
(noting that ``the civil war could last another decade or more, based
on a Central Intelligence Agency analysis of the history of
insurgencies that recently departed Deputy Director Michael Morell
privately shared with lawmakers'').
\4\ Emile Hokayem, ``Syria's Uprising and the Fracturing of the
Levant Kindle'' ed. (London: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 2013), loc. 161 of 3617.
\5\ See discussion of fragmented sovereignty in Klejda Mulaj,
``Violent Non-State Actors: Exploring Their State Relations,
Legitimation, and Operationality,'' in Klejda Mulaj ed., Violent Non-
State Actors in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press,
2010), pp. 7-10.
\6\ Joseph Holliday, ``The Struggle for Syria in 2011: An
Operational and Regional Analysis'' (Washington, DC: Institute for the
Study of War, 2011), p. 13.
\7\ Hokayem, ``Syria's Uprising,'' loc. 1219 of 3617.
\8\ Tony Badran, ``How Assad Stayed in Power--And How He'll Try to
Keep It,'' Foreign Affairs, December 1, 2011.
\9\ ``Assad Fails to Break Syrian Stalemate Despite Rebel
Infighting,'' Financial Times, Jan. 16, 2014.
\10\ For information on Russia's naval base, see Christopher
Harmer, ``Backgrounder: Naval Base Tartus,'' Institute for the Study of
War, July 31, 2012.
\11\ Phil Sands, Justin Vela & Suha Maayeh, ``Assad Regime Set Free
Extremists from Prison to Fire Up Trouble During Peaceful Uprising,''
The National (U.A.E.), Jan. 21, 2014; Ruth Sherlock, ``Syria's Assad
Accused of Boosting al-Qaeda with Secret Oil Deals,'' Telegraph (U.K.),
Jan. 20, 2014.
\12\ Serkan Demirtas, ``Ankara: Assad Leaves Turkish Border to
Kurds,'' Huurriyet Daily News, July 25, 2012.
\13\ Nicholas Blanford, ``What Syrian Rebel Infighting Means for
Assad,'' Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 13, 2014.
\14\ Mohammed M. Hafez, ``Jihad after Iraq: Lessons from the Arab
Afghans Phenomenon,'' CTC Sentinel (Combating Terrorism Center at West
Point), Mar. 2008.
\15\ Indictment, United States v. Arnaout, 02 CR 892 (N.D. Ill.,
2002), p. 2; 9/11 Commission Report: ``Final Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States'' (New York: W.
W. Norton,2004), p. 56.
\16\ Tareekh Osama memorandum, 1988, introduced by prosecution at
Benevolence International Foundation trial, Northern District of
Illinois, 2002-2003.
\17\ Zelin et al., ``Up to 11,00 Foreign Fighters in Syria.''
\18\ Thomas Hegghammer, `` `Should I Stay or Should I Go':
Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists' Choice between Domestic and
Foreign Fighting,'' American Political Science Review, Feb. 2013, p.
10.
\19\ Zelin et al., ``Up to 11,00 Foreign Fighters in Syria.''
\20\ Rana al-Sabbagh, ``Jordan Faces Growing Salafi-Jihadist
Threat,'' Al-Monitor, Feb. 4, 2014.
\21\ Taimur Khan, ``Prince Mohammed Appointment Highlights Saudi
Arabia's Terrorism Concerns Over Syria,'' The National (U.A.E.), Feb.
25, 2014.
\22\ Michael Winter, ``Report: Saudis Sent Death-Row Inmates to
Fight Syria,'' USA Today, Jan. 21, 2013.
\23\ ``Indonesians and the Syria Conflict,'' Institute for Policy
Analysis of Conflict Report No. 6, Jan. 30, 2014, p. 1.
\24\ Ibid., p. 10.
\25\ U.S. Department of State, ``Foreign Terrorist Organizations,''
May 30, 2013.
\26\ Bill Roggio, ``Abdullah Azzam Brigades Names Leader, Advises
Against Attacks in Syria's Cities,'' Long War Journal, June 27, 2012.
\27\ Anthony Shadid, ``U.N. Peacekeepers Wounded in Southern
Lebanon Attack,'' New York Times, Dec. 12, 2011.
\28\ Rob Nordland, ``Assad Supporters Suspected in New Beirut
Incidents,'' New York Times, June 26, 2012.
\29\ Anne Barnard, ``Blast in Beirut is Seen as an Extension of
Syria's War,'' New York Times, Oct. 19, 2012.
\30\ Anne Barnard, ``Car Bombing Injures Dozens in Hezbollah
Section of Beirut,'' New York Times, July 9, 2013.
\31\ Oliver Holmes, ``Gunmen Kill Pro-Assad Figure in Lebanon as
Syria War Spreads,'' Reuters, July 17, 2013.
\32\ Anne Barnard, ``Major Hezbollah Figure, Tied to Syrian War, is
Assassinated Near Beirut,'' New York Times, Dec. 4, 2013.
\33\ Misbah al-Ali, ``Pro-Assad Party Issues Ultimatum Over
Official's Killing,'' Daily Star (Lebanon), Feb. 20, 2014.
\34\ Aaron Y. Zelin & Phillip Smyth, ``The Vocabulary of
Sectarianism,'' Foreign Policy, Jan. 29, 2014.
\35\ Jessica D. Lewis, ``Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent'' (Washington,
DC: Institute for the Study of War, Sept. 2013), p. 9.
\36\ Senior administration official, U.S. Department of State,
``Background Briefing on U.S.-Iraq Political and Diplomatic JCC Meeting
and the U.S.-Iraq Bilateral Relationship Under the Strategic Framework
Agreement,'' Aug. 15, 2013.
\37\ ``What ISIS, an Al-Qaeda Affiliate in Syria, Really Wants,''
The Economist Jan. 20, 2014.
\38\ Harith Hasan, ``ISIS Exploits Weak Iraqi, Syrian States,'' Al-
Monitor, Nov. 29, 2013.
\39\ Adam Schreck & Qassim Abdul-Zahra, ``Abu Ghraib Prison Break:
Hundreds Of Detainees, Including Senior Al-Qaeda Members, Escape
Facility,'' Associated Press, July 22, 2013.
\40\ Kareem Raheem & Ziad Al-Sinjary, ``Al-Qaeda Militants Flee
Iraq Jail in Violent Mass Break-Out,'' Reuters, July 22, 2013.
\41\ Maria Abi-Habib, ``Al-Qaeda Emissary in Syria Killed by Rival
Islamist Rebels,'' Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2014.
\42\ Thomas Joscelyn, ``Pro-Al-Qaeda Saudi Cleric Calls for ISIS
Members to Defect,'' Long War Journal, February 3, 2014.
\43\ BBC Monitoring in English, Feb. 26, 2014.
\44\ BBC Monitoring in English, Feb. 28, 2014.
The Chairman. Dr. Levitt.
STATEMENT OF MATTHEW LEVITT, PH.D., DIRECTOR FOR STEIN PROGRAM
ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE
FOR NEAR EAST POLICY, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Levitt. Thank you very much, Chairman Menendez, Ranking
Member Corker, members of the committee. It is an honor to be
here to testify before you today. There is of course the
multiple connections between the two issues of Ukraine and
Syria, not the least is that President Assad just announced
that he is supporting Putin in that conflict.
The war in Syria is a humanitarian catastrophe that
threatens to tear the region apart along sectarian lines. It
has injected new oxygen into terrorist groups and movements
driven by violent ideologies around the region, including but
by no means limited to groups formerly associated with al-
Qaeda. In fact, we are now facing a sharp rise in violent
extremism within both the radical Sunni and the Shiite camps.
Over the past few weeks, much of the discussion on Syria
has focused on diplomatic talks and potential threats to the
West, but this hearing is about the regional implications of
Syria and so I want to focus on three things. The first is the
flow of foreign fighters to Syria from across the Middle East
and then back home and the impact this is already having in the
region, not just their potential to go to Europe or here, a
very real threat, but in the region, which is already
happening.
Second, the especially pernicious sectarian nature of the
conflict in hand; and third, the very sharp increase as a
result of the war in dangerous macrotrends, the kinds of things
that create conditions that are conducive to long-term violence
and instability in the region.
As I was thinking about this hearing, I reread a
declassified 1993 report written by the State Department's INR,
Intelligence and Research Branch, in which they discuss things
like the foreign fighters coming home from Afghanistan. If you
take ``Afghanistan'' and insert ``Syria,'' if you take out
things that are clear to 1993 and clear to today, this report
could have been written yesterday. Consider how then and now,
as Daveed said, fighters are traveling from around the world to
go fight on either side of this increasingly sectarian war.
Then note that the greatest number of foreign fighters on both
sides have come from the Middle East.
The likelihood, and we are already seeing it, is that the
majority of radicalized fighters are going to go home and
attack their homes in the region before they come and strike in
Europe or in the United States. We have already seen an Israeli
Arab convicted for going to fight with Jibhat al-Nusra in
Israel. We have already seen cases of suicide bombers who were
going to go to fight in Syria and in the end were sent instead
to Tunisia. We have seen people coming back from Syria and
carrying out attacks in Egypt. We see a fully Moroccan jihadist
organization created in Syria, and the cases go on and on.
But none of it should surprise. Twenty-one years ago INR
noted that the support network that funneled money, supplies,
and manpower to supplant the then-Afghan mujahedin was now
contributing experienced fighters to militant Islamic groups
worldwide, and it will be again today. As one point of that
1993 report is entitled, ``When the Boys Come Home.''
Consider the role of Libya then at the time and then think
about today Libya's Ansar al-Sharia operating on the ground,
not in Libya but in Syria, in Latakia, for example, setting up
a bakery and organizing an Ansar al-Sharia branded aid for
Sunni communities.
Meanwhile, how complicated has it got? You have Iran not
only supporting Assad, not only supporting Hezbollah, but also
supporting al-Qaeda elements moving foreign fighters and
raising money, in particular from Kuwait, through Iran and
knowingly allowing al-Qaeda elements to do so within Iran.
In terms of the proxy issues, this is no longer a simple
rebellion. This has grown into a classic case of a proxy war
between Sunnis, Sunni Gulf States, and Iran on the other. The
sectarian vocabulary that is used to dehumanize the other is
something that is going to set the stage for the next decade.
The bottom line is that, while the war itself might at some
level be negotiable, maybe, the sectarianism is not and is
almost certainly going to create conditions for instability
over the next decade.
Finally, a last comment on the trending toward instability.
The NIC, the National Intelligence Council, had a great study
called ``Global Trends 2030, Alternative Worlds.'' It talks
there about things that it describes as ``looming
disequilibria.'' Every one of those things we are seeing today,
problems with education, health, poverty, forced migration,
humanitarian assistance needs, the economic impact on fragile
economies in the neighborhood, Jordan in particular, Lebanon in
particular. This is something we are seeing in spades now.
When the NIC published its report, it actually anticipated
that this kind of chronic instability in the Middle East was
something we would see. They highlighted Iraq, Libya, Yemen,
and Syria as places where we could see things like this,
Bahrain. But clearly there is no way they could have
anticipated what we are seeing today.
I submit that the United States is not doing anywhere near
enough to address these critical problems, and failure to
respond effectively to this crisis has led in part to the
increasing horrific consequences today. Even if we do not want
either camp to win tomorrow because there are bad guys on both
sides, there are certain things we have to do. We must degrade
the regime and the extremist capabilities to create conditions
for moderates' victory some time tomorrow.
Also, we have to mitigate the regime and the extremists'
ability to continue to do damage today. Simply doing
humanitarian aid is addressing the symptoms. What are we doing
to stop the foreign fighters? What are we doing to stop the
barrel bombs so that more humanitarian crises are not created
tomorrow?
If I can put it in one last concluding statement, it is
this: Las Vegas rules do not apply in Syria. I applaud the
committee for holding this hearing today specifically on the
spillover effects in the region because what happens in Syria
will not remain in Syria.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Levitt follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Matthew Levitt \1\
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today about such a
critical and timely issue.
The war in Syria is a humanitarian catastrophe. It threatens to
tear the region apart along sectarian lines. It has injected new oxygen
into groups and movements driven by violent Islamist ideologies,
including but by no means limited to groups formally associated with
al-Qaeda. Indeed, we are now faced with a sharp rise in violent
extremism from within both the radical Sunni and Shiite camps.
Over the past few weeks, much of the discussion related to the war
in Syria has focused on either diplomatic talks in Switzerland (which
appear to be going nowhere fast) or the potential threats to the West
in general and the U.S. homeland in particular posed by the Syrian
jihad. These are critical issues, to be sure, but I am very pleased
that this committee is holding today's hearing on the regional
implications of the war in Syria.
As Director of National Intelligence James Clapper recently noted,
we can expect an increase in political uncertainty and violence across
the region in 2014.\2\ There are many reasons this will be the case,
not all of which are directly tied to the war in Syria. For today's
purposes, however, I would like to address three types of fallout from
the war in Syria that are certain to cause significant spillover of one
kind or another: First, the flow of foreign fighters to Syria from
across the Middle East and the impact this is certain to have on
regional stability; second, the especially pernicious sectarian nature
of the conflict at hand, and the impact that will have on Lebanon in
particular; and third, the sharp increase--as a result of the war--in
dangerous macrotrends, from refugees and population displacement to
poverty, hunger, and lack of adequate health care, that create
conditions conducive to violence and instability.
``when the boys come home''
Fifteen years from now, when classified documents produced today
begin to be declassified, we will surely look back with some discomfort
at just how far off some of our judgments were when written in 2014.
Such is the nature of intelligence assessments. I worry, however, that
we may look back 15 years hence and find ourselves dealing with a
laundry list of difficult problems that are in large part the result of
actions taken, or not taken, today.
This reflection is underscored by rereading a declassified August
1993 report, ``The Wandering Mujahidin: Armed and Dangerous,'' written
by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).\3\
Its subject was the possible spillover effect of Afghan mujahedin
fighters and support networks moving on to fight in other jihad
conflicts, alongside other militant Islamic groups worldwide. Much of
the report could be applied as equally to the themes we find ourselves
facing today as it did when it was written 21 years ago.
Consider how fighters are traveling from around the world to go
fight on either side of the increasingly sectarian war in Syria. Much
of the discussion about foreign fighters traveling to Syria has focused
on radicalized Muslim youth coming from Western countries--Europe,
North America, Australia--which presents an especially disconcerting
threat to homeland security given that these Western passport holders
are likely to return home far more radicalized than when they left.
These individuals are also more often than not fighting with groups
like Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) or the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
(ISIS), at least some of which, DNI Clapper recently testified, aspire
to attack the United States.\4\ But the greatest numbers of foreign
fighters, on both the Sunni and Shiite sides of the equation, have come
from the Middle East. Indeed, it must be noted that while most people
focus on the Sunni foreign fighter phenomenon, there are at least as
many Shiite foreign fighters in Syria today. Most are from Iraq, but
others have come from as far afield as Yemen, Afghanistan, and even
Australia.
Earlier this month DNI Clapper estimated that more than 7,000
fighters have traveled to Syria from more than 50 countries.\5\ In an
independent study in December, my colleague, Aaron Zelin, estimated the
numbers to be some 8,500 foreign fighters from 74 different countries.
His estimates of the range of foreign fighters from across the region
who have come to fight on the Sunni side of the war in Syria are
equally telling: \6\
ARAB WORLD
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Country Low High Country Low High
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kuwait........................................ 54 71 Lebanon......................... 65 890
Tunisia....................................... 379 970 Jordan.......................... 175 2,089
Libya......................................... 330 556 Iraq............................ 59 97
Algeria....................................... 68 123 Egypt........................... 118 358
Palestine..................................... 73 114 Saudi Arabia.................... 380 1,010
Sudan......................................... 2 96 Yemen........................... 13 110
Morocco....................................... 76 91 United Arab Emirates............ 13 13
Mauritania.................................... 2 2 Qatar........................... 14 14
Bahrain....................................... 12 12 Oman............................ 1 1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the Shiite side of the equation, Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi
Shiite militants from groups like Asaib Ahl al-Haqq and Kataib
Hezbollah make up a majority of the Shiites fighting in support of the
Bashar al-Assad regime. Some estimate that as many as 5,000 Lebanese
Hezbollah have been active in Syria, on a rotational basis.\7\ Iraqi
Shiites fighting in Syria are also estimated to be as high as 5,000.\8\
And Iranians are present in smaller support and advising roles. In
April 2011, the entire Quds Force of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) was designated by President Obama's Executive Order 13572
for human rights violations in Syria.\9\ Iran's Ministry of
Intelligence and Security (MOIS) forces as well as its Law Enforcement
Forces (LEF) have also been active in Syria, and have likewise been
designated by the U.S. Treasury Department for human rights abuses.\10\
Shiites from Saudi Arabia, Cote d'Ivoire, and Afghanistan have also
flown to Syria to fight on behalf of the regime, and Yemeni Houthi
fighters are reported to be going to Syria through Hezbollah camps in
Lebanon to fight with the regime and Hezbollah.\11\
In Syria, these foreign fighters are learning new and more
dangerous tools of the trade in a very hands-on way, and those who do
not die on the battlefield will ultimately disperse to all corners of
the world better trained and still more radicalized than they were
before. DNI Clapper stressed that it is not only foreign fighters who
are drawn to Syria today but also ``technologies and techniques that
pose particular problems to our defenses.'' \12\
``We are concerned,'' CIA Director John Brennan testified, ``about
the use of Syrian territory by the al-Qaeda organization to recruit
individuals . . . to use Syria as a launching pad'' for attacks on the
West.\13\ But the threat is not limited to actual al-Qaeda groups or
operatives, nor is it limited to attacks targeting the West. The
majority of radicalized fighters are likely to return home and attack
their own homelands even before they seek to strike ours, in large part
because the events that have followed the Arab Spring have created
conditions favorable for militant Islamist revival--social and militant
both--across the region.
Consider just a few regional reverberations of the Syrian jihad
already being felt today:
This week an Israeli court convicted an Israeli Arab citizen
of joining Jabhat al-Nusra. The presiding judge expressed
concern over the danger posed by Israeli citizens who join the
war in Syria and return home, where ``they could use the
military training and ideological indoctrination acquired in
Syria to commit terror attacks, indoctrinate others or gather
intelligence for use in attacks by anti-Israel organizations.''
\14\
For many in the region and beyond, going to fight in Syria
is a natural and unremarkable decision. For these people, the
fight in Syria is a defensive jihad to protect fellow Sunni
Muslims--women and children--from the Assad regime's
indiscriminate attacks on civilian population centers. And so
it is that Ahmed Abdullah al-Shaya, the poster boy for Saudi
Arabia's deradicalization program--which boasts a tiny 1.5
percent recidivism rate from among its 2,400 graduates--has now
turned up on the battlefield in Syria.\15\
``Tunisia's revolution and those in Syria, Egypt and Yemen,
and Libya gave us a chance to set up an Islamic state and
sharia law, and in the Maghreb first,'' explained a young
Tunisian Salafist in Tunis, Abu Salah. ``We want nothing less
than an Islamic state in Tunisia, and across the region. The
first step must be Syria. I am proud of our brothers in Syria,
and I will go there myself in a few weeks.'' \16\
Another young Tunisian, Ayman Saadi, who was raised in a
middle-class family with a secular tradition, was stopped from
going to fight in Syria several times by his parents before he
finally snuck out of the country to Benghazi. He trained there
for a short time, but instead of going on to Syria, he was
instructed to go back to Tunisia to carry out a suicide attack
at a Presidential mausoleum; Saadi was tackled by guards before
he could trigger his explosives. Just before that, another
bomber managed to kill only himself at a nearby beach resort
popular with foreign tourists.\17\
In Egypt, the government is already facing high levels of
violence largely in
reaction to the deposition of former President Muhammad Morsi.
Incidents of militants returning from Syria, too, and carrying
out violent acts against the government have occurred. The
Sinai militant group Ansar Beit al-Maqdis attracts many
returnees and has claimed responsibility for a number of
attacks in recent months. In September, Walid Badr, a former
Egyptian Army officer, after returning from Syria conducted a
suicide attack that narrowly missed Egyptian Interior Minister
Muhammad Ibrahim, instead injuring 19 others.\18\ In November,
Ansar Beit al-Maqdis published a propaganda video featuring a
segment of a speech by the late Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the
former head of
al-Qaeda's Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), which later evolved
into ISIS.'' \19\
In August, a new, fully Moroccan jihadist organization
called Harakat Sham
al-Islam was created in Syria. The group reportedly aims not
only to recruit fighters for the Syrian war but also to
establish a jihadist organization within Morocco itself:
``Although the [group's] name refers to Syria and its theater
is Syria, the majority of group members are Moroccans. The
group's creation was also announced in the Rif Latakia, where
most Moroccan jihadists who go to Syria are based.'' \20\
Last month, an Iraqi newspaper ceased publishing after
receiving death threats from the Iranian-backed Shiite militia
Asaib Ahl al-Haqq. Two bombs were placed in its office in
Baghdad, and protestors carrying photographs of Asaib Ahl al-
Haqq's leader demanded the paper be shut down. Members openly
admit to ``ramp[ing] up targeted killings.'' \21\ The militia
has been active in Iraq since the American-led war, in which it
carried out thousands of attacks on U.S. soldiers, and
currently has forces in Syria.\22\
Last week Jordanian border guards foiled an attempt to
smuggle a large amount of ammunition and other material not
from Jordan into Syria, but from Syria in Jordan.\23\
None of this should surprise. Twenty-one years ago, INR reported
that ``the support network that funneled money, supplies, and manpower
to supplement the Afghan Mujahidin is now contributing experienced
fighters to militant Islamic groups worldwide.'' When these veteran
fighters dispersed, the report presciently predicted, ``their knowledge
of communications equipment and experiences in logistics planning will
enhance the organizational and offensive capabilities of the militant
groups to which they are returning.'' A section of the 1993 report,
entitled ``When the Boys Come Home,'' noted that these veteran
volunteer fighters ``are welcomed as victorious Muslim fighters of a
successful jihad against a superpower'' and ``have won the respect of
many Muslims--Arab and non-Arab--who venerate the jihad.''
At that time, these mujahedin returned to Yemen, Egypt, Sudan,
Algeria, Libya, and beyond, where they trained local militants and
further radicalized local groups. Libya, the 1993 report noted, was
once one of the largest backers of Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
(since then designated a terrorist by the United States and the United
Nations) \24\ but ``now fears the returning veterans and has lashed out
publicly against them.'' \25\ Indeed, several of these Libyan veterans
formed the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and became senior
members of core al-Qaeda. In 2006, the U.S. Government would note that
``The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group threatens global safety and
stability through the use of violence and its ideological alliance with
al-Qaeda and other brutal terrorist organizations.'' \26\ Today,
Libya's Ansar al-Sharia is operating on the ground in Syria. In
Latakia, the group has set up a bakery and is organizing Ansar al-
Sharia-branded aid for Sunni communities.\27\
But it is not just al-Qaeda-affiliated groups that are active in
Syria. As the Treasury Department recently revealed, elements of the
al-Qaeda core remain active and involved in the Syrian jihad. On
February 6, the Treasury Department designated Iran-based Islamic Jihad
Union facilitator Olimzhon Adkhamovich Sadikov (also known as Jafar al-
Uzbeki and Jafar Muidinov) for providing logistical support and funding
to al-Qaeda's Iran-based network. An associate of Yasin al-Suri, a
previously designated al-Qaeda leader in Iran, Sadikov serves as a
Mashhad-based smuggler helping extremists and operatives to transit
Iran in and out of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Iran-based al-Qaeda
network also helps operatives and terrorist leaders travel from
Pakistan to Syria via Turkey, and facilitates the transfer of funds
from gulf-based donors--including ``an extensive network of Kuwaiti
jihadist donors''--to al-Qaeda core and other affiliated elements,
including Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria. This Iran-based network, the
Treasury Department noted, ``operates there with the knowledge of
Iranian authorities,'' indicating that Iran is not only supporting
Hezbollah and the Assad regime but also fanning the flames of sectarian
violence by knowingly allowing al-Qaeda to support its elements in
Syria from Iranian territory.\28\
And yet there are also signs that al-Qaeda core elements may be
concerned that the Syrian jihad could leave them on the sidelines and
undermine their relevance. Events in Syria are quickly changing the
nature of the jihadist enterprise. Its epicenter is no longer
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, or Yemen, but the heart of the Levant--al-
Sham--in Syria. There, both ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra are fighting the
Assad regime and its Shiite allies and more moderate Syrian rebels. The
two groups have not merged, and only one (al-Nusra) has pledged
allegiance to Ayman
al-Zawahiri. Indeed, when Zawahiri instructed ISIS to focus on Iraq and
leave the Syrian theater to al-Nusra, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
flatly refused. This month, Zawahiri responded in kind, blaming ISIS
for ``the enormity of the disaster that afflicted the Jihad in Syria''
and disavowing its ties to al-Qaeda. ``ISIS,'' Zawahiri insisted, ``is
not a branch of al-Qaeda and we have no organizational relationship
with it.'' \29\
Meanwhile, other Islamist groups, such as Ahrar al-Sham, remain
independent even as they share some ideological underpinnings with al-
Qaeda. Today, the jihadist centers that are drawing new recruits,
donations, and foreign fighters are not exclusive to al-Qaeda. Knowing
that, Zawahiri perhaps felt the need to be able to claim something big
that jihadist fighters of all shapes and sizes could rally around. What
better than an attack on Israel? And so, on January 22, Israeli
officials announced that, several weeks before, they had disrupted what
they described as an ``advanced'' al-Qaeda terrorist plot in Israel.
Although al-Qaeda-inspired jihadists had targeted Israel before (three
men who had plotted an attack near Hebron were killed in a shootout
with police in November), this marked the first time that senior al-
Qaeda leaders were directly involved in such plans.\30\
The extent to which the Syrian jihad is driven by al-Qaeda core,
its affiliates, or other violent Islamist groups is a matter of debate,
but it is clear that there is no more of a single command center today
than there was 21 years ago. The 1993 report describes several trends
that remain issues of serious concern, including some of the same
streams of financial support that continue to finance today's militant
Islamist groups (though not all--fundraising for the Syrian jihad
through social media is now a significant issue). To the present-day
reader, who will digest this 1993 report with an eye toward the
conflict in Syria, perhaps the most disturbing analytical judgment--
which could have been pulled out of a current National Intelligence
Estimate--is this:
The war-era network of state sponsors and private patrons which
continues to support the mujahidin has no rigid structure and
no clearly defined command center, but receives guidance from
several popular Islamic leaders and financial support from
charitable Islamic organizations and wealthy individuals. Key
figures who have emerged as the mentors of the mujahidin
provide one another with the contacts and conduits needed to
keep the militant groups they support in business.
The network circa 1993 was not an exact parallel to today's
combination of al-Qaeda operatives (a smaller but no less committed
cadre), affiliated networks, virtually networked like-minded followers,
and homegrown violent extremists. But the 1993 warning of an
unstructured network of jihadists moving on from their current area of
operations to other battlefronts could have been written this morning.
sectarian proxy war in the levant
The Syrian war is also a classic case of a proxy war, in this case
between Saudi Arabia and other Sunni gulf states, on one hand, and
Iran, on the other, with the additional, especially dangerous overlay
of sectarianism. The sectarian vocabulary used to dehumanize the
``other'' in the Syrian war is deeply disturbing and suggests both
sides view the war as a long-term battle in an existential, religious
struggle between Sunnis and Shiites.\31\ This suggests further that the
war in Syria is now being fought on two parallel planes, one focused on
the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition, and the other on the
existential threats the Sunni and Shiite communities each perceive from
one another. The former might theoretically be negotiable, while the
latter almost certainly is not. The ramifications for regional
instability are enormous, and go well beyond the Levant. But they are
felt more immediately and more powerfully in Lebanon to the west and
Iraq to the east than anywhere else.
Allow me to focus briefly on Lebanon in particular. Over the past
couple of years, Hezbollah's combatant role in Syria has become more
formal and overt. At the same time, intercommunal violence has
increased significantly in Lebanon, including gunfights between Sunni
and Alawite militants in Tripoli, between Sunnis and Shiites in Sidon,
and of course bombings by Sunni militants--including Jabhat al-Nusra in
Lebanon--in Shiite neighborhoods in Beirut and Hermel. Hezbollah's
stronghold in the Dahiya suburb of Beirut has been struck on multiple
occasions, and even the Iranian Embassy in Beirut was the target of a
double suicide bombing.
By siding with the Assad regime, its Alawite supporters, and Iran,
and taking up arms against Sunni rebels, Hezbollah has placed itself at
the epicenter of a sectarian conflict that has nothing to do with the
group's purported raison d'etre: ``resistance'' to Israeli occupation.
One Shiite Lebanese satirist put it this way: ``Either the fighters
have lost Palestine on the map and think it is in Syria,'' he said,
``[o]r they were informed that the road to Jerusalem runs through
Qusayr and Homs,'' locations in Syria where Hezbollah has fought with
Assad loyalists against Sunni rebels.\32\
The implication is clear: for many Lebanese, Hezbollah is no longer
a pure ``Islamic resistance'' fighting Israel, but a sectarian militia
and Iranian proxy doing Assad and Ayatollah Khamenei's bidding at the
expense of fellow Muslims. And it therefore does not surprise that the
pokes come from extremist circles, too. In June, the Abdullah Azzam
Brigades, a Lebanon-based al-Qaeda-affiliated group, released a
statement challenging Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah and his fighters
``to fire one bullet at occupied Palestine and claim responsibility''
for it. They could fire at Israel from either Lebanon or Syria, the
statement continued, seeing as Hezbollah ``fired thousands of shells
and bullets upon unarmed Sunnis and their women, elderly, and children,
and destroyed their homes on top of them.'' \33\
But while taunts might be expected from radical Sunni extremist
groups, Hezbollah now faces challenges it never would have anticipated
just a few years ago. For example, the day before Nasrallah's August
speech Lebanese President Michel Suleiman called, for the first time
ever, for the state to curtail Hezbollah's ability to operate as an
independent militia outside the control of the government.\34\ By
sending fighters to Syria, many Lebanese believe Hezbollah has put its
interests as a group ahead of those of Lebanon as a state, something
that flouts Hezbollah's longtime efforts to portray itself as a group
that is, first and foremost, Lebanese. Now the group that describes
itself as the vanguard standing up for the dispossessed in the face of
injustice, and that has always tried to downplay its sectarian and pro-
Iranian identities, finds those assertions challenged over its refusal
to abide by the Lebanese Government's official position of
noninterference in Syria. To the contrary, its proactive support of a
brutal Alawite regime against the predominantly Sunni Syrian opposition
undermines its long-cultivated image as a distinctly Lebanese
``resistance'' movement.
Hezbollah has doubled down in its support for the Assad regime,
even after bombs started going off in Dahiya, in southern Beirut.
Nasrallah was crystal clear: ``If you are punishing Hezbollah for its
role in Syria, I will tell you, if we want to respond to the Dahiyeh
explosion, we would double the number of fighters in Syria--if they
were 1,000 to 2,000, and if they were 5,000, they would become
10,000.'' Indeed, Hezbollah--and Nasrallah himself--has cast its lot
with Assad to the end. ``If,'' Nasrallah added, ``one day came, and
required that Hezbollah and I go to Syria, we will do so.'' \35\
At one point, Nasrallah tried to paper over the fact that Lebanese
Shiites and Lebanese Sunnis were now openly battling one another in
Syria, and threatening to drag that sectarian fighting across the
border into Lebanon, by proposing that Lebanese Shiites and Sunnis
agree to disagree over Syria. Addressing Lebanese Sunnis, Nasrallah
said in a speech last May: ``We disagree over Syria. You fight in
Syria; we fight in Syria; then let's fight there. Do you want me to be
more frank? Keep Lebanon aside. Why should we fight in Lebanon?'' \36\
But that pitch did not go over so well with Nasrallah's fellow
Lebanese, who wanted an end to Lebanese interference in the war in
Syria, not a gentleman's agreement that Lebanese citizens would only
slaughter one another across the border.
In that same speech, Nasrallah addressed the ``two grave dangers''
facing Lebanon. The first, he argued, is ``Israel and its intentions,
greed, and schemes.'' The second danger, Nasrallah added, is related to
``the changes taking place in Syria.'' As for Israel, Nasrallah warned
that it threatens Lebanon every day. And as for Syria, the regime there
faces an ``axis led by the United States which is for sure the
decisionmaker.'' The British, French, Italians, Germans, Arabs, and
Turks are involved, too, but ``all of them work for the Americans.''
But the true force behind the ``changes taking place in Syria''? ``We
also know that this axis is implicitly supported by Israel because the
U.S. project in the region is Israeli cum laude.'' Hezbollah is not
fighting in Syria as part of a sectarian conflict, Nasrallah insisted,
but combating a radical Sunni, takfiri project with ties to al-Qaeda
that ``is funded and backed by America'' out of an American interest to
destroy the region. In other words, the war in Syria is no longer a
popular revolution against a political regime, but a place where
America is seeking to impose its own political project on the region.
Nasrallah concluded: ``Well, we all know that the U.S. project in the
region is an absolutely Israeli project.'' And so, by fighting in
Syria, ``today we consider ourselves defending Lebanon, Palestine, and
Syria.'' \37\
There are, however, few takers for the contorted logic that the
Syrian rebellion is an American or Israeli scheme outside Hezbollah's
staunchest Shiite supporters. And the proportion of Shiites in Lebanon
has fallen considerably since the war in Syria began. There are now as
many as an estimated 1 million mostly Sunni Syrian refugees who have
fled to Lebanon, marking a significant shift in the sectarian balance
of a state whose confessional political system is based on a sense of
proportional representation (albeit outdated) among its confessional
communities. This has, to say the least, exacerbated sectarian
resentment.
trending toward instability
The humanitarian crisis resulting from the Syrian civil war is a
catastrophe that grows worse by the day. In a region long known for its
instability and sparse resources, Syria's neighbors are simply not
equipped to handle 2.4 million registered refugees. Lebanon has taken
in Syrians equal to at least one-fifth of the country's population, a
refugee camp is now Jordan's fourth-largest city, and 13,000 new
refugees are registered with the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) every day. Within Syria itself, more than 6.5
million have been displaced and more than 9 million need humanitarian
assistance.
Such numbers are more than just a depressing snapshot of the
situation on the ground today, they suggest a long-term outlook that is
no less dire. Taken together, the Syrian crisis and its secondary and
tertiary effects create a set of ``looming disequilibria,'' to borrow a
phrase from the National Intelligence Council's (NIC's) excellent study
``Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds.'' \38\ Consider, for example,
the combined impact on the region of a years-long conflict, exacerbated
by sectarianism and fueled by funds and weapons from the backers of
respective proxies. From education, health, poverty, and migration
patterns to humanitarian assistance needs and the economic impact on
fragile economies, the consequences of the Syrian war for the region
would be massive even if the war itself ended tomorrow.
Let us focus for a moment on refugee migrations, which have long
been noted as factors that increase the likelihood of militant
disputes.\39\ In today's migration displacements, the vast majority of
refugees are Sunni Muslims, posing a serious threat to the sectarian
balance of the region, especially in Lebanon. Hundreds of thousands of
Syrians have moved into Jordan's cities and put a heavy strain on local
economies. Neither country can sustain for long the added burden to
public services, from water and electricity to health care and
education. This stress can open doors for externally financed terrorist
organizations to take the place of the state, as was the case with
Hezbollah in Lebanon in the 1980s. Without considerably more
international aid, the entire region could well be facing increased
instability and opportunities for extremists for the foreseeable
future. Indeed, according to one study, ``hosting refugees from
neighboring states significantly increases the risk of armed
conflict.'' Refugee camps provide militant groups with recruits and
supplies, and refugee flows include within them fighters, weapons, and
radical ideologies. Then there are the financial and social burdens on
the host country, including disruption to the local economy and
upsetting of the local society's ethnic balance. In the case of Syria,
these researchers found, refugee influxes to Lebanon raise its risk of
civil war by 53.88 percent, and raise Jordan's conflict risk by 53.51
percent.\40\
conclusion
There is no question that the ongoing, deeply sectarian proxy war
in Syria will undermine regional stability in ways both predictable and
not. This testimony did not even touch on Iraq, Turkey, or Israel, for
example, all of which are neighboring countries deeply affected by the
war in Syria.
Even before the war in Syria got as bad as it has, projections for
the region suggested we were headed in this general direction. I leave
you with a quotation from the NIC's ``Global Trends 2030'':
Chronic instability will be a feature of the region because of
the growing weakness of the state and the rise of sectarianism,
Islam, and tribalism. The challenge will be particularly acute
in states such as Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Syria where sectarian
tensions were often simmering below the surface as autocratic
regimes co-opted minority groups and imposed harsh measures to
keep ethnic rivalries in check. In [the] event of a more
fragmented Iraq or Syria, a Kurdistan would not be
inconceivable. Having split up before, Yemen is likely to be a
security concern with weak central government, poverty,
unemployment and with a young population that will go from 28
million today to 50 million in 2025. Bahrain could also become
a cockpit for growing Sunni-Shia rivalry, which could be
destabilizing for the gulf region.
And yet, I doubt anyone could have anticipated the catastrophe we
now face in Syria, and the instability that is the result of the
regional spillover from that conflict.
I submit that the United States is not doing anywhere near enough
to address these critical problems. Failure to respond effectively to
this crisis has led to tangible and horrific consequences today.
Failure to quickly reassess our policies and roll out a far more
proactive stance toward both the humanitarian crisis and the conflict
itself will have equally damaging and painful consequences tomorrow.
I thank you for your attention and look forward to answering any
questions you may have.
----------------
Notes
\1\ The author would like to thank Jonathan Prohov and Kelsey
Segawa for their research assistance in support of this testimony.
\2\ ``Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence
Community'': Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, United States Senate, 113th Cong., 2nd. Sess. (January
29, 2014) (statement of James Clapper, Director of National
Intelligence), http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/140129/clapper.pdf.
\3\ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(INR), ``The Wandering Mujahidin: Armed and Dangerous,'' Weekend
Edition, August 21-22, 1993, available at http://
www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/globalized-jihad-then-
1993-and-now.
\4\ ``Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security
of the United States'': Hearing before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, United States Senate, 113th. Cong., 2nd. Sess. (February 11,
2014) (statement of James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence).
\5\ David Rohde, ``Analysis: Is Syria Now a Direct Threat to the
U.S.?'' Reuters, February 7, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/
02/07/us-syria-us-analysis-idUSBREA161NG20140207.
\6\ Aaron Zelin, ``Up to 11,000 Foreign Fighters in Syria; Steep
Rise among Western Europeans,'' ICSR Insight, December 17, 2013,
available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/
up-to-11000-foreign-fighters-in-syria-steep-rise-among-western-
europeans.
\7\ David Horovitz, ``5,000 Hezbollah Troops in Syria, with 5,000
More Set to Join Them,'' Times of Israel, May 26, 2013, http://
www.timesofisrael.com/5000-hezbollah-troops-in-syria-with-5000-more-
set-to-join-them/.
\8\ Jamie Dettmer, ``Number of Shia Fighters in Syria Could Rise
Following Fatwa,'' Voice of America, December 16, 2013,http://
www.voanews.com/content/number-of-shia-fighters-in-syria-could-rise-
following-fatwa/1811638.html.
\9\ U.S. Executive Order 13572, ``Blocking Property of Certain
Persons With Respect to Human Rights Abuses in Syria,'' April 29, 2011,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/
13572.pdf.
\10\ U.S. Department of Treasury, ``Treasury Designates Iranian
Ministry of Intelligence and Security for Human Rights Abuses and
Support for Terrorism,'' press release, February 16, 2012, http://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1424.aspx; U.S.
Department of Treasury, ``Treasury Sanctions Syrian, Iranian Security
Forces for Involvement in Syrian Crackdown,'' press release, June 29,
2011, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
tg1224.aspx.
\11\ ``Terrorist Groups in Syria'': Hearing before the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade, United States House of Representatives,
113th. Cong. (November 20, 2013) (statement of Mr. Phillip Smyth),
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA18/20131120/101513/HHRG-113-FA18-
Wstate-SmythP-20131120.pdf; Ariel Ben Solomon, ``Report: Yemen Houthis
Fighting for Assad in Syria,'' Jerusalem Post, May 31, 2013, http://
www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Report-Yemen-Houthis-fighting-for-Assad-in-
Syria-315005.
\12\ ``Clapper Says Syrian al-Qaida Wants to Attack U.S.,''
Washington Post, January 29, 2014,http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/clapper-says-syrian-al-qaida-wants-to-attack-us/2014/01/29/
46f35732-8905-11e3-a760-a86415d0944d_story.html.
\13\ Michael R. Gordon and Mark Mazzetti, ``U.S. Spy Chief Says
Assad Has Strengthened His Hold on Power,'' New York Times, February 4,
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/05/world/middleeast/us-
representative-to-syrian-opposition-is-retiring.html.
\14\ Jack Khoury, ``Israeli Arab Gets 18 Months for Trying to Join
Fight against Assad,'' Haaretz, February 11, 2014,http://
www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/.premium-1.573552.
\15\ Glen Carey, ``Saudis Fearing Syrian Blowback Expand Rehab for
Jihadis,'' Bloomberg, December 9, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2013-12-08/jihadis-offered-rehab-as-saudis-seek-to-avert-syria-war-
blowback.html.
\16\ Patrick Markey and Tarek Amara, ``Insight: Tunisia Islamists
Seek Jihad in Syria with One Eye on Home,'' Reuters, November 18, 2013,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/11/18/uk-tunisia-jihad-insight-
idUKBRE9AH0GO20131118.
\17\ Ibid.
\18\ David Barnett, ``Blowback in Cairo: The Syrian Civil War Has
Now Reached the Heart of Egypt,'' Foreign Policy, January 9, 2014,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/01/09/blow
back_in_cairo_syria.
\19\ Mohannad Sabry, ``Al-Qaeda Emerges amid Egypt's Turmoil,'' Al-
Monitor, December 4, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/
2013/12/al-qaeda-egypt-sinai-insurgency-growing-influence.html.
\20\ Vish Sakthivel, ``Weathering Morocco's Syria Returnees,''
PolicyWatch 2148 (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September
25, 2013), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/
weathering-moroccos-syria-returnees.
\21\ Ahmed Rasheed, ``Militants Kill 16 Iraqi Soldiers in Overnight
Ambush,'' Reuters, February 11, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/
2014/02/11/us-iraq-violence-idUSBREA1A1BC20140211; Loveday Morris,
``Shiite Militias in Iraq Begin to Remobilize,'' Washington Post,
February 9, 2014.
\22\ Loveday Morris, ``Shiite Militias in Iraq Begin to
Remobilize,'' Washington Post, February 9, 2014; Aaron Y. Zelin and
Phillip Smyth, ``The Vocabulary of Sectarianism,'' Foreign Policy,
January 29, 2014, available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
policy-analysis/view/the-vocabulary-of-sectarianism.
\23\ ``Jordan Foils Bid to Smuggle Ammunition from Syria,''
Naharnet, February 24, 2014, http://naharnet.com/stories/en/1199555.
\24\ U.S. Department of State, ``U.S. Designates Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar a Terrorist," February 19, 2003, http://
iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2003/02/
20030219165118pkurata@
pd.state.gov0.704632.html#axzz2t7LhTkjK. ``The List Established and
Maintained by the 1267 Committee with respect to Individuals, Groups,
Undertakings and Other Entities Associated with al-Qaida." United
Nations, January 6, 2014, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/
AQList.pdf.
\25\ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(INR), ``The Wandering Mujahidin: Armed and Dangerous," Weekend
Edition, August 21-22, 1993, available at http://
www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/globalized-jihad-then-
1993-and-now.69\26\ U.S. Department of Treasury, ``Treasury Designates
UK-Based Individuals, Entities Financing Al Qaida-Affiliated LIFG,"
February 8, 2006, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/
Pages/js4016.aspx.
\27\ ``Ansar al-Sharia Aid Campaign: For Our People in Bilad al-
Sham #3," Al-Riyah Media Foundation, February 9, 2014, http://
justpaste.it/ecxu.
\28\ U.S. Department of Treasury, ``Treasury Targets Networks
Linked to Iran," February 6, 2014, http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/jl2287.aspx.
\29\ Tim Lister, ``Al Qaeda `Disowns' Affiliate, Blaming It for
Disaster in Syria,'' CNN, February 4, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/
03/world/meast/syria-al-qaeda/; Aaron Y. Zelin, ``Al-Qaeda
Disaffiliates with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham,'' Policy
Alert (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 4, 2014),
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/al-qaeda-
disaffiliates-with-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham.
\30\ Yaakov Lappin, ``3 East Jerusalem al-Qaida Recruits Arrested,
`Planned Massive Bombings,' '' Jerusalem Post, January 22, 2014, http:/
/www.jpost.com/Defense/3-al-Qaida-recruits-arrested-planned-massive-
bombings-339002.
\31\ Aaron Y. Zelin and Phillip Smyth, ``The Vocabulary of
Sectarianism'' Foreign Policy, January 29, 2014, available at http://
www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-vocabulary-of-
sectarianism.
\32\ Sarah Birke, ``Hezbollah's Choice,'' New York Times, August 6,
2013,http://latitude.blogs.
nytimes.com/2013/08/06/hezbollahs-choice/.
\33\ Thomas Joscelyn, ``Online Jihadists Discuss Fate of al Qaeda
Operative Held by Saudi Arabia,'' Long War Journal, June 27, 2013,
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/06/
online_jihadists_dis.php.
\34\ Anne Barnard, ``Pressed on Syria, Hezbollah Leader Urges Focus
on Israel,'' New York Times, August 2, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/08/03/world/middleeast/under-fire-on-syria-hezbollah-leader-urges-
focus-on-israel.html?_r=0.
\35\ Ali Hashem, ``Nasrallah Threatens to Double Hezbollah Forces
in Syria,'' Al-Monitor, August 16, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/
pulse/originals/2013/08/nasrallah-double-forces-syria.
html.
\36\ ``Hezbollah Leader Hassan Nasrallah's Speech on Syria,''
Voltaire Network, May 25, 2013, http://www.voltairenet.org/
article178691.html.
\37\ Ibid.
\38\ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ``Global
Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds'' (National Intelligence Council,
December 2012), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Global
Trends_2030.pdf.
\39\ Idean Salehyan, ``The Externalities of Civil Strife: Refugees
as a Source of International Conflict,'' paper presented at the
conference on Migration, International Relations, and the Evolution of
World Politics (Princeton, N.J., Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs, Princeton University, March 16-17, 2007), http:/
/www.cas.unt.edu/idean/RefugeesWar.pdf.
\40\ Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, ``The Syrian
Refugee Crisis and Conflict Spillover,'' Political Violence @ a Glance,
February 11, 2014, http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2014/02/11/
the-syrian-refugee-crisis-and-conflict-spillover/.
The Chairman. Well, thank you both for some very insightful
and alarming testimony.
Let me ask you both. You got to a little bit of this, Dr.
Levitt, at the end there of your statement. If you were in a
position to prescribe policy, what would you say? Both of you,
what would you say it should be? Why do we not start with you?
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. I clearly have the more minimalist
view of what we can accomplish at this point. To me, I do not
think we are going to be able to make an enormous difference on
the battlefield in Syria, so I divide policy in two different
ways. One is containing the impact of the spillover. That is
reducing the amount of foreign fighters who go to the
battlefield, making sure that we can track them, and reducing
the humanitarian costs of the war.
But I think that above all else we have to actually commit
to a policy. We should not be on the fence between regime
change and something else. I think we need to make a choice. I
take a more minimalist view. I understand that many colleagues
have a very different view than I do in that regard.
The Chairman. Dr. Levitt.
Dr. Levitt. Thank you. I completely agree with Daveed and
some of the things we need to do, but I also think that,
especially on foreign fighters, control of the border with
Turkey, but I think there are other things we need to think
really carefully about. How do we deny the Assad regime
complete control over air? That does not have to be our boots
on the ground. It does not have to be providing MANPADs to
sketchy characters. We have other allies in the region. There
are things we should be thinking about doing creatively in that
area.
I think at a certain point we need to consider things that
were on the table at one point when we were talking about a
redline some time ago, that we do not necessarily need to
escalate things too far. For example, it is my understanding
that there are only 15 to 20 runways in the entire country of
Syria that are capable of taking the massive airplanes
delivering resupplies from Iran and Russia both directly to the
Assad regime and Hezbollah and their allies. We have
specialized munitions to take out those types of runways. There
are all kinds of complications with this, but if we were able
to do that then the consequence for the day after would be that
they would not be able to get the kind of weapons resupplied
that they are using on a daily basis to create this
humanitarian catastrophe.
The Chairman. I think both of you referenced the challenge
of those foreign fighters inside of Syria, who then return to
their countries or elsewhere. Obviously, if you could take one
of your policy suggestions, which is to control the borders and
therefore avoid foreign fighters from coming in, you have one
part of your answer. But how do we deal with the question of
returning foreign fighters? In essence, are we looking at what
is happening in Syria with al-Qaeda groups active in Syria,
Iraq, and Lebanon? Are they in essence a JV team getting ready
for varsity play?
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. It is going to be a variety of
answers. Some people go over, do not necessarily go to the
front line, and are drawn there for emotional reasons. Some
people do not even link up with jihadist factions. Others do.
So the question for those who do is, Are they ideologically
radicalized or is this something that they can be
reincorporated, which is a tremendous problem for some of the
countries in the region, especially those who have legal
regimes where going over and fighting is not against the law?
That means that they do not have the option of simply
arresting. They generally try to monitor, but there are all
sorts of people who have gone over who are not necessarily on
their radar screen, which creates an intelligence problem. So I
think the United States can be very helpful to partner nations.
Dr. Levitt. As the chairman is aware, I recently published
a book on Hezbollah. As I was going about talking about this, I
had an opportunity to meet with senior intelligence officials
around the world where this problem is going on. Different
countries have different ways of dealing with it, from freezing
people's passports to even denying citizenship, that we would
not have here in the United States.
Here in the United States, this is a massive problem for
FBI and DHS, trying to keep up. We have around 50 people who
have gone, reportedly. They are not necessarily getting more
full-time employees or more budget, but they need to keep tabs
on every one of these people. And by the way, it is not just
ISIS or Jibhat al-Nusra. People who are going to fight with
nondesignated, not yet designated groups, like Al-Sham, are
also a significant problem.
One of the things officials told me abroad is that they are
seeing increasingly, because Syria is not seen as an offensive
jihad--it is a defensive jihad--people are told: Look, the West
is not going and defending these Sunni women and children, so
we have to do it for our own. But when they get there, most of
these people who go, the foreign fighters, end up fighting with
the more extreme elements and they do, I am told by these
intelligence officials, come back far more radicalized, not all
of them, as Daveed said, but the vast majority do. And that
creates a tremendous problem.
The Chairman. One final question. How much of the current
activity in Syria, in Lebanon and Iraq reflects strategy
guidance or operational directions from the Pakistan-based al-
Qaeda from your perspectives?
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. That is an excellent question. It is
difficult to know, in part because we are trying to interpret
what kind of guidance might be given by an organization that
tries to keep its guidance hidden from view. We can see a few
areas in which we can interpret them I think fairly well. We
can see public messaging, for example, for which the Syrian
jihad is really put at the forefront of the rhetoric coming out
of al-Qaeda's senior leadership.
AQSL, al-Qaeda senior leadership, tends not to become as
operationally involved, that is micromanaging things on the
ground. Instead, the model that they have tended to use has
been centralization of strategy and decentralization of
implementation. So it would absolutely be a shock if we found
that Zawahiri was, for example, directing operations on the
ground in Syria.
One final thing I will note, where we can see the guidance
coming from the broader al-Qaeda network. It was referenced in
the previous panel by Director Olsen, the kind of tensions that
currently exist, where the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham
was kicked out of the al-Qaeda organization. Subsequent to the
assassination of an al-Qaeda figure, Al-Siri, one of the groups
on the ground which is al-Qaeda-affiliated, Jibhat al-Nusra,
put an ultimatum down after which it planned to attack ISIS.
You had a number of al-Qaeda-affiliated clerics come out and
condemn the ultimatum, after which Jibhat al-Nusra did back
off.
This is something which is an indication of when the
organization and members who are part of its organs act to try
to influence an outcome in a certain way, it does make an
impact. Again, that is not to say that they are micromanaging
tactics. But you can see the influence of strategic guidance.
Dr. Levitt. In a nutshell, I agree with everything Daveed
said. I just would add this. You are now seeing a very
interesting situation where ISIS is arguably the most capable
of the most extreme organizations on the ground in Syria and it
has broken with al-Qaeda. And when al-Qaeda core told it to
stop it, they said: Forget you. So it will be very interesting
to see if this leads eventually to the downgrading of ISIS or
to the downgrading of al-Qaeda's brand, either of which could
happen.
Al-Siri, who Daveed mentioned, who was assassinated, was
affiliated not with Jibhat al-Nusra or with ISIS, but with Al-
Sham, and his assassination was another message that they are
not really taking the al-Qaeda core leaders' message very, very
seriously. I think that what we are going to see from here and
from Syria going forward is the proliferation of affiliates and
nonaffiliates without necessarily seeing al-Qaeda core
disappear. As I said in my statement, you have al-Qaeda core
raising funds for Jibhat al-Nusra and others in Kuwait, in
Qatar, some of that money being funneled through Iran with
Iran's knowledge--it does not get much more complicated than
that.
The Chairman. Well, thank you both for helping the
committee in its further understanding of the challenges in
Syria. With the appreciation of the committee, this record will
remain open until the close of business tomorrow and the
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Deputy Secretary William Burns to Questions
Submitted by Senator Bob Corker
Question. There is undoubtedly overlap between human rights abusers
in Russia and those engaged in violating Ukraine's territorial
integrity. Should the Magnitsky list be expanded to include these
individuals?
Answer. We will continue to use the Magnitsky Act to sanction
individuals who meet its criteria, including those who commit gross
violations of human rights.
On March 17, President Obama issued a new Executive Order (E.O.)
under the national emergency with respect to Ukraine that finds that
the actions and policies of the Russian Government with respect to
Ukraine--including through the deployment of Russian military forces in
the Crimea region of Ukraine--undermine democratic processes and
institutions in Ukraine; threaten its peace, security, stability,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity; and contribute to the
misappropriation of its assets.
This new authority expands upon E.O. 13660, which the President
signed March 6, by authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, to impose sanctions on named
officials of the Russian Government, any individual or entity that
operates in the Russian arms industry, and any designated individual or
entity that acts on behalf of, or that provides material or other
support to, any senior Russian Government official. We have fashioned
these sanctions to impose costs on named individuals who wield
influence in the Russian Government and those responsible for the
deteriorating situation in Ukraine. We stand ready to use these
authorities in a direct and targeted fashion as events warrant.
Given that we already have the authority to target persons,
including Russians, who are engaged in violating Ukraine's sovereignty
and territorial integrity, we do not believe it is necessary to expand
the Magnitsky Act criteria. Doing so could distract from the intended
purpose of the act, which was to highlight human rights abusers within
the state of Russia.
Question. DIA Director Lieutenant General Flynn testified that
while chemical weapons stockpiles currently remain under regime
control, the ``instability in Syria presents a perfect opportunity for
al-Qaeda and associated groups to acquire these weapons or their
components.'' How concerned are you about this possibility?
Answer. We are aware of the risks associated with the security
situation in Syria, and we continue to monitor Syria's proliferation-
sensitive materials, as we have throughout the ongoing conflict. We
assess that the Asad regime remains capable of maintaining the safety
and security of its chemical weapons agent and precursors while they
remain in Syria. We have been clear that the best way to reduce any
risk of proliferation is for Syria to comply promptly with its
obligations under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2118, the relevant
OPCW Executive Council decisions, and the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Syria needs to ensure a successful handoff of these materials to the
international community at the Port of Latakia, so that they can be
destroyed outside of Syria.
The United States and the international community have provided
extensive material assistance through the OPCW-U.N. Joint Mission to
ensure that Syria is able to safely and securely transport these
materials, and the regime has demonstrated its capacity to do so over
the recent weeks. While we cannot fully discount the possibility of an
extremist group in Syria seeking to acquire chemical weapons agent or
precursor, both the Syrian Opposition Coalition and the Supreme
Military Council have publicly indicated that they support the
elimination mission and have pledged to cooperate with the OPCW-U.N.
Joint Mission. We continue to work with the OPCW-U.N. Joint Mission to
ensure that CW materials are removed from Syria as safely and
expeditiously as possible.
Question. In the absence of greater American or international
involvement, what do you believe Syria will look like in 3 years? In 5
years? Is that a situation that we can reasonably contain? How can we
prepare for a decade of instability caused by the Syrian conflict?
Answer. In my testimony, I highlighted four serious risks to our
national interest posed by the current conflict--the risk to the
homeland from global jihadist groups who seek to gain long-term safe
havens; the risk to the stability of our regional partners, including
Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq; the risk to Israel and other partners from
the rise of Iranian-backed extremist groups, especially Lebanese
Hezbollah fighting in Syria; and the risk to the Syrian people, whose
suffering constitutes the greatest humanitarian crisis of this new
century. On the current trajectory, all of these risks will be
exacerbated over the next 3 to 5 years and it will be increasingly
difficult to contain spillover from the conflict.
While we pursue a diplomatic solution, we are putting in place the
elements of a long-term response to this protracted crisis--reducing
the threat posed by terrorist networks in Syria, pushing hard against
Iranian financing and material support to its proxy groups in Syria and
elsewhere, intensifying our efforts to strengthen Syria's endangered
neighbors, and supporting global efforts to ease the humanitarian
crisis in Syria and the region.
To help mitigate the security and humanitarian challenges, the
Department of State and USAID are providing more than $260 million in
nonlethal assistance to support Syria's moderate opposition. The U.S.
Government is also the single-largest donor of humanitarian assistance
for those affected by the crisis, providing more than $1.7 billion in
aid--nearly $878 million to support those inside Syria, and nearly $862
million to support refugees fleeing Syria and assist host communities
in neighboring countries.
In FY 2015, we have requested $155 million to advance a political
transition, counter violent extremism, support communities in liberated
areas to maintain basic services and compete with extremist groups, and
preserve U.S. national security interests in the region. The FY 2015
request also includes $1.1 billion for the ongoing humanitarian
response in Syria and the region--more than 11.7 million people have
been affected by the crisis to date, a number which is likely to
continue to rise over the next several years.
We are clear-eyed about the fact that this conflict poses
significant challenges for U.S. security and those of our partners.
There is no doubt that sustained U.S. engagement and attention, in
concert with our international and regional allies, will be required.
______
Response of Assistant Secretary Derek Chollet to Question
Submitted by Senator Bob Corker
steadfast jazz
Question. In November 2013, NATO held its largest live-fire
military exercise since 2006. The exercise, called Steadfast Jazz,
involved over 6,000 NATO troops but the U.S. contribution was only 160
personnel. Why was the U.S. contribution so meager?
Answer. The purpose of STEADFAST JAZZ 2013 was to certify the Joint
Force Headquarters and component headquarters for NATO Response Force
(NRF) 2014. Because the United States does not provide the Joint Force
Headquarters any of the component headquarters, or a major ground
element to NRF 2014's Immediate Response Force, a larger contribution
would have been inconsistent with the exercise's primary purpose.
STEADFAST JAZZ 2013 was combined with a command post exercise in the
Baltic States, and although approximately 6,000 NATO troops
participated in both exercises, the STEADFAST JAZZ ground live-fire
portion was relatively small, and only a few hundred allied military
personnel were involved. STEADFAST JAZZ 2013 marked the first time that
a U.S. ground unit participated in a NRF certification exercise, and
also marked the first time that a unit based in the United States
deployed to train in Europe since the REFORGER exercises of the early
1990s.