[Senate Hearing 113-633]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-633
REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF A NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN
===================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 12, 2014
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
94-340 PDF WASHINGTON : 2015
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Daniel E. O'Brien, Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, opening statement. 3
Kagan, Dr. Frederick W., Christopher DeMuth Chair and director,
Critical Threats Project, American Enterprise Institute,
Washington, DC................................................. 16
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Modell, Scott, senior associate, Burke Chair in Strategy, Center
for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC........ 9
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Ross, Hon. Dennis, William Davidson Distinguised Fellow,
counselor, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
Washington, DC................................................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 7
(iii)
REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF A
NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 12, 2014
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez, Cardin, Coons, Murphy, Kaine,
Corker, Risch, Rubio, Johnson, Flake, Barrasso, and Paul.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will come to order.
Let me thank our panelists who I know will provide some
thoughtful insights into the regional implications of a nuclear
deal with Iran.
International attention is feverishly focused on the
question of ``if'' the P5+1 and Iran will be able to agree and
on what. I have strong views on what I think that agreement
should look like and if we reach an agreement how we ensure
Iranian compliance.
It is my view that any deal with Iran must demand
significant dismantling of Iran's nuclear infrastructure,
including eliminating the vast majority of Iran's centrifuge
cascades and LEU's, which cannot mean leaving large stockpiles
of LEU in oxide form that can easily be reconverted;
terminating Iran's R&D efforts to create more advanced
centrifuges; and fundamentally altering the internal
infrastructure of the Arak facility, not just powering it down
to a lower megawatt facility. Together, these elements must
move the timeline for detectable breakout by Iran beyond a
year.
Second, Iran must come clean and provide information about
the military dimensions of its nuclear program and allow access
to facilities where these activities have been taking place.
And third, the agreement must include a long-term robust
inspections and verification regime, hopefully in the 20-year
range, in other words, at least as long as Iran has been lying
to the world about its program.
Fourth, any suspension of sanctions will require Iran to
meet a series of clear benchmarks. There must be clear
demarcations of what constitutes a breach, including
implications for both nominal failure to comply and significant
material breaches. Repercussions for a breach by Iran will be
snapback provisions for sanctions. At the end of the day, the
specifics of the agreement will not be worth the paper they are
written on if Iran believes it can cheat without significant
repercussions.
Now, less attention is focused on perhaps the more
critical, strategically relevant question: What happens after a
deal? What are the strategic implications for the United
States, for our allies and partners? What are the strategic
implications of a politically and economically resurgent Iran,
and what are the goals of its leaders in the aftermath of such
a deal? I personally doubt that the nuclear deal is part of
broader Iranian aspiration for a rapprochement with the United
States.
This hearing will focus on what we should expect, how we
should be preparing, and options we should be considering, if
there is a deal. In other words, we must plan for a potential
success. And in my view, success will not be defined
exclusively by whether or not we get a good deal with Iran. The
illicit nuclear program is only one pillar of much broader and
equally troubling Iranian actions. Iranian support for
terrorism goes back decades, and as we speak, Iran is actively
cultivating terrorist networks and violent proxies across the
region in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen, the Palestinian
territories, and beyond.
Our gulf partners are very concerned about Iran-sponsored
terrorism. I heard this very clearly from Saudi and Emirati
officials during my recent visit to the gulf. It is imperative
that if we achieve a nuclear deal with Iran, our partners and
allies are reassured that the United States remains committed
to their security and is not naive about the nature of the
Iranian threat and its hegemonic ambitions.
It is clear to me that our partners across the region are
adopting hedging strategies toward Iran because United States
commitment to the region is being actively questioned in light
of our engagement with Iran and our hesitancy in Syria. This is
evidenced by the string of Iranian official meetings and visits
that has evolved from a trickle to a deluge. My concern is what
will happen to gulf relationships with Iran after a deal is
reached?
Finally, on sanctions, it is my view that the international
sanctions regime has been the single most influential
determinant in keeping the Iranians at the negotiating table. I
look forward to hearing from our panelists on what the regional
implications of sanctions relief would be. How will the Iranian
Government use this potential economic windfall? Can we control
access to those assets to ensure that they are not increasing
their investment in regional destabilization?
At the end of the day, we must remain cognizant of Iranian
motivations in pursuing a deal. Is it merely about sanctions
relief for the leadership in Tehran, or is this about a broader
realignment that could have serious strategic implications for
the multidimensional chess game being played across the Middle
East?
With that, let me recognize the distinguished ranking
member of the committee, Senator Corker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having the
hearing, and I want to thank our witnesses who always enlighten
us. I know we have three very distinguished witnesses today.
I think, as the chairman mentioned, there is no question
that there is a pretty major geopolitical shift that is
occurring right now in the Middle East. The United States is
facilitating that by the policies that we have not pursued or
pursued, if you will, in Syria, by Iraq being weakened as it
is, and Iran certainly playing a big role there. And our
friends on the peninsula. I, too, was there recently and it is
pretty amazing the shift in their attitude and the hedging that
is beginning to take place there and the possibility, I might
say, of tremendous amounts of proliferation should this
arrangement, as it appears today, continue on.
I think all of us want to see a diplomatic solution. I do
not think there is anybody on this dais that wants to see
anything different from that. I think all of us have been
pretty stunned, on the other hand, at the terms of the interim
agreement and find it difficult for us to get to a good end
state.
Candidly, some of the conversations we have privately with
those involved in negotiations--some comments come out from
time to time like, well, we really want to get them hooked on
cash. In other words, we want them to see how well they can do
with sanctions being undone and their economy growing and want
relief even more so as to see this through.
So, look, again, I know we are at a critical period. I know
there was a hastily called bilateral meeting that just took
place. I have not had any readout as to whether it was
successful or not. But there is no question that United States
actions over the course of the last half a year, 9 months, have
greatly strengthened Iran's role in the world. You know, even
if we get a good deal, which I hope we do--that is the most
important element, is to make sure that their program is
dismantled, not mothballed. As they say, they can crank right
back up in 30 days and be right back in business based on what
they have been discussing with us today. I know all of us want
to see a dismantlement so that that cannot occur.
But I want to emphasize again what the chairman has
mentioned. Even if we make it through this successfully, which
I hope with every cell of my body we do, they are still going
to be a major state sponsor of terrorism. They are still going
to be supporting a brutal dictator in Syria, and they are going
to still be tremendous human rights violators.
So I thank you all for being here. I thank you for the
wisdom you share. I look forward to your comments and our
opportunity to follow up with questions. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Corker.
Today we have a single panel of well-regarded experts. We
are pleased to welcome Ambassador Dennis Ross, counselor and
William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy; Scott Modell, senior associate
and holder of the Burke Chair in Strategy at The Center for
Strategic and International Studies; and Dr. Frederick Kagan,
the Christopher DeMuth chair and director of the Critical
Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute. Thank you
all for being here.
Let me remind you that your full statements will be
included for the record, without objection. I would ask you to
try to summarize your statements in about 5 minutes or so, so
that we can enter into a dialogue with you.
And with that, Ambassador Ross, we will start with you.
STATEMENT OF HON. DENNIS ROSS, WILLIAM DAVIDSON DISTINGUISHED
FELLOW, COUNSELOR, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST
POLICY, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Ross. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure
to be back here again before the committee.
I will summarize what I submitted to the committee.
I do want to start by saying I agree with your basic points
on the essence of what a deal should be, and I do want to talk
for a second about the deal not because I want to get into it
but because I do not think right now the odds of reaching a
deal are very high. It does not mean that it will never be
achieved, but in the near term, I think it is not very likely.
I think what could make it likely is the Iranians seeing
that the price is very high. Right now, the Iranian perception
is that they do not have to roll back their program either
because they do not believe they have to or because they are
not prepared to. If we want to change that because they do, in
fact, seek a rollback of sanctions, if we want to change their
calculus, they have got to see that the failure of diplomacy is
much worse for them than it is for us. They have got to see
that the costs will go up dramatically for them not only
economically, but even the huge investment they have made in
their nuclear infrastructure could be lost if there is no
diplomacy because there could well be military action.
The irony is the more we convey that kind of resolve, we
make a deal more likely, but also the irony is the more we
reassure our regional partners. The essence of this hearing is
supposed to be about the implications of a deal, and the fact
is today, if there were a deal, it would cause great concern
among both our regional partners, meaning Arab partners but
also Israel, but for different reasons.
The Saudis, in particular--the Emiratis you mentioned you
have just seen them. They look at themselves as being engaged
in an existential struggle right now with Iran not because of
the nuclear issue. They view the nuclear issue as being an
instrument in what is an Iranian effort to gain regional
dominance.
From a Saudi perspective, what do they see in the region
right now? They see troubles in their eastern province. They
see Bahrain. They see Iraq. They see Syria. They see Lebanon.
They see Yemen. Everywhere they see an Iranian hand. And that
they view as an existential struggle. So if, in fact, there
were a deal, from their standpoint right now, the deal would
either provide a kind of license to the Iranians to do much
more, but would also provide them the wherewithal to do much
more. They would be out from under severe economic sanctions.
They would be freed of that. They view the deal itself as being
a function of our desire, an American desire, whether their
perception is right or not--and I think their perception, by
the way, is exaggerated, but their perception exists. And that
perception is basically our concern with the nuclear issue
trumps everything else.
Now, that is a view that is also shared by the Israelis,
but their point of departure is different. They view the
Iranian behavior in the region as a problem but one they can
deal with. They view the nuclear issue as an existential
threat. A deal from the Israeli standpoint would be fine if it
does not leave the Iranians as a threshold nuclear state where,
at a time of their own choosing, they could end up breaking
out.
So how to deal with these collective set of concerns that
exist about Iran but are not entirely motivated by the same
factors. I am going to suggest to you a few things that we
could be doing that would be appropriate for both sets of
concerns, on the one hand, but I will also offer a few tailored
ideas on the other.
What is the most important factor for us? We need to
demonstrate unmistakably that we are prepared to compete with
the Iranians. And I would identify two things we could do that
would have an impact on both our key Arab friends and the
Israelis. Syria. You mentioned Syria. The more we are seen as
being prepared to compete there, meaning we are prepared to
raise the price to the Iranians of what they are doing in
Syria. We are prepared to change the balance of power on the
ground, meaning not only between those in the opposition vis-a-
vis ISIS, who is obviously a source of concern, given what is
going on in Iraq now, but also vis-a-vis the regime in Syria,
Bashar al-Assad regime, where the Iranians are all in with
them.
Now, what does that mean in practical terms? It does not
mean boots on the ground. It does mean the United States being
prepared to quarterback the effort to provide meaningful
assistance, including lethal assistance, designed to affect the
balance of power on the ground. It means having the United
States work with everybody else who is providing assistance,
making sure that it is coordinated, it is complementary, it is
additive, and in fact, it goes and addresses the purpose that
we seek. That is one thing that we could do.
A second thing we could do is we could actively interdict
the Iranian and clandestine arms shipments around the region.
When the Israelis interdicted the Klos C shipment that was
going from Iran taking Iranian arms to Gaza, had we done that,
the impact on the region and the impact on the Iranians would
have been big. For those who feel that, gee, that might
threaten what we are doing with Iran, Iran does not seem to
have a problem negotiating with us on the nuclear issue and
being very active throughout the region at the same time. There
is absolutely no reason that we cannot do the same thing with
them.
And by the way, if what you are trying to do is to enhance
Rouhani's position, you do not enhance Rouhani's position by
showing that Qasem Soleimani is able to do things that do not
cost the Iranians. It is the IRGC al-Quds Brigade that is
active throughout the region, and we need to show that there is
a cost to the Iranians for doing this, not only showing them
that there is a cost to do something else, it would also have
the benefit of reassuring our friends in the region that we
mean what we say. We have resolve. We are not turning a blind
eye to what the Iranians are doing in the region to change the
regional balance of power. We are prepared to compete with
them.
I know my time is about up. So let me cite a few other
things we could be doing that is tailored more specifically to
each side, to what the Saudi concerns could be, as an example,
what the Israelis' concerns could be for an example.
I will give you just one example on the Saudis. There is a
series of things that we could do with the Saudis, the
Emiratis, and others, but just one thing that would make a big
difference with the Saudis and the Emiratis. How about doing
contingency planning? How about sitting down with them and
saying let us look at the array of threats that we see
throughout the region that are coming from the Iranians. We are
not just going to do an assessment of them. Let us do
contingency planning with you so that we could actually counter
them, be prepared for them, deal with them. The signal that
would send to each of them would be, I think, quite remarkable
at this point.
And again, one of the reasons you want to do this is it
gets at what both the chairman and Mr. Corker were saying. We
do not want them going off on their own and in a sense either
engaging in hedging strategies or doing other things where the
Saudis go ahead and they parade Chinese missiles. They are
doing that for a reason, and it is sending a message to us and
to others in the region. We want them to be more reassured
about us. So contingency planning with the Saudis and the
Emiratis I think would go a long way toward addressing concerns
that they have.
With the Israelis, I will give you two examples of things
that we could do.
If the big Israeli fear is that you have a deal that could
allow the Iranians to break out or to creep out, then one of
the things you have to do with the Israelis is to give them a
high level of assurance that we are very well focused on how
the Iranians could cheat, and more importantly, we are very
well focused on making sure there is a severe consequence for
cheating. We should be talking to the Israelis about
identifying where they could break out, where the Iranians
could break out or creep out if there is an agreement. We
should be focused on what the cheating could look like. We
should talk with the Israelis about what we are prepared to do,
realizing that if we can do it collectively, it is one thing
internationally, but being prepared to do things on our own if
that is not the case. And that is not just economically. It
might also have to involve the use of force under certain
circumstances.
The second thing we could do with the Israelis, because
they might still fear that for whatever reasons we might
constrain ourselves in the event of a violation, which after
all, if you look at the history of arms control agreements, it
is not exactly unusual for there to be violations of arms
control agreements--one of the things we could do with the
Israelis is make it clear to them that we would support what
they would do. We could have conversations with them, identify
categories of different kinds of violations of the agreement,
and the more extreme the violations, we could be prepared to
support what the Israelis' actions would be, and that could
even involve us providing the Israelis, in the event of an
agreement, certain forms of compensation that could include the
provision of capabilities that the Israelis themselves do not
have today that could be useful for them if they had to act
militarily. Sending that message not only to the Israelis but
others in the region, including the Iranians, I think again
ironically would reinforce the larger purpose of reaching an
agreement in the first place, but if we do reach that
agreement, then dealing with some of the concerns that you
raised in your opening statement.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Ross follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Dennis Ross
America's readiness to negotiate a deal with the Islamic Republic
on its nuclear program is a source of deep concern among our
traditional friends in the Middle East. For the Arabs, the fear is that
the deal will come at their expense, with the United States
increasingly seeing Iran as a partner. For the Israelis, the worry is
that we will conclude a deal that leaves the Iranians as a threshold
nuclear state--capable of breaking out to nuclear weapons at a time
when we might be distracted by another international crisis.
Both sets of fears presume that there will be a deal. While the
committee has asked us to discuss the regional implications of such a
deal, I should note at the outset that I still believe the prospects of
an agreement are probably less than the 50-percent figure President
Obama cited late last year. Basic conceptual gaps remain, with the
Iranians still believing that their limited offers of transparency
should be sufficient to satisfy our concerns about the peaceful
character of their nuclear program. Will the Supreme Leader, who has
talked about not dismantling their program, accept a serious reduction
in the numbers of their centrifuges? We will see, but at this point,
Ali Khamenei either is not prepared to roll back Iran's nuclear program
or doesn't believe he will have to do so in order to produce a serious
rollback in the sanctions regime. He does not appear to understand that
there can be no rollback in sanctions without a rollback and deep
reduction in the Iranian nuclear program--meaning Iranian centrifuges
must be dramatically reduced in number; much of the accumulated
enriched uranium must be shipped out of the country; Fordow must be
shut down or completely disabled; and the Arak heavy water plant must
be converted so it cannot produce plutonium.
The Iranian negotiators at this point have given no indication of
being able to accept such a rollback. And yet, if we are to concede
limited enrichment for the Iranians, rollback of this sort plus
transparency both beyond the Additional Protocol and about the possible
military dimensions of their program will be required. Even if
President Rouhani and Mohammad Javad Zarif, his foreign minister, are
ready to accept such a deal--and it is not clear that they are--can
they sell this to the Supreme Leader? Maybe, but I suspect that still
remains a long shot.
To be sure, if there is to be a deal, the Supreme Leader must see
the very high costs to the Islamic Republic of diplomacy failing. He
must be convinced that such failure will mean enduring, severe economic
pain for Iran as well as the high probability that force will be used
to destroy the huge investment the Islamic Republic has made in its
nuclear facilities. Ironically, that posture--which may make a deal
more likely--would also be useful for assuaging the deep concerns our
regional friends have about any possible P5+1 nuclear accord with the
Iranians.
Both the Israelis and our key Arab friends believe that we are
anxious for a nuclear deal, and they are not taking seriously the
administration's declarations that no deal would be better than a bad
deal. They see active Iranian efforts to change the balance of power in
the region and, fairly or not, little sign that we are prepared to
compete with the Iranians as they do so. That has led to a perception
among our regional friends that we attach such importance to a deal on
the Iranian nuclear program that we turn a blind eye to Iranian
behavior in the region.
The administration argument that it is simply separating the
nuclear issue from the other Iranian challenges in the area has not
altered the impression of many in the region that our concerns about
the Iranian nuclear program trump everything else. Here, it is worth
highlighting that the Israeli and Arab concerns are different when it
comes to Iran.
For the Israelis, their priority is the Iranian nuclear program.
That constitutes an existential threat. Iran and its proxies like
Hezbollah constitute a threat, but, in Israeli eyes, that is
manageable. Iran possessing nuclear weapons is not manageable or
containable. For the Saudis, Iran already represents an existential
threat even without nuclear weapons. The Saudis, Emiratis, and others
see an aggressive Iranian pursuit of regional hegemony. From a Saudi
standpoint, the Iranians are encircling them--seeking to gain dominance
in, and the ability to threaten them overtly and covertly from,
Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. The Iranian nuclear program
would add to the threat--perhaps making the Iranians less risk averse--
but it is not the source of the problem they see.
Talk of a possible reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran is
likely to mean little. They are competitors in every sense of the word.
It is not just Arab versus Persian, Sunni versus Shiite, or even
traditional balance of power concerns related to regional dominance. It
is all of these things, and it goes to the source of legitimacy for
each. The Islamic Republic challenges the legitimacy of any monarchy
and has pretensions to lead Muslims internationally. The Saudis see a
fundamental threat to their role in leading Sunnis and feel that Iran
challenges it religiously.
For the Saudis, an Iran with nuclear weapons requires a
countervailing response; such weapons would certainly add to the
dangers. But in the near term, the Saudis may fear even more an Iran
that is no longer being damaged by severe economic sanctions, no longer
isolated internationally, increasingly able to develop economically,
and with more means for troublemaking. As such, the Saudis, in
particular, may fear that a deal on the nuclear program will not only
signal a new American openness to Iran, but, even more, give the
Iranians license to be more aggressive in the region, and with the
economic wherewithal to do so. Words alone will not reassure the Saudis
in the aftermath of a deal. They will look for signs that a nuclear
deal is not going to transform our relationship with Iran--and that we
will be vigilant in countering Iran's threats in the area.
Unlike the Saudis, the measure for the Israelis is what kind of
deal is reached. The Saudis will be suspicious of any nuclear deal; for
the Israelis, it depends on the deal. A deal that precludes the
Iranians from being able to turn a civil nuclear program into a nuclear
weapons capability would be welcomed. Such a deal would remove an
existential threat to Israel. The problem for the Israelis is that the
deal that would make them most comfortable is probably not attainable
in the P5+1 negotiations; Israelis feel that Iran must be denied an
ongoing enrichment capability. While that would be for the best from a
strictly nonproliferation standpoint, it is probably not attainable--at
least that is the consensus of those members of the P5+1 negotiating
with the Iranians. The question for the Israelis becomes whether they
can be reassured enough about the scope of the rollback of the Iranian
program, the transparency measures designed to prevent cheating on the
rollback, and the credible consequences that would be imposed on the
Iranians if they cheated anyway.
What implications does this have for our approach toward our
regional friends if there is a deal? Since the Saudi and Israeli
concerns are different, our approaches to them should also differ in
some respects. That said, anything which suggests that the United
States will actively compete with the Iranians would be reassuring to
both. All of our friends want to see that we will not permit Iran to
become stronger in the region at their expense, that we will be there
for our friends if they face threats, and that we don't so fear
conflict with Iran that we will acquiesce to any of its behaviors.
In this regard, there are two steps we could take that would be
reassuring to Arabs and Israelis alike:
Demonstrate in Syria that our concern is about both the
growth of the jihadist presence in the country and the
prospects of Assad cementing his hold on power. The former
threatens all of us; the latter would signal a victory for Iran
and the demonstration that it succeeds when it uses its power
to alter the landscape in the region. We need to show that we
will not acquiesce to that outcome. This means not just
increasing lethal assistance to the pragmatic Syrian
opposition, but doing so with an eye toward changing the
balance of power on the ground, including between the
opposition and the regime. This means taking control of the
collective effort to support the opposition--through training,
material assistance, arming, etc.--in order to make sure that
everything that is being done to support the acceptable
opposition is coordinated and complementary.
Show that we will not allow the Iranians to ship arms
clandestinely around the region. This means interdicting
clandestine Iranian arms shipments. The Israelis interdicted
the Klos C ship carrying Iranian arms to Gaza, but we should
have done it. We don't have to announce what we are doing or
even take public credit for it; we just need to do it. The
Iranians and our friends will see it and understand that we are
competing and that the Iranians will pay a price for what they
are doing.
As for additional steps geared toward the specific concerns of
Arabs and Israelis, we might launch contingency planning with the
Saudis and Emiratis on how we would deal with particular Iranian
threats. This would show our seriousness and also put us in a position
to act when needed; if this meant different kinds of exercises with
each, the Iranians would also get the message.
With the Israelis, if there is a nuclear deal, we could discuss the
specific steps we would take if the Iranians cheat on a deal and how we
would impose consequences--even anticipating that there might be
reluctance on the part of others to hesitate in the face of violations
of the agreement. We might also compensate the Israelis if there is a
deal by providing more bunker-buster bombs and more tankers to make
them more capable of militarily acting on their own against the
Iranians in the face of cheating. This would reassure the Israelis that
even if we felt constrained to act militarily in the face of Iranian
violations of an agreement that made a breakout possible, Israel would
not be left without options.
conclusions
Our traditional friends in the Middle East are very suspicious
about Iran's aims in the region. Although the Obama administration has
tried to reassure the Saudis, Emiratis, and Israelis about our
commitments and our understanding of Iranian behavior, there are deep-
seated doubts about what we are actually prepared to do. While our
hesitancy on Syria may reflect understandable concerns about avoiding a
quagmire, the Iranians show no such hesitancy and have invested heavily
in ensuring the survival of the Assad regime. In a region where an
Iranian win is seen as a loss for our friends, the worries about us
have increased. It is through that lens that many of our regional
friends view a possible nuclear deal with Iran. The Israeli and Saudi
fears are different, but if we want to reassure our friends about such
a deal, we need to understand the source of their worries and take
steps that address them. That does not mean accepting fears that we
think are misplaced, but it does mean taking steps that can make us
more secure and also signal to the Iranians they will pay a price for
behaviors outside the nuclear area that we find unacceptable.
Ironically, that may make a deal itself more likely.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Modell.
STATEMENT OF SCOTT MODELL, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, BURKE CHAIR IN
STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Modell. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, thank
you for the opportunity.
I would like to talk a little bit about my background
before I get into my comments because it sort of colors what
observations I want to make today.
Prior to joining CSIS, I was in the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Director of Operations, did five tours overseas. On
my last tour, I oversaw Iranian operations there, Iranian
internal operations, and oversaw a lot of the global external
operations against the Iran threat network. So much of what I
am going to say today has to do with observations on the basis
of that experience that go into my thoughts on how the Iran
threat network has evolved over the last 5 years, and in the
aftermath of the nuclear deal, good or bad, how that Iran
threat network is going to continue to be a problem for us.
I would like to start with 2009 and the Green Movement. In
2009, as the Green Movement began to coalesce and the Supreme
Leader finally came around to understanding that it was a
problem--it was an existential threat for the Iranian
Government--they realized they had to dismantle it piece by
piece, and they cleared out Evin Prison and they decided that
they did not want to make the same mistake that the Shah had
made in the late 1970s. And it is exactly what they did. They
went and they dismantled it, and it had a profound effect on
the Iran threat network. The internal security apparatus got
better. The MOIS, the IRGC, the law enforcement forces, the
Basij, everybody came together in ways that they had not come
together before.
Fast forward to a year or so later when they were faced
with attacks on their nuclear facilities. The presence of
Stuxnet led to some unintended consequences, led to
strengthening of their nuclear facilities, their industrial
security, their cyber security, their ability to detect
personnel that were not deemed sufficiently wedded to the
revolution, and it sort of strengthened the internal security
apparatus, as well as their apparatus overseas, the Iran threat
network.
Fast forward to 2012 and 2013. The sanctions regime that
was put into place against Iran--when the United States and the
European Union initially went through with an oil embargo, the
Iranian Supreme Leader had come to the conclusion that the
price of oil was going to increase from about $100 a barrel to
$200 barrel and thought that it would be unsustainable for the
world. When that did not happen, he realized that they had to
come to the table and negotiate. So I agree with the comments
made by the chairman initially that the only reason that they
are negotiating right now is because there was a collapse of
the economy and that economic recovery was a must for them.
I think the fundamental strategic calculus of the Supreme
Leader remains the same. It is preservation of the regime at
home. And they have broader regional goals that they are going
to continue to push.
Now, as far as a nuclear deal, I think there is going to be
a nuclear deal. I do not think it is going to be a good deal. I
think it is going to go on. I think there are going to be
several phases to it. I think that it is going to be presented
as a fait accompli to the international community. It is
something we are going to have to accept and for several years
try to figure out what it is going to look like and how to
implement it. And I think, like Mr. Ross said, as it frees up
money for the Iranian Government, it is only going to embolden
the Iran threat network even further.
As far as solutions, one of the things I have seen in the
way that the U.S. Government is postured toward dealing with
the Iran threat network--I think there are a number of things
that we have already done that we can take advantage of
particularly on the law enforcement side. I think in the
presence of sanctions that are eased and the presence of
credible war options being taken off the table, I think there
needs to be more of a focus on law enforcement. I think that
the Department of the Treasury needs to start looking closer at
overseas financial operations. I think we need to start looking
at counterthreat facilitation which would be going after the
criminal networks that the Iran threat network has built up
over the last couple of years in order to evade sanctions. I
think that network is going to go on in the aftermath of a
nuclear agreement. And I think having a better understanding
about how Iran evades sanctions, their transportation networks,
their intelligence networks, the way they move men, money, and
material around
the world, that feeds right into the necessity of coming up
with a comprehensive compliance and verification mechanism,
which I think will be extremely difficult.
Like the chairman mentioned, we need at least two decades
of figuring out if Iran is going to be an honest nuclear
broker. For us to figure out just the military dimensions of
that program, it is going to take quite a bit of time. I think
figuring out how to use our law enforcement overseas to detect
cheating is something critical that we will have to continue to
focus on.
In the case of Treasury, for instance, the Department of
the Treasury has done a fantastic job over the years of
collecting information on individuals, groups, and entities
that are involved in the proliferation of sanctioned materials.
We need to do a better job of working with foreign liaison
partners to actually take advantage of that. There are a number
of things we could be doing government-wide to take advantage
of the information we have, and working with our allies to do
more against the Iran threat network.
As far as regional implications, as far as the GCC goes, I
tend to agree I think they are shocked at what has transpired.
And they are looking for answers and they are looking for
reassurance. But I would also say that I tend to think that the
bilateral security relationships between the United States and
our gulf allies is strong. It is very strong. I think that they
are beginning to contemplate things they had not contemplated
in the past. But, nevertheless, I think the lack of
alternatives for them, in terms of greater security
arrangements, is going to force them to continue to rely on the
United States.
I think we should be very cautious when we hear statements
from Saudi leaders and other gulf countries talking about the
formation of joint military commands and GCC-specific entities
that are trying to enhance interoperability and jointness. They
have been talking about that for a long time. I think they are
starting to talk about it again on the basis of perceived
weakness on our part. But I think there is enough reassurance
and I think there is enough long-standing faith in the
bilateral relationships we have in terms of security to keep
those relationships going.
I would argue that what is going on in Iraq is going to be
particularly troubling. Soleimani I think is going to see that
as an opportunity to actually do what he has not been able to
do over the last couple of years due to budgetary constraints.
New units are going come online. New proxies are going to be
more deeply funded, and I think you are going to see a much
more active Quds Force inside of Iraq.
I think the same thing with Syria. As well as they have
done in Syria in creating basically a nationwide Basij force
for the Syrians, I think that is going to go on. They are going
to look to make that permanent in Syria. I think the idea of
the Shia crescent--there is truth to that, and they are going
to continue to find ways to build on that.
As far as regional implications of sort of an embolden
Iran, I think when you look at their efforts further out in
places like Latin America and Africa, I would give it a mixed
review in terms of success. They have had a very difficult time
establishing a foothold in places like Latin America. They have
had to downsize recently because of budgetary constraints, but
nevertheless, they are pushing intel officers and military
attachees and new embassies into the region. They are doing
what they can. But again, there is not as much receptivity in
that part of the world as they would like. So I think they are
going to continue to focus on their part of the world.
So the regional implications of a nuclear deal and the
influx of cash will be, I think, a near-term sort of up-tick in
their operations within the Iran threat network.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Modell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Scott Modell
June 12, 2014 Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, members of
the committee, good afternoon and thank you for this opportunity to
testify on the regional implications of a nuclear agreement with Iran.
I will briefly describe the mind-set of Iran's Supreme Leader and the
Iran Threat Network, list some of the regional implications of a
nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 countries, and offer
recommendations for the administration and Congress on future efforts
to counter one of our most pressing national security challenges.
revolution, resistance, and the supreme leader
After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran set out to radically change
its posture toward all nations, especially the United States. For the
last 35 years it has kept its word, sponsoring terrorism, deceiving the
international community about its nuclear program, supporting violent
proxies against U.S. interests around the world, and above all,
building a multifaceted global apparatus--political, ideological,
religious, and criminal--to pursue a revolutionary agenda that
envisions a new balance of power in the world.
The Supreme Leader has consistently referred to ``resistance'' when
describing Iran's struggle with the West, similar to the way Americans
speak of freedom--as a nonnegotiable value and source of national
pride. The concept of resistance is critical for understanding why the
Supreme Leader continues to champion Iran's role as the leader of an
``Axis of Resistance'' and openly condemn U.S. values, character, and
foreign policy. It lies at the core of his strategic calculus and
drives the pursuit of two fundamental goals: preserving the regime at
home and promoting the revolution abroad.
Khamenei begrudgingly supports the P5+1 nuclear talks, skeptical
that the United States will follow through on the terms of any deal. He
recognizes, however, that a deal is necessary to ease the pressure of
economic sanctions and revive Iran's economy, but will not allow a deal
to become the gateway to U.S.-Iran rapprochement. As Foreign Minister
Zarif has stated, ``Iran is looking for common ground, not
friendship.''
The Supreme Leader's closest advisors, such as Deputy Chief of
Staff Asghar Mir-Hejazi, former IRGC commander and military advisor
Yahya Rahim Safavi, and Supreme Council for National Security Chairman
Ali Shamkhani have explained that severe budget cuts have had negative
impact on the ability of Iran to conduct overseas operations. This has
taken a particularly heavy toll on the IRGC Quds Force, which has the
largest role in Iran's external resistance mission.
the iran threat network
The Iran Threat Network is the global apparatus that Iran has used
for more than three decades to promote the goals of the Islamic
Revolution. It consists of a network of government and nongovernmental
organizations that are involved in crafting and implementing the covert
elements of Iran's foreign policy agenda, from terrorism, political,
economic, and social subversion; to illicit finance and weapons
trafficking; and nuclear procurement and proliferation. Iran relies
primarily on three organizations to coordinate and oversee the
activities of the Iran Threat Network:
The Quds Force, an elite branch of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps, responsible for irregular warfare and asymmetric
operations, including a wide range of subversive activities
from nonviolent cultural and business fronts to direct support
to political resistance organizations and violent opposition
groups.
The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) is Iran's
primary civilian intelligence agency. It has the lead role in
foreign intelligence collection and several covert action
programs, both at home and abroad. It works closely with all of
Iran's closest proxies in the region and second only to the
Quds Force in Iran's global efforts to export the Islamic
Revolution.
Lebanese Hezbollah has been Iran's strongest nonstate ally
since its inception in 1982. While Hezbollah's role in
projecting Iranian power has traditionally been tied to the
goals of fighting Israel and protecting Lebanon, it remains a
key element in fighting on the front lines in Syria, alongside
Quds Force advisors and trainers and Syrian army units.
The Iran Threat Network is Iran's ``whole-of-government'' approach
to preserving the regime at home and coordinating and promoting the
revolution internationally. Its actions encompass a remarkable array of
covert action, including covert influence operations, sanctions
evasion, terrorism, training and equipping Islamic militants, and other
so-called ``resistance activities.''
the regional implications of a nuclear deal
Weak or strong, comprehensive or limited, any deal will take
several years if not decades to implement. In many countries of the
region, the status quo will make way for a nuclear Iran. No countries,
rhetoric aside, supports preemptive strikes against Iranian nuclear
sites unless there is overwhelming evidence of further Iranian
deception. Iran will be under tremendous pressure to comply with a
comprehensive agreement, but has no apparent intention of slowing down
its drive to achieve broader regional goals, which often conflicts with
U.S. and allied security interests. If a deal is reached, there are
several implications to keep in mind:
First, an agreement will give a much-needed boost to the
Iranian economy. By most accounts, Iran stands to gain access
to nearly $100 billion frozen in foreign banks, as well as
billions more as oil export restrictions are lifted. At the
same time, several EU countries appear poised to return to
Iranian markets, adding billions of dollars more in potential
foreign direct investment and trade. All of this will provide
the leaders of the Iran Threat Network with the resources they
need to gradually return to previous levels of operational
activity. It means funding proxies that were either cut off or
cut back due to sanctions; reassessing the ongoing closure or
downsizing of Iranian embassies in nontraditional areas such as
Latin America; expanding joint military training and security
programs in Africa; and increasing funding for HAMAS, PIJ, and
the new Palestinian coalition government.
Second, several countries in the gulf should expect to see a
resumption of covert activity, including training, weapons, and
nonlethal support to local proxies, especially in Bahrain,
Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, where Iran has a history of
supporting Shia opposition movements. The GCC countries will
also have to confront the growing threats posed by Iran in the
area of Computer Network Exploitation operations. Iranian
hackers employed primarily by the MOIS target the computer
systems of U.S. and gulf personnel, companies, and government
facilities. Iran has treated past Stuxnet attacks on
centrifuges at Natanz as a declaration of cyber war, and is now
responding in kind.
Third, IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani will find
ways of increasing military support to the Assad regime.
Keeping Assad in power will remain a strategic priority, mainly
because it strengthens Iran's relationship with its most
important partner in the region, Lebanese Hezbollah, but also
because in Iran's eyes there is no alternative. Soleimani will
also be focused on countering the growth of Sunni extremism in
Iraq, which has reached levels of violence unseen since 2007.
He will probably offer to increase current initiatives that
arm, train, and fund new and existing pro-Iranian Shia
militants in Iraq. Soleimani has more say over what Iran does
in Syria and Iraq than President Rouhani, enjoying the full
support of the Supreme Leader. His number one priority will
remain building an arc of influence and power across the
Levant, often referred to as Iran's ``Shia crescent.''
Fourth, there are few signs that a nuclear Iran will
increase the chances of a near-term nuclear arms race in the
Middle East. U.S.-GCC bilateral security relationships have
evolved for more than 25 years. Any strategic shift away from
the United States would take years given the depth of the
commitments involved. GCC countries are rightfully more
concerned about Iran's attempts to exploit the very real issues
of religious extremism, demographic pressures, and other
internal sources of instability that each Gulf State is trying
to address on its own.
Fifth, Iran has gone to considerable lengths to create a
global shadow apparatus designed to evade sanctions. It enables
the Iranian Government to support Islamic movements and pro-
Iran militants around the world and spread the value of the
``resistance'' via cultural, social, economic, political, and
business entities and organizations. That apparatus goes hand
in hand with the asymmetrical nature of almost everything it
does. The international community needs to develop a better
understanding of this apparatus for several reasons, but
largely because it is directly linked to some of Iran's most
destabilizing activities.
Sixth, as long as a nuclear deal does not address Iran's
ballistic missile program, which appears to be the case given
outright rejection of the idea by the Supreme Leader, Iran will
continue to develop long-range ballistic missiles that can
strike any target in the GCC and add further to its arsenal of
short-range artillery rockets that can strike coastal areas
across the gulf. Iran will attempt to improve the accuracy of
its missiles and rockets, and pursue the indigenous production
of UCAVs, cruise missiles, and possibly even nuclear warheads.
the way forward
Even if sanctions and diplomacy lead to a nuclear agreement with
Iran, the activities of the Iran Threat Network will continue to pose
significant obstacles to Iran's diplomatic outreach to the gulf and the
West. In some cases, lethal support to Shia opposition groups across
the region also threatens both U.S. and international security. To
address these threats, policymakers should consider the following
recommendations:
Coordinate U.S. Efforts Against Networks. U.S. policymakers
should call for an interagency and international task force for
developing and deploying a comprehensive and global campaign
against the operational and strategic depth of the Iran Threat
Network. Such a task force would target the illicit networks
and operatives associated with the Iran Threat Network,
including its financial, business, and logistical support
networks. The goal should be a counter network disruption
campaign, modeled where appropriate, on previous successful
U.S. whole-of-government initiatives against defiant state
actors that combine overt and covert action, law enforcement,
sanctions, and containment.
Refine and Expand Soft War Initiatives. The Supreme Leader
repeatedly refers to the U.S.-led ``soft war'' as the single
biggest threat to the existence of the Islamic Republic. An
effective soft war should expose and neutralize the state and
nonstate actors involved in subversive activities that are
instrumental in marketing the Islamic Revolution overseas. At
the very least, this should include Quds Force, MOIS, and
Hezbollah operations and criminal activities. Of equal
importance are Iran's nonofficial cover organizations--
religious, cultural, and charitable--as well as businesses that
effectively blur the lines between overt and covert activity.
Focus Efforts on Transnational Organized Crime. In addition
to being one of the world's most formidable terrorist and
paramilitary organizations, Hezbollah has become involved in a
global criminal enterprise involving money laundering,
racketeering, and drug trafficking. Indicting Hezbollah as a
transnational criminal organization would dispel its image as
an elite and ``pure'' resistance organization. We should
approach and counter Hezbollah from the vantage point of
strategic law enforcement, financial sanctions, and even the
International Court of Criminal Justice (for its long record of
global terrorism, for its involvement in the assassination of a
democratically elected head of state, and possibly even for war
crimes being perpetrated in Syria).
Developing Nonmilitary Policy Options. At any given time,
dozens of U.S. Government agencies are pursuing the same
elements of the Iran Threat Network. To improve the way
multiple agencies work against the Iran Threat Network, the
government has to be better organized. In relatively new and
developing areas such as Counter Threat Finance, it would go a
long way to work from an agreed-upon ``financial order of
battle'' that maps key networks on a transnational scale (e.g.,
banks, exchange houses, front companies, trade-based money
laundering, shipping companies, etc.). In doing so, U.S.
Government agencies should draw assiduously on partner country
liaison services as part of a global effort to build a
coalition of like-minded states. An order of battle would
generate a series of nonmilitary or military-enabled policy
options that could serve as the basis of a strategic
intelligence and law enforcement campaign--not just a series of
strikes.
Focus on Counter Threat Facilitation. As long as Iran has an
agenda of creating new centers of power in the world and doing
so at the expense of the United States, it behooves us to
consider a law enforcement-led ``Counter Threat Facilitation''
initiative. Such an initiative should emphasize strategically
planned law enforcement operations to expose illicit networks,
arrest their perpetrators, freeze assets and attack the Iran
Threat Network's crime-terror pipelines though the
international trade and banking system. It could go a long way
in weakening the illicit financial networks around the world
that buttress Iran's strategic foundations, revolutionary
resolve, domestic staying power, and power projection
capabilities.
Create Offices of Irregular Warfare. As sanctions are eased,
the U.S. Government will need to find other ways of identifying
and disrupting Iran's involvement in nuclear proliferation,
terrorism, and other threats to international security. If
sanctions and military options make way for other policy
options, the U.S. will have a much more difficult time
identifying and countering many of the Iran Threat Network's
illicit activities, which tend to be irregular or asymmetric in
nature. Creating offices of irregular warfare in various
government agencies would go a long way toward exposing and
damaging the criminal foundations of the Iran Threat Network.
While irregular warfare is usually the domain of the military,
several operationally robust and aggressive nonkinetic
initiatives should be considered. In the area of Information
Operations, for example, covert influence authorities ``with
teeth'' are necessary to more effectively bolster Iranian
moderates in Iran and to undermine Iran's message to audiences
in Africa, Central Asia, and across the Middle East. In the
still developing area of Counter Threat Finance, the Treasury
Department should be put on a financial and economic warfare
footing, or better integrated with interagency partners who
possess the needed level of financial operational authorities
and capabilities. Treasury needs to be more involved in
financial operations, particularly overseas, where there are
significant gaps of understanding in the areas of international
banking and finance. Finally, the U.S. cannot do it alone. The
Iran Threat Network has grown increasingly transnational,
making it critical to have the support of foreign liaison
partners who have the ability to hit Iran's threat facilitation
networks (transport, shipping agents, freight forwarders,
warehouses, pilots, airlines, etc.). Properly incentivizing our
partners to conduct higher impact operations against the Iran
Threat Network depends on creativity, money, and persistence.
The Rewards for Justice Program, or a version thereof, should
offer payouts to exceptional foreign government officials or
units who successfully assist U.S. Government initiatives.
conclusion
A nuclear deal with Iran will bring in hundreds of billions of
dollars as Iran recoups frozen assets, exports more oil, takes in
foreign direct investment, enters into trade agreements, and starts to
shrug off its pariah status. Yet, the strategic calculus of the Supreme
Leader and much of the ruling conservative establishment is the same
today as it was when the Islamic Revolution began: preserving the
regime at home and deterring threats from abroad, while externalizing
the revolution and resistance. The Iran Threat Network, free of
budgetary constraints and emboldened as a newly minted nuclear power,
is the engine of the regime and will resume Iran's pursuit of broader
goals in the region. Look for a return to past levels of activity by
elements of the Iran Threat Network, including units of the Quds Force,
whose budgets have been cut back as a result of Iran's economic
downturn. This means more operations in Syria, where Iran will continue
to work closely with the Assad regime and Iran-trained, equipped, and
guided militant networks; further attempts to support Shia activism in
Bahrain, where Iran has attempted several times to create the
conditions for regime change; continued use of Iraq as a transit point
for illicit commerce coming from the gulf, and the movement of men,
money, and illicit materiel across the Levant; deeper support to
Hezbollah and the newly formed Palestinian coalition government; and
likely increases in training, weapons, and funding to the Houthi rebels
in Yemen and pariah states such as the Sudan.
GCC countries will continue to harbor deep suspicion, distrust, and
enmity toward Iran, well aware of Iran's unrelenting efforts to create
internal dissent and destabilization through support to local Shia
opposition movements. Still, they will refrain from pursuing their own
nuclear programs (other than the UAE) and continue to rely instead on
strong bilateral security partnerships with the United States. For its
part, Iran will push Hezbollah to do some of its more complicated
bidding in Arab countries, which Hezbollah sometimes agrees to, other
times not. Finally, the peaceful intentions of a nuclear Iran will take
decades to validate. Until that happens, expect more denial, deception,
and dissimulation from the Iran Threat Network.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Kagan.
STATEMENT OF DR. FREDERICK W. KAGAN, CHRISTOPHER DeMUTH CHAIR
AND DIRECTOR, CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Kagan. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member
Corker, I have rarely felt more superfluous as a witness since
I agree with virtually everything that the two previous
witnesses have said. I will do my best to try to add a little
bit to that, but I am afraid this is not going to be a very
confrontational hearing, at least in terms of the witnesses.
As I wrote this testimony, I was watching Iraq die. I was
reading the reports of the fall of Mosul to the Islamic State
of Iraq and
al-Sham, to the collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces in the
north, to the really complete collapse of the Iraqi Security
Forces not only in Ninewah province but also in Kirkuk and
wondering whether and where they may be able to stop the ISIS
advance, which is not at all clear at this point.
I note that ISIS has been simultaneously conducting
operations against its rival al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-
Nusra, in Syria where it continues to expand and to control
large amounts of territory. Sectarian conflict in the region is
continuing to expand and deepen, along with al-Qaeda safe
havens and capabilities.
You might ask what does this have to do with the topic of
today's hearing, and I would say that this has everything to do
with the topic of today's hearing. Iran is a belligerent in
this regional sectarian war, and its regional activities will
be shaped to a considerable degree by the approach it adopts in
this conflict. We can only reflect on the implications of a
possible nuclear weapons deal for the region in the context of
how the Iranians are going about, and will go about, pursuing
what they perceive to be their interests in the region.
The nuclear issue is at the core of America's thinking
about Iran with the exception of this committee, for which I am
very grateful. But it is at the periphery of Iran's strategic
calculus in many ways. The purpose of pursuing a nuclear
weapons program for Iran is to enable other activities in the
region. And so from the standpoint of what the Iranians will do
in the region, with or without a deal, we have to understand
that the nuclear program was never the central objective. It
was a means to an end.
I think the point that Ambassador Ross made about whether a
deal would constitute a fundamental change in the attitudes of
Iran toward the United States and the West is an important one.
I think we should reflect on the atmosphere of United States-
Soviet relationships during and after the SALT talks. We had a
brief period of detente during which the Soviets stopped none
of the activities that they had been engaged in against the
United States and its allies and around the world, and indeed,
the period of detente ended with the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan.
There is no reason--in fact, there is ample reason from the
history of arms control agreements to believe that arms control
agreements do not generally lead to peace and brotherhood and
kumbaya moments. They can occur in the midst of extremely tense
engagements as one side or both sides decide that it is not in
their interest to pursue a particular weapons path at this time
and prefer to take that problem off the table.
But even if we could imagine a total change in the
attitudes of the Islamic Republic toward us, which in my
opinion would require the death of Ayatollah Khamenei who is
absolutely never going to change his views on us, and his
replacement by someone who has fundamentally different views,
we would still have a problem. That would not actually bring
Iran into alignment with our interests in the region. And I
think we really have to understand this point.
I began this testimony talking about Iraq because Iran's
strategy in Iraq and Syria and Lebanon and Bahrain and Yemen
and throughout the region has shown the enormous damage the
Islamic Republic does by the methods that it uses to pursue its
aims. Iran does not fill vacuums. Iran creates vacuums on the
whole. Iran does not strengthen regional states. Iran
undermines regional states because its preferred methods are
through nonstate or substate proxies.
And it is interesting--not surprising, but interesting--to
see the way as Lebanese Hezbollah has come into the Lebanese
Government, it has, nevertheless, remained an independent force
that the Lebanese Government does not control, and the Iranians
have assisted it to do so. And in fact, it has engaged in a
unilateral invasion of Syria at Iranian behest, which the
Lebanese Government certainly did not approve of.
We have seen this in Iraq as well. Iranian efforts in Iraq
have consistently undermined efforts to form coherent
governance in Iraq even when you have had an Iraqi Shia Prime
Minister, although I have never been in the camp of thinking
that Malaki was an Iranian stooge.
They are pursuing a similar approach in Yemen. They have
co-opted to a considerable extent the quasi-Shia al-Houthis
movement in northwest Yemen. And some years ago, we began to
see for the first time al-Houthis running around chanting
``death to America'' and repeating Iranian slogans. And the al-
Houthis have now established a de facto state independent of
the government of Sana'a and are, in fact, working to extend
that state. But the Iranians did not support only the al-
Houthis. They are also supporting the Southern Mobility
Movement, the secessionist movement that is a Sunni movement in
southern Yemen. In other words, the Iranian strategy in Yemen,
which is, I would submit, in some respects more well thought
through than ours, is a strategy that is fundamentally aimed at
dismembering the Yemeni state.
All of this would seem odd because we imagine the Iranians
to be the enemies of al-Qaeda and threatened by al-Qaeda. And
they certainly are threatened by al-Qaeda. But it is
interesting that Iranian operatives in Syria have made no
effort that we can see to go after the Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham. And on the contrary, Assad's forces have been
largely cooperating with ISIS because ISIS has been taking the
fight to the Kurds and the Assad regime finds that of utility.
So the point is that it is not simply that the Iranians do
not like us. It is not simply that they are opposed to our
interests. We can discuss whether the regime is evil or not,
whether it matters or not, whether it is evil. What matters is
that this regime is entirely committed to a set of strategies
that revolve around a certain set of tools and approaches that
are absolutely destabilizing to the region and absolutely
fueling the sectarian regional war that is actually the most
important American national security threat that we are facing
because that regional sectarian war not only destroys any
prospect of stability in a critically important region, but it
is also the principal recruiting force for a global jihadi
movement that is now regularly drawing recruits from the United
States itself into these conflicts and most likely cycling them
back.
So anything that we do with Iran, deal or no deal, we must
develop a strategy, as Ambassador Ross suggested, to compete
with the Iranian means and methods and approaches in the Middle
East because we must be prepared to contest with Iran not for
control of the Middle East, not for Middle East hegemony, not
for ideology, but for stability. It is very important to us
that we have a peaceful and stable Middle East, and because the
word ``stability'' is misused here very frequently, let me say
I do not believe that stability flows from the gun of a
dictator. I believe that we actually have to have some kind of
representative state, some kind of inclusive government, some
kind of support from the population. But that is not what the
Iranians seek. So if we have any prospect of achieving our core
national security objectives in the region, whether we have a
nuclear deal or not, we must develop and execute a
comprehensive strategy to press our interests in stability and
contest the Iranian drive for instability in the region.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kagan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Frederick W. Kagan
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, members of the committee,
thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today. As I write
this testimony, I am reading reports of the fall of Mosul to the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the military maneuver of
ISIS forces toward Baghdad. The Iraqi Security Forces in Ninewah have
collapsed, and it is not clear where--or if--they will be able to stop
the ISIS advance. ISIS is simultaneously conducting offensive
operations against the rival al-Qaeda affiliate in eastern Syria, where
it continues to control and govern significant territory. Sectarian
conflict in the region continues to expand and deepen, along with al-
Qaeda safe havens and capabilities.
What does this have to do with the topic of today's hearing, you
might be wondering. The answer is: everything. Iran is a belligerent in
this regional sectarian war and its regional activities will be shaped
to a considerable degree by the approach it adopts to this conflict. We
can only reflect on the implications of a possible nuclear weapons deal
for the region in this context.
The national security policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is
designed to prevail in the war Tehran believes the United States and
Israel are waging against it. Supreme Leader Khamenei declared in March
that international sanctions on Iran became ``an all-out war'' against
Iran in 2011. He denied that sanctions have anything to do with Iran's
nuclear program: ``One day, their excuse is the nuclear issue and
another day, it is the issue of the enrichment. One day, it is human
rights and another day, it is other such issues. Sanctions existed
against us before the nuclear issue was brought up and they will
continue to exist . . . even if the nuclear issue and these
negotiations are resolved.'' He sees American enmity in everything:
``From the beginning the enemy has made extensive efforts, and the more
we advance, the clearer their work becomes. They use thousands of TV
networks, radio programs, and the Internet to curse the Islamic
Republic.'' He even blames us for al-Qaeda: ``Today Takfiri groups are
working against Islam and Shias in certain regions and carrying out
evil acts, but they are not the main enemies. The main enemy is the one
who provokes them and provides them with money.'' Even the supposedly
reformist Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani declared in 2010: ``Radical
Islamic groups such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban are the creatures of
the espionage service of the United States and the West.''
These are not isolated statements. The Iranian national security
leadership regularly repeats and expands on them. Tehran has evolved a
national security strategy around the concept of ``soft war'' that
seeks to defeat the supposedly subtle and complex efforts of the U.S.
and Israel to destroy Iran with everything from smart missiles to
Internet pornography. This strategy sees any American influence in the
Middle East as anathema and a mortal threat, and its goal is the
complete expulsion of the U.S., the destruction of Israel, and the
creation of a Persian hegemony. The Islamic Republic sees itself as the
revolutionary vanguard that will overturn the current immoral, unjust,
and infidel world-order in favor of its preferred religious-ideological
vision.
Iran seeks to be not merely a great-power rival to the U.S., but a
force to destroy the U.S.-dominated (from Tehran's perspective) world
system.
The nuclear issue is at the core of America's current policy
concern with Iran, but it is at the periphery of Iran's strategic
calculus. The rational explanation for Iran's pursuit of nuclear
weapons capability is the desire to be able to deter an American or
Israeli attack on Iran once and for all. That is a defensive objective
whose primary aim is to enable other operations to achieve Iran's goals
throughout the region. Iran's nuclear program is meant to be a
strategic enabler, not a strategy unto itself.
What would happen, then, if Iran actually abandoned that program?
The international sanctions regime would be unwound, large amounts of
money and human capital would flow into Iran, the regime would be able
to stabilize itself internally and would have enormously greater
resources with which to pursue its regional goals. A nuclear agreement
would advance the regional interests of the U.S. only if it led to a
fundamental change in the nature of Iran's attitudes toward and
relationship with the U.S. and its allies.
Such a shift seems most unlikely, however. The entire ideological
foundation of the current Iranian regime rests as much on anti-
Americanism as it does on anti-Zionism (without much distinction
between the two). One could imagine a nuclear deal in which Iran yields
almost all of its enrichment capability in exchange for full sanctions
relief, but the tone of the agreement would be like the tone of U.S.-
Russian relations after the signing of the SALT treaty in 1972. There
might well follow a period of detente, but there is no reason to
imagine a wholesale change in the fundamental thinking, strategy, and
approach of the Islamic Republic. The history of arms treaties amply
demonstrates the degree to which the spirit of cooperation in which
they are negotiated can be separated from an overall atmosphere of
hostility.
But even a total reversal of Tehran's attitudes toward the U.S.
would not be enough to bring Iran into alignment with U.S. interests in
the region. I began this testimony speaking about Iraq because Iran's
strategy there and in Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, and throughout
the region has shown the enormous damage the Islamic Republic does to
regional stability through the methods by which it pursues its aims.
Iran relies mainly on substate Shia militant groups combined with overt
bribes to individuals and regimes to shape the strategies and policies
of its neighbors.
Lebanese Hezbollah, its primary regional proxy, participates in the
Lebanese Government but maintains its own large armed force--which it
sent into Syria at Tehran's behest in support of Assad. Iranian
strategy in Lebanon has consistently sought to prevent the Lebanese
Government from gaining control over Hezbollah--and thereby over much
of southern Lebanon--even after Hezbollah became part of the
government.
Iranian strategy in Iraq has turned heavily on supporting and
sustaining multiple competing Shia militia groups, political factions,
and suborned individuals. This strategy has consistently hindered
efforts to form a coherent Iraqi state. The militias themselves became
a major driver of sectarian conflict from shortly after the U.S.
invasion, in fact, and are responsible in no small way for the regional
sectarian war we now face.
Tehran has pursued a similar approach in Yemen, coopting the quasi-
Shia al-Houthis in the northwest, training, arming, and funding them as
they have established a de facto independent ministate between Yemen
and Saudi Arabia. Iran simultaneously has been providing assistance to
Sunni separatists in southern Yemen, contributing to the collapse of
that state.
And Iranian strategy in Syria has been to back Assad in the conduct
of a sectarian bloodletting of remarkable viciousness. That viciousness
has powerfully fueled the regional sectarian war and become a magnet,
rallying cry, and now training and logistical base for Sunni extremists
from around the world.
It is not just that the Islamic Republic is anti-American. The
Islamic Republic is a polarizing sectarian force whose main methods of
pursuing its goals destroy order, stability, and politics. It will seek
to manage the escalating crisis through these methods and will instead
make it worse. A nuclear deal will only give Tehran more resources with
which to pursue its mistaken and misshapen strategy.
A nuclear agreement that verifiably eliminated Iran's ability to
acquire nuclear weapons capability would of course be desirable,
although I do not believe that it is achievable. Certainly Tehran has
not put anything on the table thus far that comes even close to meeting
this standard. The Iranian penchant for pursuing secret nuclear and
weaponization programs and admitting to them only after the U.S. finds
them does not bode well for full transparency, particularly considering
the Iranian conviction that the International Atomic Energy Agency is
an espionage network for the West. There is also the question of how to
ensure continued Iranian adherence to any agreement in the absence of
sanctions. Sanctions have been absolutely essential in bringing the
Supreme Leader to the negotiating table at all. Once lifted, they will
not be easily or quickly restored. Without the credible threat of the
rapid restoration of crippling sanctions, pressure on Tehran to abide
by any agreement will be considerably less than the pressure that has
been required to bring Iran to the table. Even a deal could only work,
then, if the Iranians really undergo a fundamental change of heart on
the nuclear issue--something for which there is no evidence whatever to
suggest.
Any deal comes with the risk of miscalculation and betrayal--the
risk that Iran might after all retain the ability to field a nuclear
arsenal. We are all focused on that risk. But a deal would also come
with another risk--the risk that the U.S. would persuade itself that
solving one problem solves all. In this case, on the contrary, solving
one problem may very well make others a lot worse. But deal or no deal,
the U.S. can only hope to advance (or defend) its interests in the
Middle East through our own active engagement. Perhaps we must now
speak of reengagement after the determined retreats of the past 5
years.
This is not a brief for military regime change in Iran, for
reinvading Iraq, or for any specific policy. It is certainly not an
argument for pursuing purely military responses to regional problems
and the Iranian threat. We must instead use the moment of reflection
afforded by this hearing to consider how to develop a strategy that
competes with Iran while fighting al-Qaeda--all the while avoiding the
trap of imagining that the one can be an effective ally against the
other.
The basic outlines of such a strategy are clear. The urgency of the
situations in Iraq and Syria demands active American involvement in
those conflicts, not necessarily through the deployment of U.S. combat
troops, but certainly through the deployment of advisers, support
elements, enablers (including air power), and intelligence to assist
the majorities in both countries who seek to reject both al-Qaeda and
Iranian domination. Hezbollah's invasion of Syria has exacerbated rifts
within Lebanon and opened the possibility of driving a wedge between
Hezbollah and other parts of Lebanese society. Aggressive diplomacy and
well-targeted assistance could help weaken Hezbollah's control over its
vital base, forcing it to refocus on Lebanon and away from supporting
Assad. The U.S. must also work seriously--and not through speeches--to
regain the confidence of our Arab allies, particularly Saudi Arabia and
Turkey. America's retreat from the region has increased the costs of
implementing such a strategy, but we must keep in mind that things are
not going terribly well for Iran either, despite the current euphoria
in Tehran. A strategy that combines continued sanctions with meaningful
efforts to displace and disrupt Iran's proxies and Iran's strategies in
the region is essential to creating any prospect of long-term change in
Tehran's attitudes and of regional stability.
I thank the committee for raising this important issue and for the
opportunity to present my views.
The Chairman. Thank you all.
A lot to cover here. Let me say I see the GCC and others
increasingly warming up to Iran. Last month, Saudi Arabia
extended an invitation to Foreign Minister Zarif. Last week,
the Emir of Kuwait made an official visit to Iran. It seems
that President Rouhani may have been invited to the Egyptian
President's inauguration ceremony. These are just a few
examples, but it seems that Iran's international and regional
isolation may be quickly melting away as the anticipation of a
deal accelerates.
What is motivating the culf leaders to engage Iran,
especially after listening to your description, Ambassador
Ross, about their concerns, which while the nuclear deal is
something that is really a concern about their regional
designs, in terms of engaging the Iranians? Is this hedging?
And if so, what does that stem from?
Ambassador Ross. First, I think we probably have to
distinguish between some of the different actors in the region
on the Arab side.
The Saudi willingness to at least invite Zarif to come--by
the way, he has not come yet. I would read that through a very
careful lens. They may be prepared to talk to him, but I do not
see any sign that the Saudis are about to somehow change their
behavior toward the Iranians. Having a conversation with Zarif
might be designed to sort of, A, impose a set of principles
that if the Iranians want to see any improvement with the
Saudis, this is what the Saudis require. And there is a lot of
indication that is kind of what the message has been. Or, B, it
could just be to see if there is any information they can
acquire out of this kind of an exchange. But I do not see the
Saudis at this point, certainly not with this King who is very
clear on his view of the Iranians--I do not see a change there.
In the case of Kuwait, historically the Kuwaitis had a
different kind of relationship with the Iranians. They tried to
be somewhat more in between, and they view the Iranians as a
potential threat. They lined up more with the Saudis and the
Emiratis in terms of their attitudes in the past year when they
uncovered what was a plot within Kuwait. But I suspect right
now the more traditional instinct to at least hedge bets or at
least try to minimize--give the Iranians a reason to reduce
reasons for hostility--I think that probably accounts for it.
In the case of Egypt, look, Egypt's focus is much more
internal than anything else. They are not going to do anything
with Iran that would upset the Saudis. The Saudis are their
principal bankers right now. That is their main focus. I think
inviting the Iranians to the inauguration is more a sign of
trying to demonstrate a broad participation with regard to that
event.
If you are talking about Oman, Oman has always had a
different relationship with Iran.
Qatar also has always tried to hedge its bets.
The Chairman. You do not see a hedging of bets?
Ambassador Ross. Not right now, not by the Saudis.
The Chairman. So in this context, there are voices that I
consistently hear, some in the Congress, others from beyond the
Congress, who suggest that striking the nuclear deal with Iran
is opening the doors to a much wider set of possibilities. As I
listened to your collective testimony, it seems to me it does
not open the door to a much wider set of possibilities of
engaging Iran in a way in which they will change, particularly
the asymmetric effort that they have within the region and
beyond but will actually fuel the possibility for them to
pursue a course of action that they already determined is in
their interest. Is that a fair statement?
Ambassador Ross. Certainly the way I read it. What I was
trying to get at was it may well be that Rouhani and Zarif
represent a constituency within Iran that would like to end
Iran's isolation, would like to normalize relations, see that
the best way to support the future of the Islamic Republic is,
in fact, to have a greater normalization. Now, obviously, the
Supreme Leader I think operates on a different premise. Somehow
he was persuaded to give Rouhani a license to negotiate because
the costs of isolation, the costs of the sanctions was seen as
potentially threatening the Islamic Republic itself.
But for him, he views us through a lens of hostility. He
allows the IRGC al-Quds Forces to be their action arm
throughout the rest of the region. There is no indication that
Rouhani or Zarif have any impact on what the Iranians are doing
throughout the rest of the region. And that was what I was
trying to suggest. If you want to try to see a constituency
that seems more pragmatic to have greater authority and somehow
greater empowerment, the way to do that is to show the high
costs of the behaviors that are unacceptable throughout the
rest of the region.
And I would also say, also the only way he is going to be
able to sell the Supreme Leader on the kind of deal that is
required, by the way, outlines of which I completely agree with
what you presented--that is what is required for us to have a
deal. The reason I say I do not think a deal is likely--Scott
thinks a deal may happen. Here I would say I am more dubious. I
am not saying it will not happen, but it is not going to happen
unless there is an understanding that they get no relief on
sanctions. They get no economic benefit unless, in fact, they
roll back their program. Their approach to the negotiations
right now is we will do some semblance of transparency and we
should be able to add to the rest of the program. I do not
believe there will be a deal under those circumstances.
The Chairman. Let me ask you all this, and I would like to
have your opinion. Former CIA Director General David Petraeus
said in an op-ed published in the Washington Post--and I
quote--``rather than freeing Washington to reduce the U.S.
footprint in the Middle East and focus elsewhere, a nuclear
agreement with Tehran is likely to compel us to deepen our
military, diplomatic, and intelligence presence in the region
in order to help partners there balance against increasing
Iranian power. A variety of steps should be pursued to this
end: approval of additional military capability sought by Arab
partners and Israel, a renewed initiative to integrate the Gulf
Cooperation Council countries' air and ballistic missile
defenses, maritime and air exercises to demonstrate U.S. and
partner capabilities in the region, and sustaining, if not
augmenting, existing infrastructure and force posture there.''
That is a pretty significant universe of things. How do you
all feel about that? Dr. Kagan, let us start with you.
Dr. Kagan. I am in violent agreement with that. A nuclear
deal that lifts sanctions to any considerable extent will
result in a flood of money resources, intellectual property,
human capital, and other things into Iran. There are companies
and countries around the world champing at the bit to get into
a potentially massive and extremely lucrative market. That will
flood the coffers of the state. We know that it will also flood
the coffers of the IRGC.
It has been interesting to observe the behavior of the IRGC
leaders and their statements as these negotiations have
proceeded. Initially they were very cold, very cautious, very
suspicious, and very hostile. Now they are very supportive.
They are constantly underlining their support for Rouhani and
for what he is doing, and they are very clearly on board. And
it is the behavior more of people who believe that they are
really going to get something out of this than people who have
been simply told by the Supreme Leader to get in line.
So I think the assessment that the Iranian threat in the
region will grow enormously is absolutely spot-on because I
think Ambassador Ross has really hit it. I am not as sure that
in strengthening Rouhani per se is going to achieve our
interests. I am very confident that until and unless the
strategy that Qasem Soleimani has been pursuing is shown to be
bad for Iran and bad for the Supreme Leader in some way, the
Iranians will continue to double down on that strategy.
The Chairman. Mr. Modell, do you have any views?
Mr. Modell. I would tend to agree. I think that with the
influx of cash that comes as a result of a deal--and first of
all, I would like to clarify that. I think the world will be
presented with a deal. I do not know how good the deal is going
to be because every indication I have is that Iran does not
have any true intentions of actually honoring its obligation--
that has been very clear since the November agreement--to
actually come clean on the military dimensions of its program
which, as far as we know, in the latest IAEA Board of Governors
report, at the present time they are not actually implementing
the additional protocol and they have not answered a lot of the
fundamental questions about the military dimensions of the
program, the most troubling aspects of the program. So whatever
that deal is, we have a very, very long way to go before we can
actually call it a comprehensive deal.
But to the extent that Petraeus pointed out that there is
going to be an enhanced focus on the Middle East, I could not
agree more because the necessity of coming up with a
comprehensive verification and compliance regime is going to
demand even greater focus on all of the things that Iran does
to evade sanctions. And a lot of those mechanisms are in the
region. A lot of the ways in which they would potentially cheat
on any type of a nuclear deal, which I believe is very likely--
they basically obligate us to actually sort of double up our
resources in figuring out what they are doing.
As far as going back to the GCC issue, I want to make one
comment. I very much agree. I think behind the charm offensive,
I think when you talk to the Saudis and you talk to the
Kuwaitis and others, I think they see through it. I think there
is too much scar tissue over the last 30 years for them to
simply embrace Iran. I think the existence of Hezbollah of the
Hejaz years ago, which was used by Iran to attack targets in
Saudi, other Hezbollah entities that were backed by Iran that
are well known in the gulf left them with a very permanent,
lasting impression that Iran has broader regional roles that
are contrary to their own. And they are going to continue to
focus on their internal security, and they will keep Iran at
bay, to the extent they can. So I agree with the idea that
there is going to have to be a greater focus on the Middle
East, and there is going to be no pivot away from it.
Ambassador Ross. I support what Petraeus was suggesting.
The only difference I would have is I would not wait until
after the deal. I would do it now. I would try to do each of
those things now. And I think, again, it makes a deal more
likely.
The Chairman. Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I do want to say to the witnesses a great compliment as
the chairman let each of you go over about 3 minutes in your
testimony. And that just speaks to the importance we place on
each of you. So thank you so much for being here.
Mr. Ross, I know you have read the quote recently from the
Supreme Leader of Iran saying today launching a military attack
is not a priority from the viewpoint of Americans. They
understand that they suffered a loss on the issue of Iraq and
Afghanistan where they launched military attacks. There it can
be said that they have changed their mind about launching a
military attack.
I am just curious as to how important that statement, that
thinking process is relative to the negotiations that are
underway.
Ambassador Ross. I think it is fundamental. I think the
Supreme Leader has got to believe that the price of the failure
of diplomacy is simply unacceptable from his standpoint, and I
think the extent to which he believes that when we say all
options are on the table, he believes that they are not--that
is what his statement means--I think it makes the prospect of
diplomacy succeeding less than it would be otherwise.
Senator Corker. And does anybody dissent?
Dr. Kagan. No. I would go even further than that and say
that what we are seeing, as we observe the statements of the
Iranian military command, is a sense of triumphalism in Tehran
that is remarkable. They really do appear to believe that they
have defeated us in a very fundamental way, and that the
nuclear deal will cement that defeat. So very far from feeling
as if they are in a position of weakness and must concede
things. I think the talks are most likely to fail in many
respects because the Iranians think that they do not have to
give us anything because they think they have already won.
Senator Corker. While you have got the mike, your comment
about the strategy that Iran is displaying in the region of
dismembering, of destabilizing--one of the things I did not
pick up in that discussion was toward what end. In other words,
the role they are playing is very evident, but from their
perspective, that is toward what end in the region?
Dr. Kagan. It is toward the larger objective of Iranian
regional hegemony and the establishment of a Shia crescent and
the overthrow of states and peoples that they think have been
unjustly ruling in areas of concern to themselves and to the
establishment of solid proxies for themselves. And since they
have not historically been able to make states proxies for a
variety of reasons, they have become accustomed to working
through certain kinds of proxies, in addition to which I would
say that I think although the Iranians have a general
destination in mind, a general vision of what they would like
the region to look like, I am not persuaded that they have a
very specific vision. And I am not persuaded that they are
driving toward very particular end states in any of the
countries that they are actually supporting. They are driving
in a direction, and the direction is greater Iranian influence,
driving the United States out of the region, isolating Israel,
and empowering people who will pursue the ideology of the
Islamic Republic and, more importantly, the interests of the
Islamic Republic.
Senator Corker. So, therefore, controlling the region but
not necessarily through statehood but just through proxies and
gaining strength in that way.
Dr. Kagan. I think, obviously, they preferred the situation
when Assad was governing Syria. The situation that they now
have in Syria is much worse for them than it was before. But it
does not seem to be that much of a priority for them, honestly,
to build up the capacity of states as long as they can maintain
the effective capacity of nonstate proxies.
Senator Corker. Does anybody disagree with that thesis?
[No response.]
Mr. Modell. If you would not mind, I would like to make a
comment just on the mind-set of the Supreme Leader very
quickly.
One of the things that has been mentioned here is that
there is doubt as to whether or not the Supreme Leader thinks
that any nuclear deal, good or bad, is going to lead to a
greater rapprochement with the United States and the West.
Based on everything that I have been reading lately on the
Iranian side in the Iranian press, including the comments that
were just mentioned, I think one of his redlines, if you had to
actually define it, is exactly that. He does not believe that
any type of agreement--it may lead to the revival of the
Iranian economy, but the resumption of diplomatic relations
with the United States at this point is definitely a redline.
And I do not think that he would go there.
There has been mention of Soleimani and his influence
particularly with the Supreme Leader. When you look at the way
that Iran has carried out its foreign policy in the Levant and
Iraq, Soleimani has had a great deal of control. And Rouhani
came into office knowing that to actually come in and try to
take away influence from Soleimani in the area of foreign
policy in the immediate region--I think he realized that was
unrealistic. And I think to date you are seeing Soleimani still
really calling the shots when it comes to what Iran does and
what Iran is planning to do in that part of the world. And I do
not think you are going to see a change on that.
Ambassador Ross. I will just comment briefly on what Dr.
Kagan said. I generally agree with him. When the Supreme Leader
now takes a look at what is happening in Iraq, that is not a
good thing. Their preoccupation with Iraq is something that is
understandable. They fought a war for 8\1/2\ years. And with
ISIS establishing itself and moving toward Baghdad, this is a
challenge. This is a threat. So dismembering of states is a
lever they have. It is a tool they have. I agree with what you
said, that having someone like Assad in control of Syria where
you are not consuming lots of resources, where you are not
having to expend a lot of these proxies that you develop, they
were using Hezbollah, Qutb Hezbollah, within Syria. Now they
are going to have to mobilize all these Shia groups again and
militias back in Iraq. So that is not a great scenario for
them.
Senator Corker. So let me flip it around. So you have laid
out what you think Iran's thesis is, what their strategy is,
what their objective is. If you look at U.S. policy, what is
its objective? I mean, if you look at what happened in Syria,
we basically have purposely strengthened Assad by focusing on
chemical weapons. I have said this many times. The wisest thing
he did for his own sustainability was to kill 1,200 people with
chemical weapons, and that is all the administration now talks
about is that. And yet, he has just been reelected, quote,
quote, quote, to another term.
In Iraq, you see what is happening. There is a guy named
George Friedman who wrote a book that was the rage for a while
talking about the next decade and how the United States really
should cozy up with Iran. Is that really where we should be? I
mean, if you look at the administration's policies--I mean,
one, two, three, four--it would seem that that is the direction
they are taking.
Do you think that is something that is purposeful? Do you
think this is by accident? What is the United States policy
today relative to Iran?
Ambassador Ross. Well, the way I would read the
administration's policy is to focus on the nuclear issue first,
to prevent the Iranians from being in a position where having
civil nuclear power can be converted into a nuclear weapon. I
think that is a genuine objective. I think that is what the
administration is pursuing through negotiations.
I think it is prepared to work with our friends in the
region to counter what the Iranians are doing throughout the
rest of the region. Obviously, at this point, the way the
regional actors see it is that they do not have a high level of
confidence that we are prepared to be active enough to counter
the Iranians because they believe that our priority of the
nuclear objective is so great that everything else is
secondary. That is one of the reasons I said I would like to
see us--some of the things I even suggested that we should be
doing in the aftermath of an agreement I am actually suggesting
we should be doing now because, A, it sends a message to our
friends we are not prepared to sit back and acquiesce in seeing
the landscape and the region change fundamentally against the
interests of our friends shifting in favor of the Iranians. I
think that would do wonders for our friends. But I think, as I
said before, it would actually do wonders to actually reach an
agreement.
I do think the Supreme Leader makes a calculus about
whether something is a threat to the well-being of the Islamic
Republic. I do not think it is an accident that Rouhani was
allowed to win the election. I use the words ``allowed to win
the election'' quite deliberately. The Supreme Leader decided
that the costs were too high of staying on the path they were
on. So if you want to reach an agreement, it has to be clear
that the costs are very high if you do not reach an agreement.
And I think the more the administration can communicate that,
they will do better not only in terms of their objective on the
nuclear issue, but they will do better on their objective in
the rest of the region as well.
Senator Corker. If you could briefly respond, Dr. Kagan, I
would appreciate it. I know my time is way up.
Dr. Kagan. Senator, what I would say is that what the
administration is actually doing in the region has had the
effect generally of putting us on the side of Iran in the
region rather than on the side of other potential partners. I
have no idea whether that is deliberate, and I am reluctant to
think that it is. I think it is a corollary of policies that
are really focused on not being involved in the region and on
seeing al-Qaeda as the principal threat in the region, which it
is, and on seeing Iranian proxies as, in many respects, our
best bet for containing the al-Qaeda threat without United
States involvement, which I believe is a very bad
miscalculation.
Senator Corker. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do thank all three of our witnesses. I have found this
discussion to be very, very helpful.
Obviously, the best outcome would be for an agreement to be
reached that accomplishes what the chairman spelled out--an
agreement that eliminates a breakout capacity for Iran in a
short period of time and that ensures it will not be a nuclear
weapons state. Listening to your testimonies, none of the three
of you believe that that is likely to occur within the
timeframe set out for this agreement.
And it seems to me that the United States can influence one
of two outcomes at the end of July. One could be that we have
not achieved the objective of preventing Iran from breaking out
to a nuclear capacity, and we certainly do not have the
transparency that was needed. And therefore, we should work
with our international partners to continue and to expand the
sanctions that are imposed against Iran because of their
violations of their international commitments. We must try to
keep those sanctions as strong as possible, looking for a new
day and a new opportunity to advance our objectives of
preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state.
Or the second option could be, well, we have a framework.
Let us build on it. Let us make sure that we have transparency
to prevent Iran from continuing its nuclear program. Let us try
to make incremental progress in getting them to weaken their
capacity as a nuclear weapons state, and let us try to keep the
sanctions as tight as we can during that period of time,
recognizing there may be some concessions that have to be made
as progress is made.
It seems to me they are the two paths that we could go
down. And it does seem to me that the United States is the
driver as to which of those two courses we take since we are
the dominant player in these negotiations.
I think I know your answers, but I would like to get on the
record what you think is in the best interest of the United
States. Which of those two courses would be in our best
interest?
Dr. Kagan. Well, let us go from junior to senior.
I think what Ambassador Ross has outlined is the right
course of action, which is we should yield as little as
possible in advance of the continuation of the negotiations and
throughout the negotiations. We need to make it very clear that
there is an enormous amount of pain for Iran if it does not
come through with an agreement of the sort that is required and
we all agree on what that is here.
Senator Cardin. I hear you. I understand that, and I agree
with that.
My point is we are going to reach a point where we will
either do, as Mr. Modell suggested, announce that there is some
interim agreement--it will not be a complete agreement, as Mr.
Modell is expressing. But the United States could influence a
judgment to say that is not adequate and therefore we should go
back to where we were prior to the beginning of this year and
get the international coalition, again recognizing that Iran is
not serious about it.
What course do you think is in the best interest for the
United States? To continue along the path of holding Iran--I
think we are able to do this--to not advancing with
transparency and negotiating the process. But the cost of that
would be to give in on
some of the sanctions. Or are we better off saying no, this is
not working?
Dr. Kagan. Okay. Senator, I will give you the direct answer
to that. I apologize. Anyone who has purchased a rug in a
Middle Eastern or, as I have, in an Afghan market knows that
you have to be prepared to walk away from the table. You have
to be prepared to walk out of the shop if the deal is not going
toward what you need it to go to. And the worst thing that we
can do is make it clear to the Iranians that we want a deal so
badly that we will continue to dole out concessions, even as
they are not meeting our terms, in the hopes that they will
ultimately come to where we want them to be. So I would say at
a certain point, if it is clear that they are not going to get
there now, we should walk away, and walking away means bringing
back as harsh a sanctions regime as we can.
Mr. Modell. Senator, I would tend to agree. I think even
though we are going to be presented with some sort of a deal
that is going to take years to verify and confirm if it is
real, I would say in the runup to that, we ought to give very
serious consideration about making sure that--I agree with what
Fred says. We should be willing to say no because I think there
are simply too many indications----
Senator Cardin. Do you disagree with me that the United
States is sort of in the driver's seat here from the point of
view of whether we are presented with some sort of a deal or
saying we have not made enough progress, we are back in square
one?
Mr. Modell. The perception on the Iranian side is that we
are not in the driver's seat. If you take at face value
everything that they Iranian leaders are saying--and we are
talking about the conservative hardliners--they are saying that
the Obama administration is more desperate for a deal than Iran
is. So I think that they are hoping for an easing of sanctions,
and I think they are looking to enter into, quite frankly, a
10- or 20-year process that will allow them to replenish their
funds and get the Iran threat network back and get their
economy going. And if they do truly have intentions of
cheating, they will have plenty of time to do it. So, again, I
think there are simply too many unresolved concerns for us to
go forward.
Senator Cardin. I certainly have questions. I am going to
give Ambassador Ross a chance.
I think the administration has been clear, though, what an
agreement must look like. We have had several discussions about
that. So I am not sure I want to identify myself with your view
that the administration has already made that judgment. I am
not sure they have. And I think that the United States can
direct what path we take at the end of July.
Mr. Modell. No, I agree. I just think there is a difference
in perceptions right now.
Senator Cardin. That is an important point.
Mr. Modell. There is wishful thinking on the Iranian side
that they can actually get to a point where they will have a
little bit more flexibility.
Senator Cardin. Ambassador Ross.
Ambassador Ross. I do agree with that. I think the Iranians
right now think they can get what they want without having to
do what is necessary, and I think they are dead wrong. They
will not. I do not think the administration is prepared to
accept anything. I do think we are not going to get a deal by
July 20.
The real question you are asking is do we say, all right,
stop it now and go back to the way it was prior to the joint
plan of action or do we do what is built already into the joint
plan of action, which is by mutual agreement, you can extend it
another 6 months. It is clear that the other members of the 5+1
will say let us extend it for the remaining 6 months. I think
it will be difficult for the administration under those
circumstances to say we are going to cut it off and walk away
when the other members want to proceed and when our greatest
effectiveness, at least with the sanctions, is when everyone is
prepared to continue to implement those sanctions.
Having said that, it is not going to be a given. This will
not be a simple negotiation simply to extend because we will
say to the Iranians, all right, look. You had to roll back your
20 percent and you have done that. We need to see some other
rollback. For example, we need to see some rollback of your 3.5
percent. And the Iranians will say, well, we are not going to
do that unless we get something. So it is not a given that you
are going to be able to extend this because this itself is
going to involve a negotiation.
Right now, our focus is not on that plan B. Our focus is on
trying to get a deal by July 20. I just think where the
Iranians are is so far from where they need to be, unless this
is just purely posturing, unless they are holding out until the
last second and suddenly they are going to concede, but I doubt
that. That is not the way I think they operate. So I think it
is not going to be so simple to produce even the alternative
that you are talking about, extending it for another 6 months.
We are going to come to a point if there is no deal by the
end of the year, then what do we do. And then I would say we do
have to be prepared to walk away. I think we have to show the
Iranians we are not so anxious for a deal. The deal we are
prepared to accept is one that already involves a major
concession to them. The major concession is that they will be
allowed to enrich in a limited way. That is a big concession to
them. And the price for that has to be that they go along with
a very substantial rollback of the numbers of centrifuges, a
ship-out of almost all of the enriched uranium material they
have in country, a shutdown of Fordow, and Arak being converted
into a light water reactor with then answers to the possible
military dimensions of their program not because we are seeking
to punish them but because how are we going to have a high
level of confidence about what is going to happen in the future
if they are not prepared to reveal what happened in the past.
Senator Cardin. Well, I agree with that. And, of course,
this morning's report is not very encouraging on those issues.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Let me ask a quick question in response to
something you said to Senator Cardin. There is a third option
in terms of July 20, and that is you extend but exactly under
the same terms and conditions.
Ambassador Ross. That may be. That could be a fallback in
the event. But I think going in, if there is----
The Chairman. I am not an advocate of that, but I am just
saying it is a possibility.
Ambassador Ross. I think in the end, if you get a rollover,
it will be a rollover with them being required to roll
something further back and us also easing some additional
sanctions.
The Chairman. Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I listen to what you say, am I correct in getting out of
this that all of you think that the administration is not going
to wind up with a deal here, that the Iranians are not going to
be willing to go far enough that the administration will cut a
deal? Briefly. Is that what I am getting out of your testimony?
Ambassador Ross. By July 20, I think that is right. I am
not saying that if we do not find a way to increase the
leverage on the Iranians that we could not get a comprehensive
deal. But right now, that is not where the Iranians are, and I
do not think they think they need to be. And I think they are
wrong.
Senator Risch. Mr. Modell.
Mr. Modell. I was going to say I think the world is going
to be presented with some sort of a deal that is going to have
to be worked out over time. I do not know what that deal is
going to look like, but the more you look at the Iranians'
insistence, just as they did from 2003 to 2005, in having
50,000 centrifuges or 100,000 centrifuges eventually as part of
a nationwide civilian nuclear program, I think eventually a
deal is bound to come undone.
Senator Risch. Mr. Kagan.
Dr. Kagan. Senator, I am not prepared to say what this
administration might or might not accept or might or might not
announce. So I do not know.
On the Iranian side, I think the likelihood that the
Iranians will agree to a deal such as Ambassador Ross has
identified and which we all agree is the minimum necessary is
zero unless things change very dramatically, and the change is
not going to come through diplomacy and negotiations.
Senator Risch. Well, I guess my fear is that we will wind
up with a deal and it is not going to be the deal that needs to
be done. I got to tell you after watching negotiations, as this
administration has proceeded, I have got a really deep-seated
fear in that regard. Anybody want to try to change that for me?
Ambassador Ross. Yes.
Senator Risch. Okay, have at it. [Laughter.]
Ambassador Ross. I believe that the administration
understands that on this issue if you produce an outcome that
leaves the Iranians in a position where they are a threshold
nuclear state, where there are not very clear prohibitions that
would make it difficult for them to then turn that into having
a nuclear weapons capability, that that is not a sustainable
deal. It is not good from the administration's standpoint. It
is not good from the national interest standpoint. It is not
going to gain support within the Congress. It is certainly not
going to get support from key regional friends. And I do not
think the administration is negotiating with the Iranians in a
way at this point that suggests that they are prepared to cave
and not meet a certain basic threshold, which I think in fact
is close to what the chairman outlined in his opening
statement.
Senator Risch. Mr. Modell, do you share that optimism?
Mr. Modell. I do not. I have to disagree on that. I think
over the last 4 or 5 years, you have given the Supreme Leader
numerous reasons for him to think that the United States will
back down, that this President is committed to multilateralism
and not confronting the Iranian regime, with the exception of
the sanctions regime which we are now actually negotiating
right now. But I think there is ample evidence to suggest that
we are looking for a deal desperately, and that is what they
believe.
Senator Risch. Mr. Kagan.
Dr. Kagan. I think the administration is going to be faced
at a certain point with a very sharp dilemma as my colleagues
on the panel have outlined. I do not feel like I can predict in
advance how exactly it will react to that. My concern is that
the administration seems to be seeking desperately for some
sort of foreign policy success and this is it. And that is a
mind-set that can be very dangerous when you are in a
negotiation.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
Mr. Ross, I hope you are right and that Mr. Modell and I
are wrong. But in any event, I guess time will tell.
Very quickly. Let us assume we walk out of the rug market.
How do we get the genie back in the bottle on the sanctions? We
need some partners on this, and I use that word ``partners''
advisedly. One of those partners is Russia. It has been in all
the papers. Our relationship has not been the best lately. How
do we get the genie back in the bottle?
Ambassador Ross. Let me just say one thing. When I was
asked at the time after the events in Crimea unfolded, was I
worried that we would have an immediate problem with the
Russians on the Iranian issue, my answer was ``No,'' not
immediately because they are not in the 5+1 negotiations as a
favor to us. They do not have an interest in the Iranians
having a nuclear weapon. So it is not to say if they decided
this was the most important thing to us and it trumped
everything else and they realized that they could use it as a
lever on us on other issues, that they would not do that. They
would. But they have their own interests here.
And it is interesting that in the negotiations that have
been going on so far--and one of the reasons I think that you
have this high-level bilateral discussion that took place this
week with the Iranians was precisely because the 5+1 has
actually held together in terms of saying that where the
Iranians are is not going to make a deal possible.
Now, can I say that will hold forever? I am not so sure. If
the Iranians were to suddenly come in and change their position
and adopt a position where they offered concessions that fell
well short of where we want to be, maybe they would be able to
play upon the differences in the 5+1. But that has not been the
Iranian behavior so far. And partly--here I agree with my
colleagues--it is because the Iranians think they do not have
to do it. Well, unless we correct that impression, there is not
going to be a deal.
Senator Risch. I think the thing that has troubled all of
us here is we have all watched the media reports about this
flood of business people that are going in there and getting
ready to do business, as if the sanctions are done and over
with. And that really troubles me about trying to put that back
in the box. It seems to me it is going to be very difficult.
Mr. Modell, my time is almost up. Do you want to take a run
at this real quick?
Mr. Modell. I was just going to say I agree with Mr. Ross
on those comments with regard to the Russian mind-set and the
P5+1, but I would also be very careful about disregarding
entirely the possibility of a new strategic partnership between
Iran and Russia on some level, particularly if we get into a
long phased process for 5 or 10 or 20 years where we have to
continuously reaffirm that they are following the additional
protocol. But it is a tense process. Meanwhile, I think there
is a good indication you are going to see growing signs of
partnership between Russia and Iran behind the scenes.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
Mr. Kagan, do you want to close this out for me?
Dr. Kagan. Yes. I agree what the Russians can do in the
P5+1 and so forth may be limited. But I also agree that we are
already seeing indications of an Iranian-Russian entente of a
much deeper level than we have seen before. And what we have to
recognize is that Russia is not a partner anymore. Sadalov
Dimeter sees the United States as his enemy and sees himself at
war with us. This is extremely clear from his statements and
actions. And he sees our enemies as his potential allies. So I
think we need to understand that core pillar, that Russian
partnership as a core pillar of American strategy toward Iran
and Syria--that pillar has collapsed. And we need to
contemplate what we are going to do in the aftermath.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, for chairing
this hearing, and I want to thank our witnesses for appearing
today as we consider the very difficult potential implications
of a nuclear agreement with Iran regionally and globally.
I do share the administration's ultimate goal, stated goal,
of reaching an agreement that denies Iran the ability to
acquire nuclear weapons capability, and I do continue to hope
that a final deal could be reached that would include the most
comprehensive inspections and verification regime possible so
that we may irrefutably prevent Iran from acquiring a pathway
to a bomb.
However, I share the skepticism and concerns expressed by
this panel. We should have no illusions about these
negotiations. The Iranians have given us no reason to trust
their intentions, and any final agreement in my view must
dismantle Iran's enrichment infrastructure and address the
military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program including
particularly its ICBM capability.
So we also have to consider the regional implications and
the legitimate and shared security concerns of our vital and
trusted allies, principally Israel, and many others in the
region.
As the chair of the Africa Subcommittee, I am also
increasingly concerned about Iran's not just charm offensive,
but active engagement across the continent to find diplomatic
and potential military or economic allies as they continue to
spread their influence
and seek ways to break out from our efforts to impose
meaningful sanctions.
Ambassador, as you suggested in your written testimony,
there is no deal. There is no pathway to a deal unless the
Supreme Leader is convinced that if diplomacy fails, they will
be enduring severe economic pain and the high probability that
force will be used to destroy the investment that they have
made in the nuclear program.
I am cautiously encouraged that the sanctions regime has
not come unraveled, that the negotiations have gone this far,
and yet sanctions have largely remained effectively in place.
And I agree with the dynamics you point to that suggests that
the Russians may remain engaged with this at least for the
moment.
What do you see as the greatest risk? I agree with Dr.
Kagan. Having negotiated in a number of souks around the world,
you have to not just be willing to walk away. You have to walk
away for there to be a deal.
So what is the most important weak point of our ability to
sustain a meaningful, a punishing sanctions regime given that
we may well have to walk away?
Ambassador Ross. Well, the weakest point would be if some
of the countries that, prior to the joint plan of action, were
actually cutting back on their oil purchases stopped doing
that. I guess the question is what is the best way to ensure
that they do not do that. There are two different mind-sets
there.
One is, again, you continue to highlight, look, you do that
and you pay this terrible price with us. Now, obviously, that
imposes a price on us as well.
The other is to be able to use what is the Iranian
nonresponsiveness. Again, when we say walk away, we should be
prepared to walk away. But one of the values of having
demonstrated a readiness to negotiate genuinely and in good
faith is that you expose the Iranians. I said before our
readiness to be prepared to allow an outcome where they are
allowed to have limited enrichment is a big concession. So if
they are allowed to have limited enrichment but they are not
prepared to do a deal, one of the things we are doing is we are
exposing that. The fact of the matter is they do not want civil
nuclear power. They want the option of being able to have a
nuclear weapon, and they are not prepared to give it up. Now,
the more you can expose that, the more you are going to be able
to sustain I think the collective enforcement of sanctions that
we have right now.
Senator Coons. Well, Ambassador Ross and Dr. Kagan both, if
Iran is allowed to retain some element of a domestic enrichment
program, what do you think are the consequences of that? The
UAE in a civil nuclear agreement with the United States gave up
its enrichment capability, and I think if we get presented with
a deal where there is anything other than the most preliminary
or basic civil enrichment capability remaining within Iran, I
think it has very negative consequences regionally and
globally. But I would be interested in what you think.
Ambassador Ross. Look, there is no question that from a
strictly nonproliferation standpoint, the best outcome is no
enrichment. But that is probably not something that can be
achieved. The question is, what do you say to a country like
the UAE? I think what you say to them is look at what is being
imposed on them. The kind of verification regime we need is the
equivalent of what we had in Iraq. Do you want to have the kind
of intrusion? If you want to go ahead with enrichment, that is
what is going to be required. You do not have the same kind of
sovereignty that you have today. So I would say you can show,
yes, you did something that was the right path, but the
agreement here that they are adopting is one that imposes
limits on them that you would not want to have to face
yourself.
Senator Coons. Is it credibly possible for us to sustain an
inspection regime over the long term that will actually provide
the needed transparency and reassurance to Israel and to the
United States?
Ambassador Ross. Well, it better be. Look, we should not be
prepared to agree to an outcome where they have an enrichment
capability even if it is limited because we know from their
past behavior--you know, the old saying--Ronald Reagan's saying
was trust but verify. Well, my approach with the Iranians is
distrust and verify. So it better be.
Dr. Kagan. Senator, if I could take a shot at that, I have
got a very direct answer, which is ``No.'' I cannot imagine any
verification regime that could actually provide the kind of
guarantees that Israel or other allies would require partly
because there never has been such an inspection regime.
The Iraq inspection regime, we should remember, failed and
it failed in the most interesting possible way. It completely
failed to identify the fact that Saddam actually did not have
the nuclear program. And as a result, it led everyone in the
region to believe that he did, and it led us to believe that he
did.
It is hard for me to imagine that it will more effective in
a country the size and shape of Iran with the terrain of Iran
and with the degree of investment in digging that the Iranians
have done.
But I would just like to make one other point very quickly,
which is that we are in the process of down-scaling our own
intelligence capabilities at a dramatic rate, along with our
military footprint and our military capabilities. And you
cannot divorce the question of the verifiability of any deal
from the question of what our intelligence capabilities are
going to be down the road.
Senator Coons. I agree.
Ambassador Ross. It is a reason, by the way, that you do
have to have a very thought-out and preplanned approach to
dealing with the consequences of violations.
Senator Coons. If I might ask a last question, Mr.
Chairman.
Ambassador, following up on that exact point, there are
some publicly expressed concerns by the Israelis about their
ability to rely on our security guarantees, and there are some
repeatedly expressed concerns by Congress about our level of
engagement with oversight for a potential deal and then its
execution.
What advice might you have for the administration and for
us about reassuring the Israelis and engagement by Congress--by
the engagement by the administration with Congress in the
advance of our being presented with some deal?
Ambassador Ross. Well, it is two points that I was making
in the testimony. One, we should have a systematic conversation
with the Israelis about what cheating could look like, how best
to deal with it, and specifically what the actions would be in
the event of certain kinds of cheating, including not just
sanctions but even the use of force. And we should be prepared
to provide the Israelis some additional capabilities, with a
clear understanding that if there was cheating and we did not
act, we would support their acting and they would have the
means to do so.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Ambassador. Thank you to our
panel and your testimony.
The Chairman. Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here. Fascinating testimony.
I did not want to miss this opportunity. Today is the fifth
anniversary of the fraudulent election that brought Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad to power and the protests that followed it. And I
highlight this fact because I think that 5 years ago the
administration missed an opportunity to stand up for human
rights and for the aspirations of the Iranian people in those
weeks following that fraudulent election. And I think that has
had repercussions since.
In that vein, the general matrix that has been outlined, as
we have discussed this issue, has been that these sanctions are
in place to deter, punish, and hopefully to encourage Iran to
stop enriching and reprocessing because that gives them that
basic capability.
And then the second area argument has always been that if
in fact they ever break out and go toward a weapon, the word
that is always used is all options are on the table. But what
that really means is a military option. And yet, I now
believe--and I wanted to get your opinion--that more than ever
before in recent memory there is a solid opinion now on behalf
of the leadership of Iran, especially the Supreme Leader, that
the United States is not willing to use military force. I think
that he believes that we will use economic sanctions. I think
he believes we will use soft power and all sorts of other
things, but I do not believe that at any time in recent memory
have they believed more strongly than they do now that the
United States is not willing and/or capable of using any sort
of military force against them potentially no matter what they
do. And the implications that that is having on these
negotiations I believe are important.
And I wanted to get your sense of whether you believe that
that is true, and more importantly, was there ever a time in
recent memory where they had perhaps a different opinion or
where they perhaps had concerns that the United States, in
fact, would engage in some sort of military action? Anyone can
go first. If you agree with me, go first, please. [Laughter.]
Mr. Modell. One of the things I mentioned in my opening
comments was exactly that. In 2009, I think the United States
missed a major opportunity, probably the first real opportunity
in the 30 years at that point to actually effect some sort of a
permanent change in the foundation of the regime. We failed to
capitalize on that. In 2009, when the movement against the
fraudulent elections coalesced into the Green Movement, the
people in the Green Movement were wondering what kind of
support they should expect from the United States, and that
ended up to be no support at all. It was never designed to be a
militant move to violently overthrow the regime, but at the
same time, it sent a real strong message to the reformist
movement in the country that we were not really willing to do
anything and that instead, the President was elected on the
idea that he was going to engage with anybody, be that Hugo
Chavez in Venezuela or the Supreme Leader in Iran, that it was
all about engagement. So that started the sort of second track
of engagement. But again, it was a very clear message to the
Supreme Leader of weakness on his part, and I think that that
has been verified over and over and over again.
I think when you look at where we are now, I firmly believe
that he thinks that we are here negotiating out of desperation
for a deal. And I am not convinced that he thinks we are going
to walk away. When he repeatedly makes comments, as the
chairman mentioned, that the United States is unwilling to take
military action, I think he honestly believes that.
Dr. Kagan. I think I will pick up the hint that you I think
were throwing out there, which is, yes, in 2003 I believe that
the Iranian regime and the Supreme Leader thought that Iran
could quite possibly be next and really did seriously--much
more seriously than the Bush White House--consider the
possibility that we would finish in Iraq and pivot to the east
and take out the next country in the Axis of Evil.
Senator Rubio. What did they do as a result of that?
Dr. Kagan. They suspended the nuclear program and took a
variety of steps to conceal it and to try to reach out to us in
a variety of ways. More or less, the sincerity of those
outreaches is open to question. But, yes, that is clearly what
happened.
I would like to parse what you said about their belief in
our capability a little bit more finely, though. I do not think
the Supreme Leader believes that we do not have the capability
to remove him from power if we chose to do so. I think he
believes that we do have that capability.
Senator Rubio. And just to clarify, I did not mean the
technical capability. I meant the political capability.
Dr. Kagan. Exactly.
Senator Rubio. The political will.
Dr. Kagan. This is entirely about will.
Ambassador Ross. I agree that in 2003 they feared that they
were next, and they put a proposal on the table. It was just
suspension. They actually put a proposal on the table through
the Swiss that would have been far-reaching. There was some
question was it genuine or not, but it was never really tested.
By 2005, 2006, they had walked away from the suspension
without any consequence to them. At a point in 2006, 2007, when
we were really tied down in Iraq, they no longer had the same
kind of fear.
The Supreme Leader's statement now that we will not use
force is something he has not said before. So clearly, they
have the perception that we will not. And it is very important
for us to change that perception. If we want to have a deal, we
have to change that perception.
Senator Rubio. I would highlight, as you--I think maybe
someone mentioned this earlier on the June 4 speech. It was
underneath a banner that said America cannot do a damn thing.
They have used that slogan before. I do not think it has meant
more to them than it does today. And we recently saw as well
their generals bragging that one of our bases is now within
reach.
With the minute I have remaining, I wanted to pivot briefly
to Iraq because I think it is related to Iran, and it is an
interesting dynamic. Obviously, the situation in Syria--not
that they were not close already, but the situation in Syria
has brought that regime closer and under more of the influence
of Iran than ever before, quite frankly dependent on Iran and
Russia for their survival. And now we are seeing something
similar potentially play out in Iraq where increasingly because
of ISIL's gains over the last 72 to 96 hours, we have to assume
that the Iranians are all in with regard to pushing back
against that. And we know that there was the presence of these
Shia militias, many of whom have been equipped and trained, if
not all of them, by Iranian forces.
From a regional perspective--and of course, the interesting
dynamic is that in many respects we actually share an enemy in
ISIL even though our interests may not coincide in terms of the
long term. In fact, they do not coincide in terms of the long-
term future for that area.
But I wanted your take on what is happening now with regard
to Iraq and Malaki and that government's increasing dependence
and/or reliance on Iran for potentially its very survival.
Dr. Kagan. A couple of quick points about Iraq. One is the
Iranians, I do not believe, have the capability to help Malaki
regain control of his country any more than they have been able
to enable Assad to regain control of his country. We continue
to have a theoretical opportunity in Iraq because we can offer
the Iraqis something that the Iranians cannot. We have both the
capability
and the desire to help the Iraqis reconquer all of their
territory from ISIS, which I believe that we could with the
rapid use of military force, which is certainly not going to
happen under this administration.
So we are in a situation, as we always have been in Iraq,
which is that the Iraqis will take Iranian assistance,
especially when there is nothing else on offer, but they would
prefer our assistance because we can offer them things that the
Iranians cannot.
Another thing that we have to be very clear about, in a
certain sense we have been having a fictional conversation here
about sanctions. In the real world, unless we are prepared to
sanction Iraq, the sanctions regime is unraveling anyway. The
Iranians have been working aggressively to expand their ability
to export oil and many other things through Iraq. We have
turned a blind eye to it. I understand that in the current
context. I do not see how we could sanction Malaki while we are
trying to help him fight for his life. But what that means is
that there is an oil spigot in the Persian Gulf for Iranian oil
that we will not be able to control. And as we talk about
sanctions, we need to keep that in mind as well.
Ambassador Ross. Can I make two quick points?
First, I think we should be prepared to help in Iraq, given
the stakes, but there should be conditions for Malaki. One of
the reasons we are where we are is precisely because the way
Malaki has governed, which is to say he has governed in a
completely noninclusive fashion. He has basically alienated the
Sunnis in a way that was not required. And if we help, there
has to be some change in his behavior in order to do this.
The second point is if we help, it cannot look in the
region like--yes, ISIS is a threat to us and to our regional
friends, but it cannot look like we are prepared there to help
to counter them, but we are not prepared to go against what the
Iranians are doing in Syria because then it looks like all we
are doing is helping to shift the regional balance more in
Iran's favor.
Dr. Kagan. And I agree with both of those comments.
Mr. Modell. The only other thing I would add, Senator
Rubio, is when you look at the U.S. Government forces that are
involved in monitoring the Iran threat network around the
world, there are things that we could potentially do to address
some of the issues you are talking about, particularly Iran's
potential movement to a greater extent into Iraq. I will give
you an example.
The Department of the Treasury has done a fantastic job in
some senses, but in others, it just does not have the resources
to do what it needs to do. So OFAC designations. When you look
at the thousands of Iranian entities or individuals and groups
who have been designated over the years as violators of
sanctions, what has happened as a result of that? They simply
close this door and open up another one. There needs to be a
comprehensive look at what Treasury's OFAC designations--what
the impact of that has been and what gaps we need to address
because if you are looking at ways--in the context of the
greater nuclear issue, are we going to have a comprehensive
long-term verification mechanism that really works? Well, a lot
of the cheating that has gone on over the years could have been
prevented if we had better overseas capability, quite frankly,
not on our own but with liaison partners to actually verify the
designations are being honored.
The Chairman. Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Thank you. I appreciate the testimony.
Ambassador Ross, we are coming up right now at the end of
our negotiating period and determining whether we want to
extend or not. What concerns are there that if we do not
continue, that our allies might leave us behind, figure nothing
will ever be good enough for the Americans, we will cut our own
deal? Is there a concern about that? Should we be concerned
about that? And is that something that motivates us to stay at
the table?
Ambassador Ross. I think the answer is ``yes'' because I
think the other members of the 5+1--precisely because the joint
plan of action built into it a renewable 6 months for a total
of 1 year by mutual agreement, I am quite certain that all the
other members are going to say, look, rather than walking away,
let us take the other 6 months and let us see if we can, in
fact, reach a comprehensive agreement.
I think beyond, at the end of the next 6 months, we may be
in a different place. But a lot depends upon the Iranians. Are
they nonresponsive? Do they stay in the position they are right
now, which signals they are not close to understanding or
recognizing what is being required? They are talking right now
about wanting thousands, 30,000, 100,000 centrifuges, not
rolling back their program.
Senator Flake. Any comment on that, Mr. Kagan? Just to back
up a bit, I think we all can see that Iran is at the table
because of these sanctions, and it is because that we have had
cooperation from our, in particular, European allies on this.
And we need them to stay at the table. We need this to be Iran
versus the West rather than Iran versus the United States in
terms of sanctions. So how much of a motivating factor is that
for the United States to stay at the table because we need our
allies with us?
Dr. Kagan. I think Ambassador Ross made a very excellent
point, which is that deciding that you want to stay at the
table is one thing. Actually getting an agreement to stay at
the table and extend is another thing. That technical
discussion about what the extension would look like is probably
going to be more determinative of whether we can do this than
anything else.
I am a little bit less worried at the prospect that if we
walk away from the table, the European states will decide the
heck with us and do a unilateral deal with Iran. There are a
lot of other issues in play. As always, we talk about this in
isolation. There is tremendous nervousness about Russia and the
threat to NATO in general. There is a tremendous concern about
alienating the United States even more to the point where we
withdraw entirely at a moment when people seem to need us a
great deal. And so I think a lot of calculations would be made
regarding whether we actually are going to see European
partners just torpedo us entirely. So I am a little less
pessimistic about that even though I would be surprised if we
ended up walking away.
Senator Flake. The concern about extension and going for a
full year, obviously, is if Iran is gaming the system now in a
way that puts them closer to being a threshold state. Is it
your opinion, Mr. Modell or Mr. Ross, that this time period
does allow them to get closer? Or are they truly rolling back
in a way that benefits us in terms of a final deal?
Mr. Modell. I would say I think they are already a nuclear
threshold state. They have the ability. If they wanted to cross
that threshold and to make that move to actually break out,
they could do that. I do not necessarily think that they are
trying to delay for another 6 or 12 months. I think they
honestly want to see if they can actually work their way into a
deal that will allow them to pursue an agenda that may not be
totally transparent to us right now, particularly on the
military dimensions of their program. But they need time to do
that. So I do not think it is just simply a matter of buying
time.
But I would make a comment too. On the United States
corporate side, we have talked to a number of companies,
particularly in the energy field, who are like everybody
wondering at what point it would be prudent to start taking a
serious look about reentering the Iranian market. There is a
great deal of reluctance on their part. Really. And it is not
only in terms of the sanctions
and the political risk involved, but it is simply there are a
lot of fundamentals in terms of the deals that will be struck
on production-sharing agreements and other forms with the
fundamental agreements they would need to have in place rather
than to even consider going back in.
Senator Flake. Well, I think from what we hear, Iran
thought that they might get more out of this interim deal than
they actually are in terms of sanctions relief. It has been
more difficult just because of the interlocking nature of these
sanctions and the reluctance of people to get involved. So that
is, frankly, a good sign.
Ambassador Ross. I do not think, in answer to your
question, they are not able to game the system very much, given
the nature of this agreement. The one area where they have the
potential to game is that they can do R&D on the existing
centrifuges that they have. So they cannot deploy any new
centrifuges except one of those that break down. But it means
that the R&D that they are doing on the existing centrifuges--
and they have several generations--means at the end of this,
they would be in a better position to move quickly. But the
fact is during this time, that is the only area where they are
able to do anything that potentially advance them. And the 20
percent they have dismantled. So from that standpoint, they are
a little bit farther removed from where their breakout
capability might have been prior to the time of the deal.
Dr. Kagan. I have to disagree with Ambassador Ross on one
important point. There is a realm in which they can advance
because this agreement has done virtually nothing to improve
our ability to detect their pursuit of weaponization
technology. And I have long believed that that is actually the
long pole in the tent. They clearly have the capability under
any scenario to process enough uranium to produce enriched
uranium. We are just talking about timelines there.
The challenges that they have been facing have been
developing a working nuclear device small enough and reliable
enough to put on a reentry vehicle and so forth. There is
absolutely nothing in this deal in my opinion that has harmed
their ability to continue to pursue that effort in any
meaningful way.
Senator Flake. Mr. Kagan, I was interested in your
contention at the beginning that Iran's nuclear ambitions are
secondary to their regional ambitions in other areas. If we
were to strike a deal and get a deal that we are comfortable
with and comfortable enough to move ahead, what would be our
next step--the United States that is--in terms of trying to
influence Iran in terms of its regional activities? Would we be
in a much better position to have influence on them or not in
your view?
Dr. Kagan. I think it depends on whether or not the
administration does what Ambassador Ross is telling them to do.
If we were to right now design and implement and execute a
strategy to combat Iranian influence around the region, put
pressure on the Iranian regime and so forth in pursuit of a
good deal, then we could emerge, theoretically, at the end of
those negotiations in a better position. If we do not do that
and if we do not work to strip away from them the capabilities
that they are using to operate in the way that they are
throughout the region, then a deal will simply open the flood
gates and we will be in a much worse position.
Senator Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Paul.
Senator Paul. Thanks to the panel for coming today.
Since we have had some lessening of the sanctions with the
interim agreement with Iran, people talk about them being
easily reversible. I am not really so concerned about the
technical aspect of being easily reversible, but I am concerned
about whether or not the reconstitution of an international
coalition, which I think the sanctions, I think everyone would
agree, are not as successful if it is just us--I am interested
in the panel's opinion on whether or not we have gone beyond
getting everybody back together. Is there going to be the
ability, if there is no deal or if there is the sense that Iran
is evading even the interim deal, to reconstitute an
international coalition to make sanctions effective? Where do
you think we are in that spectrum of being able to reconstitute
that?
Ambassador Ross. I think the ability to sustain this is
much greater when you can point to Iran's bad behaviors. So if
in the end, they are not responsive and there has been clearly
a serious effort to try to offer them something and they are
not responsive, it becomes much easier to sustain this with the
kind of collective enforcement that we are seeing.
Mr. Modell. Senator, I would just add to that. When you
look at the task before us and trying to figure out, is bad
behavior going to occur in terms of illegal proliferation--
illegal actions on the part of the threat network that they
have got in the region--one of the things that we have not done
a good enough job of, I think, in the U.S. Government, is
actually defining what a comprehensive verification and
compliance regime needs to look like. It is not that easy
simply to say that we are going to crack down on Iran. There
are a lot of things that we do not do very well. There are a
lot of risks that we are unwilling to take. There is a lot of
liaison relationships out there with allied countries, by the
way, that do not have the resources they need, that do not have
the support they need, and do not have the transparency from
us, including Israel I would say. Ambassador Ross made a
comment earlier about the need for us to have actually a common
understanding with regard to Israel as to what is it going to
look like when we jointly try to pursue efforts to figure out
if the Iranians are cheating or not. Half the time, we do not
know what the Israelis are doing. They do not know what we are
doing. There has to be better dialogue and transparency on
sensitive regional and global issues if you are going to be
serious about trying to figure out if they are cheating or not.
Dr. Kagan. Senator, if the question is can we reconstitute
the regime exactly as it was and continue to strengthen it in
the way that we had been doing it; I am not sure. We certainly
have the problems with Russia that we have. We have problems
with China that we have. So I am not sure we are going to be
able to continue to do that.
However, I think that Scott has pointed out quite rightly
that as long as we can keep the current resolutions in place
and the current agreements in force--and I think that is a
perfectly feasible undertaking--we have the ability to improve
our own prosecution of the sanctions in a way that can bring
additional pain on Iran.
Senator Paul. One quick followup. All of you who feel like
nobody is evading beyond or lessening the sanctions beyond what
we sort of agreed to lessen them to--Russia and China and
others--they are still adhering to the previous set of
sanctions that supposedly are in place?
Dr. Kagan. No.
Senator Paul. But you do think they are.
Dr. Kagan. Absolutely, yes. I am certain that they are and
the Iranians are evading the sanctions in a variety of ways,
including through Iraq, as I said.
Senator Paul. And then the only other point I would like to
make--and I think this is an important one because I try to
think about these as if--you know, what a soldier thinks about
our soldier unit that you might send back into Iraq, which I am
not very excited about.
We released three Moroccans from Gitmo a while back under
the previous administration. They went home for a while and
then they decided to go fight in Syria. They are fighting on
the same side as we are in Syria. So people who hate America
are on our side, which concerns me a bit and confuses me a bit.
We are supporting a Sunni sort of movement. It has people
we say we are not going to give weapons to, but we did give
some to a military council that said recently that said they
are going for the Golan Heights when they are done with Assad.
That is confusing to me to be on the same side as people who
are going to try to reclaim the Golan Heights.
It is a Sunni resistance. It also has parts of ISIS in it.
But now we are sort of supportive of ISIS. Not really, but we
are on the same side as ISIS in one battle.
So you tell a GI who is going to carry a gun and put his
life down--and I know a guy from my neighboring town lost both
legs and an arm, and he fought for freedom. He fought for our
Bill of Rights. He fought for our Constitution. But you can see
how it might be confusing when you send a soldier back in there
that you say, well, Iran supports Hezbollah and the Allawites
and the Shiites, but Iran also likes Malaki and the Shiites in
there. So you can see how it is very confusing. We are on both
sides of two different wars.
To be at war and to kill people and to fight and to lay
down your life--it is hard for me to be certain that I am
excited to go. I mean, I hate that Mosul is falling and I hate
that those are falling, but I also think for 10 years we have
supplied the Iraqis. They cannot stand up and do anything to
defend their country and it is all up to us? It is hard for me.
And I think it is easy from a geopolitical point of view.
All the things you say are rational and logical, but I see this
also emotionally from a GI who has to go over there and
potentially lose his life, an American. And I am concerned that
it is confusing. Which side are we on? We are for the Sunnis in
one war, and we are against the same set of Sunnis in another
war in a neighboring place. It is all destabilizing.
But you could even go back 10 years and say, you know,
what? It might have been a little more stable when we had that
awful guy Hussein who hated the Iranians. So I am not saying I
am for having Hussein there. I am just saying that
geopolitically you had people somewhat at a standstill over
there, and now you have a really confusing mess that makes it
hard for me or for a GI to understand who he is shooting at and
why and he is shooting at one person in one war and a different
person in another war, neighboring war.
Ambassador Ross. Can I make just one quick response to
that?
Look, what you are saying is, obviously, a reality. But I
think one way to think about it is that there are radical Shia
militias who are armed, trained, funded by the Iranians. There
is ISIS. These are extremist radical Sunnis. Both are our
enemies. Both hate us. Both threaten us. So the key is to
identify who are our natural partners who are contending with
both, and how do we support them? We have to be able to
discriminate enough and then we have to be able to figure out
how to do that.
Senator Paul. But would you agree it is hard to sort of
decide who are our friends and who are not? We have given
antitank weapons to a group in Syria that 2 weeks ago said that
they will attack Israel. And we have already given them
weapons. We let three people go from Gitmo who are fighting on
the same side of the war. It is confusing. And there are
radical elements, but they have hated each other for thousands
of years, and they are probably going to hate each other for
another thousand years and fight each other.
I am not really saying do not be involved. I am saying try
to help in some way, but really think seriously before we say,
oh, it is real easy. We have the might. We do. We could go in
and we could do it. But are you willing to let 4,000 more
soldiers die in Iraq, Americans, to bring back Mosul? I think
it is terrible what is happening, but the Iraqis need to step
up and defend their country. And I just do not know if I am
ready to send 4,000 soldiers in.
I am also disturbed that we still have it on the books that
the President, while you say he is unlikely, which I agree--it
is still on the books that he could--we could go to war
tomorrow with no vote of Congress. This is very, very tragic.
And at the very least, even if everybody else disagrees with me
and they want to go war in Iraq again, we should vote on it.
For goodness sakes, we should not have permanent war that you
can just go to war anytime you want. That is the way it exists
right now. I am very troubled by that.
And this is not really clear-cut exactly who we are for or
who we are against, who we are shooting, and we are shooting
different people in different wars. It is quite confusing I
think. And for someone who is going to lay down their life, it
needs to be much more, I think, clear-cut who is our enemy.
Dr. Kagan. May I respond to that, please?
Senator, I do not know anyone who is excited about going
back to Iraq. I do not know anyone who thinks it will be easy.
And I do not know anyone who is advocating it with a light
heart or in a way that does not imagine that this is going to
be incredibly painful.
Senator Paul. You are in favor of sending troops back into
Iraq now?
Dr. Kagan. Sir, I am in favor of being prepared to do that
rather than allowing an al-Qaeda franchise to establish a full-
up state with an army with vehicles stretching from----
Senator Paul. And I do not question your motives. I mean, I
think you are sincere. You are all trying to think this
through. We are all Americans. We are always trying to do the
right things. So I do not question your motives. But let us be
clear. You are for sending troops into Iraq----
Dr. Kagan. Yes, sir. I am very clear about that.
Senator Paul. But to do that, you have to be prepared to
also say--are you prepared to lose 4,000 lives if it takes it
to get Mosul back? And that is a real question. Are you
prepared to have 4,000 soldiers more die to take back Iraq
again and try for another 10 years? Then what happens in 10
years? Do we have to stay 20, 30, 50? The war has been going on
a thousand years.
Ambassador Ross. Can I just say one thing?
I am not sure the choice is either you have to send troops
back in or you do nothing. And I do not think we want to put
ourselves in a position where our choice is you have to send
troops in or you do nothing. There are options short of that,
and we have to think through those because if, in fact, ISIS is
able to establish a strong foothold in northern Iraq, we will
end up finding that they do not just attack others within the
area. It will become a base to attack us.
Senator Paul. And we will go in as allies of Iran. And I
myself am concerned about Iran. I am for the sanctions. I voted
for all the sanctions. But if we go to war again in Iraq, we
will go to war as allies of Iran. So it is a little bit
confusing to tell a soldier you are going over there. We must
do everything possible, including war, to keep Iran from having
nuclear weapons, and yet we will be allied with Iran in a war
in Iraq. It is confusing. It is not clear-cut.
Dr. Kagan. Senator, I am very confident that our soldiers
will be able to understand who the enemy is largely because
there will be the enemy that is shooting at them, and they have
shown in the past that they can do that. The soldiers we are
talking about and officers are my friends. These are the people
that I have also served with overseas. I understand the costs
of this war, as well as you do, sir. And I understand the risks
of sending troops into this conflict, as well as you do.
I would not send American boots on the ground into this
conflict in the first instance. I agree with Ambassador Ross.
There are things to do short of that.
But I agree with the point that you are making
fundamentally, Senator, which is a very important one, that we
should not imagine that there is an easy course of action here
that is a limited action that is either guaranteed success or
that we can do it and then say, well, it did not work and we
are done with it. I am saying that if we are going to involve
ourselves in this, we should be prepared to----
The Chairman. I have allowed this to go on for a while, and
I know everybody is passionate about their views and I
appreciate that. There is a vote that is shortly going to be
coming up. So I am sure the debate will continue.
I will say one point about Iraq. It is not the focus of
this hearing but elements of it have seeped in. As someone who
voted against the war in Iraq, I can tell you that the biggest
beneficiary of President Bush's engagement in Iraq has been
Iran. And we are facing the flow of consequences from that. And
it is not neat and it is not nice.
I do believe after so many lives and national treasure that
to do nothing is probably unacceptable in our national
interests and our national security. But what that is I think
there can be targeted, limited, but significant assistance to
the Iraqis but only--and this is where I agree with Ambassador
Ross--but only if Malaki is willing to make public statements
with reference to a nonsectarian agenda and an Iraqi unity
regardless of sector ethnicity, and uses the opportunity to
unify his country because we can train all you want.
But when I was in Iraq and I asked are these soldiers
really ready to fight for their country or is this a job--
Americans when they sign up, especially in a volunteer army,
are fighting for their country. They are fighting for a set of
principles and beliefs. If it is just a job, there is a whole
different set of circumstances. And so unless there is a sense
of national unity and purpose, this will never be a successful
set of circumstances.
I appreciate this panel's insights. It has been very
helpful. There is a lot more work to be done on the Iran
question and many dimensions to it. And I am sure we will be
engaging with you in the days ahead.
With the appreciation of the committee, this hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[all]