[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PAKISTAN: FRIEND OR FOE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM?
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JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 12, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-173
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
DANIEL DONOVAN, New York
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
TED POE, Texas, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
DARRELL E. ISSA, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
PAUL COOK, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
------
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
MATT SALMON, Arizona Chairman
DANA ROHRABACHER, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio AMI BERA, California
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Zalmay Khalilzad, counselor, Center for Strategic
and International Studies...................................... 5
Mr. Bill Roggio, senior editor, Long War Journal, Foundation for
Defense of Democracies......................................... 16
Tricia Bacon, Ph.D., assistant professor, American University.... 29
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Zalmay Khalilzad: Prepared statement............... 9
Mr. Bill Roggio: Prepared statement.............................. 18
Tricia Bacon, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.......................... 31
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 46
Hearing minutes.................................................. 47
The Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California: Prepared statement........................ 48
Written response from Tricia Bacon, Ph.D., to question submitted
for the record by the Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative
in Congress from the State of California....................... 50
PAKISTAN: FRIEND OR FOE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM?
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 12, 2016
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
and
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock
p.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Matt
Salmon (chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific)
presiding.
Mr. Salmon. The subcommittee will come to order.
Good afternoon. I would like to thank my colleagues for
joining me in convening this important joint subcommittee
hearing. Unfortunately, Chairman Poe couldn't join us today,
but I know he is very interested and engaged on the many
challenges presented to the U.S. policymakers in Pakistan.
I would like to ask unanimous consent that his opening
statement be inserted for the record. And, without objection,
the hearing record will remain open for 5 business days to
allow for further statements, questions, and extraneous
materials for the record, subject to the length limitation in
the rules.
As we all know, the United States has spent tens of
billions in taxpayer dollars in the form of aid to Pakistan
since 9/11, all in the hope that Pakistan would become a
partner in the fight against terrorism. Unfortunately, despite
this significant investment, Pakistani military and
intelligence services are still linked to terrorist groups.
While the administration and the Pakistanis argue that
there have been some successes in the fight against terrorist
elements, particularly in Shawal Valley, terrorist
organizations with close ties to Pakistan's military elite have
been left untouched to the point of thriving while Pakistan's
governing elite turns a blind eye.
Today we will discuss the administration's policy toward
Pakistan and take a closer look at U.S. goals and expectations
and options with Pakistan. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship has
always been complicated. Pakistan is an important country of
over 200 million people. It has nuclear capabilities and is
strategically located with important neighbors, including
China, India, and Afghanistan. But this country poses
challenges that have plagued the United States for decades.
Given its significance, we can't afford to be spontaneous
with our policy toward Pakistan as there could be far-reaching
consequences. At the same time, many of us in Congress are
unwilling to continue down this same failed path that consists
of stacks of U.S. aid dollars without much support in the fight
against terrorists to show for it. To be frank, Pakistan likes
the United States because for decades we have given them a
substantial amount of aid, especially to the Pakistani
military, while they hope that they can prevent us from getting
too close with India.
The United States tolerates Pakistan because it claims to
be in the fight with us on the global war on terror. Recent
history shows us that while Pakistan is getting money and
weapons, U.S. goals in the war on terror are sadly lacking, and
Pakistan may in fact be using the assets we provide them to
undermine some of our strategic diplomatic efforts in the
region.
Pakistan claims to be fighting terrorism, but they refuse
to fight some groups who we know to be terrorists. Many
observers see Pakistani forces as selective in the terrorist
groups it fights, leaving others to continue to wreak havoc,
especially when those groups target India.
Let us not forget that Pakistan was less than helpful in
the hunt and ultimately demise of Osama bin Laden. And, to this
day, they are holding Dr. Shakil Afridi under arrest, a hero to
our country, for aiding in bin Laden's capture. Patience is
growing very thin.
The recent failure to get consensus on the proposed F-16
sale is evidence of the newly endemic weariness where Pakistan
is concerned. If our current efforts in Pakistan are not
producing the results we seek, then what are our options? We
could simply turn the money off, saving taxpayers billions of
dollars. We could enforce sanctions or designate Pakistan as a
State Sponsor of Terrorism. Sanctions were used in the '90s but
without much effect.
I hope to hear from our witnesses as to what sort of stick
and carrot approach might actually work with Pakistan, so we
can have a strategic partnership on issues of mutual interest.
Fifteen years have passed since 9/11. Billions of dollars
have been spent, and far too little change has occurred in
Pakistan. Should we continue our failed policy and attempt to
convince ourselves that Pakistan will one day see eye to eye
with the United States, or should we look at the U.S.-Pakistan
relationship through a new lens?
I look forward to today's constructive discussion to guide
our policy efforts with Pakistan, and I turn to the ranking
member, Mr. Sherman, for any comments that he might have.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you. We have relations with I think
close to 200 countries. The default position is we don't give
them money. So those who suggest aid to Pakistan have got to
show that there is a strong justification for doing so. The
evidence is not encouraging.
General Musharraf spoke on television in February about how
Pakistan supported--provided support for Lashkar-e-Tayyiba,
also known as LeT, and to the JeM, and essentially said
terrorism was fine as long as it is directed at India. His
remarks didn't provoke much of a reaction because much of the
power structure in Pakistan agrees with him.
The Pakistani Government, as our chairman just pointed out,
continues to hold Dr. Afridi. So not only do they shelter bin
Laden, they punish those who helped us unshelter bin Laden. And
the military establishment in Pakistan stokes paranoia about
India, meddles in Afghanistan, and seems to be trying to weaken
Afghanistan, so as to have a divided Pashtun population.
Regardless of how we answer the friend or foe question, our
relationship with Pakistan is important. But keep in mind, you
would think we would only provide aid to those countries where
we don't have to ask the question: Friend or foe? But Pakistan
is a nation of 180 billion people with a history of terrorist
activities, 100 nuclear weapons, very confused body politic.
The administration is requesting money for Pakistan in a number
of different accounts, including 740 million of assistance on
the civilian side, 265 million on the military side, and aid in
other categories as well.
You would think that we would at least condition a large
portion of this aid on the release of Dr. Afridi and his
family. Providing more assistance to a government that has
supported terrorists and has shown itself not very capable or
serious about combatting terrorism may not be the very best use
of taxpayer money.
We should be looking to reorient the money we do spend. I
would like to focus on three things: Human rights, education,
and public diplomacy. First, the Pakistani Government has a
regrettable record of oppressing some of the major components
of its country, large minorities, including the Sindh and the
Baloch. Free speech and political dialogue are restricted.
Extrajudicial killings are common. For example, Anwar
Leghari, the brother of a dear friend of mine, was assassinated
in Sindh just last year, and the Pakistani Government has
closed the file. I want to thank our State Department for at
least raising a question. They have reopened the file, but that
doesn't mean they will actually do anything.
A country with blasphemy laws is just begging individuals
to claim that minorities have said this or that, unprovable,
and them impose terrible penalties on someone they happen to
dislike. It is no surprise that extremism flourishes in this
environment.
Second, education. Pakistan must reform its education
system. Many textbooks contain content that perpetuates
minority stereotypes and feeds support for Islamic extremism. A
lack of government-funded schools has led to an increase in the
number of extremist madrassas in Sindh and other places in
Pakistan. Girls are often denied education.
As I proposed I think at our last hearing, if we do provide
aid, we ought to provide free textbooks, so that parents don't
have that burden, aren't tempted to send their kids to a
madrassa, and so that the textbooks, while they may not reflect
all red, white, and blue values, will at least not contain
material that would be an anathema to the American people.
And, finally, it is very hard for corrupt people to steal
textbooks, especially in a country where the textbooks are made
free by the American people.
I co-chair the Sindh Caucus, and so I focused on southern
Pakistan in particular. And I have worked to make sure that we
communicate to Sindh and other parts of Pakistan through Voice
of America in the language people speak in their homes. The
importance of Pakistan seems to be so overwhelming that we
spend billions of dollars giving it to a government that
supports terrorism, but we don't spend $1.5 broadcasting in the
Sindhi language. What a bizarre approach. What a pro-Islamabad
approach. What an approach that does not match America's
interest.
Finally, if we are going to win over the Muslim world, we
need to have the State Department maybe hire one or a few
people--fewer people that are experts in the 1800s European
diplomacy and hire at least one person whose job description
says ``understand the Quran, the hadith,'' you don't have to
write a fatwa but you should have read 1,000 of them.
To think that we are waging a war for the minds of Muslims
around the world and haven't hired a single person because of
their understanding of that religion and how it is used and how
it is misused shows an insular thinking in a bureaucracy that
prizes an understanding of the machinations of metronic in
European diplomacy two centuries ago.
I yield back.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. In the interest of time--I know we
have got other vote series coming up on the floor very soon--I
will just yield one more slot before we go to the witnesses to
the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade, Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Chairman
Salmon, for conducting this hearing. I also would like to thank
Mr. Rohrabacher and--who is here--I guess Mr. Poe as well,
Ranking Member Sherman, and I would like to thank all the
members that took the time to be here in this important
hearing.
Of course, I would like to thank our panel for being here
to discuss the topic at hand--Pakistan. Since 9/11, the United
States' relationship with Pakistan has ebbed and flowed. Over
the last decade and a half, several missteps have taken both
sides into controversy, including instances of
miscommunication, competing national interest, and fundamental
failure to broaden and deepen the relationship as a whole.
Indeed, it seems that the two countries trend toward a one-
dimensional transactional relationship centered along security
concerns, instead of a broad partnership that includes trade
and cultural linkages, is something that is problematic.
However, over the last few years, even the security concerns
have not equated to a smooth relationship. While Islamabad has
helped the United States capture and kill numerous al-Qaeda
members, including several senior leaders in its support for
groups like Taliban, the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba,
these things undermine critical U.S. national security
interest.
Further complicating the issue is the fact that both
leaders of the Taliban were killed or died within Pakistani
borders, and the former head of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, was
also killed in Pakistan, only miles from the country's capital.
There is little reason to suggest that Pakistan is going to
change its strategic calculus.
It is critical that we vigorously consider our relationship
with Pakistan and recognize that Islamabad is a willing and
able partner in certain areas, while hostile in others. To be
sure, accepting this paradigm does not mean abandoning Pakistan
altogether. At stake in the region are some of America's most
vital national security interests, including ensuring that
neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan serves as a safe haven for
global terrorists, keeping Pakistan's nuclear weapons out of
the hands of terrorists and preventing war between India and
Pakistan that could potentially go nuclear.
These interests warrant continued outreach and cooperation
with Islamabad. To that end, the United States should consider
a more balanced approach when supplying aid, an approach that
favors education and economic aid over military assistance. The
provision of U.S. weapons cannot reshape Pakistan's will to
maintain its militant proxies on its western border, but those
weapons do equip Pakistan to challenge India on its eastern
border.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and
seeing how we can shape this relationship to the benefit of
both countries.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. We are grateful to be joined today
by Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad. Appreciate you being here,
Ambassador. And Mr. Bill Roggio, appreciate you being here. And
Tricia Bacon.
And, Ambassador, we will yield the first time to you.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ZALMAY KHALILZAD, COUNSELOR, CENTER
FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Ambassador Khalilzad. Thank you very much, Chairman. I want
to thank the ranking member, the chairman of the Terrorism
Subcommittee, and all the distinguished members who are here. I
appreciate the opportunity to appear and to make a few comments
on a very important and difficult subject, the issue of
Pakistan.
As you said, Chairman, it requires a deliberate but frank
discussion and analysis of where we are and where we need to
go. I have prepared a testimony, which I will submit for the
record.
Mr. Salmon. Without objection, your formal testimony will
be injected into the record.
Ambassador Khalilzad. I would like to summarize that
testimony by making a few points and look forward to the
discussion.
While Pakistan, in the aftermath of 9/11, did provide
significant help in the overthrow of the Taliban and in the
capture of quite a number of al-Qaeda members, I think it fair
to say that if one focuses on Afghanistan, which would be the
burden of my comments today, looking at Pakistan, one can
conclude now the following.
First, Pakistan is now a State Sponsor of Terror. There is
no question that the Pakistani military and the Pakistani
intelligence agency, the ISI, the Inter-Service Agency,
supports the Haqqani Network, which we regard--the United
States has regarded as a terrorist organization. One of our
former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs called the Haqqani Network
a virtual arm of the ISI.
Point two, it is also clear that the Pakistani military and
Pakistani intelligence provide sanctuary and support for the
Taliban, which is an extremist organization that provided
sanctuary for al-Qaeda in the early period, and even recently
the leader of al-Qaeda, Zawahiri, pledged allegiance to the new
leader of the Taliban. So the relationship continues.
And these two steps that Pakistan clearly has taken--it
used to deny that there were any Taliban in Pakistan. When I
was Ambassador to Afghanistan, when I went to see President
Musharraf, and after a long discussion when I raised the issue
of the Taliban with him, he asked me, ``They are not here. Give
me their phone number. Give me their address.'' I had to remind
him that the leadership of the Taliban was called the Quetta
Shura, which, you know, is a big Pakistani city, and there is
also--there was Peshawar Shura, which is another big city in
Pakistan, and the media regularly went and interviewed some of
these people.
But, in any case, as you know, more recently he has
boasted, Mr. Musharraf, that he did obviously help the Taliban
and the Haqqani Network. But the Pakistani support for these
two groups has been a critical factor in my judgment in the
longevity and successes that these two groups have had against
the United States, against our forces.
We have lost quite a lot of people, as you know, military
in particular, but also non-military folks, and they have
imposed huge financial costs by making the war prolonged and
significant, requiring us to invest not only life but also
resources, and it has imposed huge costs also, both military
and civilian, on the Afghans.
Those of us who have studied insurgencies and counter-
insurgencies, if there is a sanctuary, it makes it much harder,
it takes longer, becomes more protracted to defeat that
insurgency. I am not saying other factors are not important;
they are. I mean, the question of governance, policies of the
government in charge, but sanctuaries make it much harder to
defeat insurgencies.
So it seems to me that our policy, if I would characterize
it, as one of engagement, providing support, sometimes
withholding some assistance, but one of assistance, has not
produced what we had hoped would be the result in Pakistan,
which is that they would change policy to bring the Taliban to
the negotiating table and move against those Taliban that are
not reconcilable or would not reconcile and then also to move
against the Haqqani Network. This has not happened.
So, as a nation, in my view, it is important that we debate
what to do next. And I believe that we need to consider a
different policy among our options, and the policy that I think
is worthy of consideration is one of increasing the cost of
this policy to Pakistan.
You know, typically, when you want to discourage bad
behavior, you have to do things that look like punishment or
imposing costs to shape a response. And Pakistan has believed
so far correctly that they can get aid, billions, and get
support and continue to do these things, and that we would not
confront them with the choice of either you take our assistance
or--and you can stop what you are doing or there will be no
assistance.
And I think unless we effect fundamentally that calculus,
that they confront the choice, it is unlikely that they would
adjust the policy that we require, that the Afghans require,
and indeed the world requires. I welcome some of the recent
announcement by the administration and some of the actions,
such as the drone attack against Mullah Mansour in Pakistan, I
think that sent a strong message.
I believe that the administration's effort to isolate
Pakistan, to pressure it more, is welcome, but I think it is
insufficient. We need to do more. And more, in my judgment, is,
one, we need to do additional drone attacks against targets
that are Haqqani and Taliban related.
If Pakistan does not move against the Haqqani Network and
the irreconcilable Taliban, we need to have, in my judgment,
very sharply focused sanctions against people in these two
institutions, the military, especially the Army, and the
intelligence network, were involved in support of the Haqqani
Network and the Taliban, and that would mean financial
sanctions and, in my view, also it means travel to the United
States.
I think we ought to suspend all non-humanitarian and non-
education assistance to Pakistan. I agree with the ranking
member that education is very important, and we ought to
continue with educational assistance, humanitarian assistance,
but non-education, not only our own, but in IMF I think we need
to use our influence there to make sure that the next package
that is likely to come up later this summer or early fall does
not go through without Pakistan taking the necessary measures
with regard to these two groups.
I also think we ought to consider, deliberate, debate
whether Pakistan should not be put on the list, State
Department list of sponsors of terrorism. Factually, it is.
Now, the question is, what are the pros and cons? And I think
there are costs for us not doing this, because the whole less
than problem becomes--loses its legitimacy when a state clearly
is doing something and we are not calling a spade a spade, and
that has its own cost.
And I also believe that calling Pakistan a major non-NATO
ally, given what it is doing, also raises questions of the
legitimacy of such a designation. We ought to signal that
without a change on these two issues we would recalibrate,
reconsider that designation.
And I would think that we ought to also, as we do with
regard to North Korea, a country that has nuclear weapons but
has many hostile and negative domestic and external policies,
consider as to when we might take the whole issue to the
Security Council, in collaboration with the Afghans, to
expose--we have not done as much as we could, in my view, to
expose the details of how this policy of support for Haqqani
and for the Taliban are actually conducted by Pakistan and the
implications, the ramifications of that in terms of the amount
of damage it has done to fellow Muslims in Afghanistan, besides
the killings that have taken place of the coalition forces who
are there.
I think also, as we think down the road, given that
Pakistan may choose not to respond favorably to this, we need
to look at the strengthening cooperation with India on
terrorism and counterterrorism and on strengthening
Afghanistan, that it can be hardened as--my judgment is that if
we do the steps that I have described, it is not out of the
question that Pakistan might reconsider, because I think if we
can shake this belief that they have that they can continue to
be both the beneficiary of U.S. assistance and continue to do
what they are doing with regard to the Taliban and the Haqqani
Network, with the view that eventually we will tire out--we
will get tired, we will leave, and then they can go back to
imposing a Taliban government on Afghanistan, and the good days
will be here again from their perspective regionally, we will
have to look at other ways with others who share our
perspective on terrorism, particularly India. And I just was
there last week, very serious discussions, I think we will need
to take a look at this.
I understand, Mr. Chairman, as a final point, that this is
not an easy issue. The administration that I was a part of, we
tried engagement, too, and assistance in the golden hour after
9/11 when our credibility was high, we didn't push as hard
Pakistan at that time, as we should have.
I think another golden hour may have become available after
the killing of Mullah Mansour, but by itself I think it is
insufficient. We need to get Pakistan's attention, and that
things are different, that they do need to make a choice, and I
recommended the steps that I did for your consideration.
Thank you, Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Khalilzad follows:]
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Mr. Salmon. Thank you very much, Ambassador.
On the clocks, please look at the amber light and the red
lights. I am not going to hold you to--this is too important an
issue, and we want to hear everything that you have to say, but
I know we have a lot of questions up here, too.
Mr. Roggio.
STATEMENT OF MR. BILL ROGGIO, SENIOR EDITOR, LONG WAR JOURNAL,
FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
Mr. Roggio. Thank you, sir. Chairman Salmon, Ranking
Members Sherman and Keating, and the rest of the committees,
thank you very much for having us here today to talk about this
extremely important issue.
You properly asked the question of whether Pakistan is a
friend or a foe, and unequivocally the answer is a foe.
Pakistan may combat some groups that threaten it--movement of
the Taliban in Pakistan, Islamic movement in Uzbekistan, groups
like that that are fighting the Pakistani State. However, they
support numerous terrorist organizations, organizations that
are listed by the U.S. Government as foreign terrorist
organizations.
In my testimony, I list six and give a brief description of
the activities, but we can list dozens or scores of groups that
Pakistan supports in India, in Afghanistan, groups that are
designated terrorist organizations, groups that provide aid and
support for al-Qaeda, groups whose leaders serve as the deep
bench for al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups when their
leadership is winnowed down via drone strikes by the U.S. and
Pakistan's tribal areas.
Again, the evidence is indisputable. Just this weekend, the
Indians killed a Kashmiri terrorist who is a member of Hizb-ul-
Mujahideen. This is a nasty terrorist organization. And,
Pakistan, did they welcome this killing? No. In fact, they
denounced it and referred to him as a Kashmiri separatist. This
is an individual who recruits online for holy war and is
recruiting youth and poisoning the youth to conduct terrorist
attacks.
And lest we pretend that, well, this has just been in
Pakistan an issue with Pakistan and Kashmir, it is not. These
Kashmiri terrorist groups that have been aided by the Pakistani
State base themselves in Afghanistan. I could list groups--
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Harakat-ul-Mujahideen, who the State
Department said as recently as 2014 is running training camps
inside Afghanistan.
These groups are attacking and killing U.S. soldiers, and I
haven't even touched on groups like the Taliban, the Haqqani
Network, or the Mullah Nazir Group. These are just small
groups. I concur--and for the interest of brevity and time--
Ambassador Khalilzad's statements on the Afghan Taliban,
Haqqani Network, I concur with 100 percent.
What the Pakistanis are doing, they are playing a fantastic
shell game. They have this narrative called good Taliban versus
bad Taliban. The good Taliban is any group that the Pakistani
likes, and those are groups that don't attack the Pakistani
State. These are groups that carry out Pakistan's foreign
policy--Haqqani Network, Afghan Taliban, Mullah Nazir Group.
And then, even the Pakistan press referred to this, groups
like Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Harakat-ul-
Mujahideen--again, I could go down the list. They are
considered ``good Taliban'' as well. And the bad Taliban, they
are the ones that fight the Pakistani State. They are the ones
being targeted in the Shawal Valley, in North Waziristan. When
the Pakistanis go after these groups, they pretend that they
are going after the Haqqani Network or the Mullah Nazir Group
or the Afghan Taliban, but they are not.
The Pakistanis haven't named a single high, mid-level, or
low-level leader killed in one of these operations, because
they haven't killed any of them. They haven't captured any of
them, although they are selectively targeting in the interest
of the Pakistani State.
As a matter of fact, this narrative of the good Taliban
versus bad Taliban, my Web site, Long War Journal, has been
banned in Pakistan for 4 years because we have reported on this
narrative, and it has been an issue that I have not let go of,
and we are banned because Pakistan has a history of killing
individuals that expose these types of situations.
Syed Shahzad was brutally executed by the ISI for his
reporting on links between Pakistan's Intelligence Service and
al-Qaeda, and attacks that were occurring within Pakistan. You
know, Pakistan is not going to change its calculus. These
groups that they support, they are doing this because they feel
it is their best chance in countering India, and that is why
they support them.
I also believe there is an ideological aspect within large
elements within the military and intelligence services as well,
and this is being reported on. So you have this confluence of
it helps their policy in India, as well as they get the
ideological, you know, radical jihadist support as well.
These groups are strategic depth for Afghanistan in case it
has to go to war, and it uses them in Afghanistan--I am sorry,
strategic depth within Pakistan against India, and it uses
these groups also to conduct its policy inside of Afghanistan
to target and kill U.S. forces and allied forces.
We have to change our calculus if Pakistan won't change
theirs, and I concur with Ambassador Khalilzad's statements we
need to--I believe all funding should stop. We should put a
brake on the situation until we can really get a handle on it.
Money is fungible. If we are funding Pakistani education, they
can fund Pakistani militants with the money they are saving.
We have to consider sanctions. We have to consider the
possibility of state sponsorship of terrorism. Do we limit or
cut off trade with Pakistan? Do we restrict Pakistani's travel
to the United States, cut off visas, student visas? All of
these options should be on the table, unless Pakistan changes
its habits and its--we have been enabling the Pakistani State
for 15 years now, nothing has changed, and it has only gotten
worse.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Roggio follows:]
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Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
Dr. Bacon.
STATEMENT OF TRICIA BACON, PH.D., ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY
Ms. Bacon. Good afternoon. It is an honor to appear before
you today to discuss Pakistan's policies toward militant
groups. Thank you very much for this opportunity.
After the terrorist attack on Easter Sunday in Lahore that
killed 70 people, Pakistani leaders reiterated their pledge to
cease their dual track policy of treating some groups as having
utility and going after only those that opposed the Pakistani
State. However, unfortunately, the opposite has occurred. These
distinctions have grown hardened, and the Pakistani State is
not willing to reevaluate them.
Most importantly, the calculus of the Pakistani Army, the
primary institution in Pakistan that wields power over these
policies, remains unwavering. It is evident that no terrorist
attack in Pakistan is large enough to cause them to reevaluate
their position vis-a-vis their militant proxies. Instead,
relations with the four major proxy groups--Lashkar-e-Tayyiba,
Jaish-e-Mohamed, the Haqqani Network, and the Afghan Taliban--
will remain a deeply entrenched component of Pakistan's
national security policies.
Today I would like to outline the Pakistani security
establishment's three-prong calculus vis-a-vis these
organizations, in part because in order to get Pakistan to
truly change its behavior, the United States will have to
effect all three of these aspects of its calculus.
First and foremost, as is well-known, Pakistan's security
establishment judges groups based on their utility vis-a-vis
India. This is not simply about Kashmir. This is also about
deep-seated fears that India is inherently aggressive toward
Pakistan. This extends to Pakistan's support to the Afghan
Taliban and the Haqqani Network, which stems from fears of
Indian encirclement and a desire to prevent India from
expanding its influence on Pakistan's western border.
As the military's efforts to achieve conventional parity
with India grows increasingly futile, and the security
situation in Afghanistan continues to deteriorate, Pakistan
will remain committed to these policies.
Second, the security establishment evaluates militant
groups based on how they affect the threat within Pakistan.
Though there is extensive cross-fertilization between groups
hostile to Pakistan and those seen as having utility, the so-
called good militants not only largely abstain from violence
within Pakistan, some also discourage other groups from
engaging in violence in Pakistan. Breaking ties with the proxy
groups runs the risk that they will turn their guns inward,
dangerously compounding the terrorist threat within Pakistan.
Third, the Army raised its capability to dismantle and
defeat militant groups. Because the civilian institutions are
still not capable of truly dealing with terrorism, this task
will fall to the Pakistani Army. Unfortunately, a military
approach alone will be insufficient to tackle these four
groups, and possibly could be counterproductive in efforts to
do so.
It is worth briefly noting that relationships have evolved,
especially since the 1990s when the Army provided extensive
active assistance to a number of proxy organizations. This
included resources, weapons, training, and even cover fire to
enable cross-border infiltrations. In essence, it operated in
the trenches with militant groups. U.S. and international
pressure has shifted the way these relationships function.
By far, the most important asset that the Pakistani State
continues to provide is safe haven and protection. The amount
of active assistance has decreased. However, in this current
environment, safe haven is also the most important asset that
Pakistan could provide for these groups. All four organizations
are highly capable and almost entirely self-sufficient other
than their need for safe haven.
They have other sources of funding and weapons and
equipment, as well as a sizeable cadre of capable and
experienced operatives. They no longer rely on the Pakistani
State for these things. The Pakistani Army did its job well.
The remaining asset that they need and that they receive is
safe haven. Yet the Army's relationship with Lashkar-e-Tayyiba,
Jaish-e-Mohamed, the Haqqani Network, and the Afghan Taliban
have proven resilient. These are the relationships that
survived the tremendous fallout from 9/11 and the aftermath.
While we have been deeply dissatisfied with Pakistan's
counterterrorism efforts, once-friendly militants saw
Pakistan's cooperation with the United States as a betrayal,
and they turned their guns against their patron. For Pakistan,
it has been the worst of both worlds.
While the first rationale still dominates, all three
reasons--the proxy group's utility against India and
Afghanistan, their mitigation of the domestic threat and
ability to worsen it, and the Pakistani State's limited ability
to confront them--mutually reinforced the security
establishment's ongoing relationship with militant proxies and
ensure that these ties will remain intact for the foreseeable
future.
I admit that I am skeptical of Pakistani pledges that they
will deal with the ``good militants'' once they have taken care
of the hostile ones. The bad militants, in their view, are not
going away, in part because they work closely with the good
militants. In the meantime, the so-called good militants will
grow stronger, and the Pakistani State will be even more--will
have an even more difficult task confronting them in the
future.
I hope that by shedding light on the situation it will help
the United States to better respond and manage the challenges
ahead.
With that, I thank you for your attention and look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Bacon follows:]
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Mr. Salmon. Thank you very much.
This has been very, very enlightening. You know, when I
have done town hall meetings back in my district, this probably
gets more people's dander up than anything else. And I know
when we have had votes on the floor to either defund or
significantly reduce the funding to Pakistan, it has always
done very well.
Most of the voters that I come into contact with wonder why
in the heck we give people money that actually aid and abet
those that commit terrorist acts across the globe. The other
thing that I have got to wonder, the other countries that we
try to influence, don't they think we are a bunch of chumps? I
mean, that is the other thing that I have got to wonder is, you
know, they see us as being so stupid.
And it kind of reminds me--you know, I wasn't there, but in
some of the movies I have seen about how the old Mafia used to
deal with businesses, come take money from them to protect
them, so to speak, it kind of seems reminiscent of that to me.
It is like paying the Mafia off, but no good is going to come
of it in the end.
So, Mr. Roggio, you suggested that we just cut off all
funding completely to Pakistan and go ahead and move with
whatever is required to declare them a State Sponsor of
Terrorism, and then also, you know, look at limiting travel for
those from Pakistan or the United States and possibly even look
at trade.
I am a believer that if we just cut off the funding, it is
not going to be enough. If we just cut off the funding, I don't
think it is going to be significant enough to them, to the
other resources they get from the bad guys, and so I am
wondering, why in the world have we continued to pursue this
policy of, you know, I don't know, giving them money when we
know all the bad things that they are doing. Why have we done
this policy in the first place?
I guess I could understand in the first place why we did
it, because there was some assistance in the war with terrorism
with Afghanistan. But now I don't understand the rationale.
Could you or Ambassador--any of you--give me the rationale, why
we are still doing it, do you--and what other options do we
have right now?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, I believe that part of the
reason for continuing to pursue this approach has been the
belief--and Pakistanis are very clever in manipulating us, I
have to say that, number one--the belief that they are about to
change. You cannot believe, Chairman, that so many times that
they notice that things are moving possibly toward a change in
our policy, then at that time they take an initiative to make
it hard for us to then actually go through with it. So they
know how to----
Mr. Salmon. Work us.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right. And you have noticed recently
when there has been, again, pressure on them to--isolating
them, they reach out to distinguished Members of Congress, and
they invite them for visits, they charm them, they promise,
once again, and even exact statement from ourselves that are
surprising in the face of facts as they are because we are a
polite people and we don't want to insult our hosts.
So I think the Pakistani ability to manipulate by their
actions in part has been a factor, but----
Mr. Salmon. We have been manipulated by a lot of countries.
North Korea is an example. And, I mean, I will go back to there
is a word for that. They are making chumps out of us.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, they are playing--if I might
use an undiplomatic term, but we have been patsies.
Mr. Salmon. Patsy, chump.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Yeah, right.
Mr. Salmon. Idiot.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well----
Mr. Salmon. Well, most Americans out there see through all
of this, and yet, you know, our so-called leaders don't really
get it. I can't even contemplate why on God's green earth we
even thought for a nanosecond about the F-16 sale. I am glad
that it has been scuttled, but none of it makes any sense at
all.
Mr. Roggio, you had a comment.
Mr. Roggio. Yes, just quickly. I mean, I think with the F-
16 sales, I mean, obviously, someone is going to make money off
of that, and there is a lobby in Congress, of course, to push
sales through like that. No secret.
But I also think that a lot of people in the case of the
aid that is going to Pakistan do think that it is going to do
good. But the reality is is the Pakistani madrassas are still
cranking out thousands upon thousands of potential jihadists,
who are going to join the Taliban or any of these other so-
called good militant groups, good Taliban groups.
So whatever we are providing, it is not working. It is not
changing Pakistani society. It is not changing Pakistani
education. So I think there certainly is--I understand that we
think we are doing good, but in the end, as you said, they are
treating us like chumps. They recognize it, and we are more
than willing to keep handing out money to Pakistan, so why
wouldn't they take it?
Mr. Salmon. I just have one other quick question, because
we have all asked questions from the State Department when they
have come about Dr. Afridi and what they have done to try to
secure his release. And every time it is the same, you know,
mantra, ``Oh, we talked to them about that.'' Are they doing
enough?
Mr. Roggio. Absolutely not. Look, he is being held in order
to punish the United States for what we did to kill Osama bin
Laden. By all rights, he should be a hero in Pakistan, as he is
here, and he is being held to punish us, to punish him, and to
send a message to any other Pakistani willing to help us that,
if you go ahead and do this, this is your fate. Honestly, I am
surprised he is alive.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. I will pick up right there. Ambassador, what
if we cut half of all aid to Pakistan until Dr. Afridi and his
family is here in the United States, what would be the reaction
of the Pakistani Government? And do you expect the Pakistani
people are going to riot in favor of imprisoning Dr. Afridi?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, I think that making a lot of
aid, you said half, conditional I think will have more of an
impact. I don't anticipate----
Mr. Sherman. Well, obviously, it has more of an impact on
the feckless policy we have had so far, but----
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right.
Mr. Sherman [continuing]. What will be the reaction in
Pakistan to that? Are they--first of all, at minimum, maybe
they take us up on it, we save almost $1 billion. That would be
a good thing to a lot of----
Ambassador Khalilzad. Even if they don't take us up, we
would have saved some money.
Mr. Sherman. Right. That is the point I am making.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right. But I think that my experience
in dealing with Pakistan is that they would only give you
something when they know that you are----
Mr. Sherman. Okay. Their counterargument on all this is
they can't give us Dr. Afridi, because, oh my God, it will be
some terrible circumstance in their country. If the Pakistani
Government were to put Dr. Afridi and his family on a plane for
the United States today, what harm would that Pakistani leader
have tomorrow?
Ambassador Khalilzad. No harm whatsoever, in my judgment,
because some of these groups that rise on the street, all the
groups that--based on long experience I can tell you that----
Mr. Sherman. They were told to riot, yes.
Ambassador Khalilzad [continuing]. When they raised these--
--
Mr. Sherman. I want to go on to Mr. Roggio. The F-16s, they
are going to be back, they are going to be asking for them. The
argument is that these are the planes best suited to going
after the terrorists in the frontier territories. Is there a
weapon system that is less expensive, just as good as being a
platform to survey, and to lob a missile at terrorists, and
that poses less of a--and would not be useful in going after
India? Something a lot less sophisticated.
Mr. Roggio. Yes, absolutely. As a matter of fact, I would
say F-16s or high advanced fighter planes are overkill in
conducting counterinsurgency operations, low-tech planes that
could loiter over the battlefield and deliver munitions.
Mr. Sherman. So if they are trying to get a plane to go
over the Haqqani Network, the F-16 is not the right choice.
Mr. Roggio. It is not the right choice. We use aircraft
like this in Iraq and Afghanistan because it is what we have
and what we know. But there is certainly a lot better options
available.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Sorry. If I might add, if they would
arrest first Jalaluddin Haqqani, that would be an indication
that they are serious about going after the Haqqani Network.
Mr. Sherman. Well----
Ambassador Khalilzad. They move them around themselves to
meetings and provide them with first-class housing. Made it a
little hard to believe that they are going to move militarily
against the Haqqani Network.
Mr. Sherman. Let me ask Dr. Bacon. Okay. Even a second year
law student has read 1,000 cases, could recognize when the
judge is citing a precedent correctly or incorrectly. Let's say
there is a fatwa that comes out relevant to your work at the
State Department. Do you have a State Department office that
can evaluate whether that fatwa was based on a strong hadith or
a weak hadith? Who do you go to? Who knows?
Ms. Bacon. When I was at the State Department--I left in
2013--there were a number of experts on political Islam.
Mr. Sherman. Political Islam. But were these people who had
read 1,000 fatwas and who knew the difference between a strong
and a weak hadith? Or were these Princeton graduates who had
studied the history of the Ottoman Empire?
Ms. Bacon. There were both. And within the intelligence
community, there certainly are a number of people who are
experts on it.
Mr. Sherman. Well, let's go like to State Department. Is
there a single person whose job description says they have got
to be as knowledgeable about Islamic law and Islamic
jurisprudence and Islamic theology as a graduate of the chief
school, institute in Cairo, for example?
Ms. Bacon. Especially when it comes to the countering
violent extremism efforts, there has been a number of people
who have been brought on to focus on----
Mr. Sherman. Can you name somebody who would know----
Ms. Bacon. I am no longer at the State Department, so I
would defer to----
Mr. Sherman. Okay. Who was there 2 years ago, 3 years ago?
Ms. Bacon. There were several people in the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research who were brought on for their
expertise in Islam, but I don't know who is currently there.
Mr. Sherman. Their expertise in Islam. So they have read
English books on the history of the Ottoman Empire.
Ambassador, is there anybody who is employed by the State
Department who could pass the final exams at--I forget the
name. I will----
Ambassador Khalilzad. Al-Azhar.
Mr. Sherman. Yes. Do we have--I know we have got a bunch
that can pass the final exams at the highest levels at
Princeton. Do we have a single person there that could pass
medium to low grades, the institute I just----
Ambassador Khalilzad. I have been out of the State
Department now for 7 years, ago----
Mr. Sherman. Okay. Seven years ago, did we have anybody?
Ambassador Khalilzad. I don't remember that--that we did.
Mr. Sherman. Okay. Dr. Bacon, if you could provide for the
record that there is somebody at the State Department who isn't
just an Ottoman history buff, but who has read thousands of
fatwa, who was hired because they know the difference between a
strong hadith and a weak hadith, either today or in 2013, that
would be helpful.
Thank you.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And before I get to Mr. Rohrabacher, we
have just been pinged for a vote on the floor. And we have 10
votes, and I don't think we will be coming back afterwards. So
if I could maybe get both you and Mr. Keating in.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I will try.
Mr. Salmon. Try. Thanks.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. I will go quick. I will say for
the record that the Pakistani Government, the ISI, created the
Taliban, along with the Saudis, after we left when the Soviets
withdrew from Afghanistan. Since that--at that time, the
Pakistani Government was deeply involved with creating that
regime that ended up offering safe haven to Osama bin Laden,
and the murder of 3,000 Americans.
Let us note, when we went to drive out the Taliban that the
Northern Alliance, with our help and our support, drove the
Taliban out. Where did they drive them to? Pakistan. Where did
Osama bin Laden go? Osama bin Laden, the murder of 3,000
Americans, was given safe haven for almost a decade in
Pakistan. I don't know anyone who believes that the leadership
of Pakistan did not know Osama bin Laden was there, right there
in their country, in an urban area.
Let us note that when our troops--when our brave special
forces went to bring justice to Osama bin Laden, that they had
to fly very specialized helicopters, so that they wouldn't be
shot down. By whom? By Pakistan. With airplanes that we had
given them. This is insane.
Let us note that Pakistan still holds Dr. Afridi, the man
who made it possible for us to identify Osama bin Laden, the
murderer of 3,000 Americans, and they hold him in a dungeon
today, which is nothing more than rubbing our face in the fact
that they can do that and how much they really hate us. This is
ridiculous that we give any aid whatsoever to a power like
that.
For the record, the people of Balochistan are being
slaughtered by this corrupt, oppressive regime. The people of
Balochistan have to understand--should understand the United
States is on their side because they are struggling for
independence and self-determination from a corrupt, vicious,
terrorist-supporting regime.
Same with the Sindhis. Same with other groups in
Afghanistan. So we have a regime that murders and represses and
is corrupt with their own people, and yet we still continue to
give them some type of support. It is absolutely absurd.
And, Ambassador Khalilzad, we have worked together many
years, I am going to ask you a tough question. When the Taliban
were driven out of Afghanistan and our friends in the Northern
Alliance came in and took Kabul, there was a decision made in
Bonn--and I think we were both at Bonn, Germany.
The decision was, who was then going to be the leader of
the new Afghanistan? Or at least in transition. I, of course,
was pushing for King Zahir Shah, as were a group of us who had
supported the Northern Alliance. It is my memory that you and
the administration were supporting Karzai. Was that due to
undue influence by the Pakistani Government on that
administration, the Bush administration, as they have had undue
influence on all of these administrations?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Thank you for the statement with
which I associate myself. Eloquently stated, Congressman. On
this question of Karzai's choice, why Karzai was selected, the
name of Karzai was first brought up by Abdullah Abdullah who
was a key figure in the Northern Alliance at that time.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Ambassador Khalilzad. He argued that for the next phase of
Afghanistan, Afghanistan needed a Pashtun leader that the
Northern Alliance could work with, and he thought that Karzai
was such a Pashtun. And this was the first time that we had
heard of Karzai for such a role. And Jim Dobbins, my colleague
who represented us at that time--and I was in the White House
then--reported that.
So, but then when we checked with others in the region and
beyond, Pakistan did not object to President Karzai's choice,
as well as quite a number of others.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me note for the record that that was a
pivotal decision that has led to problems. The problems that we
are discussing today, the King of Afghanistan would have been
much more independent, he was beloved by his people, he was a
Pashtun, and we turned him down. And I honestly believe, like
you said, we asked Pakistan for their opinions on it. Pakistan,
of course, pushed for someone they could control, someone who
would be consistent with their corrupt, repressive regime, and
that was Karzai.
Unfortunately, now we face this challenge today. Thank you
for your service. Thank all of you for your opinions.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
Mr. Keating. And we have 4 minutes now before the votes.
Sorry.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Because of the time,
I am going to just ask one question I think. And it is one that
confuses the public to an extent, so it is confusion or it is
downright obfuscation on the part of Pakistan.
What is the role of the ISI? You know, the assassinated
former Prime Minister Bhutto called the ISI a state within a
state. So if you could, just in that timeframe that we have
left, quickly comment on what you think that is. Are they a
rogue element there that is not answerable to Prime Minister
Sharif? How far does it go, in your opinion? You will have to
be brief. I apologize.
Ms. Bacon. I will be very brief. It is by no means a rogue
institution within Pakistan, and it is not operating
independently or on its own. It is an instrument and an arm of
the Pakistani Army, and it is implementing the policies of the
Pakistani Army. So it is not just a few officers, and it is not
making policy up. It is implementing on behalf of the Pakistani
Army.
Mr. Roggio. Yes. I concur. It is an arm of the Pakistani
military. It is executing the will of the Pakistani military,
which is indeed the Pakistani State. The government is really
just the face of the Pakistani military.
Ambassador Khalilzad. I concur with my colleagues.
Mr. Keating. That is great. We can all make our rollcall.
Thank you very much for your very clear and frank testimony,
and I yield back.
Mr. Salmon. I thank the panel. We could go on several
hours. You are amazing, and I really appreciate it.
For the record, I personally believe that we should
completely cut off all funding to Pakistan. I think that would
be the right first step, and give that a chance to work. And
then, if we don't see any changes, we move to some of the other
suggestions, Mr. Roggio, a State Sponsor of Terrorism
declaration, possible economic sanctions.
And I personally believe that right now we have the worst
policy that we could possibly have, and all we are doing is
rewarding thugs.
So I thank the panel very, very much. I thank the
gentleman. And this committee is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:01 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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