[House Hearing, 114 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] THE GROWING CRISIS IN SOUTH SUDAN ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ SEPTEMBER 7, 2016 __________ Serial No. 114-236 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ _________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 21-459PDF WASHINGTON : 2016 ________________________________________________________________________________________ For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, [email protected]. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan LEE M. ZELDIN, New York DANIEL DONOVAN, New York Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director --------- Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina KAREN BASS, California CURT CLAWSON, Florida DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee AMI BERA, California DANIEL DONOVAN, New York C O N T E N T S ---------- Page WITNESSES The Honorable Donald Booth, Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan, U.S. Department of State................................ 7 The Honorable Princeton N. Lyman, senior advisor to the president, U.S. Institute of Peace............................. 39 Mr. Brian Adeba, associate director of policy, Enough Project.... 45 LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING The Honorable Donald Booth: Prepared statement................... 11 The Honorable Princeton N. Lyman: Prepared statement............. 41 Mr. Brian Adeba: Prepared statement.............................. 47 APPENDIX Hearing notice................................................... 54 Hearing minutes.................................................. 55 Written responses from the Honorable Donald Booth to questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs......................... 56 The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations: Questions submitted for the record and written responses from: The Honorable Princeton N. Lyman............................... 58 Mr. Brian Adeba................................................ 59 THE GROWING CRISIS IN SOUTH SUDAN ---------- WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 2016 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. Smith. The subcommittee will come to order and good afternoon, everyone. Thank you for being here. On April 27 of this year our subcommittee held a hearing on South Sudan's prospects for peace. An accord that appeared to have finally ended the civil war that broke out in December 2013 was reluctantly signed by both the Government of South Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition in August 2015. We were cautioned by Ambassador Booth at the time and I remember your testimony on April 27, Mr. Ambassador, when you said that these are the most significant advancements yet in implementing the peace agreement. But you also cautioned and said it is only a first step toward lasting peace--the most difficult work still lies ahead and those words were prophetic and certainly very, very true, especially given what happened in July. Peace was never fully established in South Sudan as a result of the August agreement. In fact, as we all know, fighting spread to areas that had not previously seen armed conflict. An estimated 50,000 South Sudanese have been killed since December 2013. More than 2.5 million have been displaced and 4.8 million face severe hunger. According to the U.N. Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, or UNMISS, ``gross violations of human rights and serious violations of humanitarian law have occurred on a massive scale.'' South Sudanese women have long reported cases of sexual assault by armed forces throughout the country, sometimes in sight of UNMISS bases. This past July, between 80 to 100 armed soldiers broke into the Terrain compound which houses aid workers and international organizations' staff and for several hours they sexually assaulted women, beat residents, murdered one South Sudanese journalist, and looted the facility. UNMISS did not respond to the desperate calls for help from residents even though their own personnel lived in the Terrain compound and the U.N. Mission officials say the various components of UNMISS didn't respond to orders to mobilize from within the organization. U.N. peacekeepers were just minutes away but they refused to intervene despite being asked and having a robust legal mandate to do so. A contingent of South Sudanese military ultimately rescued the victims from other rampaging troops. The investigation by the South Sudanese Government is scheduled to be completed within days and just over the weekend our U.N. Ambassador, Samantha Power, had asked and has asked that there be an independent panel to look into what happened there. And there must be consequences for those who are found guilty. The rapidly deteriorating security and the increasingly dire humanitarian situation led me to undertake an emergency mission to South Sudan 2 weeks ago along with staff director Greg Simpkins. I have known Salva Kiir since he became First Vice President in the Government of Sudan in 2005. As a matter of fact, I met him in Khartoum only weeks after he assumed that office and I hoped my visit might convey to him the outrage over the murder, rape, sexual assault, attack on aid workers, and the precarious situation that his government faces. South Sudan is at a tipping point. The United Nations will likely take up a measure to impose an arms embargo if they do not see implementation of what looks like was an agreement over the weekend to deploy some 4,000 peacekeepers. The International Monetary Fund has strongly recommended a mechanism for financial transparency and that meets next month, likely expecting a response from South Sudan. Meanwhile, the House and Senate both have measures that have an arms embargo embedded in it as well. In Juba, we met with President Kiir, other members of the cabinet and his Defense Minister, Kuol Manyang Juuk, and the top members of his staff including the Chief of General Staff, Paul Malong, considered by many to be a major power behind the scenes. I emphasized to them that the widespread rape and sexual exploitation and abuse by soldiers must stop now and that perpetrators of these despicable crimes must be prosecuted in a response both President Kiir and Defense Minister Juuk agreed to produce a zero tolerance Presidential decree against rape and sexual exploitation by armed forces. Such a decree not only informs perpetrators that they will be punished for their actions but it places the government on the line to enforce such a decree. The U.N. High Commission for Human Rights has previously described the South Sudan's Government to hold perpetrators of abuses accountable as ``few and inadequate'' and that, of course, must change. President Kiir also gave us a copy of a Presidential order forming a commission to investigate the incident at the Terrain compound. The results of that are due any day now. There are, however, four military officers and one civilian in custody for looting the Terrain compound. But no one has been arrested for sexual assaults, beatings or the public murder of a South Sudanese journalist. One of the victims of sexual assault at Terrain is from my congressional district. After relating horrible details of the assault by two soldiers she gave us the name of the soldier who ``rescued her'' and who might be able to provide information that could be used to prosecute those who attacked her at the Terrain compound and I conveyed that to Salva Kiir and the Defense Minister. As you know, Mr. Ambassador, there are about 20,000 humanitarian aid workers in South Sudan, 2,000 of whom are from the United States and other foreign countries. If there is not greater security of these humanitarian personnel and supplies, vital assistance will diminish at a time that it is needed most. The exploitation of children as child soldiers must stop as well. According to UNICEF, 16,000 child soldiers have been recruited by all sides since the civil war began in December 2013. Moreover, this year the U.S. State Department Trafficking in Persons report gave South Sudan a failing grade place it on Tier 3, in part because of child soldiers. South Sudan faces the possibility again of a U.N. arms embargo, again, if they do not implement the deployment of the 4,000 Regional Protection Force. There is yet time for South Sudan to make its pivot to peace and good governance by faithfully implementing a comprehensive peace accord including and especially the establishment of a hybrid court signed 1 year ago. But time is running out. It is a very, very fluid and, unfortunately, volatile situation. The governments of the three guarantors of South Sudan's peace--the United States, the UK, and Norway--all have expressed their disgust with the South Sudanese Government and its armed opposition for not adhering to the August 2015 peace agreement and providing to the extent it can for the security and the well-being of its people. However, expressions of disdain are not enough. This hearing is not only intended to examine culpability for the current situation but also to try to find solutions that will safeguard the future of one of the world's newest nations and its citizens. As a guarantor of peace, the United States can and should do no less. I would like to now yield to my friend and colleague, Ms. Bass, the ranking member of the subcommittee. Ms. Bass. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you for your trip that you and Mr. Simpkins made. I know it was on very short notice but a very important delegation. So I'm glad that you did that and also that we are having this hearing so quickly. I also want to thank Ambassador Booth and Ambassador Lyman and I'm glad that we will be hearing your testimony today. I was in South Sudan in November and I went there with a small delegation to look at the U.N. peacekeeping mission at the time and that was before Machar returned and the big concern then was will he return and will the nation hold to the agreement. And it was shortly after President Kiir had divided up the nation and expanded the provinces and we were very concerned about how you could possibly, since that was done after the peace agreement, how can you hold to the peace--how can you hold to the power sharing that had been agreed to in the peace agreement if you've reconfigured the entire geography of the nation. At the time, we were concerned about what was happening with UNMISS then. But now, what is going on, how the violence had expanded and encompassed and victimized yet again South Sudanese citizens and especially the ones that are least able to protect themselves--women, girls, and youth. In response to the crisis, I joined several of my colleagues in a letter to President Obama outlining the severity of the deteriorating situation in South Sudan and calling on the U.S. to lead the way in calling for an arms embargo on South Sudan to stop the needless killing, endless brutality, and unconscionable impunity. The UNSC August 12th decision to renew UNMISS, the proposed revision of its mandate and inclusion of an additional 4,000 strong Regional Protection Force must be applauded. But there must also be clarification regarding the specific rules of engagement governing the UNMISS troops. I understand that the South Sudanese Government agreed to the additional Regional Protection Force as recently as Sunday. I look to Ambassador Booth to outline the next steps which must be taken to bring an end to the nightmare of violence not only by the long-term suffering citizens of South Sudan but also by the foreign nationals who, with total disregard for their personal welfare, seek to assist these citizens. Several of the questions that I have we'll get into in the dialogue but I want to propose them in the beginning and, obviously, the central question is what more can we do. An arms embargo, will it really be effective? It seems as though there needs to be a whole international effort that's beyond UNMISS and I want to know what your thoughts are in terms of the AU and the AU's capacity. And also, in terms of UNMISS, what will their role be? Will they be able to intervene? Will they be able to be aggressive or are they just going to be in a position where, you know, they will watch something happening. I just think that this situation has reached--and we all know this--has reached dire proportions. I was in Nigeria a couple of weeks ago and it was a staff member from the State Department actually had just been evacuated from South Sudan and sent to Nigeria. So I really want to be as specific as possible. It's important to understand the situation but I really want to get down to the brass tacks of okay, now what--what can we do--what can we do as a nation and what should the world do because otherwise I just don't see the situation getting particularly better. With that, I yield. Mr. Smith. Thank you, Ms. Bass. The chair recognizes Mr. Donovan. Mr. Donovan. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I'm going to yield my time so we give the witness some more time to testify. Thank you. Mr. Smith. Okay. Mr. Cicilline. Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you and Ranking Member Bass for calling this hearing on the growing crisis in South Sudan and thank all of our witnesses and particularly thank Ambassador Booth and Ambassador Lyman for being here today. I look forward to hearing from you on the deteriorating situation in South Sudan and as Congresswoman Bass said what we can do to be effective in responding. Like many observers, I was optimistic when South Sudan emerged in 2011 as an independent country. However, the civil war that has ravaged South Sudan since 2013 had escalated alarmingly since the subcommittee's last hearing on South Sudan in April. The impact is devastating and the potential for even deeper crisis is greatly disturbing. Not only does South Sudan face another post-conflict reconciliation process, massive and chronic humanitarian needs, high-level corruption and widespread displacement of its population, but an increase in human rights abuses including recruiting child soldiers, which is extremely distressing. U.N. officials have asserted that targeted attacks against civilians, humanitarians and U.N. personnel in South Sudan constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity, and the U.N. Mission in South Sudan reports that civilians have been directly targeted often along ethnic lines. Forces on both sides have committed widespread violence. There have been more than 260 attacks on humanitarian workers in 2016 alone, including an attack on a residence for aid workers in Juba in July which resulted in assaults on several Americans and the killing of a local journalist. The dangers faced by foreign aid workers could have a devastating effect on relief efforts. This is a critical time for South Sudan. If the current crisis cannot be brought under control and the violence halted, the situation will likely deteriorate further and could spin into complete chaos. I hope that the South Sudanese Government's decision earlier this week to allow the Regional Protection Force to deploy will enable the beginning of real improvement in this very dire situation. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on what else we can do to support stability in that part of the world and I thank our witnesses again for being here and yield back. Mr. Smith. Thank you. We are joined by full committee Chairman Ed Royce of California. Chairman Royce. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I would just start by commending you, Chairman, for your sustained focus on the crisis in South Sudan. As all of you know, Chairman Smith just traveled to South Sudan to engage with our Embassy there and to engage with our other partners, and this is the fifth, I think, South Sudan- specific hearing that the committee has held since this crisis began. What's unfortunate and, frankly, maddening is the underlying problems haven't changed in the past 3 years. It is still a man-made crisis. It is still a crisis political in nature. And what does change every day is the number of innocent South Sudanese killed, the number displaced. Tens of thousands have been killed, millions have now been displaced. I very much appreciate the recent senior-level engagement of the administration, including Secretary Kerry's trip to the region and Ambassador Samantha Power's leading of a Security Council delegation to South Sudan. I was on the phone a few hours ago with Secretary Susan Rice on this issue. It is really unclear whether this high-level diplomacy can have an impact on the ground. One of the oddities here is that the anti-American sentiment is growing in Juba as of late. There is reporting today of an incident in which the Presidential guard deliberately opened fire on a U.S. diplomatic convoy traveling through the city. I understand command and control of armed forces in South Sudan is practically nonexistent in this situation--practically nonexistent. But there should never be an instance in which American diplomats are specifically targeted ever. After lengthy Security Council negotiations, the Security Council approved of the deployment of a Regional Protection Force. I met with the Secretary-General recently of the U.N. on this issue and I shared that we welcome the establishment of a force. But I know how difficult it is going to be moving this from concept to reality. It's going to be far from easy. Special Envoy Booth, in your prepared testimony you explain that if the Secretary-General reports that the Government of South Sudan is impeding the new force's deployment, the administration would be prepared to support an arms embargo. We've made similar threats in other resolutions and I'm not sure anyone in South Sudan takes that threat of an embargo seriously anymore. I hope that we will be serious in terms of implementation of it. Interestingly, in your prepared testimony you made no mention of the existing Executive order that would allow the sanction of individuals who threaten peace in South Sudan. I think that is worth contemplating. I look forward to hearing from you why no one had been added to the U.S. sanctions list in over a year. There are, surely, people who deserve to be on that list. If we fail to hold South Sudan's political leaders on both sides accountable for the atrocities committed we cannot expect anything to change. So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Chairman Royce. Mr. Rooney. Mr. Rooney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank you for letting me sit in on your hearing. Mr. Ambassador, since the signing of the peace agreement in August 2015 and since the violence in July, the U.N. Security Council and the U.S. have both failed to implement an arms embargo, as you know, in South Sudan. The U.N. and the U.S. have both failed to sanction additional individuals that we have proof have been involved in the attacks against civilians and that continue to procure weapons and military equipment. Secretary Kerry, in February in the State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee, which I sit on and as well as yourself, in April, both told me that the U.S. is committed to holding senior officials accountable for continued cease-fire violations and human rights violations that undermine the terms of the peace agreement in South Sudan. You both said that the administration would be willing to implement sanctions on such individuals. But Secretary Kerry stopped short of endorsing an arms embargo. Also in August during a trip to Africa, Secretary Kerry threatened to withhold humanitarian assistance to South Sudan if leaders there continued to violate the peace agreement. So I'm curious to hear in your testimony why the U.S. is threatening to withhold assistance to the people of South Sudan rather than holding the leaders who perpetuated the violence accountable through sanctions and arms embargo. I would also like to know who exactly in the administration is preventing additional individuals from being sanctioned and who do not want to implement an arms embargo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Mr. Smith. Mr. Rooney, thank you very much. I would like to now welcome Ambassador Booth. Donald Booth was appointed Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan on August 28, 2013. He previously served as Ambassador to Ethiopia, Zambia, and Liberia. Prior to that, he was the director of the Office of Technical and Specialized Agencies in the Department of State's Bureau of International Organization Affairs. Ambassador Booth also has served as director of the Office of West African Affairs, deputy director of the Office of Southern African Affairs, economic counselor in Athens, and division chief for bilateral trade affairs at the State Department. Ambassador Booth, the floor is yours. STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD BOOTH, SPECIAL ENVOY TO SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Ambassador Booth. Thank you very much, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass and the members of the committee and subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak before you today. I want to discuss some of the tragic events that occurred over the past 2 months. But without ignoring the bitter reality on the ground, I also want to focus most of my remarks today on the possibilities for the way forward. Chairman Smith, as you know from your visit, South Sudan is in a dire state. The most recent outbreak of violence in early July created a perilous security situation in many parts of the country. The humanitarian situation, as many of you have noted, is one of the most extreme in the world, with 4.8 million people, over 40 percent of the population, facing life-threatening hunger, 2.5 million displaced and the economy in free fall. Serious crime is now a part of daily life for South Sudanese and aid workers and their supplies are targets as well. The violence in early July came about because neither President Salva Kiir nor First Vice President Riek Machar was willing to work with the other to implement the peace agreement or to set up the security arrangements that were designed to prevent a return to fighting Juba. We saw the moment of greatest optimism since the signing of the August 2015 peace agreement, the establishment in late April of the transitional government. We saw it shattered by the irresponsibility and ruthlessness of South Sudan's leaders. Both leaders lost control of their forces during a moment of tremendous political fragility, and government soldiers engaged in sexual violence against civilians including the attacks on both South Sudanese and foreigners at Terrain Camp. Now, I would be remiss not to pause here and praise the work of Ambassador Molly Phee and her team at Embassy Juba. They have faced enormous hardships and real danger in doing their jobs and their work has been, frankly, extraordinary. They have, against long odds, preserved the engagement needed to help the people of South Sudan. They have done so despite two events that I know are on your minds. First, on the night of July 7th, just a few hours after a deadly encounter between government and opposition security forces in the same area, two vehicles carrying several of our diplomats were fired upon by government soldiers. Fortunately, because they were both armored vehicles, the occupants were not injured. Ambassador Phee confronted President Kiir the following day and received an apology as well as assurances that there would be a thorough investigation. That day, however, was also the same day that major fighting broke out between the government and opposition. The second event was much more tragic--the attack by scores of uniformed government security forces against the Terrain Camp where 12 Americans and over 30 third country and South Sudanese nationals were located. The attack involved hours of looting, beatings, rapes and the murder of a prominent South Sudanese journalist, John Gatluak. I would like to express at this point my personal condolences to John's family and to all of the survivors of the attack. That attack occurred toward the end of 2 days of heavy fighting in Juba which saw government forces drive out Machar's security contingent. Even as shooting raged near the U.S. Embassy compounds, as soon as the Embassy was alerted to the attack, Ambassador Phee contacted South Sudanese security officials whom she believed still had command of their forces and the convinced them to intervene to rescue those under assault at the camp. I want to stress that Ambassador Phee did everything within her power and resources in those circumstances to assist those who were under assault at the Terrain Camp. In the aftermath of the attack, our priority was the care and evacuation of the victims and then to protect their privacy and to demand justice for them. My written testimony contains a thorough account of what we know about the awful events at Terrain Camp that day as well as what we are doing to ensure safety of our personnel. Now, I would like to focus the rest of my statement on what I see as the way forward or at least a way forward. First, in the wake of the fighting in Juba in July, a political accommodation to avoid further fighting and suffering remains as important as ever. But given that neither President Kiir nor former Vice President Riek Machar could prevent their security entourages from fighting, we do not believe it would be wise for Machar to return to his previous position in Juba. That said, this cannot serve as a justification for President Kiir to monopolize power. What is most urgently needed is creation of a secure space in Juba for an inclusive political process to forestall further violence. That is why we strongly support the Intergovernmental Authority on Development's call for deployment of a Regional Protection Force to Juba to provide for free and safe movement throughout the capital. The RPF should proactively contribute to stability and thereby allow for the demilitarization of Juba. But we must be clear that the government will need to allow the RPF to do its job once it is in Juba. No political process can take place as long as large numbers of armed men and heavy weaponry remain in the capital. Stabilizing the security situation in Juba is only the first step. Any political process, to be credible and viable, must be inclusive. I believe what is needed is for South Sudan's political and military leaders in and out of government to meet together to figure out how to jointly shoulder responsibility for preventing further bloodshed. However, this can only succeed if those currently in power are willing to accommodate the legitimate interests of others. The violence in early July drove out significant factions of the SPLM-in-Opposition, of the Former Detainees and other political parties. These groups must be deterred from supporting any further violence. Thus, they must see a path for peaceful engagement. South Sudan's leaders must also look ahead to the creation of a professional inclusive national army and other security institutions. They need to be able to articulate an agreed end state of security sector reform. As any international support for cantonment, or DDR, activities will depend among other things on the credibility of the envisioned security sector end state. The Transitional Government should then prioritize legislation, establishing an open consultative process for drafting and ratifying a new constitution under which elections will be held at the end of a transitional period. In addition, the Transitional Government should prioritize legislation regarding the African Union-led Hybrid Court for South Sudan. A recent opinion survey showed that 93 percent of South Sudanese believe there can be no enduring peace without accountability. We agree. What I have described is a sequence of interdependent events. I'm describing them as a way forward, not because it will be easy to implement them but because it is difficult to see any other path that does not lead to a future of oppressive one-party rule, renewed conflict or, most likely, both. I am not naive about the chances of these things happening. Our ability to influence events in South Sudan and steer its leaders to a more constructive behavior is limited. The Security Council's permanent representatives just returned from a trip to South Sudan. We were pleased that the council was able to come to agreement with the Transitional Government on several key issues including the government's consent to deployment of the Regional Protection Force and to work with the U.N. Mission that's already there. However, we now need to see those words turned into action. If the Secretary-General's report finds that the government is obstructing deployment of the Regional Protection Force or continuing to prevent UNMISS from fulfilling its mandate we are prepared to support an arms embargo in the Security Council. Beyond an arms embargo, we stand prepared to impose visa restrictions on individuals involved in public corruption, as official corruption has a long history in South Sudan and has played a direct role in furtherance of conflict in the country. Mr. Chairman, I would have liked to come before this subcommittee today with better news. Unfortunately, we now face a difficult and uncertain path for South Sudan. It is a frustrating and disheartening situation, particularly, of course, for South Sudanese. It is their future that grows bleaker by the day. With them in our minds I believe we must continue to press South Sudan's leaders to give peace a chance. Thank you for inviting me to speak today and I look forward to answering your questions. [The prepared statement of Ambassador Booth follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ---------- Mr. Smith. Mr. Ambassador, thank you so very much for your statement and your fine work. Without objection, your full statement will be made a part of the record. Just a few opening questions, and I do want to add my congratulations and thanks to Ambassador--the U.S. Ambassador to South Sudan, Molly Phee, and her staff who, under unbelievably trying circumstances, have been working around the clock to try to secure the peace, provide for access of humanitarian aid workers, which is one of the biggest impediments and why so many people are dying of malnutrition and why so many young people, especially children and babies, are succumbing to starvation. They are working hard and I want to thank her for her leadership as well. Let me ask you about the zero tolerance policy that the Defense Minister, when I asked him said they would do against rape and sexual assault. He made it very clear that he was going to call the President to try to get him to do it as well. We did meet with Salva Kiir and I raised it with him and he too said he would do it. We have called back since then, a little over a week. It hasn't been promulgated yet and, of course, the mere issuance of a statement without implementation is not worth the paper it is printed on. So we are hoping that the two will go hand in hand. Good strong statement--hold these service members, these armed forces to account, and police, and put them behind bars when they sexually assault and rape and kill and maim. Your thoughts on that. Secondly, Ambassador Lyman, who as you know will be testifying on the second panel, who performed your job admirably and with great distinction when he was the Special Envoy, makes the point in his testimony that the new rapid protection force should not be under UNMISS, the U.N. Mission there. Greg Simpkins and I met with Ellen Loj, who's the head of the United Nations Mission and she said they tried to get commanders to make the trip which is only or less than a mile away to try to save people who were under assault at Terrain and they wouldn't go, and this isn't the first time. It's happened several times. They have the right rules of engagement. This isn't Sarajevo all over again or UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. They have robust rules of engagement in Chapter 7 powers. He suggested it be under a separate authority and mission. Your thoughts on that, whether or not that would be improvement and provide some additional help. And then the access issue--it seems to me that if, as I said, people will die if there is not humanitarian access. The huge majority of humanitarian workers are South Sudanese who, in a way are in a special category of risk--your thoughts on what we could do there. And then security sector reform--when you testified last time you put the agreement under four basic baskets which are mutually inclusive of each other--governance and constitutional reform, macroeconomic reform and transparency, security sector reform, and justice and reconciliation. And I think as you pointed out and as pointed out by others, the Hybrid Court ought to be set up. It ought to be done yesterday to hold people to account for acts of impunity and crimes against humanity. But the security sector reform seems like the most daunting challenge. With all the militias and the lack of chain of command that appears to be the situation there, your thoughts on the prospects of meaningful systemic reform of the military. Ambassador Booth. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me go through those. First of all, I want to thank you for being such a strong advocate for the zero tolerance policy on gender-based violence and for rape other such crimes and for raising that at the highest levels during your visit in Juba. It's certainly something that we are following up on. Unfortunately, like many commitments that are made when we meet with senior officials in South Sudan, the promises are not always turned into reality. But it is something that, certainly, is important and we will continue to push on that. We will let you know what success or lack of success we may have in that regard. Secondly, as regards to the Regional Protection Force, there are a number of reasons why IGAD proposed and we have supported putting the Regional Protection Force as part of the U.N. Mission in South Sudan. First of all, there is the issue of funding it, and a separate stand-alone force under an African Union or an IGAD flag would have faced problems of being funded and would have severely delayed its ability to be deployed. Doing it under the U.N. may not be always the fastest but that's one of the things that I've been engaging on in my many trips to the region and talking with chiefs of defense and foreign ministry officials as well as other senior leaders to ensure that the three countries that have pledged troops to this Regional Protection Force--Ethiopia, Kenya, and Rwanda-- would be, indeed, prepared to move their forces very quickly and we would be prepared to help them to move them quickly to do that. Also, this force was designed in a way that it would be under one commander and that commander would report to the force commander of UNMISS but would have the authority and the mandate from the troop-contributing countries to use that force for the very specific tasks of the mandate in U.N. Security Council Resolution 2304, which is to ensure the free movement of people in Juba, to protect critical infrastructure including the airport and keeping it open, and in intervening should anyone be planning or engaging in attacks on the U.N., on civilians, on IDPs--a very broad mandate. And, again, in our discussions with the troop-contributing countries, they have assured us that the troops they would deploy to do this mission would have the political backing in their capitals to, indeed, enforce those tasks. So I understand the skepticism that many may have, having looked at other U.N. Missions. But this seemed to be the most practical and expedient way of getting troops on the ground who could actually provide a security umbrella in Juba. But as I said in my testimony, just putting those forces on the ground will not solve the problem. They need the cooperation of the South Sudanese Government and in the peace agreement and particularly in the security arrangements that followed it that were negotiated after the signing of the agreement in August 2015. There was a limitation on the number of forces that both Salva Kiir, the government, and Riek Machar, the opposition, could have in Juba and all other forces were to be at least 25 kilometers outside of the city. So that is at least a starting point for taking the heavy weapons and many of the security forces that are currently in Juba and getting them out and we would hope that the government would cooperate in further reducing the military footprint so that the citizens of Juba can feel more secure and so that there is the room for the political dialogue that I talked about. On humanitarian assistance, this is indeed a terrible situation. Since the outbreak of this conflict, 59 humanitarian aid workers have been killed, making South Sudan the most dangerous place for humanitarian aid workers, more dangerous than Syria, I am told. And so this is a serious problem. It is something we have engaged repeatedly on. In my many visits to Juba I have engaged with President Kiir, Defense Minister Kuol Manyang and others on this. We keep receiving assurances that this issue will be addressed, that orders are issued, that they simply need to have a specific example so they can go after individuals who might have been harassing aid workers or stealing aid. But, frankly, this has become a systemic problem. Shortly after the fighting in July, there was looting of many different stores in Juba. One was the World Food Programme warehouse, and it was very organized. A truck came with a crane, not only to loot the food but to take the generator from the WFP compound. So this, indeed, does need to investigated and people need to be held accountable. I think that is the only way that the message will get out that the government is truly serious that humanitarian aid workers and their supplies are meant for the people of South Sudan and should not be interfered with. But this is going to be a continued engagement and a hard slog, I am sure, with the government in Juba. On security sector reform, the peace agreement and in particular the security arrangements negotiated after it called for a security and defense sector review board to outline sort of the end state of the security arrangements of South Sudan-- what the army would look like, the security services, the police, et cetera. That board had just begun meeting when things fell apart in July this year. But even under the peace agreement it was foreseen that it would not come to conclusions for about 18 months into the transitional period whereas the idea of cantoning forces and beginning a DDR process was to start prior to that. What I'm proposing, and I've said in my testimony, is that we really need to have an idea of what the end state is. South Sudan has suffered for too long as a heavily militarized state, probably understandable in that it was the product of a long liberation struggle--Anyanya I and Anyanya II against the government in Khartoum--so almost 50 years of struggle. But it is time that South Sudan, in order to be able to be at peace and to prosper needs to be a less demilitarized state. So can we get South Sudanese to agree on what the end state is and if we agree that that's a sustainable and reasonable end state that's something that then we can look to support. So, really, our leverage on getting a meaningful security sector reform is that we will not fund things if it isn't a reasonable outcome that we are driving toward. And then on the Hybrid Court, again, we share frustration that this is moving more slowly than we would like. I have engaged numerous times and we had our legal experts engage with the African Union. We are at the verge of giving them $3.3 million to actually begin some of the work. We have encouraged them to move forward on at least establishing an office for the prosecutor so that testimonies and evidence can begin to be collected even before the court is established and judges can decide on who would be indicted or who would be looked at by the court. So that's something we want to push forward. I discussed that also with the African Union High Representative for South Sudan, the Honorable President Konare, former President of Mali, who has been deeply engaged for the past year as well in trying to sort out the problems of South Sudan. Thank you. Mr. Smith. Ms. Bass. Ms. Bass. Thank you again, Mr. Ambassador. I wanted to know if you could tell me the status of the former President of Botswana, Festus Mogae, and if you could, one, review the role he is playing and then the status of that. We've talked about humanitarian aid and I know no one wants to see that end, but how can humanitarian aid get to the population? You mentioned the World Food Programme and the theft--the organized theft that took place and I wanted to know if that was the government or the opposition. We have talked about an arms embargo and I mentioned that in my opening and I wanted to know, one, what is the position of the administration on an arms embargo and where are the South Sudanese getting their arms from now? I also wanted to mention a couple other items. Ambassador Booth. Thank you, Congresswoman. Let me start with question about the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, which is headed by Botswana former President, Festus Mogae. He was appointed by IGAD to fulfill the role as chair of JMEC. Now, JMEC is a committee that is made up of South Sudanese parties as well as of the members of IGAD Plus, who are both guarantors and in our case a witness of the peace agreement. We're not a guarantor of the peace agreement. And he chairs monthly meetings of that group, and his function is to oversee the implementation of the agreement and where the parties get stuck in implementing he is to recommend ways forward. And if the parties are blocking implementation his recourse is to report to IGAD, to the African Union Peace and Security Council and to the U.N. Security Council, and he had done a number of reports to those various bodies. He has tackled issues such as the problem of the 28 states, the impasse in the seating of members of the transitional legislature and other elements of the agreement that the parties were unable to actually find a way to implement because they were not working in good faith with each other. After the events of July 8 to 11, JMEC temporarily moved its operations to Addis Ababa. They have now gone back to Juba, and one of the tasks that the Security Council asked JMEC to undertake is to hold a security workshop to determine the level and arming of forces that should remain in Juba, and I understand that President Mogae has convened a meeting which will be held on the 22nd and 23rd of this month to look at that. So those are the types of activities that JMEC is doing. We are one of the major supporters of JMEC. We have contributed over $3 million to the operation of the JMEC and we believe it is a critical component for successful implementation of any part of the peace agreement. It has been criticized by the government in particular for usurping government authorities. We do not see it that way at all. We see it as the neutral--President Mogae in particular as the chairman, as the neutral arbiter of implementation of the agreement. On humanitarian access, I just really would like to clarify one thing on what Secretary Kerry was expressing in the press conference in Nairobi. I really think what he was expressing there was not a plan to cut off humanitarian assistance from the United States but, rather, a frustration with the continued interference with the humanitarian assistance that we are providing and really trying to put South Sudan's leaders on notice that they have to get serious about dealing with this. That was the message---- Ms. Bass. I wasn't referencing Secretary Kerry, really. I know that there is concern about that here. Ambassador Booth. Yes. So, again, how do we get the humanitarian assistance delivered? It is a systemic problem and it is partly related to the criminality. The WFP warehouse incident, for example, occurred after opposition forces were driven from the capital so it would have to have been government forces that were doing that looting. And, again, that is the type of thing that needs to be investigated and some examples need to be made of people who were involved in that type of activity. Of the people that the government claims it has arrested for looting in the aftermath of the fighting in July it is not clear to us that any individuals--of those individuals particularly involved are being looked at for involvement in this attack. And then the arms embargo--what we have tried to do with the arms embargo, as it is a major tool, is to achieve progress toward peace by threatening it and we have used that on a number of occasions and we think it is one of the reasons that the government is seriously looking at allowing the deployment of the Regional Protection Force because they know that if there is impediments to that--that the United States and I know that many other members of the Security Council are already on record of supporting the arms embargo. But I think most importantly what they heard when the Security Council permanent representatives went to Juba this past weekend was a unanimous Security Council that was saying when we pass a resolution, even though some may have abstained on it, it is the Security Council that is speaking and so you have to take that seriously. And as I mentioned in my testimony, if the Secretary- General reports that there is continued obstruction of this force we are prepared to move ahead and, as we said in Security Council Resolution 2304, which we have the pen on, that there is an appended resolution to be voted on, which is an arms embargo resolution, and we are also prepared to look at other tools such as sanctions. I must say, though, our record in getting additional people sanctioned in the Security Council has not been good. We had what we thought was a very good case back about a year ago when fighting flared up in the Malakal area right after the signing of the peace agreement and the two generals who were responsible for this--Paul Malong on the government side and Johnson Olony on the opposition side--we put their names forward for sanctioning and the Council--several members of the Council blocked that effort. So it is not--even when you think you have a very clear case it is not easy to get the Council to agree on that and it is--to be effective travel and financial sanctions really do need to have the backing of a broader community than just the United States. Ms. Bass. Did you mention who's the primary or where's the primary place that they get their arms from? Who is selling them the arms? Ambassador Booth. They seem to have mainly come from the former Soviet Union area but I think most of them come in through the gray or black market arms market. I don't have specific countries that I can attach to specific arms platforms because obviously, the government goes to some lengths to keep that information to itself. But, clearly, it has access still to arms and---- Ms. Bass. Which is why I wonder about the effectiveness of an arms embargo. But anyway---- Ambassador Booth. Well, that's why if an arms embargo is voted it has to be something that is done by the Security Council so that it will have the imprimatur of that body and the weight of the international community behind it. Ms. Bass. So, Mr. Chair, before I yield I just wanted to bring attention to someone who's in the audience who was a former intern with me, David Acuoth, who was part of the Lost Boys and Lost Girls that have been living very successfully in the United States and is leading an effort with other Lost Boys and Lost Girls--I should say Lost Men and Lost Women because they are all grown. But we actually plan to next week introduce legislation calling for a program that would be run by us, by the State Department, to allow some of the former Lost Boys and Lost Girls to return to South Sudan. Those individuals who have come here, who have gotten their education, who have been successful and want to go back and give back to their country, obviously, no one would suggest that they go back right now. But given the length of time it takes to do legislation we certainly would hope if a program like that is instituted it was one that had been suggested before many years ago by one of your former colleagues that it is something that we might consider. So I just want to mention that and I will save my other questions for the next witness. Mr. Smith. Mr. Donovan. Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Ambassador, thank you for your service to our country. Many of the things that you spoke about are troubling. Two things I would like for you to address, if you could for us, is one, is the recruitment of children to fight in these battles and the other is the U.N. Mission and South Sudan's inability to protect the workers that are going there on humanitarian missions. And the last thing, if you have a moment, is you spoke about the path of peaceful engagement. I was just curious about how you think we get there. Ambassador Booth. Thank you, Congressman. On child soldiers, I think the number was already read out of about 16,000 supposedly have been recruited during the course of this conflict since December 2013. Child soldiers had been a problem in South Sudan before this current conflict. It's something that we had actually engaged very robustly with the Ministry of Defense prior to December 2013 on and which we were making actually some real progress in getting child soldiers out of the SPLA and even addressing those who were in many of the militias throughout the country. Mr. Donovan. Ambassador, what ages are we speaking about, if you know? Ambassador Booth. I have heard of children as young as 10 and 12 being involved. It could be even younger, in some cases. But this is something that we have been constantly engaging them on. Now, during the height of the conflict they were recruiting both sides, opposition and government, and they were utilizing militias and many of these militias are traditional youth organizations that go on traditional cattle raids and there is sort of no distinction there in terms of age of majority, if you will. And so they ended up being, I think, swept into the fighting. So that's part of the problem. But, clearly, as we look--and I talked about a security sector end state. Clearly, we would want to see a security sector end state that the government would support. They would have no place at all for child soldiers and we will continue to engage on that. The State Department last week, I think, issued a very direct statement condemning the use of child soldiers in South Sudan and the continued practice of that there. On UNMISS and its problems in protecting humanitarian workers, I would just like to give a little bit of context. The U.N. Mission in South Sudan on December 14, 2013, the day after the trouble started in Juba, they had camps in Juba and in other towns. Their own bases had become the sanctuary of tens of thousands of South Sudanese who were fleeing ethnically-based killing and this was a new move, if you will, for the U.N. to actually let people onto their bases in such numbers. But we think it was the right thing to do at the time and that it saved thousands of lives to have that happen. But what has resulted is the U.N. is now saddled with somewhere between 150,000 or so people that are actually now in, if you will, their own facilities--their own camps--that they have to provide static protection to and in many instances they don't control much of a perimeter around where their camps were and so it takes a fair number of troops to be able to provide that static protection. So this means that there are fewer troops available for moving out into the city and to the countryside. But we have had numerous successes. For example, back in April of this year Ambassador Phee worked very diligently with the government in Juba, the regional governor in then Unity State and the U.N. Mission to put in a forward base in Leer, which is in Unity State. So it was a hot spot for humanitarian needs and the humanitarian community was demanding protection there. And so the U.N. did go and establish a forward base there and that enabled humanitarians to access an area that they had not been able to get to for almost 2 years of the conflict. So we have had successes like that in some specific cases. But the ability of the U.N. to be able to move about the country as well as in Juba has been restricted by the government. UNMISS has had two helicopters shot down by government forces over the years--one before the conflict and one since-- and when they need to fly they need to get government permission to fly to make sure that it is safe and the government does not always give that. So, again, I would go back to the problem is perhaps partly UNMISS but it is also mainly the government which has not allowed UNMISS to do all that it could do to facilitate humanitarian assistance delivery and that function-- humanitarian assistance delivery and supporting that--is one of the four key functions that the Security Council has given to UNMISS. So they, clearly, understand that as part of their mandate. Mr. Donovan. And if you could just spend a moment, because my time had expired, just about your vision on how we get to this path of peaceful engagement. Ambassador Booth. Well, I think the first step is, as I said, getting Juba secured so that there is some space for a political engagement. Now, why would those that are sitting in Juba now who feel that they can implement the agreement where they are--why would they go forward on that. I think the answer to that is that they have to ensure that these people that have been driven out over the past 2 months and others that felt already excluded from the peace process, if they are not given a peaceful path forward, a political path forward, it is going to result in more widespread fighting throughout the country. And can this government afford that? Is that what it wants its legacy to be, a South Sudan that goes down with more and more fighting in more and more parts of the country? So there is going to have to be pressure on the leaders for sure. But, frankly, it is the only way forward that's going to lead to peace, is to have this open up some political space and have this discussion with others. Mr. Donovan. Thank you very much, sir. Mr. Smith. Mr. Meadows. Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, let me come back to a question that my colleague, Ms. Bass, asked you, because your response was a little troubling with regards to arms and where they're coming from and where they are not coming from. Are you suggesting in your testimony that we don't know? Because you said it was a gray market. But we have unbelievable intelligence even in that region. So are you suggesting we don't know or that you can't say? Ambassador Booth. Congressman, what we do know I would have to address in a different setting than this. Mr. Meadows. All right. That's fair enough. I just wanted to make sure we clarified because here's my concern, Ambassador. I have followed Sudan and South Sudan before there was a South Sudan and it has been a passion for my family from a humanitarian standpoint. The true stories that have been told will break anyone's heart on what so much has not only been done but has not been done. And so I appreciate you being the Special Envoy and your work there in a very complex and difficult situation. But what I've also come to find out is that from both sides--those who would be supportive of Sudan and those who would be supportive of South Sudan in a particular position--they believe that the United States has failed to live up to the promises that we've made and that we make threats that we don't follow through on. And even some of your testimony here today would seem to underscore that, that when we talk about arms embargo or sanctions does it not have a chilling effect if we ask for sanctions and they don't get passed by the U.N. that there is no consequences--that life is going to be like it always has been? Ambassador Booth. Well, first of all, on the threats and particularly the example that I gave of the two generals, even then, while we were trying to get them on the list we were using that as leverage to get them to stop the fighting and they were both told directly that we were going to sanction them. We were proceeding in New York to do so and the only way they could get out of this would be if they stopped the fighting. Well, while the sanctions committee did not approve that into the list, it also did have the beneficial effect of the fighting dying down in the same time frame. So cause or effect, I can't prove it. But I think it---- Mr. Meadows. I think the results speak for themselves. But here's the concern I have. If we make too many idle threats that are not backed up by action then ultimately what happens is the threat becomes irrelevant and, Ambassador, do you believe that our country, indeed, the State Department is using all its leverage points to accomplish the task at hand on dealing with the issue in South Sudan? Are we using every leverage point that we have? Ambassador Booth. Congressman, I think--I think we are using all the leverage points that we have. Some take some time to develop. Sanctions cannot be imposed even bilaterally under U.S. law without a rather extensive package that could hold up in a court of law. Mr. Meadows. Right. Right. Ambassador Booth. And so sometimes, you know, when you think you need to move against someone you find that the actual evidentiary requirements are not there. This is, as you mentioned, the idea of idle threats. This is one reason we don't just take names up to the Security Council if we don't think we can get them through. It is also why, for example, we often, as we have done with the arms embargo, we will say this will--we will move on this and we will put the full weight of the United States behind trying to achieve this if you don't do X or Y. Mr. Meadows. Well, the reason I ask is because it sounds like you walked back a little bit Secretary Kerry's comments here today and I guess why would you walk those back? Ambassador Booth. Well, I'm certainly not trying to walk back what the Secretary said. But our humanitarian assistance-- -- Mr. Meadows. That is what it sounded but anyway, you go ahead and clarify. That's why I am asking. Ambassador Booth. Humanitarian assistance is something that we provide on the basis of need. It's not something we provide on the basis of political---- Mr. Meadows. But it is something that we must prioritize. And so if some groups are using it inappropriately there is more need than there is ability, even for a very prosperous nation like the United States. And so do they understand that there is a priority for humanitarian relief? Ambassador Booth. That is something that I think---- Mr. Meadows. But if they don't understand it please let them understand it based on this hearing. Ambassador Booth. I think it came across from what the Secretary said. It certainly is something that I've made very directly to them, that they are not the only place in the world that needs humanitarian assistance, that there are many other-- -- Mr. Meadows. And this comes from someone who is--my kids collected money in tennis cans to give to them to support. So, I mean, it is not out of a noncompassionate heart. Let me ask you one other question. I think there is a new law about NGOs and 80 percent of those NGOs have been having to be South Sudanese citizens in order--is that correct? Are my notes correct on that? Ambassador Booth. Yes. Mr. Meadows. So tell me about the implications. If that is indeed correct would that not have a chilling effect on some of the work that the NGOs have done and could do in the future? Ambassador Booth. This NGO law has been something that's been in the making for a long time, something that I've engaged on several occasions directly with President Kiir on. Yes, there is a provision that says the percentage of workers of NGOs need to be South Sudanese. This is something that many countries do to try to ensure that aid workers or aid organizations are also hiring local staff. There are a number of problems with the bill that we've pointed out. A lot of them have to do, frankly, with things like excessive registration requirements and also very vague references to what is allowed and what is not allowed that allows the government to interpret whether an NGO is doing the right thing or not. Mr. Meadows. All right. So let me ask, and be specific then--this new law do you see it having the potential of providing less humanitarian relief to some of the most needy in the country--the potential? Ambassador Booth. We certainly see this law as having a potential impact on the ability of NGOs, both international and local, to operate. Mr. Meadows. So does the President--their President not see that? Ambassador Booth. Well, I'm sure that they do see that. Mr. Meadows. But they think that we are just going to go ahead and just go along and fund it and create a jobs program? Ambassador Booth. Well, I wouldn't see this as a jobs program. I think most NGOs probably do hire more than 80 percent of their staff being local. I don't think that's---- Mr. Meadows. So why the need for the law then? Ambassador Booth. Well, that's a good question and these are some of the issues that we have raised repeatedly over 3 years when this has been under consideration. Mr. Meadows. Well, if you could---- Ambassador Booth. It is a problematic law and we have made that very clear. Mr. Meadows. Okay. If you could, as the Special Envoy, take to their very highest government officials a sincere concern from Members of Congress on this new law that potentially the humanitarian relief that needs to get to needy families and citizens could be stopped because of the unintended consequences of a new law and that we would ask them to reconsider. And with that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Meadows. Mr. Rooney. Mr. Rooney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador, you paint a very bleak picture and what we have talked about here today and the testimony you've given--we talk about a government that has lost control of its military from time to time, an opposition that's gone--a government that has raided humanitarian and food aid from this country of which I sit on the committee which helps appropriate that money, which is why it is concerning to me. But as a Catholic, it is also concerning to me that this would happen in this day and age that we, as Americans, wouldn't be able to do anything about it. And the only thing it seems like you've said that we have leverage to use is this arms embargo and we keep threatening to use it but we never really get there. And then I just noticed that maybe it might be a political thing to say if we use an arms embargo then we are admitting some kind of failure as a government. I hope that is not the case. I hope that it is a sincere ploy or a sincere intention of this government to use an arms embargo because guess what? What can it hurt if we actually do it? If this guy controls the government there is no opposition. He's used the term over-militarization--you used that term. If that is true, then the only thing that we can control is how much militarization is in that country. Then what can it hurt if the United States does take the lead to say that enough is enough? We've got diplomatic envoys being shot at. We have got all kinds of crimes that we have talked about against its own citizenry. We have got humanitarian aid and food being seized upon. We have got the opposition has fled. We have got a government that has lost control of its own military and we keep threatening to use this arms embargo as if it is something that well, maybe if we say this one more time we will put this security force in there of 4,000 people, which I got to be quite honest with you--I don't think they are going to do anything. I think that this is just going to keep going on and on and we are going to be right back here again at the next hearing talking about how this has failed but we might use an arms embargo again. I just want to know what will it hurt if we do it. Is it an admission by the administration that we failed in South Sudan? Is that the problem? Ambassador Booth. Well, Congressman, as I've said the--it is a major tool and to be effective it has to be done multilaterally, not by---- Mr. Rooney. Why? Just do it. Just use the United States as the leader of the free world and do it and other people will follow. Who cares if it is unilateral? That doesn't make any sense. We build coalitions all the time and people follow us because we are the number-one country in the world. We are the sole superpower. Ambassador Booth. Right. And because it is such an important tool we have used it effectively and we think we are using it effectively now to leverage a way forward for South Sudan to get it back to a path of peace and political dialogue. Mr. Rooney. Do you believe that? Do you believe that we are going to create this space in Juba like you say and there is going to be elections and a political process and a constitution and all that? Do you believe that--unless we do something affirmative? Ambassador Booth. Well, something affirmative we are trying to do is we are trying to get this force on the ground and get Juba to be demilitarized and this is the leverage we are using to try to get there. Now, the South Sudanese may very well not cooperate with this, in which case, as I have said, we are prepared to move forward on that as well as potentially other sanctions. So---- Mr. Rooney. Okay. I hope you do. Ambassador Booth [continuing]. Our frustration level is--we share it. Mr. Rooney. Yes. Hey, you are on the front lines so, I mean, I appreciate your service. I just don't believe that any of this stuff is going to work anymore. I don't think that the security force is going to work. I think that we need to move forward with an arms embargo now and stop as much bloodshed and killing as we can and protect the food and humanitarian aid that Mr. Meadows talked about getting in there by however means we need to figure out how to do that because I think that's the only thing that's left to do is to help the people that are starving and being oppressed. But, trying to talk about elections and that kind of stuff, I don't buy it. I yield back. Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Rooney. Mr. Rooney. Mr. Cicilline. Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Mr. Ambassador, what is your best assessment of the anticipated timeline for the Regional Protection Forces, both troop generation and deployment, and how long do you expect that negotiations with the government will continue on the composition of the RPF? How long will that delay the deployment? Have any countries outside the immediate subregion besides Rwanda indicated that they might consider providing troops to the RPF? Ambassador Booth. Okay. On the time line--what I have been told by the military leaders in the region is that they are prepared to deploy the troops very quickly, within a matter of weeks, after there is permission from the government to go in. They have made it clear they are not fighting their way into Juba. The U.N. does not send missions to fight their way into countries. But if the government in Juba accepts this force and provides land for it to be bivouacked on, what I have been told is they are prepared to move the troops very quickly. Moving the equipment will take a little bit longer and that is something that they have indicated that they might need some help with. Mr. Cicilline. Maybe I wasn't clear, because I recognize that the troops are prepared to--I guess my question is what's the length of time the government is likely to engage in negotiations. That is really the unknown piece of it. Ambassador Booth. Well, yes. I mean, there's also questions about how fast sometimes countries can actually mobilize their troops. Mr. Cicilline. Right. Ambassador Booth. In terms of that--this is what the Secretary-General's report, which should come out and will be discussed next week in the Council and will be about is the government really moving forward to accept this force and the message that was given by the Security Council visit, that Secretary Kerry gave with regional leaders including to the South Sudanese when we met in Nairobi on the 22nd of August, was a very clear message that we expect that this force is going to be deployed. It is going to be deployed as envisioned by IGAD, which is with the troops from those three countries who are committed to this mission of actually ensuring freedom of movement around Juba, protecting the critical infrastructure including the airport and preventing violent actions. So protecting civilians in a more robust, not a static, manner. Those troop-contributing countries have agreed to that mission. So we don't want to enter into a negotiation with South Sudan on who the troop contributors will be, what arms they will need, how many of them can deploy. That is foreseen and what their mission will be--that is all in the resolution. And so that is where we get to this idea of using the threat of the moving on an arms embargo and potentially other sanctions if, indeed, the government tries to delay this. So far their actions have been on the one day to say yes, the next day to say maybe, the next day to say no and then to say well, probably yes again. So this is something that we are not going to have patience with to drag on. Mr. Cicilline. So that leads to my second question, Mr. Ambassador. What influence does the United States have with the Government of South Sudan to encourage them to develop a more inclusive, transparent, and accountable approach to governance and what other things might we do to accelerate that process? Ambassador Booth. When I was here in April and we were actually looking at trying to help a Transitional Government to succeed, one of the pillars of the peace agreement that I mentioned was this idea of the economic reform and in particular strengthening the transparency of public financial management and that's something that we believe needs to happen in South Sudan. The kleptocracy of the past must end. As I mentioned in my testimony, we are continuing to look and utilize information to utilize sanctions that are available, particularly travel sanctions, for corrupt practices--to send the signal that being in charge in South Sudan it's not about just enriching yourself--trying to change a little bit of the mentality of those who might lead the country going forward. So a very important component--how do we get them to do it--again, I think our main leverage is, you know, what is it they want from us. At that point, they were clearly looking for support for their budget, for their economy, and they have recently come out again and said to the international community we need $300 million from you this year. That's not going to be forthcoming unless these types of reforms occur. Mr. Cicilline. And my final question, Mr. Ambassador, is the director of the African Center for Strategic Studies has suggested that it may be time to put South Sudan on life support by establishing executive mandate for the U.N. and the AU to administer the country until institutions exist to manage politics nonviolently and to break up patronage networks underlying the conflict. If such an initiative were to be considered how do you think it would be executed given the sensitivity of the current government to foreign intervention and parent reticence of some of the Security Council toward U.N. actions perceived to threaten South Sudan's sovereignty? It seems like that would be a very difficult initiative to move forward on. But I would love your assessment of it. Ambassador Booth. I have seen that proposal. We have looked at that idea. Frankly, the U.N. cannot impose this on a member state. The African Union I think certainly has absolutely no appetite for putting one of its member countries under an international trusteeship or guardianship, whatever you want to dress it up and call it. That is something that I don't see that we would have any support for--impractical--and I don't see how the South Sudanese would ever accept it. The visceral reaction they have had even to this--to the role of JMEC in overseeing implementation of the agreement as an extra sovereign force, the reaction that they've had, where the initial reaction to the joint--the Regional Protection Force was not one more foreign soldier--we will fight them-- this is a matter of sovereignty. I think you get the idea of how that would be received in South Sudan. Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Mr. Smith. Thank you. Before we go to our next panel, I would like to just say, I make it a point to always meet with the bishops, the faith community, the Protestants, whatever the denominations might be in every country. Greg Simpkins and I met with Archbishop Paulino Lukudu Loro, had a very, very good exchange on the reconciliation aspects of what the church can provide and also the humanitarian assistance. Are we fully utilizing the faith community in South Sudan? Secondly, there is a Foreign Policy article, September 6th--very disturbing. I was briefed on it when I was in South Sudan about the gunning and the bullets that were sent into two of our vehicles as they passed by Salva Kiir's compound by his troops. Thank God nobody was hurt but the State Department says we do not believe our vehicles and personnel were especially targeted. But the article's author, Colum Lynch, points out that 50 to 100 rounds were pumped into those two vehicles. The SUV-- armored SUVs held laminated cards with the American flag on it and also the diplomatic plate number 11. Are we investigating this? Do we believe it was by design or by mistake? Even by mistake is bad enough but it was by design? And finally, on the sanctions, we have had sanctions for 2 years--OFAC sanctions--the Office of Foreign Assets Control. They are well laid out--child soldering sanctions against persons contributing to the conflict in South Sudan. There are only six people on it and I wonder if you are looking at that to expand it and make it more robust in terms of those who meet the criteria so well laid out 2 years ago in this sanctions regime. Ambassador Booth. Well, Mr. Chairman, on your question about engaging with the faith-based community, yes, we do engage with them both within South Sudan and also the Vatican. We have been in touch with them on numerous occasions and comparing notes on South Sudan and they have also engaged. I think one of the senior cardinals recently went there as an emissary for the Pope and a number of the religious leaders spoke out during the visit of the U.N. Security Council permanent representatives this past weekend in favor of the Regional Protection Force being deployed and moving forward on a political process. So I think the faith-based community is finding its voice. We have also, through USAID, given a $6 million grant to the South Sudan Council of Churches to work on community-based reconciliation efforts. So we are engaging the faith-based community. I think in the many meetings that I have had with religious leaders in South Sudan after the outbreak of fighting in December 2013 they showed a lot of frustration and that the leaders seemed to have turned a deaf ear to them. I think they are beginning now to, as I say, find their voice in unison and it may become harder going forward. On the July 7th firing on two U.S. vehicles that contained several U.S. diplomats, this occurred, as I mentioned, very shortly after similar looking vehicles that were driven by the opposition forces who had come into town on some mission and they were going back to Riek Machar's compound area and they were driving in this--it is always a tense area because it's right by the President's compound and they tried to stop that vehicle. The opposition people refused to get out of the vehicles and they sped off and the soldiers fired at those vehicles. The opposition security officials in the vehicles fired back and killed, I believe, five government soldiers right in that very vicinity. So it was a very tense environment. There were a lot more soldiers out on the street after that incident and our cars came along and they were--it wasn't a formal checkpoint. It was a lot of soldiers on the street waving them down. It was very dark and our vehicles have tinted glass. So even though for the brief time that they stopped and tried to show identification it is not at all clear that these soldiers would have been able to see it or, frankly, even understand the license plates. You are dealing, don't forget, with an army that is primarily illiterate and so when our vehicles--according to standard operating procedures when they tried to open the doors of our cars--also sped off the soldiers opened fire, just as they had when it had happened with opposition vehicles and, again, shortly, again, in the same area shortly after that incident the country representative for UNESCO, an Egyptian national, was driving in the area and encountered a similar problem and because he was not in an armored vehicle he was actually seriously wounded. So, again, to say this was targeting Americans, we did not deduce that from the circumstances and the regional security officer working with diplomatic security back here in Washington conducted an internal investigation of the events and the review of that report is still ongoing and we were very thankful, of course, that our people had the resources, that we had the fully armored vehicles there for them to ride around Juba. That is why our security protocols call for them to be riding in armored vehicles in most parts of town and particularly after dark. And in response to that incident the Embassy's emergency action committee met the next morning and changed the curfew to a dawn to dusk so took appropriate actions to try to mitigate that. In terms of sanctions, let me just say yes, we share the frustration. I mentioned some of the difficulties of actually putting together packages that meet all the legal criteria. But we certainly will look at taking actions against those who continue to impede the peace process or hindering humanitarian delivery and the like. Ms. Bass. Yes. I just wanted to take a moment to acknowledge that there are several people here from Gabon who are expressing their concern about the elections that took place. I just want you to know that we see you. We read your posters. I know you were asked to put them down but we did see what they said and we also are concerned and I just wanted to acknowledge that your presence has not gone unnoticed. Mr. Smith. And I fully concur with the ranking member and thank you for being here. I would like to now yield to Mr. Meadows. Mr. Meadows. Ambassador, let me come back with two very quick points. I mentioned the NGOs and technology is a great thing so I got some information that would suggest that even within the last few hours or few days that there has been potentially the shutdown of 40 NGOs and the threat, if not the reality, of seizing their assets. Are you aware of that report? Ambassador Booth. We have received reports over the past several hours of harassment of a number of NGOs, civil society organizations. Mr. Meadows. So you would say that that report could be accurate? You're getting the same---- Ambassador Booth. It could be. We have to look into that and try to verify it. Mr. Meadows. All right. So will you get back to this subcommittee right away on whether that is accurate or not? And I guess the second follow-up question to that is if it is accurate will you be resolute in your condemnation of saying and that we will not tolerate that kind of behavior if our humanitarian aid is going to continue? Ambassador Booth. I can assure you, Congressman, that we will be very direct and very strong in a condemnation of any harassment of---- Mr. Meadows. But seizing of assets and it is more than just harassment and so that's my concern. And so will you commit to get back to this subcommittee within the next 7 business days to let us know what is happening on that? Ambassador Booth. Well, let me say that we will get back to you as soon as we can confirm---- Mr. Meadows. All right. Well, what is a reasonable time? If 7 days is not reasonable what is a reasonable time? Ambassador Booth. Again---- Mr. Meadows. 14 days? Ambassador Booth. I am not on the ground. Mr. Meadows. I mean--I mean, it---- Ambassador Booth. 14 days--give us 14 days, yes. [The information referred to follows:] Written Response Received from the Honorable Donald Booth to Question Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Mark Meadows update on harassment of civil society in south sudan There has been an uptick in reported harassment, threats, and violence toward South Sudanese civil society organizations (CSOs) in recent weeks and specifically following the September 3 meeting in Juba between CSOs and the UN Security Council (UNSC). The U.S. government is deeply concerned and U.S. Embassy officials have met with multiple activists to discuss this trend, and continue to follow up. Both before the UNSC arrived and immediately after they departed Juba, several CSOs reported receiving anonymous phone calls ordering them to shut down and saying their assets would be seized because of the ``anti-government'' messages they had been spreading. On the night of September 4, one activist received text messages from an unknown number asking for her present location. The following day, while she was at work, her home was visited by unidentified armed men who asked after her whereabouts and told neighbors that they wanted to talk to her because she had ``talked ill of the government'' in the September 3 UNSC-CSO meeting. Some CSOs believe that the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) Military Intelligence is responsible for the harassment, while others have blamed the National Security Service (NSS). Activists have reported that the government has made considerable effort to infiltrate civil society, including the placement of NSS officers into CSOs, which has severely undermined the trust networks activists rely upon to function in South Sudan. Some activists who were in the September 3 meeting have fled South Sudan out of fear for their safety. One civil society actor who participated in the September 3 meeting was detained and interrogated by NSS when, on September 5, he attempted to depart Juba International Airport en route to Uganda; he was eventually allowed to leave. One activist, who did not take part in the September 3 meeting, reported that another, who also seems not to have taken part, was killed by NSS officers after a political argument at a cafe later on September 3. This is an unverified report from a single source who claims second- or third-hand knowledge of the incident. The individual who was allegedly killed was not known to the U.S. Embassy or to its contacts in Juba. It has not been possible to verify this report, as many details, including the location of the body, remain unknown or unconfirmed. The State Department continues to seek information about this case. Particularly concerning is the government's use of the Non- Governmental Organizations (NGO) Act and the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) Act as tools to close down CSOs. Some groups were warned verbally that they would have to ``answer'' for ``pro-West, anti-government'' views, which they were told constituted banned political activity under the Acts, and as a result, the RRC would suspend their registrations. There have been reports of threats by the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) to freeze CSO bank assets following the September 3 meeting, although no CSO has reported any assets actually being frozen or seized since then. The CSO actors who reported harassment before and after the September 3 meeting work in advocacy areas, not in humanitarian assistance. However, humanitarian actors face numerous physical obstructions to access those in need of assistance, as well as taxes, fees, and other bureaucratic impediments imposed at multiple levels by the GOSS. While the reported harassment since September 3 has affected CSOs engaged in advocacy work, some humanitarian organizations have reported harassment by the RRC based on the language of the NGO and RRC Acts. Some CSOs report that they are working ``within their own networks'' in an effort to persuade the GOSS to relax its harassment and refrain from de-registration, and some fear that intervention on their behalf by the U.S. government or other foreign countries could make their security situation more precarious. Other CSOs have requested U.S. government engagement with the GOSS on opening the political space. Unfortunately, the closing of political space in South Sudan is a long-term trend. The State Department has registered its concern on multiple occasions in public, most recently in a press statement on September 10. Ambassador Samantha Power expressed her concerns in an official statement issued the same day. State Department officials at the highest levels previously raised concerns about the closing political space directly with the GOSS, including with President Kiir, and will continue to do so in light of this recent and troubling trend. Mr. Meadows. Okay. All right. Fourteen days--we will do that. And the last thing is this is you talked about a political environment which is open and inclusive and yet we are hearing reports that potentially someone took a letter to the U.N. Security Council and might have been murdered after that. Would you care to comment on what's happening since the U.N. Security Council's visit? Ambassador Booth. Well, some of this harassment of civil society that---- Mr. Meadows. Well, murder is more than harassment. Ambassador Booth [continuing]. That we have been hearing about has been subsequent to the visit by the Security Council. But is something that has gone on in the past as well. We have long been---- Mr. Meadows. So how much of that are we going to tolerate-- -- Ambassador Booth [continuing]. Press freedom and freedom of movement for NGOs and the like. Mr. Meadows. So how much of that are we going to tolerate? Ambassador Booth. Well, it's a matter what can we actually do to affect that behavior. Mr. Meadows. I will yield back. We have many leverage points. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your flexibility. Mr. Smith. Thank you, Ambassador Booth, for your leadership and for spending your time today with us at the subcommittee. Thank you. I would like to now invite to the witness table Ambassador Princeton Lyman, who is senior advisor to the President of the United States Institute for Peace. Ambassador Lyman served as U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan from March 2011 to March 2013. As Special Envoy, he led U.S. policy in helping in the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Ambassador Lyman's career in government included assignments as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African affairs, U.S. Ambassador to both Nigeria and South Africa and Assistant Secretary of State for international organizations. He also was a member of the African Advisory Committee to the U.S. Trade Representative. He began his career with USAID and served as its director in Ethiopia. We will then hear from Mr. Brian Adeba, who is a journalist by training and was previously an associate of the Security Governance Group, a think tank that focused on security sector reform in fragile countries. Over the last 3 years, his research interests have focused on inter linkages of media, conflict, human rights, and security. He supervised the coverage of the conflict zones in Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and eastern Sudan for the Boston- based Education Development Center's Sudan Radio Service Project in Nairobi, Kenya. Prior to this he served as project and publications coordinator at the think tank the Center for International Governance Innovation in Waterloo, Canada. Again, he is representing the Enough Project. Ambassador, please proceed. STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PRINCETON N. LYMAN, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE Ambassador Lyman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let me begin by thanking you personally for all the support you and the committee provided when I was Special Envoy, and you and Congresswoman Bass and the members of the committee continue to focus attention on this set of issues. It is very important and it is very much appreciated. I am not going to go over the background of the situation. I want to address some of the key questions that you have raised and have been raised in the previous exchange. Let me start with the peace plan itself around which all the various activities are organized. The IGAD peace plan, which was signed in 2015, on paper is a very comprehensive agreement. But it has a fatal flaw to it and that is it rests very largely on the willingness, ability, and commitment of the very antagonists who brought the country into civil war to carry out a fundamental political transformation. It is not in their interest to do so and what we have seen over the last year or so is that instead of carrying that forward they fell back into conflict. Now Riek Machar has been driven out of the country. Without a strong international oversight and administrative oversight of this program, it was not likely to succeed. The second problem that we now face is that it would be a mistake to assume that, with the accession of Taban Deng Gai to the Vice Presidency, we have a government of national unity. Taban Deng does not command the loyalty of all the various forces that were fighting this government and to assume that it is capable of carrying out a comprehensive and being inclusive would be wrong. It is not. Now we have the humanitarian crisis which the people have addressed. It is an outrageous situation that the international community, and the United States alone is spending over $1 billion a year--that over 60 aid workers have been killed trying to carry out a humanitarian program--that they have been attacked and, again, most recently in the Terrain hotel. And both sides have impeded this activity--that the international community seems to care more for the people of South Sudan than the leaders on both sides. That is an outrageous situation. And what it does is call into question whether the government has the--can claim to the rights and responsibility of sovereignty which goes with the claim of sovereignty. Recently Kate Almquist, as Congressman Cicilline mentioned, and myself, did an op-ed saying that there should be an international oversight administration of South Sudan. Without that, we did not see how this peace plan could go forward. Ambassador Booth has described the role of JMEC under the peace plan and the role of Festus Mogae. The fact is that that mechanism has no real authority over the parties and Festus Mogae himself has, on several reports, said that almost no progress has been made on implementing the peace process. Now, the proposal we made, of course, it would be extraordinarily difficult to do and Ambassador Booth indicated that. But here is the fundamental question and the fundamental challenge. The peace process is in the hands of IGAD and the African Union, primarily, and if they are not prepared to amend the current peace process and create a true oversight authority, which they will back up politically, back up by enforcing an arms embargo, by taking other measures, then that peace plan won't work. Now, if they are prepared to do that, then no one needs trusteeship or anything else. But the problem is that IGAD is badly divided. They are not in agreement. They have threatened an arms embargo many times but never followed through. And as for the U.N. Security Council, we have an adage that guides, you know, practicality. When the Africans are divided, the Security Council is divided. You are not going to get sanctions past Russia and China unless the Africans are united and say this is what they want. But the Africans are divided. IGAD is divided. So even if the U.N. Security Council wanted to pass an arms embargo, those surrounding countries would have to implement it and make sure that arms weren't sneaking through. So the primary attention and effort seems to me, for the African Union and for IGAD to decide exactly if they are in control of this process, how to strengthen it. Now, let me address this question of the 4,000 troops that are being added. As you pointed out, it is a question of putting these under UNMISS and whether they will act differently. It is very difficult to contemplate a U.N. peacekeeping force confronting in an armed way the forces of the host government. I do not think very many U.N. peacekeeping forces are prepared for that. I am not sure the Security Council is even prepared for it. So the question is, is this force really going to have the mandate to confront not just outliers but an attack like the Terrain hotel complex and go up against government forces? That is a very difficult thing to do and it has to be backed solidly by the troop-contributing countries, and by IGAD, and by the U.N. and if they are not prepared for that, then this force may secure the airport but they won't be able to protect civilians. Now, the other question is the political context. Putting more forces into Juba without changing the nature of the peace process and the way it is enforced seems to me is going to have a continuation of the situation we now have. So I think it is critical that the U.S., the international community, and the United Nations call upon the African Union and IGAD to strengthen that process so there is real oversight and enforcement of the peace process with sanctions and punishment for those who get in the way of it. Otherwise, we won't get the transformation we need and I think that is the great dilemma that we now face in South Sudan. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Ambassador Lyman follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ---------- Mr. Smith. Ambassador Lyman, thank you so very much and, again, thank you for your prior service as Special Envoy. Mr. Adeba. STATEMENT OF MR. BRIAN ADEBA, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF POLICY, ENOUGH PROJECT Mr. Adeba. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, members of the subcommittee, I want to thank you for your continued focus on South Sudan and for inviting me to testify. Impunity is entrenched in the system of rule in South Sudan. The horrific Terrain hotel incident is an example of that impunity. The country's leaders commit horrific crimes and treat state resources like their personal property. The country's money is captured by a few and used to wage war. With financial leverage on these leaders and your continued leadership and support it is possible to counter this system and the perverse inclinations of its leaders. It is possible to disrupt access to the proceeds of corruption that fund war and to shift the incentives of South Sudan's leaders toward peace. Congress can do the following four things to have an immediate impact on the perpetrators of the crisis in South Sudan. First, Congress can make sure that the U.S. Treasury Department has the staff and the funds it needs to use more anti-money laundering measures. The measures can be used to target and freeze the assets of elite politicians and leaders in South Sudan who perpetuate violence, loot public coffers, and use the international financial system, including U.S. institutions, to launder deposits of their ill-gotten wealth. Second, you can ensure the administration imposes targeted sanctions and asset freezes on top leaders and support others who take these measures. We have had discussion about how the threat of sanctions alone is not inducing the change that is needed in South Sudan. So when we look at the recommendation, this is a call to action. Third, you can push for stronger enforcement of existing sanctions and asset freezes in the United States and internationally on the South Sudanese political elite. Fourth, you can pass the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. This act authorizes the U.S. President to impose sanctions on government officials like those in South Sudan who misappropriate state assets and attack anti- corruption crusaders. I believe these four steps can strike directly at the wallets of the people responsible for the suffering in South Sudan, the people who commit crimes and enrich themselves because they believe they will not face consequences for their actions. These leaders are more likely to support peace when they pay a price for war. The institutional challenges in South Sudan require your long-term support as well. I travelled to Juba this past April to analyse this very issue. April was a month full of hope and the past Vice President and main opposition leader, Riek Machar, had returned to town. People believed that the fighting would stop and the two leaders would work together to govern. There was hope that the critical governance institutions could begin to function properly as well. I focused my research on three key institutions--the Anti- Corruption Commission, the National Audit Chamber, and the Public Accounts Committee in the National Legislative Assembly. I found that all three were severely undercut intentionally. Top-level politicians deprived them of the money they need to function. Conflicting laws prevent prosecutions of officials that have been investigated. And cronyism undermines the effort to fight graft. The mechanisms and institutions that could promote accountability do not have what they need to be effective. But there are several things Congress can do to help South Sudanese people address their institutional and systemic challenges. First, continue to support the people in South Sudan who fight for transparency and accountability. Listen to them. Stand with them and help them raise their voices. Second, ensure there is strict budget oversight for assistance to South Sudan. Those who command or commit atrocities and seek personal enrichment should not be able to misappropriate public funds, especially those given by Americans to support the South Sudanese people. Third, support and strengthen the institutions in South Sudan that can build an open and accountable government. These institutions could work much more effectively than they do today. But they need political, technical, and financial support. Most of all, they need the space to operate without undue political interference. A fourth institution that needs these same things is the Hybrid Court of South Sudan that was established in the August 2015 peace agreement to ensure accountability for war crimes. Next week, on September 12, the Sentry, an initiative of the Enough Project, will publicly present the results of a 2- year investigation into corruption in South Sudan. The Sentry has documented the connection between high-level grand corruption and violence in South Sudan and we encourage U.S. policymakers to take immediate action on the findings we release. Your support is critical. The stakes are very high in South Sudan. If South Sudanese leaders face no price, no deterrent for their crimes from anyone, South Sudan will disintegrate. With your help, that can be prevented. Thank you very much for your efforts on South Sudan and for your tireless commitment to the South Sudanese people. [The prepared statement of Mr. Adeba follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ---------- Mr. Smith. Mr. Adeba, thank you very much for your personal work, your trip, which really uncovered--and you got to see those three institutions in particular. Thank you for relaying that to us. Without objection, your full statements will be made a part of the record. And, unfortunately, we do have a series of votes--well over an hour we expect of voting. So we will conclude here but I want you to know how deeply appreciative we all are on the subcommittee for your leadership, for your guidance and we will stay in touch going forward. In a week I look forward or so to that new report which the committee will digest and, I'm sure, utilize as we have in the past with those from the Enough Project. And Ambassador Lyman, thank you, because you did extraordinary service under very difficult situations. So thank you for that leadership all those years and your entire Foreign Service career. The hearing is adjourned and, again, I would have liked to have asked some questions. I will submit a few for the record. If you could get back to us in a timely fashion that would be greatly appreciated. The hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] A P P E N D I X ---------- [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]