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**NAVAL COOPERATIVE STRATEGY**

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JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND  
PROJECTION FORCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

MEETING JOINTLY WITH

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME  
TRANSPORTATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND  
INFRASTRUCTURE

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## NAVAL COOPERATIVE STRATEGY

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, MEETING JOINTLY WITH COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION, *Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 18, 2015.*

The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 2:48 p.m. in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces) presiding.

### **OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES**

Mr. FORBES. Welcome this afternoon to the joint Seapower and Projection Forces and Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation hearing on naval cooperative strategy.

We thank our witnesses for being here.

Normally, we would have opening statements by the chairmen and ranking members of both subcommittees, but today all of the chairmen and ranking members have agreed to waive their opening remarks. They will be placed in the record. Mr. Courtney, that is my understanding. And, Mr. Hunter, it is as well.

[The prepared statements of Mr. Forbes and Mr. Courtney can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 35.]

Mr. FORBES. So we are delighted today to have three very distinguished witnesses to appear before our joint hearing.

We have Vice Admiral Charles Michel, U.S. Coast Guard, the Deputy Commandant for Operations; Major General Andrew O'Donnell, U.S. Marine Corps, Assistant Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration, Deputy Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command; and Rear Admiral Kevin Donegan, U.S. Navy, Acting Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans, and Strategy.

General, we want to thank you for your work on this strategy. You have done a great job. We look forward to hearing your comments. We will put your full testimony in the record. But we would love to have you take 5 minutes or so to summarize it in any way that you would like to do so. And so I don't know which of you would like to start off, but we are going to turn the floor over.

Admiral, we are going to recognize you now and look forward to your comments.

**STATEMENT OF VADM CHARLES D. MICHEL, USCG, DEPUTY  
COMMANDANT FOR OPERATIONS**

Admiral MICHEL. Well thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Forbes, Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Courtney, and distinguished members of the committees, good afternoon and thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the Coast Guard's role in the "Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready."

With the committee's permission, I also propose to enter the strategy document itself into the record.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 59.]<sup>†</sup>

Admiral MICHEL. The Coast Guard stands ready alongside the Navy and Marine Corps, reaffirming our unified commitment to confront national security threats from and on the sea.

The Coast Guard is a member of the Nation's five armed services and a global maritime force that complements the other sea services' roles in fulfilling the Nation's broad maritime goals. The Coast Guard leverages unique authorities, capabilities, and partnerships essential to national and homeland security.

The Coast Guard is at all times an armed service under title 10 and simultaneously has broad law enforcement authorities under title 14. The Coast Guard provides its greatest contributions to the collective strategy in the critical areas of maritime security operations, all-domain access, and maintaining flexible, agile, and ready forces.

Maritime security operations protect sovereignty and maritime resources, support free and open seaborne commerce, and deter and counter threats that seek to exploit maritime domain, including weapons proliferation, terrorism, transnational crime, piracy, sanctions avoidance, and unlawful seaborne migration.

As the Navy and Marine Corps rebalance efforts to address national imperatives in the Asia-Pacific region, Coast Guard operations projected forward in the Western Hemisphere transit zone increase in importance.

The Coast Guard's offshore patrol cutter, or OPC, acquisition is the key service recapitalization to maintain our forward-deployed, complementary, non-redundant capability in combating transnational criminal networks, the greatest threat to national security in this hemisphere. These assets can't arrive too soon.

Our medium-endurance cutters currently on scene, which annually interdict more than three times the amount of cocaine seized domestically and at every air, land, and sea border of the United States, will be 55 years old, on average, when the first OPC deploys to the Western Hemisphere transit zone.

The Coast Guard also plays a unique role in achieving all-domain access. The Coast Guard's ability to operate in polar regions ensures the Nation's maritime security interests are met in the increasingly strategic Arctic Ocean as well as in Antarctica. Through its unique authorities in international partnerships, the Coast Guard has an active maritime security presence in 29 countries

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<sup>†</sup> Some unnumbered photographic pages at the beginning and end of the report were not reproduced.

and has 60 bilateral agreements with foreign governments that enhance maritime governance, rule of law, and global leadership.

In the cyber domain, Coast Guard authorities and responsibilities span the dot-mil, dot-gov, and dot-com domains. To accomplish the collective goals of this strategy, it is imperative for our forces to remain flexible, agile, and ready.

Critical to remaining forward, on call, and ready 24 [hours] by 7 [days] to engage in a strategic and complementary manner are investments in the OPC acquisition, improved aviation capabilities, integrated command and control systems, and a proficient workforce.

In conclusion, the Coast Guard is fully committed to the strategic priorities of the strategy and remains a forward, engaged, and ready member of our sea services across the globe and at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today and for all you do for the men and women of the Nation's Armed Forces and specifically the sea services. I look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Michel can be found in the Appendix on page 38.]

Mr. FORBES. Admiral Michel, thank you so much for your testimony, for being here with us today.

General, we now recognize you.

**STATEMENT OF MAJGEN ANDREW W. O'DONNELL, JR., USMC,  
ASSISTANT DEPUTY COMMANDANT, COMBAT DEVELOPMENT  
AND INTEGRATION, DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL,  
MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND**

General O'DONNELL. Thank you.

Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Courtney, Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi and distinguished members—

Mr. FORBES. General, you might want to pull that mic [microphone] just a little closer. Sometimes it is difficult picking up.

General O'DONNELL. Thanks.

The Marine Corps' ability to serve as the Nation's premier crisis response force is due, in large part, to this subcommittee's continued strong support. And on behalf of all marines, I thank you.

Admiral Michel highlighted some key points from the "Cooperative Strategy of the 21st Century Seapower." And I would like to briefly highlight the role of your Marine Corps as an element of U.S. power.

When it comes to being where it matters when it matters, the Marine Corps is committed to keeping our force forward-deployed and forward-engaged. This means that today there are around 30,000 marines deployed in over 40 countries. These forces are currently conducting strikes in Syria and Iraq, training the Iraqi Army, and protecting our Embassy in Baghdad. They also include 22,500 marines in the Pacific, all of which are west of the International Date Line.

These forces are conducting exercises and training with their Pacific partners and are staged to rapidly respond to any crisis or contingency in the region. As Admiral Donegan will mention, this

strategy recognizes that we will continue to invest in strengthening alliances and, also, partnerships.

Marines deployed onboard amphibious ships and those forces forward of station routinely conduct theater security cooperation exercises to ensure interoperability and enhance our partners' capabilities. There is no substitute for the mission. And as this committee has heard before, virtual presence is actual absence.

This strategy paints a path forward in operating in an increasingly complex environment. It complements and amplifies the characteristics required of the Marine Corps and our capstone concept, Expeditionary Force 21. In doing so, it highlights the importance of naval forces in gaining and maintaining overseas access in peace or war.

Your Navy and Marine Corps team provides the United States the ability to project sustainable combat power overseas without the need to ask for assistance or permission from anyone. This capability is essential to protecting our citizens, advancing our national interest, and promoting global stability.

Today's security environments, as well as the challenges of constrained and uncertain budgets, require creative responses to fulfill our global commitments. Our forward-stationed and -deployed marines remain our Nation's 911 force and readiness, and this strategy will ensure that they remain poised to do so in the future.

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today. And I look forward to answering your question.

[The joint prepared statement of General O'Donnell and Admiral Donegan can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General.  
Admiral Donegan.

**STATEMENT OF RADM KEVIN M. "KID" DONEGAN, USN, ACTING DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS, AND STRATEGY (N3/N5)**

Admiral DONEGAN. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Courtney, Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi, distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today with my shipmates from the Marine Corps and Coast Guard to discuss this sea services "Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower."

With the permission of the subcommittee, I propose to keep my remarks brief, but have submitted a separate statement for the Department of the Navy that—

Mr. FORBES. All of the remarks will be so ordered. It will be put in the record. Thank you.

Admiral DONEGAN. Thank you.

Now I will offer a brief overview of the strategy and then touch on some of the—just a few of the highlights. First, the "Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready," explains how we will build and employ the naval forces in support of national security interests. It describes a force built and ready for any challenge, from high-end warfight to humanitarian operations.

Now, the strategy was revised mainly due to changes in the geopolitical landscape since 2007, including threats from violent ex-

tremist organizations, like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, evolving threats from North Korea and Iran, potential opportunities and challenges with a rising China, and recent Russian aggression in the Ukraine.

Additionally, we face new and evolving challenges that threaten our access in cyberspace and the global commons. We have also sought to align our maritime strategy to new national strategic guidance and are very aware of the impact of changes in the current fiscal environment.

Most importantly, this strategy describes a seapower that is critical for our Nation and our global economy. The strategy is underpinned by naval services with combat-credible forward presence that will be where it matters, when it matters, and our continued commitment to our allies and partners.

We will also continue to meet the historic naval functions of deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security. But our strategy has adapted, starting with an emphasis on warfighting first. In addition, we describe a new function, all-domain access, that focuses on maintaining the access we need to be where it matters, when it matters.

The strategy balances the disposition of our forces and capabilities against regional threats. It also embraces innovation and efficiency in building a modern and capable force of more than 300 ships that will overcome any challenge to our ability to fight and win.

Several key takeaways from the strategy include warfighting first. Defending our Nation and winning its wars is a core task of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps. Due to varied threats we face as a nation, the sea services—U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—together with other services, must have the capabilities and capacity to defeat any adversary and defend the homeland while honoring our alliances worldwide.

“Where it matters when it matters” means that, operating forward, we will provide the President options to defend our interests, deter and deescalate hostilities, respond to crises, and keep conflict far from our shores. The naval services also protect the strength of our U.S. economy by globally deploying that combat-credible power to ensure the unimpeded flow of commerce.

We recognize one of our advantages as a nation and a Navy has been our extensive network of alliances, partnerships, and coalitions. By leveraging the robust capabilities of naval forces worldwide, we are better postured to collectively face new and emerging challenges in the 21st century.

Accordingly, we are going to look for new ways to enhance relationships and form partnerships with traditional and nontraditional maritime partners who share a stake in international commerce, safety, security, and freedom of the seas.

Our new essential function, all-domain access, will ensure that we organize, train, and equip to overcome threats and assure access and freedom of action in any domain to enable us to fight and win, should a war be inescapable.

Our strategy also continues the efforts to rebalance forces to the Asia-Pacific. Evolving challenges in the region, including the recent activities of China’s navy and the proliferation of anti-access/area-

denial technologies, require that we maintain a leading role in that region.

Our force design construct ensures our capability and capacity to support global presence requirements. In building the future force, we are going to balance investments in a flexible, agile force while appropriately developing our people as well as the operational concepts and capabilities to remain capable and combat-ready.

Finally, I will note that the new strategy is not the end of our work. It is part of a larger effort throughout the Navy to energize our existing culture of strategic thinking that has led to innovation and an increase in operational excellence. This has already been instrumental in aligning our budget requirements and operational concepts. The strategic continuum will also align our strategic documents. It will oversee iterative wargaming, new concept development, and further increase those strategic linkages to the budget.

In closing, our foremost priority remains the security and prosperity of our Nation, the American people, and our way of life. The strategy ensures that the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard remain forward, engaged, and ready to continue protecting American citizens and advancing U.S. interests as we have done for more than two centuries.

Thank you.

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Donegan and General O'Donnell can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, thank you.

And since we have a joint hearing today and a lot of members who want to ask questions, I am going to defer my questions to the vice chairman of the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee and the chairman of the T&I [Transportation and Infrastructure Committee] Coast Guard Maritime Transportation Subcommittee, Mr. Hunter from California.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I guess my first question—or first comment is I am on the Armed Services Committee, too. We don't see the Coast Guard in here very often. I mean, it is kind of a strange thing that you are not in here more often. But it is good that you are at the same time.

I guess the first question I have is about the Arctic. Let's talk about the Arctic. There is no plans to get an icebreaker. Unless the Navy buys in and unless there is a whole-of-government approach, we are probably not going to have an icebreaker. We are not going to buy one. We are going to have to lease one.

But, at the very least, I would like to know what the Navy buy-in is and if the Navy really—do we care about the Arctic? And, if we don't, that is fine. If we do, what are we doing about it?

Admiral DONEGAN. Sir, clearly you directed that at the Navy.

This strategy clearly talks about the Arctic. It talks about it in a couple ways. We address it in relation to climate change and—

Mr. HUNTER. Admiral, let me be more specific.

You need an icebreaker to get up there and break ice to be able to operate there. So I don't care about the climate change stuff at all, frankly. I am curious about the actual icebreaker and acquiring a ship that can break ice to get the Navy and the Marine Corps and whoever else up there or having to save somebody if you had to.

Admiral DONEGAN. Yes, sir. As you know, the different missions and focuses are given to different services and different organizations.

The U.S. Coast Guard was given the responsibility for the national icebreaking mission. So we are working closely with the Coast Guard as we identify the operating requirements and capabilities needed for future icebreakers.

We absolutely agree in the future that we are going to need to be up there more than we are today. From the Navy side, we are increasing the exercises we do up there and our research so we understand that domain. But we do agree that in the future we are going to need to be up there more often.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. The Coast Guard's budget is minuscule compared to yours. The Coast Guard's budget also got cut by the President by 26 percent, just their acquisition budget.

So they are not going to be able to make the ships that they need going back about 10 years, let alone a \$400 million icebreaker—\$400 million to a billion-dollar icebreaker. It is going to take Navy money. It is going to take something like that.

Admiral DONEGAN. Sir, as you know, the Navy has its own challenges in the shipbuilding account. And adding an icebreaker, not being something that was tasked to the Navy to do, would only pressurize our accounts further. But I fully understand your point of view, sir.

Mr. HUNTER. So you all recognize the mission. You write about the Arctic, but really don't have any way to get up there and do anything there. We just say it is important.

Admiral DONEGAN. Sir, for us, as we talk about it in the strategy, we talk about when we need to be up there and for what missions that we have.

And for the portion that I will mention—was going to mention a little bit earlier was our Arctic road map lays out for us how we are going to do that and when in the future we believe we have to be there more than we do today.

And you are right, sir. As a country, we have to figure out and make sure that we have that access as those areas open up for us to move about and commerce starts to travel the routes that we know are opening now—beginning to open now.

Mr. HUNTER. That is all I have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Courtney is recognized.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And like Chairman Hunter, it is a pleasure to see the Coast Guard here in the room today.

Last time Mr. Wittman and I were over in Brunei, we were touring the 5th Fleet, ships that were tied up there, and all of a sudden we saw two white hulls there and actually had a great visit onboard the ship. The captain, of course, was trained at the Coast Guard Academy in New London.

But, frankly, it was nothing but high praise from the Navy partners in terms of the work that the Coast Guard was doing in that mission. And, obviously, this report really is just a confirmation of what is really happening. This isn't just sort of talk that we are hearing about today.

I just really have one question, which is about the sealift and logistics force piece of the puzzle that you guys are working on here. I think you will agree that this is a vital piece of our ability to execute the national military strategy regardless of area of responsibility.

Given the age of the Ready Reserve Fleet and its need for recapitalization, coupled with the fragility of the Maritime Security Program, what measures are being taken to ensure that we will have a viable and stable sealift and logistics fleet in order to execute this new maritime strategy?

And anyone who wants to take that question, the floor is yours.

Admiral DONEGAN. Well, sir, I think I will take it first and then see if there's others.

I think you will see in the strategy that strategic sealift is a key element of the sea services' ability to sustain forward operations. In particular, in the strategy, what we talk about is it is expected that the naval services can establish a sea base.

And from that sea base, we need to be able to do what it is that we need to do, whether that be project power, whether it be to launch the marines ashore on an amphibious operation or to just have the presence that we need to have in the area.

Critical to that is being able to sustain that sea base. And that comes through a combination, as you know, of the combat logistics force and, also, a Maritime Security Program [MSP] and the other methods we use to support that force. Aerial refueling, for example, is another method. So we absolutely agree that it is a requirement.

What we are working on now is defining—we understand the MSP program, for instance, is under pressure, especially as we move forward to the future. We understand that combat logistics forces that we have right now, we have to look at them closely. We have just completed a study on the combat logistics force piece of the question that told us that we have enough of the combat logistics force to sustain our operations in peacetime.

And what we are going to do in the coming months is continue that work through our iterative wargaming process where we look at the sealift—military sealift security program and the combat logistics forces and ensure that, for each of the war plans that we have and the other future operations, that we have a method to be able to continue to sustain that sea base.

It is absolutely essential that we do that, and we need to continue to make sure we have that in the future as some of these programs come under pressure.

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Garamendi, I know you were detained and got here just a few minutes after we started. But we also have recognized—we put all of our opening remarks in the record. And yours will be placed in the record.

And Mr. Garamendi is the ranking member of the subcommittee. So we now recognize you for any questions that you may have.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you very much, Chairman Forbes.

My colleague, the chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Hunter, raised the question of the Arctic and the lack of an icebreaker. This is really a question that goes to Admiral Michel, but, really, to inform my colleagues on the naval side of this committee that we are not going to be able to put together a new icebreaker without, as

Mr. Hunter said, an all-of-government strategy, one that we are going to have to take money from several different places in order to make this happen.

The National Science Foundation is interested. The Navy is, as Mr. Hunter pointed out very carefully, and certainly the Coast Guard. So we are going to have to figure out some way to do that.

My question really goes a little beyond the very important point that Mr. Hunter raised, and it goes to the existing *Polar Star*. You have authority, Admiral Michel, to take the ship out of the water, check it out.

What is the status of that process?

Admiral MICHEL. Well, there is a couple different *Polar*-class icebreakers. The *Polar Star* is actually operational right now.

Mr. GARAMENDI. The other one.

Admiral MICHEL. Yeah. I know they get confusing.

I just had the pleasure of presenting a master cutterman certificate to the captain of the *Polar Star* at McMurdo Station down in Antarctica here just about 6 weeks ago.

So the *Polar Star* is active. It is actually on its way to regular maintenance, dry dock. The *Polar Sea*, on the other hand, has been inactive for a number of years. It had a major machinery casualty.

There is money in the President's budget that continues the preservation work on there and begins the survey process of determining how much it would take in order to reactivate that ship.

Understand both these ships, the *Polar*-class, were built in the mid-1970s. Some of the technology—actually, most of the technology on there has been—only exists in museums anymore. So this is kind of a challenge. Plus, *Polar Sea*, in part, was cannibalized so that we could get *Polar Star* underway. So it is in a different condition than *Polar Star* is.

So we are getting—we have got a process here to try to get our arms around that and start looking at what resources it would take in order to activate a ship like that. And that is where we stand with the *Polar*-class reactivation.

Mr. GARAMENDI. My question had a—four letters—“when” question.

Admiral MICHEL. Well, the preservation work is going on right now. We anticipate it is 15 to 18 months for us to get a good survey of the ship. It is going to have to be pulled out of the water. Again, we are going to have to do a serious survey on some very old machinery that you can't even really purchase anymore.

So 15 to 18 months is our estimate so that we can get sort of a good cost on what that would take and a good timeline for how long it would take to get that reactivated. And, again, we would be looking for about—a 7- to 10-year reactivation timespan is what we would be shooting for.

Mr. GARAMENDI. How about a new icebreaker? When will you finalize the requirements for that?

Admiral MICHEL. So a new icebreaker we hit—we are in the early stages of an acquisition of that icebreaker. And we have been doing some of the work on that. The problem, sir, is that we have not built a heavy *Polar*-class icebreaker in this country for over 40 years.

The *Polar*-class was the last that were done. These are exceedingly complicated ships just because they exist in one of the most challenging environments on the Earth. And they are basically designed to collide with blocks of solid ice. So this requires special steels, construction techniques, and things like that.

You are looking at many years in order to be able to scope out a project like this, determine who could actually in this country build a vessel of this class. The only operators of heavy *Polar*-class icebreakers are us and the Russians. That is it. So there is very limited expertise in this area. It is going to be expensive, particularly if we have to build one.

Mr. GARAMENDI. We know that we buy our rocket engines from Russia. Maybe we can buy a ship from Russia, since you seem not to be too anxious to get about the task.

Admiral MICHEL. Well, it would obviously require legislative action in order to purchase a ship from Russia.

Mr. GARAMENDI. We understand that.

But what my question really goes to is that you seem to be hemming and hawing and putting off some day into the future what our subcommittee thinks to be a very, very important activity.

Mainly, we need an icebreaker. The Navy needs an icebreaker. This country needs an icebreaker. And the United States is now the chair of the Polar Committee. And all I am hearing from you is, "We are going to get about it someday."

Fifteen to eighteen months to figure out whether the present ship can even float and then who knows how long before the requirements are in place is not satisfactory.

Admiral MICHEL. I understand the dire situation, sir. I was there looking at that only pathway in and out of Antarctica that our ship is the only one that can break.

But here is where we are with acquisitions. As dire as we are on the *Polar* icebreaker—and I, as a sailor, understand that. It keeps me up at night—the OPC is even more dire. And that is a much larger class of ships that—even on the trajectory that we are talking about, 55 years old is the average age of those ships that will be coming offline.

Mr. GARAMENDI. We understand that. Admiral, you seem not to understand where I am driving you.

Your committee knows that it needs—that this country needs one more heavy icebreaker. We can't get by with just one. We need another one. The Navy and the *Polar*—all of those issues are before us.

And what I am hearing from you is the inability for the Coast Guard to get us the specific information that we need to be able to make a decision about where to go with this issue.

You are saying 18 months before we know whether we can rebuild the existing, and you seem not to—I don't know—5 to 7 years or maybe longer before you are willing to give us the requirements for a new one.

We want to make a decision. We cannot make that decision without the information that you need to develop for us sooner than later. I hope I am clear here.

Admiral MICHEL. Yes, sir. And I will provide you with the information as soon as I can get it. This is a complex effort.

Mr. GARAMENDI. I think I had best stop because I am about to climb up and down your back. That answer is not a satisfactory answer, as soon as you can get it. I am looking at a timeframe here where we have been prepared for more than a year and a half now to make a decision. We need your information in this timeframe.

I understand we are not going to get it this year. But if you come to us next year with the same attitude and the same delay and obfuscation, I guarantee you that at least the ranking member of this committee is not going to be happy.

I yield back my time.

Mr. FORBES. We thank the gentleman.

And we will go to Chairman Wittman.

We do point out—I think our witnesses would love to build some more ships if we can give them some money to do it with. I know Admiral Donegan from his Navy account is looking at the *Ohio*-class replacement that is going to be \$60 billion and scratching his head as to where we are going to get that.

I know I was just looking at our combatant commander requirements for BMD [ballistic missile defense] capability. They go up from this year at 44 ships to needing 77 in fiscal year 2016. And, yet, we were getting ready to put aside 11 carriers which had 5 of those BMD.

And last year the Marine Corps had to fight to get its amphibious ship, which we wouldn't have got if it hadn't have been for Mr. Wittman's hard work on his subcommittee.

So we want to continue to work with you guys. And I think Mr. Garamendi and Mr. Hunter are saying, if you can help get the information—we realize you can't build it without dollars. So we do thank you for your help in that.

Chairman Wittman is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you so much for your service to our Nation.

I do want to drill down a little bit into the "Cooperative 21st Seapower Strategy." Some questions come up with that.

Admiral Michel, you talked about flexibility and agility. I think that is critical. The question then becomes, though is: How do you operationalize it—and I want to get everybody's perspective—how do you operationalize it between the Joint Chiefs and the COCOMs [combatant commands], especially with all the challenges they have?

And, as you know, the strategy now says we are going to have all-domain access in addition to the other four tenets of seapower.

The question is: How do you achieve that? How do you make sure, too, that within your C2, your command and control—how do you make sure that you integrate Coast Guard into that?

We see integration of Coast Guard in certain mission sets, but not in every mission set. And with there being organizational differences or separation between the Coast Guard and the Navy and Marine Corps, much of this sounds great. But the question is: How do you operationalize that?

And then adding to the complexity of saying, "Now we are going to have all-domain access," which means in the electromagnetic spectrum, in cyberspace, air, sea, land—I mean, that is a pretty complex environment. How are we going to achieve that? They are

great assertions in the strategy. Give us your thoughts about operationalization.

Admiral MICHEL. I will take it here from the Coast Guard perspective. First of all, any equipment we buy, we try to make sure it is interoperable with the other sea services.

So we carry Navy-type, Navy-owned equipment on the majority of the vessels that we operate because we are required to operate as a specialized service of the Navy during time of war when the President directs. So we ensure interoperability through our equipment purchases.

Mr. WITTMAN. Let me stop you right there because I think that is an interesting question I want to build on.

As we are talking about shipbuilding and building lots of ships, we talk about building Navy ships, DDGs [destroyers], CGs [cruisers]. We talk about building medium-endurance cutters—the new class of medium-endurance cutters, the long-range cutters.

It seems like, to me, there is a great opportunity there to say, “Listen, why don’t we look at some common hull forms so, when we do acquisition, we are not acquiring Coast Guard ships here and Navy ships there.” We can say, “Listen, the national security cutter is real similar to the DDG”?

Give me your perspective on how we can gain economies there to where—if we are going to have this cooperative strategy, does cooperation get down to the operational perspective of getting ships on the water?

Admiral MICHEL. Well, it absolutely does. And we had a very robust discussion with the Navy as we were determining the requirements for the national security cutter, including looking at the LCS [littoral combat ship] and some of the other things that the Navy was doing.

Now, the LCS didn’t end up being exactly what we needed for the Coast Guard. It is a little bit more ship than I think the Coast Guard needed for its mission set. But a very robust dialogue went on in there.

On the other vessels, the FRCs [fast-response cutters] are probably a little bit small for most of what the Navy is doing, and the OPC is going to have its own requirements.

But, again, we try to—Coast Guard tries to borrow and leverage from the Navy as much as we possibly can. So when they get a weapon system or communication system or any type of intelligence capability, we are all over it with the Navy. And they are completely open with us because it is to our mutual benefit to actually share those systems. So we have got a very robust dialogue, sir.

General O’DONNELL. Sir, just a couple comments. Exactly what you are talking about. And you are well aware because you were the leader of all that when we got the LPD–17 hull form for what we are working on next.

Probably the same thing that the admiral mentioned, too, with the Marine Corps. Our Naval Board [Navy and Marine Corps Naval Board] works very, very hard to make sure that we are aligned with other services and, as you know, with the Commandant’s Planning Guidance not only with the Coast Guard, but

with SOF [Special Operations Forces], and making sure that we are integrating with everybody.

So that is the big thing about the C2 and then making sure that we all are using the same type of equipment and we are all on the same frequencies.

The other comment that I would just make very quickly is that the things that the Marine Corps is doing, we had kind of a little bit of a heads-up. As you know, we rolled out EF-21 [Expeditionary Force 21] last year, about a year ago this time. Of course, the Commandant came out with his Planning Guidance about 2 months ago. So we have already kind of hit the ground running. And we are pretty well aligned already with the tenets that are in this strategy.

So we feel pretty good. We have already had a couple exercises. The EW-15 [Expeditionary Warfare 2015] just went up and we came up with 232 gaps that we have to work on. But most of them are not—luckily, are not going to be equipment pieces, just a little bit how we are doing business.

Admiral DONEGAN. Sir, just the fact that we are here together gives you the indication—and this is the second time the three services have come together to build this strategy—should give you an indication that we get it in terms of what you said, that our objective is to make sure that the individual pieces add up to more when we put them together. I think that is really what you are trying to say.

There's a bunch of examples. The Naval Board was one. The Air-Sea Battle Office is another. It is now, as you know, chaired—we changed the name, Joint Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons. But it is now chaired by a marine. Marine three-star General Glueck is chairing that right now to drive us to that interoperability that you are talking about and take it beyond the strategy and put the strategy into action.

Mr. WITTMAN. Sure. Very good.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. FORBES. Ms. Gabbard from Hawaii is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

My question was with regards to the portion of your strategy where you talk about the sea services deploying tactics, techniques, and procedures that target adversary vulnerabilities and you talk about striking the right balance between kinetic and non-kinetic actions.

I would like to see if you can detail more what those non-kinetic actions would look like.

Admiral MICHEL. I will take it from the Coast Guard perspective. Just here in the Western Hemisphere, the Coast Guard and the Navy have worked together actually for decades against transnational organized crime, most of which isn't taken care of as a kinetic matter. It is actually taken care of as a law enforcement function.

So Navy ships carry around Coast Guard law enforcement detachments so that we can use the sensor packages and the floating hull of the Navy to transport our law enforcement folks out there

who have actually got the authority to take down the narcotraf-fickers [narcotic traffickers].

And there is a whole range of other different activities that we work with them in sort of non-kinetic or asymmetric arenas. Piracy is another example of that type of work. And some of the other things I listed under maritime security operations, which have as their endgame, not a kinetic endgame, a smoking hull in the water, but a law enforcement action or a sanctions enforcement or other types of things. And that ability to cooperate between Navy equipment and Coast Guard authority has been gold here in a lot of missions.

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you.

Admiral DONEGAN. I think that a good way for us to explain the non-kinetic and kinetic—if we just talk about this new function that we talked about, which is all-domain access, it is a perfect example that we can describe the difference between kinetic and non-kinetic.

If striking the balance means we can't have systems—things that just shoot down other things, for example, that is cost-prohibitive. We will run out of money long before we run out of the enemy having an ability to get at us.

So in our work in achieving all-domain access, it means working across the full spectrum, using all domains, to degrade, disrupt, deny, use the cyber and electromagnetic domain to make it harder for them to see us—the enemy to see us, for example and, therefore, they can't employ their weapons or, if they did, they wouldn't go to the right place so that we then can focus our kinetic resources on what got through after we did all that other work to make it much harder for them to be able to find us, see us, target us.

Ms. GABBARD. You mentioned in your focus on the Indo- and Asia-Pacific region how, by 2020, approximately 60 percent of Navy ships and aircraft will be based in the region.

What do you foresee could arise that would cause you to deter away from that plan between now and then?

Admiral DONEGAN. Well, in other words, to not focus on the—or continue the rebalance—

Ms. GABBARD. For you to not reach that size of presence in the Asia-Pacific region.

Admiral DONEGAN. Since that is our focus area and most of the forces that we have there are already targeted to go there—in other words, we have the forces there. Our FDNF [Forward Deployed Naval Forces] forces are there. We have already begun establishing our LCSs in Singapore. We have already—the Marines have already moved some forces, as you know, into Australia. We have plans to move a sub—an additional submarine into Guam and additional ships into Japan, and they are on track and going to happen in the near term—it is going to be hard for us to come off of that because of the forces that are already there and, in the short term, what we expect to be there just in the next year or so, ma'am.

Ms. GABBARD. Great. Thank you.

I ask the question because I obviously believe it is important that we recognize and continue to uphold kind of the commitment—the

strategic commitment that we have made to the region, recognizing the opportunity and the strategic necessity to do that.

Given the environment that we sit in both fiscally and politically and otherwise, it is good to hear the affirmation that this is something that is well on its way.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. FORBES. Now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Cook, for 5 minutes.

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to talk a little bit about maritime repositioning and where we stand on that. I was led to believe we still haven't replenished the supplies that were in there from our previous engagements in the Middle East.

Can you give me an update on where we stand on that and Diego Garcia, if you could?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir. I will get you all the information here. But let me just very quickly go over it.

We still only have two squadrons. We shut down the other squadron. So we still have two squadrons with 12 ships.

Each of those would have the mobile landing platform, which you are familiar with, the one—the exercises we have been doing off of Camp Pendleton, to be able to selectively offload equipment, load it onto transports, most likely, LCACs [Landing Craft Air Cushion], and put it towards the beach.

So we still have the 12, with the mixture of the old and new, the T-AKEs being the new ones, that are built in San Diego. But most of the other ships that we are building right now that will be on that thing will be that 12, along with that mobile landing platforms that will help us move those things around.

And the ships—it is my understanding—I will confirm this—all the ships have been replenished and all the gear is on the normal cycle to be turned into Blount Island and turned around on time.

Mr. COOK. Do we have anything at Diego Garcia right now?

General O'DONNELL. I will have to get back to you on that. That is where the ships are. But I don't know if we have anything ashore.

Mr. COOK. Yeah. And I am just a little nervous about—you know, the Pacific is—the world is very big, and it is a long ways from North Korea to Australia and to Guam. And, you know, I understand the concentration. And we were in Japan together, of course.

The other thing maybe I wanted to follow up on is: What is the situation with Okinawa right now in terms of relocation? I know we had that issue in the past. And there has been a change in policy with the Japanese in terms of they certainly, I think, welcome military forces there. If you could just—

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir. As I mentioned when I saw you in Yokota, I was 2 years at U.S. Forces Japan. And I saw the Congresswoman there, too.

I don't think there is a change in policy. And this is not my lane. We can get you the information. I don't think there is a change in policy by the Abe government. They are going forward.

There is that same issues down in Okinawa. But it is my understanding that the work is still going forward. And that is the agreement that we have between our two governments, that they will

build the FRF [Futenma Replacement Facility] and we will move there.

Mr. COOK. When is that supposed to be finished? Do you know offhand?

General O'DONNELL. I will have to get you that number. It is way down the road. As we said in Japan, we would tell them, "When you build it, we will move." So it is really kind of in their court right now. So we are working towards that.

Mr. COOK. Okay. Okay.

General O'DONNELL. I will get you the exact date though, sir.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 103.]

Mr. COOK. Okay. Thank you very much.

And, by the way, I did want to throw in a plug for the Coast Guard. I had the pleasure of visiting the Coast Guard Academy, a great, great institution. I encourage all my colleagues to go there. I wouldn't recommend going there in the winter. Go to Hawaii. Visit the Congresswoman.

I yield back.

Mr. FORBES. Ms. Graham from Florida is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You can go to Hawaii or you can come to Florida.

I recently had a chance to tour the Coast Guard facility in my district. And thank you for all you do. And I specifically want to thank the Coast Guard for all that you did during the tragedy that occurred last week where we lost a helicopter training group of marines and soldiers. Thank you very much for all that you are doing.

And thank you, gentlemen, as well, the other two representatives here.

My question is for Admiral Michel.

I understand the Coast Guard has been undergoing an acquisition program for a total of 8 national security cutters, 25 offshore patrol cutters, and 58 fast-response cutters.

In February of last year, the Coast Guard awarded three firm-fixed-price contracts for preliminary and contract design of the OPC. One of those contracts is in my district, Eastern Shipbuilding Group, which is located in Panama City, Florida.

Now, I know that you can't comment further on any of these finalists, but I just want to be on the record of supporting Eastern Shipbuilding. It is a phenomenal small shipbuilding operation. I have toured it. And it is a great shipbuilding yard.

With that said, Admiral Michel, can you comment on the role of the OPC in the naval cooperative strategy and, also, on the carefully crafted ratio of 8 national security cutters, 25 offshore patrol cutters, and 58 fast-response cutters. I would much appreciate your response.

Admiral MICHEL. Yes, ma'am. Well, the OPC is really going to be the workhorse of the Coast Guard fleet, and it replaces our medium-endurance cutters, two classes of those, our 210-foot cutters, which will be 55 years old, if everything stays on track, and then our 270-foot cutters, which will be about 35 years old when they come off the line with the OPC.

We are very much looking forward to the design work that comes through, and we are very encouraged that we are going to be able to get an affordable and capable platform for the OPC as we move forward.

But this really does go to the cooperative strategy because the OPC is going to be the bulk of the work that is going to be done here in the Western Hemisphere, which is Coast Guard work, by and large, that we have got to do, maritime security work, work against transnational criminal organizations, fisheries enforcement, search and rescue, marine environmental protection, responding to natural disaster, this whole basket of things.

This is going to be the workhorse for the Nation. And it will allow the Navy and our other forces who are pivoting to other areas where we have national security concerns—they can rest assured that the Coast Guard is there because we are forward, engaged with our offshore fleet, of which the OPC is going to be the centerpiece of that fleet.

It is going to be complemented by the higher-end NSC [national security cutter], but the OPC is going to be the workhorse for the Nation in that maritime security role. And we owe it to our sailors to give them decent equipment. And 55-year-old ships, which can almost take Social Security—we shouldn't be putting our sailors out there.

So, again, we very much appreciative of the support, very much look forward to the designs, and it is critical to the Nation.

Thank you.

Ms. GRAHAM. Thank you. And I look forward to it as well.

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time.

Mr. FORBES. I thank the gentlelady.

Mr. Graves from Louisiana is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you for being here today. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you a number of issues important to south Louisiana.

Thank you for your update on the “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” [CS-21]. It is certainly helpful to see the integration of forces.

In that update, you are only as strong as your weakest link, right? And the Coast Guard does play an important role in CS-21, particularly the role of the OPC and the role of the C-27Js.

When you look at the budget request, you are not seeing additional funds in there. So I am having trouble understanding how the Coast Guard is actually going to fulfill its role without the resources there to, I guess, actually conduct the mission that is laid out in CS-21. And then what type of repercussions does that have with your sister agencies?

Secondly, I think this is perhaps part of a larger problem, when you look across—as I recall, the AC&I [Acquisition, Construction, and Improvements] account this year does, as Chairman Hunter noted, experience a significant reduction this year. Yet, your mission is expanding, as has been discussed here today.

And so can you help me understand or kind of connect the dots there?

Admiral MICHEL. Well, it has been pretty clear and our Commandant has testified that we have had acquisition challenges,

budget-driven in large part, and it has forced us to continue to extend the length of our ships, whether they are the medium-endurance cutters or the *Polar*-class icebreakers, where we have just got kind of a patchwork of things to be able to do.

We have got the budget. We are going to deal with it. It is going to allow us to finish out the eight NSCs, which we need. It is going to allow us to move forward with the FRCs. But we have got some serious challenges, and I don't mean to downplay those.

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you, Admiral.

General and Admiral, could you just quickly comment. You know, again, focusing on the weakest link comment that I made earlier, do you see the Coast Guard with its aging fleet being able to fulfill the mission? Are they dragging you down—and I certainly understand acquisition challenges in other agencies as well. But are they dragging you down and challenging your ability to complete your mission?

Admiral DONEGAN. I will start first. Well, the Coast Guard is not dragging us down by any means. They are all in in not only the strategy, but in working with us.

Where they are challenged resource-wise, for instance, if we talk about the Pacific and the Asia-Pacific region, for example, if they can't get out there and participate in a particular exercise that we need to with a ship, they are there with the rest of their forces, whether they send a LEDET [law enforcement detachment] there or they have already built relationships with the countries we are going to work on.

We are leveraging the relationships that they have already. Of course, we would like them to have more resources and ships to be with us in those regards. But given the challenges that they have, we are working as closely as we can to get the most out of it.

So I look at it more as not particularly that you are as strong as your weakest link, but we are stronger because we are doing this together.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir. And I would just echo what Kid just said. I mean, by no stretch of the imagination are they dragging us down.

But I think us working together and being here together kind of shows you that we are all in on this strategy and that we—where some of the things that perhaps we can do, the Marine Corps can do that the other two gentlemen either side of me can't do, we are going to fill those lanes.

And, of course, there are plenty of gaps in the Marine Corps that both these services can help us with, too. So, no, by their being all in, I think we all are.

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you.

And I want to echo the comments of some of the more senior members in regard to the icebreakers. It seems like that is, once again, a capability that is potentially going to challenge all the services if it is not aggressively addressed.

One other comment, Admiral Michel. I keep looking at your name. In south Louisiana, that would be "Michel."

Admiral MICHEL. It actually is.

Mr. GRAVES. Oh, is it? There we go. I was listening to other folks. I will stop following the elders here.

Very quickly, in the Coast Guard's Western Hemisphere strategy, you list transnational criminal organizations as a mission of the Coast Guard and something you plan to address.

Could you talk about, just briefly, how that dovetails or intersects with CS-21 and how CS-21 perhaps addresses that challenge.

Admiral MICHEL. Sure. The Western Hemisphere strategy was designed by the Commandant specifically to work with CS-21 so that we could focus our core competencies here in the Western Hemisphere and allow our Navy/Marine Corps folks to focus in other areas.

So the strategy itself, which talks about combating networks, primarily transnational criminal organization networks, which for a lot of these countries are national security threats—I mean, ask a country like Honduras, you know, the extreme murder rates and homicide rates and things that they have in there.

And the Coast Guard's presence there really is critical to these nations because it polices off cocaine before it actually gets into Central America and creates death and devastation. Just the effectiveness of the Coast Guard last year seized 91 metric tons of cocaine.

That is about one and a half times all the cocaine seized within the United States last year by every law enforcement agency and all that seized at every air, land, and sea border of the United States combined. So that is how effective that is.

And Coast Guard interdiction efforts are much closer to the head of the snake that starts this than a buy-bust on the streets of one of our hometowns. So it is a critical national security function. It is complementary to the Navy and the rest of our sea services and was designed exactly to work like that, sir.

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you, Admiral.

General, Admiral, thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Cummings is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Michel, let me ask you just picking up on what you were just talking about. Before he retired, Admiral Papp indicated that there had been an approximately 30-percent drop in drug interdictions as a result of the cuts required by sequestration several years ago.

What trends have there been in drug interdictions over the past year? And if we return to sequestration, what impact would that have on drug interdictions? I mean, you gave some very high numbers you just mentioned. And I am just wondering.

Admiral MICHEL. Yes, sir. Well, I can tell you, based on long years of experience—I used to be the Director of Joint Interagency Task Force South [JIATF-South], which was right in the middle of this fight, sir.

And here's the bottom line for major cutters of the Coast Guard. And this has been over many years. One cutter year's worth of effort seized about 20 metric tons of cocaine. That is about a billion dollars in traffickers' profits.

Over many years, that was about the national average for all the cocaine seized within our borders every year by one ship of the

Coast Guard. That is how effective maritime interdiction is. But you got to get the ships to do it.

Right now the figures are here and there, but about three-quarters of those high-confidence intelligence cases that we know are moving out there on the water we can't interdict because there is no ships in order to be able to do it.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So you know they are out there?

Admiral MICHEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. You just can't get to them?

Admiral MICHEL. Yes, sir. I, as JIATF Director, used to watch the vessels go by, but there were not enough ships out there to be able to action it. And then, once it gets into Central America, it is broken into such small parcels it becomes hard to police up. Plus, it creates corruption, death, destruction all its way, wherever it moves on its way up to our citizens.

So it is tragic when it gets past us. But, again, that is forward, engaged, ready, complementary, non-redundant seapower capability of the Nation that works directly with our partners. So it is tragic that we have to see that go by. But if we don't build ships, that is what ends up happening.

Mr. CUMMINGS. What impact have asset failures had on the Coast Guard's ability to perform its mission?

Admiral MICHEL. Well, lots of different things, sir. We are lucky that—we had a major casualty on *Polar Star*. But, thank god, it was kind of out of the ice by the time that it actually happened. But that is a daily occurrence for the Coast Guard.

And our medium-endurance cutter fleet, our 210-foot fleet, over 20 percent of the operational hours were consumed by breakdowns. The ships are just that old that—I don't say we are in a death spiral yet, but we spend increasing amounts of lost operational time and continuous investment in these old class of ships that could be spent on recapitalization efforts.

Again, I wouldn't want to say we are in a death spiral, but we are definitely playing with fire with these old ships. As a sailor who has been around a long time, these ships are really old and they need to be replaced.

And it has an impact on a daily basis. And that is what keeps me awake. And I manage all this old infrastructure with all these pressing missions that are on top of us. That is why they pay me the money. But it is a very uncomfortable position, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So what do you have to give up, then? So you are spending this time repairing old ships. You got them falling apart. And what gives? I mean, do you have a priority of what gives or is it just sort of haphazard?

Admiral MICHEL. Sir, the risks to the Nation in the key areas of the Coast Guard that are fulfilled by these platforms increases every day. Whether it is risk of access to Antarctica, whether it is risk of access to the Arctic, whether it is fisheries enforcement, whether it is maritime law enforcement, whether it is our ability to respond to a hurricane or a national disaster or an oil spill or a mass migration incident, the risk in that fleet goes up every single day.

Now, we have brought some of it down through the national security cutter and the fast-response cutter, which are way better as-

sets than the ones that they replaced, but they are fewer in number. Our major cutter fleet is going to go even under the current plan from 44 ships down to 33 ships. Now, they are a little bit more capable ships, but, still, the numbers don't lie.

So this is all about risk management. And that is what I spend the majority of my day, sir, is managing risk, where to place assets, which ones to bring in the yard, how long can we run the ships before they break or catch on fire. That is what I do on a daily basis, sir. And that is what we are incurring as additional risk.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Last question.

Can you discuss the state of the Marine Safety Program. That is something I have always been very interested in. What is happening with it?

Admiral MICHEL. Well, that is a whole other side of the Coast Guard that is critical to the national security and the economy of the United States. That is all ensuring that our waterways operate correctly and that we have got licensed mariners and safety equipment and all that.

And that is definitely one of the priorities of the Commandant of the Coast Guard. Under our Energy Action Plan, he has asked us—well, he has tasked me with putting together an entire plan to revitalize our Marine Safety Program, which is another investment we are going to have to make to ensure that we can respond to new developments in offshore oil infrastructure or Bakken crude oil moving down the Nation's waterways or a whole range of different activities.

The marine industry is incredibly vibrant in this country and uses technology more and more as time goes on. But to keep up with that, instead of being a regulatory hurdle to that industry, really requires significant investment and increased expertise and capacity in our people.

For a while there, they were building out one tank barge a week down on the gulf coast. And each of those requires Coast Guard inspection. Each one of those requires a waterway to be operated safely on. And that is a whole other mission set of the Coast Guard. And the Coast Guard is stretched pretty thin.

But you have got my commitment to work on that area, sir. It is on my task list that is getting pretty long these days.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Byrne is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for being here today, and I know that each one of you are dealing with lots of difficulties because of budget cutbacks, and I appreciate what you do. You are managing a very difficult situation with a very difficult budget situation. So it is our job to try to make that a little better for you.

And by the way, Admiral Michel, I have got two Coast Guard bases in my district in Mobile, and I have been out in the air assets and in the marine assets, and I have seen for myself some of the challenges you've got in the Coast Guard, and my hat is off to you for what you have been able to do so far.

Admiral Donegan, I have a question for you. The 2015 strategy identifies the importance of U.S. naval cooperation with international partners, and I firmly believe the interoperability with our

allies is critical to creating an agile force. Can you elaborate on the impact of having forward-deployed assets, like the littoral combat ship in regions like the South China Sea, and what the presence of ships like the LCS means to our partners in that region.

Admiral DONEGAN. Yes, sir. I certainly can. The—as you rightly said, this strategy really talks as one of the underlying—underpinning things, along with being forward, being engaged, and the engaged piece is with our partners, to build that alliance, to build those trusts—to build that trust.

To have ships like LCS, as you know, we are putting four into Singapore, and we are going to get some more bang for the buck in terms of presence by rotating crews on those ships. That is part of the innovation piece that we are talking about, but it allows us to be responsive to things that happen that build up our credibility in the region, that when the allies turn and look, they see and know and are assured that we are going to be there.

The LCS, for instance, was one of the first ships to—*Fort Worth* that we had over there that responded when we had the recent airliner go down. That is an example. When you have humanitarian assistance or disaster response exactly that kind of ship can provide, but also when we move into the higher-end piece, as you know, that ship fills gaps in mine warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and surface warfare. So it was also meant to contribute and will contribute in the event that we have to, together with our partners, get involved in any kind of conflict. So absolutely, that ship will bring us back a return on investment.

It is also in other places, though. As you know, we are going to base them in San Diego and Jacksonville, Florida. So the one certainly based in Florida will have better access to support the Coast Guard and what we were just talking about in the SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command] commander and the missions he has on counter-drugs.

It is also going into—into Bahrain to replace the mine ships we have there, but as you know, building the partnerships amongst the navies in the Gulf requires that you have a ship that is compatible with them where they can see you operating side by side with their ships, and we can definitely do that.

An example is, we just did a mine countermeasure exercise in the Gulf. We had on the order of 44 nations and 38 different ships participating in that event. Nowhere else can you bring together that many nations to build partnerships and build that trust that we are talking about.

Mr. BYRNE. Are you already working on plans for how you will utilize the LCS when it is redesigned to be a frigate?

Admiral DONEGAN. Yes, sir. We are in the forefront of that, as you know, but it is going to bring additional capability, which means in those mission sets that I just talked about, you are talking about enhanced—enhanced reliability and survivability because of the weapons systems that we are putting out.

Mr. BYRNE. Well, thank you. I think the LCS has proven to be a very wise investment by the Navy and by the country, and I appreciate your plans and your usage of it, and I yield back.

Mr. FORBES. I would like to finish up where we started by saying what a good job that the three of you did with all of the individuals

working with you. We appreciate your hard work on this, but it is a piece of paper. So, Admiral Donegan, how do we go from strategic theory to operational effectiveness?

Admiral DONEGAN. Sir, that is a great question, and the good news is while we were building the strategy, we took on the piece of how do we operationalize it? How do we implement it?

First of all, we have to implement it together, and so because it is a strategy written by us together, all of the services are going to participate in—already participate in the process of implementation. Some of those processes are well underway with the Naval Board, with our Coast Guard and Navy warfighting talks, with the Navy and Marine Corps warfighting talks, but we also are planning on a series of—as you know, we have a classified annex is coming with this—after this strategy. That is part of the operationalizing when we bring together the staffs here in the Pentagon with our Naval War College which runs wargaming for us, with forward-deployed fleet commanders and combatant commanders and begin—and execute war games and modeling and simulation where we can iteratively look at the problems that we are facing in each region.

Each region has a certain threat, and each region has a certain plan to deal with that threat, and what we are working forward to operationalize this strategy is, is now looking at the current way we would get at that threat, running it through a series of war games, and determining if we have any gaps we need to fill, and if we fill those gaps—how would we fill those gaps? I am sorry.

It is not all about buying something new. It may be an adjustment to the concept. So we have concept development work going on. It may be something innovative like—like we are doing with high-energy lasers or railguns. Or it may be something in cyber. It may be another way to get at the problem, but it isn't just buying something, as I talked about before, where you get into this thing-on-thing problem. So we are doing that.

As you know, the Navy has also developed a strategy sub-specialty code. That is where we have identified the really smart folks, placed them in all the right places so we can link the strategy to what it is we go buy. Because in the end, this force will be what we bought and also how we employ it. So the first part gets at how we employ the second piece. We have to link this strategy to what we buy.

So those are some of the things. There is more—more into the continuum that we call the strategic continuum that does that linkage.

Mr. FORBES. We heard Mr. Garamendi, Mr. Hunter correctly be concerned about building icebreakers and more ships. If Mr. Wittman was here, he would be concerned about his aircraft carriers. Mr. Courtney would certainly be concerned about his *Virginia*-class submarine.

As I look at the strategy, it is going to call for an additional 23 forward-deployed ships, and projects about a 60-percent increase of Navy ships and aircraft in the Indo-Pacific region by 2020.

Where do they come from? Do we build them? Do we bring them from other parts of the globe? And if we build them, do we have the industrial capacity to accommodate the strategy for either?

Admiral DONEGAN. Well, sir, it is a combination of a little bit of each of what you said. We are building more. As you know, the Secretary was in here and talked to you about his plan for building some more, but it is also about the innovative employment of the assets that we do have.

An example is if the ships that we can put forward bring us more return on investment. So in terms of the commodity that we give, and that commodity is forward presence, so the ships we put into Rota, Spain, we are putting four ships into Rota, Spain. They are high-end DDGs with the ballistic missile defense capability. If we were to resource that same commitment of presence from the United States, we would need 10 of those ships. So part of the increase in the presence that we are getting is the fact that—how we are employing those ships. The LCSs that we are putting into Singapore, we are putting four of those there. They are not going to be based with their families, but we are going to rotate crews.

Our modeling and simulation tells us that we will basically get a twofold increase in presence because of that concept. So we will get—two ships, it would take back here, to keep that one forward, if that would make sense. If we were doing rotational, we would need twice as many LCSs to do that same kind of presence.

So it is a combination of the innovative way we are employing it. It is a combination of growing the force to some extent with those that are already in the shipbuilding plan.

Mr. FORBES. Please, General.

General O'DONNELL. Sir, thanks.

I would just make one comment that we are already looking—the Commandant has made it very clear that we are looking at all avenues to get marines out on ships.

Now, most of the alternate platforms we talked about earlier coming from the MPS [maritime prepositioning ships], those are for the low end of the ROMO [range of military operations], but they could be out there doing theater security cooperation or humanitarian assistance and those types of things, and that helps take some of the pressure off the amphibs [amphibious assault ships].

So we still have to—they are not a replacement for the amphibs, but they are complementary in that they could probably reduce some of the workload on those amphibs. And so we are looking very closely at that, and we are working, obviously, very closely with the Navy on that, and we see some—we see some real opportunity there to help reduce some of that thing.

The last thing I would leave you with, and I didn't get a chance to mention before, but coming from 2 years in Japan and watching—watching—I can't speak to the South China Sea, but I certainly can speak to the East China Sea, and the Japanese Coast Guard taking the brunt of that. They have learned a lot watching how our United States Coast Guard and United States Navy work together very closely hand in glove, and the 2 years I was there I saw them—a lot more interoperability among their own ships by just watching and learning from the gentlemen on either side of me and their service. That is all.

Mr. FORBES. Let's suppose my last question, and then Mr. Garamendi has a final question, but I know the President's—the Navy's President's budget request for fiscal year 2016 is 300 ships.

We are currently at 287, and let's just say we have one member that may slide in here, be just a little skeptical that we don't get there.

If we do not get there, and we have a reduction in the number of ships, is this strategy still possible with your ships?

Admiral DONEGAN. Sir, we wrote—the three services wrote this strategy based on what our assessment of that environment that I described earlier says that the Nation needs from the sea services.

So the first thing that I will say is the targets that we want to get to and how we are going to employ the force and the way we are going to do it and the capabilities we need, and to some extent, the numbers are what we believe the Nation needs. Now, that said, if we get less than that, we are still going to move out on that trajectory with those priorities, and then we are going to be coming back and talking to you about the risks that then we are going to be taking and where that would be.

We will still work as, you know, on innovation and efficiency to reduce that risk as much as we can, but we will be very open and transparent with where we see the risk coming if we are—if we are not given the resources to the level that we describe in some parts of this strategy.

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Garamendi has a final question, and after his question, as I told each of you before, we are going to give you whatever time you need as a summation or if there is anything you need to clarify or add that we haven't put on the record.

Mr. Garamendi.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for putting together this hearing. And, gentlemen, thank you for your participation and your service.

Admiral Donegan, the revised Cooperative Strategy for Seapower implies the ready deployment of sea service assets, and it does, in fact, mention the involvement of the Military Sealift Command [MSC], and that its central contribution is that the MSC vessels and capabilities are available. And it does raise the question of whether our domestic sealift capacity is sufficient to meet the needs of this new strategy.

Is it sufficient?

Admiral DONEGAN. We believe right now it is sufficient. The question, though, I think that we have to address is looking forward as we continue our iterative wargaming and simulations and modeling that we are doing. As we move to the future and that force is potentially less available or comes under greater stress, we have to define—see if the—if the combination of all things that give us sealift, which is the combat logistics force combined with Military Sealift Command and the other—and the other sealift that we bring to support our sea base are enough to do it.

I think that it is going to be a function of the scenario and the location of where it occurs, and we also have, as you know, because each of those vessels require escorts, we have to work that piece, too, to make sure that we have the right size and shape.

Right now, for what we have in the current force, yes, and I think as it comes under stress because less of those become available, we are going to have to reevaluate that as we go along.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. We have some significant concerns about the future of the Military Sealift Command, the aging of the ships, and the like. I would like to get into more detail with you on that.

Just another set of questions quickly. The Navy is using UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] off its ships, and, Admiral Donegan, my understanding is that you are advancing this program very rapidly and that you are—have some satisfaction with the potential that it brings to expanding the ability of the ship to see what is going on and to do its task. Is that the case?

Admiral DONEGAN. Sir, specifically, the strategy talks about continuing to develop unmanned systems that improve our abilities to do what we need to do, and the unmanned brings endurance, for sure, and it brings capabilities that man does not—does not bring, and I am not just talking about in airplanes. So this is airplanes, this is subsurface, and this is on the surface. So this strategy has us looking hard at that.

In terms of unmanned airplanes, as you know, we have a validated demand for our UCLASS [Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike] system based—which is CVN [aircraft carrier] ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance], but it also has with it survivable and possesses a strike capability. That demand has been validated, and we are moving forward with that.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Yeah. And I noticed, Admiral Michel, that the U.S.—that the President's budget does not have any money for UAVs. Are you working with the Navy vaulting off their work and their systems and the application of their systems to the Coast Guard?

Admiral MICHEL. Sir, we have been all in with the Navy on unmanned aerial systems for things that might be useful to the Coast Guard. Some of the Navy systems are a little bit too high-end for us, but certainly in the areas—shipborne systems like Fire Scout or ScanEagle or the smaller ones, and we have operated a number of those systems off Coast Guard cutters.

From the Coast Guard perspective on the unmanned aerial system, be extremely interested for the same reasons that the Navy is. You know, optimal sensor capability, extending the range of the ship. Very attractive. You know, whether those would be land-based or sea-based or whether they should be small and cheap or higher end and more capable, really the Coast Guard is evaluating all that because we have got to make sure that whatever investment we make there is a wise one, but the Navy has been—and the Marine Corps, for that matter, have been completely open with us and let us be full participants, sir.

Mr. GARAMENDI. And I would hope you would do this at a little faster strategy, a little faster than the icebreakers.

Finally, very quickly, the Navy is deploying a Poseidon UAV off the coast of California, probably for training purposes out of San Diego. The Coast Guard might consider being in some sort of a coordinated arrangement with the Navy since they will be looking at the same water you are presently unable to see. So I just—if you look into that and come back to me with the potential that it might have between the two forces?

Admiral MICHEL. Yes, sir. We will do that.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you.

I yield back.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 103.]

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Hunter is recognized for any final questions he may have.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just one quick question. General, what do you do when it comes to logistics right now? Do they change at all with this new plan? Meaning the amphibious logistics having stuff everywhere for when we are everywhere?

General O'DONNELL. No, sir, no. It is the same strategy. You were out, but we talked a little bit about that, and certainly with both the two squadrons that we have that are out there with the MPS, and then, as you know, the MLP [mobile landing platform] will bring that new capability of the selective offload and be able to bring those things ashore.

But I think it kind of gets back to the—as you well know, it is—everything gets a vote. So it depends on really kind of what the situation is going to be. If it is on the low end of the ROMO or whether it is going in the high end, but we are definitely going to have to have the—and the Commandant has been working very hard for the last couple of months on wargaming some of the high-end stuff, the A2/AD [anti-access/area denial], and I am sure you were briefed on it, but as we work through that, it will not change the fundamentals of the—of the organization on how we do the logistics, but just a little bit on the distances and how we would protect it and how the sea base—and, of course, we are dependent on the other services to help us with that.

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congressman Langevin was here a short time ago, had to leave, but he asked me if I could just to forward one concern he had and—or question he had. Again, I think as we all know, Jim does a lot of work in terms of cyber security with his subcommittee.

And what he was curious about was that the strategy of all-domain access in terms of whether or not that extends to cybersecurity, electromagnetic spectrum, intelligence command control, other non-kinetic regimes. And I was just wondering if any of you could talk about that a little bit for the record.

Admiral MICHEL. I will talk about—excuse me, sir. From a Coast Guard perspective, I—that is a new term, and I think it is exactly the right term, and it encaptures those things beyond the physical domain, so the ability to conduct cyber operations, electromagnetic spectrum, and that is very important to the Coast Guard to be able to do that. We are incredibly interconnected. We have our own networks. We want to be able to exploit or do whatever we need to do regarding adversaries' networks, and we have a whole regulated industry that we deal with which has cyber challenges as well from a Coast Guard perspective. So we really have a prominent place in dot-mil, dot-gov, and dot-com, and I am not aware of anybody else in the government that has that array of expertise and access, but the ability to conduct cyber operations, the ability to do the things that are necessary in cyberspace as well as the nonphysical do-

mains, absolutely critical to the Coast Guard missions. And we have got to build out a workforce and a capability in order to get at that. So thanks, sir.

Admiral DONEGAN. Sir, quickly from our standpoint is the reason that we—this group together as we were building the strategy came up with the concept of all-domain access was partly because of this cyberspace issue that we see in front of us. So it is absolutely central to the piece about access because we are talking about in all domains. It doesn't have to be the physical space by any means. So we have taken this onboard pretty hard. As you know, we have an information dominance score that is tacked on this.

We have—the Naval Academy has stood up their cyber center so we can start at the very beginning in the training for this, but where it is really going to come to an end is—point in the warfighting end of the business is the ability to have the access and use that domain to our advantage. First, we have to defend our systems, but we also have to be able to reach out and touch others to be able to potentially degrade, to potentially disable so that we are not constantly, as I said earlier, putting one of our things against another thing and losing that cost battle.

Mr. COURTNEY. Okay. And so, again, Jim's sort of observation in the notes that he left here is that, you know, at some point this is about standing up the, you know, the human capital to be able to do that, and, I mean, it sounds like you are trying to sort of form these centers of excellence at the different training facilities and—yes, sir.

General O'DONNELL. Well, I would just comment that a Marine force in cyber is—they are all connected with each other, and of course to CYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command], but I think that kind of gets what you are talking, sir, is making sure you have the human capital and the capabilities and the—training the right people to do those things that it will be this part of the all-domain we talked about.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. Yield back.

Mr. FORBES. And now I would like to give each of you an opportunity anything—last comments that you have, and in doing that, could you also include a little follow-up to Mr. Courtney's question. It is one thing to stand these things up. How do we measure success in the non-kinetic domains? That is a little trick here for us, and if you would include that in your summation. And, Admiral Michel, we are going to start with you since everybody slaughtered your name today, and thank you so much once again for being here.

Admiral MICHEL. Well, thanks for giving the opportunity for me to be here. I think having the three sea services in front of you is really the message that I want to convey here, is that your sea services are working together on a daily basis. We have folks who work in each other's commands. We do operations together on a daily basis, whether in the physical domain or whether in the cyber domain. So the taxpayer gets a huge benefit from its investment in all three sea services because we're interoperable. We face similar or same challenges, and we work together on a daily basis in a very cooperative manner. So that is the one key takeaway.

I know we focused a lot on Coast Guard acquisitions. I don't want to—we had our discussions regarding that, but your Coast Guard is ready. The Commandant reports that your Coast Guard is ready today. We are concerned about the risks that we are taking, particularly with aging equipment, but your Coast Guard is “Semper Paratus” [“Always Ready”], and I can report that to you today.

Issue on cyber, I appreciate your comments, sir. This is a workforce issue. I don't think it is going to be—you know, regardless of whatever whiz-bang equipment, we are either going to win or lose on this based on our people and being able to train and retain those high-quality people that are going to be necessary to conduct the cyber operations that we need in order to make the Nation successful.

Boy, measuring success in the non-kinetic realm is a lot harder in many ways, but as a Coast Guardsman, most of our endgames are not smoking holes in the ground. They are law enforcement actions, they are regulatory actions, or dealing with resilience and being able to rebuild infrastructure and different things like that. So the Coast Guard is comfortable with trying to measure success in non-kinetic solutions, but it is going to be very difficult.

What I would say is our strategies, typically, if we can defend ourselves, make sure that we conduct our operations in whatever areas we are, and then be able to protect the American people and our other stakeholders at an adequate level, that is probably the ultimate measure of success in most of the non-kinetic areas we operate, and that would include cyber.

Mr. FORBES. General.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir. Let me answer your last question first about how do you measure success. You know, it is more than just being able to keep in your C2 systems up and running to be able to command and control and do the things that you want to do, but you have to be able to have those as—as Admiral Michel had just mentioned how we are going to make sure we have people in there that are monitoring those types of things. But it is going to be very, very difficult to find out. You are only going to find out if you failed within those—within those cybers. But all of us—I know all the services are working very hard on that.

And the other part, the only thing I would comment about your other question was that everybody in this room manages risk, and we started about a year ago with Expeditionary Force 21, the Commandant's Planning Guidance a couple of months. And as I mentioned to you before, we have already kind of moved out on making sure that we are doing all the experimentation and we are working those things to operationalize this strategy.

Unfortunately, you know, we don't have a forecast on what the budgets are going to be and how they—but we only plan for those. But the basic, as I mentioned, the basic tenets of the strategy, whether it is the EF-21, CS-21, or the Commandant's Planning Guidance, sir, I will assure you that we are working to make sure those tenets stay the same, and that is being ready when this Nation is least ready, being forward deployed, forward engaged, building trust, working all those issues, and being the 911 force that you

expect us to be, and there is no doubt about that; and whatever funding we end up with, we will execute our mission.

Mr. FORBES. General, thank you. And, Admiral Donegan, we will let you have the last word.

Admiral DONEGAN. Thank you, sir.

I will start with getting at the hardest question you give us, which is how do we measure success in that domain. It is very difficult. We are working, and it is not one service that is working on this. As you know, Admiral Rogers and Cyber Command are working with all of us as we move forward to sort that out.

In the near term, it is cyber hygiene and making sure that we have that piece right, that we have the basic things that we need to be doing as a service. In the longer term, though, it gets beyond—it gets beyond that. When we—when we are working in acquiring our systems, we have to acquire them with this in mind as we go forward, and one of the metrics needs to be that that has to be one of the things we are looking at as we go along, and it is, but it will need to continue to be. It wasn't necessarily one of the things in mind for some of the older systems that we bought. So we have to bear that in mind, but it is going to be difficult, and I don't think that it is going to be easy.

And in closing, I think I can speak for all of us when I say we are very proud of the strategy that the three services put together. A lot of work went into it, but we are equally proud of the game plan we have for moving forward to put it—to continue to put it and implement it and make sure that we can execute the strategy, and we look forward to working with this committee and the rest of Congress as we do that.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you all for being here today. Thanks for the work you have done, and please communicate to your staffs and the people that work with you how much we appreciate the jobs that they have done, and with that we are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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**A P P E N D I X**

MARCH 18, 2015

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**PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

MARCH 18, 2015

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**Opening Remarks of the Honorable J. Randy Forbes  
for the  
Joint Seapower and Projection Forces and Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Hearing on  
Naval Cooperative Strategy  
March 18, 2015**

Today the subcommittee convenes with colleagues from the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation. I want to welcome all of our members and colleagues, as well as the distinguished panel of Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard leaders for today's hearing.

We have testifying before us on naval cooperative strategy:

- Vice Admiral Charles Michel, U.S. Coast Guard, Deputy Commandant for Operations;
- Major General Andrew O'Donnell, U.S. Marine Corps, Assistant Deputy Commandant, Combat Development & Integration; Deputy Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command; and
- Rear Admiral Kevin Donegan, U.S. Navy, Acting Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5).

Thank you all for testifying today and we look forward to your thoughts and insights.

The report, "A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower" that the Sea Services released last week outlines a U.S. maritime strategy that addresses regional threats and capabilities as well as threats to the global commons. This joint strategy demonstrates cooperation and a promising future of joint operations. It affirms U.S. resolve to project power and deter aggression, while identifying long-term planning initiatives.

The eight short years since the last maritime strategy underscore the need to build a flexible, agile maritime force that is ready to respond to threats. Whereas in 2007 the U.S. could "preserve the peace," it must now be ready to respond as a result of changes in the global security environment. Sovereign states, such as China and Russia, have expanded their regional forces and seized land of neighboring countries. Extremist and terrorist organizations are destabilizing the Middle East and parts of Africa, and under-governed shore areas foster illicit activities that fuel these organizations. Maintaining a forward U.S. presence and building our relationships with allies and partner nations is vital for global security and prosperity.

While the report identifies critical growth opportunities, the strategy neglects the roles and missions of different services, and I encourage the Sea Services to evaluate those between the Navy, Coast Guard, and Marines in order to inform implementation of this strategy. Furthermore, I would like to see additional analysis on forward deployments and surge requirements and the implications on the industrial base to support the strategy. Overall maritime strategy also needs to provide the framework for distributed sea control and power projection in the littorals. This strategy lays a good foundation, but it will require attention and congressional support to be effective. I look forward to the release of the classified annex later this year, and I hope that it will address some of these areas.

In the face of sequestration, I am concerned about implementing this strategy at a cohesive level. It is Congress' job to ensure that the Coast Guard, Navy, and Marine Corps are fully funded to be able to meet these strategic aims. Today, I would like to hear from the witnesses specifically about how this strategy will connect service budget requests to strategic plans and operations.

With that, I turn to the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Courtney. We will then hear from the Chair for Coast Guard and Transportation and the Vice Chair of this subcommittee, Mr. Hunter, and his colleague Mr. Garamendi.

**Opening Remarks for Congressman Joe Courtney  
Ranking Member  
Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee  
Naval Cooperative Strategy  
March 18, 2015**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to take a moment to welcome our colleagues from the Coast Guard and Maritime Subcommittee, who join us today to review the new Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower.

The updated 2015 strategy lays out what many of us in this room already know – that our Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard play a central and critical role in our economy and national security at home and across the globe. If anything, the importance of our sea services has only increased since the first strategy was released in 2007 – and I believe that the new strategy properly reflects the new threats, challenges and opportunities facing our sea services and our nation as a whole.

I am particularly pleased that the new strategy lays out not only the broad range of missions and concepts our sea services are tasked with, but also the force levels needed to achieve them. The Navy, with the support of this committee, has made great progress towards putting our force on a clear path to the more than 300 ships and 33 amphibious ships needed to execute the strategy. And, I know our colleagues on the Coast Guard subcommittee have been equally focused ensuring that the Coast Guard can build and maintain their fleet as well.

The new strategy, however, arrives at a time of great challenge here in Congress. This week, both chambers are beginning their work on the 2016 budget that, unfortunately, sets us on a path to fund our sea services at a level lower than the President's budget request – essentially, locking in sequestration. I think there is broad agreement on this committee that this approach is misguided and, frankly, dangerous.

While it appears that the budget will include a one-year work-around that shifts funding to emergency war supplemental funding outside of spending caps, this approach does not address the root problem – sequestration level caps in law – nor

does it provide the long term certainty needed to properly support our nation's defense. And although those of us on the House Armed Services Committee tend to discuss the defense side of the spending caps, the presence of our Coast Guard here today is a reminder that locking in lower spending caps in non-defense spending has a serious impact to our security as well.

Over the last several weeks, our committee has heard from a broad range of military leaders about the devastating impact that this approach would have on their ability to meet the defense requirements of our nation. We cannot say we have not been warned. I hope the witnesses will discuss how a lower budget level will impact their ability to achieve the path laid out in the new maritime strategy, and the resulting impact to the nation.

I look forward to the testimony today.

U. S. Department of  
Homeland Security  
  
United States  
Coast Guard



Commandant  
United States Coast Guard

2703 Martin Luther King Jr Ave SE  
Washington, DC 20593-7000  
Staff Symbol: CG-0921  
Phone: (202) 372-4411  
FAX: (202) 372-8300

**TESTIMONY OF  
VICE ADMIRAL CHARLES D. MICHEL  
DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR OPERATIONS**

**ON  
“A COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR 21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY SEAPOWER”**

**BEFORE THE HOUSE SEAPOWER AND FORCE PROJECTION SUBCOMMITTEE  
AND  
HOUSE COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SUBCOMMITTEE**

**MARCH 18, 2015**

Good afternoon Chairman Forbes, Chairman Hunter, and distinguished Members of the Committees. It is my pleasure to be here today to testify on *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready*. The Coast Guard stands alongside the Navy and Marine Corps, reaffirming our unified commitment to confront national security threats from and on the sea.

**Introduction**

Although the Coast Guard remains the smallest member of the Nation’s Armed Services, its ability to balance its law enforcement and military authorities, capabilities, competencies, and partnerships make it a unique and indispensable instrument of national security. The Coast Guard, one of the handful of Operating Components in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is a maritime force, performing a complementary and non-redundant set of maritime missions that are critical to fulfilling the wide-ranging goals of the Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower (CS21). CS21 details many shared strategic concepts that link directly to DHS and Coast Guard strategic priorities and missions. In addition to ongoing support the Coast Guard provides the Department of Defense (DOD) at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, the Coast Guard ensures the three maritime military services achieve strategic priorities in the critical areas of maritime security; all-domain access; and maintaining flexible, agile, and ready forces.

**An Armed Force—From the Tactical to Strategic**

The Coast Guard, under both its Title 10 and Title 14 authorities, is at all times an Armed Force and maintains a state of readiness to function as a specialized service in support of the Navy in time of war. The Coast Guard actively partners with DOD at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels as part of its Defense Operations mission. At the tactical level, Coast Guard cutters and aircraft are interoperable with the Navy, and use common communications and

weapons systems. Specific deployed forces include six cutters that make up Coast Guard Patrol Forces Southwest Asia in the Persian Gulf, a port security unit guarding the harbor at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station, international training teams working with DOD around the world, and Coast Guard helicopters that conduct intercepts of low, slow-flying aircraft in the National Capital Region in support of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). In domestic and international ports, the Coast Guard conducts maritime safety and security operations in support of military outloads to ensure safe and secure DOD force projection capability. At the operational level, the Coast Guard provides liaison officers to all the Combatant Commands and Coast Guard senior officers hold key leadership positions in U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command. At the strategic level, Coast Guard personnel are assigned to Office of the Secretary of Defense, the the Navy Staff and the Joint Staff at the Pentagon, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard is invited to and participates in all meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Coast Guard also cooperates on numerous initiatives, including a Navy-Coast Guard National Fleet Policy and a Tri-Service Maritime Security Cooperation agreement with the Navy and the Marine Corps.

The Coast Guard's Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security mission is another point of frequent interface with DOD. The Maritime Security Response Team, based in Chesapeake, Virginia, gives DHS and DOD additional capability to counter terrorist threats in the maritime environment. Eleven Maritime Security and Safety Teams give the Coast Guard the capability to surge anti-terrorism and force protection to ports around the country. Two Coast Guard Maritime Force Protection Units provide dedicated and robust surface protection for the Navy's ballistic missile submarines transiting in and out of port in Kings Bay, Georgia, and Bangor, Washington. Additionally, Port Security Units represent the Coast Guard's expeditionary port security capability, able to deploy as part of a joint force in a combat environment.

#### **Maritime Security**

As noted in CS21, maritime security operations protect sovereignty and maritime resources; support free and open seaborne commerce; and counter innumerable threats that seek to exploit the maritime domain, including: weapons proliferation, terrorism, transnational organized crime (TOC), piracy, and unlawful seaborne immigration. As DOD rebalances efforts to address national security imperatives in the Asia-Pacific region, the importance of Coast Guard maritime security efforts in the Western Hemisphere become more essential to countering maritime threats on the approaches to our southern border. Moreover, the Coast Guard's maritime presence, patrolling the approaches to our maritime borders and in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to protect living marine resources and the environment pays dividends beyond strictly Coast Guard missions and improves our national security through early awareness of threats to our maritime sovereignty.

As part of the President's strategy to enhance stability, prosperity, and governance in Central America, the Coast Guard is repositioning legacy forces and investing in the people and platforms necessary to carry out an offensive strategy that targets TOC networks, operating with impunity throughout the Central American region, and disrupts these criminal network operations where they are most vulnerable – at sea. The Coast Guard's Western Hemisphere Strategy, which follows the President's strategy, outlines the Service's approach to ensuring regional maritime security in our primary operating area. It follows in turn, as CS21 notes, a proper force-sizing construct is critical to ensuring the capability and capacity to meet mission

requirements in our operating area, and necessitate a fleet size of 91 National Security, Offshore Patrol, and Fast Response Cutters.

The Coast Guard enjoys strong partnerships with U.S. Southern Command, Joint Interagency Task Force South, and U.S. Northern Command; all are critical partners in achieving our national security goals in the Western Hemisphere. In response to TOC networks and instability in Central America, the Coast Guard recently surged cutter and maritime patrol aircraft forces to the Western Hemisphere Transit Zone. This allows U.S. Navy assets to rebalance to support the President's direction with their inherent capabilities. The Coast Guard is also playing a major role in DHS's Southern Border and Approaches Campaign Plan. This plan establishes three DHS Joint Task Forces that will unify DHS components' operational activities, resulting in a joint effort and a better interface with DOD commands. One of the DHS Joint Task Forces will be led by a Coast Guard Vice Admiral and the Coast Guard will support the leaders of the other two with senior officers.

#### **All Domain Access**

The Coast Guard plays a unique role in achieving all domain access, as envisioned in CS21. The Coast Guard's ability to operate in the Polar regions, its unique authorities and international partnerships, and its broad roles and missions in the cyber domain directly support shared objectives to ensure all-domain access across the globe.

Diminishing ice coverage is leading to increased maritime activity in the Arctic. Ice Operations and several other Coast Guard missions, including Marine Environmental Protection, Search and Rescue, Marine Safety, Living Marine Resources, Aids-to-Navigation, Defense Readiness, and other Law Enforcement, will need to evolve as the changes occur. Tourism activity may increase demands for Coast Guard response resources. The Arctic is also extremely rich in natural resources, which adds to its geostrategic significance.

The challenges posed by Polar environments demand specialized capabilities and personnel who are trained and equipped to operate in the most unforgiving places on Earth. With reactivation of POLAR STAR, the Coast Guard has returned to breaking out a channel, and escorting petroleum and break bulk carriers, to resupply the United States base of operations in McMurdo Sound. POLAR STAR is the only ice breaker in the United States fleet capable of conducting this mission and providing assured access.

As recognized in CS21, achieving access in all domains begins in peacetime, through security cooperation engagements with the naval and maritime forces of our allies and partners. As part of the Coast Guard's International Security Sector Assistance efforts, Coast Guard personnel are engaged with partner nations across the globe. Currently serving in 29 countries, Coast Guard personnel perform a variety of duties internationally, serving as International Port Security Liaison Officers, Coast Guard Liaison Officers, Security Assistance Officers, Security Cooperation Officers, Maritime Advisors, and Coast Guard Attachés. Moreover, the Coast Guard has over 40 bilateral law enforcement agreements and arrangements, as well as numerous other instruments that support a variety of security objectives.

As part of the DOD information network, the Coast Guard coordinates network defense activities with DOD and U.S. Cyber Command. As mandated by the Maritime Transportation Security Act

of 2002, the Coast Guard is the DHS component charged with preventing and responding to Transportation Security Incidents that take place in the maritime domain. As the Sector Specific Agency for the maritime mode of the transportation systems sector, the Coast Guard plays a critical role in helping to protect public and private maritime infrastructure owners and operators from cyber threats. This year, the Coast Guard will release a Cyber Strategy that will provide greater detail on our strategic priorities in the Cyber Domain.

**Forward, Engaged, Ready**

I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. As the strategy states, the Coast Guard is forward deployed, engaged, and ready. The Coast Guard is operating in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific to counter drug smuggling and criminal networks; it is forward in the Pacific and Bering Sea conducting fisheries patrols and enforcing the law in our Exclusive Economic Zone; and it is forward in the Persian Gulf working with U.S. Central Command providing maritime security. The Coast Guard also deploys mobile training teams around the world training partner nations to provide security for themselves. In addition, the Coast Guard leverages numerous bilateral agreements and arrangements to address counter-narcotics, illegal migration, fisheries enforcement, and weapons proliferation beyond the limits of our territorial sea, including in territorial seas of other nations that have given their consent.

The Coast Guard is ready and “on call 24/7”, both at home and abroad, to counter threats, and to do so with the Navy and Marine Corps in a complementary and non-redundant manner. Critical to remaining forward, engaged, and ready are investments in the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) acquisitionimproved marine and aviation capabilities, integrated command and control systems, and a proficient workforce.

In closing, the Coast Guard remains an adaptable Sea Service firmly committed to our role as an Armed Force carrying out maritime missions in service to the Nation.



Vice Admiral Charles D. Michel  
Deputy Commandant for Operations  
U.S. Coast Guard



Vice Admiral Charles Michel is the U. S. Coast Guard Deputy Commandant for Operations, responsible for establishing and providing operational strategy, policy, guidance and resources to meet national priorities for U. S. Coast Guard missions, programs and services.

His previous flag officer assignments include Deputy Commander, U. S. Coast Guard Atlantic Area; Director, Joint Interagency Task Force South; Military Advisor to the Secretary of Homeland Security; and Director for Governmental and Public Affairs, U. S. Coast Guard.

A native of Brandon, Florida, he graduated from the U. S. Coast Guard Academy with a Bachelor of Science degree in Marine Engineering (with high honors) in 1985. In 1992, he graduated summa cum laude from the University of Miami School of Law as the salutatorian, receiving membership in the Order of the Coif.



Tours of duty afloat included serving as Commanding Officer, USCGC RESOLUTE; as Executive Officer, USCGC DAUNTLESS; as Commanding Officer, USCGC CAPE CURRENT; and as Deck Watch Officer, USCGC DECISIVE. Vice Admiral Michel also served as Chief of the Office of Maritime and International Law, Washington, DC; Staff Attorney, Eighth Coast Guard District, New Orleans, Louisiana; head of the Operations Division, Office of Maritime and International Law, Washington, DC; and as Legislative Counsel for the Office of Congressional and Governmental Affairs, Washington, DC.

Vice Admiral Michel's awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, the Meritorious Service Medal, the Coast Guard Commendation Medal, the Coast Guard Achievement Medal, and the Coast Guard Letter of Commendation Ribbon. Vice Admiral Michel was also awarded the Distinguished Service Medal of the Colombian Navy. Vice Admiral Michel was the American Bar Association Young Lawyer of the Year for the Coast Guard in 1995, the Judge Advocate's Association Career Armed Services Attorney of the Year for the Coast Guard in 2000, and is currently a member of the Florida Bar.

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RELEASED BY THE  
HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

**STATEMENT OF  
REAR ADMIRAL KEVIN DONEGAN  
U.S. NAVY  
DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS AND STRATEGY (N3/N5) - ACTING  
AND  
MAJOR GENERAL ANDREW W. O'DONNELL, JR.  
U.S. MARINE CORPS  
ASSISTANT DEPUTY COMMANDANT, COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND  
INTEGRATION  
DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT  
COMMAND  
BEFORE THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION OF FORCES OF THE  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
AND  
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION  
OF THE TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE COMMITTEE**

*A COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY SEAPOWER:  
FORWARD, ENGAGED, READY*

**18 MARCH 2015**

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## **Introduction**

Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Courtney, Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, we are honored to be here today with our Coast Guard colleague to discuss our new tri-service maritime strategy. *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready* explains how we will build and employ U.S. Naval Forces in support of national security interests. It describes a force built and ready for any challenge from a high-end war fight to humanitarian operations.

We would like to begin this statement by providing an overview of the strategy, and then some highlights of how this strategy describes warfighting, forward presence, allies and partners, global access, the Asia-Pacific rebalance, future force design, and the focus we are placing on developing a strategic continuum within the fleet.

## **Overview**

*A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready* explains how we will build and employ the Naval Forces of the future in support of national security interests. It describes a Navy and Marine Corps built and ready for any challenge from a high-end war fight to humanitarian operations.

The strategy was revised mainly due to changes in the geopolitical landscape including threats from violent extremist organizations like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), threats from North Korea and Iran, potential for opportunities and challenges with a rising China, and recent Russian aggression in Ukraine. Additionally, the strategy is aligned with the new National Security Strategy, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. Finally, the strategy recognizes our current fiscal circumstances.

Most importantly, however, this strategy continues to emphasize combat-credible forward presence that is “where it matters, when it matters,” and a commitment to allies and partners. We will continue to meet our historic naval functions of deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security. But our strategy has adapted, starting with an emphasis on warfighting first. A new function, all domain access, enables us to get the access we need to be effective. The strategy balances forces and capabilities against regional threats. It embraces

innovation and efficiency in building a modern and capable force of more than 300 ships and 182,000 Marines that will overcome any challenge to fight and win.

Throughout the development of this strategy, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has engaged a diverse audience of junior, mid-grade and senior officers, scholars, civilians, and retirees on strategy and strategy development. He said, “we need to approach this as a continuum, and we need a re-vitalized process, we need people, and we need a system for our strategy.” These principles factored heavily into how we completed our revision to the 2007 document, and our end state is an energized culture of strategic thinking. The strategy is just one piece of our strategic continuum to enable timely and comprehensive updates to the implementation of our strategy in a dynamic global security environment.

To describe our new strategy in greater detail, we will highlight the document’s key points of emphasis.

### **Warfighting First**

Defending our Nation and winning its wars is the core task of the U.S. Naval Forces. The Navy and Marine Corps’ fundamental mission is warfighting. Due to the threats from violent extremist organizations like ISIL, threats from North Korea and Iran, potential for opportunities and challenges with a rising China, and recent Russian aggression, the Sea Services—the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—must have the capabilities and capacities to defeat any adversary and defend the homeland and our allies and partners worldwide. The Services’ number-one responsibility is to deter aggression and, if deterrence fails, to fight and win our Nation’s wars.

Because the maritime domain supports the bulk of the Joint Force’s forward deployment and sustainment, as well as enables the commerce that underpins the global economic system, the Navy and Marine Corps team places a significant premium on warfighting. To safeguard U.S. and partner nation interests, the Navy and Marine Corps team, as part of the Joint Force, must be prepared to oppose any nation’s actions that jeopardize access to and use of the global commons or that may threaten the security of our allies. Above all, we must provide U.S. Combatant Commanders with versatile and credible maritime forces.

We will provide a modern and capable force that is “combat credible” because of its ability to project power against advanced air defenses, conduct and enable littoral/amphibious operations in opposed environments, and establish blue-water dominance against highly capable surface, sub-surface, and air threats.

The Navy guarantees strategic nuclear deterrence through its fleet of ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). These submarines provide the United States with assured, precise, nuclear second-strike capability. We are always at sea, patrolling undetected, in constant communication ready to provide strike options to National Command Authorities at a moment’s notice. The Navy operates the most secure and survivable leg of the nuclear triad, and will maintain it at peak-performance and readiness.

The Navy and Marine Corps team will remain dominant as compared to potential adversaries and challengers. This means the capability to exert sea control when and where needed, to sustain operations in these areas indefinitely, to support and influence operations on land, and to enable freedom of movement for a nation’s forces. It also means the capability to do high-performance tactical air operations, high-tempo surface and submarine operations, large-scale amphibious operations, power projection from the sea with precision strike (e.g., tactical aircraft, Tomahawk missiles), and joint and combined operations.

### **Where it Matters, When it Matters**

The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps are forward deployed primarily to project power into critical world regions when needed like when the President needed immediate options to curb ISIL’s advance last Fall. Within 30 hours of being tasked, the USS GEORGE H.W. BUSH Carrier Strike Group was on station, and the Strike Group, together with the Marine Corps, then remained on station for 54 days as the only viable U.S. strike and power projection option. The Navy and Marine Corps also act to protect U.S. interests and citizens; reassure allies and partners of U.S. political and military commitment; deter potential aggressors; support humanitarian and disaster-response needs; conduct counter-terrorism and maritime-security operations; and respond to crises rapidly.

U.S. Naval Forces forward presence can be visible or invisible, large or small, provocative or peaceful, depending upon what best serves U.S. interests. The sight of a single U.S. warship in the harbor of a friend or a small rotational force of Marines can serve as tangible evidence of U.S. close relations with or commitment to that country. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps can modulate presence to exert the degree and kind of influence best suited to resolve the situation in a manner compatible with U.S. interests. In a crisis where force might be required to protect U.S. interests or evacuate U.S. nationals, but where visibility could provoke the outbreak of hostilities, U.S. Naval Forces can remain out of sight, over the horizon, ready to respond in a matter of minutes.

Operating forward provides the President with immediate options to defend our interests, de-escalate hostilities, respond to crises, and keep conflict far from our shores. Additionally, our forward Naval Forces reassure our allies, build trust with partners, and protect the strength of the U.S. economy by deploying with the credible combat-power to enable the unimpeded flow of maritime commerce.

Forward naval presence is central to everything we do. To ensure we remain forward—where it matters, when it matters—we are increasing the number of ships deployed overseas from an average of 97 ships (today) to about 120 ships by 2020. To sustain this global presence, we will increase forward-basing of forces abroad (e.g., Guam) and forward-deploying forces overseas (e.g. Japan and Spain) to reduce costly rotations and deployments while increasing in-theater presence; we will forward-operate forces from overseas locations like Singapore and Australia; and continue rotationally deploying forces from the United States.

Forward naval presence allows us to focus our platforms and capabilities where they are needed most around the globe. We will continue rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific, maintain credible combat power in the Middle East, support our NATO allies and partners in Europe, and build partner capacity in Africa and the Western Hemisphere.

### **Allies and Partners**

One of our advantages, as a nation and as a Navy, has been our extensive network of alliances, partnerships, and coalitions. By leveraging the robust capacity of Naval Forces

worldwide, we are better postured collectively to face new and emerging challenges in the 21st Century.

The value of a global network of navies is that it provides an open and adaptive architecture for facilitating both long-term cooperation and spontaneous, short-lived collaboration. This network can allow countries with converging interests in the maritime domain to form mission-focused goal-oriented associations to address common maritime-security challenges.

In the current economic environment, most navies are facing fiscal challenges at home. These challenges are forcing cuts or slowing growth in developing seapower to meet their respective needs. At the same time, security challenges in the maritime domain continue to grow. Accordingly, we will look for new ways to enhance relationships and form partnerships with traditional and nontraditional maritime partners who share a stake in international commerce, safety, security, and freedom of the seas. Operating together, the Sea Services will find innovative and low-cost ways to respond to these emerging threats to regional and global stability. We will conduct more combined, multinational exercises with foreign navies to build capacity and interoperability. We will integrate our allies and partners into cooperative deployments and real-world operations. By practicing how we fight in peacetime with our allies and partners, we are better prepared to win should conflict arise.

### **Assure Global Access**

The Department of the Navy's increased attention on assuring global access is in consonance with the 2015 National Security Strategy, which states: "Collective action is needed to assure access to the shared spaces—cyber, space, air, and oceans—where the dangerous behaviors of some threaten us all."

The strategy describes a Navy and Marine Corps that will focus on assuring global access in order to thwart any effort to lock the United States out of important world regions and to enable us to fight and win should war be inescapable. To achieve this goal, the Defense Strategic Guidance unequivocally states, "the U.S. military will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in anti-access and area denial environments."

Advanced as well as not-so-advanced weapons pose an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) challenge to U.S. military access to the global commons and freedom of action within contested littorals. In peacetime, the country possessing A2/AD weapons clearly has leverage over its neighbors, which could reduce U.S. influence in important world regions. In crisis or war, A2/AD capabilities can make U.S. power projection more difficult.

A2/AD threats comprise diverse capabilities including: ballistic and cruise missiles; sophisticated integrated air-defense systems; anti-ship weapons ranging from high-tech missiles to low-tech but still-dangerous mines and torpedoes; swarming boats; guided rockets, missiles, and artillery; an increasing number of fifth-generation fighters; low-observable manned and unmanned combat aircraft; and space and cyber warfare capabilities specifically designed to disrupt U.S. communications and intelligence systems. The United States and our allies and maritime partners must have the capability to carry out the full range of military operations in order to use the seas without threat or hindrance. Ensuring access and movements at sea is at the core of U.S. national security and remains an enduring mission for the Joint Force.

As a result, our strategy establishes a new essential function—all domain access—to ensure we organize, train, and equip our forces to overcome these threats and assure access and freedom of action in any domain (sea, air, land, space, cyberspace, and the EM spectrum). All domain access allows joint force maritime component commanders (JFMCC) to generate a range of options in all domains to defeat A2/AD measures through synchronizing and integrating the capabilities that provide battlespace awareness, assured C2, integrated fires, and electromagnetic maneuver warfare.

### **Asia-Pacific Rebalance**

The 2015 National Security Strategy states: “The United States has been and will remain a Pacific power... American leadership will remain essential to shaping the region’s long-term trajectory to enhance stability and security, facilitate trade and commerce through an open and transparent system, and ensure respect for universal rights and freedoms.” The Department of Defense prominently emphasized India’s role in the Asia-Pacific rebalance in DoD’s 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” which states that the United States’ “economic and security interests are inextricably

linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia to the Indian Ocean region and South Asia...The United States is also investing in a long-term strategic partnership with India to support its ability to be a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean.”

Moreover, the convergence of strategic maritime interests in the Indian Ocean region to include the security of critical energy and trade routes, the denial of free passage to terrorists and weapons proliferators, and the need for effective responses to natural disasters have led to a greater mutual desire for deeper naval and maritime cooperation between India and the United States.

Without question, China is building a modern and regionally powerful Navy with a modest but growing capability for conducting operations beyond China’s near-seas region. This creates both opportunities and challenges for the Navy. The issue at stake is the fundamental question of whether China will use its growing economic and military power to assert its interests without respect to international norms. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) notes that, “the rapid pace and comprehensive scope of China’s military modernization continues, combined with a relative lack of transparency and openness from China’s leaders regarding both military capabilities and intentions.” This behavior contributes to tension and instability, potentially leading to miscalculation or even escalation. The U.S. Sea Services, through our continued forward presence and constructive interaction with Chinese maritime forces, reduce the potential for misunderstanding, discourage aggression, and preserve our commitment to peace and stability in the region.

Despite mounting U.S. concern, our Nation seeks a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship with China that welcomes China’s ability to take on a responsible leadership role. The Navy and Marine Corps’ overall military concept is a balance of deterrence and encouragement, inviting the Chinese Navy to play a responsible and constructive role in promoting security and peaceful development and join in coalition operations, as it has in countering piracy in the Indian Ocean.

The combination of the Asia-Pacific’s economic importance to the world economy, its proximity to U.S. security interests, and its expansive geography require an increased U.S. naval

presence to maintain our commitment to the stability of the region. Evolving challenges in the region — including the activities of China's more modern navy and the proliferation of anti-access/area denial — require that the Navy and Marine Corps maintain a coordinated, leading role in the region.

### **Building the Naval Force of the Future**

The new strategy describes how we will employ the Navy and Marine Corps and the principles we will use to build the Naval Force of the future. The employment of our Naval Forces remains innovative through forward basing, adaptive force packages tailored to regional environments, and expanded engagements with our allies and partners like when we integrate allied ships or staffs into our Strike Group and Marine Expeditionary Unit deployments.

Our new strategy also describes a fleet of more than 300 ships—including 11 aircraft carriers, 14 ballistic missile submarines (to be replaced by 12 Ohio Replacement SSBN) and 33 amphibious ships—to support our global requirements and ensure we have flexible, agile, and ready forces that deploy within a predictable employment model that has an ability to surge additional forces when required.

Anything less than this would increase our risk, decrease forward presence, and limit our warfighting advantages. If we were to return to sequester-level funding, Navy surge-ready CSGs and ARGs would be insufficient to meet requirements. Gaps in presence and theater engagement requirements would present challenges to meet the Defense Strategic Guidance. They reduce our ability to meet security commitments to allies and partners, deter aggression, and to conduct military operations. They also decrease our ability to be where it matters, when it matters. Some places you may see these gaps manifested include not being positioned to respond as quickly as in the past, not being able to take advantage of fleeting opportunities to destroy terrorist targets, and not being as responsive in HA/DR as in the past.

In building the future force, we will balance investments in readiness, capability, and capacity to ensure we remain a capable and combat-ready force. We will invest in innovative platforms and systems that allow us to accomplish our missions at reduced cost, but not at a

lowered capability. We will focus our resources on the capabilities that allow us to retain and improve our warfighting advantages.

### **Strategic Continuum**

The new strategy is part of a larger effort throughout the Navy to energize our existing culture of strategic thinking that has led to innovation and an increase in operational excellence. The strategy has already been instrumental in aligning our budget requirements and operational concepts. Our strategic culture will continue to yield naval operational concepts such as the Air-Sea Battle Concept (now Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC)), as well as new concepts of operations for Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare, space and cyber operations, and counter-swarm tactics. Additionally, the Navy is developing a Classified Annex to this strategy which will integrate existing efforts in expanding our warfighting capability in the demanding global environment that we see today. This Classified Annex will also exploit innovation and is expected to further inform the budget process.

The strategic continuum will be further enhanced by the recent creation of a Strategist Subspecialty Code which will ensure that Sailors with the appropriate background occupy strategic billets while generating long-term expertise to foster additional strategic thinking, alignment, and assessment. These subspecialists will form the foundation of our strategic continuum and enhance our strategic underpinnings through the alignment of strategic documents, iterative wargaming, new concept development, coordinated messaging and engagements, and further increase strategic linkages to the budget. The CNO has clearly met the challenge of energizing our culture of strategic thinking, and the new maritime strategy is just part of the continuum he has reinforced to generate the innovation and efficiencies required by our Navy today.

### **Conclusion**

Changes in the world since 2007, updated strategic guidance, and our current fiscal circumstances compelled us to revise the maritime strategy. Security threats have become more sophisticated and widespread and we face new and evolving threats from violent extremist organizations, threats from North Korea and Iran, a rising China, and recent Russian aggression.

Additionally, we face new and evolving challenges that threaten our access in cyberspace and in the global commons.

To meet these challenges, we will continue emphasizing combat-credible forward naval presence – being where it matters, when it matters – as well as our commitment to allies and partners. We will continue to develop the global network of navies concept because we recognize that no one nation can meet these threats alone and every country can contribute in some way. Our historic naval functions – deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security – remain essential to our strategy, but the security conditions in which we conduct them have changed.

Our strategy adapts to the new world we face by emphasizing warfighting first. We have created a new essential function for Naval Forces – all domain access – that will sharpen our ability to defeat the advanced technologies and strategies that would otherwise hold our forces at risk. In this manner, we will maintain appropriate freedom of action in any domain – sea, air, land, cyberspace, as well as the electromagnetic spectrum. We identify regional threats to guide how we will operate. We embrace innovation and efficiency in building a modern and capable force of more than 300 ships that will meet our national objectives.

This strategy describes a Navy and Marine Corps team that is ready to meet and overcome the challenges of an increasingly dangerous world. Now and for the years to come, this force is ready to fight and win.

We thank the subcommittee for your continued support and I look forward to answering your questions.



**REAR ADMIRAL KEVIN M. "KID" DONEGAN  
DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS  
AND STRATEGY (N3/N5) - ACTING**

Rear Adm. Kevin Donegan is a 1980 Cum Laude graduate of the University of Virginia where he earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Aerospace Engineering.

His first operational assignment was as a plank owner to Strike Fighter Squadron 131 where he made the first East coast deployment of the F/A-18 culminating in the successful Libyan air strikes in April 1986. He served as a department head in Strike Fighter Squadron 37 earning the Strike Fighter Wing's Longhart Leadership Award. He also served as executive officer on USS George Washington (CVN 73) when the ship garnered the Battle E, the Admiral Flatley Safety Award and the Battenberg Cup.

Donegan commanded Strike Fighter Squadron 131 completing a deployment to the Persian Gulf and the 3rd Fleet command ship, USS Coronado (AGF 11), earning three command excellence awards. He also commanded the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) on a combat deployment earning the Battle E. He spearheaded Naval Aviation Enterprise's Carrier Readiness Team, and was honored as the Tailhook Association's Tailhooker of the Year for 2006. He also commanded Battle Force 7th Fleet and Carrier Strike Group 5 aboard USS George Washington, homeported in Japan.

Ashore, Donegan's most recent joint assignment was director of operations for United States Central Command. He served at the Pentagon as director of the Navy Quadrennial Defense Review, director of Strategy and Policy Division on the Navy staff, director of Warfare Integration, and as the aide/administrative assistant to the deputy chief of Naval operations for Plans, Policy and Operations. He completed joint duty as flag lieutenant to the commander, Allied Forces Southern Europe in Naples, Italy. During that tour he deployed to Sarajevo as the NATO liaison officer to the commander, United Nations Protection Forces serving as the principal air advisor during NATO's Deliberate Force air strikes.

He currently serves as acting deputy chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans, and Strategy.

Donegan graduated the U.S. Navy Test Pilot School as the Outstanding Student, the Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN), the Navy Nuclear Power School, the USAF Air Command and Staff College, the Joint Forces Staff College and completed Harvard Kennedy School's Executive Education Program in National and International Security.

His personal awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal, five Legions of Merit, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, four Meritorious Service Medals, the Air Medal, two Navy Commendation Medals, two Navy Achievement Medals and multiple unit, service, and campaign awards. His flying experience includes over 3,800 hours in 31 different types of aircraft and over 800 arrested landings on 15 different aircraft carriers.



**Major General Andrew W. O'Donnell, Jr.**  
**Deputy CG, Marine Corps Combat Development Command**

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Major General Andrew W. O'Donnell Jr. assumed the duties of Deputy Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA on August 8, 2014. He was commissioned via the Platoon Leaders Class from East Carolina University in May 1980.

His assignments as an infantry officer include: Platoon Commander, Weapons Platoon Commander, and Company Executive Officer for Echo Company BLT 2/3 and Officer in Charge of 3d Marine Regiment Small Unit Leadership Course.



Major General O'Donnell was designated a Naval Aviator in September 1985. Subsequent assignments include: Flight-line Officer and Logistics Officer, HMM-268; Instructor Pilot and Assistant Operations Officer, HMT-301; Aircraft Maintenance Officer, HMM-262; Chief Operational Test Director, and Operations Officer, HMX-1.

Major General O'Donnell commanded HMX-1, Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force East Timor, and HMM-265.

Major General O'Donnell also served as the Deputy Chief of Staff and Military Advisor at the United States Mission to the United Nations, New York City.

As a general officer, he has served as the Director of Capabilities Development Directorate, Marine Corps Combat Development Command; Assistant Wing Commander, 3d MAW; the Commanding General, 3d MAW(FWD) in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the Commanding General of 3d MAW and the Deputy Commander, United States Forces, Japan.

Major General O'Donnell is a graduate of the Marine Corps Executive Fellowship at the RAND Corporation Santa Monica, California, the Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course, and the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. He was designated a Command and Marine One Pilot during both tours at HMX-1. Major General O'Donnell was presented the Alfred A. Cunningham Award as the Marine Corps' Aviator of the Year in 2000 and has accumulated over 5,600 flight hours in Marine aircraft.

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**DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

MARCH 18, 2015

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FORWARD ■ ENGAGED ■ READY

# A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower



MARCH 2015

## PREFACE

America's Sea Services—the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—uniquely provide presence around the globe. During peacetime and times of conflict, across the full spectrum—from supporting an ally with humanitarian assistance or disaster relief to deterring or defeating an adversary in kinetic action—Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen are deployed at sea and in far-flung posts to be wherever we are needed, when we are needed. Coming from the sea, we get there sooner, stay there longer, bring everything we need with us, and we don't have to ask anyone's permission.

Our founders recognized the United States as a maritime nation and the importance of maritime forces, including in our Constitution the requirement that Congress “maintain a Navy.” In today's dynamic security environment, with multiple challenges from state and non-state actors that are often fed by social disorder, political upheaval, and technological advancements, that requirement is even more prescient.

The United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard are our Nation's first line of defense, often far from our shores. As such, maintaining America's leadership role in the world requires our Nation's Sea Services to return to our maritime strategy on occasion and reassess our approach to shifting relationships and global responsibilities. This necessary review has affirmed our focus on providing presence around the world in order to ensure stability, build on our relationships with allies and partners, prevent wars, and provide our Nation's leaders with options in times of crisis. It has confirmed our continued commitment to maintain the combat power necessary to deter potential adversaries and to fight and win when required.

Our responsibility to the American people dictates an efficient use of our fiscal resources and an approach that adapts to the evolving security environment. The adjustments made in this document do just that. Looking at how we support our people, build the right platforms, power them to achieve efficient global capability, and develop critical partnerships will be central to its successful execution and to providing that unique capability: presence.

Seapower has been and will continue to be the critical foundation of national power and prosperity and international prestige for the United States of America. Our Sea Services will integrate with the rest of our national efforts, and those of our friends and allies. This revision to *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower* builds on the heritage and complementary capabilities of the Navy-Marine Corps-Coast Guard team to advance the prosperity and guarantee the security of our Nation. The demands of a changing world and the defense of the American people and our interests require nothing less.




**RAY MABUS**  
Secretary of the Navy

## FOREWORD

This maritime strategy describes how we will design, organize, and employ the Sea Services in support of our national, defense, and homeland security strategies. It also sets maritime priorities in an era of constrained resources, while emphasizing warfighting capabilities and forward naval presence to advance national interests today and guide preparations for tomorrow's challenges.

Forward naval presence is essential to strengthening alliances and partnerships, providing the secure environment necessary for an open economic system based on the free flow of goods, protecting U.S. natural resources, promoting stability, deterring conflict, and responding to aggression. As global maritime commerce expands, populations increase, competition for energy and natural resources grows, and advanced military technologies proliferate across the oceans and through the littoral, so too will challenges arise for anyone operating in those regions.

The American people will continue to rely on the Sea Services to respond to fast-changing and complex world events that threaten the security of the United States and our allies and partners. Our Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen stand ready to meet these challenges with the same determination and responsiveness they have demonstrated for more than two centuries.

		
JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR. General, U.S. Marine Corps Commandant of the Marine Corps	JONATHAN W. GREENERT Admiral, U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations	PAUL F. ZUKUNFT Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard Commandant of the Coast Guard
		

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## INTRODUCTION

The United States of America is a maritime nation. For more than two centuries, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—the Sea Services—have operated throughout the world to protect American citizens and defend U.S. interests by responding to crises and, when necessary, fighting and winning wars. Since we published *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower* in 2007, changes in the security and fiscal environments, along with new strategic guidance, including the 2012 *Defense Strategic Guidance* and the 2014 *Quadrennial Defense and Homeland Security Reviews*, mandate an updated maritime strategy to ensure that we continue to advance our national interests in an increasingly complex and interdependent world.

Forward-deployed and forward-stationed naval forces use the global maritime commons as a medium of maneuver, assuring access to overseas regions, defending key interests in those areas, protecting our citizens abroad, and preventing our adversaries from leveraging the world's oceans against us. The ability to sustain operations in international waters far from our shores constitutes a distinct advantage for the United States—a Western Hemisphere nation separated from many of its strategic interests by vast oceans. Maintaining this advantage in an interconnected global community that depends on the oceans remains an imperative for our Sea Services and the Nation.

Today's global security environment is characterized by the rising importance of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, the ongoing development and fielding of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities that challenge our global maritime access, continued threats from expanding and evolving terrorist and criminal networks, the increasing frequency and intensity of maritime territorial disputes, and threats to maritime commerce, particularly the flow of energy.

In addition to the risks emerging in this turbulent 21<sup>st</sup> Century, there are opportunities as well—many facilitated by the Sea Services through routine and constructive engagement with allies and partners. Chief among them is the potential for a global network of navies that brings together the contributions of like-minded nations and organizations around the world to address mutual maritime security challenges and respond to natural disasters.

This maritime strategy reaffirms two foundational principles. First, U.S. forward naval presence is essential to accomplishing the following naval missions derived from national guidance: defend the homeland, deter conflict, respond to crises, defeat aggression, protect the maritime commons, strengthen partnerships, and provide humanitarian assistance and disaster response. Our self-sustaining naval forces, operating in the global commons, ensure the protection of the homeland far from our shores, while providing the President with decision space and options to deny an adversary's objectives, preserve freedom of action, and assure access for follow-on forces.

Second, naval forces are stronger when we operate jointly and together with allies and partners. Merging our individual capabilities and capacity produces a combined naval effect that is greater than the sum of its parts. By working together in formal and informal networks, we can address the threats to our mutual maritime security interests. Maximizing the robust capacity of this global network of navies concept, we are all better postured to face new and emerging challenges.

Forward naval  
forces ensure the  
protection of the  
homeland far  
from our shores.

The Sea Services have historically organized, trained, and equipped to perform four essential functions: deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security. Because access to the global commons is critical, this strategy introduces a fifth function: all domain access. This function assures appropriate freedom of action in any domain—the sea, air, land, space, and cyberspace, as well as in the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum.

This strategy informs naval force employment and describes a force that balances warfighting readiness with our Nation's current and future fiscal challenges. Our force employment approach aligns capability, capacity, and platforms to regional mission demands, ensuring that our most modern and technologically ad-

vanced forces are located where their combat power is needed most. It also describes how naval forces will enhance their effectiveness, employ new warfighting concepts, and promote innovation. By doing so, the Sea Services chart a course that ensures we will carry forward our Nation's interests and continue to serve as a cornerstone of U.S. national security.

## Section I

# THE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

**N**aval forces must advance U.S. interests in a global security environment characterized by volatility, instability, complexity, and interdependencies. This environment includes geopolitical changes and growing military challenges that profoundly influence this strategy.

### Geopolitical Changes

Spanning from the West Coast of the United States to the eastern coast of Africa and containing eight of the world's ten most populous countries, the Indo-Asia-Pacific region continues to increase in significance for our Nation as well as for our allies and partners. America's economy and security are inextricably linked to the immense volume of trade that flows across the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The economic importance, security interests, and geography of this vast maritime region dictate a growing reliance on naval forces to protect U.S. interests and maintain an enduring commitment to the stability of the region.

Based on shared strategic interests, the United States seeks to strengthen cooperation with long-standing allies in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand—and continues to cultivate partnerships with states such as Bangladesh, Brunei, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Micronesia, Pakistan, Singapore, and Vietnam.

China's naval expansion into the Indian and Pacific Oceans presents both opportunities and challenges. For example, China supports counter piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, conducts humanitarian assistance and disaster response missions enabled by its hospital ship, and participates in large-scale, multinational naval exercises. As a signatory of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), China demonstrates its ability to embrace international norms, institutions, and standards of

behavior commensurate with rising power status. However, China's naval expansion also presents challenges when it employs force or intimidation against other sovereign nations to assert territorial claims. This behavior, along with a lack of transparency in its military intentions, contributes to tension and instability, potentially leading to miscalculation or even escalation. The U.S. Sea Services, through our continued forward presence and constructive interaction with Chinese maritime forces, reduce the potential for misunderstanding, discourage aggression, and preserve our commitment to peace and stability in the region.

Persistent instability and under-governed areas across the Middle East and Africa allow violent extremist organizations and other terrorist organizations to operate. These include the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Hezbollah, Hamas, Al Shabab, and Boko Haram, as well as Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Networks such as these destabilize sovereign states and influence attacks like the early 2015 shootings in Paris, highlighting the indispensable nature of forward and ready naval forces in the global effort to combat terrorism.

We are stronger  
when we operate  
together, engaged  
with allies and  
partners.

Under-governed areas ashore create conditions for regional instability ranging from piracy and illicit waterborne trafficking to support for terrorist activity. Through the concerted efforts of U.S. naval forces and our global partners, piracy is currently on the decline off the Horn of Africa, yet it remains a concern around West Africa, especially in the Gulf of Guinea and on the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This regional instability threatens global economic stability in a hyper-connected world and underscores the need for a global network of navies that leverages the best capabilities of participating states.

Across North America and Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains the most powerful alliance in the world and the centerpiece of transatlantic security. Our mutual efforts to cooperate and integrate with member and partner countries on common maritime challenges such as counter piracy are a model for security cooperation. From developing an ashore ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability in Romania and Poland to operating in Standing NATO Maritime Groups, U.S. naval forces actively participate in NATO missions every day.

Russian military modernization, the illegal seizure of Crimea, and ongoing military aggression in Ukraine underscore the importance of our commitments to European security and stability. NATO members can ensure the continued viability of the alliance by maintaining their commitment to the naval forces that provide security for the European maritime theater.



America's security and prosperity grow with that of our allies and partners.

The Sea Services will continue expanding the global network of navies to address our common security interests. Shown here, the destroyer USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93) operates with the Republic of Singapore frigate RSS Steadfast (FFG 70), the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Mellon (WHEC 717) and the Republic of Singapore corvette RSS Vigilance (90) during Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) Singapore. CARAT is a series of bilateral exercises in Southeast Asia held annually to strengthen relationships and enhance force readiness.

“The reality of today is that we have to think about the global network of navies. All it takes is a willingness to cooperate—there's no commitment, you don't have to join an alliance, anyone can plug-and-play. There's a mission for everybody whether it's humanitarian assistance and disaster response, counterterrorism, counter transnational organized crime, or counter piracy.”

—ADMIRAL GREENERT

Skyrocketing demand for energy and resources, as evidenced by a projected 56 percent increase of global energy consumption by 2040, underscores the criticality of the free flow of commerce through strategic maritime crossroads including the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca, as well as the Panama and Suez Canals. Although the United States is exporting more energy than it imports for the first time in decades, we remain tied to the global economy that depends on the uninterrupted supply of oil and gas from the Middle East and Central Asia. This uninterrupted supply can be placed at risk due to rising political instability and regional conflict. In particular, Iran continues to develop an increasing capability to threaten commerce transiting the Strait of Hormuz. A disruption in energy supply would immediately and significantly affect the global economy. Closer to home, dramatic changes in energy production and transportation, as well as the completion of the Panama Canal expansion project, will fundamentally alter shipping patterns within the United States and globally.

Our Sailors,  
Marines, and  
Coast Guardsmen  
stand ready to  
meet the challenges  
that face our  
Nation.


Transnational criminal organizations (TCO) remain a threat to stability in Africa and the Western Hemisphere, especially in Central America and the southern approaches of the U.S. homeland. Their networks facilitate human trafficking and interrelated flows of weapons, narcotics, and money, all of which could be exploited by terrorists to attack our homeland, allies, and overseas interests.

Environmental trends are increasingly shaping the maritime security environment, particularly in the littorals where most of the world's population resides. Climate change-enhanced storms, rising sea levels, and coastal flooding are disproportionately affecting many island nations. This may trigger social instability and more frequent humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations. Rising ocean temperatures present new challenges and opportunities, most notably in the Arctic and Antarctic, where receding ice leads to greater maritime activity. In the coming decades, the Arctic Ocean will be increasingly accessible and more broadly used by those seeking access to the region's abundant resources and trade routes. The predicted rise in maritime activity, including oil and gas exploration, commercial fishing, tourism, and mineral mining, is expected to increase the region's strategic importance over time. Ensuring safe, secure, environmentally responsible activity in the Arctic region will require a broad spectrum of partnerships. Collaborative forums such as the Arctic Council, which the United States

The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Sterett (DDG 104), shown here, participates in the International Mine-Countermeasures Exercise (IMCMEX) with the mine-countermeasures ships USS Devastator (MCM 6) and USS Dextrous (MCM 13) and the Royal Navy mine-countermeasures ship HMS Penzance (M 106). USS Sterett deployed as part of the Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group supporting maritime security operations, strike operations in Iraq and Syria, and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. Fifth Fleet area of responsibility.

“The President directed that we be able to project power despite threats to access. We must leverage our respective Service strengths because we can no longer afford to go down separate investment paths.”

—ADMIRAL GREENERT



will chair from 2015 to 2017, and the Antarctic Treaty System present opportunities for expanded cooperation.

### **Military Challenges**

The Sea Services face a growing range of challenges in gaining access and operating freely in the maritime commons. Most prominently, the proliferation of technologies that allows potential adversaries to threaten naval and air forces at greater ranges complicates our access to some maritime regions (anti-access), as well as our ability to maneuver within those regions (area denial), including the littoral and landward access. These include long-range ballistic and cruise missiles supported by state-of-the-art command and control (C2) and integrated targeting networks; guided rockets, artillery, missiles, and mortars; advanced submarines and “smart” mines; advanced integrated air defense systems; fifth-generation fighter aircraft with enhanced sensors and weapons; and electronic warfare (EW), cyber, and space capabilities. Certainly a distinct challenge during wartime, these military technologies are also a concern in peacetime. For example, the free flow of goods and services can be impeded by state or non-state actors employing clandestine mining of a port or maritime crossroads.

New challenges in cyberspace and the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum mean we can no longer presume to hold the information “high ground.” Opponents seek to deny, disrupt, disable, or cause physical damage to our forces and infrastructure with advanced networked information systems. The exploitation of space, cyberspace, and the EM spectrum threatens our global C2. Naval forces must have the resilience to operate under the most hostile cyber and EM conditions.

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threaten the United States, our allies, and our partners. North Korea continues to refine nuclear weapon capabilities and deploy long-range ballistic missiles. Likewise, Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies capable of delivering WMD. Additionally, terrorist networks seek these weapons for use against a wide array of targets. All constitute a direct threat to our homeland as well as to allies and partners.

The complexity of these geopolitical changes and military challenges, particularly during a period of fiscal uncertainty, requires a bold and innovative approach by the Sea Services. This approach demands both a deeper cooperative relationship with our allies and partners and a greater emphasis on Joint Force interdependence, a deliberate and selective reliance and trust of each Service on the capabilities of the others to maximize its own effectiveness.

## Section II

# FORWARD PRESENCE AND PARTNERSHIP

**N**aval forces operate forward to shape the security environment, signal U.S. resolve, protect U.S. interests, and promote global prosperity by defending freedom of navigation in the maritime commons. By expanding our network of allies and partners and improving our ability to operate alongside them, naval forces: foster the secure environment essential to an open economic system based on the free flow of goods, protect U.S. natural resources, promote stability, deter conflict, and respond to aggression. During crises, forward naval forces provide the President immediate options to defend our interests, de-escalate hostilities, and keep conflict far from our shores. During wartime, forward naval forces fight while preserving freedom of access—and action—for follow-on forces.


The Navy's current budget submission will provide for more than 300 ships and a forward presence of about 120 ships by 2020, up from an average of 97 in 2014, to be "where it matters, when it matters." This includes forward-based naval forces overseas in places like Guam, Japan, and Spain; forward-operating forces deploying from overseas locations such as Singapore; and rotationally deployed forces from the United States. To provide forward presence more efficiently and effectively, we will adopt the following force employment innovations:

- Increase forward-basing of forces abroad to reduce costly rotations and deployments, while boosting in-theater presence.
- Provide globally distributed and networked expeditionary forces in concert with our allies and partners to increase effective naval presence, strategic agility, and responsiveness.
- Employ modular designed platforms that allow mission modules and payloads to be swapped instead of entire ships, saving time and money. Littoral Combat Ships, which will be redesignated as Frigates (FF) in the future, are an example of this capability.

“The security environment changes, the tactics, techniques and procedures change, the threats change, but what won't change is our role as the Nation's crisis response force of choice.”

—GENERAL DUNFORD

In early January 2011, the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), embarked aboard the USS Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) in the Arabian Sea, was directed to land its ground combat element in Afghanistan to support Operation Enduring Freedom. Shortly thereafter the tumultuous events of the “Arab Spring” began to unfold in North Africa, and a portion of the ARG/MEU was directed into the Mediterranean. To reconstitute the MEU's ground combat capabilities, they stopped at Crete long enough to embark 400 Marines flown in from the 2nd Marine Division in Camp Lejeune. They then positioned off the coast of Libya to participate in Operation Odyssey Dawn, conducting air strikes against the Gaddafi regime as well as successfully recovering a downed U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle pilot. These events illustrate the inherent operational flexibility and strategic mobility of the Navy-Marine Corps team.



- Expand the practice of employing adaptive force packages, which tailor naval capabilities to specific regional environments, thereby ensuring that our assets are located where they are most needed. For example, we tailor naval capabilities for participation in UNITAS, an annual multinational maritime exercise with our partners in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility, so that more capable Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG) with embarked Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) and Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) are available for more complex missions in other theaters.
- Take advantage of adaptive force packages to enable persistent engagements that build the capacity of allies and partners to respond to future crises.

In each region we will adhere to a force employment construct that aligns capability and capacity to mission demands.

### **Indo-Asia-Pacific**


With strategic attention shifting to the Indo-Asia-Pacific, we will increase the number of ships, aircraft, and Marine Corps forces postured there. By 2020, approximately 60 percent of Navy ships and aircraft will be based in the region. The Navy will maintain a Carrier Strike Group, Carrier Airwing, and Amphibious Ready Group in Japan; add an attack submarine to those already in Guam; and implement cost-effective approaches such as increasing to four the number of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) forward-stationed in Singapore to provide an enduring regional presence. The Navy will also provide its most advanced warfighting platforms to the region, including multi-mission ballistic missile defense-capable ships; submarines; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft. The Zumwalt-class destroyer—our most technologically sophisticated surface combatant—will deploy to the area, as will the F-35C Lightning II and the MQ-4C Triton high-endurance, unmanned aerial vehicle.

The Marine Corps will maintain a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) in the region, deploy a Marine Rotational Force to Australia, and make use of other land- and sea-based forces to provide conventional deterrence, conduct security cooperation, respond to crises and conflicts, as well as provide expeditionary support for operational plans. New assets, such as the MV-22 Osprey, CH-53K King Stallion, F-35B Lightning II, and Amphibious Combat Vehicle, will give these forces the increased range and improved capabilities required in this vast region. The Navy and Marine Corps will employ these forces from multi-purpose amphibious ships,

The amphibious capabilities provided by the Navy-Marine Corps team—especially those that are forward postured—have long played a key role in enabling overseas access for missions across the range of military operations. For example, following the events of September 11, 2001, two Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG) with embarked Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) were diverted to the North Arabian Sea from their steady-state activities elsewhere. With the addition of a fly-in command element, they formed Task Force 58 within the U.S. Fifth Fleet and conducted an amphibious assault 350 miles inland to seize a lodgment for the introduction of additional joint forces. In August 2010, the Navy-Marine Corps team once again aggregated two ARG/MEUs in that region, but this time for the purpose of conducting humanitarian assistance operations in the wake of flooding caused by torrential rains in Pakistan.

“Those same forces that conduct day-to-day forward presence and crisis response can quickly and seamlessly shift to provide assured access for Joint Forces.”

—GENERAL DUNFORD



reconfigurable platforms, and expeditionary locations ashore throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific. As an example, Marines currently deploy aboard Military Sealift Command ships such as the Dry Cargo/Ammunition (T-AKE) ship and Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) to train with partner nation security forces. The Marine Corps has recently forward-based MV-22 squadrons in the Western Pacific, and will deploy the first permanently forward-based fifth-generation strike aircraft to Japan.

The Coast Guard will rotationally deploy National Security Cutters and deployable specialized forces with the Navy and Marine Corps to safeguard U.S. territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Additionally, the Coast Guard will work with regional partners and navies using joint and combined patrols, ship-rider exchanges, and multinational exercises to build proficient maritime governance forces, enhance cooperation in maritime safety and security, and reduce illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. These multinational efforts are furthered through the Oceania Maritime Security Initiative and participation in the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum.

Our expanded forward naval presence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific will enhance our warfighting advantages in-theater, while providing a foundation for strengthening alliances through improved interoperability, more integrated operations, and increasingly complex exercises and training. It will also enhance partnerships through expanded maritime security operations, shared maritime domain awareness, and longer multilateral engagements. Our objective is to build and sustain regional capacities to deal with local maritime security challenges. By deepening security cooperation and multilateral mechanisms among the region's states—especially members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—U.S. naval forces will contribute to the long-term security of the global economic system.

### **Middle East**

The Middle East remains strategically vital for the United States and our allies. We will increase presence in the region from 30 ships today to about 40 in 2020 to maintain credible combat power in the Middle East to deter conflict, reassure allies and partners, and respond to crises.

The Navy and Marine Corps will continue the rotational deployment of Carrier Strike Groups with embarked airwings and Amphibious Ready Groups with embarked Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) to the region. In addition, the Marine Corps will maintain a continuous presence in the Middle East, including a General Officer-led Marine Air-Ground Task

Force (MAGTF) command element and a Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) equipped with MV-22 and KC-130 Hercules aircraft to maximize the operating radius for security cooperation and crisis response. The Navy and Marine Corps will maintain a headquarters facility in the Arabian Gulf, continue the deployment of ships there, and use new multi-mission vessels such as the Littoral Combat Ship, Joint High Speed Vessel, and Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) to support security cooperation, counterterrorism, expeditionary operations, mine-sweeping, and Special Operations Forces.

The Coast Guard will deploy personnel to build partner nation capacity for maritime governance and simultaneously conduct maritime security, infrastructure protection, and Port State Control activities. Coast Guard patrol boats and deployable specialized forces on Navy and coalition ships will counter illicit maritime activity.

Our sustained forward naval presence in the Middle East will protect the homeland and promote regional stability by thwarting terrorist networks that threaten local and regional governance. It will also combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and deter potential adversaries from threatening the flow of energy through the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez Canal. We will enhance the capability and capacity of key partnerships, particularly the Gulf Cooperation Council, to promote interoperability with member states and other navies throughout the region.

## Europe

NATO and our European allies and partners remain vital to U.S. security interests within the region and around the world. Our interoperability with allies remains a priority, as demonstrated by the nine-month cooperative deployment of a Carrier Strike Group with British Royal Navy staff embarked and the combined Carrier Strike Group operations between the United States and France. Our naval installations in Europe are fundamental to sustaining naval forces operating in this and adjacent areas. Naval forces operating in Europe are ideally positioned to conduct prompt, flexible sea-based operations in Europe, Africa, the Levant, and Southwest Asia.

As we rebalance to the Indo-Asia-Pacific, we continue to recognize the enduring strategic significance and contributions of Europe and NATO in addressing common maritime security challenges such as Operation Ocean Shield, which has reduced piracy in the waters around the Horn of Africa. Underscoring our commitment to NATO, the Navy will continue supporting the Standing NATO Maritime and Mine Countermeasure Groups and provide forces in Europe that make unique contributions to the alliance,

“People ask why the Coast Guard partners with foreign governments to enforce fisheries laws far from our own Nation’s coast. The answer is that the economic security of many of those partner nations is heavily reliant on delicate fish stocks, underpinning regional stability and security.”

—ADMIRAL ZUKUNFT

Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing costs the global economy between \$10 and \$20 billion annually. The United States actively develops and implements maritime governance measures that are adopted by international fisheries management organizations. Our efforts to enhance international capacity to preserve sustainable fish stocks and other living marine resources promote global economic security, build avenues for cooperation on a wide variety of issues, and reduce international tension. Here, U.S. Coast Guard and Sierra Leone law enforcement personnel conduct a fishing vessel boarding, illustrating the utility of combined training and support to maritime forces around the world.




such as Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) ashore and afloat, protecting our allies and partners from ballistic missile threats. This includes basing four multi-mission, BMD-capable destroyers in Spain by the end of 2015. These ships also provide forward presence in the Mediterranean for security cooperation, maritime security, and crisis response missions. Continued maritime integration with NATO will be necessary to ensure long-term regional security and stability.

To augment episodic Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU) presence in the region, the Marine Corps will provide a land- or sea-based Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF), trained for employment singly or as part of a larger, composited force. One such SPMAGTF was stood up in 2013 to support missions in Europe and Africa. The Marine Corps will continue to employ such task-organized forces for security cooperation while maintaining readiness for crisis response.

## **Africa**

We will provide naval presence in Africa with adaptive force packages such as the Joint High Speed Vessel or Afloat Forward Staging Base with embarked Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen. Construction Battalions (Seabees), Explosive Ordnance Disposal units, Navy SEALs and other Naval Special Operations Forces, as well as Coast Guardsmen and Marines, will continue working alongside partner security forces to combat terrorism, illicit trafficking, and illegal exploitation of natural resources through initiatives such as the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership and the Africa Partnership Station. West African nations rely heavily on maritime forces to combat illicit trafficking, which has links to terrorist enterprises. For example, the Sea Services will continue working with partner nations in the Gulf of Guinea to find a long-term solution to maritime security challenges through information sharing, exercises, and joint patrols. The Navy will maintain an expeditionary base on the continent to support counterterrorism; maritime security; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations. Forward deployed and rapidly deploying forces, such as ARG/MEUs, SPMAGTFs, and Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB) will engage in exercises and training to strengthen partnerships, remain prepared to support crisis response, and protect U.S. citizens and interests in the region.

We will continue working alongside European and African partners and regional organizations to strengthen African capabilities to respond to crises and contribute to stability in their respective states.



“The Coast Guard has more than 60 bilateral agreements with foreign governments that enable us to project maritime governance, rule of law, and global leadership through combined operations with host nations.”

—ADMIRAL ZUKUNFT

The Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) is an excellent example of naval cooperation close to our shores. This task force combines personnel from the Navy, the Coast Guard, and civilian law enforcement, all of whom work with multinational partners to reduce illicit drug trafficking throughout Central and South America. In 2013, fourteen Western Hemisphere and European nations helped seize more than 131 metric tons of cocaine valued at approximately \$3 billion. These Coast Guardsmen in Miami Beach unload millions of dollars' worth of seized illegal drugs.

### **Western Hemisphere**

We will strengthen partnerships and capacity in the Western Hemisphere to protect the homeland and to counter illicit trafficking and transnational criminal organizations. Coast Guard recapitalization efforts will produce a fleet of highly capable, multi-mission ships and aircraft, including the Offshore Patrol Cutter and the C-27J Spartan maritime patrol aircraft to counter threats, particularly in the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and eastern Pacific Ocean. The Navy will maintain its base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to support joint and combined military operations and to enhance interagency efforts to develop regional security and cooperation. The Marine Corps will employ task forces or SPMAGTFs to support security cooperation activities that increase interoperability with regional partners and strengthen their capacity to interdict transnational criminal organizations. We will employ amphibious ships and other platforms, including Littoral Combat Ships, Joint High Speed Vessels, Afloat Forward Staging Bases, hospital ships, other Military Sealift Command ships, and Coast Guard platforms, to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster response missions. We will also employ maritime patrol aircraft such as the P-8A Poseidon and unmanned aerial vehicles. Other ships and aircraft will provide periodic presence for recurring military-to-military engagements, theater security cooperation exercises, and other missions.

### **Arctic and Antarctic**

Consistent with the predicted growth in maritime activity, the Sea Services will assess Arctic access and presence needs, improve maritime domain awareness, and pursue cooperation with Arctic partners to enhance the maritime safety and security of the region. This will require us to further develop our ability to operate in the Arctic, including in ice-covered and ice-obstructed waters. The Coast Guard will apply the multi-mission capabilities of the National Security Cutter to provide a tailored seasonal presence for command and control and aerial surveillance, and will begin the design process for a new, heavy icebreaking capability to support operations in both the Arctic and Antarctic. The Coast Guard will also pursue the formation of a maritime assistance, coordination, and operations group, open to members of the eight Arctic Council nations. The purpose of this group will be coordination of multinational search and rescue operations, training exercises, maritime traffic management, disaster response, and information sharing.

## Section III

# SEAPOWER IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL SECURITY


**T**he Sea Services operate in the world's oceans to protect the homeland, build security globally, project power, and win decisively. This ability to maneuver globally on the seas and to prevent others from using the sea against our interests constitutes a strategic advantage for the United States. Carrier Strike Groups with embarked airwings, as the naval forces' preeminent strike capability, and amphibious task forces with embarked Marines, along with surface combatants, submarines, and Coast Guard cutters, provide flexible and sustainable options from the sea to the littoral in support of the following naval missions: defend the homeland, deter conflict, respond to crises, defeat aggression, protect the maritime commons, strengthen partnerships, and provide humanitarian assistance and disaster response.

We organize, train, and equip naval forces to accomplish these missions through the five essential functions: all domain access, deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security. We employ these functions in a combined-arms approach as the summation of U.S. seapower, providing a unique comparative advantage for the Joint Force and the Nation.

### All Domain Access

All domain access is the ability to project military force in contested areas with sufficient freedom of action to operate effectively. In today's security environment, that access is increasingly contested by state and non-state actors that can hold even our most advanced forces and weapon systems at risk with their own sophisticated anti-access/area denial strategies.

Employed in coordination with the Navy-Marine Corps team's sea control and power projection capabilities, all domain access allows Joint Force Maritime Component Commanders to provide cross-domain capability to the Joint Force through the following elements:



Evolving anti-access/area denial capabilities by potential adversaries drive the need to orient our warfighting capability toward greater integration and interoperability of platforms, sensors, weapons, and systems. These initiatives are being built around emerging capabilities such as the Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) program for defense against enemy aircraft and missiles. This program integrates reconnaissance, fighters, and shipboard fire control systems to defeat threats at long range. The E-2D Hawkeye, shown here landing on the flight deck of the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69), integrates these elements of NIFC-CA.

“We must be able to achieve access in any domain. That means altering how we plan and coordinate actions in the air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace domains, identifying and leveraging the right capability mix to assure access and freedom of action.”

—ADMIRAL GREENERT

- Battlespace awareness, which provides: persistent surveillance of the maritime domain, including the landward portion of the littoral, and the information environment; penetrating knowledge of the capabilities and intent of our adversaries; an understanding of when, where, and how our adversaries operate; and a comprehensive grasp of the environment in which our forces will operate.
- Assured command and control, which provides commanders the ability to maintain robust, resilient, and agile networks for the command and control of forces in contested environments.
- Cyberspace operations, including both defensive and offensive measures, which preserve the ability to utilize friendly cyberspace capabilities; protect data, networks, net-centric capabilities, and other designated systems; and project power by the application of force in or through cyberspace.
- Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare (EMW), a relatively new concept, which blends fleet operations in space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum with advanced non-kinetic capabilities to create warfighting advantages.
- Integrated fires, which provide an expanded range of kinetic and non-kinetic options for the commander to fully exploit and, when necessary, attack adversary capabilities and vulnerabilities.

Cross-domain synergy is achieved when these elements are synchronized, providing Joint Force commanders a range of options in all domains to defeat anti-access/area denial strategies. These options include greater emphasis on force-wide, coordinated non-kinetic capability and counter-targeting techniques as opposed to engaging each threat with increasingly expensive kinetic weapons. In short, we must become more comprehensive in our offensive capability to defeat the system rather than countering individual weapons. As an example, we may more effectively defeat anti-ship ballistic and cruise missile threats by making use of superior battlespace awareness to employ cyber and EMW capabilities in an integrated fires approach that defeats the threat before it has even been launched.

Assuring access in all domains begins in peacetime through routine regional operations with the naval and maritime forces of our allies and partners. These efforts enhance relationships, build capability and capacity, and lead to access in the maritime environment. When naval forces set the conditions for access in peacetime, we enhance our interoperability with allies and partners to more readily achieve all domain access during conflict.

Naval forces achieve all domain access as part of joint operations, improving relationships and deterrence in peacetime and enabling success against our enemies in wartime. This function supports all naval missions.

### **Deterrence**

We achieve deterrence by convincing potential enemies that they cannot win or that the cost of aggression would be unacceptable.


Strategic nuclear deterrence is guaranteed by Navy ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) that provide the United States with an assured, precise, nuclear second-strike capability. Always at sea, SSBNs patrol undetected, remaining in continuous communication and capable of immediate response. As the most secure and survivable element of our Nation's nuclear triad, it is imperative that our sea-based nuclear forces be maintained at peak readiness and fully resourced.

Conventional deterrence is provided by naval forces through the overwhelming combat power of our Carrier Strike Groups with embarked airwings; surface and subsurface combatants with precision attack weapons; and the scalable, deployable, expeditionary combat power of Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF), Marine Expeditionary Brigades, and Marine Expeditionary Units employed from various combinations of amphibious ships, maritime prepositioning, and forward bases. The Coast Guard maintains a continuous presence in our ports, internal waterways, along our coasts, and offshore, providing an additional layer of defense against maritime threats. Together with multi-mission ballistic missile defense-capable ships, these naval forces offer a wide range of credible deterrent options that are agile, flexible, and scalable. They are also positioned to rapidly respond to defend the homeland and our allies should deterrence fail.

This function supports the naval missions of defending the homeland, deterring conflict, and strengthening partnerships.

### **Sea Control**

Sea control allows naval forces to establish local maritime superiority while denying an adversary that same ability. Forward naval forces employ a full spectrum of layered capabilities for the destruction of enemy naval forces, suppression of enemy sea commerce, and protection of vital sea lanes, including ports of embarkation and debarkation, which enables strategic sealift and facilitates the arrival of follow-on forces. The essential elements of sea control are surface warfare, undersea warfare, strike warfare, mine warfare, air and missile defense, maritime domain awareness, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.



Naval aviation is essential to our ability to conduct power projection and to deter and defeat aggression. Helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft operating from aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, and shore stations, and helicopters operating from cruisers and destroyers—complemented by advanced unmanned aerial vehicles—have played critical roles in recent campaigns and remain ready to fulfill any assigned mission. The F/A-18E Super Hornet shown here takes off from the aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) in the Pacific Ocean.

“The centerpieces of naval capability remain the Carrier Strike Group and Amphibious Ready Group . . . These ships, aircraft, Sailors, and Marines have deterred and defeated aggression since World War II and will continue to do so well into the future.”

—ADMIRAL GREENERT

Establishing sea control may require projecting power ashore to neutralize threats or control terrain in the landward portion of the littorals. Similarly, projecting and sustaining power ashore requires establishing sea control in the adjoining seas and airspace. Because of this, sea control and power projection are mutually reinforcing. This function supports the naval missions of defending the homeland, defeating aggression, and strengthening partnerships.

### **Power Projection**

In a broad sense, power projection is the ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, or economic—to respond to crises, contribute to deterrence, and enhance regional stability.

Naval power projection includes conventional strikes against targets ashore, integrated kinetic strikes and non-kinetic fires against enemy forces, advance force operations, raids, and all forms of amphibious operations, from ship-to-objective maneuver and sea-based fire support to forces ashore to missions conducted by Naval Special Warfare and Special Operations Forces. Navy strike forces led by aircraft carriers, surface combatants, and other ships, as well as submarines provide long-range, sea-based strike capabilities. Naval expeditionary forces can project power deep inland to disrupt the enemy, destroy enemy forces, and seize terrain in support of a joint campaign.

Power projection also depends upon our ability to sea-base capabilities and leverage Military Sealift Command's strategic sealift and logistics support, as well as Joint Force aerial refueling, and the global strategic laydown of our bases and facilities that safeguard, deliver, and sustain our forces. Naval Logistics Integration is a key enabler of our ability to sustain forces operating from the sea. Historically, the capability to sustain distant operations has served as a cornerstone of naval power projection.

Naval power projection capabilities also facilitate other elements of "smart power" missions in the form of humanitarian assistance and disaster response, as demonstrated in the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the 2011 tsunami in Japan, and the 2013 typhoon in the Philippines. Positioned to respond rapidly to disasters in key regions, forward naval forces working with allies and partners are ready to save lives, provide immediate relief, and set the conditions for effective civilian response without relying on damaged or inaccessible ports or airfields ashore. This function supports the naval missions of defending the homeland, responding to crises,

U.S. participation in multinational forums and institutions, such as the International Maritime Organization, leads to improvements in global standards for commercial vessel and port security, safety at sea, anti-piracy, and protection of the maritime environment and resources. Here, U.S. Coast Guard and China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command personnel embark a stateless vessel suspected of high seas drift net fishing. This illegal and universally condemned practice poses a significant threat to ocean ecosystems and the food and economic security of nations that rely on fisheries resources.

“The Coast Guard’s vast array of authorities is unique—we are a regulatory agency, a federal law enforcement organization, and one of the Nation’s five armed services. We sustain mission excellence by combining our authorities and competencies with the significant capacity of our sister services.”

—ADMIRAL ZUKUNFT



detering conflict, defeating aggression, and providing humanitarian assistance and disaster response.

### **Maritime Security**

Maritime security protects U.S. sovereignty and maritime resources, supports free and open seaborne commerce, and counters weapons proliferation, terrorism, transnational crime, piracy, illegal exploitation of the maritime environment, and unlawful seaborne immigration.

Naval forces provide maritime security in the maritime commons and the seaborne approaches to our Nation. The United States manages critical mineral and marine resources in our 4.5 million square mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and maintains internationally recognized search and rescue responsibility in the larger Western Hemisphere Transit Zone. Operating in and beyond our EEZ, Coast Guard and Navy ships and aircraft are the forward edge of the Nation's layered defense, developing maritime domain awareness, establishing effective maritime governance, and protecting the homeland.

Maritime security supports U.S. efforts to uphold the laws, rules, and norms that govern standards of behavior in the maritime commons for transit, trade, and the pursuit of natural resources. Particularly important is cooperation with other coast guards to address both military and non-military state-sponsored challenges to sovereign rights.

We conduct maritime security operations by locating and monitoring vessels suspected of carrying illicit cargo or persons. If required, we intercept and board these vessels in support of U.S. law or international sanctions. Operating with the Coast Guard's unique legal authorities, naval forces combat the illegal drug trade, human trafficking, and the unlawful exploitation of natural resources, particularly in the Western Hemisphere. Maritime security operations further support the broad maritime governance activities of the United States. These include assuring access to ice-covered and ice-obstructed waters in the Arctic and Antarctic.

Because all nations share in the collective benefits of maritime security, it is a promising area for expanded cooperation with our allies and partners. Through multinational exercises and training, we will conduct maritime security force assistance to combat transnational organized crime and protect fisheries and maritime commerce. This function supports the naval missions of defending the homeland, protecting maritime commons, and strengthening partnerships.

## Section IV

# FORCE DESIGN: BUILDING THE FUTURE FORCE

In this time of fiscal austerity, our force is sized to support defeating one regional adversary in a large, multi-phased campaign, while denying the objectives of, or imposing unacceptable costs on, another aggressor in a different region. This force-sizing construct also ensures our capability and capacity to support global presence requirements. To accomplish this, the Navy and Marine Corps must maintain a fleet of more than 300 ships, including 11 aircraft carriers, 14 ballistic missile submarines (replaced by 12 Ohio Replacement Program SSBN(X)), and 33 amphibious ships, while the Coast Guard must maintain a fleet of 91 National Security, Offshore Patrol, and Fast Response Cutters.

A smaller force, driven by additional budget cuts or sequestration, would require us to make hard choices. We would be forced to execute this maritime strategy at increased levels of risk for some missions and functions, decrease forward presence, and reduce our footprint in some geographic regions. Such cuts would also limit our warfighting advantages. Specifically, in the event of a return to sequestration levels of funding, Navy surge-ready Carrier Strike Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups available for crises and contingencies would be insufficient to meet requirements, and the Navy's ability to maintain appropriate forward presence would be placed at risk.

In building the future force, we will make institutional changes and take prudent risks as we balance investments in readiness, capability, and capacity. We will maintain our commitment to our Service members, employ new operational concepts, and develop innovative capabilities. As we develop this future force, we will value energy as a critical resource across all naval missions to enhance our operational reach, energy security, and energy independence. The following implementation principles, along with Service-specific documents such as the Marine Corps' *Expeditionary Force 21* and *Marine Expeditionary Brigade Concept of Operations* and classified supplements, will guide our efforts to ensure we remain a capable and combat-ready naval force.

## Flexible, Agile, and Ready Forces

In designing our future force, we will:

- Preserve an appropriate inventory of surge-ready naval forces that are combat-ready and prepared to rapidly respond to crises, major contingencies, and threats against the homeland, while relying on forward deployed naval forces as our shaping and response force. Maintaining this balance allows us to respond to today's crises while remaining ready for tomorrow's conflicts.
- Develop a motivated and relevant future force of Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen who are diverse in experience, background, and ideas; personally and professionally ready; and proficient in the operation of their weapons and systems.
- Develop a balanced force of submarines, aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, and surface combatants designed for combat. These ships must be complemented by reconfigurable platforms such as the Joint High Speed Vessel, National Security Cutter, and auxiliaries including Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ships, Dry Cargo/Ammunition (T-AKE) ships, Mobile Landing Platforms (MLP), and the Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB).
- Improve Joint Force interdependence through initiatives that eliminate gaps and seams, reduce unnecessary redundancy, and increase synergy with the Air Force and Army in developing concepts of operation for countering anti-access/area denial threats. We cannot go it alone. For example, naval forces depend heavily on the Air Force's aerial refueling and global intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Likewise, the Army's globally deployable Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot missile batteries and the Navy's Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) systems complement each other with their robust capabilities. The employment of Special Operations Forces from Navy ships is another example of Joint Force interdependence.
- Implement a predictable naval force employment model—the Navy's Optimized Fleet Response Plan (O-FRP)—which structures pre-deployment maintenance, training, and inspection schedules to improve operational readiness and availability in order to meet Global Force Management (GFM) requirements.

- Prioritize affordability in every aspect of our acquisition process by controlling costs throughout the system lifecycle. For example, we will expand Open Systems Architecture initiatives to improve the use of intellectual property and increase competition. This will drive down total ownership costs, improve warfighting capability, and lead to sustainable future programs.
- Collaborate with our industry partners to design interoperable and adaptable platforms that can rapidly plug in new sensor, information, logistic, and weapon payloads. Modularity will define our future force.
- Plan and balance acquisitions and maintenance strategies to ensure the viability of the industrial base.
- Improve operational energy capabilities that enhance our reach and energy security. These measures will include the use of Marine Corps initiatives to improve deployed energy consumption, the development of bio-fuels, and other programs that emphasize energy efficiency.

## People

To ensure that our active and reserve Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen—as well as civilians—remain our greatest asymmetric advantage, we will:

- Sustain support for the needs of our families and our wounded Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen to ensure that we honor the Nation's sacred trust with those who serve and those who pay the heaviest price.
- Enhance the safety, security, and quality of professional and personal life for our Service members, civilians, and families. We will continue to hold commands accountable for establishing an environment that allows our people and their loved ones to thrive amidst the extraordinary commitments and sacrifices that they collectively undertake.
- Further our warfighting advantage by developing leaders who personify their moral obligation to the naval profession by upholding core values and ethos, who fulfill these obligations as leaders of character and integrity, and who confidently exercise their authority and responsibility with a strong and abiding sense of accountability for their actions.



“In an era of tight budgets and uncertainty, we believe we’re a reasonably priced insurance policy. And history has shown the cost of not having that insurance policy.”

—GENERAL DUNFORD

Events over the past few years have demonstrated the utility of forward deployed expeditionary forces. In 2013 the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-CR) was established for U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command to increase capacity for security cooperation and crisis response. On January 3, 2014, as a result of ethnic violence in South Sudan, elements of SPMAGTF-CR conducted a non-combatant evacuation of U.S. citizens from that country. A U.S. Marine is shown above leading U.S. Ambassador Susan D. Page to a waiting aircraft. In the future, we intend to sea-base the SPMAGTF-CR to further its operational flexibility and reach.

- Modernize the Navy's total force personnel system with a holistic strategy that evolves the All-Volunteer Force, creating more agile and family-friendly career paths in line with 21<sup>st</sup> Century social and economic realities. We will also develop a market of choice and challenge for high performers and remove the long-standing "up or out" system, which fails to maximize our investment in our people.
- Create a true learning competency that unites our acquisition, requirements, and programming efforts to deliver the latest in technology and design, resulting in realistic simulation and live, virtual, and constructive scenarios before our people deploy. Once deployed, we will further hone their skills through robust exercises with allies and partners in challenging operating environments.
- Optimize the total force mix by strategically employing the Selected Reserve, managing differentiated talents to create more adaptive and agile warriors, and expanding Service opportunities to a wider population in support of peacetime operations and to provide essential surge capacity.
- Cultivate strategic thought and intellectual capital through individual Service initiatives such as the reinvigoration of the Navy and Marine Corps Naval Board, the establishment of the Navy Strategic Enterprise to create synergy among the naval staffs and other strategically minded institutions, and the development of a cadre of strategic thinkers.
- Expand and empower the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) community to ensure they remain ready to build and strengthen international partnerships and serve as key enablers for joint, maritime, and coalition operations.

### Concepts

We will develop, refine, and validate new warfighting concepts through Service-level war games and exercises, joint concept technology demonstrations, and full-scale joint and coalition exercises. By harnessing the teamwork, talent, education, and imagination of our diverse naval force and our allies and partners, we will:

- Develop regional and global power projection capabilities, in support of the Joint Operational Access Concept, that provide a full range of options describing how the future Joint Force will conduct operations to gain and maintain access and freedom of action in the global commons.

- Advance the global network of navies concept by deepening security cooperation with allies and partners. This involves:
  - Expanding the cooperative deployment construct that integrates allied and partner forces into Carrier Strike Group and Amphibious Ready Group pre-deployment training, readiness exercises, and deployments.
  - Enhancing warfighting effectiveness between allies and partners. We will accomplish this through Service, joint, allied, and combined exercises of increasing complexity and comprehensiveness, including those that improve interoperability in amphibious operations, particularly in the Indo-Asia-Pacific and Europe. Additionally, we will increase personnel exchanges and intelligence sharing, as well as create a common operating picture on both classified and unclassified networks.
  - Pursuing regional and international forums to discuss overlapping sovereignty and economic, security, defense, and law enforcement concerns. This will foster multilateral cooperation on combined operations, information exchange, combating illegal trafficking, emergency response, maritime security, and fisheries protection.
- Re-align Navy training, tactics development, operational support, and assessments with our warfare mission areas to mirror how we currently organize to fight. In each warfare community, the Navy will establish a warfare development center responsible for conducting tactical through advanced theater-level training.
- Conduct sea control and power projection in a more distributed fashion in littoral environments. This includes employing forward deployed and surge expeditionary forces that are task-organized into a cohesive amphibious force in order to provide scalable options to defeat land-based threats, deny enemy use of key terrain, or establish expeditionary advance bases and oceanic outposts as described in *Expeditionary Force 21*. We will accomplish this using reconfigurable platforms, more sophisticated sea-basing concepts, and technologies that enhance battlespace awareness down to the expeditionary squad level.
- Develop tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that target adversary vulnerabilities. We will explore the right balance between traditional kinetic strikes and non-kinetic actions. This will

conserve capacity of limited resources in the magazine in favor of more efficient and less costly means, where available, to disrupt an adversary's kill chain.

- Develop and evolve our electromagnetic maneuver warfare, space, and cyber concepts of operation to achieve desired effects through blended kinetic and non-kinetic means. The electromagnetic-cyber environment is now so fundamental to military operations and so critical to our national interests that we must treat it as a warfighting domain on par with sea, air, land, and space.
- Evolve our counter-small boat swarm TTPs to include the use of innovative technologies such as lasers, advanced guns, and remotely piloted "smart" vehicles to counter this threat.

## Capabilities

Continuous innovation informs how we fight, and it drives how we invest. We will focus our resources on capabilities that allow us to retain and improve our warfighting advantages. When appropriate, we will prioritize capability over capacity and emphasize modularity and open architecture in current and future platform design.

### ALL DOMAIN ACCESS

In response to rising anti-access/area denial challenges, we will:

- Prioritize capabilities that gain and maintain access, when and where needed, across all warfighting domains.
- Develop a force capable of effective, autonomous operations in an information-denied or -degraded environment.
- Extend our cyber security and resiliency by addressing the acquisition and modernization of our platforms, systems, and information technology networks; by instituting quality assurance programs to protect critical warfighting capabilities; and by establishing common technical standards, certifications, and authorities to sustain the readiness of our cyber programs and systems.
- Develop networked, integrated, and multi-dimensional capabilities to defeat adversary air and missile threats. We will evolve key components of our fire control networks, advanced electronic

warfare applications, and next-generation, over-the-horizon, surface-to-air missiles that expand the range and capacity of our integrated air and missile defense capability.

- Optimize the use of our platform payload volume by integrating kinetic and non-kinetic warfighting capabilities in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. This will include cutting-edge directed energy weapons and targeted cyber and EMW operations that exploit, disrupt, disable, or destroy adversary networks, sensors, and weapon systems.
- Enhance the capability of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) to command and control forces responding to crises or contingencies and executing forcible entry operations.
- Organize and equip Marine Expeditionary Brigades to exercise command and control of joint and multinational task forces, enable the Marine Expeditionary Force for larger operations, and integrate with the Navy for amphibious operations. This includes improving the ability to rapidly deploy and combine forces into a cohesive and agile composite force scaled to the mission.
- Enhance the ability to command and control operations to project power from the sea in contested environments, including interoperability with partner nations.
- Integrate fifth-generation aviation capability into the MAGTF and forward deploy this capability in sea- and shore-based roles, including from expeditionary advance bases and oceanic outposts.

#### DETERRENCE

As long as nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction threaten our Nation and our allies, we will provide a safe, secure, and credible sea-based strategic deterrent. The Navy's top priority is to ensure that the most survivable leg of our Nation's strategic nuclear triad remains fully resourced and ready through the existing SSBN force and continued development of the Ohio Replacement Program. This includes the national command and control system, underwater platform, launch system, and ballistic missile capability that will collectively provide better survivability and increased lethality.

To enhance conventional deterrence options from the sea, we will field our next-generation aircraft carriers, ships, submarines, and aircraft capable of long-range precision strike, as well as improve the operational access of our future expeditionary forces.

## SEA CONTROL AND POWER PROJECTION

To sustain our ability to defeat aggression, respond to crises, and strengthen partnerships, we will:

- Advance naval capabilities that maintain our undersea dominance, especially in contested environments. We will continue to improve fixed and mobile undersea sensors, while also deploying advanced multi-functional sensors and protection systems on ships and aircraft, providing a high-altitude anti-submarine warfare capability, and developing unmanned undersea vehicles.
- Continue developing and integrating unmanned systems that improve our ability to operate beyond the limits of human endurance and in highly contested, high-risk environments. This includes air, surface, undersea, and land-based applications.
- Prioritize development of long-range stand-off weapons to complement stealth aircraft capabilities. This includes the ability to engage targets at extended ranges and in contested environments to provide a credible air-, surface-, and submarine-launched strike.
- Improve our capability to seize, establish, sustain, and protect austere expeditionary bases that enhance naval operations in anti-access/area denial threat environments.
- Develop the capability to employ connectors, including combinations of landing craft, amphibious vehicles, small craft, and multi-mission aviation platforms in the littoral, with reduced radar signature, greater stand-off ranges, and increased speed and capacity. This will involve continued research and development of high water speed options for amphibious assault.
- Employ more efficient at-sea power generation systems and emerging technologies in miniaturization, automation, propulsion, materials, and manufacturing. These capabilities will reduce energy consumption and enable us to better sustain forward forces while accommodating new weapons such as directed energy systems and electromagnetic railguns.
- Develop alternative weapon systems such as directed energy and electromagnetic railguns. The directed energy weapons will counter threats at the speed of light with extreme precision and

an unlimited magazine. The railgun will provide precise naval surface fire support, land strikes, and ship defense to deter enemy vessels at greater ranges.

- Continue developing innovative alternate energy sources and efficiency technologies. Hybrid powerplants, for example, are in service today and are increasing the on-station time and operational availability of our surface forces.

#### MARITIME SECURITY

To combat terrorism, illicit trafficking, piracy, and threats to freedom of navigation in the maritime domain, we will:

- Increase our capabilities in integrated maritime detection, monitoring, and intelligence, along with those of our allies and partners, to improve global maritime domain awareness. This involves exploring more stringent Automated Identification System reporting requirements for vessels weighing less than the currently mandated 300 tons, as well as fielding innovative technologies that enhance effectiveness against the small vessel threat.
- Strengthen the International Port Security Program to further ensure the integrity and legitimacy of commercial vessels and cargo traveling to our shores.
- Enhance our interoperability and capability to perform visit, board, search, and seizure in contested environments.
- Improve interoperability between Navy and Coast Guard vessels, aircraft, and shore facilities, in accordance with the National Fleet Policy to maximize sea control and maritime security capabilities.
- Support our allies and partners through training, exercises, and the provision of capabilities, via foreign military sales and financing, to increase their capacity to address maritime security challenges.

Through institutional changes, balanced investments, and a commitment to developing our Service members, we will build a future force that is capable and combat-ready.

## CONCLUSION

The United States will increasingly leverage its Sea Services in the pursuit of its national security objectives. In this turbulent world, the Sea Services provide the Nation with credible, flexible, and scalable options to sustain freedom of the seas, rapidly respond to crises, and deter and defeat aggression. This strategy identifies a series of geopolitical, military, and fiscal challenges, as well as opportunities for naval forces to shape or overcome them.

As we face the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, we will remain committed to the development of our people; we will validate new operational concepts; and we will employ innovative capabilities that sustain our warfighting advantages, particularly in contested environments. Meeting these challenges requires that we embrace the global network of navies, because we are stronger when we work together with our allies and partners.

Our foremost priority remains the security and prosperity of our Nation, the American people, and our way of life. This strategy ensures that the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard continue protecting American citizens and advancing U.S. interests, as we have done for more than two centuries. American seapower—*forward, engaged, and ready*.

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**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING  
THE HEARING**

MARCH 18, 2015

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#### **RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI**

Admiral MICHEL. In recent discussions with the Navy, the TRITON UAV is still in early testing phases. Any operational use of this capability is approximately 4 to 5 years away. The Coast Guard will remain in contact with the Navy and discuss options for collaboration, once it is operational. [See page 27.]

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#### **RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COOK**

General O'DONNELL. The Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) has been fully reconstituted after substantial quantities of prepositioned equipment were downloaded for Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) I and II.

The status of the equipment aboard the Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadrons (MPSRON) is ready for issue.

Each ship of the MPF rotates through maintenance at Blount Island Command, Florida every three years. Equipment is downloaded and undergoes maintenance, upgrades, or replacement. Additionally, any equipment which may be damaged as a result of exercise use is repaired as rapidly as possible. In FY15 there are 12 scheduled exercises in which MPF equipment will be utilized.

The MPF is made up two MPSRONS. MPSRON-2 is located in Diego Garcia and MPSRON-3 is located in Guam/Saipan. A third, MPSRON-1, was located in the Mediterranean until the end of FY12, when it was deactivated.

Each MPSRON contains six ships. The six ships in each MPSRON are two large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ships (T-AKR); three roll-on, roll-off ships (T-AK); and one dry cargo/ammunition ship (T-AKE).

The T-AKEs are the newest additions to the MPF. While the T-AKRs and T-AK carry vehicles, equipment, and containerized supplies, the T-AKEs carry palletized supplies which allows the distribution of tailored support packages to forces ashore.

During FY15 and FY16, the MPF will receive two additional ships called Mobile Landing Platforms (MLP). These ships permit the transfer of vehicles and equipment from T-AKRs to smaller craft for movement ashore. They are, in effect, a "pier in the ocean" which will enable a Marine force to operate from the sea without the need for a logistics presence ashore.

While our goal is to preposition 80% of a MEB's equipment set on each squadron, we currently have 67%. The ships currently assigned to the program are fully loaded, utilizing all available square-footage. It will take additional ships to reach that 80% goal.

The Marine Corps does not preposition anything ashore in Diego Garcia.

The only Marine Corps ashore prepositioning site is the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPN). Substantial quantities of prepositioned equipment were removed to support OIF and we have worked steadily to replace them. While this effort was going on, MCPN was reorganized to support a battalion-sized response/contingency force, as well as three reinforced company-sized units. [See page 16.]

