[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN TO CLOSE THE
GUANTANAMO BAY DETENTION FACILITY:
AT WHAT FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL
SECURITY COST?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 23, 2016
___________
Serial No. 114-165
____________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
DANIEL DONOVAN, New York
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Lee Wolosky, Special Envoy for Guantanamo Closure, U.S.
Department of State............................................ 5
Mr. Paul M. Lewis, Special Envoy for Guantanamo Detention
Closure, U.S. Department of Defense............................ 13
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Lee Wolosky: Prepared statement.............................. 8
Mr. Paul M. Lewis: Prepared statement............................ 16
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 50
Hearing minutes.................................................. 51
The Honorable Jeff Duncan, a Representative in Congress from the
State of South Carolina: Prepared statement.................... 53
The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York: Material submitted for the record....... 55
Written responses from Mr. Paul M. Lewis to questions submitted
for the record by the Honorable Edward R. Royce, a
Representative in Congress from the State of California, and
chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs......................... 58
THE ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN TO CLOSE THE
GUANTANAMO BAY DETENTION FACILITY:
AT WHAT FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL
SECURITY COST?
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 23, 2016
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Royce. This committee will come to order.
President Obama's race to empty the Guantanamo Bay
detention facility is on. In recent weeks and months, many
hardened terrorists have been released. Many of them have been
sent abroad, and according to the President's closure plan sent
to Congress last month, another 35 are set to be transferred
this summer.
Unfortunately, we know many of the recipient countries
don't have the desire or commitment or even ability to monitor
these dangerous individuals and prevent them from returning to
the battlefield. Countries like Ghana and Uruguay aren't
typical security and intelligence partners but they are being
asked to shoulder a heavy burden and a heavy responsibility.
And there are real concerns about the administration setting
aside intelligence assessments to deceive countries about the
threat posed by the militants they are being asked to take in.
That was certainly a finding of our committee investigation
into the release of six detainees to Uruguay in December 2014--
and I want to thank Mr. Jeff Duncan of South Carolina, the
chairman of our subcommittee that focuses on the Western
Hemisphere. The top State Department official overseeing
Guantanamo at the time wrote to the President of Uruguay that
there was ``no information'' that these six ``were involved in
conducting or facilitating terrorist activities against the
United States or its partners or allies.'' No information? They
were known to have been hardened al-Qaeda fighters involved in
forging documents, trained as suicide bombers, fighting at Tora
Bora, committing mayhem, committing murders in Afghanistan.
Although the law clearly states that steps must be taken to
``substantially mitigate the risk'' of released individuals
from again threatening the United States, senior Uruguayan
officials asserted before that these six arrived that they
would not impose or accept any conditions to receive these
former detainees. Indeed, these six terrorists were housed just
blocks from the U.S. Embassy, without the prior knowledge of
U.S. officials and, frankly, were often seen outside of the
Embassy.
The administration often talks of detainees ``cleared for
release'' as if they are no longer a threat. But just over 30
percent of the detainees that have been released are either
confirmed or suspected to have returned to the battlefield.
Several of the senior leaders of al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula are alums of Guantanamo.
The administration is emptying Guantanamo with the flimsy
claim that it is a terrorist recruiting tool. Let me explain
that I don't think that if you're standing in line in Raqqa to
recruit into ISIS you say, oh, Guantanamo Bay is going to be
closed--no need to enlist here. What Raqqa is about, what ISIS
is about is the establishment of the caliphate. That's what's
driving recruitment and, frankly, the success of ISIS on the
battlefield is driving recruitment.
Closing this detention facility has been opposed by
bipartisan majorities in Congress and even members of the
President's own cabinet. It is no secret that former Secretary
of Defense Hagel was pushed out in part because he was not
certifying releases fast enough for the White House.
Yet, President Obama remains determined to push out as many
terrorists as he can to other countries. Forty-five or so other
``law of war detainees'' would be moved to U.S. soil. Doing so
could open a Pandora's Box of legal issues impairing our
antiterrorism efforts.
Fortunately, any effort to bring Guantanamo detainees to
U.S. soil would be, according to the Secretary of Defense,
against the law and that's also according to the Attorney
General. I see no interest in changing that law--certainly not
by the American people--and our laws must be honored.
The White House, meanwhile, has no solid plans to detain
and interrogate terrorists captured today. That's a problem.
Indeed, the administration admits that its proposed domestic
Guantanamo would not take in any new terrorists captured on the
battlefield. If the administration was spending as much time
working to capture and detain ISIS fighters as it was trying to
close down this facility at Guantanamo Bay, we would be more
secure.
ISIS is continuing to threaten and expand in Libya,
Afghanistan, and elsewhere across the globe. Europe is under
siege by jihadists. We are under attack. So, unfortunately, we
are going to need a detention facility for fanatical terrorists
whose processing in the U.S. legal system is unwarranted and
simply is not feasible. And we're going to need that for some
time to come.
And we'll now go an introduction of our panel. This morning
we are pleased to be joined by Special Envoy Lee Wolosky. He's
the Special Envoy for Guantanamo Closure at the U.S. Department
of State.
Previously, he also served as the Director for
Transnational Threats at the National Security Council under
President Clinton.
And we also have Special Envoy Paul Lewis for Guantanamo
Detention Closure at the U.S. Department of Defense and
previously Mr. Lewis served as both the general counsel and
minority general counsel at the House Armed Services Committee.
And we welcome them both to the committee. We appreciate
that our two witnesses, along with the intelligence community,
have already agreed to meet with the committee in April in
closed session on necessary classified issues.
Without objection, the witnesses' full prepared statements
will be made part of the record and members here will have 5
calendar days to submit any questions or any statements or
extraneous material for the record.
And at this time, I would like to go to Mr. Eliot Engel of
New York who is the ranking member of this committee for his
opening statement here today.
Mr. Engel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for calling this hearing. And gentlemen, Mr. Wolosky, Mr.
Lewis, welcome to the Foreign Affairs Committee and thank you
for your service.
We're reminded again today of the terrible cost of violent
extremism. I was just on the floor of the House speaking on a
resolution declaring our solidarity with the people of Belgium.
That's why I just got here--came here right from the floor.
The dark shadow of a terrorist attack has fallen over
another of Europe's great cities, and we're all standing
alongside the Belgian people today as they mourn the dead, heal
the wounded, rebuild what's been broken, and seek justice.
In these situations it's important to look at what more we
can be done to enhance cooperation with our partners to prevent
this type of violence.
It's also important to reflect on where our policies have
gone astray and maybe made the situation worse. So, it's
appropriate today that we're taking a hard look at one of the
most troubling and divisive symbols of our counterterrorism
effort--the Guantanamo Bay detention facility.
The subtitle of today's hearing is what are the foreign
policy and national security costs of closing the Guantanamo
facility.
But, as policy makers, legislators, and experts have been
saying almost since the facility opened, the better question,
perhaps, may be what are the costs of keeping it open.
For starters, the prison's a drain on military resources.
It costs nearly $5 million a year to keep a person detained at
Guantanamo versus $78,000 a year to hold someone in our most
secure Federal prison.
Closing Gitmo and transferring detainees to other secure
prisons would free up $85 million a year, resources we could
put to better use elsewhere to combat terrorism.
The argument against this goes: We need to spend whatever
it costs--these guys are too dangerous to bring here. Let's
look at that. Today, 91 detainees remain in Gitmo. Since the
prison opened, 644 individuals have been transferred out--144
under President Obama and 500 under President Bush.
As of today, more than a third of the current detainees
have been cleared for release after a thorough review process.
Under no circumstances will these people be released onto
American soil.
Like all the others, they will be transferred directly to
other countries. Prior to 2009, more than one in five released
detainees returned to the battlefield. But, improved procedures
under the Obama administration have nearly eliminated this
problem.
If the President's plan to close the Guantanamo detention
facility goes forward, only a handful of detainees would ever
be brought to the United States and those who are would be held
in super max prisons.
They're called super max prisons for a reason. No one has
ever escaped from one. And who are some of the current
residents of these incredibly secure facilities? Terrorists.
Zacarias Moussaoui, who helped plot September 11, 2001--as a
New Yorker something that I'll never forget--Richard Reid, the
so-called shoe bomber, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the Boston Marathon
bomber, the four men behind the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing, and six terrorists responsible for bombing our
Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. All these men will call ADX
Florence in Colorado home for the rest of their days.
For the very few prisoners still in the military commission
process, we should try them in Federal court and speed justice
for their victims. If there's any doubt whether our justice
system can handle the most dangerous terrorists, ask any of the
people I just listed.
This isn't a question of what rights Guantanamo detainees
should or shouldn't be accorded. It's just a simple fact that
the Federal justice system has tried and punished terrorists
much more effectively than military commissions.
But beyond the dollars and cents or safety here at home, we
need to consider the harm Gitmo has inflicted on our security
interests around the world and, just as importantly, on our
values.
For terrorists seeking to recruit more fighters into their
ranks, the Guantanamo facility is a gift that keeps on giving.
This prison has become so infamous and so reviled that our
enemies no longer even need to call it by name.
Instead, as we've seen again and again, terrorists flip on
a camera so the whole world can see, parade out some innocent
prisoner dressed in an orange jumpsuit, and cut off his head or
light him on fire.
The orange jumpsuits weren't selected by accident. Everyone
knows what they symbolize. This prison has helped strengthen
our enemies. It has become a stumbling block in our
relationship with coalition partners.
After all, it's not just Americans that ISIS is dressing in
those orange jumpsuits and it has created deep division here at
home, and that's because Gitmo has long strained some of our
country's most important values.
It has become synonymous with torture and indefinite
detention. When we were going to school, we learned all about
rights and the Constitution. This was never allowed under
American law.
I want to quote retired Major General Michael Lehnert, the
first commander of the detention facility after 9/11. This is a
quote from him. He said:
``Guantanamo was a mistake. History will reflect that.
It was created in the early days as a consequence of
fear, anger, and political expediency. It ignored
centuries of rule of law and international agreements.
It does not make us safer and it sullies who we are as
a nation.''
So I ask unanimous consent that Major General Lehnert's
full statement be included in the record.
Chairman Royce. Without objection.
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Coming back to our
question, what are the costs of closing Guantanamo? To me, the
answers are clear.
The costs of closing the facility are far, far less than
the costs of keeping it open. I'm not alone in this view.
President George W. Bush was very clear that he wanted to close
Gitmo. John McCain made a campaign promise to do the same.
An overwhelming majority of national security and military
experts, including former Secretaries of State and Defense, CIA
Directors, National Security Advisors, and Chairmen of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff think it should be shuttered.
As I pointed out, the arguments against closing it just
don't hold up, and at the end of the day, in my opinion, the
only justification for keeping the prison open is fear--fear of
violent extremism and fear that our justice system or prison
system cannot get the job done despite all the evidence to the
contrary. Fear is precisely what our enemies want to instill in
us.
I don't want them to win. We shouldn't allow that. We
should clean up this stain on America's commitment to justice
and democracy. We should take away this propaganda tool for
terrorists. We should work to implement the President's plan
and shut down this prison.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. Everyone who
knows me knows that I take a very hard line on this. But I
think that we are far better off closing this facility for our
interests, no other interests--our American interests--than if
we leave it open.
So I look forward to hearing our witnesses. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman, and I yield back.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Engel.
Lee?
STATEMENT OF MR. LEE WOLOSKY, SPECIAL ENVOY FOR GUANTANAMO
CLOSURE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Wolosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, distinguished members
of the committee, good morning.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you this
morning to discuss the important matter of closing Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba's detention facility.
I'm honored to be joined today by my colleague, Paul Lewis,
Special Envoy for Guantanamo Detention Closure at the
Department of Defense.
Today I'll describe the rigorous processes that determine
whether a detainee should be approved for transfer and the
extensive interagency efforts that assure compliance with
applicable statutory requirements before each transfer takes
place.
At the outset, let me emphasize that President Obama
concluded that the continued operation of the Guantanamo
detention facility damages our national security for many of
the same reasons that led President George W. Bush to the same
conclusion.
According to President Bush, by his second term, and I
quote, ``The detention facility had become a propaganda tool
for our enemies and a distraction for our allies.'' It remained
so when President Obama took office and remains so today.
The bipartisan view that Guantanamo should be closed is not
limited to Presidents Bush and Obama. Senator John McCain has
said that he is in favor of closing Guantanamo.
Likewise, former Secretaries of State Clinton, Rice,
Powell, Albright, Christopher, Baker, and Kissinger have all
advocated closing Guantanamo.
So too have three former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and 42 retired generals and admirals. The list goes on.
In addition to leading Democrats and Republicans, world
leaders and international organizations from the Pope to the
Organization for American States consistently call on the
United States to close Guantanamo.
Today, there are 91 individuals detained at Guantanamo,
down from the peak population of 680. All together a total of
779 detainees have passed through Guantanamo and of those 688
have departed.
The vast majority of detainees are transferred out of
Guantanamo to other countries. Some 532 were transferred before
President Obama took office on January 20th, 2009. Prior to the
implementation of rigorous interagency procedures that were
implemented by this administration and are described more fully
in my written testimony.
My written testimony describes at length the two processes
by which this administration has approved detainees for
transfer.
What they have in common is rigorous review and analysis of
all available information in the possession of the U.S.
Government and the unanimous agreement of six agencies and
departments before a detainee may be designated as approved for
transfer.
After a detainee is approved for transfer, the Department
of State leads negotiations with foreign governments about
possible transfer. We are joined in our efforts by colleagues
from the Department of Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security
as well as by those in the intelligence community and on the
Joint Staff.
The decision as to whether, when, and where to transfer a
detainee is the culmination of a rigorous interagency process
similar to the initial decision to approve a detainee for
transfer.
This process, including the process by which we negotiate
security assurances with our foreign partners is described at
length in my written testimony.
I look forward to your questions about it. Once we arrive
at a satisfactory security framework with a foreign government,
the Secretary of Defense seeks concurrence in a specific
transfer from the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security,
the Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence,
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Only after he receives the views of those principals and
only after he is satisfied that the requirements of the
National Defense Authorization Act are satisfied does the
Secretary of Defense sign and transmit a certification to the
Congress conveying his intent to transfer a Guantanamo
detainee.
The rigorous approval and negotiation process I've
described has contributed to the dramatic reduction in the
confirmed reengagement for detainees transferred during this
administration.
Thank you again, ladies and gentlemen of the committee. I
greatly appreciate the opportunity to speak before you about
this important issue and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wolosky follows:]
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Chairman Royce. Mr. Lewis.
STATEMENT OF MR. PAUL M. LEWIS, SPECIAL ENVOY FOR GUANTANAMO
DETENTION CLOSURE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Lewis. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel,
distinguished members of the committee, good morning and thank
you for the opportunity to testify today.
I'm honored to join my colleague, Lee Wolosky. And Mr.
Chairman, I particularly appreciate your continued and
sustained interest in this extremely important issue.
At the outset, I want to echo Special Envoy Wolosky's
statement and make one fundamental point regarding the
detention facility at Guantanamo Bay.
The President and his national security team have
determined that closing this detention facility is a bipartisan
national security imperative.
The President has repeatedly stated that the continued
operation of the detention facility at Guantanamo weakens our
national security by damaging our relationships with key allies
and partners, draining resources, and providing violent
extremists with a propaganda tool.
In January of last year, 42 retired military leaders, all
retired general officers or flag officers, wrote the leadership
of the Senate Armed Services Committee and forcefully argued
for the closure of this facility, stating that the issue of
what to do with Guantanamo is not a political issue.
There is near unanimous agreement from our nation's top
military, intelligence, and law enforcement leaders that
Guantanamo should be closed.
This letter was signed by General Charles C. Krulak, a
retired commandant of the Marine Corps, Major General Michael
Lehnert, the first commander of the Joint Detention Task Force
at Guantanamo, General Joseph Hoar, former commander of U.S.
Central Command, General David Maddox, the former commander of
the U.S. Army in Europe and many other leaders. Many of these
leaders reaffirmed this letter this month.
As Lee noted, in addition, former Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen and General Martin
Dempsey support Guantanamo closure.
It's the opinion of many others in our military. Envoy
Wolosky has noted the bipartisan support for Gitmo closure but
I think it's important to highlight this broad conclusion.
This conclusion is shared by two Presidents, four former
Secretaries of Defense, eight former Secretaries of State and
it demonstrates this bipartisan support at the highest level of
our national security leadership.
As Envoy Wolosky noted, in his memoirs President George W.
Bush himself concluded that the Guantanamo detention facility
was a propaganda tool for our enemies and a distraction for our
allies.
The President himself made this statement, and as President
Obama recently noted, by 2008 it was widely recognized that
this facility needed to close. This was not my opinion. This is
the bipartisan support to close it.
As the Special Envoy for Guantanamo Detention Closure, my
primary focus is on the transfer process. Sixteen detainees
have been transferred to date in 2016. These transfers have
reduced the Guantanamo detention facility's population to fewer
than 100 for the first time since 2002.
Overall, 27 nations since 2009 have accepted Guantanamo
detainees who are not from that prospective country. In
addition, 13 other countries or territories have accepted
repatriation of their own citizens since 2009.
As with our military leaders, foreign leaders regularly
cite the Guantanamo detention facility as an obstacle to
counterterrorism efforts.
In my written statement, I cite several statements. Cliff
Sloan, Envoy Wolosky's predecessor, noted an example. As a
highly ranking security official from one our staunchest allies
on counterterrorism once told me, the greatest single action
the United States can take to fight terrorism is to close
Guantanamo.
And I know highlights by other counterterrorism experts
from the previous administration--John Bellinger and Matt
Waxman, who both worked for the Department of State--noted, the
counterterrorism effects of not closing Gitmo and I describe
those in more detail in my opening statement.
Mr. Chairman, I'm also prepared to address the plan to
close Guantanamo detention facility. The President, announcing
the plan, stated that it has four main elements.
We'll continue to transfer, we'll accelerate the POB
process, we'll look for individual dispositions and, most
importantly, we'll work with Congress to find a location to
transfer everybody from Guantanamo safely and securely.
As far as the transfer process, I just want to state that
Secretary Carter has forcefully stated that safety is his
number-one priority.
He does not transfer a detainee unless he is confident that
the threat is substantially mitigated and it's in the national
security interests of the United States.
Finally, I'd like to take a moment to recognize the
military service members conducting detention operations at
Guantanamo Bay. Too often in the course of considering the
future of this facility we lose sight of the remarkable men and
women who serve honourably under extraordinarily difficult
conditions.
They have our deepest appreciation for their service and
their professionalism, which they display each and every day on
behalf of our nation.
Gentlemen, President Bush worked toward closing Guantanamo.
Many officials in his administration worked hard toward that
objective. We're closer to it than many people realize.
Of the nearly 800 detainees who have been held at
Guantanamo since the facility opened over 85 percent have been
transferred, including more than 500 that were transferred by
the previous administration.
The President, his national security experts, and this
administration believe it should be closed. The senior military
leaders of this country and the leaders of the Department of
Defense concur.
As indicated in the letter by the retired military leaders,
many believe that closure of this facility is the single most
important counterterrorism effort the United States can
undertake.
We believe the issue is not whether to close the Guantanamo
detention facility--it's how to do it. Thank you, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lewis follows:]
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----------
Chairman Royce. Let me ask both our witnesses. The
Secretary of Defense and Attorney General Lynch have both
stated that transfers of Guantanamo detainees to the United
States are legally prohibited. Is that your understanding of
the law as well?
Mr. Wolosky. It's my understanding of the law that with the
statute in its current form prohibits transfers to the United
States, which is why we are working at this time with the
Congress or seeking to work with the Congress to modify the law
in order to be able to bring into the United States a small,
reducible minimum number of detainees as described in the
President's closure plan.
Chairman Royce. Is it correct then that under current law
the Department of Defense is prohibited from selecting any U.S.
site or making any preparations for transfer of the detainees
to the U.S.
Mr. Wolosky. Frankly, I have no idea. That is a legal
question that is most appropriately directed to the Department
of Defense.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Lewis?
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Chairman, we believe detainees can be safely
and securely and humanely detained in the United States. I
believe the current statute does prohibit us from doing that.
So we are working toward doing that. The plan that was sent
up we gave a look at locations, military facilities and Federal
and state facilities that could do that. We believe detainees,
as I said, can be detained. We did not pick a specific
location.
Chairman Royce. One of the concerns that Congress clearly
has here is that in terms of our experience with those who have
left Guantanamo Bay, over the long haul those that returned to
the fight or those who are suspected of having returned to the
fight is a little over 30 percent.
I understand the argument that the administration is making
that of recent individuals released, they haven't returned--
there's a lower percentage that return to the fight.
But, of course, there's a continuum in terms of collecting
the information and monitoring and transitioning as people end
up--I'm just looking at the overall number. The overall number
is in the neighborhood of 31 percent, and if we begin to focus
on some of the recent examples of those who did, it is pretty
concerning, given Ibrahim al-Qosi. He was one of the high-risk
detainees, transferred by this administration and by 2014 he
had joined al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and now he is in
their leadership.
And last month we saw a video urging a takeover in Saudi
Arabia. He would not be out doing his propaganda if he were
housed in Guantanamo and one of the concerns I have about the
rap sheet on those inside as we make the argument--we've been
through these discussions--when we make the argument about the
necessity of releasing them.
But the fact is--but the bottom line is they end up, a
certain percentage of them, pulling stunts like this, calling
for the overthrow of the Government of Saudi Arabia and very
engaged in that process.
And so in terms of the--I understand the theory that it's a
recruitment tool--that thesis. But the fact is that a
significant percentage of them return to the fight and we have
an unclassified letter to Congress last month from the director
of national intelligence writing that the intelligence
community lacks reporting that Guantanamo propaganda has
motivated more recent ISIS recruits to join the group.
So there is a debate. I certainly talked to former
administration high ranking officers and officials who have the
opposite of the view that you've laid out today who tell me no,
they don't think it has to do with recruitment.
We understand your theory on it. But there is the fact, and
the fact is that we do have this process. So let me ask you
this question.
We do have this challenge because of the way this process
is releasing individuals to countries that don't have the
capabilities. So here's my question.
Mr. Lewis lists in his testimony some of the countries that
the administration has transferred detainees to since 2009. So
Mr. Lewis, El Salvador, Kazakhstan, Ghana, and I would just ask
Lee, have you been to Ghana?
Now, this is one of the countries that I've been to. Are
you fully confident that it has the capability and motivation
to monitor and track these detainees?
Mr. Wolosky. Mr. Chairman, yes, we are. As you know, no
transfer occurs unless we are confident in the security
assurances that we've received and the Secretary of Defense
makes the requisite certifications to the Congress.
To date, and we only have admittedly several months of
experience, what I can tell you in this open forum--and we're
happy to come and brief you in closed session--is that we are
very pleased by the implementation by the Government of Ghana
of the security assurances that have been agreed to.
Chairman Royce. As I said, I've been to Ghana and across
West Africa. Ghana is a wonderful place. It's a wonderful
country. But the fact is that it doesn't have top notch
intelligence or law enforcement services to deal with this kind
of problem.
The GDP per capita is, like, $4,000. It's 175th in the
world. The fact is that their leaders have many, many
challenges in Ghana facing them every day. So I'm going to
guess that tracking and monitoring former Guantanamo detainees
isn't a priority just as it wasn't in other examples that I've
laid for you--laid out for you like Uruguay.
It just wasn't high up there and if they weren't returning
or if 31 percent of them haven't returned to the fight this
wouldn't be a concern. But this is a very real concern.
I'll go to Mr. Engel for his questioning.
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, emotionally--because of terrorists and the
attacks on 9/11 and the attacks in Brussels and things that
we're hearing--emotionally, you just want to say well, throw
them all in jail and put them all in jail and throw away the
key.
But that's not how were supposed to work as a nation.
That's not what we stand for, and I don't believe that we
should abandon our principles if we can still be safe.
I would say that things are a trade-off. I wouldn't be for
abandoning our principles if it meant that there was going to
be a larger chance of being unsafe as a result of releasing or
transferring some of these people.
But when you read the facts and you look at the facts, you
see that it's really worse by keeping them there. I have a
balance sheet.
I'm not for releasing anybody who was guilty, but I'm also
not for keeping people in prison year after year after year
with no trial. That's not what I learned when I was in grade
school about one of the reasons why this country is so great.
Opponents of closing the Guantanamo detention facility
often say that the people currently in the prison are the worst
of the worst or the most dangerous, and that's why we should
not release them at all.
Some critics point to risk assessments from the previous
administration--from the Bush administration--in support of
this claim.
What's your view of how risk assessments have been
conducted by the interagency task force and the periodic review
boards compared with previous risk assessments.
And given what you know about detainees currently held at
Guantanamo, are they really the most dangerous? If not, why
have they been in Guantanamo for so long?
Is it because we've already transferred all the easy cases?
Explain how these people are vis-a-vis cases that have already
been adjudicated.
Mr. Wolosky. Sure. Thank you, Congressman, for the
question.
It's certainly the case that there are some extremely
dangerous individuals who remain in Guantanamo.
But it's also the case that there are individuals in the
Guantanamo who are not extremely dangerous. Of the 36 that are
currently approved for transfer, 29 are Yemeni nationals and,
of course, we have been unable to return them to Yemen.
Returning them to the country of origin is always our first
choice in removing a Guantanamo detainee from Guantanamo.
So there is a significant component of country of origin
that goes into the remaining detainee population and while they
are still there.
With respect to your first question, it sort of bleeds into
the reengagement issues that the chairman raised which I
appreciate the opportunity to address because we actually do
have hard data on re-engagement and I'd like to refer you to
the numbers in the report issued by the Office of Director of
National Intelligence earlier this month on re-engagement.
The actual numbers are, in this administration, seven
confirmed re-engagement former detainees. In the previous
administration, 111.
Seven in this administration out of 144 transferred. That
translates into 4.9 percent. The number for the previous
administration is 111 out of 532, which translates into 20.9
percent.
We believe that this data affirms that the procedures that
we have put in place during this administration have worked to
substantially reduce any re-engagement concerns.
And I also think that you're exactly right when you
indicated in your opening statement that the risks of
transferring detainees, and we've acknowledged that there are
risks, must be weighed against the risks of keeping the
facility open.
There has been until recently a bipartisan consensus that
there are significant national security and foreign policy
risks associated with keeping the facility open.
That was articulated by the previous President who
transferred over 500 detainees out of Guantanamo in furtherance
of his effort to close Guantanamo because he recognized that it
was a propaganda tool.
The conclusion was also reached by nonpartisan military
leaders across the services. So I think that when we talk--I'll
stop speaking in a moment--when we talk about re-engagement it
is important to refer to the actual data that has been put
forward by the director of national intelligence.
Mr. Engel. Let me ask you, who's left at Guantanamo? Is it
correct that of the 91 individuals who remain at Guantanamo, 81
are not facing criminal charges? Is that true, and is it also
correct that 35 individuals have been cleared for transfer out
of Guantanamo?
So what does that mean to be transferred out? Who decides?
How long have they been cleared for transfer and why are they
still waiting to leave?
Mr. Wolosky. Thank you for your question.
There are 91 detainees in Guantanamo. Thirty-six have been
approved for transfer. Some of them have been approved for
transfer since 2010, some of them more recently.
Ten are in some stage of the military commission process
either facing charges or serving sentences and the remainder,
40 some odd detainees, are neither approved for transfer nor
currently facing charges.
Mr. Engel. Can I--Mr. Chairman, could you just indulge me?
I just want to quickly ask a Federal court question. The
administration's plan calls for some Guantanamo detainees to be
tried in the U.S. Federal courts, but Congress has imposed a
ban on transferring any Guantanamo detainees to the U.S. for
any reason including for trial.
But from what I can see, Federal courts have been extremely
effective at trying terrorism cases. Since 9/11, Federal courts
have convicted over 500 people on terrorism-related offenses.
By contrast, the 9/11 military commission trial has been in
pre-trial hearings since 2012.
So the trial itself is not expected to start until 2020.
So, why have the Federal courts, in your opinion, been so much
more effective at bringing these terrorists to justice?
Mr. Wolosky. Well, the Federal courts have a proven
mechanism for both convicting and then making sure that
convicted felons serve time safely and responsibly.
You're right, there are numerous terrorists who have been
effectively convicted and are now serving time in the Federal
prison system. Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square bomber, Richard
Reid, the shoe bomber, Mr. Tsarnaev, the Boston Marathon
bomber, Moussaoui--the list goes on. They all have been held
safely and securely.
Back to the point that the chairman raised about Mr. Al-
Qosi. I should point out that he was released from the custody
of the United States after serving his military commission
sentence.
So he is an example of someone who went through the
military commission system, pled guilty to materiel support and
conspiracy and then after he served his sentence in that system
he was released.
If he were put through the Article 3 system, he would
probably still be serving his sentence and not be off doing
what he's been doing.
Chairman Royce. If I could--we're talking about two
different sets of numbers. So if I could just address that
quickly before we go to the next member.
In terms of the administration's numbers that they
released, the administration's claim is 7.9 percent of
detainees released under the President are confirmed or
suspected of reengaging in terrorism.
You were just using the number of confirmed and the
administration that released a figure that overall the rate is
just over 31 percent. Investigators tell us that it takes 4
years to confirm.
So there is--there is a question in terms of the time line
on detainees' recidivism. But the overall rate that I'm quoting
here is the rate on confirmed or suspected.
We'll go now to Mr. Chris Smith of New Jersey.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and welcome,
both of you, to the committee.
Yesterday, I chaired an oversight hearing focusing on the
14 countries that Reuters found after a series of investigative
reports. I want this on the record and I hope the press will
take notice of this because I think it's an egregious flaw in
our implementation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act,
which I am the author of.
I am deeply concerned that Cuba's tier, their State
Department ranking, which had been the worst--it had been there
during the Bush administration, had been so designated during
the Obama administration--only to be manipulated politically
for non-human trafficking criteria in anticipation of this
rapprochement, which I find absurd.
The TIP Report should be absolutely accurate and speak
truth to power and defend those who have been--are you bored
with this?
Mr. Wolosky. No. No.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. Should speak truth to power when it
comes to sex trafficking and child sex tourism, which is
rampant, and the Castro regime gleans enormous profits from it
as they do from labor trafficking.
And we have an upgrade which takes them off the sanctions
list, which I find to be appalling. Yesterday one of our
witnesses pointed out that the Cuban Government is likely one
of the largest and most profitable trafficking promoters in the
entire world.
So my hope is that this year, and yesterday's title of our
hearing was next time get it right, that there will be no
political manipulation of the trafficking tiers.
If you read the report itself, it reads inescapably to a
tier three sanctions rating. But when it got to another level
there was a manipulation there for political reasons and I find
that appalling and deeply, deeply saddening.
Let me just ask you a question on point. The point man in
Uruguay, as we all know, for overseeing the six transferred
Guantanamo detainees is the Minister of Interior, Eduardo
Bonomi.
Are you confident in Minister Bonomi's commitment to
ensuring that the former detainees do not link up with
international Islamic terrorist networks or ensuring that these
six individuals do not threaten our Embassy personnel or
American nationals in Uruguay?
In other words, do you trust Eduardo Bonomi and believe he
is a man of honorable character?
Mr. Wolosky. Well, thank you for your question,
Congressman.
I don't know him but what I can say is that we are
confident. There's never--as I said, there's never no risk
associated with transferring a detainee. The appropriate
calculus, we believe, is the one essentially that Congressman
Engel put forth, which is weighing the risks of transferring
versus the risks which have been recognized across the spectrum
of maintaining the facility.
But we are confident, to your question, that the Government
of Uruguay is taking appropriate steps to substantially
mitigate the risk associate with each of the six detainees that
have been transferred to its custody.
Mr. Smith. Again, is it your view that the minister--this
particular minister, an avowed leftist, is trustworthy? Because
he is the guardian.
Mr. Wolosky. I don't agree with that necessarily. When we
look at countries to resettle detainees in we do not base it on
personalities.
We base it on the government as a whole, the capabilities
of the government as a whole and the willingness of the
government, and then of course the specific security assurances
that have been negotiated and our assessment of whether or not
can and will be implemented.
Mr. Smith. Well, since he is likely to be the point man or
is the point man, could you provide for the record at least
your analysis as to his trustworthiness?
Mr. Wolosky. I can't because I don't know him. But, again,
when we look at transfer opportunities we base our conclusions
on the capabilities of the government.
Mr. Smith. But he is the point person for the government.
Mr. Wolosky. He may be now. He may not be tomorrow and so
we don't--we don't rely on particular personalities is sort of
the bottom line.
Mr. Smith. I understand. But with all due respect,
personnel is policy and if a government has a person walking
point on a particular issue like this one and it happens to be
this Minister of Interior, I think we would want to know
whether or not he is a person who can be trusted, particularly
with such people who have committed terrorism and may recommit.
Mr. Wolosky. Well, again, as I said, I have not met him so
I feel uncomfortable offering a personal assessment and what we
do do is we base our decisions on governments as a whole.
Mr. Smith. But, again, that's why--for the record if you
could provide an additional amplification of those who analysed
the situation and felt comfortable enough to proceed with this
vis-a-vis this particular minister.
Mr. Wolosky. The Department of State felt comfortable.
Mr. Smith. If you could provide us that analysis in a
follow-up--just answer.
Mr. Wolosky. Just to be clear, what--the analysis of----
Chairman Royce. And we can do a lot of that by follow-up
and answer because we need to go to Mr. David Cicilline and get
through a lot of members here.
Mr. Cicilline, you're next.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
our witnesses.
The title of this hearing refers to the foreign policy and
national security costs of the administration's plan to close
Guantanamo Bay, the detention facility.
However, the vast majority of national security leaders, as
you both indicated, as well as leaders on both sides of the
political spectrum, say that the real foreign policy and
national security costs come as a result of keeping the prison
open and in fact describe the closing of the Guantanamo
detention facility is a national security imperative.
And so I'd like you to speak to how the administration's
plan to close Guantanamo Bay detention facility will impact our
ability to work with our coalition partners in the fight
against terror and how the failure to close it is providing a
real impediment to that critical work.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, sir.
As I noted in my opening statement, continuously countries
across the world and allies tell us that Gitmo hurts us. So we
work with those countries.
By closing Gitmo we address a concern of the rest of the
world. The United States needs to lead. We can't do this alone,
and when our allies in counterterrorism are telling us that
Gitmo needs to be closed we take an issue off the table.
We don't remove the risk completely. It's always going to
be a propaganda issue but we take that issue off the table.
Mr. Cicilline. And does the presence of Guantanamo Bay have
an impact on our ability to use diplomacy and soft power to
press other countries to uphold human rights obligations
including responsibilities against torture, forced
disappearance, arbitrary or definite detention--things that we
speak about with other countries--and has our credibility been
harmed by the continued indefinite detentions at Guantanamo Bay
and the opening of this facility?
Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir, I believe it does. As the President
noted in his statement last month, leaders that he meets with
continuously raise the issue of Gitmo. They continuously raise
the issue of specific detainees.
Lee's predecessor, Cliff Sloan, mentioned how he's been
told by foreign leaders that closing Gitmo would be the single
greatest issue to help our counterterrorism efforts and
repeated leaders from both this administration and the previous
administration have said the same. So I think it does hurt us.
Mr. Cicilline. And with respect to the 36 detainees that
have been approved for transfer, some since 2010, what is the--
what is taking so long for that to be completed?
Mr. Lewis. As we said, most of them are Yemenis. Twenty-
nine are Yemenis so we can't confidently send them to Yemen
right now.
So we have to go look at this list of 27 other countries
that have stepped up and find a fit for that detainee, find a
fit for the security situation in the country, their
willingness, and their capacity.
So it's a mixture of sequencing. It's a mixture of the
domestic issues in the country. But 27 countries demonstrates
that there are countries that want to help us and are willing
to step up.
We are confident that the majority of these 36 can be
transferred the next several months.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. And with respect to the issues
regarding reengagement, the office of the director of national
intelligence categorizes these reengagement in three different
ways for these purposes of this hearing.
Seventeen and a half percent of detainees have pre-engaged.
But if you break that number down prior to this President,
prior to January 2009, the number was 20.9 percent. But since
President Obama the figure if 4.9 percent.
So Mr. Wolosky, will you explain are those figures
accurate? What do they represent and how do you account for
this dramatic reduction in reengagement, which is critical? I
mean, those are--obviously, any reengagement is alarming but
the fact that it's been brought to 4.9 percent from 20 percent
didn't happen just by magic. There has to have been some change
in process. Could you speak to that?
Mr. Wolosky. Sure. Yes, there have been many changes in
process that have been put in place in this administration from
the actual decision to approve someone for transfer, which is a
complicated, time-consuming and very thorough and very rigorous
interagency process and only moves forward with the consent of
each of six agency and departments.
Two, then the actual decision to transfer and approve for
transfer detainee to a specific country which, again, is a
rigorous interagency process that entails the negotiation of
detailed and quite specific security assurances with the
specific country and then ultimately input from the same six
agencies and departments and then congressional notification by
the Secretary of Defense.
So our process is very thorough and it's very rigorous and
it's very time-consuming, further to your question about why
things have taken so long and we believe that, again, there's
never no risk.
But we believe that the relative success of our processes
are reflected in the reengagement figures when you look at the
figure--the small figure in this administration and the larger
figure in the previous administration.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, and I yield back. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, the first question I'd like answered
I think could be answered with a yes or no.
Has the Defense Department ever knowingly transferred a
detainee to a country that did not exhibit an ability to
substantially mitigate the risk or maintain control of that
individual? I think a yes or no could be--it's a very
straightforward.
Has the Defense Department ever sent someone to a country
knowing that that country was unable to keep control of that
person?
Mr. Lewis. No.
Mr. Wolosky. Well, I'm not from Defense Department but I'm
assuming that your question relates to this administration
while that was the statutory standard.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Actually, it doesn't. Do you know of any
examples?
Mr. Wolosky. I can't speak for the previous administration,
certainly.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Well, what about this
administration? Can you speak to whether or not that the
Defense Department has transferred a detainee to someone who--
is there some reason that you can't say yes or no?
Mr. Lewis. I don't work at the Department of Defense so----
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. But you----
Mr. Lewis. So what I can tell you is----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let's leave it at knowingly. Do you know
of a case where the Defense Department has knowingly
transferred a detainee to a country that did not exhibit the
ability to substantially mitigate the risk by maintaining
control of the individual? Do you know of a case like that?
Mr. Wolosky. I do not.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay.
Mr. Lewis. So the statutory standard is----
Mr. Rohrabacher. It's all right. It's all right.
Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rohrabacher. You made your answer.
Let me just suggest that this idea that people throughout
the world are so upset with us for keeping a significant number
of people who were captured as part of terrorist units--
incarcerating them in Guantanamo, that that is such a horror
story that it's a recruitment vehicle--that's what the
President is telling us. It's what the administration is
telling us.
Let me suggest if that is true than our European allies and
some others believe that taking these hardened murderers who
murder men, women, and children and incarcerating them in Cuba
or anywhere else--let me suggest that that attitude of Europe
may well be changing in the next 6 months or so when they
realize that the slaughter that's taking place in Paris and now
in Brussels is part of an international movement to destroy
Western civilization and replace it with a caliphate.
And when they understand that, my guess is that view that
it's so bad to keep these people in prison will change as well.
Let me ask you this. We say that about 30 percent or
whatever that figure is that have been released have returned
to terrorist activities.
How many lives have been lost by those terrorists who went
back to their terrorist activity? How many lives?
Mr. Lewis. I can talk about that in a classified setting
but----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Oh, classified?
Mr. Lewis. Yes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Oh, it's going to--so is it over ten?
Mr. Lewis. So what I can tell you is, unfortunately, there
have been Americans that have died because of Gitmo detainees.
Mr. Rohrabacher. How many Americans have to die? How many
people in Brussels or Paris have to die, civilians? What's the
threshold at that point--well, maybe we will keep them under
control in Gitmo?
Mr. Lewis. When anybody dies it's a tragedy and we don't
want anybody to die because we transferred detainees.
However, it's the best judgment and the considered judgment
of this administration and the previous administration that the
risk of keeping Gitmo open is outweighed--that we should close
Gitmo, that the risk----
Mr. Rohrabacher. So the innocent people who are going to
lose their lives because of this they're just part of the
equation?
Mr. Lewis. No, sir. There are risks----
Mr. Rohrabacher. I'm sorry. I want to tell you this much.
As far as I'm concerned if one child is saved because she would
have been blown up by someone who's being released it's better
to keep all 90 of those people in Gitmo, and this idea that the
people of the world oh, they're so upset with us that it's a
recruiting vehicle, that we've kept terrorists who murder
innocent people in Gitmo, well, you know what? I think the
bigger recruiting tool today is when our Government, especially
this administration, is perceived as being weak.
I think terrorists are recruited not because we've held
other terrorists in prison but because we look like we're weak
and cannot deal with the challenge.
This disgusts me. Thank you very much.
Chairman Royce. We go to Robin Kelly of Illinois.
Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Wolosky, yesterday I returned from Cuba with President
Obama's delegation where we discussed the opening of U.S.-Cuban
relations.
While we have made steps toward developing positive
bilateral relations, President Castro has repeatedly stated
that relations with the United States will never be fully
normal so long as the United States occupies or utilizes the
Guantanamo Bay detention facility.
How do you imagine the continued use of the Guantanamo Bay
detention facility would affect the process of normalizing
relations between the United States and Cuba?
Mr. Wolosky. Thank you, ma'am.
As the President has said, this administration has no plans
to turn over the base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. We are intent,
as you know, to close the detention facility at that base.
We would expect to continue to use the base for dealing
with mass migration contingencies and also to support Coast
Guard operations with respect to counter drug operations in the
region.
Ms. Kelly. Okay. To what extent do you believe this local
diplomatic security could contribute to advancing our national
security efforts?
Mr. Wolosky. Well, as you know, President Obama feels
firmly that closing Guantanamo is in the national security
interests of the United States.
No detainee is transferred from Guantanamo absent a
certification from the Secretary of Defense that the transfer
will--the specific transfer will further the national security
of the United States.
And as I said in my opening statement, President Obama was
hardly the first U.S. President to conclude that closing
Guantanamo was in the national security and foreign policy
interests of the United States.
The first President to do that was the man who opened it
up, George W. Bush, who concluded that it was a propaganda tool
and a distraction to our allies. Not only did he believe that,
he acted on it in transferring over 500 detainees from
Guantanamo to third countries.
So we believe, as did President Bush, as did numerous
former Secretaries of State of both parties, the same for
Secretaries of Defense, same for three former Chairmen of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and numerous retired flag officers, that
closing Guantanamo will on balance enhance our national
security.
As we have said, you cannot live life without risk and the
proper analysis, as Congressman Engel suggested, we believe is
balancing the risks of keeping it open versus the risks of
closing it and, you know, we work diligently to prevent
reengagement.
We've been quite successful in this administration in
preventing reengagement and even one detainee returning to the
fight is too many. But the proper analysis is balancing the
risks of closure versus the risks of keeping it open.
And I would point out that, obviously, our hearts go out to
the people of Belgium today and our hearts went out to the
people of Paris just a few short months ago.
But the continued maintenance of the facility at Guantanamo
Bay did not prevent either of those attacks.
There are, unfortunately, going to be acts of terrorism,
probably whether the facility is opened or closed. The proper
analysis is what are the risks of keeping it open in light of
the very obvious use of the that facility as a propaganda tool
which, frankly, you should not have to question.
ISIL, which has now claimed responsibility for the Belgium
attacks, uses Guantanamo as a propaganda tool. There's no
question about this.
We've all seen images of prisoners taken by ISIL being
executed wearing orange jumpsuits that we believe are meant to
mimic and invoke Guantanamo jumpsuits.
There's no question that this is being used as a propaganda
tool as President Bush himself concluded when he determined to
close the facility.
Ms. Kelly. I'm running out of time. So thank you. I yield
back.
Chairman Royce. Matt Salmon of Arizona.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As long as we're talking about Cuba policy, I've got
something I'd like to get off my chest.
I find the imagery of the President yukking it up with FARC
terrorists at a baseball game yesterday when Europe is under
siege by terrorists disgusting, absolutely disgusting, and I
believe that, well, I'm not going to go on on that. I just
think there are better things I think the public should be
seeing.
One of the troubling aspects of the transfer of the six
detainees to Uruguay was the Sloan letter, the letter assuring
the Uruguayan Government that none of the detainees had ever
been associated with terrorism. We know this isn't true, and I
know it was your predecessor who wrote the letter. Can you walk
us through how the administration could make such a misleading
statement?
How can you expect a host government to then take seriously
the monitoring and mitigation of the detainee? In Uruguay's
case, the government stated ahead of time they would not
monitor the detainees and we still released them.
Does this speak to the administration's overall willingness
to accept greater risk in pursuit of the President's political
goal to empty the prison? Mr. Wolosky.
Mr. Wolosky. Sure. Yes, sir. Thank you.
First, although we cannot speak in an open session about
the specifics of the security assurances that have been agreed
to with any one country, I can assure you that any public
statements you may have just referenced are not accurate and we
do have security assurances with Uruguay.
We briefed this committee in closed session on those
security assurances. We're happy to come and brief you about
what they are and how they're being implemented.
As to the Sloan letter, what I can tell you is that the
conclusions in the Sloan letter mirrored the conclusions
reached by the executive--the EOTF process, which was the
process put in place at the beginning of this administration to
carefully review all reasonably available information to the
U.S. Government with respect to a particular detainee.
That process was described in some detail in my written
submission. It involved dozens of national security
professionals from all relevant agencies and departments of the
government including the intelligence community, many of them
career professionals, and they reached certain conclusions
about each detainee and the information available to the United
States about each detainee.
So what the Cliff Sloan letter does is it attracts the
conclusion of the EOTF report, which was this comprehensive
interagency review that was conducted for the specific purpose
of analyzing the available information in the U.S. Government
about each detainee and then making a disposition
recommendation about that detainee.
Mr. Salmon. Whatever justification you're trying to make
for why the letter, though inaccurate, was sent doesn't really
provide a lot of comfort to most of us.
The fact is it was flat out wrong. It was an error and a
gross error. In a recent interview with NPR you said that after
having visited Guantanamo Bay you felt the detention center was
better certainly than any state or local correctional facility
or prison you visited and better than many of the Federal
facilities. Yet, you're advising the President on the closure
of this facility so we can propose building a new facility
here. Does that make any sense?
Would it not be better to tell the American people and the
world the real story about the facility, that it's a model
detention facility, that the International Committee of the Red
Cross, the ICRC, has regular access to it?
Wouldn't it be best to dispel the false narrative that some
use, rather than close down what by your estimation is a great
facility?
Mr. Wolosky. Well, I do think it's a professionally run and
a humanely run facility and in particular the servicemen and
women who serve there face enormous hardship in their service
and they do an outstanding job in running the facility.
General Kelly did an outstanding job in managing that. Now
Admiral Tidd has taken over that process, and they both do an
incredible job in maintaining what is a very well-run facility.
That said, we still think it should be closed.
Chairman Royce. We're going to Greg Meeks of New York and
then Mo Brooks of Alabama.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to get, first, a couple of things straight, you
know, for the record.
As I listened and my heart goes out to those individuals
who lost their lives recently in Belgium as well as, you know,
we talk about the Paris attacks often and you talk about--I
just want to make sure that everyone and the record is clear
that this war is not just against the West.
We don't talk about all of the attacks that have taken
place in various places. It's taken place--and we should be
just as concerned in Nigeria, in Kenya, in Turkey.
So to think--these are all human lives. We ought to be
concerned about all of those lives, not just in one area. And
it's not just against us.
It's not just against Christians because when you look at
that Muslims have been killed also by these thugs and that
should be properly noted. And it should also be clear, and I
think that the historical record is clear, that when we act out
of fear our nation has made monumental mistakes, and keeping
Gitmo in operation out of fear--because that's what I'm
hearing.
Folks are saying out of fear we need to keep Gitmo--we
beget another monumental mistake that, one, hurts America's
interest rather than helps it.
You know, what comes straight to mind is we acted out of
fear when we put the Japanese into internment camps. And so
therefore I caution us. And then after it happens then we say
oh, look at our past or we try to not talk about what we did.
And so history gives us a reminder of what we should or
should not be doing in this place and calmer heads and better
heads as opposed to acting out of fear and emotion.
So I just think that the record should be clear on that and
it should be clear that all kinds of lives are lost in all
parts of the world.
And so this is a threat to everybody--not just to the West,
not just to Christians but to everybody and that's why we've
got to band together and work together in a cooperative manner.
That being said, let me ask a quick question. Where do we
go? If the Guantanamo detention facilities close--we close
them--what will the United States do when we capture terrorist
suspects in the future?
Do we have other adequate facilities for these individuals
and how would the administration in the future capture,
detention, and interrogation of high-level ISIS commanders?
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, sir.
We do believe we have the facilities. We do--any future
captures would be considered on a case by case basis and we'd
consider whether the host nation could detain them or whether
there'd be a disposition under prosecution, either Article 3,
possibly military commissions.
But we believe we have the abilities. We've shown one or
two cases in Iraq recently to detain people and then turn them
over to the host country. But it's on a case by case basis.
Mr. Meeks. So there is a clear and concrete plan on how we
would do this?
Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Meeks. Now, let me ask also. I was listening to some of
the debate earlier and there was a question about recidivism
rates and I guess according to the official reports from the
office of the director of national intelligence that fewer than
5 percent of detainees that are transferred by the Obama
administration are confirmed to have engaged in terrorist
attacks.
But I did hear--I think it was Chairman Royce--talk about
they used a reengagement rate that is 30 percent. Now, is it
30? Can you describe how you make that determination--how those
rates are determined and why was there such a disparity?
Mr. Wolosky. Well, I'll let the chairman speak for himself.
But I think that----
Chairman Royce. Will the gentleman yield? I will speak.
Because it's confirmed and suspected and you're leaving out
suspected.
Mr. Wolosky. Not in this administration, respectfully, sir.
The rate of suspected in this administration is 8.3 percent.
Chairman Royce. No, that's the exact numbers that I concur
are right and the overall numbers are over 30 percent overall.
And 8.9 confirmed and suspected, and as explained to us the
investigators say it takes about 4 years lead time in order to
get all of the confirmation. I've just explained--I yield back.
Mr. Wolosky. There were over 530 detainees transferred
during the previous administration. Obviously, we cannot speak
to the circumstances under with those detainees were
transferred.
First, how was the decision made to transfer them. Second,
how was the decision made to transfer them to a specific
country. Third, what assurances, if any, did the previous
administration obtain from the third country to keep us and
them safe.
We can't speak to that. All we can do is speak to what we
are doing in this administration.
Mr. Meeks. And that's what I want you to do, speak to----
Mr. Wolosky. What we are doing in this administration is at
both stages of the process, first, making a determination in
principle that a detainee may be approved for transfer and
designated as such and, second, transferring him to a specific
country subject to specific and detailed security assurances.
What we are doing is very thorough. It's interagency. It's
very comprehensive and it takes a long time. It's described at
length in my written testimony. I'm happy to answer questions
about it.
But the results of it as set forth in the ODNI report from
this month are clear. The results of it are, first, confirmed
reengagement. Seven out of 144--that's 4.9 percent. Suspected,
12 out of 144. That's 8.3 percent. Those are what the numbers
are, sir, for this administration.
I'd point out also that with respect to the standards that
are applied in defining what it even means to be confirmed or
suspected it's important to point out, first, that confirmed is
a preponderance of information standard. So this is not a
reasonable doubt. This is not that we are----
Chairman Royce. The gentleman's time has expired.
If I could just go to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Yoho,
for his questions and then maybe a question from Mr. Trott and
Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Yoho. I have more of a statement, and I appreciate it.
You know, to start with, when we speak about closing
Guantanamo I'm glad to hear you on the record backing up what
the administration said that they will not transfer the naval
base back to Cuba.
We're talking about the detention center only. There are
two entities there, as we're all aware of. As far as a
recruiting tool, the Guantanamo Bay as a recruiting tool, I
don't see how--I think that's a weak argument. Because if those
people come to the United States is that not a recruiting tool,
too?
So to say that they're in Guantanamo is going to be a
stronger recruiting tool I think is sophistry at its finest
because the jihadis are going to look at them being here in the
belly of the great Satan.
So I think that argument is very weak and we shouldn't even
talk about that. And I disagree with your comments about the
Uruguay Six. I just came back there and met with their foreign
minister.
They don't have a clue of what that negotiation was when it
was negotiated under President Mujica. They don't know what the
deals were, what the conditions were. They don't have a clue of
monitoring and I think it's a joke.
But saying that, I think the overall success rate--if there
were 780 total detainees we're down to 94 percent have been
processed. That leaves only 6 percent, and of those 6 percent
there's--that's taking out the 36 percent or the 36 that have
already been cleared.
Yet this administration hasn't found them a suitable place
to go and I would encourage you to move a little bit quicker on
that.
And of the remaining 52 percent, if we take the 30 percent
that we know will go into combat against our young men and
women or suspected, that comes out to be 15.6 terrorists back
fighting our young men and women and I don't think any American
would want that or people around the world.
And I'm going to yield back the rest of my time back to Mr.
Trott, if that's----
Chairman Royce. Yes, we're going to have one question from
Mr. Trott and one question from Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Trott. So thank you. I thank the gentleman from
Florida.
So if we move the detainees to U.S. soil that's not going
to be used as a recruitment tool by ISIS? They're going to go
silent now that we've done right by our allies?
Mr. Lewis. It still will be a tool but we take away--from a
legal point of view we're taking away the issue that our allies
are asking us to do. They're saying close Gitmo. So----
Mr. Trott. And do you think our allies might change their
position in light of Brussels and Paris, like was suggested
earlier? Isn't there a chance--would you agree that there's a
chance they will change their position with respect to our
activities in Gitmo in light of recent events?
Mr. Lewis. Sir, it's been a continuing position that they
want Gitmo closed, that our leadership and the Bush
administration leadership said that the costs of Gitmo outweigh
the benefits.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Trott.
Now we go to Mr. Connolly for his question.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Wolosky or Mr. Lewis, do you remember the
CIA terrorist incident a number of years ago in Fairfax County?
Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. Was the perpetrator of that terrorist
incident caught and tried?
Mr. Lewis. It's my understanding yes.
Mr. Connolly. Was he tried in Guantanamo or was he tried in
a U.S. district court right here in Virginia?
Mr. Lewis. It's my understanding a U.S. district court here
in Virginia.
Mr. Connolly. And was he sentenced?
Mr. Lewis. It's my understanding yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. He received the death sentence, as a matter
of fact, did he not?
Mr. Lewis. That I do not know personally. I know it was a
severe sentence.
Mr. Connolly. Yes, and somehow our system of justice
worked. Not on Cuban soil--on Virginian soil. We could handle a
terrorist and did.
I just--for the record, you know, we have to take into
account the consequences of the symbolism of Guantanamo and,
frankly, the fact that the suggestion is planted that we're not
all that confident in our system of justice in handling
terrorist cases and the fact of the matter is we do have
experience and our system worked.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Connolly.
We have votes on the floor. We appreciate the time of our
witnesses this morning, and our witnesses have agreed to meet
with us in April in closed session so we appreciate that.
As you have heard, there are many concerns with the
President's plan, especially given the ever-growing terrorist
threat as evidenced by what happened in Brussels this week.
The points made by Mr. Trott and by Mr. Yoho bring to mind
a conversation I had yesterday with the former NSA and CIA
director about the concept that if you move them to U.S. soil,
that in fact that will be a magnet for terrorists--the fact
that jihadists are being held in the United States.
And so I think the last questions raised were also
questions worth contemplating. But we will adjourn at this time
for the votes and we thank our panel.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 10:54 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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