[Senate Hearing 114-662] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] S. Hrg. 114-662 THE SECURITY OF U.S. VISA PROGRAMS ======================================================================= HEARING before the COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ MARCH 15, 2016 __________ Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 22-768 PDF WASHINGTON : 2017 ____________________________________________________________________ For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office, Internet:bookstore.gpo.gov. Phone:toll free (866)512-1800;DC area (202)512-1800 Fax:(202) 512-2104 Mail:Stop IDCC,Washington,DC 20402-001 COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin Chairman JOHN McCAIN, Arizona THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware ROB PORTMAN, Ohio CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri RAND PAUL, Kentucky JON TESTER, Montana JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JONI ERNST, Iowa GARY C. PETERS, Michigan BEN SASSE, Nebraska Christopher R. Hixon, Staff Director Daniel P. Lips, Policy Director Brooke N. Ericson, Deputy Chief Counsel for Homeland Security Jose J. Bautista, Professional Staff Member Gabrielle A. Batkin, Minority Staff Director John P. Kilvington, Minority Deputy Staff Director Holly A. Idelson, Minority Senior Counsel Stephen R. Vina, Minority Chief Counsel for Homeland Security Harlan C. Geer, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk Benjamin C. Grazda, Hearing Clerk C O N T E N T S ------ Opening statements: Page Senator Johnson.............................................. 1 Senator Carper............................................... 2 Senator Tester............................................... 3 Senator Sasse................................................ 17 Senator Booker............................................... 22 Senator Ernst................................................ 26 Prepared statements: Senator Johnson.............................................. 35 Senator Carper............................................... 37 WITNESS Tuesday, March 15, 2016 David Donahue, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State.............................. 4 Hon. Leon Rodriguez, Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Department of Homeland Security................. 6 Hon. Sarah R. Saldana, Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.............. 8 Hon. John Roth, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security....................................................... 10 Alphabetical List of Witnesses Donahue, David: Testimony.................................................... 4 Prepared statement........................................... 39 Rodriguez, Hon. Leon: Testimony.................................................... 6 Prepared statement........................................... 49 Roth, Hon. John: Testimony.................................................... 10 Prepared statement........................................... 65 Saldana, Hon. Sarah R.: Testimony.................................................... 8 Prepared statement........................................... 54 APPENDIX American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) statement submitted for the Record......................................................... 80 Response to post-hearing questions for the Record: Mr. Donahue.................................................. 86 Mr. Rodriguez................................................ 122 Ms. Saldana.................................................. 169 Mr. Roth..................................................... 192 THE SECURITY OF U.S. VISA PROGRAMS ---------- TUESDAY, MARCH 15, 2016 U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Johnson, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. Present: Senators Johnson, Lankford, Ayotte, Ernst, Sasse, Carper, Tester, Booker, and Peters. OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHNSON Chairman Johnson. Good morning. This hearing will come to order. I want to, first of all, thank the witnesses for your time and your testimony and for appearing here before us today. We do have representatives from the State Department (DOS), the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). You will be hearing those acronyms. There are a lot of acronyms in this business. And then, we also have Mr. John Roth, the Inspector General (IG) for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This hearing is about the security of our U.S. visa systems and programs. I think the potential vulnerabilities came to light, certainly, in the public's awareness, with the attack on September 11, 2001 (9/11), and the fact that so many of the terrorists that killed so many Americans were here on student visas. And then, we also understood--or became aware of--the reality of visa overstays. So, we started understanding the vulnerabilities there. Back then, we, obviously, had the State Department involved in the acceptance and granting of visas, but we also had Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). You basically had one agency. After 9/11, then we kind of took that apart and set up the Department of Homeland Security. Now, we have different agencies. And, I think it is legitimate to ask: Are these agencies working together? Do we have a shared purpose, a shared goal, and a shared mission to, literally, keep this Nation safe? Allow for travel and allow for commerce, but--at the heart of it--are we making sure we can do everything, in an imperfect world, to keep our Nation safe and secure? So, that is really my primary question and the main purpose of this hearing. Are we doing all that we can to screen and vet visa applicants before they enter the country? And, second, how effectively are Federal agencies managing their responsibilities and working together--including sharing information--through each step of the visa and immigration process to ensure our security? I would ask that my written opening remarks be entered into the record with consent.\1\ And, it has been very kindly granted. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Senator Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 35. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- With that, I will turn it over to Senator Carper. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER: Senator Carper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome everybody. Thank you for holding the hearing. Thank you all for joining us. Three of the folks sitting in front of us are folks who came before us a year or two ago to be confirmed for confirmation hearings. And, we very much appreciate your service. And, that is not taking anything away from you, Mr. Donahue, but we do not have jurisdiction over the Department of State. We are working on it, but---- [Laughter.] We are not quite there yet. But, this hearing is the third in a series we have held to explore whether we are doing enough to address concerns that terrorists might try to exploit international travel to infiltrate our country. In the aftermath of the Paris terrorist attacks, this Committee first scrutinized the process in place to screen and vet Syrian refugees escaping from the carnage in the Middle East. And, we learned that the U.S. refugee resettlement process involves extensive security screening. Syrian refugees, we were told, undergo multiple rounds of screening over an average period of 18 to 24 months--including in-person interviews by immigration analysts and counterterrorism officials trained in spotting fraud and trained in spotting deception. The Committee next looked at our Visa Waiver Program (VWP), which allows citizens of certain nations to travel to the United States for a visit without a visa. And, once it became clear that the Paris terrorists held passports from European countries whose citizens enjoy visa waiver privileges, fears, understandably, arose that this program could pose a security threat. We learned that visa waiver travelers seeking to come to the United States endure nearly the same level of scrutiny and vetting as all other travelers. We also learned that, when it comes to security, nothing is being ``waived,'' as the name of the program incorrectly suggests. And, we learned that, in return for their entry into the Visa Waiver Program, countries--and there are about 38 of them--must share intelligence with the United States, they must open up their counterterrorism and aviation security systems to our inspectors, and they must abide by our standards for aviation and passport security. As a result, the Visa Waiver Program has now become a key counterterrorism tool. And, what started off as a travel facilitation program has ended up having enormous advantages to us, in terms of protecting our security. Today, we are going to continue to look at our screening systems for foreigners entering our country. We will examine the depth of security for all forms of visas--whether they happen to be for students, for tourists, for people here on business, or for those seeking to make America their permanent home. It is a daunting undertaking, given the volume of international travel to the United States. It also involves the coordination of multiple government entities, including the State Department, the Department of Homeland Security, and others that are not represented here today. Since the 9/11 attacks against our country, there have been notable changes to strengthen our visa security--including recent adjustments made following the attacks in Paris and, more recently, in San Bernardino. For example, amid the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria's (ISIS's) growing online presence, the Department of Homeland Security is exploring ways to expand its use of social media to screen travelers seeking to enter the United States. I look forward to hearing more about these efforts and also about the contribution of ICE's Visa Security Program (VSP) that may help to identify threats posed by potential travelers early on. We need to know if this program is adding real security and, if so, how to expand its reach. As with all of our recent hearings, I expect that we will find elements of our visa security that we can improve upon today--understanding that we can never eliminate all risks and should not turn our back on the many benefits of trade, travel, and immigration. Yet, as we continuously improve the security of our immigration system, we must also keep our eye on, perhaps, the even more pressing threat of homegrown terrorism. For all that we do to strengthen our borders and our immigration security, groups, like ISIS, know all too well that they may bypass our multiple layers of homeland security by using online propaganda to recruit people already inside of our borders--maybe born here--to carry out attacks against the United States. And, in this respect, preventing ISIS's twisted propaganda from mobilizing our young people to carry out terrorist violence may help to combat the long-term terrorist threats to the homeland in ways that aviation screening and watchlist checks can never do. We look forward to our continued work on this Committee, both on combating homegrown terrorism and on strengthening the security of our immigration systems. And, I hope we can use today's hearing to identify some common-sense improvements to the security of visas. Thank you all for being here. We look forward to this conversation. Thank you. Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Carper. Senator Tester can only be with us for a short period. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TESTER Senator Tester. I will make this very short. And, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate the flexibility. The Visa Waiver Program, as the Chairman and the Ranking Member have pointed out--they are important programs--important for our economy--but, they are also of concern. In your opening statements, if you could address: the security of the programs you have, first; whether you need additional tools that you do not have that would require this Committee--or another committee--to take action, second; and the third thing is manpower. Do you have the manpower to carry out the job to make sure that our country is not threatened by the visa program we have now? If you can do that, you will have answered all of my questions. Thank you. Chairman Johnson. That was under a minute. It is the tradition of our Committee to swear in witnesses, so if you will all rise and raise your right hand. Do you swear that the testimony you will give before this Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God? Mr. Donahue. I do. Mr. Rodriguez. I do. Ms. Saldana. I do. Mr. Roth. I do. Chairman Johnson. Please be seated. Our first witness is David Donahue. He is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. Mr. Donahue has also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Visa Services in the Bureau of Consular Affairs and as Coordinator for Interagency Provincial Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. Secretary Donahue. TESTIMONY OF DAVID DONAHUE,\1\ PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Mr. Donahue. Good morning, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify, today, on the topic of U.S. visa program security. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Donahue appears in the Appendix on page 39. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Department of State and our partner agencies throughout the Federal Government take our commitment to protect American borders and citizens seriously. And, we constantly analyze and update our clearance procedures. My written statement, which I request be put into the record, describes the rigorous screening regimen that applies to all visa categories. Let me begin by saying that the visa program is a layered, interagency program focused on national security, beginning with the petition to USCIS, my colleagues here, or a visa application submitted directly to a consular section abroad. During the interview, prior to travel, upon arrival in the United States, and while the traveler is in the United States, our national law enforcement and intelligence communities work together to protect our borders. The vast majority of visa applicants--and all immigrants and fiance visa applicants--are interviewed by a consular officer. Each consular officer completes extensive training, which has a strong emphasis on border security, fraud prevention, interagency coordination, and interviewing techniques. One hundred and twenty-two diplomatic security assistant regional security officer investigators at 107 posts worldwide bring additional law enforcement and anti-terrorism expertise to the visa process. All of this applicant data is vetted against databases--including terrorist identity databases that contain millions of records of individuals found ineligible for visas or regarding whom potentially derogatory information exists. We collect 10 fingerprint scans from nearly all visa applicants and screen them against DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) databases of known and suspected terrorists, wanted persons, immigration violators, and criminals. All visa applicants are screened against photos of known and suspected terrorists or prior visa applicants. When an interview raises concerns that an applicant may be a threat to national security or when the interagency screening process shows potentially disqualifying derogatory information, the consular officer suspends processing and submits a request for a Washington-based interagency security advisory opinion review conducted by Federal law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and the Department of State. The Department of Homeland Security's Pre-Adjudicated Threat Recognition and Intelligence Operations Team (PATRIOT) program and Visa Security Program, managed by our USCIS colleagues or ICE colleagues, provide additional protections in certain overseas posts. DHS Immigration and Customs Enforcement special agents, who are assigned to more than 20 embassies and consulates in high-threat locations, provide on-site vetting of visa applications as well as other law enforcement support and training for our officers. Security reviews do not stop when the visa is issued. The Department and the partner agency continuously match new threat information with our record of existing visas and will use our authority to revoke visas. We refuse more than a million applications a year for visas. Since 2001, the Department has revoked more than 122,000 visas based on information that surfaced after issuance of the visas. This includes nearly 10,000 revoked for suspected links to terrorism, again, based on information that surfaced after issuance. Notice of these revocations is shared across the interagency in near real time. I noticed that you also wanted to talk about our view of the security of the VWP. While that is managed by the Department of Homeland Security, we believe that it does really enhance our national security. It allows us to focus on those places--to have the staffing and the resources in places where we really do need to look deeply into the threat from travelers. It also provides, as was mentioned by Senator Carper, these cooperative agreements with the nations that are sending these travelers to the United States. Therefore, we have better access and a better understanding of the threats they are seeing. They are sharing with us and we are sharing with them. An advanced stage of that, while it is not part of the Visa Waiver Program, is in Canada, where we have a very close relationship in sharing derogatory information back and forth across the border to make sure we have a strong outer border for the United States. Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee, the Department of State has no higher priority than the safety of our fellow citizens at home and overseas as well as the security of the traveling public. Every visa decision is a national security decision. We appreciate the support that Congress has given us as we constantly work to strengthen our defenses. I encourage you, when you are traveling overseas, to visit our consular sections to see, firsthand, the good work that our officers are doing around the world. I look forward to your questions. Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Secretary Donahue. Our next witness is Leon Rodriguez. Mr. Rodriguez is the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Prior to this position, Mr. Rodriguez served as the Director of the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and as the Deputy Assistant Attorney General (AAG) for Civil Rights at the Department of Justice (DOJ). Director Rodriguez. TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE LEON RODRIGUEZ,\1\ DIRECTOR, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Mr. Rodriguez. Good morning, Chairman, good morning, Ranking Member, and good morning, Members of the Committee. This is my second time before this Committee to talk about this subject matter and the seventh time that I have testified before some Congressional committee in this fiscal year (FY) on this subject matter. I should hasten to say that this Committee has become one of my favorites, particularly because the level of discourse has always been a civil and intelligent one--not that the questions are easy. I think the questions we are asked are hard questions that we need to be able to answer for the benefit of the American people--but I really do appreciate the tone that you both have set here. Thank you for that. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Rodriguez appears in the Appendix on page 49. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- I believe, as an article of faith, that a healthy and robust immigration and travel system is critical to our economy, critical to the stability of our families, and critical, actually, to the successful conduct of our foreign policy and national security. I also believe that the most fundamental responsibility of government is to protect the public safety. I have spent a fair part of my career working at the local level and have learned that every time that we issue a driver's license, we need to make sure that we are not issuing that license to someone who may become a drunk driver. Every time we issue a building permit, we need to ensure that that is not a building that will collapse. And, every time we issue some sort of immigration benefit, we need to do everything we can to ensure the security of our country and to ensure that those who mean us harm or who will become threats to our public safety do not exploit the immigration system. In particular, USCIS, my agency, bears responsibility for screening refugees who are seeking admission to the United States. Since 9/11, we have admitted nearly 790,000 refugees-- and I would hasten to add that about 120,000 of those have come from Iraq. In that time, not a single admitted refugee has actually engaged in an act of terrorist violence against the United States. There have been a number--a relatively small number--of terrorist plots or attempts to affiliate with terrorist organizations that have been successfully disrupted by United States law enforcement. The reason why we have been successful is the robust screening process that already exists to screen those who are coming to the United States. It is a multi-layered process involving a multitude of Cabinet agencies, law enforcement agencies, and intelligence agencies. It involves intensive interviews conducted by several agencies, in particular by my officers, who are intensively trained and briefed to do the work that they do. Nonetheless, recognizing evolving threats--particularly those posed by lone wolves inspired by terrorist organizations--we continue to look for opportunities to intensify and strengthen the quality of the work that we do. An area of particular recent focus has been our review of social media--particularly of those seeking admission as refugees--in order to determine whether there is any derogatory information contained therein. We have undertaken, simultaneously, several pilots to identify automated tools and processes which will further enable us to do this work. But, we have not waited for the conclusion of those pilots to, in fact, begin actively using that as part of our work. And, in those cases where individuals have been flagged as of concern, being particularly among certain refugee streams, we have already been analyzing social media to determine whether any such information exists. We will continue to add capacity in this area. We will continue to strengthen our ability to do that. And, we will add more volume based on our assessment and our intelligence community (IC) partners' assessment of where the highest levels of risk are. Now, to respond in particular to your question, Senator Tester, we are working to get to the point where we actually can answer your question--where we can identify the resources and personnel that we need. Needless to say, our agency is a fee-funded agency, so the majority of this work is actually funded by our fee-paying customers. But, a lot of that work is also done in concert with various tax-based partners in the law enforcement and intelligence communities--and we will be looking forward to a further conversation should we identify needs as we develop these processes. Finally, I look forward to addressing the concerns raised in the IG's report. I would like to note a couple of particular findings. First, 93 percent of our customers in the early going of our I-90--that is, our replacement green card--launch reported that they were quite satisfied with the service that we provided. I would also like to note that the IG recognizes that, after July 2015, the conclusion of the audit window, we undertook a number of improvements. And, what I would ask is both for the IG to come back, but also to be able to engage with this Committee about those improvements, so that we can give you the confidence that, in fact, our automation process is successful and is poised for even greater success in the future. Thank you again for having me here today. Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Director Rodriguez. Our next witness is Director Sarah Saldana. Director Saldana is the Director of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Director Saldana previously served as United States Attorney for the Northern District of Texas. Director Saldana. TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE SARAH R. SALDANA,\1\ DIRECTOR, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Ms. Saldana. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and other Members of this Committee. Senator Tester, I am still having nightmares from seeing that-- was it a buffalo or a bison?--the head in your office. [Laughter.] --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Saldana appears in the Appendix on page 54. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- I am sure I will get over it. I will say, in all seriousness, that I appreciate the opportunity to talk, today, about this very important subject. I absolutely agree with my colleagues here, with respect to the importance of this issue and these issues. I appreciate what we will hear from the Inspector General, with respect to our programs and the improvements that are recommended--and, obviously, to your questions and suggestions, with respect to how we can do our jobs better. As you know, Congress authorized our role in this process back in 2002, where we were told, first, to assign agents in diplomatic posts to review visa security activities and, second, to provide training and other assistance to our State Department colleagues. This effort is led by the investigative side of Immigration and Customs Enforcement: Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), with the involvement of our Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) folks, and it is accomplished through the program that has been referred to as the Visa Security Program. Under this program, we have analysts and agents working at 26 visa-issuing posts in 20 countries to identify terrorists, criminals, and other individuals who are ineligible for visas prior to their travel or application for admission to the United States. This fits right in with ICE's larger responsibility to detect, disrupt, and dismantle transnational criminal organizations. But, in the visa security context, obviously, we are trying to stop threats--deter threats--before they reach our nation's borders. As a result of the additional Ccongressional funding in FY 2015, for which we are very thankful, ICE was able to expand VSP operations to six new issuing posts--the largest expansion in the program's history. We are looking forward to adding four more posts before the end of this fiscal year. As my colleagues have said, the process begins and ends, obviously, with the Department of State, along with the significant involvement of USCIS. But, this process also presents the first opportunity to assess whether a potential visitor or immigrant poses a threat to our country--and that is where ICE comes in--our law enforcement folks. ICE's actions complement the consular officers' screenings, applicant interviews, and reviews of applications and supporting documentation. PATRIOT, which the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary just mentioned, begins our visa screening mission by conducting a first take--an automated screening of visa application information against our vast DHS holdings--all of the information we have, not only from DHS agencies, but from the intelligence community as well. This step occurs before the applicant is even interviewed for the first time. PATRIOT takes a risk-based approach and uses interagency resources from ICE, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the State Department to identify potential national security and public safety threats. Where VSP differs from most other government screening efforts is that it leverages the fact that we have agents posted at those visa-screening sites--at the visa sites that the State Department has--and those agents are able to investigate the information that comes up in the applications-- to actually supplement the Department of State's interviews of those applicants and to identify previously unknown threats. So, we are very pleased to have those people actually onsite in those 20 different countries. In FY 2015, VSP--our agents--reviewed over 2 million visa applications--over 2 million--and we determined they identified 64,000 of them for further review. This is a flag that goes up that, perhaps, something there is indicating something to the agent, who is very well trained and versed in intelligence and criminal activity as well as other derogatory information. After in-depth vetting, the next step, we determined the existence of a little over 7,000 of 23,000 cases in which we saw derogatory information to have some nexus to terrorism, resulting in our recommendation to the Department of State to refuse visas to approximately 8,600 individuals last year. Approximately 850 terrorist database records were created or enhanced. That is the other complement to this mission--and that is, the intelligence gathering that we are able to do through our in-depth vetting and screening. While I am extremely proud of what our ICE personnel do to screen the visa applicants on the front side, we also actively work to identify and initiate action against overstay violators, which Senator Johnson mentioned earlier. This vetting helps to determine if an individual has overstayed or departed the U.S. In the last 2 years, ICE has dedicated approximately 650,000 special agent hours a year to overstay enforcement. ICE prioritizes immigrant overstay cases using risk-based analysis through our Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU). The CTCEU reviews many leads and further investigates them, referring them to others on the ERO side if we are unable to do anything with them on the investigative side. We are very proud to include both sides of our house in this effort. I believe we have actually, as a side note, increased the investigative responsibilities of our ERO folks. I look forward to working with this Committee and with our Appropriations Committee to discuss some pay reform with respect to our entire ICE workforce. And, I stand ready to answer any questions you may have. Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Director Saldana. Our final witness is Inspector General John Roth, who is the Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Mr. Roth most recently served as the Director of the Office of Criminal Investigations (OCI) at the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Prior to this, he had a 25-year career as a Federal prosecutor and senior leader at the Department of Justice. Inspector General Roth. TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE JOHN ROTH,\1\ INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Mr. Roth. Thank you. Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and Members of this Committee, thank you for inviting me here, today, to discuss my office's oversight of DHS visa programs. Our recent work has involved a number of audits and investigations, and I will discuss some of our audit results this morning. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Roth appears in the Appendix on page 65. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Deciding and administering immigration benefits, including visas, is a massive enterprise. USCIS employs about 19,000 people to process millions of applications for immigration benefits. They are required to enforce what are, sometimes, highly complex laws, regulations, and internal policies that can be subject to differing interpretations. They are rightly expected to process decisions within a reasonable timeframe. USCIS and the rest of DHS accomplish their mission while working with an antiquated system of paper-based files more suited to an office environment from 1950 than 2016. This system creates inefficiencies and risks to the program. To give you an idea of the scope of the problem, USCIS spends more than $300 million per year shipping, storing, and handling over 20 million immigrant files. This week, we published our sixth report on USCIS' efforts to transform its paper-based processes into an integrated and automated system. We undertook this audit to answer a relatively simple question: After 11 years and considerable expense, what has been the outcome of USCIS' efforts to automate benefits processing? We focused on the progress that was made and the performance outcomes. We interviewed dozens of individuals, including by traveling to the local field locations and talking to over 60 end users who are using Electronic Immigration System (ELIS). And, we literally stood next to them and watched as they struggled with the system. We found that USCIS has made little progress in transforming its paper-based process into an automated system. Previous efforts, which have cost approximately $500 million to implement, had to be abandoned, recently, in favor of a new system. USCIS now estimates that it will take more than 3 years and an additional $1 billion to automate benefit processing. This delay will prevent USCIS from achieving its workload processing, national security, and customer service goals. Currently, only 2 of about 90 different types of application forms are online for filing. We found, for example, that the time to process immigration benefits was twice that of the metrics that USCIS had established. Our earlier report on USCIS information technology (IT) systems, published in July 2014, reported that using the electronic files in use at the time actually took twice as long as using paper files. That report reflected user dissatisfaction with a system that often took between 100 and 150 mouse clicks to move among sub-levels to complete a specific process. As Director Rodriguez said, we acknowledge that DHS has recently taken significant steps to improve the process by which new information technology--including moving from a traditional development methodology to a new incremental approach, called Agile, will assist. Implementation of automation is very much a moving target, and USCIS may have subsequently made progress on the problem since the time our field work ended in July 2015. We will obviously continue to monitor the situation and report back to the Committee as necessary. Separately, in a second, earlier audit, we compared databases belonging to ICE and to USCIS and found that known human traffickers were using work, fiance, and other family reunification visas to bring their victims into the country. An important finding we made is that the data systems that USCIS uses do not electronically capture important information which would be valuable in investigating human trafficking. Again, this poses risks to the system. We made three recommendations to improve these programs. ICE and USCIS are taking actions to resolve these recommendations and we are satisfied with their progress thus far. Finally, corrupt and criminal activity on the part of DHS personnel can present a risk to the integrity of the visa process. My written testimony illustrates several examples in which employees or contractors, who are in a position of trust, were able to compromise the system to provide immigration benefits to those who are not entitled to them. This type of insider threat presents significant risks that can only be countered through continual vigilance. In summary, the size and complexity of the mission, coupled with an archaic method of processing applications, brings significant risk. There is risk to operations in that it makes it more difficult for USCIS to accomplish its mission. There is also risk to our national security in that we may be admitting individuals who do not meet the requirements for a visa. Basic information on visa applicants is not captured in an electronic format and, thus, cannot be used to perform basic investigative steps. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I am happy to answer any questions that you or other Members of the Committee may have. Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Roth. In my opening comments, I was talking a little bit about missions--the goals of the different agencies. In this Committee we have a pretty simple one: to enhance the economic and national security of America. Pretty all-encompassing. I think a problem we have, in terms of our visa programs, is that you, literally, have the tension of conflicting goals. We want to facilitate travel, commerce, and customer service, as Director Rodriguez was talking about. On the other hand, we want to ensure the security of our homeland and keep Americans safe. There is tension there. So, I want to first go to Director Rodriguez. Does your agency have a pretty simple mission statement like this Committee does? And, can you tell us what it is? Mr. Rodriguez. We have a number of different ways, but, certainly, I have been very clear with our staff--in communications to the entire staff that, in fact, to articulate a set of simple principles--and that is, where an individual qualifies for an immigration benefit, they should get that benefit in an efficient and appropriate manner, subject to, first and foremost, national security and fraud prevention. That is a key element of our draft strategic plan--subject, again, to the legal requirements that I mentioned before and subject to operational feasibility of whatever initiatives we are taking. Chairman Johnson. But, just the way you describe that, the first thing you talked about was providing benefits to your customer. So, I guess, the way I would interpret that is that that is really the first part of your mission--customer service, providing benefits to immigrants to this country, again, subject to security. Mr. Rodriguez. Right. And, subject to, and in no small way, to be given to national security and public safety. In other words, our staff clearly understands this, which is evidenced by the fact that roughly 900 of our staff members are, specifically, dedicated to the Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate (FDNS)--that if an individual poses a threat, they are denied the benefit--to be very clear about that. Chairman Johnson. Director Saldana, do you have a relatively simple mission statement for your Agency? Ms. Saldana. It is comparable to this Committee's, and that is: to ensure the national security and public safety of our country through the enforcement of immigration and customs laws. Huge. Over 400 statutes are implicated by that, but we are game. Chairman Johnson. It is a big mission. It is a serious undertaking. The results of 9/11 and the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 9/11 Commission, and what they were talking about--the stovepipes--that continues to be a concern of mine. So, you have these cross-purposes. You have two different agencies now split--and I think you were always somewhat split under INS as well. But, I am concerned about that. Director Rodriguez, are you aware of what happened at the USCIS office in San Bernardino on December 3 following the San Bernardino attack? Are you aware of the events that occurred there? Mr. Rodriguez. At the USCIS office in San Bernardino. Chairman Johnson. In San Bernardino. Mr. Rodriguez. I am not, honestly. No, I am not aware that anything occurred at our office. Chairman Johnson. Director Saldana, are you aware of it? Ms. Saldana. I think you are referring to our HSI office, Senator Johnson. Chairman Johnson. Correct. Ms. Saldana. The subject of a letter that you have sent, I believe, to the Secretary of Homeland Security, which has been sent to me for response. I am aware of it. Chairman Johnson. Can you describe what happened from the standpoint--because HSI is under your jurisdiction. Can you just describe, from your standpoint, what you are aware of with respect to that incident? Ms. Saldana. Well, with respect to the whole San Bernardino incident---- Chairman Johnson. No. I am just talking about your HSI agents showing up at the office of USCIS because they were made aware of the fact that Enrique Marquez was, potentially, there for an interview the day after the San Bernardino attack. You are not aware of that? Ms. Saldana. That I am not aware of. He showed up at USCIS? Mr. Rodriguez. Yes, Senator, now I am remembering the incident. I believe, if I understand correctly, there was a concern about the manner in which we were providing information about the individuals involved in the attack to HSI. In fact, the intent all along among our staff was to provide that information. It was just a matter of completing a very short process. Chairman Johnson. So, let me just describe--this is from an internal memo written by somebody who contacted our Committee. ``At approximately 12:00 p.m. on December 3, the FBI informed HSI and the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) that FBI field interview agents learned that Marquez and his wife, Maria Chernykh, were scheduled for a meeting at the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services office in San Bernardino for noon on December 3. HSI contacted the HSI special agent division requesting a team of armed agents to respond to the San Bernardino USCIS office in order to detain Marquez until an FBI interview team could be dispatched. The special agent division informed the HSI team that the officer in charge of USCIS would not let HSI agents in the building.'' So, HSI had a special team show up trying to, potentially, apprehend somebody who, at that point in time, they thought might have been a part of a terrorist plot, and the officer in charge of the USCIS office would not allow those agents in the building. ``The special agent division learned that Marquez and Chernykh did not show up for the meeting. The special agent division requested copies of the Alien Registration File (A File), which USCIS refused. The special agent division was allowed to take a photo of Chernykh's photo, which was contained in that A file.'' So, what happened on December 3--and this is kind of getting me to the cross-purposes. So, we had a team, armed up and, potentially, dealing with a terrorist. They had a tip from the FBI that Mr. Marquez might be at the USCIS office and the officer in charge of USCIS--the officers would not allow HSI into the building and would not give them the A file. That is not indicating a great deal of cooperation between two different agencies under DHS, whose supposedly top concern is the security of this Nation. Director Rodriguez, can you explain that? By the way, we have been told during the gathering of information process that the decision not to let HSI in came from higher up. Mr. Rodriguez. That much is not correct, in the sense that, once field leadership had consulted with higher-ups, the instruction was, in fact, to facilitate the actions that HSI wanted to take. Unfortunately, this was all--as these situations do--evolving very quickly. Ordinarily, we do not have situations where law enforcement comes into a USCIS office to effect an arrest. Chairman Johnson. But, how can you explain that the officer in charge of USCIS would not allow HSI agents in there when they are saying, ``Listen, you could have a potential terrorist here-- somebody who was involved in what just happened yesterday, in the slaughter of 14 Americans.'' And, they do not even allow them in the office? How could that possibly happen? Mr. Rodriguez. Again, Chairman, I think the point here is that we operate according to certain protocols. That individual was seeking guidance from higher-ups. The guidance was to facilitate what HSI was trying to accomplish. Unfortunately, it all happened so quickly that it was, incorrectly, perceived as our folks trying to, in some way, obstruct what ICE was trying to do. Do we need to look at our protocols to make sure that those misunderstandings do not occur? That may well be something that we need to do. But, there was never an actual intent to prevent them from doing what they needed to do. Chairman Johnson. It sounds like they were prevented. Director Saldana, can you explain this? And, what do you now know about it with, maybe, your memory refreshed? Ms. Saldana. I will say, in all honesty, Senator, that I had a similar reaction when I first heard about the incident. But, we do forget the number of law enforcement and other people involved in this incident and the confusion and the chaos that was going on in San Bernardino. We had immediate conversations when it came to my attention--and I am having a hard time, right now, remembering exactly. I believe it was the same day, and it was taken care of and clarified immediately. And, we did get the information we needed. But, I am with the Director. We can always do things better. And, if we do not, as I tell my son, learn lessons from the mistakes we make, then shame on us. But, I believe--he and I meet very often. Chairman Johnson. Coming from the private sector--I am just putting myself in the position of individuals at USCIS. The day after a terrorist attack, if I had a team, armed, coming into my office and saying, ``We believe somebody who was involved in that terrorist incident is in your building, we want to come in,'' I would say, ``Come on in.'' There would not have been a question in my mind. And, yet that is not what happened. It is quite puzzling. Senator Carper. Senator Carper. My first question is for you, Ms. Saldana. Over your right shoulder is a gentleman sitting in the crowd right behind you--in the row right behind you. He looks very familiar--right over your right shoulder in the front row. It looks like his first name might be Jason, and I think he used to work here. He used to sit right behind us here on this dais. Ms. Saldana. We have spent a lot of time together. Senator Carper. It is nice to see you, Jason. Welcome back. Thank you for your service. A couple of you alluded to one of my favorite aphorisms, that, if it is not perfect, make it better. And, one of those is how we move from a paper process to an electronic process. And, I think the Inspector General and, I think, Mr. Rodriguez both have touched on this--and the IG talked about a project that was abandoned, maybe, within the last year--I think after an investment of, I think you said, $500 million--and you thought that there had been some progress since the July 2015 audit. And, I heard the word ``Agile'' mentioned, a term describing something. Just help and make some sense of it for me. I think we know that, to the extent that we can take a paperwork process--paper processes and make them electronic, oftentimes that provides better service and better security. How would this have done that? Where did we go wrong? And, how are we fixing it now? Mr. Rodriguez, lead us off. Mr. Rodriguez. Yes. So, the question is first to me. Is that correct, Senator? Senator Carper. Please. Mr. Rodriguez. I think it is well known to just about everybody here, including this Committee, that, in fact, there were a number of quite serious and quite protracted false starts with respect to our automation process. We were using what was sort of an antiquated development process, the Waterfall development process, which was directed by an outside entity. We have since migrated to this Agile process, which, essentially, involves multiple contractors competing against each other and also shrinks the development steps in such a way that we can develop a particular item, test it, try it out in the field, make corrections as we need to, and then move on to the next item--instead of trying to do everything all at once. To understand the timelines here, the first generation was the Waterfall generation. There was a second generation called ELIS. We began, really, the third generation, live, in March of last year, which, in other words, was about a month before the Inspector General's audit began. We launched the I-90, which is our replacement Green Card. That, already, incorporates a number of critical functionalities, which are then going to be used for other applications in the future. We have now processed approximately 300,000 I-90 applications through there and we have also added the Immigrant Visa (IV) payment since that time. So, we now have, approximately, 16 percent of our overall business on ELIS. What we have done so far, certainly, from a customer perspective, is working quite well. A number of the concerns that our internal employees had either reflected the older generation of ELIS or are things that reflected that early time when we first launched the I-90 application. Many of those issues have since been, not only resolved, but resolved well. Again, that is why I would like to invite the IG to come back and to invite the Committee to scrutinize further what we are doing. By the end of this year, we will have 30 percent of the business on ELIS, including some of our most complex forms. And, this is where---- Senator Carper. I am going to ask you to hold it right there because I have some other questions. But, thank you for that explanation. Inspector General Roth, a quick reaction to what you are hearing from Leon Redbone--excuse me, Leon Rodriguez. [Laughter.] That is my favorite nickname for him. Mr. Roth. I mean, certainly, what we simply did was we went out to where the work is being done and we talked to the USCIS employees who were actually confronted with the system that they had. And, the level of frustration, which is reflected by the glitches and the hiccups in the rollout of the ELIS report, were significant. And, we were able to isolate that and to uncover a few root causes, including that there was a lack of user engagement--that is, the folks in the field did not particularly feel that they were being engaged and listened to in the development of the software. Second, that the testing was not done on an end-to-end basis--in other words, that the testing of certain elements of the software was done sporadically--but it was not done in a complete way. And, third, that the technical support was lacking. Now, the Agile development process means that you put out a minimum viable product and then you improve that product as you go. You basically fix the car while it is running, to use an analogy. Here, we thought that the testing, though, was insufficient, that the rollout was too soon, and that the user experience--the folks who were actually using it were highly frustrated with the system. Those issues--that is, user engagement, testing, and technical support--were the same things that we had seen in the previous version of ELIS--the $500 million one that ultimately had to be scrapped. Senator Carper. Alright. Mr. Rodriguez has extended an invitation for your folks to come back and revisit them. I would urge you to do that and to do it soon. Mr. Roth. That is part of our audit process. We will, obviously, continue to sort of monitor this situation. We have made specific recommendations--some of which they have agreed with and some of which they have not--and we will continue to monitor and report as appropriate. Senator Carper. OK. Good. We will continue to monitor this. Thank you for the update. Director Saldana and Mr. Donahue, how do your agencies use social media when you vet and screen visa applicants? And, what challenges have you encountered in doing so? Ms. Saldana. I will begin with our portion of the responsibility here with respect to the vetting and screening. We are, first and foremost, a law enforcement agency--and HSI is an investigative agency. In all of our investigations and reviews, we use social media to the extent that the evidence leads us there. So, in the visa screening process, in particular, there is no bar to our use of it. There are occasions where we do. As I mentioned, we go through PATRIOT first. There is a preliminary assessment as to whether there are some indicators for further review. Where there is further review, we might actually use social media--review a person's social media in order to determine whether we should have a further study or whether we should recommend a negative result to the Department of State. So, we have that under our current authorities--and we have no problem using it when the case indicates we need to. Senator Carper. Alright. Mr. Donahue--same question. How do your folks use social media when you vet and screen visa applicants? And, what challenges have you encountered as you do that? Mr. Donahue. Sure. In Consular Affairs, we have used social media for a while. We have it in our regulations. In fact, we just updated our social media regulations. We use it when we see that there is a reason to look further into the case. We are now doing a pilot program in countries of concern to find out how effective it can be. It is a studied program where we are using social media on our IR1--our immigrant visa for spouses--and our K cases to see what kind of especially terrorist-related information we can find in the process. We do not have the results yet, but we have used it for a long time on the fraud side of the house. Senator Carper. OK. Thank you everyone. Chairman Johnson. Senator Sasse. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SASSE Senator Sasse. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Saldana, in January, 21-year-old Sarah Root was killed in Omaha by an illegal alien named Eswin Mejia. He was street driving while drunk. This is not the first time that local police had arrested Mr. Mejia for driving drunk. And, after he was arrested for the incident, he posted bail. Prior to being released from jail, however, local police contacted ICE and requested that he be detained because of his immigration status. ICE, however, refused and said that that would not be consistent with the President's Executive Actions on immigration. Mejia was released and disappeared. Do you think someone who street races while driving drunk and kills another person is a threat to public safety? Ms. Saldana. Yes. Senator Sasse. If an illegal alien kills an American citizen, should ICE let that person go free? Ms. Saldana. Go free? Well, there will be---- Senator Sasse. Which is what happened here. Ms. Saldana. There will be criminal consequences. Senator Sasse. We do not know where the man is. Ms. Saldana. Right. And, sir, I do not understand where you got the information, with respect to our refusing to deal with this individual. That is not my understanding of the facts. Senator Sasse. This is ICE's public comment. ICE has said this in response to Omaha law enforcement, who said they requested that ICE detain him. Ms. Saldana. I am ICE and I do not recall making that statement. I would not have said that. What we did do was--we look at every individual case, like we did here with Mr. Mejia, and we determine whether a detainer to recommend to local law enforcement is appropriate. As you know, that has been a subject of much conversation. We are working very hard to get all local law enforcement offices to work with us on it--and we have made some great strides. But, in this case--there is not a single injury or death that occurs at the hands of an illegal immigrant that does not weigh heavily on me, Senator. Senator Sasse. I believe that. I am going to interrupt because I am quoting your agency here. This is my letter to you, dated February 29. I am quoting your Agency's public statement. This is footnote 4 in my letter. Do you have the letter from February 29? Your agency said in response, ``At the time of his January 2016 arrest in Omaha--and local criminal charges, Eswin Mejia, 19, of Honduras, did not meet ICE's enforcement priorities, as stated by the November 20, 2014 civil enforcement memo issued by Secretary Johnson.'' Ms. Saldana. Oh, I understood you to be saying that we told local law enforcement we were not going to do anything about him because he did not meet our priorities. That is a statement of fact in one person's interpretation. Quite frankly, sir, it is very easy to look back and say that that person's judgment was incorrect--and I have some concerns about that. As I said earlier, for every situation we have that results in something as horrific as this, we always try to learn from it. And, I will be following up to look at the specific individuals involved, how the judgment was formed, and why that was done. But, I misunderstood your question. I understood your question to mean that we told law enforcement that we are not going to do that. Senator Sasse. Well, the rest of your statement says--your Agency's statement, not you personally--that Mejia is scheduled to go before an immigration judge on March 23, 2017--but he was released by the police once he posted bail. They contacted your agency and asked you to detain him. ICE did not act. How do you explain that to the family? Ms. Saldana. We tried to act, sir, but I believe it was a matter of hours between the time that we were contacted and the actual release. It is very hard for us to get to every inquiry that is made by law enforcement, and, unfortunately, it had a horrible consequence here. But, we try very hard to respond as quickly as possible. We just cannot get to every site within a matter of hours. I think it was 4 hours, if I am not---- Senator Sasse. I do not know that fact. Ms. Saldana. If I am remembering correctly. But, that is a fact--that we try very hard to get to and to respond to local law enforcement. It does not do us any good to tell them to cooperate with us if we are not going to respond. Senator Sasse. My letter to you is from 16 days ago. Can you tell me when I will receive a reply? Because it has details on all of these questions. Ms. Saldana. Yes, I think we will get you a reply within a couple of weeks--if that is satisfactory. And, if you need it sooner, I will certainly work to try to get that. Senator Sasse. Could we have that by the end of next week? Ms. Saldana. Yes, you can. Senator Sasse. Thank you, ma'am. General Roth, in November 2014, Secretary Johnson issued a number of memos changing DHS's policies on immigration known collectively as ``the President's immigration Executive Aactions.'' One of these memos addressed changes to ICE's detention policy for illegal aliens. DHS said in that memo that it was designed to identify threats to public safety. Specifically, it says that, unless an illegal alien has been charged with a serious crime, ICE will not likely detain that person. Does this policy mean that ICE does not consider someone a threat to public safety unless they have already been convicted? Mr. Roth. Frankly, I was not involved in writing that memo or in developing that policy, so it is difficult for me to respond to that. Senator Sasse. To your knowledge, though, are ICE officials required to strictly follow the new policy, or is it used as guidance and then there is discretion on a case-by-case basis? Mr. Roth. Again, we have not looked at that in any kind of audit or investigation, so I think that question is best directed to members of the administration or to ICE. Senator Sasse. Does the IG's office have any plans or any current studies of the President's Executive Actions on immigration? Mr. Roth. We do not. Senator Sasse. Director Saldana, how should ICE officials implement the new detention policies that were put in place in November 2014 with regard to cases like this? You mentioned the timing. Can you give us a broad sense of how you exercise your discretion? Ms. Saldana. Well, generally speaking--and let me just respond to the tail end of that question that you had, and that is the requirement of conviction. I am happy to share with you this card that we have, which we provide to our ICE officers who are involved in this activity. But, there are many categories here where a conviction is not necessary. If this is a person with a gang affiliation, no conviction is necessary. If there is a person with terrorist ties, no conviction is necessary. There are several that do involve a conviction, but let me point out to you, sir--and I have met with all of our field office directors to specify, clearly, to them that there is always this category--which is kind of an umbrella category--that says that if this does not fit a specific case, but you, as an informed and well-trained officer of Immigration and Customs Enforcement believe that that person presents a public safety threat, you are free to exercise your judgment in the manner consistent with that judgment. Senator Sasse. But, in this case, Sarah Root is dead. So, what if someone kills a U.S. citizen? That does not meet the threshold? Ms. Saldana. That was after the fact, sir. What you are saying, as I understand it, is that that person was injured and had not--when that 4-hour period of time--seriously injured, but had not passed away until later. Again, sir, it is easy to look back and say that that judgment was poorly exercised. And, as I said earlier, I intend to learn from this particular incident. I feel terrible for the Root family and--but I can say, I wish I had a 100-percent foolproof method to ensure and--to look in the future and ensure whether somebody is going to commit a crime or not. And, it is very difficult to do that. I hope you take my word that we do the best we can. Senator Sasse. I hear you. But, it is not the case that he was released and then went and had another drunk-driving, street-racing case. This was drunk-driving, street-racing that killed someone. Then, he posted bond. Then, the Omaha police asked that he be detained. ICE did not detain him and now he has fled. Ms. Saldana. And, I intend to use this--again, I am going to look further into this and use it for lessons learned if I find that there were serious errors of judgment here. But, many times prosecutorial discretion is just that. It is a judgment that is being exercised by the person based on what they see at the time. Senator Sasse. Thank you. Chairman Johnson. Senator Peters. Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, I also want to join to thank our witnesses today for your work. There is no question that the most important duty that we have as members of the Federal Government is to ensure the security of our borders and to ensure the security of the citizens of this country. So, I appreciate all of your efforts in doing that each and every day. And, I know that it is a difficult job that you all have. I am very proud to represent, as all of you know, a very large and vibrant Arab-American and Muslim community in the State of Michigan. And, I heard, from a number of my constituents, some concerns about the impact that the dual national provisions could have on their families as they are traveling to other Visa Waiver Program countries around the world. We know that Syria and Iran deem individuals to be nationals of those countries, regardless of where someone was born or whether they have even set foot in that country, simply because their fathers were citizens of those countries. Because the Visa Waiver Program is based on reciprocity, it is possible that a Visa Waiver Program country could impose the same requirements on dual national Syrian and Iranian Americans. So, I would like a response. Is the Administration--it can be from anyone on the panel. Is the Administration concerned that other Visa Waiver Program countries could impose restrictions on American citizens limiting their ability to travel to participating VWP countries without a visa? Mr. Donahue. Thank you for your question, Senator. It certainly is a concern, I think, for the State Department and the Department of Homeland Security. Our Secretaries have been working together on the new legislation regarding dual nationals. We are certainly concerned that citizens who have non-meaningful citizenship that they cannot remove--about the effects that that has on their life. They certainly can apply for a visa and travel to the United States. We are still reviewing that--and, certainly, we are concerned that there could be reciprocity from other countries. Senator Peters. Would anybody else like to comment? No? [No response.] Also, for the panel, I would like to know--I would like to just get a better sense of how the United States makes dual national determinations. So, for example, would a German citizen who was born and raised in Germany and has never traveled outside of the country, but whose father was Iranian, would he be considered a dual German-Iranian national by the United States? Mr. Donahue. Again, I think we are looking at that. We have not made a final decision on how we are going to manage the dual citizenship. Senator Peters. OK. I would love to work with you on that as we go forward. Obviously, we have a situation where a number of folks are going to be in that category and they are just concerned about how the process will work. And, we need to know how the process will work. Also, Mr. Donahue, given some of your concerns, are there waivers that the State Department would recommend for classes such as journalists, non-governmental organization (NGO) employees, and, perhaps, certain dual nationals that you could offer? Mr. Donahue. Yes, the Secretary of State recommended to Secretary Johnson that there--and Secretary Johnson agreed that that was a reasonable interpretation of the law and that there be waivers for those who are helping us in the work that we are doing. I think, particularly, we think about aid workers who are providing food and sustenance to the millions of people who are in camps in countries of concern--Syria, for example--going forward. Again, while these travelers can travel with a visa--it does not affect their travel--it could deter people who want to help us in our work. For example, people who are working for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) going to Iran to ensure implementation or people who are in business in Northern Iraq and are helping that country develop. So, we are very concerned about that. We are working together. We are looking at those cases. DHS has been building questions as part of the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) program that screens visa waiver travelers, and no decisions have been made--or no waivers have been granted thus far--but, we do believe that the law was written to allow for waivers. Senator Peters. Great. Thank you. The other area that I think we need to focus on--as a country, we are, but I was just hoping to get some response from the panel as to how your agencies work on an interagency basis with other parts of the Federal Government. A key area is trying to stem the financing of terror networks and focus on stopping the flow of money back and forth. And, I am just curious as to how the interagency visa vetting process works-- how it incorporates information about financial crimes that may have been conducted by individuals who may be part of a terror financing network. The Department of Treasury is very active with this issue. I am just curious as to how you work with the Department of Treasury to identify those individuals who may be engaged in activities that are seeking to move around the world to continue to further those activities. Ms. Saldana. Well, I will say that our agency, Homeland Security Investigations--that is exactly up our wheelhouse. We are concerned about illicit trafficking--illicit financial transactions across transnational boundaries. So, what we do is we build databases to share information with the Department of State and USCIS, specifically, to communicate information that we may have regarding a target in an investigation or someone who has actually been convicted of a crime, which is available to them. We communicate through-- obviously, the PATRIOT system is that first line of defense with respect to the visa screening process, but what I am talking about is, not only the visa screening process, but criminal investigations, in general, worldwide. That is exactly what Homeland Security Investigations does. Mr. Rodriguez. The one thing that I would add is that we have strong relationships running in both directions with our law enforcement and intelligence community partners. Beginning with our law enforcement partners within DHS, like ICE and CBP, it is critical that we receive information from them when we adjudicate immigration benefits. We get that information as we need it. At the same time, we, occasionally, in the course of our work, identify information that is either of law enforcement or intelligence value, and we have well-developed pathways to make sure that that information is shared. One example is, during the course of refugee screening, if we learn information that is potentially of intelligence value, that information is, in fact, shared with the intelligence community. Senator Peters. Thank you. Mr. Donahue. And, we work very closely with the Department of Treasury. When they make a designation, as part of the announcement of that designation, anyone who is designated--and quite often their family members or anyone who benefits from these actions--they pass those to us and we immediately enter them into our Lookout system, review any visas, and we can do prudential revocations of the visas of anyone who is found by the Department of Treasury to be in that class. Senator Peters. Great. Thank you. Chairman Johnson. Senator Booker. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BOOKER Senator Booker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say, first and foremost, how grateful I am for the dedication, the work, and the service that the four of you render to our Nation. We have an incredible country, the oldest constitutional democracy. We were founded in a different way than any other nation in the history of the Earth at that time. We were founded not because we all prayed the same, not because we all looked the same, and not because we all heralded from the same genealogy, but rather because we were a nation of ideals. And, every generation in this country has aspired to make more real those ideals. One of the things that has sourced the richness and the greatness of this country has been the fact that we are a Nation that has people from all over the planet Earth who have brought such strength to our economy--growth. Our diversity has yielded diversity of thought, diversity of innovation, diversity of accomplishment, and, I think, that is one of the things that makes America great. And, you all, every day grapple in an incredibly difficult space where you are balancing our values and our ideals with the urgencies of our time. First and foremost amongst them is to keep us safe. So, I know how difficult your work is and I just want to say thank you. I know these hearings, as, I think, the Honorable Mr. Rodriguez was hinting at, can often be difficult, but please know I am one of those Senators that just appreciates your work. I want to just dive in where Senator Peters left off. I have a lot of concerns about the issues that face what was brought forth in the omnibus last year, when Congress passed a provision that would bar dual nationals from Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Sudan from using the Visa Waiver Program. I am very happy that, in a bipartisan way, Senators Flake, Durbin, and I introduced bipartisan legislation, the Equal Protection and Travel Act, repealing--seeking to repeal the restrictions on dual nationals while, obviously, leaving the other changes to the Visa Waiver Program intact. I just find it very disturbing that the prohibition on dual nationals applies to individuals who were born in Visa Waiver Program countries, but who have never even traveled to Iraq, Iran, Sudan, or Syria. But, they are nationals of those countries solely because of their ancestry. It seems to violate, in my opinion, really the values of this country that we have seen throughout our history. And so, my colleagues and I support the tightening of the Visa Waiver Program, but singling out people based solely on their ancestry or national origin does not, I believe, make us safer. And, it is inconsistent with what I love about our country and our interests--and it invites, in my opinion, retaliation or discrimination against American citizens who are also dual nationals. So my question--and maybe I will start with you, Mr. Donahue--is just very plain: do you believe that the dual national restrictions that I just described enhance our national security? Mr. Donahue. We certainly are always reviewing where we need to put more emphasis and we want to be sure that every visa interview is used effectively to protect our borders. But, we also realize that the Visa Waiver Program, by its very nature, has allowed us to move resources to those places where we need to look more closely. Senator Booker. So, does it make us safer that somebody from Britain or France who has Iranian, Syrian, or Sudanese ancestry--does barring them from the Visa Waiver Program make us safer, in your opinion? Mr. Donahue. I think, all things being equal, not knowing the individual--not knowing--you always try to do these on a case-by-case basis. But, I agree with you that that is not, in and of itself, an indicator---- Senator Booker. I appreciate that. Mr. Donahue [continuing]. That this person is a higher threat. Senator Booker. In the Senate, whenever I hear those words ``I agree with you,'' I get very happy--and I appreciate that. And so, Mr. Rodriguez or the Honorable Ms. Saldana, do you think we gain any additional security benefits by barring individuals based on their national origin or heritage? Ms. Saldana. Well, as a general proposition, no. Senator Booker. OK. Thank you, Mr. Rodriguez. Mr. Rodriguez. Let me be very clear. No, we do not. And no, we do not do that. We scrutinize people, perhaps, differently in situations where they come from conflict zones, particularly, conflict zones where there are organizations that are actively promoting violence against the United States. Senator Booker. Clearly. Mr. Rodriguez. But no, we do not--and I would never operate an Agency that operated that way. Senator Booker. But, the omnibus that passed last year called for us to do those things. And, I am very happy that, again, a bipartisan group of Senators is saying that we should not do those things. And, you are saying to me that we do not do them now, or--does it add to our national---- Mr. Rodriguez. Certainly not in the manner in which my agency does any of its work. I do not operate the Visa Waiver Program. My agency does not operate that. We do other things where we make decisions based on---- Senator Booker. Right, but you do not think that what I described and what was in that omnibus enhances national security? Mr. Rodriguez. Again, not my lane, so I would not be opining on the Visa Waiver Program. Senator Booker. You are a smart man to stay in your lane. [Laughter.] But, a rule, I think, is very important. But, the Honorable Ms. Saldana, you do not think it makes us any safer? Ms. Saldana. As I said, as a general proposition--again, in our role as investigators, we look at every aspect of the facts and circumstances pertaining to an individual's application-- and there may be some reason to explore further. But, as a general proposition, of course not--not just solely based on a remote relationship with someone from a particular country. Senator Booker. I am grateful for that response. Let me shift into your lane, sir. It was very clear to me, after the horrific attacks in France, that many of the people who participated in that could have used the Visa Waiver Program to come to our country and, by the way, walk into a gun show, buy a trunk full of weapons, and commit those crimes here just as easily. And so, one of the aspects of the Visa Waiver Program that is important to me is our coordination and cooperation with our European allies, specifically, in sharing information and working against terrorism. So, my final question in my remaining few seconds is: I worry that our European allies and others might not be doing enough to help strengthen our security--to share information and to up their procedures and policies to the point where we could effectively rely on them. And so, what are we doing to help Europe strengthen its border security entry procedures, so that they are effectively documenting the refugees coming into their countries? And, if that is a new signal for my time almost being up, it is very effective. [Laughter.] Go ahead. Mr. Rodriguez. Yes, what I do know is that we work on those issues, primarily, through our U.S. intelligence community and law enforcement partners. I do know that they are actively engaged with their counterparts in Europe and throughout the English-speaking world. Just 2 or 3 weeks ago, I spent a lot of time with our partners from Australia, England, and Canada exchanging information and talking about our common goals in this area. We are going to continue doing that on a multilateral basis to make sure that we are supporting one another in what is really a very critical mission. Senator Booker. Mr. Roth, are you satisfied that we are doing enough in partnership with our European allies to strengthen their policies and procedures to make our country safer? Mr. Roth. We have not looked at that specific issue of information sharing with our foreign partners. I would say, though, that anytime that you have a risk-based system, particularly in the current terrorist environment, in which you have functionally pop-up terrorists--people who are not on anybody's list and who are unknown--that the kind of individual scrutiny that is required with the Visa Waiver Program really is sort of the stop-gap for that. Senator Booker. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And, thank you for holding such an important hearing. Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Booker. I want to talk a little bit about the problem of overstays. I do not quite understand it. I mean, I do but I do not. We are often cited the statistic about how 40 percent of the people in this country illegally are here on overstays. Of the best estimate--11 to 12 million people in this country illegally-- that puts the number somewhere between 4.4 and 4.8 million people here that are overstaying a visa. Let me start by asking, does anybody know which visas are primarily abused? I will start with Director Saldana. Ms. Saldana. I would defer that to the State Department, with respect to the overall picture. Chairman Johnson. Secretary Donahue, you got the football thrown to you. Mr. Donahue. I am not sure I have seen a figure on any particular area. I really do not know. Chairman Johnson. I mean, why would we not know that? The article I am looking at says there are still, today, about-- what does it say?--523,000 visa overstays per year. Why would we not be tracking that? Mr. Donahue. We do track at all of our posts and we do this through a validation study. We will check to see, for instance, if people from a certain country are coming to the United States and staying on a certain type of visa. And, different kinds of visas are harder to track. For instance, a visitor, admitted for a certain amount of time, 6 months usually--or 3 months if they are eligible for a visa waiver. A student--that is a long-term admission and it is hard to determine at what point they become---- Chairman Johnson. But, are we not working with the schools, and are there not requirements of the schools to keep us up to date if somebody drops out, is not paying tuition, or something like that--that we can report that and then are aware of it, so that ICE can potentially enforce? Ms. Saldana. Yes. And, of course, with respect to a category, this is an educated, I think, guess and that is, the most visas we have are B1s or B2s--travelers for business or pleasure. So, I would think there would be some correlation between that and the number of overstays. But, absolutely, we are responsible for the Student Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) and we have the database of information in the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) database that relates to all 8,000 universities that have students placed there. And, we do have leads that are provided to the CTCEU, which I mentioned earlier, with respect to overstays. Once again, so much of what we do is risk-based, so we are looking at the large universe of overstays and trying to determine which of these folks could potentially pose a danger or a public safety threat. And, the information we have--at least I can give you this, sir: we have about half a million--489,579--leads that were provided to CTCEU, where there is a flag with respect to business and pleasure travelers--the B1 and B2 visas. That is the largest category of individuals that we are running down, so I think that correlation is supported by that number. Chairman Johnson. I realize there are millions--tens of millions--of people that come and go out of the United States. In today's information technology age, I do not understand what is so hard about keeping track of this. Everybody that comes here, legally, has a passport that has a number attached, correct? Ms. Saldana. Yes. Chairman Johnson. That goes into a database. What is so hard to then have that passport attached to a particular visa? Should we not just have the information on this thing? Again, I am an accountant, so I am kind of into numbers and I am kind of into information. But, when we take a look at what we can do in other areas of our economy, whether it is tracking numbers with shipments--that type of thing--what has been so hard about us developing that database, so we know exactly who has come in, who has not gone, and can tie it to a visa--and just know, with a great deal of certainty, by pretty much a push of a button on a computer all of that information? Why is that? Ms. Saldana. Well, we do know, with some degree of certainty, what the Principal Deputy was mentioning earlier---- Chairman Johnson. You were not able to tell me how many-- under what visa program--again, I understand the vast majority of visas are in certain categories, so you assume. But, it is not like you have ready information, in terms of, ``No, this is exactly how many people were granted a visa and have not checked out on time--there is an overstay that should be, potentially, subject to enforcement.'' Inspector General Roth, can you speak to this? Mr. Roth. What you are referring to really is a biometric system for exits, so you can understand who it is that has left the country, so you are able to compare those two sets of data. Chairman Johnson. First of all, let me--it is just numbers. It is actually easier than that. Again, unless I am missing something, in terms of people coming in with a passport and a visa--that is numerical information and can be easily loaded into a database with a set time that a visa expires. We do not have a record of this person leaving. To me, that is an incredibly simple database to manage. Why do we not do it? Mr. Roth. Well, as my most recent report shows, the challenges, in the Federal Government, for building these kinds of information systems is very difficult. I think there has been some effort to try to get an exit system that has not been successful. So, I think, as a Federal Government, we are aware of the problem, but we have not been able to implement a solution. Chairman Johnson. Would you agree with me that, in the private sector, this would almost be like falling off of a log---- Mr. Roth. Yes. Chairman Johnson [continuing]. In terms of developing a database like this? Mr. Roth. Yes. Chairman Johnson. Which begs the question: why can we not do this after 10 years in the Federal Government? Unbelievable. I will go to Senator Ernst. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ERNST Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, for the ICE Director, please, a number of my colleagues have already spoken on this--Senator Grassley, in a floor speech and last night, and also Senator Sasse here, in this forum, this morning asked a question and raised the case of the tragic death of Iowan Sarah Root, who was killed by a drunk driver who was, reportedly, in the country illegally and has since posted bail and absconded. If it is the case that ICE refrained from lodging a detainer on Mejia because his arrest for felony vehicular homicide ``did not meet ICE's enforcement priorities,'' would you agree with me that ICE needs to take another look at its so-called enforcement policies? Ms. Saldana. Well, we do that every day. We train and we respond to evolving situations on the basis of things we have experienced and seen. So, that prosecutorial discretion, as I said a little earlier, is just that. It is a person's judgment in looking at all of the information in front of them as to whether or not they lodge a detainer or not. We do it on a case-by-case basis. And, as I said earlier, Senator, this is a terrible instance where we will look at it and learn from that situation. But, prosecutorial discretion could have been exercised a different way here. That is us looking back. I want to look forward, so that we do not have that situation arise again. Senator Ernst. Well, except that the way we look forward, though, Director, is also by learning from mistakes of the past--and this is not an isolated incident by any means. And, the priority should be to ensure that people who enter our country illegally and kill American citizens are deported and never allowed to return. And, unfortunately, in this situation, we have a gentleman who has done exactly that--and I am guessing he is still here in the United States somewhere. Ms. Saldana. And, we will be looking for him, Senator. This does not end there. Senator Ernst. I certainly hope so. There is a family that demands answers--as do we. And, just to be clear, if he is apprehended, today, would Mr. Mejia fit the President's enforcement priorities? Ms. Saldana. Absolutely. Senator Ernst. OK. I look forward to continuing the discussion on this. This is important. But, again, it is not an isolated incident and we have to make sure that all of our agencies--local and Federal--are working together on these issues. And, I think we all can learn from this incident. Ms. Saldana. I agree. Senator Ernst. Thank you for your time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Johnson. Senator Carper. Senator Carper. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to go back to visa overstays. Every State has its own Medicaid program. We are told that one of the cost drivers for Medicaid is that people have an appointment, but sometimes do not show up--oftentimes these are moms, dads, and young children--and so, they do a lot of things to try to make sure people show up. One of the things that we do in Delaware--and in some other States as well--and I think we got this idea from Johnson & Johnson (J&J)--the other Johnson. Chairman Johnson. A good name. Senator Carper. And, it is called ``Text for Baby.'' And, text messages are sent to parents, who need to make sure that their child has an appointment and actually shows up. And, they do this maybe a week before or they do it like a day before. They may even do it the day of, I think. And, it seems to me that that is an idea that--and it has actually helped. It makes it more certain that people actually show up for their appointments. It saves some money for Medicaid and makes sure people get the health care they need. I am just wondering if a similar approach might be helpful for folks that come to this country--most of the people that come to this country come here legally--overwhelmingly so--but a bunch of them overstay their visas, as you know. And, I think it might be helpful if they were just getting pinged with the countdown to the date that their visa expires, saying, ``You have 2 weeks to go,'' ``You have 1 week to go,'' ``You have 2 days to go,'' or ``You have 12 hours to go.'' It is the kind of thing that is easily automated and most people who come to this country have cell phones. And, I think I always like to look to the private sector for a solution that might work for a public purpose. Actually, the other is sort of a public purpose as well. Just react to that, please. Ms. Saldana. It is a very interesting idea, Senator. Obviously, everything that we hear here we take back and talk to our folks about. We have a massive number of students in the system and, as the Principal Deputy said earlier, they are on different programs. I understand what you are saying--to do the ping at the end of the term of the visa, whether or not they are finished with their program. So, right now, as I said earlier, we are using a risk-based analysis with respect to these overstays--who presents a risk in those overstays. It is a matter of resources and trying to direct them to the area where the greatest risk is. But, that is certainly an interesting idea. I think it would require a tremendous number of additional resources than we have now to ping millions of people. But, that is certainly something I can study further. Senator Carper. I was sitting here listening to Senator Johnson. He is shaking his head and he said, ``No, it would not.'' Ms. Saldana. No, it would not require additional resources? Is that what you are saying, sir? Chairman Johnson. Not a tremendous amount. Senator Carper. Just think about it, OK? And, I am going to ask you to do more than just think about it. Ms. Saldana. Absolutely. Senator Carper. We will put you in touch with the ``Text for Baby'' people and your folks can figure out how they do it. Ms. Saldana. Are you saying ``baby''? Senator Carper. B-A-B-Y. Ms. Saldana. B-A-B-Y, OK. Senator Carper. ``Bring back my baby to me.'' All right. This is a question for Director Saldana and Mr. Donahue. You are a good couple here. As I understand it, ICE uses an automated system--we talked about it here a little bit earlier today--called PATRIOT to conduct the screening of visa applicants for all visas that are processed at overseas posts where ICE's visa security teams are present. What is holding ICE and the State Department back from requiring this automated system to be used for all incoming visas? Is it simply a matter of resources? Ms. Saldana. I would not say ``simply,'' but that is certainly a factor. And, actually, Senator, we are undergoing a pilot right now under PATRIOT--a PATRIOT expansion pilot--that is looking at three additional countries to try to do all--that are not necessarily among these 20 or 26 posts where we have visa screening--but looking at expanding that and what it would take and how much time would be consumed. So, we are actually undertaking an evaluation and study of that because, if it is possible, it is certainly something we would like to do. But, right now, I am not in a position to tell you, ``Absolutely, that can happen.'' I think our study wraps up in May, so I will be able to report back to you my thoughts and ideas based on what we have learned from that expanded PATRIOT project. Senator Carper. Would you do that? Ms. Saldana. Absolutely. Senator Carper. Thank you. Mr. Donahue, any thoughts on this one? Mr. Donahue. I think we are also working with ICE in countries where the physical presence would be good, but is not possible because of resources or other reasons, to have some of the PATRIOT functions--the computerized functions--done domestically and then advising posts of the response to the PATRIOT checks. So, that will also expand their ability to expand it to more countries. Senator Carper. OK. This is a question for everybody--and then I am done. Since 9/11, one of the key themes of our homeland security efforts has been information sharing. The testimony today references a lot of different programs and different databases used to screen applicants before they come to the United States. Can each of you just take a moment to reflect on how well integrated these resources are and what barriers remain? And, how much of this sharing is automated and how much requires time and initiative by an individual officer? Mr. Donahue. I can begin from our side. Senator Carper. Please. Mr. Donahue. I have seen a revolution in the realm of information sharing since 9/11--and, especially, in my 32 years of doing this kind of work. I think one of the most remarkable things is that, today, someone can be interviewing an applicant for a visa in Mali. That person's visa will be checked by my colleagues and the interagency--law enforcement and the intelligence community--response will come back to that officer--whether there is anything to be concerned about--in addition to whatever he or she has been able to find out in the interview. Then that person is issued a visa. A person can get on a plane today, arrive in Atlanta, and, at the port of entry, the officer there will have all of the information that was used in making that decision back in Mali--just in less time than the flight. So, that kind of information sharing, where we can look into--for instance, our database--our major database--there are more DHS users than there are State Department users, so that people know why we issued a passport or why we issued a visa. And, I think that has made us all much more effective. Senator Carper. OK. Anyone else? Just very briefly, Mr. Rodriguez. Mr. Rodriguez. Sure. I think, as this Committee knows, I spent most of my career in law enforcement and, very early on, I was an organized crime prosecutor. I remember, back in the late 1980s and early 1990s, where what was considered our organized crime database was actually rows and rows of filing cabinets that would fill this room. We have certainly come a long way from that time. We now have, at USCIS, a very well automated process to ping law enforcement and intelligence community databases to determine whether an individual seeking an immigration benefit presents a threat to the United States. That will never, in my view, be a substitute for the human judgment that is required on both ends--to make an intelligence community judgment and then for us to make an immigration judgment with that information. So, that will always continue to be part of it. But, in terms of the information moving, we really have reached a pretty good point these days. Senator Carper. Good. Thank you. Ms. Saldana, the same question, just briefly. Ms. Saldana. And, I agree, we can always improve and we can always do better--we have heard of one or two instances where the information--the sharing broke down a little bit. But, the Visa Security Program, itself, is an extraordinary example of that information sharing. We have our DHS holdings that we bounce the PATRIOT inquiry against and it has so many different contributors--FBI, obviously the State Department, and other law enforcement--and that is an example of the progress that we have made. We are always working on this to make it better--and internationally with our allies and the countries out there that we are in. Senator Carper. OK. Thank you. General Roth, the last word. Mr. Roth. Well, thank you, and my apologies for being the contrarian or the skeptic in the room. I will have to say that---- Senator Carper. No, no. Be yourself. Be yourself. [Laughter.] Mr. Roth. It is an occupational hazard, Senator. Several of our audits note sort of the difficulty with the paper-based system. So, for example, when we compared ICE data with USCIS data, in regard to human-trafficking victims, what we found was that the perpetrators of human trafficking, who people at ICE had investigated, were, in fact, using the visa system to bring their victims into the country. And, one of the reasons that has occurred is because USCIS still has a paper-based system-- and I am sympathetic to Director Rodriguez's challenges in this area. But, for example, an individual who applies for a T visa--which is the individual who is a victim of human trafficking--submits a statement as to what occurred to that person that allows them to receive a T visa. That is not digitized in any way, so there can be names and identifiers of perpetrators of human trafficking that simply get lost in the system. So, while I agree that, in many ways, there are systems in place that allow for this kind of information sharing, there is much that can be done to improve that. Senator Carper. All right. Thank you. Thank you for being the contrarian in the room. And, thank you to each of you for your testimony, your efforts, and your leadership. Thank you. Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Carper. I think we should work together on some piece of legislation to facilitate using the private sector skills that are out there--and technologies. Go to any business involved in logistics, whether it is FedEx, UPS, or any trucking company. These programs exist for tracking. It is a similar type of process--almost off of the shelf. I would suggest, maybe, getting some of their IT experts in your agencies and let us get this program done. It should not take years and years or billions and billions of dollars. We have done it in the private sector. It is unbelievable what they can really track. And, the information, just from a desktop, that a customer can obtain, in terms of a package being transferred from this truck to another truck--we ought to be able to do the same thing, in terms of tracking visa overstays. I do want to ask a couple more questions about resource capabilities. This is kind of going to what Senator Tester was talking about. I will go to you, Mr. Donahue. Again, I am an accountant, so I like numbers. As best I can determine, somewhere between 20 million and 32 to 33 million people go to consulates, go to embassies, and have to do an interview to get a visa to come to the United States on an annual basis. Is that kind of roughly about the right number? Does that sound about right to you? Mr. Donahue. It is closer to about 13 million that come in and 13.5 million that come in for a visa. The Visa Waiver Program is additional to that. Chairman Johnson. Something different, OK. You have about 1,800 foreign service officers that do those interviews, so, based on the 13 million number, it is going to be less. But, if you talk about 13 million people divided by 1,800, we are talking about just a few minutes--probably less than 15 minutes per interview. That is not a whole lot of time, is it? Mr. Donahue. Well, I think if you take into account the entire package, that the person has already gone through biometric and biographic database checks and that they have completed a very long visa application form that asks a lot of information that we check against--we do have fraud units and we do have our ICE Visa Security Units (VSUs). And, like any other business--you are a businessman--you expedite the easy and you spend time on what needs to have time spent on it. So, when a person walks in and everything is clear, you do a quick interview. You believe the person because of your training and knowledge that this person--just as you see at the ports of entry--that this person is doing what they say they are doing. If the next person comes in and you have concerns, you can stop the interview and send it to your fraud unit or go to one of our colleagues in DHS. You can continue the interview as long as you need to. So, while one may take one minute, another may not be cleared for weeks. Chairman Johnson. So, it is your sense from around the world, really, that the foreign service officers who are in charge of this do not feel pressure. You feel that they feel they are adequately resourced for the task at hand? Mr. Donahue. Certainly people would always like to have a few more officers, but I think we have used business practices to make this as organized as possible and to make sure that the time they spend at the window is the most effective. We would certainly like to keep all of our fees--because we are a fee- based organization--so that we could plow all of that into making our business work more efficiently for our customers and make sure that we have all of the security checks there. But, I think most officers are using good business practices and their training. They are putting the work in with those few people who come to the United States to do us harm. Really focusing on that has proved effective. Chairman Johnson. By the way, you talked about a fee-based service. It is, again, that tension between security and customer service. I come from a business background. Mr. Donahue. Right. Chairman Johnson. You are generating revenue for your organization. You have an incentive for generating more revenue, which is somewhat at cross-purpose--trying to run more people through to generate the revenue versus ensuring the security. So, it does concern me. Director Rodriguez, I know President Obama announced the granting of--or allowing about 10,000 additional Syrians into the country. That is about a 20-percent increase in the number of refugees. Again, I am concerned a little bit about taking any shortcuts in the process. It normally takes 18 to 24 months to review those files. Do you believe you are adequately resourced to have a 20-percent increase in the number of refugees you fully vet? Mr. Rodriguez. I would point out that that is still--even that increase is a relatively small part of our overall business. We have 8 million cases that we handle in any given year across our 19,000 employees. Let me also be very clear that we will do our job with respect to the refugees that we screen. No corners will be cut. Chairman Johnson. Good. Mr. Rodriguez. We will do what we need to do. Chairman Johnson. That is really what I view our responsibility as a Committee to be: to make sure that we do not take any shortcuts. So, I appreciate your comments there. Let me just wrap up. There are a number of points we did want to make--and I want to be respectful of people's time. I mentioned that December 3 incident at the office of USCIS in San Bernardino. Inspector General Roth, I would appreciate it if you would investigate exactly what happened there. That does show the potential breakdown of inter-agency cooperation. Again, I find it pretty disconcerting, to say the least. The K1 visa--ICE is really responsible for verifying those marriages. If you come in on a K1 visa, you are supposed to be married within 90 days. Again, I do not think we have a system--I do not think we are really verifying those things, which is a potential vulnerability. Inspector General Roth, you talked about the poor data collection and information sharing that resulted in human trafficking coming across our borders. I would appreciate you keeping an eye on that and everybody being aware of that. I have not yet received an answer for a letter I have written. We had ICE Agent Taylor Johnson in for one of our hearings involving government whistleblowers and the retaliation against them, which is really prevalent in the Federal Government. It is really jaw-dropping. So, Director Saldana, I would really appreciate it if you would respond to that, because now, apparently, Agent Johnson has been terminated--and the process has not really gone through the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) or the Inspector General. I am really concerned about that particular case. Ms. Saldana. And, we have that letter. We are preparing a response, sir. Chairman Johnson. OK. Again, the oversight of student visas--the overstays is a significant issue. I really will work with Ranking Member Carper in trying--if we have to produce some legislation to facilitate the computer systems, the IT systems, to do this--again, coming from the private sector and knowing what is available out there, this should not be that hard. And, I think it is a critical step we have to take. So, again, I do want to thank all of you for your service to this Nation. I realize this is tough. There is no perfect system. You have a serious responsibility. I know you take those responsibilities seriously. So, thank you for your service to this Nation, for providing thoughtful testimonies, and for taking the time to answer our questions. With that, the hearing record will remain open for 15 days, until March 30 at 5 p.m. for the submission of statements and questions for the record. This hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] A P P E N D I X ---------- [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]