[Senate Hearing 114-600]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-600
AN INDEPENDENT PERSPECTIVE OF
UNITED STATES DEFENSE POLICY
IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 3, 2016
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JACK REED, Rhode Island
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BILL NELSON, Florida
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska TIM KAINE, Virginia
MIKE LEE, Utah ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
TED CRUZ, Texas
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
wednesday, february 3, 2016
Page
AN INDEPENDENT PERSPECTIVE OF UNITED STATES DEFENSE POLICY IN THE
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION............................................ 1
Green, Michael J., Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan
Chair, The Center for Strategic and International Studies...... 4
Conant, Lieutenant General Thomas L., USMC (Ret.), Former Deputy
Commander, United States Pacific Command....................... 9
(iii)
AN INDEPENDENT PERSPECTIVE OF UNITED STATES DEFENSE POLICY IN THE ASIA-
PACIFIC REGION
----------
Wednesday, February 3, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m. in Room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Ayotte,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Reed, Nelson,
McCaskill, Manchin, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono,
Kaine, and King.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Good morning. The Armed Services Committee
meets this morning to receive testimony on United States
defense policy in the Asia-Pacific. The National Defense
Authorization Act [NDAA] for Fiscal Year 2015 instructed the
Secretary of Defense to commission an independent review of
United States rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. This review would
assess the risks to U.S. national security interests in the
region, analyze current and planned U.S. force structure, and
evaluate key capability gaps and shortfalls.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies was
selected to conduct this review, and they have now provided it
to the Congress. I offer my thanks and appreciation to CSIS for
a first-rate independent assessment of our policy in the Asia-
Pacific region. Reports like these are an invaluable way for
this committee to gain insights and consider serious
recommendations on the way forward.
To present the review's findings, I am pleased to welcome
Dr. Michael Green, senior vice president for Asia and Japan
chair at CSIS and one of the report's study directors; and
Lieutenant General Thomas Conant, former deputy commander at
U.S. Pacific Command [PACOM] and a member of the report's
senior review board.
America's national interests in the Asia-Pacific region are
deep and enduring. We seek to maintain a balance of power that
fosters the peaceful expansion of free societies, free trade,
free markets, and free commons--air, sea, space, and cyber.
These are values that we share with an increasing number of
Asia's citizens. And for 7 decades, administrations of both
parties have worked with our friends and allies in the region
to uphold this rules-based order and to enlist new partners in
this shared effort.
This is what the rebalance to Asia-Pacific is supposed to
be all about. The rebalance has shown some success, including
efforts like the Trans-Pacific Partnership [TPP]; new levels of
cooperation between Japan, Australia, and India; and new forms
of military access to the Philippines, Australia, Singapore,
and Vietnam.
But ultimately, the rebalance policies fail to adequately
address the shifting military balance in any serious manner. I
note the report's conclusion that, and I quote, ``The Obama
administration has not articulated a clear, coherent, or
consistent rebalance strategy. The U.S. rebalance must be
enhanced if the United States is to defend its vital interests
in the PACOM area of responsibility.''
China is engaged, as we all know, in a rapid military
modernization deliberately designed to counteract or thwart
American military strengths. Under Xi Jinping, China is not
just building up its military but reorganizing it to better
wage modern, joint warfare at the close direction of the
Chinese Communist Party.
Despite their claims to the contrary, make no mistake, the
Chinese are not done with their land reclamation activities in
the South China Sea. Indeed, it has been disappointing to see
how the United States seems to have been totally caught off
guard by the pace and scope of these activities.
A year ago this month, this committee held a hearing with
Director Clapper where we discussed Chinese reclamation. At
that time, China had reclaimed a total of 400 acres in the
Spratly Islands. Today, that figure is a staggering 3,200
acres, with extensive infrastructure construction underway or
already complete.
It is shameful that what is known publicly about China's
reclamation activities has come from the CSIS Asia Maritime
Transparency Initiative and not the United States Government,
which should have been providing needed strategic clarity by
releasing photos of these developments every step of the way.
While our government has fallen short, we owe a debt of
gratitude to CSIS for providing true transparency of China's
maritime activities.
Going forward, routine naval and aviation presence and
freedom of navigation operations are necessary to demonstrate
that the United States will not recognize the legality of
China's excessive claims, and will continue to fly, sail, and
operate wherever international law allows.
I was pleased to see the freedom of navigation operation in
the Paracel Islands last week, and I look forward to seeing
another conducted inside 12 nautical miles of Mischief Reef in
the near future.
The Pacific theater of World War II taught this Nation, at
a terrible price, that we cannot afford to garrison our
military power back in Hawaii or the continental United States.
If anything, China's activities in the South China Sea, and the
instability and uncertainty they have generated in the Asia-
Pacific, are a reminder of the importance of sustaining a
predictable, credible, and robust forward presence capable of
shaping the peacetime security environment and prevailing in
the event of conflict.
This is a major focus of the CSIS report, and we look
forward to hearing from our witnesses on its specific
recommendations.
For example, given the demands on our carrier fleet
globally, the sailing time required to traverse the Pacific
Ocean, the additional combat power a second carrier would
provide, and the strong signal it would send our partners in
the region, I believe we should take a hard look at the trade-
offs associated with stationing a second carrier in the
Pacific.
Even as we devote the preponderance of our attention and
funding to large platforms like aircraft carriers, we must
remember that they are only as effective as the payloads they
are able to deliver. We cannot lose sight of the importance of
weapons, sensors, decoys, jammers, and other technologies to
our warfighting effectiveness. And we must continue to push the
envelope in adapting and innovating existing payloads to
deliver new capabilities.
These will be a key element in closing the gap identified
by the CSIS report in capabilities that give the United States
an asymmetric, cost-imposing counter to potential competitors.
I also would like to note the CSIS report's endorsement of
the relocation plan for United States facilities in Okinawa. I
continue to support the current relocation plan, including the
construction of the Futenma Relocation Facility; the ultimate
closure of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma; and the
redeployment of Marines to Guam, Australia, and Hawaii.
Taken together, this plan will reduce our overall presence
in Okinawa, relocate United States forces to less populated
areas of the island, and generate a more operationally
resilient force posture across the region.
Despite a series of setbacks in the past year, I continue
to have confidence that Prime Minister Abe and the Government
of Japan will be able to execute the necessary realignment of
United States force in Okinawa.
This committee will also continue its oversight of the
buildup on Guam, including the cost of new housing construction
there.
There are several more important issues I hope we will
discuss throughout the course of the hearing, and this
committee's ongoing consideration of the CSIS report and its
recommendations.
Once again, I would like to thank all those at CSIS who
worked so hard on this important report, and I look forward to
the testimony of our witnesses.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
thank you for calling this very, very important hearing.
I also want to welcome our witnesses, Dr. Green and General
Conant. Thank you for your extraordinary service.
The report recently issued by CSIS is very thoughtful in
addressing the challenges that we face in the Asia-Pacific
region. Thank you for that.
In the last few years, security in the region has grown
more complicated and challenging for the United States. China
has become more assertive in the South China Sea, alarming its
neighbors and militarizing land features in a body of water
that is critical for trade and regional peace.
Kim Jong-un has destabilized the Korean Peninsula even
further with nuclear and ballistic missile developments.
Regimes as authoritarian and insulated as North Korea are
brittle and prone to collapse. How we would deal with such a
collapse, and the security and humanitarian problems that would
ensue, is an ongoing debate and challenge for United States
Forces Korea and PACOM.
As the Asia-Pacific region grows more complicated, the
Defense Department faces an increasing number of international
challenges also, including ISIL [the Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant] as a growing international threat; and a resurgent
Russia, which is exerting its military influence to undermine
European security, further destabilizing the Middle East and
also obviously has access to the Pacific.
Additionally, we face an increasingly austere fiscal
environment. We must learn to do more with less.
While the administration has sought to rebalance the Asia-
Pacific region, where most of our long-term strategic interests
lie, that effort has faced challenges from the exigencies of
the day.
I appreciate the time and effort that went into producing
this thoughtful report, and I would like to hear from the
witnesses about how we should position ourselves to better
implement the rebalance within the context of the global
challenges facing the Department of Defense and the government
as a whole.
Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Chairman McCain. Dr. Green?
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. GREEN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR ASIA
AND JAPAN CHAIR, THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES
Dr. Green. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, members of
the committee, and staff, thank you for this opportunity on
behalf of my co-leads at CSIS, Dr. Kathleen Hicks and Mark
Cancian, and all of the contributors to the report, including
our excellent senior review panel, represented today by
Lieutenant General Conant. This is an opportunity that we
appreciate, to give you the results of our study.
We conducted this study in a first iteration in 2012 and
concluded that the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific is worthy of
our support and our efforts but needed more intense strategic
conceptualization and resourcing. We concluded at that time
that the United States interest is in shaping an environment in
the Asia-Pacific region where cooperation with China and among
all countries is possible but that to build that future we had
to have deterrent capabilities, the partnerships, the presence,
the capacity, to ensure that no one country tried to change the
rules that have governed this region and led to peace and
prosperity for many decades.
Since 2012, four developments have made a reassessment of
the rebalance necessary.
First, defense budget cuts have limited the Department of
Defense's ability to implement critical rebalance initiatives,
particularly as those resources come under stress from
challenges in EUCOM [United States European Command] and
CENTCOM [United States Central Command].
Second, the threat from so-called anti-access/area denial,
A2/AD [anti-access/area-denial], is growing as states in the
region seek to deny the United States the ability to project
power or even maintain bases in the Western Pacific.
Third, I think we have found in the last 2 years that
China's tolerance for risk in relations with the United States
and neighboring countries is significantly higher than anyone
would have anticipated.
And fourth, North Korea has demonstrated that it will
continue with impunity on its program to develop nuclear
weapons and the ballistic missiles to deliver them against our
allies and, their ultimate goal, the United States itself.
Taken together, these trends suggest that the United States
rebalance must be enhanced, if the U.S. is to defend our
interests and our allies in the Asia-Pacific region. To that
end, CSIS, in this report, has made four major recommendations
for strengthening the rebalance.
First, and this was a theme in our first report, and one
the chairman just mentioned, the United States has to align our
Asia strategy within the United States Government and with
allies and partners, and articulate the strategy in a way that
is compelling, that provides guidance to our forces, and
confidence to our allies.
When we began working on this project, we asked where we
could find a document that described the strategic concept of
the rebalance, and we were recommended to read the speeches
about the rebalance by principles in the administration, and we
did. And you will see in the report our findings that, in many
cases, the articulation of our strategy is inconsistent, that
priorities are listed differently, appear and disappear.
And so there is still, in the region among our allies, and
I think with our commands, some confusion about not the
importance of the Pacific--I think that is clear--not the
importance of rebalancing our forces in the Pacific, but what
is our bottom line? What are we willing to defend? How do we
view, for example, China's operations in the South China Sea?
What is the degree of our willpower? These are questions we
continue to hear.
So our first recommendation is that the administration
needs to, with Congress and with our allies, work on aligning
our views of the strategy and clarifying our concept. The
Congress has already required the next administration to do an
interagency report on Asia strategy. We fully endorse that. We
recommend that the Congress consider establishing an Asia-
Pacific observers group, comparable to the arms control
observers group in the Cold War era, to help make sure that our
message to allies and between branches of government is well-
aligned.
The second recommendation, the United States, in our view,
needs to strengthen ally and partner capability, capacity,
resilience, and interoperability. We have different allies and
partners in the Asia-Pacific region at different levels of
technical competence, different geographic circumstances. At
the high end, with allies like Japan, Australia, the Republic
of Korea, we recommend moving toward more of a federated
defense concept, where we are pooling our best technology and
resources. A good example of that potential is evident in the
Japanese and Australia discussions of jointly developing a new
diesel attack sub.
Second, we believe that states that are struggling to
maintain capacity and resilience in the face of a significantly
larger Chinese military presence, the Philippines and so forth,
need our help with basic capabilities such as maritime domain
awareness. Fortunately, Japan, Korea, Australia, our major
partners, are helping, and we should network with these allies
to help frontline states, like the Philippines, with their own
capacity and resilience.
And third, we recommend creating a new joint task force for
the Western Pacific. The reason is that, in discussions with
our allies in particular, we found a disconnect in command and
control when it comes to these maritime problems. We have a
joint and combined command in Korea, very effective. But the
challenge in the East China Sea and South China Sea is such
that we think that both the Pacific Command and our Japanese
allies need to create command-and-control structures that in
real-time are working together constantly, that are agile and
ready for the challenges we face.
Our third recommendation, the U.S. should sustain and
expand our regional presence. We recommend continuing to
implement and resource key posture initiatives in Japan,
Australia, and, of course, Guam, and also increasing in some
areas our forward capabilities. Particularly important are
amphibious lift, which is insufficient for the Marine Corps
even before we distribute them to Guam, to northern Australia.
Second, additional attack subs--undersea warfare is our trump
card, our long-term advantage.
And we recommended studying the deployment of a second
carrier in the Western Pacific, probably in Yokosuka. That is a
big thing to take on, but we think there is merit, as the
chairman mentioned.
Finally, we recommended that the United States accelerate
the development of innovative concept capabilities to deal with
the A2/AD environment that is becoming increasingly
challenging, including things like innovative missile defense
from direct energy to railgun, to powder guns to prevent
competitors from imposing costs on us and to develop more cost-
effective countermeasures ourselves. This will cost money, but,
in our view, many of the initiatives described are within the
realm of the possible if we take the threat and our interests
seriously.
And I would conclude by saying, while the committee asked
us to focus, in particular, on the Department of Defense [DOD]
and the Pacific Command's responsibilities, Asia is a region
where the United States has, on the whole, succeeded for over
200 years because we have combined our military capabilities
with a commitment to trade, to supporting our democratic
values, and to building partnerships. So we are describing one
tool in a broader strategic toolkit necessary for the United
States.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Green follows:]
Prepared Joint Statement by Dr. Michael J. Green and Lt. Gen. Thomas L.
Conant
Thank you Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, members of the
Committee, and staff. We appreciate this opportunity to testify today
on our views of the United States rebalance to the Asia-Pacific and the
importance of strengthening United States commitment to the Asia-
Pacific region.
independent assessment
Congress directed in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2015
that the Department of Defense solicit an independent organization to
assess United States strategy and force posture in the Asia-Pacific
region, as well as that of U.S. allies and partners. The Department of
Defense chose CSIS to conduct that assessment. CSIS built on a previous
Congressionally-required assessment of United States defense posture in
the Asia-Pacific. That assessment looked specifically at the
realignment of U.S. Marines and their dependents and was concluded in
2012.
The current study required us to assess the region more broadly,
and to achieve that wider view we assembled CSIS experts on the full
range of the Asia-Pacific, as well as on defense capabilities and
development. Research included interviews with leading defense and
security officials, experts, and military officers throughout the
United States government and foreign capitals. Michael Green, Kathleen
Hicks, and Mark Cancian led that study for CSIS and were aided by a
senior advisor group that includes General Conant. The report before
you reflects the seriousness with which CSIS undertook this assessment
as well as the range of challenges and opportunities facing the United
States across the Asia-Pacific region.
key findings
The CSIS study team made four main findings about the security
situation in the Asia-Pacific. The first two findings concern the need
for greater commitment and direction from Washington, the second two
findings address Beijing's growing capabilities and increased appetite
for risk.
First, the Obama administration has not articulated a clear,
coherent, or consistent rebalance strategy, particularly when it comes
to managing China's rise. Many U.S. allies and partners in the region
are looking to uphold the regional and international order that has
enabled so many people throughout Asia to enjoy greater security and
prosperity. Yet, too often U.S. statements have listed different
objectives and priorities for the rebalance to Asia, confusing even the
most careful observers. Without a single strategy document to guide the
rebalance, this confusion will continue.
Second, defense budget cuts have limited the Defense Department's
ability to the implement critical rebalance initiatives. Cuts to the
defense budget, and in particular the uncertainty caused by the
combination of sequestration and the Budget Control Act, leave the
Defense Department insufficient resources, and insufficient
flexibility, to prepare for the growing range of challenges confronting
the United States. Additionally, meeting demands in other regions--from
ISIS to Russia--will require a level of resources and agility that is
impossible under the current budget arrangements.
Third, the threat from so-called anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)
threats is rising as some states seek to deny the United States the
ability to project power in Asia. The breadth and pace of A2/AD
investments throughout Asia, especially by China, are creating the
potential for countries to hold at risk U.S. forward deployed and
forward operating forces throughout the Western Pacific. Regional A2/AD
capabilities are evolving more rapidly than the U.S. ability to counter
them, requiring that the Department of Defense and regional allies work
together if they are to maintain the ability to project power in East
Asia.
Fourth, China's tolerance for risk has exceeded most expectations.
China has surprised many experts by engaging in a series of coercive
actions against neighboring states, including the creation of
artificial features in disputed waters of the South China Sea. China's
apparent willingness to challenge vital elements of the existing rules-
based regional and international order should be of concern to U.S.
policymakers, and to others around the world who believe a rules-based
order provides benefits to all.
Taken together these trends suggest that the U.S. rebalance must be
enhanced if the United States is to defend its vital interests in the
PACOM area of responsibility. Executing an effective Asia strategy will
require a clear and consistent but agile approach; continuous dialogue
with regional allies, partners, and competitors; robust economic
engagement throughout the region; development of new military concepts
and capabilities for deterrence, defense, and crisis management; and
close cooperation between the executive and legislative branches. We
suggest 29 recommendations for doing so.
main recommendations
The report's recommendations fall into four key areas, discussed
briefly below. Efforts are ongoing in many of these areas and should
remain top priorities, but additional efforts are needed in other areas
to adequately implement the rebalance.
First, the United States should align Asia strategy within the U.S.
government and with allies and partners. Although the Obama
administration issued a series of speeches and documents on the
rebalance, there remains no central U.S. government document that
describes the rebalance strategy and its associated elements. In
interviews with leaders throughout the Department of Defense, in
various U.S. agencies, on Capitol Hill, and across the Asia-Pacific,
the study team heard consistent confusion about the rebalance strategy
and concern about its implementation. Indeed, a 2014 study by CSIS
found that language used to describe the rebalance has changed
substantially since its announcement in 2011. Addressing this confusion
will require that the executive branch develop and then articulate a
clear and coherent strategy and discuss that strategy with Congress as
well as with allies and partners across the world. We recommend
preparing an Asia-Pacific strategic report; increasing administration
outreach to Congress through an Asia-Pacific Observers Group; ensuring
alignment between strategy and resources in the next QDR (now known as
the Defense Strategy Review); better coordinating U.S. strategy with
allies and partners; and expanding confidence building mechanisms and
crisis management with China.
Second, the United States should strengthen ally and partner
capability, capacity, resilience, and interoperability. The United
States needs robust allies and partners across the Asia-Pacific, but we
found growing concern that security challenges are outpacing the
capabilities of regional states. Many allies and partners are
struggling to mitigate security risks, particularly those having to do
with maritime disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea. The
United States seeks and benefits from the success of all states
throughout the region, so building ally and partner security capability
and capacity is in the U.S. interest. Working together more closely,
through coordination of strategic approaches and greater
interoperability, is an important step in this direction. Strengthening
regional security capability, capacity, resilience, and
interoperability requires a differentiated strategy that works with
highly capable militaries like Japan, Australia, India, South Korea,
and Singapore while also assisting states in Southeast Asia struggling
to meet basic defense needs. We recommend pursuing what we call
federated approaches with highly capable regional allies; building
maritime security capacity in Southeast Asia; forming a standing U.S.
joint task force for the Western Pacific; encouraging Japan to
establish a joint operations command; and deepening regional whole-of-
government humanitarian assistance and disaster relief expertise.
Third, the United States should sustain and expand its regional
military presence. We encountered concern both in Washington and in
foreign capitals about the sustainability of U.S. military presence
throughout the region. Forward-stationed U.S. forces are one of the
most important ways to signal U.S. political commitment to the region.
The political and military value of forward presence is enormous. U.S.
military presence serves as a stabilizing force in the region, helping
to deter conflict on the Korean Peninsula and manage crises from the
South China Sea through the Indian Ocean. Forward presence provides
opportunities for partnership, interoperating, training, and exercising
with allies and partners that U.S.-based forces cannot support. We
recommend continuing to implement and resource key posture initiatives;
increasing surface fleet presence; improving undersea capacity;
deploying additional amphibious lift; continuing to diversify air
operating locations; bolstering regional missile defenses; advancing
and adapting the U.S. Army's Regionally Aligned Forces concept;
addressing logistical challenges; stockpiling critical precision
munitions; and enhancing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
cooperation with allies.
Fourth, the United States should accelerate development of
innovative capabilities and concepts. We identified capability gaps in
two types of areas. First are those capabilities required to offset an
emerging risk to U.S. forces, such as the growing ballistic missile
risk to U.S. ships and forward bases. Second are those capabilities
that the United States could develop to provide an asymmetric counter
to potential regional competitors. Both will be needed for the U.S.
military to retain a resilient forward presence and the ability to
project combat power in the Asia-Pacific, despite competitors' efforts
to constrain U.S. leaders by increasing the risk to U.S. forces.
Existing concepts and capabilities must be updated to ensure that the
future force is capable of deterring and prevailing in potential
conflicts. China's development of anti-access/area-denial capabilities
aims to restrict U.S., ally, and partner freedom of maneuver. To
overcome this challenge, the United States is developing new concepts
of operation and next-generation capabilities. However, the security
environment is highly dynamic and will require a culture of
adaptability, a willingness to try new approaches and risk failure
through experimentation, and the ability to move rapidly from concept
to acquisition. We recommend institutionalizing a culture of
experimentation; encouraging rapid platform evolution; developing
advanced long-range missiles; funding innovative missile defense
concepts; fielding additional air combat systems; exploiting the U.S.
undersea advantage; and augmenting space, cyber, and electronic warfare
capabilities.
Many of the efforts described above would require additional
resources, as we describe in more detail in the full report. If the
United States is to protect its interests in Asia, then meeting these
resource challenges should be a top priority for U.S. leaders, both in
the administration and in Congress.
conclusion
The initiatives outlined above are focused on the defense portion
of the rebalance, as directed by Section 1059 of the 2015 National
Defense Authorization Act. However, additional effort is needed not
just on the defense component of the rebalance, but on the prosperity
and values aspects as well. Passing the Trans-Pacific Partnership, for
example, is an economic initiative but is vital to regional security,
as well as prosperity. Strengthening the rebalance to Asia will require
that Washington use all the tools at its disposal if the United States
and its allies and partners are to maintain a secure, peaceful,
prosperous, and free Asia-Pacific region.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
General?
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL THOMAS L. CONANT, USMC (RET.),
FORMER DEPUTY COMMANDER, UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND
General Conant. Senator McCain, Senator Reed, and members,
thank you for allowing us to come here to talk to you.
My message is simple, as it says in the report. I am a
strong believer that there is a strategic imperative, that we
have a very clear and concise message to our partners and
allies and to the world on what the rebalance really means. I
think that strategy and that message needs to be consistent in
its vision and in its articulation across the whole of
government.
And then I think you need that continuous engagement with
allies and partners throughout the region to reassure them that
we are there for them, and that the rebalance is, in reality, a
fact.
From the defense side of the house, Chairman, I think we
will see new concepts we will have to look at as we study this
problem set that China has presented to us.
You will see more distributed operations, dispersal of
forces, and such. Long-range strike in both weapons and
platforms will become an imperative.
And then I think there will be the proper investment in
both naval platforms and air platforms, not to include Army.
So there is a lot to discuss, and I look forward to your
questions, sir, instead of me just carrying on. So thank you so
much.
Chairman McCain. Thank you very much. I thank the
witnesses.
In your report you say, ``The Obama administration has not
articulated a clear, coherent, or consistent rebalance
strategy, particularly when it comes to managing China's
rise.''
It seems to me that we have, in this behavior of China, an
opportunity to strengthen our relationships with other nations
in the region--Philippines, Vietnam, in particular--that would
not have been thought of in some years past. What steps do we
need to take to take advantage of this new deep concern that
the Pacific Region, nations in the region, have concerning
China, Dr. Green?
Dr. Green. We have done a survey, Senator, at CSIS of
elites in 10 Asian countries several times over the past 5
years. And it is remarkable how much strategic thinkers,
political leaders, from Vietnam to India to Japan, want more of
us. They want more cooperation. They want more exercises. They
want more trade agreements. They do not want bases. They do not
want bases, in most cases. But they are willing to accept new
arrangements.
Chairman McCain. Like the Australia arrangement.
Dr. Green. Like the Australia arrangement, where we rotate
Marines through Darwin, where we will, if we can move the
negotiations forward, have access to Royal Australian Air Force
airfields. In the Philippines, where the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement has passed the Supreme Court test, we
will be able to move people through, that kind of thing. Cam
Ranh Bay, perhaps, in Vietnam, that is an opportunity.
We suffer a bit, in my view, Senator, because the way we
articulate our vision of the future of Asia has been quite
inconsistent. At times, senior administration officials have
embraced Chinese leader Xi Jinping's vision of what he calls a
new model of great power relations, which is designed to
stabilize U.S.-China relations, but to do so by recognizing
that China and the United States and Russia are great powers
that should settle the affairs of Asia.
And we at various points at senior levels have said we
embrace that idea, and we want to operationalize that idea. The
fundamental flaw, from our perspective, should be this new
model of great powers does not include great democracies like
Japan, India, Australia, Korea, Indonesia as great powers. They
are considered second-tier.
So the way we have talked about how we see order in Asia,
the relations, has sent confused signals. We need to get that
straight.
We also should be realistic that while we are getting more
access and more cooperation with the Philippines, with Vietnam,
with Malaysia, these are all systems where political leadership
could change. In Vietnam, there was just a change. The
Philippines have an election.
So we need to be patient, and we need to be in this for the
long game. And we need to build it on professional
relationships between the militaries.
It may not always be us, in a case like Vietnam. It may be
Japan or Korea, which are providing patrol boats that take the
lead in helping build capacity. But we all have the same
interests.
So we, in the report, suggest we need a venue or a
framework with our allies and partners to make sure that we are
all helping these states, irrespective of how our specific
bilateral relations with them or leadership changes affect our
expectations.
Chairman McCain. I am very interested in your
recommendation about a second carrier to Japan. We are sending
our carriers from the West Coast on 10-month deployments. That
is too long to in any way maintain a sustainable all-volunteer
force.
But one of the sources of frustration for me and other
members of this committee is the situation in Okinawa and the
relocation. Talk about fits and starts and setbacks and
political problems in Okinawa itself. It is one of the more
difficult issues, but yet, I think one of the most important.
What is the witnesses' latest assessment of that situation?
Dr. Green. We have spent a lot of time on this issue,
Senator, in 2012 and in this report. My colleague Nick
Szechenyi spent time in Okinawa, talking to local political
officials. We did meet with the governor of Okinawa, as you
did, sir.
It is complicated. The Okinawan people suffered in the
Second World War like no other Japanese in that terrible
battle. But it is not as black and white as it often appears in
the media.
Prime Minister Abe has committed to moving forward with the
Futenma Replacement Facility. His chief cabinet secretary, Mr.
Suga, is working this strenuously. He is responsible for a
whole host of issues, but he is focused on this. And they are
committed. It is in Japan's national interests, and it is in
their political interests, to move forward on this.
The mayoral election in Ginowan, the town closest to the
current Marine Corps Air Station, resulted in a victory for
someone who supports moving forward.
It will not be easy, but I think--and this is based on
detailed looks at the operational questions but also the local
politics--this is the best of a lot of hard options. And I
think, and we agreed in our group unanimously, we need to move
forward.
We also, frankly, need to remember that that are other
airfields in Okinawa. They may not provide the solution for the
Marine's requirements, but as we look at the A2/AD threat and
the ballistic missile threat and the increasing requirements
for humanitarian disaster relief, we ought to be working with
Japan's defense forces.
And that is an important development, by the way, Senator.
The Japan Self-Defense Forces were viewed very negatively in
Okinawa after the war, because of what the Imperial Japanese
Army did to them. That has changed significantly. There is
considerable pride and support for Japan Self-Defense Forces in
Okinawa.
So we ought to, in the longer term, be looking at joint use
of bases. The Ground Self-Defense Force wants to create a
marine corps capability. And General Conant can speak to this.
We can co-locate with them.
In other words, we can give Japan more ownership of these
bases and build more support, I think, as we go forward.
General Conant. Sir, thank you for that question.
I think, looking at the carrier, we just do not need to
restrict ourselves to Japan. There other places you could
possibly put it, whether it is Guam, whether it is back in
Hawaii, whether it is even in Australia, in Perth. There are
ways to look at the situation.
It is easiest to go to Japan, because the infrastructure is
there, and so the investment and the additional investment for
the Navy probably carries the day on that.
As you look, the A2/AD and the ballistic and cruise missile
threat out of an adversary, then you are already under that
umbrella if you are stationed that far forward in Japan. So
depending on the strategic messaging you want to send, we could
look and possibly look at putting it someplace else.
Chairman McCain. Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Green, I noticed that when you were talking, in your
comments, you described our undersea assets as the trump card.
I think, for the record, you were making a gambling allusion,
not a political allusion.
But I think there are several factors here, and you both
have talked about it, is the increased precision strike
capability of Chinese forces from land-based and other bases,
which makes surface ships much more vulnerable. They would have
to launch, in the case of a carrier, from much further away.
Submarines do not have those particular vulnerabilities. Also,
just in terms of technology, we have a significant advantage
over what we are seeing right now in the waters with the
Chinese and others.
So I would assume that, for that reason, we want to make a
much more vigorous investment in deployment of undersea assets
into this area. That could be the leading-edge of the sword. Is
that fair?
Dr. Green. Senator, that is right. We have an advantage
undersea, over any potential adversary, that is considerable.
And if you add into the mix the really first-class undersea
capabilities of Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Forces and the
Royal Australian Navy, and increasingly the Indian Navy, that
is a pretty strong undersea net around the entire Indo-Asia-
Pacific, which would cause any potential adversary pause, if
they thought about challenging us in a serious military way.
So we thought it was very, very important. And one of the
areas we need to focus on more is interoperability with these
other navies, one more reason why our group thought discussions
between Japan and Australia about not only a common platform
but also increasing cooperation is the kind of development we
should want to see.
Senator Reed. General Conant, any comments?
General Conant. Yes, sir. In my time as deputy commander at
PACOM as a Marine, I found out the significance of what that
submarine force provided for us. In so many other things that
we can't talk about in open source, but really, in its
capability sets in ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance] and just discovering what is going on.
It is also a way to send a message to those who want to
threaten our access in the region that there is a cost to that
activity, if somebody chooses to bring it to conflict.
That submarine force is very, very capable. And if I had
one more marginal dollar, and you weren't going to spend it
anywhere else, as a Marine, I would probably put it in the
submarine force, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
One other aspect of this, and I think it is implicit in
your report, is that, most likely, if we are engaged in a
serious confrontation in the area, that the cyber activity
would be so extensive that we will be operating literally in
the dark. GPS [Global Positioning System] will go down. Systems
on aircraft and surface ships, everything, will be operating
almost as we were 50, 100 years ago.
Is that realistic, General? Or is that sort of more
apocalyptic?
General Conant. No, that is a very good assessment.
In fact, when we were out at PACOM talking with Admiral
Locklear one day, I thought we ought to do a Nimitz project.
Admiral Nimitz fought World War II with about a 65-man staff
that grew to 200-some. And he thought it grew too big.
What they did is they provided specific mission guides,
mission orders, and then sent them out on task forces. I think
you would have to get something like that, where you could
have, within the task force, internally assured mission sets
through some classified work. But then you wouldn't be beholden
to the GPS and some other things. But space will become a new
issue and then navigation.
So it is a good way to think about it, but I don't think
just cyber alone, it is hard for all of us to understand, even
at my level, what it can do and what it won't do. And then you
are into law and policy.
But they don't care. They will shut us down quickly, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Dr. Green, in the report, you talked about the relationship
between China and North Korea. And there have been some reports
that the Chinese are willing to tolerate a nuclear-armed North
Korea to a certain degree, which is very dangerous to the
world, given the instability in that government.
And the other aspect, and this is a real question, not a
rhetorical, is that any sort of effective solution, I would
assume, would have to take the United States and the Chinese
together to be able to bring the appropriate political and
diplomatic influence on the North Koreans to behave better. Is
that fair? And what is your sense of the whole issue?
Dr. Green. Sir, I would agree that an ultimate resolution--
and I worked on the North Korea problem in the previous
administration and spent time in Pyongyang and Beijing, and
frankly, came away very pessimistic about any near-, medium-,
and maybe even long-term diplomatic solution.
But ultimately, if we are going to denuclearize the
peninsula, we are going to need to do it with our allies first,
but with China and Russia. And if we have a sudden or
cataclysmic collapse of the North Korean state, which is
feasible, is possible, at a minimum, we are going to want to
deconflict with China. So it is very important.
But we have not had much success. When I was in the
previous administration, we kind of bullied the Chinese into
helping us in the six-party talks. And we thought we were
making progress and that China would be helpful. But frankly,
the Chinese have an interest in a denuclearized peninsula, but
it is, I think, becoming evident that they have a greater
interest in stability and in maintaining a dominant position
over the peninsula in the long term.
So I believe they will tolerate a nuclear program in North
Korea, so long as it is not destabilizing the whole region. And
then they can settle it when, in their view, they have greater
strategic purchase, greater influence.
Our approach generally has been to respond to these North
Korean nuclear tests and missile tests in the Security Council
and try to get consensus with China. And I think this most
recent test, and China's rather anemic reaction, demonstrates
that that is not an approach that is going to get us results.
And the other approach would be to do more with our allies
to make it evident that we will increase our missile defense
capabilities, we will increase the joint operations, and all of
these things which are necessary because of the North Korean
threat, and that from Beijing's perspective their nonaction
will have consequences. As we take care of ourselves and our
allies, they may not like--we need to think about how we
incentivize the Chinese beyond trying to point out their
interests in denuclearization at this point.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, gentlemen. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Green, in your testimony, you recommend fielding
additional air combat systems as a means to counter China's
increasing A2/AD capabilities. Specifically, you state in your
abridged report that developing a fleet of next-generation
aircraft with the right combination of capabilities will be
critical to prevailing in a major conflict against a peer
competitor.
Does our fleet of fifth-generation fighter aircraft,
specifically the number of operational F-22s, currently meet
the need? And I think we are probably being optimistic if we
say we can anticipate 140 of those aircraft in a reasonable
time frame.
Does that meet our need today? And if not, what would our
need be? And is this the right question, in terms of the F-22
being part of that solution?
Dr. Green. Senator, General Conant should speak to this as
well.
The F-22 and the F-35 have had various challenges as
programs, but talking to our allies, talking to the air
component commander's on our side in the Pacific, it is pretty
clear to me what we do get for this, and it is significant.
We do not just get a squadron of F-22s or F-35s. We get
stealthy platforms that can coordinate fourth-generation
aircraft. It is a multiplier effect that, frankly, when I went
out and talked to people, was not coming from the generals,
with all respect to the generals. It was coming from captains
and majors innovating with this new platform. And this is what
the Royal Australian Air Force, the Koreans, and the Japanese
are starting to discover as well. So there is a multiplier
effect we have to consider, and then the interoperability and
jointness effect among our allies.
The next generation, meaning the sixth, seventh generation,
and I defer to General Conant on this, may not be manned,
ultimately. But for what we have in the fifth generation, we
get a lot.
If I had a concern, and Admiral Harris, the Pacific
commander spoke to this, our platforms are stealthy, they are
excellent. But our air-to-air missiles, our surface-to-surface
missiles, do not have the range that the Chinese, with much
less capable platforms, increasingly are fielding to hit us.
So that is one of the capability gaps that I think needs
near-term addressing.
General Conant. Senator Rounds, good question.
The F-22 or the F-35 as a fifth-generation fighter is very
capable. But it is not the end-all and be-all, as Dr. Green
alluded to.
When I was at 3rd MAW [Marine Aircraft Wing], we had an
exercise where we brought F-22s out and worked with our F/A-18A
Pluses and Cs, a fourth-generation legacy airplane. And we had
the capability to share that picture that F-22 presented.
What those majors and what those captains did with those
packages, once they got wiped out by just trying to fight the
F-22, they then went into a strike package type training
scenario. It was phenomenal.
And I am a stronger believer that you do not have to put
all your eggs in one basket. In fact, we have kind of gone down
the road where we really are almost doing that.
So F-22s have tremendous capability. Nothing else can match
it. The F-35s are great.
But we have fourth-generation fighters we can do things
with that give more respectful numbers that you are going to
need out in this problem set. And then there is a value of
quantity to this problem set, and China sees that. So they are
sticking with four and four-plus gen. But they are very, very
capable.
So it all doesn't have to be fifth gen, sir, but it is part
of the mix.
Senator Rounds. What role do you see long-range strike
systems, the LRS-B [Long-Range Strike Bomber], as an example,
that particular bomber? How do you see that playing into the
U.S. defense strategy in Asia in the coming years?
General Conant. As we wargame various scenarios, and as we
look at the ballistic and cruise missile threat out there, as I
said on the Defense Science Board for that task force, you are
going to need long-range strike. And you ought to have the
capable platform that brings that strike in.
We have always done, as Dr. Green alluded to, fifth-
generation fighters with fourth- and third-generation weapons.
So we need to match that capability and the platform with a
weapon system.
As you look at long-range strike, it is not just the
airframes. Our SAGs, surface action groups, need that long-
range strike capability also. We are putting it on submarines.
So that creates a bigger problem set for the adversary and
gives you more decision space, if you do come up into a problem
set, sir.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Hirono?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The stability in the Asia-Pacific area is hugely important.
And the U.S. role in being a part of creating the stability is
critical. We have articulated our commitment as rebalance--and
yes, I agree that it would be helpful to have a much clear
articulation of this. But a lot of what we talk about in
rebalance is in the implementation. Part of our rebalance
strategy, as implemented, is in our force posture.
So I did want to ask you a little bit more about your
suggestion that we should consider deploying a second carrier
in that area, and also mentioned by the chairman.
So, for example, if we wanted to locate a second carrier at
Yokosuka, which already has infrastructure, is there a time
frame when it would be most advantageous for us to pursue a
study and come to a decision, i.e., while Prime Minister Abe is
still in office? Can you talk a little bit more about the time
frame for locating a second carrier in the Pacific?
Dr. Green. There is a saying in Japanese politics, because
they have a parliamentary system, so you can have an election
at any moment, that one step ahead is darkness.
But Prime Minister Abe, or if not Prime Minister Abe,
someone with a comparable commitment to our alliance, is likely
to be in power for some time. The year 2019 is something of a
date, because that is when the USS Gerald Ford will be ready
for deployment. It seems to me that would be the opportunity.
Now, we did not come out with a hard recommendation on
this, because there are operational questions and costs and
infrastructure questions. If you deployed this new carrier in
Yokosuka, you would have to find a place for the air wing.
Iwakuni, which handles the air wing now, could probably
expanded. But that is a political lift for the Japanese
Government, questions of host nation support.
But when we put this suggestion out, it got covered in the
Japanese press, and there was not a lot of pushback. A number
of senior officials and military officers in Japan were quite
intrigued, because of the signal it sends and the firepower it
provides.
And it addresses a concern our allies have, which is the
Seventh Fleet's one carrier is out of the Pacific, or PACOM AOR
[area of responsibility], a lot, and they watch that. So they
would have constant coverage, in their view, in an increasingly
difficult region.
But 2019 and the USS Gerald Ford, that is a heavy lift for
Japanese politics. It would have to be Japan's decision.
I was in the White House when we asked Japan to take the
George Washington, the first nuclear carrier. Everyone said
they would never do it. They needed and wanted that firepower,
that commitment, that connectivity with us.
I think it is politically feasible, and 2019 would be the
target date, I would think.
Senator Hirono. So we should move ahead with a study, so
that we can make the decision in an appropriate time frame.
I think the Japanese are well aware of the changing
environment with North Korea and China.
Dr. Green, can you talk more about your suggestion that we
should form an Asia-Pacific observers group? I am not familiar
with where that suggestion is coming from. And what would it do
to enhance the rebalance implementation?
Dr. Green. This was John Hamre, the president of CSIS, my
boss, his idea. Of course, as you know, he worked for this
committee for a long time and in the Pentagon. He suggested it
after looking at the problem of articulating our strategy to
the Congress, to our allies. And I think, for him, the
comparable group that monitored arms control negotiations in
the Reagan administration, bipartisan, was the model.
But I would offer another model, Senator, in all sincerity,
and that is a great Senator from Hawaii, who, with Ted Stevens
from Alaska, Senator Inouye, provided constant oversight of our
strategy in Asia. I was in the White House for 5 years, and
when the Inouye-Stevens combination went out to the region, it
was like another aircraft carrier. I mean, it was quite
powerful.
So both in terms of monitoring and coordinating in
Washington, but also as a bipartisan group that could speak to
the region, not always about reassuring about our commitment,
but telling sometimes our friends and allies what they have to
do.
Senator Hirono. And this would not require legislation.
Dr. Green. No.
Senator Hirono. So my time is almost up, but I did want to
ask you, as we look 10 to 20 years in the future, what would a
successful rebalance look like in this region?
Maybe you can think on it and respond to me in writing.
Dr. Green. No, I would be happy to do that, Senator. We
have thought about it. We were tasked with----
Senator Hirono. Senator McCain, would it be all right for
him to respond now?
Chairman McCain. Absolutely.
Dr. Green. I apologize.
Our tasking was to look out 10 years, so we took that
seriously and considered this. I think my colleagues at CSIS,
and I think I will speak also for our senior advisory review
board, would say that the friction we have with China right now
over the South China Sea and the East China Sea is not going to
go away, that we are going to probably be living with this for
5 or 10 years, because it is built into the PLA's [People's
Liberation Army] operational concept, their force structure
building, their doctrine. And the Foreign Ministry or others in
the China system are not going to knock them off of that
trajectory. And in my view, that is true whether the Chinese
economy slows down or not.
So in 10 years and for the next 10 years, we will have some
friction in our relationship with China, and we should know
that, and we should not be afraid of it. We need to manage it.
But in 10 years, if we have a relationship with our allies and
partners, not a collective security arrangement like NATO
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization], almost no one wants that.
And that is a bit too much for China. That would produce a
China we do not want. But the kind of network and cooperation
that incentivizes China to play within the rules; and the kind
of capacity-building for the Philippines and for smaller micro
states, CNMI [the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands]
and so forth, where they can handle earthquakes and tsunamis or
internal corruption problems in a way where they are not
vulnerable strategically; and where we have, frankly, a trade
agreement, the TPP plus the regional agreements, fusing toward
more of a rules-based open Pacific order--I think that is what
we should be thinking about. And if we do think in those terms,
I think it will add some discipline to how the administration
and others articulate our strategy, what we are aiming for. We
are not containing China. We are looking for a rules-based
order, and here is how it might look in terms of our relations
with allies and other partners.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Manchin?
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for your service.
If I may ask you this, Dr. Green, your report assesses that
Chinese President Xi Jinping has a less awestruck view of the
U.S. power than his predecessors, contributing to a greater
tolerance for risk and a reduction of emphasis on the China-
U.S. relations.
So I would ask, that is a pretty striking observation. What
do you think has led to his diminished view of U.S. power? And
what do you think it will take to alter his views?
Dr. Green. Xi Jinping is the first Chinese leader since
Deng Xiaoping who is not, as the Chinese say, helicoptered,
picked up personally by Deng Xiaoping and groomed for
leadership. So he is not beholden to the Deng Xiaoping vision
of relations with the U.S., which was competitive but one where
China dampens down any sense of competition as much as possible
in order to focus on economic development, ending the Cold War
to balance the Soviet threat to China.
He is unconstrained by that, because of his independence
from being groomed and brought up by Xiaoping. That is one
factor.
The other factor is that I think the financial crisis in
2008 and 2009 led a lot of Chinese observers to conclude that
America's best days were over, and that there was going to be a
pretty fundamental shift. They are probably rethinking that
now, but that set this----
Senator Manchin. That sets me up for the following question
then. Does China's economic slowdown affect its regional
military capabilities?
And also, should the U.S. rebalance strategies take into
account lower Chinese economic growth? Should we be considering
what they were thinking of us in 2007, 2008, 2009? Should we be
thinking that same type of thought process now, since they are
having a reversal?
Dr. Green. It is an excellent question, Senator. It is an
interesting one to contemplate. We should learn from the
Chinese mistake underestimating American wherewithal and not
assume that the nature of Chinese rule in Asia will
dramatically change.
Senator Manchin. You believe that they are going to double
down, just as Russia might be doubling down, even at the
expense of their own people?
Dr. Green. I think there is a debate among experts about
whether China's increased aggressiveness and their military
modernization reflects their economy or reflects a more
fundamental definition of interests. I think it is the latter.
Even if we are talking about a China growing at 3 percent
or 4 percent, that is a huge economy. Those are a lot of
resources. It absolutely dwarfs anybody in the region, except
us and Japan. And it changes the trajectory, but I do not think
it minimizes the complication for us in any way that would lead
us to change our strategy.
We may want to change the way we think about U.S.-China
relations in economic terms. But in terms of creating a
military presence capability and alliances and partnerships----
Senator Manchin. We should be----
Dr. Green. We should be doing what we are doing.
It could be that you have a more humble China in 5 years.
It could be. You could also have a China that is more
nationalistic and grumpy.
But in terms of their capabilities, I do not think the
trajectory changes all that much.
Senator Manchin. Let me follow up with General Conant.
General, your report notes that most military, economic,
and diplomatic conditions favor a future Russia strategic
alignment with China, but that Russia is ultimately likely to
seek a balance between collaborating with and hedging against
China.
So I would ask, what concrete Russian or Chinese interests
stand in the way of a strategic alliance?
General Conant. Sir, from my personal experience, I think
there is still mistrust between the two powers. But they are
working closer together than they have ever worked before. And
they are starting to do exchanges.
To follow up what Dr. Green, a little bit, thought on this
slowdown on the growth of China, we know they had a target at
10 percent, went down to 9.5 percent, went down to 9 percent. I
was once told that if they could not grow at 9 percent, then
they thought they would have internal problems.
Now they are down to 7 percent, 7.5 percent. But you still
see them, even in their maritime and military buildup of what
we would call a coast guard, they are building larger ships.
They are arming those ships. And they are building fourth-
generation fighters. They have a series of five to six new
fighters, new ships.
So I do not see it slowing down. They may worry about what
the people think, but that Politburo of seven people answers to
nobody but the party.
Senator Manchin. If this alignment would take effect, the
alignment between Russia and China would take effect, even
though there was distrust there, but let's say that it moves in
a different way economically but militarily that they basically
start teaming up, if you will, what action should the United
States undertake basically in security, economic, or diplomatic
realms to affect the likelihood of that?
General Conant. Well, I think you have to have a dialogue,
first of all, of why that alignment is necessary.
Senator Manchin. Following up really quick--and I know my
time is up, Mr. Chairman, if I may. Following up, what type of
dialogue do we have basically on the military aspects between
Russia and China, between the U.S.? What would you say, how
those relationships----
General Conant. Well, between Russia and China, we have
very little.
Senator Manchin. We, the country?
General Conant. We. So when I was deputy, to have the
Russian engagement, I had to go to Stuttgart, and we were going
to have the EUCOM lead to the Russian piece.
Senator Manchin. Okay.
General Conant. So together, though, we could build that
discussion and bring that into the China realm.
Senator Manchin. Right now, we have very little
interaction.
General Conant. I am not current enough to try to make a
statement for Admiral Harris, sir.
Senator Manchin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. Dr. Green, General,
thank you.
I would like to ask you just a couple things about
advancing and adapting the U.S. Army's regionally aligned
forces concept, particularly as it relates to our Army Reserve
and National Guard forces, and if you could talk a little bit
about the State Partnership Program and how that could be
usefully employed in that region.
Iowa is a member of the State Partnership Program. We are
partnered with Kosovo through EUCOM. I think there are 22
partnerships in EUCOM. There are 22 with SOUTHCOM [United
States Southern Command]. But there are only eight with PACOM.
So if you could talk through that, how that might be
beneficial, employing those forces and developing those
partnerships, I would appreciate that.
Dr. Green. We think there is an enormous opportunity for
the State National Guard components to play in the rebalance.
The Army's Pacific Pathways program is quite welcome in the
region.
The challenge is that most countries in Asia cannot handle
a Stryker brigade or the kind of unit that the brigade
formations of the big Army is built around.
We were also struck, Senator, that only eight of the State
partnerships are in the Pacific, which over half of Americans
now consistently say in polls that Asia is the most important
region to our future. That is not just Hawaii and California.
That is the entire Republic.
Now the Army tells us they cannot decide who does State
partnerships, but it makes sense that National Guard units do
more.
There is another reason, which is there are some quite
close sister city relationships. I think Haiphong in Vietnam,
for example, with I think Seattle, if I remember correctly.
These cities are doing disaster preparedness exercises,
continuity of government.
It seems to me there is a logical role for the Guard to
play in these exercises, and it is not expensive. It is not a
large-scale thing. And it has multiple benefits for us, among
them, showing some of these countries that are transitioning
toward a more democratic system how civil-military relations in
a democracy should work.
So I hope, of the recommendations that we looked at, that
there is interest in that one, because there is enormous
opportunity and real synergies with the region and between the
Guard and local and municipal governments.
Senator Ernst. General, do you have any thoughts?
General Conant. Yes, ma'am.
First of all, I think when we did the Tonga State
partnership with Admiral Locklear, that was over 1.5 years just
to get through the wickets, whatever those wickets are.
Senator Ernst. Right.
General Conant. I think it is kind of a political football
between the Department of State, Army, and Guard. But the
benefit to those State partnerships are tremendous, and it
gives a cultural awareness for that State partnership, and the
training aspect is that even the smaller countries focus on
small unit leadership.
It does not take a lot to make a big impact. So I am a big
proponent of it. When we first looked at it with Admiral
Locklear, we found these small numbers not aligned. Europe has
been the most beneficiary of that.
So we ought to somehow figure out how to bring more into
the Pacific at the pace and at the level those countries
desire.
Senator Ernst. That is fantastic. I am a huge proponent of
the State Partnership Program. And we have hosted many
Kosovars, young NCOs [non-commissioned officers] and officers,
with our soldiers in the Iowa Army National Guard. It has been
a great benefit to both countries, as well. And sister cities,
we also have a sister city program now that came out of State
Partnership, because of our great relationship.
And I will tell you, Mr. Chairman, just this last Friday,
we opened the first consulate in the State of Iowa in Des
Moines, Iowa. That consulate is the Republic of Kosovo
consulate.
So there are many great things happening through the State
Partnership Program. I do hope that we are able to project more
of those into the Pacific region.
So thank you very much, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman McCain. Is this to send ethanol to Kosovo? Pretty
much?
[Laughter.]
Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thanks to the witnesses. I have two lines of questions
for you.
The first deals with the U.S.-India relationship going
forward. Senator King and I visited India in October 2014 and
had dialogue in a number of areas, but including the mil-to-mil
cooperation and opportunities under the government, which is
not connected to sort of the nonalignment tradition that had
been an Indian tradition.
We saw some real opportunities. We visited the shipyard at
Mazagon Docks in Mumbai and saw the shipbuilding expertise in
India and encouraged them to come visit the United States.
There has been a recent delegation of Indian military officials
to see our shipbuilding capacity.
And we were also told by the Indians that they do more
joint military exercises with the United States than with any
other Nation.
Talk a little bit about that relationship and what you
could realistically predict going forward 10 years or beyond,
and how that would be helpful in our posture in the region.
Dr. Green. I was in the Bush administration, and I had
responsibly in the NSC [National Security Council] for India,
and the bipartisan and continuous support for building this
relationship is a very positive thing for our country.
As you mentioned, Senator, there is still this nonalignment
tradition in the Ministry of External Affairs, but it is not
growing. It is receding. Public opinion polls about the U.S.
and India are very, very positive. As you said, we do more
exercises with India than India does with the whole rest of the
world combined.
We also sell a lot of stuff. People forget we lost the
fighter competition, but we sell a lot of things to India.
A 10-year vision, I think, would include regular Malabar
exercises that would include the Indian Navy but also Japan,
Singapore, Australia, maybe China or others. Depending on the
exercise, you can do these in sequence and have different kinds
of exercises. We do more of that.
In our commercial or defense-industrial relationship, I
think there is potential for ASW [anti-submarine warfare]
patrol, maybe even submarines. Ten years from now, I wouldn't
erase that. But it is not going to be a U.S. nuclear attack
sub. It is going to be some version of a Japanese or Australian
sub where maybe we help with the integration of the weapon
systems. So there is an industrial part.
One of the most difficult parts of the relationship has
been the intelligence relationship, which is the lifeblood of
any alliance or partnership. And that is moving in a good
direction, too.
So a sustained by partition commitment to the relationship
is good. I would say, of all the aspects of U.S.-India
relations, the defense component now is moving forward with the
most speed. Nothing is fast in India, but with the most speed,
in that context.
Senator Kaine. General?
General Conant. Yes, sir. I think they are an important
strategic ally and partner.
We were told to kind of go at them and try to find a better
way for cooperation. When I was at PACOM, we were getting
there. They like a shared coproduction aspect in anything you
want to sell them or produce. I do not think we should be
afraid of that.
Senator Kaine. Right.
General Conant. I think we ought to look at that.
And then you get in the acquisition world. That needs a
little with reforming.
I was just reading today, the CEO [chief executive officer]
of Boeing is out there, posturing maybe a coproduction with the
F/A-18E/F. The more we could share in that, the more we could
get to that.
Now, the multilateral exercises, the only way you will be
successful in any multilateral activity is having a very strong
bilateral relationship with those multilateral partners. So I
used to tell the PACOM staff, make sure we are square U.S. to
India before we go U.S. to India to Japan to Australia or
anybody else, planning that. And make sure we are answering
their concerns and assuaging their fears of how we are going to
do the exercise.
Senator Kaine. Great.
General Conant. So you listen more. So that is a key point.
When you say multilateral, as Dr. Green said, there is a
steppingstone to that process.
Senator Kaine. The second question is, would it be valuable
if the Senate ratified the Law of the Sea Convention, again, in
terms of our posture in the region?
Dr. Green. It would, on balance. And many of our allies and
partners--our closest allies and partners in the region are
asking us to ratify.
In my own personal view, though, the fact that we have not
ratified UNCLOS [United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea] is often exaggerated as an obstacle to progress on these
disputes in the South China Sea and so forth. We, the United
States Government, the Navy, basically abide by the convention
based on previous conventions and our practice and doctrine and
policies.
And the real problem, ultimately, is not that we have not
ratified it. The real problem is that China, which says that it
has, defines it in a way that is completely alien to the spirit
of the convention and the understanding of all the other
parties. I am not sure our ratifying----
Senator Kaine. Do we have standing to critique them on
that, if we have not ratified?
Dr. Green. It gives them a talking point to throwback at
us.
Senator Kaine. Yes.
Dr. Green. Would ratifying change China's interpretation of
UNCLOS? I am doubtful. But it would give us some more purchase.
It would align us more with other allies and partners in the
region who have ratified.
Senator Kaine. Great. My time has expired.
Thanks, Mr. Chair.
And thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, Dr. Green, good to see you. I want to thank you
for your great work that you have been doing, not only on this
report, but for years. It is very much appreciated.
One of the things about the Asia-Pacific--you mentioned it,
Senator Hirono, earlier--a lot of us are, certainly, interested
in it. My State is an Asia-Pacific State.
And I think it is an opportunity, a rare one, to be honest,
where you have the legislative branch supporting the executive
branch on a major foreign policy strategy, the so-called pivot
or rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. I think you see a lot of
support in this committee for that.
However, your report kind of makes it a little bit clear
that that is not necessarily the most cogent strategy. How
would you describe that strategy right now in one word?
Dr. Green. The rebalance strategy?
Senator Sullivan. Yes.
Dr. Green. Well, if I were given one word, it would be
``rebalance.'' That sounds like a copout.
Senator Sullivan. It is.
Dr. Green. Part of the problem with this articulation of
the strategy is that rebalancing is a process. It is a ways,
not an end. And I think what we have lacked in the articulation
of the strategy is an articulation of the Asia-Pacific and the
kinds of relationships that we are aiming for and what we will
and will not tolerate.
Senator Sullivan. How would you improve it, in particular,
not just the strategy? Your report stated that the Obama
administration has not articulated a clear, coherent, or
consistent strategy for the region. So not just the strategy,
but the FONOP [Freedom of Navigation Operation] issue, which I
think many of us, again, bipartisan, are very interested in. We
have encouraged the administration to get behind those as a
regular occurrence, routine missions and operations with our
allies, if possible.
But in my discussions with some of our allies, there seems
to be enormous confusion even on the articulation of what we
are trying to do with those. How would you help improve that?
Dr. Green. So we mentioned this in the report, Senator. The
speeches by the senior-most officials in the administration
articulate our priorities for the region differently every
time. I think the Secretary of Defense and his predecessors
have had the most consistent articulation. But there is not the
kind of consistent explanation of our priorities that we need
or that you had in previous administrations articulating our
strategy towards the region.
I mentioned this earlier, but we have, at the senior-most
levels, embraced a vision that Xi Jinping put forward for a new
model of great power relations, which is a great power of
Russia, China, and the U.S. And our allies were unhappy,
understandably.
So how we have articulated this at the senior most levels,
in terms of how we see the order and future of the region,
keeps shifting. That is one problem.
Also, I think, in the FONOPs, we do not have a story. I
mean, the Australians, the Japanese, the Philippines, all our
treaty allies wanted us to do freedom of navigation operations
after this alarming Chinese reclamation and building of
military spec airfields across the South China Sea. The first
was near Subi island. It was at low-tide elevation. We did it
as an innocent passage, because it was also within 12 nautical
miles of island features. So that was confusing.
The most recent one was more consistent, but ultimately, as
the chairman articulated at the beginning of the hearing,
ultimately, we need to demonstrate that we do not accept these
new artificial island outposts as having any legitimacy in
terms of territorial waters. And we need to do it consistently,
and we need to make it appear we are not doing it reluctantly,
because the first FONOP came after sort of Macbeth-like ``to do
or not to do'' drama in the press.
So we need to show how we view the region, why our values
and allies are at the center of it; and second, that when
order, freedom of navigation challenge are challenged, we don't
break a sweat.
Senator Sullivan. I am going to ask one final quick
question.
I appreciate that you have focused a lot in this report on
the Arctic and the interests of different countries in the
Arctic. And at the same time, we have done a lot on this
committee, and there is a lot of interest from a lot of
different Senators on the issues of the Arctic. We required DOD
to have a plan for the Arctic in the NDAA.
At the same time, as the President talked about
strengthening our presence in the Asia-Pacific, they are
looking at dramatically cutting our military forces,
particularly our only airborne brigade combat team in the
Arctic, in the entire Asia-Pacific.
Do you think that our potential adversaries, whether it is
the Koreans, whether it is the Russians, view that kind of
cutback in a way that undermines the credibility of our focus
on the rebalance, and also on our focus, late to the game, of
course, on the Arctic where the Russians, as you mentioned in
the report, are dramatically increasing their presence? And
that is for both of you.
General?
Dr. Green. If I may start, General.
When the President announced the rebalance in Australia in
November 2011, it was well-received in the region. We have done
polling where over 80 percent outside of China, over 80 percent
of elites, welcome or would welcome a U.S. rebalance. There are
questions about implementation, but the idea we are going to do
this is important to them.
In that speech in Australia, the President said that
defense cuts will not, and he said, I repeat, will not, come at
the expense of the Asia-Pacific region.
So, technically, is the 425 part of PACOM? It is a little
gray.
Senator Sullivan. It is.
Dr. Green. Will our allies see it as such? Yes.
So this would be the first cut in the Pacific since the
announcement of the rebalance.
You mentioned the Arctic. There are growing uncertainties
about the future of, frankly, not only the legal status and the
exploitation of the Arctic but the security environment.
So I saw that General Milley, in response to your question
in his hearing, said he would need to look at operational
requirements before force cuts. As we said in our report, that
strikes us as the right sequence.
Senator Sullivan. General?
General Conant. I am more simple. The Army said they
regionally aligned with the forces out of I Corps, that unit
that comes out of I Corps, which means you have less capacity
and capability for the Pacific.
The airborne aspect of it, I have been up there in your
State and visited them. It is very impressive.
I am not one for giving it away because you just do not
know when you might need it. I understand there might be a cost
factor. But again, I go to that regional alignment that Army
has dictated to the rebalance, and that is the I Corps and
425th being part of that.
I understand that we have gone the way with NORTHCOM, who
owns Alaska and all that. But it is really the force should not
be drawn down, because it is just paying another bill somewhere
else. I would be interested in where that bill is being paid.
Thank you.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding this hearing, another very valuable session in the
development of strategic concepts and initiatives.
And I want to thank both of you for being here and for your
very, very important insights and information.
I want to come back to undersea warfare that was raised by
Senator Reed, because it is identified in the report as the
area of our greatest asymmetric advantage right now, but only
if we continue to invest in it. We have a technological edge,
but the Chinese and Russians and others are seeking to catch
us.
So my question, Dr. Green, is, how should we target that
investment to make sure we preserve and even enhance that
advantage undersea?
Dr. Green. Some of this, Senator, is in the classified
report we provided. And I am certain that our colleagues would
be happy to come and brief you on some of the specific ideas.
Senator Blumenthal. I would welcome that.
Dr. Green. One area we emphasized in the unclassified
report is deployment forward.
Senator Blumenthal. Deployment of another six?
Dr. Green. Yes. To us, it makes sense to put more Los
Angeles class in Guam and eventually Virginia-class----
Senator Blumenthal. But you also identified as critical the
Ohio replacement program.
Dr. Green. Right.
Senator Blumenthal. And that will take a major investment.
So my question is, in targeting resources, how would you
suggest that we preserve that as a priority of the Navy?
Dr. Green. Well, as General Conant said earlier, of the
different assets we want forward deployed to have a credible
deterrent, submarines are at the top of the list. I would say
followed closely by amphibious capabilities for the Marines.
But I should let General Conant answer.
General Conant. Senator, as I said before, it is such a
valuable strategic asset that it does so many different
missions. And I am talking subs, and we are looking at unmanned
systems that go along with subs.
Nobody is going to match that. Nobody can match our
submarine crews. Nobody can match our ability to go on patrol
and do what needs to be done in those special collection
missions and other things they do anywhere else in the world.
And it is something we should not back away from. And I
think it is something we will have as a superior capability for
some time to come.
So I would be, again, really looking hard at how we do that
investment.
There is a part of the nuclear piece you need to look at,
that is part of the triad that needs to be replaced. And that
is another deterrence value that sends a strong message, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. The amount of the investment in the
Ohio replacement is so large, $100 billion, shouldn't the
financing, the funding for it, come from the DOD as a whole,
not limited to the Navy budget?
General Conant. Being a former programmer in the Marine
Corps, I used to hear those conversations about HMX [Marine
Helicopter Squadron One] and other things that people said they
cannot afford to fund. At the end of the day, the Navy has
that, I think, responsibility. Whether they get a bigger share
of the pie than others, I am all for that.
But I do not who else--I mean, I do not know how you do
that, other than creating a firestorm for the Pentagon
comptroller, which he can handle.
Senator Blumenthal. To shift to the unmanned undersea
vehicles, is our investment sufficient now?
General Conant. From what I have looked at, I think you are
doing well. I think you can do little bit more. As you look at
maybe doing some aspect of unmanned systems that have other
things in them that pop up, and all of a sudden in a battle
space can contribute to that knowledge and to that ability to
control it. It is a little bit classified, but again, it is
talking in generalities here.
I think the Navy is doing a very, very good job at looking
at that. I was briefed on that right before I left PACOM. So,
again, I would watch it with a close eye. It may become a bill
payer as other things come due.
Senator Blumenthal. I just want to finish, in the seconds I
have left, to ask you about institutionalizing a culture of
experimentation, which I view as a very promising vision, the
idea of the red and green teams, and awarding citations, and so
forth.
Has that been proposed before? And has it ever been
implemented in the Department of Defense or intelligence
community?
General Conant. Yes, we have used that numerous times as we
looked at different plans. But my experience with General
Krulak, back during his commandant days when he said we do not
have any money but we have our brains. So you can apply a very
small investment into this red team, blue team, gold team,
white team, whatever you want to call it, and apply the
intellectual rigor against how we should be doing things
different. That was when I talked about these new conceptual
pieces that we are going to have to think about.
Senator Blumenthal. And that is one of the recommendations
of the report?
General Conant. Yes.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Conant. And you see that being done up in the Naval
War College and the Air War College and Marine War College.
They are starting to look at these new concepts.
But you ought to get the service labs really involved in
what is the art of the possibility, because sometimes you are
just going to study something you are not going to gain for 20
years, and you do not have the time to invest in it.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks very much.
Chairman McCain. Senator King?
Senator King. Two areas that I would like to talk about,
North Korea nuclear policy and also the area of most immediate
potential conflict with China, which is the South China Sea.
Shouldn't we change the name of the South China Sea? It is
not anywhere near China.
I do not understand how they claim the Spratly Islands,
which is about the same distance from China as Venezuela is
from us. How are we going to deal with this incredibly
expansive claim, which does not necessarily affect us but all
those other regional--Vietnam, Malaysia, although other
regional countries that are encompassed in this? It just seems
that this is fraught with risk.
What is the thinking of the group on what we should do to
deal with this issue?
General Conant, do you want to take a pass at that?
General Conant. Sure. First of all, I do not think we let
them define the problem set, them being China. So the nine-dash
line came out, spent a couple years trying to figure out what
it was all about, and it comes from a historical document. And
so, therefore, they think they have a claim.
It kind of goes back to Senator Kaine's question on UNCLOS.
If you are not there at the table and you do not have your best
lawyers engaging in the law of warfare, the lawfare that they
use against us, that they think against us in a strategic
context, then you are not going to get there.
I wouldn't rename anything.
Senator King. I was being facetious.
General Conant. I know, sir. But historical norms, I think
it is worth the engagement. But again, they will say the
relevancy is, are you a treaty signator or not? But I think
that is worthy of it.
But they are out and about, and they are reclaiming rocks,
submerged assets, submerged----
Senator King. Well, they are reclaiming, but they are also
rebuilding airstrips on them and reconstructing.
General Conant. They are.
Senator King. I agree with you on the Law of the Sea
Treaty. We are on the sideline, and I think we are undercutting
our own national interests by not being at the table.
We recently did a kind of sail-by to establish
international waters. What should be our actions? What should
we do to assist in trying to move toward a resolution of what I
see as a long-term potential problem?
Dr. Green. Senator, as a spinoff of this report, which was
commissioned by your committee, we at CSIS have done a separate
project, we would be happy to brief you or your staff on, on
exactly that question. What would a counter-coercion strategy
look like, to increase the cost to China and slow them down,
frankly, try to get some stability in the region?
Senator King. Are the neighbors down there concerned about
this?
Dr. Green. Absolutely. Every single one of them now. It
used to be just the Philippines or Vietnam. But now, across all
the members of the Association of Southeast Asian nations,
ASEAN, there is concern.
One thing we do have to do is recognize this is not just a
manifestation of Chinese nationalism, that there are
geopolitical and military operational implications.
When we had the Taiwan Straits crisis with China in 1995,
1996, that southern flank, that South China Sea, we could have
entered with impunity. If we have another crisis with China in
the first island chain with these airfields, they may be easy
targets when the shooting starts, but before that point, with
these airfoils, we will have to or our allies will have to
stretch our attention and our forces to deal with that flank so
that it is not a bastion for us, in effect, to be outflanked.
Senator King. I would appreciate a briefing on that, on
your report on that particular issue.
The second question, very briefly, how does North Korea's
recent actions with regard to missiles and nuclear tests change
that calculus in terms of our deterrent, our commitment to our
allies in the region? My concern is that if our allies lose
confidence in our deterrent, they are going to develop their
own capability, and then we are moving away from
nonproliferation.
General?
General Conant. Yes, sir. I think that is a spot-on
assessment. We have heard forever that China can influence
North Korea to some factor.
Senator King. I wish they would do it.
General Conant. I am here to tell you, in personal
conversations and other times, I just do not see that
happening. So the worst thing that could happen, if Kim Jong-un
decides to not only nuclearize but miniaturize a delivery
vehicle, put it on a three-stage Taepodong, then you have an
existential threat that we have not thought about before.
It is in our interests to ensure that that never happens or
that does not happen.
To think that we can count on China helping us with that, I
am not sure history has shown us that is going to happen.
Senator King. Thank you. I would like to pursue that issue,
too, offline.
Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To what degree do you think the successful passage of the
Pacific trade agreement is important to our defense policy in
the Pacific region?
Dr. Green. It is very important. Passage of TPP would
indicate--I mean, there are economic advantages. But in
addition to those, the passage of TPP, in short, indicates
American competence and willpower.
From an Asian perspective, TPP looks so obviously in
American interests economically and strategically, it would be
very difficult to explain why we could not pass it. And it
would raise questions, and I hear these in the region. And I
apologize if I am being too blunt, but it would great questions
about our willpower to lead in that region and our competence
in assembling tools that the region wants to help us assemble
to lead.
So it is not just about economics, Senator. I think it gets
to the heart of what is ultimately the most important thing to
this region. They care about how many subs we have. They care
about how many Marines we have. But they care, above all, about
our willpower and our competence to lead.
Senator Nelson. General?
General Conant. Yes, sir. I think it is extremely important
because it is another factor of U.S. strategic vision on what
should happen out in that region.
The factor that you have such people as Vietnam and
Cambodia wanting it to happen for the benefit to themselves is
tremendous.
Again, it is a shared awareness that you are going to have
over 40 percent GDP [gross domestic product] production out of
that part of the world. And not to have some kind of trade
agreement or partnership with them would seem to be not in the
best strategic vision sense for this Nation.
But a lot of capability out there that goes both ways.
Senator Nelson. And does it get us in the economic door
before China with those countries?
Dr. Green. Senator, it does, in many cases.
For example, there are estimates that $100 million a year
of trade with the U.S. would shift from China to Vietnam
because Vietnam is in TPP, and Vietnam would be accepting the
rules, not just the tariff, but the behind the border rules.
TPP is important for another reason, which is, it is
sparking a debate in China about whether they can afford to be
outside of the emerging rules in the Asia-Pacific region. So
the complexity of the strategy we describe in our report is, we
are trying to deter China, we are trying to shape China's
behavior, but we do not want to make China an enemy. TPP is one
of the tools that allows us to force people in Beijing to think
about the advantages of being in a rules-based system and the
cost of being out. They can do the math and figure that out.
Over the past few years, once Japan committed to TPP, the
debate in Beijing changed. Instead of talking about this as
containment of China, they talked about it as the external
pressure they need to reform their economy.
So it has a multiplier effect for us that goes beyond the
job creation, recognizing, of course, that trade is hard,
because there are winners and losers in these agreements.
Senator Nelson. If I am correct, the sand spits that they
are now turning into runways are between Vietnam and the
Philippines. If that is the case, and if you were the commander
in chief, what would you do and how close would you run our
naval vessels? And beyond that, as a show of force, what would
you do to deter this Chinese strategy?
General Conant. Good question. A difficult question, first
of all. But I will not speak for anybody but myself.
I think, in that aspect, you need an engagement process
that shows those transits of ships, the overflight of
airplanes. You are going to have your reconnaissance missions
out there trying to see what they are doing and what they are
not doing.
I think that process alone sends a strong message. But
every time we do that, there is a process it has to go through
to approve those missions, and it is very complex, convoluted.
And sometimes it takes days, weeks, to get that approval.
Sometimes they are turned off at the last minute.
So if you want true freedom of navigation through the air
and through the sea, then we should be trying to empower those
commanders on a reasonable basis in consultation with the
administration on when we run them and how we should run them.
We know how to do this, sir. We have done it before. And it
should not threaten anybody.
But the fact that China is squawking so hard about it is
probably something that we ought to pay attention to. It may be
a deterrence factor in the end.
And also allies and partners, we have five allies. We have
very many partners out there, and the partners are as important
as allies.
Dr. Green. If I may, Senator?
I agree completely with General Conant's recommendations.
First and foremost, we need to do more of these freedom of
navigation operations, and we probably need to do one near
Mischief Reef or one of these undersea features, to demonstrate
that we and our allies will welcome it, and our partners do not
accept China's claim that this is an island with territorial
rights.
On a broader strategic scale, I think the assumption in
Beijing is that time is on their side and that our bilateral
alliances in Asia will gradually whither as China becomes more
important economically. If China sees that its actions are not
only strengthening our alliances, but causing more cooperation
and networking across alliances--the U.S., Australia, Japan,
India, support for the Philippines--that is not built into
their assumptions about China's longer term interests in Asia.
I think that is how you cause second thought in Beijing. If
they start creating the antibodies in the system to come
together because of what they are doing, they will have to
rethink their assumptions about China's future strategic
interests and position in the Asia-Pacific region.
Chairman McCain. Well, I want to thank the witnesses.
Amongst the many recommendations I am interested in is one of
your recommendations about encouraging Japan to establish a
joint operations command. Thinking outside of the box, now that
there seems to have been a reconciliation between Japan and
South Korea, you might even think about expanding that as well.
I think one of the least noticed, but more important events
of recent years is finally resolving the comfort women issue,
so that we could have arguably the two strongest nations in the
Pacific region with us in a much more coordinated fashion.
And I think the witnesses would agree that things are not
going to get quieter in the Pacific region, in the near future
anyway. So I thank you all.
Senator Reed do you have anything?
Senator Reed. No, sir. Thank you very much.
Chairman McCain. Thank you very much. The hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:04 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[all]