[Senate Hearing 114-720]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-720
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION, RUSSIA, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
THURSDAY, JULY 7, 2016
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman JACK REED, Rhode Island
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma BILL NELSON, Florida
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
JONI ERNST, Iowa MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina TIM KAINE, Virginia
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
MIKE LEE, Utah MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
TED CRUZ, Texas
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
July 7, 2016
Page
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Russia, and European 1
Security.
Smith, Julianne, Senior Fellow and Director, Strategy and 4
Statecraft Program, Center for a New American Security, Former
Deputy National Security Advisor to Vice President Joe Biden.
Burns, Honorable R. Nicholas, Goodman Professor of Diplomacy and 10
International Relations, Harvard Kennedy School.
Jones, General James L., USMC (Ret.), Chairman, Brent Scowcroft 11
Center on International Security, Atlantic Council, and Former
National Security Advisor.
(iii)
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION, RUSSIA, AND EUROPEAN
SECURITY
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 7, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in Room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe,
Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Tillis, Sullivan, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and
Heinrich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Well, good morning. Senate Armed Services
Committee meets this morning to receive testimony on the NATO
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] alliance, Russia, and
European security.
We're grateful to our witnesses for appearing before the
committee today: Ambassador Nicholas Burns, a distinguished
member of the faculty at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government
and former U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO; General James
Jones, Chairman of the Scowcroft Center on International
Security at the Atlantic Council--among many senior positions
he held during his long career in public service, General Jones
served as Supreme Allied Commander Europe for NATO and
Commander of U.S. European Command; and Julianne Smith, Senior
Fellow and Director of the Strategy and Statecraft Program at
the Center for a New American Security and former Deputy
National Security Advisor to Vice President Joe Biden.
Ambassador Burns and General Jones are the authors of the
Atlantic Council's new report on ``Restoring the Power and
Purpose of the NATO alliance.'' Ms. Smith served as a member of
the report's review board. I thank the Atlantic Council and all
those that contributed to this timely, substantive report.
Last week marked the 100th anniversary of the start of the
Battle of the Somme in World War I, 141 days of carnage that
killed or wounded over one million soldiers. This is a powerful
reminder of a time fading from memory, yet not all that
distant, that Europe was a war-torn continent. It's also a
reminder of how fortunate we are that the United States and our
allies changed that tragic arc of history at a crucial
inflection point. We forged the rules-based international order
out of the ashes of World War II. We are committed, ourselves,
to human rights, democracy, rule of law, open markets, and
peaceful settlements of disputes, and we built a NATO alliance
to protect, defend, and advance a Europe whole, free, and at
peace.
Again we stand at a critical inflection point as the shadow
of war is returned to Europe. The Atlantic Council report
warns, and I quote, ``The peace, security, and democratic
stability of Europe can no longer be taken for granted.''
Today, the NATO alliance faces the greatest threat to peace and
security in Europe since the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the
challenges to our alliance are great: radical Islamic terrorism
radiating instability across the Middle East, the worst refugee
crisis since World War II, a weakened European Union, and
perhaps most significant of all, a revanchist and unrepentant
Russia willing to use military force to achieve political
objectives.
Two years ago, for the first time in seven decades on the
European continent, Vladimir Putin invaded and annexed the
territory of a southern--of a sovereign nation by force.
Unfortunately, since then he has learned from bloody experience
in Ukraine, and now in Syria, that military adventurism pays,
that diplomacy can be manipulated to serve his strategic
ambitions, and that the worst refugee crisis since World War II
can be weaponized to divide the West and weaken its resolve.
Two years later, our alliance is still struggling to adjust
to the scope, scale, and seriousness of the new strategic
reality we face. Confronted by brazen aggression, the Obama
administration maintains its refusal to provide Ukraine with
the lethal assistance it needs to defend itself. Many of our
NATO allies have failed to reverse declining defense budgets
and honor their pledge to reach the two percent target within a
decade. Setting aside targets, the reality is that European
defense spending is simply not commensurate with the security
challenges faced by the alliance. Many NATO allies have
inexplicably been reluctant to make the strategic investments
in critical military capabilities needed to further alliance
inoperability and improve readiness.
That said, there has been important progress. NATO has
stood up a Rapid Reaction Force, increased air policing and sea
patrols, expanded training and exercises, and moved more forces
and equipment east toward the Baltic states, Poland, and the
Black Sea region. Yet, it concerns me to hear senior European
officials criticize even these limited steps to provide
credible deterrence against Russian aggression as, ``saber-
rattling or warmongering.'' Such comments suggest a troubling
head-in-the-sand mentality that yearns for a speedy return to
the days of the delusional Russia reset and what General
Breedlove has called ``hugging the bear.'' Worse, such comments
fundamentally misrepresent and undermine NATO's recent effort
to defend itself. At a time of renewed danger, our alliance
seeks to reaffirm and reinforce a decades-old commitment to
promote a Europe whole, free, and at peace. That is what we
must continue to do as we work to ensure the credibility of
NATO's collective defense commitment in all domains:
conventional, cyber, hybrid, and nuclear.
Finally, let me add that a strong NATO is in America's
national security interests. Nowhere has that been made more
clear than in Afghanistan, where our allies have sacrificed
blood and treasure fighting alongside us for 15 years. Our
shared mission is not over yet. That's why I welcome the
President's announcement yesterday that the United States will
retain 8,400 troops in Afghanistan into next year. I believe
that conditions on the ground warranted retaining the current
force level of 9,800. I fail to see any strategic rationale for
the withdrawal of 1,400 U.S. troops while the security
situation remains, in the President's own word, ``precarious.''
That said, it's important the United States signaled our
ongoing commitment to the mission in Afghanistan ahead of the
NATO summit in Warsaw, this week, where our allies will make
troop and funding commitments to the Resolute Support mission.
I believe the commitments our allies make this week will once
again demonstrate that NATO is a critical force multiplier and
a vital partner to promote global stability and security.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, and the
opportunity to discuss their recommendations for strengthening
the NATO alliance, reinvigorating U.S. global leadership, and
meeting our shared challenges.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me join you in welcoming the witnesses, thanking them
not only for their testimony today, but for their service to
the Nation in so many different ways.
Thank you very, very much.
The NATO alliance and our partners are confronted by a
security landscape that has undergone drastic changes in recent
years. NATO faces multiple threats to regional stability,
including ongoing Russian provocations in the east which flout
international norms; the conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and North
Africa which continue to destabilize the region and have driven
a historic number of refugees to flee into NATO countries; and
the prospect that radicalized citizens of NATO countries may
export their battlefield training from these conflicts in the
Middle East back to their home country. In addition, there are
challenges beyond the military domain, in areas such as
economic stability, in cyber and energy security. When the NATO
summit begins in Warsaw tomorrow, all of these issues will be
discussed at length.
Two years ago, at the Wales summit, members agreed to
several important steps in an effort to recalibrate the
alliance with the new security environment. They approved a
Readiness Action Plan to enhance the alliance's ability to
respond quickly to security challenges. They affirmed defense
spending commitments of two percent of GDP [gross domestic
product], and agreed that it is not enough just to increase
spending; investments must also be focused on strategic
capabilities that strengthen the alliance. In Warsaw, expected
announcements included enhanced forward presence to the east,
the declaration of cyber as a domain, and the affirmation of
NATO allies' and partners' long-term commitment to Afghanistan.
On that last point, I support the President's decision to
retain approximately 8,400 United States troops in Afghanistan
into 2017 to continue training, advising, and assisting the
Afghan Security Forces and conducting counterterrorism
operations.
Yesterday's announcement comes at an important time in this
year's fighting season. It takes into account the advice of the
commanders on the ground and gives clarity to our NATO allies
as their own contributions are discussed at Warsaw this week.
The issue of deterrence, and what constitutes an effective
deterrence, will also be discussed in Warsaw. Included in this
year's Senate-passed National Defense Authorization bill is
$3.4 billion for the European Reassurance Initiative, a
fourfold increase over last year's funding. This funding is
intended to enhance the U.S. military presence and activities
in Europe and focus United States efforts more intently on
deterrence measures. In addition, NATO will announce the
deployment of four battalions to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
and Poland to enhance forward presence. As both of these
initiatives move forward, it will be essential to ensure that
they are integrated so that deterrence measures are amplified
and not simply duplicated. I will be interested to hear our
panelists' views on how best to--these integration efforts.
Thank you again, to our panelists, for their willingness to
appear this morning. I look forward to your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. I thank the witnesses. I do believe that
this hearing is a very timely one, given the President and
Secretary of Defense's departure for Warsaw for a NATO summit.
I thank the witnesses.
Ms. Smith, we'll begin with you.
STATEMENT OF JULIANNE SMITH, SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR,
STRATEGY AND STATECRAFT PROGRAM, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN
SECURITY, FORMER DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO VICE
PRESIDENT JOE BIDEN
Ms. Smith. Thank you very much. Thank you, Chairman McCain,
Ranking Member Reed, and members of the committee, for the
opportunity to testify this morning on the NATO alliance, on
Russia, on European security.
As you both noted, the summit, the NATO summit, will start
tomorrow in Warsaw, Poland, and run over two days. As you also
know, NATO summits tend not to garner much attention by publics
on the other side of the Atlantic or even by our public here in
the United States. To the extent that Americans and Europeans
notice that a summit's even occurring, what do they see? They
see red carpets. They see handshaking. They see a lot of
champagne toasts. They have a hard time understanding how all
of that will have any impact on their day-to-day lives.
To the extent that they follow the details of the summit,
or have in the past, they also hear lots of pledges by our
European allies to spend more on defense. That has not happened
over several decades, and they've seen those pledges
essentially gone unfulfilled. But, I believe that this
particular summit in Warsaw, the one that starts tomorrow, is
worth watching and deserves a considerable amount of praise.
Let me take just a few minutes to explain why.
In terms of the actual deliverables at the summit, the
first deliverable is the fact that we're having a summit at
all. The summit is one of the deliverables. What do I mean by
that? Well, with Europe buckling under the weight of Brexit,
the migration crisis, counterterrorism challenges, instability
in the Middle East, and a resurgent Russia, this summit is a
very useful and, Senator McCain, you used the word, ``timely''
opportunity for the transatlantic partners to come together and
showcase resolve, solidarity, and unity at a time when,
frankly, they need it most.
In regards to the threats that NATO faces east, we've
already heard some of the ways in which the alliance is going
to be strengthening its policies and tools to address those
threats. Most notably in the area of deterrence, the alliance
will be adding four new multinational brigades--battalions, I'm
sorry--in the three Baltic states and Poland.
In regards to the threats that NATO faces in the south, the
alliance will be making two major decisions. One, it's going to
increase training and capacity-building inside Iraq, which is
rare for the alliance. The alliance tends to prefer to do those
types of things outside of conflict zones. This is an important
decision. The alliance is going to assume the risk and take on
these types of missions inside Iraq.
Two, the alliance is going to announce that it's going to
be deploying AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System] as
part of the anti-ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]
coalition, which is also important, because, frankly, I think
the alliance has been trying to avoid getting involved in this
conflict for quite some time.
As another deliverable, I would note that the alliance is
taking the rather controversial decision of adding Montenegro,
its 29th member, to the alliance. This is obviously important
news for Montenegro, which has worked tirelessly to meet all of
the criteria for NATO membership, but, more importantly, this
is a way that the West can send a very strong signal to Moscow
that sovereign nations have the right to determine freely, or
choose freely, their associations and alliances.
There will be other important initiatives at this summit
announced over the next two days, and we can get into those
details perhaps later this morning, but, just quickly, I would
note that the alliance will be reaffirming NATO nuclear policy.
This is something, frankly, that the alliance has almost
forgotten about in recent years. That will be put back on the
agenda. You'll also see some new initiatives in regards to EU
[European Union]/NATO cooperation, which is important, because
these are two institutions that have been unable to cooperate
over several decades. You'll hear more about resilience and
ways in which the alliance is going to be strengthening the
toolkit it has to respond to the hybrid tactics that our
friends in Russia are using. You'll hear some news--not enough
good news, but some good news--on defense spending, as well.
But, ultimately, we have to ask ourselves, Is all of this
enough? I would answer no. After the red carpets are rolled up,
after all those handshakes and the champagne toasts and the
praise that NATO deserves for this summit, NATO has to get back
to work. In particular, I think the alliance needs to turn its
attention to Libya, which is now commonly described as the
second-biggest source of instability in the Euro-Atlantic area,
after Syria. I think the alliance is going to have to ensure
that those new battalions are reinforced and can be sustained
over the long term. The alliance is going to have to focus on
defense spending and ensure that allies are continuing to march
towards that two percent target. We're also going to have to
spend some time on Romania and Bulgaria and the Black Sea, a
region that has received less attention than the Baltic states.
Finally, we're going to have to look at what other tools NATO
can develop in cooperation and working with the EU to deal with
cyberthreats, strategic communications challenges from the
Russians, and all sorts of other hybrid tactics that they
regularly use. Above all, we have to ensure that NATO can
continue to rely on U.S. leadership, which has been a key
ingredient to the alliance's success over many, many decades.
In closing, I'd only state that I disagree with those that
say NATO is obsolete. It is imperfect, but it is also capable
of innovation, adaptation, and concrete policy initiatives that
make a real difference in enhancing European security and our
own security. We'll see plenty of evidence of that over the
next two days.
Again, thank you very much for the opportunity. I look
forward to your question.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Smith follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Ambassador Burns.
STATEMENT OF HONORABLE R. NICHOLAS BURNS, GOODMAN PROFESSOR OF
DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL
Ambassador Burns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed,
members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to
testify this morning.
Twenty-five years ago this autumn, we in NATO believed that
Europe's historic demons of war and division--and you
referenced them this morning, Mr. Chairman, in your statement--
we thought they had been vanquished, because communism
collapsed, Germany was united in NATO, the United--the USSR
vanished from the scene, and that allowed President George H.
W. Bush to proclaim a strategic imperative that I think all
administrations since, Democrat and Republican, have agreed on,
that Europe is whole, free, and at peace. It was one of the
most significant foreign policy accomplishments in our history.
Twenty-five years later, General Jones and I believe that
Europe and the United States are facing the greatest threat to
the peace since the end of the Cold War. Specifically, we're
encountering a dramatically changed and perilous security
environment in Europe produced by four interlocking challenges.
The first is Vladimir Putin's aggression, his division of
Georgia and of Ukraine, his annexation of Crimea, his threats
to the Baltic states, and his military's harassment of United
States military forces in international airspace and
international waters. The second challenge is a dramatically
weakening and potentially fractured European Union, now
exacerbated by the possible departure of the United Kingdom.
The third is the tsunami of violence spreading from the Levant
in North Africa into Europe, itself. The fourth is uncertain
and sometimes seemingly unconfident European and American
leadership in the face of these combined challenges.
It would be an exaggeration to say that we're returning to
the Cold War or that our dream of a united, peaceful Europe is
no longer attainable, but these are daunting risks requiring a
rededication to one of our most enduring bipartisan objectives,
a secure, durable, strengthened American link to Europe's
future and Europe's success. That is why the NATO alliance
remains so important to the United States. That is why such a
changed security situation requires a significant and bold
response by the United States and its NATO allies to Putin and
the other threats that we mentioned.
The Atlantic Council report that General Jones and I shared
makes many recommendations. You've seen them. But, the
principal recommendation is that NATO should station military
forces, on a permanent basis, in the Baltic states, in Poland,
in the Black Sea region, and to have stronger capacity in the
Arctic region. This will make NATO's strategic deterrence and
our article 5 commitment to our allies real and unambiguous and
unyielding to the Russian Government. It's the best way to
secure the peace in Europe.
We may need to hold the line against Putin in eastern
Europe for some time to come, and that is why we must also
maintain American, European, and Canadian sanctions against
Putin until he has met all the conditions of the two Minsk
agreements negotiated with the Ukrainian Government, the
British, and the French. To let him off the hook, as some
European leaders are already advocating, would let him get away
with larceny and aggression not seen in Europe--and you
referenced this, as well, Mr. Chairman--in 70 years. That is
also why the United States should extent lethal military
assistance to Ukraine, so that it has the capacity to defend
itself against clear and open Russian aggression.
We need, furthermore, to push our NATO allies to rebuild
their militaries and spend much more in the--on the--on their
defense, given this altered strategic environment. It is
unacceptable that these wealthy countries are nearly all
punching below their weight. Only five of the 28 NATO allies
are spending above NATO's minimum of two percent of GDP on
their national defense. We need, especially, a stronger Germany
to help lead NATO, and help the United States lead NATO, in
this new era. We need a stronger United Kingdom, France, Italy,
Spain, and Poland, to enable NATO meet these new threats.
My final point, Mr. Chairman, is that our most complex
challenge may come from within the NATO countries, themselves.
Our strongest link, of course, is that we are all democracies,
but many of us, including our own country, are confronting a
wave of isolationist sentiment and, in some cases, extremism,
in our domestic political debates. NATO is going to need
strong, unflinching American leadership to cope with these
challenges. The next American President will have the
opportunity, and the obligation, to provide such leadership to
weather these storms.
An early NATO Summit in 2017 could confirm the decision to
keep adequate forces in Afghanistan, to train the militaries of
Iraq and Tunisia and Jordan, to increase our national defense
budgets, to maintain the sanctions on Putin, and to provide
effective strategic deterrence against him. Most importantly,
the next President must win the battle for public support here
at home, within the United States. That effort should focus on
what we know to be true, that our alliances strengthen, and
they don't weaken, us; that American isolation, on the left and
the right, is not the answer to these problems; and that NATO
remains not only relevant, as Julie has said, but essential in
this changed world where American leadership is so critical and
so much in demand.
Thank you very much.
Chairman McCain. General Jones.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC (RET.), CHAIRMAN,
BRENT SCOWCROFT CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, ATLANTIC
COUNCIL, AND FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
General Jones. Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, members of the
committee, thank you very much for inviting me to testify,
along with my colleagues, before this committee on the
important topic of NATO, Russia, and European security in the
context of the upcoming NATO Summit in Warsaw.
I'm honored to work with the Atlantic Council and my
friend--my friends, Ambassador Burns and Julianne Smith, in
producing the study ``Restoring the Power and Purpose of the
NATO Alliance.'' We're pleased to submit this report as the
official testimony for the record.
If you--with your permission, I'd like to make a few key
points in reference to the major challenges facing the alliance
and the way ahead. But, before I do, however, I'd like to make
a reference to an issue about which I testified before this
committee last year, and that's the deplorable treatment of
refugees of Camp Liberty in Iraq.
On Monday, July 4th of this year, at 20:35 local time, the
MEK [Mujahadeen-e-Khalq] at Camp Liberty came under the direct
fire of 50 missiles and rockets launched by paramilitary forces
associated with Iran's Quds Force and with the tacit approval
of the Iraqi Government. This--attacks inflicted severe damage
upon the residents of the camp, and a number of residents were
severely injured, about 50. The MEK is continually subjected--
is--has been continually subjected to attacks directed by the
Iranian regime since their installation at Camp Ashraf.
Monday's attack is the latest in an ongoing string of assaults
on the residents at their current residence of Camp Liberty.
All told, the MEK has been victim to eight attacks and have
resulted in 140 people killed and over 1400 injured. It's only
a matter of time, as I said last year, until they come under
assault once again.
I previously recommended in testimony that the United
States Government should adopt a much more compassionate view
of the MEK and, by extension, a more aggressive posture when it
comes to ensuring their safety. The United States Government
took on an explicit obligation in 2003 to protect them while in
residence, and now, I submit, in captivity, at Camp Liberty. To
date, the--we have failed them miserably and tragically.
Fourteen-hundred remaining members of this group are waiting to
go to Albania today.
I'd also like to acknowledge the role of the Albanian
Government in agreeing to accept the residents, and encourage
the United States Government to do all it can to ensure the
residents' swift and complete transfer to Albanian soil.
Mr. Chairman, the world and Europe face deep instability,
the likes of which we have not seen in decades, which impacts
our interests and the interests of our allies. Instability is
the implacable enemy of peace and development, and directly
threatens the interests of the United States and our allies.
Europe faces the alarming prospect of real retreat and
unraveling as--and, as we point out in this report, NATO faces
its greatest security threats since the end of the Cold War.
There is today a--clear differences, in my view, in how the
eastern European nations and the western European nations view
the Russian threat. This undercuts a longstanding bipartisan
United States goal of a united Europe whole and free. The
security order in the Middle East is unraveling, which affects
not only the Middle East, but also the United States and our
allies in Europe. Sixty-five million people are now displaced
by instability, perhaps the most in history. The move of
migration towards Europe has deeply destabilized our European
allies, and Africa could be right behind.
Retreat and isolationism from the world, however, do not
suit U.S. interests or enhance American security, prosperity,
and our values. In a world of rising instability, U.S.-led
alliances enhances our security, bolsters global stability, and
enhances U.S. influence globally. Vacuums are created when
leadership--U.S. leadership is not present and is not visible.
The first point I'd like to make is that NATO is a force
multiplier for United States, not a burden. Our 27 NATO allies
offer American forward basing, which allows us to better fight
enemies, like ISIS, and deter adversaries, like the new Russia,
and to meet shared challenges. Twenty-eight countries acting as
one is a powerful alliance.
Allies are instrumental to global security and have helped
carry the security burden in places like Iraq and Afghanistan.
Nearly 1,000 European and Canadian troops paid the ultimate
price in Afghanistan. Our allies support us politically at the
U.N. [United Nations] and through other political and economic
organizations and coalitions.
NATO is also an anchor of stability. That is priceless in a
world of instability. History clearly shows it is far less
costly in blood and treasure to invest in maintaining Europe's
peace than coming to Europeans' rescue after the outbreak of
conflict, as we did in World War I and World War II.
There is a need for greater U.S. leadership in NATO. Over
the last two administrations, the U.S. has retreated
considerably from its historic leadership role within the
alliance. It started in the Bush administration, and continues
today. NATO functions best when the United States provides
leadership. But, what does U.S. leadership mean? It means
American officials make the case for NATO and do not denigrate
our allies. Some are questioning the relevance of our most
important security alliance, which is NATO. That's not vision
and leadership. It's blindness and abdication, and it places
America at risk. We must rally our allies to meet the most
urgent threats at the doorstep: ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant], Russia, refugees, the radical spread of
fundamentalism, and the like. But, we must also position the
alliance to address emerging threats before they become
emergencies. This will require a new type of NATO. American
leadership is important to convince our allies to take on a
greater share of the security burden. We have a right to expect
that our allies should do more, or at least to live up to their
commitments that they've previously made, such as the two
percent for--of their GDP [gross domestic product] for defense
spending, agreed upon in 2002 at the Prague summit.
In a world of instability and hybrid threats, the United
States must put forward a vision for a proactive NATO. NATO
cannot be reactive in the 21st century. NATO should be active
in forming partnerships and building security capacity in
Africa and the Middle East. We need a stronger NATO/EU
[European Union] relationship in the face of terrorists and
hybrid threats. There is a need for NATO to take measures to
enhance societal resilience, and NATO should consider how
nonmilitary measures can affect security--for example,
sanctions--and serve as important tools for influence, like
energy security and cybersecurity, as well.
Mr. Chairman, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is in
a state of flux, but I'm confident that, with American
leadership and persuasion, that, when you look at the world
that we face, that we can shape this alliance, and we can make
it--we can transform it into a 21st-century reality that will
enhance our collective security.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Thank you, General. Thank you for bringing
this--to the attention of the committee this latest attack on
Camp Liberty. It is a compelling argument to get those people
out of there as quickly as possible. Clearly we have failed in
our commitment to them.
We need to get your opinion, the three witnesses, on the
President's decision, instead of withdrawing down to what was
once described as embassy-centric forces, where now the
President has decided to have 8,400 troops remaining in
Afghanistan. I don't see the rationale for withdrawing 1,400. I
know for a fact that the military advice was to maintain 9,800.
But, it's better than the--what had been planned and stated
plans by the President.
We'll begin with you, Ms. Smith, on this latest iteration
of our commitment in Afghanistan.
Ms. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I support the decision to maintain higher troop levels
inside Afghanistan. I am also in support of your personal view,
that that number should be as high as possible and reflect the
advice of our military commanders.
I look at it through an allied lens. I know from past
experience, in my position working NATO issues inside the
Pentagon, that, should the United States decide to leave, we
would then see a rapid departure of all of our allies. The
truth of the matter is that they have sacrificed a great deal
and contributed considerably to the Afghan mission through
many, many years; but the reality is that they cannot make
those contributions without the support of the United States,
without our enablers, the lift we provide, the medevac, the
list goes on and on. So, I am glad to see that the number will
stay higher than inspected. I wish it were a little higher.
But, I am also glad because of the impact it will have on our
allies that are on the ground with us in Afghanistan.
Chairman McCain. Ambassador Burns.
Ambassador Burns. Mr. Chairman, I agree. I support the
President's decision, but I also agree with you and Julie Smith
that it would have been preferable to keep the number where the
military wanted the number, at 9800. I was at NATO
headquarters, visiting, ten days ago, and it was clear, in my
conversations with the Secretary General and others, that NATO
wants to stay, but they need the United States to stay and to
lead. This will allow NATO to stay.
I would just conclude by saying that General Jones and I
were both at NATO--Jim, as SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander
Europe], and I was Ambassador--when we deployed NATO to
Afghanistan in August 2003. We didn't realize how long a
mission it would be. But, looking at the security situation and
the threat from the Taliban, al Qaeda, and the Islamic State in
Afghanistan, and looking at, I think, some of the good measures
of the current Afghan Government, we have an obligation to stay
and help them succeed.
Chairman McCain. Additionally, General Jones, as you know,
in June there was a change in the rules of engagement, which
previously had prohibited attacks on the Taliban, which is
beyond bizarre. But, I'm glad that we have, now, that
capability. Your comment?
General Jones. Mr. Chairman, I support the recommendations
of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the combatant
commanders and the whatever. I do not know what they
recommended, but I--I'm glad to see we're leaving a substantive
force there.
I do think that President Ghani deserves our support. I
think he has the right intellectual and sense of mission, in
terms of what needs to be achieved in Afghanistan. The military
piece is one, for sure, but the other is to do everything we
can to help jumpstart the economy and show the Afghan people
that there is a better future for them and their children. I
think the third element is, obviously, governance and rule of
law that the Afghan people need to see is moving in the right
direction. So, it's--combination of those three things that I
think will turn Afghanistan in the right direction.
All of us are continuously, for years, disappointed that
our NATO allies haven't reached their two percent target, but
it's also a myth that it continues to be conveyed that the U.S.
accounts for about three-fourths of NATO funding. But, the
Washington Post pointed out, on 30 March, that U.S. contributes
22 percent.
So, I guess my question, beginning you--again with you, Ms.
Smith, is that--Mr. Trump has said, ``NATO is obsolete. It's
extremely expensive for the United States.'' Do you believe
that NATO is obsolete? Obviously the--could you say, briefly,
the consequences of our withdrawing for NATO or a dissolution
of NATO?
Ms. Smith. I'm not someone who believes that the alliance
is obsolete. I think it has its flaws, and I think defense
spending will continue to be a challenge. I would note that in
2015, last year, 16 allies spent more on defense than they had
the year prior, and next year 20 of the 29 allies will spend
more. Is it enough? No, it's not enough. We need to keep
pushing them towards two percent. I would note that some
allies, though, spend less than two percent, countries like
Norway that contribute a great deal to the missions that we
conduct around the world.
What would happen if the U.S. left the alliance? I think it
would collapse. I think U.S. leadership is absolutely critical.
I think this alliance serves our interests. It gives us very
capable partners that have assets, that have capabilities, that
have the will to act. They stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the
United States to face aggression to the alliance's east, to its
south. I think, particularly in light of Brexit, assuming it
happens, the NATO alliance will be more important than ever.
Ambassador Burns. Mr. Chairman, I think the United States
provides 22 percent of the direct costs of NATO, as that
Washington Post report indicated. There's a second figure. The
United States defense spending is about 73 percent of all
defense spending in Europe. So, there are different ways of
looking at this. But, direct cost to Europe is 22 percent.
The key country in the debate about burden-sharing is going
to be Germany. Chancellor Merkel, who I think has been a great
leader and a great friend of the United States, said, last
Wednesday, that she hoped Germany would be able to get to two
percent. It was the most significant statement that we've heard
from a German leader recently. She's not getting much help from
her coalition partners, but, if she can be returned--and we
don't know if that's to be the case--if Germany could step up--
in the recent trends that Julie Smith has indicated, 20 of the
allies have increased--have at least stopped cutting, and have
modest increases. We need to push the Europeans in that
direction.
Chairman McCain. So, you don't believe that NATO is
obsolete?
Ambassador Burns. I do not believe that NATO is obsolete,
Mr. Chairman. I would say this. I think that Mr. Trump's
comments, his consistent denigration of NATO and his consistent
praise of Vladimir Putin, are completely misguided. I think
he's already done a lot of damage to the alliance in
threatening, implicitly, to walk out, by saying that NATO is
obsolete and we shouldn't commit ourselves to it. I--the
number-one strategic advantage we have over Russia and China is
that we have alliances in Europe and Asia, and the Russians and
Chinese do not. So, we should build those alliances.
Chairman McCain. General Jones?
General Jones. Mr. Chairman, I don't believe NATO is
obsolete, but I do think it has been neglected a little bit in
the--as I've mentioned in my remarks, that the absence of
dedicated, visible leadership by the United States is
absolutely essential to make a 28-country alliance work.
For example, in the aftermath of Russia's invasion of
Crimea, in portions of the Ukraine, there was no emergency
meeting of the North Atlantic Council [NAC] called for by the
United States. I find that to be incredible. That is clearly in
the backyard of the alliance. I think there should have been an
emergency meeting of the NAC, as would--you would have expected
during the Cold War.
Many NATO nations are participating in the NATO ISIL
coalition in meaningful ways, but, as of now, the mission is
taken through a U.S.-led coalition, and there's disagreement in
the alliance about whether NATO should adopt a more formal
role. I believe NATO should first develop a strategy for
combating ISIL. NATO taking over command and control of the
coalition will be much more effective--a much more effective
use of resources. But, some allies may resist this move, for
various reasons. But, again, American leadership, properly
articulated, can convince them otherwise. I think that this is
a mission that Europe should respond to, as well as us.
Chairman McCain. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me once again commend you all for the report that the
Atlantic Council did. It was very thorough and very thoughtful
and, I think the word continues to pop up, ``timely.'' So,
thank you very much.
General Jones, one of the recommendations was a permanent
stationing of NATO forces in the Baltic. The alternative, and
the one that seems to be being pursued at the moment, is a
rotational force, where there would be a presence, but it
would--battalions would come in and come out. Can you give an
indication of what's the advantage of a permanent, versus
rotational, force?
General Jones. Well, I think the permanent forces are
always a little bit more expensive. I think there are really
two fronts that we should consider. One is the Baltics, and the
second one is the Black Sea.
I visited the--Romania recently. I was very pleased to
discover that 700 U.S. marines were training on some bases that
we established back in 2006. That was heartwarming;
heartwarming to the Romanians, I can assure you. But, I think
if the alliance decides a permanent basing is what's required,
then I would absolutely support that. But, I--clearly, there
has to be some presence that acts as a deterrence to Russian
goals.
Senator Reed. Yeah.
Ambassador Burns, your comments?
Ambassador Burns. We support permanent stationing, because
it would provide much more effective strategic deterrence
against Putin. He needs to know that NATO is going to defend
those countries--they're members of NATO--that article 5 will
be respected. A permanent basing in the Baltics, in Poland, in
my judgment, would be a much stronger warning to Putin than
these persistent rotations that the NATO alliance will be
announcing in the next 48 hours.
Senator Reed. To every action, there's an opposite and
equal reaction. That's physics as well as, sometimes, politics.
So, would there be a different reaction to the Russians to a
permanent, rather than rotational, force base?
Ambassador Burns. In my view, Putin would take us more
seriously if we deployed on a permanent basis, if we had
installations that were permanent, if we had some capacity to
defend these countries. We're not going to put, in the Baltic
states and Poland, the number of troops that Putin has across
the Narva River or across--in the western part of Russia. But,
it has to be strong enough to get his attention, and that
allows us to deal with him on a much more solid basis.
Senator Reed. Ms. Smith, your comments?
Ms. Smith. I agree with Ambassador Burns. I believe that
having a permanent presence would serve as a stronger deterrent
to Russian aggression. I think that Putin knows that these
measures, particularly the United States measures, are
temporary, and there's some question about their sustainment,
from a budgetary standpoint, but just in the sheer logistical
perspective, as well. I think, by putting permanent presence
into the region, we do send a very strong signal to Moscow.
Now, that said, will the Russians overreact? Will they
complain? Absolutely. But, they're going to do that--they're
already doing that in regards to the rotational presence. I
can't imagine that we'd see that much of a difference. They're
complaining about Montenegro joining the alliance. I mean, the
list of complaints is never-ending.
I feel like we've given Russia ample opportunity to take
the so-called ``exit ramp'' over the last two years. He has
refused to do so. I think now we need to do what we view
necessary to ensure that we can defend the Baltics, should
anything go terribly awry.
Senator Reed. As we contemplate, and, in fact, put into
effect, some of these provisions, or more constantly, the
permanent or rotational force in the Baltic, talking--General
Jones's suggestion of having some operations--coordinated
operations in the Black Sea, my sense--or just--ask you--we
also have to maintain sort of a communications channel with
Russia, because one problem would be an inadvertent escalation,
misreading what they're doing, and they misreading us. Is that
something that you would also see as critical to--as we build
up, maintaining, somehow, this effective channel of
communication?
Ms. Smith. Absolutely. Along with some of my colleagues, I
ran a war game earlier this year at the Center for New American
Security, called Assured Resolve, and we looked at this
question of potential Russian aggression in the Baltic states,
in the Nordic-Baltic region. I think the potential for a
seemingly small incident to spiral out of control is
considerable. Because of that, I think we do have to ensure
that we have just a basic line of communication open with the
Russians at all times so that we can work through a potential
crisis. As you well know, they regularly, for example, fly
jets, they've turned their transponders off, we've had a couple
of near misses. Let's say one of those jets were to collide
with a commercial airliner. We would immediately need to work
that through various channels we have with the Russians.
So, yes, we have to work with them, we have to engage with
them, clearly on Syria, as well, given the role that they play
and the relationship they have, sadly, with President Assad.
There are other challenges where we're going to need their
cooperation.
So, it's challenging. I do think we can do both. I think we
can build out deterrence and have a stronger deterrent inside
central and eastern Europe, but I also think that we can work
with them when it's in our direct interests.
Senator Reed. Very brief comments, Ambassador and General,
if you have them.
Ambassador Burns. Senator Reed, the bumper sticker from--
that we're going to hear in the next 48 hours from NATO is
going to be ``Deterrence and Dialogue with Russia.'' We ought
to have both. I argued, in my trip to Europe, when we presented
this report in Berlin and Brussels, that deterrence has to be
clear and strong, and that will allow a more effective
dialogue; we'll be taken more seriously. So, yes, to keep the
channels open. Secretary Kerry talks to Minister Lavrov a lot.
Senator Reed. A lot.
Ambassador Burns. Many times a week. But, the Russians have
to reciprocate. What Julie has pointed out, their egregious
behavior towards our military, that's obviously something
that's got to be brought up in that dialogue.
Senator Reed. General Jones, any comments, very quickly?
General Jones. Just a brief comment to say that--following
Ambassador Burns's point, that deterrence is very important. I
think some in western--in the western part of Europe are more
interested in dialogue and less in deterrence. But, if you go
to eastern Europe, they're more interested in deterrence----
Senator Reed. Than dialogue.
General Jones.--and dialogue. I think we need to focus--I
mean, this is, after all, a great military alliance. I think
the deterrence piece has to be--and it doesn't have to be just
military deterrence. I mean, sanctions are important. economic
pressures are important. We have all kinds of things that we
can do, that we should do collectively.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Jones, it's--in light of what's happened recently
with our action with--in legislation that's being passed and
proposed with Puerto Rico, I think it's appropriate to bring
up--it's hard for me to believe that it's been 16 years since
we fought, and lost, the battle of Vieques. I think it might
have some--be worth revisiting today. With all the problems
that they have there, I remember so well, right here in this
room, with Governor Rossello, from Puerto Rico, here, talking
about the fact that they were going to be closing the range.
It's--and we were bluffing when we said that the Roosevelt
Roads would be closed. Of course, obviously, its primary
purpose was to support the live range. You remember that?
General Jones. I remember it very well.
Senator Inhofe. Do you remember also the statement you made
when you were the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and you said,
``Vieques provides integrated live-fire training critical to
our readiness, and the failure to provide for live--for
adequate live-fire training for our naval forces for forward
deployment will place these forces in an unacceptable--
unacceptable--high risk. Vieques must not be closed,'' Remember
that?
General Jones. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Now that the time has gone by, I know
there--there was a concern for the training that we had prior
to going into Kosovo. A lot of that training, the proper
training, could have taken place, but didn't. I recall also the
incident where--in Kuwait, when we dropped, I think, five--
three 500---bombs off-target. That's the kind of training that
maybe could have been precluded in the training in Vieques. Do
you agree with that?
General Jones. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Well, the--I remember, after that,
personally going to a number of places, looking for that type
of training--Cape Wrath, in northern Scotland, Capo Teulada, in
Sardegna, and about 15 other areas.
Now, the point that I'm bringing up is that we tried--we
looked for comparable training; and, to my knowledge, we still,
today, don't have the kind of training that we needed at that
time. Do you think that the training that we're getting today
at the various installations, instead of having it all unified
in one place like we did in Vieques, is just as adequate as if
we still had Vieques?
General Jones. I think the Vieques range was beneficial for
not only the variety of training that we had, but also because
it was on United States soil and there were far fewer caveats
and restrictions. I thought it was a national asset. We--at the
time, we did not--we were not able to find other areas quite
to--quite like Vieques. But, the decision was made to cease
training there. It's hard to say what, exactly, the
consequences of that decision were, but we certainly lost a
very valuable training base.
Senator Inhofe. Well, I've been talking to a number of
people there, who were on our side----
General Jones. Correct.
Senator Inhofe.--at that time, who say it could come back.
We'll see what happens.
Ambassador Burns, I want to compliment you on the very
strong language you used in your opening statement concerning
what has happened over in the Ukraine. I and some of the others
were over there during their parliamentary elections, where,
for the first time in 96 years, they don't have one Communist
on their Parliament. That's due to their allegiance to the West
and to us. Then, of course, when Putin went in and started
killing those people, our--what is your idea of our response at
that time?
Ambassador Burns. Well, I think we were--President Obama
was certainly right to impose economic sanctions and to
encourage the Europeans to do the same. I'm concerned, Senator,
on my recent trip to Europe, week before last, that there are
many European leaders--President Hollande, the Prime Minister
of Italy, the Foreign Minister of Germany--who are now talking
about getting to the end of those sanctions before Putin has
met the letter of the two Minsk agreements that he agreed to in
2014, that he would remove his--that all forces--foreign forces
would be removed, mercenaries removed, and the OSCE could
deploy along the Russian-Ukrainian border. He's not--met none
of those conditions.
So, there's going to be a very important discussion, slash,
debate between the United States and Europe in December of this
year, when the European Union has to look at whether those
sanctions apply again. I think President Obama has been right
to insist on those sanctions. In my testimony, I said that, in
addition to sanctions, I certainly support lethal military
assistance----
Senator Inhofe. Right.
Ambassador Burns.--to Ukraine so that it can defend itself.
These are defensive weapons that people have been talking
about, and they----
Senator Inhofe. Well----
Ambassador Burns.--they deserve that right.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah. Well, my feeling was, our response
was totally inadequate. But, in our current defense
authorization bill, as you're probably aware--as I'm sure
you're aware--we are offering lethal assistance--defense
assistance to Ukraine. I assume that you support that.
Ambassador Burns. I do.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Burns, you noted in your testimony that there
are a number of very significant challenges facing NATO, but
you saw the--one of the most significant, if not the most
significant, is coming from within NATO itself, and that is
this trend, what--I would call it--describe a trend toward
isolationism, exemplified probably by Brexit and some comments
made by presidential candidates. How would you counter this
trend toward isolationism?
Ambassador Burns. Well, that's where American leadership of
the alliance is so important. We are the natural leader. We're
the strongest country. The Europeans look towards us for
leadership. As I said, to have one of our presidential
candidates effectively denigrate the alliance, itself, threaten
to walk away, I think is deeply damaging to the--to American
leadership today, as it would be in the future.
Secondly, there's a lot of concern at the rightwing
nationalist parties in France, in the Netherlands, in Germany,
in Greece, who are arguing for isolationism, themselves, to
pull back from European commitments. As we said in the last
answer to Senator Inhofe, the fact that so many European
politicians are now suggesting that it's time to end the
sanctions on Russia, it's time to get back to business as
usual--the United States can't cure all the ills of NATO. This
is a debating society. We have to be convincing in our
arguments. But, the American voice is very important. I'm sure
that President Obama will be putting that voice forward this
weekend in Warsaw. But, the next President is going to have a
major opportunity to lead the alliance. As I suggested in my
remarks, on Afghanistan, keeping the troops there, on defense
spending, and on sanctions against Putin, there's an early 2017
agenda that we need to lead, in the United States, no matter
who is elected President.
Senator Hirono. To the other two panelists, all--well, all
three of you have said that U.S. leadership is very critical to
the strength of NATO. Are there other very specific actions
that the United States or the President, himself or herself,
should be exhibiting, diplomacy, economically, militarily, to
show U.S. leadership? Very specific actions that we can take
to----
Ms. Smith. Yes.
Senator Hirono.--show that leadership?
Ms. Smith. I think the next President should see if he or
she could convene a summit fairly early on in his or her
tenure. I think a summit of NATO leaders, possibly in
cooperation with EU leaders, to bring wider Europe together
would be wise.
I think we have to be present more inside Europe. That will
require more trips, more deploying members of the Cabinet,
ensuring that we're present, that we're putting forward fresh
ideas, that we're challenging the alliance, that we're asking
them for leadership specifically with diplomatic initiatives,
with military investments, with economic investments that they
can make in the Middle East. Europe is going to be distracted
for the better part of the next two years because of Brexit,
again, assuming that that moves forward. But, I think the
United States is going to have to push the European continent
to lift its head up, focus simultaneously on the crisis at
home, but also help us address the instability across the
Middle East and North Africa, where it does have relationships
that matter, assets that can contribute, and a lot of
diplomatic heft that could be of use to the transatlantic
partners, more broadly.
Senator Hirono. General Jones, did you want to add anything
to this?
General Jones. I do believe that NATO has to become a more
agile organization, and it has to become more responsive the
needs that are being--the threats that are coming our way,
collectively.
If what we achieve is to reinvent NATO as a 20th-century
defensive, reactive organization that doesn't do anything until
it's too late, and then you have no choice but to fight a major
war, then I think that NATO will be less useful. On the other
hand, if the United States chooses to leave the alliance and
convince our allies that we have--that 28 sovereign countries,
working with the Arabs, in particular, who show signs of
wanting to develop a NATO-like organization, we can do an awful
lot to prevent future wars coming from different parts of the
world, notably Africa and the Middle East.
So, I think NATO has to be more proactive. It has to be--
the mission has to be to fight and win, if necessary, but also
to prevent future conflicts. You can do that with 28 countries
acting as one.
Senator Hirono. I think all of you mentioned that there
should be a permanent stationing of our troops. Is this going
to be a subject of discussion for this Warsaw summit that's
going on?
General Jones. I think it will be, yeah.
Ambassador Burns. I think it's already clear, from the
Defense Minister's meeting two weeks ago, that NATO is likely
to announce, on Saturday, that it will deploy----
Senator Hirono. Yes.
Ambassador Burns.--rotational forces.
Senator Hirono. Right.
Ambassador Burns. It won't meet that permanent basis. The
alliance operates on consensus, so all 28 allies have to agree.
There were many countries who wanted permanent stationing, as
General Jones has said, mainly the countries in eastern Europe.
Some of the west European countries disagreed. So, it would be
my hope that we could convince the allies to move towards
permanent stationing in the next few years.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. I want to thank all of you for being here.
I wanted to follow up. General Jones, you had mentioned
that NATO should take a more aggressive leadership role. I'd
like to get to the question of what NATO's role should be, more
specifically, with regard to the fight against ISIS. So, you
talked, General Jones, about NATO developing a strategy--an
ISIL strategy. Then I know that, in the Warsaw summit, they're
going to deploy AWACS, they're also going to put some training
forces into Iraq. But, what greater role could NATO play, here,
because--to address ISIL? As I think about a NATO member--for
example, Turkey--with what just happened in Istanbul and what
needs to happen, and the operations right now on the Manbij
Pocket there along the 90 kilometers along the Turkey border,
where it's been a--obviously, a place where refugees have gone
back and forth, and also, as we know, fighters--foreign
fighters have gone back and forth, which has been very
significant. I'd love to hear from each of you, Where do you
think, in the ideal, NATO's role could be, along with--combined
with American leadership? What should our leadership role be in
encouraging NATO and the Arab nations to join together so that
we can more effectively defeat ISIS?
General Jones. Senator, I think that NATO has the capacity
to be very, very influential in helping Arab countries form
their own version of NATO, for example. I think there's--the
logic would indicate that that would be a natural mission.
First--the first obligation for NATO is to respond to its
members' needs, and, where they feel threatened, that we act as
one and we help in any way we can. We've done that several
times, particularly with Turkey. I think we should continue to
support our membership.
But, beyond that, if we really want to avoid a human
disaster--another human disaster, perhaps even bigger, I think
proactive engagement in different countries in Africa, North
Africa in particular, but also sub-Saharan Africa, to help them
form security measures that are--that enable them to defend
their borders and to protect themselves, share intelligence,
and collectively band together with like-minded nations to show
ISIL-like organizations that they have no future and they have
no hope. That involves training, it involves all kinds of
development of border security, national security forces, and
the deployment, I think, of NATO forces in the Mediterranean.
For instance, we have unparalleled naval capabilities, and I
think we need much more cohesion within the alliance to project
that kind of sentiment, that NATO is not simply coming in to
invade or to cause more problems, but to actually prevent
problems from happening.
So, it's a whole litany of things that I think NATO--the
new NATO, in the 21st century, can and should take on.
Senator Ayotte. Ambassador?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, I think you're right to focus on
Turkey and the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria. The Turks want a closer relationship with us on issues
like refugees, possible safe havens in the future, should that
be possible, should this or a future administration want to go
in that direction. We are also going to need NATO attention in
Libya, where the Islamic State, as you well know, has an
outpost. The allies are going to be critical.
The terrorist attacks in Europe have been a huge wake-up
call for the European publics and their political leaders, so I
think we're getting much more receptivity on counterterrorism,
intelligence cooperation, judicial cooperation from the
Europeans. Where I would want to see NATO act together against
the Islamic State--I don't think it's going to be politically
possible to have everybody, 28 countries, agree on a NATO
military mission. That would help to--us to shoulder the
responsibility. It would ask the Europeans to do more. They
should do more, both in North Africa and the Levant. But, I
don't think it's going to be politically possible to have NATO
act as one, militarily, so we'll have to create these
coalitions of NATO members. That's another reason why NATO is
so valuable to us. Because of our joint training, we're able to
work together, even in smaller coalitions.
Senator Ayotte. Ms. Smith?
Ms. Smith. I would love to see NATO get more engaged in the
counter-ISIL coalition, in general, because I think it brings a
great deal of international legitimacy. I think NATO has just
incredible command-and-control assets that would be very
useful. NATO also has an array of partners in the neighborhood,
in the region, that it could very easily work with, as it did
in its Libya operations, some time ago.
I am with Ambassador Burns. I think it is unlikely, in the
short term. The debate is changing, but I don't see any major
muscle movements in that regard, for a couple of reasons. One,
Europe has about two million soldiers, and there are estimates
that about five percent of them are actually deployable. So,
there's the sheer logistics of getting there, that some of them
literally don't have the forces to send and don't have the
ability, if they do have the forces, to get them there. I mean,
there are real capability challenges.
Two, you hear from Europeans, oftentimes, this argument
that the NATO brand is too negative, that NATO's not welcome in
the region. There's this mythology, in my mind, that NATO
getting engaged more aggressively in the counter-ISIL mission
would not be helpful. We're up against that debate. I think we
could have that debate and work through it, but it is there,
and it comes up quite frequently.
Then, also, I would note that NATO, as an institution,
always looks for a request to get engaged. You find NATO
members saying, ``Well, we're--the phone's not ringing,'' you
know, ``We are not--we haven't been asked to get engaged,''
which is a little bit of a sad excuse. But, they do wait to be
called upon to assist. They're probably hoping--well, not
hoping, actually, to be truthful--that they would have a formal
request come from Iraq, say, that they want NATO to take
ownership of this mission, or a call from the United States,
which has not come, either.
Senator Ayotte. So, I know my time is up, but couldn't we
call this----
Ms. Smith. Of course.
Senator Ayotte.--and say----
Ms. Smith. Yes.
Senator Ayotte.--"Look at what's happened--Paris,
Brussels''----
Ms. Smith. We could.
Senator Ayotte.--"Istanbul.''
Ms. Smith. Yeah.
Senator Ayotte. This is about all of us.
Ms. Smith. This is back to the question about U.S.
leadership. We should be asking those questions, absolutely.
Senator Ayotte. Right.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thanks, to the witnesses.
To preface my first question, the estimate is that, at any
point in time, there's about four million Americans who are
either living in Europe or traveling in Europe, including
70,000 servicemembers stationed there. In your professional
opinion, if the U.S. were to eliminate or dramatically reduce
its support for NATO, what would the effect of that be on the
risk of terrorist attacks in Europe?
General Jones. I think any diminution of American presence
and leadership in Europe would cause an escalation and a
probability of more terrorist attacks.
Senator Kaine. I'd like ask the other witnesses to answer
the same question.
Ambassador Burns. The Europeans depend, in large part--and
we depend on them--for counterterrorism information, for
intelligence-sharing, for all the things that go into that
battle against terrorist groups. It doesn't all take place at
NATO, but NATO's a big part of it. It's also the symbolic
presence of the United States in Europe. So, it would be very
detrimental.
Senator Kaine. Ms. Smith?
Ms. Smith. Yeah, I would agree, absolutely, with both of my
colleagues. I think the work that we do with our European
allies, particularly in the area of law enforcement and
intelligence-sharing, when it comes to addressing the terrorist
threat inside Europe, it's just indispensable. I would hate to
see that go away. As Ambassador Burns noted, it's not all
conducted inside NATO, but there is a critical part of it
that's inside the NATO alliance.
Senator Kaine. It's important to remember that the effect
on Europe, which is very serious, and we should take it very
seriously, is also an effect on four million Americans who are
in Europe every day, including 70,000 servicemembers.
Second, in your professional opinion, what would the effect
on Russian behavior be if the United States dramatically
reduced or eliminated its support for NATO?
General Jones. It is Mr. Putin's ambition to weaken NATO,
wherever he possibly can. I say that because I've heard him say
it. I think anything that--anything that causes the United
States to retreat from its presence in Europe is a good day for
the Russian President.
Senator Kaine. Ambassador Burns?
Ambassador Burns. There would be no strategic deterrence to
Putin if NATO disappeared. So, from a conventional standpoint
and a nuclear-weapons standpoint, NATO provides the defense of
the European continent for its members against this leader, who
has now divided several European countries along his southern
and western border. So, it would be a disaster for Europe and
the United States.
Senator Kaine. Ms. Smith?
Ms. Smith. I think that's right. I think we'd see more
military probing at sea, in the air, all over the Nordic-Baltic
region and beyond. I think we'd see additional acts of
intimidation, greater support for populist parties and
candidates across Europe directly by the Russians. If he
perceives--he already does, but if he perceives that NATO and
the EU are weak and falling apart and unraveling, that will
motivate him to get even more engaged in the European space. We
have to do just the opposite, we have to bolster deterrence,
reassure our allies, and try to send a stronger signal to him
about our collective resolve.
Senator Kaine. Thank you for your candid----
Oh, General Jones.
General Jones. One other thing. We've had this discussion
before, during the Bush administration, where the then-
Secretary of Defense wanted to pull troops out of Europe and--
because we could always send them back. That creates vacuums.
Vacuums are filled by people who don't have your best interests
at heart. I think, you know, one of my favorite sayings about
our presence in the globe is, `` Virtual presence is actual
absence.'' If you're actually absent, you're not influencing
the--you're not--things are not going to go the way you want
them to go.
Senator Kaine. Thank you for your candid answers to my two
questions.
Mr. Chair.
Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all very much for the report and for your
testimony this morning.
I want to begin by echoing Chairman McCain's comments and
thanking you, General Jones, for your comments about what has
happened at Camp Liberty. I think it's unconscionable, and I
think it reflects on the United States, given the assurances
that we have given. We should be doing more to address that
situation. So, thank you for raising it.
You all have all referenced Brexit and the potential impact
of Brexit. But, none of you have really gone into any detail
about what you think will happen as a result of England's
vote--or Britain's vote on leaving the EU, and how that will
affect NATO, its presence in NATO, and European security. So,
could I ask you--Ambassador Burns, I'll ask you to go first, if
you could talk a little bit more about what you see happening
as a result of that vote. The--and also maybe I could ask you
about the lessons that we should be taking away from what's
happened there.
Ambassador Burns. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Three quick
points.
First, just reading the British press and talking to
friends in Britain, it's not at all sure, of course, it's going
to happen. We'll have to see what happens with the Labour Party
and the Conservative Party and British public opinion. This may
be answered in 2017 or 2018. Point one.
Point two. But, if it does happen, I think it's an ominous
development for the United States, in two respects. First is, a
weakened, distracted, and potentially fractured, U.K. [United
Kingdom], if the Act of Union comes apart, if Scotland leaves,
if Northern Ireland's constitutional position is in question,
then our strongest ally in NATO--and Britain is our strongest
military partner and our strongest political partner--is not
going to be there for us. That's going to make it more
difficult for the United States, and will weaken NATO.
Secondly, I really worry about the effect on the European
Union, itself, because Britain was, and is, really our bridge
to the European Union on strategic issues. Britain translates
the United States to the European Union, and the EU back to us.
It's a very important bridge. Without Britain's sensible,
pragmatic, centrist voice--I can think of four or five
instances in the last 15 or 20 years when the EU may have done
something--whether it was the Clinton, Obama, or Bush
administrations--that would have been vexing to us, really
dissatisfying to us. So, without that role, we're going to need
a stronger Germany, a stronger American link to Germany, and
hopefully a stronger military power in Germany.
So, I think it's bad news for the United States, if it
happens.
Senator Shaheen. General Jones, Ms. Smith, do either of you
have anything you'd like to add to that?
General Jones. Well, I would just say, on its surface, the
effect of Brexit on NATO should be marginal. The U.K. will
remain a special ally of the United States and a leader in
NATO. One possible effect is a more coherent EU security
policy, but we'll see. Our collective prosperity is critical to
our collective security. Anything that weakens the bonds of
that relationship concerns me, because it will eventually erode
our strength.
So, given the reality of Brexit, I think the United States
should take steps to strengthen and reinforce the special
relationship with the U.K. while maintaining strong ties to the
EU. The United States should not be forced into choosing
between the U.K. and the EU, and should use its diplomatic
clout in Europe to ensure the divorce, if, in fact, it happens,
doesn't destabilize Europe.
I'd just simply add that, at the NATO-EU level, there are
political difficulties. There have been for the last decade.
There is some reason to think that there might be some
accommodations. But, part of the problem that--part of the
problems that we have with NATO now is--particularly in western
European countries, there's a tendency want to put a--an EU
mantle on their security challenges. I just don't think they
can have it both ways. It's not affordable.
Ms. Smith. I think my colleagues are exactly right. I'll
just add one point. That is the question of defense spending
inside the United Kingdom. Quite recently, they were at a point
where they were conducting another strategic review looking at
their defense budget, as you know, and the United States pushed
very hard, along with a number of other allies, but especially
here in Washington, to ensure that they would maintain that two
percent target.
I think, depending on how the situation unfolds, and
depending on how bad the budgetary situation is inside the
U.K., we could potentially see a situation where they look to
the defense budget to try and find some additional resources.
What we have to ensure is that that doesn't happen, that we
need the U.K. to be part of the five that are now meeting that
target, that hopefully will become more in the future. I would
hate to lose them as the cornerstone of--in that small club of
countries that are meeting that two percent target.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you all very much.
Chairman McCain. Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank all of your for being here.
If I could start--and I'll start with you, Ambassador. Do
you know of any experts--military experts, even retired or
current military experts--that, basically, are professing that
we should leave NATO, that would be advising any presidential
candidate? Do you know of anybody that's setting there saying
this would be a good thing, for us to leave?
Ambassador Burns. I don't know of any experts suggesting--
--
[Laughter.]
Ambassador Burns.--that we should leave NATO.
Senator Manchin. But, there are some military--some retired
military people or Active military people that would support
that?
Ambassador Burns. I'm not aware of any.
Senator Manchin. You're not. Are any of you all aware?
General, are you?
General Jones. I'm not aware of any that I've talked to
that advocate----
Senator Manchin. So, we don't know where that advice would
be coming--or where that counseling would be coming--that we
should? Because I've been--I was at Wroclaw, at the Global
Forum, and I saw the value of NATO. The thing I would--my next
question--I'm going to follow up--Ms. Smith, do you know
anybody that would be advocating that, that would have
expertise?
Ms. Smith. I don't.
Senator Manchin. Okay. So, nobody. You all should know
somebody, if they were, right? I would think so.
My hardest thing was--is why we cannot--and there's no
penalties that we place upon any NATO country that doesn't
fulfill its obligation of a two percent--at least two percent.
Some of the countries that can--when I look at Greece, all
their problems, they're still committed to spending two
percent. But--and I--and, I think, Ambassador, you said, about
Germany, you're absolutely correct, everybody I spoke to at
that Global Forum said, if Germany would take the lead, it
would make such a difference in what would happen. Is there
anything that we can do--the United States should do or could
do--whether it's financing world global banks and all the
different things that we have some strength in--could make them
step to the plate? I mean, we just--we don't do anything.
Ambassador Burns. Well, we have been fighting this battle--
--
Senator Manchin. I know.
Ambassador Burns.--for 40 or 50 years.
Senator Manchin. Right.
Ambassador Burns. I remember, the NATO minimum used to be
three percent, under President Carter's administration. Now
it's two percent. We've--it's gotten easier.
I do think you're right, Senator Manchin, that Germany is
the key country here. We don't know what's going to happen in
the German elections in 2017. But, it was very interesting to
be in Berlin ten days ago to see the German Foreign Minister
make these egregious comments when he said that NATO exercises
on NATO territory, the Baltics and Poland, were saber-rattling.
Then to see Chancellor Merkel come out, three days later, and
to say she supported the NATO exercises, and she supported a
German effort to get to two percent. I do think a lot will
hinge on what kind of government is put together, and who leads
it, in Germany in 2017. The French have elections in 2017.
They're the key continental countries. If they move towards two
percent, then others will move with them. If they don't,
there's an excuse.
Senator Manchin. What I was--I've always thought that,
basically, someone has to be the bad guy, someone has to be the
boogeyman, if you will. If--getting into this market, this
trading market and all the trading things that we do, there
should be some sort of a penalty. You've got to give them a
reason to go back to their electorate and says, ``We have to do
this, because, for us to have access to this market, this is
what we have to do.'' Then really be strict about that. We can
get people step to the plate, because I think NATO is so
important to us and our success and our defense of our country.
But, unless they're willing to step to the plate, the American
electorate is going to get pretty tired of carrying the load
we've been carrying for 40 or 50 years.
I would follow up with one other thing. I just saw where
in--Putin and Obama discussing military coordination in Syria.
I don't know if you saw that article yet. That they're
basically--now there's coordination. It said that Putin
initiated that with President Obama. Do you believe that to be
a positive movement? Concrete? That something can be made out
of that?
General Jones. Well, if I recall correctly, the United
States has tried to achieve something like that from day one. I
mean, obviously, deconflicting the airspace and reducing the
possibility of----
Senator Manchin. What do you think brought it upon--I mean,
I've read the article, here, and it's----
General Jones. Yeah. I--but, obviously, you know, if we--as
you can find some accommodation, that's useful. But, I'm not
terribly hopeful.
Senator Manchin. Ms. Smith?
Ms. Smith. I think it's important--we both have troops on
the ground--I think it's important to deconflict and ensure
that our troops are not running into each other or endangering
each other's lives. That said, what we have to be careful about
is that Putin will make certain assumptions that this is
transactional and that, by cooperating on Syria, he can get a
pass on Ukraine. That cannot be part of our message. I know
that the administration has been adamant in relaying that to
the Russians, but I think we have to push back harder and drive
that message home, both in private and at any public venue we
can, so that they understand clearly that we will not trade any
potential cooperation in a place like Syria for letting go on
the pressure we're exerting on Russia over their actions inside
Ukraine.
Senator Manchin. One thing I'll comment on is, our dear
friends in Canada, which--Canada basically has been sliding by
with Americans carrying them. They're at one percent, been at
one percent for quite some time. Thirty-five States. It's the
largest trading partner, with 35 States out of the 50 in the
United States. That's one area that we can make a difference in
extremely quickly. Do you agree, Ambassador?
Ambassador Burns. I do. Canada has led on refugees, but
they are deficient on defense spending, and we ought to be
pushing the Canadians and the new Prime Minister towards a much
healthier defense budget.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
When Putin moved on Crimea and used as an excuse the
Russian-speaking population, it was speculated at the time
that, since there's a large percentage of Russian-speaking
population in the three Baltic states, especially Estonia, that
he might try the same thing. What have you seen since Crimea
that would indicate that he is, or is not, doing that?
Ambassador Burns. Since Crimea, President Obama went to
Tallinn, in September 2014, about four months later, and said
that the security of Tallinn was equal to us, as important as
is Paris or Berlin or London. That was an important statement.
Now we have to follow it up with actions, thus permanent
stationing of troops in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. Putin has
not tried to cross the Narva River into Estonia. But, I would
think that he would be tempted, by a hybrid offensive, to try
to divide the Estonians from within, to try to play on the
sympathies of the ethnic Russian population, about a quarter of
the population in Estonia, even more in Latvia. That's what
we've got to guard against.
We also know that Putin has been an aggressor in the
cyberdomain. What NATO needs to do is build a much greater
capacity to defend itself in the cyber realm and then to decide
when a cyberattack does, or does not, trip article 5. This is a
very difficult problem to look at, but we've got to look at.
So, this is a very consequential summit coming up in Warsaw.
Senator Nelson. Couple of years ago, when I was in
Lithuania, at the time, we were rotating in United States
military forces into the three Baltics. Is that more on a
permanent basis now?
General Jones. We--the alliance is considering permanent
bases of NATO forces in the Baltics. We have--we support that
in this report. Back in 2004, 2005, and 2006, we had
deployments of F-16s from different countries--not just U.S.,
but different countries--in the Baltic states. The Russians
have consistently pushed the envelope on airspace in the Baltic
states. They continue to do so very aggressively. So, I don't
know if that's a--an omen of things to come, but I do believe
that the Russian actions over the last several years should not
go unanswered. I think putting permanent troops there is a good
idea.
Senator Nelson. General, from a standpoint of military
warfare, if Russia really decided to move on the three Baltics,
it would be very hard, because of their geographical position.
So, is our deterrence simply that they know we would engage
them in a fight, and that could lead to overall worldwide
implications? Speak to the deterrence, please.
General Jones. Well, Senator, you're touching on a very
important aspect of the alliance, and that's article 5. I think
one of the things that any potential adversary needs to hear
when confronting NATO is that article 5 is inviolate. I think
it needs some shoring up, frankly. I think the United States
President is the one who's probably most qualified and best
suited to shore up whatever--to make sure there's no
misunderstanding that 28 sovereign countries support article 5.
That has to be heard in Moscow, and in any other place--any
other capital, very, very clearly.
Senator Nelson. I agree with you. Some of the NATO alliance
has been less than eager to indicate that, under all
circumstances, they would support article 5. So, how do you get
them to get some spine, some backbone?
General Jones. Well, I--in my view, not to repeat myself,
but I think this is--if there is weakness--and I agree with you
that there is at least some weakness--but, that has to be
shored up critically, because the consequences for not doing
that could be catastrophic.
Senator Nelson. Ambassador, how?
Ambassador Burns. It does require American leadership.
Right now, you have uncertainty in many European countries
about their willingness to stand up to the Russians. We have a
weakened U.K. So, for President Obama and his successor, that
leadership is desired by the Europeans, and it's essential on
the question that General Jones just answered. We have only
invoked article 5, as you well know, once in our history. I was
the American Ambassador at the time. It was the day after 9/11.
The Europeans came to our defense. It was tremendously
encouraging.
But, I must say, we don't see the same European unity when
we talk about problems of territorial aggression in the eastern
part of Europe, which gets to another point that General Jones
raised earlier. We've got to be--the Americans--the champions
of the east Europeans, because sometimes we don't sense that
the west Europeans have the same degree of backbone that
President Clinton, President Bush, and President Obama have had
in standing up for them.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to continue, General Jones, along this line that
Senator Nelson brought up of deterrence. In addition to article
5, obviously historically we have also relied very heavily on
the nuclear deterrent to continue that line between eastern
Europe and Russia's influence. Russia has sort of a new
doctrine these days, that--this ``escalate to de-escalate''
approach, which I think we all find very concerning. Could you
talk a little bit about how important it is that we continue
ongoing modernization in that area to ensure that those
assigned to the NATO mission are survivable and well exercised
and ready to counter the Russian nuclear doctrine?
Specifically, talk a little bit about your thoughts on this
evolution to ``escalate to de-escalate.''
General Jones. Senator, I think that the situation is--
has--that has developed is very worrisome, and it--in terms of
Russia. While I do think that dialogue is important and should
be maintained, I think the--what has to be shored up is the
deterrence portfolio. We can do that in a number of ways. Some
of the things, we're already doing. The United States is
contributing monetarily to the alliance, we're contributing
rotational troops, we have permanent--permanently-based troops,
in a significant amount. We have the opportunity, here at the
summit, for the President to make the case that the alliance is
viable and is moving in the right direction for the--to meet
the threats of the 21st century: missile defense, nuclear
deterrent, reinvigorating the concept of article 5 in a serious
discussion, given what's going on in the world. It's hard to
understand that members of the alliance would not sign up to
that. But, I think it's going to have to be very direct
involvement at the presidential/head-of-state level to make
sure that any weakness is shored up very quickly. This
absolutely has to be done. Mr.----
Senator Heinrich. Ambassador----
General Jones.--Mr. Putin has shown that he is an
opportunist, and that he will take advantage of perceived
weakness.
Senator Heinrich. Yeah.
General Jones. You know, we've been through this in the
Cold War, so a lot of this is, you know, dusting off the
playbook.
Senator Heinrich. Right.
General Jones. But, I also think that we should lead the
alliance into more of a transformative doctrine of preventing
future conflicts by acting to prevent those future conflicts
and by helping others in different continents who are
struggling to achieve the same kind of freedoms that we've
enjoyed--developing economies, helping rule of law, teaching
how militaries are subordinate to civilian leadership. All of
those things, an alliance should be able to do, and it's a lot
cheaper than having to fight in another war.
Senator Heinrich. Ambassador Burns or Ms. Smith, do you
have anything to add from that perspective?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, I'd just say that transparency
with the Russians is going to be really important to limit the
possibility of an accidental conflict.
Second, the next administration is going to have to
decide--in addition to strategic deterrence, we do need an
effective--a more effective channel into the Russian Government
on nuclear issues----
Senator Heinrich. Right.
Ambassador Burns.--and conventional-force issues in Europe.
The Russians are walking away from all the agreements that we
negotiated from the '80s----
Senator Heinrich. Right.
Ambassador Burns.--to after 9/11. It's a big concern.
Getting to that is going to be an important, I think, early
initiative of a new administration.
Ms. Smith. I would just add that, before Crimea, I think
the alliance, years prior, was making certain assumptions about
the neighborhood--we all were--that Europe was essentially
whole, free, and at peace. NATO nuclear doctrine really took a
backseat in many ways, and we lost the muscle movements. We--
there was atrophy.
Now what you'll see with the summit is that NATO's
exercising those muscles again. It's meeting at a higher level
inside the alliance on these issues. It's going to reaffirm
where NATO nuclear doctrine sits in a broader deterrence
policy. I don't think there'll be any major announcements tied
to nuclear weapons, but I think the signal here will be, to
Moscow, that NATO is in a process of reviewing where Russia
stands with its own nuclear strategy, and is taking a fresh
look at things like DCA, again, doctrine policy, writ large.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, each of you, for giving us the benefit of your
expertise and experience. I've been following it as I move
between different committee meetings. You know how that works.
I think that the focus on NATO is very well justified.
I would like to focus on what I think is a major threat to
NATO's stability and effectiveness, even though it doesn't come
directly from Russia. We're in the midst of the biggest refugee
crisis in our lifetimes, certainly since World War II. Millions
of people are continuing to flee across borders, and there is
enduring chaos and violence in Syria and the wider Middle East,
which, in turn, threatens the stability of Europe and, in my
view, potentially the stability of NATO.
So, I'd like to ask each of you, How does the refugee
crisis impact our ability to respond to Russian aggression and
to maintain the strength and stability of NATO? Do you see it
as a threat? If so, what should we be doing about it? Because,
ultimately, if it is a threat to the effectiveness of NATO,
it's something that we'll have to address before it reaches
crisis proportions.
Maybe, Ms. Smith, if we could begin with you and go down
the table.
Ms. Smith. Sure. Well, thank you, Senator. Thank you for
raising this issue.
The refugee crisis in Europe is transformative. It is
fundamentally going to alter the face of Europe for the future.
It will alter the ways in which we work with Europe. It, in
many ways, in the short term, will lead to a distracted Europe
and a divided Europe, because they have such wide--a huge array
of differences on how to handle this crisis.
The other bad news is, it's creating a tremendous amount of
friction with Turkey, one of our NATO allies, between Turkey
and the European Union or other European countries. They have,
as you know, managed to agree on this migration deal, and
they've managed to slow some of the flow from Turkey into
Greece. But, there are signs that this deal could start to fall
apart and the tensions between Ankara and Brussels is
considerable, and not good news for any of us.
In terms of how Putin looks at it, I mean, Putin--I think
General Breedlove used the term ``weaponization of refugees"--I
mean, Putin has certainly realized that by putting all this
pressure on Aleppo, he is potentially sending anywhere from
another 500,000 to million refugees into Europe. He has opened
up some of the border crossings and made it easier for refugees
also to come into Europe through Finland, which is deeply
troubling to our friends in Helsinki. So, he is very crafty in
his use of this crisis to yield some sort of an advantage and
to see how he might continue to weaken the European project.
So, in my mind, this is bad news all around. I think we
have to see--since we're talking about NATO today, we have to
think about ways in which NATO can play a more constructive
role. NATO's already contributing to the mission in the Aegean.
There's some talk about opening up that mission now to cover
the waters between Libya and Italy. I think that would be wise.
Not without controversy. But, I think we should challenge the
alliance to think more creatively.
They're taking a fresh look at this Operation Endeavor, one
of the maritime missions in the Mediterranean, and seeing how
they might reshape that mission to be more helpful to deal with
the refugee crisis. So, I think there's more we can do.
Certainly, I'm in a position--I believe that the United
States should do more, and I think we need to figure out how we
can be a stronger supporter to our European allies as they deal
with this monumental crisis.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. That's a great answer.
Ambassador Burns?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, I agree with Julianne in all
respects. I would add this. The source of the problem, of
course, is Syria and Iraq--12 million Syrian homeless in a
population of 22.4 million. So, at some point, we're going to
have to use our influence with the Russians and the Syrian
Government to get U.N. humanitarian aid corridors into those
refugee areas. Number one.
Number two. I don't think we should foreclose the
possibility of establishing no-flight zones and safe havens on
the ground in northern Syria to protect the refugees. Turkey
wants to work on that with us. Many of the Sunni Arab states
want to work on it with us. Extremely complicated, dangerous.
You can't--you have to plan this in a very careful way. But, if
we don't do that, the refugee crisis could worsen, and
therefore, the resulting impact on surrounding states--Iraq,
Jordan, Lebanon, Israel possibly, certainly Europe--I think we
have to face that question at some point.
Senator Blumenthal. General?
General Jones. Thank you, sir.
I think Julianne said it correctly, it's a transformative
threat. Right now in Europe, it's mostly handled by the
European Union. But, it could easily, I think, become a NATO
problem, simply because of the assets NATO can bring to the
table.
But, I think that refugees from the east, as serious as it
is, could actually be somewhat minor if the African continent
is subverted by radicalism, organized crime, and corruption at
the national levels. Refugees are caused by a loss of hope.
Where there is no hope, people start moving into the areas
where there is hope. Europe is the natural attraction for
both--from both the east and the south. I think that this is a
very serious problem. I think we should collectively address
the conditions in different countries to make sure that
radicalism doesn't gain the foothold that it's trying to gain,
and that we continue to hold high the example of good
governance and rule of law so that--you know, particularly in
Africa, so the countries that are coming up for elections
actually live up to their constitutions and have changes of
leadership. There are some big elections coming up in Africa
this year, and there are quite a few leaders who don't appear
to want to step down when their time comes. That's not a good
trend.
So, I think there's a lot of things that we could work on
to stem a future flow that could even be worse than the one
we're seeing now.
Senator Blumenthal. I thank all of you for these very
important insights.
I find this prospect of the continued refugee crisis and
the equally alarming prospect that our adversaries will be
crafty and ingenious--to use Ms. Smith's word, ``crafty"--it
doesn't take much craftiness to exploit this problem, but they
will be, certainly, ingenious and exploitive.
So, thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Jones, just to follow up on your final comment, I
completely agree with you. I would add climate change to some
of those factors, because, to the extent that the equatorial
regions of the world suffer 120-degree heat, droughts, famine,
that's going to motivate. I'm just afraid the refugee crisis
we're seeing now is a precursor to a much more serious one
caused by those regions essentially becoming uninhabitable.
Ambassador Burns, you said something very interesting. I
think I picked it up. You said--talking about Brexit, you said
``if it happens.'' Do you have information or thoughts that
there may be--that the British may reverse this decision?
Briefly?
Ambassador Burns. I have no inside information, except to
say I think the prevailing opinion now, two weeks--nearly two
weeks later, is that there's so much uncertainty about British
politics--Corbyn is--the Labour Party leader, Corbyn, is on the
ropes. He's been disavowed by his members of Parliament. We'll
see who wins the Conservative Party race. It could be Theresa
May. She says there should be an orderly process. But, the
British don't have to actually start the clock on their article
50 negotiations with the EU anytime this year. They can choose
the time that they do that. There has been huge regret in the
British public. You look at the capital----
Senator King. Do you think it gets to the--my question is,
though, Is there a political possibility of a reversal of the
decision?
Ambassador Burns. Some people, some political observers in
London, believe that it's possible that, in 2017, a new
government could engineer a second referendum. So, I don't
think it's inevitable that they leave. It may be probable, but
not inevitable.
Senator King. Thank you.
Changing the subject back--getting back to NATO, I was with
a group of Intelligence Committee folks in--we were in Paris
the morning of the Brussels attack, meeting with French
counterterrorism officials. The big lesson that we took away
from that was the dreadful lack of coordination among European
intelligence agencies, and their lack of--their suspicion,
their lack of sharing. We then went on to Berlin. Similar
situation there.
Could NATO serve as a sort of neutral repository of
intelligence information that could then be shared? It--there--
it just--these countries with these ancient enmities aren't
going to be very cooperative with one another. Is there a
Interpol or NATO--could NATO serve this function of a
repository and then sharing--a kind of clearinghouse of
intelligence information to bypass these silos that they now
are in? Even--in Brussel--in Belgium, they have separate
intelligence agencies within the country that don't talk to
each other. I'm--any one of you, but--Ambassador Burns,
perhaps?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, I guess I'm skeptical. I think
that NATO has never played that role in the past. There has
been--there is--it's a forum to discuss issues that are outside
the military and political realm, but we've never had NATO be
the central repository. It would take a lot of work. All the
countries would have to agree. Again, consensus is so difficult
to reach, at 28. I think it's probably more likely that you're
going to--you've seen, as a reaction to these attacks, greater
French-German coordination, for instance; greater French-
Belgian coordination. They've had to, because attacks have been
transnational, across the borders. But, I'm not sure that NATO
can play that particular role.
Senator King. The problem is, if those countries aren't
fully cooperative with one another, then they're only as strong
as the weakest link, because you can drive from Italy to
Finland.
Let me just change the subject again. The challenge with
the Russians is--I think there are two--one is, you have--we've
talked about how they take advantage of any weakness. The best
description of Russian foreign policy I ever heard was that
they were like a hotel thief who goes down the hall, trying
every door until they find one that's open, and then they go
in. That's really what you were saying about--any show of
weakness, and they're going to try to find a way in.
On the other hand, they have a historic paranoia about the
West. Frederick the Great, going back--you read Putin's
speeches, and encroachment and that everybody's against them.
How do we find the right balance between being protective, vis-
a-vis NATO, and being provocative? In other words, adding NATO
states that the Russians would view as a historic threat. Do
you see the question?
General Jones, your thoughts on that question?
General Jones. Well, during our time at NATO, Ambassador
Burns and I, we were actually--they were at a good time, when
it looked like the NATO Russia Council was doing things. Under
President Medvedev, during the first few years of the
administration, we signed the START [Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty] Treaty. I actually really believed that we had turned
the corner and that Russia had decided to be part of the Euro-
Atlantic arc and not outside of it. But, one man changed that.
I think that's to be deplored, frankly.
So, I don't know that that's going to change anytime soon.
We have to recognize the situation for what it is. It is
threatening. It is something that the alliance has to take
under--take into account, and the 28 nations have to make sure
that they send the message that some of this behavior is
unacceptable, particularly if you want to avoid more problems
in Georgia, in Moldova, and other places like that, that are
extremely--feel extremely threatened for--by their--with regard
to their future.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. I thank the witnesses.
Before we close, there's a story that's been banging around
in the last couple of days, ``Obama and Putin Speak by Phone,
Ready to Increase Syria Coordination.'' Kremlin said, in a
statement, that Putin had used the call to urge Obama to aid
the separation of the, quote, ``moderate opposition in Syria
from the Nusra Front and other extremist groups.'' Who's been
bombing the moderates? Is it--this stuff, you can't make up.
It's staggering. It--now we're going to have a relationship
with the Russians, and they're urging us to separate the
moderate opposition. I wonder how many of the moderates have
been killed by Russian aircraft and bombing. I just--I--it's
unbelievable that we're now trying to have an accommodation
with the country that has killed so many of those who we had
armed and trained and equipped, and who were fighting against
Bashar Assad, who is the one who has killed 250-, 300-,
400,000--I don't know, it depends on whose estimates you have--
and now our only enemy is ISIS. The--and the alliance between
the Iranians, Vladimir Putin, and, of course, Bashar Assad is--
been solidified.
I wonder if anyone on the panel believes that, as President
Obama said, it's not a matter of ``whether,'' but ``when''
Bashar Assad will leave power.
General Jones?
General Jones. I'd--my personal view is, I don't see it
happening in the near future.
Ambassador Burns. He appears to be expanding his power base
in Syria. We should be skeptical of any arrangement with the
Russians when the Russians don't produce a diplomatic path
that's real. Because the Syrian Government won't agree to it.
We ought to be building up our support for the moderate rebels,
our military and political support, as a counterweight. So, I
would be very skeptical of this arrangement.
Chairman McCain. Ms. Smith?
Ms. Smith. I think it's shameful that Putin tried to
persuade everyone that he was withdrawing from the conflict in
Syria. He's not doing that at all. He's still there. He's still
targeting the forces we support, and playing a very unhelpful
role. I think we need to call him out on that strategy and,
basically, acknowledge that he is not contributing to the
future stability of the country, but, in fact, quite the
contrary, continuing to contribute to its demise.
Chairman McCain. I want to thank the three of you.
I also want to thank the Atlantic Council for the good work
that they do.
All three of you have had great service to the Nation. I
hope that--and I believe that my colleagues have gained further
insight into the challenges we face, which I think we can draw
the conclusion are almost unprecedented since the end of the
Cold War, which makes your service and expertise and input all
the more important to the United States Congress.
Jack?
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, I simply want to second your
comments, thank the panel for their work, in terms of the
report and their extraordinarily insightful testimony today.
Thank you very much.
Chairman McCain. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]